[JPRT, 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress
2d Session JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT
_______________________________________________________________________
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1999--VOLUME I
__________
R E P O R T
submitted to the
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
and the
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
U.S. SENATE
by the
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]CONGRESS.#13
APRIL 2000
Printed for the use of the Committees on International Relations of the
U.S. House of Representatives and Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate
respectively
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
------
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
VOLUME I
Page
Foreword......................................................... VII
Letter of Transmittal............................................ IX
Preface.......................................................... XI
Introduction..................................................... XV
Africa:
Angola....................................................... 1
Benin........................................................ 14
Botswana..................................................... 20
Burkina Faso................................................. 29
Burundi...................................................... 39
Cameroon..................................................... 47
Cape Verde................................................... 69
Central African Republic..................................... 74
Chad......................................................... 85
Comoros...................................................... 94
Congo, Democratic Republic of................................ 99
Congo, Republic of........................................... 128
Cote d'Ivoire................................................ 138
Djibouti..................................................... 155
Equatorial Guinea............................................ 166
Eritrea...................................................... 173
Ethiopia..................................................... 182
Gabon........................................................ 203
Gambia, The.................................................. 211
Ghana........................................................ 220
Guinea....................................................... 237
Guinea-Bissau................................................ 249
Kenya........................................................ 256
Lesotho...................................................... 279
Liberia...................................................... 288
Madagascar................................................... 299
Malawi....................................................... 305
Mali......................................................... 313
Mauritania................................................... 321
Mauritius.................................................... 337
Mozambique................................................... 343
Namibia...................................................... 357
Niger........................................................ 369
Nigeria...................................................... 379
Rwanda....................................................... 402
Sao Tome and Principe........................................ 412
Senegal...................................................... 415
Seychelles................................................... 427
Sierra Leone................................................. 433
Somalia...................................................... 442
South Africa................................................. 449
Sudan........................................................ 464
Swaziland.................................................... 482
Tanzania..................................................... 490
Togo......................................................... 505
Uganda....................................................... 518
Zambia....................................................... 535
Zimbabwe..................................................... 547
Latin America, Canada, and the Caribbean:
Antigua and Barbuda.......................................... 569
Argentina.................................................... 573
Bahamas...................................................... 584
Barbados..................................................... 590
Belize....................................................... 594
Bolivia...................................................... 601
Brazil....................................................... 611
Canada....................................................... 634
Chile........................................................ 641
Colombia..................................................... 656
Costa Rica................................................... 691
Cuba......................................................... 698
Dominica..................................................... 718
Dominican Republic........................................... 722
Ecuador...................................................... 737
El Salvador.................................................. 747
Grenada...................................................... 763
Guatemala.................................................... 767
Guyana....................................................... 792
Haiti........................................................ 801
Honduras..................................................... 815
Jamaica...................................................... 829
Mexico....................................................... 834
Nicaragua.................................................... 857
Panama....................................................... 872
Paraguay..................................................... 885
Peru......................................................... 896
St. Kitts and Nevis.......................................... 924
Saint Lucia.................................................. 928
St. Vincent and the Grenadines............................... 932
Suriname..................................................... 936
Trinidad and Tobago.......................................... 943
Uruguay...................................................... 948
Venezuela.................................................... 954
East Asia and the Pacific:
Australia.................................................... 971
Brunei....................................................... 978
Burma........................................................ 984
Cambodia..................................................... 1006
China (includes Hong Kong and Macau).....................1018, 1089
China (Taiwan only).......................................... 1095
Fiji......................................................... 1106
Indonesia.................................................... 1113
Japan........................................................ 1153
Kiribati..................................................... 1166
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of....................... 1179
Korea, Republic of........................................... 1169
Laos......................................................... 1189
Malaysia..................................................... 1199
Marshall Islands............................................. 1227
Micronesia, Federated States of.............................. 1230
Mongolia..................................................... 1234
Nauru........................................................ 1239
New Zealand.................................................. 1242
Palau........................................................ 1247
Papua New Guinea............................................. 1251
Philippines.................................................. 1256
Samoa........................................................ 1268
Singapore.................................................... 1272
Solomon Islands.............................................. 1288
Thailand..................................................... 1292
Tonga........................................................ 1306
Tuvalu....................................................... 1309
Vanuatu...................................................... 1312
Vietnam...................................................... 1316
VOLUME II
Europe:
Albania...................................................... 1337
Andorra...................................................... 1348
Armenia...................................................... 1351
Austria...................................................... 1366
Azerbaijan................................................... 1375
Belarus...................................................... 1390
Belgium...................................................... 1414
Bosnia and Herzegovina....................................... 1422
Bulgaria..................................................... 1440
Croatia...................................................... 1458
Cyprus....................................................... 1479
Czech Republic............................................... 1488
Denmark...................................................... 1503
Estonia...................................................... 1507
Finland...................................................... 1515
France....................................................... 1519
Georgia...................................................... 1531
Germany...................................................... 1546
Greece....................................................... 1559
Hungary...................................................... 1574
Iceland...................................................... 1585
Ireland...................................................... 1590
Italy........................................................ 1598
Kazakhstan................................................... 1606
Kyrgyz Republic.............................................. 1628
Latvia....................................................... 1640
Liechtenstein................................................ 1649
Lithuania.................................................... 1652
Luxembourg................................................... 1661
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia........................ 1664
Malta........................................................ 1675
Moldova...................................................... 1678
Monaco....................................................... 1688
Netherlands, The............................................. 1691
Norway....................................................... 1698
Poland....................................................... 1702
Portugal..................................................... 1719
Romania...................................................... 1725
Russia....................................................... 1735
San Marino................................................... 1797
Serbia-Montenegro............................................ 1799
Slovak Republic.............................................. 1844
Slovenia..................................................... 1857
Spain........................................................ 1861
Sweden....................................................... 1875
Switzerland.................................................. 1882
Tajikistan................................................... 1890
Turkey....................................................... 1902
Turkmenistan................................................. 1937
Ukraine...................................................... 1947
United Kingdom............................................... 1970
Uzbekistan................................................... 1988
Near East and North Africa:
Algeria...................................................... 2009
Bahrain...................................................... 2020
Egypt........................................................ 2031
Iran......................................................... 2050
Iraq......................................................... 2070
Israel and the occupied territories.......................... 2092
Jordan....................................................... 2124
Kuwait....................................................... 2137
Lebanon...................................................... 2151
Libya........................................................ 2162
Morocco...................................................... 2170
Western Sahara............................................... 2189
Oman......................................................... 2192
Qatar........................................................ 2201
Saudi Arabia................................................. 2207
Syria........................................................ 2219
Tunisia...................................................... 2230
United Arab Emirates......................................... 2248
Yemen........................................................ 2256
South Asia:
Afghanistan.................................................. 2277
Bangladesh................................................... 2294
Bhutan....................................................... 2315
India........................................................ 2325
Maldives..................................................... 2367
Nepal........................................................ 2374
Pakistan..................................................... 2389
Sri Lanka.................................................... 2434
Appendices:
A. Notes on Preparation of the Reports....................... 2457
B. Reporting on Worker Rights................................ 2459
C. International Human Rights Conventions.................... 2462
D. Information on International Human Rights Conventions
Listed in Appendix C....................................... 2468
E. FY 1999 U.S. Economic and Security Assistance (Actual
Obligations)............................................... 2469
F. 55th Session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission Voting
Record..................................................... 2474
G. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights...... 2478
FOREWORD
----------
The country reports on human rights practices contained
herein were prepared by the Department of State in accordance
with sections 126(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, as amended. They also fulfill the legislative
requirements of section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as
amended.
The reports cover the human rights practices of all nations
that are members of the United Nations and a few that are not.
They are printed to assist Members of Congress in the
consideration of legislation, particularly foreign assistance
legislation.
Benjamin A. Gilman,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations.
Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
Department of State,
Washington, DC, February 25, 1999.
Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the Secretary of State, I
am transmitting to you the Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 1998, prepared in compliance with sections
116(d)(1) and 502(B)(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
as amended, and section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as
amended.
We hope this report is helpful. Please let us know if we
can provide any further information.
Sincerely,
Barbara Larkin,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
Enclosure.
PREFACE 1999
----------
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS
Why The Reports Are Prepared
This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department
of State in compliance with sections 116(d) and 502(b) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, and section
504 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. The law provides that
the Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate, by February 25 ``a full and complete report
regarding the status of internationally recognized human
rights, within the meaning of subsection (A) in countries that
receive assistance under this part, and (B) in all other
foreign countries which are members of the United Nations and
which are not otherwise the subject of a human rights report
under this Act.'' We have also included reports on several
countries that do not fall into the categories established by
these statutes and that thus are not covered by the
congressional requirement.
The responsibility of the United States to speak out on
behalf of international human rights standards was formalized
in the early 1970's. In 1976 Congress enacted legislation
creating a Coordinator of Human Rights in the Department of
State, a position later upgraded to Assistant Secretary. In
1994 the Congress created a position of Senior Advisor for
Women's Rights. Congress also has written into law formal
requirements that U.S. foreign and trade policy take into
account countries' human rights and worker rights performance
and that country reports be submitted to the Congress on an
annual basis. The first reports, in 1977, covered only
countries receiving U.S. aid, numbering 82; this year 194
reports are submitted.
How The Reports Are Prepared
In August 1993, the Secretary of State moved to strengthen
further the human rights efforts of our embassies. All sections
in each embassy were asked to contribute information and to
corroborate reports of human rights violations, and new efforts
were made to link mission programming to the advancement of
human rights and democracy. In 1994 the Bureau of Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs was reorganized and renamed as the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, reflecting both a
broader sweep and a more focused approach to the interlocking
issues of human rights, worker rights, and democracy. The 1999
human rights reports reflect a year of dedicated effort by
hundreds of State Department, Foreign Service, and other U.S.
Government employees.
Our embassies, which prepared the initial drafts of the
reports, gathered information throughout the year from a
variety of sources across the political spectrum, including
government officials, jurists, military sources, journalists,
human rights monitors, academics, and labor activists. This
information-gathering can be hazardous, and U.S. Foreign
Service Officers regularly go to great lengths, under trying
and sometimes dangerous conditions, to investigate reports of
human rights abuse, monitor elections, and come to the aid of
individuals at risk, such as political dissidents and human
rights defenders whose rights are threatened by their
governments.
After the embassies completed their drafts, the texts were
sent to Washington for careful review by the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, in cooperation with other
State Department offices. As they worked to corroborate,
analyze, and edit the reports, the Department officers drew on
their own sources of information. These included reports
provided by U.S. and other human rights groups, foreign
government officials, representatives from the United Nations
and other international and regional organizations and
institutions, and experts from academia and the media. Officers
also consulted with experts on worker rights issues, refugee
issues, military and police matters, women's issues, and legal
matters. The guiding principle was to ensure that all relevant
information was assessed as objectively, thoroughly, and fairly
as possible.
The reports in this volume will be used as a resource for
shaping policy, conducting diplomacy, and making assistance,
training, and other resource allocations. They also will serve
as a basis for the U.S. Government's cooperation with private
groups to promote the observance of internationally recognized
human rights.
The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices cover
internationally recognized individual, civil, political, and
worker rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. These rights include freedom from torture or
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;
from prolonged detention without charges; from disappearance or
clandestine detention; and from other flagrant violations of
the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person.
Universal human rights aim to incorporate respect for human
dignity into the processes of government and law. All persons
have the inalienable right to change their government by
peaceful means and to enjoy basic freedoms, such as freedom of
expression, association, assembly, movement, and religion,
without discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national
origin, or sex. The right to join a free trade union is a
necessary condition of a free society and economy. Thus the
reports assess key internationally recognized worker rights,
including the right of association; the right to organize and
bargain collectively; prohibition of forced or compulsory
labor; the status of child labor practices and the minimum age
for employment of children; and acceptable work conditions.
Within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
the editorial staff of the Country Reports Team consists of:
Editor in Chief--Marc J. Susser; Supervisory Editor--Leslie A.
Gerson; Managing Editor--Jeannette P. Dubrow; Technical
Editor--Larry Arthur; Editors--Liana Brooks, Frank B. Crump,
Joan Garner, Stanley Ifshin, David T. Jones, Lisa N. Kaplan,
Susan F. Kovalik, Amy E. McKee, Gregory P. Moody, Diana D.
Perry-Elby, Yvette Saint-Andre, Rachel D. Settlage, John C.
Sheerin, Carol A. Timko, James C. Todd, Stephen W. Worrel;
Assistant Editors--John Bradshaw, Charles J. Brown, Christine
Camillo, Douglas B. Dearborn, Carol G. Finerty, Jose Garriga,
Ramona Harper, Peter Higgins, Ann Hudock, Alex Kronemer, Susan
Keogh, Paul Martin, Edmund McWilliams, Robert L. Norman, David
Park, Maria Pica, Susan O'Sullivan, Tamara J. Resler, Mark D.
Schall, Madeleine Seidenstricker, Wendy L. Shapiro, Wendy B.
Silverman, Mark A. Simonoff, Yvonne F. Thayer, Amy Young,
Robert C. Ward; Editorial Assistants--Charmaine Coleman, Linda
Hayes, Katie Janick, Laura Muir, Carrie O'Connell, Jennifer
Pekkinen, Joshua Rubinstein, Vonzella Taylor, Eunice Watson.
INTRODUCTION TO THE 1999 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
I. The Third Globalization: Transnational Human Rights Networks
Today, all the talk is of globalization. But far too often,
both its advocates and its critics have portrayed globalization
as an exclusively economic and technological phenomenon. In
fact, in the new millennium, there are at least three universal
``languages:'' money, the Internet, and democracy and human
rights. An overlooked ``third globalization''--the rise of
transnational human rights networks of both public and private
actors--has helped develop what may over time become an
international civil society capable of working with
governments, international institutions, and multinational
corporations to promote both democracy and the standards
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
In Davos recently, President Clinton noted that ``Since
globalization is about more than economics, our interdependence
requires us to find ways to meet the challenges of advancing
our values.'' In 1999 the United States continued to meet that
challenge. As a leader in promoting democracy and human rights
around the world, the United States played an essential and
catalyzing role in the process of creating transnational human
rights networks. Just this past year, President Clinton and
Secretary Albright helped forge international solutions to the
crises in Kosovo and East Timor by encouraging a wide range of
governmental and nongovernmental actors to join together in
public-private networks to promote international justice. The
United States is committed to the long-term project of helping
such networks develop into an international civil society, an
effective partnership of governments, international agencies,
multinational corporations, and nongovernmental organizations
(NGO's) that will support democracy worldwide and promote the
standards embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
The great American civil rights leader Martin Luther King,
Jr. acknowledged ``the interrelatedness of all communities and
states . . . caught in an inescapable network of mutuality,
tied in a single garment of destiny.'' What Dr. King
understood, even 40 years ago, was the need--in an increasingly
interdependent world--for governments, businesses, NGO's, and
individuals to work together as agents of change. But what Dr.
King could not fully envision was an era in which these growing
national networks would face both the profound opportunities
and the challenges posed by globalization.
Traditionally, networks have evolved out of communities of
like-minded individuals who gather around shared interests and
values. Often they begin as informal conversations, over dinner
tables and conference tables, which help individuals identify a
shared set of values and standards upon which they can base
their behavior. They help generate what de Tocqueville called
``habits of the heart''--those characteristics of human nature
that encourage otherwise isolated individuals to connect with
one another into a broader community. At times, private
networks coalesce into a single NGO. More frequently, however,
they remain loose coalitions of membership-based citizens'
lobbies, labor unions, foundations, academics, professional
associations, religious bodies, and other groups that share a
desire to identify solutions to a single problem.
Such networks developed at the neighborhood, the community,
and at times the national level. But today, new kinds of
networks--linked by air transport, telecommunications, the
global media, and the Internet--are helping create
transnational communities of shared institutions, shared ideas,
and--most importantly--shared values. We are rapidly moving
toward a global network of government officials, activists,
thinkers, and practitioners who share a common commitment to
democracy, the universality of human rights, and respect for
the rule of law.
Not surprisingly, the emergence of global
telecommunications and commercial networks--the two other new
``global languages''--have served as important driving forces
behind this trend. Just as the Berlin Wall once stood as a
physical barrier to movement and the free spread of democracy,
governments that abuse human rights also seek to build walls
that will stop the free flow of information. But the global
information revolution has perforated such walls: E-mail, the
Internet, cell phones, and other technologies have helped
activists from around the globe to connect with one another in
ways that were impossible only 10 years ago. The Internet has
created a world in which traditional hierarchical,
bidirectional models of authority have been replaced by
nonhierarchical, multidirectional systems that naturally feed
the growth of transnational networks. Similarly, the global
commercial revolution has multiplied contact points between
open and closed societies. As corporations, banks,
international financial institutions, and private investors
engage with transitional societies, they increasingly serve as
transmission belts for human rights norms and advocates for
human rights improvements.
Increasingly, some of the most successful transnational
networks are those that partner with, respond to, or support
government initiatives on behalf of democracy and human rights.
Perhaps the best example of the power of such public-private
network partnerships can be found in the developments over the
past year in Kosovo and East Timor. In the days and weeks
leading up to both NATO's decision to use military force to
stop Serb atrocities in Kosovo and the United Nations' decision
to use military force to stop militia and army human rights
abuses in East Timor, transnational networks of human rights
activistsplayed a key role. During and after the Kosovo crisis,
networks of human rights advocates and humanitarian relief workers
worked closely with governments, the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, and NATO and KFOR forces to document
allegations of war crimes and violations of humanitarian law. In both
Kosovo and East Timor, NGO's are working with U.N. missions to build
networks to support reconstruction, document human rights abuses, and
support justice initiatives.
When nongovernmental groups worked with intergovernmental
agencies and national governments in Kosovo and East Timor, NGO
efforts enriched government policy-creation efforts, and
governments in turn helped guide and coordinate the work of
NGO's. As a result of this public-private collaboration,
governments successfully pooled their military and financial
resources to halt the atrocities, and the international
community began the hard work of rebuilding badly damaged
societies.
Transnational human rights networks of governments and
nongovernmental actors have also worked closely together to
secure the adoption of a wide range of declarations,
international treaties, conventions, and protocols addressing
key human rights issues. Many of these networks emerged from
the world human rights conferences that took place in the
1990's. At the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in
1993 and the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in
1995, NGO activists worked with democratic governments to
combat efforts made by dictatorships to distort the
conferences' final declarations. Both conferences also led to
the creation of permanent confederations of NGO's, which have
continued to work in partnership with democratic governments.
More recently, NGO's and governments have worked together to
secure agreements on eliminating the worst forms of child labor
and ending the use of child soldiers.
Transnational networks have played an important role in
shaping the robust debate over how to guarantee international
justice. While various actors in the international community do
not yet agree fully on how best to address past human rights
violations, particularly in the context of difficult democratic
transitions, a great deal of concrete progress nonetheless has
been made. As recently as the Vienna Conference on Human
Rights, most governments (and many NGO's) regarded efforts to
establish international judicial mechanisms to promote justice
as remote or even utopian. Yet 7 years later, the world has
witnessed the establishment of International Criminal Tribunals
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Indeed, there also has
been active and sometimes controversial domestic civil and
criminal litigation against former dictators.
Each of these developments took place in part because like-
minded governments worked with NGO's to create a public-private
network through which ``the international community'' could
address critical human rights concerns. To be sure, no
international consensus yet exists on many international
justice issues, including the establishment of an International
Criminal Court. However, the critical achievements of
transnational human rights networks have been to place
international justice issues on the agenda and to search for
forums in which justice ultimately can be reached.
The United States continues to be a leader in the formation
of new transnational human rights networks. For example, the
U.S. Institute of Peace and the Department of State recently
hosted a roundtable on justice and reconciliation at which
visiting Indonesian officials drew on the experiences of five
other countries--El Salvador, Chile, Argentina, South Africa,
and South Korea--that have confronted the human rights abuses
of prior authoritarian regimes while making the transition to
democracy. Participants focused on the advantages and
disadvantages of a range of mechanisms for promoting justice
and reconciliation: Truth commissions, noncriminal sanctions,
criminal accountability, and compensation for victims. Other
recent successful efforts at human rights networking began at a
private-public conference at the United States Holocaust Museum
in Washington to discuss the design of an atrocities prevention
information and action network and at a public-private
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
supplemental Human Dimension Meeting on Roma and Sinti issues.
In a number of critical areas, the Department of State has
appointed special representatives to take the lead on building
and working with existing human rights and civil society
networks. As 1999 ended, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
Stuart Eizenstat, in his role as Special Representative of the
President and Secretary of State on Holocaust-Era Issues,
catalyzed efforts by the German Government and German industry
to capitalize a multibillion dollar foundation to make payments
to those who worked as forced and slave laborers for German
companies during the Nazi era and to others who were injured
during World War II. He also helped stimulate the work of the
historical commissions of 19 nations, including the United
States, to examine their roles during the War and their
relationship to Holocaust-related assets.
Others have played an equally important role. Under
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Alan Larson has worked
with a wide range of civil society groups in the Department's
advisory group on international economic policy and the
transatlantic consumer dialog. He also plays an active role in
bringing the private business sector together with other civil
society groups to address issues ranging from foreign economic
policy to corporate responsibility. Robert Seiple, Ambassador
atLarge for International Religious Freedom, has worked closely
with advisory groups and religious organizations, as well as the
Commission on International Religious Freedom, to develop strategies to
expand religious freedom worldwide. David Scheffer, Ambassador at Large
for War Crimes Issues, has undertaken similar efforts along with
governments, intergovernmental entities, and NGO's dedicated to
accountability and justice for past abuses and prevention of future
atrocities. Joseph Onek, the Department of State's Global Rule of Law
Coordinator, has built partnerships with bar associations, ministries
of justice, judicial and prosecutorial training centers, and legal
academics to promote rule of law and legal institutions worldwide.
Theresa Loar, the Department's Senior Coordinator on Women's Issues and
Director of the President's Interagency Council on Women, has worked
closely with existing global networks to promote women's rights as
human rights leading to the fifth anniversary of the Beijing Women's
Conference. Sandra Polaski, the Secretary's Special Representative for
International Labor Affairs, has strengthened the connection between
the Department of State and the international labor movement by
regularly convening the Secretary's Advisory Committee on International
Labor Diplomacy and expanding the international labor function within
the Department of State.
Over the past 2 years, public-private transnational
networks also have helped advance and promote the cause of
democracy, as both a fundamental human right in itself and as a
means to greater protection for a wide range of human rights.
One of the most startling political changes of the post-Cold
War era has been the explosion in the number of democracies
worldwide: By most counts the number of democratic governments
expanded fourfold in the last quarter of the 20th Century, from
30 in 1974 to some 120 today. The U.S. Government's democracy-
promotion efforts have played an important role in bringing
about this fundamental revolution in the way most nations are
governed.
In 1999 U.S. democracy-promotion strategy set out upon four
new paths: Priority-setting; resource-matching; standard-
setting; and network-building. First, in an effort to give
greater priority in U.S. support to countries that are at
critical transition points in their movement toward democracy,
Secretary of State Albright designated four countries--
Colombia, Indonesia, Nigeria and Ukraine--as ``democracy
priority'' countries. Second, the Secretary used her
legislatively enhanced authority over the Agency for
International Development to gain greater oversight over the
assistance budgeting process, thereby seeking to channel more
resources directly to the democracy priority countries. Third,
to make clear that the right of democratic governance is not
simply a privilege or a luxury, the United States introduced a
resolution at the 55th Session of the United Nations Human
Rights Commission in Geneva that explicitly reaffirmed that
each individual has not just a hope of, but a right to,
democratic governance: the resolution passed by a margin of 51-
0, with only 2 member countries abstaining.
Fourth and finally, an impressive series of gatherings has
helped lay the groundwork for creating a worldwide community of
democracy activists and practitioners. In Mali, African
governments and democratic activists met with aid officials
from donor nations to discuss democratic development. In India,
the world's democratic NGO's gathered in the first meeting of
the ``Worldwide Movement for Democracy'' to discover shared
values that transcend regional, cultural, or religious
differences. In Yemen, small and emerging democracies met to
identify common concerns. In Romania, new and restored
democracies agreed on an agenda of action to support democracy
in international fora. In the Republic of Korea, activists
gathered at separate events to discuss the interrelationship
between democracy and economic growth and the need for a
network of Asian democrats. In Austria, Iceland, Northern
Ireland, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay, women from
government and NGO communities gathered at Vital Voices
conferences to promote greater political participation for
women in democratic dialog.
In the first months of 2000, U.S. democracy-promotion
efforts have expanded in two new directions. First, as
challenges to democratic governance have emerged in Paraguay,
Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, and Pakistan, the global democratic
network has worked to develop common strategies not just to
promote ``democratic advance,'' but also to combat ``democratic
backsliding.''
Second, to develop a full-fledged intergovernmental dialog
among those nations of the world committed to pursuing a
democratic path and to explore how best to strengthen
democratic institutions and processes, the foreign ministers of
Poland, the Czech Republic, Chile, India, the Republic of
Korea, Mali, and the United States have agreed to convene in
Warsaw, Poland, in June 2000 a meeting of the ``Community of
Democracies.'' This intergovernmental gathering should provide
an unprecedented opportunity for established, emerging, and
aspiring democracies to exchange experiences, to identify best
practices, and to formulate an agenda for international
cooperation in order to realize democracy's full potential.
Concurrent with the ministerial meeting, a number of
distinguished thinkers and path-breaking promoters of democracy
from around the world will gather in Warsaw to discuss
complementary issues and ideas. These representatives of
intellectual life and civil society will present to the
ministerial meeting their ideas as to how governments and
citizens can better work together to strengthenand preserve
democracy, thereby helping to strengthen the public-private regime
dedicated to democracy-promotion and preservation.
Transnational human rights and democracy networks also can
play an influential role in securing change within
international institutions. In recent years, the World Bank,
Regional Development Banks, and the United Nations Development
Program, with the support of the U.S. Government, all actively
have sought out dialog with a wide range of human rights and
democracy groups to integrate respect for human rights,
democratic governance, and the rule of law into their vision of
human development. Much of the work of the U.N. Commissions on
Human Rights and the Status of Women now takes place on the
margins of the formal sessions, in informal networking among
governments, and between NGO's and governments. Other U.N.
bodies, such as UNICEF, UNIFEM, and the offices of the U.N.
High Commissioners for Refugees and Human Rights frequently
seek out the counsel of networks of like-minded governments,
NGO's, and regional organizations, such as the European Union,
the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American
States, and the Organization for African Unity.
In addition in areas ranging from environmental protection
to human rights, corporations have begun to meet regularly not
only with unions but with broader transnational human rights
networks to identify how they can work together to solve
problems. Corporate social responsibility increasingly has been
accepted as a core tenet of global corporate citizenship,
generating gatherings from Davos to San Francisco to London, as
well as new networks of concern, including the new Global
Sullivan Principles, the Fair Labor Association, the Worker
Rights Consortium, the SA 8000 initiative, the ``No Sweat''
Initiative, and the Apparel Industry Partnership.
The U.S. Government has sought to encourage this trend by
interacting and building alliances with multinational
corporations that share a commitment has to establish a public-
private network devoted to human rights advancement. In
partnership with American companies, we have developed a set of
voluntary Model Business Principles; we also have worked with
the business and labor communities as well as the International
Labor Organization to promote 1998's Declaration on Core Labor
Standards. We are working closely with the garment and footwear
industries, trade unions, and community activists to combat the
still-too-pervasive reality of sweatshop labor at home and
abroad. Most recently, we have been exploring new ways to work
together with community activists, human rights NGO's, and
corporations working in the extractive industries to promote
human rights, support democratic institutions, and strengthen
the rule of law, particularly in the three democracy-priority
countries of Colombia, Indonesia, and Nigeria.
In every area, the work of the U.S. Government in
democracy, human rights, and labor is increasingly being done
not in isolation, but in partnership: Not just with other
public entities, such as governments and intergovernmental
organizations and international financial institutions, but
with private entities, such as human rights and humanitarian
NGO's; the media; labor unions; religious organizations; and
corporations and commercial entities. As the new millennium
unfolds, these transnational human rights networks will only
expand and flourish. As international commerce and
telecommunications continue to bind the world's peoples
together, the United States will remain committed to using the
universal language of human rights to build public-private
networks to promote democracy and human rights worldwide.
II. The Year in Review
Perhaps because there was no defining moment like the
collapse of the Berlin Wall, few analysts noticed that 1999 saw
as profound a positive trend toward freedom as 1989. Thanks to
democratic elections in Indonesia and Nigeria, two of the
world's most populous states, more people came under democratic
rule than in any other recent year, including 1989. In
addition, the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the international
intervention in East Timor demonstrated that the international
community has the will and the capacity to act against the most
profound violations of human rights.
Yet these significant gains in democracy and human rights
cannot overshadow the fact that the past year also saw a number
of profound challenges to human rights. Serbia's expulsion of
over 850,000 Albanians, the Indonesian military's complicity in
the militia rampage through East Timor, and the horrors
perpetrated by rebels in Sierra Leone all show that the world
still has a long way to go before it fully adheres to the
precepts of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In
addition, the coup in Pakistan and popular dissatisfaction in
Latin America clearly demonstrate that the road to democratic
governance is not without its problems and challenges. And
despite the gains in Nigeria and Indonesia, too many
authoritarian governments continue to deny basic human rights,
including the right to democracy, to their citizens. The
following sections highlight key developments over the past
year in human rights, democracy, and labor.
A. Developments in Human Rights
1. The Right to Democratic Dissent. Article One of the
United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders states
that ``Everyone hasthe right . . . to promote and to strive for
the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental
freedoms.'' All too often, we take this principle for granted. Yet each
year, dedicated human rights activists and democratic dissidents around
the world lose their lives defending this remarkable, transforming
idea. In a large number of the countries covered in this report, human
rights defenders and democratic dissidents face harassment,
imprisonment, disappearances, or torture; in some cases, the risk comes
from government sources. In many others, however, the risk is from
nongovernmental insurgent, terrorist, or criminal elements.
Certain countries seem to take particular pleasure in
restricting the right to democratic dissent. Take Serbia, where
the Government of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia President
Slobodan Milosevic initiated a brutal and indiscriminate police
and military crackdown against ethnic Albanian opponents in
Kosovo and sought to limit and suppress dissent closer to home.
The Kosovo campaign ended only after the international
community intervened militarily. Before and during the
conflict, Kosovar Albanians known to oppose the regime were
murdered, raped, disappeared, expelled, or detained in Serbian
prisons. In addition over 850,000 Kosovar Albanian civilians
were expelled forcibly to neighboring Albania, Montenegro, and
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Severe violations of
human rights, though less dramatic, also characterized the
situation in the Serbian heartland, where the regime muzzled
independent voices and forcibly dispersed citizens peaceably
protesting government policies.
Similarly in Cuba, the regime of Fidel Castro continued to
suppress opposition and criticism. Cuban authorities routinely
harass, threaten, arbitrarily arrest, detain, imprison, and
defame human rights advocates and members of independent
professional associations, including journalists, economists,
doctors, and lawyers, often with the goal of coercing them into
leaving the country. The Government denied political dissidents
and human rights advocates due process and subjected them to
unfair trials. Many remained in prison at year's end. Although
the Government sought to discourage and thwart foreign contacts
with human rights activists, it did publicly state before the
Ibero-American Summit in November that visiting delegations
were free to meet with any person in the country, and about 20
dissidents met with 9 different delegations, including 3 heads
of state. Prior to the summit, however, authorities temporarily
detained a number of human rights activists to prevent them
from preparing for meetings with the visiting leaders.
In Asia, dissidents and defenders face a range of
challenges. In China, authorities broadened and intensified
their efforts to suppress those perceived to threaten
government power or national stability. Citizens who sought to
express openly dissenting political and religious views faced
widespread repression. In the weeks leading up to both June
4th, the 10th anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre, and
October 1st, the 50th anniversary of the founding of the
People's Republic, the Government moved against political
dissidents across the country, detaining and formally arresting
scores of activists in cities and provinces nationwide and
thwarting any attempts to use the anniversaries as
opportunities for protest. Authorities targeted members of the
China Democracy Party (CDP), which had already had three of its
leaders sentenced to lengthy prison terms in December 1998.
Beginning in May, dozens of CDP members were arrested in a
widening crackdown, and additional CDP leaders were convicted
of subversion and sentenced to long prison terms in closed
trials that flagrantly violated due process. Others were kept
detained for long periods without charge. In addition both
leaders and followers of the popular Falun Gong spiritual
movement faced harassment, beatings, arrest, detention, and in
some cases, sentences to prison terms for protesting the
Government's decision to outlaw their practice. Many not
formally arrested reportedly were sentenced administratively,
without trial, to up to 3 years in reeducation-through-labor
camps. By year's end, almost all of the key leaders of the CDP
were serving long prison terms, and only a handful of
dissidents nationwide dared to remain active publicly.
In North Korea, government repression is so severe that no
organized opposition to the regime is known to exist. The
Government regards almost any independent activity--including
listening to foreign broadcasts, writing letters, and
possessing ``reactionary'' printed matter--crimes against the
state. In Burma, the military junta intensified its systematic
use of coercion and intimidation to restrict further freedom of
association. Authorities undertook a sustained, systematic
campaign to destroy the National League for Democracy (NLD)
without formally banning it, pressuring thousands of NLD party
members to resign and closing NLD offices throughout the
country. Hundreds of prodemocracy activists remain in jail.
Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi has had to constrain her
activities as a result of threats from the junta, which has
severely restricted her freedom of movement.
Dissidents and defenders in the former Soviet Union also
faced problems. In Belarus, two well-known opposition leaders
disappeared under mysterious circumstances. Government security
forces closely monitored human rights activists and arbitrarily
arrested, detained, and beat political opponents and average
citizens. Similarly in Uzbekistan, security forces arbitrarily
arrested or detained human rights activists, pious Muslims, and
other citizens on false charges. At least one human
rightsactivist died in prison, allegedly after not receiving adequate
medical care. In Turkmenistan, opposition figures and human rights
activists regularly face arbitrary arrest, prolonged pretrial
detention, unfair trials, and interference with privacy.
In the Middle East, dissidents and defenders had to contend
with similar difficulties. In Iraq, the regime of Saddam
Hussein continued to commit widespread, serious, and systematic
human rights abuses, summarily executing actual and perceived
political opponents. In Syria, the Government uses its vast
powers to quash all organized political opposition.
Defenders and dissidents in Africa also faced severe
challenges. In Sudan, despite the adoption of a new
Constitution through a referendum in June 1998, the Government
continues to restrict most civil liberties, including freedom
of assembly, association, religion, and movement. Government
security forces regularly tortured, beat, harassed, arbitrarily
arrested, and detained opponents or suspected opponents of the
Government, and they did so with impunity. Government forces
also were responsible for extrajudicial killings and
disappearances. In Equatorial Guinea, the Government encouraged
the illegal kidnaping and involuntary repatriation of political
opponents living abroad. There are no effective domestic human
rights NGO's, and in April the Government promulgated a new law
that further restricted NGO's and precluded them from
functioning in the area of human rights.
A growing trend around the world is the threat posed to
democratic dissent by nongovernmental insurgent, terrorist, or
criminal forces. In Colombia, for example, paramilitary forces,
some with links to the armed forces, were responsible for the
murder of numerous human rights activists as well as threats
against many others. Guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) murdered three American indigenous
rights activists who had traveled to that country to work with
local indigenous leaders. In Sri Lanka, human rights defender
and Tamil parliamentarian Neelan Tiruchelvam was killed by a
suicide bomber believed to be linked with the separatist
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
Some countries saw improvements in the treatment of
defenders and dissidents. Domestic human rights organizations
continued to play a significant and increasing role in securing
improved human rights conditions, although some NGO's reported
monitoring and interference by the authorities. In April the
Parliament repealed the 1963 Anti-Subversion Law, although it
subsequently incorporated six crimes specified in that law into
the Criminal Code. In March, the Habibie Government freed 52
political prisoners, and in December the Wahid Government freed
196 more. However, activists working in East and West Timor,
Aceh, and Papua (Irian Jaya) continued to face significant
restrictions on and interference in their activity.
A number of governments took the positive step of releasing
prominent defenders and dissidents. In Turkey, the Government
suspended for 6 months the sentence of former Human Rights
Association Chairman Akin Birdal, citing medical reasons
stemming from injuries Birdal sustained during a May 1998
attempt on his life. However, Birdal is subject to
reimprisonment to resume his sentence in March 2000 and also
faces many other charges. In Tunisia, the Government released
on early parole Tunisian Human Rights League Vice President
Khemais Ksila, who was arrested in September 1997 and convicted
on charges of defamation of the public order, dissemination of
false information, and inciting the public to violence. In
Morocco, political dissident Abraham Serfaty, who had been
exiled since 1991, was allowed to return. In Bhutan, the
Government released dissident and former government official
Tek Nath Rizal, who had been held for nearly 10 years. In
Russia, retired Russian naval captain and environmental
activist Aleksandr Nikitin was acquitted of espionage charges,
but his legal difficulties and official harassment continue.
The passport and visa services office has refused to issue him
an international passport, and the local tax police have called
him in for questioning, claiming that he owes personal income
tax on all funds that western organizations raised and spent on
his legal defense.
2. Human Rights in Countries in Conflict. Civilians
continue to endure human rights abuses, war crimes, and
violations of humanitarian law in those countries facing
internal insurgencies or civil war. Throughout the world,
insurgents, paramilitary forces, and government security,
military, and police forces used murder, rape, and inhumane
tactics to assert control over territory, to secure the
cooperation of civilians, and to silence opposition voices. As
was the case in previous years, tens of thousands of civilian
men, women, and children continued to die not only from
conflict, but also from premeditated campaigns intended to
instill terror among civilian populations.
Africa continues to be the locus of many of the world's
worst conflicts. In Sierra Leone, rebel forces committed
numerous egregious abuses, including murder, abduction,
deliberate mutilations, and rape. Progovernment militias also
committed abuses, albeit on a lesser scale. The rebels
continued their particularly vicious practice of cutting off
the ears, noses, hands, arms, and legs of noncombatants--
including small children and elderly women. Rebel forces
abducted missionaries, aid workers, U.N. personnel, and
journalists; ambushed humanitarian relief convoys; raided
refugee sites; and extorted and stole food. They abducted
children to use as soldiers and other civilians to serve as
forced laborers, sex slaves, andhuman shields. After the May
cease-fire, insurgents continued to commit abuses, although
significantly fewer were reported.
Continued civil conflict in the Democratic Republic of
Congo saw government forces lose control of more than half the
country's territory to rebels, who were often supported by
troops from other African countries. Government security forces
increasingly used arbitrary arrest and detention throughout the
year and were responsible for numerous extrajudicial killings,
disappearances, torture, beatings, rapes, and other abuses.
Rebel forces also committed serious abuses, including murder,
disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrests, rape, extortion,
robbery, harassment of human rights workers and journalists,
and recruitment of child soldiers.
In Angola, fighting between government and rebel forces led
to numerous, serious human rights abuses by both sides. In
Burundi, government forces killed both rebels and civilians,
including women, children, and the elderly. Rebel forces also
attacked and killed civilians. Rebel attacks on the military
often generated army reprisals against civilians suspected of
cooperating with the insurgents. At year's end, the army
forcibly relocated an estimated 330,000 Hutus in
``regroupment'' sites in an effort to stop rebel attacks. In
Uganda, insurgent groups, including the Lord's Resistance Army
and Allied Democratic Forces, killed, tortured, maimed, raped,
and abducted many persons (including children).
Other parts of the world were not immune to conflict. In
Serbia, Government military and security forces forcibly
expelled over 850,000 Kosovar Albanians from their homes. Many
women were raped in the process. The International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is in the process of
investigating reports of 11,000 persons killed and buried in
529 mass graves and has indicted Yugoslav Federal President
Slobodan Milosevic and several other senior Government
officials for war crimes and crimes against humanity. At the
conclusion of the conflict, the international community assumed
responsibility for the administration of Kosovo; since then it
has had to contend both with Kosovar Albanian reprisals against
the rump Serbian population and Serb attacks against Albanians
in the remaining Serb enclaves.
In Russia, the seizure by armed insurgent groups from
Chechnya of villages in the neighboring republic of Dagestan
escalated by year's end into a full-fledged attack by Russian
forces on separatists in Chechnya, including the Chechen
capital of Groznyy. The Russian attack included air strikes and
the indiscriminate shelling of cities predominantly inhabited
by civilians. These attacks, which in turn led to house-to-
house fighting in Groznyy, led to the death of numerous
civilians and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more.
There are credible reports of Russian military forces carrying
out summary executions of civilians in Alkhan-Yurt and in the
course of the Groznyy offensive. As this report was going to
press, there were credible reports that Russian forces were
rounding up Chechen men of military age and sending them to
``filtration'' camps, where they allegedly were tortured. The
Russian Government has a duty to protect its citizens from
terrorist attacks but must comply with its international
commitments and obligations to protect civilians and must not
engage in extrajudicial killing, the blocking of borders to
prevent civilians from fleeing, and other violations in the
name of internal security. Chechen separatists also reportedly
committed abuses, including the killing of civilians.
Afghanistan suffered its 20th consecutive year of civil war
and political instability. Both the ultraconservative movement
known as the Taliban (which controls roughly 90 percent of the
country) and the United Front for Afghanistan (also known as
the Northern Alliance) committed serious human rights abuses,
particularly against women and girls, in the areas they
occupied and during their attempts to conquer territory. Both
also were responsible for the indiscriminate bombardment of
civilians. Years of conflict have left an estimated 2.6 million
Afghans living outside the country as refugees, while another
250,000 are internally displaced.
In Indonesia, civil conflict and violence continued or
worsened despite the country's relatively successful struggle
to move from dictatorship to democracy. A variety of motives
drove the violence. Dissatisfaction that had remained pent up
under the long-time rule of Soeharto boiled over under
successor Governments. Anger at Indonesian military, security,
and police units only fed widespread popular support for
independence in East Timor, Aceh, and Papua (Irian Jaya). In
Aceh, military forces and police committed numerous abuses,
including extrajudicial killings, excessive force,
disappearances, rape, arbitrary arrest, and detention without
trial. Military forces sometimes resorted to force in order to
disrupt peaceful demonstrations. Thousands of Acehnese
residents fled their villages during various security
crackdowns against separatist groups. In addition, dozens of
low-level civil servants, police, and military personnel were
murdered and abducted, most likely by separatists. In Ambon and
throughout Maluku, fighting between Moslems and Christians left
more than 1,000 dead by the end of the year. In West
Kalimantan, more than 200 persons died in fighting pitting
Madurese immigrants against indigenous Dayak and Melayu groups.
In East Timor, paramilitary units supported by or under the
control of the Indonesian military went on a rampage of
violence, looting, and destruction after a United Nations-
sponsoredreferendum saw more than 78 percent of Timorese vote
for independence. Elements of the Indonesian security forces and the
prointegration militias (which were armed and largely supported by the
military) were responsible for numerous extrajudicial killings. In
September hundreds of persons were killed in a wave of military-
sponsored militia violence after the announcement of the
proindependence vote. Over 250,000 East Timorese fled the violence.
Violations included summary executions, massacres, rapes, deportations,
and the destruction of property. Both an International Commission of
Inquiry and an investigative commission established by the Indonesian
Human Rights Commission subsequently concluded that the Indonesian
military failed to stop, colluded in, or participated in the violence.
In the early part of the year, proindependence groups also committed
serious abuses, including killings.
In Sri Lanka, the Government's conflict with the separatist
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) continued to result in
serious human rights abuses by both sides. Government security
forces committed extrajudicial killings and at least 15
individuals disappeared from their custody. The Government did
begin to investigate allegations that as many as 400 Tamils
killed by security forces were buried in multiple graves in the
town of Chemmani. Two exhumations recovered 15 bodies, but
authorities have not yet sought criminal indictments against
security forces in relation to the killings. LTTE forces were
responsible for extrajudicial executions, disappearances,
torture, arbitrary arrests, and detentions. LTTE attacks and
suicide bombings killed close to 100 civilians, and at least 14
persons who were found guilty of offenses by the LTTE's self-
described courts were executed publicly.
In Colombia, despite the Government's efforts to negotiate
an end to hostilities, widespread internal armed conflict and
rampant political and criminal violence persisted. Government
security forces, paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and narcotics
traffickers all continued to commit numerous serious abuses,
including extrajudicial killings and torture. Throughout the
country, paramilitary groups killed, tortured, and threatened
civilians suspected of sympathizing with guerrillas in an
orchestrated campaign to terrorize them into fleeing their
homes. These groups were responsible for numerous massacres.
Guerrillas regularly attacked civilian populations, kidnapped
numerous individuals, committed massacres and summary
executions, killed medical and religious personnel, and
forcibly recruited civilians (including children). The
Government took important steps toward ending collaboration by
some security force members with the paramilitaries. President
Pastrana, Vice President Bell, and members of the military high
command declared repeatedly that collaboration--whether by
commission or omission--by members of the security forces with
paramilitary groups would not be tolerated. The President
removed from service four generals and numerous mid-level
officers and noncommissioned officers for collaboration, for
failing to confront paramilitaries aggressively, or for failing
to protect the local population.
3. Religious Freedom. In September the Department of State
delivered to Congress the first Annual Report on International
Religious Freedom. The Department carries a statutory
responsibility to prepare these reports annually. The Report
sought to create a comprehensive record of the state of
religious freedom around the world and to highlight the most
significant violations of this right. The Report demonstrates
that violations of religious freedom, including religious
persecution, are not confined to any one country, religion, or
nationality. Throughout the world, Baha'is, Buddhists,
Christians, Hindus, Jews, Muslims, and other believers continue
to suffer for their faith.
Too much of the world's population still lives in countries
in which religious freedom is restricted or prohibited.
Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes remain determined to
control religious belief and practice. Other regimes are
hostile to minority or ``unapproved'' religions. Some tolerate,
and thereby encourage, persecution or discrimination. Still
other governments have adopted discriminatory legislation or
policies that give preferences to favored religions while
disadvantaging others. Some democratic states have
indiscriminately identified minority religions as dangerous
``sects'' or ``cults.''
The International Religious Freedom Act also required the
President or his designee (in this case the Secretary of State)
to use the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom and
other resources to identify those countries where the
government has engaged in or tolerated ``severe'' or
``particularly severe'' violations of religious freedom. In
October Secretary Albright informed Congress that she was
designating five ``Countries of Particular Concern'': Burma,
China, Iran, Iraq, and Sudan. The Secretary also informed
Congress that she was identifying as particularly severe
violators the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Government
of Serbia. This last action was not taken under the auspices of
the International Religious Freedom Act because the United
States does not regard the Taliban as a government or Serbia as
a country as envisioned by the act.
In Burma, the Government arrests and imprisons Buddhist
monks who promote human and political rights. Security forces
destroyed or looted churches, mosques, and Buddhist monasteries
in some insurgent ethnic minority areas. In some insurgent
China ethnic minority areas, security forces used coercive
measures to induce Christians to convert to Buddhism.
China continued to restrict freedom of religion and
intensified controls on some unregistered churches. Unapproved
religious groups, including Protestant and Catholic groups,
continued to experience varying degrees of official
interference, repression, and persecution. The Government
continued to enforce 1994 State Council regulations requiring
all places of religious activity to register with the
Government and come under the supervision of official,
``patriotic'' religious organizations. In some areas,
authorities guided by national policy made strong efforts to
control the activities of unapproved Catholic and Protestant
churches; religious services were broken up and church leaders
or adherents were harassed, fined, detained, and at times,
beaten. According to reports, there were instances of torture.
At year's end, some remained in prison because of their
religious activities, while others remained unaccounted for. In
Tibet, the Government expanded and intensified its ``patriotic
education campaign'' aimed at controlling monasteries and
expelling supporters of the Dalai Lama, increasing pressure on
Tibetan Buddhists. Controls on religious freedom in Xinjiang
also remained tight. The Government also launched a crackdown
against the Falun Gong spiritual movement in July. Tens of
thousands of Falun Gong members reportedly were detained in
outdoor stadiums and forced to sign statements disavowing the
Falun Gong before being released.
In Iran, the Government committed numerous human rights
abuses based in part on religion. Religious minorities, in
particular Bahais, continued to suffer repression by
conservative elements of the judiciary and security
establishment. Thirteen Jews were arrested in February and
March on suspicion of espionage on behalf of Israel, an offense
punishable by death, leading to charges of anti-Semitism. In
Iraq, the Government of Saddam Hussein has conducted a campaign
of murder, summary execution and protracted arbitrary arrest
against the religious leaders and adherents of the Shia Muslim
population. Security forces have murdered senior Shia clerics,
desecrated mosques and holy sites, and arrested untold numbers
of Shi'a. In Sudan, discrimination and violence against
religious minorities persisted. Government security forces
harassed and detained persons on the basis of their religion.
Eyewitnesses reported aerial bombardments of Christians,
Muslims, and animists in the Nuba Mountains. Government-
supported forces conducted raids, abducted persons--including
women and children--and sold them into slavery. Many non-
Muslims were converted forcibly to Islam.
In Afghanistan, the ultraconservative movement known as the
Taliban, which controls about 90 percent of the country,
enforced their interpretation of Islamic law through
punishments such as public executions for adultery or murder
and amputations of one hand and one foot for theft. Taliban
militiamen often judged accused offenders and meted out
punishments, such as beatings, on the spot. In Serbia, a
predominantly Christian Orthodox country, authorities employed
killing, torture, rape, and the forced mass emigration of
Kosovar Albanians, who are overwhelmingly Muslim, in an effort
to drive them from the country.
Other countries also saw significant violations of
religious freedom. In Saudi Arabia, neither the Government nor
society in general accepts the concept of separation of
religion and state. The religious police enforce adherence to
Islamic norms, intimidating, abusing, and detaining citizens
and foreigners. In Pakistan, both the pre and postcoup
Governments, as well as sectarian groups, continued to
discriminate against religious minorities, particularly Ahmadis
and Christians. Three Ahmadis sentenced in 1997 to life in
prison for blasphemy remain incarcerated. Religious and ethnic-
based rivalries resulted in numerous killings and civil
disturbances. In India, there was widespread intercaste and
communal violence.
In Uzbekistan, the Government harassed and arrested
hundreds of Islamic leaders and believers on questionable
grounds, citing the threat of extremism. While the Government
tolerated the existence of some Christian denominations and
even facilitated their registration, its laws still have the
potential to limit the activity of some evangelical Christian
groups. In Vietnam, the Government arbitrarily arrested and
detained citizens for the peaceful expression of their
religious views. The Government significantly restricts the
operation of religious organizations other than those approved
by the State.
In countries such as Indonesia, the problem was not
government repression, but communal violence. In Maluku
province, fighting principally involved Muslims and Christians
(mostly Protestants). More than a thousand died and tens of
thousands were displaced. Clashes began in the provincial
capital of Ambon in January, then spread to neighboring
islands. Economic tensions between native Christians and
Muslims who migrated to Maluku in recent decades were a
significant factor. Christian and Muslim communities in Maluku
blamed each other for initiating and perpetuating the violence.
Exhaustive mediation efforts, including an initiative launched
by the Indonesian military in April, failed to secure a durable
peace.
In Azerbaijan, the news was better. President Aliyev
publicly took law enforcement and security officials to task
for the harassment of religious believers. He also pledged that
such abuse would not continue and that violators would be
punished. The Government rescinded deportation orders for
foreign religious workers, secured the reinstatement of
believers who had lost their jobs, and prosecuted members of a
local police force accused of harassment.
4. Press Freedom and the Information Revolution. Attacks on
independent media--whether print, broadcast, or electronic--
remained commonplace. Journalists continued to risk harassment,
arrest, and even death to report the news. Murder remained the
leading cause of job-related deaths among journalists
worldwide. A wide range of governments throughout the world
continue to utilize a variety of tools, including licensing,
limits on access to newsprint, control over government
advertising, jamming, and censorship, to inhibit independent
voices. The growth of new, Internet-based media did help
facilitate public access to a wide range of information, but
some governments continued to develop means to monitor e-mail
and Internet use and restrict access to controversial,
political, news-oriented, and human rights web sites. Other
governments have chosen to prohibit Internet access or limit it
to political elites.
In China, control and manipulation of the press by the
Government for political purposes increased during the year.
After authorities moved at the end of 1998 to close a number of
newspapers and fire several editors, the press and publishing
industries were more cautious. Nonetheless, the press continued
to report on cases of corruption and abuse of power by some
local officials. As part of its crackdown against the Falun
Gong, the Government used the state-controlled media to conduct
a nationwide propaganda campaign. By some estimates, as many as
8.9 million Chinese citizens had access to the Internet, but
the Government increased its efforts to try to restrict
information available on the Internet and to monitor usage.
In Cuba, the Castro regime continued to tightly control
access to information. In February the National Assembly passed
the Law to Protect National Independence and the Economy, which
outlaws possession and dissemination of ``subversive''
literature or information that could be used by U.S.
authorities in the application of U.S. legislation. The
Government has not yet charged anyone under the new law, but
many independent journalists have been threatened with arrest,
some repeatedly. National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon
told foreign correspondents that even reporters working for
accredited foreign media could be sentenced to up to 20 years
in prison under the new law. The Government continued to
subject independent journalists to internal travel bans,
arbitrary and periodic brief detentions, small acts of
repudiation, harassment, seizures of office and photographic
equipment, and repeated threats of prolonged imprisonment. The
Government tightly controls access to computers, limiting
access to the Internet to certain Government offices, selected
institutes, and foreigners.
In Serbia, the Government of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
President Slobodan Milosevic continues to harass and detain
journalists and shut down their newspapers and radio stations.
At least one journalist was murdered under suspicious
circumstances. In Serbia's sister republic of Montenegro,
however, the Government worked to provide a hospitable working
environment to independent media, including media that were
harassed, threatened, or shut down by Serbian authorities.
In Ethiopia, fewer journalists were detained than in
previous years, but at least eight remained in detention at
year's end. Some 45 journalists obtained bail during the year
but still are subject to trial. In Peru, the Government
inhibits freedom of speech and of the press. Journalists faced
increased government harassment and intimidation and practiced
a great degree of self-censorship.
In Ukraine, the Government increasingly interfered with
freedom of the press, most notably in the period before the
October presidential elections. Government authorities stepped
up pressure on the media, particularly broadcast outlets,
through tax inspections and other measures. In Russia,
journalists complained of increasing governmental interference.
In mid-January 2000, Russian authorities detained Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent Andrey Babitskiy and held
him incommunicado, but they did not make public his detention
until the end of the month. On February 3, the Government
claimed that Russian forces had turned Babitskiy over to
Chechen forces in exchange for Russian soldiers; neither
Babitskiy's wife nor his employer has heard from him since, and
his whereabouts remain unknown.
In Turkey, Parliament suspended for 3 years the sentences
of writers and journalists convicted of crimes involving
freedom of expression through the media. By the end of the
year, at least 25 had been released. However, the law did not
apply to crimes committed through speech, and human rights
observers and some released writers said the conditions for the
suspension amount to censorship. Limits on freedom of speech
and of the press remained a serious problem. Authorities banned
or confiscated publications and raided newspaper offices, and
security forces occasionally beat journalists. Police continued
to interfere with the distribution of some Kurdish newspapers,
and radio and television broadcasts in Kurdish remained
illegal. Although Kurdish music recordings were widely
available, bans on certain songs and singers persisted. The
Committee to Protect Journalists estimated at year's end that
at least 18 journalists remain in prison.
5. Women. The plight of women in Afghanistan continued to
be the most serious women's human rights crisis in the world
today. Taliban discrimination against women and girls remained
both systematic and institutionally sanctioned. The Taliban
imposed strict dress codes and restricted women from working
outside the home except in very limited circumstances such
ashealth care and humanitarian assistance. They also severely
restricted women's and girls' access to many levels and types of
education. The impact of Taliban restrictions is most acutely felt in
cities such as Kabul and Herat, where there are a number of educated
and professional women.
Elsewhere, women continue to face a wide range of human
rights abuses. On a daily basis, women faced violence, abuse,
rape, and other forms of degradation by their spouses and by
members of society at large. Women suffer domestic violence in
most if not all countries around the world. Many governments
still fail to act against ``honor killings,'' domestic
violence, and even rape. In Nigeria, for example, the law
allows a husband to ``chastise'' his wife, as long as it does
not result in ``grievous harm.'' In China, many women contended
with domestic violence. Coercive family planning practices
sometimes included forced abortion and forced sterilization.
Trafficking and prostitution continued. In India, Bangladesh,
and Nepal, dowry-related violence remained a serious problem.
In Egypt, India, Iran, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan,
Yemen, and a number of other societies where religion and
tradition play a predominant role, societal and cultural
constraints kept women in a subordinate position.
In Kuwait, women do not have the right to vote or seek
election to the National Assembly. Although the ruling Amir
issued a decree in May which sought to give women the right to
vote, to seek election to the National Assembly beginning with
the parliamentary election scheduled for 2003, and to hold
cabinet office, the Parliament vetoed it on constitutional
grounds. Subsequent identical legislation introduced by Members
of Parliament was defeated by a two-vote margin.
Female genital mutilation, which has negative, life-long
health consequences for women and girls, continues to be
practiced in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, and to varying degrees
in some countries in the Middle East, including Egypt, Oman,
and Yemen. Trafficking of women and children remains endemic in
many parts of the world; in response, the Department of State
has for the first time established a separate section in each
Country Report to highlight U.S. concern about this serious
problem (see Section C.2 below).
6. Protection of Minorities. In some states, majorities in
power choose to mistreat or persecute those not like
themselves. However, persecution and discrimination is not
confined to states but also can be present in societies. Much
remains to be done on the national level, and far too many
governments do not grant individuals their rights because of
race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social status. In
many cases, such repression inevitably leads to violence and
separatism.
In China, for example, particularly serious human rights
abuses persisted in minority areas, especially in Tibet and
Xinjiang, where restrictions on religion and other fundamental
freedoms intensified. Some minority groups, particularly
Tibetan Buddhists and Muslim Uighurs, came under increasing
pressure as the Government clamped down on dissent and
``separatist'' activities. In Tibet, the Government expanded
and intensified its continuing ``patriotic education campaign''
aimed at controlling the monasteries and expelling supporters
of the Dalai Lama. In Xinjiang, where violence between the
Government and separatist forces has escalated since 1996,
authorities tightened restrictions on religion and other
fundamental freedoms in an effort to control independence
groups.
In Serbia, discrimination and violence against Kosovar
Albanians, Muslims, Roma, and other religious and ethnic
minorities worsened during the year. The Milosevic regime's
oppressive policies toward Kosovo's ethnic Albanians imperiled
prospects for interethnic cooperation and encouraged a
separatist insurgency. In response, the regime launched a
brutal police and military crackdown against the insurgents,
which escalated into a full-fledged campaign of ethnic
cleansing against civilians. As many as 850,000 Kosovars fled
the province for squalid camps in neighboring states. After
diplomatic intervention failed to resolve the matter, NATO
forces began an air campaign against the Serbian regime. In
June Serbia withdrew its forces from Kosovo, and the
international community assumed responsibility for the
province's administration. Since then, international
peacekeeping forces have had to contend both with Kosovar
Albanian reprisals against the rump Serbian population, and
Serb attacks against Albanians in remaining Serb enclaves.
Although the erection of a wall to separate Roma from their
neighbors in the Czech city of Usti nad Labem captured
international attention, the problems facing Roma and Sinti
populations in Europe went far beyond the building of a wall.
Both populations suffer disproportionately from poverty,
unemployment, and other socioeconomic ills. In many countries,
particularly in Central and Southeastern Europe, they face
prejudice, discrimination, and abuse.
7. The Holocaust: Completing the Historical Record.
Spearheaded by Deputy Treasury Secretary Stuart Eizenstat in
his capacity as Special Representative of the President and
Secretary of State on Holocaust-era issues, the United States
promoted further international recognition of the need for
justice and remembrance for the victims of the greatest human
rights violation of the 20th Century, the Holocaust. German
industry and government pledged DM10 billion to capitalize a
foundation that, among other things, will make payments to
those who worked as forced and slave laborers for German
companies during the Nazi era.Nineteen nations, including the
United States, have established Holocaust Commissions to review their
own involvement with Holocaust-era assets. Consistent with the 1998
Washington Conference on Art Principles, millions of dollars worth of
art stolen by the Nazis are being returned to rightful owners. At the
Stockholm International Forum in January 2000, the United States, along
with over 40 other governments, made an unprecedented common political
commitment to strengthening Holocaust education, remembrance and
research activities, and to opening archives bearing on the Holocaust.
B. Developments in Democracy
1. Democracies Under Threat. In The Third Wave, his seminal
study of democratization, Samuel Huntington warned that the
wave of democratization that began with Portugal in 1974 (and
continues today) might suffer significant reversals in
countries where conditions for democracy are weak. Over the
past year, the number of democracies around the world continued
to grow, but a small number of countries on the path to
democracy saw reversals or threats to democratic governance.
This trend was particularly notable in Latin America, where
elected governments in Ecuador and Paraguay confronted
attempted coups or instability, and an elected government in
Peru undermined democratic governance by concentrating power in
the executive. In Ecuador, what could have been a disastrous
coup became instead an unfortunate but ultimately
constitutional succession. Indigenous activists, with the
support of elements of the military, occupied the Ecuadorian
Congress building, demanded the resignation of President Jamil
Mahuad and attempted to replace him with a three-person junta
that included an indigenous leader, a former Supreme Court
judge, and a military officer. To end the institutional crisis,
President Mahuad asked Ecuadorians to support Vice President
Gustavo Noboa as his constitutional successor. The National
Assembly confirmed the change in presidents the same day.
In Paraguay, President Raul Cubas Grau, a protege of
retired General and coup plotter Lino Oviedo, sought to
undercut the constitutional authority of the legislative and
judicial branches. In March, Cubas' foe and Vice President Luis
Maria Argana was assassinated, allegedly by Oviedo supporters.
On March 28, after widespread demonstrations against Cubas and
Oviedo, Cubas resigned, and Oviedo fled Paraguay. Senate
president Luis Gonzalez Macchi assumed the presidency, forming
a national unity Government that included, for the first time
in 50 years, the two major opposition parties. By the end of
the year, however, the Government faced economic difficulties,
rural unrest, and increasing opposition.
In Peru, a dominant executive branch often uses its control
of the legislature and the judiciary to the detriment of the
democratic process. The Constitutional Tribunal has not
functioned effectively since 1997, when Congress removed three
of its members for opposing an interpretation of a law
permitting President Fujimori to run for a third consecutive
term. In Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez Frias, the leader of
an attempted coup in 1992, was elected President on a promise
of radical reform, including constitutional change through the
election of a National Constitutional Assembly (ANC). In April,
voters overwhelmingly approved his referendum, giving the ANC a
6-month mandate to rewrite the Constitution. The ANC, which was
dominated by Chavez's political party, drafted a new
constitution, which was approved by voters in December. At
year's end some observers remained concerned that too much
power was being concentrated in Chavez's hands.
In other parts of the world, the main threat to democracy
came from the military. In Pakistan, Army Chief of Staff
General Pervaiz Musharraf overthrew the elected civilian
Government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in an October
bloodless coup. Musharraf, in consultation with senior military
commanders, designated himself Chief Executive, and suspended
the Constitution, the National Assembly, the Senate, and the
provincial assemblies. Despite repeated promises to restore
democracy, Musharraf at year's end had not established either a
timetable or milestones; his decision early in 2000 to require
judges to swear a loyalty oath to the military (rather than the
Constitution) further distanced his regime from a return to
democratic rule.
In Cote d'Ivoire, retired General Robert Guei took over the
Government after a mutiny that began in December evolved into a
major military revolt and culminated in the dismissal and
forced departure of President Henri Konan Bedie. The Guei
regime arrested numerous Government ministers and military
officers; by year's end, it had released all except 40. Guei
has pledged to rewrite the Constitution, clean up government
corruption, and hold fair and transparent elections.
2. Free and Fair Elections. According to Freedom House,
there were 120 democracies at the end of 1999, a net increase
of 3 over the previous year, and the largest number ever. As
noted above, however, this trend away from dictatorship saw
several reversals, most notably in Pakistan. Although Indonesia
and Nigeria, two of the world's most populous states, made
great strides toward democratic rule, a number of other states
saw tainted or flawed elections stall their transitions to
democracy.
Indonesia made significant progress in its transition from
authoritarian to democratic rule. In June, the country held its
first pluralistic, competitive, free, and fair
parliamentaryelections in 43 years. A new Parliament (DPR) and People's
Consultative Assembly (MPR) were installed on October 1st. In
accordance with constitutional procedures, the MPR subsequently
elected, in a transparent balloting procedure, Abdurrahman Wahid as
President, and Megawati Soekarnoputri as Vice President.
In Nigeria, the military regime of General Abdulsalami
Abubakar completed its transition to democratic civilian rule
with the election and subsequent May inauguration of retired
General Olusegun Obasanjo as President. In accordance with
Abubakar's transition program, members of the new civilian
Government were chosen in four elections held over a 3-month
period. Elections for local Government leaders were held in
December 1998, those for state legislators and governors in
January, and those for national legislators and president in
February. The elections, most notably the presidential
election, were flawed, but most observers agreed that the
election of Obasanjo as President reflected the will of the
majority of voters.
Several states saw limited gains. In Tunisia, the October
presidential and legislative elections marked a modest step
toward democratic development, with opposition presidential
candidates allowed to participate in the presidential race for
the first time in Tunisia's history. However, the campaign and
election processes greatly favored the ruling party, and there
was wide disregard for the secrecy of the vote. In Niger,
President Ibrahim Mainassara Bare, who overthrew a
democratically elected Government in 1996, was assassinated in
January by members of his presidential guard. A group of
military officers led by Major Daouda Malam Wanke asserted
control over the Government and announced a 9-month transition
to a democratically elected Government. In July citizens voted
to approve a new Constitution. In November they voted for a new
National Assembly and for a new President; Tandja Mamadou was
elected President with 60 percent of the vote in an election
that was considered by international observers to be generally
free and fair.
Other countries were not as successful in their
transitions. In Belarus, Aleksandr Lukashenko's legal term as
President expired in July. He had extended arbitrarily his term
of office until 2001 after the illegal 1996 constitutional
referendum. In Kazakhstan, President Nazarbayev was elected in
January to a new 7-year term in an election that fell far short
of international standards. Parliamentary elections held in
October were an improvement over the presidential election but
still fell short of international standards. In Azerbaijan, the
country's first-ever municipal elections held in December, were
marred by a nearly universal pattern of interference by local
officials, which allowed them to control the selection of the
election committees that supervised the election. In Armenia,
irregularities marred both the May parliamentary elections and
the October local elections. OSCE observers categorized the
parliamentary elections as a step toward compliance with OSCE
commitments, but said that they still failed to meet
international standards.
In Haiti, a prolonged stalemate between President Rene
Preval and the opposition-controlled legislature prevented the
holding of elections in autumn 1998 to replace the Parliament
as legally required. Preval announced that he would not
recognize Parliament's decision to extend its incumbents'
mandates until new elections could be held, thereby leaving the
country without a functioning legislative branch for over a
year. In March, Prime Minister Alexis formed a cabinet after
negotiations with the five-party opposition coalition. Due to
the absence of a parliament, the new ministers took office
without being confirmed. The international community is
assisting Haiti in preparations for new elections, scheduled
for March and April 2000, with the goal of restoring the lapsed
democratic institutions.
In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni, elected to a 5-year
term in 1996 under the 1995 Constitution, continued to dominate
the Government. The 1995 Constitution formally extended the
one-party movement form of government for 5 years and severely
restricted political activity. Although Museveni supporters
remained in control of the legislative branch, Parliament acted
with increasing independence and assertiveness during the year.
A national referendum on whether to allow multipartyism again
is scheduled for 2000.
3. Civil Society. In many nations, civil society--that
broad array of nongovernmental organizations, clubs, societies,
trade unions, and political parties that are the domestic
counterparts to transnational networks--played an increasingly
influential role. Although some critics have warned that the
emergence of the Internet culture would stunt social
interaction, civil society groups showed no sign of slowing
down at year's end, and as noted above, many were taking
advantage of technological developments to establish new
transnational networks of common interest and concern.
Many governments continue to seek means to limit, repress,
or shut down the growth and development of civil society, which
they regard as a profound threat to their authoritarian rule.
In Belarus, for example, Government restrictions prevent an
embryonic civil society from developing further. The security
services infringed on citizens' privacy rights and monitored
closely the activities of opposition politicians and other
segments of the population. Restrictions on freedom of speech,
the press, and peaceful assembly continued, and the Government
did not respect freedom of association.
In Iraq, then-U.N. Special Rapporteur for Iraq Max Van der
Stoel noted in his February and October reports that freedom of
speech, press, assembly, movement, and association do not
exist. The Government effectively has eliminated the civil
rights to life, liberty, and physical integrity and the
freedoms of thought, expression, association and assembly. In
Cuba, the Government denied citizens the freedoms of speech,
press, assembly, and association. Authorities routinely harass,
threaten, arbitrarily arrest, detain, imprison, and defame
members of independent associations, including human rights
advocates, journalists, economists, doctors, and lawyers, often
with the goal of coercing them into leaving the country.
In China, an unknown number of persons, estimated at
several thousand, have been detained for peacefully expressing
their political, religious, or social views. Persons or groups
seeking to promote political change, monitor human rights, or
in any way challenge the authority of the Communist Party were
repressed, their leaders often harassed, beaten, and jailed. At
the same time, most average citizens went about their daily
lives without significant interference from the Government,
enjoying looser economic controls, increased access to outside
sources of information, greater room for individual choice, and
more diversity in cultural life. Social groups with economic
resources at their disposal continued to play an increasing
role in community life. Pilot experiments with contested local
village elections continued.
In Malaysia, a U.N. Special Rapporteur reported that the
Government systematically curtailed freedom of expression.
Government restrictions and proliferating slander and libel
suits stifled freedom of speech, and the Government
significantly restricted freedom of movement, association, and
assembly. The Government prohibited some peaceful gatherings,
prevented students from participating in some political
activities, and regularly and harshly criticizes domestic NGO's
that venture into the political arena.
In Turkey, which has an active and growing civil society
movement, the Government still continued to limit freedom of
assembly and association, and police harassed, beat, abused,
and detained a large number of demonstrators. The Saturday
Mothers, who had held weekly vigils in Istanbul for more than 3
years to protest the disappearances of their relatives,
discontinued their gatherings this year in the face of ongoing
police harassment, abuse, and detention of the group's members.
In general, the Government continued to harass, intimidate,
indict, and imprison individuals for ideas that they had
expressed in public forums. However, there were some signs of a
growing tolerance for civil society: State Minister Irtemcelik
and President Demirel met with NGO's, and one office of a human
rights NGO reopened in October after being closed for 5 years.
4. Rule of Law. All too often, authoritarian governments
insist that they respect the rule of law when in fact they
abuse the law to justify their rule. In far too many
countries--Belarus, Burma, Cuba, Iraq, Libya, North Korea,
Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam, for example--
absolute rulers use the legal system to serve their own
interests. Without the rule of law, these leaders violate human
rights with impunity, suspend democracy, void contracts, and
engage in corrupt practices. Governments that respect the rule
of law have transparent and fair legal systems that feature
professional and independent judges who act as final arbiters
of the law.
In China, abuses included instances of extrajudicial
killings, torture, and other mistreatment of prisoners, forced
confessions, arbitrary arrest and detention, lengthy
incommunicado detention, and denial of due process. In many
cases, particularly in sensitive political cases, the judicial
system denies criminal defendants basic legal safeguards and
due process. A number of statutes passed in recent years hold
the potential to enhance citizens' rights. If fully
implemented, these laws would bring criminal laws closer toward
compliance with international norms. However, the new statutes
are violated routinely in cases involving political dissidents.
In Malaysia, police continued to use certain provisions of
the legal code to detain some individuals without trial or
charge. Prolonged pretrial detention occurs in some cases. The
police were criticized for reports of physical abuse of
prisoners and other citizens, although the number of police
extrajudicial killings declined during the year. Many observers
expressed serious concern about the decreasing independence and
impartiality of the judiciary and about apparently politically
motivated selective prosecution by the Attorney General.
In Pakistan, rule of law problems were rampant both before
and after the October coup. The judiciary was subject to
executive and other outside influence and suffers from
inadequate resources, inefficiency, and corruption. The former
Sharif Government used special antiterrorism courts to try the
crimes of murder, gang rape, child molestation, and ``illegal''
strikes. After the coup, General Musharraf illegally detained a
number of political figures from the Sharif Government and
their families.
In Algeria, the authorities did not always respect
defendants' rights to due process, and security forces
committed extrajudicial killings, tortured detainees, and
arbitrarily detained many individuals suspected of involvement
with armed Islamist groups. However, there were no reports of
new disappearances during the year in which the security forces
were suspected. Prolonged pretrial detention and lengthy trial
delaysare problems, as are illegal searches and infringements
on citizens' privacy rights.
In Peru, arbitrary arrest, prolonged pretrial detention,
lack of due process, and lengthy trial delays remained
problems. In July, the Government announced its withdrawal from
the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
after the Court determined that Peru had failed to provide due
process in the case of four Chileans convicted by a military
tribunal of treason. In Haiti, the judiciary remained plagued
by understaffing, inadequate resources, and in many cases,
corrupt and untrained judges. Judicial dockets remain clogged,
and fair and expeditious trials are the exception rather than
the rule. In a number of key cases, the executive branch
continued to detain persons in defiance of release orders
issued by judges. The 5-year-old Haitian National Police
continues to benefit from international assistance, but it is
grappling with problems of excessive use of force and other
human rights abuses, including a marked increase over last year
in the number of extrajudicial killings. Arbitrary arrest and
detention and prolonged pretrial detention also remained
problems.
Several countries saw positive developments in the rule of
law. In Israel, a September decision by the High Court of
Justice resulted in a significant reduction in the number of
abuses committed by members of the security forces during the
interrogation of security prisoners. In Cambodia, the
Government withdrew a draft NGO law that had been criticized
for its potential to place NGO's under arbitrary and severe
restrictions on their ability to operate.
In Colombia, the Pastrana administration took measures to
initiate structural reform and strengthen the rule of law. In
July, the regional ``anonymous'' court system was abolished and
replaced with a new specialized jurisdiction. In August,
Congress passed a military penal reform bill that, while not
yet implemented, is expected to correct some of the worst
abuses in the military justice system and to be of great help
in the fight against impunity. Thanks to the diligent efforts
of the Prosecutor General's Human Rights Unit, a number of
security force members were investigated, prosecuted, and
convicted of past human rights violations. Impunity, although
still widespread, is no longer total. Nonetheless, the civilian
judiciary remains inefficient, overburdened by a large case
backlog, and undermined by intimidation.
C. Developments in Labor
1. Worker Rights. Throughout the year, the impact of
globalization on worker rights was the subject of serious
discussion in many international forums. The World Trade
Organization (WTO) Ministerial in Seattle saw a transnational
network of human rights, environmental, and labor organizations
focus debate on public concern that workers and their families,
particularly in developing countries, receive a fair share of
the benefits derived from the global economy. In response, the
United States sought to win support for a proposal calling for
establishment of a working group in the WTO that would examine
the relationship between trade and labor. On several occasions
in Seattle, President Clinton strongly urged both the WTO and
the international community to remember that free trade cannot
come at the cost of excluding workers.
Despite the fact that Seattle did not lead to a new round
of negotiations, a number of positive developments did take
place during the year. In June, member nations of the
International Labor Organization (ILO) unanimously adopted a
landmark convention on the prohibition and immediate
elimination of the worst forms of child labor. By this action,
member nations pledged to ban a number of abuses, including
child slavery; bonded labor; work that is inherently harmful to
the health or morals of children, such as dangerous work or
child prostitution; and the forced or compulsory recruitment of
children under 18 for use in armed conflict.
President Clinton traveled to Geneva to support the
adoption of the convention, and worked with Congress to ensure
that the United States was one of the first countries in the
world to sign and ratify it. In January 2000, governments again
met in Geneva to adopt a draft optional protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child that prohibits
governments and insurgencies from using child soldiers. It is
expected that the protocol will be formally adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly later this year. President
Clinton has indicated that the United States is committed to a
process of speedy review and signature and to working with the
Senate to ensure ratification.
Notwithstanding the growing international consensus in
support of worker rights, certain governments continued to
violate core worker rights in defiance of their obligations
under the ILO's Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work. Trade unions continued to face harassment and
closure, many workers continued to face discrimination, and
bonded and forced labor remained significant problems.
Despite the new convention, child labor remained a severe
problem in many parts of the world. According to the ILO, more
than 250 million children under the age of 15 work around the
world, many in dangerous conditions. The ILO's International
Program on the Elimination of Child Labor, to which the United
States is by far the largest contributor, made some progress,
but much more remains to be done.
Another problem common to many parts of the world is the
misuse, mistreatment, and abuse of domestic labor. In much of
the Middle East and parts of Europe, Asia, and the Americas,
workers who travel from developing countries to work as
domestic servants, as well as native-born workers, must contend
with poor working and living conditions, minimal or nonexistent
wages, violence, and sexual assault. Although some governments
have taken steps to minimize abuses, many domestic workers find
they must tolerate terrible working conditions to support their
often far-off families.
Workers in a number of countries faced significant
violations of their rights. In China, the Government continued
to restrict tightly worker rights. The Communist Party controls
the country's sole official union, and independent trade unions
are illegal. The Government continued to detain and arrest
independent labor activists, sentencing at least seven to terms
ranging from 1 to 10 years. Neither the Constitution nor the
labor law provides for the right to strike. Forced labor is a
serious problem, particularly in penal institutions. Some
prisons contract to perform manufacturing and assembly work,
while others operate their own companies. A 1999 directory of
Chinese corporations published by a foreign business-
information company listed at least two prisons as business
enterprises. The Government also maintains a network of
reeducation-through-labor camps, whose inmates are required to
work. There have been reports that products made in these
facilities are exported. Most anecdotal reports conclude that
work conditions in prison factories are similar to those in
other factories, but conditions on the penal system's farms and
in mines can be very harsh.
In Burma, the Government continued to restrict worker
rights and ban unions. The forced use of citizens as porters by
the army remained a common practice. Forced civilian labor
remained widespread, although its use on major infrastructure
projects has declined due to the use of soldiers. Child labor
including forced child labor remained widespread. In Vietnam,
the Government continues to restrict worker rights. Child labor
is a problem and there were some reports of forced child labor.
In Indonesia, enforcement of labor standards remained
inconsistent and weak in some areas. Forced and bonded child
labor remained a problem, particularly on fishing platforms,
despite government efforts to reduce the problem. In Thailand,
forced labor and illegal child labor are problems.
In the former Soviet Union, Belarus in particular stands
out for its repression of the rights of workers. In Russia,
workers face long delays in receiving their wages, as do
pensioners. Conditions of work are health and even life
threatening in many industries. Workers do have the right to
join unions, but plant managers frequently work with the
Federation of Independent Trade Unions, the successor to
Communist trade unions, to destroy new unions. Court rulings
have further limited the right of association by ruling that
collective action based on nonpayment of wages is not a strike
and that individuals who participate in such actions are not
protected by the law. The Labor Code prohibits forced or
compulsory labor, but there were credible reports of soldiers
being ``sold'' by their superior officers to perform work for
private citizens or organizations.
In Guatemala, poverty, the legacy of violent repression of
labor activists and others, the deep hostility of many in
business and the military towards trade unions, and a weak
labor inspection and labor court system continued to constrain
worker rights and limit enforcement of standards. In one case
in which vigilantes abducted union leaders, physically abused
them, and forced them to resign from their jobs and union
positions, none of the vigilantes has been arrested, although
more than a dozen suspects have been indicted on charges
ranging from coercion to illegal detention. While the
Constitution bars employment of minors under the age of 14,
child labor remains a serious problem. Most child labor occurs
in agriculture, domestic service, construction, stone
quarrying, and family businesses. According to the Guatemalan
Labor Ministry, 3,000 to 5,000 children are employed in the
illegal cottage fireworks industry. This dangerous employment
violates ILO Convention 182 banning the worst forms of child
labor.
In Colombia, the Government, under strong international
pressure, bowed to the demands of its unions, agreeing to the
dispatch of a special ILO team to investigate killing and
kidnaping of trade unionists and other worker rights
violations. Physical intimidation of trade unionists, including
killings, remains a very serious problem.
In India, the use of forced and bonded adult and child
labor, though illegal, continues. While programs sponsored by
the ILO and private groups have moved many children from, for
example, carpet looms to classrooms, enforcement of child and
bonded labor laws is spotty. Dalits and tribals, who constitute
the majority of India's bonded labor, continue to face
widespread discrimination. In Pakistan, child and bonded labor
remains a serious problem. Thousands of families work in debt
bondage, with children born into a life of bonded labor. While
the Government has worked with the ILO to move children from
work to school in several industries, enforcement of the laws
against bonded and child labor has been inadequate. In
Bangladesh, the Government failed to keep promises it had made
to the international community with regard to worker rights,
notably affording workers freedom of association and the right
to organize in export processing zones. However, the Government
hasworked constructively with the ILO on a program to reduce
child labor.
2. Trafficking of Persons. Trafficking in persons is a
growing global problem that touches countries on every
continent. The insidious reach of this modern-day form of
slavery hurts women, children, and men from all walks of life,
and of every age, religion, and culture. Traffickers rob their
victims of basic human rights. They exploit and trade in human
hopes and dreams to profit from inhuman suffering and misery.
Victims are treated as chattel to be bought and sold across
international and within national borders. This human tragedy
rips the fabric of communities and tears families apart.
The trafficking industry is one of the fastest growing and
most lucrative criminal enterprises in the world. Profits are
enormous, generating billions of dollars annually and feeding
into criminal syndicates' involvement in other illicit and
violent activities. Trafficking in persons is considered the
third largest source of profits for organized crime, behind
only drugs and guns.
Trafficking cases appear in many forms. In some cases,
traffickers move victims through transit countries using drugs,
violence, and threats to ensure cooperation. In other cases,
economically desperate parents sell their child to traffickers.
Many times, trafficked victims begin their journey voluntarily
and unwittingly fall into the hands of trafficking schemes.
In Russia and the Ukraine, for example, victims who yearn
for economic independence within economies that offer few jobs,
are lured by advertisements promising well-paying jobs abroad.
However, once victims arrive in countries of destination, they
are held captive and forced into bonded labor, domestic
servitude or the commercial sex industry through threats,
psychological coercion and severe physical brutality, including
rape, torture, starvation, imprisonment, and death.
The majority of trafficking victims are girls and women.
The reasons for this are linked to the economic and social
status of women in many countries. Not all victims are women,
however. Boys are frequently trafficked for prostitution,
pornography, and in at least one country, used as camel
jockeys. Men from a number of countries such as China are
trafficked overseas to work in restaurants or in sweatshops in
the garment industry. They travel to their destinations in
rickety boats or cargo containers before becoming indentured
servants to pay their ``debts.'' If they try to leave
employment, they risk violence or the extortion of their family
members back home.
The underground nature of trafficking makes it difficult to
quantify. The most reliable estimates place the level of
trafficking at 1 to 2 million persons trafficked annually. As
this report documents, trafficking into the commercial sex
industry is merely one form of a broader range of trafficking
exploited by organized criminal enterprises.
The problem is particularly widespread in South Asia. India
and Pakistan are significant countries of origin, transit, and
destination. Poor economic conditions in Nepal, Bangladesh, and
rural areas of India result in women and children being
trafficked into major cities for the sex trade and forced
labor. In many cases, girls from poverty-stricken families are
sold to traffickers by parents or relatives. Women who seek to
return home often face stigmatization. Many are HIV positive.
While criminal laws against trafficking exist, inadequate
enforcement and lax penalties do little to stem trafficking
patterns.
In East Asia, many women are coerced into prostitution
under the guise of overseas employment contracts. In Thailand,
women from hill tribes and neighboring countries are especially
vulnerable to exploitation because of their inability to speak
Thai. In Burma, women and children in border areas and from the
Shan ethnic minority are particularly susceptible to being
forced by traffickers into neighboring countries to work as
prostitutes. In the Philippines, some women are lured into
entering employment contracts overseas by unethical recruiters.
Once they arrive at their destination, the women are subjected
to work in the sex entertainment industry or suffer abuse at
the hands of foreign employers or husbands.
The range and scope of trafficking in Africa remains
largely undocumented. Officials in Europe, however, report an
active and growing market from trafficking in women and
children from Nigeria. There is evidence that Nigerian crime
syndicates may use threats, physical injury, and legal coercion
to stop women forced into the sex trade from escaping. Inside
Nigeria, there is an active trade in child laborers, some
exported to neighboring countries, from the Niger Delta region.
Trafficking also exists in the Western Hemisphere. Forced
prostitution is also a problem in the Dominican Republic, where
there are disparities in law enforcement. In Brazil, the sexual
exploitation and prostitution of children is a serious problem.
Prostitution rings foster a sexual tourism industry that
exports children from the Amazon region to large urban centers
and major cities.
III. Conclusion
The events of the past year have demonstrated the
undisputed and growing power of transnational public-private
networks in promoting democracy, human rights, and labor.
Traditionally, ``norm entrepreneurs'' have been individuals
whose role in society or government has given them the ability
to influence the direction of policy. Oscar Arias Sanchez,
former President Jimmy Carter, the Dalai Lama, Mahatma Gandhi,
Vaclav Havel, Pope John Paul II, Martin Luther King, Nelson
Mandela, and Eleanor Roosevelt are but a few of the human
rights advocates who instantly come to mind. Such individuals
still have an important role to play, but increasingly, public
and private networks of transnational actors are becoming
``norm entrepreneurs'' in and of themselves--networks capable
of mobilizing popular opinion and political support at the
national and international level in order to secure
international recognition and acceptance of new principles,
standards, or approaches to complex human rights problems.
These transnational networks increasingly wield influence
comparable to the power of individual nation-states, in their
capacity to spotlight abuses, mobilize shame, generate
political pressure, and develop structural solutions. But
recent history also teaches that such networks cannot succeed
without involving democratic governments dedicated to the same
human rights goals. As President Clinton noted in Davos
recently, all sides need to ``lower the rhetoric and focus on
results.'' No transnational network can firmly or permanently
entrench human rights, democracy, or the rule of law in
unfamiliar soil without forging partnerships with democratic
governments and other domestic and international members of the
emerging human rights community. These partnerships, which
cross public and private, institutional and national lines,
will be increasingly challenged to work together and prod one
another to yield creative and enduring solutions to emerging
problems. As this new century unfolds, the United States will
continue to be a leader in creating and partnering with such
transnational networks to seek democracy and human rights for
all the world's peoples.
Harold Hongju Koh,
Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.
AFRICA
----------
ANGOLA
The Republic of Angola's transition from a single-party state to a
multiparty democracy and its recovery from 25 years of civil conflict
were hindered by a renewal of fighting between government forces and
the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in the
second half of 1998, which continued throughout the year and led to a
halt in the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka Peace Protocol between
the Government and UNITA. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA) has ruled the country since its independence from
Portugal in 1975. The country's competing independence movements began
a civil war immediately after independence, which lasted until the
signing of the Bicesse Accords in 1991. Under the Bicesse Accords, one-
party rule ended with the passage of a new Constitution that legalized
opposition parties and called for U.N.-monitored elections, which were
held in 1992. President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos of the MPLA won a
plurality of the votes cast in an election that U.N. observers
considered free and fair. UNITA rejected the results of the vote and
resumed the civil war. In 1998 the National Assembly voted to cancel
the never-held runoff election between the leading presidential
candidates and allow Dos Santos to hold the presidency until a
determination is made that proper conditions exist to hold new
elections. In 1994 in an effort to end the civil war, the Government
and UNITA signed the Lusaka Protocol, which called for the
demilitarization of UNITA, the creation of a national army, the seating
of a government of national unity and reconciliation, and the extension
of state administration to areas formerly under UNITA control. The
Government generally complied with its obligations under the protocol,
although the conduct of the police and, to a lesser extent, military
units in former UNITA areas drew widespread criticism. UNITA failed to
comply with several fundamental aspects of the protocol. It maintained
a potent military capability and refused to return to state
administration the territory it held. In April 1997, UNITA officials
joined the newly formed national unity government; however, the
Government continues to back a splinter group of UNITA dissidents who
are challenging the leadership of UNITA's longtime party president
Jonas Savimbi. Fighting resumed between the Government and UNITA at the
end of 1998, and by August armed conflict had resumed throughout the
country. UNITA had taken substantial territory and increased its
military pressure on government-held areas. The judiciary, where it
functions, is not independent of the President and the MPLA.
The Ministry of Interior is responsible for internal security, a
function that it exercises through the Angolan National Police, the
Rapid Intervention Police (PIR), and other organs of state security.
The PIR was created in 1992 as an elite paramilitary force. The Armed
Forces of Angola (FAA) are responsible for protecting the State against
external threats and have intervened in regional conflicts every year
since 1996. In 1997 the FAA integrated some 10,000 UNITA soldiers. With
the resumption of localized hostilities inside the country the FAA
became involved in counterinsurgency operations against UNITA. The FAA
also is involved in similar operations, although on a smaller scale,
against separatists who favor the independence of Cabinda province. The
Government's security forces firmly are under civilian leadership.
Security forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
The security factors that inhibited the country's transition to
full multiparty democracy had a similar effect on the country's
transition from a directed, state-dominated economic system to one
based on market principles. The Government's economic policies remained
directed towards a military build-up, with the Government resisting
calls for greater transparency in public accounting. The economy was in
disarray and despite abundant natural resources, output per capita is
extremely low. Angola produces about 780,000 barrels of oil per day.
Diamond production by the formal sector in government-controlled areas
was estimated at 2 million carats. The estimated value of combined
formal and informal sector diamond production in government-controlled
areas was $320 million. Because the diamond-producing areas controlled
by UNITA were reduced, diamond sales in UNITA-controlled areas declined
significantly to less than $50 million. There also are lucrative
untapped mineral, agricultural, and hydroelectrical resources in the
country; however, corruption and mismanagement are pervasive in the
public sector and widespread in the private sector. The Government has
begun to liberalize its import regimes and reform its regulatory
agencies to better allow the importation of the goods and services on
which the economy depends. Annual per capita gross domestic product was
approximately $450. The country's wealth continued to be concentrated
in the hands of a small elite whose members used government positions
for massive personal enrichment, and corruption continued to be a
common practice at all levels. The average monthly salary of urban wage
earners (approximately 20 percent of the labor force) was far below
what is required for basic subsistence. Rural wages are even lower, as
the majority of the rural economy is dependent on subsistence
agriculture and is highly vulnerable to political unrest. Civilians
residing in UNITA-held areas live under a primitive and brutal form of
economic feudalism, their crops and other goodsare subject to arbitrary
seizure by armed UNITA elements, and they are vulnerable to forced
labor, including military service. They suffer from extreme scarcities
of consumer goods, basic medical supplies, and other necessities.
The Government's human rights record continued to be poor, and it
continued to commit numerous serious abuses. Citizens have no effective
means to change their government. The second round of the 1992
presidential elections were canceled in a government agreement with the
breakaway faction of UNITA. New elections were postponed indefinitely
until the U.N. determines proper conditions exist to hold them. Members
of the security forces committed numerous extrajudicial killings, were
responsible for disappearances, and tortured, beat, raped and otherwise
abused persons. The Government was unable to pay the salaries of the
majority of its security service personnel. The poor discipline and
poor working conditions of the police force made it the worst offender;
military units generally have better discipline and a more effective
chain of command. Other than those personnel assigned to elite units,
the Government took no effective action to prevent security personnel
from supplementing their incomes through the extortion of the civilian
population. Prison conditions were life threatening. The Government
routinely used arbitrary arrest and detention, and lengthy pretrial
detention is a problem. The Government was unable or unwilling to
punish those in the security services who were responsible for abuses.
The judiciary is subject to executive influence, only functions in
parts of the country, and does not ensure due process. The Government
infringed on citizen's privacy rights and forcibly recruited military-
age males. The Government at times restricted freedom of speech and of
the press, and intimidated journalists into practicing self-censorship.
The Government restricted freedom of assembly, association, and
movement. The Government continued to limit independent investigations
of human rights abuses, although it allowed international human rights
organizations, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International,
to conduct research in the country. Discrimination and violence against
women were common; adult and child prostitution is a problem; and
children and the disabled continued to suffer as a result of the
ongoing conflict and poor economic conditions. The Government continues
to dominate the labor movement and restricts worker rights, although
there were improvements in the independent labor sector. Forced labor
and child labor are problems.
UNITA also was responsible for numerous, serious abuses. UNITA
forces were responsible for killings, disappearances, torture, rape,
and other abuse. UNITA military units reportedly pillaged rural areas;
depopulated large parts of the country, killed traditional leaders, and
eliminated all opposition, real or potential. UNITA tightly restricted
freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, and movement.
UNITA refused all attempts to conduct investigations in areas under its
control. UNITA continued forced military recruitment, including of
underage males, and used forced labor for a large part of its local-
level logistical support. The sexual abuse of women conscripted to work
as porters was reportedly common in UNITA areas.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Incidents of
extrajudicial killings occurred during the year as the war continued
and, although figures and details were unavailable, observers believe
that the number of such killings increased during the year. Security
forces were responsible for numerous extrajudicial killings. Police
frequently participate in shakedowns, muggings, carjackings, and
killings. Major human rights abuses occurred as government forces
carried out counterinsurgency operations. In February government forces
reportedly killed several civilians after retaking the town of Mbanza
Congo from UNITA. In December there was an unconfirmed report that the
FAA killed 47 civilians during operations in the Luanda Sul province.
Government aircraft bombed military targets in UNITA-held towns, which
reportedly resulted in civilian casualties.
Government soldiers sent to support the Government of the Republic
of Congo committed acts of execution, rape, and looting while in the
Republic of the Congo.
Prison conditions are life threatening due to inadequate food,
medicine, and sanitation and many prisoners died in official custody
(see Section 1.c.).
There were no investigations into, nor was any action taken against
those responsible for, the extrajudicial killings of more than 40
persons during 1998, including the UNITA provincial secretary in Xa-
Cessau, the UNITA communal secretary of Quibaxe, and the local UNITA
secretary of Cangundu.
In January a U.N. chartered aircraft was shot down in an area of
active military operations and all nine persons on board were killed.
The Government and UNITA both deny responsibility for the shooting. An
investigation was pending at year's end.
In January unknown gunmen killed Father Albino Saluaco, a Catholic
parish priest, and two catechists in a town in the province of Huambo
that was under UNITA military occupation (see Section 2.c.). In
September UNITA National Assembly Deputy Joao Ngolongombe Jacob was
killed by unknown persons.
A number of killings remain unsolved. The killings of senior UNITA
officials in Luanda following the resumption of hostilities in 1992
never have been investigated. The Government has refused to return the
bodies of UNITA vice president Jeremias Chitunda and secretary general
Salupeto Pena to their families. The 1996 murders of independent
journalist Ricardo de Mello and state-television reporter Antonio
Casimiro, and the 1994 murder of the vice governor of Malange province
also remain unsolved. The results of the investigation of the 1993
death of opposition politician Carlos Simea never were released.
Numerous localities changed hands during the year, a process that
often involved the extrajudicial killing of government or UNITA
administrators and persons accused of collaboration. Internally
displaced persons and refugees risked their lives to flee to
government-held areas or neighboring countries. Undocumented Congolese
workers in diamond fields were targeted by government or UNITA forces
seeking to take control of alluvial diamond mining operations. An
unknown number of civilians died in the course of engagements between
the security services and insurgents, particularly in the Central
Highlands and in the northwest. Landmines laid by both sides during the
conflict resulted in approximately 650 deaths. Strong anecdotal
information suggests that both sides summarily execute prisoners of war
(POW's).
UNITA troops committed numerous extrajudicial killings during
attacks on villages. Interviews with refugees indicated that UNITA
committed abuses, including public extrajudicial killings, as a
deliberate policy. In February UNITA forces reportedly entered a
village near Luena and killed the village's soba (traditional leader)
and his family. In April UNITA soldiers reportedly killed 25 villagers
who were attempting to return to their homes in Muconda in the Luanda
Sul province. In July UNITA attacked the town of Catete, killing 9
persons and abducting 22 persons. There were unconfirmed reports that
following military actions taken in the fall in Camacupa, Bie Province,
mass graves were found containing the bodies of dozens of UNITA
victims.
UNITA killed numerous civilians during attacks on civilian traffic
on roads throughout the country; such attacks were designed to halt
transportation, disrupt commerce, isolate populations, and maintain a
climate of insecurity. For example, in April on a stretch of road
between Gabela and Sumbe, UNITA soldiers reportedly attacked a clearly
marked aid vehicle, killing five humanitarian workers. In June UNITA
soldiers reportedly attacked another aid vehicle, killing two persons.
The shelling of cities by UNITA forces often killed civilians,
particularly in Malange, Huambo, and Kuito. According to the Bishop of
Malange, more than 1,000 persons were killed, and 700 injured, as a
result of shelling; however, this report could not be confirmed.
UNITA allegedly was responsible for some civilian deaths in
Namibia.
UNITA engaged in forced conscription and frequently killed persons
who attempted to desert (see Section 1.g.).
UNITA never has accounted for the deaths of numerous senior party
officials, including Wilson dos Santos and Tito Chingunji. A number of
former high-ranking UNITA officials who have defected revealed the
extent of extrajudicial killings in UNITA-held areas. Two former UNITA
secretary-generals, a former head of UNITA intelligence, and others
have reported that Savimbi personally ordered extrajudicial killings of
opponents and, in some cases, personally carried out the executions.
UNITA also never has allowed the U.N. to investigate any claims of
human rights abuses in areas of the country under its control unless
those abuses were thought to be the work of government forces.
b. Disappearance.--The Government and UNITA continued to accuse
each other of abductions and of causing the disappearances of
civilians, including government officials, party activists, and
traditional leaders. The number of allegations and the prevailing
conditions of insecurity made it impossible for the U.N. and other
organizations to investigate all of these allegations.Persons taken
into police custody often are reported to disappear without a trace,
particularly in rural areas. Suspects accused of illegal weapons
ownership or collaboration with UNITA disappeared, as did UNITA party
officials in some areas where the Government regained control.
Civilians abducted by UNITA generally either were forced to become
soldiers or support personnel, or were considered government
collaborators. There were unconfirmed reports in April from internally
displaced persons that UNITA abducted persons in Nequile, Chitmebo, and
Gimba Filili villages in Bie Province. In July UNITA abducted 22
persons during an attack on the town of Catete (see Section 1.a.). In
December, UNITA abducted 20 persons from Namibia, who subsequently were
rescued by Namibian forces. The frequent discovery of dead bodies in
the aftermath of attacks suggested that suspected collaborators were
executed summarily. Those who escaped UNITA custody and were able to
return to government-held areas reported that they were subjected to
torture, beatings, and sexual abuse (see Section 1.c.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and the Penal Code explicitly prohibit
all forms of mistreatment of suspects, detainees, or prisoners;
however, security forces tortured, beat, raped, and otherwise abused
persons. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the U.N.,
and human rights organizations report that there is widespread
government abuse of suspects.
Security service personnel regularly employed torture and other
forms of cruel and degrading treatment, including rape. Police used
torture and induced confessions frequently during investigations, and
rarely, if ever, are punished for such abuses. Those suspected of ties
to UNITA regularly are incarcerated under inhuman conditions and are
subjected to primitive and brutal forms of interrogation. There have
been no cases in which an army or police official has been disciplined
for use of excessive force against a UNITA suspect. Police often beat
and released suspects in lieu of trials (see Section 1.d.) Police
frequently participate in shakedowns, muggings, carjackings, and
killings. Police extorted money from travelers at checkpoints, and
routinely harassed refugees (see Section 2.d.).
There have been numerous reports of FAA soldiers crossing the
border into Namibia and abusing and harassing Namibian civilians. There
was at least one report of rape by an FAA soldier, and numerous reports
of molestation of women and theft from small shops. In early December,
the FAA commander in the south announced the arrest of three soldiers
for abusing civilians in Namibia.
There were several incidents in which security forces mistreated
journalists. In April a Voice of America (VOA) correspondent was
assaulted by a soldier after she reported on the lack of whites or
persons of mixed race at a military recruitment center. In May police
reportedly beat a journalist during a routine traffic stop when they
learned of his profession. In July two television crews were arrested
after filming a gunfight between police and suspected robbers. During
the arrest, members of one of the crews were threatened, kicked, and
hit with the butts of machine guns. There were no investigations into
any of these incidents, nor were any actions taken against those
responsible.
Two of five UNITA deputies detained by the Government did not
receive adequate medical attention when ill, and all of the deputies
reported that they were denied food and water for periods of up to 36
hours (see Section 1.d).
Landmines laid by both sides during the conflict resulted in an
increasing number of casualties, including maiming (see Section 1.g.)
The U.N. and human rights organizations report that abuse of
suspects is universal in areas under UNITA control. Interviews with
persons who fled UNITA-held areas revealed that UNITA uses cruel and
inhuman practices, including public torture and mutilation, to punish
dissent and deter further acts of disloyalty. There have been repeated
credible allegations that UNITA President Jonas Savimbi has ordered
suspects tortured and executed in his presence.
Prison conditions constituted a serious threat to the health and
lives of prisoners. The Government and the National Assembly Committee
on Human Rights have acknowledged that conditions are inhuman. Cells
are overcrowded and lack basic sanitary facilities. The prison system
holds approximately five times the number of prisoners it was built to
hold. Many prisons, lacking financial support from the Government, were
unable to supply prisoners with adequate food and health care. There
werecredible reports that many prisoners died of malnutrition and
disease.
Prison officials routinely beat detainees. Prisoners depend on
families, friends, or international relief organizations for basic
support. Prison officials, who are chronically unpaid, support
themselves by stealing from their prisoners and extorting money from
family members. Juveniles, often incarcerated for petty theft, are
housed with adults and suffer abuse by guards and inmates.
The Government permitted local and international human rights
monitors to visit prisons, but not individual prisoners, during the
year.
According to widespread reports, UNITA prison conditions are
extremely harsh. UNITA reportedly maintained a prison in its Andulo
headquarters that included large numbers of persons accused of treason.
There was at least one report that UNITA prison officials beat
detainees.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention are serious ongoing problems. Under the law, a person caught
in the act of committing a crime may be arrested and detained
immediately. Otherwise, the law requires that a judge or a provincial
magistrate issue an arrest warrant. Arrest warrants also may be signed
by prosecutors attached to police commands, and confirmed within 5 days
by a magistrate. The Constitution provides for the right to prompt
judicial determination of the legality of the detention. Under the law,
the prosecution and defense have 90 days before a trial to prepare
their case, although both sides generally have the right to request an
extension of this deadline under extenuating circumstances. The
Constitution also provides prisoners with the right to receive visits
by family members. However, none of these rights exist in practice;
there is a scarcity of personnel and resources, and a lack of official
determination to ensure these rights. Although the Ministry of Justice
is nominally in charge of the prison system, the Ministry of Interior
continued to systematically, arbitrarily, and secretly arrest, and
detain persons for all categories of crimes and for indefinite periods,
often with no apparent intent to bring the detainees to trial.
In January authorities arrested five UNITA deputies and members of
Parliament on suspicion of treason and subversion (see Section 3).
While in prison, the deputies generally were held incommunicado and two
deputies who were ill were denied adequate medical treatment (see
Section 1.c.). One deputy was released in May and the other four
remained in custody until the Supreme Court ordered their release in
October due to lack of evidence.
In January authorities detained for 4 days a local employee of the
U.N. Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) on suspicion of being a UNITA
spy. In June in response to UNITA shelling, government security forces
engaged in large-scale arrests of suspected UNITA infiltrators and
collaborators in Huambo and Malange. It is believed that more than
1,000 persons were detained, although most were released by year's end.
Police detained approximately 20 journalists for questioning in
connection with charges of slander, defamation, and crimes against the
security of the state; however, rather than charging journalists,
police often inform journalists that they remain under investigation
(see Section 2.a.). In January two journalists from Radio Morena were
arrested for rebroadcasting a Portuguese radio interview with a UNITA
official. On August 9 and 10 police detained for questioning the
director, the news producer, an editor, and staff of Radio Ecclesia
after the station rebroadcast a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
interview with Jonas Savimbi (see Section 2.a.). In August police
detained a VOA journalist for 2 hours for questioning and accused him
of defamation after he filed a report that local government officials
had been diverting humanitarian aid. In September the director of Folha
8 and a journalist were detained and questioned in connection with an
article on the Radio Ecclesia detentions. In October the National
Department of Criminal Investigation (DNIC) detained Rafael Marques, an
independent journalist and human rights activist known for his vocal
criticism of the government, and charged him with defaming the
President and slandering the Attorney General. Marques was held for
approximately 5 weeks before being released in late November pending an
indefinitely postponed trial.
In September the police detained several dozen foreign businessmen
(see Section 2.d.).
Under criminal law a person may not be held for over 135 days
without trial. The National Security Law provides for a maximum of 180
days preventative detention. In practice, over 90 percent of inmates in
Luanda still are awaiting trial, and it is believed that the national
average is over 50 percent. Inmates who have been awaiting trial for 2
or 3 years are common. In many cases,police beat and then release
detainees rather than make any effort to prepare a formal court case.
The Government holds an unknown number of suspected UNITA officials
and supporters in areas where government control was regained. The
Government invariably accused these persons of illegal weapons
possession or collaboration with UNITA, although formal charges rarely
were filed.
UNITA continues to detain persons against their will. The number of
such persons is unknown, though a number of confirmed cases exist,
including two Russian aircrews taken hostage in May and June when their
planes were shot down, and four Portuguese and one Spaniard from
M'banza, Congo.
In March, alleged FLEC activists kidnapped two Portuguese and one
French oil worker who were released later for ransom.
The Lusaka Protocol provides for the release, under ICRC auspices,
of persons detained for war-related reasons. With the resurgence in
Government-UNITA fighting around the country, both sides have taken
POW's. Neither the Government nor UNITA has allowed the ICRC or any
other institution access to POW's. Strong anecdotal information
suggests that both sides summarily execute POW's (see Section 1.a.).
The Government did not use forced exile as a form of punishment.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary, where it functions, is
not independent of the President and the MPLA. In practice the court
system lacks the means, experience, training, and political backing to
assert its independence from the President and the ruling party. The
President has strong appointive powers, including the power to appoint
Supreme Court justices without confirmation by the National Assembly.
The judicial system largely was destroyed during the civil war and did
not function in large areas of the country.
The court system consists of the Supreme Court at the appellate
level plus municipal and provincial courts of original jurisdiction
under the nominal authority of the Supreme Court. Only 9 of the 12
seats on the Supreme Court were filled by year's end. The Supreme Court
serves as the appellate division for questions of law and fact but does
not have the authority to interpret the Constitution. The Constitution
reserves that role for a Constitutional Court, which is mandated by the
1991 Constitution, but had yet to be established at year's end. Trials
for political and security crimes are supposed to be handled
exclusively by the Supreme Court.
Five UNITA parliamentarians, arrested in January on suspicion of
treason and subversion, were held incommunicado. One was released in
May and the other four were released in October by the Supreme Court
for lack of evidence.
The Constitution provides defendants with the presumption of
innocence, the right to a defense, and the right to appeal. Legal
reform in 1991 established the right to public trials and a system of
bail, and recognized the accused's right to counsel; however, the
Government does not respect these rights in practice. Judges usually
are lay persons, not licensed lawyers. The judge and two lay persons
elected by the full court act as the jury.
UNITA has established a nominal military and civilian court system
in territories under its control and claims that its Civil Code is
equivalent to the Portuguese Civil Code currently used by the
Government. UNITA President Jonas Savimbi appoints judges personally,
and UNITA trials are not open to the public. Juries consist of male
elders chosen from the community. The accused reportedly has the right
to a lawyer. However, areas of the country under UNITA control remain
under strict martial law.
There were no reports of government-held political prisoners.
There are probable cases of UNITA-held political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
Correspondence.--The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
The Government maintained a sophisticated security apparatus dedicated
to the surveillance, monitoring, and wiretapping of certain groups,
including opposition party leaders, journalists, members of the
National Assembly and foreign diplomats. Legal requirements for search
warrants routinely are disregarded.
To enforce mandatory military laws, the military and police
conducted forced conscription drives in many of the areas under the
control of the Government, including Luanda, in which some minors may
have been recruited. Persons who could prove thatthey had jobs usually
were released, and those with financial means could buy their way out
of the military. The Government denied that forced recruiting was
taking place. Church groups, civil society institutions, and foreign
embassies protested the manner of conscription.
UNITA continued to conscript civilians forcibly for military duty
(see Section 1.g.).
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--The escalation in military operations by both the
Government and UNITA resulted in a significant increase in the number
and severity of human rights violations. The Government and
humanitarian organizations reported that there are several hundred
thousand new internally displaced persons, with estimates of the total
internally displaced population varying between 1.5 and 3 million.
Military attacks have resulted in indiscriminate and summary killings,
torture, abductions, destruction of property, and theft. The provinces
most affected were Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malange, Bie, Uige, and
Huambo. Congolese diamond miners were victims in numerous attacks on
alluvial mining operations in Lunda Norte province.
The Government's frequent failure to pay, feed, and equip military
and police personnel resulted in extortion and theft. Government
personnel frequently confiscated food, including donated relief
supplies, livestock, and personal property, including nongovernmental
organization (NGO) vehicles, often after forcibly depopulating areas
and robbing the displaced persons. However, the reports of such
activity decreased in the latter half of the year due to increased
troop support and improved field liaisons between humanitarian agencies
and the military.
The Government and UNITA continued to use landmines to strengthen
defensive positions, and in the case of UNITA, prevent residents within
its own areas from fleeing to government-held areas (see Section 2.d.).
Landmine explosions increased during the year to approximately 52
incidents per month and resulted in numerous casualties (see Section
1.a.). Approximately 1 in every 356 persons is an amputee as a result
of landmine explosions. Observers believe that the increase in
incidents is due not to new landmines, but to the movement of
internally displaced persons into areas in which they are less
familiar. There were reports that some internally displaced persons,
desperate for nourishment, used the sticks that marked mined fields to
light their cooking fires.
UNITA forces routinely violated citizens' rights and caused
thousands of civilian casualties in pursuit of military objectives.
UNITA's strategy included ambushes against civilian traffic to halt
transportation, driving persons living in the countryside into town in
order to overwhelm government services and take over their land, and
laying siege to those towns by extensive mining and artillery shelling.
The major provincial cities of Kuito, Huambo, and Malange in
particular, were affected. In mid-March UNITA shelled Malange, killing
18 persons and wounding 15 others.
UNITA carried out forced recruiting, including of minors,
throughout all of the country's disputed territory. Recruits were taken
to isolated military camps and subjected to psychological stress and
extreme hardships; those who attempted to desert were executed. Women,
many as young as 13 years of age, were recruited forcibly to serve as
porters and camp followers, and reports of sexual assault were
widespread and credible.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of expression and of the press and specifically provides that
the media cannot be subject to ideological, political, or artistic
censorship; however, the Government does not respect this right in
practice. Moreover, unlike 1998, when the Government's record in this
area improved, it deteriorated during the year. The Government
continued to intimidate and threaten journalists into practicing self-
censorship. There were reports that the Government pays journalists to
publish progovernment stories. Government authorities, including the
Minister of Interior, and the presidential spokesman, consistently
warned the press that they were subject to press and national security
laws and would be subject to fines and imprisonment for reporting
information that ``threatens the security of the state.'' The
Government detained or placed under investigation journalists who
reported on sensitive issues, including military operations, government
corruption, and UNITA, especially Jonas Savimbi. Journalists
acknowledge that they exercise self-censorship.
In January the Government issued a memo that effectively ordered a
news ban on coverage of the civil war. The ban largely was ignored by
the independent media, prompting the Government to accuse it of
supporting UNITA. In June and again in September, the Minister of
Social Communication threatened the independent press with closure if
it did not support the Government's war efforts against UNITA.
Between June and August, the Government prosecuted several cases in
the courts against journalists for violating the press law. The editor
of the private newspaper Agora received a suspended sentence and was
fined approximately $5 (30 kwanzas) for 90 days for slandering two
Ministers. Two other reporters received similar sentences. The
Government restricted a small number of journalists from writing and
traveling while their cases remained pending.
In April a soldier assaulted a VOA correspondent after she reported
on the lack of whites or persons of mixed race at a military
recruitment center (see Section 1.c.). In May police reportedly beat a
journalist during a routine traffic stop when they learned of his
profession. In July two television crews were arrested after filming a
gunfight between police and suspected robbers, and during the arrest,
police abused members of one of the crews (see Section 1.c.).
Police detained approximately 20 journalists for questioning in
connection with charges of slander, defamation, and crimes against the
security of the State. In January two journalists from Radio Morena
were arrested for rebroadcasting a Portuguese radio interview with a
UNITA official (see Section 1.d.). On August 9, Radio Ecclesia
rebroadcast a BBC interview with Jonas Savimbi; shortly after the
broadcast police raided the studio and detained for questioning the
director, the news producer, and an editor. They were released the
following morning. On August 10, the police again detained for
questioning the journalists detained the previous evening in addition
to five other staff members. All were released later that day. In
August police detained a VOA journalist, Isaias Soares, for 2 hours for
questioning and accused him of defamation after he filed a report that
local government officials were diverting humanitarian aid. In
September William Tonet, the editor of Folha 8, and another journalist,
were detained and questioned in connection with an article on the Radio
Ecclesia detentions. Shortly thereafter the Government warned Tonet
that he still was under investigation and could not to leave the
country. In October the National Department of Criminal Investigation
(DNIC) detained Rafael Marques, an independent journalist and human
rights activist known for his vocal criticism of the government.
Marques was charged with defamation and slander, and held for
approximately five weeks before being released pending a trial (see
Section 1.d.).
The majority of the media is state-run and carries very little
criticism of the Government. Semi-independent newspapers and private
radio stations grew increasingly bold in their criticism of government
policies and actions. There are five private weekly publications with
circulations in the low thousands. There are also five commercial radio
stations including the Catholic Radio Ecclesia, and Radio Lac Luanda,
which openly criticize aspects of government policies and highlight
poor socioeconomic conditions.
A committee composed of the Minister of Social Communication, the
spokesman of the presidency, and the directors of state-run media
organizations controls media policy and censorship. The MPLA's
secretary general also influences the content and tone of state-run
media reporting. The Government used its control of the media to engage
in a hostile propaganda campaign against UNITA, including unconfirmed
allegations of UNITA massacres, as a means of influencing local and
international public opinion.
The Government generally did not restrict the activities of foreign
media, including the BBC and the VOA; however, it continued to refuse
to allow direct retransmission, and in January, after a Portugeuse
daily newspaper ran a story criticizing the Government, authorities
withdrew press credentials from one of the newspaper's reporters and
ordered her to leave the country. The Government also denied entry into
the country to another reporter from the newspaper. Foreign journalists
require authorization from the Ministry of Interior in order to obtain
access to government officials or to travel within the country. Travel
to UNITA-controlled areas routinely was denied. The Government placed
no abnormal visa restrictions on foreign journalists and generally
allowed them to report freely on all aspects of society in government-
controlled areas. The Government allowed the U.N. to contribute to
broadcast content but denied it the ability to open its own radio
station.
In UNITA-controlled areas no media organizations can function
except under the absolute control of party officials. UNITA media
includes Radio Vorgan, which broadcasts sporadically from the
highlands, and a UNITA website. No media personnel wereallowed free
access to UNITA areas by either the Government or UNITA after the
resumption of the conflict.
Academic life has been circumscribed severely by the civil war.
Generally, there is academic freedom; however, the Government dismissed
a university rector for political reasons during the year. Reportedly
the rector came into conflict with the Ministry of Education for
supporting higher wages for professors and increased academic
standards. The rector's dismissal led to a strike by the university's
professors (see Section 6.a.). Academics do not practice self-
censorship.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of assembly; however, the Government restricts
this right in practice. The law requires a minimum of 3 days' prior
notice before public or private assemblies are held, and makes
participants liable for ``offenses against the honor and consideration
due to persons and to organs of sovereignty.'' Applications for
progovernment assemblies are granted routinely without delay; however,
applications for protest assemblies rarely are granted.
The Constitution provides for the right of association; however,
the Government restricts this right in practice. Legislation allows the
Government to deny registration to private associations on security
grounds, and the Government arbitrarily limits organized activities
deemed adverse to its interests.
There is no freedom of assembly or association in areas of the
country under UNITA control.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, including the separation of church and state, and the
Government respects this right in practice. Members of the clergy in
government-held areas regularly use their pulpits to highlight the
human costs of war and to call on the Government and UNITA to make
peace. Radio Ecclesia, run by the Catholic Church, is one of the few
sources of independent news. The station began practicing self-
censorship in August after the Government harassed it for
rebroadcasting a Jonas Savimbi interview with the BBC (see Section
2.a.).
While in general UNITA permits freedom of religion, interviews with
persons who left UNITA-controlled areas reveal that the clergy does not
enjoy the right to criticize UNITA policies.
In January unknown gunmen killed Father Albino Saluaco, a Catholic
parish priest, and two catechists in a town in the province of Huambo
that was under UNITA military occupation. Father Saluaco had served as
deputy director of a project to reintegrate child soldiers into their
families.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement and residence, and freedom of exit from and entry into the
country; however, the Government does not respect these rights in
practice. A network of government checkpoints throughout the country
interfered with the right to travel. Such checkpoints serve as a source
of income for many of the country's security service personnel.
Extortion at checkpoints is routine in the center of Luanda and
pervasive on major commercial routes. The Government routinely cuts off
access to areas of the country that are deemed insecure or beyond the
administrative authority of the State. Transportation links between
government- and UNITA-held territory were broken as a result of
conflict. The Government did not place restrictions on emigration and
repatriation. In September the police detained and harassed several
dozen foreign businessmen in an effort to control currency speculation;
several of the businessmen ultimately were deported.
As a result of the conflict approximately 75,000 citizens fled into
neighboring countries during the year, including to the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Namibia, and Zambia.
Human rights and relief workers who interviewed Angolan refugees
and displaced persons reported that UNITA limits the free movement of
the civilian population both by preventing persons from fleeing some
areas under their control, and by displacing them to areas of
government control. The patterns that emerged from the discussions
suggested that UNITA uses military patrols, checkpoints, and landmines
to keep persons from leaving their home areas. Refugees who fled the
country and who were not part of the Ovimbundu majority within UNITA
said that arbitrary public punishment, including death by firing squad
or by immolation, was used to deter others from leaving. There is also
some evidence to suggest a pattern of UNITA displacing persons and
forcing them to flee to government-controlled cities in order
toincrease pressure on the Government to deal with increased
humanitarian burdens.
Mines laid by UNITA forces on roads are a major impediment to the
freedom of internal circulation. According to U.N. and NGO reports,
UNITA uses antipersonnel and antivehicle mines to prevent government
forces from entering areas under its control and to restrict movement
of civilians, either by keeping them within areas it controls, or by
keeping them from leaving government towns. UNITA also used landmines
to make areas unsuitable for cultivation and to deny hostile
populations access to water supplies and other necessities. Government
use of landmines generally was confined to defensive positions and
around towns under threat of UNITA attack. Estimates of the total
number of landmines deployed throughout the country range into the
millions. Fear of injury and death from landmines effectively
imprisoned and impoverished entire communities. There were an unknown
number of fatalities due to landmine explosions during the year, and
there are over 80,000 survivors of landmine explosions.
The law provides for the granting of refugee and asylee status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees. The Government provides first asylum to
refugees. An eligibility committee to evaluate asylum claims meets
regularly to evaluate asylum requests. There are approximately 11,000
refugees in the country, mostly from the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The majority of Rwandan refugees in Luau, Moxico province, an area that
reverted to government control in September 1997, had left the country
for camps in Zambia by the end of 1998.
There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons with valid
claims to refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides all adult citizens with the right to vote
by secret ballot in direct multiparty elections to choose the President
of the Republic and deputies in the 220-seat National Assembly;
however, in practice, citizens have no effective means to change their
government. The Lusaka Protocol established the mechanism for returning
the country to an electoral calendar, but in June the National Assembly
voted to postpone new elections indefinitely due to the renewal of
conflict. Opposition parties complain of harassment and intimidation by
government security forces.
The President is elected by absolute majority. If no candidate wins
such a majority, there is a runoff between the two candidates with the
most votes. Of the 220 Deputies in the National Assembly, 130 are
elected on a national ballot, and 90 are elected to represent the
provinces. The Electoral Law also calls for the election of three
additional deputies to represent citizens living abroad; however, those
positions were not filled in the 1992 elections.
Ruling power is concentrated in the President and other members of
the Council of Ministers, through which the President exercises
executive power. The Council can enact decree-laws, decrees, and
resolutions, thereby controlling most functions normally associated
with the legislative branch. The National Assembly has served as an
important debating forum; however, in matters of budget and
legislation, it is largely a rubber stamp for executive decisions.
Although the Constitution establishes the position of Prime Minister,
the President dismissed the Prime Minister during the MPLA Party
Congress at the end of 1998, and assumed the position himself by
decree. The seating of 70 UNITA Deputies in April 1997 fostered
substantive debates for the first time on issues ranging from the peace
process to the Government's budgeting priorities and accountability.
These debates have decreased since, due to the formation of UNITA-
Renovada, a government-backed UNITA splinter group, and the
Government's sensitivity to criticism following resumption of the
conflict.
The National Assembly established a commission to revise the
Constitution beginning in the fall. Deliberations are expected to
continue through 2000 with participation from all parties represented
in the National Assembly.
The 1992 elections were the first multiparty democratic elections
in the country's history and were conducted with U.N. supervision and
financial support. MPLA President Jose Eduardo dos Santos won a
plurality of votes cast in the presidential election (49 percent) and
UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi finished second (40 percent). Although local
and international observers declared the election to be generally free
and fair and called on UNITA to accept the results, UNITA claimed that
the elections were fraudulent, rejected the results, and returned the
country to civil war. The runoff election between Dos Santos and
Savimbi never was held. The Lusaka Protocol stated that it would take
place following a U.N. determination that requisite conditionsexist.
The National Assembly voted in June to cancel the runoff election
pending a determination that conditions are appropriate for a new
election.
In April 1997, UNITA and 10 smaller opposition parties joined the
ruling MPLA in a government of national unity and reconciliation. In
1998 UNITA officials assumed 4 ministerial and 7 vice-ministerial
positions, and 70 UNITA deputies took their seats. The remaining
positions were filled by members of a dissident UNITA group, UNITA-
Renovada, which is recognized and assisted by the Government. The
National Assembly promulgated a special status for Savimbi, declaring
him the leader of the largest opposition party and providing him with 5
official residences and a bodyguard contingent of 400 personnel. The
National Assembly revoked Savimbi's status in 1998, for abrogating his
duties under the Lusaka Protocol. During the year, the Government
declared Savimbi a war criminal and issued a warrant for his arrest.
In January authorities arrested five UNITA deputies and Members of
Parliament on suspicion of treason and subversion (see Section 1.d.).
Under the law and the rules of the National Assembly, Members of
Parliament are immune from arrest unless caught in act of committing a
capital offense; however, two of the deputies were asleep when the
police came to their homes to arrest them. In February the National
Assembly lifted the deputies' immunity. While in prison, the deputies
generally were held incommunicado and two deputies who were ill were
denied adequate medical treatment (see Section 1.c.). One deputy was
released in May and the other four remained in custody until the
Supreme Court ordered their release in October due to lack of evidence.
In November the deputies resumed their seats in Parliament.
There are no legal barriers to the participation of women in the
political process, and while women occupy a number of important
government positions, they were underrepresented in government and
politics. Women hold 10 of 83 cabinet positions and 35 of 220 seats in
the National Assembly.
Section 4. Governmental Attitudes Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government does not formally prohibit independent
investigations of its human rights record, but it fails to cooperate
and often uses security conditions as pretext to deny access to
affected areas.
There are over 120 registered NGO's operating in the country, of
which approximately 45 are domestic NGO's.
Several international organizations have a permanent presence in
the country including the ICRC, and the human rights division of MONUA.
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International visited the country during
the year.
The Constitution provides for the creation of an office of the
Provider of Justice, or ombudsman, designated by the National Assembly
for a 4-year term, to defend citizens' rights and liberties; however,
this office had not yet been filled at year's end.
The MONUA human rights division, established in 1997 to conduct
human rights training for U.N. forces and investigate individual cases
of human rights abuses, had a countrywide presence prior to the
outbreak of hostilities in late 1998. The MONUA human rights division
closed its team sites around the country in February and March, and as
a result, the ability of local and international observers to conduct
human rights investigations was limited.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Under the Constitution all citizens are equal before the law and
enjoy the same rights and responsibilities regardless of color, race,
ethnicity, sex, place of birth, religion, ideology, degree of
education, or economic or social condition. The Government does not
have the ability to enforce these provisions effectively.
Women.--Violence against women was widespread. Credible evidence
indicated that a significant proportion of homicides was perpetrated
against women, usually by their spouses. In 1997 a Ministry of Women
was created to deal specifically with violence against women. During
the year, the Ministry worked closely with NGO's and international
organizations on a project to reduce violence against women and improve
the status of women.
The Constitution and Family Code provide for equal rights without
regard to gender; however societal discrimination against women
remained a problem, particularly in rural areas. In addition, a portion
of the Civil Code dates back to colonial times and includes
discriminatory provisions against women in the areas ofinheritance,
property sales, and participation in commercial activities. A series of
national conferences on women's rights, partially funded by foreign
donors, continued to produce calls for the Government to amend the
Civil Code to end women's legal inequality, create a social welfare
program, and strengthen enforcement mechanisms for existing
legislation.
The maternal mortality rate in 1996 was estimated at 1,500 deaths
per 100,000 live births. There are no effective mechanisms to enforce
child support laws, and women carry the major portion of
responsibilities in raising children. Due to poor economic conditions,
an increasing number of women engaged in prostitution.
Despite constitutional protections, women suffer from
discrimination. The law provides for equal pay for equal work, but in
practice, women rarely are compensated equally. Some women hold senior
positions in the military (primarily in the medical field) and civil
service, but women mostly are relegated to low-level positions in
state-run industries and in the small private sector. In much of the
country, women constituted a growing percentage of the disabled, since
they were most likely to become victims of landmines while foraging for
food and firewood in agricultural areas. Under the law, adult women may
open bank accounts, accept employment, and own property without
interference from their spouses. Upon the death of a male head of
household, the widow automatically is entitled to 50 percent of the
estate with the remainder divided equally among legitimate children.
Children.--Some 50 percent of the population is believed to be
under the age of 15; however, the Government gave little attention to
children's rights and welfare. The Ministry of Education barely
functions due to lack of resources. Private religious, community, or
corporate groups have been unable to fill this vacuum. Teachers are
chronically unpaid and the net enrollment rate of school-age children
is 40 percent, with an 18 percent gap favoring boys over girls. Almost
1 million children are estimated to be out of school, with no prospect
of integrating them into the education system. Most of the educational
infrastructure is damaged either partially or totally and lacks basic
equipment and teaching materials. Only 42 percent of the population are
literate, and the illiteracy rate for women is almost twice that of
men.
UNITA and the Government allowed 8,000 child soldiers to be
demobilized in 1996-1997. The Government has not brought any
significant number of children back into the armed forces, although
some children might have been caught up in forced recruitment campaigns
(see Section 1.f.). There are credible reports that UNITA forcibly has
recruited children into its armed forces.
The U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) in 1998 estimated that there were
approximately 5,000 street children in Luanda; some were orphans or
abandoned while others ran away from their families or from government
facilities that were unable to support them. Living conditions in
government youth hostels are so poor that the majority of homeless
children preferred to sleep on city streets. Street children shine
shoes, wash cars, and carry water, but many resort to petty crime,
begging, and prostitution in order to survive (see Section 6.d.). One
international NGO that works with street children estimated that there
were 500 to 1,000 underage prostitutes in Luanda.
The government-sponsored National Institute for Children is a well-
intentioned organization, but it lacks the capacity to assist
adequately efforts by international NGO's to assist dispossessed youth.
There are no active private children's rights advocacy groups.
Female genital mutilation (FGM) is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health. There has been very little evidence of FGM. There
were rare occurrences in remote areas of Moxico province, bordering the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia in past years; however,
information from local and international health workers, including
midwives, indicated that indigenous groups do not practice FGM.
People with Disabilities.--The number of physically disabled
persons includes an estimated 80,000 disabled landmine survivors. While
there is no institutional discrimination against the disabled, the
Government is doing little to improve their physical, financial, or
social conditions. There is no legislation mandating accessibility for
the disabled in public or private facilities, and, in view of the
degradation of the country's infrastructure and high unemployment rate,
it is difficult for the disabled to find employment or participate in
the education system.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population includes 1 to 2
percent of Khoisan and other linguistically distinct hunter-gatherer
tribes scattered through the provinces of Namibe, Cunene, and Cuando
Cubango. There is no evidence that they suffer from official
discrimination or harassment, but they do not participate actively in
the political or economic life of the country and have no ability to
influence government decisions concerning their interests.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right to form and join trade unions, engage in union activities, and
strike; however, the Government does not respect these rights
consistently in practice. The Government dominated the National Union
of Angolan Workers (UNTA), which is the labor movement affiliated with
the ruling MPLA party; however, the General Center of Independent and
Free Labor Unions of Angola (CGSILA) is independent, and has
approximately 51,000 members. The law requires that labor unions be
recognized by the Government. Restrictions on civil liberties
potentially prevent any labor activities not approved by the
Government; however, the major impediment to labor's ability to
advocate on behalf of workers is the 80 percent formal sector
unemployment rate.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike. Legislation
passed in 1991 provides the legal framework for, and strictly
regulates, that right. The law prohibits lockouts and worker occupation
of places of employment, and provides protection for nonstriking
workers. It prohibits strikes by military and police personnel, prison
workers, and firefighters. The law does not prohibit employer
retribution against strikers effectively.
There were several public sector strikes over salaries and
conditions, which deteriorated due to the high inflation rate. Public
employees received major pay increases as a result of these strikes.
The most notable strike took place in August when university professors
protested the Government's dismissal of the university rector for
political reasons (see Section 2.a.).
Unions have the right to affiliate internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution provides for the right to organize and for collective
bargaining; however, the Government generally does not respect these
rights in practice. The Government dominates the economy through state-
run enterprises. The Ministry of Public Administration, Employment, and
Social Security sets wages and benefits on an annual basis. Legislation
prohibits discrimination against union members and calls for worker
complaints to be adjudicated in regular civil courts. Under the law,
employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are required to
reinstate workers who have been fired for union activities. In
practice, neither the Labor Code nor the judicial system are capable of
defending these rights.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law permits the
Government to force workers back to work for breaches of worker
discipline and participation in strikes, and has been cited by the
International Labor Organization (ILO) as an example of forced labor in
violation of ILO conventions. The law prohibits forced or bonded child
labor, and there are no reports that such labor occurs in government-
held areas; however, the Government does not have the capacity to
enforce this legislation in nongovernment-held areas.
UNITA forces regularly abduct children for military service and
other forms of forced labor. UNITA depends on forced labor for much of
its logistical support. Refugees and internally displaced persons
reported that rural women frequently are forced to work as porters for
UNITA military units and kept in life threatening conditions of
servitude. There also were credible reports of sexual assault.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment is 14 years. Children
between the ages of 14 and 18 may not work at night, in dangerous
conditions, or in occupations requiring great physical effort; however,
these provisions generally are not enforced. The Inspector General of
the Ministry of Public Administration, Employment, and Social Security
is responsible for enforcing labor laws. The Ministry maintains
employment centers where prospective employees register, and the center
screens outapplicants under the age of 14; however, many younger
children work on family farms, as domestic servants, and in the
informal sector. Family-based child labor in subsistence agriculture is
common. Poverty and social upheavals have brought large numbers of
orphaned and abandoned children, as well as runaways, into unregulated
urban employment in the informal sector. The law prohibits forced or
bonded child labor; however, the Government is unable to enforce these
provisions (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage set by the
Ministry of Public Administration, Employment, and Social Security was
approximately $30 (180 kwanzas) per month prior to the rapid
devaluation of the kwanza in the mid-1990's. During the year, the
minimum wage was set at approximately $2.50 (15 kwanzas) per month;
however, the Government does not enforce this standard. The majority of
urban workers earn less than $20 (120 kwanzas) per month. Most workers
hold second jobs, engage in subsistence agriculture, rely on aid from
relatives, or engage in corruption to supplement their incomes. Neither
the minimum wage nor the average monthly salary, which is estimated at
$15 (90 kwanzas) to $200 (1200 kwanzas) per month, are sufficient to
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. As a
result, most wage earners depend on the informal sector, subsistence
agriculture, corruption, or support from abroad to augment their
incomes.
A 1994 government decree established a 37-hour workweek; however,
the Ministry of Public Administration was unable to enforce this
standard, just as it was unable to enforce existing occupational safety
and health standards. Workers cannot remove themselves from dangerous
work situation without jeopardizing their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution prohibits trafficking;
however there continued to be allegations that UNITA abducted persons,
including children, for forced labor, and abducted women for use as sex
slaves.
______
BENIN
The Republic of Benin is a constitutional democracy headed by
President Mathieu Kerekou, who was inaugurated on April 4, 1996, after
elections that generally were viewed as free and fair. President
Kerekou, who ruled Benin as a Socialist military dictator from 1972 to
1989, succeeded his democratically elected predecessor and continued
the civilian, democratic rule begun in the 1990-91 constitutional
process that ended his previous reign. There are 19 political parties
represented in the unicameral, 83-member National Assembly. The March
30 parliamentary elections, which were free, fair, and transparent
resulted in significant gains by the opposition, notably the party of
former President Nicephore Soglo, which gained 27 seats in Parliament.
Although a loose alliance of progovernment deputies holds a 42 to 41
seat majority, some progovernment deputies side with the opposition,
depending on the issue. Consequently, legislative power is shared
between opposition and progovernment forces. For example the President
of the National Assembly belongs to an opposition party. The Government
respects the constitutional provision for an independent judiciary;
however, the executive has important powers in regard to the judiciary,
and the judiciary is inefficient and susceptible to corruption at some
levels.
The civilian-controlled security forces consist of the armed
forces, headed by the Minister Delegate for Defense Matters in the
office of the President, and the police force under the Interior
Minister. The Ministry of Defense supervises the gendarmerie, which
exercises police functions in rural areas while the Ministry of
Interior supervises other police forces. The armed forces continued to
play an apolitical role in government affairs despite concerns about
morale within its ranks and its ethnic imbalance within the forces.
Members of the police committed some human rights abuses.
Benin is an extremely poor country with average yearly per capita
income below $400. The economy is based largely on subsistence
agriculture, cotton production, regional trade (including transshipment
of goods to neighboring countries), and small-scale offshore oil
production. The port of Cotonou serves as a major conduit for goods
entering neighboring Nigeria legally and illegally. The Kerekou
administration continued, and in some cases stepped up, the austerity
program begun by its predecessor; privatized state-owned enterprises;
reduced fiscal expenditures; and deregulated trade. In spite of an
inefficient bureaucracy and widespread unemployment, the country's
economicrecovery continued under liberal economic policies instituted
since the return to democracy. Although the economy expanded, real
growth was lower than in previous years. The Government estimated a 4
percent growth rate with inflation at 3.5 percent through August. The
Government privatized the state-owned oil and cement companies.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in several areas. Reports came
to light of extrajudicial killings by police in 1998. There were
credible reports that police sometimes beat suspects, and at times the
authorities arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The most
prominent human rights problems continued to be the failure of police
forces to curtail acts of vigilantism and mob justice; harsh and
unhealthy prison conditions; serious administrative delays in
processing ordinary criminal cases with attendant denial of timely,
fair trials; judicial corruption; societal discrimination and violence
against women; and trafficking in and abuse of children. The practice
of female genital mutilation (FGM) and, to a lesser extent, infanticide
also remain problems. Child labor continues to be a problem. The
Constitutional Court continued to demonstrate independence. On several
occasions during the year, the court ruled that legislation proposed by
the Government and approved by the National Assembly was defective. On
each occasion the legislation was redrafted to satisfy the court's
objections, then reapproved by the legislature before promulgation. For
example, the Constitutional Court ruled that some provisions of the
decentralization law were unconstitutional; the legislature and the
President accepted this decision.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by
government officials. According to Amnesty International, Florent
Adoko, died at the principal police station in Cotonou in January 1998
after being beaten by a guard. There were also reports that other
detainees may have been killed on the same day at the same police
station. The report also alleges that police killed Adjakieje Alexandre
while dispersing a peaceful demonstration in Gbendo, near Abomey, in
May 1998. The State Prosecutor's office reportedly is investigating
these allegations.
As in previous years, incidents of mob justice were reported by the
media and other sources. These were most often cases of suspected
criminals being killed or severely injured, particularly thieves caught
in the act. Although a number of these incidents occurred in urban
areas and were publicized in the press, the Government apparently made
no concerted attempt to investigate or prosecute anyone involved. A
rural demagogue incited mobs to lynch upwards of 100 suspected
criminals in southwestern Benin between March and October. Most of the
victims were burned alive, many after being abducted, beaten, and
tortured by the demagogue's followers. Initially, police did not
attempt to stop the so-called militias from carrying out the lynchings.
The killings abated when soldiers dispatched by the Government
extracted a promise from the demagogue that he would order his
followers to cease lynching suspected wrongdoers and instead turn them
over to the authorities. However, credible reports indicate that
individual incidents of mob justice continue to occur nationwide and
that police frequently ignore vigilante attacks.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, there
were credible reports that police sometimes beat criminal suspects. The
Government continued to make payments to victims of torture under the
military regime that ruled from 1972 to 1989.
Mob justice resulted in serious injuries to a number of persons
(also see Section 1.a.).
Prison conditions continued to be extremely harsh. Extensive
overcrowding and lack of proper sanitation and medical facilities posed
a risk to prisoners' health. The prison diet is seriously inadequate;
malnutrition and disease are common. Prisoners are allowed to meet with
visitors such as family members, lawyers, and others.
Some progress was made in 1998 with the opening of three modern
facilities in the departments (provinces) of Borgou, Mono, andAtacora
through foreign funding. The prisons provide, for the first time,
separate units for men, women, and minors. The Government is expected
to continue its plan for prison renovation, rehabilitation, and
construction with assistance from foreign donors--both governments and
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's).
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors. A
special rapporteur from the Commission Africaine des Droits de l'Homme
et des Peuples (African Human Rights Commission) visited prisons in
August.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, at times the
authorities arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The Constitution
prohibits detention for more than 48 hours without a hearing by a
magistrate whose order is required for continued detention. However,
there were credible reports that authorities exceeded this 48-hour
limit in many cases, sometimes by as long as 1 week, using the accepted
practice of holding a person without specified time limit ``at the
disposition of'' the public prosecutor's office before presenting the
case to a magistrate. Approximately 75 percent of persons in prison are
pretrial detainees.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile of citizens, and it is not
practiced. Many citizens who went into exile prior to the establishment
of democratic rule have returned.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respects this
provision in practice; however, the executive has important powers in
regard to the judiciary, and the judiciary remains inefficient in some
respects and is susceptible to corruption at some levels.
The President appoints career magistrates as judges in civil
courts, and the Constitution gives the Ministry of Justice
administrative authority over judges, including the power to transfer
them. Inadequate facilities, poorly trained staff, and overcrowded
dockets result in slow administration of justice. The low salaries of
magistrates and clerks have a demoralizing effect on their commitment
to efficient and timely justice and make them susceptible to
corruption.
A civilian court system operates on the national and provincial
levels. There is only one court of appeals. The Supreme Court is the
court of last resort in all administrative and judicial matters. The
Constitutional Court is charged with passing on the constitutionality
of laws and on disputes between the President and the National Assembly
and with resolving disputes regarding presidential and National
Assembly elections. Its rulings against both the executive and
legislative branches, which were respected by both branches,
demonstrated its independence from both these branches of government.
The Constitution also provides for a High Court of Justice to convene
in the event of crimes committed by the President or government
ministers against the State. Implementing legislation to create the
High Court of Justice was passed in 1996. Although the legislation was
passed, the Constitutional Court later found some of its provisions to
be unconstitutional. In accordance with the court's ruling, the
National Assembly revised the law and sent the new legislation to the
President. In 1998 he, in turn, submitted it to the court for
reconsideration; textual errors were corrected in January, but the law
has not yet been promulgated. Inefficiency and corruption particularly
affect the judiciary at the trial court and investigating magistrate
level. Military disciplinary councils deal with minor offenses by
members of the military services, but have no jurisdiction over
civilians.
The legal system is based on French civil law and local customary
law. The Constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial. A
defendant enjoys the presumption of innocence and has the right to be
present at trial and to representation by an attorney, at public
expense if necessary. In practice the court provides indigent
defendants with court-appointed counsel upon request. A defendant also
has the right to confront witnesses and to have access to government-
held evidence. Trials are open to the public, but in exceptional
circumstances the president of the court may decide to restrict access
to preserve public order or to protect the parties.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and
government authorities generally respect these prohibitions in
practice. Police are required to obtain a judicial warrant before
enteringa private home, and they usually observed this requirement in
practice.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. The government entity with oversight responsibility
for media operations is the High Authority for Audio-visual Media and
Communications (HAAC), which requires broadcasters to submit weekly
lists of planned programs and requires publishers to deposit copies of
all publications with it. However, this requirement is not observed by
the media in practice.
There is a large and active privately owned press consisting of
more than a dozen daily newspapers. These publications criticize the
Government freely and often, but their effect on public opinion is
limited because of their urban concentration. The majority of citizens
are illiterate and live in rural areas; they largely receive their news
via radio. A nongovernmental media ethics commission (ODEM) was
established in May and has censured a number of journalists for
unethical conduct as well as commended some journalists for adherence
to the standards of their profession.
In August a trial court sentenced five journalists to various jail
terms not exceeding 1 year and fines for criminal libel in several
cases that did not involve criticism of the Government. For example
Vincent Foly, a reporter for Le Point au Quotidien, was arrested in
January following a tough editorial and sentenced to 1 year in prison
in August. At year's end, none of these sentences had been executed and
appeals are pending.
New privately owned radio and television stations began
broadcasting in December 1997. Throughout the year, they broadcast
programs that criticized the Government without interference. It is
unclear what effect the private electronic media have on public
opinion; however, an increase in the number of ``call-in'' and panel
shows has contributed to greater public involvement in political
affairs and a heightened awareness of important national problems.
However, the Government continued to own and operate the media most
influential in reaching the public. Until December 1997, it owned the
only radio stations that transmitted locally. The Benin Office of Radio
and Television (ORTB) transmits on the FM and AM bands and by short
wave, in French and local languages. Radio France International (RFI)
also transmits on a local FM band under an agreement with the
Government. In June the British Broadcasting Corporation began French
and English language broadcasting in Cotonou. Five rural radio stations
governed by local committees broadcast several hours a day exclusively
in local languages. These stations receive support from the ORTB. Radio
is probably the most important information medium.
A similar arrangement is in place for television transmissions: the
ORTB broadcasts 5 hours per day on a signal that is easily received in
urban areas. Approximately 80 percent of the ORTB's television
programming is in French. TV5, a commercial venture with investments by
television broadcasting organizations in France, Canada, Belgium, and
Switzerland, broadcasts locally 24 hours per day entirely in French
under an agreement with the Government. A new privately owned
television station, LC-2, began broadcasting in Cotonou in 1997. LC-2
is owned entirely by a local businessman and features light
entertainment and news, although news coverage requires payment in many
circumstances. Although neither television station broadcasts partisan
programs in support of, or unduly critical of, the Government, the vast
majority of news programming centers on government officials'
activities, government-sponsored conferences, and international stories
provided by French television or other foreign sources.
The Government does not censor works by foreign journalists,
authors, or artists.
HAAC regulations govern satellite reception equipment and movie and
video clubs. There is little enforcement of these regulations.
In general academic freedom is respected. University professors are
permitted to lecture freely, conduct research, and publish their work.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
this right in practice. The Government requires permits for use of
public places for demonstrations and routinely grants such permits.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government
requires associations to register and routinely grants registrations.
The Government did not take any actions against nonregistered
organizations for failure or refusal to register.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Persons
who wish to form a religious group must register with the Ministry of
the Interior. Registration requirements are identical for all religious
groups. There were no reports that any group has been refused
permission to register or has been subjected to untoward delays or
obstacles in the registration process. Religious groups are free from
taxation.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice.
However, the presence of police, gendarmes, and illegal roadblocks
impedes domestic movement. Although ostensibly meant to enforce
automotive safety and customs regulations, many of these checkpoints
serve as a means for officials to exact bribes from travelers. The
Government maintained previously implemented measures to combat such
petty corruption at roadblocks.
The Government's policy toward transhumance allows migratory Fulani
herdsmen from other countries to enter freely; it does not enforce
designated entry points. Disputes have arisen between the herdsmen and
local landowners over pasturage.
The Government does not restrict international travel for political
reasons, and those who travel abroad may return without hindrance.
Historically, the Government has cooperated closely with the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees, including those in need of first
asylum. The Government provided first asylum to up to 200,000 citizens
of Togo during the 1993 political violence in that country. While most
have returned to Togo, the UNHCR estimates that some 1,300 remain.
Despite severe economic pressures that limit its ability to provide
education for its children, the Government has allowed these Togolese
to enroll their children in local schools and to participate in some
economic activities. During the year, the Government welcomed about 690
at-risk refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo destined for
eventual resettlement in another country.
In contrast the UNHCR estimates that 250 Ogoni refugees from
Nigeria, disadvantaged because they do not speak French, cannot work,
nor can their children attend schools. UNHCR officials have warned them
to remain within the confines of the refugee camp.
In addition there are lesser numbers of other refugees from
Nigeria, Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic,
Chad, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Ethiopia, Niger, Liberia, Rwanda, Sudan, and Sierra Leone.
There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons having a
valid claim to refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully. Citizens exercised this right in legislative
elections in 1991, 1995, and in presidential elections in 1991 and
1996, all of which were considered free and fair. The Constitution
provides for a 5-year term of office for the President (who is limited
to two terms) and 4-year terms for National Assembly members (who may
serve an unlimited number of terms).
Women participate actively in the political parties but are
underrepresented in government positions. Following a Cabinet reshuffle
in June, there are 2 women in the 19-member Cabinet, 1 less than in the
previous 18-member Cabinet. There are 5 female deputies in the 83-
member, unicameral National Assembly, including the leader of the
largest opposition party. The previous legislature consisted of 82
deputies with 6 female members. The President of the Constitutional
Court and the Solicitor General are women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups, both domestic and international,
operate without government restriction, investigating and publishing
their findings on human rights cases. Government officials are
generally cooperative and responsive to their views.
The Beninese branch of Amnesty International and other NGO's
reported during the year without government interference of the alleged
discovery of hundreds of bodies of victims of Togolese security forces
washed up on Beninese beaches in 1998.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, and
religion, but societal discrimination against women continued.
Women.--While no statistics are available, violence against women,
including wife beating, occurred. The press sometimes reports incidents
of abuse of women, but judges and police are reluctant to intervene in
domestic disputes, considering such disputes a family matter.
Although the Constitution provides for equality for women in the
political, economic, and social spheres, women experience extensive
societal discrimination, especially in rural areas where they occupy a
subordinate role and are responsible for much of the hard labor on
subsistence farms. In urban areas, women dominate the trading sector in
the open-air markets. By law women have equal inheritance and property
rights, but local custom in some areas prevents them from inheriting
real property. Women do not enjoy the same educational opportunities as
men, and female literacy is about 16 percent (compared with 32 percent
for males). However, elementary school pass rates in recent years
highlighted significant progress by girls in literacy and scholastic
achievement.
There are active women's rights groups that have been effective in
drafting a family code that would improve the status of women and
children under the law. The draft code has yet to be adopted by the
National Assembly, although it has been on the legislature's agenda for
more than a year and has been considered by parliamentary committees.
Many observers believe that consideration of the draft was postponed
because of provisions that would threaten male prerogatives, which is a
highly volatile political issue. Action on the draft code is not
anticipated until a new legislature convenes.
Children.--The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is responsible
for the protection of children's rights, primarily in the areas of
education and health. In particular the Government is trying to boost
primary school enrollment, which is only about 66 percent. In some
parts of the country, girls receive no formal education.
Some traditional practices inflict hardship and violence on
children, including most prominently the custom of ``vidomegon,''
whereby poor, often rural, families place a child, primarily a
daughter, in the home of a more wealthy family. In July the Ministry of
Justice launched a nationwide publicity campaign to alert parents
regarding the risks of placing their children in vidomegon and to
inform adults with vidomegon children of their responsibilities and of
the children's rights.
There were no reports of any action in the case of the official
detained for beating a 12-year-old maid to death in 1996.
Other traditional practices include the killing of deformed babies,
breech babies, and one of two newborn twins (all of whom are thought to
be sorcerers in some rural areas). There is also a tradition in which a
groom abducts and rapes his prospective child (under 14 years of age)
bride. Criminal courts mete out stiff sentences to criminals convicted
of crimes against children, but many such crimes never reach the
courts.
Trafficking in Beninese children for purposes of forced labor or
prostitution in other countries remains a problem (see Sections 6.c.
and 6.f.).
The Government, in concert with NGO's, made serious efforts to
combat child abuse and trafficking in children, including media
campaigns, programs to assist street children, and greater border
surveillance. Despite such efforts, the abuse of children is a serious
human rights problem.
The Government has been less successful in combating female genital
mutilation (FGM), which is not illegal. FGM is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health. FGM, or excision, is practiced on females ranging
from infancy through 30 years of age. Studies vary widely and suggest
that as few as 5 percent or as many as 50 percent of women are affected
by this practice, mostly in the northern provinces. The actual
incidence probably falls between these estimates. A prominent NGO, the
Benin chapter of the Inter-African Committee, has made progress in
raising awareness of the dangers of the practice; the Government has
cooperated with its efforts. According to recent research, there is a
strong profit motive in the continued practice of FGM by those who
perform the procedure, usually older women. The Government, in
cooperation with NGO's, held workshops during the year aimed at
eradicating the practice. One NGO paid those who perform the procedure
to abandon their profession.
People with Disabilities.--Although the Constitution provides that
the State look after people with disabilities, the Government does not
mandate accessibility for them. It operated a number of social centers
for disabled persons to assist their social integration. Nonetheless,
many are unable to find employment and must resort to begging to
support themselves.
In 1998 a new labor code was promulgated that includes provisions
to protect the rights of disabled workers.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There is a long history of
regional rivalries. Although southerners are preeminent in the
Government's senior ranks, many prominent military officers come from
the north. The south has enjoyed more advanced economic development, a
larger population, and has traditionally held favored status. In the
1996 elections, a northerner was elected President.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides workers
with the freedom to organize, join unions, meet, and strike, and the
Government usually respects these rights in practice. A new Labor Code
went into effect on January 8. The code was approved after long
discussions between the Government, labor unions, and the National
Assembly. The labor force of about 2 million is primarily engaged in
subsistence agriculture and other primary sector activities, with less
than 2 percent of the population engaged in the modern (wage) sector.
Although approximately 75 percent of the wage earners belong to
labor unions, a much smaller percentage of workers in the private
sector are union members. There are several union confederations, and
unions are generally independent of government and political parties.
The Economic and Social Council, a constitutionally mandated body
established in 1994, includes four union representatives.
Although there were no serious strikes in the private sector during
the year, public school teachers, principally in primary schools, held
a series of strikes because of low wages, unpaid salary arrears, and
poor working conditions. Labor unions continue to oppose the
Government's merit-based promotion scheme. Unions also oppose a 1969
decree (which is still in effect) permitting the Government to dock the
wages of striking public sector employees.
There were no known instances of efforts by the Government to
retaliate against union activity. Laws prohibit employer retaliation
against strikers, and the Government enforces them effectively.
Unions may form freely or join federations or confederations and
affiliate with international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
provides for collective bargaining, and workers freely exercised these
rights. Wages in the private sector are set in negotiations between
unions and employers.
The new Labor Code permits unions to become affiliated with
international organizations. It also includes a section on the rights
of disabled workers. The Government sets wages in the public sector by
law and regulation.
The Labor Code prohibits employers from taking union membership or
activity into account regarding hiring, work distribution, professional
or vocational training, or dismissal. The Government levies substantial
penalties against employers who refuse to rehire workers dismissed for
lawful union activities.There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and specifically prohibits forced
and bonded labor by children; however, forced child labor and
trafficking in children are problems (see Section 6.f.). Some
financially desperate parents indenture their children to ``agents''
recruiting farm hands or domestic workers, often on the understanding
that money paid to the children would be sent to the parents. According
to press reports, in some cases unscrupulous individuals take the
children to neighboring countries (see Section 6.f.). The Government
has taken steps to educate parents and to prevent such kidnapings of
children. Also, many rural children are sent to cities to live with
relatives or family friends, often on the understanding that in return
for performing domestic chores, they would receive an education. Host
families do not always honor their part of the bargain, and abuse of
child domestic servants occurs. The Government has taken some steps to
curb abuses.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits the employment or apprenticeship
of children under 14 years of age in any enterprise; however, child
labor remains a problem. The Ministry of Labor enforces the Labor Code
in only a limited manner (and then only in the modern sector), due to
the lack of inspectors. To help support their families, children of
both sexes--including those as young as 7 years old--continue to work
on rural family farms, in small businesses, on construction sites in
urban areas, in public markets, and as domestic servants. Children also
commonly work as street vendors.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children but is
unable to enforce these prohibitions except in the modern sector (see
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government administratively
sets minimum wage scales for a number of occupations. In April 1997,
the Government increased the minimum wage by 8 percent from $32.74 (CFA
francs 20,300) per month to $35.36 (CFA francs 21,924). The decision
was made in consultation with trade unions. However, this increase is
not sufficient to cover the costs for food and housing even of a single
worker. Many workers must supplement their wages by subsistence farming
or informal sector trade. Most workers in the wage sector, however,
earn more than the minimum wage, although many domestics and other
laborers in the informal sector actually earn less.
The Labor Code establishes a workweek of from 40 to 46 hours,
depending on the type of work, and provides for at least one 24-hour
rest period per week. Domestic and agricultural workers frequently work
70 hours or more per week. The authorities generally enforce legal
limits on workweeks in the modern sector. The code establishes health
and safety standards, but the Ministry of Labor does not enforce them
effectively. The code does not provide workers with the right to remove
themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to continued
employment. The Ministry of Labor has the authority to require
employers to remedy dangerous work conditions but does not do so
effectively.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Article 15 of the Constitution provides
for fundamental civil rights, and long-standing provisions of the
criminal code prohibit kidnaping. Laws dating to 1905 but still in
force prohibit trafficking in persons in general and in underage
females in particular. Trafficking in children, which is always a
problem, continued to be the subject of considerable media coverage.
Most victims are abducted or leave home with traffickers who promise
educational opportunities or other incentives. They are taken to places
in foreign countries (according to the press, principally located in
Nigeria, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gabon) and sold into servitude in
agriculture, as domestics, or as prostitutes (see Section 6.c.).
The media reported during the year that gendarmes and police
intercepted a number of traffickers trying to smuggle children into and
out of the country and arrested those responsible. The Justice Minister
stated in 1998 that in 3 years a total of 1,363 children had been
intercepted and returned to their parents. The Government worked with
NGO's to combat trafficking in children, including media campaigns and
greater border surveillance (see Section 5).
The Minor Protection Brigade, under the jurisdiction of the
Interior Ministry, combats crimes against children. The brigade
intercepted a number of children during the year who smugglers were
attempting to transport to other African countries for domestic or
agricultural labor. According to press reports, in June authorities
prevented the smuggling of 92 children across the border with Togo.
Also in June, the authorities arrested 3 Beninese near Togo's border
with Benin for attempting to smuggle 11 children between the ages of 6
and 17. According to press reports, the children were destined for
plantation labor in Cote d'Ivoire.
In January 1998, gendarmes in Togo arrested three traffickers who
were transporting 22 children from Tchaoudjo prefecture in Togo into
Benin, from which they were to be taken to Nigeria. In March 1998,
police arrested four traffickers of Beninese minors in Tohoun, Togo.
These traffickers were taking 22 Beninese children to Cote d'Ivoire via
Togo.
______
BOTSWANA
Botswana is a longstanding, multiparty democracy. Constitutional
power is shared between the President and a popularly elected National
Assembly. The House of Chiefs, representing all of the country's major
tribes and some smaller ones, has no legislative power but may offer
its views to both the President and National Assembly on legislation.
Festus Mogae, who, as Vice President, became President upon former
president Sir Katumile Masire's resignation in 1998, continued to lead
the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which has held a majority of seats
in the National Assembly continuously since independence. In October
elections generally regarded as largely free and fair, despite initial
restrictions on opposition access to radio and press reports of ruling
party campaign finance improprieties, the BDP increased its majority in
the National Assembly and elected President Mogae to a second term. The
Government respects the constitutional provisions for an independent
judiciary.
The civilian Government exercises effective control over the
security forces. The military, the Botswana Defense Force (BDF), is
responsible for external security, but in practice sometimes has
performed internal security functions. The Botswana National Police
(BNP) are responsible for internal security. Members of the security
forces occasionally committed human rights abuses.
The economy is market oriented with strong encouragement for
private enterprise, and has achieved rapid sustained real per capita
economic growth since independence. Per capita gross domestic product
(GDP) rose during the year to just over $2,800 (13,049 Botswana pula),
due largely to increased world demand for diamonds. Diamond exportation
provided over two-thirds of the country's export income and much of the
revenue of the Government, which owned half of a company engaged in the
production of diamonds from existing mines. Per capita GDP increased 12
percent from 1998, when diamond prices had been depressed by the Asian
financial crisis. Nearly half the population is employed in the
informal sector, largely subsistence farming and animal husbandry.
Rural poverty remains a serious problem, as does a widely skewed income
distribution.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, problems continued in some areas. There were
credible reports that the police sometimes beat or otherwise mistreated
criminal suspects in order to obtain evidence or coerce confessions.
The authorities took action in some cases against officials responsible
for such abuses. Prison conditions were poor and there were credible
reports of torture and deaths under suspicious circumstances. In many
instances, the judicial system did not provide timely fair trials due
to a serious backlog of cases. The Government began to relax its
monopoly of domestic radio broadcasting but limited opposition access
to state-owned radio broadcasts. At times the Government held newly
arrived refugees from neighboring countries in local jails or special
areas in prisons; however, the Government ceased to detain in prison
persons to whom it refused asylum, and instead lodged them in a refugee
camp. Women continued to face legal and societal discrimination, and
violence against women remained a serious problem. Some citizens,
including groups not numbered among the eight ``principal tribes'' of
the Tswana nation, the majority ethnic group, still did not enjoy full
access to social services and, in practice, remained marginalized in
the political process. Trade unions continued to face some legal
restrictions, and the Government did not always ensure that labor laws
were observed in practice.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
There were instances of suspicious deaths in prison (see Section
1.c.).
In September a high court judge acquitted five officers from the
BDF military intelligence unit charged with murder in the 1996
suffocation death of a burglary suspect in police custody.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution explicitly forbids torture, inhuman, and
degrading treatment or punishment, and the authorities generally
respect this prohibition in practice, although instances of abuse
occur. In some cases, the authorities have taken disciplinary or
judicial action against persons responsible for abuses. While coerced
confessions are inadmissible in court, evidence gathered through
coercion or abuse may be used in prosecution. There were credible
reports that police sometimes beat persons and used intimidation
techniques in order to obtain evidence or elicit confessions. In
general, however, beatings and other forms of extreme physical abuse
remained rare.
Customary courts continued to impose corporal punishment sentences
in the form of lashings on the buttocks. There were periodic press
reports of floggings, particularly of young offenders in villages,
imposed by customary courts for vandalism, theft, hooliganism, and
other infractions. The Government has refused to adopt a motion
submitted by the House of Chiefs to reinstate flogging across the back
rather than the buttocks.
Prison conditions were poor, and there were credible reports of
torture and deaths under suspicious circumstances. A December 15 report
by the Gaborone Prison Visiting Committee (GPVC) cited what it called
``appalling'' conditions and the suspicious deaths in prison of two
inmates. In the women's prison, Boitumelo Nthoiwa complained during a
July visit by the GPVC of assault by prison officials, including kicks
to her stomach. Prison officials cited pneumonia as the cause for
Nthoiwa's death in October. Prison officials said that Andrew Molefe
died in the first offender's prison after taking an illegal substance
that had been smuggled into the prison by another inmate. With the
country's high incidence of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, prison
overcrowding constitutes a serious health threat. The 21 prisons across
the country have a capacity of 3,198 but held 6,777 by year's end,
according to press reports. The Commissioner of Prisons has ordered
full investigations into the management and conditions of prisons
covered in the GPVC report.
The Government generally permits access to prisons for monitoring
purposes by international and local nongovernmental organizations
(NGO's) after a detailed inquiry procedure; however, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) did not visit prisons during the
year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Under the Constitution,
``every person in Botswana'' is entitled to due process, the
presumption of innocence, and freedom from arbitrary arrest; and the
authorities respected these provisions in practice. Suspects must be
informed of their legal rights upon arrest, including the right to
remain silent, to be allowed to contact a person of their choice, and
generally to be charged before a magistrate within 48 hours. A
magistrate may order a suspect held for 14 days through a writ of
detention, which may be renewed every 14 days. Most citizens charged
with noncapital offenses are released on their own recognizance; some
are released with minimal bail. Detention without bail is highly
unusual, except in murder cases, where it is mandated. In August, a
High Court judge ruled unconstitutional a 1998 law that denied bail for
persons accused of rape.
Detainees have the right to hire attorneys of their choice, but in
practice most are unable to afford legal counsel. However, poor police
training and poor communications in rural villages make it difficult
for detainees to obtain legal assistance, and authorities do not always
follow judicial safeguards. The Government does not provide counsel for
the indigent, except in capital cases. One NGO, the Botswana Center for
Human Rights, provides free legal services, but its capacity is
limited. Another NGO, the University of Botswana Legal Assistance
Center, provides free legal services in civil, but not criminal,
matters. Constitutional protections are not applied to illegal
immigrants, although the constitutionality of denying them due process
has not been tested in court.
Pretrial detention has been prolonged in a large number of cases.
In Gaborone Central Prison, the average wait in prison before trial was
one year.
The Government sometimes held newly arrived refugees and asylum
seekers in local jails until they could be interviewed by the Botswana
Council for Refugees (BCR) or the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). However, the Government transferred persons granted refugee
status to the Dukwe RefugeeCamp. Since the Government had no other
internment facility for refugees, some refugees, including some who had
left Dukwe without permission, were removed to a holding area, separate
from criminal prisoners, within the prison at Mahalapye. At year's end,
about 60 refugees from Namibia's Caprivi Strip who left the Dukwe Camp
or were involved in disturbances there were being held in Mahalapye
Prison. The BCR stated that this is a temporary measure, but the
Government lacks a minimum security internment facility. Although the
Government has planned for several years to build a long-term ``illegal
immigrant internment center,'' its construction has been deferred and
it now appears unlikely to open soon (see Section 2.d.).
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice.
The judiciary consists of both a civil court (including
magistrates' courts, a High Court, and a Court of Appeal) and a
customary (traditional) court system.
The law provides for the right to a fair trial. However, the civil
courts remained unable to provide for timely, fair trials in many cases
due to severe staffing shortages and a backlog of pending cases.
Most trials in the regular courts are public, although trials under
the National Security Act (NSA) may be held in secret. Those charged
with noncapital crimes are tried without legal representation if they
cannot afford an attorney. As a result, many defendants may not be
informed of their rights in pretrial or trial proceedings. In October,
a High Court judge declared a mistrial in the case of two Basarwa
(Bushmen) men who had been convicted in 1995 of a murder that occurred
the same year, and were awaiting execution. A human rights group
claimed that the two did not understand the language used at the trial
and that translations were poor. It also questioned whether the accused
understood their rights or the charges against them, and noted that
attempts by the men to change their court-appointed lawyers had been
disregarded. Ruling that the two had been deprived of their
constitutional rights, the judge ordered a new trial. A date had not
yet been set for the new trial by year's end (see Section 5).
Most citizens encounter the legal system through the customary
courts, under the authority of a traditional leader. These courts
handle minor offenses involving land, marital, and property disputes.
In customary courts, the defendant does not have legal counsel and
there are no precise rules of evidence. Tribal judges, appointed by the
tribal leader or elected by the community, determine sentences, which
may be appealed through the civil court system. The quality of
decisions reached in the traditional courts varies considerably. In
communities where chiefs and their decisions are respected, plaintiffs
tend to take their cases to the customary court; otherwise, people seek
justice in the civil courts.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects this right in practice; however, the State has monopolized
domestic radio broadcasting. During the year, the Government began to
relax this monopoly by granting licenses to private radio stations. The
Government limited the access of opposition political leaders to state-
owned radio, which continued to dominate domestic broadcasting;
however, in the latter part of the election campaign all state-owned
media provided balanced news coverage of the main political parties and
candidates.
The independent press is small but growing, and has a long
tradition of vigorous, candid, and unimpeded discourse. It continued
frequently to be critical of the Government and of the President. At
year's end, four privately-owned weeklynewspapers were published in
Gaborone and distributed to the country's main cities and towns. One
privately owned weekly newspaper was published in Francistown, the
country's second-largest city. Nine privately owned magazines were
published monthly. These publications reported and editorialized
without fear of closure or censorship. For example, the independent
press reported on several corruption scandals involving irregular
payments to senior government officials from companies holding
government contracts and on the case of an assistant minister of
finance serving on the board of directors of one of these companies.
However, government officials sometimes complain of bias in the
private press. For example, in June the Finance Minister, who was also
chairman of the ruling party, publicly accused the private press of
having ``a hidden political agenda'' after private newspapers reported
a large anonymous contribution to the ruling party through a Swiss bank
and traced it to a subsidiary of a globally dominant international
diamond company.
Government officials and other public figures have recourse to the
courts if they believe that they have been libeled. However, libel is a
civil law matter in the country; there are no criminal libel laws.
Radio remained the most important medium of public communication;
the circulation of privately owned print media continued to be limited
mostly to the main cities and towns. The Government adopted a new
broadcast law in 1998 after consultation with media representatives.
The new law provides for issuance of broadcast licenses to private
companies for the first time and provides copyright protection of
broadcast material. It also created a National Broadcast Board, which
would grant broadcast licenses. However, the National Broadcast Board
is not yet functioning. The Botswana Telecommunications Authority (BTA)
reviewed the initial applications for, and in May granted, the first of
two radio licenses to private companies. The second was granted in
September.
Yarona FM and GABZ FM, the two new private radio stations, went on
the air in June and November, respectively. Both broadcast only to the
Gaborone metropolitan area; state-owned radio continued to be the only
domestic radio service broadcasting outside the capital area. Both
private radio stations have a news component to their programming with
no discernible policy of supporting a particular political party.
The only television station in the country is the privately owned
Gaborone Broadcasting Company (GBC), which has operated since 1987,
broadcasting mostly foreign-made programming. GBC broadcasts reach
viewers only in the capital area.
Independent radio and television from neighboring South Africa are
received easily.
Internet access is spreading quickly. The Government does not
restrict e-mail or Internet usage. By year's end, five Internet service
providers were competing for the domestic market, four of them private
companies and one the commercial arm of the parastatal Botswana
Telecommunications Corporation.
The Government's Botswana Press Agency (BOPA) provides most of the
information found in the media that are owned and operated by the
Government, the free ``Daily News'' newspaper and Radio Botswana, which
broadcasts to almost all of the country. The news coverage of both
these state-owned media focuses on the activities of government
officials and supports government policies and actions
During the election campaign, opposition candidates initially had
limited access to state-owned media, including state-owned radio, which
was the only domestic radio service and the sole domestic source of
news for most of the rural population. During the first part of the
campaign season, the state-owned media gave opposition candidates less
news coverage than ruling party candidates. When opposition politicians
complained about this, the Government initially countered that the
activities of ministers and other government figures were inherently
more newsworthy and therefore deserving of more coverage. However, the
Government subsequently changed its policy, and during the latter part
of the election campaign season the state-owned media gave balanced
news coverage to the main opposition parties and included stories about
the smaller political parties as well. Opposition leaders expressed the
view that government media practices seriously disadvantaged opposition
parties relative to the ruling party during the election campaign.
On occasion the Government has taken steps, under loosely defined
provisions of the National Security Act, to limit publication of
information that in its view impinged on national security; however,
there were no such incidents during the year.
Academic freedom is not restricted.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
The Constitution provides for the suspension of religious freedom in
the interests of national defense, public safety, public order, public
morality, or public health. However, any suspension of religious
freedom by the Government must be deemed ``reasonably justifiable in a
democratic society.''
All religious organizations must register with the Government. To
register a group submits its constitution to the Ministry of Home
Affairs. After a generally simple bureaucratic process, the
organization is registered. There are no legal benefits for registered
organizations. Unregistered groups are potentially liable to penalties
including fines up to $220 (1,000 Pula), up to 7 years in jail, or
both. Except for the case of the Unification Church, there is no
indication that any religious organization has ever been denied
registration.
The Unification Church was denied registration (but not suspended)
in 1984 by the Ministry of Home Affairs on the public order grounds
stipulated in the Constitution. The Government also perceived the
Unification Church as anti-Semitic and denied registration because of
another constitutional provision, which protects the rights and
freedoms of individuals to practice their religion without
intervention. In the intervening 15 years, although it has petitioned
unsuccessfully the offices of the President and Vice President, the
Unification Church has made no move to challenge the Ministry's
decision in the courts.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice. There are no
formal barriers to domestic and international travel or emigration.
Some human rights organizations continued to assert, going back as
far as 1995, that the Government has pressured several Basarwa
(Bushmen) communities within the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR)
into relocating to partially built settlements outside of the Reserve.
Government officials maintained that the ``voluntary'' resettlement was
necessary in order to provide the Basarwa with better public services
and to avoid conflicts between wildlife and humans within the CKGR.
When the Basarwa arrived at the new settlements, services and
facilities were substandard or nonexistent. Although conditions later
improved, they remain very basic. The Government permits relocated
Basarwa to return to the CKGR, but does not provide services within the
reserve.
The law provides for the granting of asylum and refugee status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the
UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The
Government has maintained a policy of considering resettlement requests
only from refugees from bordering countries. However, the Government
has permitted failed asylum seekers to remain in the country, although
they must stay at the Dukwe Refugee Camp. Although the Government
sometimes held newly arrived refugees and asylum seekers in local jails
until they could be interviewed by BCR or UNHCR officials, it
transferred persons granted refugee status to the Dukwe Refugee Camp,
pending resettlement or voluntary repatriation. Some problematic
refugees were removed to a separate holding area at Mahalapye Prison
(see Section 1.d.).
There were no confirmed reports of the forced return of persons to
a country where they feared persecution.
More than 2,500 refugees from the Caprivi Strip in neighboring
Namibia have fled to the country since late 1998. Many were armed and
linked to the armed, ethnically based opposition groups based in the
Caprivi Strip of Namibia. Male refugeeslinked to such groups requested
asylum based on their claim that they were being forced into the
Namibian army to fight in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The
Government provided first asylum to all these persons. In February the
Government granted asylum to Meshake Muyongo, the former leader of the
armed United Democratic Party (UDF) Namibian opposition group, and 14
others who entered the country in 1998. In consultation with the UNHCR,
the Government began negotiations with the Government of Namibia to
facilitate the return of Nambian refugees. To date, 1,375 persons have
returned voluntarily to Namibia. The UNHCR resettled 3 of Muyongo's
group of 15 DTA leaders and their families, who feared for their safety
in Namibia, in other countries. Of the other 12 refugees from this
group, 8 remain in the country awaiting adjudication of their
resettlement applications, and the Government revoked the refugee
status of 4 who left of the country in violation of their status. The
four refugees were detained in Wambu, Zambia in mid-June and deported
along with two others to Namibia in early August. The Government has
stated that refugees who refuse offers of resettlement in other
countries would face the loss of their refugee status and imprisonment.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, generally free and fair elections held on the basis
of universal adult (18 years of age) suffrage. The President is elected
by the National Assembly and is limited to two 5-year terms in office.
Members of the BDP have held a majority of seats in the National
Assembly, and as a result also the presidency, continuously since
independence.
Elections for the National Assembly were held in October and
generally were regarded as largely free and fair by domestic and
international observers, despite preferential access for BDP candidates
during much of the campaign to state-owned media including state-owned
radio, the sole domestic source of news for most of the rural
population, and despite press reports of large anonymous campaign
contributions to the ruling party, purportedly by international diamond
interests (see Section 2.a). The BDP increased its majority in the
National Assembly from 31 to 37 of 44 seats, thereby ensuring the
election of its presidential candidate, incumbent President Mogae. In
1998 Mogae, then Vice President, had succeeded Sir Ketumile Masire as
President upon the latter's resignation. Of the 7 seats won by
opposition parties in October, the Botswana National Front (BNF) won 6
and the Botswana Congress Party (BCP) won 1 seat.
The National Assembly did not pass legislation, proposed in 1998,
that would have required National Assembly members who change parties
to stand for reelection in a by-election.
The ruling party and opposition parties selected their candidates
in the year's National Assembly and district councilor elections
through primary elections. In the case of the ruling party, a
representative number of party activists in each ward voted for the
candidates of their choice. Both ruling and opposition party primary
elections were followed by scattered claims of vote-rigging and court
challenges of the results, all of which were upheld.
The House of Chiefs, an advisory body with limited powers, is
restricted constitutionally to the eight ``principal tribes'' of the
majority Tswana ethnic group and four elected chiefs representing
smaller tribes, including the Bakalanga, Lozi, Humbukush, and
Bakgalagadi. Consequently, other groups, for example, the Basarwa,
Herero, Baloi, or Bayei are not represented there. Given the limited
authority of the House of Chiefs, the impact of excluding other groups
of citizens is largely symbolic, but some non-Tswana view it as
important in principle (see Section 5). Members of the National
Assembly are required to speak English.
The State is highly centralized. There are 406 district governments
with elected councilors, but they have no fiscal autonomy and must rely
on the central Government for revenue.
In practice women are underrepresented in the political process.
However, the 1999 elections doubled the number of women serving in the
National Assembly, from 4 to 8 of 44 members. The number of women
serving in the cabinet also increased from 3 to 4 of 17 members. Of the
13 High Court justices, 1 was a woman.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Domestic and international human rights groups operate without
government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on
human rights cases. Ditshwanelo, the Botswana Center for Human Rights,
actively promotes human rights and investigated alleged abuses. The
Metlhaetsile Women's Information Center, Emang Basadi, and Women
Against Rape are active on issues concerning women's rights,
particularly rape and domestic violence. Government officials are
generally cooperative and responsive to these groups. The Government
does not have a human rights office.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution forbids State discrimination on the basis of
ethnicity, race, nationality, creed, sex, or social status. These
provisions are implemented in practice by government authorities.
However, neither the Constitution nor any known law prohibits
discrimination by private persons or entities.
Women.--Violence against women remains a serious problem. Domestic
abuse is one area of concern. Under customary law and in common rural
practice, men have the right to ``chastise'' their wives. Police rarely
are called to intervene in cases of domestic violence. Reports of
sexual exploitation, abuse, and criminal sexual assault are increasing,
and public awareness of the problem generally is growing. The national
police force has begun training officers in handling domestic violence
problems to make them more responsive in such cases. Rape is another
grave national problem, and the Government acknowledged in April that,
given the high incidence of HIV/AIDS, sexual assault has become an even
more serious offense. In 1998 Parliament enacted legislation that
increased all penalties for rape, incest, and other forms of sexual
assault by imposing minimum sentencing requirements where none existed
previously. The minimum sentence for rape is now 10 years, with the
minimum increasing to 15 years with corporal punishment if the offender
is HIV positive and to 20 years with corporal punishment if the
offender knew of his or her HIV status. In August a High Court ruled
unconstitutional a provision in the new law that allowed the detention
of rape suspects without bail.
However, although the Government has become far tougher in dealing
with criminal sexual assault, societal attitudes toward other forms of
domestic violence remain lax. Half the murders of women were linked to
histories of domestic violence. Human rights activists estimate that 6
women in 10 are victims of domestic violence at some time in their
lives. In June a judge gave a reduced sentence of 5 years to a woman
who was convicted of murdering her husband but who claimed in her
defense to be a victim of battered spouse syndrome.
Sexual exploitation and harassment continue to be problems as well,
with men in positions of authority, including teachers, supervisors,
and older male relatives, pressuring women to provide sexual favors.
Greater public awareness and improved legal protection have led more
victims of domestic violence and sexual assault to report incidents to
the authorities.
Women legally enjoy the same civil rights as men; however, in
practice discrimination persists. A number of traditional laws enforced
by tribal structures and customary courts restrict women's property
rights and economic opportunities. A woman married under traditional
law or in ``common property'' is held to be a legal minor, requiring
her husband's consent to buy or sell property, apply for credit, and
enter into legally binding contracts. Under a law enacted in 1996,
women married under an intermediate system, referred to as ``in
community of property,'' are permitted to own immovable property in
their own names; however, their husbands still retain considerable
control over jointly-held assets of the marriage. The law was a step
toward equalizing a husband's and a wife's legal control over property
held in community of property. Moreover, the 1998 Deeds Registry Act
stipulates that neither spouse can dispose of joint property without
the written consent of the other party.
Women have, and increasingly are exercising, the right to marriage
``out of common property,'' in which case they retain their full legal
rights as adults. Polygyny is still legal under traditional law with
the consent of the first wife, but it rarely is practiced. In September
1998, consultants submittedto the Labor Ministry a report identifying
provisions of existing law that potentially discriminate against women.
Well-trained urban women enjoy growing entry level access to the
white-collar job market, but the number of opportunities decreases
sharply as they rise in seniority. Discrimination against women is most
acute in rural areas where women engaged primarily in subsistence
agriculture have weak property rights.
The Government and interested NGO's meet regularly to implement the
long-term plan of action described in the National Policy on Women
adopted in 1996. The plan identifies 6 critical areas of concern,
prioritized as follows: (1) women and poverty, (2) women and
powersharing and decisionmaking, (3) education and training of women,
(4) women and health, (5) the girl child, and (6) violence against
women. The Women's Affairs Department of the Ministry of Labor and Home
Affairs, in conjunction with the United Nations Development Program, is
implementing a ``market plan'' to ensure that the gender program and
overall policy on women are incorporated into policymaking, budgeting,
and planning decisions.
A number of women's organizations have emerged to promote the
status of women. The Government has entered into a dialog with many of
these groups. While some women's rights groups reportedly felt that the
Government has been slow to respond concretely to their concerns,
women's NGO's state that they are encouraged by the direction of change
and by the increasingly collaborative relationship with government
authorities. Major women's NGO's include the Emang Basadi Women's
Association, which promotes the social, economic and legal status of
women; the Metlhaetsile Women's Information Centre, which provides
legal assistance to poor women; and the Botswana Council of Women.
Children.--The Government provides 7 years of free primary
education for children, although attendance is not compulsory. Recent
government estimates of the proportion of children who never attend
school have ranged from 10 to 17 percent, and fewer than 20 percent of
children complete secondary school; school attendance and completion
rates are highest in urban areas, and lowest in remote rural areas,
especially those inhabited chiefly by Basarwa (San or Bushmen). The
national literacy rate is 69 percent: 70 percent for females and 67
percent for males. However, in some cases, girls are denied schooling
because of religious or customary beliefs. The Government continued to
allocate the largest portion of its operating expenditures to the
Ministry of Education, and the second-largest portion to the Ministry
of Local Government, Lands, and Housing, which administered primary
education. It also continued to allocate a large part of its investment
expenditures to construct primary and secondary schools, so that
children have ready access to education.
It was estimated during the year that HIV/AIDS infected about 29
percent of adults between the ages of 15 and 49, and that, largely for
this reason, there were 26,000 registered orphans in the country;
UNICEF estimated that there were another 40,000 unregistered orphans.
Increasing numbers of children, mostly believed to be orphans, were
observed begging or engaging in prostitution in urban areas.
The rights of children are addressed in the Constitution and the
1981 Children's Act. Under the act Botswana has a court system and
social service apparatus designed solely for juveniles. The Government
launched a 10-year program of action for children in 1997,
incorporating the seven major global goals identified at the 1990 U.N.
World Summit for Children. In 1996 the Ministry of Labor and Home
Affairs transferred responsibility for children to the Social Welfare
Department in the Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing. Laws
pertaining to children continued to be under review to align them with
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Adoption Act also
continued to be reviewed to ensure that adopted children are provided
for and not exploited as cheap labor.
There is no societal pattern of abuse against children, although
incest and other forms of child abuse have received increased attention
from the media and from local human rights groups.
The problem of sexual harassment of students by teachers is a
national concern. Reports of rape and sexual assault of young women,
particularly those doing their national service in remote regions of
the nation are common, and cases of incest and ``defilement'' of young
girls appear with greater frequency in the news.
People with Disabilities.--The Government does not discriminate on
the basis of physical or mental disability, although employment
opportunities for the disabled remain limited. The Government does not
require accessibility to public buildings and public conveyances for
people with disabilities, and the NGO community only recently has begun
to address the needs of the disabled. In 1997 Parliament adopted a
national policy that provides for integrating the needs of disabled
persons into all aspects of government policymaking. The Government
funded NGO's that provide rehabilitation services and supported small-
scale work projects by disabled workers.
Indigenous People.--The Basarwa (also known as San), who now
inhabit chiefly the Kalihari Desert, are the earliest known inhabitants
of the country, and were the only inhabitants until Bantu groups
arrived during the 16th century. They are physically, linguistically,
and culturally distinct from the rest of the population. They remain
economically and politically marginalized; they have lost access to
their traditional land in fertile regions of the country and are
vulnerable to exploitation by their non-Basarwa neighbors. Their
isolation, ignorance of civil rights, and lack of political
representation have stymied their progress. The estimated 52-55,000
Basarwa people represent about 3 percent of the country's total
population. Although the Baswara traditionally were hunter-gatherers,
most Basarwa now are employed as agricultural workers on farms or at
cattle posts belonging to other ethnic groups. The formation of the
20,000 square mile Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) by the colonial
government in 1961 on traditional Basarwa lands set the stage for
conflict between the Basarwa's pursuit of their traditional way of life
and wildlife conservation. The Government in the past followed a policy
of prohibiting human habitation in the CKGR with the goal of wildlife
preservation, but has made accommodation for the estimated 1-3,000
Basarwa who still pursue hunting and gathering there. The Government
has provided very limited social services within the CKGR, and has
encouraged those living there to leave the reserve for permanent
settlements; there were some reports that the Government sometimes
forced Baswara to leave the reserve. However, the Government has made
little real progress since international attention in 1996 focused on
the intractable problem of resettling Basarwa living in the CKGR. Both
the Basarwa and the Government are seeking out concerned NGO's to
assist with the resettlement process and to address the larger issue of
improving the Basarwa's standard of living without sacrificing what
remains of their traditional way of life.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Well over half of the country's
1.4 million inhabitants belong to the Tswana ethnic group, of which the
Constitution recognizes eight principal tribes, and which has a
tradition of peacefully coexisting with non-Tswana groups. Some non-
Tswana ethnic groups are more numerous than the Tswana in some rural
areas of the country: the Kalanga and Lozi in areas of the north; the
Bayei and Herero in the Okavango Delta region; and the Baswara in the
arid west. There are also communities of persons of Asian and European
descent.
Each of the eight principal Tswana tribes is represented in the
advisory House of Chiefs; large non-Tswana ethnic groups are not
represented in the House (see Section 3). However, apart from the lack
of schooling in their own languages and their lack of representation in
the House of Chiefs, Botswana's non-Tswana communities are not subject
to discrimination by the State. Societal discrimination also is
limited. Intermarriage between Tswana and non-Tswana ethnic groups is
common. Urban neighborhoods are not ethnically segregated. There
generally is little correlation between income and ethnicity among
persons of African descent, although many persons of Asian and European
descent are prominent in the commercial sector.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of association. In practice all workers, with the exception of
government employees, are free to join or organize unions of their own
choosing. Government workers including teachers may form associations
that function as quasi-unions but without the right to negotiate wages.
The industrial or wage economy is small, and unions are concentrated
largely in mineral extraction and to a lesser extent in the railway and
banking sectors. There isonly one major confederation, the Botswana
Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU), but there are no obstacles to the
formation of other labor federations.
Unions are independent of the Government and are not closely allied
with any political party or movement. Unions may employ full-time
administrative staff, but the law requires elected union officials to
work full time in the industry that the union represents. This rule
severely limits union leaders' professionalism and effectiveness, and
has been criticized by the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU).
The law also severely restricts the right to strike. Legal strikes
are theoretically possible after an exhaustive arbitration process, but
in practice none of the country's strikes has been legal. Sympathy
strikes are prohibited.
Unions may join international organizations, and the BFTU is
affiliated with the ICFTU. The Minister of Labor must approve any
affiliation with an outside labor movement, but unions may appeal to
the courts if an application for affiliation is refused.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution provides for collective bargaining for unions that have
enrolled 25 percent of a labor force. In reality only the mineworker
unions have the organizational strength to engage in collective
bargaining. Elected labor union officials are required by law to work
full time in whatever industry they represent; consequently, there are
no full-time elected labor leaders in the country. However, unions may
employ full-time staff.
Workers may not be fired for union-related activities. Dismissals
may be appealed to labor officers or civil courts, but labor offices
rarely do more than order 2 months' severance pay. In May the privately
owned First National Bank of Botswana fired a clerk whom it accused of
leaking to the private press information about a large and possibly
illegal contribution to the ruling party by a subsidiary of an
international diamond company.
Botswana has only one export processing zone, located in the town
of Selebi-Phikwe, and it is subject to the same labor laws as the rest
of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The constitutional
provision prohibiting forced or bonded labor applies to all citizens,
although its application to children is not specified. There were no
reports of forced or bonded labor.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment
of Children.--Although education is not compulsory, the Government
provides 7 years of free primary education to every child, and most
children take advantage of this opportunity. Only an immediate family
member may employ a child age 13 or younger, and no juvenile under age
15 may be employed in any industry. Only persons over age 16 may be
hired to perform night work, and no person under age 16 is allowed to
perform hazardous labor, including mining. District and municipal
councils have child welfare divisions, which are responsible for
enforcing child labor laws. The constitutional provision prohibiting
forced or bonded labor applies to all citizens, although its
application to children is not specified (see Section 6.c.). Because
research on the issue of child labor is limited, it is difficult to
state whether child labor laws are enforced effectively. However, there
is general agreement among the Labor Commissioner, officials of the
Ministry of Local Government, Lands, and Housing, and UNICEF that the
child labor problem is limited to young children in remote areas who
work as cattle tenders, maids, or babysitters.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum daily wage for most
full time labor in the private sector rose to $3.70 (17 pula), which
remained less than 50 percent of what the Government calculates is
necessary to meet the basic needs of a family of five. The Ministry of
Labor is responsible for enforcing the minimum wage, and each of the
country's districts has at least one labor inspector. During the year,
the Ministry of Labor received over 9,000 labor disputes and referred a
small but undisclosed number of them to the Industrial Court for its
review.
Formal sector jobs almost always pay well above minimum wage
levels. Informal sector employment, particularly in the agricultural
and domestic service sectors, where housing and food are included,
frequently pay below the minimum wage. There is no mandatory minimum
wage for domestic workers, and the Ministry of Labor no longer
recommends a minimum wage for them. Illegal immigrants from poorer
neighboring countries, primarily Zambians and Zimbabweans, are
exploited easily, as they would be subject to deportation if they filed
grievances against their employers.
The law permits a maximum 48-hour workweek, exclusive of overtime,
which is payable at time and a half for each additional hour. Most
modern private and public sector jobs are on the 40-hour workweek.
The law provides that workers who complain about hazardous
conditions may not be fired. However, the Government's institutional
ability to enforce its workplace safety legislation remains limited by
inadequate staffing and unclear jurisdictions between different
ministries. Nevertheless, employers generally provide for worker
safety, with the occasionally notable exception of the construction
industry.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons. There were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to,
or from the country.
______
BURKINA FASO
President Blaise Compaore continued to dominate the Government of
the Fourth Republic, assisted by members of his party, the Congress for
Democracy and Progress (CDP), despite increasing challenges from a
number of fronts within society. In spite of the existence of dozens of
political parties, there is little viable opposition to the President
and his Government. The Government includes a strong presidency, a
Prime Minister, a Council of Ministers presided over by the President,
a two-chamber National Assembly, and the judiciary. In November 1998,
President Compaore was reelected to a second 7-year term with 88
percent of the vote; 56 percent of the electorate voted. Both national
and international observers described the presidential election as
substantially free and fair and an improvement over the 1997
legislative elections, particularly in regard to logistical
organization of the balloting and the functioning of the polling
stations. However, there were a limited number of voting
irregularities. The national observers identified a number of systemic
weaknesses in the Electoral Code that precluded the serious assurance
of a perfectly regular and transparent vote, and a coalition
representing a number of opposition parties boycotted the election. The
CDP now controls 102 of 111 seats in Parliament. International
observers considered the 1997 legislative elections to be substantially
free and fair, although a collective of 14 local nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) cited generalized and systematic corruption and
voter list irregularities.
The security apparatus consists of the armed forces, the
gendarmerie, controlled by the Ministry of Defense, and the police,
controlled by the Ministry of Territorial Administration. Some members
of the security forces committed human rights abuses.
Over 80 percent of the population of almost 11 million persons
engages in subsistence agriculture. Frequent drought, and limited
communication and transportation infrastructures, in addition to a 77
percent illiteracy rate, are longstanding problems. The 50 percent
devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 made imports more expensive for
salaried workers and civil servants, but improved the competitiveness
of livestock and cotton exports. Since 1991 the Government has adopted
a series of structural adjustment programs designed to open the economy
to market forces and to reduce government deficits, while shifting
resources to the education and health sectors. In recent years, the
country has registered strong gains in lifeexpectancy, literacy, and
school attendance rates, although it remains a very poor country with
annual per capita income of about $220.
There continued to be serious problems in the Government's human
rights record. Although the Government continued attempts to improve
its respect for human rights, a general climate of impunity for members
of the security forces along with a lack of progress in identifying or
punishing those responsible for abuses committed continued to tarnish
its record. The continued dominance of President Compaore and his
ruling party limited citizens' right to change their government,
although the 1998 presidential election represented a further step
toward democratic government. The security forces were responsible for
two extrajudicial killings and continued to mistreat detainees. Prison
conditions remained harsh. Arbitrary arrest and detention are problems,
and authorities do not ensure detainees due process. Courts are subject
to executive influence, and authorities do not ensure fair trials. At
times authorities restricted media activity, and the media practices
self-censorship. The death of internationally respected journalist
Norbert Zongo, his brother, and two other men in a suspicious car fire
in December 1998 remained a focus of public concern during the year.
The Government's reaction to public demonstrations and general strikes
triggered by those deaths was, on balance, moderate and
nonconfrontational. The Government succeeded in reducing tensions
somewhat during the year by displaying an increased openness to dialog,
including with opposition leaders, and by making concessions on
occasion to civil society, including to the Collective of Mass
Democratic Organizations and Political Parties. (The Collective, which
was created in response to the killings is made up of 57 organizations,
including labor unions, opposition political parties, human rights
groups, and development, student, and women associations.) However, the
Government withdrew certain privileges from a leading human rights
advocate. Societal discrimination against women persisted. Violence
against women and children, particularly female genital mutilation
(FGM), remained a problem. The Government took steps to educate
citizens about the dangers of this practice. Child labor is a problem.
Killings of criminal suspects by vigilante mobs remained a problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings; however, there were two reports of
extrajudicial killings. On January 22, Auguste Pepin Ouedraogo, an
employee of the national electric company SONABEL, died from injuries
he had suffered a couple of weeks earlier in a beating by gendarmes in
Bobo-Dioulasso. The gendarmes detained Ouedraogo on January 11, 3 days
after he had tried to help resolve an argument involving a traffic
dispute between one of his friends and a gendarme commander. In
response to news of Ouedraogo's death, unions representing SONABEL
workers shut off both power and water throughout much of the country on
January 22. Defense Minister Albert de Millogo, called for public calm
and announced on the same day that the gendarmes involved had been
arrested. On June 22, SONABEL workers again cut power and water to
pressure authorities to move the gendarmes implicated in the killing
from a gendarme facility to the main civilian prison in Ouagadougou.
They were subsequently moved. As of September, Ouedraogo's murder was
still under investigation in the military justice system. On December
11, the criminal court handling Ouedraogo's case rendered its decision.
One of the gendarmes involved received a 5-year prison sentence one a
3-year sentence, and three 2-year sentences each.
In August gendarmes shot and killed mechanic Mamadou Kone when he
was in their custody in Banfora, a village in the province of Comoe.
Kone had been arrested as a result of an investigation involving stolen
car engines. As he was being booked, Kone struck at two gendarmes in an
attempt to escape and was then shot by a third gendarme. The officer
who shot Kone was handed over shortly thereafter to judicial
authorities in Bobo-Dioulasso. As of year's end, the case was being
investigated in the military justice system, and the officer who shot
Kone remained under detention.
The January 1998 extrajudicial killing of David Ouedraogo, the
chauffeur of President Compaore's brother Francois, remained
unresolved. Ouedraogo, along with two other domestic employees of
Francois Compaore, had been taken to the Presidential Guard barracks in
December 1997 after being accused of stealing money from the home of
the President's brother. Francois Compaore'srefusal to cooperate with
judicial authorities impeded the official investigation, and he was
never arrested. In March the civil court handling the case declared
itself incompetent to rule on the matter since Ouedraogo had died at
the hands of members of the Presidential Guard within their barracks.
As a result, the case was sent to a military tribunal. The civil court
decision was prompted by arguments put forth by Francois Compaore's
lawyer that the charges of murder and concealing a body filed against
the President's brother in January should be dropped because of
technical errors made in the filing of the case. The civil court agreed
that there had been errors.
In June authorities arrested 3 members of the Presidential Guard
who were implicated in Ouedraogo's murder in response to a
recommendation made by the Council of Wisemen, a 16-member Council made
up of former heads of state, religious and traditional leaders, and
otherwise respected persons. The three men arrested also had been named
as ``serious suspects'' in the Independent Investigatory Commission's
final report on the Zongo killing.
In June the two domestic employees of Francois Compaore who had
been accused, along with David Ouedraogo, of stealing money from the
home of the President's brother were released provisionally after
spending over a year in preventive detention. Their release was
prompted by a recommendation made by the Wisemen's Council.
In January in response to pressure from the Collective of Mass
Democratic Organizations and Political Parties, the Government agreed
to modify the composition of the Independent Investigatory Commission
looking into the deaths of journalist Norbert Zongo, his brother, and
two other men in a suspicious car fire in December 1998. In May the
Commission released its final report. The report, which was based in
part upon evidence obtained by a pathologist, a forensic doctor, and
French ballistic and fire experts, determined that the four men had
died for ``purely political motives.'' The report did not identify the
authors of the crime because of a lack of formal proof but named six
members of the Presidential Guard who had offered contradictory
testimony about their whereabouts on the day of the murders. The
Commission stated that this did not render them guilty but did make
them ``serious suspects.'' The six included two soldiers, one corporal,
two sergeants, and one warrant officer. The Commission noted that the
official documents from the Presidential Guard and the army that might
have clarified the issue of their whereabouts could not be found and
probably had been destroyed intentionally.
After discrediting other hypotheses, the Commission argued that the
most probable motive for Zongo's murder was to put an end to the
articles that he had been writing on the January 1998 killing of David
Ouedraogo, the chauffeur of President Compaore's younger brother
Francois, allegedly by members of the Presidential Guard. The
Independent Investigatory Commission's final report recommended that
the Government pursue the results of the Commission's work in court;
that the separation of functions between the police and the military be
enforced; that the Presidential Guard limit its duties to the
protection of the Chief of State; that unresolved cases of
disappearances and killings in the recent past be settled; and that the
National Assembly pass a law to eliminate any time limit for resolving
the Zongo case. As of year's end, the courts were continuing work on
the Zongo case, and the separation of functions between the police and
military was being enforced. However, the presidential guard had not
officially limited its duties to protecting the President, no
unresolved cases of disappearances and killings in the recent past had
been settled, and the National Assembly had not passed a law to
eliminate any time limit for resolving the Zongo case.
In May the Council of Ministers ruled in extraordinary session to
send the Zongo case to the Justice Ministry for further action. It also
decided that the six suspects could not be arrested at that time since
the Independent Investigatory Commission had not established their
guilt firmly. As of year's end, five of the six were in detention but
only because they also had been implicated in the killing of David
Ouedraogo, the chauffeur of President Compaore's brother Francois, who
had died in January 1998 while in the custody of members of the
Presidential Guard.
On May 21, in a rare address to the nation, President Compaore
announced actions to carry out the recommendations made by the
Independent Investigatory Commission. He ordered that the judge
handling the Zongo case be given all the necessary material and
financial means to pursue it; that the Defense Minister accelerate the
military tribunal's investigation of the Presidential Guard members
implicated in the death of David Ouedraogo; that the Defense Minister
proceed immediately with reorganization of the Presidential Guard; that
all demonstrators arrested for acts of vandalism and violence over the
preceding weeks be released, except for those involved in suits
thatalready had been filed by individual citizens; and that a Council
of Wisemen be set up and given 45 days to review the political crimes
that have taken place since Burkina's independence, and to make
recommendations for restoring social peace in the wake of the Zongo
killings. As of year's end, five of the six presidential guard members
implicated in the death of David Ouedraogo were in detention, and all
demonstrators arrested for acts of vandalism and violence were
released. The Presidential Guard had not been reorganized.
On August 2, the Council of Wisemen issued its final report, which
recommended reform of the judicial system; creation of an ad hoc
consensual commission to review certain articles of the Constitution,
particularly Article 37, which was amended in 1997 to allow a president
to run for an unlimited number of terms; formation of a government of
national unity; creation of a truth and justice commission to direct
the nation's reconciliation process; and dissolution of the National
Assembly. On October 8, President Compaore instructed the Prime
Minister to reshuffle the Government. The new Government included no
officials from civil society and only four members of the opposition.
The major opposition group, the Group of 14 February, refused to
participate. On October 29, the Council of Ministers passed decrees
creating a Commission for Political Party Consultations and a
Commission of National Reconciliation. The Commission for Political
Party Consultations issued a final report on December 22. The President
announced in his traditional New Year's Eve address that he would
accept all of the report's recommendations, including designating a
formal leader of the opposition in Parliament and reintroducing
presidential term limits beginning in 2005. He said that he would call
new parliamentary elections ``if necessary.''
No progress was made in punishing those responsible for abuses
reported in previous years. The major problem with law enforcement
remains a general climate of impunity for human rights abusers fostered
by the failure of the government's investigations to result in guilty
findings and appropriate sanctions. Inquiries tend to continue until
they are overshadowed by subsequent incidents or quietly shelved.
Appeals by human rights organizations generally go unanswered. The
failure to prosecute previous abuses remains the most important
hindrance to further human rights progress.
The 1996 incident in which members of the police in the town of Reo
shot and killed an unarmed villager during an operation to fine owners
of unregistered vehicles remained unresolved. An official investigation
into the 1995 shooting death of two unarmed high school demonstrators
in Garango yielded no results. There were no further developments
regarding the 1994 corruption scandal that led to the death in custody
of two suspects under suspicious circumstances.
To date, the authorities have provided no explanation of the death
of Doin Redan, who was found dead in 1994 a day after being detained by
police. The Government continued to make no real effort to investigate
the fate of a Ghanaian detainee reportedly killed in 1993 while in
police custody. International and local human rights groups pressured
the official commission investigating the 1991 killing of Clement
Ouedraogo, a prominent opposition leader, to submit a report of
preliminary findings to the Prime Minister. The report has not been
made public and the case remains open, as do the cases of the 1989
disappearance of Professor Guillaume Sessouma, detained for allegedly
participating in a coup plot, and of medical student Dabo Boukary in
1990, detained following student demonstrations. Credible reports
indicated that security forces tortured and killed both men. The
Government failed to respond to students' calls for information on
Boukary's death, which was included in a list of demands issued during
university strikes in 1997.
There were some killings of criminal suspects by vigilante mobs.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits the mistreatment of detainees; however,
members of the security forces continued to mistreat persons, often to
extract confessions. There are credible reports that officials at Maco
prison continued to employ degrading treatment. The Government is not
known to have taken any disciplinary action against those responsible,
and the climate of impunity created by the Government's failure to
prosecute abusers remains the largest obstacle to ending abuses.
Police used tear gas to disperse protesters (see Section 2.b.).
Prison conditions are harsh, overcrowded, and can be life
threatening. The federal prison in Bobo-Dioulasso, built in1947, houses
about 1,000 prisoners, although it was designed to hold less than half
that number. There are separate facilities for men, women, and
children. The prison diet is poor, and inmates often must rely on
supplemental food from relatives.
According to human rights monitors, prison visits are granted at
the discretion of prison authorities. Permission is granted routinely,
and advance permission is not required.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention were problems, and authorities did not ensure due process.
The Constitution provides for the right to expeditious arraignment and
access to legal counsel. The law limits detention for investigative
purposes without charge to a maximum of 72 hours, renewable for a
single 48-hour period; however, in practice police rarely observe these
provisions. The average time of detention without charge is 1 week, and
the law allows judges to impose an unlimited number of 6-month
``preventative detention'' periods.
On May 17, following violent student demonstrations in Ouagadougou
and Bobo-Dioulasso, and the closure of schools in both cities, the
Government detained three opposition leaders: Burkinabe Movement for
Human Rights (MBDHP) president and head of the Collective of Mass
Democratic Organizations and Political Parties Halidou Ouedraogo; head
of the Sankara Association Thibault Nana; and Alliance for Democracy
and, Federation and Democratic African Assembly (ADF/RDA) president
Hermann Yameogo, who as a deputy elected to the National Assembly
enjoys parliamentary immunity. Ouedraogo was released after 2 hours of
police questioning, and Nana was freed early on May 18. Yameogo, who
was accused of having incited students to riot during a series of
speeches, was released at the end of the statutory 72-hour period for
preventive detention.
In November 1998, eight armed policemen temporarily detained
opposition Party for Democracy and Progress (PDP) deputy Gerard
Karambiri and a PDP supporter. Police awakened both men in their
respective homes in Bobo-Dioulasso in the early hours of the morning,
apparently searching for opposition parties' materials calling for a
boycott of the presidential election. The officers lacked the required
warrants and entered their homes at times other than the 6 a.m. to 9
p.m. ``legal hours.'' Police took them to headquarters, interrogated
them for about 2 hours, then released them. Parliamentarians believed
that the detention of Deputy Karambiri was a violation of the
parliamentary immunity granted to all deputies under the Constitution.
Several days later, after demanding that the detentions be investigated
fully, PDP deputies walked out of a National Assembly plenary session
in protest. In response the governing CDP parliamentary group sent
three of its leading deputies to express support for the PDP, and
National Assembly President Melegue Traore addressed a letter to the
Prime Minister asking that the incident be investigated. The Government
has never responded.
Police arrested and detained protesters and detained a journalist
in September (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.).
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is subject to
executive influence. The President has extensive appointment and other
judicial powers. The Constitution stipulates that the Head of State is
also the President of the Superior Council of the Magistrature, which
can nominate and remove some high-ranked magistrates and can examine
the performance of individual magistrates.
The Zongo killing and its aftermath have focused attention on the
severe weaknesses in the justice system, including removability of
judges, outdated legal codes, an insufficient number of courts, a lack
of financial and human resources, and excessive legal costs.
The Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is the highest
court in the country. Beneath it are 2 Courts of Appeal and 10
provincial courts (``de grande instance''). There is also a High Court
of Justice, with jurisdiction to try the president and senior
government officials for treason and other serious crimes. In 1995 the
National Assembly passed legislation reforming the military court
system, making military courts less susceptible in principle to
executive manipulation; however, their independence has not yet been
demonstrated.
In addition to the formal judiciary, customary or traditional
courts, presided over by village chiefs, handle many neighborhood and
village problems, such as divorce and inheritance disputes. The
population generally respects these decisions but citizens also may
take a case to a formal court.
The Constitution provides for the right to public trial, access to
counsel, and has provisions for bail and appeal. While these rights
generally are respected, the ability of citizens to obtain a fair trial
remains circumscribed by an ignorance of the law because 77 percent of
the population is illiterate and by a continuing shortage of
magistrates. Amendments to the Penal Code to make it more relevant to
modern requirements, such as the revision making FGM a crime, were
adopted by Parliament during its last session in 1996 and entered into
effect early in 1997.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for these rights, and in
practice the authorities generally do not interfere in the daily lives
of ordinary citizens. However, in national security cases a special law
permits surveillance, searches, and monitoring of telephones and
private correspondence without a warrant. By law and under normal
circumstances, homes may be searched only with the authority of a
warrant issued by the Attorney General.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The 1991 Constitution and the 1990
Information Code provide for freedom of speech and of the press;
however, in practice these freedoms still remain circumscribed both by
government action and by a certain degree of self-censorship. The
President and his Government remain sensitive to criticism. Provisions
in the Code granting the Government strong legal powers to intimidate
the press through a broad interpretation of defamation were removed in
1993. As a result, journalists charged with libel may defend themselves
in court by presenting evidence in support of their allegations. The
independent press, particularly the written press, continued to
exercise greater freedom of expression. However, the suspicious death
of internationally respected journalist and newspaper editor Norbert
Zongo in December 1998 raised serious questions on the limits to the
exercise of this freedom (see Section 1.a.). Zongo was well known for
his investigative reports on government scandals.
On December 1, police in Ouagadougou detained two journalists and
six leaders of the Collective of Mass Democratic Organizations and
Political Parties, including its president Halidou Ouedraogo, to
question them about a communique that they addressed to the armed
forces, calling upon the military to guarantee demonstrators' safety
and right to demonstrate. One of the men detained was Paulin Yameogo,
editor of the weekly newspaper San Finna, which had just printed on its
cover a photo of the scarred back of one of the men allegedly tortured
by the Presidential Guard at the same time as David Ouedraogo, the
murdered chauffeur of President Compaore's brother. The eight were
arrested 2 days later and charged with ``attempts against the army's
morale,'' a charge that carried the penalty of 1 to 5 years in prison.
On December 27, the case against them was dropped when the judge ruled
that procedural flaws in their arrest and indictment prevented a fair
trial.
All media are under the administrative and technical supervision of
the Ministry of Communication and Culture. The audiovisual media are
further regulated by the Superior Council of Information (CSI).
The official media, including the daily newspaper Sidwaya, and the
national radio and television displayed progovernment bias. The
independent press includes 6 daily and 12 weekly newspapers. There are
20 independent radio stations and 1 religious television station. The
only private commercial television station ceased to broadcast, due to
financial difficulties. These media outlets include stations that are
critical of the Government.
In 1998 the CSI released new regulations for private and
independent radio and television. All new regulations were fully in
effect as of February. The new regulations allowed reinstatement of
call-in shows, which had previously been suspended in 1997. However,
radio stations are held responsible if their call-in programs threaten
the public order or the rights of any third party. In May employees
from two radio stations were called in for questioning after
broadcasting a call-in show on the Zongo killings that featured the
secretary general of Reporters Without Borders, Robert Menard. After
being threatened with formal expulsion, Menard involuntarily left the
country. In September he was denied entry into the country.
National and international observers reported that the CSI
effectively fulfilled its responsibilities under the Electoral Code to
assure equal media treatment of the candidates during the period prior
to the November 1998 presidential election.The collective of
independent election observers stated after the election that the press
generally had been open to the different candidates and that press
reporting on candidates' campaigns, with the exception of the national
television and state-owned newspaper, which initially gave the
President more attention that the other two candidates, became more
balanced after a complaint presented to the CSI early in the campaign
by Green Party candidate Ram Ouedraogo.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
respected this right in practice. Political parties and labor unions
usually have been allowed to hold meetings and rallies without
requesting Government permission since early 1990. In October 1997, the
National Assembly passed a law to replace an existing 1992 law
regulating public demonstrations. The new law requires that authorities
be notified in advance of planned demonstrations and gives the
executive the right to use reasons of public order to forbid
demonstrations. In addition penalties for violations were increased
from 6 months to 5 years to 2 to 5 years. Permits must be obtained from
municipal authorities for political marches. Applicants must indicate
the date, time, duration, and itinerary of the march or rally, and
authorities may alter or deny requests on grounds of public safety.
Denials or modifications may be appealed before the courts.
After the January 3 incident, the Government permitted many marches
and protests with or without the required prior notice, and its
handling of demonstrations was, on balance, moderate and
nonconfrontational. In January the Government agreed to the
Collective's demand to end the ``state of siege,'' a term referring to
the use of strong-arm police tactics to prevent the formation of
demonstrations. In February some 400 intellectuals were not permitted
to meet with the President but were allowed to present a petition
against impunity to the Minister of Territorial Administration. In
March a crowd estimated at 1,000 persons marched peacefully to Norbert
Zongo's grave during the FESPACO film festival. Also in March, some
3,000 to 5,000 demonstrators marched peacefully to the office of the
President without interference. On November 27, between 10,000 and
20,000 persons participated in a peaceful march in Ouagadougou that was
organized by the Collective to press for justice in the case of Norbert
Zongo's killing. On December 13, to mark the first anniversary of
Zongo's death, approximately 25,000 persons walked more than 2 miles
from the labor union headquarters in Ouagadougou to the cemetery where
the journalist was buried. Security forces did not interfere with
either demonstration.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this in practice. Since early 1990,
political parties and labor unions usually have been permitted to
organize without seeking government permission.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
country is a secular state. Islam, Christianity, and traditional
religions operate freely without government interference.
The Government requires that religious groups register with the
Ministry of Territorial Administration. Registration establishes a
group's legal presence in the country but entails no specific controls
or benefits. There are no penalties for failure to register.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement, and authorities respect this right in practice. Gendarmes
routinely stop travelers for identity and customs checks and the
levying of road taxes at police and military checkpoints. There is no
restriction on foreign travel. In May the secretary general of
Reporters Without Borders was forced to leave the country
involuntarily. In September he was denied entry into the country (see
Section 2.a.).
The law include provisions for the grant of refugee and asylee
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Refugees are
accepted freely. The Government provides first asylum. The Government
cooperated with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The
approximately 25,000 refugees and displaced persons remaining in the
country in 1997, mostly Tuaregs from Mali and Niger, were repatriated
by the beginning of 1998. A few hundred refugees from the Great Lakes
region remain. There were no reports ofthe forced return of persons to
a country where they feared persecution. There were no reports of the
forced expulsion of persons with a valid claim to refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the constitutional right to change their government
through multiparty elections; however, although the November 1998
presidential election represented a further step toward democratic
government, in practice citizens are unable to exercise this right
fully due to the continued dominance of the President and his ruling
party. President Compoare won 88 percent of the vote; 56 percent of the
eligible voters went to the polls. The irregularities cited by
observers in the actual voting process were limited in number and scope
and did not appear to have an impact on the ultimate outcome of the
election. However, the national observers identified a number of
systematic weaknesses in the electoral code that precluded a perfectly
regular and transparent vote, and a coalition representing a number of
opposition parties boycotted the election. On November 24, 1998, the
Supreme Court confirmed the final vote count released by the
independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) 6 days earlier.
Neither of the two candidates opposing President Compaore contested the
results.
The 1997 legislative elections gave the ruling CDP 101 out of 111
parliamentary seats. (The CDP now controls 102 seats because of a
defection to the ruling party by an opposition deputy.) The victory
reflected both general support for policies of the governing party and
a lack of viable opposition alternatives. While international observers
described the elections as substantially free and fair, a collective of
14 local NGO's cited generalized and systematic corruption and voter
list irregularities. The Supreme Court annulled the results in four
constituencies because of these irregularities.
In May 1998, the National Assembly approved the establishment of an
Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) to replace the
National Committee for the Organization of Elections (CNOE) that
supervised the 1997 legislative elections. The law creating the CENI
gave it responsibility for creating a census bureau, installing voting
stations and training poll workers, organizing election observation,
ensuring election security, and distributing election material.
However, developing electoral lists is still the responsibility of the
Ministry of Territorial Administration and Security. The law also
called for the CENI to be headed by an elected president and vice
president who could not come from the hierarchy of any political party.
The president and vice president are elected by CENI members. In July
1998, the CENI was installed with 26 members, of which 6 came from the
opposition, 6 from the ruling party, 3 from the religious community, 3
from the traditional tribal community, 6 from the labor movement, and 3
from a human rights organization. A committee of six persons from
various government ministries is available to advise the CENI. However,
there were concerns regarding CENI's independence since its funding was
channeled through the Government, and it was scheduled to cease
operations 60 days after the election. During the November 1998
election, the CENI was not able to carry out its functions in some of
the country's 45 provinces due to inadequate staffing.
The Compaore Government includes a strong presidency, a Prime
Minister, a Council of Ministers presided over by the President, a two-
chamber National Assembly, and the judiciary. The legislature is
independent, but it remains susceptible to external influence from the
executive branch.
In January 1997, the CDP-dominated National Assembly amended the
Constitution to allow a president to run for an unlimited number of
terms. Previously, the Constitution had restricted the mandate to two
7-year terms.
There are no restrictions in law or practice on the participation
of women or minority group members in politics; however, women are
underrepresented in positions of responsibility. Only 3 of the 29
ministers and 8 of the 111 National Assembly deputies are women. The
President of the Social and Economic Council is a woman. In part
because of the important role that women played in reelecting President
Compaore in 1998, the Congress for Democracy and Progress voted at its
first ordinary Congress held in July to increase the number of women on
its National Executive Council from two to six.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government's attitude toward local human rights organizations
was mixed. According to monitors, the Government did not interfere with
the activities of any such group during the year. However, on March 21,
the Council of Ministersterminated the agreement that had existed
between the Government and the InterAfrican Human Rights Union (UIDH)
since 1995. The Council stated that UIDH head Halidou Ouedraogo, who
also served during the year as president of the Burkinabe Movement for
Human Rights (MBDHP) and as president of the Collective of Mass
Democratic Organizations and Political Parties, had mixed politics with
human rights and thus had acted in ways incompatible with the
agreement. The Council also considered illegal the UIDH's participation
on a parallel inquiry commission that was set up in January by the
Collective to investigate the Zongo killings. Under the 1995 agreement,
the UIDH had benefited from tax exemptions, a government subsidy that
paid $500 (300,000 CFA) a month to rent temporary offices for the
organization, and Ouedraogo, a Burkinabe national, had enjoyed
diplomatic immunity as head of an international organization. In
addition the Government again has failed to answer inquiries from
international human rights organizations concerning past abuses.
Amnesty International (AI) still is awaiting the results of the
Government inquiry into the 1995 killings in Garango and the 1995
extrajudicial executions of seven men from Kaya Navio, Nahouri
Province, but the Government has not responded to AI's request for
information.
In 1994 the Government announced the creation of the Office of
Ombudsman, called ``Mediateur du Faso.'' Retired General Marc Garango
was appointed to the position, which is responsible for mediating
disputes between the state and its citizens. In June 1998, the
Ombudsman's Office issued its first activity report, which indicated
that half the cases brought before it dealt with career problems of
civil servants and the other half with a variety of issues, including
land questions and bureaucratic inaction.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
religion, or ethnic origin. Minority ethnic groups are, like the
majority Mossi, represented in the inner circles of the Government, and
government decisions do not favor one group over another.
Women.--Violence against women, especially wife beating, occurs
occasionally. Cases of wife beating usually are handled through
customary law and practice. There are no statistics on rape, although
it is recognized as a crime. Spousal rape is not discussed. There are
organizations that counsel rape victims, including Catholic and
Protestant missions, the Association of Women Jurists in Burkina, the
Burkinabe Movement for Human Rights, the Association of Women, and
Promofemmes, a regional network that works to combat violence against
women. The Government is attempting to change attitudes toward women,
using education through the media. The Penal Code explicitly prohibits
sexual harassment but has no special laws protecting women against
violence other than general laws dealing with violence.
There are no specific constitutional provisions or laws protecting
women, who face extensive discrimination. In general women continue to
occupy a subordinate position and experience discrimination in such
areas as education, jobs, property, and family rights. Overall, women
represent 45 percent of the work force. However, in the modern sector
women make up one-fourth of the government work force, although they
are usually found in lower paying positions. Women still do much of the
subsistence farming work. After the May 1997 parliamentary elections,
the Government created a Ministry of Women's Affairs and appointed a
woman as minister.
Children.--The Constitution nominally protects children's rights.
The Government has demonstrated its commitment to improving the
condition of children by adopting a national policy to revitalize
primary health care through the privatization of hospitals, which
provided greater autonomy in hospital management. The Government has
stated its commitment to improve access to primary education and as of
1996 had raised the literacy rate to 22 percent. The Government
provides free primary school education to all children. If a child
qualifies on the basis of grades and social condition (that is, his/her
family is ``poor''), free education can continue through junior high
and high school. In practice, the family condition requirement is often
ignored giving many children a free education through high school.
Females constitute approximately one-third of the total student
population in the primary school system and are represented in the
secondary and higher educational systems, although the percentage
decreases significantly beyond the primary level. Schools in rural
areas have disproportionately fewer female students than schools in
urban areas. The Government has set upa scholarship program for female
secondary students to encourage them to stay in school.
Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, still is practiced widely, especially in many
rural areas, and usually is performed at an early age. The percentage
of females who have undergone this procedure may be as high as 70
percent. The Government has made a strong commitment to eradicate FGM
through educational efforts, and a national committee (The National
Committee for the Fight against Excision) campaigns against the
practice. The Penal Code was revised in 1996 to make FGM a crime, with
stricter punishments for those involved in its practice. Perpetrators
are subject to 6 months to 3 years imprisonment and a significant fine.
The Government continued its sensitization campaign regarding the
deleterious effects of this practice. Another form of mutilation,
scarification of the faces of both boys and girls of certain ethnic
groups, gradually is disappearing.
People with Disabilities.--While there are modest government
subsidies for workshops for the disabled, there is no government
mandate or legislation concerning accessibility for the disabled. There
is no legislation to protect persons with disabilities from
discrimination. Programs to aid the disabled are limited, but human
rights groups are not aware of any discrimination against the disabled.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1962 Labor Code has been amended
several times during the past decade, most recently in 1996. Under this
legislation, workers, including civil servants, traditionally have
enjoyed a legal right of association, which is recognized under the
Constitution. There are 4 major labor confederations and 12 autonomous
trade unions linked together by a national confederal committee. They
represent a wide ideological spectrum; the largest and most vocal
member espouses socialist doctrine. Essential workers, such as police,
may not join unions.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, and workers use
strike actions to achieve labor goals. Many strikes were called
throughout the year both by labor organizations to advance workers'
objectives, and by the Collective of Mass Organizations and Political
Parties to press for justice in the aftermath of the Zongo killings
(see Section 1.a.). For example, from September 7-10, the Union of
Workers in Human and Animal Health (SYNTSHA) held a 72-hour strike to
press for satisfaction of labor demands. From January 20-22, the
Collective held the first of several general strikes (``ville morte'')
during the year to press for justice in the Zongo killings. In July the
army took to the streets to protest the Government's failure to repay
housing allowances previously deducted from military salaries. The
Government responded by negotiating with what the foreign press called
mutineers and acceded to their demands.
Labor unions may affiliate freely with international trade unions.
The National Confederation of Burkinabe Workers (CNTB) is affiliated
with the Brussels-based World Confederation of Labor (WCL).
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have the
right to bargain for wages and other benefits, both directly with
employers and with industry associations. These negotiations are
governed by minimums on wages and other benefits contained in the
Interprofessional Collective Convention and the Commercial Sector
Collective Convention, which are established with government
participation. If no agreement is reached, employees may exercise their
right to strike. Either labor or management may refer an impasse in
negotiations to labor tribunals. Appeals may be pursued through the
Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court, whose decision is binding on both
parties. Collective bargaining is extensive in the modern wage sector,
but it encompasses only a small percentage of workers.
The Labor Code prohibits antiunion discrimination. The Labor
Ministry handles complaints about such discrimination, which the
plaintiff may appeal to a labor tribunal. If the tribunal sustains the
appeal, the employer must reinstate the worker. Union officials believe
that this system functions adequately.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced labor, and it is not practiced.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and there
were no reports of its use.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code sets the minimum age for employment at 14
years, the average age for completion of basic primary school. However,
the Ministry of Employment, Labor, and Social Security, which oversees
labor standards, lacks the means to enforce this provision adequately,
even in the small wage sector. Children commonly work with their
parents in rural areas or in family-owned small businesses in villages
and cities. Most children actually begin work at an earlier age on
small, family subsistence farms, in the traditional apprenticeship
system, and in the informal sector. There are no reports of children
under the age of 14 employed in either state or large private
companies. The Government prohibits forced or bonded child labor, and
there were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code mandates a
minimum monthly wage, a standard workweek of 40 hours with at least one
24-hour rest period for nondomestic workers and a 60 hour workweek for
household workers, and establishes safety and health provisions. The
minimum monthly wage in the formal sector, about $45 (27,089 CFA), does
not apply to subsistence agriculture, which employs about 85 percent of
the population. The Government last set a minimum wage in 1996. It is
not adequate for an urban worker to support a family. Wage earners
usually supplement their income through reliance on the extended
family, subsistence agriculture, or trading in the informal sector.
A system of government inspections under the Ministry of
Employment, Labor, and Social Security and the labor tribunals is
responsible for overseeing health and safety standards in the small
industrial and commercial sectors, but these standards do not apply in
the subsistence agricultural sector. However, the Government's Labor
Inspector Corps does not have sufficient resources to fulfill its
duties adequately. Every company is required to have a work safety
committee. If a workplace has been declared unsafe by the government
Labor Inspection Office for any reason, workers have the right to
remove themselves from dangerous work without jeopardy to continued
employment. In practice there are indications that this right is
respected, but such declarations are relatively rare.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons. There were occasional reports of trafficking in women and
children for the purposes of forced prostitution or domestic service.
______
BURUNDI
Burundi is ruled by an authoritarian military regime led by self-
proclaimed interim President Pierre Buyoya, who was brought to power in
a bloodless coup by the largely ethnic Tutsi armed forces in 1996 and
who abrogated the Constitution. In 1998 the Buyoya regime reached a
political agreement with the opposition-dominated National Assembly,
which adopted a Transitional Constitutional Act and a transitional
political platform. The agreement brought the predominantly ethnic Hutu
opposition party FRODEBU into the Cabinet. Buyoya holds power in
conjunction with a political power structure dominated by members of
the Tutsi ethnic group. Political parties operate under significant
restraints. Since 1993 the country has suffered from a civil war with
thousands of civilian deaths and mass internal displacement. The
judiciary is controlled by the ethnic Tutsi minority and is not
impartial.
The security forces are controlled by the Tutsi minority and
consist of the army and the gendarmerie under the Ministry of Defense,
the judicial police under the Ministry of Justice, and the intelligence
service under the presidency. Security forces committed numerous
serious human rights abuses.
The country is poor and densely populated, with 92 percent of the
population dependent on subsistence agriculture. Many internally
displaced citizens have been unable to grow food and depend largely on
international humanitarian assistance. Per capita income is less than
$200 per year. The civil war has caused severe economic disruption,
especially to the small modern sector of the economy, which is based
mainly on the export of coffee, tea, and cotton. The Government has
announced that it plans to privatize publicly owned enterprises, but
efforts to carry out such a transformation are lagging. Other
governments in the region that had imposed economic sanctions on the
country lifted them in January.
The Government's human rights record remained poor. Citizens do not
have the right to change their government. Security forces continued to
commit numerous extrajudicial killings. The armed forces killed armed
rebels and unarmed civilians, including women, children, and the
elderly. Rebel attacks on the military often were followed by army
reprisals against civilians suspected of cooperating with the
insurgents. Despite Buyoya's stated commitment to end abuses by the
military, his Government was unable or unwilling to do so, and
perpetrators were not punished. Impunity for those who commit serious
human rights violations, and the continuing lack of accountability for
those who committed past abuses, remained key factors in the country's
continuing instability. There were credible reports of disappearances
and the security forces continued to torture and otherwise mistreat
persons. Prison conditions were life threatening. Arbitrary arrest and
detention, and lengthy pretrial detention, are problems, and there were
reports of incommunicado detention. The court system suffers from a
lengthy case backlog. The dysfunctional justice system was unable to
resolve pressing issues of detention and impunity because of its lack
of independence, its inefficiency and administrative disruption, and
the partiality of Tutsi officials. Authorities infringe on citizens'
privacy rights. The Government controls the media and restricts freedom
of speech and of the press. It restricts freedom of assembly and does
not permit political demonstrations. The Government restricts freedom
of association and movement. At the end of the year, the army forcibly
relocated an estimated 330,000 Hutus in an effort to stop rebel attacks
on the nearby capital, Bujumbura. The armed forces sometimes limited
access to certain areas by human rights observers, citing dangerous
security conditions. Violence and discrimination against women
continued to be problems. The Government is unable to protect the
rights of children or prevent discrimination against the disabled. The
indigenous Twa (Pygmy) people remain marginalized economically,
socially, and politically. Incidents of ethnically motivated
destruction and killing occurred throughout the country. State
discrimination against Hutus is widespread. Soldiers required
internally displaced persons to perform forced labor. Child labor is a
problem.
Rebel Hutu militias also continued to commit many serious abuses,
including repeated killings of unarmed civilians, and requiring
civilians to perform forced labor.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces
committed numerous extrajudicial killings. On January 4, soldiers
killed more than 55 civilians in Mubone, Kabezi commune, Bujumbura
Rural province, according to international human rights observers. The
Government promised to investigate; however, any findings were not made
public. It is not known if those responsible were punished.
On May 26, soldiers killed 11 Hutu civilians, including women and
children, most of whom lived in the household of a man suspectedof
participating in the 1993 killing of Tutsis, according to an
international human rights observer.
On July 19, soldiers killed 30 civilians in Kanyosha commune,
Bujumbura Rural province, according to international observers.
On August 11, the army shot and killed an estimated 50 civilians in
Kanyosha commune, Bujumbura Rural province, according to international
human rights observers. On August 12, the army used grenades and
machine guns to kill an unknown number of civilians in Ruziba,
Bujumbura Rural province, observers reported. The army suspected the
civilians of collaborating with rebels. International observers were
prevented from investigating because of security forces' claims that
the areas were unsafe. The Government promised to investigate; however,
its findings were not made public.
On October 9, a soldier shot and killed six persons, including
three children and two women, at the Ruyaga regroupment site in
Bujumbura Rural province where they had been moved forcibly, according
to the authorities. Seven others were injured. The soldier was detained
immediately although his name was not released publicly, authorities
said.
There were reports that soldiers shot and killed some persons who
tried to leave ``regroupment sites'' to which Hutus were forcibly
relocated starting in September (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).
Deaths in prisons continued due to disease and malnutrition (see
Section 1.c.).
Amnesty International (AI) estimates that 200,000 persons were
killed in ethnic violence between October 1993 and the end of 1998. No
credible countrywide casualty figures were available for 1999.
Throughout the year, the Government and security forces frequently
prevented journalists and human rights observers from going to areas
where casualties occurred, making it difficult to gather information
about the perpetrators and the victims. AI reported that the army and
rebel groups killed 600 civilians between November 1998 and March 1999
in Bujumbura Rural province alone. Based on media and other reports,
much of the extrajudicial killing and destruction during the year was
concentrated in the province around the capital and in the southern and
eastern provinces.
Accurate information about landmines is hard to obtain. However,
the armed forces apparently use mines to prevent rebels from accessing
territory, and rebel groups use landmines as tools of terror. Landmine-
related civilian injuries and deaths were reported, particularly in
provinces along the southern border with Tanzania.
A domestic human rights organization reported that 51 persons were
sentenced to death in the regular criminal courts during the first 10
months of the year. A death sentence handed down by a military court
was carried out in July, and legal irregularities in the case prompted
protests by AI. On July 28, Corporal Bonaventure Ndikumana was
sentenced to death for deliberately killing an officer. Ndikumana was
executed the next day without being allowed to file an appeal of his
conviction as required by law, according to the authorities and AI. No
executions were carried out in 1998. In 1997, after a 15-year period
with no executions, the State executed 6 of 38 civilians sentenced to
death for the first time since 1982.
In May the media reported the surprise announcement of a judgment
in the trial of the 1993 assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye.
The Supreme Court sentenced five members of the army to death and 23
others to prison. Another 38 persons were acquitted, 10 cases were sent
back for further review, and 5 cases were dropped because the suspects
had died. No high-ranking army officers were convicted, although
charges were brought originally against many past and present senior
army members. The new Attorney General, who is a Hutu, announced that
the case would be reopened.
In January rebels killed 178 civilians in Makamba province,
according to the media. The civilians were killed either by rebels or
were caught in a crossfire between the rebels and the army, according
to reports.
On August 28, Hutu rebels killed 39 persons in Bujumbura, most of
them Tutsi civilians according to the authorities. Victims were shot or
burned. The authorities permitted rapid access to the scenes of the
attacks.
On October 12, unknown attackers killed two U.N. foreign staff
members and seven others during a U.N. humanitarian assessment mission
to Rutana province. Officials said that rebels carried out the attack,
possibly to halt humanitarian aid. The Government called on Tanzania to
arrest the perpetrators, who it said fled to Tanzania after the attack.
Rebels accused the armed forces of committing these killings. In
response to this attack, the U.N. halted most of its field operations
indefinitely.
A grenade attack in Bujumbura's central market in November killed 5
persons and injured 14 others.
There are no definitive statistics available on how many civilians
were killed by Hutu rebels; the Government stated that killings by
rebels represent the majority of civilian casualties. Rebels reportedly
often kill civilians for suspected collaboration with the regime and
for their refusal to pay ``taxes'' to rebels. Hutu rebels ambushed
minibuses carrying civilians on national highways, robbing and killing
the occupants.
Three persons accused of the 1995 killings of Italian religious
workers were not tried. The Government did not identify or bring to
justice the persons responsible for the June 1996 killing in Cibitoke
province of three foreign employees of the International Committee of
the Red Cross.
b. Disappearance.--Human rights groups reported that abductions and
disappearances occurred during the year, but no credible overall
figures were available. AI reported on October 5 that it had credible
reports of the disappearance of three persons believed to have been
arrested by soldiers in September. According to AI, at least one of the
men was believed to have been executed and secretly buried. The media
carried brief reports of kidnapings of civilians by Hutu rebels.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Transitional Constitution Act prohibits these abuses;
however, members of the security forces continued to torture and
otherwise abuse persons. In one such case, AI reported that members of
the security forces were believed to have withheld food from detainees
and beaten one of them severely. There were no know prosecutions of
members of the security forces for these abuses.
At the end of the year, signs emerged of renewed government support
for policing of the capital and countryside by armed civilians, which
raised fears of the return of militias created in 1995 to destabilize
the then Hutu-led government.
Conditions in state-run prisons were life threatening and are
characterized by severe overcrowding and inadequate hygiene, clothing,
medical care, food, and water. A total of about 10,000 inmates are
housed in facilities built to accommodate a maximum of 3,600 persons.
Prisoners rely on family members to provide an adequate diet, and
officials say that prisoners suffer from digestive illness, dysentery,
and malaria. Poor prison conditions contributed to deaths of prisoners
from disease and malnutrition. In April AI reported that a 12-year-old
boy, improperly charged in connection with 1993 killings, had been
abused sexually by male inmates at Bujumbura's central prison.
U.N. human rights monitors were permitted to visit prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile; however, security forces
arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. Limits on the length of
pretrial detention were not respected. Presiding magistrates are
authorized to issue arrest warrants. Police and gendarmes can make
arrests without a warrant, but are required to submit a written report
to a magistrate within 48 hours. A magistrate can order the release of
suspects or confirm charges and continue detention, initially for 15
days, then subsequently for periods of 30 days, as necessary to prepare
the case for trial.
The law requires arrest warrants. The police are required to follow
the same procedures as magistrates; however, the police have detained
suspects for extended periods without announcing charges, certifying
the cases, or forwarding them to the Ministry of Justice as required.
There were numerous instances of arbitrary arrest. Bail was permitted
in some cases. Human rights organizations reported that incommunicado
detention exists, although it is prohibited by law.
The disruption of the political process and the general insecurity
severely impeded the judicial process. In mid 1999, an estimated 7,500
pretrial detainees constituted 78 percent of the total prison
population. About 750 of an estimated 9,500 detainees reportedly were
released in 1999, but these reports could not be confirmed.
The Government has not used forced exile as a means of political
control. However, many persons remained in voluntary exile in Belgium,
Kenya, Tanzania, Zaire, and elsewhere. Some senior authorities maintain
their families outside the country. Anumber of officials of the
government of deposed president Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, who fled the
country in 1996, have not yet returned.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Transitional Constitutional
Act provides for an independent judiciary; however, in practice the
judiciary is not independent and is dominated by ethnic Tutsis. An
international human rights organization estimated in 1998 that ethnic
Hutus accounted for only 5 percent of the country's judges and lawyers,
although they constitute an estimated 85 percent of the population.
Most citizens assume that the courts promote the interests of the
dominant Tutsi minority; members of the Hutu majority believe that the
judicial system is biased against them.
The judicial system is divided into civil and criminal courts with
the Supreme Court at the apex. The armed forces have a separate
judicial system, and there is a labor court.
Citizens generally did not have regular access to civilian and
military court proceedings. Defendants in theory are presumed innocent
and have the right to appeal; however, in practice some lawyers say
that the structure of the court system inappropriately limits the
possibility of appeals for those accused of the most serious crimes.
While defendants have a right to counsel and to defend themselves, in
practice few have legal representation. The civil court system
functions, but the lack of a well-trained and adequately funded
judiciary constrains expeditious proceedings. Many citizens have lost
confidence in the system's ability to provide even basic protection.
The majority of persons arrested on criminal charges since October 1993
remain in pretrial custody.
In July the National Assembly passed a new criminal code, which was
scheduled to take effect in January 2000, and in theory provides
protections for suspects' rights to a lawyer before official charges
are filed and during pretrial investigations.
There are some clearly identifiable political prisoners. Charges
against defendants convicted for nonpolitical crimes sometimes are
politically motivated.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Transitional Constitutional Act provides for the
right to privacy, but the authorities reportedly do not respect the law
requiring search warrants. Security forces are widely believed to
monitor telephones regularly.
Beginning in September, following rebel attacks on the mainly
Tutsi-inhabited capital (see Section 1.a.), the Government forcibly
relocated an estimated 330,000 mainly Hutu inhabitants of Bujumbura
Rural province to ``regroupment sites'' where security forces could
more readily monitor and control their movements. Inhabitants were
moved to sites with inadequate sanitation and insufficient access to
water, food, shelter, and medicine. The Government's stated rationale
for these forced relocations was to protect the relocated persons from
rebel attacks.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties: Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Transitional Constitutional
Act does not impose restrictions on the media; however, the Government
restricts freedom of speech and of the press. A press law requires that
newspaper articles undergo review by a government censor 4 days before
publication, and the Government controls the media and harasses and
detains journalists.
The regime controls much of the news, since it owns the only
regularly published newspaper and the major radio and television
stations. The government-owned Le Renouveau is published 3 times a
week. Other newspapers, including at least one opposition newspaper,
appear irregularly. Political tracts circulate, and two private faxed
newsheets are published almost daily. These represent a variety of
political viewpoints. In June the National Communications Council
suspended the activities of the FRODEBU opposition political party's
newspaper, L'Aube de la Democratie. In October the Council temporarily
suspended the newspaper, La Verite.
Security forces and the regime harass journalists, questioning or
detaining them or having their property searched and seized. In June
the editors of two private faxed newsheets were detained for brief
periods for failing to send advance copies of their dispatches to
government agencies, even though the advance review law applies only to
daily newspapers. In September the DefenseMinister publicly compared
some journalists to rebels and indicated that they should be treated as
such. When journalists protested what they described as a death threat,
the Minister explained that he meant only to criticize unprofessional
journalists.
The government-owned radio broadcasts in the Kirundi language,
French, and Swahili and offers limited English programming. The private
radio station, Umwizero, is financed by international donors and
broadcasts in French and Kirundi. Listeners also can receive
transmissions of the British Broadcasting Corporation, the Voice of
America, and Radio France Internationale. A clandestine radio station
operated by Hutu rebels once broadcast briefly from the Democratic
Republic of Congo.
No laws or regulations limit academic freedom, and no persons at
the University of Burundi were persecuted for what they published or
said. However, the state university remains primarily ethnic Tutsi.
Tensions occasionally flare between Hutu and Tutsi students on campus,
where politically and ethnically motivated killings occurred in 1995
and 1996.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
restricts freedom of assembly. The Transitional Constitutional Act
permits political demonstrations, but in practice none have been
allowed by the Government.
The Government restricts freedom of association and has arrested
members of organizations and political parties.
The Transitional Constitutional Act permits political parties to
operate; however, the regime places restrictions on groups critical of
its policies.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The transitional Constitutional Act
provides for freedom of religion, and the Government respects this
right in practice. There is no state religion, and the Government does
not restrict freedom of worship.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Immigration, and Repatriation.--The Transitional Constitutional Act
provides for these rights; however, the Government restricts this right
in practice.
Beginning in September the regime forcibly relocated an estimated
330,000 Hutus from Bujumbura Rural province. Residents of parts of
Bujumbura Rural more heavily populated by Tutsis were not subject to
relocation. The relocated population, at ``regroupment sites,'' some of
which were remote, at times lacked access to food, safe drinking water,
shelter, basic sanitation, and health care. Authorities said that they
were relocating the population to protect it from rebels, but there
were credible reports that the displacements also were used to remove
rebels from the relocated population and to impede civilian assistance
to rebels. Persons who tried to leave the sites, allegedly to search
for food and water, reportedly were shot, sometimes fatally, by
soldiers.
At year's end, about 550,000 other citizens remained in internally
displaced persons (IDP's) camps created in 1993-94 throughout the
country. With the recently relocated persons, a total of 13 percent of
the population live in 360 sites, according to an international relief
organization. Inhabitants of these sites raised some of their own food
with the permission of the armed forces. Soldiers guarding these camps
provide a measure of protection to camp inhabitants; however, they
sometimes commit human rights abuses against them.
Camp inhabitants often are required to perform labor for the
soldiers without compensation (see Section 6.c.).
Civilians who remain outside the sites reportedly have been killed
by Hutu rebels for allegedly collaborating with authorities and by the
armed forces on suspicion of collaborating with the rebels.
The authorities occasionally restricted foreign travel for
political reasons in the past; there was one such case in 1999. In
August an official from the FRODEBU wing of the party, which is
critical of the regime, was prevented temporarily from leaving the
country for consultations related to the peace talks in Arusha.
Authorities cited legal, not political, reasons.
The majority of citizens could travel legally in and out of the
country.
Travel within the country is possible but could be hazardous in
areas of rebel activity, particularly in parts of Bujumbura Rural,
Bururi, Rutana, and Makamba provinces.
The armed forces sometimes denied access to certain areas to human
rights observers, citing dangerous security conditions (see Section 4).
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that as of
the end of September, about 11,000 Burundian refugees were repatriated
in the course of the year from Rwanda, Tanzania, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and other countries. During the same period, an
estimated 25,000 Burundians fled Burundi to Tanzania, according to the
UNHCR. Approximately 296,000 Burundian refugees, most of them Hutu,
remain in Angola, Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zambia. Some of
these persons fled as early as 1972, and many fled following the
assassination of former president Ndadaye in October 1993.
The Government has granted first asylum in recent years.
Approximately 325 citizens of the Democratic Republic of Congo live
in Burundi, many of whom claim asylum. Rwandan refugees who fled the
1994 ethnic massacres in Rwanda departed the country by 1997. Another
200,000 Rwandans who came in earlier waves of refugees, some as early
as 1959, are not registered officially with the UNHCR and are
integrated into Burundian society.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. The
Transitional Constitutional Act makes no provision for elections. The
1992 Constitution and 1994 Convention of Government were suspended by
the Buyoya military regime that assumed power on July 25, 1996, in a
bloodless coup. On that date, the regime dissolved the National
Assembly and banned political parties. About 3 weeks later, Buyoya
announced the restoration of the National Assembly and political
parties with certain restrictions. The National Assembly is dominated
by the opposition party, FRODEBU, which draws the majority of its
membership from the Hutu ethnic group.
In April 1998, multiparty peace talks began in Arusha, Tanzania,
and Burundi's regime subsequently launched an internal peace process.
On June 4, 1998, the National Assembly and the Government entered into
a partnership agreement. The National Assembly adopted a Transitional
Constitutional Act and a Transitional Political Platform. The act
changed the structure of government by eliminating the post of prime
minister, creating two vice presidents, removing the National Assembly
Speaker from the line of presidential succession, and enlarging the
National Assembly. The act placed no time limits on the President's or
the National Assembly's term of office. By year's end, no such limits
had been enacted, and no future presidential or national assembly
elections had been scheduled.
The Transitional Political Platform endorses in general terms the
restoration of democracy and correction of the ethnic imbalance within
the army and the judicial system. It calls for the creation of an
international tribunal to try crimes of genocide. No such tribunal had
been created by year's end.
On June 12, 1998, a new Government was announced in which the First
Vice President and 10 of the 22 cabinet ministers are members of
FRODEBU. The Cabinet includes 12 Hutus, including the Minister of
External Relations. Progovernment ethnic Tutsi members hold the key
Ministries of Defense, Interior, Justice, and Finance.
Under the 1992 Constitution, deposed President Ntibantunganya would
have remained in office until 1998. The last elections to fill the
Assembly took place in June 1993. The Transitional Constitutional Act
stipulates that the National Assembly shall consist of 121
parliamentarians: those elected in 1993 who sat in the previous
National Assembly, plus 40 new members--28 members of civil society
appointed by the President and one representative each (selected by
their respective parties) from all 12 officially recognized political
parties not previously represented. Not all of those elected in 1993
are alive or in the country, and the vacant seats were filled by
substitutes from the same political party as the original
parliamentarian. Tutsi supporters of the Government filled many of the
40 new seats.
Political parties operate under significant constraints.
The National Assembly has nominal budgetary oversight, but the
Council of Ministers legally can enact a budget if the National
Assembly fails to do so. The Transitional Constitutional Act gives the
President the authority to declare a state of emergency by decree after
consulting with the National Assembly Speaker, the National Security
Council, and the Constitutional Court.No legal restrictions hinder the
participation of women or indigenous people in elections or politics;
however women and the ethnic Twa (Pygmies) are underrepresented in
government and politics. Of the 22 cabinet seats, 1 is filled by a
woman, who serves as the Minister of Women, Welfare, and Social
Affairs. (In the previous government women held 2 of the 24 cabinet
seats.) In 1993 women were elected to 9 of 81 seats in the National
Assembly. One of these nine women was killed in Cibitoke province in
1995. The expansion of the National Assembly and the filling of vacant
seats has brought the total of female parliamentarians to 16. One of
the nine members of the Supreme Court is a woman as are three of the
seven Constitutional Court members, including its president. About 1
percent of the population is Twa, but there are no Twa in the Cabinet.
One Twa is an appointed member of the National Assembly (also see
Section 5).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Domestic human rights groups received varying degrees of
cooperation from government ministries. The local human rights group,
Iteka, continued to operate and publish a newsletter. Amnesty
International representatives and the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human
Rights visited the country during the year. The U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights maintains an office in the country, but reduced its
observer staff in October due to poor security conditions (see Section
1.a.).
Real and claimed insecurity in rural areas was cited by the regime
in denying access to some areas of the country to journalists,
international relief workers, and human rights observers. Army elements
in the field frequently denied access to human rights observers when
the army was accused of human rights violations. For example, human
rights observers were denied full access to areas in Bujumbura Rural
province, where the army is believed to have killed more than 50
civilians on August 10, 11, and 12 (see Section 1.a.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Sex, Religion, Disability, Language,
or Social Status
The Transitional Constitutional Act provides equal status and
protection for all citizens, without distinction based on sex, origin,
ethnicity, religion, or opinion. However, the Government failed to
implement effectively the act's provisions. Hutus continue to perceive,
correctly, that the Tutsi-dominated government and army discriminate
against them. The question of exclusion was a central question at the
peace talks in Arusha.
Women.--Violence against women occurred, but its extent is
undocumented. Wives have the right to charge their husbands with
physical abuse, but they rarely do so. Police normally do not intervene
in domestic disputes, and the media rarely report incidents of violence
against women. No known court cases dealt with the abuse of women.
Women face legal and societal discrimination. Explicitly
discriminatory inheritance laws and discriminatory credit practices
continued. By law, women must receive the same pay as men for the same
work, but in practice they do not. Women are far less likely to hold
mid-level or high-level positions. In rural areas, women traditionally
perform hard farm work, marry and have children at an early age, and
have fewer opportunities for education than men.
Children.--The law provides for children's health and welfare, but
the Government cannot adequately satisfy the needs of children and, in
particular, of the large population of orphans resulting from the
violence since 1993. Many of the victims in the civil war are children.
The Government provides elementary education at nominal cost through
grade six. About 44 percent of children are enrolled in primary school.
The Government provides subsidized health care.
People with Disabilities.--The Government has not enacted
legislation or otherwise mandated access to buildings or government
services for persons with disabilities. There are few job opportunities
for the physically disabled in Burundi, where most jobs involve
significant manual labor.
Indigenous People.--The Twa (Pygmies), who are believed to be the
country's earliest human inhabitants, now make up only about 1 percent
of the population, and generally remain economically, socially, and
politically marginalized. Most Twa live in isolation,uneducated, and
without access to government services, including health care. One Twa
was appointed to the National Assembly, but the Twa are
underrepresented in the political process.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The principal national problem
continued to be ethnic conflict between the majority Hutus and the
minority Tutsis. Burundi's civil conflict stems from more than three
decades of violence and systematic discrimination, which compounds the
fears by both sides of genocide and exclusion. Tutsis claim to have
been the targets of a genocide carried out in 1993 by Hutus angered
over the assassination of democratically elected Hutu president
Ndadaye. The Tutsis historically have held power, and they dominate
educated society and control the security forces. In 1996 a coup
deposed president Ntibantunganya, a Hutu, and replaced him with Major
Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi.
The Transitional Constitutional Act provides equal status and
protection for all citizens, without distinction based on sex, origin,
ethnicity, religion, or opinion. However, the Government failed to
implement effectively the act's provisions. The Tutsi-dominated
government and army discriminate against Hutus. State discrimination
against Hutus, who constitute an estimated 85 percent of the
population, affects every facet of society, but most strikingly higher
education and certain branches of the Government such as the armed
services and the judicial system. The President and the Tutsi-dominated
army retain their dominance in decision making and have not initiated
genuine power sharing.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Labor Code protects the rights of
workers to form unions, although the army, gendarmerie, and foreigners
working in the public sector are prohibited from union participation.
Most union workers are urban civil servants.
According to the Confederation of Free Unions of Burundi (CSB), an
umbrella trade union, 60 percent of the 80,000 formal private sector
employees are unionized. All employees in the public sector, except
those prohibited by law, are unionized.
Since gaining independence from the Government in 1992, the CSB has
been dependent financially on a system of checkoffs, as are local
unions. In 1995 a rival umbrella trade union, the Confederation of
Burundi Unions (COSEBU) was founded. Both COSEBU and the CSB
represented labor in collective bargaining negotiations in cooperation
with individual labor unions during the year.
Tutsis dominate the formal sector of the economy and the unions.
The Labor Code permits the formation of additional unions or
confederations outside the CSB. When settling disputes in which more
than one labor union is represented, the law stipulates that the
Minister of Labor must choose the union representing the greatest
number of workers to participate in the negotiations.
The Labor Code provides workers with a restricted right to strike.
The restrictions on the right to strike and to lock out include: All
other peaceful means of resolution must be exhausted prior to the
strike action; negotiations must continue during the action, mediated
by a mutually agreed upon party or by the Government; and 6 days'
notice must be given. The law prohibits retribution against workers
participating in a legal strike, and this provision is respected.
Strikes by telecommunications and social security workers took place
without government intervention.
Unions are able to affiliate with international organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
recognizes the right to collective bargaining, formerly acknowledged
only by ordinance. Since most workers are civil servants, government
entities are involved in almost every phase of labor negotiations.
Public sector wages are set in fixed scales in individual contracts
and are not affected by collective bargaining. In the private sector,
wage scales also exist, but individual contract negotiation is
possible.
The Labor Code gives the Labor Court jurisdiction over all labor
dispute cases, including those involving public employees. Negotiations
are conducted largely under the supervision of the tripartite National
Labor Council, the Government's highest consultative authority on labor
issues. The Council represents government, labor, and management and is
presided over and regulated by the Minister of Labor.
The Labor Code prohibits employers from firing or otherwise
discriminating against a worker because of union affiliation or
activity. This right is upheld in practice.
There are no functioning export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
the performance of forced or compulsory labor by adults or children;
however, soldiers guarding internally displaced persons sites often
require inhabitants to cook, fetch water, chop wood, and perform other
chores without compensation. The rebels also require peasants to
perform uncompensated labor, including the transport of supplies and
weapons. Apart from these situations, forced labor is not known to
occur. There were no reports of forced child labor.
d. Status of Child labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code states that children under the age of 16
cannot be employed by ``an enterprise'' even as apprentices, although
it also states that they may undertake occasional work that does not
damage their health or interfere with their schooling. In practice,
children under age 16 in rural areas do heavy manual labor during the
daytime in the school year.
The minimum age for military service is 18, but there are believed
to be some children below that age in the army.
Children are prohibited legally from working at night, although
many do so in the informal sector. Most of the population lives by
subsistence agriculture, and children are obliged by custom and
economic necessity to participate in subsistence agriculture, family-
based enterprises, and the informal sector. The law prohibits forced
and bonded labor by children, and the Government enforces this
prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The formal minimum wage for
unskilled workers is $0.27 (160 francs) per day in the cities of
Bujumbura and Gitega, and $0.23 (140 francs) in the rest of the
country, with a graduated scale for greater skill levels. This amount
does not allow a worker and family to maintain a decent standard of
living, and most families rely on second incomes and subsistence
agriculture to supplement their earnings. A 1997 survey of day labor
wage rates in nine provinces by an international organization revealed
that actual wages ranged upward from the equivalent of $0.30 per day.
Unionized employees, particularly in urban areas, generally earn
significantly more than the minimum wage. Public sector wages are set
by agreement between the government and either the CSB or COSEBU.
The Labor Code stipulates an 8-hour workday and a 40-hour workweek,
except in cases where workers are involved in activities related to
national security. Supplements must be paid for overtime. Foreign
workers are protected by law and are not subject to discrimination.
The Labor Code establishes health and safety standards that require
an employer to provide a safe workplace and assigns enforcement
responsibility to the Minister of Labor. However, the Ministry does not
enforce the code effectively. Health and safety articles in the Labor
Code do not address directly workers' rights to remove themselves from
dangerous tasks.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law was known specifically to
prohibit trafficking in persons, although abduction and imposition of
involuntary servitude have been serious crimes since the colonial era.
There were no reports of trafficking in persons during the year.
______
CAMEROON
Cameroon is a republic dominated by a strong presidency. Since
independence, a single party, now called the Cameroon People's
Democratic Movement (CPDM), has remained in power and limited political
choice. In October 1997, CPDM leader Paul Biya won reelection as
President in an election boycotted by the three main opposition
parties, marred by a wide range of procedural flaws, and generally
considered by observers not to be free and fair. Although the
Government legalized opposition parties in 1990 after widespread
protests, most subsequent elections, including the May 1997 legislative
elections, which were dominated by the CPDM, were flawed by numerous
irregularities. International and local observers generally consider
the election process, which is controlled by the Government's Ministry
of Territorial Administration, as not free and fair. No President has
ever left office in consequence of an election. The President retains
the power to control legislation or to rule by decree. In the National
Assembly, government bills take precedence over other bills, and no
bills other than government bills have been enacted since 1991,
although legislation proposed by the Government sometimes has not been
enacted by the Assembly. The President repeatedly has used his control
of the legislature to change the Constitution. The 1996 Constitution
lengthened the President's term of office to 7 years, while continuing
to allow Biya to run for a fourth consecutive term in 1997 and making
him eligible to run for one more 7-year term in 2004. The Government
has taken no formal action to implement other 1996 constitutional
changes that provide for new legislative institutions, including a
partially elected senate and elected regional councils, and a more
independent judiciary, even though the President had announced in 1997
that most of these reforms would be implemented in 1998. Although the
country's first local government elections were held in 1996, President
Biya limited their scope by expanding the number of municipal
governments headed by presidentially appointed ``delegates'' rather
than permitting the election of mayors, especially in pro-opposition
regions. The Government remained highly centralized. The judiciary is
subject to political influence and suffers from corruption and
inefficiency.
Internal security responsibilities are shared by the national
police (DGSN), the National Intelligence Service (DGRE), the
gendarmerie, the Ministry of Territorial Administration, military
intelligence, the army, and to a lesser extent, the Presidential Guard.
The police and the gendarmerie have dominant roles in enforcing
internal security laws. The security forces, including the military
forces, remain under the effective control of the President, the
civilian Minister of Defense, and the civilian head of police. The
security forces continued to commit numerous serious human rights
abuses.
The country's population of about 15 million had a recorded mean
per capita Gross National Product (GNP) of about $590. Following nearly
a decade of economic decline, economic growth resumed in 1994 and
subsequently has continued, due chiefly to large public sector salary
cuts, a 50 percent currency devaluation, stabilization of terms of
trade, and increased external preferential financing and debt relief.
In recent years, recorded mean per capita GNP growth has averaged about
2 percent a year in real terms. However, economic recovery continues to
be inhibited by a large inefficient parastatal sector, excessive public
sector employment, growing defense and internal security expenditures,
and by the Government's inability to collect internal revenues
effectively, especially in economically important pro-opposition
regions. Widespread corruption in government and business also impedes
growth. The civil service and the management of state-owned businesses
have been dominated by members of the Beti and Bulu ethnic groups. The
majority of the population is rural, and agriculture accounts for 25
percent of GNP. Principal exports include timber, coffee, cocoa,
cotton, bananas, and rubber. The Government also continued to receive
substantial assistance from international financial institutions.
The Government's human rights record continued to be generally
poor, and government officials continued to commit numerous serious
abuses. Citizens' ability to change their government remained limited.
Security forces committed numerous extrajudicial killings; reportedly
were responsible for disappearances, some of which may have been
politically motivated; and tortured and often beat and otherwise abused
detainees and prisoners, generally with impunity. However, the
Government prosecuted some of the most egregious offenders; policemen
were convicted and sentenced to prison terms for several extrajudicial
killings, although the sentence in at least one case was reduced
greatly on appeal. Conditions remained harsh and life threatening in
almost all prisons, although the Government granted international
humanitarian organizations increased access to prisoners. Security
forces continued to arrest and detain arbitrarily various opposition
politicians, local human rights monitors, and other citizens, often
holding them for prolonged periods, often without charges or chance for
trial and, at times, incommunicado. Security forces conducted illegal
searches and harassed citizens. The judiciary remained corrupt,
inefficient, and subject to political influence. A military tribunal
exercised criminal jurisdiction over civiliansand denied them fair
trials. The Government infringed on privacy and monitored and harassed
some opposition activists. The Government continued to impose some
limits on press freedom. Although private newspapers enjoyed
considerable latitude to publish their views, journalists continued to
be subject to serious official harassment. Unlike previous years, there
were no reports that the Government seized newspaper editions; however,
the Government continued its prosecutions of pro-opposition journalists
under criminal libel laws. The Government continued to obtain
convictions against several journalists under these laws. A 1996 law
revoked formal press censorship and moved supervision of the press from
the administrative authorities to the courts, but the Government has
not yet implemented a 1990 law designed to end its virtual monopoly of
domestic broadcast media. The Government sometimes restricted freedom
of assembly and association. At times the Government used its security
forces to inhibit political parties from holding public meetings.
Government security forces limited freedom of movement and at times
impeded the activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's).
Violence and discrimination against women remained serious problems.
Female genital mutilation (FGM) persisted in some areas. Discrimination
against indigenous Pygmies continued. Societal discrimination based on
religion persisted in some areas. Discrimination against ethnic
minorities remained widespread. The Government continued to infringe on
workers' rights, and restricted the activities of independent labor
organizations. Child labor remained a problem. Slavery reportedly
persisted in parts of northern Cameroon. Forced labor and child labor,
including forced child labor, were problems. There were reports of
trafficking in persons. Mob violence continued to result in some
deaths.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed reports of political killings; however, the security forces
continued to use excessive, lethal force against private citizens and
committed numerous extrajudicial killings.
On the night of January 18-19, in the Yaounde neighborhood of Cite
Verte, a gendarmerie captain named Angoula shot and killed Yves Atiback
following a dispute. Captain Angoula was arrested and charged with
murder. At year's end, he was detained in the Yaounde Central Prison,
where he was awaiting trial.
On February 4, villagers in Bali in the Northwest Province seized
three young Fulani shepherds, Issa Adamaou, Salihou Sinbo, and Idrissou
Kari, and killed them by burning them alive without trial. The
villagers allegedly acted on the orders of the Fon of Bali, the local
traditional ruler, who reportedly accused the shepherds of having
stolen two of the Fon's cows. Police arrested seven individuals in
connection with these killings, but by year's end their trial had not
begun. The Fon of Bali was not arrested or detained.
In March, Denis Nzidchem, a detainee in Douala's New Bell Prison,
died of injuries inflicted by Douala police and prison guards after
they apprehended Nzidchem following his escape the previous day.
In a September bar fight over a woman, three members of the
Presidential Guard beat to death Theophole Mbasi Ombe. Ombe died on
September 24 in Obala Hospital.
There was a media report that in October, Frederic Djomeli died of
internal bleeding in the hospital in Bafang in Haut-Nkam Division of
the West Province, shortly after he was released from police custody
and found bleeding and unconscious on a street. According to the media
report, his family filed suit against Police Superintendent Simon
Menzoui, alleging that police officers tortured Djomeli on Menzoui's
orders after arresting him on suspicion of having stolen windshields
from parked motor vehicles.
Credible reports by the press and the Maroua-based Movement for the
Defense of Human Rights and Liberties (MDHRL), one of the few operating
human rights organizations in the Far North province, describe a large
but undetermined number of extrajudicial killings perpetrated by a
special antigang gendarmerie unit tasked with combating highwaymen.
This unit was created under the direct authority of the Minister of
Defense and operates outside the normal chain of command for law-and-
order units. While some armed suspects were killed in firefights with
law-and-order forces, there were credible reports that others caught in
dragnet operations were executed summarily. Families of the deceased
and human rights NGO's have accused the head of this unit, Colonel Pom,
of extrajudicial killings of innocent locals. The MDHRL estimated that
between 300 and 800 persons have been killed since the beginning of
1998. The Government's NationalCommission on Human Rights and Freedoms
(NCHRF) confirmed this estimate of the number of killings, although it
has been unable to determine the exact number of persons killed, since
many of the victims' families are too frightened to speak with human
rights groups. At least one private newspaper, the Douala-based
biweekly Mutations, also reported in 1998 that security forces
summarily executed hundreds of alleged highway robbers in northern
Cameroon during recent years.
Numerous prisoners died in custody due to abuse inflicted by
members of the security forces or harsh prison conditions and
inadequate medical treatment (see Section 1.c.). Samuel Muko, one of
several Anglophones arrested in the Northwest Province in September
1998 on suspicion of manufacturing guns and subsequently detained in
Bafoussam Central Prison in the West Province, died in the Gendarmerie
Hospital in Bafoussam in October reportedly as a result of mistreatment
allegedly including torture and starvation in prison. Muko allegedly
weighed only 100 pounds when he died. According to reliable reports, at
least eight detainees held after March 1997 attacks on government
installations in Northwest Province died from abuse or illness and
inadequate care since their imprisonment (see Section 1.c.). According
to a human rights group in Bamenda, Patrick Jimbou died in Yaounde's
Jamot Hospital on June 28 after a lengthy illness due to poor treatment
in prison, and Laurence Fai died on August 31, 1998.
In May U.N. Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur Nigel
Rodley investigated torture and extrajudicial killings in the Far North
Province (see Sections 1.c. and 4), but the conclusions of his trip and
final report were not made public during the year.
On June 10, at the conclusion of a judicial process that began in
January, the Douala Higher Instance Court upheld the conviction of
policeman Noe Nguene and sentenced him to 20 years in prison for having
shot and killed Alain Tuno Fossi, a 28-year-old Douala-based
businessman, at a roadblock in July 1998. Fossi's funeral procession
had been joined by a group of Douala residents protesting police
brutality.
On September 29, 1998, Thomas Ngoh, an Anglophone barkeeper, died
while in detention by gendarmes in the town of Wum in the Northwest
Province. According to a post mortem report by a doctor of Wum Main
Hospital, Ngoh died of a fracture of the sternum, and his corpse also
had several other broken bones, was missing toenails that had been
pulled out, and had large injuries on the back and buttocks as well as
candle wax drippings on parts of the body. Ngoh had been detained on
September 27 by gendarmes, one of whom, Martin Nzeffe, had left his
service pistol overnight at Ngoh's bar, from which it allegedly was
stolen. In October manslaughter charges were filed against Nzeffe and
another gendarme, Singa Docta, who were detained in Baffoussan Prison
awaiting trial as of year's end.
On December 28, 1998, Police Inspector Gaston Ndjere shot and
killed 20-year-old Guy Herv Diesse at the gate of Diesse's family house
in Bafoussam. The shooting followed a fight between Diesse and four
other men, including Ndjere and policeman Yves Marie Ngongang. Ndjere
and Ngongang were arrested. The Bafoussam Higher Instance Court
convicted Njere of murder and on August 2 sentenced him to life
imprisonment and ordered the Government to pay damages equivalent to
about $36,000 to Diesse's family. Ngongang, too, was tried but was
acquitted and released.
On February 9, the Yaounde Court of Appeals ruled on the cases of
former Police Commissioner Joseph Nsom Bekoungou and Police Inspector
Jacques Bama, both of whom a lower court had convicted in 1998 in
connection with the November 1997 death of a robbery suspect in their
custody, Emile Maah Njock, after interrogating officers beat him and
applied an electric iron to his genitals and other parts of his body
during a 3-day effort to extract a confession. From ``complicity in
torture,'' the charges against Bekoungou were lowered to ``omission to
provide assistance.'' This resulted in his 6-year jail term being
reduced to a 1-year jail term and a fine. The same appeals court
reduced Bama's prison term from 10 to 8 years, declared the DGSN
responsible for the death, and ordered the Government to pay damages to
Njock's family.
There were no known developments in three apparently unclosed 1998
cases: The reported January 1998 police killing of Serge Francois
Massoma; the June 1998 police killing of a 17-year-old male during
racial violence against whites in Yaounde; the June 1998 police
shooting of truck driver Jean-Marie Penga at a roadblock in Douala.
There continued to be no developments in the 1997 security force
killing of Faustin Fetsogo and of five persons killed in 1997 during
opposition politician Koulagne Nana's election campaign following a
skirmish with the forces of a traditional ruler loyal to the ruling
party.
Ethnic conflicts in rural areas continued to generate occasional
mass violence in at least one instance (see Sections 1.c. and 5),but
there were no reports of deaths due to such violence during the year.
Mob violence and summary justice directed against suspected thieves
and those suspected of practicing witchcraft and other crimes
reportedly continued to result in a number of deaths and serious
injuries. Although the number of reported cases of mob killings
appeared to diminish in major cities during the year, such incidents
reportedly have continued in rural areas in recent years. In one case
during the year, a mob lynched an alleged chicken thief. The burning to
death of three Fulani shephers in Bali in connection with an alleged
cattle theft also appeared to involve elements of mob violence.
b. Disappearance.--There were reports of disappearances of persons
in the custody of security forces; there had been no such reports in
previous recent years. Some of these reported disappearances may have
been politically motivated.
A spokesman for a Chadian political party stated in a radio
interview that in July, Chadian political refugees Jim Temba and El
Hadj Bakeye, who had been living in the northern part of the country,
were summoned by Cameroonian security forces and were never seen again.
Local human rights monitors have judged this report credible.
A number of Chadian herders were reported as disappeared and
presumed killed.
The family of truck driver Mahamat Oumar was unable to find him
between September 25, when elements of the special gendarmerie antigang
unit based in the Far North Province arrested him, and year's end.
The Government had not initiated any public investigation of any of
these disappearances by year's end.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Penal Code proscribes torture, renders inadmissible in
court evidence obtained thereby, and prohibits public servants from
using undue force against any person; however, although President Biya
also promulgated a new law in 1997 that bans torture by government
officials, there were credible reports that security forces continued
to torture, beat and otherwise abuse prisoners and detainees. In New
Bell and other nonmaximum-security penal detention centers, beatings
are common and prisoners reportedly are chained or flogged at times in
their cells. However, the authorities often administer beatings not in
prison facilities but in temporary detention areas in a police or
gendarme facility. Two forms of physical abuse commonly reported to be
inflicted on detainees include the ``bastinade,'' in which the victim
is beaten on the soles of the feet, and the ``balancoire,'' in which
the victim, with his hands tied behind his back, is hung from a rod and
beaten, often on the genitals. Nonviolent political activists often
have been subjected to such punitive physical abuse during brief
detentions following roundups of participants in antigovernment
demonstrations or opposition party political rallies.
Security forces subject prisoners and detainees to degrading
treatment that includes stripping, confinement in severely overcrowded
cells, and denial of access to toilets or other sanitation facilities.
Police and gendarmes often beat detainees to extract confessions and
the names and whereabouts of alleged criminals. Pretrial detainees
sometimes are required, under threat of abuse, to pay so-called ``cell
fees'' (essentially a bribe to the prison guards to prevent further
abuse).
Government officials at the Nkondengui and Mfou production prisons
near Yaounde continued to inflict severe physcial abuse on the
incarcerated survivors of the Anglophones who were arrested in a
security force dragnet following armed attacks in March 1997 on
government facilities in the Northwest Province (see Section 1.e.). Two
individuals acquitted of the same charges by a military tribunal in
1997 and released in 1998, alleged that they had been tortured
repeatedly, often by flogging, at the garrison of the Lakeside
gendarmerie company in Yaounde. The Anglophone detainees have argued
consistently that their original confessions were extracted through
torture. Such torture ranged from severe beating to being forced to
walk on sharp objects while barefoot. One of these detainees had to
have all of his toes removed due to the extent of his injuries from
bastinade torture. Although the military court that tried these
detainees allowed them to state these charges, it did not rule the
testimony extracted through torture as inadmissible.
On January 17, in the Yaounde neighborhood of Melen, a group of
armed men, one of whom had identified himself as working for a
``colonel,'' shot at Hilaire Tshudjo Kamga, secretary general of
Conscience Africaine, a human rights NGO, and ran his car off theroad
in a car chase, inflicting injuries that required hospitalization. The
attack came shortly after Kamga received several telephone calls
threatening his life in connection with his human rights work (see
Section 4).
On May 11 in Buea, the capital of the Anglophone South West
Province, four gendarmes in plain clothes dragged Martin Zacharia
Njeuma, a university professor of history, out of his vehicle, and beat
him severely. Although authorities subsequently indicated that this was
a case of mistaken identity, police authorities took no disciplinary
action. Mr. Njeuma reportedly attempted to pursue a court case against
the gendarmes.
In October in Bafoussam in the West Province, gendarmes using
batons publicly beat four employees of the Bafoussan urban council 50
times each on the soles of their feet. The public beating reportedly
was ordered without any judicial process by provincial governor Admadou
Tidjani, also known as ``Pinochet'' among inhabitants of the West
Province. The four urban council employees reportedly had fought with a
taxi driver in the course of manning a road checkpoint that the locally
elected but revenue-poor opposition-dominated urban council continued
to maintain in order to enforce revenue-generating local traffic
ordinances after the governor, a central government appointee, had
ordered it dismantled (see Section 3).
It was learned during the year that on September 29, 1998, an
Anglophone barkeeper died while in detention, reportedly as a result of
torture by gendarmes in the town of Wum in the Northwest Province; two
gendarmes reportedly were facing manslaughter charges in connection
with this killing (see Section 1.a.).
In October an Anglophone man detained in Bafoussam since September
1998 on suspicion of manufacturing guns died of mistreatment reportedly
including starvation and torture, and allegedly weighing only 100
pounds at his death (see Section 1.a).
There was a media report that in October in Bafang in the West
Province, a man detained by police on suspicion of having stolen
windshields from parked motor vehicles died from massive internal
bleeding shortly after being released from police custody (see Section
1.a.). However, initial investigation could not confirm this report.
Seke Columban, the police commissioner in Guider, in North
Province, beat Madi Baddai both while arresting him in a nightclub on
September 14, and during a subsequent 4-day detention, causing serious
injuries. The Commissioner reportedly became enraged with Madi Baddai
after Madi Baddai inadvertently touched the commissioner at the night
club; refusing to accept Madi Baddai's apologies, the commissioner
reportedly dragged him to the police station while continuing to beat
him. Although Madi Baddai filed charges against the commissioner, no
action against him had been taken by year's end (see Section 1.d.).
In November police in Yaounde beat on the soles of their feet
several persons whom they were detaining without charge at a district
police station (see Section 1.d.).
Security forces harassed and threatened journalists (see Section
2.a.).
Security forces frequently used roadblocks to exact bribes or
thwart opposition political activities (see Section 2.d.).
On February 22, the Douala Military Tribunal convicted of breach of
orders causing bodily harm and destruction an undisclosed number of
personnel of the 21st Navy Battalion who in January 1998 broke into a
church in Douala, beat and stabbed the priest and several youths, raped
young women, and stole funds. The tribunal sentenced them to 1 years'
imprisonment with no possibility of remission. At year's end, the Buea
military tribunal was preparing to try the commander of the 11th Navy
Battalion and two noncomissioned officers in conncection with looting
and alleged beatings and rapes of civilians by naval cadets in the
Anglophone Southwest Province port of Limbe in November 1998. There
were no developments in other 1998 cases of nonlethal violence by
security forces.
On June 22, there was an incident of tribal violence in the
Northwest Province, where there was a land dispute involving the Awings
and the Balighams. Several people were injured in the conflict, before
the dispute was finally settled by the Northwest Fons Conference
(NOWEFCO) (see Section 5).
Prison conditions remained harsh. Prisons are seriously
overcrowded, unsanitary, inadequate, especially outside major urban
areas. Serious deficiencies in food, health care, and sanitation due to
a lack of funds are common in almost all prisons, including in
``private prisons'' in the north operated by traditional rulers.
Prisoners are kept in dilapidated colonial-eraprisons, where the number
of detainees is four to five times the original capacity. Health and
medical care are almost nonexistent, and prisoners' families are
expected to provide food for their relatives in prison. Prison
officials torture, beat, and otherwise abuse prisoners (see Section
1.c.). Prisoners routinely die due to harsh prison conditions and
inadequate medical treatment. In Douala's New Bell Prison, there were
only seven water taps for a reported 2,300 prisoners; this contributed
to poor hygiene, illness, and deaths. In New Bell and other nonmaximum-
security penal detention centers, families are permitted to provide
food and medicine to inmates. However, beatings are common. Prisoners
reportedly are chained or flogged at times in their cells and often are
denied adequate medical care.
Credible press reports indicate that Douala's New Bell prison,
originally built for 600 inmates, held more than 2,300 during the year.
A 1997 report on prison conditions indicated that Bertoua Prison, which
was built to hold 50 detainees, housed over 700 persons. The Kondengui
Central Prison in Yaounde, constructed in 1967 to hold 1,500 inmates,
reportedly held more than twice that number during the year. The
government official in charge of prisons, Antar Gassagay, reportedly
said in June that the Central Prison of Bafoussam, built for 320
inmates, held 3,140 persons. Overcrowding is exacerbated by the large
number of long pretrial detentions and the practice of ``Friday
arrests'' (see Section 1.d.). According to credible press reports, more
than 1,400 of the inmates of the Douala prison were pretrial detainees,
whereas only 900 were convicted prisoners.
Juveniles and nonviolent prisoners often are incarcerated with
violent adults, although not usually in the same cells. There are
credible reports of sexual abuse of juvenile prisoners by adult
inmates. Corruption among prison personnel is widespread. Persons
awaiting trial often are held in cells with hardened criminals. There
are few detention centers for women; women routinely are held in prison
complexes with men, occasionally in the same cells. Some high-profile
prisoners are able to avoid some of the abuse that security forces
routinely inflict on many common criminals. They are held in elite
wings of certain prisons, where they enjoy relatively lenient
treatment.
Numerous NGO's, diplomatic missions, and the NCHRF all have
criticized publicly the conditions of the group of Anglophone detainees
arrested in 1997. One reliable report described 28 detainees sharing a
cell measuring 14 square meters (about 140 square feet). At least eight
of the original detainees reportedly have died from abuse or lack of
medical care: Emmanuel Konseh, Samuel Tita, Mathias Gwei, Neba Ambe,
Mado Nde, Richard Fomusoh Ngwa, Patrick Jimbou, and Lawrence Fai.
In the north, the Government permits traditional Lamibe (chiefs) to
detain persons outside the government penitentiary system, in effect in
``private prisons.'' The places of detention in the palaces of the
traditional chiefs of Rey Bouba, Gashiga, Bibemi, and Tcheboa have the
reputation of seriously mistreating their inmates. Members of the
National Union for Democracy and Progress (UNDP) party, which was in
opposition until late 1997, have alleged that other UNDP members have
been detained in these private jails and that some have died from
mistreatment.
Both the Cameroonian Red Cross and the NCHRF visited prisons only
infrequently during the year. However, the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) began to visit prisons on March 1, pursuant to a
December 1998 agreement with the Government under which the ICRC was to
have free access to all detention centers and prisons, have private
discussions with the inmates, and make repeated or unscheduled visits
(see Section 4). Although the ICRC does not release its findings
publicly, the Government generally complied with its agreement with the
ICRC, which had not conducted prison visits in the country during the
previous 7 years due to dissatisfaction with the limited access allowed
by the Government. However, despite government assurances that he would
have free access to such sites, officials denied U.N. Special
Rapporteur for Human Rights Nigel Rodley access in May to holding cells
operated by the Government's special antigang unit (see Sections 1.a.
and 1.b.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Penal Code requires
that an arrest warrant be required for any arrest, except when the
criminal is caught in the act; however, security forces continued to
arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. The Penal Code also stipulates
that detainees be brought promptly before a magistrate; however,
arbitrary, prolonged detention remained a serious problem, as security
forces often failed to bring detainees promptly before a magistrate and
sometimes held them incommunicado for months or even years.
Police legally may detain a person in custody in connection with a
common crime for up to 24 hours, renewable three times, before bringing
charges. However, the law provides for the right to a judicial review
of the legality of detention only in the twoAnglophone provinces.
Elsewhere, the French legal tradition applies, precluding judicial
authorities from acting on a case until the administrative authority
that ordered the detention turns the case over to the prosecutor. After
a magistrate has issued a warrant to bring the case to trial, he may
hold the detainee in administrative or ``pretrial detention''
indefinitely, pending court action. Such detention often is prolonged,
due to the understaffed and mismanaged court system. Furthermore, a
1990 law permits detention without charge by administrative authorities
for renewable periods of 15 days, ostensibly in order to combat
banditry and maintain public order. Persons taken into detention
frequently are denied access to both legal counsel and family members.
The law permits release on bail only in the Anglophone provinces, where
the legal system includes features of British common law. Even there
bail is granted infrequently.
Government officials and security forces continued to use arbitrary
arrest to harass and intimidate members of opposition parties and other
critics of the Government. On April 14, gendarmes in the Mbam and
Inoubou Division of the Center Province arrested Gilbert Ndengue
Ndengue, the divisional leader of the Social Democratic Front (SDF),
the country's leading opposition party, when Ndengue refused to comply
with an order from the deputy mayor of Deuk, a member of the ruling
CPDM party, to remove portraits of SDF National Chairman John Fru Ndi
that were hanging in Ndengue's house. Ndengue was charged with
``aggression'' and detained until December 12, when he was released on
bail.
On April 20, gendarmes arrested Francois Fofie, legal advisor to
the Littoral Province executive committee of the SDF opposition party,
at his hotel in Yaounde during a national convention of the SDF, for
allegedly possessing an illegal weapon, even though Fofie reportedly
has legal authorization to carrry a weapon. Gendarmes reportedly
asserted that a company that Fofie manages is supplying the SDF with
weapons to wage an armed insurrection. Fofie was detained for about 2
months, then released.
Starting on July 17, on orders of the Douala urban council,
security forces arrested 70 homeless and mentally disabled persons who
habitually lived in the streets of the city, in order to prevent French
President Jacque Chirac from seeing them during his visit to the
country the following week. The 70 persons were kept in custody in a
special ward of the La Quintinie Public Hospital until released on July
30. Some persons who were mistaken for homeless or mentally disabled
persons also were arrested because they appeared to be part of the
targeted group. Municipal officials in Yaounde also implemented a
similar roundup in connection with the Chirac visit.
On the night of September 14, in Guider, in North Province, Police
Commissioner Seke Colomban, arrested Madi Baddai and detained him for 4
days. The Commissioner reportedly became enraged with Madi Baddai after
Madi Baddai inadvertently touched him, and the Commissioner beat him
both in the night club and while in custody (see Section 1.c.).
In November police in Yaounde arrested and briefly detained several
persons, including journalist Norbert Ouendji, at a telephone kiosk,
following an argument between the kiosk owner and the wife of the
Minister of Territorial Administration. Several of those detained were
beaten on the soles of their feet while they were held in a district
police station (see Section 1.d.). No charges were filed against any
police officers.
Security forces harassed and occasionally detained journalists and
beat demonstrators and members of human rights NGO's (see Sections 2.a.
and 2.b.).
Four Anglophones, Abel Achah Apong, Crispus Kennebie, John Kudi,
and Zacque Njenta, have been in the Yaounde Central Prison since 1995,
and a fifth, Etchu Wilson Arrey, since 1997. Each was incarcerated
after signing or displaying a petition for a referendum on independence
for the Anglophone provinces. At year's end, none of these detainees
had been brought before a judge or charged with a crime.
Nana Koulagne, a former member of the National Assembly and UNDP
activist, has remained in prison in Garoua since May 1997, when members
of the security forces attacked and arrested him and other activists of
the then-opposition UNDP while he was campaigning for election in the
North Province.
Twelve refugees from Equatorial Guinea remained in offical
detention at a military base at year's end, although in fact the
Government allowed them substantial freedom of movement both on and off
the base (see Section 2.d.).
Police and gendarmes often arrest persons on spurious charges on
Fridays at mid-day or in the afternoon. While the law provides for a
judicial review of an arrest within 24 hours, the courts do not convene
sessions on the weekend, so the detainee remains in prison at least
until Monday. Police and gendarmes commonly accept bribes to make such
``Friday arrests'' from persons who haveprivate grievances against the
person arrested. There are no known cases of any policemen or gendarmes
being sanctioned or punished for this practice.
Government intimidation extends beyond the police stations and
holding cells. In his efforts to combat highwaymen (``coupeurs de
route''), Colonel Pom and his special antigang gendarmerie unit (see
Section 1.a.) use informants to identify and accuse persons of taking
part in highway robbery. Standards of proof for such accusations are
nonexistent. Accusations occasionally have been used to pursue private
grievances, and informants repeatedly have extorted money from innocent
persons by threatening to accuse them of being bandits.
The Government does not use forced exile. However, some human
rights monitors or political opponents who considered themselves
threatened by the Government have left the country voluntarily and
declared themselves to be in political exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary remains highly subject to
political influence and corruption. The court system remains
technically part of the executive branch, subordinate to the Ministry
of Justice. The Constitution specifies that the President is the
guarantor of the legal system's independence. He also appoints judges
with the advice of the Supreme Council of the Magistrature. However,
during the 1990's, elements of the judiciary began to show some modest
signs of growing independence. For example in 1992 the Supreme Court
publicly itemized numerous flaws in President Biya's reelection. In
1996 courts voided 18 municipal elections that the Ministry of
Territorial Administration had declared won by ruling party candidates
and ordered the Ministry to hold them again (see Section 3). Since 1997
the courts repeatedly have used powers given them under the 1996 press
law to order the Ministry of Territorial Administration to desist from
seizing print runs of newspapers critical of the Government. However,
an appeals court overturned a criminal libel conviction of journalists
on the grounds that it violated 1990 legislation providing for freedom
of the press (see Section 2.a.). However, some politically sensitive
cases never are heard.
The court system includes the Supreme Court, a court of appeals in
each of the 10 provinces, and courts of first instance in each of the
country's 58 divisions.
Military tribunals may exercise jurisdiction over civilians not
only when the President declares martial law, but also in cases
involving civil unrest or organized armed violence. A law on the
organization of the judiciary promulgated in 1998 also transferred to
military tribunals jurisdiction over gang crimes, grand banditry, and
highway robbery.
The legal system includes both national law and customary law, and
many cases can be tried using either. Customary law is based upon the
traditions of the ethnic group predominant in the region and is
adjudicated by traditional authorities of that group. Accordingly,
particular points of customary law differ depending upon the region and
the ethnic group where a case is being tried. In some areas,
traditional courts reportedly continue to try persons accused of some
offenses, such as practicing witchcraft, by subjecting them to an
ordeal, such as drinking poison (see Section 2.c.). Customary courts
may exercise jurisdiction only with the consent of both parties to a
case; either party has the right to have any case heard by a national
rather than a customary court, and customary law is supposed to be
valid only when it is not ``repugnant to natural justice, equity, and
good conscience.'' However, many citizens in rural areas remain unaware
of their rights under civil law and have been taught since birth that
customary laws form the rules by which they must abide. Consequently,
traditional courts remain important in rural areas and serve as an
alternative for settling disputes. Their authority varies by region and
ethnic group, but they are often the arbiters of property and domestic
disputes and may serve a probate function as well. Most traditional
courts permit appeal of their decisions to traditional authorities of
higher rank.
Corruption and inefficiency in the courts remain serious problems.
Justice frequently is delayed or denied before reaching the trial stage
(see Section 1.d.). At trial political bias often brings trials to a
halt or results in an extremely long process, punctuated by extended
court recesses. Powerful political or business interests appear to
enjoy virtual immunity from prosecution; some politically sensitive
cases are settled with a payoff and thus never are heard. Private
journalists, political opponents, and critics of the Government often
are charged or held and sometimes jailed under libel statutes
considered by observers as unduly restrictive of press freedom (see
Section 2.a.). Prisoners may be detained indefinitely during pretrial
proceedings.
The legal structure is strongly influenced by the French legal
system, although in the Anglophone provinces certain aspects of the
Anglo-Saxon tradition apply. The Constitution provides for a fair
public hearing in which the defendant is presumed innocent. Because
appointed attorneys receive little compensation, the quality of legal
representation for indigent persons is often poor. The Bar Association
and some voluntary organizations, such as the Cameroonian Association
of Female Jurists, offer free assistance in some cases. Trials are
normally public, except in cases with political overtones judged
disruptive of social peace.
On March 1, police in Guider, in North Province, arrested and
detained Mohamdou Tigele on robbery charges that allegedly were
fabricated by Guider Police Commissioner Seke Colomban, who reportedly
was his accomplice in a scheme to sell stolen motor bikes in Douala.
Police beat him severely on March 15 (see Section 1.c.). Tigele
subsequently was tried, convicted, and sentenced to two prison terms of
5 and 8 years.
During the year, the Minister of Culture sued Moise Moubitang for
contempt. In 1998 Moubitang, a civil servant at the Ministry of
Communications, was assaulted by the bodyguard of the Minister of
Culture, arrested, and detained because he did not stop working when
the visiting minister entered his work area. In July at the conclusion
of a trial in which, according to Moubitang, he was not allowed to call
any witnesses to testify on his behalf, a court gave Moubitang a
suspended sentence of 3 years' imprisonment and ordered him to pay a
fine equivalent to approximately $80.
The Government holds a number of political prisoners; however, As
in previous years, there were no reliable estimates of the number of
political prisoners held at the end of the year.
In April 1999, the Government began the trial of the 65 surviving
Anglophones who had been detained, some for more than 2 years, on
suspicion of participating in armed attacks against government
installations in the Northwest Province in March 1997. This judicial
process did not follow either international or national legal norms.
The defendants were not told the specific charges levied against them
until the opening of the trial. The Government transferred jurisdiction
from a civil court to a military court on the grounds that the attacks
were carried out with rifles, classified as ``weapons of war.'' In
addition, the trial location was moved from the Northwest Province
where the attacks occurred and where judicial proceedings must be
conducted in English, to Yaounde, in the Center Province, where
judicial proceedings are conducted in French, even though there was an
acceptable court in the Northwest Province. Before and during the
trial, the accused were incarcerated in detention centers far from
their homes and families. Relatives who attempted to make the journey
to Yaounde to visit the detainees were denied prison visits. The
presiding judge allowed the written testimony of key government
witnesses to stand without giving the defense the opportunity to cross-
examine them. Senior government officials did not refrain from making
public comments on the merits of the case while it was being
adjudicated; for example, on June 17, the Minister of Defense commented
before the National Assembly that ``these people are nothing but grand
bandits,'' and CRTV radio and television broadcast this remark
nationwide. The tribunal admitted into evidence confessions credibly
alleged in court to have been exacted under torture (see Section 1.c.).
The prosecution generally did not produce eyewitnesses able to link
each of the accused to the crimes, while other eyewitnesses offered
contradictory testimony. In October the military tribunal convicted 37
of the accused, sentencing 3 to life imprisonment and 34 to terms
ranging from 1 to 20 years in prison. The tribunal acquitted the 28
defendents, some of whom had been detained for 30 months, during which
at least 8 of the persons originally arrested in this case died in
custody, some of them as a result of torture inflicted on many of these
detainees (see Section 1.c.). The tribunal declared itself incompetent
to rule on two accused illegal Ghanaian immigrants. International human
rights NGO's including Amnesty International issued public statements
criticizing the trial as unfair.
Titus Edzoa, former Minister of Health and longtime presidential
aide, who had declared himself a candidate to oppose incumbent
President Biya in the 1997 election, remains incarcerated, together
with Michel Atangana, his campaign manager. They were sentenced in 1997
to 15 years' imprisonment on embezzlement and corruption charges, for
which Edzoa was arrested shortly after declaring his presidential
candidacy (see Section 3). On April 27, the Yaounde Court of Appeals
confirmed their convictions and their 15-year prison terms. At year's
end, Edzoa reportedly still was held in confinement at the maximum
security gendarmerie headquarters, in cramped quarters with very
limited access to visitors.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The preamble of the Constitution provides for the
inviolability of the home, for the protection against search except by
virtueof law, and for the privacy of all correspondence; however, these
rights are subject to the ``higher interests of the State,'' and there
were a number of credible reports that police and gendarmes harassed
citizens, conducted searches without warrants, and opened or seized
mail. The Government continued to keep some opposition activists and
dissidents under surveillance.
The law permits a police officer to enter a private home during
daylight hours without a warrant if he is pursuing an inquiry and has
reason to suspect that a crime has been committed. The officer must
have a warrant to make such a search after dark. However, a police
officer may enter a private home at any time in pursuit of a criminal
observed committing a crime.
An administrative authority may authorize police to conduct
neighborhood sweeps in search of suspected criminals or stolen or
illegal goods without individual warrants. Such roundups are conducted
frequently. During the year, as in 1998, sweeps involving forced entry
into homes occurred in Yaounde, Douala, Ekondo Titi, Maroua, and
Kousser. In cases where the police have a search warrant for a house or
neighborhood, they have the authority to arrest persons without
personal arrest warrant if they believe those persons are accomplices
to a crime. Typically, security forces seal off a neighborhood, search
homes one after another, arrest persons arbitrarily, and seize
suspicious or illegal articles. A February 19 breakout by prisoners in
the Douala Central Prison was followed by a broad house-to-house search
operation through several Douala neighborhoods. During the search,
citizens without identification papers were arrested or required to pay
a bribe; many were forced to bribe officers to prevent destructive
searches of their homes and seizure of any household item for which
they did not possess a receipt.
Central government administrative officials in pro-oposition
regions reportedly continued to use units of the armed forces to
conduct raids on civilian communities involving massive warrantless
search and seizure operations, ostensibly intended to force the
population to pay taxes, but characterized by some observers as
extralegal punishment for failure to pay taxes. Throughout the 1990's,
and most recently in October, government officials publicly have blamed
opposition parties for the Government's inability to collect internal
revenues effectively in the country's large and economically important
pro-opposition regions.
In November hundreds of persons lost their homes in the Kobba-
Bonaberi neighborhood of Douala when the Douala municipal government
cleared the land, saying that the residents were illegal squatters,
although some residents claimed to have permits signed by municipal
officials.
Security personnel at airports sometimes prevented persons carrying
copies of domestically published private newspapers from traveling
abroad (see Section 2.d). During the year the Government discontinued
and reversed its 1998 intensification of restrictions on the reception
of international and satellite broadcasts (see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of expression and of the press; however, the Government
continued to impose limits on these rights. The Penal Code's libel laws
specify that defamation, abuse, contempt and dissemination of false
news are offenses punishable by prison terms and heavy fines. These
statutes sometimes are invoked by the Government to silence criticism
of the Government and government officials.
While approximately 60 private newspapers were published, only
about 18 were published on a regular basis. Most continued to be highly
critical of President Biya, his Government, its corruption, its human
rights abuses, and its economic policies. However, private journalists
continued to practice greater self-censorship than they did before the
Government's 1994-95 crackdown on the private press.
In 1996 the Government repealed the law that had authorized the
Government both to censor private publications and extrajudicially to
seize publications ``dangerous to public order'' or suspend newspapers'
publication licenses. Previously, the Government often had taken these
extrajudicial actions to inflict economic damage on newspapers critical
of the Government and had done so especially often during election
years.
Since 1997 formal censorship has ceased. In addition seizures of
print runs of private newspapers and other interference with private
newspaper distribution appear to have become less frequent; the
Government did not seize print runs of private newspapers or interfered
with private newspaper distribution during the year. The Government
also did not suspend or revoke the publication licenses of any
newspapers during the year.
However, security forces continued frequently to restrict press
freedom by harassing or abusing private print media journalists .
On April 12, gendarmes based at state-owned Yaounde General
Hospital arbitrarily detained Marie-Noelle Guichi, a Yaounde
correspondent of Le Messager, a Douala-based French-language triweekly
newspaper, for 24 hours, after the head of the hospital accused the
journalist, who was preparing an investigative report on artificial
insemination, of being a spy. The following day gendarmes detained
Guichi's colleague, Norbert Ouendji, after he came to the hospital to
look for her.
On May 31, security forces in Douala, acting on instructions from
the Douala prosecutor, arrested Peter William Mandio, the publisher of
the Douala-based Le Front Independent newspaper. Police detained Mandio
for 24 hours on contempt charges related to an article on the Port
Authority that his newspaper published; the article allegedly contained
military information for which Mandio did not receive military
clearance. The charges later were dropped.
On July 22, gendarmes arrested Christophe Bobiokono, a journalist
with Mutations, a Yaounde-based biweekly newspaper, without a warrant
at the newspaper's Yaounde office, and held him for 24 hours, in
connection with an article he had written about corruption allegedly
involving the son of the Minister of Finance.
The police commissioner, military officials, and gendarmes in the
Ndian Division of the Southwest Province continued to harass Philip
Njaru, correspondent for a Yaounde-based English-language triweekly
newspaper, The Herald (see Section 1.c.), who has written articles
about corruption involving government officials in the Northwest
Province.
Security forces repeatedly questioned the family of Aime Mathurin
Moussy, head of the sporadically-published Douala-based newspaper La
Plume du Jour, while Moussy was in France in May and June, in
connection with Moussy's ongoing public criticism of government
restriction of press freedom.
In May Christian Ngah Mbipgo, the Fon (traditional ruler) of Kumbo,
a small town in the Northwest Province, acting under traditional law at
the request of the mayor of Kumbo, expelled the local correspondent of
The Herald newspaper, Christian Ngah Mbipgo, who had written reports
critical of the mayor.
In May, after producing an audio cassette tape entitled ``Popol va-
t-en'' that poked fun at President Biya, Emmanuel Nyoungwa Kemta
received multiple anonymous threatening phone calls and fled Yaounde to
an undisclosed location.
In June police acting under the instructions of a central
government subprefect broke up a press conference in Douala organized
by a human rights NGO, Solidarity for the Promotion of Human Rights
(PRODHOP). The authorities subsequently banned the press conference,
although PRODHOP had notified the competent administrative authority in
advance. The police detained Dr. Samuel Mack-kit, the secretary general
of the NGO, for 3 hours.
Since 1996 the Government frequently has prosecuted its critics in
the print media under the criminal libel laws. These laws authorized
the Government, at its discretion and at the request of the plaintiff,
to criminalize a civil libel suit, or to initiate a criminal libel suit
in cases of alleged libel against the President and other high
government officials. There continued to be allegations that government
ministers and other high officials offered to drop criminal libel suits
in exchange for cash payments from newspapers or journalists. During
the year, the Government arrested, prosecuted, or convicted a number of
members of the press on criminal libel charges. However, this practice
declined in frequency and severity from previous years, apparently due
in part to greater caution on the part of journalists.
On February 18 the Yaounde Court of First Instance convicted
opposition SDF party chairman John Fru Ndi and journalists Severin
Tchounkeu and Henriette Ekwe of the prominent Douala-based triweekly
newspaper, La Nouvelle Expression, on criminal libel charges. In late
1998, former SDF official Basile Kandoum filed a libel suit against
these three persons in connection with an interview published in La
Nouvelle Expression in which Fru Ndi reportedly stated that Kandoum had
embezzled party funds, and the state counsel initiated a criminal libel
prosecution. The court sentenced the defendants to a suspended fine
equivalent to about $80, and ordered them to pay symbolic damages of
less than one cent to Kandoum.
On June 8, the Bafia Court of First Instance sentenced Severin of
Tchounkeu, publisher of La Nouvelle Expression, and Souley Onohiolo, a
freelance journalist who published an article in thatnewspaper, to pay
a fine equivalent to about $80 (50,000 CFA Francs) pursuant to a
criminal conviction for libel and dissemination of false news. The
court also order the two journalists to pay damages equivalent to about
$133,000 (83 million CFA Francs). Tchounkeu and Onohiolo reportedly
appealed the decision. Some observers indicated that if Tchounkeu loses
his appeal, he may have to serve a prison sentence that was suspended
in connection with a 1997 criminal libel conviction.
On June 15, the Yaounde Court of First Instance sentenced Anselme
Mballa, publisher of Le Serment, a sporadically-published, Yaounde-
based newspaper, to 6 months in prison, pursuant to a conviction for
criminal libel of Denis Oumarou, Secretary of State for Posts and
Telecommunications. Mballa's lawyer appealed the ruling. Mballa was
detained on June 15 and remained in the military barracks of the
Yaounde Central Prison.
However, an appellate court judge provisionally released Michel
Michaut Moussala, publisher of Aurore Plus, a Douala-based, French-
language biweekly, on the grounds that the court of first instance that
had convicted him of criminal libel in 1998 had disregarded the
applicability of the 1990 Law on Freedom of Mass Communication.
There were no developments in several other outstanding criminal
libel cases against private journalists.
No new developments were reported in the following criminal libel
cases, which were believed to be in appellate litigation during 1998:
The 1996 conviction of Patrice Ndedi Penda, publisher of Galaxie; the
1996 conviction of Samuel Eleme and Gaston Ekwalla, publisher and
correspondent of La Detente; the 1996 convictions of Tietcheu Kameni,
Paul Nyemb, and Eyoum Ngangue of Le Messager; and the conviction of
Vianney Ombey Ndzana, publisher of Generations; however, all these
newspapers were published during the year, and their licenses were no
longer suspended at year's end.
The Government publishes an official newspaper, The Cameroon
Tribune. This paper only occasionally implies criticism of the
Government; its reporters do not report extensively on activities or
political parties critical of the Government, overtly criticize the
ruling party, or portray government programs in an unfavorable light.
The Government continued to operate almost all domestic broadcast
media and to determine the content of radio and television broadcasts,
which reach far more citizens than the domestic print media. Because of
their relatively high cost, as well as distribution problems,
newspapers are not read widely outside the major cities. In 1990 and
again in 1995, laws were enacted that provided for the licensing of
private radio and television stations, but the Government has not
approved implementing regulations, despite repeated public promises to
do so. In June the Minister of Communications stated that the
implementing decrees were ready and were awaiting presidential
approval; however, the President did not approve them by year's end.
Since 1997 the Government for the first time has allowed limited
exceptions to its monopoly of broadcast media: It has licensed five
low-power rural community radio stations with extremely limited range,
which are mostly funded by foreign countries, broadcast education-
oriented programs to small audiences, and are not allowed to discuss
politics. In addition three private radio stations broadcast in Yaounde
without licenses; one, Radio Reine, broadcasts Catholic religious
programs. Radio Lumiere, broadcasts music out of a secondary school,
Ndi Samba Superier, and also serves as a training center for journalism
students. The third station, Radio Soleil, began operating in
September. In March the Minister of Communications stated, on a CRTV
radio broadcast, that such unlicensed stations operate ``at their own
risk,'' although the Government took no action to close them. During
the year, the Government discontinued and reversed its 1998
intensification of restrictions on the reception of international cable
and satellite television broadcasts (see Section 1.f.). Local
authorities abandoned their insistence that private cable and satellite
companies cease operations pending implementation of the 1990 law to
liberalize the broadcast media.
Like The Cameroon Tribune, the government-controlled radio and
television monopoly, CRTV, provided broad reporting of CPDM functions,
while giving relatively little attention to the political opposition.
CRTV management, which repeatedly has instructed CRTV staff to ensure
that government views prevail at all times in CRTV broadcasts,
continued during the year to punish CRTV journalists who criticized
government policy. In March management suspended Lazare Etoundi and
Saint Lazare Amougou, two CRTV journalists, for broadcasting a
Congolese artist's interview that sharply criticized the CRTV general
manager's policies toward Congolese music. On May 27, the CRTV general
manager suspended journalist Guy Roger Eba for failing to read all the
congratulatory messages sent to President Biya by other heads of state
around the world on the occasion of the country's nationalday. In June
CRTV management suspended two CRTV journalists, Kenneth Asobo Khan and
Daniel Anicet Noah, for reading a communique that was not approved by
management concerning a meeting of the employees of the Ministry of
Communication who wished to discuss difficulties that journalists face
in dealing with the Government.
Television and radio programming include a weekly program,
Expression Directe, which ostensibly fulfills the Government's legal
obligation to provide an opportunity for all political parties
represented in the National Assembly to present their views. However,
CRTV continued to restrict the opposition SDF party's freedom of
expression through that program, routinely censoring and significantly
shortening proposed SDF programming. For example, on June 17, and again
on August 12 and 13, CRTV management refused to broadcast an SDF expose
of corruption charges against President Biya involving a French oil
company, and on September 9 and 10, CRTV censors deleted parts of SDF
programming about a taxi drivers' strike.
High-tech communications, including the Internet, e-mail, and
satellite phones, are not widely available or utilized; however, a few
cybercafes provide occasional Internet or e-mail access in some urban
areas. There are at least six domestic Internet service providers, one
of which has been in operation for 3 years. Some are privately owned.
The Government has not attempted to restrict or monitor these forms of
communications.
Although there are no legal restrictions on academic freedom, state
security informants operate on university campuses. Many professors
believe that adherence to opposition political parties can affect
adversely their professional opportunities and advancement. Free
political discussion at the University of Yaounde is dampened by the
presence of armed government security forces. Security forces have
subjected Dr. Charley Mejame Ejede, a professor of philosophy at the
University of Douala who is also national secretary of the Liberal
Democratic Alliance political party, to prolonged harassment,
presumably due to his political activism.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for freedom of assembly; however, the Government sometimes restricts
this right in practice. The Penal Code requires organizers of public
meetings, demonstrations, or processions to notify government officials
in advance; it does not require prior government approval of public
assemblies, and does not authorize the Government to suppress public
assemblies that it has not approved in advance. However, for many years
government officials routinely have asserted that this provision of the
Penal Code implicitly authorizes the Government to grant or deny
permission to public assemblies, often have not granted permits to
assemblies organized by persons or groups critical of the Government,
and repeatedly have used force to suppress public assemblies whose
organizers submitted advance notice as required by law but for which
government authorities did not issue permits. The UNDP party in the
Faro and Deo region of Adamaoua Province complained that local
authorities repeatedly blocked their political activities by denying
them permission to meet, even in private residences. The Government
continued its pattern throughout the 1990's of allowing opposition
political parties greater freedom of assembly during nonelection years
than during election years.
However, in February security forces prevented one of two groups of
opposition SDF party officials from attending a meeting in Zoetele, a
small town of the South Province, by erecting a roadblock. The other
group of SDF officials attended the meeting, although government
authorities cut off electricity to the meeting hall.
On June 9, gendarmes and police charged university students who
were demonstrating on the Yaounde-Soa road and beat many students with
rifle butts and batons. The students were demonstrating for measures to
make that dangerous stretch of road safer.
On June 11 in Douala, police and gendarmes broke up a march to a
state-owned radio station by retired workers protesting alleged
nonpayment of benefits by the National Social Insurance Company;
members of the security forces reportedly seized and destroyed
demonstrators' signs and placards.
In June in Doula security forces acting on orders from government
authorities disrupted a public press conference by a human rights NGO
(see Sections 2.a and 4).
The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice during the year, although
there were some exceptions. The conditions for government recognition
of a political party, a prerequisite for many political activities,
were not onerous. Over 150 political parties operated legally, together
with a large and growing number of civic associations. However, the
Government was widely suspected of fomenting splits in the main
opposition party, theSDF, as a pretext to withdraw official recognition
from the main body of the party led by John Fru Ndi. In 1993, following
a split in another opposition party, the Government withdrew official
recognition from the main faction and conferred it on a smaller but
more accommodating faction.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
Relations between the State and religious groups are governed
chiefly by the Law on Religious Congregations. Religious groups must be
approved and registered with the Ministry of Territorial Administration
in order to function legally; there were no reports that the Government
refused to register any group. It is illegal for a religious group to
operate without official recognition, but the law prescribes no
specific penalties for doing so. Although official recognition confers
no general tax benefits, it allows religious groups to receive real
estate as gifts and legacies for the conduct of their activities. In
order to register, a religious denomination must fulfill the legal
requirement to qualify as a religious congregation. This definition
includes ``any group of natural persons or corporate bodies whose
vocation is divine worship'' or ``any group of persons living in
community in accordance with a religious doctrine.'' The denomination
then submits a file to the Minister of Territorial Administration. The
file must include a request for authorization, a copy of the charter of
the group that describes planned activities, and the names and
respective functions of the officials of the group. The Minister
studies the file and sends it to the presidency with a recommendation
for a positive or negative decision. The President generally follows
the recommendation of the Minister, and authorization is granted by a
presidential decree. The approval process usually takes several years,
due primarily to administrative slowness. The only religious groups
known to be registered are Christian and Muslim groups and the Baha'i
Faith, but other groups may be registered. The Ministry has not
disclosed the number of registered denominations, but the number of
registered religious groups is estimated to be in the dozens. The
Government does not register traditional religious groups, on the
grounds that the practice of traditional religions is not public but
rather private to members of a particular ethnic or kinship group, or
to the residents of a particular locality.
Religious missionaries are present throughout the country and
operate without impediment. Several religious denominations also
operate diverse private schools. The Catholic Church, the largest
religious denomination in the country, also operates the country's only
private institution of general post-secondary education, as well as the
country's oldest private radio station, one of the country's very few
modern private printing presses, and a bimonthly newspaper, which until
the 1990's was one of the only private newspapers in the country (see
Section 2.a.).
Although post-secondary education continues to be dominated by
state institutions, private schools affiliated with religious
denominations, including Catholic, Protestant, and Koranic schools,
have long been among the country's best schools at the primary and
secondary levels. The Ministry of Education is charged by law with
ensuring that private schools run by religious groups meet the same
standards as state-operated schools in terms of curriculum, building
quality, and teacher training. For schools affiliated with religious
groups, this oversight function is performed by the Sub-Department of
Confessional Education of the Ministry's Department of Private
Education.
Disputes within registered religious groups about control of places
of worship, schools, real estate, or financial assets are resolved in
the first instance by the executive branch rather than by the
judiciary. In November 1997, 81 of 87 churches of the Cameroon Baptist
Conference (CBC) in the Belo Field District, in Boyo Division of
Northwest Province, reportedly withdrew from the CBC and formed a new
denomination, the Cameroon National Baptist Convention (CNBC). In March
1998, the Ministry of Territorial Administration reportedly ordered
CNBC clergy to cease using CBC facilities and to cease operating CBC
schools. According to one media report, a 1997 Ministry of Education
decision about the control and supervision of CBC-affiliated schools
precipitated the withdrawal of the dissenting congregations.
Government officials criticized and questioned criticisms of the
Government by religious institutions and leaders, but there were no
reports that Government officials used force to suppress such
criticism. During the 1997 presidential election campaign, government
representatives verbally attacked the Catholic Church for being overly
supportive of the political opposition through its forthright criticism
of corruption and mismanagement in government.The practice of
witchcraft is a criminal offense under the national penal code;
however, persons are generally prosecuted for this offense only in
conjunction with some other offense, such as murder. Witchcraft
traditionally has been a common explanation for diseases of which the
causes were unknown.
There was a media report that in September traditional authorities
in Lobe, in Ndian Division of the Southwest Province, banished from the
locality six persons, including one blind man, accused of having killed
a woman by practicing witchcraft. According to the report, a
traditional court tried the accused by requiring them to drink poison
that traditionally is believed to kill only those who lie to the court,
convicted the accused when they refused to drink, ordered them to pay
in-kind, blood-price damages, and expelled them from the locality when
they refused to pay. The accused reportedly filed a protest with the
divisional officer of the central Government. However, initial
investigations could not confirm this report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law does not restrict freedom of
movement within the country; however, in practice government security
forces routinely impede domestic travel. Police frequently stop
travelers to check identification documents, vehicle registrations, and
tax receipts as security and immigration control measures. Police
commonly demand bribes from citizens whom they stop at roadblocks or at
other points.
Roadblocks and checkpoints manned by security forces have
proliferated in cities and most highways and make road travel both
time-consuming and costly, since extortion of small bribes is
commonplace at these checkpoints. In past years, violent and sometimes
fatal confrontations have occurred repeatedly at such checkpoints when
travelers would not or could not pay the bribes demanded by the
security forces.
During the year, unlike previous years, there were no reports that
the Government used its passport control powers to prevent entry or
exit from the country of critics and political opponents. However,
security force personnel at airports sometimes prevented persons from
traveling abroad if they had with them copies of private domestic
newspapers (see Section 1.f.).
Cameroon has long been a safe haven for displaced persons and
refugees from nearby countries.
The law contains provisions for granting refugee status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The Government
provides first asylum to persons who arrive at the border without
documentation but who can show a valid claim to refugee status. The
UNHCR estimated that there were about 47,000 refugees in the country
for whom Cameroon was a country of first asylum. However, some NGO's
claim that the number is as high as 60,000. The majority of these
persons are Chadians, whose total number was estimated to be more than
41,000. The remainder were principally from Rwanda, Burundi, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, with small numbers from Liberia,
Sudan, and Ethiopia. The Government accepts for resettlement refugees
who are granted refugee status by the UNHCR.
Since 1997 government security forces have detained 12 former
senior military officers of Equatorial Guinea who had been granted
refugee status by the UNHCR and had lived in the country for 4 years.
In 1998 these 12 officers, who were affiliated with an Equato-Guinean
opposition party and included Alfonso Mba Nsogo, former head of the
Equato-Guinean military, contested the Government's assertion that it
had arrested them for their own protection. At year's end, the 12
remained in Cameroon under official detention at a security base near
Yaounde. However, they are allowed to leave the base on condition that
they inform the base commander.
There were no confirmed reports of the forced return of persons to
a country where they feared persecution. Although the Government
occasionally returns illegal immigrants, there were no reports of
forced repatriation of recognized refugees. However, in July two
Chadian political refugees disappeared after being summoned to the
Cameroon Security Office (see Section 1.b.). Some illegal immigrants
have been subjected to harsh treatment and imprisonment. Communities of
Nigerians and Chadians have often been the targets of police and
gendarme harassment. During raids, members of the security forces often
extort money from those who do not have regular residence permits or
those who do not have valid receipts for store merchandise (see Section
5).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the constitutional right to change their government,
but dominance of the political process by the President and his party
limits the ability of citizens to exercise this right. President Paul
Biya has controlled the Government since 1982 and the ruling party
since 1984. The 1992 and 1997 presidential elections and the 1997
legislative contests were widely criticized and viewed as fraudulent by
international and domestic observers. In these elections, administered
by the Ministry of Territorial Administration, members of largely pro-
opposition ethnic groups and inhabitants of largely pro-opposition
localities effectively were prevented from registering or voting,
registration and vote counting procedures were not transparent, a
public announcement of results was delayed, and the number of votes
cast in some progovernment areas exceeded the adult population.
Elections are held by balloting that officially is described as
secret but may permit voters to leave the polling place with evidence
of how they voted. At polling places on election day, registered
citizens receive a package containing one card for each candidate.
Citizens vote by depositing into a sealed ballot box, while alone
inside a closed booth, an envelope containing one of these cards.
Voters are supposed to be given an opportunity to dispose of the unused
ballots privately before leaving the polling place, but polling
officials rarely act to ensure that this is done.
Following the flawed 1997 legislative elections, international
observers endorsed a series of reform measures, including the creation
of a permanent and autonomous electoral commission to replace the
present system of elections run by the Ministry of Territorial
Administration. The Government's control of the electoral process leads
to a variety of abuses including preelection manipulation of voter
registration lists.
President Biya's October 1997 reelection was marred by serious
procedural flaws as well as by a boycott by the three major opposition
parties. While the boycott made the outcome a foregone conclusion, most
observers nonetheless considered the contest to be neither free nor
fair. Election irregularities were especially egregious in opposition
strongholds, where boycotting opposition activists chose not to be
present to monitor the voting count.
The Biya administration has proven particularly intolerant of
opposition from within its Beti/Bulu ethnic-regional base in southern
Cameroon. Following the unexpectedly strong showing of opposition
parties in the region in the 1996 municipal elections, Titus Edzoa, a
ruling CPDM member from southern Cameroon, a former Minister of Health,
and a longtime presidential aide, declared himself a candidate to
oppose incumbent President Biya in the October 1997 election. Edzoa and
his campaign manager were arrested shortly after he declared his
candidacy and before the election was held. They were sentenced to 15
years' imprisonment on embezzlement and corruption charges and remained
incarcerated at year's end (see Section 1.e.). Generations, a Yaounde-
based newspaper, which was one of last newspapers to have its
publication license suspended, was also one of very few newspapers that
was both critical of the Government and run by a Beti, Vianney Ombe
Ndzana.
In December 1997, after the Supreme Court announced the official
result, declaring President Biya the winner with 92.57 percent of the
vote, much of the UNDP, which previously had been in opposition, joined
the CPDM in a coalition government. The new ruling coalition also
included a faction of the UPC party that had participated in previous
CPDM-dominated coalition governments under President Biya.
No significant positive reforms have been undertaken to correct the
flaws in the electoral process. In 1998 talks between the ruling CPDM
party and the leading opposition party, the SDF, broke down over the
issue of creating an independent electoral commission, as recommended
by most international observers of the 1992 and 1997 Presidential
elections. The SDF demanded such a commission but the CPDM refused to
grant this demand. Rather, the CPDM-dominated National Assembly passed
a few minor reforms to the 1991 electoral code, including increased
discretionary power for the Minister of Territorial Administration to
rule on the admissibility of candidacies.
The President's control over the country's administrative apparatus
is broad and deep. The President appoints all Ministers, including the
Prime Minister, who serve at the President's pleasure. The President
also directly appoints the governors of each of the 10 provinces. The
governors wield considerable power in the electoral process,
interpreting the laws and determining how these should be implemented.
The President also has the power to appoint important lower level
members of the 58 provincial administrative structures, including the
senior divisional officers, the divisional officers, and thedistrict
chiefs. The governors and senior divisional officers wield considerable
authority within the areas under their jurisdiction, including,
significantly, the authority to ban political meetings that they deem
likely to threaten public order. They also may detain persons for
renewable periods of 15 days to combat banditry and other security
threats.
The 1996 amendments to the 1972 Constitution retained a strongly
centralized system of power, based on presidential authority. However,
the amendments imposed a limit of two 7-year (in place of unlimited 5-
year) terms on the President. They provided for the creation of a
partially elected (70 percent) and partially appointed (30 percent)
senate, along with the creation of a similarly constituted set of
provincial assemblies with limited power over local affairs. Although
promulgated by the President in January 1996, the senate and regional
council amendments have not yet been implemented.
Citizens' right to choose their local governments remained
circumscribed. In 1996 the Government held local government elections
that were unprecedented in the Francophone region and the first such
elections since the 1960's in the Anglophone region. These elections
were for mayors or deputy mayors and council members in Douala,
Yaounde, provincial capitals, and some division capitals. President
Biya first promised such elections in 1992, but postponed them twice.
In the meantime, the Government greatly increased the number of
municipalities run by presidentially-appointed delegates instead of
elected mayors. Delegate-run cities, of which there were only four in
1992, by 1996 included all the provincial capitals and some division
capitals in pro-opposition provinces, but not in the southern provinces
that had tended to support the CPDM. In 1998 a 60-member Committee on
Good Governance, created by the Government, publicly recommended that
the Government eliminate the position of delegate in order to allow
elected local officials to manage municipal governments more freely.
Even in municipalities with elected mayors, local autonomy is limited,
since elected local governments must rely on the central Government for
most of their revenues and their administrative personnel.
Like the 1992 National Assembly elections, the 1996 municipal
elections were less flawed than other elections held since 1990.
Foreign observers considered the elections largely free and fair,
having detected few instances of malfeasance during or after the
voting, although opposition parties credibly alleged systematic
preelection government manipulation of the registration lists and
arbitrary government disqualification of their candidates, especially
in the south. Government election authorities acknowledged that
opposition candidates won 104 of the 336 offices at stake. Ninety-six
contests in which the Government declared the ruling party candidate
the winner were appealed to the Supreme Court, which declared itself
unqualified to adjudicate many of these complaints, but nullified the
results of 18 elections, which it ordered the Government to hold again.
As of year's end, the Government had not complied with any of these
Supreme Court orders.
During the year the Biya Government continued to use against its
preeminent political opponent the criminal libel prosecution tactic
that it developed in recent years against its critics in the private
press. In 1998 the Government criminalized a civil libel suit filed
against SDF party chairman John Fru Ndi by a disgruntled former SDF
official whom Fru Ndi reportedly had accused publicly of embezzling
party funds (see Section 2.a.). In February the Government obtained a
felony conviction of Fru Ndi in a nonjury trial. The court did not
sentence Fru Ndi to prison. Conviction and imprisonment on a felony
charge, including a criminal libel charge, renders a citizen legally
ineligible to hold public office. Although legal opinion appeared
divided about whether a felony conviction without a prison sentence may
also render a citizen legally ineligible to hold public office, some
observers believed that Fru Ndi's conviction might enable the
Government to disqualify him for any public office for which he may
seek to run in the future. In April Fru Ndi--who in the country's only
seriously contested presidential election in 1992 finished a close
second to Biya despite serious flaws in the electoral process that
favored the incumbent--was reelected overwhelmingly as the national
leader of the country's largest opposition party, the SDF, in a freely
contested, transparent, and apparently fair election at a national
party convention.
There are no laws that specifically prohibit women or members of
minorities from participating in government, in the political process,
or in other areas of public life. However, women are underrepresented
in government and politics. Women hold 3 of 50 cabinet posts, 10 of 180
seats in the National Assembly, and few of the higher offices of major
political parties, including the CPDM.
Many of the key members of the Government are drawn from the
President's own Bulu/Beti ethnic group, as are disproportionately large
numbers of military officers and CPDM officials. Membersof some of the
other 200 ethnic groups hold 34 cabinet seats, compared with 16 cabinet
positions held by members of the President's ethnic group.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Domestic and international human rights monitoring groups generally
have considerable latitude to operate. A large number of independent
human rights monitoring groups exist, although the activities of
virtually all are limited by a shortage of funds and trained personnel.
The Government did not formally prevent human rights monitors from
operating. In the past, the Government used its authority to approve or
withhold official recognition of NGO's, but there have been no recent
cases in which such recognition was withheld. However, Government
officials repeatedly impeded the effectiveness of human rights NGO's by
limiting access to prisoners, by refusing to share information, and
increasingly by threatening and using violence against personnel of
human rights NGO's (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
Domestic human rights NGO's include the National League for Human
Rights, the Organization for Human Rights and Freedoms, the Association
of Women Against Violence, the Cameroonian Association of Female
Jurists, the Cameroonian Association for Children's Rights, Conscience
Africaine, the Movement for the Defense of Human Rights and Liberties
(MDHRL), the Human Rights Defense Group, the National Association of
Nontribalists and Nonracists, the Committee of Action for Women's and
Children's Rights (CADEF), the Human Rights Clinic and Education
Center, the Association of Women against Violence, the Cameroonian
Association for Children's Rights, the Cameroon National Association
for Family Welfare (CAMNAFAW), Tribes Without Frontiers (TSF), the
Association for the Promotion of Communal Initiatives, and the League
for Rights and Freedoms (LDL). A number of these groups issued press
releases or reports detailing specific human rights violations. Many
held seminars and workshops on various aspects of human rights.
However, during the year there were regular reports that government
officials, including members of the security forces as well as
anonymous persons, interfered with the operations of human rights NGO's
by threatening and using violence against their personnel. On January
17, in Yaounde a group of unidentified armed men shot at Dr. Hilaire
Kambga, the secretary general of the national chapter of Conscience
Africaine, and ran his car off the road in a car chase, inflicting
injuries that required hospitalization. Kamga indicated that one of his
attackers, just before the attack, had stated that ``my colonel''
wanted to see Kamga, that his car had been followed the previous day
and that he recently had received anonymous threatening phone calls in
connection with his human rights work (see Section 1.c.). Elements of
Colonel Pom's special antigang gendarmerie unit repeatedly threatened
Abdoulaye Math, a human rights monitor and chairman of the Maroua-based
MDHRL, and Semdi Soulaye, the MDHRL's secretary general, causing them
to flee from the Far North Province to Yaounde for a week in early
June. In June in Douala police acting on orders from government
authorities broke up a press conference by a human rights NGO and
detained the NGO's secretary general (see Section 2.a.). As of year's
end, the Government had not prosecuted any of the persons who
reportedly committed these abuses.
The Government generally cooperated with the U.N. Special
Rapporteur for Human Rights on a visit to the Far North Province, but
Colonel Pom's special antigang gendarmerie unit denied him access to
its holding cells (see Section 1.c.). The Government allowed the ICRC,
for the first time in 7 years, to have generally unrestricted access to
all prisons and detention places and to hold private discussions with
inmates.
The governmental National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms
(NCHRF), although hampered by a shortage of funds, conducted a number
of investigations into human rights abuses, visited prisons, and
organized several human rights seminars aimed at judicial officials,
security personnel, and other government officers. Although the
Commission infrequently condemned publicly the Government's human
rights abuses, its staff intervened with government officials in
specific cases of human rights harassment by security forces, attempted
to stop Friday arrests (see Section 1.d.) in at least one Yaounde
police station, and attempted to obtain medical attention jailed
suspects in specific cases. The NCHRF is prohibited by law from
publishing information on specific human rights cases. However, it may
and does submit reports on specific alleged abuses to the government
authorities directly involved, along with recommendations for improving
conditions or punishing violators.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution does not explicitly forbid discrimination based on
race, language, or social status. The Constitution prohibits
discrimination based on sex and mandates that ``everyone has equal
rights and obligations,'' but the Government does not enforce these
constitutional provisions effectively.
Women.--Violence against women remains at high levels. Women's
rights advocates report that the law does not impose effective
penalties against men who commit acts of domestic violence. There are
no gender-specific assault laws, despite the fact that women are the
predominant victims of domestic violence. Spousal abuse is not a legal
ground for divorce. In cases of sexual assault, a victim's family or
village often imposes direct, summary punishment on the suspected
perpetrator through extralegal means ranging from destruction of
property to beating. While there are no reliable statistics on violence
against women, the large number of newspaper reports--a fraction of
actual incidents--indicates that it is widespread.
Despite constitutional provisions recognizing women's rights, women
do not, in fact, enjoy the same rights and privileges as men. The civil
law theoretically provides equal status and rights for men and women.
However, no legal definition of discrimination exists, and some points
of civil law are prejudicial to women. The 1981 Civil Code allows a
husband to oppose his wife's right to work in a separate profession if
the protest is made in the interest of the household and the family.
While the law gives a woman the freedom to organize her own business,
the Commercial Code allows a husband to end his wife's commercial
activity by notifying the clerk of the commerce tribunal of his
opposition based upon the family's interest. Partly for this reason,
some employers require a husband's permission before they hire a woman.
Polygyny is permitted by law and tradition, but polyandry is not. In
cases of divorce, the husband's wishes determine the custody of
children over the age of 6. While a man may be convicted of adultery
only if the sexual act takes place in his home, a female may be
convicted without respect to venue.
Civil law offers a more equal standard than customary law, which is
far more discriminatory against women, since in many regions a woman
customarily is regarded as the property of her husband. Because of the
importance attached to customs and traditions, laws protecting women
often are not respected. Despite the law that fixes a minimum age of 15
years for a bride, many girls are married off by their families by the
age of 12. In the customary law of some ethnic groups, husbands not
only maintain complete control over family property, but also can
divorce their wives in a traditional court without being required to
provide either verifiable justification or alimony. The extent to which
a woman may inherit from her husband normally is governed by
traditional law in the absence of a will, and customs vary from group
to group. In many traditional societies, custom grants greater
authority and benefits to male than to female heirs. Another problem
facing women is forced marriage; in some regions, girls' parent can and
do give them away in marriage without their consent. Often, a bride's
parents are paid a ``bride price'' by the husband, who is sometimes
many years older than the girl. Since a price has been paid, the girl
is considered the property of the husband. When a married man dies, his
widow is often unable to collect any inheritance, since she herself is
considered part of the man's property. The widow often is forced to
marry one of the deceased's brothers. Refusal means that she must repay
the bride price in full (she usually has no source of funds) and leave
the family property. In the northern provinces, some Lamibe
(traditional rulers) reportedly prevent their wives and concubines from
ever leaving their palaces. The lack of a national legal code covering
the family leaves women defenseless against male-oriented customs.
In practice, although not in law, women also suffer from
discrimination in access to education. The gap in school attendance
rates between boys and girls is 9 percent nationally and 14 percent in
the three northern provinces. This problem, which is especially accute
in rural areas, results in higher levels of illiteracy among women than
among men. According to a 1995 study by a U.N. agency, the adult
literacy rate was 75 percent for men but only 52 percent for women. In
addition, fewer girls are found at higher levels of education;
according to a 1992 study by the Ministry of Women's Affairs, women
made up only 23 percent of postsecondary students.
Children.--The Constitution provides for a child's right to
education, and schooling is mandatory through the age of 14.
Nevertheless, in the wake of public sector expenditure cuts and a
currency devaluation in 1993-94, increases in formal and informal
school fees relative to disposable income have forced many families
toforego sending their children to school. The Government has chosen to
make public education bear a disproportionate amount of its fiscal
retrenchment since 1993. Government spending on education shrank from
4.3 percent of recorded GDP in 1992-93 to an estimated 1.8 percent of
recorded GDP in 1998-99.
In 1998 the Government ordered the closure of about 180 unlicensed
private primary and secondary schools, mostly in Douala and other pro-
opposition areas, in which enrollment had grown to perhaps 50,000
pupils. During the year the Government closed down dozens more such
schools, mainly in Douala. While the government vowed to combat
clandestine schools, these institutions have sprung up mainly in
response to the deterioration of public schools.
Female genital mutilation (FGM), which has been condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is not practiced widely, but it is traditional
and continues to be practiced in some areas of Far North and Southwest
Provinces. It includes the most severe form of the abuse, infibulation,
and usually is practiced on preadolescent girls. The Government has
criticized the practice; however, no law prohibiting FGM is known to
exist.
The degree of familial child abuse is not known but is one of
several targeted problems of children's rights organizations.
People with Disabilities.--A 1983 law and subsequent implementing
legislation provide certain rights for persons with disabilities. These
include access to public institutions, medical treatment, and
education. The Government is obliged to bear part of a disabled
person's educational expenses, to employ disabled persons where
possible, and, as necessary, to provide them with public assistance.
However, these rights in fact rarely are respected. There are few
facilities for disabled persons and little public assistance of any
kind. Lack of facilities and care for the mentally disabled is
particularly acute. In recent years, the Government reportedly has
reduced the share of its expenditures that benefit disabled persons and
has terminated subsidies to NGO's that help disabled persons. On one
occasion during the year, the municipal governments of Yaounde and
Douala each detained a large number of people who appeared to be
mentally disabled or homeless to prevent their being seen by a visiting
foreign dignitary (see Section 1.d.). Society tends to treat the
disabled as tainted, leaving churches or foreign NGO's responsible for
providing assistance. However, there is no widespread societal
discrimination against the disabled. The law does not mandate special
access provisions to buildings and facilities for the disabled.
Indigenous People.--A population of perhaps 50,000 to 100,000 Baka
(Pygmies), a term that encompasses several different ethnic groups,
primarily reside in the forested areas of the South and East provinces,
of which Pygmies were the earliest known inhabitants. While no legal
discrimination exists, other groups often treat Pygmies as inferior and
sometimes subject them to unfair and exploitative labor practices.
There have been credible reports of Pygmies being forced out of their
homes by logging companies and security forces. There continued to be
reports that Pygmies complain that the forests they inhabit are being
logged without fair recompense for the negative consequences suffered
by the Pygmies of the region.
Religious Minorities.--Approximately 40 percent of the population
are at least nominally Christian, about 20 percent are at least
nominally Islamic, and about 40 percent practice traditional indigenous
religions or no religion. Christians are concentrated chiefly in the
southern and western provinces. Muslims are concentrated chiefly in the
northern provinces. Traditional indigenous religions are practiced in
rural areas throughout the country.
Some religious groups face societal pressures within their regions.
In the northern provinces, especially in rural areas, societal
discrimination by Muslims against persons who practice traditional
indigenous religions is strong and widespread, and some Christians in
rural areas of the north complain of discrimination by Muslims.
There were occasional reports of isolated conflict between
Christians and practitioners of traditional indigenous religions. In
December 1998, members of a local traditional secret society, the
Nwerong, accused Emmanuel Ngah, the pastor of the Cameroon Baptist
Church in Ndu, a village in Northwest Province, of having killed by
witchcraft Emmanuel Siben, an employee of the state-owned electrical
power company. The Nwerong reportedly attempted to expel Ngah from the
village, along with eight other persons whom the Nwerong also accused
of practicing witchcraft. Some of the nine persons reportedly left Ndu
for the neighboring villageof Ntumbaw, from which they reportedly were
expelled by the Nwerong of Ntumbaw.
There was one incident of religiously motivated violence by
practitioners of a traditional indigenous religion against persons who
did not practice that religion. In April near Buea in Southwest
Province, villagers said to be acting on the orders of local
traditional rulers beat three Germans working with a nongovernmental
environmental organization for taking pictures of Mount Cameroon during
an eruption of that volcano. Local traditional rulers reportedly had
banned all travel to the mountain pending traditional indigenous
religious rites to appease local deities in the hope of controlling the
eruption.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population is divided into
more than 200 ethnic groups, among which there are frequent and
credible allegations of discrimination. Members of virtually all ethnic
groups commonly provide preferential treatment to fellow members when
they are able to do so. Ethnic-regional differences continue to pose
obstacles to political and economic liberalization.
Members of President Biya's Bulu ethnic group and of closely
related Beti groups of southern Cameroon are represented
disproportionately and hold key positions in government, the civil
service, state-owned businesses, the security forces, the military, and
the ruling CPDM party. The large size and centralized character of the
public sector has long been widely perceived to favor these groups.
Prospective economic and political liberalization is widely perceived
as being likely to harm these groups, and to favor other groups, such
as the large Bamileke and Anglophone ethnic-cultural groups of the
west, whose members tend to be more active in private commerce and
industry and have tended to support the SDF since the legalization of
opposition parties. Since 1990 natives of the two Anglophone provinces,
the Northwest and Southwest Provinces, have suffered disproportionately
from human rights violations committed by the Government and its
security forces, have been underrepresented in the public sector, and
generally have believed that they have not received their fair share of
public sector goods and services. Since the flawed 1992 presidential
election, which SDF Chairman John Fru Ndi, a native of the Northwest
Province, accused Biya of having stolen from him, many residents of the
Anglophone region have sought to achieve greater freedom, greater
equality of opportunity, and better government, at least partly by
regaining regional autonomy rather than through nationwide political
reform, forming several quasipolitical organizations to pursue that
goal (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.).
During the year, following an international press report that
Anglophone separatists had begun smuggling in arms from Nigeria the
Government increased deployments of units of the armed forces in the
Anglophone provinces and arrested increasing numbers of Anglophones and
SDF members on charges of illegally owning or making arms (see Sections
1.a., 1.c. and 1.d.), although the leadership of the SDF repeatedly
reaffirmed publicly the party's longstanding commitment to nonviolent
forms of political struggle and to federalist decentralization rather
than Anglophone secession. On December 30, a group of armed Anglophones
seized the state radio station in Buea, occupied it for 3 hours, and
broadcast a message proclaiming the independence of the two Anglophone
provinces; no violence or arrests were reported in connection with
their occupation of the station. In June the Mayor of Bafoussam, the
capital of the West Province officials, reportedly voiced suspicions
that ruling CPDM party activists set fires that destroyed a market in
Bafoussam on June 10, and SDF national party chairman Fru Ndi
reportedly speculated publicly that agents of the central Government
might have started market fires in Bafoussam and other towns targeting
the commercially active Anglophone and Bamileke communities; however,
no evidence materialized to confirm such suspicions. Also during the
year, the Vatican's appointment of a Bamileke to serve as the Roman
Catholic Church's Archbishop of Yaounde led to criticism and some
public demonstrations by members of the Beti ethnic group.
Northern Cameroon suffers from ethnic tensions between the Fulani
(or Peuhl), a Muslim group that conquered most of the region 200 years
ago, and the ``Kirdi,'' the descendents of diverse groups who then
practiced traditional indigenous religions and whom the Fulani
conquered or displaced, justifying their conquest on religious grounds.
Although some Kirdi subsequently have adopted Islam, the Kirdi remain
socially, educationally, and economically disadvantaged relative to the
Fulani in the three northern provinces. Traditional Fulani rulers
(lamibe) continue to wield great power over their subjects, often
including Kirdi, sometimes subjecting them to tithing and forced labor.
The slavery still practiced in parts of northern Cameroon is reported
to be largely enslavement of Kirdi by Fulani. Although the UNDP party
is based largely in the Fulani community, the ruling CPDM party has
long been widely perceived to represent Fulani as well as Beti-Bulu
interests.
During the 1990's, local-language broadcasts by government-
controlled regional radio stations in the south Cameroon, as well as
private French-language newspapers with close ties to leading
government and CPDM figures, repeatedly have incited ethnic animosity
against Bamilekes and Anglophones. During the year, anti-Bamileke and
anti-Anglophone commentaries continued unabated in the radio
broadcasts, but were less conspicuous in the pro-CPDM print media than
they were earlier in some prior years.
Members of the country's large community of Nigerian immigrants
often complain of illegal discrimination and even persecution by
elements of the Government. Crackdowns on undocumented Nigerian
immigrants repeatedly have been announced by government officials. For
example, in March and April, security forces in Fako Division in the
Southwest Province reportedly conducted mass arrests of foreigners
without residence permits, most of whom were Nigerians.
On June 22, a land dispute between the Awing and Baligham tribes in
the Northwest Province led to mass violence, in which several persons
were injured; the dispute subsequently was adjudicated by NOWEFCO, a
voluntary association of traditional rulers (see Section 1.c.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1992 Labor Code allows workers to
form and join trade unions of their choosing. The Labor Code permits
groups of at least 20 workers to organize a union but also requires
registration with the Ministry of Labor. However, in practice
independent unions have found it extremely difficult to obtain
registration. Registered unions are subject to government domination
and interference. Some sections of the Labor Code have never taken
effect because not all of the implementing decrees have been issued.
There are two trade union confederations. Until 1995 the sole labor
confederation was the Confederation of Cameroonian Trade Unions (CCTU),
formerly affiliated with the ruling CPDM party under another name (the
Organization of Cameroonian Trade Unions.) In 1995 the Government
encouraged the creation of a new labor confederation, the Union of Free
Trade Unions of Cameroon (USLC), with which it maintains close ties.
This move was seen as an effort by the Government to create a rival
trade union confederation more firmly under its control. In 1998 the
CCTU, government control of which had been eroding since large public
sector salary cuts in 1993, split into two rival factions, and the
Government banned a conference by the CCTU's reformist faction, led by
Benoit Essiga. A CCTU congress held in April, which was attended by
international observers and held under the auspices of the
International Labor Organization (ILO), elected the reform faction
slate of candidates to CCTU leadership positions. However, the
Government has been unwilling to recognize the new leadership, and
refuses to meet, speak or bargain with the union.
The Labor Code explicitly recognizes workers' right to strike, but
only after mandatory arbitration. Arbitration proceedings are not
enforceable legally and can be overturned by the Government. The Labor
Code provides for the protection of workers engaged in legal strikes
and prohibits retribution against them. However, these provisions of
the Labor Code do not apply to civil servants, employees of the
penitentiary system, or workers responsible for national security.
Instead of strikes, civil servants are required to negotiate grievances
directly with the minister of the concerned department and with the
Minister of Labor.
During the year, actual and threatened labor strikes were much more
numerous than in recent prior years. There were strikes by taxi
drivers' and railroad workers' unions. The university teachers and high
school teachers, who are generally state employees, won concessions
from the Government after issuing credible strike threats (see Section
5).
The CCTU is a member of the Organization of African Trade Unions
and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The USLC
filed applications for membership with these organizations in 1995.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
provides for collective bargaining between workers and management in
workplaces, as well as between labor federations and business
associations in each sector of the economy. No sectoral collective
bargaining negotiations have occured in recent years. When labor
disputes arise, the Government chooses which labor union to invite into
the negotiations, selectively excluding some labor representatives. The
Labor Code prohibits antiunion discrimination, and employers guilty of
such discrimination are subject to fines of up to an amount equivalent
to about $1,600 (1 million CFA Francs).However, employers found guilty
are not required to reinstate the workers against whom they
discriminated. The Ministry of Labor has reported no complaints of such
discrimination during recent years.
There is an industrial free zone regime, but the Government did not
grant approval to any firms to operate under it during the year. Free
zone employers are exempt from some provisions of the Labor Code but
must respect all internationally recognized worker rights.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
the Labor Code prohibit forced or compulsory labor; however, it occurs
in practice. Forced or bonded labor by children is not prohibited
specifically. The authorities continued to allow prison inmates to be
contracted out to private employers or used as communal labor for
municipal public works.
There were credible reports that slavery continued to be practiced
in parts of northern Cameroon, including in the Lamidat of Rey Bouba, a
traditional kingdom in the North Province (see Section 5). In the South
and East Provinces, Baka (Pygmies), including children, continued to be
subjected to unfair and exploitative labor practices (see Section 5).
There were reports of trafficking in girls (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--A 1969 Ministry of Labor order and the 1992 Labor Code
provide the legal framework for the protection of children in the field
of labor and education. Article 86 of the Labor Code and the
Ministerial Order both set the minimum age for the employment of
children at 14. The Ministerial Order also enumerates tasks that cannot
be performed legally by children between the ages of 14 and 18. These
tasks include moving heavy weights, dangerous and unhealthy tasks,
working in confined areas, or tasks that could hurt a child's morality.
The order also states that a child's workday cannot exceed 8 hours. In
order to allow children between the ages of 14 and 18 to improve their
knowledge and education, employers are required to train them. To this
end, work contracts must contain a training provision for these minors.
However, Ministry of Labor inspectors responsible for enforcing the
law lack resources for an effective inspection program. Moreover, the
legal prohibitions do not include family chores, which in many
instances are beyond a child's capacity to do. In the north of the
country, there are credible reports that children from needy homes are
placed with other families to do such work for money. The Constitution
does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded labor by children, and
there were reports of its practice (see Section 6.c.).
In rural areas, many children begin work at an early age on family
farms. Often, rural youth, especially girls, are employed by relatives
as domestic helpers, while many urban street vendors are under 14 years
of age. There are no special provisions limiting working hours for
children. Primary education is compulsory through the age of 14.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Under the Labor Code, the
Ministry of Labor is responsible for setting a single minimum wage
applicable nationwide in all sectors. The minimum wage is approximately
$40 (23,514 CFA Francs) per month. It does not provide a decent
standard of living for an average worker and family.
The Labor Code establishes a standard workweek of 40 hours in
public and private nonagricultural firms, and 48 hours in agricultural
and related activities. The code makes compulsory at least 24
consecutive hours of weekly rest.
The Government sets health and safety standards, and Ministry of
Labor inspectors and occupational health doctors are responsible for
monitoring these standards. However, they lack the resources for a
comprehensive inspection program. There is no specific legislation
permitting workers to remove themselves from dangerous work situations
without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Penal Code provides that any person
who engages in any traffic in persons shall be punished with
imprisonment of from 10 to 20 years and that the court may also impose
a forfeiture penalty.
According to the NCHRF, there have been reports of farm-to-city
trafficking of girls who were promise jobs in cities, but were forced
into prostitution or other labor. Early in the year, there was a media
report that young girls in Douala were being seized as they left school
and subsequently sold. In late March, according to that report, local
youths in Douala's Bapenda neighborhood reportedly caught a woman in
the act of trying to kidnap a young girl from the Bepanda nursery
school. The same report indicated that police rescued the woman from a
lynching by fire at the hand of neighorhood residents and detained her
in Doula's New Bell Prison, where she assisted investigators who sought
to break this trafficking network. Initial efforts to investigate these
reports could not corroborate them, but inquiries were continuing at
year's end. No NGO's were known to be working to reduce trafficking in
persons.
______
CAPE VERDE
Cape Verde is a multiparty parliamentary democracy in which
constitutional powers are shared between the elected Head of State,
President Antonio Mascarenhas Monteiro, an independent; the Head of
Government, Prime Minister Carlos Wahnon Veiga; and his party, the
Movement for Democracy (MPD). The MPD has an absolute majority in the
National Assembly. The principal opposition party, the African Party
for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV), held power in a one-party
state from independence in 1975 until 1991. The judiciary is
independent, but there were accusations that courts manipulate trial
schedules for political reasons.
The Government controls the police, which has primary
responsibility for maintenance of law and order. Some members of the
police and prison guards committed human rights abuses.
Cape Verde has a market-based economy but little industry and few
exploitable natural resources. Based on 1998 data, the per capita
income is $1,312 (11,312 escudos). The country has a long history of
economically driven emigration, primarily to Western Europe and the
United States, and receipts from Cape Verdeans abroad remain an
important source of income. Even in years of optimum rainfall, the
country can produce food for only 25 percent of the population of
approximately 400,000 persons, resulting in heavy reliance on
international food aid.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, problems remain in several areas. There were a few
credible reports of police abuse, including beatings, of citizens
detained on suspicion of criminal activity. While in principle the law
and the judiciary provide means to deal with isolated instances of
abuse, in practice the Government has not held accountable police
officers who were credibly accused of human rights abuses. Prisons do
not meet minimum international standards. The judicial system is
overburdened, and lengthy delays in trials are common. There were
allegations of media self-censorship. Violence and discrimination
against women and mistreatment of children continued to be serious
problems. Although the Government supported legislation to ameliorate
these problems, it failed to adopt, implement, and enforce policies
designed to address the most critical challenges. The revision of the
Constitution in July included the creation of an independent ombudsman.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, but there were
a number of credible reports that police and prison guards mistreated
prisoners. While mechanisms for investigating citizen complaints of
police brutality exist in theory, in practice these mechanisms neither
ensure the punishment of all those responsible, nor effectively prevent
future violations. In addition in some instances of violence against
women, the police did not protect the victims effectively.
Prisons do not meet minimum international standards and they are
severely overcrowded. In August the Minister of Justice took
disciplinary action against prison guards accused of abusing detainees.
The Government permits both formal visits by human rights monitors
to prisons and routine visits to individual prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The laws provide for
protection from arbitrary arrest and detention, and the authorities
generally observe these laws in practice. The law stipulates that a
suspect must be charged before a judge within 48 hours of arrest.
Police may not make arrests without a court order unless a person is
caught in the act of committing a felony. A provision that allowed
authorities to detain a person for up to 5 days in exceptional cases
was revoked.
The courts have jurisdiction over state security cases. There is a
functioning system of bail.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for a
judiciary independent of the executive branch, and the Government
respects this provision in practice. However, there continued to be
accusations of politicized and biased judicial decisions. In July a
prosecutor dismissed a case against four citizens associated with the
main opposition party who had been arrested for church desecration in
1996. In 1998 a judge ordered their release from detention because of
lack of evidence. The prosecutor's decision in July should have ended
the State's efforts to prosecute the case permanently; however, the
Attorney General did not confirm the prosecutor's decision and declared
that the case should await better proof. Another case also involving
church desecration appeared to indicate an attempt by a state official
to manipulate the judicial process, but in July everyone involved was
found innocent (see Section 5). Soon afterwards the Director-General of
the judiciary police publicly questioned the judge's impartiality on
the grounds that a relative of the judge's appeared as a defense
witness. The Director-General's behavior was criticized by the High
Court of Magistrates. Many observers recognize that the law requires a
judge to recuse himself when the plaintiff or defendant is a relative.
This exchange led some persons to question whether the Director-
General's motive was to elicit a complaint against him by the judge. If
so the judge would be required to recuse herself from a criminal trial
scheduled for October, in which the Director-General was to testify as
the prime investigator for the prosecution and the judge was scheduled
to preside.
The judicial system is composed of the Supreme Court and the
regional courts. Of the five Supreme Court judges, one is appointed by
the President, one by the National Assembly, and three by the Superior
Judiciary Council. This council, created by the last revision of the
Constitution in July, consists of the President of the Supreme Court,
the Attorney General, eight private citizens, two judges, two
prosecutors, the senior legal inspector of the Attorney General's
office, and a representative of the Ministry of Justice. Judges are
independent and may not belong to a political party.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial. Defendants
are presumed to be innocent; they have the right to a public, nonjury
trial; to counsel; to present witnesses; and to appeal verdicts. Free
counsel is provided for the indigent. Regional courts adjudicate minor
disputes on the local level in rural areas. The Ministry of Justice
does not have judicial powers; such powers lie with the courts.
Defendants may appeal regional court decisions to the Supreme Court.
The judiciary generally provides due process rights. However, the
right to an expeditious trial is constrained by a seriously
overburdened and understaffed judicial system. A backlog of cases
routinely leads to trial delays of 6 months.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities respect these prohibitions, and violations are subject to
effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the
freedom to express ideas by words, images, or any other means, and for
freedom of the press without censorship, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice. There is a substantial and growing
independent press. Two new private newspapers have emerged.
Nevertheless, there was continued criticism by independent political
figures of the performance of the state-controlled television, radio,
and print media for their failure to exercise vigorously their
monitoring role in a multiparty system. In several instances persons
whose views did not coincide with those of the Government and the
ruling party were transferred, fired, or subjected to other
disciplinary actions, the Government does not acknowledge that the
divergence of views was the reason for such actions.
During the revision of the Constitution in July, the provision on
freedom of expression was amended so that this freedom cannot be used
as a defense in cases involving defamation or offense to personal
honor. This wording was criticized strongly by the opposition and some
journalists on the grounds that it may limit freedom of expression
significantly.
Journalists are independent of government control and are not
required to reveal their sources. However, there are credible reports
that journalists within the government-controlled media still practice
self-censorship.
Government authorization is not needed to publish newspapers or
other printed material. Despite the broadly interpreted criminal libel
laws, no independent media outlets reported having experienced direct
pressure in their daily operations or businessactivities. The national
radio station provides live broadcasts of National Assembly sessions.
The law requires a formal licensing mechanism for mass media,
including government authorization to broadcast.
The Constitution provides for academic freedom, and this right is
respected in practice.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly and association without
authorization and without harassment by the authorities. Throughout the
year, labor organizations, opposition political parties, civic action
groups, and numerous others exercised this right without government
interference or objection.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion and the separation of church and state. It also prohibits the
State from imposing religious beliefs and practices. The Government
respected these rights in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides citizens with the right
to travel and establish residence without government restrictions.
The Constitution provides for repatriation, and the Government
respected this in practice.
The Constitution provides for the right of asylum by refugees, and
no violations were reported. The law provides for the granting of
refugee and asylum status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. According to
the Human Rights Commission, credible media reports, and government
officials, Nigerian citizens have been subject to harassment and
prejudice by immigration authorities.
The Government has not formulated specific policies regarding
refugees or first asylum, and the issue of first asylum has never
arisen.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government. Power was
transferred peacefully by the PAICV to the MPD following free and fair
elections in 1991; a second general election in 1995 and municipal and
presidential elections in 1996 also were judged free and fair by
international observers.
The Constitution provides for the separation of powers. Cabinet
ministers are not required to be members of the National Assembly, but
they are individually subject to confirmation by the President.
Collectively, they must retain the support of a parliamentary majority.
The President may dismiss the Government with the approval of the
political parties represented in the National Assembly and the Council
of the Republic. This council consists of the President of the National
Assembly, the Prime Minister, the President of the Constitutional
Court, the Attorney General, the Ombudsman, the President of the
Economic and Social Council, the former presidents, and five private
citizens appointed by the President.
There are no restrictions in law or practice regarding the rights
of women or members of minorities to vote or to participate in the
political process; however, women are underrepresented in government.
Women constitute 11 percent of the deputies elected to the National
Assembly. There are two female cabinet ministers and three secretaries
of state (junior ministers).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are two private human rights groups, the National Commission
of the Rights of Man and the Ze Moniz Association. The Ze Moniz
Association carried out a study on conditions in prisons.
The post of an independent ombudsman, to be elected by the National
Assembly, was created by the revision of the Constitution in July. To
date the ombudsman's powers remain undefined.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
religion, disability, language, or social status. However, despite the
Government's increasing efforts to enforce all relevant constitutional
provisions, it still does not do soeffectively, and not all elements of
society, particularly women and children, enjoy full protection against
discrimination.
Women.--Domestic violence against women, including wife beating,
remains common. Both the Government and civil society encourage women
to report abuses such as rape and spousal abuse to the police; however,
longstanding social and cultural values inhibit victims from doing so,
and such reports remain rare, according to the media. Nevertheless,
reporting of such crimes to police has increased somewhat, and the
media increasingly report their occurrence. Women's organizations are
seeking legislation to establish a special family court to address
crimes of domestic violence and abuse.
Violence against women has been the subject of extensive public
service media coverage in both government- and opposition-controlled
media. In December 1998, the Parliament revised the Penal Code,
widening the scope of the concept of sexual abuse and strengthening
penalties.
Despite constitutional prohibitions against sex discrimination and
provisions for full equality, including equal pay for equal work,
discrimination against women continues. Although they often are paid
less than men for comparable work, women are making modest inroads in
the professions. However, some employers claim that they prefer to hire
men.
The Constitution prohibits discrimination against women in
inheritance, family, and custody matters. However, largely because of
illiteracy, most women are unaware of their rights. Women often are
reluctant to seek redress of domestic disputes in the courts. The
Organization of Cape Verdean Women alleges disparate treatment in
inheritance matters, despite laws calling for equal rights.
Children.--The Government prepared studies of social policy
priorities and legal rights for children and adolescents, and the Cape
Verdean Institute for Children was restructured in accordance with
norms established in the Convention on the Rights of the Child to
implement its obligations under the Convention. The Government has
extended free mandatory education to 6 years of primary school for all
children. Normally, it covers children age 6 to 12. According to the
latest UNICEF figures, attendance is approximately 97 percent for
children. Attendance by boys is less than one percent more than
attendance by girls. The Government also seeks to reduce infant
mortality and disease, combat drug and alcohol abuse, and discourage
teenage pregnancy; however, progress has been slow.
Child abuse and mistreatment, sexual violence against children, and
juvenile prostitution are continuing problems, exacerbated by chronic
poverty, large unplanned families, and traditional high levels of
emigration of adult men. The media reports cases of sexual abuse
against children and adolescents. The inefficiencies of the judicial
system make it difficult for the mass media and government institutions
to address the problem.
People with Disabilities.--Although the Constitution mandates
``special protection'' for the aged and disabled, the Government does
not require access to public buildings or services for the disabled.
There are no official schools or trained teachers for the disabled,
although several nongovernmental groups, including an association for
the blind, are active.
Religious Minorities.--In July three Seventh-Day Adventists, who
were tried for the desecration of Catholic churches on Boavista Island,
were freed. In August the Attorney General rejected a local
prosecutor's dismissal of the case against the four individuals of the
``S. Domingos Group,'' who were accused of desecrating a Catholic
church in 1996 (see Section 1.e.). While the MPD has accused supporters
of the PAICV of involvement in the crimes and made it an election
issue, the perpetrators remained unknown.
More than 20 cases involving the desecration of Catholic churches
have been reported to the police over the years. While some cases date
from 1975, after 1990 and especially from 1994-95, the incidence has
increased. The persons responsible for the desecrations have never been
identified, and the topic has remained a controversial electoral issue
since the MPD has accused supporters of the main opposition party PAICV
of involvement in the crimes. However, to date, the courts have
dismissed every formal accusation that has been brought, usually for
lack of evidence.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides that
workers are legally free to form and to join unions without government
authorization or restriction. There are two umbrella union
associations: The Council of Free Labor Unions, composed of 11 unions
with about 14,000 members; and the National Union of Cape Verde
Workers,formed by the former ruling party but operating independently,
composed of 14 unions with about 16,000 members. The Government does
not interfere with the activities of these organizations, but the
National Union of Cape Verde Workers claims that it received less than
its share of funds for unions. Both unions suffer from a shortage of
funds.
The Constitution provides union members with the right to strike,
and the Government respects this right. However, in July and August,
the workers of the shipping company Arca Verde made two attempts to
strike. The Government invoked a ``civil request,'' under which it has
the power, in an emergency or if a strike threatens coverage of basic
needs, to name a list of minimum services that a union must continue to
provide during any strike. Because of the Government's ``civil
request,'' the crew and workers of four of the five ships in the fleet
were required to continue working. According to the National Union of
Cape Verde Workers, the Government's decision violated the law, since
there was no emergency. The union claimed that, under such
circumstances, the ``minimum services list'' that it presented to the
Government would have ensured the continuation of essential services of
public interest. The union presented the case to the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, which in August filed a complaint
against the Government with the International Labor Organization (ILO).
The law requires an employer to either reinstate a worker fired
unjustly or to provide financial compensation. This law is enforced in
practice.
There were three legal strikes. In June telecommunications workers
went on a 2-day strike, demanding a salary increase. In July National
Institute of Rural Engineering and Forests workers went on strike for 2
days demanding that their contractual situation be solved. Radio and
television workers went on a 2-day strike (October 14-15) over the
revision of their working conditions.
The Government was invited by the ILO to contest the case presented
by the labor union UNTAC-CS regarding the arrest of two of its
activists during a demonstration 1 year ago. The Government contested
the case in July. At year's end, the outcome was not known.
Unions are free to affiliate internationally and have ties with
African and international trade union organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution provides for the right to organize, to operate without
hindrance, and to sign collective work contracts. Workers and
management in the small private sector, as well as in the public
sector, reach agreement through collective bargaining. However, as the
country's largest employer, the Government continues to play the
dominant role in setting wages. It does not fix wages for the private
sector, but salary levels for civil servants provide the basis for wage
negotiations in the private sector. There are no collective bargaining
agreements.
A 1991 legislative decree bans antiunion discrimination by
employers with fines for offenders. No cases were brought to court
during the year.
Praia has a new, 30-acre export processing zone, which houses two
Portuguese companies and a Cape Verdean-Sengalese joint venture. There
are no special laws or exemptions from regular labor laws for such
zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is
forbidden by law and is not practiced.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and
such practices are not known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment is 14 years. The law
prohibits children under the age of 16 from working at night, more than
7 hours per day, or in establishments where toxic products are
produced; but the Government rarely enforces the law. In practice the
Ministry of Justice and Labor enforces minimum age laws with limited
success, and then only in the urban, formal sectors of the economy.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and such
practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There are no established minimum
wage rates in the private sector. Large urban private employers link
their minimum wages to those paid to civil servants. For an entry-level
worker, this wage is approximately $120 (11,193 escudos) per month. The
majority of jobs pay wages insufficient to provide a worker and family
a decent standard of living; therefore, most workers also rely on
second jobs, extended family help, and subsistence agriculture.
The maximum legal workweek for adults is 44 hours. While large
employers generally respect these regulations, many domestic servants
and agricultural laborers work longer hours.
The Director General of Labor conducts periodic inspections to
enforce proper labor practices and imposes fines on private enterprises
that are not in conformity with the law. However, the Government does
not systematically enforce labor laws, and much of the labor force does
not enjoy their protection. Few industries employ heavy or dangerous
equipment, and work-related accidents are rare.
There is no legal provision for workers to remove themselves from
unsafe working conditions without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Illegal trafficking in emigrants to
various points in Europe is believed to be a thriving business, and it
has become a concern for local authorities. Several notices in the
press report that the police have arrested some persons, traffickers as
well as victims.
______
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
The Central African Republic is a constitutional democracy with a
multiparty legislature. Ange Felix Patasse, leader of the Movement for
the Liberation of the Central African People (MLPC), who first was
elected President in 1993, was reelected with a narrow majority in
September. The presidential election, like National Assembly elections
held in late 1998, was generally free but was controlled by the
Government and was marred by irregularities that tended to favor the
ruling party candidate. The December 1998 defection of a National
Assembly member elected on an opposition ticket gave the MLPC and its
political allies a one-seat majority in the unicameral legislature, a
development strongly protested by opposition parties. In January
opposition parties strongly protested this defection and boycotted the
inauguration of the new National Assembly; mediation both by the United
Nations peacekeeping force, MINURCA, and by other elements of the
international community helped end the boycott. Although the
Constitution provides for separation of powers, the legislature is
vulnerable to manipulation by the President, who dominates the
Government. The President can veto legislation, although two-thirds of
the unicameral legislature can override his veto, and he can rule by
decree under special conditions. The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, it is subject to executive
interference.
The National Police under the direction of the Ministry of Interior
and Public Security, the military forces and the national gendarmerie
under the Ministry of Defense, and the Special Forces for the Defense
of the Democratic Institutions (FORSDIR), which are responsible for
presidential security, share responsibility for internal security. The
FORSDIR presidential guard included members of the Chadian armed forces
assigned on a rotating basis. Although all security forces are
nominally under the control of the President and the Ministry of
Defense, the military, much of which mutinied in 1996-97, is widely
perceived to be of doubtful loyalty to the Patasse Government, and
implementation of government plans to reduce its size have been delayed
by lack of funds for severance pay and pensions. A 1,350-person
peacekeeping force known as MINURCA was deployed by the United Nations
Security Council in 1998, with a mandate to assist national security
forces in maintaining law and order, to strengthen the national
reconciliation process, to maintain a climate of security and stability
during the legislative and presidential elections, and to facilitate
the disarmament process. In December MINURCA began to withdraw its
forces over a 3-month period. The domestic security forces, and the
FORSDIR in particular, continued to commit serious human rights abuses.
The country is landlocked and sparsely populated. The majority of
the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture. Annual per capita
gross domestic product is estimated at $330. Principal exports are
coffee, cotton, timber, tobacco, and diamonds. Salary arrears continued
during the year at an average of 12 months' pay for civilians and 9
months' pay for the military. The arrears continued to impair the
functioning of the Government and the authority of the State to enforce
the rule of law. The misappropriation of public funds and corruption in
the Government have diminished but remained widespread.
The Government's overall human rights record remained poor, with
serious problems in many areas and deterioration in others. Citizens
generally were able to choose their national government; however,
government control of the electoral process and an instance of
government manipulation of the National Assembly called this right into
question. Security forces continued to commit extrajudicial killings,
including government-approved executions of suspected bandits and
killings reportedly committed for political reasons by members of the
presidential guard. There also were credible reports of deaths of
prisoners due to police abuse. Police continued to torture, beat and
otherwise abuse suspects and prisoners. Other human rights abuses
included harsh prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention;
prolonged detention without trial; limits on judicial independence;
infringements on citizens' right to privacy; restraints on press
freedom to criticize the government; restriction of freedom of assembly
and association; some limits on freedom of religion; and some limits on
freedom of movement. Violence and discrimination against women; female
genital mutilation (FGM); child prostitution; discrimination against
indigenous people (Pygmies); tensions and occasional violence,
especially within the security forces, between some largely
progovernment northern ethnic groups and some largely pro-opposition
southern ethnic groups; and child labor, including instances of forced
child labor, continued to be problems.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--On the night of
November 18-19, armed men, identified by press reports and by the
president of the Central African Human Rights League (HRL) as members
of the FORSDIR presidential guard, killed former army lieutenant
Antoine Bodo in his home in Kembe, in the country's southern region.
Bodo, a member of former President Kolingba's Yakoma tribe, was rumored
to be working with the former President's son, Captain Serge Kolingba,
to create a Yakoma militia. Bodo's killers then abducted several other
persons who may have witnessed Bodo's killing and killed four of them,
dropping their bodies along the road as they returned to Bangui, the
capital; these four persons were gendarme Apollinaire Hondet, a pastor
named Grembete of the Apostolic Church, Al Ahzdi Khalill, a local
leader of the Central African Democratic Rally (RCD) party headed by
former president Kolingba, and a man named Delphan from a merchant
family. On December 4 the Government dispatched a team of gendarmes to
Kembe to investigate the incident. A group of National Assembly members
from the largely pro-opposition region accompanied the gendarmes;
however, the government's Office of Human Rights was not permitted to
send a representative. By year's end, neither the gendarmes nor the
legislators had released their reports on the Kemba killings. However,
on December 6, the president of the HRL alleged in a press statement
that the killings were planned in Bangui and committed with the use of
government vehicles, and that that the killers had been identified but
had rejoined their units. The LCDH president accused the Patasse
Government of preventive repression of its political opponents,
particularly Yakoma supporters of former president Kolingba.
Police executed several suspected armed bandits and robbers with
prior arrest records. A special Squad for the Repression of Banditry
(OCRB), formed in response to the spread of armed robbery throughout
Bangui following the military mutinies of 1996 and 1997, continued to
operate. The police commissioner continued repeatedly to publicize on
radio and television the crimes of criminals apprehended by this squad;
they were executed the following day. For example, in late April three
young members of an armed gang were shown on television with goods they
allegedly had stolen, including guns, ammunition, and computers, and
the head of the police explained their alleged crimes. They were
executed without a trial. The prosecutor indicated that he has no
record regarding the activities or detainees of this police squad.
Medical staff confirmed that the OCRB often takes the bodies of persons
it has executed to the hospital and leaves them for the family to pick
up. Some detainees died after torture (see Section 1.c.). The
Government tacitly approved the actions taken by the police squad to
reduce armed robbery; it has never prosecuted members of the security
forces for these extrajudicial killings. Many citizens also supported
the practice of killing alleged armed robbers extrajudicially.
On June 19 FORSDIR presidential guards shot and killed six Chadian
herdsmen outside Bangui, in a fight precipitated by trampling of a
farmer's field by a Chadian cow. Members of the guard also wounded
eight Chadian herdsmen, and herdsmen stabbed and killed one FORSDIR
guardsman. The gendarmerie investigated the incident, and the
Government financially compensated the families of the victims.
The Government did not prosecute any members of the security forces
for extrajudicial killings.
There were deaths due to mob violence, including mob killings of
persons suspected of practicing witchcraft. Although religious
tolerance among members of different religious groups is the norm,
rural radio stations have reported several killings of persons
suspected of practicing witchcraft. In October 1998, in the eastern
prefecture of Obo, villagers buried alive an old man suspected of
having caused by witchcraft the deaths by drowning of two young boys.
In February authorities in the village of Sibut detained three men
alleged to have caused the death of young persons by witchcraft. The
detained men were brought before a court on charges of murder. After
the court released the three men for lack of evidence, they were killed
by a mob on their way home. Government gendarmes arrested some suspects
and the accused are awaiting trial.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Although the Penal Code prohibits torture and specifies
sanctions for those found guilty of physical abuse, police continued to
beat and otherwise abuse criminal suspects and prisoners. In January
FORSDIR presidential guards tortured and beat a pro-opposition labor
union leader whom they had detained arbitrarily (see Sections 1.d.
2.b., 3 and 6.a.). As in previous years, family members and the HRL
Executive Committee continued to file court complaints with the
prosecutor based on several deaths of prisoners due to police abuse,
but the authorities continued to take no action (see Section 1.a.).
FORSDIR continued to be a well-equipped force parallel to the
military that frequently used excessive force in its operations; it
reportedly also was responsible for other serious human rights abuses
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.). For most of the year, the Government
resisted acting on a U.N. Security Council recommendation that it limit
the mission of FORSDIR to the protection of the President, his family,
and government institutions. As part of military restructuring
legislation adopted in November, the FORSDIR unit was placed under the
civilian control of the Minister of Defense. Integration of FORSDIR
elements into the regular armed forces had not occurred by year's end.
There was occasional political violence during the presidential
campaign (see Section 3).
There have been occasional reports that villagers who were believed
to be witches were harassed, beaten, or sometimes killed by their
neighbors. Courts have tried, convicted, and sentenced some persons for
crimes of violence against suspected witches.
Armed foreigners, including soldiers of the governments of the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC) and of Chad, who had fought in the
civil war in the DROC on the side of the DROC Government but had fled
into the country in the face of advancing DROC rebel and Ugandan
forces, repeatedly abused civilians. In May heavily armed Chadian
forces that withdrew from DROC conflicts committed robberies and rapes
on their way back to Chad. In August six armed men alleged to be DROC
government soldiers raped one French and two Korean nuns at their
residence in Bangassou, near the border with the DROC, and beat a local
priest (see Section 2.d.).
Prison conditions are harsh. Ngaragba, Bangui's main prison, was
ransacked during the 1996 mutinies. Nearly 500 detainees, half of whom
are awaiting trial, still were being kept in 10 police stations around
Bangui at year's end. Cells are overcrowded, and the basic necessities
of life, including food, clothing, and medicine, are in short supply
and often are confiscated by prison officials for their personal use.
Prisoners frequently are forced to perform uncompensated labor at the
residences of government officials and magistrates (see Section 6.c.).
Male and female prisoners are confined in separate facilities in Bangui
but housed together elsewhere. Minors routinely are housed with adults
and subjected to physical abuse.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors. The
national Red Cross and religious groups routinely provide supplies,
food, and clothes to prisoners. The ICRC has unrestricted access to
prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides
protection against arbitrary arrest and detention, but the security
forces often ignored these provisions. The law stipulates that persons
detained in cases other than those involving national security must be
brought before a magistrate within 96 hours. In practice authorities
often do not respect this deadline, in part due to inefficient judicial
procedures. Judicial warrants are not required for arrest. By law,
national security detainees are defined as ``those held for crimes
against the security of the State'' and may be held without charge for
up to 2 months.
On January 9, FORSDIR presidential guards arbitrarily detained
labor union leader Sonny Cole shortly after he played a leading role in
organizing a 1-day general strike to protest the ruling party's
acquisition of a one-seat majority in the NationalAssembly through the
postelection defection of a member elected as an opposition candidate
(see Section 3). He was released the next day after being tortured and
beaten (see Sections 1.c, 2.b., 3 and 6.a.), following initiatives on
his behalf by MINURCA officials and the HRL. During the year, the
Government released Corporal Jean Tindani, one of the 1996 mutineers
who was granted amnesty following the 1997 Bangui Accords but had been
under arbitrary detention by the police Squad for the Repression of
Banditry since May 1997.
Prolonged pretrial detention is a serious problem. Approximately
one-half the male prison population consists of pretrial detainees.
The law does not permit the use of exile, and the Government does
not employ it in practice. The Government has stated repeatedly that
any person in exile for strictly political, rather than criminal,
reasons may return without fear of persecution.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, but there are reliable reports of executive
interference.
The judiciary consists of regular and military courts. New courts
of justice were created in 1997 in both urban and rural areas. A
juvenile court was created in 1998. However, these courts are not
functioning due to inefficient administration, shortage of trained
personnel, growing salary arrears, and a lack of material resources. In
April the Criminal Court opened its second session. Lawyers defended
all accused persons. Some were found guilty and sentenced to
imprisonment.
In criminal cases, the accused are presumed innocent and have the
right to legal counsel, to public trial, to be present at their trials,
and to confront witnesses. The Government generally respects these
safeguards in practice in many cases; however, a number of persons were
subjected to prolonged detention without trial or were summarily and
extrajudicially killed by the OCRB.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits invasion of homes without a warrant
in civil and criminal cases. On occasions police used provisions of the
Penal Code governing certain political and security cases that allow
them to search private property without a warrant. Security forces
continued to carry out warrantless searches for guns and ammunition in
private homes, a practice initiated in 1997 as part of a disarmament
process following the 1996-97 military mutinies. In February the OCRB
repeatedly searched the private residence of an opposition Member of
Parliament, Alphonsine Boganda, without judicial warrant or respect for
her immunity, allegedly for illegally possessed guns. No guns were
found. Deputy Boganda filed a complaint against the police involved in
the search that she dropped after receiving an apology from the head of
the OCRB. In March the police searched without warrant the office and
the residence of the editor of a private newspaper, Le Citoyen, shortly
after that newspaper published articles critical of the Patasse
Government (see Section 2.a.). The Government continued to monitor the
telephones of some opposition figures and to engage in wiretapping
without judicial authority.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government at times
restricted the freedom of the print media to criticize the government.
Legislation enacted in 1998 rescinded the Government's authority to
censor the press, defined the rights and responsibilities of private
media, and created a High Broadcast Council to regulate the media;
however, the Government continued to dominate domestic broadcast media.
Libel cases are addressed in civil rather than criminal courts.
Citizens continued to speak freely and publicly, criticizing the
Government and political parties. Opposition leaders in particular used
press statements, manifestos, and copies of open correspondence to the
Government to circulate their views. The Government made no apparent
effort to censor, seize, or halt the printing and circulation of these
materials.
The Government owns and controls two newspapers, the Agence
Centrafricaine de Presse (ACAP) bulletin, which appears sporadically,
and Be Africa Sango. Echo de CentrAfrique, a private daily newspaper
created at the beginning of 1999, is close to the ruling party.
More than a dozen private newspapers were published over varying
intervals; eight were published on a regular basis during the year.
These newspapers often were outspoken in their criticism of the
President, the Government's economic policies, and official corruption.
However, the editor of Le Citoyen reported that in March the former
Interior Minister--the present chief of the gendarmerie--harassed him
regarding his criticism of the Government. In May security forces
searched his office and attempted to arrest him in an effort to
identify his sources of information.
Radio is the most important medium of mass communication, since
literacy is not universal and newspapers and television are relatively
expensive and rarely are found outside urban areas. The Government owns
and operates a radio station and a television station. Programming was
dominated by reporting on the activities of President Patasse and
senior government officials. Observers noted that the ruling majority
parties received more coverage of their activities or meetings than
opposition parties. In January the Director General suspended Christien
Noel Panika, a government radio station newscaster, from work for 3
months because he had broadcast a press release on a students' strike
without approval of the Minister of Communications and had reported to
Radio France International (RFI) on government actions. The presidency,
especially the President's communications advisor, reportedly controls
the radio programs and broadcasts. Some programs, such as a popular
call-in show, whose listeners often expressed opinions critical of the
Government, were taken off the air.
Government television and radio broadcasts included weekly programs
that provided an opportunity for political parties to present their
views and discuss their programs. Although the opposition originally
welcomed this promised access to the public media, in practice it did
not materialize. During the legislative and presidential elections,
political parties had access to the public media according to a
schedule established by the High Council of Communication; opposition
candidates received equal coverage and had equal access to state-owned
media.
Since the mid-1990's, the Government has partially relaxed its
monopoly of domestic radio broadcasting. A private radio station,
Africa Number One, part of a French-owned network based in Libreville,
Gabon, has been broadcasting in Bangui since 1995. Its programming
includes national news coverage by a correspondent based in the
country. A station affiliated with the Catholic Church began operations
the same year. Its programming includes national news, debates, legal
counseling, and human rights education. RFI has been broadcasting
domestically since 1997. Its programming includes some national news
coverage by a correspondent based in the country. In 1998 Radio
MINURCA, the U.N. peacekeeping forces' radio, began broadcasting.
However, there are no private broadcast media entities owned and
operated by citizens of the country, as distinct from transnational
French networks or Catholic networks. There are no privately owned
stations that broadcast domestically produced national news or
political commentary.
The Government continues to monopolize domestic television
broadcasting. Private television broadcasting is allowed by law; the
High Council of Communication is responsible for authorizing private
television as well as radio stations. No applications to establish a
private television station have been received. In the judgment of
domestic investors, the economic preconditions for one do not exist.
The Government does not restrict domestic receipt or distribution of
satellite or cable television, but few citizens can afford it, and it
is not widespread even in the capital. A private telecommunications
company established pursuant to a 1996 law that liberalized
telecommunications operates a domestic Internet and e-mail service
provider as well as cybercafes. Few citizens can afford home access to
the Internet, but many urban residents rent brief access at cybercafes.
Prior to 1999, the Government did not impede foreign journalists in
their work. However, on January 14, journalists Stephen Smith, of the
newspaper Liberation, and his wife, Geraldine Faes, of Jeune Afrique
magazine, along with their two children, were turned back by the
presidential guards immediately after landing at the airport, despite
having received proper visas at the Government's embassy in Paris. In
1998 Smith had written anarticle on President Patasse's diamond
interests. Their friend, human rights activist lawyer Nicolas Tiangaye,
who met them upon arrival, was pushed and threatened by the
presidential security guards (see Sections 2.d. and 4).
The Government respects academic freedom. University faculty and
students belong to many political parties and generally express their
views without fear of reprisal.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of assembly; however, the Government restricted
this right in practice on several occasions during the year. In
addition, some legal restrictions on freedom of assembly remain. A 1992
decree requires organizers of demonstrations and public meetings to
register with the Government 48 hours in advance and also prohibits
political meetings in schools or churches. Prior to 1999, the Ministry
of Administration, Territory, and Security, now known as the Ministry
of Interior, generally had not prohibited demonstrations or public
meetings if notified in advance. However, in January and February the
Government, with the express approval of President Patasse, refused to
allow the Union des Forces Acquises a la Paix (UFAP), a coalition of
political parties, labor unions, and NGO's, to hold public meetings on
the grounds that it was not a registered organization. The ban was not
lifted by the end of the year. The UFAP cancelled a public meeting that
it had called for February 6 in order to avoid a violent confrontation
with security forces. Also in February, following the opposition
boycott of the National Assembly, police dispersed an opposition
meeting organized in Bimbo, south of Bangui, by the deputies of the
opposition Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD), an opposition
party, to explain the ongoing crisis at the National Assembly to their
constituency. Due in part to these government restrictions on public
meetings, the opposition resorted to a 1-day general strike to express
widespread disapproval of the means by which the ruling party had
obtained a majority in the National Assembly. After the Presidential
election, in late September and early October, the Government again
enforced its ban on all public demonstrations and mass meetings
nationwide.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
Government restricted this right in practice. All associations
including political parties must register with the Ministry of Interior
in order to enjoy legal status. The Government usually has granted
registration expeditiously.
There are more than 35 registered political parties and a variety
of nonpolitical associations. The Government normally allows them to
hold congresses, elect officials, and publicly debate policy issues
without interference except when they advocated sectarianism or
tribalism. However, in January the Interior Minister suspended for 3
months the activities of two nongovernmental organizations (NGO's).
These NGO's, the AITAO (Brotherhood Association) and Le Cri de la Foret
distribute medicine to the rural population and promote forest
conservation.
Also, in connection with prohibiting the UFAP from holding public
meetings, the Government enforced a law that does not allow
nonpolitical organizations to coalesce for political purposes; no
comparably significant reports of enforcement of this law had been
reported during previous years of the Patasse Government.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion but establishes fixed legal conditions and prohibits what the
Government considers religious fundamentalism or intolerance. The
constitutional provision prohibiting religious fundamentalism is widely
understood to be aimed at Muslims. There is no state religion. The
population is believed to be about 50 percent Christian, 15 percent
Muslim, and 35 percent practitioners of traditional indigenous
religions, or non-religious. Most Christians also practice some aspects
of their traditional indigenous religions. In practice, the Government
permits adherents of all religions to worship without interference.
Religious organizations and missionary groups are free to proselytize,
worship, and construct places of worship.
Religious groups (except for traditional indigenous religious
groups) are required by law to register with the Government's Ministry
of Interior. This registration is free and confers official recognition
and certain limited benefits, such as customs duty exemption for the
importation of vehicles or equipment, but does not confer a general tax
exemption. Theadministrative police of the Ministry of Interior keep
track of groups that have failed to register, but the police have not
attempted to impose any penalty on such groups. The Government
continued to refuse to reregister the previously registered and
subsequently banned Unification Church.
The Ministry of Interior has registered more than 100 religious and
nonreligious groups since 1993. However, any religious or nonreligious
group that the Government considers subversive is subject to sanctions.
The Ministry of Interior may decline to register, suspend the
operations of, or ban any organization that it deems offensive to
public morals or likely to disturb the peace. The Government has banned
the Unification Church since the mid-1980's as a subversive
organization likely to disturb the peace, specifically in connection
with alleged paramilitary training of young church members. However,
the Government imposed no new sanctions on any religious group during
the year. The Ministry of Interior also may intervene to resolve
internal conflicts about property, finances, or leadership within
religious groups.
The practice of witchcraft is a criminal offense under the Penal
Code; however, persons generally are prosecuted for this offense only
in conjunction with some other offense, such as murder. Witchcraft
traditionally has been a common explanation for diseases of which the
causes were unknown. The practice of witchcraft is widely understood to
encompass attempts to harm others not only by magic, but also by covert
means of established efficacy such as poisons.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Persons are free to move about within
the country, but the police, security forces, and other officials
harass travelers unwilling or unable to pay bribes at checkpoints along
major intercity roads and at major intersections in Bangui. However,
under pressure from the National Assembly, the Ministry of
Administration, Territory, and Security removed some security forces
checkpoints on the main roads outside the capital during the year.
Presidential security forces (FORSDIR) continued to be stationed at
the airport to control travelers. Immigration authorities informed some
citizens, when attempting to leave the country, that their names were
on unspecified official lists that prohibited their departure. The
Government generally allows opposition leaders to travel abroad or
inside the country without restrictions; however, interventions by
human rights organizations and the international community were
required to achieve this in some cases during the year. Moreover, in
October the Government, acting on orders from President Patasse,
prevented General Timothee Malendoma, the 63-year-old leader of an
opposition party, from leaving the country for the stated purpose of
attending an evangelical religious conference. In January the FORSDIR
refused to allow French journalists to enter the country (see Section
2.a.).
Attacks by bandits on major routes to the north and east sometimes
occurred, even though travelers moved in convoys with military escorts.
The 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol have the force of law, and the Government treats refugees
in accordance with its provisions. The Government continued to work
with the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) in hosting Chadian, Sudanese, Rwandan, and Congolese refugees.
Almost all refugees were registered with the National Commission for
Refugees.
In May the Government allowed units of the Chadian armed forces
that had been fighting on the side of the DROC government in the DROC
civil war to return to Chad overland through the country (see Section
1.c.). In July approximately 15,000 to 20,000 DROC civilians and DROC
government soldiers entered the country as DROC rebel forces advanced
into areas of the DROC adjacent to the country. The Government
facilitated UNHCR efforts to feed, house, and provide medical treatment
to the refugees. It also facilitated the return of the DROC soldiers
and their weapons to Kinshasa in Libyan aircraft.
Applicants for asylum generally are well treated and often are
accepted. There were no reports of the forced return of persons
considered to be refugees under international standards to a country
where they feared persecution, but some of the DROC soldiers who were
repatriated feared prosecution and possible execution for desertion by
the DROC government.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
Citizens first exercised this right in 1993, in free and fair
elections that were the culmination of a successful democratization
movement led by Ange Felix Patasse. Patasse's MLPC won both the
presidency and a majority of seats in the unicameral national
legislature. Citizens again exercised their constitutional right to
change their government by democratic means through National Assembly
elections in 1998 and a presidential election on September 19.
International observers deemed both elections generally free and fair.
However, the presidential elections were marred by irregularities in
voter registration and distribution of electoral materials. Some of the
registration irregularities tended to favor the ruling party.
In the 1998 National Assembly elections, opposition parties won 55
seats, while the ruling MLPC party of President Patasse and its allies
won 54 seats. However, the defection of one opposition National
Assembly member in December 1998 gave the ruling party and its
coalition a one-seat majority. The opposition parties and the UFAP
strongly protested this defection and boycotted the inauguration of the
new session of the legislature. Since the Government restricted their
freedom of assembly, the opposition resorted to a 1-day general strike
to express widespread disapproval of the means by which the ruling
party obtained a majority in the National Assembly. FORSDIR
presidential guards arrested and tortured a labor union activist
following the strike (see Sections 1.c and 1.d.). The FORSDIR harassed
observers, such as the president of the Central African Human Rights
League (LDCH), after he strongly criticized the monopolization of power
by President Patasse (see Section 4).
President Patasse's first term of office expired in October, but he
was constitutionally eligible to seek a second consecutive term. In
June the Government established an Independent Electoral Commission
(CEMI) to supervise the presidential election. Although the CEMI
included representatives from many political parties on its board, its
staff was run at the national level by a chairman appointed by
President Patasse, and was run at the local level by central government
subprefects who served at the pleasure of the President and most of
whom belonged either to the ruling party or one of its coalition
allies. The Government explicitly rejected suggestions by elements of
the international community, which provided material and financial
support for the election, that the executive branch of the Government
not involve itself in the management of the electoral process. In
August President Patasse promulgated a decree that subordinated CEMI to
the state Organ of Control (OCASPA), a state organization that he had
created by decree on May 1 to oversee the election process. Before the
presidential election, there were credible reports of attempts to
inflate the number of registered voters sharply in pro-MLPC northern
areas, although this was corrected before the polling. The Government
postponed the first round of the presidential election, first from
August 29 to September 12, and then to September 19, after serious
problems in ballot distribution became evident; however, the Government
denied requests from opposition leaders for further delays to permit
more complete resolution of problems with the electoral process. Some
provisions of the electoral code, requiring publication of voter lists
at least 15 days before the election and distribution of voter
identification cards at least 8 days before the election, were not
respected. On election day, a shortage of ballots was reported in some
largely pro-opposition districts. Opposition party poll-watchers
reported the use of some falsified voter identification documents by
voters, and there were several reports of ballot boxes being delivered
to the CEMI without certified tally sheets, or from unofficial polling
places.
On October 2, two weeks after the voting, the Constitutional Court
announced the official results of the election and declared President
Patasse reelected with 51.6 percent of the votes cast. Nine other
candidates certified by the Constitutional Court had competed in the
election. The Constitution required a second-round runoff election if
no candidate received 50 percent of votes cast in the first round
election. However, only one of the unsuccessful candidates filed a
complaint with the Constitutional Court.
There was occasional violence during the presidential election
campaign. On September 10, fighting in Bangui between supporters of
President Patasse and former president Kolingba, who was running
against Patasse, left about 20 persons wounded. On October 2, when the
Constitutional Court declared President Patasse reelected, and while
the Government's ban on all largepublic meetings was in effect (see
Section 2.b.), some opposition supporters attacked the residence of the
French Ambassador and vehicles that belonged to the Embassy of China to
protest those two governments' perceived support for Patasse.
The Constitution provides for multiple political parties. The State
is highly centralized. The central Government appoints all subnational
government officials, and subnational government entities have no
significant fiscal autonomy. The Government failed to hold
constitutionally required local elections in recent years, ostensibly
due to budgetary restrictions. The Government has appointed four
successive mayors of Bangui, the capital, a southern city well outside
the ruling party's main political base in the north (see Section 5).
There are no laws that restrict the participation of women or
minorities in the political process, but their numbers are few in
government and politics. Before and during the legislative and
presidential elections, the Government's Department of Social Affairs
and women's NGO's implemented programs and launched an extensive public
awareness campaign to encourage women to register to vote and to
compete for public office. There are very few women in prominent
government positions. Only 8 members of the National assembly are
women, although 80 women competed for the 109 seats. Three of the 25
cabinet members are women. The President, for the first time, appointed
five women as prefects.
At year's end, there was one Muslim in the Prime Minister's
Cabinet, and there were at least five Muslims in the National Assembly.
President Patasse is a member of the Sara-Kaba ethnic group.
Members of northern ethnic groups, including the Sara and Baya,
continued to predominate among the President's advisors, in the
leadership of the ruling party, and among ruling party members of the
National Assembly; they also held most ministerial positions in the
Government until November, when Patasse appointed a more ethnically
diverse Government. Both Prime Minister Qanicet George Dologuele and
Luc Dondon Konambaye, who became President of the National Assembly in
January, are distant relatives of Patasse.
Pygmies (Ba'aka), the indigenous inhabitants of the southern part
of the country, who represent from 1 to 2 percent of the population,
are not represented in the Government and have little political power
or influence.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Central African Human Rights League (LCDH) publicizes human
rights violations and pleads individual cases of human rights abuses
before the courts. The LCDH distributed to prisons, police stations,
courts, schools, and to other NGO's pamphlets describing human rights
and information on judicial access. In January the LCDH issued a press
release protesting the arbitrary arrest and torture of union leader
Sonny Cole by the FORSDIR and urged the Government to release him. In
the same document, the LCDH also severely criticized the monopolization
of executive and legislative power by members of President Patasse's
ethnic group and Patasse's refusal to compromise with the opposition.
Security forces harassed the president of the LDCH after he strongly
criticized the monopolization of power by President Patasse (see
Section 3).
Several other NGO's, including the Movement for the Defense of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Action and some religious groups actively
monitor human rights problems. Although the Government welcomed the
role that some of these NGO's played in mediating its negotiations with
military mutineers in 1996 and 1997, it did not welcome their criticism
of the process by which the Government formed a slender majority
coalition in the National Assembly in December 1998 (see Section 3).
On January 14, FORSDIR presidential guards physically abused human
rights lawyer Nicolas Tiangaye at Bangui's airport, where he was
meeting foreign journalists (see Section 2.a.). The previous day, in an
interview on RFI, Tiangaye had criticized the growing concentration of
political power in the hands of members of President Patasse's ethnic
group and discussed allegations of human rights violations during the
Patasse Administration.
International observers including U.N. human rights monitors from
MINURCA observed the 1998 legislative elections and theSeptember
presidential election. No other international human rights
organizations are known to have sought to visit the country during the
year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution stipulates that all persons are equal before the
law without regard to wealth, race, sex, or religion, but the
Government does not enforce these provisions effectively, and
significant discrimination exists.
Women.--Violence against women, including wife beating, occurs
although inadequate data make it impossible to quantify the extent.
Victims seldom report incidents. The courts try very few cases of
spousal abuse, although litigants cite these abuses during divorce
trials and civil suits. Some women reportedly tolerate abuse in order
to retain a measure of financial security for themselves and their
children. The Government continued not to address this problem during
the year.
In daily practice, women are treated as inferior to men both
economically and socially. Single, divorced, or widowed women, even
with children, are not considered to be heads of households. Only men
are entitled to family subsidies. Women in rural areas generally suffer
more discrimination than do women in urban areas. Sixty to 70 percent
of urban women have attended primary school, whereas only 10 to 20
percent of their rural counterparts have done so. At the primary level,
females and males enjoy equal access to education, but the majority of
young women drop out at age 14 or 15 due to social pressure to marry
and bear children. Only 20 percent of the students at the University of
Bangui are women. There are no accurate statistics on the percentage of
female wage earners. Women's access to educational opportunities and to
jobs, particularly at upper levels in the professions or in the
government service, traditionally has been limited. In 1999 numerous
active women's groups organized workshops and seminars to promote
women's and children's rights and to fully participate in the electoral
process.
Polygyny is legal, although this practice faces growing resistance
among educated women. The law authorizes a man to take up to four
wives, but a prospective husband must indicate at the time of the first
marriage contract whether he intends to take additional wives. In
practice many couples never marry formally because men cannot afford
the traditional bride payment. Women who are educated and financially
independent tend to seek monogamous marriages. Divorce is legal and may
be initiated by either partner. The law does not discriminate against
women in inheritance and property rights, but a welter of conflicting
customary laws often prevails. A family code designed to strengthen
women's rights was enacted in May 1998.
The Association of Central African Women Lawyers advises women of
their legal rights. The organization also publishes pamphlets in
conjunction with the Ministry of Social Affairs on the dangers of FGM
and of food taboos.
Children.--Although there is no official discrimination against
children, the Government spends little money on programs for children.
Churches and NGO'S have relatively few programs for youths. The failure
of the education system, caused by a meager budget and salary arrears,
resulted in a shortage of teachers and an increase in street children.
Education is compulsory beyond the age of 5 years through primary and
secondary school, but parents rarely are prosecuted for their
children's nonattendance. Moreover, in practice, the age at which a
child starts school often varies by 2 to 3 years in rural areas. Many
children survive by begging and stealing. Several charitable
organizations strive to assist them. In some rural areas, teachers or
principals use their pupils as farm laborers.
A teacher's strike that lasted all year further reduced educational
opportunities for children (see Section 6.a.).
Some girls enter prostitution to earn money for the survival of the
family. The presence of international peacekeeping forces in the
capital has aggravated the problem of teenage prostitution. Child
prostitution increased in the capital until late in the year, when
MINURCA began its withdrawal from the country. The Government did not
address these problems during the year.
The Penal Code forbids parental abuse of children under the age of
15 years. The Family Code was designed to strengthen children's rights.
Illegitimate children now have the same rights as those born in
wedlock. A juvenile court was set up in 1998 but lacked the means to
function (see Section 1.e.).
A 1996 ordinance banned female genital mutilation, which is widely
condemned by international health experts as damaging to both physical
and psychological health. However, girls continued to be subjected to
this traditional practice in certain rural areas, and to a lesser
degree in Bangui. Approximately 45 to 50 percent of adult females have
undergone FGM. A campaign of awareness organized by the Ministry of
Social Welfare and NGO'S has reduced the incidence of FGM in some rural
areas. This campaign was continuing at year's end.
People with Disabilities.--There is no codified or cultural
discrimination against the disabled. There are several government-
initiated programs designed to assist the disabled, including
handicraft training for the blind and the distribution of wheelchairs
and carts by the Ministry of Social Services. There are no legislated
or mandated accessibility provisions for the disabled.
Indigenous people.--Despite constitutional protection, there is
societal discrimination against Pygmies (Ba'aka), the earliest known
inhabitants of the rain forest in the southern part of the country, who
make up about 1 to 2 percent of the country's population. In general,
Pygmies have little input in decisions affecting their lands, culture,
traditions, and the allocation of natural resources. Indigenous forest-
dwelling Pygmies, in particular, are subject to social and economic
discrimination and exploitation, which the Government has done little
to correct. Pygmies often work for villagers at wages lower than those
paid to members of other groups.
Religious Minorities.--Muslims (who constitute about 15 percent of
the population), particularly Mbororo (also known as Peulh or Fulani)
herders, continued to claim that they were singled out for harassment
by authorities, including extortion by police, due to popular
resentment of their presumed affluence. Muslims play a preponderant
role in the economy. On September 14, supporters of an opposition
presidential candidate looted Muslim businesses in Kouanga, on the DROC
border.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population of about 3.5
million includes about 90 ethnic groups; many of these groups speak
distinct primary languages and are concentrated regionally outside
urban areas. The largest ethnic groups are the Baya (more than 30
percent), the Banda (more than 25 percent), the Mandja (more than 20
percent), and the Sara (about 10 percent). The Mbororo make up about 5
percent of the population but play a preponderant role in the economy.
They are involved in mining development and remain the most important
cattle breeders in the country.
Until 1993 there was little ethnic balance at the higher levels of
government. Under the regime of Andre Kolingba, who ruled from 1981 to
1993, members of Kolingba's ethnic group, the Yakoma subgroup of the
Ngbandi, held a disproportionate number of senior positions in
government, the armed forces, and state-owned firms. As a result of
President Patasse's 1993 election, Yakomas no longer hold a
disproportionate number of positions in the civil service, but the
armed forces still are being restructured to achieve greater ethnic
balance. At year's end Yakomas still constituted the majority of the
army. President Patasse is a member of the Sara ethnic group, which is
linked to the Baya. The Patasse Government initially brought about a
more representative ethnic balance to the Government. However, by 1998
observers noted that members of the Sara and Baya northern ethnic
groups close to the President were a majority in Patasse's Cabinet and
also receive favorable treatment in government appointments. During the
year, the opposition criticized the growing concentration of state
power in the hands of members of northern ethnic groups, including the
President, the President of the National Assembly, and the Prime
Minister (see Section 3). In November, after the presidential election,
the President appointed an ethnically more diverse group of cabinet
ministers and advisors, as did the Prime Minister for his cabinet.
However, about 80 percent of FORSDIR members are native to the
President's northern region; many belong to the President's ethnic
group or closely related groups.
Major political parties tend to have readily identifiable ethnic or
ethnic-regional bases. The results of the 1998 legislative elections
and the September presidential election confirmed that the MLPC Party
of President Patasse has strong support in the north, especially among
the Sara and Baya ethnic groups, but also has strengthened its support
in the capital. The Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD) party
of former President Dacko is strong in the southwestern part of the
country and the Central African Democratic Rally (RDC) Party of
Kolingba, is popular in the southeast, in the Oubangui River basin,
especially among the Yakoma.
Section 6. Workers Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Under the Labor Code, all workers are
free to form or join unions without prior authorization. A relatively
small part of the workforce has exercised this right, chiefly wage
earners such as civil servants. There are five recognized labor
federations. The two most important are the Organization of Free Public
Sector Unions and the Labor Union of Central African Workers (USTC),
which are independent of the Government.
Unions have the right to strike in both the public and private
sectors. To be legal, strikes must be preceded by the union's
presentation of demands, the employer's response to these demands, a
conciliation meeting between labor and management, and a finding by an
arbitration council that union and employer failed to reach agreement
on valid demands. The union also must provide 8 days' advance written
notification of a planned strike. The Labor Code states that if
employers initiate a lockout that is not in accordance with the code,
the employer is required to pay workers for all days of the lockout.
Other than this, the code does not provide for sanctions on employers
for acting against strikers. No employer actions against strikers are
known to have occurred during the year. Primary and secondary teachers
remained on strike throughout the year in protest against unpaid salary
arrears and unsuitable working conditions.
On January 9, FORSDIR presidential guards arbitrarily detained,
beat and tortured labor union leader Sonny Cole shortly after he played
a leading role in organizing a 1-day general strike to protest the
ruling party's acquisition of a one-seat majority in the National
Assembly through the postelection defection of a member elected as an
opposition candidate (See Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.b., and 3).
Labor federations are free to affiliate internationally. The USTC
is affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade
unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
grants trade unions full legal status, including the right to sue in
court. It requires that union officials been employed full-time in the
occupation as a wage earner, but they may conduct union business during
working hours. The code does not provide specifically that unions may
bargain collectively. While collective bargaining has taken place in
some instances, the Government usually is involved in the process.
Wage scales are set by the Ministry of Labor and Civil Service.
Salary arrears continued during the year at an average of 12 months for
civilians and 9 months for military personnel; they continued to be a
major complaint of the unions.
The law expressly forbids discrimination against employees on the
basis of union membership or union activity. The Labor Code does not
state whether employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are
required to reinstate workers fired for union activities.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is
specifically prohibited by the Labor Code, and there were no reports of
forced or bonded labor, except for prisoners who were forced to work
without compensation for government officials or magistrates (see
Section 1.c.). The Labor Code also applies to children, although it
does not specifically prohibit forced labor by children. However, the
Government does not have sufficient resources to enforce the
prohibition effectively. In some rural areas, teachers or principals
use school children as labor on farms and someparents force their
daughters into prostitution to help support the family (see Section
5.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law forbids the employment of children under 14 years
of age, but the Ministry of Labor and Civil Service enforces the
provision only loosely. In practice child labor is common in many
sectors of the economy, especially in rural areas. The Labor Code
prohibits forced and bonded labor in general and children are covered
by its provisions, but the Government does not enforce its provisions
effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code states that the
Minister of Labor must set minimum wages by decree. The minimum wage
varies by sector and by kind of work. For example, the monthly minimum
wage is equivalent to about $12 (7,800 CFA francs) for agricultural
workers but to about $28 (18,000 CFA francs) for office workers. The
minimum wage does not enable a worker and family to afford the basic
necessities and is not adequate to maintain a decent standard of
living. Most labor is performed outside the wage and social security
system, especially by farmers in the large subsistence agricultural
sector.
The law sets a standard workweek of 40 hours for government
employees and most private sector employees. Household employees may
work up to 55 hours per week. The law also requires a minimum rest
period of 48 hours a week.
There are also general laws on health and safety standards in the
workplace, but the Ministry of Labor and Civil Service neither
precisely defines nor actively enforces them, a matter about which the
International Labor Organization has expressed concern to the
Government for many years. The Labor Code states that a labor inspector
may force an employer to correct unsafe or unhealthy work conditions,
but it does not provide the right for workers to remove themselves from
such conditions without risk of loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law was known specifically to
prohibit trafficking in persons, but there were no known cases that
occurred.
______
CHAD
Chad is a centralized republic dominated by a strong presidency.
President Idriss Deby, leader of the Patriotic Salvation Movement
(MPS), has ruled since taking power in a 1990 rebellion. The Sovereign
National Conference confirmed Deby in 1993 as Chief of State, and he
was elected President in mid-1996 under a Constitution adopted in a
referendum earlier that year. According to widespread credible reports,
fraud, vote-rigging, and local irregularities marred both the 1996
presidential election, which Deby won, and the 1997 legislative
elections in which members of the MPS won 65 of 125 seats in the
National Assembly. The Government remained unable to exert effective
control over the northwestern region of the country where former
Defense Minister Youssouf Togoimi began a rebellion in October 1998. On
April 28, President Deby swore in 16 members of the Supreme Court,
which began operations in July. Despite this major step in formally
fulfilling the 1996 Constitution's requirement for the establishment of
an independent judicial branch, the courts remained ineffective,
overburdened, and subject to outside interference, including by the
executive branch.
The army, gendarmerie, police, National and Nomadic Guard (GNNT),
and intelligence services are responsible for internal security.
Officers from president Deby's ethnic group dominate the Rapid
Intervention Force (FIR), and the National Security Agency (ANS), a
counterintelligence organization that has acted as an internal
political police force. The security forces continued to commit serious
human rights abuses.
The economy is based on subsistence agriculture, herding, and
fishing. Annual per capita income is estimated at $230. The country has
little industry; its chief export is cotton. Among the impediments to
economic growth are corruption, numerous state-owned monopolies, a
bloated civil service, and a thriving informal sector outside
government taxation policies. There are substantial unexploited oil
reserves, which are the subject of ongoing negotiations with a
consortium of international oil companies. The Government remains
heavily dependent on assistance from external donors and international
financial institutions.
The Government's human rights record remained poor, and there
continued to be serious problems in many areas. The Government limited
citizens' right to change the government. State security forces
continue to commit extrajudicial killings, and they torture, beat,
abuse, and rape persons. Prison conditions remain harsh and life
threatening. Security forces continued to use arbitrary arrest and
detention. Although the Government detains and imprisons members of the
security forces implicated or accused of criminal acts, it rarely
prosecutes or sanctions members of the security forces who committed
human rights abuses. The Government also did not prosecute or punish
security force personnel accused in previous years of killings, rape,
torture, and arbitrary arrest and detention. The Government released
jailed opposition Deputy Ngarlejy Yorongar, opposition party leader
Yaya Batit and over 200 other prisoners in February; however, it still
held political detainees, and lengthy pretrial detention remained a
problem. The judiciary remained subject to executive interference and
was unable to provide citizens with prompt trials. Security forces used
illegal searches and wiretaps and monitored the contents of private
mail. The Government at times restricted freedom of speech and of the
press. It threatened the private press with judicial action if
independent newspapers continued to publish interviews and statements
by rebel leader Youssouf Togoimi. The Government at times limited
freedom of assembly, religion, and movement and interfered with the
operations of human rights groups. Societal discrimination against
women remained common. Violence against women also is believed to be
common, and female genital mutilation (FGM) remained widespread. Both
official and societal ethnic and regional discrimination remained
widespread; northerners, and in particular members of President Deby's
Zaghawa ethnic minority, continued to dominate key positions in the
public sector. There also were instances of forced labor, including
forced child labor. Child labor is a problem. Serious armed conflict
between the Government and rebels in the Tibesti continued.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Officially
sanctioned extrajudicial killings of suspected criminals by police,
customs officers, and gendarmes continued, although some members of the
security forces were taken intocustody pending further judicial action.
Units of the armed forces were responsible for the extrajudicial
killings of suspected members of the northwestern rebellion in the
Tibesti.
In January security forces in collaboration with local
administrative officials were responsible for killing seven presumed
thieves in the Mayo Kebbi and Bongor areas. Also in January, two
businessmen suspected of murder in Tan'djile died while in police
custody. In February customs officials in Bol beat to death three men,
which touched off a local sit-in. In March a local human rights group
in the Logone Oriental discovered a common grave containing three
unidentified corpses of persons who allegedly died at the hands of
security forces from Moundou.
Throughout the year, members of the Tibesti rebellion reported
human rights abuses and the killing of suspected collaborators among
the civilian population by members of the army. During March a human
rights group verified four deaths in Zouar that were attributed to the
army. In July Hemchi Dogori, a gendarme implicated in civilian
massacres in the two Logones in 1993, opened fire on a group of
villagers in Gourma near Faya Largeau. Nine persons were wounded,
including two pregnant women, and one 81-year-old man was killed.
b. Disappearances.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances during the year. However, there remain numerous cases of
disappearances from previous years that have never been resolved. For
example, in February 1998, security forces arrested Kibel Justin in
Sarh for suspicion of aiding rebel leader Dr. Nahor Ngawara Mamouth.
Although most detainees held for complicity in Dr. Nahor's 1998
kidnaping of four Frenchmen were released in July 1998, Kibel Justin
cannot be accounted for or located in other prisons.
c. Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution specifically prohibits torture and
degrading or humiliating treatment; however, members of the security
forces tortured, beat, abused, and raped citizens. No one was
prosecuted for these abuses.
In January two members of the Ati gendarmerie broke the right arm
of a high school student. In February members of the N'djamena
gendarmerie arrested a member of the National Sugar Society and
severely beat him for allegedly embezzling funds.
Dr. Djibrine Ibrahim spent much of the period from February 1998 to
June in detention on suspicion of aiding rebel leaders Dr. Nahor
Ngawara Mamouth and Youssouf Togoimi. During his months of
incarceration, military officers as well as ANS agents subjected Dr.
Ibrahim to various forms of torture, including ``arbatachar'' (where
the victim's arms and legs are tied behind his or her back cutting off
circulation and sometimes resulting in paralysis), as well as severe
beatings. Due to double fractures of his right hip, Dr. Ibrahim's right
leg remains crippled, requiring him to use a cane in order to walk.
Both his legs are heavily scarred as a result of numerous beatings and
the application of irritants to open wounds on both legs. Despite
lengthy periods of incarceration, the Government never permitted Dr.
Ibrahim legal counsel or brought him before a judge on formal charges.
Police injured two students when they dispersed demonstrations in
February (see Section 2.b.).
Security forces extorted money at roadblocks (see Section 2.d.).
In September members of the police and military forces tortured a
businesswoman at the behest of a presidential advisor who was in debt
to the victim. Due to the publicity surrounding the case, President
Deby dismissed the Minister of Justice, the presidential advisor, as
well as the Director General of the Gendarmerie.
Two specialized police units under the Ministry of Interior's
authority committed numerous human rights abuses during the year.
Members of the Police Rapid Action Company (CARP) and the Special
Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Unit (RAID) tortured, beat, and raped
detainees, without sanction by government authorities. Impunity for
those who commit human rights abuses remains widespread.
Prison conditions were harsh and life threatening. Prisons were
characterized by serious overcrowding; poor sanitation;inadequate food,
shelter, and medical facilities; and the mixing of adult male and minor
prisoners. Female prisoners usually are separated from males. The law
provides that a doctor must visit each prison three times a week;
however, there were credible reports that this was not done.
Human rights organizations in June called on the Government to
investigate numerous accusations by citizens in the Kenga canton of the
Guera prefecture who claimed that the canton chief was operating a
private prison in which some prisoners were tortured and whipped.
The Government permitted the ICRC to visit all prisons, including
military prisons, although it insisted on advance notice; the ICRC
conducted 37 prison visits during the year. Domestic nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's), including human rights groups, may visit a
prison only with authorization from a court or from the Director of
Prisons. These groups reportedly were not allowed access to military
prisons, and their access to civilian prisons depended greatly on the
personal inclinations of judges and prison administrators.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the
Penal Code prohibit arbitrary arrest; however, security forces
continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention. Arrest warrants must
be signed by a judicial official; however, the Government often does
not respect these requirements.
Human rights organizations cite the cases of over 100 detainees
held during the period from 1996 to 1999 by the canton chief in Kenga,
Guera, who is accused of operating a private prison. In view of the
lack of adequate judicial coverage in the country, the Government
accords traditional chiefs some judicial authority in the area of
arrest and short-term detention until prisoners can be turned over to
judicial officials. However, the Kenga canton chief abused his
authority in numerous cases.
In the first 3 months of the year, the army arrested three persons
in Faya Largeau on suspicion of aiding Tibesti rebel leader Togoimi. On
March 18, the director general of the gendarmerie of Faya Largeau,
acting under the orders of the Minister of Defense, arrested the imam
of the Faya Largeau mosque. The Government also detained imams Sheskh
Mahamat Marouf and Sheik Kaki Suzuki (see Section 2.c.).
Members of CARP and RAID were responsible for numerous cases of
arbitrary arrest and detention, and tortured, beat, and raped detainees
(see Section 1.c.). Persons accused of crimes may endure up to several
years of incarceration before being charged or tried, especially those
arrested for felonies in the provinces, who must await remand to the
overcrowded house of detention in N'djamena.
The Government released jailed opposition Deputy Ngarlejy Yorongar,
opposition party leader Yaya Batit, and over 200 other prisoners in
February. However, the Government continued to hold political
detainees. Detainees implicated in Dr. Nahor's rebellion remain in jail
without charges and without trial. Despite the arrests of individuals
on suspicion of subversive activities against the Government, no one
has been tried for such crimes since Deby came to power. Political
detainees either eventually are released or they disappear. The army
returned from the Democratic Republic of Congo in June with a group of
Congolese prisoners of war, many of whom were ordinary civilians.
Although the Government claimed that they were Ugandan and Rwandan
soldiers, the group consisted entirely of Congolese nationals who
remain housed at a military facility in N'djamena.
The Government did not practice forced exile; however, some family
members of persons who joined the northern rebellion chose to leave the
country for security reasons.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution mandates an
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary was ineffective,
underfunded, overburdened, and subject to executive interference. In
practice officials and other influential persons often enjoyed immunity
from judicial sanction. Executive influence remains a serious problem
in the judiciary. For example, in the case of the 11-month imprisonment
of an imam in Abeche (see Section 2.c.), President Deby supported the
prolonged incarceration of the imam despite the lack of a judicial
review of the case (also see Section 1.d.). During the year, the
President intervened in a number of legal cases for political reasons.
On April 28, President Deby swore in 16 members of the Supreme
Court as well as 9 members of the Constitutional Court. Establishment
of the two courts fulfilled the Constitution's formal requirement for
an independent judicial branch. Due to funding restrictions, both
courts did not begin operations until mid-year and still are relatively
untested legal bodies. The national judicial system operates with
courts located in provincial capitals. The N'djamena court of appeals
is supposed to conduct regular sessions in the provinces, but funding
limitations do not permit the court to make periodic circuit visits.
Applicable law can be confusing, as courts often tend to blend the
formal French-derived legal code with traditional practices. Residents
of rural areas often lack effective access to formal judicial
institutions. In most civil cases, they rely on traditional courts
presided over by village chiefs, canton chiefs, or sultans. Decisions
may be appealed to a formal court.
Official inaction and executive interference continue to plague the
judiciary. Long delays in trials result in lengthy pretrial detention
(see Section 1.d.).
Justice officials' salaries are often low. Although the Government
has stated that the strengthening and reform of the judiciary are top
priorities, it made little progress in these areas.
The Government has not enforced the Military Code of Justice since
the 1979-80 civil war, and court martials instituted early in the Deby
regime to try security personnel for crimes against civilians no longer
operate.
In February the President pardoned opposition deputy Ngarlejy
Yorongar and opposition political party leader Yaya Batit, along with
approximately 200 other prisoners. Both men had been accused of
defamation in 1998. The Government denied Batit a public trial and did
not provide him legal counsel. Yorongar's trial and subsequent appeals
were characterized by irregularities and questionable judicial
proceedings.
There were no reliable figures concerning the number of political
prisoners. A prominent political prisoner, Dr. Djibrine Ibrahim, was
released in June. Political prisoners rarely are convicted of any crime
and are either released or disappear.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy of
home, correspondence, and other communications, as well as freedom from
arbitrary search; however, authorities infringed on those rights. The
Penal Code requires authorities to conduct searches of homes only
during daylight hours and with a legal warrant; however, in practice
security forces ignored these provisions and conducted extrajudicial
searches at any time.
The Government engages in wiretapping without judicial authority
and monitors the contents of private mail through the postal service.
The Government illegally conscripted young men from eastern Chad
and Sudan into the army where they were trained for fighting against
rebel forces in northern Chad.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government at times
restricted this right in practice. The Government threatened
journalists with legal retaliation for publication of antigovernment
articles. The Government's primary concern centered on a series of
interviews with rebel leader Youssouf Togoimi, which the Minister of
Communications labeled as seditious. Intelligence services personnel
visited the offices of one journalist and threatened her if she
continued to publish articles about the rebellion. However, unlike the
previous year, the Government did not prosecute private print
journalists for libel.
NGO's published their findings on human rights cases in the print
media, often sending statements to diplomatic missions and
international human rights NGO's.
A number of private newspapers are published in the capital; some
are vociferously critical of government policies and leaders.
Due to widespread illiteracy and the relatively high cost of
newspapers and television, radio is the most important medium of mass
communication and information. Until 1999 there was only one privately
owned domestic radio station, La Voix du Paysan, which is owned by the
Catholic Church and began operating in 1997. Located in Doba, it
broadcasts locally produced programming including news coverage and
political commentary in French and indigenous languages over a 140 mile
range. The High Council on Communications (HCC) has set the licensing
fee for a commercial radio station at a prohibitively high level: about
$9,000 (5 million cfa francs) per year, 10 times the fee for radio
stations owned by nonprofit NGO's, like La Voix du Paysan.
A new community radio station in N'djamena, DJA-FM99, received a
license from the HCC but has only begun broadcasting music. Station SM-
Liberte, owned by a group of human rights organizations, also received
a license but has not started broadcasting.
The State owns and operates the only domestic television
broadcasting station. There have been no requests to establish a
private television station, economic preconditions for which may not
exist. There is one privately owned cable television service that
distributes foreign-sourced programming in French and Arabic, but
relatively few citizens can afford to subscribe. A South African cable
station also sells subscriptions.
The sole Internet access server is provided by the government-owned
telecommunications monopoly. The Government does not restrict access to
the Internet; however, the state-owned firm reportedly sets prices and
provides a quality of service that may discourage the establishment of
private domestic Internet service providers.
The official media, consisting of a national radio network, a press
agency, and N'djamena's only national television station, are subject
to both official and informal censorship. However, at times they are
critical of the Government. The official media also give top priority
to government officials and events, while providing less attention to
the opposition. The HCC acts as an arbiter whose main function is to
promote free access to the media, but it has no powers of enforcement.
Academic freedom is respected. In February students held a 3-day
protest over an increase in tuition fees (see Section 2.b.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government at times
limited this right in practice. The law requires organizers of public
demonstrations to notify local authorities 5 days in advance.
Authorities banned demonstrations critical of the Government despite
being notified in advance as required by law. The Government did not
permit students at N'djamena University to protest the accidental
killing of two university professors by customs authorities during a
high-speed pursuit of smugglers. Despite the lack of formal government
concurrence, a 3-day student protest over the increase in tuition fees
erupted in February. Subsequent police action in dispersing the
students resulted in injuries to two students.
By contrast peaceful demonstrations in support of the Government
and its policies are condoned. In October the Government permitted
demonstrations in support of the oil project.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respected this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
freedom, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
however, at times it limited this right. The Constitution also provides
that the country shall be a secular state. However, despite the secular
nature of the State, a large proportion of senior government officials,
including President Deby, are Muslims, and some policies favor Islam in
practice. For example the Government sponsors annual Hajj trips to
Mecca for certain government officials.
Non-Islamic religious leaders claim that Islamic officials and
organizations receive greater tax exemptions and unofficial financial
support from the Government. State lands reportedly are accorded to
Islamic leaders for the purpose of building mosques, while other
religious denominations must purchase land at market rates to build
churches.
The Government requires religious groups, including both foreign
missionary groups and Chadian religious groups, to register with the
Ministry of the Interior's Department for Religious Affairs.
Registration confers official recognition but not any tax preferences
or other benefits. There are no specific legal penalties for failure to
register, and there were no reports that any group had failed to apply
for registration or that the registration process is unduly burdensome.
The Government reportedly has denied official recognition to some
groups of Arab Muslims in Ati, near the eastern border with Sudan, on
the grounds that they have incorporated elements of traditional African
religion, such as dancing and singing, into their worship. In addition
to registration, foreign missionaries must receive authorization from
the Ministry of Interior, but do not face restrictions.
Instances of government intervention and prohibition of religious
practices during the reporting period involved both Christians and
Muslims. The Christian Eglise Evangelique des Freres (EEF), which
consists of approximately 40,000 adherents located primarily in Bessao
in the South, underwent a split in 1998 into moderate and
fundamentalist factions. Due to tensions between the two groups as well
as the fact that the moderate faction controlled the church
organization recognized by the Government (and resulting in
registration for all EEF churches), the Government banned the
fundamentalist group from its churches and further forbade adherents
from meeting in their homes for prayers. Although tension remains
between the two factions, the Ministry of the Interior rescinded its
ban on the fundamentalist faction and issued it a legal registration on
April 7 to practice under a new name (Eglise des Freres Independantes
au Tchad--EFIT).
Within the Islamic community, the Government intervened to imprison
and sanction fundamentalist Islamic imams believed to be promoting
conflict among Muslims. In January the Government arbitrarily arrested
and detained imam Sheikh Mahamat Marouf, the fundamentalist Islamic
leader of the northeastern town of Abeche and refused to allow his
followers to meet and pray openly in their mosque. Sheikh Marouf
remained in jail without formal charges until November 19 when the
President ordered his release. The Government prohibited a
fundamentalist imam in N'Djdamena, Sheik Faki Suzuki (named after the
Suzuki car equipped with loudspeakers that he used for broadcasting his
sermons around town) from preaching Islam for 6 months, from October
1998 to March. The Government claimed that his messages promoted
violence, and it also placed him under house arrest.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights; however, there were some limits on them in practice. The
Government did not require special permission for travel in areas that
it effectively controls. However, elements of the security forces,
rebels, and bandits continued to maintain many roadblocks throughout
the country, extorting money from travelers. The Government did not
officially condone such behavior on the part of security forces
members, but did not discourage it effectively. In addition armed
bandits operated on many roads, assaulting, robbing, and killing
travelers; some bandits were identified as active duty soldiers or
deserters.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations assisting
refugees. There were no confirmed reports of the forced expulsion of
persons with a valid claim to refugee status, but refugees continue to
complain about threats to their safety while waiting for their cases to
be adjudicated. The country provides first asylum for refugees and has
done so in past years. The Government has granted refugee and asylee
status informally to persons and has allowed them to remain for
resettlement.
In January 5,000 additional Sudanese refugees fleeing tribal
violence in the western Sudan joined 12,500 Sudanese refugees who
entered Chad in 1998. All remain scattered in more than 30 villages
along the eastern border near Adre. Despite entreaties from the
Government of Sudan to return, the Sudanese refugees continue to reside
in Chad.
The Government adheres to the principles of U.N. refugee standards
and criteria; however, these principles are not incorporated into the
law. An official national structure is in place to deal with Chadian
and foreign refugee affairs, called the National Committee for
Welcoming and Reinsertion. Since 1993 the Government has registered
refugees in N'djamena and sent their applications for refugee status to
UNHCR Central African headquarters in Kinshasa, the Democratic Republic
of Congo, or other regional UNHCR offices in Africa. A person whose
application is accepted is eligible to enroll in a 6-month care
maintenance program that includes a monthly subsistence allowance,
medical care, and assistance in finding work. This program is funded by
a local NGO.
Chadian refugees are legally free to repatriate, and the UNHCR
intends to repatriate approximately 25,000 Chadians from surrounding
countries in the next 3 years. Most Chadian refugees reside in the
Central African Republic, Niger, Libya, Sudan, Nigeria, and Cameroon.
A group of foreign individuals, mostly Sudanese, claiming to be
refugees, continue to charge that foreign officials often monitor
refugees applying at the UNHCR branch office N'djamena and have stated
that this intimidates some refugees.
There were no known instances of persons being returned to a
country where they feared persecution. However, the Sudanese government
forcibly repatriated several Chadian rebels in September, even though
the Government of Chad characterized their return as a reconciliation.
Although the men are no longer in prison, their movements are
restricted and they are unable to leave the country.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
Citizens' right to change their government peacefully remained
limited. The 1996 presidential election, which Deby won, and the 1997
National Assembly elections, in which Deby's MPS party won 65 of a
total of 125-seats, were the first multiparty elections in many years.
However, both elections were compromised by widely reported fraud,
including vote rigging and other irregularities committed by election
officers, government officials, members of the ruling party, and other
parties.
The Government is headed by a prime minister who is nominated by
the President and confirmed by the National Assembly. Prime Minister
Nassour Ouaidou Guelengdouksia has held office since May 1997.
The State remains highly centralized. The national government
appoints all subnational government officials, who also must rely on
the central government for most of their revenues and their
administrative personnel. Using its parliamentary majority, the
Government during the year passed twin legislative bills outlining the
proposed decentralization structure leading to local government
elections that are required by the Constitution. Local elections have
been delayed since the conclusion of the 1997 parliamentary elections.
The newly established Constitutional Court in September returned both
legislative bills to parliament after finding that they violated the
Constitution.
Many political parties objected to the Government's proposed
decentralization plan and its presidentially decreed internal
territorial divisions. Political leaders accuse the Government of
coopting their most popular local politicians to run as candidates in
local elections and also alleged intimidation and threats by the
military forces against those party members who refused.
Women are underrepresented in Government and politics; few women
hold senior leadership positions. There are 2 women of cabinet rank and
3 female members of the 125-seat National Assembly.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights organizations generally operate with few overt
restrictions, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are often accessible to human rights
monitors but generally are unresponsive or hostile to their findings.
The Government obstructed the work of human rights organizations during
the year through arrest, detention, and intimidation. Incidents between
state security forces and human rights monitors occurred in the Kanem,
Moyen Chari, Mayo Kebbi, Tan'djile, and Ouaddai regions.
NGO's have gained recognition under the Deby regime and play a role
in political events. Human rights groups have assisted the Government
in mediation efforts to reconcile the ancient conflict between herders
and farmers over land and water rights. Numerous NGO's participated in
a national conference on the farmer/herder conflict sponsored by the
Government in May.
Human rights groups are outspoken, if often partisan, in
publicizing abuses through reports and press releases, but only
occasionally are they able to intervene successfully with authorities.
Many human rights groups are composed of opponents of the Government,
which impairs their credibility with both the Government and
international organizations.
In January the European Interparliamentary Union issued a report on
the arrest, detention, and legal proceedings against then--imprisoned
opposition deputy Ngarlejy Yorongar. The delegation that visited Chad
on a fact-finding mission in late 1998 raised serious objections to
Yorongar's treatment in prison, the political nature of his arrest, and
the lack of impartial judicial treatment in his case.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens,
regardless of origin, race, religion, political opinion, or social
status. In practice cultural traditions maintain women in a status
subordinate to men, and the Government favors its ethnic supporters and
allies.
Women.--While no statistics are available, domestic violence
against women is believed to be common. By tradition wives are subject
to the authority of their husbands, and they have only limited legal
recourse against abuse. Family or traditional authorities may act in
such cases, but police rarely intervene.
Discrimination against women remains widespread. In practice women
do not have equal opportunities for education and training, making it
difficult for them to compete for the few formal sector jobs. Property
and inheritance laws do not discriminate against women, but traditional
practice favors men. Exploitation of women is especially pervasive in
rural areas where women do most of the agricultural labor and are
discouraged from formal schooling.
In August the Government held meetings with representatives of
religious groups and civil society to update the Family Code. In the
absence of a comprehensive law governing women's rights, the Family
Code sets the parameters of women's rights under the law.
The Government promoted increased awareness of women's rights in
March by sponsoring a National Women's Congress in Moundou in honor of
international women's day. Although the meetings did not result in
formal resolutions or a groundbreaking political action plan, the
meetings nevertheless served to focus attention on many of the problems
that confront women.
Children.--The Government has demonstrated little commitment to
children's rights and welfare. Although increasing its assistance to
the education sector, the Government has not committed adequate funding
to public education and medical care. Educational opportunities for
girls are limited, mainly because of tradition. About as many girls as
boys are enrolled in primary school, but the percentage of girls
enrolled in secondary school is extremely low, primarily because of
early marriage. Although the law prohibits sexual relations with a girl
under the age of 14, even if married, this law rarely is enforced, and
families arrange marriages for girls as young as the age of 11 or 12,
sometimes forcibly, for the financial gain of a dowry. Many wives then
are obligated to work long hours of physical labor for their husbands
in fields or homes. Children work in agriculture and herding (see
Section 6.d.).
Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is widespread--estimated to have been practiced
on about 60 percent of all females--and deeply rooted in tradition.
Advocated by women as well as by men, the practice is especially
prevalent among ethnic groups in the east and south, where it was
introduced from Sudan. All three types of FGM are practiced. The least
common but most invasive procedure, infibulation, is confined largely
to the region on the eastern border with Sudan. FGM usually is
performed prior to puberty as a rite of passage, an occasion that many
families use to profit from gifts from their communities.
Opposition to the elimination of FGM is strong. Both the Government
and the NGO community in recent years have conducted active and
sustained public education campaigns against the practice. A 1995 law
makes FGM theoretically a prosecutable offense as a form of assault,
and charges can be brought against the parents of FGM victims, medical
practitioners, or others involved in the action; however, no suits have
been brought under the law.
People with Disabilities.--There is no official discrimination
against disabled persons. However, the Government operates only a few
therapy, education, or employment programs for persons with
disabilities, and no laws mandate access to buildings for the disabled.
Several local NGO's provide skills training to the deaf and blind.
Religious Minorities.--About half the population is Muslim, about
one-third is Christian, and the remainder practice traditional
indigenous religions or no religion. Most northerners practice Islam;
most southerners practice Christianity or a traditional religion.
Consequently, tensions and conflicts between government supporters from
the politically dominant northern region and rebels from the
politically subordinate southern region occasionally have religious
overtones.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population of
about 7 million consists of approximately 200 ethnic groups, many of
which are concentrated regionally and speak distinct primary languages.
Most ethnic groups are affiliated with one of two regional and cultural
traditions: Arab and Saharan/Sahelian zone Muslims in the north,
center, and east; and Sudanian zone Christian or animist groups in the
south.
Societal discrimination continued to be practiced routinely by
members of virtually all ethnic groups and was evident in patterns of
buying and employment, in patterns of de facto segregation in urban
neighborhoods, and in the paucity of interethnic marriages, especially
across the north-south divide. Although the law prohibits state
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, in practice ethnicity
continued to influence government appointments and political alliances.
Northerners, in particular members of President Deby's Zaghawa ethnic
group, continued to dominate the public sector and were overrepresented
in key institutions of state power, including the military officer
corps, elite military units, and the presidential staff. Political
parties and groups generally continued to have readily identifiable
regional or ethnic bases.
In the army's fight against the Tibesti rebels, several hundred
soldiers were killed or injured by land mines. The Government exhibited
a pattern of discrimination in selectively separating wounded
northerners from southerners for treatment, with the northerners given
preferential medical treatment, including evacuation abroad. Many
untreated wounded southerners were left to die as a result of the
selective access to medical treatment based solely on ethnicity.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution recognizes freedom
of association and union membership, as well as the right to strike,
and the Government generally respected the right to organize and strike
in practice. All employees, except members of the armed forces, are
free to join or form unions. Unions no longer need authorization from
the Government in order to operate legally. However, few workers belong
to unions, as most workers are unpaid subsistence cultivators or
herders. The main labor organization is the Federation of Chadian
Unions (UST). Its former major constituent union, the Teacher's Union
of Chad, broke off from UST and became independent in 1998. Neither
union has ties to the Government. A number of minor federations and
unions, including the Free Confederation of Chadian Workers, also
operate, some with ties to government officials.
The telecommunications workers struck in July over issues relating
to the pending privatization of the telecommunications sector.
Labor unions have the right to affiliate internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution contains only general provisions for the rights of the
Government to set minimum wage standards and to permit unions to
bargain collectively. The Labor Code has specific provisions on
collective bargaining and workers' rights. The Labor Code empowers the
Government to intervene in the bargaining process under certain
circumstances.
The Labor Code protects unions against antiunion discrimination,
but there is no formal mechanism for resolving such complaints.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
the Labor Code prohibit slavery and forced or compulsory labor by
adults and children; however, while there are no reports of forced
labor practices in the formal economy, there were isolated instances of
forced labor by adults and children in the rural sector by local
authorities as well as in military installations in the north.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code stipulates that the minimum age for
employment in the formal sector is 14 years. The Government does not
enforce the law, but in practice children rarely are employed except in
agriculture and herding due to the high unemployment rate; however, in
agriculture and herding, child labor is nearly universal. Children
rarely are employed in the commercial sector; however, some children
work on contract with herders. The Government does not support the use
of minors in the military services, and minors were believed to have
been mustered out in the demobilization program of 1997. However, there
were credible reports that minors continue to serve in the military
services. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children;
however, it does not enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section
6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code requires the
Government to set minimum wages. The minimum wage at year's end was $50
(25,480 cfa) per month. Most wages, including the minimum wage, were
insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. Nearly all private sector and state-owned firms paid at least
the minimum wage, but the lowest public sector wages remained below the
minimum wage. The Government increased the salaries of civil servants
by 5 percent in January because it was unable to pay many government
employees the minimum wage during 1998. The Government reduced wages
paid to the armed forces, which are already well below the minimum
wage.
The State, which owns businesses that dominate many sectors of the
formal economy, remained the largest employer. The Government reduced
significantly the large salary arrears owed to civil servants and
military personnel, although some arrears remain. Nevertheless, wages
remained low, and many state employees continued to hold second jobs,
raise their own food crops, or rely on their families for support.
The law limits most agricultural work to 39 hours per week, with
overtime paid for supplementary hours. Agricultural work is limited to
2,400 hours per year. All workers are entitled to 48 hours of rest per
week, although in practice these laws rarely are enforced.
The Labor Code mandates occupational health and safety standards
and inspectors with the authority to enforce them. These standards
rarely are respected in practice in the private sector and are
nonexistent in the civil service. The UST has alleged before the
International Labor Organization that the labor inspection service is
not allocated the resources necessary to perform its duties. In
principle workers can remove themselves from dangerous working
conditions, but in practice they cannot leave without jeopardizing
their employment.
f. Trafficking.--The law prohibits trafficking in persons, and
there were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to, or from the
country.
______
COMOROS
The Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros is ruled by Colonel
Assoumani Azali, who took power in a coup in April. The country
consists of three islands (Grande Comore, Anjouan, and Moheli) and
claims a fourth, Mayotte, which is governed by France. Comoros has been
prone to coups and political insurrection since independence in 1975.
On April 29 and 30, army commander Colonel Azali staged a bloodless
coup and overthrew President Tadjiddine Ben Said Massounde, the Interim
President who had held office since the death of democratically elected
President Mohamed Taki Abdoulkarim in November 1998. Colonel Azali
justified the coup and his subsequent self-designation as president by
stating that the previous government was unable to maintain law and
order on Grande Comore or to solve the Anjouan secession crisis.
Colonel Azali said that he would step down on April 14, 2000 and
relinquish power to a democratically elected president. However, his
vow was conditioned on Anjouan's return to the republic and
participation in the elections. On May 6, Azali decreed a new
Constitution that gives him both executive and legislative powers.
While the Cabinet is predominantly civilian, three-quarters of the
regime's directorate, where the real power is thought to reside, is
composed of members of the military. In December in response to
international criticism, Azali appointed a civilian prime minister,
Bianrifi Tarmidi; however, Azali remains the Head of State and army
commander in chief. The judiciary was the only federal institution to
survive the coup intact. Its nominal independence was not tested during
the year; however, in the past, both the executive and other elites
have influenced the outcome of court cases.
The Anjouan secession crisis entered its third year. In April
Anjouanais representatives were the only parties who refused to sign a
reunification accord brokered by the Organization for African Unity's
(OAU), which was negotiated in Antananarivo, Madagascar. The Anjouanais
leadership had not signed the accords by year's end. In August
legislative elections were held on Anjouan, in which the faction led by
Lieutenant Colonel Said Abeid won an overwhelming majority. Opposition
parties alleged that most of their candidates were disqualified
unfairly. Several opposition leaders were expelled to Mayotte in
September, then imprisoned when they were sent back to Anjouan by
French authorities. The OAU observer force departed the country after
the coup. The OAU General Assembly and Council of Ministers both have
criticized the coup, and the General Assembly threatened sanctions if
constitutional government was not restored before the next OAU summit.
The Comorian Defense Force (FCD) and the gendarmerie are
responsible for internal security and are under Azali's direct control.
Security forces committed some human rights abuses.
The economy of this extremely poor country is dominated by
agriculture. Revenues from the main crops--vanilla, essence of ylang-
ylang, and cloves--continue to fall while the population of 547,600 has
been growing at a rate of 2.7 percent annually. Per capita income was
approximately $400 per year in 1997. The national accounts have not
been updated since 1998. The country depends heavily on foreign
assistance from the European Union and Arab countries, including
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
The human rights situation remained poor, and worsened in several
areas. Citizens do not have the right to change their government.
Police regularly threatened Christians, prison conditions remain poor,
and police sometimes arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. There
were some infringements on freedom of the press and academic freedom.
The military regime limits freedom of religion. Societal discrimination
against women and Christians continued to be serious problems. There
were some instances of forced child labor. Prior to the coup,
nongovernmental political factions harassed and beat Anjouanais
residents throughout Grande Comore after Anjouanais representatives
refused to sign the Antananarivo accords in April.
On at least one occasion, quasi-police authorities known as
embargoes on Anjouan beat and detained Christians. Political violence
on Anjouan resulted in a number of deaths.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or extrajudicial killings by the authorities on
Grande Comore.
Between May 11 and 13, 1998, police clashed with protestors on
Grand Comore over the May 6 government closure of the opposition
party's Radio Tropique. Police seriously injured several persons, but
the only death reportedly was due to a traffic accident caused by the
fighting. No police officers were held responsible for their actions
during the protests.
In addition to the police and the military, there are many groups
throughout Anjouan that are armed, including paramilitary forces,
militias, and civilians. Battles between rival militias resulted in
about a dozen deaths.
In May a Paris, France court acquitted Bob Denard, a 70-year-old
mercenary, of charges that he killed President Ahmed Abdallah in 1989.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The new Constitution declared by Colonel Azali does not
specifically prohibit torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment; however, while there were no reports of
security force brutality, police regularly threatened Christians (see
Section 2.c.).
In April just prior to the coup, nongovernmental political factions
and gangs of youths harassed and beat hundreds of Anjouanais on the
main island of Grand Comore after representatives from Anjouan refused
to sign a reunification accord.
In April embargoes arrested, beat, and detained three local
Christians (see Section 2.c.). Prison conditions continued to be poor.
A lack of proper sanitation, overcrowding, inadequate medical
facilities, and poor diet are common problems. The military regime has
not taken action to remedy these problems.
The military regime permits prison visit by independent monitors;
however, no such visits occurred during the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution does
not prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention specifically, and there
were instances in which authorities arbitrarily arrested and detained
citizens. Three opposition politicians, including former interim Prime
Minister Abbas Djoussouf, were arrested and detained briefly following
minor street demonstrations in September. In September the courts
dismissed charges against all three. In October authorities arrested a
journalist for writing an article that suggested that there was discord
within the army over Azali's rule (see Section 2.a.).
In April embargoes on Anjouan arrested, beat, and detained for a
day three local Christians (see Sections 1.c. and 2.c.). Usually the
authorities hold those detained for a few days and often attempt to
convert them forcibly to Islam. This incident was not investigated, nor
was any action taken against the persons responsible. Anjouan
authorities also detained political opponents.
In September secessionist authorities on Anjouan exiled a score of
opponents to Mayotte, then imprisoned several of the group's leaders
when they were sent back to Anjouan by French authorities. The
opponents were released from prison in early October, and no charges
were filed against them.
The Constitution does not prohibit forced exile, but the military
regime did not use it.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary enforced by the Head of State; however, while the
nominal independence of the judiciary was not tested during the year,
in the past, the executive and other elites have exercised influence
over court cases. The Head of State names magistrates by decree.
The High Council, made up of four members appointed by the
President, three members elected by the Federal Assembly, and a member
of each island council, also serves as the High Court of the Republic
and rules on cases of constitutional law. The May Constitution does not
provide for equality before the law of all citizens. It does not
mention the right to counsel. Trials are open to the public except for
limited exceptions defined by law. The legal system incorporates
Islamic law as well as French legal codes. There are very few lawyers
in the country, making it difficult to obtain legal representation. The
military regime does not provide legal counsel to the accused. Most
disputes are presented to village elders for possible resolution before
being taken to court.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--There were no known cases of arbitrary interference
with privacy or correspondence. Former President Taki's bans on alcohol
and immodest dress no longer remained in effect. Alcohol can be
imported and sold with a permit from the military regime.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution does not provide
specifically for freedom of the press, and on at least one occasion
authorities infringed on this right. In early October, a freelance
correspondent with Agence France Presse, Aboubacar Mchangama, was
arrested and detained for reporting about unease within the army
between supporters and opponents of Colonel Azali. He reportedly was
released on bail on October 21. Nevertheless, small independent
newspapers exist side-by-side with the semiofficial weekly Al-Watwan,
and some of the independent newspapers criticized the regime freely.
The regime-controlled radio station, Radio Comoros, was the only
national radio station until the opposition radio station Radio
Tropique resumed operations in June. In addition there are at least 10
regional and local stations, some of which are openly critical of the
regime. Residents also receive broadcasts from Mayotte Radio, as well
as from French television, without government interference. A national
television station is under construction with assistance from the
Chinese Government. There are several private local television
stations, and satellite antennas are popular. Amateur radio licenses
have been issued without hindrance in the past.
Foreign newspapers are available, as are books from abroad.
Internet service was introduced by the Taki Government in September
1998.
In August an independent radio station on Anjouan, Radio Ushababi,
which was opposed to the independence movement, reportedly was forced
to cease broadcasting after being harassed by police and threatened on
several occasions by a group of separatist militiamen.
There is no university, but secondary students and teachers speak
freely and criticize the regime openly. Public schools no longer are
closed on Grand Comore. In order to pressure the Anjouan authorities
into signing the Antananarivo accords, the Azali military regime
prevented Anjouanais students who traveled to Grande Comore from taking
their baccalaureate exams.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
does not provide specifically for freedom of assembly and association,
but the regime generally respected these rights in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution does not prohibit
discrimination based on religion or religious belief specifically, and
authorities infringed on this right. An overwhelming majority of the
population is Sunni Muslim. Authorities restricted the right of
Christians to practice their faith. Police regularly threatened and
sometimes detained practicing Christians. Usually, the authorities hold
those detained for a few days and often attempt to convert them to
Islam forcibly. In October two citizens were arrested, tried, and
convicted of ``anti-Islamic activity'' in part because they possessed
Christian books and audiovisual material. One of the citizens was
sentenced to 18 months in prison, while the other was sentenced to 4
months. Local government officials attempted to force Christians to
attend services at mosques against their will.
There are two Roman Catholic churches and one Protestant church.
However, prior to the April coup, the former military regime restricted
the use of these three churches to noncitizens. There was no
information available as to whether the new military regime continued
this practice. Many Christians practice their faith in private
residences. The regime permits Christian missionaries to work in local
hospitals and schools, but does not permit them to proselytize.
The Ulamas council, which had advised the President, Prime
Minister, President of the Federal Assembly, the Council of Isles, and
the island governors on whether bills, ordinances, decrees, and laws
are in conformity with the principles of Islam, no longer exists.
In April embargoes on Anjouan arrested, beat, and detained for a
day three local Christians. Some community authorities on Anjouan
banned Christians from attending any community events and banned
Christian burials in a local cemetery.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution does not specifically
provide for these rights; however, the military regime generally
respected them in practice. There is no longer a curfew in effect. Air
links that had been severed since December 1998 between Grande Comore
and Anjouan were restored in April. Passports were again available.
The regime has not formulated a policy regarding refugees, asylees,
or first asylum.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
According to the Constitution's preamble and in practice, citizens
do not have the right to change their government. The Constitution
states that national sovereignty belongs to the nation's citizens who
may exercise it through referendums; however, the regime had not
scheduled a referendum by year's end.
According to the Constitution, the Head of State--self-appointed
President Azali--has legislative power, which he exercises through
ordinances, and executive power, which he exercises through decrees. On
April 30, Colonel Azali said that he would step down on April 14, 2000,
and relinquish power to a democratically elected president if Anjouan
returns to the Republic and participates in the elections.
There are no bans in effect on political parties, which continue
openly to criticize the regime without penalty.
Village chiefs and Muslim religious leaders tend to dominate local
politics. Traditional social, religious, and economic institutions also
affect the country's political life in important ways.
Although women have the right to vote and to run for office, they
are underrepresented severely in national politics. At least two women
hold senior government positions: one is the Minister for National
Education and the other holds the second highest position on the State
Council, which advises the Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The military regime did not prevent the operation of human rights
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), and a number of NGO's operated
in the country. However, the Comoros Human Rights Association,
established in 1990, was on the verge of disintegration due to a lack
of funds.
The military regime cooperated with international NGO's, and a few
international NGO's operated in the country.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution does not prohibit discrimination based on these
factors specifically, but only states that the judiciary is the
guardian of individual liberties. Local communities discriminate
against and harass Christians, and Islamic fundamentalism is growing in
popularity as more students return to the country after pursuing
Islamic studies abroad.
Women.--Violence against women occurs, but medical authorities, the
police, and women's groups believe that it is rare. In theory a woman
could seek protection through the courts in the case of violence, but
in fact the problem is addressed most often within the extended family
or at the village level.
Men have the dominant role in society. A matriarchal African
tradition affords women some rights, especially in terms of
landholding. Societal discrimination against women was most apparent in
rural areas where women have onerous farming and child-rearing duties,
with fewer opportunities for education and wage employment. In contrast
an improvement in the status of women was most evident in the major
towns, where growing numbers of women are in the labor force and
generally earn wages comparable to those of men engaged in similar
work; however, few women hold positions of responsibility in business.
While legal discrimination exists in some areas, in general inheritance
and property rights do not disfavor women. For example, the house that
the father of the bride traditionally provides to the couple at the
time of their marriage remains her property in the event of divorce.
Children.--The regime has not commented on the protection of
children's rights and welfare, nor has it taken any action to protect
or promote children's welfare. Population pressure and poverty force
some families to place their children in the homes of others. These
children, often as young as 7 years of age, typically work long hours
as domestic servants in exchange for food and shelter (see Section
6.c.). Legal provisions that address the rights and welfare of children
are not enforced because of a lack of inspectors.
Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, generally is not practiced. Child abuse appears
to be rare.
People with Disabilities.--There is no evidence of widespread
discrimination against the disabled in the provision of education or
other services. No legislation is in force concerning accessibility to
public buildings or services for persons with disabilities.
Religious Minorities.--There is widespread societal discrimination
against Christians in all sectors of life. Attempts have been made to
isolate Christians from village life. Christians face insults and
threats of violence from members of their communities. Christians have
been harassed by mobs in front of mosques and summoned for questioning
by religious authorities. In some instances, families forced Christian
members out of their homes or threatened them with a loss of financial
support. Some Christians have had their Bibles taken by family members.
Local government officials, religious authorities, and family members
have attempted to force Christians to attend services at mosques
against their will.
Community members and authorities in Lingoni, Anjouan, banned
Christians from attending any community events, and in Mremeni,
Anjouan, they banned Christian burials in the local cemetery.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution does not provide for
the right to unionize and strike, but these rights are practiced
freely. Farming on small land holdings, subsistence fishing, and petty
commerce make up the daily activity of most of the population. The wage
labor force is small, and numbers less than 7,000 including government
employees, and less than 2,000 excluding them. Teachers, civil
servants, and dockworkers are unionized. Unions are independent of the
regime. Teachers and hospital workers strike intermittently, mostly
because they often are not paid for months at a time. There are no laws
protecting strikers from retribution, but there were no known instances
of retribution.
There are no restrictions on unions joining federations or
affiliating with international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have the
right to bargain collectively, and strikes are legal. Wages are set by
employers in the small private sector and by the Government, especially
the Ministries of Finance and Labor, in the larger public sector. The
Labor Code, which is enforced only loosely, does not include a system
for resolving labor disputes, and it does not prohibit antiunion
discrimination by employers.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
does not mention forced or compulsory labor, but it generally is not
practiced; however, some families place their children in the homes of
others where they work long hours in exchange for food or shelter (see
Section 5).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code defines the minimum age for employment as
15 years of age. The Ministry of Labor has few resources to enforce
this provision, but, except for domestic work, child labor is not a
problem due to the general lack of wage employment opportunities. There
were some instances of forced or bonded labor by children (see Section
5 and 6.c.). Children generally help with the work of their families in
the subsistence farming and fishing sectors (see Section 5).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage.
Previous governments periodically have reminded employers to
respect the Labor Code, which specifies 1 day off per week plus 1 month
of paid vacation per year, but the regime has not set a standard
workweek.
There are no safety or health standards for the minuscule
manufacturing sector.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
in, to, or from the country.
______
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
Much of the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) continued
to be ruled by President Laurent Desire Kabila, whose Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) overthrew
the authoritarian regime of Mobutu Sese Seko by armed force in 1997.
The State continued to be highly centralized formally--although in
practice the country's dilapidated transportation and communications
infrastructure impaired central Government control--and Kabila
continued to rule by decree, unconstrained by a constitution or a
legislature. Kabila continued to ban political party activity, and
replaced the ADFL with Libyan-trained ``People's Power Committees''
(CPP's) that monitored the activities of citizens in neighborhoods,
schools and workplaces. The July 10 Lusaka Accords provided for a
political dialog among the Government, rebel factions, the unarmed
opposition, and elements of civil society; however, little was
accomplished toward this end during the year. The judiciary continued
to be subject to executive influence and corruption.
By year's end, the Government had lost control of more than half
the country's territory to armed antigovernment organizations, the
Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), and the Movement for the
Liberation of the Congo (MLC). The RCD remained dominated by members of
the Tutsi ethnic minority but split in May into two factions: One that
continued to be headquartered in Goma and to command most RCD forces
and continued to be supported by the Government of Rwanda; and a new
faction based in Kisangani that commanded fewer troops and, like the
largely non-Tutsi MLC, was supported by the Government of Uganda. War
broke out in August 1998, when Kabila tried to expel Rwandan military
forces that had helped him overthrow Mobutu. Congolese Tutsis as well
as the Governments of Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda all relied on the
Rwandan military presence for protection against hostile armed groups
operating out of the eastern part of the country. These groups
included: The Interahamwe militia of Hutus, mostly from Rwanda, which
took part in the 1994 genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda and who fought the
Tutsi-dominated Government of Rwanda; Hutu members of the former
Rwandan armed forces, which also took part in the 1994 genocide of
Tutsis in Rwanda, and who also fought the Government of Rwanda; the Mai
Mai, a loose association of traditional Congolese local defense forces,
which fought the influx of perceived Rwandan immigrants; the Alliance
of Democratic Forces (ADF), made of up Ugandan expatriates and
supported by the Government of Sudan, which fought the Government of
Uganda; and several groups of Hutus from Burundi fighting the Tutsi-
dominated Government of Burundi. In the ensuing war, elements of the
armed forces of Rwanda and Uganda operated inside the country in
support of the RCD or the MLC; elements of the armed forces of Angola,
Chad (whose forces withdrew from the country during the year), Namibia,
and Zimbabwe operated inside the country in support of the Government;
and the Mai Mai and Hutu armed groups operated inside the country on
the side of the Government, often as guerillas operating inside
territory held by antigovernment forces. Elements of the armed forces
of Burundi operated inside the country against armed groups of Hutus
from Burundi who used the country as a base. A small detachment of
Libyan troops was present in the capital for a few months but did not
conduct any combat operations. Antigovernment forces generally
continued to win territory from progovernment forces during the year
despite sporadic fighting among rival rebel organizations. A cease-fire
agreement negotiated in Lusaka in July was violated by all parties
especially in the north and east, but fighting was generally less
intense than during the first half of the year.
The Government's security forces consist of a national police force
under the Ministry of Interior, a National Security Council (CNS), the
National Intelligence Agency (ANR), and the Congolese Armed Forces
(FAC), which includes an Office for the Military Detection of
Subversive Activities (DEMIAP). There is also a Presidential Guard,
which has its own Investigative Branch (DGGP). The immigration service
(DGM) and the recently organized Autodefense Forces (FAP) and CPP's
also function as security forces. During the year, Kabila gave Mai Mai
leaders commissions in the FAC and coordinated operations with the Mai
Mai and Hutu militias; the Government also formed People's Defense
Committees (CPD's), which were armed elements of the new CPP's and
operated outside the formal structure of the State, but which were not
yet armed in some areas at year's end. The police force, reorganized in
1997, handles basic criminal cases. The CNS shares responsibility for
internal and external security with the ANR, including border security
matters. The FAC retains some residual police functions. Military
police have jurisdiction over armed forces personnel. The security
forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
Most sectors of the economy continue to decline. Production and
incomes continued to fall, and the modern sector virtually has
disappeared. Physical infrastructure was in serious disrepair,financial
institutions have collapsed, and public education and health have
deteriorated. Annual per capita national income fell from an estimated
$115 in 1998 to less than $100 in 1999. Subsistence activities, a large
informal sector, and widespread barter characterized much of the
economy; the insolvent public sector could not provide even basic
public services. External economic assistance remained limited, and the
State's revenues from diamond exports, its leading source of foreign
exchange, declined. Public sector employees, including most soldiers,
routinely went months without pay, which caused a number of strikes.
Rebel-held areas increasingly were integrated financially and
administratively with the economies of Rwanda and Uganda. The
Governments of Rwanda and Uganda established commercial agreements and
reportedly have levied and collected taxes and customs duties.
The Kabila Government's human rights record remained poor. Citizens
do not have the right to change their government peacefully. Security
forces were responsible for numerous extrajudicial killings,
disappearances, torture, beatings, rape, and other abuses. In general,
security forces committed these abuses with impunity, although a
special military tribunal tried and executed some security force
members for various human rights abuses. Prison conditions remained
harsh and life threatening. Security forces increasingly used arbitrary
arrest and detention throughout the year. Prolonged pretrial detention
remained a problem, and citizens often were denied fair public trials.
The special military tribunal tried civilians for political offenses
and executed civilians, frequently with total disregard for process
protections. The judiciary remained subject to executive influence and
continued to suffer from a lack of resources, inefficiency, and
corruption. It was largely ineffective as either a deterrent to human
rights abuses or a corrective force. Security forces violated citizens'
rights to privacy. Forcible conscription of adults and children
continued, although children were conscripted to a lesser extent than
in the previous year. Government security forces continued to use
excessive force and committed violations of international law in the
war that started in August 1998. On at least three occasions,
government aircraft bombed civilian populated areas in rebel-held
territory. Although a large number of private newspapers often
published criticism of the Government, the Government continued to
restrict freedom of speech and of the press by harassing and arresting
newspaper editors and journalists and seizing individual issues of
publications, as well as by continuing to increase its restrictions on
private radio broadcasting. The Government severely restricted freedom
of assembly and association. The Government continued to restrict
freedom of movement; it required exit visas and imposed curfews even in
cities not immediately threatened by the war. The Government continued
to ban political party activity and used security services to stop
political demonstrations, resulting in numerous arrests and detentions.
It also harassed and imprisoned members of opposition parties and
harassed human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). Violence
against women is a problem and rarely was punished. Female genital
mutilation (FGM) persists among isolated populations in the north.
Discrimination against indigenous pygmies and ethnic minorities is a
problem. Serious governmental and societal violence and discrimination
against members of the Tutsi ethnic minority continued; however, the
Government protected many Tutsis who were at risk and permitted 1,341
to leave the country. The Government arrested labor leaders during
public sector strikes and allowed private employers to refuse to
recognize unions. Child labor including use of child soldiers remained
a common problem. There were credible reports of beatings, rapes, and
extrajudicial killings of Tutsis; however, societal abuses of Tutsis in
government-controlled areas were far fewer than in 1998 because by the
start of the year surviving Tutsis generally either had left the
government-controlled part of the country or were in hiding, places of
refuge, or government custody.
There were numerous credible reports that Mai Mai groups fighting
on the side of the Government committed serious abuses, including many
extrajudicial killings and the torture of civilians.
There were many reports, some of which were confirmed, that some
antigovernment forces, in particular Rwandan army and RCD-Goma units,
committed serious abuses against civilians living in territories under
their control, including deliberate large-scale killings,
disappearances, torture, rape, extortion, robbery, arbitrary arrests
and detention, harassment of human rights workers and journalists, and
forcible recruitment of child soldiers. Rebel organizations severely
restricted freedom of speech, assembly and association in areas they
held. There were also many deaths due to interethnic mob violence in
areasheld by antigovernment forces. However, reports from such areas
often were difficult to investigate.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The widespread
extrajudicial killings of Tutsis and suspected Tutsis that occurred in
government-controlled areas after the start of the war in 1998 did not
continue during the year; by the start of the year, surviving Tutsis
generally either had left the government-controlled part of the country
or were in hiding, places of refuge, or government custody. One Tutsi
girl died of an illness while in government custody, but it was
credibly reported that her death was not due to government negligence
or abuse. The Government also materially supported Mai Mai and Hutu
armed groups, which, according to credible reports, repeatedly killed
unarmed as well as armed Tutsis in areas held by antigovernment forces.
However, government officials no longer instigated mob violence against
unarmed Tutsis, and there were no further reports of mass extrajudicial
killings of Tutsis by the security forces.
Members of the security forces committed extrajudicial killings,
and the Government misused the judicial system to try, sentence, and
execute numerous persons without due process.
On the night of January 6 in Kinshasa, members of the Presidential
Guard under the command of an officer named Kabengele beat and killed
university student Remy Lushima Nyamangombe, whom they accused of being
a member of the armed rebellion. After stealing Lushima's personal
belongings, presidential security agents then beat the student to
death. No action is known to have been taken against the members of the
Presidential Guard who committed this abuse.
On February 14, in the Ndjili district of Kinshasa, an FAC soldier
shot and killed a civilian in the Sebastien Bar after bumping into his
table.
On April 17 in Kinshasa, unidentified soldiers shot and killed a
public transportation driver known only as Kalle. The soldiers flagged
down his vehicle and ordered him to drive them to Kinshasa's
international airport. When Kalle explained he was taking a woman in
labor to the hospital, the soldiers shot him, leaving the pregnant
woman alone in the vehicle.
On April 17, security force members charged with protecting a
presidential motorcade shot and killed a minibus driver. They shot the
driver three times in the head as he was attempting to move his vehicle
out of the way of the coming motorcade.
In May Col. Ndoma Moteke died at the Gombel Polyclinique, in the
commune of Lemba, of injuries suffered when members of government
security forces tortured and beat him at the Groupe Litho-Moboti
building (GLM) detention facility on May 20 (see Section 1.c.).
In the early hours of July 16 in Ndjili, uniformed soldiers from an
unidentified unit shot and killed an unarmed 12-year-old boy in his own
home. The soldiers shot the boy and his father, whom they wounded in
the shoulder, when he opened the door of his house in response to their
request.
On July 7 in Kinshasa, uniformed soldiers shot and killed Charles
Bokeleale, then stole his vehicle.
On November 15 in Kinshasa, FAC soldiers enforcing a night time
curfew at a roadblock shot at a taxi that veered around their barricade
and killed Kamba Kanyinda, a student who was riding in the taxi (see
Section 2.d.). On November 17 students from Kanyinda's school took to
the streets to protest his killing.
On November 24 in Kinshasa, 23-year-old Simon Makoko died of
injuries inflicted by soldiers the previous night. Makoko was in the
home of Leon Lumingu when, at about midnight, soldiers broke in,
accused the household of making too much noise during the nighttime
curfew, and whipped Makoko when he refused to comply with an order to
go outside and sit on the ground.
Throughout the year, government military tribunals continued to
sentence to death many civilians after military trials that were often
perfunctory, and many of these civilians were executed (see Section
1.e.). Members of the security forces repeatedlykilled civilians,
particularly in areas that they were preparing to abandon to advancing
antigovernment forces. The military justice system, revised in 1997,
prosecuted FAC members for individual incidents ranging from armed
robbery to rape to murder, and sentenced to death and executed more
than 50 FAC members during the year (see Section 1.e.).
Harsh prison conditions and abuse led to an undetermined number of
deaths in prisons. Many prisoners died of illness or starvation (see
Section 1.c.). On October 11, Sangu Matembi, an activist of the United
Lumumbist Party (PALU), died in Makala Central Prison; in a press
release, PALU reported that he died after being deprived of food and
medical care since his arrest in July. It was reported that, since
Kabila took power in 1997, both extrajudicial killings and deaths due
to torture and neglect have become common at a secret detention center
known as ``Alfa'' that was run directly by the Office of the President
(see Section 1.d.).
The Government continued to fail to prosecute any state officials
or other persons in connection with the mass extrajudicial killings of
Tutsis in 1998.
There was widespread reporting throughout the year of killings and
other human rights abuses by both pro and antigovernment forces.
Verification of these reports is extremely difficult, particularly
those emanating from remote areas and those affected by active combat
primarily in eastern Congo. Independent observers often find access
difficult due to hazardous security conditions as well as frequent
impediments imposed by authorities. Both pro and antigovernment forces
extensively use propaganda disseminated via local media, including
charges leveled at opposing forces, further complicating efforts to
obtain accurate information regarding events and acts in the Congolese
interior.
Progovernment Mai Mai guerrilla units reportedly killed many
civilians, sometimes after torturing them, in areas where they
operated. In January in the Kamituga area of South Kivu Province, Mai
Mai leader Silvestre Louetcha reportedly executed 32 women who had
supported the Mwami (traditional ruler) of Kamituga in resisting Mai
Mai demands for forced labor; before killing these women, the Mai Mai
reportedly accused them of witchcraft, then cut off their breasts and
forced them to eat their own breasts (see Sections 1.c. and 5). There
were also reports that Mai Mai units killed persons by crucifying them.
Hutu militia units fighting on the side of the Government also killed
many noncombatants. It was reported that in August in South Kivu
Province alone, Interahamwe militia killed a police officer at
Luhwindja and that the Forces for the Defense of Democracy, a Burundian
Hutu nongovernmental armed group based in the country, killed six Tutsi
herders while conducting an interethnic cattle raid at Kiliba (see
Section 5). Information about killings by Mai Mai and Hutu militia
units remained very incomplete, and many such killings may not have
been reported.
Mob violence resulted in killings; however, the Government did not
incite lethal mob violence during the year, unlike 1998.
In December in the Ituri District of Orientale Province, an area
dominated by Ugandan and Ugandan-supported forces, a large but unknown
number of persons were killed in fighting between members of the Lendu
and Hema tribes that reportedly displaced tens of thousands of persons.
This fighting, which continued and was worsening at year's end,
reportedly arose from a dispute about land use. (see Section 5).
During the year, antigovernment forces, particularly RCD-Goma and
Rwandan units, committed repeated mass killings, generally in reprisal
for Mai Mai attacks against RCD or Rwandan forces. Some of the many
reports of such killings were verified; however, investigations of such
reported killings often were difficult, and details of reported abuses
sometimes emerged long after the events.
On December 31, 1998, and January 1, RCD and reportedly also
Rwandan units killed a large number of civilians in the area of
Makobola, 9 miles south of Uvira in South Kivu Province. The attack was
in retaliation for losses that the rebels recently had suffered during
a fight with Mai Mai fighters on December 30. Red Cross volunteers,
Catholic priests, and Protestant pastors and their families were among
those killed.
From January 1-3, in Walungu in South Kivu Province, following a
fight with government troops, RCD-Goma rebels reportedly killed 12
civilians, looted homes, and stole livestock.
On January 5, in Mwenga in South Kivu Province, RCD-Goma rebels
reportedly killed two local chiefs.
During the months of January and February, antigovernment forces
reportedly killed some 45 civilians in North and South Kivu Provinces.
Eight bodies were discovered along the Nshesa River, near Walungu. On
February 11, Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers entered the town of Loashi in
North Kivu Province and reportedly attempted to force local inhabitants
to lead them to Interahamwe arms stashes. When the inhabitants fled,
some soldiers reportedly opened fire, killing 10 persons.
During the same months, antigovernment forces killed 16
noncombatants in 9 separate incidents; those reportedly killed included
villagers, shepherds, travelers, and merchants.
On February 24, rebels reportedly attacked a civilian convoy of
seven vehicles escorted by nine government soldiers. Rebels reportedly
killed at least seven civilians, including a mother and her two
children, who died when their vehicle caught fire.
In early March, according to a report by the Rome-based Missionary
News Agency (MISNA), RCD-Goma rebels killed more than 100 noncombatants
in a series of killings near Kamituga in South Kivu Province; no
independent reports of this were known to have emerged during the year.
There were credible reports that between March 19 and March 21
Rwandan soldiers killed many civilians, more than 250 according to one
report, in Burhinyi and Ngweshe in South Kivu Province, apparently in
retaliation for a Mai Mai attack.
It was reported that in April antigovernment forces including RCD
units killed at least 20 persons, most of whom were women and children,
in the villages of Gasiza and Nyabubuye in South Kivu Province.
On May 7, Father Paul Juakali, a priest in Kalembe, near Goma,
reportedly was ambushed and killed by RCD rebels who previously accused
him of spreading false information about life in rebel-occupied
territories.
During the night of July 27, Rwandan and RCD-Goma troops reportedly
burned alive 41 civilians in the town of Kasala in Katanga Province, by
locking them in 5 separate houses, then setting the houses on fire.
From August 14 to 16, disputes among antigovernment forces led to
fighting in Kisangani between Rwandan and Ugandan troops. During the
clashes, rebels, Rwandans, and Ugandans reportedly killed approximately
50 civilians. It was reported that Rwandan and RCD-Goma rebels also
attempted to kill archbishop Monsengwo of Kisangani, who fled his home
dressed as a servant.
Between September 4 and 10, RCD-Goma rebels reportedly launched
retaliatory attacks against civilians in South Kivu Province, leaving
an undetermined number dead.
On September 24 near Rutshuru in North Kivu Province, elements of
the Rwandan army reportedly killed 19 civilians.
In mid-September, on the banks of Lake Mukamba, Rwandan troops
reportedly executed an undisclosed number of Congolese tribal chiefs
from the Dimbelenge area of western Kasai Province. The chiefs were
called together by Rwandan military authorities, who accused them of
sabotaging the Rwandan advance towards Kananga and Mbuji-Mayi. After
executing several chiefs, the Rwandans reportedly shot villagers who
came running toward the sounds of gunfire, killing an unknown number.
In early November, in the Mwenga area of South Kivu, RCD-Goma
rebels tortured and buried alive 15 women whom they suspected of
supporting local Mai Mai guerrillas, according to several reports. At
year's end, NGO's were investigating these reports.
On November 22, at the Kalonge Parish near Bukavu in South Kivu
Province, Rwandan and RCD-Goma units shot and killed an abbot and other
persons attending a Catholic mass, according to a missionary news
agency report.
The Government publicly alleged that antigovernment forces
massacred civilians at Ngweshe in South Kivu Province on February 15,
at Kongolo in Northern Katanga Province in August, in Kibumbu, near
Kalungwe in South Kivu Province on October 23, and at Nonge, an unknown
location on an unknown date; however, no independent reports to support
any of these allegations are known to exist.
b. Disappearance.--There were many reported cases of disappearance,
most as a result of the war. Government and antigovernment forces
reportedly were responsible for the disappearance of many persons.
Throughout the year, government security forces regularly held alleged
suspects in detention for varying periods of time before acknowledging
that they were in custody. Typical accounts described unidentified
assailants who abducted, threatened, and often beat their victims
before releasing them. Journalists and opposition members claimed that
they were targets of such actions.
On February 9, security force members rearrested Commandant Jean
Nkumu Wangala, former chief of police in Matadi during the Mobutu era,
whom a military court had acquitted of charges of treason on January
12. He has not been heard from since, although authorities told his
wife that he had escaped from state custody.
In April two refugees from the neighboring Republic of Congo
disappeared from ANR detention facilities in Kinshasa. Both Congolese--
Bernard Ntandou, former police commander of the Point Noire military
district, and Jean Mpalabouna, a follower of B. Kolelas--were
affiliated with organizations involved in armed opposition to the
Government of the Republic of Congo. On May 25, two representatives
from a human rights NGO visited the ANR prison in an attempt to
determine their whereabouts. ANR security agents refused to answer any
questions and threatened them with arrest (see Section 4).
On June 6, security agents forced their way into a private
residence in the Limete neighborhood of Kinshasa and abducted Justin
Djuambe Tegi and Michel Gbetoro. Neither has been seen since, and both
are presumed to have disappeared. No motive is known for the abduction.
In November, an RCD leader publicly alleged that Zimbabwean troops
aligned with the Government kidnapped and held as hostages 17
missionaries of the Church of Jesus Christ on Earth of the Prophet
Simon Kimbangu; however, no other reports of this were known to have
emerged, and no other abuses by Zimbabwean forces were reported.
Belmonde Ma Gloire Coffi, the owner of the newspaper, Le Point
Congo and a citizen of Benin, was last seen on September 3, 1998, and
is believed to have disappeared. He reportedly drove into town after
editing the latest edition of Le Point. There has been no reported
trace of either him or his vehicle (see Section 2.a.).
In February the Democracy and Human Rights Committee (CDDH), an
NGO, reported that in December 1998 CDDH investigator Donnat N'Kola
Shambuyi disappeared in Tshikapa in Western Kasai Province.
The bodies of many persons killed extrajudicially in the war were
burned, dumped in rivers, or buried in mass graves that remain
unopened. Neither side is known to have kept or released records of the
identities of the persons whom its forces killed extrajudicially.
Rebel forces reportedly were responsible for the disappearance of
many persons. There were reports that antigovernment forces repeatedly
failed to acknowledge detaining persons. Persons whom rebel, Rwandan,
or Ugandan forces allegedly detained in 1998 reportedly have been
transferred to Rwanda or Uganda and remained unaccounted for at year's
end. These missing persons included 22 Franciscan friars from Sola in
Katanga Province and 3 university professors from Bukuvu in South Kivu
Province.
c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law forbids torture; however, security forces and
prison officials used torture, and often beat prisoners in the process
of arresting or interrogating them.
Authorities of the Kabila administration have not responded to
charges of inmate abuse and repeated beatings by its security force and
prison officials.
Members of the security forces also raped, robbed, and extorted
money from civilians; some abusers were prosecuted (see Section 1.a.).
Incidents of physical abuse by security forces occurred during the
arrest or detention of political opponents, journalists, and
businessmen (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
On January 12, soldiers of the 50th Brigade who were raiding the
Bethany Catholic Center to arrest Tutsis who were hiding there beat
human rights activists Christophe Bintu and Bienvenu Kasole, who were
visiting the center. Kasole lost a tooth and suffered from bleeding
during a subsequent 6-day detention, but military authorities refused
him medical attention. Guards forced Bintu and Kalole to sleep on the
ground and denied them food and visitors (see Sections 1.d. and 4).
Following his arrest on January 12 on charges of divulging state
secrets, security forces at the Committee of State Security prison and
at the Kokolo detention center repeatedly beat newspaper publisher
Thierry Kyalumba with a belt and buckle during pretrial interrogations
(see Sections 1.e. and 2.a.).
On February 16, two military officers known only as Gisha and
Chubaka who worked on the staff of Joseph Kabila, the son of President
Kabila and chief of staff of the Congolese army, entered the Kinshasa
home of Toussaint Muhavu Shankulu without a warrant and tortured him
inside his own house. They then took Muhavu to an underground cell at
the Tshatshi military camp, where they abused him until he signed a
document giving up the equivalent of $700 to a man known as Benoit, on
whose behalf Gisha and Chubaka reportedly were acting. When Muhavu
lodged a complaint against Gisha and Chubaka, the two attempted to find
Mr. Muhavu, who was then in hiding, by abducting and torturing a
neighbor and personal friend of Muhavu. Other members of Joseph
Kabila's staff then kidnaped Muhavu's wife in an attempt to force
Muhavu out of hiding. Senior officers at Camp Tshatshi prevailed upon
Muhavu not to press charges against Gisha and Chubaka.
On February 20, military personnel beat with sticks Luyinumu Lelo
Koko and Jonas Ndoko in a wooded area outside Kinshasa after arresting
them for breaking a curfew 3 hours before the curfew started (see
Section 1.d.).
In February guards beat and tortured professor Tshibangu Kalala
during a 2-week detention following his arrest by ANR agents for
describing to students poor economic conditions in Katanga Province
(see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
On March 10, at the police station in the Kin-Maziere building in
the Gombe district of Kinshasa, police stripped two female money
changers and beat them with a wire whip after interrogating them about
changing money at a different exchange rate from that set by the
central bank (see Section 1.d.).
On March 22, presidential security personnel lashed a detained
journalist 100 times with a whip, reportedly saying that they did so
because the journalist possessed ``Tutsi facial features'' (see Section
1.d.).
On April 29, at the ANR detention center at Binza ma Campagne, ANR
agents severely beat Lambert Edimba, whom ANR agents had arrested for
associating with members of various opposition political parties (see
Section 1.d.).
Between May 17 and May 26, at the headquarters of the Investigative
Branch of the Presidential Guard in the Gombe neighborhood of Kinshasa,
guards daily beat with a whip eight members of the opposition PALU
party and forced them to eat mud; after 10 days of detention, one PALU
member was urinating blood and three others were unable to stand or
walk (see Section 1.d.).
During May 20-23, DEMIAP police repeatedly beat on the feet
Christian Badibangi, the president of the opposition party Union
Socialist Congolaise, while detaining him in a cell measuring 3 square
yards with approximately 60 other prisoners without food, water,
ventilation, or sanitation facilities (see Section 1.d.)
On May 20, guards at the GLM detention facility in Kinshasa
tortured and beat Colonel Ndoma Moteke, an army officer under the
Mobutu regime, who died of the resulting injuries at a medical clinic
in the Righini area of Kinshasa a few days later (see Section 1.a.).
On June 23, members of the security forces publicly beat three
journalists working for the Kinshasa daily newspaper Tempete des
Tropiques, after arresting them at the newspaper's offices and before
taking them away in a vehicle (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
On June 29, naval personnel tortured the owner of a dugout canoe,
known only as Motinga, from the Limete commune of Kinshasa. Motinga
reportedly complained of a lack of space to dock his canoe. According
to a human rights group, the rankingnaval commander, identified only as
Jean Louis, ordered his men to beat Motinga until he lost
consciousness.
On July 26, security forces in the town of Mbuji Mayi whipped Jean
Marie Kashils, of the Agence Congolaise de Presse, and Bienvenu Tshiela
of Kasai Horizon Radio Television, while briefly detaining them on
orders from the deputy governor of Eastern Kasai Province, Kalala
Kaniki (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
Following his arrest on July 29, security forces in Lumbumbashi
tortured professor Kambaj Wa Kambaji and denied him access to his
doctor and his family. Security forces also mistreated him during an
August 19 aircraft flight to Kinshasa (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
In September police at the GLM detention facility in Kinshasa's
Gombe neighborhood beat human rights NGO activist Wetemwani Katembo
Merikas an average of four times a day during a 4-day detention. A
colleague bringing meals for Katembo said that prison guards stole the
food and ate it in front of prison visitors (see Sections 1.d. and 4).
On and after September 10, ANR agents in Mbuji Mayi in Eastern
Kasai Province tortured Francois Mpoyi Mukandu, the legal adviser of
the governor of the province, and Marcel Mpuanga Mindu, who was also an
attorney. ANR agents reportedly tortured and beat Mpoyi so severely
that he could not walk and he was taken to a hospital. ANR agents also
beat Ditutu bin Bwebwe, a court clerk whom the head of the bar
association in Mbuji Mayi sent to the ANR to serve a summons on
Tshiamuang Tshombe, the ANR's chief investigator in Mbuji Mayi, in
connection with the detention of Mpoyi and Mpuanga (see Section 1.d.).
In early October, according to domestic media reports, Pascal
Kusehuka, secretary general of the PALU opposition party for Bandundu
Province, stated that a group of men including the son and the nephew
of Marc Katshunga, the governor of Bandundu Province, dragged him naked
through the streets of Kikwit after arresting him and accusing him of
political activity.
Some persons suffered physical abuse from both sides of the war. On
March 8, RCD members reportedly raided the Goma home of Dieudonne
Mirimo Mulongo and, finding Miromo gone, physically abused his wife
while interrogating her about the whereabouts of her husband. Soon
thereafter, Miromo and his wife fled to Kinshasa, where government
security forces arrested and detained him and reportedly beat him while
interrogating him about his brother-in-law, whom they suspected of
being a Tutsi (see Section 5).
There were numerous reports that nongovernmental armed groups
fighting on the side of the Government tortured, raped, and otherwise
physically abused many persons during the year. Mai Mai guerillas
reportedly killed persons by torture, including by mutilation and
crucifixion (see Section 1.a.). There were reports that Interahamwe
militia in South Kivu Province often raped women, especially in
villages near Kahuzi Biega Forest.
There were numerous reports of killings and torture of prisoners by
some antigovernment forces. A number of prisoners reportedly died of
suffocation after guards detained them in overcrowded shipping
containers. Guards reportedly overcrowded containers with prisoners,
sealed the prisoners inside without ventilation, then the cut off all
food and water, causing death by dehydration, suffocation, and
exhaustion. This treatment reportedly was reserved for suspected
Interahamwe or Mai Mai collaborators.
Mobs sometimes beat persons, including mostly suspected thieves but
also suspected Tutsis. In April a mob of students at the University of
Lubumbashi severely beat and destroyed the vehicle of a foreigner
employed by the government of an ethnically largely European country
that some government propaganda had portrayed as supporting the RCD
(see Section 5).
The Kabila Government operated 220 known prisons and other places
of detention, and in all such facilities, conditions remained harsh and
life threatening; there reportedly were many other secret or informal
detention centers (see Section 1.d.). During the year, the Government
made limited efforts to improve the harsh conditions at Kinshasa's main
prison, the Makala National Penitentiary and Reeducation Center. The
Government provided food at some prisons, but not in sufficient
quantities to ensure adequate nutrition for all inmates. Prison
conditions remained a threat to prisoners' lives. Living conditions
were harsh and unsanitary, and prisoners were treated poorly. Thepenal
system suffered from severe shortages of funds, medical facilities,
food, and trained personnel.
Overcrowding and corruption in the prisons are widespread.
Prisoners reportedly were beaten to death, tortured, deprived of food
and water, or died of starvation (see Section 1.a.). Prisoners are
wholly dependent on the personal resources of family or friends for
their survival. Guards have been known to steal food brought to
prisoners. Inmates at Makala Prison in Kinshasa sleep on the floor
without bedding and have no access to sanitation, potable water, or
adequate health care. There were reports of guards forcing 55 or 60
prisoners into a small cell with room only to stand. No water or food
is given to these prisoners. There are no toilets, forcing prisoners to
urinate and defecate on the floor. Tuberculosis, red diarrhea, and
other infectious diseases are rampant. Although authorities do not
target women for abuse, prison guards rape female inmates.
The Government exacerbated the overcrowding of civilian prisons by
incarcerating in them many soldiers who declined to fight for the
Kabila Government in the war. In March it was credibly reported that of
2,509 persons incarcerated at Makala Prison, 1,854 were soldiers,
almost all of whom were awaiting trial for refusing to fight in the
war.
The use of unpublicized and unofficial detention sites by the civil
and military authorities circumvented humanitarian groups' access to
many prisoners and detainees. The International Committee for the Red
Cross (ICRC) was denied access to these sites, and to regular detention
facilities, including some facilities where the Government incarcerated
Tutsi civilians and the ``Alfa'' prison facility in Kinshasa run by the
Office of the President (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
It was reported that RCD-Goma forces frequently used the private
residences of Rwandan or rebel military commanders for purposes of
incarceration. Reports from former detainees indicate a systematic
pattern of beatings, undernourishment, and deliberate killings in these
houses.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Despite legal provisions
governing arrest and detention procedures, the security forces were
responsible for numerous cases of arbitrary arrest and detention.
Under the law, serious offenses (those punishable by more than 6
months' imprisonment) do not require a warrant for a suspect's arrest.
Only a law enforcement officer with ``judicial police officer'' status
is empowered to authorize arrest. This status also is vested in senior
officers of the security services. The law instructs security forces to
bring detainees to the police within 24 hours. The law also provides
that detainees must be charged within 24 hours and be brought within 48
hours before a magistrate, who may authorize provisional detention for
varying periods.
In practice these provisions were violated systematically. Security
forces, especially those carrying out the orders of any official who
could claim authority, used arbitrary arrest to intimidate outspoken
opponents and journalists. Charges rarely were filed, and the political
motivation for such detentions often was obscure. When the authorities
did press charges, the claims that they filed sometimes were contrived
or recitations of archaic colonial regulations.
Detention without charge has been a frequent problem under the
Kabila administration. During the year, a number of leaders of human
rights and religious organizations indicated that increases not only in
the number of arrests and detentions but also in the number of security
agencies arresting and detaining persons and in the number of detention
centers made it increasingly difficult to monitor arrests and
detentions or investigate reports of arbitrary arrest and detention.
There were many secret or unofficial detention centers in Kinshasa,
some of which reportedly were run by the Office of the President (see
Section 1.a.); there were several reports of secret jails on the
premises of the presidential palace.
Throughout the year the Government continued to arrest and detain
members of the Tutsi ethnic group without charge and merely on the
basis of their ethnicity. On January 12, soldiers of the 50th Brigade
raided the Bethany Catholic Center and arrested about 50 Tutsis who
took refuge there, and whom theGovernment subsequently incarcerated.
Hundreds of Tutsis arrested in 1998 after the start of the war remained
detained during the year, at locations including Kokolo military camp,
the National Social Security Institute west of Kinshasa, and Lubumbashi
in Katanga Province. However, the Government released many Tutsis on
condition that they leave the country through ICRC relocation programs.
In June the ICRC repatriated detained Tutsis whom the Government
regarded as Rwandan, Ugandan, or Burundian nationals, and who were
willing to depart the Congo; starting in October, the ICRC evacuated
detained Tutsi citizens to other countries. About 3,000 persons who
claimed to be Tutsis in hiding presented themselves for detention in
Kinshasa during the year, mostly after the Government announced that
Tutsis could be relocated to foreign countries. Many Tutsis remained in
detention because of their ethnicity at year's end. However, due in
part to intervention by the international community, at some detention
sites Tutsis' terms of detention became increasingly liberal during the
year and included substantial freedom of movement by year's end.
Government detention of at least some Tutsis became increasingly
protective rather than punitive and many Tutsis increasingly felt safer
in government custody than elsewhere in the government-controlled part
of the country; throughout the year, Government officials and state
media continued to publish and broadcast anti-Tutsi propaganda, the
Government directed its security forces and encouraged the CPP's and
CPD's to search for and detain Tutsis, and outside their special
detention centers even suspected Tutsis were harassed and beaten (see
Sections 1.c., 1.f. and 5).
Between December 31, 1998, and January 29, police in Kinshasa
arrested four members of the Solidarity labor union, apparently in
connection with a strike by Finance Ministry employees, and
subsequently detained them at Makala Prison (see Section 6.a.); they
later were released.
On January 1, ANR agents detained Adrien Phongo Kunda, the
secretary general of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS)
political party, for 9 hours at the ANR facility in Gombe. He was
charged with breaking a ban on political activity by distributing a New
Year's message to party members. On January 16, he was arrested again
and interrogated about the activities of the UDPS. He was released 9
days later. On the night of January 5, police in Kinshasa arrested and
then released Louis Botimbili, who was visiting the capital, on charges
of being a suspicious character who did not register his presence with
the commune. He was called back to the police station on January 7 for
being a member of the human rights NGO Friends of Nelson Mandela. He
was released on January 9, after the intervention of several human
rights NGO's.
On January 8, ANR agents in Kinshasa arrested the 74-year-old
father of former FAZ general Kpama Baramoto for having an international
telephone conversation with his son. Baramoto suffered from
hypertension, but was refused treatment by ANR guards. He was released
after a few days.
On January 8, soldiers in Mawanga in Bandundu Province arrested
former government minister Hypolite N'sema Mambakila, detained him for
a week at Kenge and Kikwit, and then transported him to Kinshasa. He
was charged with breaking the ban on political activity and organizing
a band of rebels near the border with Angola. He was freed on February
26.
On January 12, soldiers of the 50th Brigade who were raiding the
Bethany Catholic Center to detain Tutsis arrested human rights
activists Christophe Bintu and Bienvenu Kasole, who were visiting the
center. Soldiers beat Bintu and Kasole. Kasole lost a tooth in
detention and suffered from bleeding, but military authorities refused
him medical attention. They also were forced to sleep on the ground and
were denied food and visitors. Bintu and Kasole were released on
January 18 (see Section 4).
On January 16, five police officers in Kinshasa arrested UDPS
political counselor Jean Joseph Mukendi wa Mulumba on suspicion of
carrying out political initiatives in defiance of a Kabila decree
banning all political party activities. He was held in confinement
until January 21, when he was released as a result of poor health.
On January 16, police arrested the following opposition political
party members on the charge of conducting political activities: Adrien
Phongo Kunda (UDPS), Cleophas Kamitatu Masamba (PDSC), and Charles
Bofassa Djema (MPR). On January 21, police arrested Nyembo Shabani
(UDPS) and Denis Bazinga (of afaction of the UDPS) on the same charge.
All were released by January 25.
On January 21, police in Kinshasa arrested UDPS spokesman Joseph
Kapika Ndji Kanku on charges of violating the ban on political
activities by hosting party events at his house. He was freed on
January 25 but was rearrested on February 3 and brought to the ANR
holding facility at Lemera, where he was charged with criticizing the
law banning political party activity in an interview with a foreign
radio station. ANR guards reportedly threatened his life and subjected
him to cruel and humiliating treatment. Kapika was released in
December.
On January 26, and again on February 4 and February 5, security
forces arrested newspaper editor Andre Ipakala; following the third
arrest, they held him for 3 days without charge (see Sections 2.a. and
2.d.).
Between January 28 and February 13, ANR agents in Kinshasa and
Mbuji Mayi arrested 11 employees of a cellular telephone company, a
manager and 10 workers who had formed a bargaining group, and
subsequently detained them in Makala Prison (see Section 6.a.).
On February 1, five members of the PALU opposition political party
were arrested for hoisting the party flag in defiance of the
presidential ban on all political activity. One was released on
February 10. The other four, Lexis Mikwinzi, Kasongo Mumoshi, and
Luzolo and Mpoyo Doingo Moise, were released in December.
On February 3, ANR agents raided the offices of the daily newspaper
Le Potentiel, arrested five journalists, and detained them for a day,
without producing a warrant either for the search or for the arrests;
the journalists were released the following day (see Section 2.a.).
On February 5, DEMIAP agents detained Floribert Chebeya Bahizire,
president of the human rights NGO, Voix des Sans-Voix (VSV), and two
other VSV colleagues, and reportedly threatened to kill them before
releasing them later the same day. Security forces then ordered
Chebeya, one of the Congo's most prominent human rights advocates, to
present himself daily to police authorities in the Gombe district of
Kinshasa (see Section 4).
On February 9, police in Kinshasa arrested Theo Ibwala for wearing
a T-shirt promoting the UDPS political party. Ibwala was held for 3
days, during which he suffered several epileptic fits and was refused
treatment. Ibwala was never charged. Police forced him to change into a
``Support President Kabila'' T-shirt before allowing him to leave.
On February 16, members of the security forces briefly detained
three members of the Front for the Pursuit of Democracy (FSD),
including FSD president Eugene Diomi Ngongala, as they left a foreign
embassy, allegedly for visiting a foreign embassy without prior
government permission (see Section 2.b.).
On February 16, presidential security agents detained VSV activist
Justin Chiba Sengey. He was released after 7 hours, and told to tell
his colleagues to stay clear of any matters concerning military
security.
On February 20, military personnel arrested Luyinumu Lelo Koko and
Jonas Ndoko in the Ndjili neighborhood outside Kinshasa. While the
arrests were made at 8 p.m. for allegedly breaking a curfew, the actual
curfew did not begin until 11 p.m. Soldiers took the pair to a wooded
area and beat them with sticks (see Section 1.c.). Soldiers also stole
the equivalent of $2 (10 francs) from Ndoko.
On February 24, ANR and CNS agents arrested Mabanza Meti, acting
managing director of the Citibank office in Kinshasa in connection with
an alleged international funds transfer on behalf of a rebel leader.
Authorities detained two other Citibank employees in connection with
the same alleged transfer on February 6. At least one bank employee was
held incommunicado for several days. All three bank employees were
released on March 3, without being charged formally.
On February 27, authorities lured Brigitte Sakina Lundula to the
ANR station at Binza ma Campagne with the promise of a ministerial
post. On her arrival, Sakina was arrested and accused of being an RCD
rebel agent. She was released on May 22 without being charged.
In February ANR agents arrested Professor Tshibangu Kalala in
Kinshasa and detained him for 2 weeks without charges (see Sections
1.c. and 2.a.).
On March 5, soldiers in Kinshasa acting under the orders of a
military tribunal raided the offices of Mitchell and Associates, an
international law firm that represented foreign investors, seized the
firm's files, and arrested two partners in the firm, Lambert Djunga and
Pierre Risasi Nsimbwa. The two lawyers were charged with high treason
and acquitted in November. Their detention and indictment is believed
to have been related to the role their firm played in the South African
Government's seizure of a shipment of tin ore from the country.
On March 10, police arrested two female money changers, detained
them at the police station in the Kin-Maziere building in the Gombe
district of Kinshasa, and accused them of changing money at a different
exchange rate from that set by the central bank. After an interrogation
by Major Muanza, the pair were ordered to pay a fine equivalent to
$200, which the police took without issuing a receipt. After a second
interrogation by another police officer, the women were stripped and
whipped with a wire cable before being released (see Section 1.c.).
On March 14, ANR agents arrested four persons at the Kinshasa
airport as they returned from a conference about the war in the country
that was held in South Africa, and in which the Government had refused
to participate. Those arrested were: Modeste Mutinga, editor of Le
Potentiel newspaper; Andre Ipakala, editor of La Reference Plus
newspaper; Marie-Ange Lukiana, president of the National Womens' Union;
and a political party representative named Kabamba. Mutinga, Ipakala,
and Lukiana were detained for about week, and Hamuli for about 2 weeks,
without being charged (see Sections 2.b. and 2.d.).
On March 16 and again on April 5, ANR agents arrested a missionary
for ``suspicious behavior'' for using a cell phone near an ANR
facility. The missionary worked in a building across the street from an
ANR facility and used a cell phone to summon his driver. The missionary
was released for the second time on April 19.
On March 22, police detained a journalist after his driver parked
his vehicle close to a police roadblock. The journalist and driver were
taken before presidential security personnel who whipped the journalist
(see Section 1.c.).
On April 16, ANR agents at Ndjili Airport arrested former Minister
of Posts, Telephone and Telegraph Kinkela vi Kin'sy, who subsequently
was detained at Makala Prison for about 1 month. The ANR agents
reportedly accused Kinkela of trying to flee the country, but Kinkela
reportedly stated that he was at the airport to meet a friend who was
traveling (see Section 2.d.).
On March 29, police Major Bruce Kifua arrested Simon Tshamala for
being a ``rebel sympathizer.'' He was incarcerated for 4 days without
food or water and released on April 2. No charges were filed.
On April 6, ANR security forces arrested Baudouin Hamuli Kabarhuza,
executive secretary of the NGO umbrella group, National Council of
Nongovernmental Organizations for Development (CNONGD). He was charged
with leaving Congo in order to meet with both Mobutists and rebels in
South Africa. He was released on April 14.
On April 8, members of the security forces arrested the vice
president of the local chapter of the UDPS opposition party while he
was conversing on the street with a colleague. He remained in detention
until April 14. No charges were filed.
On April 10, presidential security agents arrested two electric
company workers for allegedly speaking ill of President Kabila on a
city bus. The two, Kennedy Mukendi and Don King Mabuso, were placed in
an airless overcrowded cell with 11 other prisoners and released the
following day.
On April 26, ANR agents arrested Andre Bamwe Kabasu, Thierry
Tshiamumayi Kabunda, and Daniel Faustin Kalala Mashika after reportedly
intercepting a letter addressed to a rebel leader. The letter,
allegedly written by the president of the Congolese Socialist Union
president, claimed that the three men would be willing to receive the
rebels, should the town of Tshikapa fall. The three were detained for a
week, then released after ANR authorities determined the letter to be
false.
On April 29, ANR agents arrested Lambert Edimba for associating
with members of various opposition political parties. They took Edimba
to the ANR detention facility at Binza ma Campagne, where they
confiscated a tape recorder and several video cassettes. ANR agents
severely beat him before confining him to a cell. Edimba was released
on May 8 (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
On May 2, rapid intervention police arrested Emmanuel Cole,
president of the NGO, Bill Clinton Foundation. He was charged with
illegally operating an NGO and conspiracy against the security of the
State. He was released on May 11.
On May 8, police arrested Stephane Kitutu O'leontwa, president of
the Congo Press Union, in an effort to locate the author of an article
that was published in a newspaper for which Kitutu had never written.
Kitutu was released 4 days later (see Section 2.a.).
On May 12, ANR agents in Kinshasa arrested four members of the
opposition UDPS party: Professor Alidor Mwamba Mtita, a journalist and
member of the national committee of the UPDS; Raymond Kabala,
administrative secretary of the UPDS national committee; Odile Kalala,
a national committee member and an employee of Catholic Relief
Services; and Mpoyi Placide, a U.N. agency employee. They were arrested
at Mpoyi's home and held incommunicado for 8 days. On May 19, they were
transferred from an ANR facility to Kokolo, a military camp also used
to detain Tutsis. Mitita and Kabala were released in December, without
having been charged; the others reportedly remained in detention at
year's end.
On May 17, eight members of the opposition PALU party were rounded
up in Kinshasa and arrested. The eight were taken to the headquarters
of the presidential guard investigative branch in the Gombe
neighborhood of Kinshasa. Authorities accused the eight PALU members of
attempting to overthrow Kabila and being in league with the rebellion,
and kept them in a small dark airless cell. Guards administered daily
beatings with a whip. One detainee urinated blood, while three others
were unable to stand or walk. The eight detainees then were thrown into
mud and told to eat it. Authorities freed the eight after 10 days in
detention but kept them under surveillance throughout the year (see
Section 1.c.).
On May 20, DEMIAP police arrested the president of the opposition
party Union Socialist Congolaise, Christian Badibangi, along with
approximately 40 supporters. They remained in jail at the DEMIAP
holding facility in Kinshasa commonly called ``L'inter'' until July 5,
when they were released. Badibangi was charged with being in contact
with the armed rebellion and training rebel forces in Angola. For the
first 2 days he was repeatedly beaten on the feet. He was placed in a
cell measuring 3 square yards with approximately 60 other prisoners,
who were held without food or water. Ventilation was cut off, and
prisoners were wedged in so tightly that they could not sit. There were
no toilet facilities. This holding cell is called ``Ouagadougou'' and
is allegedly a holding cell for dangerous criminals. No one is allowed
access to this area, and the Kabila Government refuses to allow NGO
representatives to visit it. Badibangi developed permanent health
problems as a result of his incarceration. As of September, the
Government continued to refuse to grant him an exit visa to seek
medical attention overseas.
On May 20, Major Bruce Kifua, son of National Police Inspector
General Celestin Kifua, and his police bodyguards stopped the driver of
a sports car for passing them. The driver was taken to Kifua's office,
where he was lashed 50 times with a whip. His vehicle, watch, cellular
phone, personal jewelry, and money worth about $150 were confiscated.
He then was delivered to the police. Police authorities returned his
confiscated vehicle, but not his other belongings. No action was taken
against Kifua.
On May 25, security forces arrested two journalists of a Kinshasa-
based newspaper, Le Soft, on charges of ``undermining the Government,''
in connection with the publication of an article describing
mismanagement of the central bank. Both journalists were released on
June 4 (see Section 2.a.).
On May 27, security agents arrested a medical doctor named Elongo,
who worked with SEMBUAC, a domestic NGO. He was accused of being an
infiltrated rebel and was detained at an ANR facility in Kinshasa's
Gombe neighborhood for nearly a week.
On May 29, security forces arrested Laurent Kantu Lumpungu,
president of L'Association des Cadres Penitentiaires du Congo, a human
rights NGO, after he criticized the summary executionscarried out by
orders of military courts. Security forces detained Kantu at various
locations between May and August, without giving him a court hearing.
On August 26, a state-controlled television station broadcast a
documentary on Kantu, entitled ``A Smuggler Unlike the Others,'' and
alleged that Kantu was in possession of subversive documents at the
time of his arrest. He was not charged or tried, and remained in
detention at year's end (see Section 4).
In June security forces arrested Beyeye Djema, formerly a supporter
of President Mobutu, and accused him of keeping a pistol at his house;
he was released in December.
In June security forces arrested Tabu Kalaia, president of the
Katangan provincial branch of the opposition UDPS party; he
subsequently was detained at the ANR detention facility in Lubumbashi.
He remained in detention at year's end.
On June 3, security agents arrested Kazadi Ntumba Mulongo, editor
of the Kinshasa newspaper Top Media, and detained him for about a week
without charges; security agents accused Ntumba of publishing articles
too critical of the Government (see Section 2.a.).
On June 10, security forces in Kinshasa arrested three UDPS party
members, Raoul Nsolwa, Tchete Katala, and Tchaba Fils, as well as five
associates. The eight were detained until June 23 at various facilities
around Kinshasa, on charges of using bad language towards two soldiers.
On June 14, police in Kinshasa jailed 12 members of the opposition
UDPS party for allegedly booing the passing motorcade of President
Kabila. The police released nine of the detainees over a period of
several weeks. However, three remained in detention until December (see
Section 2.b.).
On June 23, members of the security forces raided the Kinshasa
office of Tempete des Tropiques, a daily newsaper, and arrested three
journalists. The journalists were beaten publicly before being loaded
into a vehicle and taken away; they were released later the same day
(see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
On June 28, security agents arrested a reporter for the Kinshasa
daily newspaper, Le Potentiel, after learning that he intended to write
a story detailing animosity between the President's chief of staff and
the Minister of Finance. The reporter was released the following day
(see Section 2.a.).
On July 2, police detained Bertin Lukhanda, a member of the human
rights NGO Haki za Binadamu, which specializes in protecting the rights
of prisoners. Security agents interrogated Lukhanda concerning the
activities of his organization before releasing him the following day
(see Section 4).
Between July 16 and August 27, security agents rounded up and
arrested approximately 154 activists of the opposition PALU party. The
Government charged the PALU members with illegally engaging in
political activity and dispersed them among various holding facilities
in Kinshasa. It is believed that most were arrested for exhibiting the
party flag and other emblems of PALU, although the Government filed no
formal charges against them (see Sections 2.b. and 3).
On July 19, according to a public statement by the PALU opposition
party, members of the security forces arrested and detained PALU member
Sangu Matembi on charges of political activity; Matembi reportedly died
in Makala Prison on October 11 due to lack of food and medical care
(see Section 1.a.).
On the night of July 24-25, members of the security forces arrested
Christophe Lutundula, president of the Movement for Solidarity,
Democracy and Development (MSDD), an opposition party, at his home.
Security forces detained Lutundula for 46 days without bringing charges
against him, after he made comments critical of the country's political
institutions (see Section 2.a.).
On July 26, ANR agents arrested Honore Kaputu and Timothe Dikueza,
both members of the domestic human rights after they attempted to mail
a VSV newsletter to the NGO's leader in Germany (see Sections 1.f. and
4). Both detainees were released a few days later without being
charged.
On July 26, security forces in the town of Mbuji Mayi arrested,
briefly detained, and whipped two journalists for criticizing the
deputy governor of Eastern Kasai Province (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
On July 29, security forces in Lubumbashi arrested professor Kambaj
wa Kambaji because of the professor's critical analysis of the use of
ethnic hate radio in Congolese politics (see Section 5). Security
forces in Lubumbashi tortured professor Kambaji in detention and denied
him access to his doctor and his family. He was flown to Kinshasa on
August 19 and mistreated aboard the aircraft. At year's end, Professor
Kambaji remained in detention at an ANR facility in Kinshasa (see
Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
In early August, DEMIAP personnel again arrested Christian
Badibangi, president of the Union Socialiste Congolaise, who had been
detained from May 21 until July 20. He was released a few days later
with no charges pressed and no explanation given; his repeated
detentions appeared to be an attempt to curb his political activities
(see Section 2.b.).
On August 2, the rapid intervention police arrested three union
leaders while dispersing striking civil service workers who were
protesting low pay and nonpayment of salaries (see Sections 2.b. and
6.a).
On August 13, police in Kinshasa arrested an attorney named
Ntamirira, who was attached to the appeals court of Kinshasa/Gombe.
Police gave no reason for the arrest. Ntamirira was transferred from a
police jail to an ANR holding facility despite health problems, and he
was allowed no visitors. Police released Ntamirira on August 18.
On August 24, police in Kinshasa arrested two members of the free
speech NGO, Journalistes en Danger, Mwamba wa Ba Mulamba Morro and
Achille Kadima, and detained them for 4 days in a private house in the
Kintambo neighborhood of Kinshasa, after they wrote an article
implicating the Director General of Taxation in corruption (see
Sections 2.a. and 4).
In September the police arrested Wetemwani Katembo Merikas, an
activist with the youth-oriented human rights NGO Cojeski. Police
accused Katembo of being a rebel infiltrator charged with starting a
clandestine political party. Security agents took Katembo to the GLM
detention facility in Kinshasa's Gombe neighborhood, where he was held
in a dark cell for 4 days. During his incarceration, police handcuffed
and beat Katembo an average of four times a day (see Sections 1.c. and
4).
In early September, security forces again arrested Cleophas
Kamitatu, who had been detained in January, and had subsequently become
president of a newly-formed opposition group, Community of the
Pluralist Democratic Opposition (CODEP). He was arrested soon after he
criticized the Government in a foreign radio broadcast, but he was
charged with malfeasance in connection with prior service as ambassador
to Japan. Kamitatu reportedly signed over the deed of a provincial
house in return for a promise of release, and a court ruled that he be
placed under house arrest; however, he remained in detention at year's
end (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.).
In the predawn hours of September 7, security forces raided the
offices of the Biaka Press and arrested two writers and the printer of
Alerte Ndule, a periodical dedicated to music. Security officials
apparently sought writers of the newspaper L'Alarme and did not
distinguish between the names. The three were released three days after
their arrest (see Section 2.a.).
On September 10, ANR agents in Mbuji Mayi in Eastern Kasai Province
arrested Francois Mpoyi Mukandu, the legal adviser of the governor of
the province. No charges were made public. ANR agents reportedly
tortured and beat Mpoyi so severely that he could not walk, and he was
taken to a hospital. On the same day and in the same city, a second
attorney, Marcel Mpuanga Mindu, also was arrested by the ANR and
tortured. The head of the bar association in Mbuji Mayi then complained
to the Minister of Justice about these abuses and dispatched the court
clerk to give Mbuji Mayi ANR chief investigator Tshiamuang Tshombe a
summons to appear in court. Tshiamuang ordered police to arrest the
court clerk on bogus charges of breaking into his house. The clerk,
Ditutu bin Bwebwe, was taken to an ANR holding facility where he was
beaten. Ditutu was released after 9 days. The two attorneys were
released in November (see Section 1.c.).
On September 10, ANR security police arrested prominent soccer
player Eugene Kabongo Ngoy upon his return to Kinshasa from Lusaka,
Zambia. The arrest came after Kabongo was seen in the lobby of a Lusaka
hotel greeting a number of persons believed to be rebels.
On September 14, security forces briefly detained Catherine Nzuzi,
president of former president Mobutu's Popular Movement of the
Revolution (MPR) party, in connection with a mass for thelate president
that she organized on the second anniversary of his death (see Section
2.c.).
In mid-September, security forces arrested Albert Bosange Yema, a
journalist employed by L'Alarme, a Kinshasa-based daily newspaper, who
reportedly wrote an erroneous article on the capture of Lake Mukamba by
the rebels (see Section 2.a.).
During the week preceding September 28, security forces arrested
and detained 18 PALU opposition party members, according to a PALU
press release issued on that date.
In early October, according to media interviews with Pascal
Kusehuka, secretary general of the PALU opposition party for the
Bandundu Province, a group of men including the son and nephew of
provincial governor Marc Katshunga, acting on orders from Katshunga,
arrested Kusehaka, accused him of political activity, and tortured him
(see Section 1.c.). Kusehaka reportedly was released later the same
month without being charged formally.
On October 2, DEMIAP officials in Kinshasa arrested the publisher
of the weekly newspaper Avant Guard on charges of compromising state
security, and detained her for 2 days, reportedly in connection with a
military tribunal judge's effort to learn the names of the authors of
some open letters that were published anonymously in Avant Guard (see
Section 2.a.).
In November security forces arrested Djojo Kazadi Mpayo, editor of
the Kinshasa newspaper, Palme d'Or, after that newspaper published a
story that predicted that natives of the Kivu Provinces (apparently an
allusion to RCD rebels) would soon take President Kabila to court (see
Section 2.a).
On December 11, two unidentified men blindfolded and abducted
University of Kinshasa student leader Alain Shekomba Okende. They
reportedly tied him up, took him to an unknown location, and
interrogated him about suspected ties to the media and to foreign
embassies and intelligence services. It was reported that shortly after
Shekomba's release on December 13, the ANR summoned him and other
student leaders to the ANR facility in Kin-Maziere, where they detained
but subequently released him and another student leader, Ntumba
Kapajika.
On December 10, the Government freed 156 political detainees,
including all 90 PALU activists then detained in Malaka Prison and 4
prominent UDPS members, including party spokesman Joseph Kapika and two
UDPS members arrested on May 12, Professor Alidor Mwamba Mtita and
Raymond Kabala. However, seven UDPS activists reportedly remained in
detention at year's end.
On November 7, 1998, police arrested Thiery Itangaza Mubango and
held him in detention until January 8, for attempting to make a long
distance telephone call to a foreign business executive whose business
he represented in the country. He was held at the ANR facility in the
Gombe neighborhood of Kinshasa. He was arrested without a warrant and
never charged.
Pretrial detention often was prolonged. In March it was credibly
reported that of 2,509 persons incarcerated at Makala Prison, only 276
had been tried and convicted; almost 90 percent of the inmates were
awaiting trial. Two-thirds of Makala's 655 civilian inmates were
awaiting trial.
The Government also held prisoners of war, reportedly including
about 96 members of the Rwandan armed forces and a few members of the
Burundian armed forces. They reportedly were guarded by members of the
Zimbabwean armed forces. Although the Lusaka Accords called for an
exchange of prisoners, none took place during the year.
Antigovernment forces reportedly detained persons repeatedly (see
Section 1.b.). Many of those whom antigovernment forces detained
reportedly were Hutus. The Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces held some
Zimbabwean and Namibian prisoners of war, and allowed the ICRC to visit
them. However, government soldiers captured by antigovernment forces
reportedly were held by the RCD or MLC, which reportedly did not permit
the ICRC to visit them.
The law prohibits forced exile, and the Government did not practice
it formally; however, the Government released 1,341 Tutsis from
detention on the condition that they leave the country through
internationally-sponsored relocation programs. These Tutsis chose
freely to leave the country rather than remain in government detention.
In February the Government moved approximately 200 at-risk Tutsis from
Camp Kokolo to the National Social Security Institute (INSS) center, in
the western suburbs of Kinshasa, where their comfort and security were
improved greatly and where the ICRC had continued access. Theyremained
at the INSS center until June, when the ICRC repatriated Rwandans,
Ugandans, and Burundians who were willing to depart the Congo. The
remaining at-risk individuals remained at the INSS until late October.
In Lubumbashi some 270 at-risk individuals were detained during the
same period and also were repatriated to Burundi, Rwanda, or Uganda by
the ICRC or evacuated to Belgium or Benin.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Transitional Act of the Mobutu
regime and Kabila's Decree Law No. 3 provide for the independence of
the judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary was not independent
of the executive branch, which could and did manipulate it. The Kabila
administration continued not to establish mechanisms to ensure the
independence of the judiciary; a judicial reform decree, reportedly
awaiting presidential approval since 1997, still had not been
promulgated. The judiciary also is ineffective and suffers from
corruption.
The civil judiciary, including lower courts, appellate courts, the
Supreme Court, and the Court of State Security, was largely
dysfunctional; during the year military tribunals that have been
organized since August 1997 tried nearly all cases and sentenced many
civilians as well as military personnel to death after summary trials.
Defendents before these tribunal had no automatic right of appeal to a
higher court, and many apparently lacked counsel.
Between January and early August at least 183 individuals were
tried and convicted by military courts. By April the military tribunals
in Kinshasa and Matadi had sentenced 52 persons to death; by year's
end, they were believed to have sentenced more than 100 persons to
death. Fourteen of the condemned were executed publicly on May 13 at a
police facility in Kinshasa. On May 25, 23 others were executed at Camp
Tshatshi, in Kinshasa. Death sentences and executions resulting from
summary military trials became increasingly frequent as the year
progressed. According to a domestic human rights NGO, between August 23
and November 23 alone, military tribunals sentenced 278 persons to
death, of whom 142 already were executed by late November. Government
military tribunals repeatedly sentenced civilians to death for
nonviolent offenses, including mismanagement of public funds and
violations of government restrictions on private economic activity,
such as private distribution of state-monopolized and state-rationed
gasoline. Military tribunals also convicted and ordered the execution
of persons charged with armed robbery, murder, inciting mutiny,
espionage, and looting while in a state of mutiny. Persons convicted by
military tribunals sometimes were executed publicly in ceremonies held
in stadiums and presided over by senior government officials, such as
provincial governors.
Civil and criminal codes are based on Belgian and customary law.
The legal code provides for the right to a speedy public trial, the
presumption of innocence, and legal counsel at all stages of
proceedings; however, the Government did not respect these rights in
practice. Defendants have the right to appeal in all cases except those
involving national security, armed robbery, and smuggling, all of which
are adjudicated in theory by the Court of State Security, and cases
adjudicated by the special military tribunals, whose jurisdiction
appears ill defined. The law provides for court-appointed counsel at
state expense in capital cases, in all proceedings before the Supreme
Court, and in other cases when requested by the court. The Kabila
administration still has not stated a position on providing counsel,
and has provided it only at its discretion.
Corruption remained pervasive, particularly among magistrates, who
were paid very poorly and only intermittently, and also were trained
poorly. The system remained hobbled by major shortages of personnel,
supplies, and infrastructure.
On March 30, a military tribunal convicted Thierry Kyalumba,
publisher of the Kinshasa newspaper, Vision, of divulging state secrets
and sentenced him to 4 years in prison for writing an article
describing a Ugandan purchase of missiles destined for rebel forces. He
was beaten repeatedly during pretrial interrogations. He escaped from a
prison hospital in May, and is believed to have left the country (see
Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
On June 18, a military tribunal in Katanga province sentenced two
journalists to 8 months in prison for ``slander and lies'' for
publishing an article that alleged that the governor of Katanga favored
antigovernment insurgents. President Kabila granted clemency to the
journalists on September 27 (see Section 2.a.).
On June 16, the Government released Joseph Olenghankoy, head of the
political party Innovative Forces for Unity and Solidarity (FONUS),
whom a military tribunal in May 1998 had convicted and sentenced to 15
years' imprisonment on charges of violating the ban on political
activity.
At year's end the Government continued to hold some political
prisoners, including ADFL co-founder Anselme Masasu and former Bas
Congo Province governor Fuka Unzola and five associates, all of whom
were convicted and sentenced to long prison terms in 1998. However,
television reporter Joseph Mbakulu Pambu was tried and acquitted in
December. The total number of political prisoners could not be
ascertained due to restrictions on access to prisons by independent
monitors (see Section 1.c.). Persons whom the Government incarcerated
during the year for political offenses, including violations of
Kabila's ban on political activity, mostly were detained without being
tried and many were released in December (see Section 1.d.).
Similarly, persons reportedly incarcerated by antigovernment forces
for political reasons generally were reported to be detained without
being formally tried (see Section 1.d.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Security forces routinely ignored legal provisions for
the inviolability of the home, the family, and private correspondence.
Members of the security officials often harassed and robbed persons.
Government security forces routinely kept under surveillance the
headquarters of opposition parties and the movements of leading
opposition political figures (see Section 2.b.).
The security forces repeatedly raided private businesses, including
newspapers, banks, and law firms, seizing documents and other property,
and arrested and detained employees whom they accused of collaborating
with antigovernment forces (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). Security
forces routinely ignored requirements for search warrants, entering and
searching at will. In February the Government seized two foreign-owned
diamond mines near Tschikapa in Western Kisai Province, and
subsequently operated them.
When unable to locate a specific individual, authorities routinely
arrested or beat the closest family member (see Sections 1.c. and
1.d.). On July 9, soldiers entered and searched the home of Innocent
Kyuma without a warrant, seeking to arrest him for unknown reasons.
After stealing money, they arrested Kyuma's pregnant wife and his
sister. Military personnel held the two hostage until Kyuma appeared,
and then arrested him. His release had not been reported by year's end.
In March security agents forced their way into the homes of two
Kinshasa families, ostensibly searching for Tutsis in hiding (see
Sections 1.d. and 5). In one house, they arrested the son, since the
father was not at home. In both homes they looted belongings and
threatened to kill the inhabitants. On July 9, the same soldiers raided
the office of a businessman named Kisaka for unknown reasons. The
soldiers reportedly whipped the office staff as well as clients in
their search for Kisaka. Upon learning that he was traveling, the
soldiers arrested his secretary and stole her minibus. Later that night
the same soldiers arrested Kisaka's younger sister Judith. ANR agents
detained Kisaka's secretary for almost 1 week, and his sister for
almost 2 weeks.
Security agents forced their way into private homes without search
or arrest warrants, often beating the inhabitants and stealing money
and goods. There were reports that security forces raped women during
these raids. The police often raided opposition party leaders'
residences, made arrests, and seized files (see Sections 1.c. and
1.d.). On January 11, security forces invaded the residence of UDPS
opposition party member Jean Joseph Mukendi wa Mulumba. They claimed to
be searching for Tutsis in hiding (see Sections 1.d. and 5).
On April 17, elements of the 50th brigade cordoned off sections of
the Masina neighborhood of Kinshasa, ostensibly to search for rebels in
hiding. However, the raid likely was in retaliation for an unfavorable
reception residents recently gave to President Kabila's passing
motorcade. In the course of searching the neighborhood's homes without
warrants, soldiers arrested 72 individuals on charges ranging from a
lack of documentation to being in possession of suspicious objects such
as cellular telephones. All were released from police custody the same
day.
On February 8, the CDDH publicly reported that soldiers in Tshikapa
in Western Kisai Province, then a government-controlled area, had
recently committed several acts of robbery, looting, and rape,
including a violent robbery of parish priests.
ANR security agents monitored mail passing through private express
delivery companies as well as through the largely dysfunctional state
mail service. On July 26, ANR agents arrested two members of the
domestic NGO VSV, after intercepting and reading the contents of their
private correspondence. The ANR agents were assigned to the mail room
of the international package delivery company Express Mail
International, and intercepted a newsletter NGO activists Honore Kaputu
and Timothe Dikueza attempted to send to a colleague in Germany. The
ANR agents arrested the pair when they appeared at the package delivery
company to inquire about the delay in delivery (see Section 1.d.).
The Government was widely believed to monitor telephone
communications.
There were credible reports that government forces used forcible
conscription, and that many of those forced to enlist were children.
The Government stated that it would reduce its use of child soldiers
and curtailed forcible conscription of children during the year;
however, there was no general demobilization of child soldiers, and
many children already in the armed forces continued to serve in them
(see Section 5).
Some Mai Mai and Hutu militia units fighting on the side of the
Government routinely seized private property and looted homes to supply
themselves. On two occasions in September, Burundian Hutu militia units
operating out of the country raided and looted villages in Zambia.
Antigovernment forces subjected civilians to arbitrary interference
with privacy, family, home, and correspondence of civilians in the
areas that their forces dominated (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
Between January 1 and 3, following fighting in the Mushinga and
Kanioka areas, and near the chiefdom of Ngweshe in the Walungu
territory, antigovernment forces stole livestock, tore apart homes, and
hauled away windows and glass (see Section 1.a.). In October Rwandan
soldiers and RCD-Goma rebels reportedly evicted Kisangani university
professors from their homes and occupied their houses.
There were credible reports that rebel forces used forcible
conscription, and that many of those forced to enlist were children.
The problem reportedly diminished during the year and rebel forces
stated that they would reduce their use of child soldiers; however,
there were no reports that they generally demobilized child soldiers,
and many child soldiers reportedly continued to serve in rebel armed
forces.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--Throughout the year, war continued with external
intervention on both sides. The war began in August 1998, when Kabila
tried to expel from the country Rwandan military forces that had helped
him overthrow Mobutu. Congolese Tutsis and the Governments of Rwanda,
Uganda, and Burundi all relied on these Rwandan forces for protection
from hostile nongovernmental armed groups operating out of the eastern
part of the country. These groups included: The Interahamwe militia of
ethnic Hutus, mostly from Rwanda, which fought the Tutsi-dominated
Government of Rwanda, and Hutu members of the former Rwandan armed
forces, two groups believed to be responsible for the 1994 genocide of
Tutsis in Rwanda; the Mai Mai, a loose association of traditional
Congolese local defense forces, which fought the influx of Rwandan
immigrants; the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF), made up of Ugandan
expatriates and supported by the Government of Sudan; and several
groups of Hutus from Burundi fighting the Tutsi-dominated Government in
Bujumbura. Kabila's attempt to expel the Rwandan armed forces was
frustrated by the outbreak on August 2 of a rebellion, led by a group
that called itself the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). The RCD was
dominated by members of the Tutsi ethnic minority, but from the outset
depended heavily on troops, materiel, and direction from the Government
of Rwanda, and, to a lesser extent, the Government of Uganda. Military
intervention by Angola, Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe resulted in the
defeat of an RDC drive on Kinshasa in August 1998, but antigovernment
forces advanced elsewhere. During the year, the rebels split into three
factions, a Rwandan-supported faction of the RCD based in Goma, a
Ugandan-supported faction of the RCD based in Bunia, and the Ugandan-
supportedMovement for the Liberation of the Congo, which, unlike the
original RCD, was not dominated by ethnic Tutsis. Nevertheless,
antigovernment forces continued to advance and at year's end controlled
most of the country's territory, including its eastern and northern
regions. During the year, elements of the armed forces of Rwanda and
Uganda continued to operate inside the country in support of rebels,
and elements of the armed forces of Burundi operated inside the country
against armed groups of Hutus from Burundi. Elements of the armed
forces of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe continued to operate inside the
country in support of the Government throughout the year, but the
Chadian forces withdrew from the country in May. Nongovernmental armed
groups such as the Interahamwe, former Rwandan Hutu military, and Mai
Mai continued to operate inside the country on the side of the
Government, often as guerillas inside territory held by antigovernment
forces. Cease-fire accords signed in July between progovernment and
antigovernment forces briefly reduced the intensity of the war. By the
end of the year, all sides violated the cease-fire, although the level
of fighting was generally limited. In this conflict, both sides
repeatedly used excessive force and committed numerous abuses.
Progovernment forces on several occasions used excessive force by
bombing civilian populations in air raids against towns held by
antigovernment forces. The crude bombs used, their manner of delivery
(rolled out of the aircraft through an open hatch), and the fact that
the raids were carried out at night over populated areas, nearly always
resulted in heavy civilian casualties and little or no damage to
antigovernment forces. On the night of January 10, progovernment forces
bombed the city of Kisangani, killing 12 civilians and wounding 26. Two
civilians reportedly died as a result of being hit by antiaircraft
fire. In addition to human casualties, the raids also damaged houses,
water, and electrical facilities in the communes of Makiso and Tshopo.
There were also reports of progovernment air strikes in May. On June 2,
government aircraft raided Bukavu and Uvira. During the first week of
August progovernment aircraft bombed the towns of Makanza and Bobonga.
A large although uncertain number of civilians were killed in these
attacks. According to a report by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo, not only
the government's armed forces but also elements of the armed forces of
other countries, including Zimbabwe, conducted such bombings.
However, the widespread killings of Tutsi noncombatants, reportedly
including some mass killings, which were the most serious violations of
humanitarian law committed by government security forces during 1998,
did not continue during the year. Government security forces continued
to use child soldiers, but greatly reduced their forcible recruitment
of child soldiers during the year (see Sections 1.f. and 5).
There were reports that Mai Mai and Hutu guerrillas fighting on the
side of the Government killed and tortured noncombatants (see Sections
1.a. and 1.c.).
There were many reports, at least some of them credible, that
elements of the Rwandan armed forces and the Goma faction of the RCD
repeatedly committed mass extrajudicial killings of noncombatants,
usually in reprisal for attacks in the same area on RCD forces by Mai
Mai or Hutu groups (see Section 1.a.). Rebel forces reportedly
continued to use child soldiers, but reduced their forcible recruitment
of child soldiers greatly during the year (see Sections 1.f. and 5).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Statutes provide for these rights,
and remain in effect; however, in practice the Government increasingly
restricted these rights.
The Libyan-inspired CPP's that Kabila formed during the year
monitored persons' speech, as well as association and movement, in
residential areas, workplaces, and schools, and reported speech
critical of the Government to security forces. Although the CPP's were
not part of the formal structure of the State, they were clearly
agencies of the Kabila regime.
On June 14, police jailed 14 members of the opposition UDPS party
for allegedly having booed the passing motorcade of President Kabila.
Among those arrested were Tito Malengi, Nlandu Mavakala, Alain Ngoy,
Gauthier Missau, Ibula Mosanzu. The police released nine of the
detainees over a period of several weeks. However, three remained in
detention until December, when they were released (see Section 1.d.).
Incidents of harassment, intimidation, and detention of journalists
were increasingly frequent for the second consecutive year, and
violations of press freedom became more common. During the year
government security forces arrested and detained more than 80
journalists; few of them were tried. At least three remained
incarcerated at year's end. Others were subjected to harassment,
beatings, and torture. Police seized radio stations, shut down
newspapers, and set fire to publishing houses. State authorities
expelled foreign journalists and banned the transmission of some
international radio broadcasts.
Almost 400 newspapers were licensed to publish but only a score
appeared regularly in Kinshasa. There was also an active private press
in Lubumbashi, and some private newspapers were published in other
provincial cities. Of the Kinshasa-based newspapers, seven were
dailies; the rest of the newspapers that appeared regularly were
published between one and three times a week. Most private news
publications relied on external financing, often from political parties
and individual politicians. News publications tended to emphasize
editorial commentary and analysis rather than factual descriptions of
events; many were highly critical of the Government. There were no
overtly government-controlled newspapers. However, the editors of at
least two newspapers, L'Avenir and L'Ouragon, worked respectively at
the office of the presidency and the Ministry of Justice. Le Forum and
Le Palmares have close ties to the security services. Of these, only Le
Palmares appeared daily.
The newspaper industry is regulated by a press law enacted in 1996.
Publishers must continue to deposit copies of their publications with
the Information Ministry. However, there is no longer a formal
censorship regime. Criminal libel laws exist but were not used against
journalists, even though, in most cases where journalists were charged
formally, state authorities charged them with ``endangering the State''
through the publication or broadcast of political news, or news of the
war. Charges often were brought under the June 22, 1996, press law.
However, the law has not been published by the Government in 5 years,
and many of the judges, as well as the journalists on trial, are
unfamiliar with it. Government officials criticized or implicated in
fraudulent practices by the press at times encouraged police to arrest
the journalists responsible for such stories.
On January 12, the police arrested Thierry Kyalumba, publisher of
the Kinshasa newspaper, Vision, for writing an article describing a
Ugandan purchase of missiles destined for rebel forces. Security forces
repeatedly beat him with a belt and buckle while interrogating him
during his subsequent detention at the Committee of State Security
prison and the Kokolo military detention facility. On March 30, a
military tribunal convicted him of divulging state secrets and
sentenced him to 4 years in prison. He escaped from a prison hospital
in May, and is believed to have left the country (see Sections 1.c. and
1.e.).
On February 3, ANR agents raided the offices of the Kinshasa
newspaper, Le Potentiel, and arrested five journalists, after the pro-
opposition daily criticized a statement by the President in which he
encouraged the formation of CPP's. The five, director of publication
Moise Musanga, assistant editor Vernon-Clement Kongo, and reporters
Emmanuel Katshunga, Godefroid Ngamisata, and St. Theodore Ngangu, were
detained for 1 day at the ANR station in the Gombe neighborhood of
Kinshasa, where they were made to sing pro-Kabila songs and warned not
to ``annoy the President'' before being released (see Sections 1.d. and
1.f.).
On February 5, police in Kinshasa arrested journalist Andre
Ipakala, of the daily newspaper, Reference Plus, and held him for 3
days without charge. In what appears to be a pattern of intimidation,
security forces also arrested Ipakala on January 26 and February 4. The
latest arrest followed a number of intimidating telephone calls to the
newspaper. Authorities reportedly claimed that Ipakala's recent
coverage of President Kabila was ``too tendentious'' (see Section
1.d.).
On May 8, police in Kinhasa arrested Stephane Kitutu O'leontwa,
president of the Congo Press Union, because they had been unable to
locate the author of an article that appeared in the satirical
newspaper Pot-Pourri. Kitutu had never written for Pot-Pourri and was
released 4 days later (see Section 1.d.).
On May 25, security forces arrested Kidimbu Mpese, managing editor
of the Kinshasa newspaper, Le Soft, and reporter Awazi Kharomon on
charges of ``undermining the Government,'' in connection with the
publication in Le Soft, 6 weeks earlier, ofan article describing
mismanagement of the central bank. Both journalists were released on
June 4 (see Section 1.d.).
On June 3, security agents arrested Kazadi Ntumba Mulongo, editor
of the Kinshasa newspaper Top Media, who also worked as a reporter for
a state-owned radio/television station. Security agents accused Ntumba
of publishing articles too critical of the Government. He reportedly
was released after about a week's detention. No charges were filed
against him (see Section 1.d.).
On June 18, a military tribunal in Katanga province sentenced Bella
Mako and Ngoy Kikungula, the publisher and editor in chief of a
Lubumbashi weekly, Le Lushois, to 8 months in prison for ``slander and
lies,'' in connection with an article published in Le Lushois that
alleged that the governor of Katanga favored antigovernment insurgents.
President Kabila granted clemency to the journalists on September 27,
after an appeal by the NGO, Journalists in Danger (see Section 1.e.).
On June 23, members of the security forces raided the Kinshasa
office of Tempete des Tropiques, a daily newspaper, and arrested three
journalists: managing editor Martin Mukania, editor in chief Dimbuka wa
Dimbuka; and reporter Boniface Lopaka. The journalists were beaten
publicly before being loaded into a vehicle and taken away (see
Sections 1.c. and 1.d.); they were released later the same day.
On June 28, security agents arrested Clin Beya, a reporter for the
Kinshasa daily newspaper Le Potentiel, after learning that he intended
to write a story describing animosity between the President's chief of
staff and the Minister of Finance. He was released the following day,
after several other papers published the same story (see Section 1.d.).
On July 26, security forces in the town of Mbuji Mayi arrested,
briefly detained, and whipped Jean Marie Kashils of the Agence
Congolaise de Presse, and Bienvenu Tshiela of Kasai Horizon Radio
Television. The deputy governor of Eastern Kasai Province, Kalala
Kaniki, ordered the arrest, claiming that journalists criticized him in
various reports. In 1998 Kanini ordered the whipping of another
journalist, Robert Ndaye, for the same reason (see Sections 1.c. and
1.d.).
On August 9, following news coverage of a military tribunal
hearing, security agents again raided the offices of Le Potentiel.
Unable to find the authors of the article, security agents arrested
Modeste Mutinga, the publisher. He was released later in the day.
On August 24, police arrested Achille Kadima Mulamba on the order
of employees of the public treasury, after Kadima wrote an article
implicating the Director General of Taxation in fraudulent practices.
Police held him for 4 days at the Kinshasa/Kitambo police station (see
Section 1.d.).
In the predawn hours of September 7, security forces raided the
offices of the Biaka Press and arrested two writers of Alerte Ndule, a
periodical dedicated to music. Security officials apparently sought
writers of the daily newspaper L'Alarme and did not distinguish between
the names. The security agents, who did not identify themselves,
arrested Alerte Ndule writers Kala Bokangu and Bosange ``Feu D'or''
Ifonge. Agents also arrested the printer Emile Thomas Dodo Lumingu (see
Section 1.d.). Later the same month, security forces arrested L'Alarme
journalist Albert Bosange Yema, who reportedly wrote an erroneous
article on the capture of Lake Mukamba by the rebels (see Section
1.d.).
On October 2, DEMIAP officials ordered Perserverance Ndeghey, the
publisher of the weekly newspaper Avant Guard to report to a DEMIAP
detention center, where he was arrested on charges of compromising
state security. Ms. Ndeghey reportedly was arrested by the order of
military tribunal judge Col. Alamba Mungako, who sought to learn the
names of the authors of some open letters that were published
anonymously in Avant Guard. When Avant Guard journalists failed to
provide this information, he reportedly ordered the editor's arrest
(see Section 1.d.).
In November security forces arrested Djojo Kazadi Mpayo, editor of
the Kinshasa newspaper, Palme d'Or, after that newspaper published a
story that predicted that natives of the Kivu Provinces (apparently an
allusion to RCD rebels) would soon take President Kabila to court (see
Section 2.a). Palme d'Or also had recently published a photograph of
former president Mobutu.
Security forces also arrested other print media journalists during
the year (see Section 1.d.).
On February 7, 1998, authorities arrested Albert Bonsange Yema of
L'Alarme along with his two wives and six of his children. His wives
and children were released within a few days. However, Bonsange was
transferred to the Makala prison in Kinshasa. A military tribunal
convicted him of endangering the security of the State by publishing an
article written by members of the political opposition and sentenced
him to pay fines worth about $1,433. Upon his release on February 3,
Bonsange required medical attention as a result of mistreatment while
in detention. Police continued their harassment of Bonsange following
his release; he was arrested again in September.
Government security forces sometimes seized individual issues of
various newspapers or printing equipment. During the first quarter of
the year, security forces occasionally seized newspapers from street
vendors to prevent circulation of articles deemed damaging to the
Government. Security forces also occupied the offices of the newspaper,
Elima, and prevented the newspaper from going to press.
Due to limited literacy and the higher costs of newspapers and
television, radio remained the most important medium of public
information. At year's end, 6 radio stations operated in Kinshasa
alone. In 1997 the Kabila Government lifted the Mobutu regime's ban on
news programming on private radio; however, two radio stations
continued to be state-owned and government-controlled. Opposition
parties were unable to gain access to state-owned radio, and private
radio was markedly less critical of the Government than private
newspapers. The Kabila Government has closed down private radio
stations because they broadcast news unfavorable to the Government or
commentary critical of the Government. In 1998 the Government shut down
Radio Amani, a privately owned radio station affiliated with the
Catholic Church, because it carried British Broadcasting Company (BBC)
news programming and commentary unfavorable to the Government.
On October 24, 1998, security forces arrested Joseph Mbakulu Pambu,
a reporter for a private television station in Matadi, for having
collaborated with the rebels during their August 1997 drive on
Kinshasa. A military tribunal tried and acquitted him of endangering
the security of the State.
Other methods of silencing the broadcast media have included
burning down radio stations and expelling journalists from their homes.
On January 13, a mysterious nighttime fire broke out and destroyed the
radio and television studios of Message de Vie, in the Kasa Vubu
district of Kinshasa. The station was owned by a Pentecostal minister
and opened only recently. Neighbors and observers believe that the
blaze was set deliberately. On January 26, soldiers expelled national
radio and television journalist Michael Museme Diawe from his home,
claiming it had been allocated to a member of the President's staff.
Diawe was arrested and suspended previously for statements made on the
air.
Eight television stations broadcast in the Kinshasa area, two of
which are state-controlled, and two of which are religious; opposition
parties remained unable to gain access to state-controlled television.
During the year, the Government prevented foreign broadcasts
through domestic transmitters. On July 22, Information Minister Didier
Mumengi ordered privately owned radio and television stations to cease
transmitting foreign broadcasts. The order was aimed at Elikya, a
Catholic radio station that transmits Radio Vatican, and Raga FM, which
broadcasts the VOA, BBC world service, and Deutsche Welle. However,
Kinshasa still receives Radio France Internationale, which is
transmitted from nearby Brazzaville.
At year's end, there were two domestic Internet service providers.
Because of technical difficulties and high costs, the Internet is not
widely used.
Some antigovernment forces, including the RCD-Goma, reportedly
restricted freedom of speech and of the press; at year's end, there
reportedly were no independent media in areas controlled by the RCD-
Goma.
On July 21, RCD security forces in Bukavu in South Kivu Province
seized the radio transmitter and other equipment from the private radio
station radio Maendeleo, effectively taking it off the air.
On August 25, RCD-Goma soldiers arrested two journalists from Radio
Maendeleo, senior editor Kizio Mushisi and programmingchief Omba
Kamengele, as they were leaving a meeting of the Regional Council of
Nongovernment Development Organizations (CRONGD). Four NGO members also
were arrested. Mushisi and Kamengele were taken to the offices of the
RCD-Goma's Agence National de Reseignement. They were released
September 13, along with the four NGO members.
Academic freedom increasingly was endangered as professors
exercised self-censorship or modified their lectures to suit the views
of their patrons in the Government. Faculty members complained that
members of the Government took an increasing interest in activities at
the university. The regime monitored university classrooms through
student and teacher members of the newly created CPP's (see Section
2.b.). During the year CPP's were introduced to university campuses in
Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, employing a cadre of both students and
faculty. Several lecturers were arrested after CPP members denounced
them for questioning the Government. In February ANR agents arrested
professor Tshibangu Kalala in Kinshasa and detained him for 2 weeks
without charges after CPP members criticized the professor for relating
to students his impressions of the poor economy and infrastructure of
Katanga after he returned from a visit to that province. Guards beat
and tortured him during his incarceration (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
On July 29, security forces in Lubumbashi arrested professor Kambaj wa
Kambaji because of the professor's critical analysis of the use of
ethnic hate radio in Congolese politics (see Section 5). ANR agents
raided his home and seized student essays dealing with hate radio.
Security forces in Lubumbashi tortured professor Kambaji in detention
and denied him access to his doctor and his family. He was flown to
Kinshasa August 19 and mistreated aboard the aircraft. At year's end,
Professor Kambaji remained in detention at an ANR facility in Kinshasa
(see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--There is no legal
protection for freedom of assembly, and the Government continued to
restrict this right severely. The Government considers the rights to
assemble and associate subordinate to the maintenance of ``public
order.'' The Government requires all organizers to apply for permits,
which are granted or rejected at the Government's discretion. Public
activities generally are dispersed by government security services.
On August 2, the Kabila Government took over the agenda of a peace
rally planned by Kinshasa-based NGO's that it previously had approved.
Government military and police personnel, as well as elements of the
CPP' dispersed themselves among the crowd and refused to let NGO
officials or opposition politicians speak. The government agents turned
the event into a Kabila rally, as ministers spoke extolling the virtues
of the President.
In August the rapid intervention police dispersed striking civil
service workers who assembled before the office of the Ministry of
Finance to protest low pay and nonpayment of salaries. Three union
leaders were arrested (see Section 6.a.).
On September 9, a planned demonstration by university students
during a faculty strike was thwarted by the presence of police and
military units that surrounded the campus of Kinshasa University. The
Kabila Government threatened to shut down Kinshasa University and turn
out its 28,000 students if the unrest continued; however, a Government
promise to increase faculty salaries ended both the strike and student
unrest.
The law provides no protection for freedom of association, and the
Government severely restricted this right. Upon assuming power in 1997,
the Kabila Government suspended political party activities, but not
political parties themselves. In January Kabila issued a decree that
partially lifted the ban on political party activities. However, the
decree allows the Interior Minister to ban parties arbitrarily, and
requires that legally recognized parties have members from all
provinces, a requirement that could not be satisfied under war
conditions. Moreover, in practice, the Government continued to ban any
political activity by opposition groups beyond small administrative
meetings.
During the year, President Kabila dissolved the AFDL movement,
which he led. In its stead Kabila organized CPP's, based on the Libyan
model developed by Muammar Qadhafi; state-funded CPP's in residential
neighborhoods, workplaces, and schools not only undertook community
development projects but also monitored all activity, including forms
of association that they deemed suspicious or a threat to the State. In
a July presidential decree legalizing the CPP's, Kabila proclaimed that
all political activity must pass through the CPP's, which he leads.
This decree was widely criticized.
Individuals from opposition parties served in Kabila's Government,
but in their individual capacities (see Section 3). Political party
offices by and large remained open, and parties continued internal
administrative functions. At different times and for different periods,
the headquarters of various political parties were under surveillance,
padlocked, or patrolled by soldiers. The Government effectively
prevented public political gatherings, although opposition party
leaders remained able to conduct small private meetings. The effects of
the restrictions on political parties varied widely throughout the
country, and they were enforced less strictly in some provinces.
In theory anyone wishing to form a new political party could do so
by registering with the Minister of Interior. The President's January
decree required all political parties including existing parties to
register. However, no political parties were registered during the
year.
NGO's are required to register with the Minister of Justice, filing
copies of internal regulations and descriptions of organizational
structure. During the year, President Kabila promulgated a decree that
restricted the activities of NGO's, including religious organizations,
by establishing requirements for their activities. However, some
existing organizations were exempt, and the decree was not enforced
during the year.
Security forces arrested individuals visiting foreign embassies, as
well as persons who have contacts with NGO's or citizens living in
other countries (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 4).
There were credible reports that antigovernment forces seriously
restricted freedom of assembly and association in the areas that they
controlled. However, antigovernment forces permitted some humanitarian
NGO's to work in those areas, and such NGO's reported that their
working environment improved in some of those areas during the year.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion is recognized, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice, with the
reservation that the expression of this right neither disturb public
order nor contradict commonly held morals. The establishment and
operation of religious institutions is provided for and regulated
through a statutory order on Regulation of Non-profit Associations and
Public Utility Institutions. Requirements for the establishment of a
religious organization are simple and the process was not abused;
exemption from taxation is among the benefits of official recognition
as a religious organization. During the year President Kabila
promulgated a decree that restricts the activities of NGO's, including
religious organizations, by establishing requirements for them;
however, existing religious organizations were exempt, and the decree
was not enforced during the year. There is no legally established or
favored church or religion.
Although the Government required that foreign religious groups
obtain the approval of the President, through the Minister of Justice,
foreign religious groups generally operate without restriction once
they receive approval from the Government.
A 1971 law regulating religious organizations grants civil servants
the power to establish and dissolve religious groups. There have been
no reports of the Government suspending or dissolving a religious group
since 1990, when the Government suspended its recognition of Jehovah's
Witnesses; that suspension subsequently was reversed by a court.
Although this law restricts the process for official recognition,
officially recognized religions are free to establish places of worship
and to train clergy. In practice, religious groups that are not
recognized also worship freely.
Many recognized churches have external ties, and foreigners are
allowed to proselytize. The Government generally did not interfere with
foreign missionaries. The Government took no action to limit the
ability of members of Jehovah's Witnesses or any other group to
practice their faith.
On April 19, security agents arrested Pastor Job Mukendi as he was
driving his vehicle in Kinshasa. Security forces took this action after
Pastor Mukendi criticized the new presidential decree establishing
requirements for the activities of religious organizations. Pastor
Mukendi was released the following day.
In January a radio and television studio owned by a Pentecostal
pastor burned down under suspicious circumstances. The government's
July order that private radio stations cease transmitting foreign radio
broadcasts effectively targeted aCatholic radio station; in 1998 the
Government shut down a Catholic radio station that transmitted domestic
broadcasts (see Section 2.a.).
On September 14, security forces arrested Catherine Nzuzi,
president of the major faction of the MPR party, after she organized a
Mass for former president Mobutu on the second anniversary of his
death. She was detained for 5 hours on charges of violating a decree
prohibiting political activity (see Section 1.d.).
In September security forces arrested Reverend Fernando Kuthino
after his actions sparked street demonstrations by Muslims; he
converted a Muslim on television, then publicly burned notes the
convert had taken while studying the Koran. He remained in detention at
year's end (see Section 5).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Although the law allows for freedom of
movement, the Government, and in particular the security forces acting
independently, continued to restrict this freedom; the Government
increased its restrictions after the war began. The war also brought
new restrictions on internal travel even within the government-
controlled and rebel-controlled zones and made movement between the two
zones difficult and dangerous.
Even before the war, security forces throughout the country
established and manned many roadblocks at which they demanded that
travelers produce documents and bribes. There were many more such
roadblocks than could be justified by public safety considerations;
both their numbers and the conduct of the security force members
manning them indicated that their main function was to extort money and
goods from travelers to supplement their below-subsistence official
wages. This made internal travel costlier, more time consuming, and
more dangerous, since violence including shootings was not uncommon at
these roadblocks.
During the war, the Government has required exit visas for all
foreign travel. No data on the refusal rate for exit visa applications
was available; there were several known cases in which a political
leader was denied an exit visa during the year. Security forces
occasionally hindered foreign travel by citizens, including
journalists.
On January 26, airport authorities arrested Andre Ipakala, the
editor of the Kinshasa-based daily newspaper La Reference Plus.
Ipakala, who was traveling to attend conferences in Kenya and Ethiopia,
was charged with attempting to smuggle issues of his own newspaper out
of the country. He was released the following day after explaining that
the issues in question were a week old and already had been
disseminated internationally over the Internet (see Section 1.d.).
On March 14, airport security agents arrested four members of a
returning Congolese delegation that had traveled to South Africa to
discuss the upcoming national dialog. The four were Modeste Mutinga,
editor of Le Potentiel, Andre Ipakala, editor of La Reference Plus,
Marie Angue Lukiana, president of the NGO National Women's Union, and a
representative of an opposition political party (see Section 1.d.).
On April 16, airport authorities arrested Kinkela vi Kin'si, former
Minister of Post, Telephone, and Telegraph. The Kabila Government
claims that Kinkela was attempting to flee the country after being
ordered to remain at the Ministry to brief his successor. Kinkela
maintains that he was at the airport to greet an arriving friend (see
Section 1.d.).
The Government refused an exit visa in late June to UDPS President
Etienne Tshisekedi. The opposition leader was traveling to Europe to
attend a seminar on the crisis in the Congo. The Government claimed
that his passport was not in order, since it was issued under the last
regime. Police also surrounded his house to prevent his departure.
On September 11 and again on September 12, the Kabila Government
denied the exit visa application of prominent journalist Modeste
Mutinga Mutuishayi, effectively preventing his travel. Mutinga, the
owner/editor of the newspaper Le Potentiel, was due to travel to the
United Kingdom and Canada to attend a series of conferences on good
governance. Airport and ANR authorities seized his passport, apparently
in retaliation for Mutinga's recent hosting of a conference that
questioned Kabila's overt favoritism toward his own Muluba tribe.
The Kabila Government also refused to permit international travel
by Christian Badibangi, head of the opposition party Union Socialiste
Congolaise. Badibangi was seeking medical attention overseas following
repeated beatings while in detention (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
The Government lifted Kinshasa's night-time curfew in April, but
reimposed it in October, although there was no evident immediate
military threat to the capital. Security forces enforcing the reimposed
curfew killed two persons (see Section 1.a.). The Government again
lifted the curfew in December.
There reportedly was substantial freedom of movement within the
rebel-controlled territories. However, travel across the war front was
often inconvenient and sometimes impossible.
The significant risk of rape, sometimes perpetrated by uniformed
men, restricts freedom of movement at night for women in many
neighborhoods. Groups of citizens implemented neighborhood watch
programs, but women in many parts of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi do not
leave their homes at night due to fear of attack.
The law includes provisions to grant refugee status and asylum in
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government continued
to provide first asylum. Tens of thousands of refugees were accepted
into the country from the Republic of Congo during the year. Refugees
from Uganda and Angola also continued to live in the country.
The Government's cooperation with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other international agencies fluctuated widely.
The Ministry of Human Rights and in particular Human Rights Minister
She Okitundu played an active role in organizing the protection and
voluntary departure of Tutsis who were not incarcerated before their
departure from the country. Since the start of the war, the Government
has stopped its former practice of involuntarily repatriating Hutus to
Rwanda.
Antigovernment forces cooperated with NGO's in voluntarily
repatriating Rwandan Hutus to Rwanda. There was no independent
confirmation of news reports in May, that antigovernment forces were
repatriating Rwandan Hutus involuntarily.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government
peacefully. Citizens have not been able to change their government
through free elections since independence in 1960.
In his May 1997 inaugural address, President Kabila promised a
constitution and elections by 1999. However, the 1998 outbreak of war
proved a setback for the democratic process as it effectively ruled out
holding national elections. The President used the pretext of war to
suppress the activities of political opposition parties and continued
to rule by decree. The war also provided a reason for security forces
to arrest anyone they chose on charges of subversion or being in league
with the rebellion (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
The Government did not pursue the ratification of the proposed
constitution drafted in 1998; after it was disseminated in the press,
many leaders of political parties, NGO's and religious organizations
criticized it as insufficiently democratic.
To address allegations that President Kabila had no intention of
introducing democracy, the Government called for a national dialog to
settle questions surrounding the legitimacy of its power. Cease-fire
accords signed in July at Lusaka between the progovernment and
antigovernment forces called for an open national dialog among all
political parties and civil society groups. In October, the Government
staged a ``national debate,'' whose agenda was controlled by the
Government; nongovernmental entities, anticipating the more open dialog
prescribed by the Lusaka Accords, participated very little, and the
national debate attracted little press coverage. The Government
subsequently reaffirmed its commitment to participate in a national
dialog under the control of a neutral facilitator.
Although the Government did not ban political parties, it continued
to impose severe restrictions on their activities, and to enforce these
restrictions with numerous arrests and detentions (see Sections 1.d.
and 2.b.). In practice the permitted operations of political parties
continued to be restricted to internal administrative functions. At
various times government security forces put opposition political
partymembers under surveillance. Police also raided and padlocked party
headquarters.
Hundreds of political activists were arrested for engaging in
political activity and detained for prolonged periods, although most
were released on December 10 (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.).
The State continued to be highly centralized in many ways.
Governors generally were appointed by the central government executive,
but once in the provinces they had considerable autonomy, due in part
to the poor communications and transportation infrastructure.
Territorial administrators were also were appointed from Kinshasa.
Provincial government resources, both financial and logistical, have
come almost exclusively from Kinshasa since Kabila took control of the
Government.
A disproportionate number of Kabila's ministers were from the
President's home province of Katanga and from his Muluba tribe.
There are no official restrictions on the participation of women or
minorities in politics; however, in practice, they are
underrepresented, and there are few women or Muslims in senior
positions in the government or in political parties. There were five
female ministers and vice ministers in the Cabinet at year's end.
The rebel movements established civil administrations in the areas
controlled by antigovernment forces, including appointment of
provincial governors and issuance of visas for foreigners to travel
into their areas. Rebel authorities reportedly began training police
forces, but appointed local officials rather than holding local
elections.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Kabila Government showed increased hostility to effective human
rights organizations, either domestic or international, operating in
the country. Local human rights NGO's continued to investigate and
publish their findings on human rights cases, but these activities took
place in the context of significant government harassment.
The main domestic human rights organizations operating in the
country include Comite Droits de l'Homme Mainenant (CODHOM), a national
network of human rights organizations; VSV, an active Kinshasa-based
organization; Groupe Amos, a Christian-inspired group that focuses on
human rights and democracy issues; Toges Noires, an international
association of lawyers and judges involved with human rights; and
Associations de Defense des Droits de l'Homme (ASADHO). In addition,
numerous groups that are involved with development and with specific
issues such as voter education and women's rights are active.
Local human rights activists were subjected to frequent harassment,
arrest, and detention by security forces (see Section 1.d.). The
legality of such arrests was often unclear, as was the authority of the
security forces members effecting the arrests and detentions. In
December 1998, Donnat N'Kola Shamuyi, an investigator for the human
rights NGO CDDH, disappeared while working in Tshiapa in Western Kisai
Province (see Section 1.b.).
In November VSV issued a report stating that the Government
responded to only 18 percent of VSV's requests for information during
the year. During the year, VSV staff received numerous threats from
government officials. Security agents detained or questioned VSV
members on at least eight occasions between January and July and forced
several VSV members into temporary hiding (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
In June security forces visited VSV offices to invite VSV activist
Floribert Chebeya to witness the release of a detained government
minister. When informed that Chebeya was not in the office, soldiers
arrested two VSV activists, took them to Kokolo military camp, and
interrogated them about what Chebeya knew about the arrested government
minister. The minister was not released that day; he apparently only
had been used as bait to lure Chebeya.
U.N. Special Rapporteur Roberto Garreton visited the Congo in
February, August, and September. After reviewing the prevailing human
rights situation, the U.N. Rapporteur called for the release of
political prisoners and the end of capital punishment in the Congo. He
expressed concern at the abuses of government military tribunals, as
well as at a wide variety of serious abuses in both government-
controlled and RCD-controlled territory.
During the year there were no further investigations into the
massacres of Hutus reportedly committed in the country in 1997 by
Rwandan forces and domestic Tutsi militias during the campaign in which
they and Kabila's ADFL overthrew the Mobutu government.
Human rights groups and members of political, religious and other
nongovernmental organizations in the parts of the country held by
antigovernment forces frequently were harassed and detained on
suspicion of helping the Government.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The previous Constitutions forbade discrimination based on
ethnicity, sex, or religious affiliation, but the Government did not
enforce these prohibitions effectively and continued to act with
serious official prejudice against members of the Tutsi ethnic group.
Societal discrimination remained an obstacle to the advancement of
certain groups, particularly women, Tutsis, Muslims, and the indigenous
Pygmy (Batwa) people.
Women.--Domestic violence against women, including rape, is common,
but there are no known government or NGO statistics on the extent of
this violence. The police rarely intervene in domestic disputes. Rape
is a crime, but the press rarely reported incidents of violence against
women or children. Press reports of rape generally appear only if rape
occurs in conjunction with another crime, not because of the act of
rape itself.
Women are relegated to a secondary role in society. They constitute
the majority of primary agricultural laborers and small-scale traders
and are almost exclusively responsible for child rearing. In the
nontraditional sector, women commonly receive less pay for comparable
work. Only rarely do they occupy positions of authority or high
responsibility. Women also tend to receive less education then men.
Women are required by law to obtain their spouse's permission before
engaging in routine legal transactions, such as selling or renting real
estate, opening a bank account, accepting employment, or applying for a
passport. A 1987 revision of the Family Code permits a widow to inherit
her husband's property, to control her own property, and to receive a
property settlement in the event of divorce. In practice, sometimes
consistent with customary law, women are denied these rights. Widows
commonly are stripped of all possessions--as well as their dependent
children--by the deceased husband's family. Human rights groups and
church organizations are working to combat this custom, but there is
generally no government intervention or legal recourse. Women also are
denied custody of their children in divorce cases, but they retain the
right to visit them. Polygyny is practiced, although it is illegal.
Father-child relationships resulting from polygamous unions are
recognized legally, but only the first wife is recognized legally as a
spouse.
Children.--Government spending on children's programs is nearly
nonexistent. Primary school education is not compulsory, free, or
universal. In public schools, parents are required formally to pay a
small fee, but parents often are expected informally to pay teachers'
salaries. Dire economic circumstances often hamper parents' ability to
cover these added expenses, meaning that children may not be able to
attend school. Most schools function only in areas where parents have
formed cooperatives. The Government's economic policies have resulted
in massive unemployment, inflation, and a devaluation of the currency,
putting basic education out of reach of many families. There have been
reports of economic circumstances forcing children to hunt or fish for
their family's livelihood, instead of attending school.
There are no documented cases in which security agents or others
targeted children for specific abuse, although children suffer from the
same conditions of generalized social disorder and widespread disregard
for human rights that affect society as a whole. These conditions
sometimes render parents unable to meet their children's basic human
needs.
Some children as young as 10 years of age have been allowed to
enlist as soldiers in the FAC. The Government has not taken
comprehensive measures to remove child soldiers from its armed forces,
although it has stated its intention of demobilizing child soldiers
once the war is over. While many child soldierscontinued to serve in
the armed forces, during the year the Government greatly reduced and
may have stopped recruiting children into its armed forces. However,
the Government increasingly encouraged the enlistment of children in
paramilitary organizations. In March the African Association of Human
Rights reported that unemployed Katangan youth recruited by the GSSP
were ``excessively militarized,'' and that provincial authorities in
Katanga were arming unemployed youth through CCP's.
Rebel forces, too, reportedly continued to use child soldiers
already in service, but greatly reduced and may have stopped recruiting
them during the year. Credible reports have indicated that rebel forces
have conscripted forcibly boys as young as age 10, but there were no
reports that this practice continued during the year.
Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is not widespread, but it is practiced on young
girls among isolated groups in the north. The Government has not
addressed the problem.
People with Disabilities.--The law does not mandate accessibility
to buildings or government services for the disabled. There are some
special schools, many with missionary staff, which use private funds
and limited public support to provide education and vocational training
to blind and physically disabled students.
Indigenous People.--There is a population of fewer than 10,000
Pygmies (Batwa), who are believed to have been the country's original
human inhabitants. Societal discrimination against them continued.
Although citizens, most Pygmies continued to live in remote areas and
took no part in the political process.
Religious minorities.--Approximately 50 percent of the population
are Roman Catholic, 20 percent are Protestant, and 10 are percent
Islamic. About 20 percent practice traditional indigenous religions
exclusively.
However, many persons practice elements of both Christianity or
Islam and a traditional indigenous religion. Although relations among
religious groups generally were amicable, accusations of witchcraft in
a traditionalist rural area and tensions between Christians and Muslims
reportedly contributed to some violence during the year.
In January in the Kamituga area of South Kivu Province, Mai Mai
leader Sylvestre Louetcha reportedly accused of witchcraft 32 women who
supported their traditional ruler in resisting Mai Mai demands for
forced labor, then cut off their breasts, forced them to eat their own
breasts, and killed them. In November, in the Mwenga area of South Kivu
Province, RCD-Goma rebels tortured and buried alive 15 women who were
suspected of having performed witchcraft in support of a local Mai Mai
force, according to some accounts of that incident (see Sections 1.a.
and 1.c.).
In September Muslims in Kinshasa staged street demonstrations to
protest the actions of Protestant Reverend Fernando Kuthino, who
converted a Muslim on television, then publicly burned notes the
convert had taken while studying the Koran. Security forces suppressed
the demonstrations and arrested and detained Reverend Kuthino (see
Section 2.a.).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The last official census was
taken in 1984. It is estimated that the population is now 45 to 50
million, and comprises more than 200 separate ethnic groups. These
groups generally are concentrated regionally and speak distinct primary
languages. There is no majority ethnic group; the four largest ethnic
groups are the Mongo, Luba, Kongo, and Angbetu-Azande, who together
make up about 45 percent of the population. Four indigenous languages--
Kiswahili, Lingala, Kikongo, and Tshiluba--have official status. French
is the language of government, commerce, and education.
Societal discrimination on the basis of ethnicity is widely
practiced by members of virtually all ethnic groups and is evident in
private hiring and buying patterns, and in patterns of de facto ethnic
segregation in some cities; however, intermarriage across major ethnic
and regional divides is common in large cities.
Persons from President Kabila's home province, Katanga, and from
his Mulaba tribe, filled a disproportionate number of positions in his
Government and in the senior ranks of the civil service, and dominated
the FAC officer corps. Katangans in the FAC were substantially more
likely both to be promoted and to be paid than persons from other
regions; about 80 percent of army promotions announced in June were
granted to Katangans. Since the start of the war, Tutsis have been
absent from the Government, which previously included persons from all
regions and major ethnic groups.
Birth on national territory reportedly does not necessarily confer
citizenship. The Government continued to refuse to recognize the
citizenship claims of longtime residents whose ancestors immigrated to
the country, including the Banyamulenge Tutsis. According to some
accounts, resentment of their noncitizen status contributed to the
participation of many Tutsi residents of the country first in Kabila's
rebellion against Mobutu and then in the RCD rebellion against Kabila.
Since the start of the war in August 1998, ethnic Tutsis have been
subjected to serious abuses, both in the capital and elsewhere, by
government security forces and by some citizens, for perceived or
potential disloyalty to the regime (see Section 1.a.). During the year,
extrajudicial killings of noncombantant Tutsis in government-controlled
areas largely stopped. However, in Kinshasa and in Katanga Province,
Tutsis continued to be held in prolonged detention, from which the
Government was willing to release them only on condition that they
leave the country (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.). One Tutsi girl died of
an illness while in government custody, but it was credibly reported
that her death was not due to government negligence or abuse.
Throughout the year, government officials and state media continued to
publish anti-Tutsi propaganda, and continued to exhort not only state
security forces but also citizens and in particular CCP members to
exercise vigilance to uncover Tutsis in hiding and Tutsi infiltrators
(see Sections 1.c. and 1.f.). Consequently, although most surviving
Tutsis in government-controlled areas were either in hiding or detained
or had left the government-controlled part of the country, many non-
Tutsis who physically resembled Tutsis were detained or beaten on
suspicion of being Tutsi. The Government also materially supported Mai
Mai and Hutu armed groups, which, according to credible reports,
repeatedly killed unarmed as well as armed Tutsis in areas militarily
dominated by antigovernment forces. However, the Government no longer
incited mob violence against unarmed Tutsis, and there were no reports
of mass extrajudicial killings of Tutsis by the security forces.
On January 12, security forces from the 50th brigade broke into the
Bethany Catholic Center, where a number of Tutsis and Rwandan nationals
were granted refuge with the consent of the Government. Soldiers forced
the Tutsis out of the compound and led them to camp Kokolo, a military
installation, where they suffered mistreatment and deprivation until
the Government, under international pressure, moved them to a training
facility. During the raid soldiers of the 50th brigade looted and
vandalized the Catholic Center, stealing food and money from both the
Tutsis and the staff.
On April 30, members of the presidential guard attacked, severely
beat, and abducted Ralph Biteo because he had the facial features of a
Tutsi. Biteo was visiting a child in a hospital when agents of the
presidential guard, under the command of a Major Batembo, stopped him
at the hospital entrance. Despite Bitco's explanation that he was a
member of the Batembo tribe from South Kivu, he was beaten severely by
presidential guardsmen. Biteo told the guardsmen that he was visiting
the hospital to see the burned child of a cousin, Mirimo Mulongo.
Members of the presidential guard then arrested Mulongo, who had
traveled from Goma with a child suffering from burns. Both Biteo and
Mulongo were taken to the GLM detention facility in the Gombe area of
Kinshasa. Both were denied visitors and were believed to still be in
detention at year's end.
The longstanding violent conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic
groups continued inside the country. Congolese Hutu militias continued
to increase their recruitment from populations of Hutu refugees from
Rwanda and Burundi in neighboring countries, including the Republic of
Congo and Zambia. According to credible reports, these recruitments
occurred with the knowledge and consent of the Government, which
welcomed the support of these Hutu groups in its fight against the
Tutsi-dominated RCD and the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Government.
Senior government officials and state media continued to represent
the war as part of a larger supranational conflict between Bantus and
Nilotics. Similar Nilotic-Bantu rhetoric also appeared in private
publications and broadcasts in the country.
State-owned television and radio and progovernment private
newspapers repeatedly published racist remarks directed not only
against Tutsis and Nilotics, but also against Europeans, in connection
with propaganda alleging that countries in Europe and with populations
largely of European ethnicity supported antigovernment forces in the
war.
In December in the Ituri district in Orientale Province, an area
dominated by Ugandan and Ugandan-supported forces, fighting between
members of the Lendu and Hema tribes reportedly killed many persons and
displaced tens of thousands of persons. This fighting, which continued
and was worsening at year's end, reportedly arose from a dispute about
land use (see Section 1.a.). Local officials, one of whom was a Hema,
sold arms to the Hema, reportedly after using administrative authority
to advance Hema interests at the expense of Lendu interests.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Legislation in effect from the Mobutu
period permits all workers except magistrates and military personnel to
form and join trade unions.
Before 1990 the law required all trade unions to affiliate with the
National Union of Zairian Workers (UNTZA), the sole recognized labor
confederation, which also formed part of Mobutu's Popular Movement of
the Revolution (MPR) Party. When political pluralism was permitted in
April 1990, the UNTZA disaffiliated itself from the MPR and reorganized
under new leadership chosen through elections deemed fair by outside
observers. After the ADFL takeover, the union renamed itself the
National Union of Congolese Workers (UNTC). Although the UNTC remains
the largest labor federation, almost 100 other independent unions are
now registered with the Labor Ministry and two other large federations
are active. Some are affiliated with political parties or associated
with a single industry or geographic area.
Government security forces repeatedly arrested and detained labor
leaders and activists.
On January 28, ANR agents in Kinshasa briefly detained an employee
of the cellular telephone company Telecel named Kimene and seven of his
colleagues, who had formed a bargaining group, the Confederation
Democratique du Travail (CDT). On February 13, police in Mbuji Mayi in
Eastern Kasai Province arrested Telecel's Mbuji Mayi manager and two
employees who were CDT members, and accused all three of ``uncivic''
behavior and violating a law forbidding transactions in foreign
currency. Telecel called all three employees to Kinshasa, then handed
them over to police, who detained the company manager until February 15
and the two union members until February 20 (see Section 1.d.).
During the year, police also arrested and detained a number of
communications workers who attempted to form unions for the purpose of
collective bargaining.
On December 31, 1998, police arrested Toussaint Kilundu Manbongo,
an employee of the Direction General des Contributions (DGC) branch of
the Finance Ministry and a member of the union, Solidarity. Three other
Solidarity union members were arrested the same month: Albano Mopipi on
January 17; Anderson Yoba Mbeso on January 18; and Laise Banzwa on
January 29. The three were interrogated by ANR agents and transferred
to Makala prison (see Section 1.d.). Kilundu and the other three
Solidarity union members were released in August. The arrests appeared
to be connected to a strike within the Finance Ministry over wages.
The law recognizes the right to strike. However, legal strikes
rarely occur since the law requires prior resort to lengthy mandatory
arbitration and appeal procedures. Labor unions have not been able to
defend effectively the rights of workers in the deteriorating economic
environment. The law prohibits employers or the Government from
retaliating against strikers, but this prohibition rarely is enforced.
On August 2, civil servants in Kinshasa staged a strike to protest
low salaries and months of unpaid wages. University administrators and
health care workers soon followed them. Whenstriking workers gathered
before the offices of the Ministry of Finance, rapid intervention
police arrested three union leaders (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). The
police on August 12 also arrested four organizers of the health care
workers strike but quickly released them. In October the Government
claimed that it would meet the demands of the strikers. It did so by
implementing progressively a comprehensive, higher civil service salary
scale; however, civil servants were still paid sporadically.
Unions may affiliate with international bodies. The UNTC
participates in the organization of African Trade Union unit, and the
Central Union of Congo is affiliated with the World Confederation of
Labor.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for the right to bargain collectively, and an agreement
between the UNTC and the employers' association formerly provided for
wages and prices to be negotiated jointly each year under minimal
government supervision. This system, which functioned until 1991, broke
down as a result of the rapid depreciation of the currency. The
professional unions and the Congolese Business Federation signed a
cooperative agreement in 1997. While collective bargaining still exists
in theory, continuing inflation encouraged a return to pay rates
individually arranged between employers and employees.
The collapse of the formal economy also has resulted in a decline
in the influence of unions, a tendency to ignore existing labor
regulations, and a buyer's market for labor. The Labor Code prohibits
antiunion discrimination, although this regulation was not enforced
effectively by the Ministry of Labor. The law also requires employers
to reinstate workers fired for union activities. In the public sector,
the Government sets wages by decree; public sector unions act only in
an informal advisory capacity.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, and the Government it not known to use it,
apart from forcible conscription of adults and children (see Section
1.f.). However, there were reports that some Mai Mai guerrillas
fighting on the side of the Government in the war demanded forced labor
from persons in rural areas, and tortured and killed persons when a
local traditional ruler refused to provide such forced labor (see
Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). The law does not specifically prohibit forced
and bonded labor by children, and such practices are not known to
occur, apart from the forcible conscription of children (see Sections
1.g. and 5).
Antigovernment forces also forcibly conscripted adults and
children.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment is 18 years.
Employers legally may hire minors between the ages of 14 and 18 with
the consent of a parent or guardian, but those under age 16 may work a
maximum of 4 hours per day; those between the ages of 16 and 18 may
work up to 8 hours. The employment of children of all ages is common in
the informal sector and in subsistence agriculture, which are the
dominant portions of the economy. Such employment is often the only way
a child or family can obtain money for food. Neither the Ministry of
Labor, which is responsible for enforcement, nor the labor unions make
an effort to enforce child labor laws. Larger enterprises generally do
not exploit child labor. The availability of education for children is
extremely limited in practice (see section 5). The law prohibiting
forced or compulsory labor does not specifically mention children, but
there were no reports of such practices, apart from forced conscription
(see section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Most citizens are engaged in
subsistence agriculture or commerce outside the formal wage sector. The
minimum wage, last adjusted by government decree in 1990, subsequently
was rendered irrelevant by rapid inflation. The average wage does not
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most
workers rely on the extended family and informal economic activity to
survive. The maximum legal workweek (excluding voluntary overtime) is
48 hours. One 24-hour rest period is required every 7 days.
The Labor Code specifies health and safety standards. The Ministry
of Labor officially is charged with enforcing these standards, but it
does not do so effectively. No provisions in the Labor Code permit
workers to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without
penalty.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to,
or from the country.
______
REPUBLIC OF CONGO \1\
The Republic of Congo continued to be ruled by a transitional
government that came to power by force of arms in October 1997.
President Denis Sassou-Nguesso wields executive power without
meaningful legislative or judicial constraints. Forces supporting
Sassou-Nguesso, a northerner, defeated those of former president Pascal
Lissouba, a southerner, with the help of Angolan troops in 1997.
Sassou-Nguesso's principal base of political support lay in the
sparsely populated northern region of the country and in particular
among his minority Mbochi ethnic group. Lissouba was elected
democratically in 1992 after 28 years of one-party rule, including a
lengthy period (1979-91) during which Sassou-Nguesso served as
President. Lissouba's administration was characterized by severe
mismanagement and by recurring clashes among militia forces loyal to
the country's major political leaders. A civil war began when
Lissouba's forces surrounded Sassou-Nguesso's home in June 1997, in an
apparent attempt to eliminate his political-military faction. Civil
conflict between the Government and armed groups of southerners
throughout much of the south broke out in August 1998 and continued
during the year. Fighting and heavy looting led to the destruction of
many southern towns, including parts of Brazzaville, the capital. An
estimated 800,000 civilians, mostly from the south--approximately one-
third of the country's total population--were displaced as a result of
the violence. During the second half of the year, the Government
reestablished effective control over most of the south through military
offensives, offers of amnesty, negotiations, and efforts to broaden the
government's political base. In August President Sassou offered amnesty
to rebel fighters who renounced violence and turned in their arms. The
Government signed cease-fire and reconciliation accords with leaders of
some rebel groups in November and with most other rebel groups in late
December. Soon after taking power in 1997, President Sassou-Nguesso's
Government replaced Congo's 1992 constitution with a new Fundamental
Act. The Fundamental Act establishes a strong and highly centralized
presidential system of government. The President appoints all members
of the Government, all senior military officers and all subnational
government officials, serves as commander in chief of the armed forces,
and is mandated specifically to direct the general policy of the
Government and exercise regulatory powers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The United States Embassy evacuated its facilities in the
country during the 1997 civil war and subsequently has operated out of
the American Embassy in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Throughout
the year, fighting in both countries impeded efforts to collect
information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legislative authority is vested in the 75-member National
Transition Council (NTC), a body that was elected at the National
Reconciliation Forum convoked by the Government in January 1998.
Although the forum included some representatives of opposition
political parties and nongovernmental actors, the event was
orchestrated by the executive and did not constitute a sufficiently
broad-based forum from which to elect a genuinely representative
legislature. During the forum, the Government announced its intention
to create a new Constitution and hold elections within a flexible 3-
year timetable. In August a constitutional committee named by the
President in late 1998 presented him with a draft constitution that,
once approved by the Cabinet, is to be submitted to the NTC and then to
a popular referendum. The President has announced his intention to
complete the constitutional reform process during the year 2000 and
then hold elections. The judiciary is overburdened and subject to
political interference and corruption.
The security forces include the police, the gendarmerie and the
armed forces; the functional distinction between these forces is not
clear. In theory the police should be the first to respond to security
incidents, with gendarmes and army units intervening later if
necessary; in practice joint operations are common. Many new recruits
who have joined the security forces since the 1997 civil war are former
members of nongovernmental militias. Effectively autonomous
progovernment ``Cobra'' militia units also continued to operate,
although the Government asserted increasing control over these units
during the second half of the year. Units of the Angolan armed forces
operated inside the country in support of the Government. Rwandan Hutu
militiamen, formerly in refugee camps in the country, as well as
citizens of Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC), also
participated in government military operations. Members of the security
forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
The economy has suffered serious losses from destruction and
looting in much of the south during the 1997 civil war and the 1998-99
conflict, particularly in Brazzaville, where more than one-third of the
country's population of roughly 2.7 million normally resides. However,
this violence did not affect significantly the oil industry, which
operates offshore. Oil exports and external assistance remained the
country's main sources of foreign exchange. The doubling of world oil
prices during the year greatly increased government revenues and by
mid-year enabled the Government to stop the accumulation of salary
arrears to public sector employees including members of the security
forces. Although per capita gross domestic product wasestimated at
about $670 per year, this figure includes substantial oil exports, the
benefits of which are not widely distributed throughout the population.
Lack of transparency in government and high levels of defense and
security spending continued to impede growth. During the first half of
the year, large salary arrears for state employees including members of
the security forces continued to contribute to widespread looting and
other human rights abuses.
The Government's human rights record was poor, and there continued
to be numerous serious abuses. Citizens do not have the right to change
their government peacefully. Security forces, which included many
undisciplined and poorly controlled former members of nongovernmental
militias, were responsible for extrajudicial killings, including
summary executions; disappearances; rapes; beatings and physical abuse
of detainees and the civilian population; arbitrary arrest and
detention; and arbitrary searches and widespread looting of private
homes. Prison conditions remained life threatening. The judiciary was
overburdened, underfinanced, and subject to corruption and political
influence. It was unable to ensure fair and expeditious trials. The
Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government
continued to monopolize domestic broadcast media, although private
newspapers circulated freely and were sometimes critical of the
authorities. The Government permitted opposition political parties and
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), including human rights
organizations, to function, and there was a relatively open dialog on
public policy issues. The Government sent mixed signals on political
participation by opposition figures. While many former cabinet
ministers and other officials of the Lissouba government returned to
Brazzaville during the year and were permitted to resume political
activities, the Government also repeatedly stated that the most senior
figures--including former President Lissouba and Prime Minister
Kolelas--would be subject to trial for war crimes. Security forces
restricted freedom of movement within the country. Violence and
societal discrimination against women are serious problems, and
incidents of rape increased during the renewal of civil unrest. Some
minority indigenous Pygmies face severe exploitation and are inherited
by Bantu patrons. Societal discrimination on the basis of ethnicity
remained widespread. Ethnic and regional tensions continued to
contribute to large-scale organized civil violence. Child labor,
reportedly including forced labor, persists. Citizens sometimes
resorted to vigilante justice, killing those presumed to be criminals.
Rebel militiamen were responsible for serious abuses, including
summary execution, rape and extortion. Rebel militias severed rail and
power lines, thereby causing serious food and water shortages in
southern towns. Militia commanders prevented displaced civilians from
returning to their homes, prolonging their suffering under conditions
of inadequate food and medical care.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces
committed many extrajudicial killings. There were numerous reported
cases of summary execution of suspected rebels among displaced
civilians, most of whom were southerners, as they returned from other
countries to which they had fled or emerged from forests or other
places of refuge within the country. Young men were singled out for
beatings or execution, and women were raped routinely. There were
reports that in May members of the security forces shot and killed men
a group of who were separated from groups of returning refugees.
In some cases, security forces summarily executed soldiers or
members of progovernment militias who were looting (see Section 1.f.).
The Government often deployed undisciplined troops, including some
recently recruited from President Sassou-Nguesso's former Cobra
militia. These government forces were responsible for summary
executions as well as rape, looting, and other violent acts. Numerous
incidents were documented by local human rights groups, as well as
humanitarian organizations such as Medecins sans Frontieres. While some
improvements in government forces' discipline were noted as the year
progressed, serious abuses continued. In October the Minister of
Defense announced that military tribunals would be established to bring
to justice those responsible for such abuses and the Government
introduced legislation to that end; however, as of year's end these
tribunals were not in place.
Angolan troops allied with the government generally were better
disciplined, but also committed acts of summary execution, rape, and
looting.
There continued to be deaths due to mob violence, as civilians took
vigilante action against presumed criminals, although police sometimes
intervened to stop such action.
Rebel militiamen, particularly the ``Ninjas'' and ``Nsiloulou''
based in the southern Pool region, also committed summary executions.
These militiamen questioned young men among displaced civilians in the
local dialect to ascertain their ethnicity and, if they were unable to
answer, killed them as suspected government infiltrators. There were
credible reports that rebels burned villages suspected of harboring
infiltrators or whose inhabitants contemplated returning to government-
controlled areas. During rebel advances in the town of Dolisie in
January and February, opposition ``Cocoye'' militiamen summarily
executed government officials and military officers in the town,
although precise numbers are unknown.
b. Disappearance.--According to credible reports, young men, mostly
members of southern ethnic groups, who took refuge in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DROC) early in the year were separated from their
families by security forces upon returning to Brazzaville in May and
subsequently disappeared. While some sources reported that security
forces shot and killed these men, no firm evidence was developed, and a
poor counting of the returnees made it difficult to verify what
happened to them after arrival in Brazzaville. As a result of these
reports, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) increased
monitoring of returnees which largely ended further charge of
disappearance. An association of family members of persons who
disappeared reported that 74 of those who returned in May remained
unaccounted for as of year's end. A joint report issued by a local
human rights group and an international human rights federation in June
reported that approximately 30 persons who had been detained in late
1998 by security forces remained unaccounted for; these detainees were
transferred late in the year to Impfondo, in the Likouala region, and
subsequently were released.
Given the incomplete figures on those killed in the 1997 civil war
and subsequent civil conflict, and the massive displacement of civilian
populations as a result of the fighting, many disappearances may have
occurred that have not been reported.
c. Torture and Other Cruel and Inhuman Treatment or Punishment.--
The Fundamental Act prohibits torture; however, in practice, security
forces sometimes used beatings to extract confessions or merely to
punish detainees. Security forces generally operated with impunity in
committing such acts. Members of the security forces looted citizens'
homes (see Section 1.f.), and security forces extorted money from
travelers at checkpoints (see Section 2.d.). Security force officers
sometimes beat and released civilian looters instead of arresting them.
There were reports that security forces repeatedly separated males
from groups of displaced southerners returning to the country or
emerging from forests where they had hidden, detained them, stripped
and searched them for scars or other evidence of combat experience, and
beat and interrogated those whom they suspected of having ties to rebel
groups. Some persons reportedly died from such beatings.
Security forces routinely raped internally displaced women.
Humanitarian NGO's cited more than a thousand cases of rape by security
force members of such women returning to Brazzaville and believed that
many more cases went unreported.
Security forces also were responsible for looting (see Section
1.f.).
There were credible reports that rebel militia groups from the Lari
ethnic group and operating in the Pool region repeatedly raped women,
looted homes, and killed persons, even among their own ethnic group,
and that they also tortured suspected infiltrators from other groups.
Prison conditions remained life threatening, as they have been for
years, due to overcrowded facilities and scarcity of resources to
provide food or health care to the inmates. The Brazzaville prison
(Maison d'Arret), which was vacated by all inmates due to heavy
fighting in 1997, was repaired and reoccupied during the year. The
Pointe Noire prison continued to function. Detainees held at police
stations often were subjected to beatings, overcrowding, extortion, and
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Paul Omoye Kamaro, a
detainee held without charge for twelve months in the Regional
Directorate for Territorial Surveillance (DGST) in Pointe Noire,
contracted pulmonary tuberculosis while in detention and died shortly
afterbeing transferred to the Pointe Noire military hospital in
October.
Human right groups sometimes encountered difficulty in gaining
access to prisons. However, a local human rights group sometimes was
able to gain access to Pointe Noire prison through informal channels
during the year. In November the Government signed an agreement to
permit the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) complete
access to all prisoners and detainees, and by year's end the ICRC had
been permitted to visit several detention centers.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Fundamental Act
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, in practice security
forces frequently commit such acts. The Code of Penal Procedure, which
remains in force, requires that a person be apprehended openly and that
a lawyer be present during initial questioning. The code further
stipulates that warrants be issued before arrests are made and that
detainees be brought before a judge within 3 days and either charged or
released within 4 months. In practice the Government often violates
these legal provisions. Detainees usually were informed of the charges
levied against them, and lawyers and family members usually had free
access to them.
There were political detainees at year's end. Precise figures are
unknown, but local human rights groups estimated fewer than 20
political detainees remaining in Pointe Noire at the end of November.
In most cases, no formal charges had been brought. The detainees were
primarily minor officials of the former Lissouba Government. No figures
were available for political detainees at locations elsewhere in the
country. In February Nestor Makounzi Wolo, who had been detained since
November 1998 in connection with his service on the Lissouba-era
Constitutional Court, was released from detention. In October Bar
Association President Herve Ambroise Malonga, another former
Constitutional Court member held since November 1998, was also
released. Also in October, the Government freed 12 Lissouba-era
military officers who had been detained since the 1997 civil war, and
announced that they would be re-integrated into the national armed
forces.
The Fundamental Act does not address forced exile, and the
Government does not practice it formally. Some officials of the
predecessor government including former president Lissouba and former
Prime Minister Kolelas remained outside the country, and in practice
the threat of trial for war crimes in Congo was among the factors
discouraging their return. However, other officials of the former
government--including cabinet members--returned during the year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Fundamental Act mandates the
President to ensure the independence of the judiciary through the
Higher Council of Magistrates; however, in practice, the judiciary
continued to be overburdened, underfinanced, and subject to corruption
and political influence. Resource problems increased as a result of the
destruction and looting sustained by judicial facilities during the
1997 civil war.
The judicial system consists of local courts, courts of appeal, the
Supreme Court, and traditional courts. In rural areas, traditional
courts continued to handle many local disputes, especially property and
probate cases, and domestic conflicts that could not be resolved within
the extended family.
In general defendants are tried in a public court of law presided
over by a state-appointed magistrate. The defense has access to
prosecution evidence and testimony and the right to counter it. In
formal courts defendants are presumed innocent and have the right of
appeal. However, the legal caseload far exceeded the capacity of the
judiciary to ensure fair and timely trials. Some cases never reach the
court system. In October the Government announced plans to establish
military tribunals to try soldiers for abuses committed during recent
periods of conflict, and the Government introduced legislation to
establish these tribunals, however, they were not functioning by year's
end.
During the last quarter of the year, a court tried former President
Lissouba and three other former government officials in absentia on
charges of having conspired to kill President Sassou in June using four
Europeans alleged to be mercenaries. In December the court convicted
all four former officials and sentenced them in absentia to 20 years'
imprisonment. The Government subsequently expelled the four Europeans,
who also were tried and convicted in the same process.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
Correspondence.--The Fundamental Act provides for the inviolability of
the home, and for privacy of letters, correspondence,
telecommunications, and other forms of communication, except as may be
provided by law; however, in practice government security forces often
illegally entered, searched, and looted private homes.
Members of government security forces continued to loot the
southwest Brazzaville neighborhoods of Bacongo and Makelekele during
the first 4 months of the year, and other areas of the south throughout
the year. Following the return of civilians, first to Bacongo and
Makelekele in May, and later to areas beyond the Djoue River southwest
of the city, the Government increased efforts to prevent looting. These
methods were often brutal and included summary executions and beatings
of looters (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Looting also was widespread in
other areas of southern Congo where Government forces clashed with
rebel militiamen and continued through November. The town of Dolisie,
in Niari Region, served as a market for looted goods brought by
government forces from throughout the southern zone of military
operations.
The Government was widely believed to monitor private mail and
telephone communications. An NGO report in June cited two cases in
which civilians were detained apparently after security forces
intercepted their mail and found reports of summary executions by the
security forces or hardship among displaced civilians.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--The civil conflict that broke out in mid-1998
intensified in early 1999 before subsiding during the second half of
the year. During the year, the conflict pitted forces supporting the
Government, including Angolan allies, Rwandan Hutu militiamen, and
irregular fighters of Chadian and DROC nationality, against southern
rebel groups, including Cocoye militiamen operating in Bouenza, Niari,
and Lekoumou regions, and Ninja and Nsiloulou militiamen operating
principally in southern Pool region. Although the Cocoyes were formed
from a nucleus of former President Lissouba's Presidential Guard and
the Ninjas originally were founded by former Prime Minister Kolelas, it
was unclear whether Lissouba and Kolelas continued to exercise any
meaningful control over rebel military operations. The Ninjas and
Nsiloulou were based largely in the Lari ethnic group. Members of the
Nsiloulou widely believed that traditional indigenous religious
practices made them invisible or bulletproof (see Section 5).
During January and February, opposition groups denied the
Government control of a large area of southern Congo extending nearly
210 miles, from Dolisie to the outskirts of Brazzaville. Combat at
Dolisie was intense in late January and early February as government
forces deployed heavy artillery and Angolan aircraft to prevent rebel
capture of the city, Congo's third largest. Government troops gradually
drove the rebels east from Dolisie and west from Brazzaville, and then
north and south from these positions, reducing the zone of rebel
control. However, as late as May 12 rebel Ninja forces briefly
penetrated Brazzaville, but subsequently were not able to threaten the
capital. By the end of November, Government forces had recaptured most
of the south and pushed remaining rebel concentrations to the vicinity
of the Gabonese border. The northern region was unaffected by the
conflict.
Government forces used artillery and aerial bombardment from
helicopters in areas populated by civilians during the year. They also
engaged in widespread looting in all areas where they were present.
Despite a presidential amnesty offered in August to opposition
militiamen who renounced violence and turned in their weapons, there
were reports of summary execution of some militiamen who surrendered
both before and after the amnesty. Following the amnesty and subsequent
cease-fire agreements, Government sources reported that some 6,000
militiamen had surrendered and were being returned to civilian life or
integrated into the military. Parties to the conflict generally did not
take prisoners.
From January through mid-August, opposition forces cut electric
power to much of Pointe Noire, Congo's second largest city and
principal port, causing severe hardship for the civilian population.
Rebel forces also disrupted the economically vital Pointe Noire to
Brazzaville railroad and sabotaged bridges and railway stations along
the route. While partial train service was restored from Pointe Noire
to Nkayi during the year, full operations did not resume by year's end.
The power and transport cutoffs caused serious water and food shortages
in southern towns, contributing to widespread hunger, disease, and
displacement.
The conflict in southern Congo displaced approximately 800,000
civilians, according to U.N. estimates, or nearly one-third of Congo's
population of 2.7 million. Tens of thousands of personsfled into
neighboring countries, chiefly Gabon and the DROC. The health and
nutritional conditions under which the displaced lived were life
threatening. Among the more than 200,000 displaced persons who returned
to Brazzaville in the late spring and summer, humanitarian agencies
noted a 40 percent malnutrition rate among children under 5 years of
age and a high incidence of adult malnutrition. Insecure conditions
precluded humanitarian access to most of those displaced to rural areas
and, for much of the year, rebel forces prevented civilians from
returning to government-controlled areas where they could receive
assistance. Although the Government appealed for the return of
civilians to areas under its control, in practice government forces'
continued extortion, rape, and summary execution of returnees
undermined this message until late in the year, after cease-fire and
reconciliation accords were concluded.
In November the Government and leaders of some rebel groups signed
an accord calling for a cessation of hostilities and disarmament of
militias. In late December, representatives of the Government and most
other rebel groups also signed cease-fire agreements.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Fundamental Act provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and in practice the Government
generally respected this right, although it continued to monopolize
broadcast media. The 1996 Press Law, which sharply increased criminal
penalties for libel, remained in effect.
There is no state-owned newspaper. Approximately 10 private
newspapers appear weekly in Brazzaville. Some of these newspapers take
editorial positions critical of the Government and print articles
unflattering to the authorities. Newspapers on occasion published open
letters written by opponents of the Government who are in detention or
living abroad. Print media do not circulate widely beyond a small elite
in Brazzaville and Pointe Noire.
Most citizens obtained their news from the broadcast media, which
remained effectively a government monopoly. Government-owned Radio
Congo broadcast approximately 18 hours a day; Government-owned
Television Congo broadcast for fewer hours. However, Radio France
Internationale was rebroadcast on a local FM station, and radio and
television broadcasts from neighboring Kinshasa, in the DROC, could be
received in Brazzaville. The independent Radio Liberte, established by
President Sassou-Nguesso's forces during the civil war, continued to
broadcast. A new Government station, Radio Brazzaville, was established
at mid-year to serve listeners in the capital.
Local rebroadcast of Gabon-based Africa Number One was suspended
from February through July after the Government accused the station of
promulgating rebel views.
The news coverage and the editorial lines of the state-owned media
reflected government priorities and views. Government broadcast media
focused its attention on the activities of the government officials and
their supporters; there was no meaningful airing of alternative
political views.
No Internet service providers were based in the country, but
connections through providers in the neighboring DROC were available.
There were no known abridgements of academic freedom. The Marien
Ngouabi University, which was disrupted by civil unrest in fall 1998,
resumed classes in fall 1999.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Fundamental
Act provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
respected this right in practice. Political parties and civic
associations held numerous meetings during the year. Public
demonstrations were less common and there were no known public
protests. Groups that wished to hold public assemblies were required to
inform the Ministry of Interior, which could withhold authorization for
meetings that threatened public order; however, there were no known
instances in which the authorities withheld permission for request to
meet.
The Fundamental Act provides for freedom of association, and the
Government largely respected this right in practice. The act permits
associations, political parties and other groups to form freely,
provided that they respect principles of Congolese sovereignty,
territorial integrity, national unity, and democracy. No political
parties were banned or suspended. The parties of some prominent leaders
of the former government continued to operate, but under the leadership
of political figures willing to cooperate with the Government.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Fundamental Act provides for freedom
of religion and the Government respected this right in practice. There
is no official state religion. About half the population is Christian;
most of the rest practices either traditional indigenous religions or
no religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Fundamental Act provides for freedom
of movement; however, the Government restricted this right in practice.
Military checkpoints sometimes interfered with the movement of
civilians. Members of the security forces manning these checkpoints
commonly extorted bribes from travelers. The number of checkpoints
increased late at night and in areas of insecurity. Government forces
operating southwest of Brazzaville routinely stopped vehicles carrying
displaced persons returning to the capital, and often extorted money,
brutalized or killed young men, and raped women.
For much of the year, rebel ``Ninja'' and ``Nsiloulou'' militiamen
prevented the return to Brazzaville of civilians who had fled the
capital in December 1998. Rebels denied the displaced persons access to
information about conditions in Brazzaville and punished families or
villages of those who sought to return. Throughout the year, insecurity
and rebel sabotage of the railway prevented train service between
Brazzaville and Pointe Noire.
The Fundamental Act provides for the right of asylum. The
Government reiterated its commitment to respect applicable
international refugee law, but it permitted Hutu militiamen from
refugee camps to join in military operations with government forces.
The country was host to a small number of Burundians and approximately
7,000 Rwandan, largely members of the Hutu ethnic group, who fled camps
in eastern Zaire (now the DROC) in 1996 and arrived in Congo in May and
June 1997. The Government, in collaboration with the office of UNHCR,
has announced plans to integrate these refugees in regions of north-
central Congo.
A total of approximately 45,000 Congolese fled to the Bas-Congo
Province of the DROC in late 1998 and early 1999. Beginning in May, the
Congolese and DROC governments agreed to repatriation, with UNHCR
facilitation, of those refugees who wished to return to Brazzaville. By
year's end, approximately 40,000 had been repatriated.
As a result of military operations in northwest Niari and Lekoumou
regions in July, approximately 15,000 Congolese fled to Gabon. None
were repatriated as of the end of November.
Approximately 6,000 Angolan refugees fled the Angolan province of
Cabinda in 1992 and continue to receive UNHCR assistance in camps near
Pointe Noire.
The Government granted first asylum to refugees from other
countries. Fighting in the neighboring DROC's Equateur province in July
prompted the flow of approximately 15,000 refugees and combatants
(including both DROC troops and Rwandan Hutu militiamen) to the
northern Likouala region. The combatants among the new arrivals were
repatriated to Kinshasa.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to countries
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government
peacefully. The current Government came to power by force of arms in
1997 with the help of the armed forces of Angola. During the National
Reconciliation Forum that it convened in January 1998, the Government
announced its intention to create a new constitution and hold elections
within 3 years. A constitutional committee appointed by the President
presented him with a draft Constitution in August. Once approved by the
cabinet, this draft must be passed by the NTC, then adopted by popular
referendum. In October, President Sassou publicly reaffirmed his
intention to complete the constitutional reform process during 2000 and
then to hold elections.
The executive branch dominates the current system of government.
Under the Fundamental Act, the President is mandated to direct the
general policy of the Government and to exercise regulatory powers. He
appoints all significant military, executive, and judicial officials.
The President convenes the interim national legislature, called the
NTC. The CNT was elected at the 1998 National Reconciliation Forum.
Although the forum included some representatives of opposition
political parties and nongovernmental actors, the event was
orchestrated by the executive and did not constitute a sufficiently
broad-based forum from which to elect a genuinely representative
legislature. Although the NTC debates issues freely and summons cabinet
ministers to answer questions about their portfolios, it wasdominated
by supporters of the President and did not serve as a meaningful check
on executive authority.
Major political parties included the ruling Congolese Workers'
Party, the Panafrican Union for Social Democracy, the Congolese
Movement for Democracy and Integrated Development, the Union for
Democracy and the Republic, the Rally for Democracy and Social
Progress, and many others. In some cases, party leaders remained in
exile while other party officials willing to cooperate with the
Government remained in the country. In the absence of electoral
politics or a constitutional framework for such politics, party leaders
held meetings and party congresses, commented to the media on the
current political environment, and raised questions in the NTC. The NTC
included representatives of a range of political parties but was
dominated by allies of the Government.
The State is highly centralized. Since the 1997 civil war, key
regional and local leaders have been appointed by the central
Government. Subnational government entities lack an independent revenue
base and do not represent a significant check on central authority.
The Government has announced repeatedly its intention to bring to
trial members of the former government on charges of war crimes,
genocide, or other criminal acts, and in December a court convicted
former president Lissouba of plotting to kill President Sassou (see
Section 1.e.). In 1998 the NTC passed a law on genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity that permits the exclusion from public
office of those found guilty of such crimes. This law could be used to
exclude opponents from the political process, and the mere threat of
charges under this law may dissuade political figures who are in exile
from returning to the country, including former president Lissouba and
former prime minister Kolelas. Nonetheless, many senior officials of
the former government--including a number of cabinet ministers--
returned to Congo during the year and resumed political activities
without incident.
There are no legal restrictions on representation by women or
minority populations; however, women were underrepresented in
government and politics. Two of 25 cabinet ministers were female, and
women held 2 of 7 leadership positions in the NTC. Pygmies continued to
be effectively excluded from the political process. The cabinet
included members of many ethnic groups throughout the country. Although
many key posts were held by northerners, including members of the
President's Mbochi ethnic group, there was no consistent pattern of
clear overrepresentation of any ethnic or regional group.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Several domestic human rights organizations operated with minimal
government restriction and investigated and published their findings on
human rights problems. While some human rights leaders maintained that
they sometimes were subjected to subtle forms of intimidation, they
continued to publish reports that were highly critical of the
Government with no apparent reprisal. On one occasion, a local human
rights group reported that security forces confiscated copies of an
Amnesty International report; however, the report later was circulated.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) maintained an
office in Brazzaville and, among other activities, continued its
program of human rights training for units of the armed forces.
Responding to some of the issues raised by non-governmental human
rights groups, in July the Government published a ``Report on Violence
Committed in Congo Since the End of the Civil War,'' which emphasized
abuses by the opposition.
While insecurity in much of the south early in the year prevented
U.N. and other humanitarian agencies from assessing conditions in these
areas, by year's end they enjoyed improved access to Dolisie, Nkayi,
Kinkala, and among other towns in the south.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Fundamental Act specifically prohibits such discrimination;
however, societal discrimination persisted in practice, particularly
against women and Pygmies. Ethnic and regional differences, especially
between northern and southern ethnic groups contributed to large-scale
organized civil violence during the year. Members of northern ethnic
groups generally supported the Government, while nongovernmental armed
rebel forces generally drew their support from southern ethnic groups.
Women.--Domestic violence against women, including rape and
beatings, is widespread but reported rarely. Domestic violence is
handledwithin the extended family and only in the most extreme
incidents is it brought to the police. There are no provisions under
the law for spousal battery. Widespread rape during the recent civil
conflict raised public awareness of violence against women.
Nongovernmental organizations, such as the International Rescue
Committee, continued to draw attention to the issue and provided some
counseling and assistance to victims.
The Fundamental Act provides for the equality of all citizens,
prohibits discrimination based on sex, and stipulates that women have
the right to equal pay for equal work. In practice women are
underrepresented in the formal sector. Most women work in the informal
sector and thus have little or no access to employment benefits. Women
in rural areas are especially disadvantaged in terms of education and
wage employment and are confined largely to family farm, petty
commerce, and childrearing responsibilities. School attendance by women
declines precipitously at the high school level and, especially, at the
university level. In 1997 the literacy rate was 77 percent for the
total adult population and 70 percent for women.
Marriage and family laws overtly discriminate against women. For
example, adultery is illegal for women but not for men. Polygyny is
legal; polyandry is not. While the Legal Code provides that 30 percent
of the husband's estate goes to the wife, in practice the wife often
loses all rights of inheritance. The symbolic nature of the dowry set
in the Family Code often is not respected, and men are forced to pay
excessive amounts to the woman's family. As a result, the right to
divorce is circumscribed for some women because they lack the financial
means to reimburse the brideprice to the husband and his family. This
problem is more prevalent in rural areas than in urban centers.
There are a number of nongovernmental organizations that work on
women's problems. However, their effectiveness varies widely. The
Ministry of Public Service, Administrative Reform, and the Promotion of
Women is responsible for coordinating government initiatives regarding
the status of women.
Children.--The Fundamental Act affords children equal protection
under law. Child labor is illegal and education is compulsory until the
age of 16; however, in practice, these laws generally are not enforced,
particularly in rural areas. There are indigent street children in
Brazzaville, and their numbers appear to be growing as a result of
civil conflict since 1997.
People With Disabilities.--The Fundamental Act prohibits
discrimination based on physical condition. In practice, this
prohibition generally was not enforced, because the ministry charged
with implementation faced severe financial constraints. There was no
overt discrimination against the disabled in employment and education.
There were no laws mandating access for the disabled.
Indigenous People.--The Fundamental Act prohibits discrimination
based on ethnicity. In practice the indigenous Pygmy people, who number
in the tens of thousands and live primarily in the northern forest
regions, do not enjoy equal treatment in the predominantly Bantu
society. Pygmies were marginalized severely in the areas of employment,
health, and education. They usually are considered social inferiors and
have no political voice. Many have never heard of the concept of voting
and have minimal ability to affect government decisions affecting their
interests. Many Pygmies have a Bantu patron to whom they are obligated
in perpetuity. These Pygmies are inherited by their patron's eldest
son, an arrangement rooted in the ancestral tradition of Pygmy slavery.
Many Pygmies, possibly including children, have been exploited by
Bantus. The extent to which these practices continued during the year
is not known.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Fundamental Act prohibits
discrimination based on ethnicity; in practice, however, the Government
did not enforce this prohibition effectively, and there were credible
reports that the Government and its security forces discriminated
against members of southern ethnic groups, and often used violence
against them.
Four major ethnic groups make up about 95 percent of the country's
population; these groups speak distinct primary languages, and are
concentrated regionally outside of urban areas. The largest ethnic
group is the Kongo, who constitute the main ethnic group in the
southern part of the country and about half the country's population.
Within the Kongo group are various subgroups, including the Lari and
the Vili. Other major ethnic groups include the Teke of the central
region, with about13 percent of the population, and the Mbochi of the
northern region, with about 12 percent of the population.
Societal ethnic discrimination is widely practiced among virtually
all ethnic groups, and is evident in private sector hiring and buying
patterns and de facto segregation of urban neighborhoods. The greatest
interethnic tension is between the Kongo and other ethnic groups of the
more prosperous and commercial south, near the Atlantic coast, and the
ethnic groups of the less developed and more sparsely populated
northern region, which lies deep in the interior, at the heart of
Africa's equatorial rain forest. Because southerners are more numerous
and tend to have more commercial opportunities than northerners, both
political and economic liberalization are widely perceived as likely to
advance southern interests and jeopardize northern interests. There are
also longstanding tensions among some northern ethnic groups, in
particular between the Mbochi and Kouyou groups; however, these
tensions, unlike north-south tensions, have not contributed materially
to large-scale civil violence in recent years.
Ethnic overtones were apparent in the 1997 civil war fought in
Brazzaville and other areas and 1998-99 conflict in the southern part
of the country since 1997. These conflicts sometimes have been
oversimplified as pitting northerners, who support President Sassou,
against southerners, who support former president Lissouba and former
prime minister Kolelas. There does tend to be heavy representation from
each leader's ethnic group in his immediate entourage: Mbochi for
Sassou, Lari for Kolelas, and the groups of the Niari, Bouenza, and
Lekoumou regions for Lissouba. However, the correspondence between
ethnic-regional and political cleavages is only approximate, and
supporters of the current and recent governments have included persons
from a broad range of ethnic and regional backgrounds. During the year,
Sassou took steps to broaden his predominantly northern political base
to include his wife's Vili ethnic group, which is concentrated in the
coastal region of the south.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Fundamental Act provides workers
with the right to form unions, and the Government respects this right
in practice. Any worker is free to join a union of his choice. The
Labor Code affirms the right to associate freely and prohibits
restrictions on the formation of trade unions. Most workers in the
formal (wage) sector are union members, and unions have made efforts to
organize informal sectors such as agriculture and retail trade.
The Fundamental Act also affirms workers' right to strike, subject
to conditions established by Law. Unions are free to strike after
filing a letter of intent with the Ministry of Labor, thereby starting
a process of nonbinding arbitration under the auspices of a regional
labor inspector from the Labor Ministry. The letter of intent must
include the strike date, at which time the strike legally may begin,
even if arbitration is not complete. Employers have the right to fire
workers if they do not give advance notice of a strike. On several
occasions during the year, groups of public servants protested delays
in salary payment. In some cases, the relevant ministries offered
partial payment to assuage these workers and persuade them to return to
their jobs.
Unions are free to affiliate with international trade unions and
they maintain cooperative accords with foreign trade union
organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
allows for collective bargaining, which is practiced freely. The
Government sets industry-specific minimum wage scales, but unions
usually are able to negotiate higher wages for their members. Employers
are prohibited from discriminating against employees who join a union.
There were no reported firings for union activities.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children, but
such practices occur. There have been credible reports that some
Pygmies, possibly including children, have been exploited by Bantus,
who inherit Pygmies and to whom Pygmies are obligated in perpetuity
(see Section 5).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Ministry of Labor, which is responsible for enforcing
child labor laws, concentrates its efforts only on the formal wage
sector. Child labor is illegal, and education is compulsory until the
age of 16. However, child labor persists. Children continue to work in
rural areas and in the informal sector in cities without government
supervision or monitoring. The law prohibits forced labor by children;
however, there have been allegations of exploitation of Pygmy children
(see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Fundamental Law provides
that each citizen has the right to remuneration according to his work
and merit. The Labor Code stipulates that overtime must be paid for all
work in excess of 40 hours per week, and that regular days of leisure
must be granted by employers. The minimum wage is $83 (50,00 CFA
francs) per month. It is not sufficient to provide a worker and family
with a decent standard of living. High urban prices and dependent
extended families oblige many workers to seek opportunities beyond
their principal employment.
Although health and safety regulations call for twice-yearly visits
by inspectors from the Ministry of Labor, in practice such visits occur
less regularly. While unions generally are vigilant in calling
attention to dangerous working conditions, the observance of safety
standards is often lax. Workers have no specific right to remove
themselves from dangerous working conditions without risking loss of
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
in, to, or from the country.
______
COTE D'IVOIRE
Cote d'Ivoire is in transition following a bloodless military coup
in December. Retired General Robert Guei took over the Government after
a mutiny that began on December 23, evolved into a major military
revolt on December 24, and culminated in the dismissal and forced
departure of President Henri Konan Bedie. General Guei, who was Chief
of Staff under Presidents Felix Houphouet-Boigny and Bedie, declared
himself the new President, suspended the Constitution, dissolved the
National Assembly and formed the National Committee for Public
Salvation (CNSP), which consists of himself and eight military officers
(including two soldiers who participated in the coup). Guei pledged to
rewrite the Constitution, clean up government corruption, and hold fair
and transparent elections in the year 2000. All of the country's
political parties, including the former ruling Democratic Party of Cote
d'Ivoire (PDCI) pledged to support Guei's transition government. Prior
to the coup, Cote d'Ivoire was a centralized republic dominated by a
strong presidency.
Members of a single political party, the PDCI, had occupied both
the presidency and a majority of seats in the national legislature
since independence in 1960, although other parties have been legal
since 1990. Upon the death in 1993 of Houphouet-Boigny, who had been
President since independence, National Assembly President Bedie became
President by constitutional succession and served out the remainder of
Houphouet's term. Due to concerns about 1994 changes to the candidacy
requirements of the electoral code that excluded a leading opposition
rival to Bedie, and about irregularities in voter registration, the
major opposition parties staged an ``active boycott'' of the 1995
presidential election, both declining to participate and trying to
interfere with the voting process; however, in 1995 President Bedie won
96 percent of the vote. The opposition parties and Bedie then reached
an accord that allowed for full party participation in legislative
elections later in 1995. These elections were marred by irregularities
in voter registration; they were suspended in 3 of the 175 districts
due to interethnic violence, and results in another 3 districts were
invalidated, but make-up elections in 1996 were orderly and
transparent. The PDCI continued to control more than the 80 percent of
National Assembly votes needed to amend the Constitution. In June 1998,
the National Assembly enacted amendments to the Constitution that
further increased the already preponderant power of the presidency and
were criticized widely. However, in December 1998, after negotiations
with a major opposition party, the President signed an agreement
obliging him to rescind some of these powers in a second round of
constitutional amendments. In October these amendments were debated in
the National Assembly, which eventually passed several pieces of
legislation including the formation of an independent body to monitor
elections. However, the Assembly did not do anything to curb
presidential powers. The judiciary is subject to executive branch and
other outside influence.
Following the coup d'etat, the structure of the security forces did
not change. Security forces include the army, navy, and air force, all
under the Ministry of Defense; the Republican Guard, a well-funded
presidential security force; the national police (Surete); and the
Gendarmerie, a branch of the armed forces with responsibility for
general law enforcement, maintenance of public order, and internal
security, including suppression of violent crime. The National Security
Council, which was formed in 1996 coordinates security policy, both
internal and external. The civilian Directorate of General Intelligence
(DRG) is responsible for countering internal threats. A Security Staff
(L'Etat Major de la Securite) collects and distributes information
about crime and coordinates the activities of the security forces in
times of crisis. The Special Anticrime Police Brigade (SAVAC) continued
its operations. Before the December coup, the armed forces accepted the
primacy of civilian authority. Seven of the 18 members of the military
forces accused of plotting a coup in 1995 were dismissed from the
military forces, then released from detention in 1996. Four other
officers who had been suspended were reinstated in April 1998. Security
forces, including the SAVAC, committed numerous human rights abuses.
The economy is largely market-based and heavily dependent on the
commercial agricultural sector. Most of the rural population remains
dependent on smallholder cash crop production. Principal exports are
cocoa, coffee, and wood. Fewer than half of adults (52 percent of men
and 30 percent of women) are literate. Recorded Gross National Product
per capita in 1998 was about $700. Economic growth has resumed since a
large currency devaluation in 1994,although income remains unevenly
distributed. The Government increased funding for the always large
share of its operating expenditures devoted to basic health services
and education. However, economic growth continued to be impeded by
widespread corruption rooted in a lack of transparent and accountable
governance. The Government received only limited assistance from
international financial institutions during the year, and the European
Union stopped its assistance programs due to government corruption.
The Bedie Government's human rights record was poor, and there were
serious problems in a number of areas. The Government limited citizens'
right to change their government. Members of the security forces
committed extrajudicial killings, and the security forces beat and
abused detainees and used force to disperse protesters. Prison
conditions remained harsh and life-threatening. The Government also
used arbitrary arrest and detention, and prolonged detention remained a
problem. Journalists and students, in particular, were detained without
trial for long periods. The Government often failed to bring
perpetrators of these abuses to justice. The judiciary did not ensure
due process and was subject to executive branch influence, particularly
in political cases. Security forces infringed on citizens' privacy
rights. The Government restricted freedom of speech, the press,
assembly, and movement. Despite some formal restrictions on freedom of
association, the Government generally permitted it in practice. Between
30 and 40 percent of the country's adult population, including many
lifelong residents of the country, remained politically disenfranchised
noncitizens. Discrimination and violence against women, abuse of
children, and female genital mutilation (FGM) remained problems
(although FGM was made a crime in 1998). Prior to the coup, the
minority Baoule ethnic group's longstanding domination of the ruling
party and the State exacerbated sometimes violent ethnic tensions.
Societal discrimination based on ethnicity remained a problem, as did
child labor, forced child labor, and trafficking in children.
The CNSP's seizure of power led to a number of abuses. Citizens do
not have the ability to change their government. CNSP forces and others
were responsible for numerous robberies, carjackings, widespread
looting, and acts of intimidation. The CNSP arrested 150 government
ministers and military officers; however, it released all but 40 of
them by year's end. The new Government ordered the Superior Islamic
Council, a pro-Bedie religious organization, to disband and seized the
computers of the pro-PDCI nongovernmental organization (NGO), Servir.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed reports of politically motivated killings by government
forces. As violent crime remained widespread, the security forces
frequently resorted to lethal force and committed numerous
extrajudicial killings. Credible media reports indicated that the
Special Anticrime Police Brigade continued its shoot-to-kill policy
when pursuing criminal suspects. According to the Ministry of Security,
64 persons were killed by the security forces during 1998. Statistics
have not yet been published for the year; however, the number of
persons killed by security forces was expected to be higher.
During the year, confrontations between the police and
demonstrators resulted in at least 4 deaths and at least 15 serious
injuries (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). Sixteen-year-old high school
student Silue Lassina died on April 28, 2 days after a tear-gas
canister thrown by police to disperse a protest in Yopougon broke his
skull. Lassina had not been involved in the demonstration. No arrests
were made.
On August 25, police broke up another Yopougon demonstration,
killing Guy Mathias Koffi and seriously injuring three other persons.
Minister of Security Marcel Dibonan Kone promised to investigate
Koffi's death, but no charges were filed.
On November 8, police personnel killed Basouleymane Ouattarra by
striking him on the head with a club during a demonstration protesting
the arrest of several leaders ofthe opposition Republican Rally (RDR)
party. The police officer was not arrested.
Following a September 16 demonstration by the opposition Republican
Rally (RDR) in Adjame, 28-year-old Malian businessman Harouna Kanoute
was dragged forcibly from a telephone booth and beaten to death by
police in Adjame. In spite of numerous eyewitness accounts, the
Minister of Security denied that the police were responsible for
Kanoute's death.
Harsh prison conditions contributed to the death of a large number
of prisoners (see Section 1.c.).
The transition government detained a number of police personnel who
are believed to be responsible for deaths and injuries during the
demonstrations that occurred between April and October.
The 15 trainee gendarmes who arrested Camara Yaya and several
others in December 1998 for cocaine possession, and are accused of
beating Camara to death, were arrested early in the year; however, they
were not tried by year's end.
Police have made no arrests in the December 1998 death in police
custody of Jean Claude Lama, a 16-year-old street child. The
authorities continue to characterize the death as a suicide.
In July Police Sergeant Gohoun Gnapia was tried, convicted, and
sentenced to 6 months' imprisonment, and fined $185 (100,000 CFA
francs) for having shot and killed Riot Police Brigade (BAE) officer
Coulibaly Yacouba, whom Gnapia had mistaken for a thief in October
1998. The court also ordered Gnapia and the Government to pay the
family $65,000 (35 million CFA francs) in damages.
Other military personnel, SAVAC, and police personnel were also
prosecuted for killings or beatings regarded by the government and
citizens as blunders. On October 22, the Abidjan Military Court
sentenced Sergeant Lambert Tia Kone to 6 months' imprisonment and fined
him $185 (100,000 CFA francs) for killing taxi driver, Mamadou
Diomande, at a checkpoint in 1997. In August 1998 three members of the
Republican Guard, Jacques Agoua Aicho, Daniel Abriki Djoman, and
Raymond Ayama Djoman, were given suspended sentences of 6 months in
prison and fined a mere $148 (80,000 CFA francs) each for having beaten
to death Hubert Dale in Yamoussoukro in August 1997.
There were no developments in the case of six ``active boycott''
detainees who died in prison in 1996. They had been held since the
``active boycott'' of the 1995 presidential election.
Since Abdoulaye Bakayoko, the owner of the opposition newspaper, Le
Liberal, received death threats prior to a September 21 car-jacking in
which he was killed, some human rights activists and politicians
speculated that Bakayoko was the victim of a targeted political
killing. An apparent September 26 attempt on the life of Liberation
editor Lama Fofana abetted popular suspicions that Bakayoko's death was
politically motivated as did an October break-in at the new premises of
Liberation; the perpetrators killed a security guard and stole computer
equipment. No arrests were made in these incidents.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Although the Penal Code generally prohibits violence
against persons, neither the Constitution nor the Penal Code
specifically prohibits torture or other mistreatment, and police
sometimes beat detainees and prisoners to punish them or to extract
confessions. Press photographs regularly show criminal detainees with
swollen or bruised faces and bodies.
In December 1998, the Government enacted legislation allowing
lawyers to assist their clients at the stage of preliminary police
hearings, that is, during the early stages of detention when abuse may
be most likely. In spite of the new legislation, during the year police
officers continued to mistreat suspects and other personssummoned to
police and Gendarmerie stations (see Section 1.d.).
There were no public reports of government officials being arrested
or tried for these abuses.
Jurists' union officials reported that police continue to beat
suspects to obtain confessions and that suspects are afraid to press
charges against the police officers involved. According to local human
rights groups, police beat and also humiliate detainees or prisoners.
Police also humiliate lawyers who try to assist their clients (see
Section 1.d.).
In July Momble Roger Zemon, a driver for Sucrivoire, was shot and
injured by two police officers in Abidjan's Yopougon district. Zemon
had refused to stop for the police because he thought they were
criminals. No arrests were made in the case.
Issa Traore, a 30-year-old member of the Truck Drivers and Truck
Owners Trade Union, was beaten severely, arrested, and detained for 48
hours beginning on January 25 in Abidjan's Adjame district. The police
suspected Traore of smuggling cellular telephones into the country. He
was released only after reportedly paying a bribe of $222 (120,000 CFA
francs). No police officers were arrested for these abuses.
Police frequently used violence to restrain demonstrators. Riot
police used tear gas and truncheons against protesting students and
other demonstrators on several occasions during the year. On at least
four occasions police used lethal force against protesters and innocent
bystanders (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
On April 29, police in Bonoua shot and wounded Sammuel Dago, a 19-
year-old student, as he participated in a student protest in that city.
No police officers were arrested in the case.
Police used tear gas and truncheons to prevent a university student
meeting in Abidjan's Cocody district on May 27. Eleven injured students
were treated at the University Hospital. No arrests were made.
On October 16, police used tear gas and truncheons to break up an
RDR sit-in in front of the national television station, Radiodiffusion
Television Ivorienne (RTI). RDR leaders organized the sit-in to press
demands for access to government-owned television and radio. Security
personnel stated that they broke up the demonstration because it was
not authorized; at least 10 persons were injured seriously. No police
officers were arrested.
On October 27, the RDR held a follow-up demonstration. Police again
used tear gas and truncheons to break up the demonstration, injuring
numerous demonstrators. Following this protest, police personnel
arrested 20 RDR leaders (see Section 2.b.).
Detainees often are denied food for many hours, as were 388 RDR
supporters who were detained in Cocody on September 10. A journalist,
detained in another part of Abidjan in September also was denied food
(see Section 1.d).
Police routinely harassed and abused noncitizen Africans (see
Section 5). On occasion police enter the homes and businesses of, and
extort money from, Ivorian citizens, non-Ivorian Africans, and other
non-Ivorians (see Section 1.f.). Police, gendarmes, and other officials
extort money from motorists at roadblocks (see Section 2.d.).
CNSP and others forces were responsible for numerous robberies,
carjackings, widespread looting, and acts of intimidation.
Prison conditions are harsh and life threatening. Problems include
overcrowding, malnutrition, a high incidence of infectious disease, and
lack of treatment facilities and medications. HIV/AIDS reportedly is
also a significant cause of death. It was credibly reported that more
than 700 prisoners died in 1997. Complete information for 1998 and 1999
is not available, but at least 60 prisoners died during 1998. The
Director of Penitentiary Administration stated that the death rate at
the Abidjan House of Arrest and Corrections (MACA) had dropped by 60
percent since October 1998 and was expected to remain low due to
improvements made in June to the sanitation system, which were jointly
financed by Doctors Without Borders and theGovernment. Several
journalists released from prison in 1996 reported that white-collar
prisoners are afforded better treatment than blue-collar prisoners.
According to the Ivorian Human Rights League (LIDHO), conditions at
the MACA were especially hazardous for women, who were housed together
with violent and nonviolent male criminals, as well as with minors.
However, during 1998, the prison began to separate female and male
prisoners and to maintain female guards for female prisoners and male
guards for male prisoners. There still are no health facilities for
women, and there continued to be credible reports of children born in
prison. However, during the year there were no reports that guards
raped female prisoners. Nevertheless, there were still reports that
female prisoners engaged in sexual relations with their wardens in
exchange for food and more privileges.
In late July, after 2 months as a prisoner in the MACA, Kouame
Kouakou, deputy secretary general of the Federation of High School and
University Students of Cote d'Ivoire (FESCI), sank into a coma (see
Section 2.a.). He was hospitalized only after representatives of the
LIDHO and the FESCI intervened with the authorities.
On September 28, FESCI secretary general Charles Ble Goude, who was
detained at the MACA, was hospitalized, suffering from pain in his
spinal column and thorax. At the hospital, prison authorities chained
Ble Goude to his bed despite his doctor's protests that this was
detrimental to his condition. After the opposition press published
photos of Ble Goude chained to his bed, the Government released him
from custody. None of the police officials involved in the incident was
arrested.
Many unemployed and homeless detainees reported that they were
beaten by authorities in prison (see Section 1.d.).
The Government has offered access to prisons to nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) that seek to provide food and medical care to
prisoners. Unlike previous years, humanitarian NGO's did not report
difficulty in gaining access to prisons. Several humanitarian NGO's,
including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
Prisoners Without Borders, and Doctors Without Borders, had access to
the prisons and visited them during the year to provide food and
medical care to prisoners. However, none of these NGO's specifically
were monitoring human rights conditions in the prisons. LIDHO, which
monitors human rights conditions in prisons, did not visit prisons
during the year because it was denied authorization to do so without
giving advance notice. LIDHO applied twice for authorization to visit
prisons at any time without advance notice, but it has not received
such authorization to date.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government
arbitrarily arrests and detains citizens. Under the Code of Penal
Procedure, a public prosecutor may order the detention of a suspect for
only 48 hours without bringing charges. A magistrate may order
detention for up to 4 months but also must provide the Minister of
Justice with a written justification for continued detention on a
monthly basis. However, the law often is violated. Police and the CNSP
have held persons for more than 48 hours without bringing charges.
According to a member of a jurists' union, this practice is common, and
magistrates often are not able to verify that those who are not charged
are released.
Defendants do not have the right to a judicial determination of the
legality of their detention. A judge may release pretrial detainees on
provisional liberty, if the judge believes that the suspect is not
likely to flee. In 1996 the Attorney General referred in public to the
long detention periods suffered by prisoners awaiting trial in the
country's principal prison, the MACA, listing a total prisoner
population of 4,600, of whom l,741 were detainees who had yet to be
tried. Of the detainees, 470 had been detained for more than 2 years,
60 for at least 4 years, and 39 others between 5 and 12 years. Based on
these figures, pretrial detainees at that time made up about 35 percent
of the prison population. On December 24, 6,693 persons were detained
at the MACA, a prison built for 1,500. However, no breakdown was
available. A law enacted in December 1998 limits pretrial detention to
10 months in civil cases and 22 months in criminal cases; if these
limits are exceeded, the prisoner must be released on provisional
liberty with no bail, and if the responsiblejudge takes no action, the
prison director must act to free the suspect or face sanctions.
Between April and August the police detained at least 180 students
across the country for their involvement in sometimes violent strikes
and demonstrations. Of those 180, 120 were released; of the remaining
60, all the minors were tried and released to their parents; 6 of those
who were 18 years or older were sentenced to 5 years in prison; and the
remainder were sentenced to terms of less than 5 years.
During student strikes on May 27, police arrested student leaders
Kouame Kouakou and Drigone Faya in Bouake on charges of inciting
violence and destruction of property under the 1992 Antivandalism Law.
Charles Ble Goude, the FESCI secretary general was arrested on August
17 and also was charged with inciting violence and destruction of
property.
On September 30, police personnel arrested 51 persons for creating
a public disturbance at the Sorbonne, a gathering place for public
discussions about contemporary political or social issues. Police
released all 51 of the detainees following identity checks; however,
former president Bedie subsequently banned meetings at the Sorbonne
(see Section 5).
On October 1, the Government granted pardons to the over 60
students awaiting trial, including those who had been convicted of
crimes. The students all were released from custody.
On October 5, Debe Kouassi, a freelance journalist for pro-RDR
newspapers reportedly was arrested, held in detention for 5 days,
deprived of food, interrogated, and finally transferred to a hospital
due to deteriorating health. He was released from custody by year's
end.
On October 27, 20 RDR leaders and Ouattara supporters were arrested
following a demonstration that was dispersed violently by police
personnel (see Sections 1.c.and 2.b.). The leaders were charged with
inciting the destruction of public property and organizing a prohibited
public demonstration under the country's 1992 Antivandalism Law.
In a November trial the detainees were tried; 11 were sentenced to
2 years in prison, five were sentenced to 1 year in prison, and the
remaining four were acquitted. During the December coup, rebel soldiers
freed all of those convicted from prison and granted them amnesty.
Journalists Raphael Lakpe and Jean Khalil Sylla of Le Populaire
were arrested in April and June respectively for publishing false
stories of student deaths, disturbing public order, and offending the
Head of State. They were tried in October and both were sentenced to 6
months' imprisonment and fined $185 (100,000 CFA francs).
On December 9, the Bedie Government issued a warrant for Alassane
Ouattara's arrest for the alleged falsification of documents and their
use. Newspaper accounts speculated that Bedie ordered the warrant
issued to intimidate Ouattara and to prevent him from returning to the
country.
During and following the coup, the mutineers arrested 150
ministers, military officers, and other officials known as supporters
of the Bedie government; no formal charges were filed. The new regime
released the majority of these prisoners; however, approximately 40
remained in custody at year's end.
Although it is prohibited by law, police restrict access to some
prisoners. Despite the frequency of arbitrary arrest, there is no
accurate total of suspects held. In April 1998, police held over 800
unemployed persons and vagrants in investigative detention in Abidjan,
after arresting many in an effort to identify criminals. Several
reported that police beat them (also see Section 1.c.).
Souleymane T. Senn, a journalist for Notre Voie, was detained by
police from September 13 to 16, after writing an article about his
attempt to interview Togolese President Gnassingbe Eyadema. Senn
reportedly was accused of embezzling funds from the trip to Togo, but
he never saw a written complaint. He was deprived of food for the first
34 hours of his incarceration; during that time the police denied that
he was in custody.
Lawyers who defended suspects in the preliminary hearings sometimes
are harassed. In July, all of the lawyers in thecountry participated in
a 1-week strike to protest the mistreatment and humiliation to which
police officers subject them when they try to assist their clients. The
lawyers' strike was prompted by the arrest of lawyer Kone Anna de Messe
Zinzou by two officers at the Abidjan police prefecture at the behest
of Dr. Sami Daher, one of her clients. Lawyers agreed to end the strike
only after the two police officers were arrested, and after they met
with Prime Minister Daniel Kablan Duncan to discuss improvements to the
judicial system. Former president of the Bar Association Essy N'Gatta
stressed that the lawyers' objective was to put an end to arbitrary
detention .
Favide Innocent, a Beninese car importer arrested in 1994 pursuant
to an extradition request by the Government of Togo, remained in
detention in the MACA although various courts had ordered his release
on several occasions, most recently in April 1998. In November 1998,
Innocent staged a hunger strike to protest his continued detention; he
finally was released from prison on December 24.
In September police detained 388 political demonstrators for 2 days
without providing them with food on the first day (see Section 2.b.).
On October 17, 20 RDR leaders and Ouattara supporters were arrested
for allegedly inciting violence and destroying property (See Section
2.b.).
Of the military personnel arrested on charges of coup plotting in
1995 and released 14 months later, four were reinstated.
The Government does not use forced exile as a means of political
control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is subject to
executive branch and other outside influences. Although the judiciary
is independent in ordinary criminal cases, it follows the lead of the
executive in national security or politically sensitive cases. Judges
serve at the pleasure of the executive, and reports that they submit to
political pressure are credible. During the year, a judge from the
tribunal of Dimbokro annulled opposition candidate Alassane Ouattara's
certificate of nationality, allegedly due to pressure from Ministry of
Justice officials.
The formal judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court and
includes the Court of Appeals and lower courts.
Military courts do not try civilians. Although there are no
appellate courts within the military court system, persons convicted by
a military tribunal may petition the Supreme Court to set aside the
tribunal's verdict and order a retrial.
In rural areas, traditional institutions often administer justice
at the village level, handling domestic disputes and minor land
questions in accordance with customary law. Dispute resolution is by
extended debate, with no known instance of resort to physical
punishment. The formal court system increasingly is superseding these
traditional mechanisms. In 1996 a Grand Mediator was appointed to
settle disputes that cannot be resolved by traditional means. This
office appears designed to bridge traditional and modern methods of
dispute resolution. During the year, about 90 disputes, including land
rights disputes, were submitted to it.
The law provides for the right to public trial, although key
evidence sometimes is given secretly. The presumption of innocence and
the right of defendants to be present at their trials often are not
respected. Those convicted have the right of appeal, although higher
courts rarely overturn verdicts. Defendants accused of felonies or
capital crimes have the right to legal counsel, and the judicial system
provides for court-appointed attorneys; however, no free legal
assistance is available. In practice many defendants cannot afford
private counsel, and court-appointed attorneys are not readily
available.
In December 1998, the Government granted amnesty for all offenses
committed by all persons in connection with the active boycott of the
1995 election. In September that amnesty was extended to military
officers accused of involvement in the October 1995 coup plot. This
lattergroup included General Robert Guei. There were no other reports
of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Code of Penal Procedure specifies that a police
official or investigative magistrate may conduct searches of homes
without a judicial warrant if there is reason to believe that there is
evidence on the premises concerning a crime. The official must have the
prosecutor's agreement to retain any evidence seized in the search and
is required to have witnesses to the search, which may not take place
between 9:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m.
Desire Tanoe, an ambassador in the Ivorian Foreign Service and
Elizabeth Kapet, the Treasurer of the International Movement of Female
Democrats (MIFED), a women's NGO active on student issues, were
suspected of being in contact with FESCI leaders (in particular Ble
Goude), and arrested without warrants at 4:00 a.m. on June 5. After
being questioned by police for a few hours, they were released from the
National Security Council headquarters.
On August 31, presidential security guards seized and searched
Alassane Ouattara's luggage at the Abidjan airport. On October 1, the
PDCI newspaper, The Democrate, published the contents of some of the
documents contained in Ouattara's luggage. Ouattara intends to pursue
legal action against the Government for theft of private
correspondence.
On November 1, plainclothes police officers detained and questioned
Ousmane Sy Savane, an RDR deputy and mayor of Odienne. The police
confiscated several documents, including the transcript of a press
conference given by Alassane Ouattara's lawyers.
In practice police sometimes use a general search warrant without a
name or address. On occasion police have entered homes of non-Ivorian
Africans (or apprehended them at large), taken them to local police
stations, and extorted small amounts of money for alleged minor
offenses.
Security forces reportedly monitored some private telephone
conversations, but the extent of the practice is unknown. Government
authorities monitored letters and parcels at the post office for
potential criminal activity, and are widely believed to monitor private
correspondence, although no evidence of this has been produced. The
Government used students as informants at the University of Abidjan
(see Section 2.a.).
During the December coup, mutineers entered forcibly the homes of
some former government officials. The soldiers conducted illegal
searches and arrested some officials without warrants. Coup forces also
were responsible for widespread looting.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although the Constitution provides
for freedom of expression, and private newspapers frequently criticize
government policies, the Government imposes significant restrictions on
this right. The two government-owned daily newspapers, Fraternite Matin
and Ivoir Soir, offer little criticism of government policy, while
government-owned radio and television offer none at all. While private
newspapers (12 daily, 26 weekly, 5 fortnightly, and 9 monthly),
opposition leaders, and student groups voice their disapproval of
government or presidential actions frequently and sometimes loudly, the
Government does not tolerate what it considers insults or attacks on
the honor of the country's highest officials. A law enacted in 1991,
soon after the Government first allowed substantial numbers of private
newspapers to operate, authorizes the State to initiate criminal libel
prosecutions against persons who insult the President, the Prime
Minister, foreign chiefs of state or government or their diplomatic
representatives, or defame institutions of the State, or undermine the
reputation of the nation. In addition, the State may criminalize a
civil libel suit at its discretion and at the request of the plaintiff.
Criminal libel is punishable by 3 months to 2 years in prison.
Journalists exercise considerable self-censorship.
In an August 1998 letter to the publisher of Notre Voie, a private
Abidjan-based daily newspaper affiliated with a major opposition party,
the Minister of Communications cautioned that a series of then-planned
articles on domestic political repression by the security forces
``might harm national security'' and might violate provisions of the
1991 press law that forbid the publication of national defense secrets.
In October 1998, the Abidjan offices of Notre Voie and an affiliated
daily newspaper, Actuel, were entered forcibly and burglarized by three
armed and hooded persons. The perpetrators stripped and beat the night
guard and removed files that documented corruption involving senior
government officials and ethnic discrimination in the armed forces, but
left telephones, computers, and facsimile machines untouched. In 1995
the offices of Notre Voie--then called La Voie--had been burned by
persons unknown. No arrest warrants were issued in either case.
In October 1998, the Government announced that it would henceforth
initiate criminal libel prosecutions only on behalf of the President
and would punish criminal libel convictions by fines rather than
imprisonment except in cases of libel against the President. The
preponderance of state-initiated criminal libel prosecutions of
journalists since 1991 have alleged libel against the President (see
Section 1.d.).
In October 1998, a former minister filed a libel suit against the
staff of Le Jour, a private Abidjan-based daily newspaper, which had
reported allegations of the minister's involvement in a pedophilia
scandal. In July in trials in the lower court and the appeals court,
the newspaper and one of its journalists were found guilty. The
publisher and the journalist were each given suspended sentences of 3
months in prison and were fined $185 (100,000 CFA francs); the paper
was required to pay an additional $9,250 (5 million CFA francs) in
damages and interest.
On April 28, police arrested Raphael Lakpe, editor in chief of the
Abidjan daily Le Populaire, and four of the journalists working for the
newspaper for publishing a false report concerning a student's death,
allegedly at the hands of the authorities, and for offending the Head
of State in several articles. Following intercession by the Ivorian
Union of Journalists, the four journalists were released on June 3, and
Lapke was tried and released in October.
On May 20, the courts found the editor in chief and a journalist
from Argument guilty of libeling Minister of State for Interior and
Decentralization Emile Constant Bombet and his family. The journalists
were fined $925 (500,000 CFA francs) and given suspended sentences of 1
year; the court ordered the newspaper to pay Bombet an additional
$37,000 (20 million CFA francs) in damages.
On July 9, the Public Prosecutor lodged a complaint against three
Abidjan daily newspapers--Notre Voie, Liberation, and Le Patriote--for
allegedly offending the Head of State and detained the editors in
chief. All three had published articles alleging that President Bedie's
doctoral thesis had been written by a French national whom he had paid
to draft it. The arrests followed the publication of articles about
President Bedie's reconstruction of President Houphouet-Boigny's
residence and Prime Minister Duncan's alleged acquisition of an
apartment in Paris for more than $5 million (3 billion CFA francs). The
police released all three editors in chief after they made statements
on July 12.
Beginning on July 27, police seized without a warrant at least 500
copies of the French publication Africa Golfe Eco, which contained
highly critical stories about President Bedie and his Government.
Subsequent issues have not been circulated.
Both because literacy is far from universal, and because newspapers
and television are relatively expensive, radio is the most important
medium of mass communication. The government-owned broadcast media
company, Radiodiffusion Television Ivorienne (RTI), owns two major
radio stations; only the primary government radio station is broadcast
nationwide. There are also four major private domestic radio stations:
Radio France Internationale (RFI), the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC), Africa Number One, and Radio Nostalgie. They broadcast on FM in
Abidjan only, except for RFI, which in November 1998 signed an
agreement with RTI to allow it to broadcast via relay antennas to the
north and center of the country. The RFI and BBC stationsbroadcast only
internationally produced programming. The Africa Number One station,
which is 51 percent domestically owned, broadcasts 6 hours a day of
domestically produced programming; the rest of the time it broadcasts
programming from Africa Number One's headquarters in Libreville, Gabon.
Radio Nostalgie is 51 percent owned by Radio Nostalgie France. The RFI,
BBC, and Africa Number One stations all broadcast news and political
commentary about the country. The private stations have complete
control over their editorial content. However, only Radio Nostalgie
frequently has been critical of the Government in its editorials. On
September 16, the Government ordered Radio Nostalgie to suspend its
broadcasts for 72 hours because it had violated the terms of its
license, which allows 3 to 5 minute news flashes, by making extended
commentary on the September 14 events outside former Prime Minister
Alassane Ouattara's home (see Section 2.b.) The Government forced Radio
Yopougon to close for 24 hours in October for violating its license by
broadcasting to a larger geographical range than was permitted.
However, no journalist of any station is known to have been prosecuted
by the Government for libel.
Radio station license applications are adjudicated by a commission
under the Ministry of Information, which has accepted applications and
awarded licenses only once, in 1993. On that occasion, the commission
denied 7 of 12 applications on a variety of grounds, including, in one
case, affiliation with a major opposition political party.
In 1998 the Government authorized 43 community radio stations with
very limited broadcast strength, no foreign-language programming, no
advertisements, and public announcements limited to the local area.
Roman Catholic church groups began to operate four community radio
stations: Radio Espoir in Abidjan, Radio Paix Sanwi in Aboisso, Radio
Notre Dame in Yamoussoukro, and Radio Dix-Huit Montagnes in Man. No
Muslim station is broadcasting yet, because the Government required
that all four major Muslim associations agree to share a single
frequency; however, in February, the Muslim associations agreed to
submit a joint proposal and received a license on April 21.
There are two television stations that broadcast domestically
produced programs. Both are owned and operated by the Government. Only
one is broadcast nationwide. The only private television station, Canal
Horizon, is foreign owned and broadcasts no domestically produced
programs. The Government has not accepted any applications to establish
a privately owned domestic television station.
The National Council of Audiovisual Communication (NCAC),
established in 1991 and formally organized in 1995, is responsible for
regulating media access during the 2-week formal political campaign
period and for resolving complaints about unfair media access. However,
members of the PDCI constitute the majority of the membership of the
council. Due to the conflict between the regulating body and the fact
that the domestic television stations are state-owned, the NCAC is
sometimes powerless. In October Henriette Dagri Diabate demanded that
the RDR be granted equal time in the media. NCAC spokesmen responded
that, according to law, the government television station should comply
with the request, but that it did not have the means to enforce this
law.
In October Levy Niamkey, an anchorman on the national television
station's nightly news program, was suspended from his job for 2 months
for broadcasting a report, which criticized the RDR and its leaders at
the end of the news broadcast instead of the beginning. The Ministry of
Information reduced Niamkey's suspension to 8 days following an
outpouring of support from journalists and opposition members; however,
Niamkey ultimately resigned from his post.
The Government does not restrict access to or distribution of
electronic media. There are twelve domestic Internet service providers,
of which four are major providers; the first began operations in 1996.
All twelve are private. The licensing requirements imposed by the
government telecommunications regulatory body, ATCI, reportedly are not
unduly restrictive.
The Government continues to exercise considerable influence over
the official media's program content, news coverage, and other matters,
using these media to promote government policies. Much of the news
programming during the year wasdevoted to the activities of the
President, the Government, the PDCI, and pro-Bedie groups.
The case of 12 employees of the government broadcast media company,
RTI, who had participated in an April 1997 strike that reportedly
caused an interruption of RTI broadcasting, came to trial in November
1998. The RTI employees were tried on charges, filed in 1997, of
disturbing public order, willful destruction of public property, and
interfering with public services. The judge finally rendered a verdict
in January, acquitting six and convicting the other six. Those
convicted were given suspended 6-month sentences and fines of
$92(50,000 CFA francs) each (see Section 6.a.).
There is no known law specifically concerning academic freedom,
although academics have cited laws of French origin concerning the
operations of universities to support their claims of academic freedom.
In practice the Government tolerates much academic freedom, but also
inhibits political expression through its proprietary control of most
educational facilities, even at the post-secondary level. On April 27,
the president of the University of Cocody banned all meetings and sit-
ins on the campus; and 2 days later the Council of Ministers ratified
and extended the President's action, banning all FESCI activities
throughout the country.
Students at universities and secondary schools staged many
demonstrations and protests about educational issues, resulting in
hundreds of arrests and 63 prosecutions. In May the Government closed
all schools at all levels, including primary school, for 17 days,
following widespread demonstrations. The Government also forbade all
student meetings and banned FESCI activities. On July 30, the
universities declared the 1998-99 academic year ``invalid'' for
students in most disciplines, meaning that no credit would be given and
that the universities would be even more crowded beginning in October,
underscoring FESCI complaints about overcrowding. In spite of religious
and human rights groups' efforts to promote dialog between the student
union, FESCI, and the Government, dialog effectively ended with the
arrest of FECSI leaders (see Section 1.d.).
Many prominent scholars active in opposition politics have retained
their positions at state educational facilities. However, some teachers
and professors suggest that they have been transferred or fear that
they may be transferred to less desirable positions because of their
political activities. According to student union statements, government
security forces continued to use students as informants to monitor
political activities at the University of Abidjan.
There were numerous student protests during the year (see Section
2.b.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government sometimes
restricted this right during the second half of the year.
Groups that wish to hold demonstrations or rallies are required by
law to submit a notice of their intent to do so to the Ministry of
Security or the Ministry of Interior 48 hours before the proposed
event. No law expressly authorizes the Government to ban public
meetings or events for which advance notice has been given in the
required manner. Nevertheless, the Government sometimes has denied the
opposition permission to meet in public outdoor locations. In September
the Dabou city council banned a planned September 11 opposition RDR
rally, stating that the rally could lead to a violent confrontation. On
September 20, the mayor of the Abidjan's Koumassi district forbade all
political meetings in the district.
However, the RDR did stage a large public demonstration in Abidjan
on September 27. Although the Government warned of dire consequences in
the event of violence, it did not ban that demonstration, and no
violence occurred.
Police repeatedly used violence to break up demonstrations and
gatherings even when organizers duly gave the advance notice required
by law. Between April and August, police forcibly suppressed many
demonstrations held by students and other citizens to protest
overcrowded classrooms, high prices, increasing unemployment, and low
standards of living (see Section 1.c.). Police generally used non-
lethalforce such as tear gas against demonstrators. However, in one
case a student demonstrator was killed by a tear-gas canister that was
thrown by police to disperse a protest (see Section 1.a.). No charges
were filed against the police in regard to the 3 deaths and 15 serious
injuries that resulted from those demonstrations (see Section 1.a.).
Between April and August, police personnel detained at least 180
students and unemployed persons across the country for their
involvement in sometimes violent strikes and demonstrations (see
Section 1.d.) Police also arrested 13 persons in connection with the
August 25 demonstration in Yopougon following which Guy Koffi was
killed (see Section 1.a.).
Beginning on September 10, hundreds of RDR supporters staged a sit-
in outside RDR leader Ouattara's house in Cocody to protest PDCI
attempts to ban Ouattara from running in the 2000 presidential
elections. On September 14, police removed 388 demonstrators after some
participants in the demonstration attacked a police commissioner who
had come to deliver a letter informing Ouattara that he was to be
questioned by the police. On September 15, President Bedie pardoned the
388 detainees, who were denied food for several hours at the beginning
and end of their detention. They returned to Ouattara's house the next
day and remained there until September 19 (see Section 1.d.).
A 1992 Antivandalism Law holds organizers of a march or
demonstration responsible if any of the participants engage in
violence. A leading civil rights NGO, the LIDHO, and all major
opposition parties criticized the law as unduly vague and as one that
imposed punishment on some persons for the crimes of others.
In September police personnel arrested 51 persons at the Sorbonne,
a gathering place for public discussions. All of the detainees were
released following identity checks; however, the Bedie Government
subsequently banned all meetings at the Sorbonne (see Section 1.d.).
On October 27, at least 20 RDR leaders and Ouattara supporters were
arrested following a demonstration that was dispersed violently by
police personnel (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). The leaders, including
Henriette Dagri Diabate, four Members of Parliament, one mayor, and a
journalist for the pro-RDR newspaper, Le Liberal, were charged with
inciting the destruction of public property and organizing a prohibited
public demonstration under the Antivandalism Law. In November the
leaders were tried; 11 were sentenced to 2 years in prison (including
Diabete), 5 were sentenced to 1 year in prison, and the remaining 4
were acquitted. During the December coup, rebel soldiers freed all of
the RDR leaders from prison and granted them amnesty.
On November 26, President Bedie issued Presidential Decree Number
99-668, which eliminated the right to hold outdoor meetings and
demonstrations during the workweek. The ban was to remain in effect
until May 30, 2000. This decree eliminated a number of opposition
demonstrations that were planned for December; however, the Government
did allow an outdoor rally to take place on December 18. The decree
remained in effect at year's end.
The Government restricts freedom of association formally, but
generally respects it in practice. Opposition parties assert that the
Constitution permits private associations to form. The Government
rejects this interpretation and requires all organizations to register
before commencing activities. In order to obtain registration,
political parties must provide information on their founding members
and produce internal statutes and political platforms consistent with
the Constitution. Before the coup, there were 102 legally recognized
political parties, of which 3 were represented in the National
Assembly. Although there were no reports in the past 5 years of denial
of registration, an August decree implementing the 1993 political party
registration law apparently was interpreted to be aimed at former Prime
Minister Ouattara and his RDR. The law also prohibits the formation of
political parties along ethnic or religious lines.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
There are no known impediments to religious expression. There is no
state religion; however, for historical as well as ethnic reasons, the
Government informally favorsChristianity, in particular the Roman
Catholic Church. Catholic Church leaders often are the first on whom
the high government officials call for advice and mediation in times of
social or political discord. Members of the Catholic clergy take part
in political debate, whereas Islamic leaders may be criticized by
government figures and offical press organs if they engage in political
debate. However, the Government permits the open practice of religion,
and there are no restrictions on religious ceremonies or teaching.
According to a 1988 census, about 25 percent of citizens were
Muslim, about 23 percent were animist, and 31 percent were Christian;
13 percent practiced no religion. However, because the country hosts a
large population of noncitizens, many of whom are Muslim, Muslims make
up substantially more than 25 of the population.
Some Muslims believe that their religious or ethnic affiliation
makes them targets of discrimination by the Government with regard to
both employment and the renewal of national identity cards (see Section
5).
The Catholic Church began to operate community radio stations in
1998; on April 21, the Government authorized Muslims to operate a
similar station (see Section 2.a.).
The CNSP ordered the Superior Islamic Council, a pro-Bedie
organization, to disband.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Although neither the Constitution nor
any law provides for freedom of movement, the Government generally does
not restrict internal travel; however, uniformed police, gendarmes, and
water, forestry, and customs officials commonly erect and operate
roadblocks on major roads, where they demand that passing motorists or
passengers produce identity and vehicle papers and regularly extort
small amounts of money or goods for contrived or minor infractions.
Citizens normally may travel abroad and emigrate freely and have
the right of voluntary repatriation. However, in November airport
security officials prevented Hamed Bakayoko, a friend of Alassane
Ouattara and the director of Radio Nostalgie, from traveling to Paris
for a business trip. Security officials similarly prevented Morifere
Bamba, leader of the opposition Party for Progress and Socialism from
traveling abroad.
There are no known cases of revocation of citizenship, although the
Bedie Government challenged the citizenship of presidential candidate
Alassane Ouattara, alleging that he is really a citizen of Burkina
Faso.
The country has not enacted legislation to provide refugee or
asylee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
The only domestic statute in force is the 1990 immigration law, which
includes refugees without specifying a separate legal status for them.
Nevertheless, the Government respects the right to first asylum and
does not deny recognition to refugees, either by law or custom. An
estimated 65,000 Liberian refugees remain in the country; from 150,000
to 200,000 refugees have returned to Liberia either under United
Nations auspices or independently. There are also several thousand
refugees from Sierra Leone and the Great Lakes region, including Rwanda
and Burundi. There were no reports that persons who had a valid claim
to asylum or refugee status were involuntarily repatriated to a country
where they feared persecution.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees in health, education, and food distribution programs for
refugees. In January International Rescue Committee staff identified
sanitation problems and severe overcrowding in schools at the Nicla
Camp.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their
government peacefully through democratic means; however the Bedie
Government limited this right in practice and the December coup
effectively disenfranchised citizens, preventing them from exercising
this right.General Guei pledged to rewrite the Constitution and hold
fair and transparent elections in the year 2000.
Prior to the coup, the PDCI controlled both the presidency and the
National Assembly continuously since independence in 1960, and no
president has ever left office in consequence of an election. Between
30 and 40 percent of the country's adult population, including many
lifelong residents, are politically disenfranchised noncitizens (see
Section 5).
In 1994 the Government enacted changes to the Electoral Code that
included more restrictive parentage and residency requirements. These
changes had the effect of excluding from the 1995 presidential election
Alassane Ouattara, then a major potential rival to President Bedie.
Citing concern about these changes in the electoral code and about
irregularities in the voter registration process, the major opposition
parties boycotted and tried to disrupt the 1995 presidential election,
in which Bedie was reelected with 96 percent of the vote.
Prior to the coup, legislative elections were scheduled to be held
every 5 years, and presidential elections every 7 years, by balloting
that authorities describe as secret, but that allows a voter to leave a
polling place with tangible evidence of how he voted. At polling places
on election day, registered citizens receive a package of color-coded
cards, containing one card for each candidate. Each citizen votes,
alone inside a closed booth, by depositing into a sealed ballot box an
envelope containing one of these cards. However, the voter is free to
carry the unused cards from his package out of the polling place.
Consequently voters can and sometimes do present these unused ballots
as proof of how they voted to agents of candidates who pay them for
their votes. This balloting system tends to favor an incumbent party
that can draw directly or indirectly on the resources of the State to
reward those who vote for its candidates. During negotiations with the
PDCI late in the year, a leading opposition party demanded
unsuccessfully that single, fully secret ballots be used in future
elections.
The number of registered voters in districts of the National
Assembly, each of which elects one representative, varies by as much as
a factor of 10; these inequalities systematically favor the ruling
party. National Assembly elections held in 1995 were marred both by
violent incidents and by flaws in the electoral process, which were
noted by both international and domestic observers. In 1998 ONE, a
domestic NGO that monitors elections, cited irregularities in election
list compilation and voting card distribution; these irregularities
favored ruling party candidates. On April 25, a legislative by-election
in a nominally pro-opposition area was marred by the destruction of 15
ballot boxes, the invalidation of results from 7 polling stations, and
the sequestration of 3 subprefects. Two opposition candidates objected
and asked the Constitutional Council to invalidate the result. However,
the Council confirmed the PDCI candidate's election in May.
In practice the presidency consistently has dominated the State. In
the name of ruling party discipline, the PCDI-controlled National
Assembly has enacted with very few modifications most bills submitted
by the Government. Moreover, members of the National Assembly seldom
have initiated legislation, and the National Assembly only rarely has
enacted legislation introduced by a member rather than by the
Government.
In June 1998, the National Assembly enacted amendments to the
Constitution that diminished the authority of the Prime Minister
relative to the President, authorized the President to annul elections
or to postpone announcing election results, extended the presidential
term from 5 to 7 years, mandated the creation of a second legislative
chamber (senate), provided for the president of the senate to succeed
the President in the event of his death or incapacitation, and wrote
into the Constitution the presidential eligibility restrictions of the
1994 electoral code. Diverse domestic and international observers--
including the LIDHO, an antitribalist NGO (Notre Nation), and the
French Socialist Party--criticized these constitutional amendments
publicly for tending both to limit the right of citizens to change
their government and to increase the already preponderant power of the
presidency. In December 1998, as part of a formal written accord
between the ruling party and a major opposition party, then-President
Bedie agreed to renounce in a second round of constitutional amendments
some of the powersconferred on him by the constitutional amendments,
including the power to postpone announcements of election results and
the power to annul elections. However, all the constitutional
amendments remained fully effective at year's end.
In November 1998, Roger Nasra, a businessman accused of defrauding
the Government of nearly $2 million in 1995 (10,810,000 CFA francs),
testified that he had given that money to a senior treasury official
for diversion to Bedie's election campaign. The treasury official
denied the charges; he was transferred in August.
Government and opposition observers both have indicated that almost
half of citizens do not have national identity cards, without which
they cannot vote. The Government enacted and began to implement a law
that simplified the process and greatly reduced the cost of obtaining
national identity cards. This was intended to increase voter
eligibility and registration. However, the same law tripled the cost of
residence permits required of noncitizens.
The major opposition parties continued to demand that elections be
organized and supervised by an electoral commission independent of the
Government, as domestic and international election-monitoring NGO's
have recommended. On December 9, the National Assembly voted to allow
the creation of a National Election Commission to supervise elections.
This decision was enacted as one of several agreements between the PDCI
and the opposition Ivorian Popular Front (FPI); however, at year's end
the organization of elections remained in the hands of the Ministry of
Interior.
Citizens' ability to elect subnational governments is limited. The
State is highly centralized. Subnational government entities exist on
several levels, including 16 regions, 58 departments, 230
subprefectures, and 196 communities. However, at all levels except for
communities, which are headed by mayors elected for 5-year terms, and
traditional chieftaincies, which are headed by elected chiefs, all
subnational government officials are appointed by the central
Government. Subnational governments generally must rely on the central
Government for much of their revenue, but mayors have autonomy to hire
and fire community administrative personnel.
Although there are no legal impediments to women assuming political
leadership roles they are underrepresented in government and politics.
Under the Bedie government, only 14 of the 175 National Assembly
deputies were women. Women held 3 of the 17 leadership positions in the
National Assembly. There were 3 women in the 35-member presidential
Cabinet named in August, and 3 members of the Supreme Court are women.
In January Henriette Dagri Diabete was elected to the post of secretary
general of the opposition RDR; she became the first woman to lead a
political party.
There are no legal impediments to the exercise of political rights
by any of the more than 60 ethnic groups in the country. However, it is
widely believed that the Baoule and other ethnic groups that have
tended to support the ruling party are overrepresented in both mid-
level and low-level appointed positions throughout the public sector.
Prior to the coup, Baoules always had held the positions of President
and Defense Minister. However, General Guei is Toura, a subgroup of the
Yacouba, one of the main ethnic groups in the west of the country; many
of his supporters are from historically underrepresented ethnic groups
in the north and west.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Non-
governmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The LIDHO, a domestic human rights NGO formed in 1987 and
recognized by the Government in 1990, investigated alleged violations
of human rights actively and issued press releases and reports, some
critical of the Government. Other NGO's such as Amnesty International
and the Ivorian MIFED also monitored government human rights abuses and
published press releases critical of them.
The Government has cooperated with international inquiries into its
human rights practices, which were chiefly in the area of prison
conditions (see Section 1.c.).
The CNSP Government seized the computers of the pro-PDCI NGO
Servir.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Discrimination based on race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, or
religion is prohibited by law, but in practice women occupy a
subordinate role in society. Muslims complain of governmental
discrimination (see Section 2.c.), societal ethnic discrimination is a
problem, and the Baoule ethnic group dominates the ruling party and
through it, the Government.
Women.--Representatives of the Ivorian Association for the Defense
of Women (AIDF) state that spousal abuse (usually wife beating) occurs
frequently and often leads to divorce. A July 1998 AIDF survey found
that many women refused to discuss their experience of domestic
violence; of women who completed the AIDF interview process, nearly 90
percent had been beaten or struck on at least one occasion. Doctors
state that they rarely see the victims of domestic violence. A severe
social stigma is attached to such violence, and neighbors often
intervene in a domestic quarrel to protect a woman who is the known
object of physical abuse. The courts and police view domestic violence
as a family problem, unless serious bodily harm is inflicted, or the
victim lodges a complaint, in which case they may initiate criminal
proceedings. Women's advocacy groups have protested the indifference of
authorities to female victims of violence and called attention to
domestic violence and female genital mutilation (FGM). The groups also
reported that women who are the victims of rape or domestic violence
often are ignored when they attempt to bring the violence to the
attention of the police. The Government does not collect statistics on
the rape or other physical abuse of women. The Government has no clear
policy regarding spousal abuse beyond the strictures against violence
in the civil code. In December 1998, the National Assembly enacted the
Law Concerning Crimes against Women, which forbids and provides
criminal penalties for forced or early marriage and sexual harassment,
but says nothing about spousal abuse. In July the AIDF launched a
petition drive to pressure the authorities to enact and enforce laws
against domestic violence, especially spousal abuse; 18,000 petitions
were collected by year's end. The AIDF also is active in opposing
forced marriage and advancing the rights of female domestic workers.
In rural areas, women and men divide the labor, with men clearing
the land and attending to cash crops like cocoa and coffee, while women
grow vegetables and other staples and perform most menial household
tasks. Government policy encourages full participation by women in
social and economic life, but there is considerable informal resistance
among employers to hiring women, whom they consider less dependable
because of their potential pregnancy. Women are underrepresented in
some professions and in the managerial sector as a whole. Some women
also encounter difficulty in obtaining loans, as they cannot meet the
lending criteria mandated by banks. These criteria include such
elements as title to a house and production of profitable cash crops,
specifically coffee and cocoa. However, women in the formal sector are
paid on an equal scale with men.
Children.--Primary education is compulsory, but this requirement is
not enforced effectively. Many children leave school after only a few
years. There is a parental preference for educating boys rather than
girls, which is noticeable throughout the country but more pronounced
in rural areas. The primary school enrollment rate for girls is
increasing in the northern part of the country. In part to combat low
enrollment rates for girls, in January 1998 the Government instituted
new measures against statutory rape of students by school teachers. The
Minister of National Education stated then that almost one-third of the
66 percent primary and secondary school dropout rate was attributable
to pregnancies, and that many of the sexual partners of female students
were teachers, to whom girls sometimes granted sexual favors in return
for good grades or money. According to UNICEF statistics, 79 percent of
males and 58 percent of females of primary school age reportedly were
enrolled in the period between 1990 and 1996.
Cities, especially Abidjan, have large populations of street
children. Some children are employed as domestics and are subject to
sexual abuse, harassment, and otherforms of mistreatment by their
employers, according to the AIDF and press reports (see Section 6.d.).
In September 1998, an Abidjan daily newspaper reported allegations
by a 14-year-old boy that he had been sodomized repeatedly over many
months by a network of pedophiles that included former Minister of
Economic Infrastructure Ezan Akele and a foreign ambassador. Leading
human rights organizations, including the LIDHO, demanded that the
alleged pedophiles not be shielded from prosecution. On January 4,
judges released 6 of the 8 accused in this matter on provisional
liberty. The case still is pending.
At least hundreds and perhaps thousands of Malian children were
trafficked and sold into indentured servitude on Ivorian plantations
(see Sections 6.c. and 6.f).
The Ministries of Public Health and of Employment, Public Service,
and Social Security seek to safeguard the welfare of children, and the
Government also has encouraged the formation of NGO's such as the
Abidjan Legal Center for the Defense of Children. In 1996 the
Government announced a series of measures aimed at reducing the
population of street children. These steps include holding parents
legally and financially responsible for their abandoned children and
the development of training centers where children can learn a trade.
One of these centers opened in Dabou on July 31.
Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is a serious problem. Until 1998 there was no law
that specifically prohibited FGM, which was considered illegal only as
a violation of general laws prohibiting crimes against persons.
However, the Law Concerning Crimes against Women enacted in December
1998 specifically forbids FGM and makes those who perform it subject to
criminal penalties of imprisonment for up to 5 years and a fine of from
roughly $650 to $3,500 (360,000 to 2 million CFA francs); double
penalties apply for medical practitioners. FGM is practiced
particularly among the rural population in the north and west and to a
lesser extent in the center. The procedure usually is performed on
young girls or at puberty as part of a rite of passage; it is almost
always done outside modern medical facilities, and techniques and
hygiene do not meet modern medical standards. According to the World
Health Organization and the AIDF, as many as 60 percent of women have
undergone FGM. Since the law on FGM was enacted in December 1998, 6
girls in Abidjan's Port Bouet district were mutilated, and police and
social workers neither acted to prevent the mutilation nor to arrest
the girls' parents.
Women's advocacy organizations have sponsored campaigns against
FGM, forced marriage, and marriage of minors, patterns of inheritance
that exclude women, and other practices considered harmful to women and
girls. In 1997 the Ministry of the Family and Women's Affairs organized
a seminar on FGM. In some areas traditional authorities, who generally
have upheld the practice, began to take part in public demonstrations
against FGM.
People With Disabilities.--Until recently there were no laws
mandating accessibility to buildings, transportation, or other public
services by the disabled. However, in October 1998 the National
Assembly enacted a law, sponsored by former President Bedie's wife,
that requires the State to educate and train the disabled, to hire them
or help them find jobs, to design houses and public facilities for
wheelchair access, and to adapt machines, tools, and work spaces for
access and use by the disabled. The law covers individuals with
physical, mental, visual, auditory, and cerebral motor disabilities.
Laws also exist that prohibit the abandonment of the mentally or
physically disabled and enjoin acts of violence directed at them.
Traditional practices, beliefs, and superstitions vary, but infanticide
in cases of serious birth disabilities is less common than in the past.
Disabled adults are not specific targets of abuse, but they encounter
serious difficulties in competing with able-bodied workers. The
Government supports special schools, associations, and artisans'
cooperatives for the disabled, but physically disabled persons still
beg on urban streets and in commercial zones.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population of
about 15 million is ethnically diverse. The citizenry--which excludes
the largenoncitizen part of the population--is made up of five major
families of ethnic groups. The Akan family made up more than 40 percent
of the citizenry, according to the 1988 census; the largest Akan ethnic
group, and the largest ethnic group in the country, was the Baoule, to
which perhaps one-fourth of all citizens belong. About 25 percent of
citizens belong to the Mande family, of which the Malinke are the
largest group. About 15 percent of citizens belong to the Krou family,
of which the Bete are the largest group. Slightly more than 15 percent
also belong to the Voltaic family, of which the Senoufo are the largest
group. Major ethnic groups generally have their own primary languages
and their nonurban populations tend to be concentrated regionally.
Between 30 and 40 percent of the population are Africans, mostly
from neighboring countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso, who may not
claim citizenship legally. Birth in Ivorian national territory does not
confer citizenship. The ethnic composition of the whole population
including these noncitizens is quite different from that of the
citizenry alone.
Societal discrimination on the basis of ethnicity sometimes is
practiced by members of all ethnic groups. Urban neighborhoods still
have identifiable ethnic characteristics, and major political parties
tend to have identifiable ethnic and regional bases, although
interethnic marriage is increasingly common in urban areas.
Some ethnic groups include many noncitizens, and their share of the
electorate would be increased by enfranchising noncitizens. Other
ethnic groups include few noncitizens, and their share of the
electorate would be decreased by enfranchising noncitizens. There are
societal and political tensions between these two sets of ethnic
groups. This cleavage corresponds to some extent to regional
differences; ethnic groups that include many non-citizens are found
chiefly in the north. Members of northern ethnic groups that are found
in neighboring countries as well as in the country often are required
to document their citizenship, whereas members of politically powerful
ethnic groups, such as the Baoule and the Agni, reportedly do not have
this problem. Police routinely abuse and harass noncitizen Africans
residing in the country. Official harassment reflects the frequently
encountered conviction that foreigners are responsible for high local
crime rates, as well as concern for Ivorian national identity.
Election law changes in 1994 limited presidential candidates to
those who could prove that both parents had been born in Cote d'Ivoire.
This restriction was incorporated into the Constitution in June 1998.
It is due to this restriction that the PDCI considered presidential
hopeful Alassane Ouattara ineligible to run for president in the 2000
elections. In July 1998, the Government tripled the cost of the
residence permits for noncitizens. The Government requires citizens of
other West African countries to carry these cards, but simultaneously
it greatly reduced the cost of national identification cards for
citizens. This discriminatory law tended to perpetuate the political
disenfranchisement of noncitizens by making it harder for them to
become citizens. It also tended to entrench the electoral power of
ethnic groups that include relatively few noncitizens, such as the
Baoule.
Differences between members of the Baoule group and other ethnic
groups, especially the Bete, are a major source of political tensions
and have erupted repeatedly into violence, most recently in 1997. Many
members of the Baoule group, which has long inhabited the east-central
region, have settled in towns and on previously uncultivated land in
other areas, especially in more westerly regions. In the past, the
Government generally has viewed use of land as conferring de facto
ownership of land. However, in December 1998, the National Assembly
enacted the new Land Use Law, which establishes that land title does
not transfer from the traditional owner to the user simply by virtue of
use.
Members of the Baoule ethnic group dominate the PDCI and were
widely believed to hold disproportionate numbers of positions in the
public sector, including the security forces, the civil service, and
state-owned businesses during the Bedie regime (see Section 3). In
1998, a serving non-Baoule army officer complained publicly in letters
published in private newspapers about ethnic discrimination against
non-Baoules in the armed forces, as did a former non-Baoule army
officer in 1999; the serving officer was reprimanded by the Ministry of
Defense.
Security forces were accused of favoring Baoules in 1997 violence
between members of the Baoule and Guere ethnic groups.
In May 1998, the Government ordered the Dozos, a group of
traditional hunters from the north and northwest regions, to cease
activities ``outside the geographic and cultural sphere of their
origin,'' and to surrender any modern weapons. Some reports pointed out
that the Government's order came shortly after Dozos, some of whom long
had served as bodyguards for ruling party politicians, began to perform
security functions for opposition party leaders and rallies. Government
and Dozo spokespersons indicated that the Government's order responded
to infiltration of the Dozos by ``false Dozos'' who had begun to use
excessive force in their private security roles.
During the latter part of the year, tensions arose between Ivorian
and non-Ivorian ethnic groups. In November a member of the native Krou
ethnic group allegedly was killed by a Burkinabe in the southwestern
region of Tabou. Following his death, a number of ethnic Krous attacked
Burkinabe settlements, burning their homes and chasing more than 12,000
persons to Burkino Faso; they had not returned to the country by year's
end. On November 17, members of the Baoule ethnic group attacked the
Malian population in Tiebissou after the death of a Baoule during a
land use conflict. After the attack, several hundred persons fled the
area. On December 7, members of the Baoule ethnic group allegedly
attacked members of the Burkinabe population in Tiebissou, which
resulted in many Burkinabes fleeing the region.
In July 1998, members of the Agni ethnic group burned villages of
descendants of Bozo immigrants in a fishing rights dispute and drove
many Bozos back to their ancestral areas in Mali. Ghanaian Fanti
fishermen similarly were driven out of parts of southwestern Cote
d'Ivoire in December 1998.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers with the
right to form unions. Registration of a new union requires 3 months.
For almost 30 years, the government-sponsored labor confederation, the
General Union of Workers of Cote d'Ivoire (UGTCI), dominated most union
activity. The UGTCI's hold on the labor movement loosened in 1991 when
several formerly UGTCI-affiliated unions broke away and became
independent. In 1992 11 formerly independent unions joined together to
form the Federation of Autonomous Trade Unions of Cote d'Ivoire. There
are now also two other registered labor federations not affiliated with
the Government.
Although unions are legally free to leave the UGTCI and join
another federation, in practice their choice is restricted by
anticompetitive official discrimination in favor of the government-
affiliated UGTCI. In September 1998, after a 3-year struggle and with
the assistance of the International Labor Organization, labor
inspectors were obliged to organize an election of union delegates at
the Sip Cata company in San Pedro, and to allow Dignite, an independent
labor federation, to compete with the UGTCI. Dignite's candidates won
the election, and the union switched its affiliation to Dignite.
The right to strike is provided by the Constitution and by statute.
The Labor Code requires a protracted series of negotiations and a 6-day
notification period before a strike may take place, effectively making
legal strikes difficult to organize. Although the UGTCI seldom has
called strikes, it called a strike in June to protest continuing low
wage increases and lack of funding for the social security and medical
systems. Bailiffs and customs officers also struck. Non-UGTCI unions
also called strikes of lawyers, garbage collectors, street cleaners,
and taxi drivers.
Twelve employees of the government broadcast media company, RTI,
who had participated in an April 1997 strike that reportedly caused an
interruption of RTI broadcasting, were tried in November and December
1998 on charges, filed in May 1997, of disturbing public order, willful
destructionof public property, and interfering with public services.
They had been detained for 3 months in 1997. The judge finally rendered
a verdict in January, acquitting six and convicting the other six.
Those convicted were given suspended 6-month sentences and fines of $92
(50,000 CFA francs) each (See Section 2.b.).
Unions are free to join international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
grants all citizens, except members of the police and military
services, the rights to join unions and to bargain collectively.
Collective bargaining agreements are in effect in many major business
enterprises and sectors of the civil service. In most cases in which
wages are not established in direct negotiations between unions and
employers, salaries are set by job categories by the Ministry of
Employment and Civil Service. Labor inspectors have the responsibility
to enforce a law that prohibits antiunion discrimination. There have
been no known prosecutions or convictions under this law.
There were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is
prohibited by law; however, the International Labor Organization's
Committee of Experts in its 1993 annual report questioned a decree that
places certain categories of prisoners at the disposal of private
enterprises for work assignments without their apparent consent. There
has been no change in this decree.
The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor; however, the
Government does not enforce this prohibition effectively, and children
trafficked to the country were sold into forced labor (see Section
6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--In most instances, the legal minimum working age is 16.
However, the Ministry of Employment and Civil Service enforces this
provision effectively only in the civil service and in large
multinational companies. Labor law limits the hours of young workers,
defined as those under the age of 18. However, children often work on
family farms, and some children routinely act as vendors, shoe shiners,
errand boys, car watchers, and washers of car windows in the informal
sector in cities. There are reliable reports of some use of child labor
in informal-sector mining and also of children working in ``sweatshop''
conditions in small workshops. Primary education is mandatory but far
from universally enforced, particularly in rural areas. Many children
leave the formal school system when they are between the ages of 12 and
14, having failed secondary school entrance exams.
Although the Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor, it
does not enforce this prohibition effectively. There was widespread
abuse of foreign children for forced labor on agricultural plantations
(see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government administratively
determines monthly minimum wage rates, which were last adjusted in
1996. A slightly higher minimum wage rate applies for construction
workers. The Government enforces the minimum wage rates only for
salaried workers employed by the Government or registered with the
social security office. Minimum wages vary according to occupation,
with the lowest set at approximately $67.90 (36,607 CFA francs) per
month, which is insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for
a worker and family. The majority of the labor force works in
agriculture or in the informal sector where the minimum wage does not
apply.
Through the Ministry of Employment and the Civil Service, the
Government enforces a comprehensive Labor Code that governs the terms
and conditions of service for wage earners and salaried workers and
provides for occupational safety and health standards. Those employed
in the formal sector generally are protected against unjust
compensation, excessive hours, and arbitrary discharge from employment.
The standard legal workweek is 40 hours. The law requires overtime
payment on a graduated scale for additional hours.The Labor Code
provides for at least one 24-hour rest period per week.
Government labor inspectors can order employers to improve
substandard conditions, and a labor court can levy fines if the
employer fails to comply with the Labor Code. However, in the large
informal sector of the economy involving both urban and rural workers,
the Government's occupational health and safety regulations are
enforced erratically, if at all. Workers in the formal sector have the
right, under the Labor Code, to remove themselves from dangerous work
situations without jeopardy to continued employment by utilizing the
Ministry of Labor's inspection system to document dangerous working
conditions. However, workers in the informal sector ordinarily cannot
remove themselves from such labor without risking the loss of their
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons, and there were credible reports that it occurs. In
September 1998, a private Abidjan daily newspaper exposed the
widespread practice of importing and indenturing Malian boys for field
work on Ivorian plantations under abusive conditions. For example,
children recruited by Malians in the border town of Sikasso were
promised easy and lucrative jobs in Cote d'Ivoire, transported across
the border, and then sold to other Malians who dispersed them
throughout the plantations of the central region. These children were
forced to work 12-hour days in the fields and were locked at night in
crowded sheds, with their clothing confiscated. The Governments of Mali
and Cote d'Ivoire confirmed the reports. The Government of Mali and the
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) took steps to halt this
trafficking and repatriate the children to Mali. About 100 children
from Mali were returned to their families in 1998. In 1998 the
Government of Mali arrested 5 persons in Sikasso who were responsible
for trafficking. The extent of this practice was difficult to estimate,
because many Malian adults also worked on Ivorian plantations in the
same area under difficult conditions.
Mali was not the only source of forced child labor used in the
country. In January authorities repatriated 11 10- and 11-year old
girls to Lagos, Nigeria from Abidjan.
On June 11, 13 girls from Benin ranging from 4 to 10 years old were
intercepted at Cote d'Ivoire's border with Ghana, and Beninese child
traffickers Marcelin Dagbegnon and Antoine Assogba were arrested.
According to Soir Info, an Abidjan daily newspaper, in 1998 Beninese
police intercepted almost 1,000 children who were being ``sold into
slavery'' in Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Togo, Cameroon, and Gabon. In July
police in Divo broke up a ring of child traffickers which had brought
children from Burkina Faso to work on farms and plantations in Cote
d'Ivoire. Police released and arranged for the repatriation of six
teenagers and were seeking 11 others who already had been placed with
Ivorian families by trafficker Madeleine N'Da Adjoua. In March 1998,
police in Togo arrested 4 Beninese traffickers taking 22 Beninese
children to Cote d'Ivoire by way of Togo.
______
DJIBOUTI
On April 9, Djibouti elected its second president since gaining
independence from France in 1977. Ismael Omar Guelleh, the candidate of
the ruling party, the People's Rally for Progress (RPP), won the
election with 74 percent of the vote. Opposition candidate Moussa Ahmed
Idriss, of the Unified Djiboutian Opposition (ODU), received 26 percent
of the vote. For the first time since multiparty elections began in
1992, no group boycotted the election. Moussa Ahmed Idriss and the ODU
later challenged the results based on election ``irregularities'' and
the assertion that ``foreigners'' had voted in various districts of the
capital; however, international and locally-based observers considered
the election to be generally fair, and cited only minor technical
difficulties. Guelleh took the oath of office as President on May 8
with the support of an alliance between the RPP and the government-
recognized Section of the Afar-led Front for the Restoration of Unity
and Democracy (FRUD). Gouleh succeeded former President Hassan Gouled
Aptidon, whom he had served as chief of staff and a key advisor for 20
years. The RPP, which has been in power since independence in 1977,
continues to rule the country despite 1992 constitutional changes that
permitted the creation of opposition political parties. Two main ethnic
groups hold most political power: Somali Issas (the tribe of the
President), and Afars. Citizens from other Somali clans (Issak,
Gadabursi, and Darod), and those of Yemeni and other origins, are
limited unofficially in their access to top government positions. In
1994 the Government and a faction of the FRUD signed a peace accord,
ending 3 years of civil war. In the accord, the Government agreed to
recognize the FRUD as a legitimate political party. The Government
named two FRUD leaders to Cabinet positions in 1995; however, part of
the FRUD rejected the peace accord and remains opposed to the
Government. Two other legal political parties have existed since 1992,
the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Party for Democratic
Renewal (PRD); neither holds a parliamentary seat or a cabinet level
post. In 1997 the ruling party coalition that includes the FRUD party
won all 65 seats in legislative elections, which took place without
international observers and amid opposition claims of massive fraud.
The judiciary is not independent of the executive.
The 8,000-member National Police Force (FNP) is responsible for
internal security and border control, and is overseen by the Ministry
of Interior. The Ministry of Defense oversees the army. The Gendarmerie
Nationale, a police force responsible for the President's security,
which previously had reported to the Ministry of Defense, is an
autonomous unit under the presidency. A small intelligence bureau also
reports directly to the President. Civilian authorities generally
maintain effective control of the security forces, but there were
instances in which the security forces acted independently of the
Government's authority. Some members of the security forces committed
human rights abuses.
Djibouti has little industry and few natural resources. Services
provide most of the national income. Minor mineral deposits remain
mostly unexploited. Only a tenth of the land is arable and only 1
percent is forested. Outside the capital city, the primary economic
activity is nomadic subsistence. Citizens are free to pursue private
business interests and to hold personal and real property. The part of
the annual gross domestic product not generated by and for the foreign
community, which includes some 8,000 French citizens, is estimated at
no more than $250 per capita annually.
The Government's human rights record remained poor. Although the
April presidential elections were considered generally fair, the 1997
parliamentary elections took place amid claims of massive fraud, and
the RPP continues to control the political system to suppress organized
opposition. Members of the security forces committed at least three
extrajudicial killings. There were credible reports that security
forces beat, otherwise abused, and at times tortured detainees, and
raped female inmates. There were credible reports that soldiers raped
women in rural districts, and police beat protesters. Prison conditions
remained harsh. The Government continued to harass, intimidate, and
imprison political opponents and union leaders and to arrest and detain
persons arbitrarily. Prolonged detention and incommunicado detention
remained problems. The judiciary is not independent of the executive
and does not ensure citizens' due process. The Government also
infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government at times
restricted freedom of speech and of the press. Police occasionally
jailed or intimidated journalists. The Government limited freedom of
assembly, and restricted freedom of association. The Government
discouraged proselytizing. There were some limits on freedom of
movement. Violence and discrimination against women persisted, and the
practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) continued to be widespread.
Discrimination on the basis of ethnic and clan background persisted.
The Government imposed limits on unions and their leaders, and there
were reports of instances of forced labor. Child labor persisted.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces
committed several extrajudicial killings. On April 27, government
forces in the vicinity of Oroborou in the Obock district killed three
civilians, Abdallah Ahmed Mohamed Rebeh, Moussa Abdallah, and Ahmed
Yagouri. Two of the victims were shot, and the third was stabbed to
death. A fourth individual, Ali Mohamed Ali ``Derbi,'' was stabbed and
left for dead. According to the Paris-based FRUD leader Ahmed Dini, the
Government killed the civilians allegedly in retaliation for a series
of landmine explosions that left several soldiers dead and many more
wounded. On September 23, while attempting to arrest Moussa Ahmed
Idriss, police officers fired shots after his supporters attempted to
block the arrest, resulting in one death and two injuries. One of the
injured included Moussa Ahmed Idriss's wife. (see Sections 1.d. and
1.e.).
On March 12, a political detainee died in the main prison under
unexplained circumstances (see Section 1.c.).
On August 15, an army helicopter exploded in an area of the
Tadjourah district known for insurgent FRUD rebel activity, killing
eight persons including two nurses and a doctor on a medical mission.
Although the FRUD claimed responsibility, the Government cited
mechanical failure.
There continued to be numerous reports of fighting involving the
army and Afar FRUD rebels. Landmine incidents related to the conflict
resulted in a number of deaths during the year. On April 3, two
civilians were killed and three were wounded in a landmine explosion on
the road between Tadjourah and Obock. On April 14 and 15, landmines
exploded in the Tadjourah district killing seven persons, including six
policemen, and injuring seven others. On April 26, a landmine explosion
killed four soldiers and injured four others in Medeho. In May a
civilian transport vehicle hit a landmine, killing two girls and
injuring seven others. A landmine explosion in July killed one civilian
and injured five others. In late September, a landmine explosion killed
three persons and injured three others in Tadjourah district.
In 1998 gendarmes killed one man and injured another in downtown
Djibouti when they shot into a crowd while attempting to make an
arrest. The gendarmerie successfully prevented a police investigation
into the incident, and no action has been taken against the gendarmes
responsible.
In 1998 soldiers killed two Afar community elders near Assa Gueyla,
reportedly in retaliation for a landmine explosion. Relatives of the
victims filed legal complaints against three officers stationed in
Tadjora District, but the case was still pending at year's end. There
has been no investigation into the 1997 police killing of Hassan Aden
Farah, who was shot following a car chase. Police claimed that Farah
was plotting to kill a high-level official.
On March 4, the Paris-based Association for the Respect of Human
Rights in Djibouti (ARHRD), and an unidentified citizen presented a
complaint in a French court against former President Gouled and current
President Guelleh alleging human rights violations, including summary
executions. The complaint listed a series of human rights abuses and
judicial abuses dating back to 1995.
Reportedly charges were dropped in the legal proceedings against
six soldiers accused of the 1995 killings of Randa's religious leader,
Ali Houmed Souleh, and an associate.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
In May police detained an Ethiopian guard at a private residence,
allegedly because he was an illegal immigrant. The guard's whereabouts
were unknown at year's end.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution provides that no one shall be subjected
to torture or to other inhuman, cruel, degrading, or humiliating
punishments, and torture is punishable by 15 years' imprisonment;
however, there continued to be credible reports that police and
gendarmes routinely beat, otherwise physically abused, and at times
tortured prisoners and detainees.
On March 4, an unidentified citizen in conjunction with the ARHRD
presented a claim in a French court (see Section 1.a.) against
President Guelleh and former President Gouled, alleging that hehad been
detained arbitrarily and tortured, and had suffered physical and
psychological damage as a result. In April the ARHRD reported that
Saleh Mohamed Dini, who was arrested on April 10 (see Section 1.d.),
was tortured while in custody. In April more than 20 Afars were
arrested in the Obock district for expressing support for the FRUD, and
there were unconfirmed reports that some of the detainees were
subjected to physical violence (see Section 1.d.). In May there was an
unconfirmed report from a Paris-based NGO that police beat a civilian
after trying to force him to walk on a landmine.
On February 12, police used tear gas to break up a political rally
and detained some of the participants for several hours (see Sections
1.d. and 2.b.). On March 28, while trying to prevent a political rally
from marching on the presidential palace, police forces beat several
participants severely, injuring up to 24 persons, at least three
seriously (see Section 2.b.). The police also used tear gas, fired guns
into the air, and arrested many of the participants (see Sections 1.d.
and 2.b.). In August police used tear gas to disperse a crowd that had
gathered outside the Ministry of Justice to protest the arrest of two
opposition journalists (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.).
There were unconfirmed reports that government security forces in
the northern districts denied access to food and water to citizens who
refused to declare loyalty to the Government and renounce the FRUD.
An Eritrean illegal immigrant woman, Zenaba Agoden, was raped by
soldiers while in detention in Obock. As a result of the rape, she
suffered paralysis over one side of her body and required several
months of hospitalization. Reportedly no investigation was made into
the incident and no action was taken against the officers responsible.
In recent years there have been credible reports that security force
personnel raped at least 120 Afar women in the northern districts of
Obock and Tadjourah (see Section 5). In almost all cases the victims
did not press charges due to shame and fear.
In February an unknown person threw a hand grenade into an Arabic
class at Dikhil's junior high school, injuring five students.
On May 23, a hand grenade thrown from a passing vehicle exploded
outside the house of Jean-Paul Noel Abdi, president of the newly-formed
Djiboutian Human Rights League. A teenage boy walking past the compound
was injured seriously; his injuries were exacerbated by the fact that
he was left unattended while the police and the gendarmes argued over
jurisdiction.
Landmine explosions during the year resulted in a number of deaths
and injuries (see Section 1.a.).
There were reports of injuries in May as a result of clashes
between unemployed citizens and Ethiopians in various parts of the
capital. On May 26, a gang of approximately 30 unemployed youths,
apparently upset that Ethiopians were hired for a construction project
for a new Ethiopian Embassy compound, began attacking Ethiopians. The
attacks continued for several days and resulted in numerous injuries on
both sides. The great majority of those attacked were refugees.
Prison conditions are harsh and prisons are severely overcrowded.
Gabode prison, built for 350 persons, at times housed nearly twice that
number. The Government sometimes shortens prison terms to reduce
overcrowding. The Ministry of Justice estimates that 60 percent of
prisoners are illegal Ethiopian immigrants who have committed crimes in
the country. Children under the age of 5 of female inmates sometimes
are allowed to stay with their mothers; authorities say that milk is
provided for them. Prisoners reportedly must pay authorities to obtain
food. Health care sources reported that prison guards raped female
inmates. Several prisoners were reported to be suffering from untreated
illnesses or gunshot wounds received during arrest. Medical care is
inadequate, and the prison infirmary lacks sufficient medication. In
April approximately 40 prisoners at Gabode prison went on a hunger
strike to protest the health conditions of prisoners in the prison.
There are no educational or rehabilitation facilities within the
prison. Ministry of Justice officials said that lack of funding hampers
their ability to provide even minimal services. In principle, juveniles
are housed separately from adult prisoners; however, in practice, this
is not always the case.
On March 12, Abdi Houfaneh Liban, a 35-year old political prisoner
arrested in April 1998, died under unexplained circumstances.
Djiboutian human rights groups in France asserted that Abdi's death was
caused by harsh living conditions in the Gabode prison. Some opposition
supporters believe that Abdi's death might have been due to poisoning.
A foreign journalist who visited the prison shortly after Abdi's death
believes that Abdi died after taking incorrect medication. The
journalist noted that the prison infirmary was poorly stocked and
prisoners often were given incorrect medications.
Conditions at Nagad detention center, where Ethiopians are held
prior to deportation, also are extremely harsh. Detainees at Nagad are
held in unsanitary conditions and often are not fed for several days
before their deportation.
An International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegate from
Kenya made quarterly visits to the main prison; however, in May the
Government denied access to the prison to an ICRC delegate and a doctor
from Nairobi, Kenya. On May 4, in response to media criticism of prison
conditions, the Government organized a prison visit by a delegation
consisting of domestic human rights monitors, doctors, and attorneys.
During the fall, human rights activists were permitted to visit several
detainees, including Moussa Ahmed Idriss, General Wais, and Daher Ahmed
Farah (see Section 1.d.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Despite legal
protections, arbitrary arrest and detention remained problems. The 1995
Penal Code stipulates that the State may not detain a person beyond 48
hours without an examining magistrate's formal charge. Detainees may be
held another 24 hours with the prior approval of the public prosecutor.
All persons, including those accused of political or national security
offenses, must be tried within 8 months of arraignment. Nevertheless,
the police often disregarded these procedures, typically arresting
persons without warrants (see Section 1.f.), and sometimes detaining
them for lengthy periods without charge. The penal code provides for
bail and expeditious trial. Incommunicado detention is used.
In April more than 20 Afars were arrested in the Obock district for
expressing support for the FRUD. After 4 days of detention in a
military camp at Medeho, five men were released, one was detained
further, and nine were transferred to a police prison near the capital.
There were unconfirmed reports that some of the detainees were
subjected to physical violence. On February 12, police detained three
ODU party leaders and six busloads of ODU supporters, including human
rights attorney Aref Mohamed Aref, for several hours after dispersing a
political rally with tear gas (see Section 1.c. and 3). Some ODU
members were detained for more than 7 hours.
On February 15, Aref was arrested again and imprisoned on charges
of fraud stemming from a 1994 commercial transaction. After a 2-hour
trial marred by legal irregularities, Aref was sentenced to 2 years in
prison (see Section 1.e.). He was released from prison on May 11 as
part of a presidential amnesty program (see Section 1.e.).
On March 28, police arrested 17 supporters of opposition
presidential candidate Moussa Ahmed Idriss who were attempting to march
on the presidential palace, charged them with disturbing the peace,
fined them, and released them after a few days (see Sections 1.c. and
2.b.).
On April 10, police arrested Saleh Mohamed Dini, the chief of
Mabla, allegedly because he insulted President Guelleh. On May 23,
after a hand grenade exploded in front of the house of Djiboutian Human
Rights League President Jean-Paul Noel Abdi (see Section 1.c.), police
arrested Abdi and several others who were in the residence at the time
of the attack. Some members of the League, as well as several women and
children who lived in rented rooms within Abdi's house, were detained
for up to 6 hours. Three of the women and a 4-year-old girl were held
for more than a day. Abdi and two other members of the League who were
inside the house at the time of the attack were rearrested 4 days after
the attack, and held in protective custody for 2 days.
On June 16, police arrested and detained Abdoulfatah Moussa Ahmed,
the son of opposition leader Moussa Ahmed Idriss. He was released on
June 20, rearrested on June 21, and charged with an economic crime; his
case was still pending at year's end.
On August 28, police arrested two opposition newspaper editors,
Daher Ahmed Farah and Ali Meidal Waiss, and charged them with
distributing false information after their newspapers reprinted a
letter from Ahmed Dini, claiming responsibility for the downing of an
army helicopter (see Sections 1.a. and 2.a.). On September 2, a court
sentenced both journalists to 1 year in prison and a fine of
approximately $5,650 (1 million DF). In December they were released as
part of a presidential amnesty (see Section 1.e.). On September 23,
police arrested Moussa Ahmed Idriss on charges of behavior inciting
sedition. The police also arrested 19 of his supporters who attempted
to prevent his arrest (see Section 1.e.). Moussa Idriss was sentenced
to 8 months' imprisonment, subsequently reduced to 4 months, and fined;
however, he was released in December as part of a presidential amnesty
(see Section 1.e.). Mousssa Idriss's 19 supporters were also among
those released in the December amnesty.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is not
independent of the executive. Constitutional provisions for a fair
trial are not respected universally, even in nonpolitical cases,
because of interference from the executive branch. Since ministerial
changes in December 1997, the Justice Minister is officially
responsible for human rights.
The judiciary, based on the French Napoleonic code, comprises a
lower court, appeals courts, and a Supreme Court. There are no longer
``special courts'' to try cases outside normal judiciary channels. The
Supreme Court can overrule decisions of the lower courts. Magistrates
are appointed for life terms. The Constitutional Council rules on the
constitutionality of laws, including those related to the protection of
human rights and civil liberties; however, its rulings are not always
respected.
The legal system is based on legislation and executive decrees,
French codified law adopted at independence, Shari'a law, and nomadic
traditions. Urban crime is dealt with in the regular courts in
accordance with French-inspired law and judicial practice. Civil
actions may be brought in regular or traditional courts. Shari'a law is
restricted to civil and family matters.
Traditional law (Xeer) often is used in conflict resolution and
victim compensation. For example, traditional law often stipulates that
a blood price be paid to the victim's clan for crimes such as murder
and rape.
The Constitution states that the accused is innocent until proven
guilty and has the right to legal counsel and to be examined by a
doctor if imprisoned. Although trials are public officially, in
politically sensitive cases security measures effectively prevent
public access. Legal counsel is supposed to be available to the
indigent in criminal and civil matters; however, defendants often do
not have representation. Court cases are heard in public before a
presiding judge and two accompanying judges. The latter receive
assistance from two persons--assessors--who are not members of the
bench, but who are thought to possess sufficient legal sophistication
to comprehend court proceedings. The Government chooses assessors from
the public at large, but credible reports indicate that political and
ethnic affiliations play a role in the selection.
On February 15, human rights attorney Aref Mohamed Aref was
arrested and imprisoned for fraud stemming from a 1994 commercial
transaction. Aref's 2-hour trial was marked by legal irregularities and
may have been influenced by Aref's long-time stance as a critic of the
Government's record on human rights. The Government repeatedly refused
to allow Aref to be represented by a French attorney despite a
bilateral accord permitting such representation. After 5 minutes of
deliberation, the judge sentenced Aref to 2 years in prison. He was
transferred immediately to Gabode prison and placed in a small solitary
cell normally used for the most dangerous criminals. Aref was released
from prison on May 11 as part of a presidential amnesty program;
however, by year's end his passport was not returned. In 1997 the
Djiboutian Bar Association had disbarred Aref and his colleague Djama
Amareh Meidal for alleged irregularities in their representation of a
client in a 1994 commercial transaction. Aref and Meidal remained
disbarred at year's end.
On September 16, the National Assembly lifted the parliamentary
immunity of Moussa Ahmed Idriss. He was arrested on September 23 on
charges of behavior inciting sedition. Nineteen of his supporters who
tried to block the arresting police were arrested at the same time (see
Section 1.d.). Moussa Idriss was sentenced to 8 months' imprisonment,
subsequently reduced to 4 months, and fined. Several dates to hear his
appeal of the sentence were deferred; however, he was released on
December 7 as part of a presidential amnesty.
On May 11, the President granted amnesty to and released Aref
Mohamed Aref and 40 common criminals. Of the more than 40 political
prisoners held in Gabode prison, only Aref was released at that time.
None of the imprisoned FRUD supporters, who are considered terrorists
by the Government, received amnesty. On December 7, the Government
announced that, in honor of Ramadan, the President had signed a decree
approved by the Council of Ministers that granted a general amnesty to
all prisoners serving sentences of 2 years or less, and reducing the
sentences by 6 months of all prisoners serving sentences of more than 2
years. Recipients of the amnesty included Moussa Ahmed Idriss, Daher
Ahmed Farah, Ali Meidal Wais, and other persons imprisoned on political
grounds during the year. The creation of the Committee for the Support
of Political Prisoners (CSPP) was announced in February 1998 (see
Section 4). The CSPP reported that the Government held 52 political
prisoners, including 12 relatives of former cabinet director Ismael
Guedi Hared who were arrested in October 1998, allegedly for hoarding
weapons, and 40 FRUD dissidents who had been handedover by Ethiopian
authorities or were FRUD rebels captured in clashes with the army.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
family, home, correspondence, and communications; however, the
Government infringed on these rights. The law also requires that the
authorities obtain a warrant before conducting searches on private
property; however, in practice the Government does not always obtain
warrants before conducting such searches, and it reportedly monitors
and sometimes disrupts the communications of some regime opponents.
Authorities harassed the family members of opposition leaders (see
Section 3).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of the press; however, at times the Government restricted this
right in practice. The law prohibits the dissemination of false
information and regulates the publication of newspapers. The
Constitution prohibits slander.
The Government owns the principal newspaper, La Nation, which in
April expanded publication from weekly to biweekly printings. There are
several opposition-run weekly and monthly publications that circulate
freely and openly criticize the Government. However, journalists, and
even vendors of opposition newspapers, occasionally are jailed or
intimidated by police.
The Government also owns the radio and television stations. The
official media generally are uncritical of government leaders and
government policy.
In April the Government banned for a period of several weeks a
local FM station from broadcasting Radio France International (RFI)
after RFI reported on a group of hunger strikers in Paris protesting
Djiboutian prison conditions.
On August 28, two opposition newspaper editors, General Ali Meidal
Wais and Daher Ahmed Farah (also known as DAF), were arrested and held
on charges of distributing false information. Wais, the former head of
the armed forces, is a high-ranking member of the ODU, and editor of
the ODU newsletter Le Temps. DAF is President of the PRD and editor of
the opposition newspaper Le Renouveau. Wais and DAF were arrested after
Le Temps and Le Renouveau reprinted a letter in which the Paris-based
FRUD leader Ahmed Dini claimed responsibility for the downing of an
army helicopter (see Section 1.a.). Police forces detained the two men
overnight before charging them and transferring them to Gabode prison.
On September 2, a court sentenced both journalists to 1 year in prison
without parole and fined them approximately $5,650 (1 million DF). Both
were released in December as part of a presidential amnesty (see
Section 1.e.). The court also banned publication of Le Temps and Le
Renouveau for six months. With the release of their editors in the
December amnesty, the ban lapsed; however, no issues were published
between December 8 and December 31.
On October 22, the Government detained two foreign journalists whom
it accused of attempting to ``tarnish the image'' of the country.
There are no specific laws or criminal sanctions that threaten
academic freedom. In general, teachers may speak and conduct research
without restriction, provided that they do not violate sedition laws.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The right to free
assembly is provided for in the Constitution; however, the Government
limited this right in practice. The Ministry of Interior requires
permits for peaceful assembly and monitors opposition activities. While
permits generally are approved, the Government commonly uses a show of
police force and threatening tactics to intimidate and discourage
would-be demonstrators. Some opposition leaders effectively practiced
self-censorship and, rather than provoke a Government crackdown,
refrained from organizing popular demonstrations.
On February 12, police detained three ODU party leaders and six
busloads of ODU supporters, including human rights attorney Aref
Mohamed Aref, for several hours after dispersing a political rally with
tear gas (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). On March 28, police used tear
gas and fired guns into the air to prevent approximately a thousand
supporters of opposition presidential candidate Moussa Ahmed Idriss
from marching on the presidential palace. Police broke up the crowd and
arrested 17 persons after participants threw rocks at them. The
opposition asserted that several more supporters were injured, some
seriously, and witnesses to the incident saw police beating protesters.
InAugust police used tear gas to disperse a crowd of approximately 200
persons who gathered outside the Ministry of Justice to protest the
arrest of two opposition journalists (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association provided that
certain legal requirements are met; however, the Government restricts
this right in practice. A referendum held in 1993 approved limiting the
number of political parties to four. This result has not yet been
codified into law. The Government took advantage of an absence of
leadership in the main opposition party, the PRD, following the late
1996 death of its leader, and conferred legal recognition on what
appeared to be the weaker half of the party. In 1997 police detained
the leader of the unrecognized PRD faction, DAF, and charged him in a
closed hearing with illegally operating a political party, illegally
publishing a newspaper, disseminating false information, forgery (for
the use of party seals), usurping a title, and organizing an illegal
demonstration. In 1997 DAF was given ``provisional liberty,'' which
granted him freedom while his case was pending. His case was dropped in
early 1999; however, on August 28, DAF was arrested again and charged
with disseminating false information (see Section 2.a.).
Nonpolitical associations must register and be approved by the
Ministry of Interior.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution, while declaring Islam to
be the state religion, provides for freedom of religion, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice; however,
proselytizing is discouraged. In May, the President declared that Islam
would be a central tenet of his Government, and named the Qadi, the
country's senior judge of Islamic law, as Minister of State for
Charitable and Religious Affairs, reporting to the Minister of Justice,
whose functions include ``fostering tolerance.'' Although Islam is the
state religion, the Government imposes no sanctions on those who choose
to ignore Islamic teachings, or practice other faiths. Virtually the
entire population is Sunni Muslim.
The Government requires that religious groups be registered. There
were no reports that the Government refused to register any religious
groups.
On several occasions, groups of Ethiopian Pentecostal Christians
were detained during prayer meetings, but were released after a few
days. These arrests reportedly were due to loud singing that disturbed
neighbors or to a general crackdown on illegal residents, rather than
to the Ethiopians' religious faith.
There is no legal prohibition against proselytizing, but
proselytizing is discouraged. Foreign clergy and missionaries are
permitted to perform charitable works and to sell their religious
books. A small number of foreign Christian missionary groups operate in
the country. The groups, which focus on humanitarian services in the
education and health sectors, reportedly faced no harassment during the
year. Foreign missionary groups are licensed by the Government to run
schools.
Islamic law based on the Koran is used only with regard to family
matters, and is administered by the Qadi. Civil marriage is permitted
only to non-Muslim foreigners. Muslims are required to marry in a
religious ceremony, and non-Muslim men can only marry a Muslim woman
after converting to Islam.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution allows freedom of
movement; however, there were instances in which authorities limited
this right. In general citizens may travel or emigrate without
restriction or interference. However, a judge may order a passport
seized for those under judicial surveillance or awaiting trial. In
October 1998, the passport of GDR leader Moumin Bahdon Farah was seized
despite the fact that a court had ordered that his passport be returned
to him to enable him to leave the country. In December 1998,
authorities seized the passport of human rights attorney Aref Mohamed
Aref. Neither Moumin's nor Aref's passports were returned by year's
end.
Up to 18,000 Afars sought asylum in Ethiopia during the 1991-94
civil war. At least 10,000 are believed to have repatriated themselves
since the 1994 peace accord. According to Ethiopian authorities, no
Djiboutian Afars remain in Ethiopia; however, because the displaced
Afars were not in refugee camps, and because Afars are indigenous to
Ethiopia and Eritrea as well, it is difficult to estimate their number.
The law provides for the granting of refugee or asylum status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government offers first asylum;
however, the government committee responsible for determining refugees'
status has not met since 1995, and theGovernment does not recognize
those refugees under the protection of the U.N. High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR) absent this approval.
The country hosts up to 100,000 refugees and illegal immigrants
from neighboring countries, equal to about one-fifth of the population.
These numbers have increased since May 1998 due to the still unresolved
border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The UNHCR assists 21,000
Somali and 1,000 Ethiopian residents of the two remaining refugee
camps. Some 2,500 Ethiopian and Somali urban refugees are registered
with the UNHCR office in Djibouti City.
There has been no major repatriation effort since the UNHCR's 1994-
96 repatriation of 35,000 Ethiopian refugees and migrants from the
capital. The Djiboutian National Office for the Assistance of Refugees
and Displaced Persons reported that it deports up to a thousand
Ethiopians each week.
In May clashes between unemployed citizens and Ethiopians led to a
number of injuries (see Section 1.c.).
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
Government, and citizens exercised this right through a democratic
process in presidential elections held in April. RPP candidate Ismael
Omar Guelleh, the designated successor of former President Hassan
Gouled Aptidon, won the April 9 election with 74 percent of the vote.
ODU candidate Moussa Ahmed Idriss received 26 percent of the vote. For
the first time since multiparty elections began in 1992, no group
boycotted the vote. Although Moussa Ahmed Idriss and the ODU challenged
the results, alleging election ``irregularities'' and asserting that
``foreigners'' voted in various districts of the capital, international
and domestic observers considered the election to be generally fair,
citing only minor irregularities. All five of the districts were
visited by at least 1 of the 22 international observers on election
day. Observers representing the Arab League, the International
Organization of Francophone States (La Francophonie), and the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) issued a joint communique that
expressed satisfaction with the transparency of the election, citing
only minor technical problems. Representatives of both candidates were
present in virtually all voting stations and there was no ethnic strife
among Afars, Yemenis, and Somalis. Large numbers of persons of all
communities supported both candidates. However, in the December 1997
legislative elections the RPP alliance with the legal FRUD party won
all 65 seats. The elections took place without international observers
amid opposition claims of fraud.
The RPP, which has been in power since independence in 1977,
continues to rule the country. The RPP also continues to control
carefully the implementation of the four-party system to suppress any
organized opposition. There is no independent election commission.
Previous efforts by both the legal and unrecognized opposition parties
to unify also floundered due to disagreements among their leaders over
who should lead a unified opposition.
The 1994 peace agreement between the Government and the FRUD
required that FRUD members be included in senior government positions.
Two FRUD members were named to the Cabinet in June 1995, and in May
1999, two new FRUD members were appointed to the Cabinet. A former FRUD
military commander was appointed to the Defense portfolio and another
FRUD member assumed the Health portfolio. The government-recognized
faction of the FRUD was registered as a political party in 1996. The
unrecognized FRUD faction includes members who refused to accept the
terms of the peace accord, as well as Afars extradited from Ethiopia in
1997 (see Section 2.d.).
Government harassment of opposition leaders was a problem. On
August 28, police arrested Daher Ahmed Farah, the president of the PRD,
along with General Wais, a high ranking member of the ODU, for
distributing false information (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). On
September 23, Moussa Ahmed Idriss, the opposition presidential
candidate, and some of his followers were arrested (see Sections 1.d.
and 1.e.). In May 1998, Moumin Bahdon, the President of the GDR, was
questioned about his links with FRUD rebels and in October 1998, his
passport was taken from him despite the fact that a court had ordered
that his passport be returned to him to enable him to leave the country
(see Section 2.d.). Bahdon's family members claimed that they faced
constant harassment from the Government, for example, with respect to
access to schooling for children.
On February 12, police used tear gas to break up a political rally
and detained some of the participants for several hours (see Sections
1.d. and 2.b.). In March while trying to prevent a political rally from
marching on the presidential palace, policeforces beat several
participants severely, used tear gas, fired guns into the air, and
arrested many participants (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.).
Although legally entitled to participate in the political process,
women largely have been excluded from senior positions in government
and in the political parties, and are underrepresented in government
and politics. On May 18, the new President announced the appointment of
the first female minister to his cabinet. Hawa Ahmed Youssouf was
designated as Minister of State for the Promotion of Women's, Family,
and Social Affairs, and reports to the Prime Minister. Khadija Abeba,
President of the Supreme Court, is the highest-ranking female official
and, according to the Constitution, would become interim President
should that position become vacant.
The President's subclan, the Issa Mamassans, wields
disproportionate power in affairs of state. Afars hold a number of high
Ministerial posts, but are not well represented at lower levels. Somali
clans other than the Issa and Djiboutians of Yemeni origin are limited
unofficially to one ministerial post each. There are also informal
limits on the number of seats for each group in the Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government remains antagonistic to the formation of local human
rights groups. The Association for the Defense of Human Rights and
Liberties (ADDHL), which ceased operations in 1997, briefly resumed
activity as a progovernment organization in 1998 but did not resume its
investigations into, or criticisms of, human right abuses. The ADDHL
was inactive during the year.
The formation of the Committee in Support of Political Prisoners
(CSPP) was announced in February 1998. The Committee's goal is to
publicize the plight of political prisoners and mobilize support for
the improvement of prison conditions and for the release of political
prisoners. The leader of the newly-formed Djiboutian Human Rights
League, Jean-Paul Noel Abdi, was detained without charges twice during
the year. In May, a hand grenade was thrown into his compound by
unknown persons (see Section 1.c.).
The Union of Djiboutian Women (UNFD) and the Djiboutian Association
for the Promotion of the Family (ADEPF) promote the rights of women and
children.
The ICRC maintains a small office that is staffed locally. The ICRC
regional representative who is based in Nairobi makes quarterly visits.
A post of government ombudsman was created by presidential decree
in October and the first incumbent took office in November.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of language,
race, sex, or religion; however, discrimination against women and
ethnic minorities persists. In particular, the Government's enforcement
of laws to protect women and children is weak.
Women.--Violence against women exists but reported cases are few.
The Government has been concerned about the problem of rape, and the
1995 revised Penal Code includes sentences of up to 20 years'
imprisonment for rapists. More than 80 such cases were tried during the
year, but only a few led to conviction. Violence against women normally
is dealt with within the family or clan structure rather than in the
courts. The police rarely intervene in domestic violence incidents, and
the media report only the most extreme examples, such as murder. In
almost all the cases of the rape of Afar women by soldiers in recent
years, the victims did not press charges due to shame and fear (see
Section 1.c.).
Women legally possess full civil rights, but custom and traditional
societal discrimination in education dictate that they play a secondary
role in public life and have fewer employment opportunities than men.
Few women work in managerial and professional positions; women largely
are confined to trade and secretarial fields. Customary law, which is
based on Shari'a (Islamic law), discriminates against women in such
areas as inheritance, divorce, and travel (see Section 2.d.). Male
children inherit larger percentages of an estate than do female
children. Women are not permitted to travel without the permission of
an adult male relative. The few educated womenincreasingly turn to the
regular courts to defend their interests.
Children.--The Government devotes almost no public funds to the
advancement of children's rights and welfare. A few charitable
organizations work with children. Primary education is compulsory;
however, the Government does not monitor compliance. Many schools are
in poor condition and need upgrading. The number of classrooms for
secondary students is inadequate, and only approximately 20 percent of
children who start secondary school complete their education. More than
53 percent of the population is illiterate: only 32 percent of girls
are literate compared with 60 percent of boys. Only 62 percent of girls
attend primary school compared with 73 percent of boys, and only 23
percent of girls attend secondary school compared with 33 percent of
boys. Girls made up only 36 percent of all secondary students. The
Government in November reaffirmed its 1998 commitment to increase the
number of female students in the educational system to 50 percent, and
significant progress was made toward this goal in the primary grades.
The new Government announced its intention to revitalize the education
sector during the course of a national week-long symposium on education
policy held in December with the support of the Ministry of Education.
Participants included representatives of the education profession,
parents, students, and other interested parties.
According to a recent report, as many as 98 percent of females age
7 or older have undergone female genital mutilation, which is widely
condemned by international health experts as damaging to both physical
and psychological health. FGM traditionally is performed on girls
between the ages of 7 and 10. In 1988 the Union of Djiboutian Women
(UNFD) began an educational campaign against infibulation, the most
extensive and dangerous form of FGM. The campaign has had only a
limited impact on the prevalence of this custom, particularly in rural
areas, where it is pervasive. After the 1995 U.N. Women's Conference in
Cairo, Egypt, the UNFD declared that all forms of mutilation should be
forbidden. The revised Penal Code that went into effect in 1995 states
that ``violence causing genital mutilation'' is punishable by 5 years'
imprisonment and a fine of over $5,650 (1 million DF). However, the
Government has not yet convicted anyone under this statute. The efforts
of the UNFD and other groups appeared to be having some effect, at
least in the capital city. In 1997 some health workers reported a
precipitous drop in the number of hospitalizations related to FGM in
Djibouti City. Many believe that the incidence of the most extreme
procedure, infibulation, has decreased, although no systematic data was
available on the problem. U.N. and other experts believe that lesser
forms of FGM still were widely practiced and that infibulation still
was common in rural areas.
Child abuse exists, but is not thought to be common. The Government
has not addressed child abuse, which often is punished lightly; for
example, when a child is raped or abused, the perpetrator usually is
fined an amount sufficient to cover the child's medical care. The
Government has not used applicable existing provisions of the Penal
Code to deal with child abuse more severely.
People with Disabilities.--The Government does not mandate
accessibility to buildings or government services for the disabled.
Although disabled persons have access to education and public health
facilities, there is no specific legislation that addresses the needs
of the disabled, and there are no laws or regulations that prevent job
discrimination against disabled persons. The disabled have difficulty
finding employment in an economy where at least 60 percent of the able-
bodied adult male population is underemployed or jobless.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government continued to
discriminate against citizens on the basis of ethnicity in employment
and job advancement. Somali Issas are the majority ethnic group and
control the ruling party, the civil and security services, and the
military forces. Discrimination based on ethnic and clan affiliation
limited the role of members of minority groups and clans, particularly
the Afar minority ethnic group, in government and politics.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Under the Constitution, workers are
free to join unions and to strike provided that they comply with
legally prescribed requirements; however, the Government limits these
rights. Since 1992 unions have been free to join or form other
confederations. The state body, the General Union of Djiboutian Workers
(UGTD), and the Union of Djiboutian Workers (UDT) formed a
confederation in 1995 and have gained increasing support despite
governmentharassment. In 1996 the Government sealed the headquarters of
the UDT/UGTD confederation, and UDT/UGTD confederation bank accounts
remained frozen at year's end. Nevertheless, in the small formal
economy, about 70 percent of workers are members of the combined UDT/
UGTD confederation. Previously the Government controlled individual
unions by making membership mandatory in the state-organized labor
confederation. To counter the UDT/UGTD, the Government created the
Djiboutian Labor Congress composed of Ministry of Labor officials. At
its June 1997 meeting, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
determined that the Government had violated the ILO constitution by not
allowing a member of the UDT/UGTD confederation to join the workers'
delegation at the meeting.
In 1998 after a visit from an ILO delegation, the Government agreed
to begin a dialog with the UDT/UGTD regarding the creation of a
tripartite labor commission consisting of unions, government, and
business representatives. The Government also accepted an invitation to
the ILO June 1998 meeting in Geneva; however, the Government did not
send representatives to Geneva and did not begin the promised dialog.
As a result of the ILO visit, the UDT/UGTD were able to reclaim their
headquarters in 1998, which had been taken from them in 1996. However,
their bank accounts remained frozen at year's end. During the year, a
rival UDT/UGTD was created with government support. The new faction of
the UDT/UGTD remains unrecognized by the original union leaders.
The law requires representatives of employees who plan to strike to
contact the Interior Ministry 48 hours in advance. Teachers' strikes
continued during the year, primarily to protest delays in salary
payments and a lack of equipment and teaching materials. Kamil Hassan,
a schoolteacher, who previously had been detained in February 1997 as a
leader of a teacher's strike, still was not permitted to teach in
public schools.
Unions are free to maintain relations and exchanges with labor
organizations abroad. The UDT has been a member of the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) since 1994.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Although labor
has the legal right to organize and bargain collectively, collective
bargaining rarely occurs. Relations between employers and workers are
informal and paternalistic. Wage rates generally are established
unilaterally by employers on the basis of Ministry of Labor guidelines.
In disputes over wages or health and safety problems, the Ministry of
Labor encourages direct resolution by labor representatives and
employers. Workers or employers may request formal administrative
hearings before the Ministry's inspection service, but critics claim
that the service suffers from poor enforcement, due to its low priority
and inadequate funding. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, and
employers found legally guilty are required to reinstate workers fired
for union activities. However, the Government does not appear to
enforce the law.
An export processing zone (EPZ) was established in 1994. Firms in
the EPZ are exempt from the Government's social security and medical
insurance programs. Instead, they must provide either government or
private accident insurance. The minimum wage in the EPZ is
approximately $1 (176 DF) per hour. Although the regular workweek is 40
hours, in the EPZ it is 45 hours. An employee who works for the same
firm in the EPZ for at least 1 year has the right to 15 days' annual
leave, compared with 30 days in the rest of the country (see Section
6.e.). Discussions took place during the year on the creation of a
``free trade zone'' that would offer certain benefits and exemptions to
foreign investors.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
all forced or compulsory labor, including by children; however, while
the law generally is observed, there are reports that members of the
security forces sometimes compel illegal immigrants to work for them
under the threat of deportation. There were no reports of forced child
labor.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits all labor by children under the age of
14, but the Government does not always enforce this prohibition
effectively, and a shortage of labor inspectors reduces the likelihood
of investigation. Children generally are not employed for hazardous
work. Children may and do work in family-owned businesses, such as
restaurants and small shops, at all hours. The law prohibits forced or
compulsory labor, including by children, and there were no reports of
forced child labor (see Section 6.c.)
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Only a small minority of the
population is engaged in wage employment. The Government
administratively sets minimum wage rates according to occupational
categories, and the Ministry of Labor is charged with enforcement. The
monthly wage rate for unskilled labor, set in 1976, is approximately
$90 (15,840 DF). Most employers pay more than the minimum wage. Some
workers also receive housing and transportation allowances. The minimum
wage for unskilled labor does not provide adequate compensation for a
worker and family to maintain a decent standard of living.
By law the workweek is 40 hours, often spread over 6 days. Some
employers ask employees to work up to 12 hours per day and pay them an
additional wage. Workers are provided daily and weekly rest periods and
paid annual leave. The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing
occupational health and safety standards, wages, and work hours.
Because enforcement is ineffective, workers sometimes face hazardous
working conditions, particularly at the port. Workers rarely protest,
mainly due to fear that they may be replaced by others willing to
accept the risks. There are no laws or regulations permitting workers
to refuse to carry out dangerous work assignments without jeopardy to
continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, and there were no reports of persons being trafficked in, to,
or from the country.
______
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Equatorial Guinea is nominally a multiparty constitutional
republic; however, in reality power is exercised by President Teodoro
Obiang Nguema and the small Mongomo subclan of the majority Fang tribe,
which has ruled since the country's independence in 1968. President
Obiang, who has ruled since seizing power in a military coup d'etat in
1979, was elected to a 7-year term in February 1996 in elections that
were marred by extensive fraud and intimidation. The President's
Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) controls the judiciary and
the legislature, the latter also through elections in March that were
widely criticized as seriously flawed by the international community.
The judiciary is not independent.
President Obiang exercises control over the police and security
forces through the Minister of the Interior, who serves as President of
the National Electoral Board as well. The Director General of National
Security is the President's brother, Armengol Ondo Nguema. The security
forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
The majority of the population of approximately 470,000 lives by
subsistence agriculture, supplemented by hunting and fishing. Barter is
a major aspect of the economy, and the monetary sector is based on
exports of petroleum, cocoa, and timber. Most foreign economic
assistance has been suspended due to the lack of economic reform and
the Government's poor human rights record. However, in October the
Government of Spain, which suspended aid 6 years ago, signed a new
cooperation agreement with the Government. Substantial oil deposits
were first discovered in 1995, and exploitation began in 1996. However,
the investment and other use of oil revenues lacks transparency despite
repeated calls from international financial institutions and citizens
for greater financial openness. Poor fiscal management and a lack of
public accounting transparency in national finances undermine the
country's economic potential. Little evidence is apparent that the
country's oil wealth is being devoted to the public good.
The Government's human rights record remained poor. Serious and
systematic human rights abuses continued, and the security forces
committed a number of abuses. Citizens do not have the right to change
their government in fair elections. There were reports of extrajudicial
killings, both of prisoners in detention and of individuals in rural
areas. Other principal abuses by security forces included: Torture;
beating and otherphysical abuse of prisoners; arbitrary arrest and
detention; incommunicado detention; extortion from prisoners; searches
without warrants; the looting of private homes; and the confiscation of
property without due process. Members of the security forces generally
commit abuses with impunity. Prison conditions remained life
threatening. Prisoners often are subjected to torture in order to
extract confessions. The judicial system continued to fail to ensure
due process and remained subject to executive pressures. The Government
severely restricted freedom of speech and of the press. It continued to
restrict the right of assembly and did not always respect the right of
association. The Government continued to limit freedom of religion and
freedom of movement. The Government encouraged the illegal capture and
involuntary repatriation of its political opponents living abroad.
There are no effective domestic human rights nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's), and in April the Government promulgated a new
law that further restricted NGO's and appears to preclude them from
functioning in the area of human rights. Violence and discrimination
against women and foreigners remain serious problems. Discrimination
against minorities, particularly the Bubi ethnic group continued. The
Government continued to restrict labor rights; no labor unions exist,
and strikes are prohibited. The abuse of workers' rights is a
particular problem in the oil industry. Child labor persists, and
forced prison labor is used.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were
unconfirmed reports of extrajudicial killings by security forces both
of prisoners in detention and of individuals in rural areas.
During the year, the Government did not prosecute for extrajudicial
killings any members of the security forces, including those considered
responsible for extrajudicial killings in prior years.
b. Disappearance.--There were reports of disappearances; however,
these were difficult to confirm.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Fundamental Law (Constitution) mandates respect for
the liberty and dignity of persons, but does not specifically prohibit
torture or cruel or inhuman punishment, and members of the security
forces tortured, beat, and otherwise abused prisoners. The level of
these abuses is serious and, in the wake of the 1998 revolt, increased
over previous years. A number of prisoners are still under sentence
from the revolt, and reports of their abuse and torture continue to
circulate. The Government does little to prevent excesses and routinely
attributes any reported instances of torture to allegedly rogue
elements.
Officials reportedly detained, interrogated, beat, and tortured
opposition political activists (see Section 1.d.).
Police routinely stop citizens and members of the opposition at
roadblocks and subject known members of the opposition in particular to
searches and extortion. Local authorities also singled out foreigners
from neighboring countries for harassment, intimidation, and extortion.
Prison conditions are primitive and life threatening. Rations are
inadequate, and sanitary conditions practically nonexistent. Prisoners
sentenced following the 1998 revolt reported being fed bread and water
only once every 2 days. Initially no food was allowed in from outside
as is the custom. During the year both family visits and provisions
reportedly were allowed.
Prison conditions ostensibly are monitored by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which normally makes recommendations
to the Government. However, the head of the regional ICRC office,
despite repeated attempts, was not granted access to any prisons or
detention centers during the first 11 months of the year; he was
granted access in December.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There are nominal legal
procedural safeguards regarding detention, the requirement for search
warrants, and other protection of citizens' rights; however, these
safeguards are ignored systematically by security forces, which
continued to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily.
Police routinely hold prisoners in incommunicado detention.
Foreigners from neighboring countries sometimes are targeted for
arbitrary mistreatment and random arrest. These included visitors and
residents from Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, and Benin. Members of the security
forces often resorted to such activities in order to extort money prior
to national holidays.
Political detentions seldom lasted more than a few months.
Following the 1998 revolt, approximately 500 ethnic Bubis reportedly
were arrested and interrogated. Reliable information on the number and
identities of detainees was not readily available. The majority of them
were released, although 15 who were tried and sentenced to death had
their sentences commuted to life imprisonment by President Obiang later
in 1998. It is difficult to estimate the exact number of political
detainees, although it is believed to be less than 100 persons.
During the year, the Government arrested opposition political
activists on a number of occasions, especially around the time of the
legislative elections and detained them without charge for periods up
to several weeks. Officials reportedly interrogated, beat, and tortured
them. In June three activists of the Republican Democratic Force (FDR)
were arrested in Mongomo, supposedly for holding an unauthorized
meeting, and were jailed in Bata. In September the Government arrested
Placido Miko, secretary general of the opposition Convergence for
Social Democracy (CPDS) party in Bata and confiscated his computer and
files. Although he was released a week later, he was given provisional
liberty and told to report twice a month to the authorities in Bata. No
formal charges were brought. It is estimated that some 90 opposition
party members were arrested during the year and held for short periods.
The Government uses the psychological effects of arrest, along with the
fear of beatings and harassment, to intimidate opposition party
officials and members.
During the year, government security forces on one occasion
detained an employee of a foreign oil company for a short period for
alleged irregularities in processing the import of equipment.
The Government does not force its citizens into exile; however,
some persons have fled the country for political reasons.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is not independent;
judges serve at the pleasure of the President and are appointed,
transferred, and dismissed for political reasons. Corruption is
widespread.
The court system is composed of lower provincial courts, two
appeals courts, a military tribunal, and a Supreme Court. The President
appoints members of the Supreme Court, who report to him. Tribal elders
adjudicate civil claims and minor criminal matters in traditional
courts in the countryside.
The Fundamental Law and laws passed by the chamber of deputies
provide for legal representation in trials and the right to appeal. In
practice the authorities often do not respect these provisions. Civil
cases rarely come to public trial. Cases involving national security
are tried by the military tribunal.
The Government holds a number of political prisoners. In May 1998
the Government conducted a public trial before a military tribunal of
116 persons allegedly involved in the January 21, 1998, revolt on Bioko
island. The defendants were charged with terrorism, undermining state
security, and illegal possession of weapons. Many defendants claimed
that the Government had obtained confessions from them by torture.
However, the president of the military tribunal refused to allow
defense lawyers to raise the question of torture, although a number of
the accused bore unmistakable marks of recent physical abuse. The
conduct of the trials drew universal criticism, although observers
noted that some defendants might have been guilty of the offenses with
which they were charged. The tribunal found 63 persons guilty on at
least one charge, but acquitted 53 of all charges. It sentenced 15
convicted defendants to death, and sentenced the 48 others to terms
ranging from 6 to 26 years in prison. The 15 condemned to death were
the only defendants absent from the court when the sentences were
announced. They were not executed, and President Obiang later commuted
theirsentences to life imprisonment, following petitions for clemency
from foreign governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's).
Two members of the ruling Mongomo clan and of the banned Democratic
Republican Forces (FDR) party, former Education Minister Felipe Ondo
and former Planning Minister Guillermo Nguema remained in prison. They
were convicted of libeling the State and sentenced to 30 months'
imprisonment in 1998, after Equatoguinean security forces repatriated
them involuntarily from Gabon with the consent of the Government of
Gabon (see Section 2.d.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Government infringes on these rights. It does not
enforce the law requiring judicial warrants for searches. Security
forces regularly search homes and arrest occupants, and generally do so
with impunity.
On several occasions the Government reportedly attempted to force
opposition members or officials to join the ruling PDGE party.
Moreover, the arrests of opposition members appeared to be a
coordinated government campaign spread out over a wide area and
designed to intimidate the opposition prior to the legislative
elections and dissuade voters from voting for opposition parties.
Detainees included members of the CPDS, the Union Popular, and the
banned Partido Del Progresso. All were jailed in violation of the
national pact signed between the Government and oppositions parties in
Malabo in 1997.
For lawyers, government employees, and some others, PDGE party
membership is necessary for employment and promotion. Even in the
private sector, many citizens claim that party membership is required
in order to be hired. The party banner is displayed prominently with
the national flag in government offices, and many officials wear PDGE
lapel pins.
There is reportedly surveillance of members of the opposition
parties and foreign diplomats.
According to credible sources, citizens living in rural areas are
hesitant to associate with or even be seen with foreigners, due to the
fear of repercussions from the authorities.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government severely
restricted these rights in practice. Journalists practice self-
censorship.
In April shortly before a national symposium on press liberty was
scheduled, the Minister of the interior ordered the removal of the
democratically elected president of the Press Association (ASOPGE),
Manuel Nze Nzogo, even though the ASOPGE was a legally recognized NGO.
The reason given was that its president was supposedly not properly
qualified for the position.
The Government allows mild criticism of infrastructure, public
institutions, and public sector mismanagement and permitted some
increased criticism of minor administrative decisions. However, it
permits no criticism of the President or the security forces. All
journalists must be registered with the Ministry of Information.
According to press sources, there are about a dozen independent
reporters registered with the Ministry of Information. Between 30 and
40 reporters employed by the official party or government publications
also are registered. Visiting foreign reporters must be accompanied by
guides from the Ministry of Information.
Two general-interest newspapers appear regularly: La Gaceta, a
Malabo-based publications with connections to the Government is
published monthly. Human-interest stories dominate its domestic news
coverage. Ebano, a publication of the Ministry of Information, appears
about twice a month. Two new newspapers, El Tiempo and La Opinion were
approved in September by the Ministry of Information and were
authorized to begin publication in 2000.
The current press law, enacted in 1992, reportedly is based on
Spain's 1967 Franco-era press law and authorizes government censorship
of all publications. The Ministry of Information sometimes requires
publishers to submit copy for approval prior to publication. All local
publications exerciseself-censorship and are subject to prior
restraint. Few foreign publications are available for sale, and
security forces reportedly peruse the contents of publications from
Spain and confiscate literature critical of the Government.
Radio is the most important medium of mass communication. The
Government continued effectively to monopolize domestic radio
broadcasting. It owns and operates Radio Malabo. In 1998 the Government
permitted the establishment of the country's first private domestic
radio station, the FM station Radio Asonga. However, that station
reportedly is owned by the Minister of Forestry, Environment, and
Fisheries, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, the son of the President. The
Government has not approved other applications to operate private radio
stations, although several applications are pending.
The domestic television station is government controlled and
broadcasts only a few hours a day. Foreign cable television is
available, and offers the Cable News Network, French news, movies,
sports events, and cartoons, but relatively few citizens can afford it.
Satellite reception is increasingly available.
The Government generally withholds access to domestic broadcasting
from prodemocracy opposition parties and rarely refers to what it calls
the ``radical'' opposition in anything but negative terms when
broadcasting the news.
Radio Exterior, the international short-wave service from Spain,
often broadcasts news about the country and interviews with opposition
politicians. It is virtually the only means for the opposition to
widely disseminate its views and positions. Its editorials, like those
of most of the Spanish media, are often highly critical of the
Government. The Government regularly accused Radio Exterior of
misrepresenting the situation in the country and in 1998 asked the
Spanish Government to halt broadcasts that ``may provoke problems.''
Internet service is available, although access is expensive, and
computer ownership is not widespread.
During the year the Government opened a National University, the
country's only institution of higher learning.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Fundamental
Law provides for the right of assembly; however, the Government
restricts this right in practice. Government authorization must be
obtained for meetings of more than 10 persons in private homes for
discussions that the regime considers political. Although the
Government formally has abolished permit requirements for party
meetings within party buildings, in practice opposition parties must
inform the authorities in order to hold gatherings of any kind,
regardless of location.
Security forces generally observe gatherings in public places, even
small gatherings. The Government requires notification for public
events and routinely denies permission to meet, effectively restricting
the right of assembly.
The Fundamental Law provides for the right of association; however,
the Government does not always respect this right in practice. Police
routinely and systematically harass and jail members of opposition
parties. Opposition party members complained of disruption of meetings
and of roadblocks at which they are forced to pay soldiers in order to
proceed.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Fundamental Law provides for freedom
of religion; however, the Government limits this right in practice.
There is no state religion, and the Government does not discriminate
against any faith. However, the Ministry of Justice and Religion must
approve a religious organization before its religious activities are
allowed formally. The Government continued to restrict the freedom of
expression of the clergy, particularly regarding any open criticism of
the regime. The Government requires permission for any activities
outside church walls, but in practice this nominal requirement does not
appear to be a hindrance to organized religious groups.
The Government restricted the activities of the Catholic Church, of
which most citizens are at least nominally members. The Government
continued to detain throughout the year Father Eduardo Losha Belope,
who is a priest, a Bubi, and the president of the Malabo chapter of the
Catholic NGO, Caritas; security forces arrested him in February 1998 in
connection with theJanuary 1998 revolt. In July 1998, the Archbishop of
Malabo, Laureano Ekua Obama, stated publicly that the Government now
requires Catholic priests to obtain government permission before
celebrating mass and commented that the Government does this because
the church repeatedly criticized human rights violations, social
injustice, and corruption in the country. The Archbishop also stated
that government harassment made it very difficult to be a Catholic
priest.
The Government relaxed some restrictions on religious activities by
foreign missionaries in 1996. Missionaries in Bata and Malabo reported
little government interference in their work, although there were
increasing problems bringing in materials and equipment duty-free,
which they had been allowed to do in the past.
There appears to be a marked official preference towards the
Catholic Church. Religious study is required in schools and is usually,
but not exclusively, Catholic.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--In principle freedom of movement and
travel throughout the country is provided for by law; however, the
Government limits these rights in practice. Local police routinely
demand bribes from occupants of cars, taxis, and other vehicles
traveling outside the capital. The police routinely stop citizens and
in particular known members of the opposition at roadblocks, subject
them to searches, and extort money from them. Members of the Bubi
ethnic group on the island of Bioko are unable to move about freely,
according to credible sources. Roadblocks throughout the island prevent
Bubis from traveling easily between villages.
All citizens are required to have permission to travel abroad, and
members of opposition parties regularly are denied this permission and
sometimes are interrogated or detained upon their return.
Government officials attempt to control the movements of all
citizens by requiring exit visas or denying or confiscating passports.
Those who depart Malabo without an exit visa must travel by canoe
across 40 miles of open ocean to reach mainland Africa, and then they
face possible immigration charges upon their return. However, several
prominent members of opposition parties were able to travel abroad
without hindrance. Prior to the legislative elections, resident
diplomats were not allowed to travel around the country freely until
the day before the voting.
During recent years, an average of one or two foreigners a year,
from Mauritania, Nigeria, or the Congo, requested refugee or asylee
status in the country. The Government provides first asylum and
generally grants asylum requests, although security forces reportedly
have harassed asylum seekers, few of whom have remained long in the
country. There were no reports of the forced return of any foreigners
to a country where they feared persecution.
The Government continued to attempt to neutralize opposition groups
outside its borders by kidnaping its citizens living in other countries
(see Section 1.e.).
Since September 1997, 12 Equatoguineans and their families, now in
opposition to the Government, have been detained by Cameroonian
security forces--ostensibly for their own protection--at a military
base in Yaounde. The majority are former military officers, and all
have refugee status granted by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.
In October the Cameroonian press reported that two of the refugees
escaped from the base and met with others to plot a coup attempt
against the Equatorial Guinea regime. They subsequently were arrested
in Douala and returned to the capital. In mid-October a number of
senior-level visitors from Malabo to Cameroon reportedly requested
their extradition to Equatorial Guinea, which the Cameroonian
Government did not grant. All 12 refugees remain under loose detention
at the military base.
The Government continued to demand that the Spanish Government
repatriate Severo Moto, leader of the now-banned Popular Party, who led
an attempt to overthrow the government by armed force in 1997 and whom
the Government of Spain had granted asylum.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
The Constitution nominally provides citizens with the right to
change their government peacefully; however, in practice there have
been no free, fair, and transparent elections since independence in
1968. The President exercises complete power as head of state,
commander of the armed forces, and leader of the government party, the
PDGE. With the main exception of the Prime Minister, a Bubi, leadership
positions within the Government in general are restricted to the
President's Mongomo clan of the Fang ethnic group and its closest
supporters. While there is an elected Chamber of Deputies, it is not
representative and is dominated completely by the Government. The
Minister of the Interior also acts as President of the National
Electoral Board.
The February 1996 presidential election, in which President Obiang
claimed reelection with 98 percent of the vote, was considered openly
fraudulent by international observers. Some opposition politicians who
campaigned were beaten and jailed. Voting was done in the open and
without secrecy, with opposition parties allegedly being barred from
access to polling areas. There were credible reports of widespread
arrests and violence against opposition party members before the
elections, as well as of beatings, roadblocks, stuffed ballot boxes,
and the presence of security forces. Most opposition parties, claiming
that it was futile to run amidst such blatant corruption, boycotted the
election.
In 1997 the Government and 13 political parties promulgated a
revised national pact following 3 months of debate. The pact calls for
the creation of a multiparty electoral commission and an observance
commission to monitor compliance with the agreement. The pact also
stipulated an end to various political and electoral abuses and the
extension of voting rights already nominally provided for in the
Constitution. However, the Government has not abided by most of the
pact's provisions. Opposition activists report that the Government has
made virtually no effort to implement the pact. The Government's
refusal to issue exit visas to opposition figures violates the pact's
principle of freedom of travel. The continued arrests of CPDS, UP, and
FDR activists further undermined the Government's claims that it abides
by the pact, as did its continued restrictions on freedom of movement
and the continued lack of access to government media by the opposition.
In 1998 the Government enacted a new electoral law that mandates
the replacement of open voting by secret ballots in future elections
but prohibits coalitions between political parties, which weakens the
opposition by preventing the formation of any opposition umbrella
groups.
The legislative elections that should have been held in the fall of
1998 were postponed until March 7. The new electoral census was
completed in December 1998, but not all of the opposition parties
agreed to sign it. International observers considered the election
process to be seriously flawed. The UP and CPDS opposition parties won
only 5 of the 80 seats, refused to take their seats in the new
legislature, and called for the results to be annulled and new
elections held.
Although there are no legal restrictions on the participation of
women in politics; however, women remain seriously underrepresented in
government positions. There are 4 women in the 41-member Cabinet, and 5
in the 80-member legislature.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no effective domestic human rights nongovernmental
organizations. No international human rights NGO has permanent presence
in the country. The Government does not recognize their reports or
acknowledge their credibility.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights visited in March and
December 1998 and ostensibly received the Government's cooperation. The
Government made strenuous efforts to have the Rapporteur replaced and
was successful early in the year. A new Rapporteur visited the country
in November.
In April the Government promulgated a new law governing NGO's that
is restrictive and identifies those specific areas in which they may
operate: human rights is not one of these areas.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
While the Constitution condemns all forms of discrimination, both
governmental and societal discrimination continued. These are reflected
in traditional constraints on women's education and in restricted
opportunities for professional and occupational achievement by ethnic
minorities. The Government deliberately limits potential opportunities
for ethnic minorities, and the Fang actively discriminate against the
Bubi and other ethnic minorities.
Women.--Societal violence against women, particularly wife beating,
is common. The public beating of wives is forbidden by government
decree, but violence in the home generally is tolerated. The Government
does not prosecute perpetrators of domestic violence.
Although the Constitution provides for equal rights, women largely
are confined by custom to traditional roles, particularly in
agriculture. Polygyny, which is widespread among the Fang, contributes
to women's secondary status, as does limited educational opportunity.
On average women receive only one-fifth as much schooling as men do.
There is no discrimination against women with regard to inheritance
and family laws, but there is discrimination in traditional practice.
For an estimated 90 percent of women, including virtually all ethnic
groups except the Bubi, tradition dictates that if a marriage is
dissolved, the wife must return the dowry given her family by the
bridegroom at the time of marriage, while the husband automatically
receives custody of all children born after the marriage. The mother
maintains custody of all children born prior to the marriage.
Similarly, in the Fang, Ndowe, and Bisio cultures, primogeniture is
practiced, and as women become members of their husband's family upon
marriage, they usually are not accorded inheritance rights. According
to the law, women have the right to buy and sell property and goods,
but in practice the male-dominated society permits few women access to
sufficient funds to engage in more than petty trading or to purchase
real property beyond a garden plot or modest home.
Children.--No provisions for the welfare of children are
legislated. The Government devotes little attention to children's
rights or their welfare and has no set policy in this area. Education
is compulsory up to the age of 18, but the law is not enforced.
People with Disabilities.--There is no constitutional or legal
provision for the physically disabled with respect to discrimination in
employment or education. No legislation mandates access for the
disabled to buildings or government services.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There is no legal
discrimination against ethnic or racial minorities, and the Government
does not overtly limit their participation; however, the monopolization
of political power by the President's Mongomo clan of the Fang ethnic
group persists. In practice some members of minorities face
discrimination because they are not members of the Fang ethnic group,
or belong to a Fang subclan other than the President's. Minorities do
not face discrimination in inheritance, marriage, or family laws.
Differences between the majority Fang ethnic group and the Bubi
ethnic minority are a major source of political tension and often have
erupted into violence. Bubis led the January 21, 1998, separatist
revolt on Bioko, after which the Fang-dominated Government and the
security forces intensified their longstanding institutionalized
repression of the Bubis and allowed Fang vigilante groups to abuse Bubi
citizens with impunity. Before independence the Bubis were a majority
of the population on the island of Bioko (then Fernando Po), which was
both administratively distinct from and more economically developed
than the larger and more populous mainland (then Rio Muni), where the
Fang were a majority. The two Spanish colonies were united 9 years
before independence, after which many Fang migrated to Bioko, where
Malabo, the capital, is located. The Fang dominated the united
independent state; during the first decade after independence, misrule
by Obiang's uncle, Macias Nguema, reduced the country's population by
about one-third and devastated the economy.
Differences among clans of the Fang ethnic group, in particular
resentment of the political dominance of the Mongomo clan, are also
sources of significant political tensions and occasional violence;
however, there were no reports of such violence during the year.
Several thousand citizens of Nigeria, Ghana, and Francophone Africa
continue to reside in the country. Most are small traders and
businesspersons. The police reportedly continued to harass them (see
Section 1.d.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Although the Constitution provides
for the right to organize unions, the Government has not passed
enabling legislation. In the small wage economy, no labor unions exist,
although there are a few cooperatives with limited power. The law
prohibits strikes. The Labor Code contains provisions to uphold worker
rights, but the Government generally does not enforce them.
It generally is acknowledged that membership in the PDGE, the
President's party, is a prerequisite for hiring and promotion, both in
the public and private sectors (see Section 1.f.). Membership in a
rival political organization is considered grounds for dismissal from
any position, public or private. Opposition politicians who are not
participating in the Government often claim to have been dismissed from
their jobs after joining alternate political groups.
The country's major private employer, the oil industry, which is
dominated by foreign firms, took steps to reduce government control of
hiring in the industry. In previous years, international oil companies
operating in the country hired Equatoguinean employees exclusively
through a government agency, APEGESA, which screened applicants for
positions and reportedly excluded those whom it considered unfriendly
or indifferent to the PDGE. During the year, the oil companies ceased
to use an exclusive contractor and hired primarily on the basis of
testing designed to identify the best candidates for further training.
APEGESA in the past reportedly kept nearly two-thirds of employees'
wages. Recent legislation mandates that oil workers receive at least 60
percent of their wages. Oil sector workers receive a much higher scale
than elsewhere in the national economy, often 10 times the minimum
wage. The Minister of Mines and Energy allegedly manages APEGESA. In
the past, when several employees signed a petition complaining of ill
treatment, they were fired.
The Government does not allow unions to affiliate internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There is no
legislation regarding these rights or prohibiting antiunion
discrimination. There is little evidence of collective bargaining by
any group. The Government and employers set wages, with little or no
participation by the workers. Employers must pay the minimum wages set
by the Government, and most companies pay more than the government-
established minimum.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law forbids
forced or bonded labor (including that performed by children) and
slavery, and there generally were no reports of these practices;
however, convicted felons perform extensive labor outside prison
without compensation, which is provided for by the law.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum age for the employment of children is 18
years, but the Ministry of Labor does not enforce this law. The
Government also does not enforce the law that stipulates mandatory
education up to the age of 18. Underage youth perform both family farm
work and street vending. The Labor Code prohibits forced or bonded
labor by children, and there were no reports that it exists (see
Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum monthly wage was
approximately $41 (27,000 CFA francs). The minimum wage is not
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family.
The law prescribes a standard 35-hour workweek and a 48-hour rest
period, which are observed in practice in the formal economy.
The Labor Code provides for comprehensive protection for workers
from occupational hazards; however, the Government does not enforce
this in practice. Employees who protest unhealthy or dangerous working
conditions risk losing their jobs.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law was known to prohibit
trafficking in persons; however there were no reports that persons were
trafficked in, to, or from the country.
______
ERITREA
Eritrea became an independent state in 1993, following an
internationally monitored referendum in which citizens voted
overwhelmingly for independence from Ethiopia. The Eritrean People's
Liberation Front (EPLF), which led the 30-year war for independence,
has controlled the country since it defeated Ethiopian armed forces in
1991; its leader, Isaias Afwerki, serves as the President. The EPLF
became the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), and
redefined itself as a political party in 1994; it is the sole political
party. The Government continues to delay its stated program to hold
elections: elections originally scheduled for 1998 were postponed
indefinitely due to the outbreak of an armed border conflict with
Ethiopia that began in May 1998. The Constitution provides for
democratic freedoms; however, while it entered into force in May 1998,
its provisions have not been implemented fully yet. The judiciary is
formally independent, but it is weak and subject to executive
interference.
The police are responsible for maintaining internal security,
although the Government may call on the 200,000 member armed forces,
the reserves, and demobilized soldiers in response to both domestic and
external security requirements. In May 1998, fighting broke out between
Eritrean armed forces and Ethiopian militia along the border. Eritrea
responded to an escalating military conflict by calling up reserves and
increasing its armed forces to approximately 200,000 soldiers. In
addition to the border conflict, the army has been forced to deal with
the Eritrean Islamic Salvation (EIS), a small, Sudan-based insurgent
group that has mounted terrorist attacks in the north and west since
1993. Some members of the security forces committed human rights
abuses.
The border conflict with Ethiopia has interfered with Eritrea's
transition from a deteriorating centrally planned economy to a market-
based economy through the privatization of formerly state-owned
enterprises and the liberalization of investment and trade. The local
currency was devalued by 34 percent, economic growth virtually ceased,
and private foreign investment was halted. The termination of trade
relations with Ethiopia, the country's largest trade partner prior to
the conflict, has created serious disruptions in export markets. The
integration of more than 67,000 ethnic Eritrean deportees from Ethiopia
and the large number of internally displaced persons have strained
resources, and there is a shortage of skilled labor in many areas as a
result of increased military conscription. While trade, services, and
manufacturing provide the greatest portion of gross domestic product,
the rural economy is based largely on subsistence agriculture, with
more than 70 percent of the population of 3.6 million involved in
farming and herding. The small industrial sector consists mainly of
light industries, many using outmoded technologies. International
economic assistance has accounted for a significant portion of external
revenues, with loans replacing grants. Citizens who live abroad also
provide a significant source of external revenues. The country is
extremely poor, with an annual per capita income of less than $238.
The Government's human rights record was poor, and serious problems
remain; however, there were improvements in some areas. Citizens did
not have the ability to change their Government, which is dominated by
the PFDJ. Although a constituent assembly ratified a new Constitution,
the Government has not yet fulfilled its stated program for a
transition to democracy. Security forces laid thousands of landmines;
landmines resulted in the deaths of a number of persons. There were
reports that police at times treated ethnic Ethiopians roughly. The
Government generally does not permit prison visits by local or
international human rights groups, although the Government permitted
some independent monitoring of conditions in detention facilities after
the conflict with Ethiopia began. Arbitrary arrest and detention are
problems. An unknown number of persons suspected of association with
the Ethiopian Mengistu regime, radical Islamic elements, or terrorist
organizations remain in prolonged detention. However, after the
outbreak of conflict with Ethiopia, the Government began to grant
representatives of the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC)
broad access to prisoners and detainees, but not to Ethiopian prisoners
of war (POW's). The Government's actions were prompted in large measure
by Ethiopian allegations of substantial human rights violations against
Ethiopians resident in Eritrea. The provision of speedy trials is
limited by a lack of trained personnel, inadequate funding, and poor
infrastructure, and the use of a special court system limits due
process. There were some infringements on the right to privacy. The
Government restricts press freedom, including the rights of the
religious media, and there are some limits on the freedom of
association. The Government restricts religious freedom and freedom of
movement. Societal discrimination against women is a problem, and
female genital mutilation (FGM) remains widespread despite official
government discouragement of the practice. Jehovah's Witnesses face
some societal discrimination. The Government supported armed opposition
groups whose attacks in Ethiopia resulted in some civilian deaths.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Extrajudicial Killing.--Ethiopian media alleged
that the Government was responsible for the extrajudical killing of
Ethiopians in Eritrea; however, investigation of these allegations by
international human rights groups, and local and foreign officials
revealed no evidence to substantiate the charges.
There were unconfirmed reports that in November soldiers killed 17
Ethiopian Afar civilians during a cross-border attack.
During the year, the Government provided support to armed groups
that had long-opposed the Ethiopian Government and, as a result, there
was an increase in armed attacks within Ethiopian territory by these
opposition groups operating mostly out of Somalia and Kenya. These
attacks took the form of landmine incidents and hit-and-run attacks by
guerrillas armed with small arms and grenades. Some civilians and
combatants were killed as a result of these attacks and in
confrontations between Ethiopian government forces and the guerrillas,
although the total number of deaths could not be confirmed.
According to U.N. officials, government forces laid approximately
50,000 to 60,000 landmines in the Badme area during their 8-month
occupation of this disputed territory. There were reports that at least
10 Ethiopian civilians were killed by landmines while attempting to
return to their farms in the Badme area.
There are an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 landmines in the country,
mostly laid by Ethiopia during the 1961-91 war in which Eritrea fought
for independence. On occasion, new mines were laid by the EIS. There
were reports that at least 18 civilians were killed by landmines during
the year; however, this figure is considered to be very low since many
such incidents in isolated rural areas are never reported.
In February as part of the border conflict, an Ethiopian plane
bombed the Eritrean village of Laili Dada, killing at least five
persons and wounding several others.
There were reports that Ethiopian forces shelled the border town of
Adi Keyih in April, killing at least eight civilians and wounding
dozens of others.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances. During the border conflict with Ethiopia, Ethiopian
media alleged that Ethiopians in Eritrea had disappeared. Investigation
of the Ethiopian allegations by international human rights groups, and
local and foreign officials revealed no evidence to substantiate the
charges.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Ethiopian Penal Code, as modified by the transitional
Penal Code of Eritrea, prohibits torture, and, unlike the previous
year, there were no reports of torture or serious physical abuse;
however, there were credible reports that on occasion police used rough
physical treatment when dealing with army deserters and with homeless
ethnic Ethiopians sleeping on the streets in Asmara. Ethiopian media
alleged that Ethiopians in Eritrea were tortured. Investigation of the
Ethiopian allegations by international human rights groups, and local
and foreign officials revealed no evidence that the Government had
tortured, beaten, or abused Ethiopians.
There were a number of instances in which private individuals
threatened and beat Ethiopians. The Government and the police generally
took action to prevent such abuse; for example, in Adi Keyih in March,
the chief of police was able to halt the beatings of a number of
Ethiopians. However, there were credible reports of several incidents
in which police allowed citizens to abuse ethnic Ethiopians, intervened
too late to prevent abuse, or were unable to control such abuse.
There have been a number of civilians injured as a result of the
conflict with Ethiopia. In February Ethiopian planes bombed Laili Dada,
injuring several persons. There were reports that on April 15,
Ethiopian forces attacked the Eritrean town of Adi Keyih, injuring 10
school children and an elderly man. In May Ethiopian forces bombed the
port of Massawa reportedly wounding three persons (see Section 1.a.).
Prison conditions are Spartan. The Government permits three visits
per week by family members. There were no confirmedreports that any
prisoners died due to lack of proper medical care. Although in previous
years, there were occasional reports that authorities beat or abused
prisoners, there were no such reports during the year. Juvenile
offenders are often incarcerated with adults. There are no juvenile
detention centers or correction facilities.
The Government generally does not permit prison visits by local or
international human rights groups; however, in 1998 the Government
began to permit some independent monitoring of conditions in detention
facilities after the conflict with Ethiopia began. The Government
continued to deny the ICRC access to Ethiopian POW's.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention is a problem. The Penal Code stipulates that detainees may be
held for a maximum of 30 days without being charged with a crime. In
practice the authorities sometimes hold persons suspected of crimes for
much longer periods. In May 1998, the Government arrested approximately
1,000 Ethiopians suspected of supporting Ethiopia in the border
conflict. By year's end, almost all of these individuals had been
released and many chose to be repatriated to Ethiopia. Fewer than 20
Ethiopians remained in detention at year's end.
There were reports that many Ethiopians were detained in February
and March, apparently to protect them from being beaten by private
citizens. In March in Adi Keyih, police held approximately 20
Ethiopians in jail for 3 days. According to the chief of police, they
``could not control the townspeople'' and were holding the Ethiopians
in protective custody.
In 1995 on the second anniversary of independence, the Government
pardoned and released 91 detainees who had been held for up to 4 years
for collaboration with the Mengistu regime. An unknown number of
additional suspected collaborators remain in detention without charge,
despite a statement by President Isaias in 1995 that their cases would
be considered soon. An unspecified number of persons associated with
radical Islamic elements or suspected terrorist organizations also
remained in detention without charge. There were unconfirmed reports
that the Government arbitrarily holds several Eritrean Liberation Front
members. Authorities sometimes arbitrarily arrest and detain former
combatants or members of the PFDJ who violate an unwritten code of
conduct (see Section 1.e.).
In March representatives of Jehovah's Witnesses reported that three
members of Jehovah's Witnesses have been detained without trial or
charge for more than 4 years, allegedly for failing to participate in
national service (see Section 2.c.).
There were unconfirmed reports that the Government continued to
hold approximately 30 Muslims arrested in 1994 after the Government
severed relations with Sudan.
The Government generally does not use exile as a means of political
control; however, immediately following the outbreak of hostilities
with Ethiopia in 1998, the Government expelled approximately 1,000
Ethiopians from Eritrea, many for alleged security concerns. Since that
time, several thousand Ethiopians have left Eritrea, although the large
majority chose to leave voluntarily, in many cases because of the
negative economic impact of the conflict. Following the renewal of
fighting in February, the Government moved approximately 1,500 ethnic
Ethiopians and some Eritreans away from the combat zone and temporarily
resettled them in a camp in Hawasheit. The Government then deported the
ethnic Ethiopian women and children from Eritrea to Ethiopia without
notification to the ICRC or the Ethiopian authorities. Approximately
500 ethnic Ethiopian men of military age were sent to a second camp in
Forto, and eventually were released in the cities of Agordat, Keren,
and Asmara with warnings not to return to the border area.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is formally
independent but is weak and subject to executive interference. The
continued use of an executive special court system allowed ongoing
executive interference with the judiciary. In addition, the judicial
branch is administered as part of the Ministry of Justice and relies on
the Ministry for logistical and salary support, thereby further
limiting the judiciary's independence.
The judicial system has three parts: civilian, military, and
special courts. The civilian court system consists of village courts,
subregional courts, regional courts, and a High Court that serves as an
appellate court. The still developing judicial system suffers from a
lack of trained personnel, inadequate funding, and poor infrastructure
that in practice limits the State's ability to grant accused persons a
speedy trial. Although 16 new courthouses were completed in 1998,
further development of the judicial infrastucture was constrained due
to the conflict with Ethiopia. At independence the Government choseto
retain the Ethiopian legal system. Under this Code, simple crimes are
brought to village courts and subregional courts. More serious offenses
are argued before regional courts, and cases involving murder, rape,
and other serious felonies are heard by the High Court. All cases
except those argued before the High Court are heard by a single judge:
on the High Court, panels of three judges hear cases. Defendants have
access to legal counsel, usually at their own expense. Although there
is no formal public defender's office, the Government has requested
successfully that attorneys work without fee to represent defendants
accused of serious crimes punishable by more than 10 years in prison
who are unable to afford legal counsel. Defendants may appeal verdicts
to the High Court, which is composed of a president and five judges.
Since the population is largely rural, most citizens only have
contact with the legal system through the traditional village courts.
Village judges, appointed by a panel of government magistrates, provide
justice in civil matters. Criminal cases are transferred to magistrates
versed in criminal law. Many local issues--for example, property
disputes and most petty crimes--are adjudicated by local elders
according to custom or, in the case of Muslims, Shari'a law. The
traditional courts cannot impose sentences involving physical
punishment. The Ministry of Justice also is offering seminars in
alternative dispute resolution for handling petty criminal and civil
cases.
The drafting of many civilians, including court administrators,
defendants, judges, lawyers, and others involved in the legal system,
into the National Service due to the border conflict with Ethiopia had
a significant negative impact on the judiciary. The High Court was
reduced from seven benches to three benches and provincial, zone, and
village court personnel were reduced by 40 percent. Most of the 21
University of Asmara law school graduates who were hired by the
Ministry of Justice in 1998 were drafted for national service as a
result of the border conflict as well. As a result of these personnel
constraints, there were lengthy delays in the processing of cases.
In February 1997, in order to reduce the growing backlog in the
civilian court system, the Defense Minister created the special court
system. Judges in the special courts are senior military officers, most
of whom have little or no legal experience. The special courts have
jurisdiction over criminal cases, including capital offenses, felonies,
misdemeanors, cases of tax evasion involving large sums and cases of
embezzlement by senior officials. The special courts may also retry
civilian court cases, including those decided by the High Court. In
1997 the press reported that 2,431 civilians had been tried by these
special courts. Approximately half were fined and imprisoned, while 360
were found not guilty. There was no information available on the
remaining 850 civilians. In the special courts there are no defense
lawyers and no right of appeal. The continued handling of civilian
cases by these special courts raised problems of due process because of
the absence of defense counsel and denial of the right to appeal. In
past years, the denial of due process has been a problem on occasion
for critics of the Government (see Section 2.a.).
Crimes involving corruption, theft, and misuse of government
authority allegedly committed by former members of the EPLF during the
war for independence are handled by the special courts. Senior former
fighters often are held to a stringent unwritten code of conduct, and
violations of this code are handled by special courts outside the
normal judicial process. Former fighters accused of violating this
circle of trust have been arrested and held without formal charge.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Under the law, warrants are required in routine
searches and seizures, except in cases where authorities believe
individuals may attempt to escape or destroy evidence. Warrants also
are required before the Government can monitor mail, telephones, or
other means of private communication. There is no evidence that the
Government monitored private mail service, but there is evidence that
the Government monitored some international telephone calls. In July
the Government began the process of implementing Internet access
through its telecommunications system. The Government has the authority
to ban the import of any foreign publication; however, it has not yet
done so (see Section 2.a.).
There were numerous reports that on April 16, officials of the
Capital Area Administrative Zone and the police rounded up hundreds of
evening secondary school students during the mid-term exam period to
examine their identification documents to determine eligibility for
military service. While many students were released by the following
morning because they were too young for military service, were not
Eritrean, or were able to demonstrate that their financial support of
other family memberswas critical, approximately 350 students were sent
directly to military training.
There were reports that a small number of Ethiopians were expelled
from their homes in Eritrea near the Ethiopian border. There were also
reports that police harassed or intimidated some Ethiopians. A
significant but unknown number of Ethiopians were fired or lost their
jobs due to their nationality. However, in some cases, this was due to
the fact that Ethiopians were working for Ethiopian businessmen who
left the country or who found that their enterprises were no longer
viable because they had lost their Eritrean clients. An estimated 1,000
Ethiopians in the Asmara region, who no longer can pay rent, are
homeless and destitute.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, in practice, the
Government restricts these rights, although it did so to a lesser
extent than in the previous year. In late October, the Government
arrested an editor who refused to disclose the address of a reader
whose ``letter to the editor'' criticized the commercial practices
associated with Saudi Airlines operations in the country. The editor
was arraigned, charged with slander, and released pending a trial
scheduled for February 2000. He was rearrested briefly in late November
for additional questioning. While the Government has tolerated
increased public debate over government decisions since the outbreak of
the conflict with Ethiopia, the media continued to practice self-
censorship.
The Government controls almost all media, including three
newspapers, one radio station, one television station, and the only
newspaper printing press. There are no private radio or television
stations; however, the independent print media flourished during the
year. The Government has the authority to ban the import of any foreign
publication, although it has not yet done so. The press proclamation
issued in 1996 forbids the local reprinting of articles from banned
publications. The Government continued to restrict the right of the
religious media to comment on politics or government policies. In
theory nonreligious print media are free to criticize the Government.
Nonetheless, criticism tends to be limited and fairly mild, and the
media practices self-censorship.
The Government's press proclamation allows individuals to publish
newspapers, and private newspapers and magazines began publishing at
the end of 1997. There were 11 independent newspapers and magazines
operating at year's end and 1 of these, Setit, had the largest
circulation. The success of Setit marked a step towards the development
of a free press. However, the press proclamation does not allow private
ownership of any broadcast media or foreign ownership of any media. The
Proclamation requires that all newspapers obtain a license from the
Ministry of Information before publication and that all reporters
register with the Ministry. The Government also may punish ``whosoever
insults, abuses, defames, or slanders the Government or one of the
constituted legislative, executive, or judicial authorities,'' and
forbids the publication of any matter that contravenes general
morality. In November independent journalists were informed that copy
submitted for printing would be required to have the signature of
several Ministry of Information censors. In response to threats to
publicize this information, the Ministry of Information stated that,
henceforth, all independent weeklies would be advised if content was
objectionable and would be warned when a piece ought not be published,
but that they would be free to print despite those cautions. There were
no reports of arrests or prosecutions under this authority; however,
this authority has hindered the development of print or broadcast media
critical of the Government.
There were no restrictions on academic freedom. In April police
reportedly rounded up hundreds of evening secondary school students for
military service while they were taking exams (see Section 1.f.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respected this
right in practice. The Government requires a permit from the Ministry
of Local Government for a public meeting or demonstration. In general,
permits are granted freely for nonpolitical meetings or gatherings, and
there were no reports that permits for political demonstrations were
denied.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association and states
that every citizen shall have the right to form organizations for
political, social, economic, and cultural ends; however, the PFDJ has
stated its opposition to the formation of any religiously or ethnically
based parties on the grounds that such parties could exacerbate ethnic
and religious differences.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion; however, the Government restricts this right in practice. The
Constitution provides for the ``freedom to practice any religion and to
manifest such practice'' and Islam and Christianity are practiced and
tolerated widely throughout the country with persons free to worship at
the church or mosque of their choice. However, the Government continued
to harass, arrest, detain, and discriminate against members of the
small community of Jehovah's Witnesses.
Members of Jehovah's Witnesses have refused universally on
religious grounds to participate in national service or vote in a
referendum. This spurred widespread criticism that members of Jehovah's
Witnesses collectively were shirking their civic duty. Some Muslims
have also objected to universal national service with regard to the
requirement that women perform military duty. The Government does not
excuse individuals who object to national service for religious
reasons, nor does the Government allow alternative service. Although
other individuals reportedly have been punished for failure to
participate, only members of Jehovah's Witnesses have been subject to
dismissal from the civil service, had their trading licenses revoked,
and been denied passports due to their refusal to participate in
national service. In addition to these measures, members of Jehovah's
Witnesses also are denied identification cards, exit visas, trading
licenses, and government housing universally, unless they fulfill their
civic obligations, some of which are prohibited by their religious
beliefs. In 1998 several members of Jehovah's Witnesses were arrested
for failure to comply with the National Service Law and some were
tried, although there is no information available regarding the
verdicts or sentences in these cases. In March representatives of
Jehovah's Witnesses reported that three members of Jehovah's Witnesses
have been detained without trial or charge for more than 4 years,
allegedly for failing to participate in national service. The maximum
penalty for refusing to perform national service is only 3 years'
imprisonment. Ministry of Justice officials deny that any members of
Jehovah's Witnesses were held without charge, although they acknowledge
that some members of Jehovah's Witnesses, and a number of Muslims, are
in jail serving sentences for convictions on charges of evading
national service.
The Government has banned religious organizations from involvement
in politics and restricts the right of the religious media to comment
on politics or government policies (see Section 2.a.).
The Government discouraged proselytizing by members of one faith
among adherents of another, and also discouraged foreign religious
groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) from proselytizing, as
it believes that this could create unnecessary friction in the delicate
balance between the Muslim and Christian populations. In a 1995
proclamation, it described specific guidelines on the role of religion
and religion-affiliated NGO's in development and government, stating
that development, politics, and public administration are the sole
responsibility of the Government and citizens. Pursuant to the 1995
proclamation, religious organizations are permitted to fund, but not
initiate or implement, development projects; however, this proclamation
was not enforced in practice--several religious organizations executed
small-scale development projects without government interference. The
1995 proclamation also sets out rules governing relations between
religious organizations and foreign sponsors.
Authorities informed all religious organizations in April 1998 that
religiously funded schools providing general education would be
incorporated into the public school system. At the time, it was not
made clear whether the clerical authorities would continue to
administer the curriculum with government oversight or whether the
school faculty would be absorbed into the Ministry of Education.
However, no action was taken to implement this initiative because of
the outbreak of the border conflict with Ethiopia. In January 1998, the
Government decreed that religiously affiliated organizations were
prohibited from running kindergartens; however, this decree has not
been implemented yet.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the rights
of movement and emigration. In general citizens may live where they
choose and travel freely throughout the country. However, some areas
are restricted for security reasons. The border with Ethiopia was
closed in May 1998, due to the outbreak of conflict, although Eritreans
deported from Ethiopia crossed the border and were allowed to resettle
in Eritrea. More than 67,000 ethnic Eritreans have been deported from
Ethiopia. The deportees were provided with a $200 (1500 nakfa) grant
from the Eritrean Relief and Refugee Commission, and, if they wished,
were placed in villages with friends or family. Those who no longer had
connections in Eritrea were placed temporarily in camps with other
deportees and internally displaced persons before being PERSONAL
COMPUTER\J\063935-A935A*-197-*****-*****-Payroll No.: -Name: -Folios: -
Date: April 28, 2000 -Subformat:settled in the general population. In
order to facilitate the deportees' integration into society, the
Government has provided deportees with documentation of Eritrean
citizenry. Some of the deportees that have assumed Eritrean citizenry
were ordered to report for military service. The Government
significantly improved the process for the granting of exit visas to
Ethiopians who wish to leave Eritrea.
Clashes between government forces and EIS members in 1997 led the
Government to restrict travel along much of the border with Sudan. Some
areas remain heavily mined, a legacy of the war for independence, and
occasionally new mines are set by the EIS, leading to additional travel
restrictions (see Section 1.a.).
Citizens largely are free to travel outside the country, although
members of Jehovah's Witnesses (see Section 2.c.), officials of the
former Ethiopian military regime, and those who have not completed
national service have been denied passports or exit visas. In addition,
as a result of the conflict with Ethiopia, the Government increasingly
denied exit visas to some young men and women, apparently on the ground
that they were approaching the age of eligibility for national service.
In general citizens have the right to return. Instances in which
citizens living abroad have run afoul of the law, have contracted a
serious contagious disease, or have been declared ineligible for
political asylum by other governments are considered on a case-by-case
basis.
Approximately 250,000 Eritreans have been displaced internally as a
result of the conflict with Ethiopia. Many internally displaced persons
have been settled temporarily in camps that also shelter deportees from
Ethiopia. According to the ICRC, the conditions in the camps are
Spartan but generally adequate.
Following the renewal of fighting in February, the Government moved
approximately 1,500 ethnic Ethiopians and some Eritreans away from the
combat zone to a camp in Hawasheit. The Government then deported the
ethnic Ethiopian women and children from Eritrea to Ethiopia, but
released the men with warnings not to return to the border areas (see
Section 1.d.).
The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee or asylee
status in accordance with the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government
cooperates with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The
Government provides first asylum and provided it to Sudanese refugees
from the conflict in Sudan during the year. There were also
approximately 2,200 Somalian refugees in the country. The Eritrean
Relief and Refugee Commission, a government agency, is the principal
organization for refugee issues.
A pilot refugee return program sponsored by the UNHCR resulted in
the repatriation of 25,000 Eritrean refugees from Sudan in 1995.
However, the estimated 136,000 Eritrean refugees remaining in Sudan
were not repatriated under the program because of the failure of the
governments of Eritrea and Sudan to conclude an agreement on the
modalities of such a repatriation. In December the Government and the
UNHCR reached agreement on a repatriation program scheduled to begin in
the year 2000 for the remaining Eritrean refugees in Sudan.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Although the Constitution provides for this right, citizens have
not yet been able to change their government in multiparty elections.
Credible reports suggest that authority within the Government is held
very narrowly. The Government is dominated by the PFDJ, which came to
power in the 1993 popular referendum in which over 98 percent of voters
chose an independent Eritrea managed by a transitional government run
by the PFDJ rather than electing to remain part of Ethiopia. The PFDJ
still has not fulfilled the ambitious program that it initially
outlined for a transition to a democratically elected government in
1997. Elections originally scheduled for 1997 were postponed until
1998. An electoral commission was established in 1997 to draft an
electoral code for 1998 elections, but accomplished little because of
the outbreak of the border conflict with Ethiopia, and elections again
were postponed, this time indefinitely. There are no opposition
parties. The government leadership stated that public education and
institutional structures were needed before multiparty democracy would
be established.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. In an effort
to encourage broader participation by women in politics, the PFDJ named
3 women to the party's Executive Council and 12 women to the Central
Committee in 1997. Women participated in the Constitutional Commission
(filling almost half of the positions on the 50-person Committee) and
hold senior government positions, including the positions of Minister
of Justice, and Minister of Labor.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Local
Government jointly are responsible for handling human rights inquiries.
All NGO's also must register with the Eritrean Relief and Refugee
Commission. There are no domestic or international human rights
organizations. In 1997 the Government proclaimed a policy restricting
NGO activities to supporting the Government in the sectors of health
and education. One human rights group, Citizens for Peace, was formed
during 1998 to investigate and publicize Ethiopia's deportation of
Eritreans. Journalists from the country's 11 independent newspapers met
late in the year and formed an organizing committee to establish an
independent journalists' organization. In October they filed for a
license with the Ministry of Local Government, but had not received it
by year's end.
In 1995 the Government proclaimed that religious organizations,
including religious-based NGO's, could not engage in development
activities; however, this proclamation has not been enforced in
practice (see Section 2.c.). In addition, in the latter part of the
year, the four main religious groups (Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim, and
Protestant) created a committee to coordinate the provision of relief
services to ethnic Eritrean deportees from Ethiopia in conjunction with
the Eritrean Refugee and Relief Organization. A 1998 decree prohibiting
religiously affiliated organizations from running kindergartens has not
been implemented yet (see Section 2.c.). In May 1998, the Government
announced that all religiously funded schools providing a general
education were to be incorporated into the state system, although no
schools had been incorporated into the state system by year's end (see
Section 2.c.).
A governmental proclamation issued in 1996 required that all
private NGO's hire only those who have completed their national
service; however, this proclamation was not enforced in practice. This
proclamation was part of the Government's effort to provide benefits to
citizens who have served in the military.
In January 1998, the Government ordered remaining NGO's to close
down their programs, allegedly because they wasted too much money on
administrative costs. Most NGO's left by mid-year, although several
remained at year's end including Dutch Interchurch Aid, Lutheran World
Federation, and Africare. However, several NGO's returned during the
year when the Government sought to encourage greater NGO participation
in development and humanitarian aid. Oxfam and Save the Children/UK
established offices in the country during the year.
In July 1998, the ICRC opened an office in the country. The ICRC
was granted full access to assist those Ethiopians who wished to depart
Eritrea and coordinated with its counterpart office in Addis Ababa to
supervise cross-border exchanges. The ICRC expanded its programs during
the year and provided shelter and supplemental food to approximately
250,000 persons displaced by the conflict with Ethiopia. The ICRC also
was permitted access to the few Ethiopians who remained in detention.
However, the ICRC was not permitted to visit Ethiopian POW's (see
Section 1.c.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution and the transitional Civil Code prohibit
discrimination against women, children, and the disabled, and the
Government generally enforces these provisions.
Women.--The Government has taken a firm public stance against
domestic violence. Health, police, and judicial authorities report that
no serious domestic violence problem exists.
The Government consistently advocated improving the status of
women, many of whom played a significant role as fighters in the
struggle for independence. Since independence women have enjoyed a
legal right to equal educational opportunities, equal pay for equal
work, and legal sanctions against domestic violence. In 1994 the Third
Party Congress advocated more rights for women, including parity in the
right to land and other property. However, much of society remains
traditional and patriarchal, and most women have an inferior status to
men in their homes and communities. The law provides a framework for
improving the status of women, but laws are implemented unevenly,
because of a lack of capacity in the legal system and ingrained
cultural attitudes. In practice, males retain privileged access to
education, employment, and control of economic resources, with more
disparities in rural areas than in cities.
The law requires that women between the ages of 18 and 40
participate in the national service program, and during the year women
were engaged in fighting in the conflict with Ethiopia.During the year,
the Government began removing women from direct combat and assigning
them other responsibilities, including training and heavy equipment
operations.
Children.--The Ministry of Labor and Human Welfare is responsible
for government policies concerning the rights and welfare of children.
In 1996 the Government created the Children's Affairs Division under
the Ministry of Labor and Human Welfare. The Children's Affairs
Division covers childcare, counseling, and probation. Education through
grade 7 is compulsory and free; however, while the situation improved,
there is a shortage of schools and teachers, and only about 60 percent
of primary-school-aged children attend school. School attendance above
grade 7, which is neither free nor compulsory, is 53 percent.
Approximately 75 percent of the population are illiterate.
A small number of children under the age of 18 entered military
service, usually as the result of the absence of a proper birth
certificate or other identification. When soldiers were found to be
under the age of 18, they were removed from service.
Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is widespread, with estimates placing the number
of women and girls who have been subjected to FGM at 95 percent. FGM is
practiced by almost all ethnic and religious groups. There is no law
prohibiting FGM. The Government, through education programs sponsored
by the Ministry of Health and the National Union of Eritrean Women, a
government organization, discourages this practice.
People With Disabilities.--The long war for independence left
thousands of men and women physically disabled from injuries they
received as guerrillas and as civilian victims. The Government spends a
large share of its resources to support and train these war disabled
citizens, who are regarded as heroes, and does not discriminate against
them in training, education, or employment. There are no laws mandating
access for the disabled to public thoroughfares or public or private
buildings; however, many newly constructed buildings provide access for
disabled persons.
Religious Minorities.--Members of Jehovah's Witnesses generally are
disliked and face some societal discrimination because of their refusal
to participate in the independence referendum in 1993 and to perform
national service, a refusal that is seen widely as unpatriotic.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--There are no government restrictions
regarding the formation of unions, including within the military, the
police, and other essential services. Labor association is encouraged
by the Government, which promulgated Proclamation 8 in 1991 providing
workers with the legal right to form unions and to strike to protect
their interests. The National Confederation of Eritrean Workers (NCEW),
which was part of the EPLF during the war, is independent of both the
Government and the PFDJ. It represents over 23,000 workers from 129
unions and receives some assistance from the ILO and foreign union
organizations. The largest union is the Textile, Leather, and Shoe
Federation. There were no strikes reported during the year.
During the year, the Government ratified seven basic ILO
conventions on forced labor, freedom of association, the right to
organize and bargain collectively, equal remuneration, abolition of
forced labor, non-discrimination in employment, and minimum age for
employment.
Unions may affiliate internationally, and all five workers'
federations within the NCEW affiliated with international unions during
the year.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
International Labor Organization (ILO) provided assistance in 1993 to
prepare the draft labor code, which prohibits antiunion discrimination
by employers and establishes a mechanism for resolving complaints of
discrimination. Wages are determined by the market.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
children, and it is not known to occur. All citizens between the ages
of 18 and 40 are required to participate in the National Service
Program, which includes military training as well as civic action
programs. High school students also are required to participate in a
summer work program, for which they are paid.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment is 18 years, although
apprentices may be hired at age 14. Labor inspectors in the Ministry of
Labor and Human Welfare are responsible for the enforcement of laws
pertaining to the employment of children. According to labor officials,
50 percent of children are not able to attend school due to a shortage
of schools and teachers. It is common for rural children who do not
attend classes to work on their family farms, and in urban areas, some
children are street vendors of cigarettes, newspapers, or chewing gum.
The Constitution prohibits forced or bonded labor, including that
performed by children, and there were no reports that it occurred (see
section 6.c.). There were reports that the Government inadvertently
employed children under the age of 18 as soldiers (see Section 5).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There are two systems regulating
employment conditions--the civil service system and the labor law
system. There is no legally mandated minimum wage in the private
sector. In the civil service sector, wages vary from $34 to $400 (320
to 3,800 nakfa) per month, with factory workers in government-owned
enterprises earning the highest wages. The minimum wage does not
provide the average worker and family with a decent standard of living.
The standard workweek is 44\1/2\ hours, but many persons work fewer
hours. Under the Labor Law, workers are entitled to 1 day of rest per
week, and most workers are allowed 1 to 1\1/2\ days off per week. The
Government has instituted occupational health and safety standards, but
inspection and enforcement vary widely among factories. Workers are
permitted to remove themselves from dangerous work sites without
retaliation.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
in, to, or from the country.
______
ETHIOPIA
Ethiopia continued its transition from a unitary to a federal
system of government. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi leads the Government
of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (GFDRE), which was
elected in 1995 to replace a transitional government established in the
aftermath of a long and brutal civil war. Most opposition groups
boycotted the elections. Candidates affiliated with the dominant party
within the transitional government, the Ethiopian Peoples'
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), won a landslide victory in
national and regional elections. Although observers judged the
elections to be generally free and fair, they cited irregularities.
Officials affiliated with the dominant coalition, the EPRDF, control
the Government, and the principal faction within the EPRDF remains
Prime Minister Meles' Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF). Federal
regions, largely organized along ethnic lines, increasingly are
autonomous and have a large degree of local control over fiscal and
political issues. However, the relationship between the central
Government and local officials and among various judiciaries lacks
consistent coordination and occasionally actions are taken at the local
level that conflict with stated federal policy. A long history of
highly centralized authority, great poverty, civil conflict, and
unfamiliarity with democratic concepts combine to complicate the
implementation of federalism. The federal Government's ability to
protect constitutional rights at the local level is limited and uneven.
Local administrative, police, and judicial systems remain weak
throughout the country. The judiciary is weak and overburdened, but
continued to show signs of independence.
Military forces that had been assigned to help police and local
militia in the Gambella and Benishangul-Gomuz regions establish order,
control banditry, and curtail rebel activities were redeployed to areas
bordering Eritrea. Without the military's assistance, these areas once
again have experienced a breakdown in law and order. There was
increased internal military presence in some parts of the Somali region
and Oromiya. Armed conflict between the military forces of Ethiopia and
Eritrea along contested border areas resumed in February. In addition,
military forces conducted an increased number of low-level operations
against the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Somalia-based Al'Ittihad
terrorist organization, and elements of the Ogaden National Liberation
Front (ONLF) both in the country and in southern Somalia and northern
Kenya. The national police organization is subordinate to the Ministry
of Justice. Some local officials and members of the security forces
committed human rights abuses.
The economy is based on smallholder agriculture, with more than 85
percent of the estimated population of 61.7 million living in rural
areas under very basic conditions. Agriculture accounts for
approximately 80 percent of total employment. Per capita gross national
product (GNP) is estimated at $130 per year. Real GNP growth was 2 to 3
percent. Total exports declined 18 percent to $494 million. The decline
was due to a drop in the export value of coffee. Coffee accounted for
70 percent of the value of 1998 exports and 60 percent of 1999 exports.
The conflict with Eritrea has led to increased military spending.
Military spending during the year was estimated to be $350 million. The
Government continued to implement an economic reform program designed
to stabilize the country's financial position, promote private sector
participation in the economy, and attract foreign investment. In
December the customs authority introduced a 10 percent surtax on most
imports to raise funds for the war effort.
The Government's human rights record generally was poor; although
there were improvements in a few areas, serious problems remain.
Security forces committed a number of extrajudicial killings. In
November security forces killed up to 10 persons in Sodo while
suppressing widespread riots and demonstrations in protest of the
imposition of a new language as a medium of instruction in schools.
Security forces at times beat and mistreated detainees, and arbitrarily
arrested and detained citizens. Prison conditions are poor, and
prolonged pretrial detention remains a problem. The Government
continued to detain persons suspected of sympathizing with or being
involved with the OLF. The Government continued to detain and deport
without due process Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin. Since
the outbreak of the border conflict in May 1998, more than 67,000 such
persons have left Ethiopia for Eritrea; the vast majority were
deported, although a small number left voluntarily. Another 1,200 male
Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin are being held in
internment camps. Although prompted by national security
considerations, the expulsions and detentions raised fundamental
concerns regarding arbitrary arrest and detention, forced exile, the
forcible separation of families, and nationality issues, as well as the
hardships and financial losses suffered by those who were detained or
expelled. The judiciary lacks sufficient trained staff and funds, which
limits its ability to provide citizens the full protection provided for
in the Constitution. The Government continued to train additional civil
and criminal judges and assigned them to regional courts. The Supreme
Court reduced the number of judges required to hear a simple civil
proceeding from three to one, thereby speeding up the provision of
justice. TheGovernment infringes on citizen's privacy rights, and the
law regarding search warrants is widely ignored.
The Government restricts freedom of the press and continued to
detain or imprison members of the press; however, fewer journalists
were detained than in previous years. At year's end, eight journalists
remained in detention, three of whom where charged with alleged
involvement with terrorist activities. Approximately 45 journalists
obtained bail during the year but still are subject to trial. Most were
accused or convicted of inciting ethnic hatred, committing libel, or
publishing false information in violation of the 1992 Press Law.
Nevertheless, the private press is active and flourishing. Although the
Government has not banned formally any newspaper or publication, the
publication of some journals remains suspended due to the detention of
editorial staff, and journalists continued to practice self-censorship.
The Government at times restricted freedom of assembly. Despite
Ministry of Education assurances to the contrary, the independent
Ethiopian Teachers' Association (ETA) was not permitted to organize
seminars in the regions. The Government limits freedom of association;
however, the nongovernmental organization (NGO) registration process,
which is slow and tedious, continued to improve. The Ethiopian Human
Rights Council (EHRCO) was registered after a 7-year effort, and the
organization won a suit against the Government for blocking its bank
accounts; however, the Government continues to refuse the registration
of some NGO's. The Human Rights League (HRL), which was founded in 1997
by prominent Oromo civic leaders, has not been permitted to register,
and its office records and equipment, confiscated by the Government in
1998, have not been returned. In June ETA secretary general Dr. Taye
Woldesemayat was convicted and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for
treason. Four codefendants were given prison sentences ranging from 8
to 13 years. The sentences were much more severe than expected.
While in general the Government respects freedom of religion, on
occasion local authorities infringed on this right. The Government
restricted freedom of movement. In August Eritreans residing in
Ethiopia and those Ethiopians of Eritrean origin who voted in the 1993
referendum on Eritrean independence were required to register with the
SIRAA and issued 6-month residence permits. There were reports of the
forced return of Djiboutian Afars who were not permitted to register as
refugees. The border conflict with Eritrea, along with drought
conditions in some areas, have displaced a large number of persons
internally.
Violence and societal discrimination against women, and abuse of
children remained problems, and female genital mutilation (FGM) is
widespread. The National Committee on Traditional Practices in Ethiopia
(NCTPE) reported in September 1998 that FGM occurs in 72.7 percent of
the female population, down from 90 percent in 1990. The Government
supports efforts to eliminate FGM and other harmful traditional
practices; however, such practices are widespread. The exploitation of
children for economic and sexual purposes remained a problem. There are
approximately 150,000 street children in urban areas, and their number
is growing daily. Societal discrimination against disabled persons was
a problem. Discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities
persists. Child labor was a pervasive problem. Forced labor was also a
problem, and there were some reports of trafficking in persons.
The Government's Special Prosecutor's Office (SPO) continued
conducting the trials of persons accused of committing crimes under the
brutal Marxist regime (1974-91) of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam.
Charges have been brought against 5,198 persons. All have been indicted
and arraigned, and the testimony of victims continues to be heard in
open court. However, more than half of those accused are not in custody
and were charged in absentia. Most SPO detainees have been held in
custody for 7 or 8 years awaiting trial and judgment.
After extensive public consultations the House of People's
Representatives (HPR) in October passed enabling legislation to meet
the constitutional requirement to create a human rights commission and
office of the ombudsman. The commission has full powers to receive and
investigate all complaints of human rights violations made against any
person. Neither entity was operational by year's end.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The security forces
committed a number of extrajudicial killings. In June a youth attending
the funeral of All Amhara People's Organization (AAPO) founder Dr.
Asrat Woldeyes was shot and killed by an undercover security officer
who subsequently was arrested and charged for the crime. There were
reports that in August security forces fired on a group of Somalis who
wereprotesting the military's occupation of a Somali border town,
killing two persons. There also were unconfirmed reports of
extrajudicial killings by Government security forces from Oromiya and
the Somali region.
Actions taken by the Government as part of the border conflict
resulted in some civilian deaths. In February an Ethiopian plane bombed
the Eritrean village of Laili Deda, killing at least five Eritrean
civilians and wounding several others. There were reports that in April
Ethiopian forces shelled the border town of Adi Keyih, killing at least
eight Eritrean civilians and wounding dozens of others.
The Government announced a no-fly zone along its northern border
soon after its military conflict with Eritrea began in May 1998. In
August air defense forces shot down an unarmed civilian Learjet en
route to South Africa from Italy when it violated the no-fly zone,
killing two European nationals.
In November student protests against the arrest of two teachers who
criticized new textbooks in the Welayita speaking sections of the
Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region State (SNNPRS) led
to widespread demonstrations and riots (see Sections 1.d. and 5).
Special police units called in to suppress the riot killed up to 10
persons and wounded many others.
In March a 70-year old man accused of involvement with OLF
terrorist activities died in prison (see Section 1.c.). In June Kebede
Desta, a defendant charged along with 127 others for genocide (see
Section 1.d.), died in prison of multiple chronic illnesses. Also in
June, ETA acting secretary general Shimelis Zewidie died the same month
of tuberculosis. Many international labor observers and ETA officials
claim that Shimelis Zewdie's medical condition was exacerbated by a 75-
day detention in late 1998.
The Government provided financial support to a coalition of
Eritrean opposition groups based in Sudan, which laid landmines in
Eritrea that resulted in several civilian deaths.
The outbreak of hostilities with Eritrea has led to Eritrean
support of armed opposition groups that have been attempting to
overthrow the Ethiopian Government. This has led to an increase during
the year in armed attacks within Ethiopian territory by these groups
operating mostly out of Somalia and Kenya. These attacks took the form
of landmine incidents and hit-and-run attacks by guerrillas armed with
small arms and grenades. In response the Government conducted military
incursions into Somalia and around Kenya against these armed opposition
groups. Some civilians and combatants were killed as a result of these
attacks and in confrontations between government forces and the
guerrillas, although the total number of deaths could not be confirmed.
In 1997 the federal High Court in Addis Ababa began the arraignment
and prosecution of 5,198 persons formally charged with genocide and
other war crimes, including extrajudicial killings, under the previous
regime. Of the 5,198 persons charged, 2,246 were in detention, while
the remaining 2,952 were charged in absentia. At year's end, witnesses
still were being heard and evidence taken in the ongoing trials. In
November the federal High Court handed down a death sentence in
absentia to Getachew Tebeka, a former district governor and army
lieutenant. Terba was convicted of ordering the detention, torture, and
execution of five alleged opponents of the Derg Government, and is the
first SPO defendant to receive the death penalty.
According to U.N. officials, Eritrean forces planted more than
50,000 landmines in the Badme area during their occupation of the
territory. At least 10 civilians were killed by landmine explosions
while attempting to return to their homes in the area.
In August and November, landmines derailed railroad engines pulling
passenger trains outside Dira Dawa, killing at least four persons and
injuring several others. Observers believe that the landmines were set
by the radical Islamic group Al'Ittihad.
Banditry remained a serious problem in parts of the country.
Bandits, often heavily armed, killed civilians, police, and soldiers
during robberies and attempted robberies. Most evidence suggests that
their motives primarily were economic.
There were unconfirmed reports that in November Eritrean forces
killed 17 Ethiopian Afar civilians during a cross border attack.
b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of
disappearances perpetrated by the Government, although both domestic
and international human rights groups claim that there were many
politically motivated disappearances.
In 1997 the federal High Court in Addis Ababa began the arraignment
and prosecution of 5,198 persons charged withgenocide and other war
crimes under the previous regime, including the disappearance of 14,209
persons (see Section 1.a.).
In January a foreign aid worker was kidnaped in the Somali region
by unknown persons and taken to Somalia where he was released unharmed.
In April unknown gunmen reportedly kidnaped three persons, including a
foreign aid worker, in the Ogaden region.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the use of torture and
mistreatment; however, there were credible reports that security
officials sometimes beat or mistreated detainees. Government media
published occasional reports of officials who were jailed or dismissed
for abuse of authority and violations of human rights.
In November police injured many persons and killed up to 10 others
while suppressing riots in the SNNPRS (see Sections 1.a., 1.d. and 5).
There was an increase during the year in armed attacks within
Ethiopian territory by Eritrean-supported opposition groups operating
mostly out of Somalia and Kenya (see Section 1.a.). These attacks have
taken the form of landmine incidents and hit-and-run attacks by
guerrillas armed with small arms weapons and grenades.
Prison conditions are poor and overcrowding remains a serious
problem. Prisoners often are allocated fewer than 21.5 square feet of
sleeping space in a room that may contain up to 200 persons. Prison
food is inadequate, and many prisoners have food delivered to them
every day by family members or use their own funds to purchase food
from local vendors. Prison conditions are unsanitary, and access to
medical care is not reliable. Prisoners typically are permitted daily
access to prison yards, which often include working farms, mechanical
shops, and rudimentary libraries. Visitors are permitted. Prison
letters all must be written in Amharic, making outside contact
difficult for non-Amharic speakers; however, this restriction is not
enforced. Female prisoners are housed separately from men, and rape
does not appear to be a problem.
Several prisoners and detainees died during the year due to illness
and disease (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.).
In May six detainees suspected of involvement in terrorist
activities staged a 10-day hunger strike to protest the prison policy
of keeping them in handcuffs 24 hours a day (see Section 1.d.). Another
3-day prison wide hunger strike in protest of prolonged court
proceedings took place in Kaliti prison in June.
The army used military camps located near Zewaye Goba in Bale zone,
Oromiya for the temporary detention and interrogation of OLF fighters
and alleged supporters.
In June approximately 1,200 internees of Eritrean origin and 172
prisoners of war were moved from the Bilate detention camp to the
Dedesa internment camp in western Oromiya. The new camp is in an area
less prone to malaria. In July approximately 350 Eritrean prisoners of
war (POW's) were moved from the Tigray region to the Dedesa internment
camp.
The Government permits independent monitoring of prison conditions
and police stations by the ICRC and by diplomatic missions. The ICRC,
in general, had access to federal and regional prisons, civilian
detention facilities, and police stations throughout the country;
however, after a July visit, the Government refused to allow the ICRC
access to the Central Investigation Division (CID) detention facility
in Addis Ababa, which holds upwards of 200 persons whose cases are
under investigation. Furthermore, the ICRC was unable to gain access to
police stations in Addis Ababa where ethnic Eritreans are believed to
be detained. The ICRC had restricted access to military detention
facilities in the east and the southeast, where suspected OLF fighters
are held.
The Government generally permitted the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) access to detention facilities holding Eritrean
POW's. The ICRC also regularly visited civilian Eritrean nationals and
Ethiopians of Eritrean origin being detained on national security
grounds. However, in February the Government instructed ICRC staff to
leave the Tigray region. In April ICRC staff were permitted to visit
POW's held in Tigray; however, the ICRC was not permitted to resume its
program in Tigray until August.
Government authorities permitted diplomats to visit prominent
detainees held by the SPO for alleged involvement in war crimes and
terrorist activities. These detainees include former Derg housing
ministry official and governor of Sidamo, Abera Yemane-Ab, 1968 Olympic
marathon winner Mamo Wolde, and former Addis Ababa University President
Dr. Alemayehu Tefera. ETA secretarygeneral Dr. Taye Woldesemayat, now
serving a 15-year sentence for plotting violent insurrection, also is
permitted visitors from the diplomatic community.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and
both the criminal and civil codes prohibit arbitrary arrest and
detention; however, the Government does not always respect these rights
in practice.
Under the Criminal Procedure Code, any person detained must be
charged and informed of the charges within 48 hours and, in most cases,
be offered release on bail. Those persons believed to have committed
serious offenses may be detained for 15 days while police conduct an
investigation, and for additional 15-day periods while the
investigation continues. Some offenses, such as murder and treason, are
not bailable. In practice, and especially in the outlying regions,
authorities regularly detain persons without a warrant, do not charge
them within 48 hours, and--if persons are released on bail--never
recall them to court. Thousands of criminal suspects remained in
detention without charge, most of whom were accused of involvement in
OLF terrorist activities. Often these lengthy detentions are due to the
severe shortage and limited training of judges, prosecutors, and
attorneys.
Federal and regional authorities arrested and detained persons
without charge or trial for activities allegedly in support of armed
opposition groups. The vast majority of these incidents took place in
the Oromiya and Somali regional states. More than 7,500 persons
allegedly associated with armed opposition groups remain in detention.
Most detainees were accused of participating in armed actions by the
OLF or the ONLF. In typical cases, security forces arrested and held
these persons incommunicado for several days or weeks before eventually
releasing them.
The closed trial of 65 Oromos suspected of involvement in OLF
terrorist acts continued. In March one of the Oromo defendants who was
70 years of age died while in jail. In April three other defendants
were granted bail. Six of the defendants staged a 10-day hunger strike
in May to protest the prison policy of keeping them in handcuffs 24
hours a day.
Thirty-one AAPO officials and supporters, most detained since 1994,
were convicted on treason charges in March. They were convicted of
inciting an armed uprising and promoting civil war. Four of the
individuals, an elderly defendant, two women, and a youth, received 4-
year sentences and were released for time served. The remaining 27
received sentences ranging from 5 to 20 years.
In response to attacks by armed opposition groups operating out of
Somalia and Kenya (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.), the Ethiopian military
has conducted operations in and around the areas bordering Somalia and
Kenya. These operations have resulted in the capture and detention of
hundreds of opposition fighters and their suspected supporters on both
sides of these borders during the year.
A total of nine journalists were detained during the year, of whom,
two remained in prison at year's end because they could not meet bail
requirements (see Sections 1.e. and 2.a.). In April Samson Seyoum, the
former editor in chief of two now defunct weekly independent newspapers
who had been detained since December 1995, was sentenced to 4\1/2\
years' imprisonment on charges of incitement to war and attempting to
spread Islamic fundamentalism (see Section 2.a.). In May another editor
in chief was sentenced to 1 year and 1 month in prison for libel but
was released in July for time served (see Section 2.a.).
In December 1997, the trials began of three of the five journalists
and editors associated with the opposition newspaper Urjii, who were
arrested in October and November 1997 for violating the press law and
for alleged involvement in OLF terrorist activists. The arrests of the
journalists occurred without warrants, and the detainees were held
incommunicado for up to a month. One of the detainees, charged only
with violating the press law, was released on bail in December 1998;
his trial was pending at year's end. The fifth detainee was convicted
of violating the press law and sentenced to a year in prison, but five
other charges still are pending against him (see Section 2.a.).
In December the Government arrested up to 26 Nuer tribal political
activists associated with the Gambella People's Democratic Congress
(GPDC) (see Sections 3 and 5). Some of the activists were arrested for
inciting Nuer students in November to demonstrate for the use of the
Nuer language in school (see Section 2.b.), while others were arrested
on suspicion of supporting the OLF. All of the activists remained in
detention at year's end.
On November 6, police arrested two teachers in Sodo in the SNNPRS
for objecting to the use of a new language in student textbooks (see
Section 5). Student demonstrations against the arrests led to
widespread week-long demonstrations and riots. Special police units
brought in to suppress the demonstrations killed up to 10 persons,
injured hundreds and arrested up to 1,000 others (see Sections 1.a,
1.c., and 5). A former Young Men's Christian Association camp in Sodo
was used as a temporary detention facility for hundreds of
demonstrators. At year's end, between 70 and 120 persons remained in
detention in prisons in the Sodo area, including several elders from
the Welayita community.
In March 1997, the SPO formally charged 128 defendants with
politically motivated genocide dating back to the 1976 ``red terror.''
In December 1998, the SPO began presenting prosecution testimony in the
case of former Addis Ababa University President Alemayehu Tefera,
imprisoned since 1993, although the charges on which he originally had
been detained were dropped the same year. His petition to separate his
case from the 127 other defendants was denied (see Section 1.a.). The
court also started hearing testimony in December 1998 on the case of
former Olympic marathon champion Mamo Wolde, who was charged with
genocide for the state-sponsored killing of 14 teenagers during the
prior regime. Wolde has been detained since 1992.
In June the trial of ETA secretary general Dr. Taye Woldesemayet
concluded with a conviction for treason and alleged involvement in an
underground terrorist organization. He was sentenced to 15 years in
jail. In handing down the sentence the court referenced two alleged
terrorist acts that had been dropped from the list of charges against
Dr. Woldesemayet during the trial. Four other SPO defendants also were
convicted and given sentences ranging from 8 to 13 years. The sentences
were much more severe than expected. In June another SPO defendant,
Kebede Desta, died in prison of multiple chronic illnesses, and ETA
acting secretary general Shimelis Zewidie died the same month of
tuberculosis (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
Opposition groups allege that some of the persons detained by the
SPO, as well as some others, are held for political reasons. The
Government denies that it holds persons for political reasons.
In February 39 Eritrean exchange students held in Bilate detention
camp since July 1998 were released and flown by chartered aircraft to
Asmara, Eritrea.
Civilian residents of Eritrean origin have been detained since the
outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Government
justified these detentions on grounds of security. Approximately 1,200
civilian residents of Eritrean origin remained detained in internment
camps at year's end. There were credible reports that hundreds of
others were held in police stations for months prior to being deported.
The ICRC was not granted access to detainees allegedly held in police
stations. A total of 512 Eritrean POW's captured in fighting between
Ethiopia and Eritrea remained detained at year's end. Beginning in
April, authorities began releasing Eritrean detainees if they could
obtain visas to a country other than Eritrea. Approximately 90
detainees have left Ethiopia, mostly to other African countries,
particularly Uganda and Malawi. In early August, 25 Eritrean detainees
obtained fraudulent travel documents and left Ethiopia to Malawi on a
scheduled airline flight. They were detained in Malawi where they
refused an offer of transit to Eritrea. The Malawian authorities then
forcibly returned the former detainees to Ethiopia. One former detainee
was killed and at least six were wounded in a confrontation with Malawi
authorities (see Section 2.d.).
Exile is illegal, and the Constitution provides that citizens shall
not be deprived of their nationality against their wills; however,
since the outbreak of conflict with Eritrea in May 1998, the Government
has detained and deported more than 67,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of
Eritrean origin on national security grounds. Some of the deportees
were voluntary returnees who had requested return to Eritrea; however,
the vast majority were deported forcibly. Deportation orders originated
from the Security, Immigration, and Refugee Affairs Authority in Addis
Ababa. The Government's actions raised serious issues of due process
since there were no preliminary hearings to determine the merits of the
deportations, no right to counsel was provided to detainees, and
detainees only had a very circumscribed opportunity to register
protests. In addition, the issue of the nationality of Eritrean-origin
Ethiopians has not been settled yet. Heads of households were taken
without warning, detained, and often deported via overland routes
within 48 hours. Remaining family members were given arbitrary
deadlines to sell property and sometimes were subjected to departure
taxes based on estimated annual income and unpaid balances on
government bank loans. The ICRC monitored most border crossings until
September when government notification to the ICRC ceased. Since
September 4,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin were
deported, reportedly without provision for their safety, hygiene,
sanitation, or food. Some of these deportees were hospitalizedupon
reaching Eritrea. In August all Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean
origin over 18 years of age who had taken part in the 1993 referendum
on Eritrean independence were required to register with the Security,
Immigration, and Refugee Affairs Authority (SIRAA) and complete
residence application forms. After registration, applicants received
identity cards and residence permits valid for 6 months (see Section
2.d.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is weak and overburdened.
Although the federal and regional courts continued to show signs of
judicial independence, in practice severe shortages of adequately
trained personnel in many regions, as well as serious financial
constraints, combined to deny many citizens the full protections
provided for in the Constitution.
Consistent with the Constitution, the Government continued to
decentralize and restructure the judiciary along federal lines with the
establishment of courts at the district, zonal, and regional levels.
The federal High Court and federal Supreme Court hear and adjudicate
original and appeal cases involving federal law, transregional issues,
and national security. The regional judiciary is increasingly
autonomous, with district (woreda), zonal, high, and supreme courts
mirroring the structure of the federal judiciary. The Government has
delegated some of the war crimes trials to the supreme courts in the
regions where the crimes allegedly were committed.
The Constitution provides legal standing to some preexisting
religious and customary courts and gives federal and regional
legislatures the authority to recognize other courts. By law, both
parties to a dispute must agree before a customary or religious court
may hear a case. Shari'a (Islamic) courts may hear religious and family
cases involving Muslims. In addition, some traditional courts still
function. Although not sanctioned by law, these courts resolve disputes
for the majority of citizens who live in rural areas and who generally
have little access to formal judicial systems.
The outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea adversely
impacted the military justice system. Most foreign assistance to train
officers and noncommissioned officers was suspended at the same time
that the rapid expansion of the military greatly increased the need for
trained military lawyers and judges. The military's involvement in the
detention of opposition fighters and their suspected supporters has
constrained further its badly overburdened justice system.
The Constitution provides that persons arrested have the right to
be released on bail. In most cases, bail is set between approximately
$125 (1,000 birr) and approximately $1,250 (10,000 birr). At year's
end, two journalists were being held in prison, since they could not
meet these bail requirements. Certain offenses such as capital crimes
are not bailable.
Authorities detained hundreds of persons without charge for
supposed involvement with the OLF and the ONLF (see Section 1.d.). Such
cases often reflect arbitrary actions on the part of local officials
but also result from an overburdened and cumbersome judicial system
marked by a shortage of trained and competent prosecutors and judges.
Regional offices of the federal Ministry of Justice monitor local
judicial developments, but the federal judicial presence in the regions
is limited. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some local officials
interpret decentralization to mean that they no longer are accountable
to any higher authority, even within their own regions. For example,
local government officials throughout the country ignored instructions
from the National Electoral Board (NEB) on the acceptance of candidate
endorsement signatures from opposition party candidates.
To remedy the severe lack of experienced staff in the judicial
system, the Government continued to identify and train lower court
judges and prosecutors, although officials acknowledge that the pay
scale offered must be increased significantly to attract the required
numbers of competent professionals. Senior government officials charged
with judicial oversight estimate that the creation of a truly
independent and skilled judicial apparatus would take decades. The
Government has welcomed foreign financial and technical assistance to
accelerate this process.
Pending passage by regional legislatures of laws particular to
their region, all judges are guided exclusively by the federal
procedural and substantive codes.
According to the Constitution, accused persons have the right to a
public trial by an ordinary court of law within a reasonable time after
having been charged. Accused persons have the right to be represented
by legal counsel of their choice. However, in practice, lengthy
pretrial detention was common, closedproceedings occurred, and at
times, detainees were allowed little or no contact with their legal
counsel. The Public Defender's Office provides legal counsel to
indigent defendants, although its scope remains severely limited,
especially with respect to SPO trials. The law does not allow the
defense access to prosecutorial evidence before the trial.
The SPO was established in 1992 to create a historical record of
the abuses committed during the Mengistu Government and to bring to
justice those criminally responsible for human rights violations. The
federal High Court has considered the cases of 2,658 defendants accused
of genocide, war crimes, and aggravated homicide. Trials began in 1994
and continue; however, the process is subject to frequent and lengthy
adjournments. Court appointed attorneys, sometimes with inadequate
skills and experience, represent many of the defendants, following
claims that they could not afford an adequate defense. Of the 5,198
defendants, the Government is trying 2,952 in absentia, including
former dictator Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, who returned to exile in
Zimbabwe after a brief visit during the year to South Africa for
medical treatment. All the defendants in custody appeared before the
court during the year with many defendants charged and tried
collectively in each instance. Most cases still were in progress at
year's end. No SPO defendant has been released on bail, although 33
defendants have been released for lack of evidence. A number of
defendants have been convicted, including Lieutenant Getachew Tekeba,
who was sentenced to death in absentia (see Section 1.a.), and Colonel
Zeleke Zerihun, who received a 15-year sentence for genocide and crimes
against humanity. In July the Minister of Agriculture of the prior
regime, Dr. Geremew Debele, received an 8-year sentence on charges
related to abusing employees of the central slaughterhouse. The court
cleared him of murder charges. He was released for time served but his
political rights reportedly are limited for the next 3 years.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
Correspondence.--The law requires judicial search warrants; however,
they seldom are obtained outside of Addis Ababa in practice.
There were credible but unconfirmed reports that in certain rural
areas local officials used threats of land redistribution to enforce
support for the ruling coalition. There also were credible reports that
teachers and other government workers have had their employment
terminated if they were not of the dominant ethnic group in their
region (see Section 5).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and the 1992
Press Law provide for the freedom of free speech and of the press;
however, the Government used legal and other mechanisms to restrict
these rights in practice. The Government continued to prosecute
journalists and editors for publishing articles that violated the Press
Law, and some journalists practiced self-censorship. Nonetheless, the
private press was very active and often published articles extremely
critical of the Government.
The Government uses provisions of the Press Law concerning
publishing false information, inciting ethnic hatred, and libel to
justify the arrest of journalists. The number of journalists in prison
dropped from 15 at the beginning of the year to 8 at year's end: a
total of 9 journalists were detained during the year, including 2 who
remained in detention at year's end. Most of the journalists detained
were accused of violating the Press Law.
Five journalists of the Oromo-oriented private weekly ``Urjii'',
arrested in October and December 1997, are among the group of 65 Oromos
indicted for involvement in OLF terrorist activities (see Section
1.d.). Three of these journalists remain in prison and also are on
trial for press law violations. In March the acting editor in chief of
Urjii, Alemu Tolossa, was released after paying bail of approximately
$125 (1,000 birr). Former Urjii publisher and secretary general of the
Human Rights League, Garoma Bekele, was convicted on one count of
violating the press law and, in May, was sentenced to 1-year's
imprisonment. Five other Press Law charges are pending against him.
Two journalists detained for violating the Press Law remain in jail
because they cannot meet bail (see Section 1.e.). Approximately 45
journalists who obtained bail still are subject to trial for violations
of the Press Law.
In April Samson Seyoum, former editor in chief of Agere and
Tequami, now defunct weekly independent newspapers, was sentenced to
4\1/2\ years' imprisonment on charges of incitement to war and
attempting to spread Islamic fundamentalism. This is the longest
sentence handed down to any journalist in the country. Seyoumhad been
detained since December 1995. In August the court released Samson
Seyoum pending appeal of his conviction. In May Fisseha Alemu, editor
in chief of the newspaper Tarik, was sentenced to 1 year and 1 month in
prison for libel. In July he was released for time served.
In December the editor in chief of the Amharic-language newspaper
Tobia was given a 6-month suspended sentence for publishing an article
allegedly inciting ethnic animosities against Tigrayans.
In May and June, three newspaper editors, Abonesh Aberra and Sisay
Agena of Ethop, and Dawit Taye, former editor in chief of Aemero, both
independent weekly newspapers, were found not guilty and acquitted of
Press Law violations. The charges related to news reports and
editorials on the assassination attempt against Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa in June 1996 that were critical of
Ethiopian security.
However, despite the overhanging threat of legal action, the
private press is still very active. Many private newspapers continue to
publish false information, unsubstantiated stories, and harsh
antigovernment articles without any official sanction. The Government
has not banned any newspaper or publication. The office of the
government spokesperson was created in 1998 as a temporary entity
responsible for distributing press releases on the border conflict with
Eritrea to the Ethiopian news agency, foreign news agencies, foreign
embassies, and international organizations. The Government continued to
bar some private newspapers and news organizations from attending
government briefings and press conferences, and most government
officials still refuse to meet with private journalists.
The Ethiopian Free Press Journalist's Association (EFPJA), which
consists of 80 members from the private press, has been trying for 5
years to gain Ministry of Justice approval for its registration as a
professional association, without success (see Section 2.b.).
Although most independent newspapers have supported the
Government's position on the conflict with Eritrea, the private press
remained confrontational and continued to publish articles extremely
critical of the Government and continued to report on human rights
abuses.
According to the Constitution, citizens generally are free to
discuss publicly any topic they choose; however, on occasion the
Government restricted this right in practice. The Government opposed
the activities and operations of groups critical of the Government such
as the ETA and the HRL (see Sections 2.b. and 4), and arrested two
teachers who criticized a new government education policy (see Sections
1.d. and Section 5). Nevertheless, several groups critical of the
Government held press conferences and public meetings without
retribution. For example, in June EHRCO held a news conference that was
covered by both government and private news media, and in November
Parliament invited opposition political parties to appear on a
political panel with EPRDF leadership, during which opposition
criticism of government policy was reported on national radio and
television.
Because of a high illiteracy rate and extreme poverty, only about 1
percent of citizens regularly read any newspaper or magazine. While the
literacy rate for persons over 10 years of age in Addis Ababa is 82.5
percent, the overall literacy rate is only 23.4 percent. Furthermore,
private newspapers are not circulated widely outside the capital and,
as a result, citizens outside of Addis Ababa have extremely limited
access to the print media.
There are 27 independent Amharic language weekly newspapers and 6
independent English language weekly newspapers with an estimated total
circulation of 144,000. There are 5 EPRDF coalition party newspapers,
published in Amharic, Tigrigna, and Oromiffa languages, with a total
circulation of 120,000.
Nearly all private newspapers as well as state newspapers are
printed at one of the state-owned printing presses, but there were no
reports of problems printing any newspapers or magazines. The Ministry
of Information and Culture requires that newspapers show a bank balance
of approximately $1,250 (10,000 birr) at the time of their annual
registration for a license. In December the Ministry reportedly ordered
12 newspapers, including 4 weekly independent political newspapers, to
close when they were unable to show sufficient bank assets.
While much of the private press continues to lack professionalism
in its reporting, some print media are developing into more responsible
publications. Others actually are opposition newsletters that often
purvey unsubstantiated criticism of the Government. Several are tied to
distinct ethnic groups, especially the Amharas and Oromos, but severely
criticize the Government for being ethnocentric. Newspapers critical of
government leaders and their policies are available widely in the
capital but scarce elsewhere.
Foreign journalists continued to operate freely and often wrote
articles critical of government policies. They or their local
affiliates were granted greater access to government officials than
were local independent journalists. A number of foreign journalists
were allowed to go to the war front under restricted circumstances.
About 10 Ethiopian affiliates of foreign news agencies also were
permitted to go to the war front in February and August to visit
liberated areas and Eritrean prisoners of war. Local journalists
representing privately owned newspapers were denied access to the war
front.
Radio remains the most influential medium for reaching citizens,
especially those who live in rural areas. The Press Law allows for
private radio stations, but there only are two nongovernmental radio
stations in operation: Radio Fana, a station controlled by the ruling
EPRDF coalition, and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) radio,
which broadcasts in the Tigrigna language from Mekele. The Government
operates the sole television station, and news is controlled tightly.
However, there are no restrictions on access to international news
broadcasts. Ownership of private satellite receiving dishes and the
importation of facsimile machines and modems are permitted. Internet
access is unrestricted. During the year, the Government issued
regulations providing for the licensing of private Internet service
providers; however, no private Internet service providers were
operating at year's end. Private satellite transmission uplinks are not
allowed, even for international organizations.
In June the Government issued a broadcast proclamation creating a
broadcasting authority to review applications for private radio and
television licenses; however, there were delays in promulgating the
proclamation and establishing the authority. The broadcast proclamation
prohibits political parties and religious organizations from owning
stations; foreign ownership also is prohibited.
The official media, including broadcast, wire service, and print
media, legally are autonomous and responsible for their own management
and partial revenue generation, although they continue to receive
government subsidies. Government reporters practice self-censorship,
but at times questioned official policies. The Government's press and
information department acts as an official spokesperson and implemented
the 1996 Information Policy, which guides contacts among the
Government, the press, and the public.
Academic freedom is respected; however, in general, political
activity is not encouraged on university campuses. The Ministry of
Education has approved the charter for the country's first private
university, Unity College. This 4-year college is to offer a complete
bachelor's degree program, including a major in journalism. Despite
government assurances that Addis Ababa University would not be affected
by the conflict with Eritrea, in 1998 the institution dismissed nine
Ethiopian academics of Eritrean origin. In addition, in 1998 the
authorities detained approximately 82 Eritrean exchange students early
in the hostilities. Most of the students were released in 1998, and in
February the last 39 students were released and returned to Eritrea
(see Section 1.d.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly; however, on occasion the
Government restricted this right in practice. Organizers of large
public meetings or demonstrations must notify the Government in advance
and obtain a permit. While there were no reports that any permits were
denied, there were long unexplained delays in issuing permits, which
hindered the ability of groups to organize events. EHRCO and some
opposition political parties reported that they had difficulties
renting halls from local government officials. The ETA was not
permitted to organize seminars in the regions, despite Ministry of
Education assurances in 1998 that it would be allowed to do so.
In January the Coalition of Ethiopian Opposition Political
Organizations held a rally in Addis Ababa to announce its political
agenda. The rally was attended by fewer than 3,000 persons. The
organizers stated that they were unable to organize properly for the
event because local authorities did not approve their permit for the
rally until the day before the event was to occur. Both the government
and private press covered the rally.
In November student demonstrations against the arrest of two
teachers who criticized new textbooks in the Welayita speaking sections
of the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region State
(SNNPRS) led to widespread demonstrations and riots during which police
killed up to 10 persons, injured hundreds, and arrested and detained as
many as 1,000 others (see Sections 1.a., 1.c. 1.d. and 5).
In November Nuer students in the Gambella region demonstrated for
the use of the Nuer language in schools (see Section 5). In December
the Government arrested up to 26 Nuer tribal politicalactivists and
leaders associated with the GPDC on charges of inciting the Nuer
students to demonstrate (see Sections 1.d. and 5.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association and the right
to engage in unrestricted peaceful political activity; however, the
Government limits this right in practice. The Government changed its
procedures for registration of NGO's in 1996, and the NGO registration
process has improved significantly over previous years; however, a
number of policy issues regarding NGO's remain unresolved, and the NGO
registration process still is extremely slow. Primary registration
rests with the Ministry of Justice. EHRCO was granted registration as
an NGO in June, after a 7-year effort. However, the Ethiopian Free
Press Journalist's Association (EFPJA), which consists of 80 members
from the private press, has been trying for 5 years to gain Ministry of
Justice approval for its registration as a professional association,
without success. The Ministry of Justice recognizes the Ethiopia
Journalists' Association (EJA), which represents journalists working
for government-owned media.
Authorities closed the offices of the HRL in April 1998, on the
grounds that some HRL board members wished to use the organization as a
front for the OLF. Board members denied any connection to the OLF. The
HRL had been operating without a license, but it had fulfilled the
prerequisites for licensing and had been waiting for over a year to get
a license (see Section 4). The government investigation of the HRL was
ongoing at year's end, and the contents of its office, confiscated by
the Government in 1998, have not been returned.
The Government requires political parties to register with the NEB.
Parties that do not participate in two consecutive national elections
are subject to deregistration. Registered political parties also must
receive permission from regional governments to open local offices. The
opposition AAPO complained that the Oromiya regional government has
refused its application to open branch offices in the region. There are
58 organized political parties. Of these, eight are national parties,
and the remainder operate only in limited areas. In June a European
diplomat received an official reprimand from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs for inviting a registered political party to meet with the
international donor working group to discuss preparations for elections
in 2000 (see Section 3).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion; however, while the Government generally respects freedom of
religion in practice, on occasion local authorities infringed on this
right.
The Government requires that religious groups be registered.
Religious institutions, like NGO's, are registered with the Ministry of
Justice and must renew their registration every year. Unlike NGO's,
religious groups are not subject to a rigorous registration process.
Two religious organizations reportedly have refused to comply with the
government requirement that they register, without consequence. Under
current law, a religious organization that undertakes development
activities must register its development wing separately as an NGO. The
Government does not issue work visas to foreign religious workers
unless they are attached to the development wing of a religious
organizations. Religious groups are not accorded duty-free status, but
they are given free government land for churches, schools, hospitals,
and cemeteries. Religious groups, like private individuals or
businesses, must apply to regional and local governments for land
allocation. An interfaith effort is underway to promote revision of the
law, since it affects the duty-free status of religious groups.
In March Jehovah's Witnesses received a letter of apology from a
court in Tigray for actions taken in 1998 by local officials to disrupt
a religious service and the temporary detention of some 50 believers.
There are more than 3,000 members of Jehovah's Witnesses in the
country. When the Government began deporting Eritreans and Ethiopians
of Eritrean origin in 1998, it decided that members of Jehovah's
Witnesses of Eritrean origin, who might face religious persecution in
Eritrea, were not to be subject to deportation. Approximately 100
members of Jehovah's Witnesses from Eritrea were permitted to remain in
the county despite their Eritrean nationality.
There was a credible report that local officials extorted medical
supplies from a clinic operated by a religious organization for sale on
the black market. The officials threatened to cancel the NGO
registration of the clinic if they did not cooperate.
Evangelical leaders have complained of strict regulations on the
importation of bibles, as well as heavy customs duty on bibles and
other religious articles; however, bibles and religious articles are
subject to the same customs duty as are all imported books and most
imported items.
There were some instances of conflict among religious groups, most
noticeably between Orthodox Christians on the one hand, and
evangelicals and Pentecostals on the other. While some Pentecostals and
evangelicals complained in past years that the police failed to protect
them adequately during instances of interreligious conflict, there were
no complaints of inadequate police protection during the year. In most
interreligious disputes, the Government maintains neutrality and tries
to be an impartial arbitrator. Some religious leaders have requested
the establishment of a federal institution to deal with religious
groups. The Government considered the request, but had taken no action
to establish such a federal institution by year's end.
The Constitution requires the separation of church and state. The
Government has interpreted this constitutional provision to mean that
religious instruction is not permitted in schools, whether they are
public or private schools. Catholic, Orthodox, evangelical and Muslim-
owned and operated schools are not permitted to teach religion as a
course of study. Most private schools teach a morals course as part of
the school's curriculum, and the Government Education Bureau in Addis
Ababa has complained that such courses are not free of religious
influence. Churches are permitted to have Sunday schools, the Koran is
taught at mosques, and public schools permit the formation of clubs,
including those of a religious nature.
Muslim leaders complained that public school authorities sometimes
interfered with their free practice of Islam. Certain public school
teachers in the SNNPRS, Addis Ababa, and in the Amhara region objected
to Muslim schoolgirls covering their heads with scarves while at
school. In February a school in Woldea in the Amhara region closed for
3 weeks when Muslim girls insisted on wearing their headscarves to
class. In April Muslim leaders complained that Addis Ababa University
refused to serve food appropriate for the Muslim Eid feast to Muslim
students. When three Muslim students complained, the university
expelled them.
Protestant groups occasionally complained that local officials
discriminate against them when seeking land for churches and
cemeteries. Evangelical leaders complain that because they are
perceived as ``newcomers'' they remain at a disadvantage compared with
the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the Supreme Islamic Council when it
comes to the allocation of land.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement, including the right of domestic and foreign travel,
emigration, and repatriation; however, the Government restricted these
rights in practice. In principle, citizens can freely change their
residence or workplace; however, since the outbreak of the border
conflict with Eritrea in May 1998, Eritreans and Ethiopian citizens of
Eritrean origin were subjected to detention and deportation to Eritrea.
By year's end, more than 67,000 such persons had been compelled to
leave or had left Ethiopia for Eritrea; the vast majority were
deported, although a small number left the country voluntarily to join
family members who were deported (see Section 1.d.). It is estimated
that more than 200,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin
remain in Ethiopia. In August the Government decreed that all
Eritreans, 18 years of age and above residing in Ethiopia who either
had taken part in the 1993 referendum on the independence of Eritrea
from Ethiopia or who had been granted Eritrean citizenship, had to
register as aliens with the SIRAA immediately. Those registering would
be issued an identity card and given a 6-month residence permit;
however, this permit does not permit individuals access to hospitals or
other public services. The Ethiopian passports of residents of Eritrean
origin routinely were confiscated or restricted in use for a single
exit and no reentry.
Beginning in April, the Government adopted a policy of releasing
those Eritrean detainees from the Bilate and Dedesa internment camps
who could obtain visas to a country other than Eritrea. Approximately
90 detainees took advantage of this opportunity, with most going to
African countries, particularly Uganda and Malawi. In August 25
detainees obtained fraudulent Malawian visas and traveled to Malawi
with government-issued laissez-passers. They were returned forcibly to
Ethiopia after refusing an offer to travel to Eritrea. One former
detainee died and at least six others were wounded in a confrontation
with Malawi police. The Government reportedly reacted to this incident
by deciding not to permit detainees to depart for countries in Africa.
The law requires citizens and residents to obtain an exit visa
before departing the country. Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean
origin have been able to obtain exit visas but often are not permitted
to return to the country.
In Addis Ababa and western Gondar in the Amhara region there are
very small concentrations of Ethiopian Jews (Falashas) and those who
claim that their ancestors were forced to convert from Judaism to
Ethiopian Orthodoxy (Feles Mora). Approximately 3,000 Feles Mora
migrated voluntarily from the western Amhara region to Addis Ababa in
1991 at the time of ``Operation Solomon,'' when a large number of
Falashas were airlifted to Israel. The Feles Mora also seek to
immigrate to Israel. The number of Feles Mora in the country is
approximately 9,000. Israeli officials evaluate the Feles Mora
immigration claims on a case-by-case basis and estimate that
approximately 20 percent of the Feles Mora eventually may be eligible
to immigrate under Israel's law of return. In June the Israeli
Government announced that 3,500 Falashas requesting citizenship would
be airlifted from Quara, Ethiopia to Israel, and in July 6 Israeli
officials went to Gondar to process applications. All the eligible
Falashas in Quara left for Israel by year's end.
As a result of the border dispute with Eritrea, approximately
343,000 persons have been displaced internally. The Government has
presented relief and rehabilitation proposals for these internally
displaced persons to bilateral donors and NGO's.
The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The
Government generally treats asylum seekers fairly and cooperates with
the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees
and returning citizens. However, there were reports of the forced
return of Djiboutian Afars who were not permitted to register as
refugees.
Ethiopia hosts 261,661 refugees; most are from Somalia and Sudan.
The Government, in cooperation with UNHCR, continues to provide first
asylum to refugees from Sudan and Somalia. Along the border of
northwest Somalia 195,345 Somali refugees were settled in eight camps,
down from 600,000 in 1996. Along the Sudanese border 58,600 Sudanese
refugees were settled in four refugee camps around Gambella and Asossa
at year's end. Approximately 80 percent of the Sudanese refugees are
women and children. There are approximately 1,500 Djiboutian Afar
asylum-seekers remaining in the country, down from a high of 18,000
when Djiboutian Afars first entered the country in 1993. These asylum
seekers have requested but never were granted formal registration by
the Ethiopian Agency for Refugee and Resettlement Affairs (ARRA).
Negotiations began in 1997 between the Government and the UNHCR
concerning their status and were ongoing at year's end. ARRA conducted
an informal registration of Djiboutian Afars in May without UNHCR
involvement.
In June Kenya repatriated 1,388 Ethiopians from refugee camps. In
October the Government began repatriating 4,700 Kenyans from the Moyale
refugee camp; however, approximately 550 Kenyan refugees were turned
away at the Kenyan border due to a lack of proper identification and
were returned to the camp. They had not been repatriated by year's end.
During the year the UNHCR repatriated approximately 15,000 Somalian
refugees to northwest Somalia.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
Citizens exercised the right to vote for a national government for
the first time in 1995; however, most opposition groups boycotted the
election, claiming that the Government impeded their ability to
participate in the political process, and those who participated
complained of harassment. The boycott was one of the factors that led
to an overwhelming victory by the better-funded and better-organized
EPRDF over candidates of the relatively weak and poorly organized
opposition parties and independent candidates. Nevertheless, observers
organized by foreign donor governments, the Organization of African
Unity (OAU), and a coalition of domestic NGO's judged the elections to
be generally free and fair, although they cited numerous
irregularities.
The Constitution requires that elections to the national
legislative body, the HPR, be held every 5 years; the next elections
are scheduled for May 2000. Seventeen opposition political parties are
expected to contest the election, including the AAPO, the Southern
Ethiopia People's Democratic Coalition, and the Oromo National
Congress. In August all registered political parties were invited to a
meeting sponsored by Africa Initiative for a Democratic World Order and
the Addis Ababa University student association to discuss the ground
rules for the elections. In November the Government initiated a dialog
with opposition parties to discuss preparations for the election.
Government officials stated that they would accept election monitoring
by the OAU, local U.N. staff, and domestic NGO's, but that they would
not invite international observers. In June a European diplomat
received an official reprimand from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for
inviting a registered political party to meet with the international
donor working group to discuss preparations for the year 2000
elections. The Governmentstated that it would make efforts to level the
playing field for non-EPRDF political parties, particularly in regard
to access to mass media and the ability to open offices. The Government
addressed one primary complaint of opposition parties by establishing
an election time-table for nominating party candidates and for campaign
activities that is much longer than the time-table used in the 1995
elections. In December the HPR struck down the election law that
required civil servants to resign from their posts if they wished to
run for elections.
The NEB is investigating abuses of election laws related to
candidate registration for the 2000 election in the SNNPRS and in the
Gambella region. There were credible reports the local officials
throughout the country ignored NEB instructions on the acceptance of
candidate endorsement signatures from opposition party candidates. In
December the Government arrested up to 26 Nuer tribal political
activists associated with the GPDC on charges of inciting Nuer students
in November to demonstrate for the use of the Nuer language in schools
(see Sections 1.d. and 5.). The GPDC claimed that charges were without
merit and that the Government was attempting to interfere with the
political process for the 2000 elections. The NEB sent investigators to
the region, but had not issued a report by year's end. Political
participation remains closed to a number of organizations that have not
renounced violence and do not accept the Government as a legitimate
authority. These groups include Medhin, the Coalition of Ethiopian
Democratic Forces, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party, the
Oromo Liberation Front, some elements of the Ogaden National Liberation
Front, and several smaller Somali groups. The AAPO complained that the
Oromiya regional government refused its application to open branch
offices in the region (see Section 2.b.).
Neither law nor practice restricts the participation of women in
politics; however, while women's status and political participation are
greater than ever, women are underrepresented in national politics, the
Council of Ministers, and among the leadership of all political
organizations. Only 1 of the 15 members of the Council of Ministers is
a woman; 2 other women hold ministerial rank; and a number of others
hold senior positions. There only are 15 women among the 545 members of
the HPR, and only 8 of 115 members in the upper house, the House of
Federation, are women, including the speaker. Among the 23 judges on
the Federal High Court, 6 are women, and there are 2 women on the
Supreme Court.
The government policy of ethnic federalism led to the creation of
individual constituencies to help ensure representation in the HPR of
all major ethnic groups; however, small ethnic groups were not
represented in the legislature. There are 23 nationality groups in 6 of
the region states that do not have a sufficient population to qualify
for constituency seats, and as a result, the Government determined that
individuals from these nationality groups would compete in 2000 for 23
special seats in addition to the 545-seat HPR.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights organizations include EHRCO, the HRL, the Ethiopian
Women's Lawyers Association, the Inter-Africa Group, the National
Committee on Traditional Practices, the Peace and Development
Committee, the Society for the Advancement of Human Rights Education,
Enwayay, the Center for Local Capacity Building and Studies, African
Initiatives for a Democratic World Order, and Hundee. These and
numerous other groups primarily are engaged in civic and human rights
education, legal assistance, and trial monitoring. The Research Center
for Civil and Human Rights was registered in January, having applied in
1997. In June EHRCO, which monitors human rights, received legal status
as an NGO after a 7-year effort, after winning a suit in January
against the Government for blocking its bank accounts. The HRL, founded
by prominent Oromo civic leaders in 1997, still is being investigated
by the Government for its alleged ties to the OLF. Authorities closed
the offices of the HRL in April 1998 and confiscated the contents of
its offices, which have not been returned (see Section 2.b.). In
October the Ministry of Justice decertified the Ethiopian Congress for
Democracy, reportedly for financial irregularities.
In March 160 domestic and international NGO's signed a code of
conduct and formed a code observance committee. The code details
standards of conduct for numerous areas including moral and ethical
integrity, transparency and accountability, good governance, gender
equity, and environmental consciousness. The code observance committee,
composed of five members elected by the NGO general assembly and two
representatives from civil society at large, hears and decides matters
in all instances involving a violation or breach of the code.
The ICRC conducts regular visits to detention centers and prisons
throughout the country; however, since July the Government hasdenied it
access to the Central Investigation Department of the Addis Ababa
police. In addition, the ICRC was unable to gain access to police
stations in Addis Ababa where ethnic Eritreans are believed to be
detained (see Section 1.c.). Until September the ICRC escorted ethnic
Eritrean deportees during their several mile walk across ``no man's
land''--the distance from the deportation bus stops at the Ethiopian
border into Eritrea. However, in September the Government ceased to
inform the ICRC of deportations (see Section 2.d.). The ICRC was given
access to Eritrean POW's in camps along the border with Eritrea and in
other regions; however, in February the Government asked the ICRC to
leave the Tigray region for several months (see Section 2.d.). In 1998
the Government invited the ICRC, international NGO's, and foreign
diplomats to visit centers where detained Eritreans were gathered prior
to deportation, and permitted diplomats to visit ethnic Eritrean
detainees in Bilate prison camp. In April diplomats visited Bilate
prison camp.
The Government is required under the Constitution to establish a
human rights commission and office of the ombudsman. An international
conference on the subject was held in 1998, followed by extensive
public hearings during the year attended by NGO's, opposition groups,
and a wide variety of members of civic society. The HPR passed enabling
legislation in October. The office of the ombudsman is expected to have
the authority to receive and investigate complaints with respect to
misadministration by executive branch offices. Neither entity was
operational by year's end.
The Government continues to encourage international human rights
groups and foreign diplomats to observe the war crimes trials that
began in 1994. Officials of the Federal Security Authority generally
have been responsive to requests for information from the diplomatic
community. Several international human rights groups visited the
country during the year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that all persons are equal before the law.
The law provides that all persons should have equal and effective
protection without discrimination on grounds of race, color, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, wealth, birth, or other status. However, the Government has not
yet fully put into place mechanisms for the effective enforcement of
these protections.
Women.--Culturally-based abuses including wife beating and marital
rape are pervasive social problems. While women have recourse to the
police and the courts, societal norms and limited infrastructure
inhibit many women from seeking legal redress, especially in remote
areas. Social practices obstruct investigations into rape and the
prosecution of the rapist, and many women are not aware of their rights
under the law. There are only an estimated 20 rape convictions a year
and rape sentences typically are much lighter than the 10 to 15 years
prescribed by law.
The Constitution provides for the equality of women; however, these
provisions often are not applied in practice. Furthermore, these
provisions often are in conflict with the 1960 Civil Code and the 1957
Penal Code, both of which still are in force. The 1960 Civil Code is
based on a monarchical constitution that treated women as if they were
children or disabled. Discriminatory regulations in the civil code
include recognizing the husband as the legal head of the family and
designating him as the sole guardian of children over 5 years old.
Family Arbitration Councils, and not the courts, have the legal power
to dissolve marriages. Domestic violence is not considered a serious
justification under the law to obtain a divorce. There is only limited
juridical recognition of common-law marriage. Irrespective of the
number of years the marriage has existed, the number of children raised
and the joint property, the woman is entitled to only 3 months'
financial support should the relationship end. However, a husband has
no obligation to provide financial assistance to his family and, as a
result, women and children sometimes are abandoned when there is a
problem in the marriage. All land belongs to the State; however, land
reforms enacted in March 1997 stipulate that women may obtain
government leases to land. Discrimination is most acute in rural areas,
where 85 percent of the population lives. In urban areas, women have
fewer employment opportunities than men do, and the jobs available do
not provide equal pay for equal work.
As a result of changes in the Labor Law in 1998, thousands of women
traveled to the Middle East as industrial and domestic workers. There
were credible reports that female workers were abused, and even killed,
in these positions (see Section 6.f).
Although illegal, the abduction of women and girls as a form of
marriage still is widely practiced in Oromiya regions and the SNNPRS.
Forced sexual relationships often accompany mostmarriages by abduction,
and women often are abused physically during the abduction. Abductions
have led to conflicts between families, communities, and ethnic groups.
To enhance the status of women, the Government formally adopted a
National Program of Action in 1997. The program seeks to expand
educational and work opportunities for women, improve women's access to
health care, and educate women about certain unhealthy traditional
practices such as early marriage. There have been few improvements in
the status of women since the inception of this program; however, girls
reportedly attended school in greater numbers in some regions, and
according to a study done by the National Committee on Harmful
Traditional Practices (NCTPE), certain harmful traditional practices
such as early marriage and marriage by abduction appeared to be on the
decline.
In December 1998, the Ministry of Justice completed a draft Family
Law with the purpose of bringing discriminatory elements of the 1960
Civil Code into accord with the Constitution. The draft was sent to the
Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives. The House of
Representatives organized six forums during the year with participants
from all sectors and regions of the country to discuss the law and the
various issues still in need of reform. The draft bill still was under
discussion at year's end.
The Ministry of Justice also completed a revision of the 1957 Penal
Code and a national debate on the revisions began. Critical issues
affecting women and children include the penalties for rape, domestic
violence, and child molestation. However, regardless of changes to the
Penal Code, tradition and culture often prevail over civil and criminal
law, and in practice women do not enjoy equal status with men. For
example, the harmful traditional practice of abduction as a form of
marriage already is illegal under the penal code but still is widely
practiced in many rural areas.
Children.--The Government has encouraged efforts by domestic and
international NGO's that focus on children's social, health, and legal
issues. For example, local officials provided transportation and free
facilities to NGO outreach activities. However, the Government has
limited ability to provide improved health care and basic education.
Despite efforts by the Government to increase the number of schools,
including the construction of 303 new schools during the year, there
are not enough schools to accommodate the country's youth. Nationwide,
only 52 percent of male primary age children and 31 percent of female
primary age children attend school, and many do so in shifts. However,
government reports show that over 40 percent of the children who attend
school leave the system before they reach grade two of primary school.
The chance of their relapsing to illiteracy is high. The overall
literacy rate is approximately 23 percent; however, only 17 percent of
women are literate compared with 26 percent of men. Only 10 percent of
males and 7 percent of females attend secondary school. In 1998 only
23,712 males and 8,484 females earned a school-leaving certificate, a
prerequisite to attend college. There is space in institutions of
higher education for only a small percentage of these graduates.
Five additional Child Protection Units (CPU's) were created in
Addis Ababa's police stations to protect the rights of children by
assisting them when they become victims of crime. There are a total of
10 CPU's, which are staffed by members of an NGO. Some police officers
underwent training on procedures for handling cases of child abuse and
juvenile delinquency. Nevertheless, there is a clear need for reform of
the juvenile justice system. The Federal Supreme Court has assigned
only three judges to sit on one bench to hear all cases of juvenile
offenses. There is a large backlog of juvenile cases and accused
children often remain in detention with adults until their cases are
heard. There is only one juvenile remand home with a capacity of 150
for children under age 15, and the juveniles who cannot be accommodated
at the juvenile remand home are incarcerated with adults.
Societal abuse of young girls continues to be a problem. The
majority of girls undergo some form of female genital mutilation (FGM),
which is widely condemned by international health experts as damaging
to both physical and psychological health. The NCTPE conducted a survey
that was published in 1998, which indicated that 72.7 percent of the
female population had undergone FGM, down from an estimated 90 percent
of the female population in 1990. Clitoridectomies typically are
performed 7 days after birth and consist of an excision of the labia.
Infibulation, the most extreme and dangerous form of FGM, is performed
at any time between the age of 8 and the onset of puberty. The law does
not specifically prohibit FGM, although it is discouraged officially,
and the Government has been very supportive of the NCTPE. The
Government also is working to discourage the practice of FGM through
education in public schools.
Other harmful traditional practices surveyed by the NCTPE included
uvulectomy, milk-teeth extraction, early marriage, marriage by
abduction, and food and work prohibitions. The Constitution defines the
age of consent as 15 for females and 18 for males. Nevertheless, early
childhood marriage is common in rural areas, with girls as young as age
9 subjected to arranged marriages. In the Afar region of the east,
young girls continue to be married to much older men, but this
traditional practice is coming under greater scrutiny and criticism.
The Tigray Women's Association also has had an impact in changing
societal attitudes toward early marriage. Pregnancy at an early age
often leads to obstetric fistulae resulting in lifelong misery due to
total and permanent incontinence. Treatment is available at only one
hospital in Addis Ababa that performs over 1,000 fistula operations a
year. It estimates that for every successful operation performed, 10
other young women need the treatment. The maternal mortality rate is
extremely high due, in part, to food taboos for pregnant women,
poverty, early marriage, and birth complications related to FGM,
especially infibulation.
UNICEF estimates that there are approximately 150,000 street
children in the urban areas, of which 100,000 reside in Addis Ababa.
These children beg, sometimes as part of a gang, or work in the
informal sector in order to survive (see Section 6.d.). Government and
privately run orphanages are unable to handle the number of street
children, and older children often abuse younger children. Due to
severe resource constraints, abandoned infants often are overlooked or
neglected at hospitals and orphanages. There are a few credible reports
that children are maimed or blinded by their ``handlers'' in order to
raise their earnings from begging.
Child prostitution continues to be a problem. In 1996, a National
Steering Committee Against Sexual Exploitation of Children was formed
and is chaired by the Children, Youth, and Family Affairs Department of
the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. In October the committee
reported that child prostitution is on the increase especially in major
urban centers of the country. NGO's report that girls as young as age
11 are recruited to work in houses of prostitution where they are kept
ignorant of the risks of HIV infection. There have been many press
reports of the large-scale employment of children, especially underage
girls, as hotel workers, barmaids, and prostitutes in resort towns and
truckstops south of Addis Ababa. In past years, there were reports that
poor rural families sold their young teenage daughters to hotel and bar
owners on the main truck routes; however, there were no reports of such
activity during the year. Social workers note that young girls are
prized because their clients believe that they are free of sexually
transmitted diseases. The unwanted babies of these young girls usually
are abandoned at hospitals, police stations, welfare clinics, and
adoption agencies. There were numerous anecdotal accounts of young
girls going to the Middle East to work as house servants and nannies,
some of whom were abused, including sexually. (see also Section 6.c.,
6.d., and 6.f.). Factors aggravating the problem of child prostitution
are pervasive poverty, migration to urban centers, and limited
educational and job opportunities.
Child labor is pervasive, and child laborers sometimes are
subjected to abuse, including neglect, and among children working as
domestic servants, sexual abuse and rape (see Section 6.d.).
It is the policy of the Ministry of Defense not to permit persons
under the age of 18 to join the armed forces, and the Government made
efforts to enforce this policy; however, there were reports that some
children under the age of 18 were recruited into the military. There
were reports that local officials have been given military
``recruitment quotas'' to fill and that, as a result, they are
recruiting students who are 18 years of age or older. If young boys
demonstrated that they are under 18, they are exempted; however, in
rural areas children often do not have birth certificates. There is
also evidence that persons under the age of 18 were able to obtain
documentation to overstate their age and join the armed forces. There
is evidence that children as young as age 14 are permitted to join
local militias with the consent of village leaders. This reportedly is
part of an effort to keep children in local areas despite limited
educational or employment opportunities.
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution stipulates that the
State shall allocate resources to provide rehabilitation and assistance
to the physically and mentally disabled; however, limited government
resources restrict action in these areas. The Government has not yet
put into place mechanisms to enforce a 1994 law mandating equal rights
for the disabled. The Government does not mandate access to buildings
or government services for the disabled, and persons with minor
disabilities sometimes complain of job discrimination. According to one
NGO report, only 500 of the approximately 700,000 visually impaired
persons in the country have access to employment opportunities. There
are numerous domestic NGO's that work with the disabled. For example,
theAmhara Development Association operates a project to provide
vocational training to disabled war veterans in Bahir Dar. The Tigray
Development Association has established a similar center in Mekele. A
1994 census determined that there were 989,000 disabled persons in the
country; however, observers believe that number has grown and is
significantly higher.
Religious Minorities.--Despite the generally broad level of
societal tolerance for established faiths, there were instances of open
conflict among religious groups in past years, most noticeably between
Ethiopian Orthodox Christians on the one hand, and Pentecostals and
evangelicals on the other, and there continued to be pockets of
interreligious tension and criticism during the year. Newer faiths such
as Jehovah's Witnesses and Pentecostals have encountered overt
opposition from the public. Muslims and Orthodox Christians complain
about proselytization by Pentecostals and Jehovah's Witnesses.
Ethiopian Orthodox leaders complain that sometimes Protestants fail to
respect Orthodox holy days and Orthodox customs. Muslims complain that
some Pentecostal preachers disparage Islam in their services. There
were complaints by Muslim leaders that the Ethiopian Orthodox Church's
desire to ``show supremacy'' sometimes caused irritation in the
country's various regions.
Protestant and Pentecostal leaders complained that, on occasion,
Orthodox or evangelical adherents interrupted Protestant and
Pentecostal religious meetings and attempted to prevent the
construction of Protestant churches in predominately Orthodox or
evangelical areas.
In February a Seventh-Day Adventist minister rented a room in a
building in Bahir Dir and conducted a religious service. Local
Ethiopian Orthodox Church members gathered outside the building and
threw stones. There were no reported injuries.
In April two Muslim communities attempted to construct new mosques
but abandoned the construction when local Orthodox Church members
caused damage to the construction sites and beat one Muslim who tried
to prevent their actions.
Nevertheless, in most sections of the country Orthodox Christians
and Muslims participate in each other's religious observances, and
there is tolerance for intermarriage and conversion in certain areas,
most notably in Welo, as well as in urban areas throughout the country.
In the capital, Addis Ababa, persons of different faiths often live
side-by-side. Most urban areas reflect a mixture of all religious
denominations. Longstanding evangelical Protestant denominations,
particularly the Mekane Yesus Church and Kale Hiwot Churches, provide
social services such as health care and education to nonmembers as well
as to members. Mekane Yesus and Kale Hiwot leaders reported improved
relations with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church during the year.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There are more than 80 ethnic
groups. Although many of these groups have influenced the political and
cultural life of the country, Amharas and Tigrayans from the northern
highlands have played a dominant role. Some ethnic groups such as the
Oromos, the largest single group, were subjugated during the 19th
century. In an attempt to address ethnic concerns, the Government has
established a federal system with political boundaries drawn roughly
along major ethnic lines. With federalism regional states have much
greater control over their affairs. In Oromiya, for example, the
regional government required that all primary schools adopt Oromiffa as
the language of instruction. This has drawn protests from groups that
reside in Oromiya whose mother tongue is not Oromiffa and who believe
that their children are now at a disadvantage. There are credible
reports that teachers and other government workers have had their
employment terminated if they are not of the dominant ethnic group in
the region.
In May local administrators in the SNNPRS informed elementary and
high school teachers that new textbooks would be used in the North Omo
Zone, which merged four closely related languages spoken in the zone:
Welayita, Gamo, Goffa, and Dawro. Neither local communities nor
teachers had been consulted before the decision was made to introduce
the new textbooks. Representatives of the elders committee of the
Welayita ethnic group complained to local and federal officials about
the loss of the Welayita language as a means of instruction and
requested that the Welayita be granted zonal status within the SNNPRS,
but the officials denied their request. The Welayita ethnic group has a
larger population than four federal region states, but only controls 7
of the 22 districts in the North Omo zone. When the school year began,
students boycotted classes in protest of the new textbooks, and in
November police arrested two teachers for objecting to the new language
(see Section 1.d.). The arrests led to widespread demonstrations and
rioting in the city of Sodo during which police killed up to 10
persons, injured hundreds, and arrested and detained as many as 1,000
others (see Sections1.a., 1.c. and 1.d.). Schools remained closed until
December, approximately 100 special police remained in Sodo at year's
end, and approximately 100 teachers were transferred from the area
because of their opposition to the new language.
There has been a long history of tension between the Nuer and Anuak
tribal groups. In November Nuer students in the Gambella region
demonstrated for the use of the Nuer language in schools: the Amharic
language is the medium of instruction in schools in the Gambella
region. In December the Government arrested up to 26 Nuer tribal
political activists associated with the GPDC on charges of inciting the
Nuer students to demonstrate (see Section 1.d.). The GPDC accused the
Anuak tribe, whose political organization, the Gambella People's
Democratic Party, is an EPRDF affiliate, of interfering with their
political activities prior to the May 2000 elections (see Section 5).
The expansion of the military from a low of 60,000 personnel in
April 1998 to approximately 325,000 to 350,000 personnel at year's end
has aided greatly in the goal of bringing other ethnic groups into the
military. By most accounts, the military is an ethnically diverse
organization with very little friction between the various groups
represented, at least in the lower ranks. At the higher ranks the
officer cadre is much less ethnically diverse. Promotions awarded in
July to major general, brigadier general, and colonel were heavily
weighted towards the Tigray ethnic group, although some Amharas and one
notable Oromo were included on the promotion list. Persons from the
west, south and east conspicuously were absent from the senior officer
promotion lists.
Section 6. Worker rights
a. The Right of Association.--Only a small percentage of the
population is involved in wage labor employment, which is concentrated
largely in urban areas. Approximately 85 percent of the work force live
in the countryside and are engaged in subsistence farming.
The Constitution provides most workers with the right to form and
join unions and engage in collective bargaining, but the 1993 Labor
Proclamation specifically excluded teachers and civil servants,
including judges, prosecutors, and security services, from organizing
as a union. Only 300,000 workers are unionized. The 1993 Labor
Proclamation also decreed that workers who provide ``essential
services'' are not allowed to strike. Essential services are defined
broadly to include air transport services, railways, bus service,
postal, police and fire services, banking, telecommunications, and
medical services.
The ETA formerly had a membership of 120,000; however, that number
has decreased significantly due to government intimidation and
restrictions on ETA activities. In 1992 Dr. Taye Woldesemayat was
elected chairman of the ETA. Soon thereafter the ETA executive
committee issued demands to protect teachers' rights and improve
working conditions and questioned aspects of the Government's education
policies. There are credible reports that the Government began to
harass the ETA leadership at all levels beginning in 1993 and that such
harassment continued during the year. In March 1996, Kebede Desta,
chairman of the retired teachers union, was arrested and died in jail
in March. In May 1996, Dr. Taye, upon his return from Europe, was
arrested and charged with being the leader of a clandestine political
organization. In May 1997, Assefa Maru, an ETA executive committee
member, was killed by police. In August 1998, the Government sealed the
ETA executive offices, detained ETA leaders, and transferred the assets
of the ETA over to an ETA faction supportive of the Government's
educational policies. In June Dr. Taye was sentenced to 15 years in
prison (see Section 1.d.).
There is no requirement that unions belong to the Confederation of
Ethiopian Trade Unions (CETU), which was established in 1993,
decertified in December 1994 because of internal management and
political disputes, and officially reestablished and recertified in
April 1997. CETU includes all nine federations organized by industrial
and service sectors rather than by region. In September the Banking and
Insurance Workers Federation (BIWF) rejoined CETU when four of the five
core unions in the BIWF voted to join CETU.
The Labor Law stipulates that a trade organization may not act in
an overtly political manner. The Labor Law explicitly gives workers the
right to strike to protect their interests, but it also sets forth
restrictive procedures that apply before a legal strike may take place.
These apply equally to an employer's right to lock out workers. Strikes
must be supported by a majority of the workers affected. The Labor Law
prohibits retribution against strikers but labor leaders state that
most workers are not convinced that the Government would enforce this
protection. Both sides must make efforts at reconciliation, provide at
least 10 days' notice to the Government, include the reasons for the
action, and in cases already before a court orlabor board, the party
must provide at least a 30-day warning. If an agreement between unions
and management cannot be reached, the Minister of Labor may refer the
case to arbitration by a Labor Relations Board (LRB). The Government
has established LRB's at the national level and in some regions. The
Minister of Labor and Social Affairs appoints each LRB chairman, and
the four board members include two each from trade unions and employer
groups. Some efforts to enforce these regulations are made within the
formal industrial sector. There were no strikes during the year. Labor
officials have stated that in view of high unemployment and the
inattention courts have given to labor cases, workers are afraid to
participate in strikes or other labor actions.
Independent unions and those belonging to CETU are free to
affiliate with and participate in international labor bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining is protected under the Labor Law and under the Constitution
and is practiced freely throughout the country. Collective bargaining
agreements concluded between 1975 and the promulgation of the 1993
Labor Law remain in force. Labor experts estimate that more than 90
percent of unionized workers are covered by collective bargaining
agreements. Wages are negotiated at the plant level. The law prohibits
antiunion discrimination by employers against union members and
organizers. There are grievance procedures for hearings on allegations
of discrimination brought by individuals or unions. Employers found
guilty of antiunion discrimination are required to reinstate workers
fired for union activities. Labor leaders point to a number of court
cases that are 3 or 4 years old in which workers have been terminated
for union activities as examples of inattention by the courts to worker
rights. Seasonal and parttime agricultural workers are not organized
even on state-owned plantations. Seasonal workers' compensation,
benefits, and working conditions are far below those of unionized
permanent plantation employees.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Criminal Code,
which applies to persons over the age of 15 specifically prohibits
forced labor; however, forced labor can be used by court order as a
punitive measure. Forced or compulsory labor by children is illegal;
while there were reports in past years that young girls reportedly were
sold or forced into prostitution, there were no such reports during the
year (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). There also were numerous anecdotal
accounts of young persons, especially girls, traveling to the Middle
East to work as house servants and nannies, some of whom were abused,
including sexually (see Section 6.f.). The Constitution proscribes
slavery, which was abolished officially in 1942, and involuntary
servitude. There were no reports of slavery within the country.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Under the Labor Law, the minimum age for wage or salary
employment is 14 years; special provisions cover children between the
ages of 14 and 18, including the prohibition of night work or hazardous
work.
Children may not work more than 7 hours per day; work between the
hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.; work on public holidays or rest days; or
perform overtime work. While the Government has made some effort to
enforce these regulations within the formal industrial sector, social
welfare activists, civic organizers, government officials, and
entrepreneurs agree that child labor is pervasive throughout the
country, especially in the informal sector. In urban areas, children in
large numbers can be seen working in a variety of jobs, including
shining shoes, hustling passengers into cabs, working as porters,
selling lottery tickets, and herding animals. Child domestic workers
are common. Child laborers often are abused. A research study published
during the year reported that the prevalence of child abuse among urban
child laborers is 70 percent, compared with 24.5 percent among non-
economically active children from the same urban district. The study
concluded that physical and emotional abuse were twice as common among
child workers compared with non-workers, sexual abuse was five times as
common, and neglect was eight times as common. Among child workers
surveyed, rapes occurred exclusively among child domestics. A second
research study of child labor sponsored by CETU's National Federation
of Farm, Plantation, Fishery, and Agro-industry Trade Unions and
published during the year focused on rural locations. The study
reported that 30 percent of the workers on state farms surveyed were
between the ages of 7 and 14. Child workers typically worked 6 days a
week, received no benefits, and earned less than $10 (80 birr) a month.
At one plantation 75 percent of the children worked 12-hour days. There
also is evidence that children as young as age 14 are permitted to join
local militiaswith the consent of village leaders. This reportedly is
part of an effort to keep children in local areas despite limited
educational or employment opportunities (see Section 5). The Government
maintains that most economically active children are engaged in family-
based, nonexploitative child work that is part of the socialization
process and maintains that there is not a child labor problem.
Forced or compulsory labor by children is illegal, and, unlike in
past years, there were no reports that it happened. (see Sections 5,
6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1995 the Government
established a minimum wage of approximately $15 (120 birr) per month
for all wage earners in both the private and public sectors. In
addition, each industry and service sector has established its own
minimum wage. For example, public sector employees, the largest group
of wage earners, earn a minimum wage of approximately $22 (175 birr)
per month; employees in the banking and insurance sector have a minimum
wage of $25 (200 birr) per month. According to the statistics reported
by the Office of the Study of Wages and Other Remuneration, these wages
are insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker
and family. Consequently, most families must have at least two wage
earners to survive, and that is one of the reasons children leave
school early.
The legal workweek, as stipulated in the Labor Law, is 48 hours,
consisting of 6 days of 8 hours each, with a 24-hour rest period.
However, in practice, most employees work a 40-hour workweek consisting
of 5 days of 8 hours each.
The Government, industry, and unions negotiate to set occupational
health and safety standards. However, the Inspection Department of the
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs enforces these standards
ineffectively, due to a lack of human and financial resources. Workers
have the right to remove themselves from dangerous situations without
jeopardy to continued employment; however, most workers fear losing
their jobs if they were to do so.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons; however, there were numerous anecdotal accounts of young girls
traveling to the Middle East to work as house servants and nannies,
some of whom are abused, including sexually. There reportedly is a
network of persons based in the tourism and import-export sectors who
are involved heavily in soliciting potential clients, recruiting young
girls, arranging travel, and fabricating counterfeit work permits,
travel documents, and birth certificates (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
Although illegal, the abduction of women and girls as a form of
marriage still is widely practiced in Oromiya regions and the SNNPRS
(see Section 5).
As a result of a change in the Labor Law the Government no longer
acts as an employment agency for workers going abroad. Private entities
now arrange for overseas work and as a result, the number of women
being sent to Middle Eastern countries as domestic or industrial
workers increased significantly. Lebanon is the most popular
destination. There were credible reports that hundreds of the
approximately 15,000 Ethiopian domestic workers in Lebanon were
subjected to abusive conditions, including sexual exploitation. In
September and October, pictures appeared in the local press of workers
returning bruised and beaten. There were also reports that Ethiopian
domestic workers were abused in other Middle Eastern countries.
The Government began revising the Federal Civil and Penal Codes to
increase the penalties for traffickers. Training programs were
implemented for police officers on the criminal aspects of trafficking.
______
GABON
Gabon is a republic dominated by a strong Presidency. Although
opposition parties have been legal since 1990, a single party, the
Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) has remained in power since 1968 and
has circumscribed political choice. Elections for the presidency and
the National Assembly generally have not been free and fair but have
varied widely in quality; some suffered chiefly from poor organization,
while others were fraudulent. PDG leader El Hadj Omar Bongo has been
President since 1967 and was reelected for another 7-year term in a
December 1998 election marred by irregularities that generally favored
the incumbent, including incomplete and inaccurate electoral lists and
the use of false documents to cast votes. In July 1998, following
opposition victories in 1996 elections for local government offices
that recently had been made elective, the Government transferred key
electoral functions to the Interior Ministry from an independent
National Electoral Commission that had been established pursuant to a
1995 constitutional referendum. Members of the PDG and allied parties
hold large majorities of seats in both chambers of the national
legislature: The directly elected National Assembly, for which the most
recent elections, held in December 1996, were poorly run and
fraudulent; and the Senate, members of which are chosen by municipal
and regional government officials. The judiciary is independent but
remains vulnerable to government manipulation.
The national police, which are subordinate to the Interior
Ministry, and the gendarmerie, which is subordinate to the Defense
Ministry, are primarily responsible for domestic law enforcement and
public security. In addition elements of the armed forces and the
``Republican Guard,'' an elite, heavily armed unit that protects the
President, sometimes have performed internal security functions; both
the armed forces and the Republican Guard are subordinate to the
Defense Ministry. Members of the security forces occasionally committed
human rights abuses.
The country's economy is underdiversified and heavily dependent
upon external trade. The State dominates much of the economy through
telecommunications, timber export, and oil refinery parastatals;
however, the production of wood, oil, and other minerals is largely
private, and the water, electric, railroad, and sugar parastatals have
been privatized. Government financial mismanagement and corruption have
contributed to significant arrears in domestic and external debt
payments. Since the discovery of offshore oil in the late 1970's, the
oil industry has generated nearly half of recorded gross national
product; oil export earnings have allowed the country's approximately 1
million citizens to enjoy a relatively high material standard of living
based on imports of consumer goods and have drawn to the country's
capital, Libreville, a third of the country's citizens and many
immigrants from poorer African countries who work chiefly in the
informal and service sectors. Average annual per capita GDP was
approximately $4,500, although income distribution remained badly
skewed in favor of urban dwellers and a small economic elite, while the
rural population continued to receive relatively few social services.
However, the depletion of proven reserves of oil and timber contributed
to declining export earnings and state revenues during the year.
The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens in
some areas; however, longstanding human rights abuses continued.
Members of the security forces committed isolated extrajudicial
killings, the security forces beat and tortured prisoners and
detainees, prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening,
arbitrary arrest and detention continued, the judiciary remained
subject to government influence, and authorities routinely infringed on
citizens' privacy rights. The Government continued to restrict freedom
of the press. The ability of citizens to change their government
remained limited. Violence and societal discrimination against women
and forced labor by foreign children as domestic and agricultural
workers remained problems.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of politically motivated extrajudicial killings; however,
members of the security forces committed isolated extrajudicial
killings.
In April an off-duty member of the Republican Guard shot and killed
a taxi driver who had refused to lend his taxi to the soldier. Despite
demands from the media to prosecute thealleged assailant, police had
not charged the suspect by year's end.
In July a group of off-duty policemen reportedly killed 2 persons
and wounded 11 in a discotheque in Libreville. This reportedly was in
retaliation for the killing of a policeman at the same discotheque
several nights earlier. There were no arrests in this case by year's
end.
Although there were no confirmed reports of attempted killings that
appeared to be politically motivated, Pierre Mamboundou, who contested
the December 1998 presidential election as the candidate of the
opposition High Council of the Resistance Party, and to whom official
results assigned the second-largest number of votes cast in that
election, stated in December 1998 that armed commandos attempted to
kill him on December 12, 1998, 1 day before the official results of
that election were announced. Mamboundou stated that he believed that
the Government was responsible for the alleged attack, but no evidence
supporting this allegation was known.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture or cruel and inhuman
punishment; however, security forces often beat or physically mistreat
prisoners and detainees as punishment and to exact confessions.
In February police used force to disperse student demonstrators
(see Section 2.a.).
There were occasional incidents of violence in which practitioners
of some traditional indigenous religions (see Section 5) inflicted
bodily harm on other persons. However, the details of these incidents
are uncertain. The Ministry of the Interior maintained that violence
and bodily harm to others in the practice of a traditional religion is
a criminal offense and is prosecuted vigorously. Media reports
suggested that this was true; however, little information about such
prosecutions or their results is available.
Conditions in most prisons are harsh and life threatening.
Sanitation and ventilation are poor, and medical care is almost
nonexistent. Prisons provide inadequate food for inmates. There were no
known visits by human rights monitors to prisons during the year,
although the Government was not known to have impeded such visits.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention are problems. The law provides for up to 48 hours of initial
preventive detention, during which time police must charge a detainee
before a judge. However, in practice police rarely respect this
provision. Charges often are not filed expeditiously and persons often
are detained arbitrarily for long periods. Bail may be set if there is
to be a further investigation. Pretrial detainees have the right to
free access to their attorneys, and this right is respected in
practice. Detainees have the right to an expeditious trial, as defined
by the law. Pretrial detention is limited to 6 months for a misdemeanor
and to 1 year for a felony charge. These periods may be extended for 6
months by the examining magistrate. Prolonged pretrial detention is
common. The Attorney General's office estimates that roughly 40 percent
of persons in custody are pretrial detainees.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, while the judiciary is generally
independent in principle, it remains vulnerable to government
manipulation.
The judicial system includes the regular courts, a military
tribunal, and a civilian State Security Court. The regular court system
includes trial courts, appellate courts, and the Supreme Court. The
Constitutional Court is a separate body charged with examining
constitutional questions, including the certification of elections.
There are no traditional or customary courts. In some areas, minor
disputes may be taken to a local chief, but the State does not
recognize such decisions.The State Security Court, last convened in
1990, is constituted by the Government as required to consider matters
of state security.
There were systemic resource and personnel shortages in the
judiciary, which often contributed to prolonged pretrial detention (see
Section 1.d.).
The Constitution provides for the right to a public trial and the
right to legal counsel. These rights are generally respected in
criminal cases. Nevertheless, procedural safeguards are lacking,
particularly in state security trials. A judge may thus deliver an
immediate verdict of guilty at the initial hearing if sufficient
evidence is presented by the State.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for protection from
surveillance, from searches without warrant, and from interference with
private telecommunications or correspondence. As part of criminal
investigations, police may request search warrants from judges, which
they obtain easily, sometimes after the fact. The Government has used
them in the past to gain access to the homes of opposition figures and
their families.
Government authorities also routinely monitor private telephone
conversations, personal mail, and the movements of citizens.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press and, although citizens generally
continued to speak freely and criticize the Government, the Government
continued to restrict press freedom. Legislators in the National
Assembly openly criticize government policies, Ministers, and other
officials.
The only daily newspaper was the state-affiliated L'Union. About 10
privately owned weekly or monthly publications in newspaper format,
representing independent views and those of various political parties,
appeared during the year; however, most appeared irregularly due to
financial constraints and, in some instances, to government suspensions
of their publication licenses. All newspapers--including L'Union--
actively criticized the Government and political leaders of all
parties. Most also criticized the President.
Journalists are subject to the Communication Code, a law which
specifies their rights and responsibilities. Libel can be either a
criminal offense or a civil matter. The law authorizes the State to
initiate criminal libel prosecution against persons for libeling
elected government officials; it also authorizes the State to
criminalize civil libel suits.
In April the National Communication Council (CNC), a government
agency subordinate to the Communications Ministry, released its draft
of a proposed new Communications Code that would further restrict press
freedom by expanding the scope of criminal libel laws in the name of
protecting ``dignity of the person,'' but would shift the penalties for
libel away from imprisonment and toward monetary fines; it would reduce
prison sentences for journalists convicted of criminal libel while
increasing fines that could be imposed on such journalists and on the
newspaper firms that employ them. The new Communications Code was
pending in the National Assembly at year's end.
In recent years, the Government repeatedly has suspended the
publication licenses of some pro-opposition newspapers. For example,
the publication license of Le Bucheron, a Libreville-based weekly
affiliated with the National Rally of Lumberjacks (RNB) the country's
largest opposition party, was suspended by the Ministry of
Communications in 1993, by the Ministry of Interior in 1995, and twice
by the CNC during 1997. In each instance, the grounds for suspension
were the contents of articles or cartoons critical of President Bongo
or his Government. The most recent suspension, for 3 months starting in
October 1997, resulted from the newspaper's publications of allegations
that President Bongo stifled dissent by practicing witchcraft.
In April the CNC suspended the publication license of La Griffe, a
Libreville-based satirical weekly newspaper, on the grounds that it was
publishing anonymous editorials in contravention ofa legal requirement,
necessary for the enforcement of criminal libel laws, that publications
indicate the authors of everything they publish. The Ministry of
Communications previously had suspended the same newspaper's license
from August 1998 through March after the Government successfully
prosecuted members of the newspaper's staff for criminal libel. La
Griffe's publication license remained suspended at year's end.
The Government did not prosecute any journalists for criminal libel
during the year. However, in recent years, the Government increasingly
has used criminal libel prosecutions to restrict freedom of expression,
especially criticism of the Government. Two private print media
journalists, convicted of criminal libel in August 1998, fled the
country early in the year while their appeals were pending and remained
outside the country at year's end: Michel Ongoudou Loundah, editor-in-
chief of La Griffe, and La Griffe reporter Pulcherie Beaumiel, both of
whom the Government had prosecuted and whom a court had convicted and
sentenced to 8 months' imprisonment for reporting that the director
general of the state-owned airline had used the airline to smuggle
ivory internationally. In August 1998, Charles Moussavou Mabika, a
journalist at Gabonese Radio and Televison (RTG) and president of the
national journalists' union, was convicted of libel and sentenced to a
fine and 1 month's incarceration with no opportunity to appeal, for
alleging that the Minister of Communications had embezzled a sum
equivalent to $3.5 million; Mabika served his sentence and was released
in late 1998. In January 1998, Pierre-Andre Kombila, publisher of Le
Bucheron, was convicted of libeling the President by printing
accusations that President Bongo practices witchcraft and was fined the
equivalent of $1,800 and given a suspended sentence of 4 months'
imprisonment.
The State owns and operates two radio stations, RTG-1 and RTG-2,
which broadcast to all areas of the country. Much of their news
coverage concerns the activities of government officials. However, RTG
editorials sometimes are critical of specific government policies and
even specific Ministers of government. The CNC issues and sometimes has
suspended the broadcasting licenses of private radio and television
stations. During the year, license suspensions by the CNC reduced the
number of privately owned radio and television stations. At year's end,
only six privately owned radio stations operated in the country: Africa
No. 1, Radio Nostalgie, Radio Generation Nouvelle, Radio Unite, Radio
Mandarine, and Radio Soleil. Radio Soleil is affiliated with the
opposition RNB party and is highly critical of the Government. The
other privately owned radio stations were apolitical. The State owned
and operated two television stations, RTG-1 and RTG-2; an apolitical
station, TV Plus, was the only privately owned television station still
broadcasting in the country at year's end.
In December 1998, while the Government was tabulating the results
of the presidential election, domestic broadcasts of Radio Soleil were
jammed, and the station's telephone lines were cut.
In February the CNC suspended a live call-in program from Radio
Soleil. The CNC maintained that the program, Feedback, violated an
ordinance in the communications code. Specifically, the CNC claimed
that a caller, on a live broadcast that subsequently was rebroadcast,
had insulted President Bongo.
On October 11, the CNC suspended the broadcasting licenses of two
privately owned radio stations, Note Dame de Perpetuel Secours and
Radio Liberte, and of two privately owned television stations, TV 11
and Woleu Vision.
The Government did not interfere with domestic reception of
broadcasts of international radio stations, including Radio France 1
and the Voice of America. Foreign newspapers and magazines were widely
available.
The Government did not restrict access to or use of the Internet.
At year's end there were two Internet service providers in the country,
one state-owned and the other privately owned. In urban areas there
were cybercafes that provided relatively affordable access to the
Internet.
There are no restrictions on academic freedom, including research.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
respected this right in practice for citizens and recognized
organizations. The law requires thatgroups obtain permits for public
gatherings in advance, and the Government usually grants them.
In February police used force to disperse demonstrations by high
school and university students who had been on strike since November
1998 to protest shortages of school buses and other facilities; some
such demonstrations had become destructive of property and disruptive
of traffic.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respected this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
freedom, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
There is no state religion, and authorities do not engage in religious
persecution or favoritism. A 1983 decree banning Jehovah's Witnesses,
which the government promulgated on the grounds that Jehovah's
Witnesses allegedly do not adequately protect individuals who might
dissent from the group's views, remained in effect throughout the year.
However, the Government did not enforce the ban; in practice, Jehovah's
Witnesses in the country worshipped free from any known hindrance by
the State. Interior Ministry officials reportedly have met with
representatives of Jehovah's Witnesses to discuss lifting the ban; as a
condition of lifting the ban, the Government reportedly seeks a written
commitment from the denomination that it would respect individual
rights.
The Ministry of the Interior maintains an official registry of some
religious groups; however, it does not register traditional indigenous
religious groups. The Government does not require religious groups to
register but recommends that they do so in order to assemble with full
constitutional protection. No financial or tax benefit is conferred by
registration. The Government has refused to register about 10 religious
groups, including Jehovah's Witnesses.
In October the Government suspended the broadcasting license of a
privately owned radio station affiliated with the Catholic Church (see
Section 2.a).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights. There are no legally mandated restrictions on internal
movement. Police and gendarmes continued frequently to stop travelers
to check identity, residence, or registration documents, and members of
the security forces regularly harassed expatriate Africans working
legally as merchants, service sector employees, and manual laborers.
They extorted bribes and demanded services with the threat of
confiscation of residence documents or imprisonment. Residence permits
cost up to $1,000.
An unevenly enforced law requires married women to have their
husbands' permission to travel abroad. An exit visa is no longer
required for citizens to travel abroad. Aliens resident in the country
must obtain a visa in order to leave and return.
In July 1, 500 security force members including army soldiers were
deployed in the capital to round up illegal immigrants and bandits;
according to a Defense Ministry statement, they were instructed ``to
search systematically the maximum number of vehicles.''
The law contains provisions for granting refugee status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government strictly controls the
process of refugee adjudication. Coordination with the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is generally adequate. During the
year, an estimated 15,000 refugees from the Republic of Congo
(Brazzaville) entered the country; many of them were fleeing offensives
against Congolese rebels by forces supporting the Congo's government.
The Government cooperated with the UNHCR and international
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) that provided assistance to these
refugees.
During the year there were no reports that the Government forcibly
returned persons to a country were they feared persecution. However, in
1997 the Government handed over two refugees from Equatorial Guinea to
members of the Equatoguinean security forces who accompanied the
President of Equatorial Guinea on a visit to the country; they were
repatriated forcibly on the visiting President's plane, subsequently
were imprisoned in Equatorial Guinea, and remained in prison at year's
end.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The 1991 Constitution explicitly provides this right, but
mismanagement and serious irregularities in both the 1990 and 1996
legislative elections and the 1993 and 1998 presidential elections
called into serious doubt the extent to which this right exists in
practice. A single party, the PDG, has remained in power since its
creation by President Bongo in 1968, and political choice has remained
limited in practice despite the legalization of opposition parties
since 1990.
In a July 1995 constitutional referendum, citizens approved by a 96
percent majority reforms, including most significantly the
establishment of an independent National Electoral Commission (NEC).
The referendum was carried out under arrangements that assured that all
political parties could monitor voting and vote counting.
The Republic is dominated by a strong Presidency. The President can
veto legislation, dissolve the national legislature, call new
elections, and issue decrees that have the force of law while the
legislature is not in session. The legislature generally has approved
legislation presented to it by the President, but occasionally has not
done so. The President appoints and can dismiss judges through the
Ministry of Justice, to which the judiciary is responsible. The
President appoints ministers of government, provincial governors,
prefects and subprefects, and the heads of parastatal firms.
PDG leader El Hadj Omar Bongo has been President since 1967, when
the former president died while Bongo was Vice President. He was
reelected for another 7-year term in a December 1998 election marred by
irregularities that generally favored the incumbent, including
incomplete and inaccurate electoral lists and the use of false
documents to cast multiple votes. In July 1998, the Government
transferred key electoral functions, including the maintenance of voter
registration lists, from the NEC to the Interior Ministry. In October
1998, the representatives of three major opposition parties withdrew
from the NEC to protest their inability to verify the accuracy of voter
registration lists. Official results showed Bongo winning about two-
thirds of the votes cast.
The most recent elections for the National Assembly, the lower
house of the bicameral national legislature, held in 1996, were poorly
run and fraudulent. Candidates belonging to the PDG and other parties
supporting President Bongo won more than 80 of the 120 seats, including
8 of 10 seats in the capital, where the opposition recently had won
fairer local government elections. The military and NEC magistrates
fraudulently ensured victory for parties supporting the President by
arbitrarily altering vote counts, particularly in the capital.
The ability of citizens to choose their subnational governments
remains limited in practice. Among subnational officials, provincial
governors, prefects, and subprefects are officers of the central
Government, responsible to the President. Mayors and municipal councils
are elected; however, municipal governments have limited financial
autonomy and depend heavily on funding from the central Government.
During the year, the Mayor of Libreville, a member of the RNB
opposition party, complained that the central Government was not
disbursing funds allocated to Libreville's municipal government.
Local elections for mayors and municipal councils held in 1996 were
poorly organized and later were repeated in key districts. In both sets
of elections, opposition parties won most of the municipal council
seats in the capital, Libreville, where the RNB candidate was elected
mayor.
The Senate, the upper house of the bicameral national legislature,
was created in 1996. The first elections for Senators were held in
1997. Municipal and regional government officials elect all 91
Senators.
Major opposition parties include the RNB and the Gabonese
Progressive Party (PGP). The RNB's political base is in the northern
province of Woleu-Ntem, which is inhabited chiefly by members of the
Fang ethnic group, and in Libreville neighborhoods with many Fang
residents, although the party attracts some support from other regions
and ethnic groups. In 1998, before the presidential election, the RNB
spit into two factions. The PGP enjoys strong support in Port Gentil,
the country's economic center, and among the Myene ethnic group.
Ideological splits and rivalries between Libreville and Port Gentil
have reduced the effectiveness of the PGP.
There are no restrictions on the participation of women and
minorities in politics. At year's end, 6 of the 120 National Assembly
representatives, 9 of the 91 senators, and 4 of the 41 cabinet members
were women. Indigenous Pygmies rarely participate in the political
process, and the Government has made only limited efforts to include
them (see Section 5).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government officially allows the existence of independent human
rights groups, although none are active. No domestic nongovernmental
associations (NGO's) actively investigate, report on, or work to
mitigate human rights abuses. The largest and best-financed domestic
NGO's are government-associated and financed; the president of one such
NGO, GERDDES-Gabon, is a senior official of the ruling party. In
October the Government announced its intention to set up a National
Human Rights Commission; it had not yet done so by year's end.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution forbids discrimination based on national origin,
race, gender, or opinion. The Government does not uniformly enforce
these constitutional provisions and tolerates a substantial degree of
discrimination against women, especially in domestic affairs. It has
also provided a lower level of health care and educational services to
children of families of other African nationalities than it provided to
citizens.
Women.--Violence against women is common and is especially
prevalent in rural areas. While medical authorities have not
specifically identified rape to be a chronic problem, religious workers
and hospital staff report that evidence of beatings of women is common.
Police rarely intervene in such cases, and women virtually never file
complaints with civil authorities. Only limited medical and legal
assistance is available.
The law provides that women have rights to equal access in
education, business, and investment. Women own businesses and property,
participate in politics, and work throughout the government and the
private sector. Women nevertheless continue to face considerable
societal and legal discrimination, especially in rural areas. According
to a U.N. agency, only 52 percent of women were literate in 1994,
compared with 74 percent of men.
By law couples must stipulate at the time of marriage whether they
intend to adhere to a monogynous or a polygynous relationship. For
monogynous married couples, a common property law provides for the
equal distribution of assets after divorce. Wives who leave polygynous
husbands suffer severe reductions in their property rights. In
inheritance cases, the husband's family must issue a written
authorization before his widow can inherit property. Common law
marriage, which is socially accepted and widely practiced, affords a
woman no property rights.
The law still requires that a woman obtain her husband's permission
to travel abroad; however, this requirement is not consistently
enforced.
Children.--The Government has used oil revenue to build schools, to
pay adequate teacher salaries, and to promote education, even in rural
areas. The country has a relatively high infant mortality rate, and not
all children have access to vaccination. Traditional beliefs and
practices provide numerous safeguards for children, but children remain
the responsibility of the extended family--including aunts,
grandmothers, and older siblings. There is little evidence of physical
abuse of children. Protection for children's rights is not codified in
law.
There is concern about the problems facing the large community of
children of African noncitizens. Almost all enjoy far less access to
education and health care than do children of Gabonese and are
sometimes victims of child labor abuses (see Section 6.d.). Female
genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by international
health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health,
occurs among the resident population of expatriate Africans. There are
no laws againstFGM, but according to local women's groups, it is not
practiced on Gabonese children.
People With Disabilities.--There are no laws that prohibit
discrimination against persons with disabilities, or that provide for
access to buildings or services.
Indigenous People.--The Baka people (Pygmies) are the earliest
known human inhabitants of the country. Several thousand indigenous
Pygmies live in the country, most in large tracts of still-intact rain
forest in the northeast. Domestic law grants them the same civil rights
as other citizens. Pygmies are largely independent of formal authority,
keeping their own traditions, independent communities, and local
decisionmaking structures. Pygmies did not participate in government-
instituted programs that integrated many small rural villages into
larger ones along major roads. As a result, their access to government-
funded health and sanitation facilities was limited. There are no
specific government programs or policies to assist or hinder Pygmies.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's citizen
population includes several ethnic groups, each of which generally
speaks a distinct primary language and is concentrated in an
identifiable area of the country. There is no majority ethnic group;
the largest ethnic group is the Fang, which makes up over 30 percent of
the population and is concentrated in the north. Other major ethnic
groups include the Myene, the Bapunu, the Bateke, the Obamba, and the
Nzebi. Urban neighborhoods are not ethnically segregated; interethnic
marriage is common.
There was some correlation between ethnic and political cleavages.
Support for the ruling party is stronger among persons from southern
ethnic groups, including President Bongo's Bateke ethnic group, than
among the northern Fang group or the coastal Myene group (see Section
3).
The Government generally fostered ethnic balance in the public
sector, throughout which persons from all major ethnic groups continued
to occupy prominent positions. However, there was evidence that members
of the President's Bateke ethnic group and other ethnic southerners
held a disproportionately large number of key positions throughout the
military and security forces (see Section 3).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution places no
restrictions on the right of association and recognizes the right of
citizens to form trade and labor unions. Virtually the entire formal
private sector work force is unionized. Unions must register with the
Government in order to be recognized officially. Public sector
employees may unionize although their right to strike is limited if it
could jeopardize public safety. Until 1990 there was only one
recognized labor organization, the Gabonese Labor Confederation
(COSYGA), to which all unionized workers contributed a mandatory
percentage of their salaries. In 1992 the Government accepted the
establishment of independent unions and abolished the mandatory
contribution to COSYGA. Since 1993, many independent unions have
emerged, including powerful unions of teachers, civil servants,
transport workers, and communications workers. Some independent unions
have associated to form the Gabonese Confederation of Free Unions
(CGSL). COSYGA has continued to be affiliated with the Government but
has publicly criticized some government policies it perceived as
contrary to labor interests.
In 1994 the National Assembly passed an extensively revised version
of the Labor Code, which was published and implemented in early 1995.
The code provides extensive protection of worker rights.
Strikes are legal if they are held after an 8-day notice advising
that outside arbitration has failed. The Labor Code prohibits direct
government action against individual strikers who abide by the
arbitration and notification provisions. It also provides that the
Government cannot press charges against a group for criminal activities
committed by individuals.
The country's largest union, which represents public sector
employees, went on strike in November 1998 to demand higher wages and
remained on strike until February. On January 26, the Prime Minister
issued a public statement threatening criminal penalties against public
sector workers who continued to strike.
In October the employees of the Chamber of Commerce went on strike
to protest the state-owned Chamber's failure to pay their salaries,
which in turn resulted from its failure to receive funds from the
Government.
Unions and confederations are free to affiliate with international
labor bodies and participate in their activities. COSYGA is affiliated
with the Organization of African Trade Union Unity, while the CGSL is
affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
Both COSYGA and CGSL have ties with numerous other international labor
organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
provides for collective bargaining by industry, not by firm;
collectively bargained agreements set wages for whole industries. Labor
and management meet to negotiate differences, and the Ministry of Labor
provides an observer. This observer does not take an active part in
negotiations over pay scales, working conditions, or benefits.
Agreements also apply to nonunion workers. While no laws specifically
prohibit antiunion discrimination, the court may require employers who
are found guilty by civil courts of having engaged in such
discrimination to compensate employees.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced labor, and there are no reports that it exists in the adult
community. The Government also specifically prohibits forced and bonded
labor by children, but does not enforce this prohibition effectively.
However, children and in particular immigrant children are forced to
working as domestic or agricultural help. The Government is cooperating
actively with the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) to combat this abuse;
however, UNICEF has reported that some government officials privately
use forced labor by immigrant children (see Section 6.d.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Children below the age of 16 may not work without the
express consent of the Ministries of Labor, Education, and Public
Health. These ministries rigorously enforce this law with respect to
Gabonese children, and there are few Gabonese under the age of 18
working in the modern wage sector. A significant number of children
work in marketplaces or perform domestic duties. UNICEF and other
concerned organizations have reported that government officials often
privately use foreign child labor, mainly as domestic or agricultural
help. These children do not go to school, have only limited means of
acquiring medical attention, and are often victims of exploitation by
employers or foster families. Laws forbidding child labor theoretically
extend protection to foreign children as well, but abuses often are not
reported. Education is compulsory until age 16. However, there is
evidence that fewer than half of all secondary-school-age children
attended school as of 1996; secondary school attendance rates for
immigrant children appear likely to be lower, although public schools
accept immigrant children, and the Government encourages them to
attend.
On January 23, the Minister of Education announced the indefinite
closure of all public primary and secondary schools, following a strike
by some public school teachers and most university students (see
Sections 2.a and 6.a); however, all affected schools reopened in
February following the resolution of the strike, and remained open
throughout the rest of the year.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children but
does not enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code governs working
conditions and benefits for all sectors and provides a broad range of
protection to workers. The Code stipulates a 40-hour workweek with a
minimum rest period of 48 consecutive hours. Employers must
compensateworkers for overtime work. All companies in the modern wage
sector pay competitive wages and grant generous fringe benefits
required by law, including maternity leave and 6 weeks of annual paid
vacation.
Traditionally, representatives of labor, management, and the
Government met annually to examine economic and labor conditions and to
recommend a minimum wage rate within government guidelines to the
President, who then issued an annual decree. This procedure has not
been followed since 1994, in part because the Government was pursuing a
policy of wage austerity recommended by international financial
institutions. The monthly minimum wage was kept at its 1994 level of
about $110 (cfa 64,000). Wages provide a decent standard of living for
a worker and family.
The Ministry of Health has established occupational health and
safety standards but does not enforce or regulate them effectively. The
application of labor standards varies greatly from company to company
and between industries. The Government reportedly does not enforce
Labor Code provisions in sectors where the bulk of the labor force is
non-Gabonese. Foreigners, both documented and undocumented, may be
obliged to work under substandard conditions; may be dismissed without
notice or recourse; or may be mistreated physically, especially in the
case of illegal aliens. Employers frequently require longer hours of
work from noncitizen Africans and pay them less, often hiring on a
short-term, casual basis in order to avoid paying taxes, social
security contributions, and other benefits. In the formal sector,
workers may remove themselves from dangerous work situations without
fear of retribution.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law specifically prohibits
trafficking in persons; however, authorities have indicated that a
provision of the Constitution that prohibits endangering the physical
well-being of a person authorizes the State to prosecute persons who
commit this abuse.
There were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to, or from
the country during the year.
______
THE GAMBIA
The Gambia is ruled by President Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh, the former
chairman of the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) that
seized power in a military coup in 1994, deposing a democratically
elected government. Jammeh resigned his military commission and was
elected president in controversial elections in September 1996, which
observers considered neither free nor fair. Three of the 13 members of
the current Cabinet are retired army officers who were Jammeh's allies
during or immediately following the coup, and the security forces
continue to exert strong influence in the Government. In January 1997,
the Constitution of the Second Republic came into effect, restoring
formal constitutional government, and citizens chose a National
Assembly in elections, the results of which generally were accepted by
the opposition. Jammeh's party, the Alliance for Patriotic
Reorientation and Construction (APRC), won 33 of the 45 assembly seats
filled by election. The Constitution provides for an independent
judiciary; however, the judiciary reportedly is subject at times to
executive branch pressure, especially at lower levels, although the
courts have demonstrated their independence on occasion.
The Gambian National Army (GNA) reports to the Secretary of State
for Defense (who is now the President). The police report to the
Secretary of State for the Interior. The National Intelligence Agency
(NIA), established in 1995 by government decree, reports directly to
the President but is otherwise autonomous. Members of the security
forces committed serious human rights abuses.
The rapidly growing population of 1.3 million is divided between a
rural majority and a growing urban minority. Much of the population is
engaged in subsistence farming. The country's farmers, a majority of
whom are women, grow rice, millet, corn, and groundnuts (the country's
primary export crop). The private sector, led by tourism, trading, and
fisheries, is experiencing modest growth. However, a high population
growth rate has diluted the positive effects of economic expansion. Per
capita gross domestic product is estimated to be $360.
The Government's human rights record generally was poor, and
serious problems remained. President Jammeh's dominance and
restrictions on opposition parties continued, and in practice citizens
still do not have an effective right to change their government.
Security forces sometimes beat or otherwise mistreated detainees and
prisoners. There was at least one credible report that police severely
beat an opposition figure while in custody. Prison conditions remained
very poor. Security forces at times arbitrarily arrested and
detainedcitizens, particularly opposition politicians and journalists.
Some of the detainees alleged harsh treatment at the hands of their
captors. The courts reportedly are subject to executive branch
pressure, particularly at lower levels, although magistrates
occasionally demonstrate some independence by ruling against the
Government. However, members of the security forces occasionally defy
High Court orders with relative impunity. The Constitution prohibits
the prosecution of any member of the AFPRC for any act or omission in
the performance of official duties following the 1994 coup. The
Government at times infringed on citizens' privacy rights; the right to
transfer funds or assets remained restricted for most senior officials
of the former Jawara government. The Government significantly limited
freedom of speech and of the press through intimidation and fear.
Journalists still practice self-censorship. Citizens have been arrested
for making antigovernment statements in public. The Government
restricted freedom of assembly and association. The opposition United
Democratic Party (UDP), in at least two instances, was denied
permission to hold public rallies on the grounds that it did not
provide sufficient notice. Although opposition forces were active and
vocal in the National Assembly, a standing order forbade
parliamentarians from criticizing the Head of State in their debates or
discussing any matter before the courts. Although formal constitutional
rule was restored in 1997, some constitutional provisions have not been
respected in practice, and others have not been tested in the courts.
An apparently unconstitutional ban on political activity by some
politicians and political parties remains in effect and has not been
subject to judicial review. The Government at times limited freedom of
movement, particularly for some senior officials of the former Jawara
government. The Government continued to withhold passports from at
least three current opposition politicians, although in May a new
passport was issued to one of the politicians. Discrimination and
violence against women persisted. The practice of female genital
mutilation (FGM) is widespread and entrenched. Child labor is common.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
The Government has not taken any action against a group of soldiers
who shot and killed a man on a beach in October 1997, despite
assurances by the Department of State for Defense that the matter would
be ``judiciously and expeditiously addressed.''
The circumstances of the May 1997 death of Yaya Srammeh, a rebel
accused of treason, have not been explained publicly, nor has there
been an investigation into his death.
In July 1998, the Secretary of State for the Interior stated before
the National Assembly that there had been no progress in his
department's investigation of the 1995 death of former Finance Minister
Ousman Koro Ceesay. The Government made no further statements on this
matter during the year.
There were no reported developments concerning the 1995 death of
Sadibou Haidara, a member of the junta that seized power in 1994.
In January rebels allegedly belonging to the Movement of Democratic
Forces for the Casamance (MFDC) in Senegal crossed the border and
attacked the village of Gambissara, killing two persons. On January 16,
police arrested three alleged members of the MFDC.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture or inhuman or degrading
punishment; however, security forces sometimes beat or otherwise
mistreated detainees and prisoners. There were also reports that
security forces beat military and security detainees, and that security
prisoners sometimes are threatened with summary execution.
According to a member of the National Assembly, police allegedly
severely beat and tortured an opposition politician who was arrested
and detained for 2 days (see Section 1.d.).
Police harassed citizens at checkpoints (see Section 2.d.).
There were no developments in the promised investigation of the
detention and torture of eight UDP officials in 1997. At the time of
the incident, the Government promised a fullinvestigation and
appropriate action by the Attorney General. Since the incident, police
investigators have interviewed some witnesses, but some victims say
that they have not been contacted. No one has been arrested and no
results of the investigation have been made public.
There were no further developments in the case of the reported
detention and severe beating of UDP member Yaya Sanneh in July 1997.
Conditions at Mile 2, Janjanbureh, and Jeshwang prisons remained
very poor. Mile 2 prison was reported to be grim, overcrowded, and
lacking in medical facilities. Prisoners are locked in their cells for
over 20 hours each day. There were credible reports of beatings,
malnourishment, and other harsh treatment of political, military, and
security detainees. Women are housed separately.
Conditions in one representative local jail reportedly were
unsanitary and overcrowded. Inmates slept on cement benches or on the
floor without blankets. There was one water tap in the cell area but
often no water. Police are reluctant to terminate fistfights between
prisoners until the dispute is settled, and many of the prisoners are
injured.
The International Committee of the Red Cross visited Mile 2 prison
during the year. Local nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) also
generally are permitted to visit prisons upon request. A member of the
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Special
Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa visited the
three prisons during the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
includes provisions to protect against arbitrary arrest and detention;
however, on occasion, security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained
citizens. Periods of detention ranged from a few hours to several days.
The Government has not revoked formally military decrees enacted
prior to the current Constitution that give the NIA and the Secretary
of State for Interior broad power to detain individuals indefinitely
without charge if ``in the interest of national security.'' The
Constitution provides that decrees remain in effect unless inconsistent
with constitutional provisions. These detention decrees appear to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, but they have not yet been subject
to judicial challenge. The Government has stated that it no longer
enforces these decrees; however, in some instances, the Government did
not respect the constitutional requirement that detainees be brought
before a court within 72 hours.
In April the NIA arrested two airport security officials and
detained them without charge for 2 days after they attempted to prevent
a senior presidential advisor from escorting a group of foreign
officials onto the airport tarmac. The presidential advisor reportedly
drew his gun after being denied entry, forced his way onto the tarmac,
and then struck the more senior of the security officials on the head
with the butt of the gun. Upon being released from detention, both
security officers were fired from their jobs; however, in July they
were reinstated and the senior security officer was promoted.
In May the NIA arrested Tata Camara, chairperson in Janjanbureh of
the UDP, and six other UDP supporters in Dankunku. Tata allegedly was
discussing privately her views of economic hardships in the country
when arrested. The arrests of the other six followed a UDP political
rally held in Dankunku in May. The six UDP supporters were released
after 6 hours but Camara remained in detention for 2 weeks.
On May 26, an opposition member, Shyngle Nyassi, was abducted from
his house in Brikama and detained without charge by the NIA. The NIA
defied a High Court order to release Nyassi, who was detained for 2
weeks, falsely claiming that he was not in the agency's custody. The
NIA released Nyassi a week after the court-ordered time.
On July 16, a reporter from a new newspaper, The Independent, was
detained for over 2 hours. He allegedly was harassed for reporting that
government immigration officers had arrested non-citizen, disabled
beggars. On July 30, the NIA arrested six staff members of The
Independent and detained them for 3 hours for questioning after the
newspaper continued publishing despite a court order to cease
publication. On August 1, the NIA arrested and detained for a day the
editor in chief and the managing editor of The Independent (see Section
2.a.).
In September a reporter from The Daily Observer and the editor in
chief were arrested and detained for questioning after publishing a
story about an alleged military skirmish in the village of Kanilai,
which is President Jammeh's home village (see Section 2.a.). The editor
was released after 2 hours of questioning, butthe reporter was detained
for 48 hours. Both were released without charge.
In September the chairman of the opposition National Reconciliation
Party (NRP) in Dankunku village, Musa Jallow, was arrested and detained
for 2 days by the police. He was accused of insulting President Jammeh
and other government authorities. A member of the National Assembly,
who visited Jallow during his detention, reported that Jallow had been
beaten and tortured.
In May 1998, 10 persons, including UDP leader Lamin Waa Juwara and
the imam of the largest mosque in Brikama, were arrested in a
politically charged dispute over minor construction work at a mosque in
Brikama (see Section 2.c.). None of those arrested was charged within
the constitutionally required 72-hour period. Charges against five of
those detained were dropped. The four that were charged with damaging
public property were acquitted and discharged by the magistrate court
in February.
On December 28, three journalists with the Independent newspaper
were arrested for ``libel against the President'' (see Section 2.a.).
They were released on bail, but must check in with the police on a
regular basis. Their trial was pending at year's end.
The Government has made no progress in investigating the detention
and torture of eight UDP activists in 1997 (see Section 1.c.).
The Government did not exile opponents; however, former President
Jawara remains outside the country under threat of arrest and detention
on corruption charges if he returns. Other senior officials of the
former government, for example, Vice President Saihou Sabally, and
Secretary General Abdou Sara Janha, also remain outside the country,
but do not face official charges.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary reportedly is subject at
times to executive branch pressure, especially at the lower levels. The
courts nevertheless have demonstrated their independence on several
occasions, at times in significant cases. In February the High Court
dismissed charges against some of the defendants in the politically
charged dispute concerning a mosque in Brikama (see Section 1.d.). In
1997 the Court of Appeal, the country's highest court, overturned the
treason convictions and death sentences of four men who led an abortive
coup in November 1996. The Government has appealed this decision to the
Privy Council in London, but the case was pending at year's end.
The judicial system comprises a Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council (based in London), the Court of Appeal, high courts, and eight
magistrate's courts. The Constitution provided for a reconfiguration of
the courts by which a Supreme Court would replace the Privy Council as
the ultimate court of appeal. The new Supreme Court was inaugurated in
December, and a full compliment of judges and a Chief Justice were
appointed. Appeals to the Privy Council ceased. Village chiefs preside
over local courts at the village level.
The judicial system recognizes customary, Shari'a, and general law.
Customary law covers marriage and divorce for non-Muslims, inheritance,
land tenure, tribal and clan leadership, and all other traditional and
social relations. Shari'a law is observed primarily in Muslim marriage
and divorce matters. General law, following the English model, applies
to felonies, misdemeanors in urban areas, and the formal business
sector. Trials are public, and defendants have the right to an attorney
at their own cost.
The 1998 trial of three men accused of complicity in a July 1997
coup attempt was closed to the public after the court accepted a
prosecution motion that public presentation of certain evidence would
lead to a ``breach of peace and public order.'' One of the accused made
detailed allegations of torture before the proceedings were closed. The
three were convicted of treason in October 1998 and sentenced to death;
their appeals of the convictions were pending at year's end.
The junta that took power in 1994 appointed four commissions to
investigate individuals and organizations suspected of corruption
during the First Republic. These commissions had powers similar to a
grand jury, with additional authority to recommend the seizure of
assets, to imprison and fine for contempt, and to imprison or demand
bond from individuals considered likely to abscond. Three of the
commissions completed their work in 1998, the fourth completed its work
and submitted its report. The commissions were closed in December. No
findings were made public by year's end.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such abuses; however,
although the Government generally respects these prohibitions, in
practice there were some exceptions. The Government has not canceled
Decree 45, which abrogates Constitutional safeguards against arbitrary
search and permits search and seizure of property without due process.
This decree remains formally in effect, pending a judicial finding that
the decree is inconsistent with the Constitution. In practice the
Government appears not to enforce it, but no court case has been
brought to test the decree's constitutionality.
Observers assume that the Government monitors citizens engaged in
activity that it deems objectionable. In the past, surveillance
included monitoring of telephones and mail. In previous years,
investigating commissions made findings resulting in the forfeiture of
private property, principally that property held by former government
and parastatal officials. The work of these commissions, which began
under the AFPRC regime, is sanctioned under the Constitution with
provisions for due process. However, it is not clear that the full
rights of due process were accorded to officials investigated by the
commissions before the Constitution took effect. The evidentiary
standards applied by the commissions in ordering the forfeiture of
money and property are not clear, and orders by the commissions have
not yet been subject to effective judicial review.
The Government restricted the right to transfer funds or assets of
some senior officials of the former Jawara government accused of
corruption.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and the press; however, in practice, the Government
significantly limits the full exercise of these freedoms by using
intimidation, police pressure, regulatory scrutiny, and laws that
inhibit the media. As a result, journalists practice a significant
degree of self-censorship.
On July 23, the publishers of The Independent received a letter
from the Attorney General, ordering them to cease publishing until they
had registered their business name with the Commissioner of Income Tax
as required by the Business Registration Act of 1973. The Independent
ignored the order and continued to publish. On July 30, the NIA raided
The Independent offices and arrested six staff members. They were
detained for questioning for 3 hours and released without charge. On
August 1, the editor in chief and the managing editor were arrested and
detained by the NIA for continuing to publish the newspaper. They were
released on August 2 (see Section 1.d.). The Independent subsequently
completed the registration of its name and resumed publishing on August
20. On December 28, the editor in chief, the managing editor, and a
staff reporter with the Independent were arrested for ``libel against
the President,'' after they wrote an article questioning the stability
of the President's marriage. They were released on a bail of $1,000
(10,000 dalasi) each, but must check in with the police on a regular
basis. Their trial was pending at year's end.
In early 1998, the NIA closed the country's leading independent
radio station, Citizen FM, after it broadcast a report that a senior
NIA official had been implicated in a currency counterfeiting scheme.
The station also was charged with failure to pay its licensing fees.
The station's owner and news editor were detained briefly. Despite the
controversy over licensing fees, a government press release made it
clear that the station's editorial policies were a principal reason for
the government action. The press release warned about ``disciplinary
measures'' for reporting ``allegations and unconfirmed rumors.'' In
July 1998, a magistrate's court ordered that the station be forfeited
to the Government for failure to pay the licensing fees, despite
repeated offers by the station's ownership to pay past due accounts.
The station's ownership has appealed the judgment; the trial resumed at
the High Court in June, but was adjourned until 2000.
The Daily Observer, the country's leading independent newspaper,
also has experienced significant governmental interference. In May the
Daily Observer was sold to a businessperson said to be more amenable to
President Jammeh than the previous management. Nevertheless, Daily
Observer reporters still encounter politically motivated resistance. In
September a reporter from the Daily Observer and the editor in chief
were arrested and detained for questioning, subsequent to an Observer
article reporting on an alleged military skirmish in the President's
home village. The editor in chief was released after 2 hours and the
reporter released after 48 hours (see Section 1.d.).
In September an opposition politician was arrested, detained, and
reportedly beaten for allegedly insulting President Jammeh and other
government authorities (see Section 1.d.).
The Government employed arrest, detention, and interrogation to
intimidate journalists and newspapers that published articles that it
considered inaccurate or sensitive (see Section 1.d.). Decrees 70 and
71, enacted in 1996, remained in effect and continued to inhibit free
reporting. The decrees require all newspapers to post a $10,000
(100,000 dalasis) bond or cease publication. The bond is required to
ensure payment of any penalties imposed by a court for the publication
of blasphemous or seditious articles or other libel. State-owned
publications are not subject to these decrees. The possession and
distribution of documents deemed to be ``political literature'' also is
barred by decree. These decrees and the fear of reprisals and
government action have had a chilling effect on the press. Although
still independent, the nongovernment press practices a significant
degree of self-censorship. However, strong criticism of the Government
is frequent, and opposition views appear in the independent press.
English, French, and other foreign newspapers and magazines are
available.
Radio broadcasts from the government station and private stations
normally reach listeners in the eastern part of the country. Private
radio stations simulcast news provided by Radio Gambia, the government
station. After the closure of Citizen FM, only one private radio
station produced independent news broadcasts. However, occasionally
there were public affairs broadcasts on at least two independent radio
stations. The British Broadcasting Corporation, Voice of America, Radio
France International, and other news reports sometimes are rebroadcast
by local stations, and all are available via short-wave radio.
Senegalese television and radio are available in many parts of the
country. Wealthy residents also use television satellite systems for
independent news coverage.
Government radio and television give very limited coverage to
opposition activities, including statements by opposition
parliamentarians in the National Assembly. In most other respects, the
state media serve as propaganda instruments for the Government and its
supporters.
There were no reports of any government restrictions on academic
freedom. There is no university, but a university extension program
completed its fourth academic year in August.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricts
this right in practice. The authorities interfered with efforts by the
principal opposition party, the UDP, to organize public meetings. In
several instances, the Government denied UDP requests for permits to
hold political rallies on the grounds that the requests were submitted
late. Nevertheless the UDP held several well attended rallies at which
leaders made statements highly critical of the Government.
In May the police arrested a female chairperson and six other UDP
supporters for attending a political rally. The six were released
within 24 hours, but the chairperson was detained without charge for 2
weeks (see Section 1.d.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
Government restricts this right in practice. Decree 89 banned from
political activity three major opposition political parties, and all
former presidents, vice presidents, and ministers until 2024. The
decree's penalty of life imprisonment for an individual or a $100,000
(1 million dalasi) fine for an organization considerably restricts
political activity (see Section 3). Despite the fact that the decree
apparently conflicts with provisions of the Constitution, it has not
been challenged in court. The severe penalties for violating the decree
have inhibited political challenge, since most cases would have to be
brought by a person who violated the decree. The three banned major
parties have not resumed activity nor have the various political
figures covered under the ban done so.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
Adherents of all faiths are free to worship without government
restriction.
The foreign leadership and foreign staff members of the Ahmadiyah
Islamic branch, who left the country in 1997 claiming fear of
persecution after being criticized by the imam of the Statehouse mosque
so far have not returned. However, in 1998 the Gambian head of the
Ahmadiyah branch returned from exile, and the institutions of the
Ahmadiyah, which were closed as a result of the conflict, were
reopened. The Statehouse imam has made no further criticism of the
Ahmadiyah branch.
In May 1998, the imam of the largest mosque in Brikama was arrested
in a dispute over minor construction work at a mosque that reportedly
was financed by supporters of the ruling party. The imam, a largely
apolitical figure who nevertheless is believed by many to oppose the
ruling party, ordered a halt to the construction. Subsequently he was
arrested, together with a leading opposition party politician and eight
others. In February after a protracted legal battle, all of those
arrested were acquitted of charges of destruction of property and
discharged by the High Court. However, the Government refused to allow
the imam to lead prayers at the mosque both as a result of this
incident and due to pressure from his opponents in the community. The
Government's refusal to allow the imam to lead prayers was being
considered in the High Court at year's end.
The Government permits and does not limit religious instruction in
schools. Bible and Koranic studies are provided in both public and
private schools throughout the country without government restriction
or interference. Religious instruction in public schools is provided at
government expense, but is not mandatory.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement but allows for ``reasonable restrictions,'' and there were
instances in which the Government restricted this right. At a major
police checkpoint outside of Banjul, police and NIA personnel
reportedly harassed individuals not carrying the recently required
identification card. Even citizens who carried Gambian passports were
detained and threatened at gunpoint. However, observers reported that
such activity lessened by year's end.
The authorities prohibited those under investigation for corruption
or security matters from leaving the country. Three politicians
associated with the opposition UDP also were denied passports, although
they were not facing corruption or security charges. One of the
politicians was granted a passport in May. The leader of the opposition
UDP and other opposition figures have traveled outside the country
without incident.
The law does not provide for the granting of refugee and asylee
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, the Government
cooperates with the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees. The Government provided first asylum for approximately 3,000
persons from Senegal and Guinea-Bissau during the year. There were no
reports of the forced expulsion of persons with a valid claim to
refugee status. The Government works with the UNHCR and local NGO's in
processing refugee claims. The Gambia hosts approximately 8,000
refugees from Sierra Leone, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and other
countries. The Government continues to host approximately 3,500
Senegalese refugees from the troubled Casamance region. In August with
the assistance of the Government, the UNHCR repatriated 93 refugees to
the Casamance region in Senegal and 250 to Guinea-Bissau.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Despite a new Constitution and legislative elections in 1997,
citizens still do not have an effective right to change their
government in practice. Citizens attempted to exercise this right in
presidential elections in 1996; however, the few international
observers who were present noted serious problems in the electoral
process. Foreign governments criticized the election as not being free
and fair, primarily because of government intimidation, restrictions
imposed by the Government on opposition campaign efforts, and limited
access to the government-owned media prior to the election.
Government-owned media continued to deny news coverage and other
access to opposition politicians and engaged in a number of other
practices that restricted political activity (see Section 2.a.). In
September an opposition politician was arrested, detained, and
reportedly beaten for allegedly insulting President Jammeh and other
government authorities (see Section 1.d.). The Government frequently
refused to authorize opposition meetings (see Section 2.b). Decree 89
bans three former political parties and all persons who held the
offices of president, vice president, and minister since 1965 from
involvement in politics until 2024 (see Section 2.b.). Although Decree
89 apparently is unconstitutional, it has not been challenged in the
courts and remained in effect. The severe penalties for violating the
decree have inhibited challenge, since most cases would have to be
brought by a person who violated the decree. During the year, the
Government thwarted an opposition effort to have the National Assembly
repeal Decree 89.
In January 1997, the Constitution of the Second Republic came into
effect, and citizens chose a new National Assembly inelections whose
results were accepted by the opposition. President Jammeh's party, the
Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) won 33 of
45 assembly seats filled by election; 4 members are appointed by the
President. Procedural methods are used to restrict debate within the
National Assembly.
The Constitution provides for the democratic election of the
President every 5 years. National Assembly elections are held 3 months
after the presidential elections. Presidential elections are scheduled
for 2001. Local elections originally scheduled for 1998 were postponed;
no new date has been fixed yet.
There are no obstacles to the participation of women in government;
however, they are underrepresented in government and politics. Only 1
of 45 members of the National Assembly is a woman. The Vice President
(who is also Minister of Health) is a woman and there are three female
ministers in the Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are several organizations whose mandates provide for human
rights monitoring. The AFPRC's Decree 81 of 1996 requires NGO's to
register with the National Advisory Council, which has the authority to
deny, suspend, or cancel the right of any NGO to operate (including
that of international NGO's). However, the Government did not take
action against any NGO's during the year.
There are three major organizations whose primary mandate is the
promotion of human rights--the International Society for Human Rights
(ISHRA), the African Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies
(ACDHRS), and the Institute for Human Rights and Development (IHRD).
Both the ISHRA and the ACDHRS have conducted training in democratic
rights and civic education. The IHRD is a new organization and focuses
principally on the operations of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, an organ of the Organization of African Unity based in
Banjul.
In May President Jammeh appointed the first government ombudsman as
required in the Constitution. On May 3, the National Assembly approved
the appointment. The ombudsman's office, which began operations during
the year is charged with investigating allegations of mal-
administration, mismanagement, or discrimination.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
religion, disability, language, or social status, and the Government
generally respects these prohibitions.
Women.--Domestic violence, including abuse, occasionally is
reported, and its occurrence is believed to be fairly common. Police
tend to consider these incidents to be domestic issues outside of their
ordinary jurisdiction.
Rape and assault are crimes under the law. The law does not
differentiate between married and unmarried women in this regard. Any
person who has carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of 16 is guilty
of a felony (except in the case of marriage); incest is also illegal.
These laws generally are enforced.
Neither sexual harassment nor de facto sexual discrimination are
believed to be widespread, although individual instances have been
noted.
Traditional views of women's roles result in extensive societal
discrimination in education and employment. Families frequently educate
male children before female children. Females constitute about 40
percent of primary school students and roughly \1/3\ of high school
students.
Employment in the formal sector is open to women at the same salary
rates as men. No statutory discrimination exists in other kinds of
employment; however, women generally are employed in endeavors such as
food vending or subsistence farming.
Shari'a law usually is applied in divorce and inheritance matters
for Muslims, who make up approximately 90 percent of the population.
Women normally receive a lower proportion of assets distributed through
inheritance than do male relatives. Marriages often are arranged and,
depending on the ethnic group, polygyny is practiced. Women in
polygynous unions have property and other rights arising from the
marriage. They have the option to divorce, but not a legal right to
approve or be notified in advance of subsequent marriages.
Active women's rights groups exist, which are focused primarily on
economic issues and the elimination of female genital mutilation (FGM).
Children.--The Government is committed to children's welfare. The
Department of Education and the Department of Health, Social Welfare,
and Women's Affairs are the two most generously funded departments.
However, the lack of resources limits state provision of both education
and health services.
The Constitution mandates free compulsory primary education, but in
view of the current state of the educational infrastructure, this
provision represents a goal and not an accomplishment. There is no
effective compulsory education. However, in February 1998, the
President announced an end to fees for the first 6 years of schooling,
and the Government has implemented the decision. Opportunities for
secondary education are even more limited. The participation of girls
in education is very low; there is approximately a two to one ratio of
boys to girls enrolled in school at all levels. The enrollment of girls
is particularly low in rural areas where a combination of poverty and
socio-cultural factors influence parents' decisions to not send girls
to school.
The care and welfare of children in distress is considered
primarily a family responsibility. In cases of divorce, the Department
of Social Welfare attempts to require periodic financial support by
fathers; however, there is no criminal prosecution when fathers fail to
provide financial support.
Authorities generally intervene when cases of child abuse or
mistreatment are brought to their attention, however, there is no
societal pattern of abuse against children. Serious cases of abuse and
violence against children are subject to criminal penalties.
There are a few instances of child street begging. The tourist
industry has stimulated a small amount of child prostitution, which is
prosecuted vigorously. In rural areas, most children assist their
families in farm and housework. In urban areas, many children work as
street vendors or taxi and bus assistants.
The practice of female genital mutilation, which is widely
condemned by international health experts as damaging to both physical
and psychological health, is widespread and entrenched. Reports place
the number of women having been subjected to FGM at between 60 and 90
percent. Seven of the nine major ethnic groups practice FGM at ages
varying from shortly after birth until 18 years old. In recent years,
the Government publicly has supported efforts to eradicate FGM and
discourages FGM through health education. However, the Government has
not passed legislation against FGM, and FGM is not considered a
criminal act. In February President Jammeh stated publicly that the
Government would not ban FGM, and that FGM is a part of the country's
culture.
People with Disabilities.--There are no statutes or regulations
requiring accessibility for the disabled. No legal discrimination
against the physically disabled exists in employment, education, or
other state services. Severely disabled individuals subsist primarily
through private charity. Less severely disabled individuals are
accepted fully in society and encounter no discrimination in employment
for which they are physically capable.
Section 6 Worker Rights a. The Right of Association
The 1990 Labor Act, which applies to all workers except civil
servants, specifies that workers are free to form associations,
including trade unions, and provides for their registration with the
Government. It specifically prohibits police officers and military
personnel, as well as other civil service employees, from forming
unions or striking. About 20 percent of the work force is employed in
the modern wage sector, where unions are most active. Approximately
30,000 workers are union members, constituting about 10 percent of the
work force.
The Gambian Worker's Confederation and the Gambian Workers' Union
are the two main independent and competing umbrella organizations. The
Government recognizes both organizations.
The Labor Act authorizes strikes but requires that unions give the
Commissioner of Labor 14 days' written notice before beginning an
industrial action (28 days for essential services). It prohibits
retribution against strikers who comply with the law regulating
strikes. Upon application by an employer to a court, the court may
prohibit industrial action that is ruled to be in pursuit of a
political objective. The court also may forbid action judged to be in
breach of a collectively agreed procedure for settlement of industrial
disputes. Because of these provisions and the weakness of unions, few
strikes occur.
Unions may affiliate internationally, and there are no restrictions
on union members' participation in international labor activities. The
country applied in 1995 to join the International Labor Organization.
It has been accepted in principle but must make modifications to its
labor and employment laws before gaining full membership; however, the
Government took no action during the year to modify its labor and
employment laws. b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The 1990 Labor Act allows workers to organize and bargain
collectively. Although trade unions are small and fragmented,
collective bargaining takes place. Each recognized union has guidelines
for its activities specified by the appropriate industrial council
established and empowered by the Labor Act. Union members' wages exceed
legal minimums and are determined by collective bargaining,
arbitration, or agreements reached between unions and management after
insuring that the agreements are in compliance with labor law. No
denial of registration has been reported. The act also sets minimum
contract standards for hiring, training, terms of employment, and
provides that contracts may not prohibit union membership. Employers
may not fire or discriminate against members of registered unions
engaged in legal union activities.
The Government is attempting to establish an export processing zone
at the port of Banjul, but no manufacturer has begun operations yet. c.
Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits compulsory labor, and it is not known to
occur. Although the law does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded
labor by children, it is not known to occur. Most children performing
customary chores or who are engaged in petty trading do so as a part of
an extended family. d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age
for Employment
The statutory minimum age for employment is 18 years. There is no
effective compulsory education, and because of limited secondary school
openings, most children complete formal education by age 14 and then
begin work. Employee labor cards, which include a person's age, are
registered with the Labor Commissioner, but enforcement inspections
rarely take place. Child labor protection does not extend to youth
performing customary chores on family farms or engaged in petty
trading. In rural areas, most children assist their families in farming
and housework. In urban areas, many children work as street vendors or
taxi and bus assistants. The tourist industry has stimulated a small
amount of child prostitution (see Section 5).
Although the law does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded
labor by children, it is not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wages and working hours
are established by law through six joint industrial councils: Commerce;
Artisans; Transport; Port Operations; Agriculture; and Fisheries.
Labor, management, and the Government are represented on these
councils. The lowest minimum wage is about $1.04 (12 dalasis) per day
for unskilled labor. This minimum wage is not sufficient to provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family. Only 20 percent of
the labor force, essentially those workers in the formal economic
sector, are covered by the minimum wage law. The majority of workers
are employed privately or are self-employed, often in agriculture. Most
citizens do not live on a single worker's earnings but share resources
within extended families.
The basic legal workweek is 48 hours within a period not to exceed
6 consecutive days. A 30-minute lunch break is mandated. Nationwide,
the workweek includes 4 8-hour workdays and 2 4-hour workdays (Friday
and Saturday). Government employees are entitled to 1 month of paid
annual leave after 1 year of service. Private sector employees receive
between 14 and 30 days of paid annual leave, depending on length of
service.
The Labor Act specifies safety equipment that an employer must
provide to employees working in designated occupations. The Factory Act
authorizes the Ministry of Labor to regulate factory health and safety,
accident prevention, and dangerous trades, and the Ministry is
authorized to appoint inspectors to ensure compliance with safety
standards. Enforcement is inconsistent due to insufficient and
inadequately trained staff. Workers may demand protective equipment and
clothing for hazardous workplaces and have recourse to the Labor
Department. Workers may refuse to work in dangerous situations without
risking loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to,
or from the country.
______
GHANA
Ghana is a constitutional republic dominated by a strong
presidency. Flight Lieutenant (ret.) Jerry John Rawlings has ruled the
country for 18 years. He became the first President of the Fourth
Republic following controversial elections in 1992. This ended 11 years
of authoritarian rule under Rawlings and his Provisional National
Defense Council (PNDC), which had seized power from an elected
government in 1981. The opposition fully contested the 1996
presidential and parliamentary elections, which were described as
peaceful, free, and transparent by domestic and international
observers. President Rawlings was reelected with 57 percent of the
popular vote. Rawlings' National Democratic Congress (NDC) party won
133 of the Parliament's 200 seats, just short of the two-thirds
majority required to amend the Constitution. The Constitution calls for
a system of checks and balances, with an executive branch headed by the
President, a unicameral parliament, an independent judiciary, and
several autonomous commissions, such as the Commission for Human Rights
and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ). In reality this system of checks
and balances is circumscribed by a parliament dominated by the
President's party, a hesitant judicial service, and a system-wide lack
of resources that hobbles the effectiveness of all three branches. The
presence of a significant number of opposition parliamentarians has led
to increased scrutiny of the Government's activities. In 1998 in
peaceful elections voters elected new district assembly representatives
and, for the first time, unit committee members to complete the local
government structure outlined in the Constitution. The judiciary
appears subject to executive influence on occasion and lacks adequate
resources.
Several security organizations report to various government
departments. The police, under the jurisdiction of an eight-member
Police Council, are responsible for maintaining law and order. A
separate department, the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI),
handles cases considered critical to state security and answers
directly to the executive branch. Although the security apparatus is
controlled by and responsive to the Government, monitoring,
supervision, and education of the police in particular remain poor.
Police committed some serious human rights abuses.
The economy remains dependent on agriculture, with about 41 percent
of gross domestic product (GDP) and 59 percent of employment derived
from this sector, according to government statistics. Gold, cocoa, and
timber are the traditional sources of export earnings, although cocoa
and gold revenues fell due to the drop in the prices of these
commodities on the world market. Tourism is the third largest foreign
exchange earner. Service sector growth outpaced both agriculture and
industry, according to an International Labor Organization (ILO) study
released in September. The economy grew at a rate of 4.4 percent, down
from 4.6 percent in 1998, due to the fall in the world price of gold
and cocoa and the increase in the price of crude oil. Inflation
decreased from 15 percent to 13.8 percent. Per capita GDP decreased to
approximately $400.
There continued to be problems in the Government's human rights
record; however, it continued its attempts to improve its practices.
Police use of excessive force again resulted in a number of
extrajudicial killings as well as injuries, although the use of rubber
bullets and water cannons improved the ability of the police to manage
crowd control situations without killings or serious injuries. Numerous
incidents from earlier years remained unsolved. There were continued
credible reports that members of the police beat prisoners and other
citizens, and arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. Police
corruption is a problem. Prison conditions remained harsh, and
prolonged pretrial detention remained a problem. Inadequate resources
and a system vulnerable to political and economic influence compromised
the integrity of the overburdened judicial system. The Government
sometimes infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government
continued to prosecute two criminal libel cases. In 1998 three
independent journalists were jailed following legally flawed contempt-
of-court cases, strengthening the perception that the judiciary
operates under the influence of the executive. In November a journalist
was sentenced to 3 months in jail and fined about $460 after being
found guilty in a criminal libel case. The Government continued to
pressure the media. Some journalists practiced self-censorship. The
nongovernment press, nonetheless, continued its vigorous and outspoken
criticism of various government policies. Police used force to disperse
demonstrations. Government-supported demonstrations took place
unimpeded, while demonstrations critical of the Government, when they
occurred, were circumscribed. Violence against women is a serious
problem. Traditional practices, including a localized form of slavery
practiced in some rural areas, still result in considerable
discrimination against and abuse of women and children. Female genital
mutilation (FGM) still is practiced. In May mobs attacked three
charismatic Christian churches in a seasonal conflict over a
traditional ban on drumming. Some ethnic groups complain of
discrimination. Child labor is a problem in the informal sector, and
there were reports of forced child labor, and trafficking in women and
children. Vigilante justice also is a problem. Legislation intended to
provide additional protection to women and children came into effect,
following similar legislation in 1998 intended to protect women and
children.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces
committed a number of extrajudicial killings. The number of deaths
reportedly caused by members of the security services remained the
same, although the use of rubber bullets and water cannons improved the
ability of the police to manage crowd control situations without
killings or serious injuries. In recent years, the police service in
particular has come under severe criticism following incidents of
police brutality, corruption, and negligence. Public confidence remains
low and mobs attacked several police stations. In January the
presidential Archer Commission issued a white paper critiquing police
operations and providing specific directives as to how to address
police manpower, training, and logistical needs. The Inspector General
of Police publicly acknowledged these problems and attempted to address
them through training in human rights and riot control.
On January 13, a farmer was fatally shot and 12 policemen injured
during a riot at Juaso, outside of Kumasi in the Ashanti Region. A
former chief held a year-end party for his supporters although the
police prohibited the gathering. The 36-year-old farmer was reportedly
hit by a warning shot fired by the police. The ex-chief and more than
60 townspeople were arrested by a joint police and military team in
connection with the riot (see Section 5).)
On February 14, police fired live bullets indiscriminately into a
Konkomba market crowd, while attempting to stop looting, killing a 15-
year-old boy and injuring two other persons.
On June 24, an employee of the National Security Council allegedly
shot and killed an agricultural officer following a traffic dispute
near Abelemkpe in Accra. The suspect, who reported having shot an armed
robber, was arrested and released on bail. The case is ongoing.
On August 12, the Deputy Superintendent of Police allegedly shot a
vendor at Soe, near Bolgatanga in the Upper East Region, in a dispute
over the siting of a kiosk. The vendor died 3 days later. One other
person was injured by a stray bullet fired by police during the
confrontation. The police are investigating. The Inspector General of
Police (IGP) attended the vendor's funeral.
On August 19, a policeman allegedly shot and killed a passenger in
a truck after the driver refused to stop when signaled to do so in
Winneba in the Central Region. The policeman reportedly was on the
lookout for armed robbers and tried to deflate the truck's tires with
an AK-47, killing the victim by mistake. The incident is under
investigation.
On September 25, a policeman reportedly shot and killed a driver at
his residence in Korpeyia, near the border with Togo. The police
maintain the deceased was a notorious criminal who threatened to kill a
policeman who had gone into his house to arrest him and that the
policeman shot him in self-defense.
On November 13, a plainclothes police inspector shot and killed the
driver of a timber truck at a police barricade in the Ashanti region
town of Barekese. Initial reports stated that the man was shot
accidentally in a scuffle with the police, but eyewitnesses reported
that there was no scuffle and the driver was killed deliberately.
Police authorities suspended the inspector immediately and initiated an
investigation that was underway at year's end.
On December 24, a patrol team of police and military personnel shot
and killed two passengers in a taxi in Tema, a coastal town in the
greater Accra region. The taxi driver reportedly failed to stop at a
checkpoint, and the police were making spot checks on vehicles
following a report of an armed robbery. The police say they fired
warning shots, but witnesses said there were more than 10 bullet holes
in the vehicle and the tires were flat from the shooting. At year's
end, there had been no further action.
In late 1998, the police established a special judicial tribunal to
try officers suspected of unlawful and careless use of weapons. Of the
fatalities that occurred in 1998, several remained under investigation,
with the implicated police officers transferred. Police actions in the
July 2, 1998 incident in the Brong Ahafo Region were determined to have
been in self-defense. The case has been closed and the officer
transferred to another region. In February the Government accepted the
results of the inquiry into the October 28, 1998 murder of a man in
Accra. The commander of the operation was found personally liable. The
IGP instigated disciplinary action against all the policemen involved
and ordered compensation for the victim's family. The Ministry of
Interior acknowledged that police of all ranks needed to be retrained
in the handling of weapons. The police officers involved filed a
protest stating that they are not personallyliable for the incident
because they were performing official duties.
The committee investigating the police officer implicated in the
May 31, 1998 killing of a bystander in Sekondi indicted the officer in
charge. The police have not yet compensated the family of the victim.
The officers involved in the October 7, 1998 beating of a farmer in
Pramkese were suspended pending investigation. At year's end, the case
was still under investigation.
In June the Government released the report of the committee that
investigated the March 1997 death of two youths. The deaths occurred
when police opened fire on demonstrators in Kumasi. The committee
found, and the Government concurred, that the police failed to follow
riot control procedures and that the families of the deceased should be
compensated with approximately $2,900 (10 million cedis) for each
family. Disciplinary action was ordered against the police officer in
charge during the riot.
In June the family of a man who died on November 9, 1998 in a
Western Region police cell reasserted that the deceased was brutalized
by police and detained in handcuffs for 5 days. In response to a family
petition filed a week after the death, the regional police command
denied that police mistreated the deceased.
The Government again refused to launch an independent inquiry into
the deaths of four demonstrators during a May 1995 protest against
government tax policy after having closed the case inconclusively. The
police report was never released to the public.
The Government continued to refuse to investigate extrajudicial
killings in the early years of PNDC rule, despite the July publication
of the names of 199 alleged victims in an independent newspaper.
During the year, chieftancy disputes led to several deaths and a
number of injuries (see Section 5).
The press reported numerous cases of vigilante style ``instant
justice'' conducted by angry citizens and mobs on suspected criminals
and suspected witches that led to a number of deaths and injuries.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution states that the dignity of all persons
shall be inviolable and that no one shall be subjected to torture or
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, or any
other condition that detracts from human dignity; however, there were
continued credible reports that members of the police and customs
officials beat prisoners and other citizens. It is generally believed
that severe beatings of suspects in police custody occur throughout the
country but go largely unreported. On February 16, six soldiers from
the 4th battalion reportedly stabbed a Kumasi man after one soldier
stormed into his house and beat him. While the civilian was en route to
the hospital with his brother, they both allegedly were assaulted by
five more soldiers. The brother later lost hearing in one ear. In April
another brother of the same man was brutalized and his room vandalized,
allegedly by a forestry commission employee and hired ``machomen''
(private security enforcers). The incidents were reported to the Chief
of Defense Staff and the Inspector General of Police. There were no
reports of progress in these investigations.
Also in February, five Achimota police officers were suspended
after detaining a woman in a cell with her husband and 15 other males.
A local human rights group was instrumental in spurring the police
administration to investigate. In July after a human rights activist
alerted the CHRAJ, news media reported the story of a woman who had
become pregnant by a suspected criminal also in police custody while
she was held in remand for 16 months on an attempted murder charge in
Anloga in the Volta Region. In August the police administration
suspended the district officer and launched an investigation into the
breach of the policy that female suspects not be detained in cells with
male counterparts.
On May 27, a man suffered gunshot wounds when Customs, Excise, and
Preventive Service (CEPS) officers fired warning shots against a mob of
angry youth at Dodo-Amanfrom in the Volta Region. The clash followed
CEPS' seizure of goods believed to be uncustomed. A CEPS' investigation
found that the officers had acted within the law in self-defense.
In June three soldiers and a district forestry officer shot and
wounded six persons at Nkunkum in the Eastern Region for allegedly
violating timber harvesting regulations.
On August 13, police used water cannons and tear gas to disperse a
student demonstration against increased university fees. Police beat
several students, who required medical attention (see Sections 2.a. and
2.b.).
On December 13, in the Western Region town of Abontiakoon near
Tarkwa, soldiers and policemen reportedly shot and wounded nine people
in a middle-of-the-night raid, apparently in response to a peaceful
demonstration earlier that day. The demonstration was to protest the
closing of an underground mine that had provided income for much of the
community's youth. Press reports state the men arrested were severely
beaten, and some of them had not returned to their homes by the end of
December. In addition, police and soldiers allegedly destroyed personal
property and beat many other citizens. A curfew was imposed on the town
and its electricity cut off. The Western Regional Security Council
denied knowledge of any brutalities committed by security forces sent
to keep order in the town.
In mid-December, two youths were treated for gunshot wounds after a
confrontation between police and youths in Zabzugu, in the Northern
Region. The youths threw stones and created roadblocks to protest the
District Chief Executive's (DCE's) alleged misuse of the district
common fund. Security forces escorting the DCE attempted to disperse
the demonstrators by throwing tear gas and firing warning shots. On
December 24, the minister for the Northern Region established a
committee to look into the situation.
Police set up illegal barriers to elicit bribes from motorists (see
Section 2.d.). There were credible reports that police abuse their
authority by arresting citizens in exchange for bribes from detainees'
disgruntled business associates and demanding that money before
granting bail (see Section 1.d.). Police received a public trust rating
of 49.6 percent in a survey released during the year. In March the IGP
banned police from firing warning shots. He also warned the police
against demanding money from suspects as a precondition of their
release on bail. The IGP dismissed a constable who had been found
extorting money randomly from drivers.
A number of cases from 1998 remained open, with the implicated
police officers suspended in most instances. The police officers
involved in the November 2, 1998 shooting of two girls in an arrest
attempt near Accra were dismissed from the police force. Police stated
that the officers were performing an unauthorized action (which would
not obligate the police to compensate the girls' families). Of the
remaining detainees in the November 24, 1998 killing of 2 police
officers in Ablekuma, 6 of the accused are pending trial, 6 were
dismissed for lack of evidence, and 14 are still in remand.
Reports continued of isolated incidents in which Accra Metropolitan
Assembly (AMA) operatives known as the Chameleon Bombers, allegedly
inflicted injury and destroyed property. However, the degree of
violence decreased following media attention. The AMA officially
dissolved the group in late 1998 following repeated public criticism,
but continued to ``decongest'' vendors from the streets and destroy
unauthorized structures. Kumasi, Ghana's second largest city,
reportedly deployed a similar force called the Sanitation and
Decongestion Tigers to eject unlicensed street vendors from city
streets.
``Machomen'' and land guards, private security enforcers hired by
citizens to settle private disputes and vendettas caused injury and
property damage. The machomen are not legally constituted, but
organized privately and operate outside the law. In both Accra and
Kumasi, some were arrested following attacks on land developers but
were not prosecuted.
During the year, chieftancy disputes led to numerous injuries. Off-
duty soldiers reportedly took part in one clash (see Section 5).
Prisons are in most cases very poorly maintained, and conditions
are extremely harsh. In 1996 the CHRAJ published a report on prison
conditions. It described prisons as unsanitary, overcrowded, and poorly
ventilated. Prisoners are malnourished. Reports of the daily food
allowance per prisoner vary. In July the Minister of Interior informed
Parliament that the country's prisons, with a total capacity of 5,000,
house some 8,000 inmates. The Minister also reported that there were
about 90 mattresses and few beds for the approximately 700 prisoners at
the Kumasi central prisons. Overcrowding contributes to a high
prevalence of skin and other communicable diseases among prisoners. In
April the prisoners' daily food allowance was raised from approximately
$.41 (1,500 cedis) to about $.50 (1,800 cedis), bringing the total
daily allowance to approximately $.83 (3,000 cedis), including housing,
medical and clothing costs. Families still supplement prisoners' food
and bribe prison guards for visitation rights. Prisoners also suffer
from lack of medicine unless paid for or provided by the inmates or
their families. The report concluded that prison conditions were ``a
flagrant violation of the individual's fundamental human rights.'' The
CHRAJ's findings and recommendations continued to generate much press
coverage and some changes; however, while the Government concurred with
the 1996 findings, it stated that lack of funding prevented further
improvements. In spite of acontinued lack of funding, some improvements
were made during the year: an increase in prisoners' food allowance and
an amnesty to old and ill prisoners. Juveniles now more frequently are
separated from the adult prison population. The Ghana Prisons Service
Council has formed an assessment team to inspect facilities.
The Prison Service Council, established in 1998, visited Central
and Volta Region prison facilities in early 1999. Following these
inspections, the council suggested that prison authorities adopt a more
humane approach to dealing with prisoners. The Council identified the
number of remand prisoners due to the courts' inability to hear cases
promptly as the greatest problem facing the prison system. The Council
also criticized health hazards (including poor sanitation) and the
state of prison structures.
While the CHRAJ has access to monitor the prisons, the Government
resisted granting access to the press. In 1998 two journalists reported
what they had experienced and observed during their 30-day
incarceration. Inmates of the Sunyani Prison in the Brong-Ahafo Region
demonstrated on September 2 to protest the alleged extortion of cash
and seizure of food and belongings by some prison officials in the
Central Region. Some suspects allegedly pleaded guilty in order to be
sent to prison and leave the unsanitary conditions in the police remand
cells. In a December 17 speech at a prison officers' graduation
ceremony, President Rawlings stated that the Government is considering
the introduction of parole, suspended sentences, and community service
as a way to alleviate the overcrowding in prisons.
NGO's are not given access to prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention are problems. The Constitution provides for protection
against arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile and states that an
individual detained shall be informed immediately, in a language that
the detained person understands, of the reasons for the detention, and
of the right to a lawyer and to an interpreter, at state expense. It
also requires judicial warrants for arrest and provides for arraignment
within 48 hours. In practice, however, many abuses occur, including
detention without charge for longer than 48 hours and failure to obtain
a warrant for arrest. Authorities do not routinely notify prisoners'
families of their incarceration; such information is often obtained
only by chance.
The court has unlimited discretion to set bail, which can be
prohibitively high. The court may refuse to release prisoners on bail
and instead remand them without charge for an indefinite period,
subject to weekly review by judicial authorities. The Constitution
allows judicial authorities to hold citizens for up to 48 hours without
filing charges against them. However, in practice it is common to
remand a prisoner to investigative custody. The Constitution requires
that a detainee who has not been tried within a ``reasonable'' time be
released either unconditionally or subject to conditions necessary to
ensure that he appears at a later date for court proceedings. In June
the CHRAJ reported that there were a number of remand prisoners held
for periods ranging from 1 week to 8 years. The Kumasi central prison
had 338 in 1996-97. As of early July, about 23 percent, or 1,840 of the
8,000 inmates nationwide, were remand prisoners.
Despite the provisions of the law, abuses occur. Persons sometimes
are detained for trivial offenses or on unsubstantiated accusations.
Twenty suspects in the November 24, 1998, murder of two policemen in
Ablekuma remained in custody without bail since December 1998. Four
others were granted, but did not fulfill the requirements of, bail on
December 12.
The Government has not implemented any meaningful policy to reduce
the numbers of pretrial detainees, although the independent press has
called for reduction of harsh bail conditions for suspects who do not
pose a threat to society. Many credible sources report that private
citizens pay the police to arrest business associates in deals gone
awry. The 1996 CHRAJ report on prison conditions recommended
improvement in the administration of criminal justice, which currently
denies many citizens their constitutional rights to be charged within
48 hours, to have bail posted within the same period, and to a speedy
trial. Similarly, in March the CHRAJ discovered that 10 Nigerian
nationals, 2 Lebanese, and 4 Ghanaians were detained at the Osu police
station for periods ranging from 1 to 5 weeks. No bail had been set,
nor had the suspects appeared before court for allegedly committing
various offenses, including immigration offenses. A farmer in the Volta
Region has been in remand for 9 years. He is suspected of poisoning and
killing another farmer, but has yet to be formally charged.
In December the IGP warned policemen not to refuse to grant bail to
suspects in order to settle personal scores and reminded police that
the law is there to protect citizens and not to harass them. Lawyers
for a former army sergeant accused in an alleged 1994 plot to overthrow
the Government continued their appeal of an Accra High Court decision
to retry him for treason. His original trial ended in 1996, but
judgment was postponed because of the illness and subsequent death of
one of the trial judges. The defendant has been in custody since 1994.
In November, after a Muslim-Protestant conflict in the Central
Region town of Agona Nyakrom, police arrested over 700 men and brought
them to Accra for investigation (see Section 2.c.). Over 650 of them
then signed bonds to be on good behavior. Thirty others, including a
chief, were detained. The case still was pending at year's end. The
Commissioner of the CHRAJ called for police to improve their ability to
screen suspects at the scene of the crime rather than effect mass
arrests.
Rural women can be punished with banishment by traditional village
authorities for teenage pregnancy or suspected witchcraft. The press
reported that hundreds of women accused of witchcraft were sent to
penal villages in the Northern Region by traditional authorities such
as a shaman. In 1997 2 villages contained 400 elderly women, and 1
village contained 2,000 women and family members, all sentenced by
village authorities who claimed to have the power to divine witches.
Although the women face no formal legal sanction if they leave, most
fear that they would be beaten to death if caught outside the penal
villages (see Section 5).
The Presbyterian Church sponsored a ``go home'' project to
reintegrate into society women accused of witchcraft and forced to live
at the Gambaga ``witches'' village. A total of 55 of 200 such women
have reunited with their families. The project also provided for loans
to enable the liberated women to become more financially independent
and to contribute to the well being of their families.
The Government does not practice forced exile and encourages
citizens, including dissidents, living abroad to return. Some former
government and PNDC officials have returned and resumed careers and
political activities.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary appears to be
subject on occasion to executive influence. The Constitution allows the
Government to nominate up to 15 members of the Supreme Court;
confirmation is the responsibility of a Parliament currently dominated
by the President's party. The Chief Justice is empowered to impanel the
justices of his choice to hear cases. These provisions, along with a
debilitating lack of resources, have called into question the court's
role as a balance to the power of the executive branch and contributed
to the perception that the judiciary is occasionally subject to
executive influence.
This perception was furthered by the judiciary's crackdown on
members of the privately owned press in 1998. In late July, the courts
incarcerated two journalists for 30 days and fined the publishers
heavily, following a contempt-of-court case widely viewed as legally
flawed. Two other journalists, with criminal libel lawsuits pending,
had their passports seized under court order. An editor was jailed for
9 days in another questionable contempt-of-court case in July 1998. All
the affected journalists are known to be avowed opponents of the
Government and aggressive in their highly personal criticism of the
President and his family (see Section 2.a.).
The integrity of the legal system is compromised by a severe lack
of financial, human, and material resources. There were no official
charges of corruption on the part of judges; however, in September a
privately owned paper published an alleged report by the Serious Fraud
Office that found evidence of malpractice in the awarding of contracts
by the judicial service. In August 1998, the BNI reportedly questioned
a judge, the chairman of an Accra regional tribunal, about allegations
that he and his staff accepted a $9,000 bribe to grant bail for a
Nigerian woman arrested for drug smuggling. He has not been charged. A
1997 survey revealed that 66 percent of citizens believe that money
influences the judicial system.
The Constitution establishes two basic levels of courts: superior
and lower. The superior courts include the Supreme Court, the Appeals
Court, the High Court, and regional tribunals. Parliament may establish
lower courts or tribunals by decree. The CHRAJ provides a forum to
which citizens with grievances against government agencies or private
companies can bring cases for mediation and settlement (see Section 4).
The CHRAJ's charter provides for it to investigate alleged
violations of human rights and take action to remedy proven violations.
It continues to hold workshops to educate the public, traditional
leaders, the police, and the military on human rights issues. It
mediates and settles cases brought to it by individuals with grievances
against government agencies or private companies.
The Chieftaincy Act of 1971 gives village and other traditional
chiefs power to mediate local matters and enforce customary tribal laws
dealing with such matters as divorce, child custody, and property
disputes. However, a number of laws passed during the PNDC era (1981-
92), as well as the 1992 Constitution, have eroded steadily the
authority of traditional rulers and vested it in civil institutions,
such as courts and district assemblies.
Legal safeguards are based on British legal procedures. Defendants
are presumed innocent, trials are public, and defendants have a right
to be present, to be represented by anattorney (at public expense if
necessary), and to cross-examine witnesses. In practice the authorities
generally respect these safeguards.
There were no reports of political prisoners. The trial of five
defendants for allegedly plotting to overthrow the Government in 1994
concluded. In February a special court sentenced four of the defendants
to death after finding them guilty. The fifth defendant was acquitted
for lack of evidence. Attorneys for the four condemned defendants
appealed the judgment. A former army officer also alleged to be a part
of the plot was arrested in Sierra Leone and flown to Ghana. He is in
remand awaiting trial. At year's end, the defendants were still in
prison and have appealed for a stay of judgment on the basis that the
judgment was in error.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides that a person shall be free
from interference within the privacy of his home, property,
correspondence, or communication; however, this article has yet to be
tested in court, and in practice the Government sometimes infringed on
these rights. In April a combined municipal and military team
demolished a private hotel in Accra, said to be blocking a drainage
route. The owner of the hotel allegedly had fallen out with the ruling
party prior to the demolition. The demolition occurred without due
process. Although the law requires judicial search warrants, police do
not always obtain them in practice. Observers assumed that the
Government continued surveillance of citizens engaged in activities
that it deemed objectionable, including monitoring of telephones and
mail. Several opposition political activists reported being followed.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and in practice these provisions
generally were respected, although the Government continued to pressure
the media. Opposition political parties and others frequently criticize
the Government, and the Government has allowed more control of print
and electronic media to be transferred to the private sector.
Nonetheless, the Government continued to pressure some journalists and
media organizations, sometimes directly (e.g., through telephone
calls), and increasingly by filing libel suits when it found coverage
to be offensive. Consequently, some journalists exercised self-
censorship. The criminal libel laws provide for 10 years' maximum
imprisonment for reporting intended to injure the reputation of the
State. At year's end, there were an estimated 120 libel suits before
the courts, some of which had been in progress for over a year. Two of
the pending suits were criminal libel suits filed by the Government,
and the rest were filed by government officials in their personal
capacities or by private individuals. A civil libel case brought by the
First Lady was resolved successfully by the National Media Commission.
In November the editor of the Free Press was sentenced to 90 days in
prison and a fine of approximately $460 in a criminal libel case
involving allegations about the First Lady.
There are more than a dozen newspapers including two government-
owned dailies, two government-owned weeklies, and several privately
owned newspapers published weekly, biweekly, or triweekly. One of the
government-owned dailies has national circulation. However, most
newspapers circulate only in regional capitals, and many of the smaller
private newspapers are available only in the capital. Some independent
newspapers claim that they are unable to obtain advertising revenues
due to government pressure on businesses.
According to the National Communications Authority, Accra has 1
government-owned and 12 private FM radio stations, and there are about
40 private FM stations across the country. Most stations are
independent and air a wide range of viewpoints. There are 12 regional
television stations in Accra, Kumasi, and Takoradi, and one government-
owned station that broadcasts nationwide. There are six Internet
service providers in the country.
The Government-owned media occasionally reported charges of
corruption or mismanagement in government ministries and government-
owned enterprises, but they rarely criticized the Government's policies
or President Rawlings' activities. In the past, the Government
occasionally disciplined or dismissed journalists working in
government-subsidized media for articles deemed unacceptable. The
Government ended subsidies to the state-owned publishing companies, and
the newspapers are published by profit-making printing companies but
these have not been privatized.
In late October, a tape which appeared to implicate President
Rawlings in several infamous extralegal actions of the predemocratic
era, including murder, bombings, and arson, was published and broadcast
by some private media. The Government denied the authenticity of the
tape and arrested the journalists and publisher involved. The
journalists were released on bail of approx. $3,000 (10.5 million
cedis), and three of them, including an opposition Member of Parliament
(the publisher), wereprovisionally charged with publication of false
news. The private radio announcer who broadcast part of the audiotape
was fired, allegedly for failing to abide by the station's procedures.
By the end of the year, there had been no formal government
investigations into the allegations on the tapes or prosecutions of the
journalists.
Some privately owned newspapers were harshly critical of the
Government's policies and of President Rawlings, his wife, and his
regime generally, and some reporters and editors were alleged, at
times, to have failed to abide by professional ethical guidelines.
Parties affected by such lapses--most often Government officials--
showed a tendency to go to court. The Government, government officials,
and private individuals filed a record number of civil libel suits
(over 120 before the courts), and one criminal libel suit remains in
progress at year's end. The Government continued to prosecute two
independent journalists under a rarely used sedition law for allegedly
libeling President Rawlings and his wife, and, through them, the State.
The trials, repeatedly postponed, were seen by many observers as a sign
of press harassment. For example in July 1998, after being found in
contempt of court, two newspaper editors were sentenced to 1 month's
imprisonment and each publisher was fined approximately $4,350 (10
million cedis) (see Section 1.e.). According to the Minister of
Communications, the criminal libel law and other such laws simply check
the excesses of journalists. The National Media Commission is
researching comparative freedom of information (FOI) legislation with
the intent to propose draft FOI legislation for the Government's
consideration. This draft legislation had not been presented to the
Government by year's end.
In addition on November 11, after a 5-year libel trial, the editor
of an independent paper, which had printed allegations against the
First Lady, was sentenced to 90 days in prison. He was also fined
approximately $460 (1.5 million cedis) for two counts of intentional
libel. He was released on December 29 after serving his full term,
including time in remand before his conviction and sentencing.
The Government readily granted accreditation to foreign
journalists. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Radio
France International (RFI) have full-time FM rebroadcasting stations in
Accra, and several foreign radio broadcasts, including Voice of America
(VOA), have part-time affiliations with local stations in several
cities. Foreign periodicals were sold in Accra and other major cities
and circulated freely even when they contained articles critical of the
Government. Most citizens obtain their news from the electronic media,
the VOA, and the BBC radio service. Several companies have cable
orsatellite rebroadcasting stations that serve the country's three
major cities.
The Government again refused to launch an independent inquiry into
the deaths of four demonstrators during a protest against government
tax policy in May 1995 and in 1997 finally closed its case
inconclusively (see Section 1.a.). Some of the privately owned media
renewed calls for a thorough investigation on the anniversary of the
incident.
There was no restriction of academic freedom. Academics are allowed
to publish and pursue research. The National Union of Ghanaian
Students, one of the more vocal critics of the Government, is allowed
to organize and hold meetings. However, in late 1997, following a
serious student brawl, the public university in Accra imposed a ban on
campus demonstrations, which remained in effect at year's end. In
August students demonstrated against increased university fees, and
police forcibly broke up the demonstration (see Sections 1.c. and
2.b.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government generally
respects this right in practice. The Government does not require
permits for demonstrations. Parliament passed a public order law in
late 1994 requiring that all organizers of ``special events'' or
``processions'' inform the police of their intentions at least 5 days
in advance so that the police can institute precautionary measures. The
law also provides for curfews and arrest without warrants in specified
instances. In November a presidential aide called street demonstrations
by registered political parties ``a provocative attempt to destroy the
democratic order'' and ``a declaration of war on the national
democratic order and an act totally against the national interest.''
Other government and ruling party officials echoed this view, as did
other organized bodies who were widely believed to have done so at the
Government's behest.
The Government dissuaded two groups from demonstrating during the
year. In the first case, a popular radio personality and comedian, who
has been openly critical of both the Government and opposition, was
pressured not to hold a ``million man march'' in Accra in October. This
march was supposed to show male opposition to violence against women,
following a spate of murders of women in an Accra neighborhood.
Although the organizer provided the requisite advance notice, police
had indicated they could not provide adequate security for the march.
Earlier in October, an opposition Member of Parliament (MP) was
implored not to organize a demonstration against the unsolved murders
of women in her constituency. The MP settled for a press conference and
a limited march within the immediate area rather than throughout Accra.
However, shortly thereafter, the National Council on Women in
Development staged a government-sanctioned demonstration on the same
issue (see Section 5).
In the second case, the Jubilee 2000 group (whose platform is debt
forgiveness for developing countries) gave the greater Accra police the
required 5 days' notice of their planned demonstration. The police
denied them permission to demonstrate, stating that the police needed
more time to investigate the Jubilee 2000 organization. Jubilee 2000 is
considering legal action. The IGP later stated that the regional police
command did not have the authority to refuse permission for the
demonstration, which was scheduled at the end of a donors' meeting. In
contrast demonstrations against those who publicized a tape alleging
the President's role in several human rights abuses during the PNDC era
(see Section 2.a.) occurred without the required 5 days' notice.
On September 23, concerned citizens marched in Kumasi to protest
the continued tenure of the Kumasi chief executive, who had allegedly
ordered the assault on an opposition Member of Parliament and a
district assemblyman. Police used tear gas, water cannons, and rubber
bullets to disperse the crowd that threw objects at the police. There
were several injuries but no fatalities.
A joint opposition demonstration against alleged government
mismanagement took place in Accra November 25, despite numerous calls
to cancel the demonstration by government officials, local traditional
leaders, and trade bodies, who reminded the planners of the fatal
results of the 1995 anti-VAT demonstration. There were threats of a
simultaneous counter-demonstration. In addition, the Government
tightened security around the capital, in response to an alleged coup
plot announced over the Internet for the following day. The
demonstration took place without incident on a route announced by the
police, but was sparsely attended. Organizers felt that government
pressure had discouraged participants.
The 1997 ban on campus demonstrations remained in effect, but was
not enforced, at the public university in Accra. On August 13, police
used water cannons and tear gas to disrupt an off-campus protest
against increased university fees. Several injuries resulted from
alleged police beatings (see Section 1.c.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice. NGO's arerequired
to register with the Registrar General's office and the Department of
Social Welfare, but this registration is routine.
The Electoral Commission (EC) must accredit political parties. The
parties must show evidence of a ``national character,'' such as
official representation in all 10 of the country's regions. The EC
evaluates whether the party has shown evidence of a viable national
support base before granting accreditation and can annul the
registration of a party that fails to meet the criteria for being a
viable party. In July the EC certified a breakaway faction of the
ruling party as a political party in its own right.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
Religious institutions that wish formal recognition are required to
register with the Registrar General's Department. This is a formality
only. Most traditional religions, with the exception of the Afrikania
Mission, do not register. Formally recognized religions receive some
tax relief. However, beyond a certain point the institutions are
required to pay tax. In 1989 during the Provisional National Defense
Council (PNDC) regime, which ruled the country from 1981 to 1992, a law
requiring the registration of religious bodies was passed in an effort
to regulate churches. The Ghana Council of Churches interpreted this
law as contradicting the concept of religious freedom in the country.
The PNDC repealed the law in 1992.
About 35 percent of the country's estimated population of 18
million are at least nominally Christian. Christian denominations
include Roman Catholic, Methodist, Anglican, Mennonite, evangelical,
Presbyterian, African Methodist Episcopal Zionist, Christian Methodist,
Evangelical Lutheran, F'eden, numerous charismatic faiths, the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons), Seventh-Day Adventist,
Pentecostal, Baptist, and the Society of Friends. Christianity often
includes an overlay of traditional beliefs.
About 31 percent of the population adhere to traditional indigenous
religions. These religions include a belief in a supreme being,
referred to by the Akan ethnic group as Nyame or by the Ewe ethnic
group as Mawu, and lesser gods who act as intermediaries between the
supreme being and man on earth. Veneration of ancestors is also a
characteristic, as they too provide a link between the supreme being
and the living and may even be reincarnated at times. The religious
leaders of those sharing these diverse beliefs commonly are referred to
as priests and are trained in the arts of healing and divination. These
priests typically operate shrines to the supreme deity or to one of the
lesser gods, relying upon the donations of the public to maintain the
shrine and for their own maintenance.
About 27 percent of the population are Muslim. Three principal
branches of Islam are represented in the country: the orthodox Sunnis
and Tijanis, and the less orthodox Ahmadis. The Shi'a branch is
virtually absent from the country's Islamic community.
About 7 percent of the population practice other religions. This
includes the Baha'i Faith, Buddhism, Judaism, Hinduism, Shintoism,
Ninchiren Shoshu Soka Gakkai, Sri Sathya Sai Baba Sera, Sat Sang,
Eckanker, the Divine Light Mission, Hare Krishna, Rastafarianism, and
other international faiths, as well as some separatist or spiritual
churches or cults, which include elements of Christianity and
traditional beliefs such as magic and divination. Some consider the
ethnic Ga tradition to be a religion.
The followers of the more traditional religions mainly dwell in the
rural areas of the country. Both Christians and Muslims live throughout
the country.
The Government lacks the resources to prevent seasonal clashes
between traditionalists and some charismatic Christian churches and has
not pursued suspects in such attacks (see Section 5).
There is no state-favored religion and no apparent advantage or
disadvantage attached to membership in any particular sect or religion.
Foreign missionary groups generally have operated throughout the
country with a minimum of formal restrictions.
In November a dispute during a Central Region soccer game between
an Islamic middle school and a Methodist middle school resulted in
arson and other destruction of Muslim property (corn mills, livestock,
approximately 100 houses, and 3 mosques) in the town of Agona Nyakrom.
A group of youths also attacked Muslims in the area, including the
headmaster of the Islamic school, who was severely beaten. Five people
suffered gunshot wounds. Newspapers reported that as a result of the
conflict large numbers of Muslims had moved out of the area (see
Section 1.d.).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights as an aspect of the provision for personal liberty, and the
Government generally respects these provisions in practice.
Citizens and foreigners are free to move throughout the country.
Police checkpoints exist nationwide to prevent smuggling, but most are
unmanned during daylight hours. There were numerous reports that police
used checkpoints to solicit bribes. Citizen complaints about police
harassment caused the Government to reduce the number of checkpoints
from 125 to 38 in 1997 and to 31 by the end of 1998. Government
roadblocks and car searches are a normal part of nighttime travel in
larger cities. In February and August, taxi drivers struck in Koforidua
to protest extortion by motor transport and traffic unit police. The
police administration has admitted that the force has a problem with
some members occasionally erecting illegal barriers to solicit bribes
from motorists. Citizens are generally free to travel internationally
and to emigrate or to be repatriated from other countries.
The Government cooperates with the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees, and the law conforms in all particulars to the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
Ghana has a liberal policy of accepting refugees from other West
African nations. The Government provides first asylum. The country
continued to provide first asylum to approximately 11,669 Liberians,
1,046 Togolese, 902 Sierra Leoneans, 102 Sudanese, 28 Nigerians, and 22
Rwandans. It also provided first asylum to citizens of: Ethiopia (7),
Libya (6), Burundi (6), Congo Brazzaville (5), Cameroon (3), Burkina
Faso (3), Somalia (1), Uganda (1), and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (1).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government, and citizens exercised this right through a democratic
process in presidential elections held in December 1996. The country
continued its transition from a one-party state to a more established
multiparty constitutional system. The political system includes
recognized opposition parties, which express their views freely within
Parliament.
President Rawlings was reelected in 1996 for a final 4-year term
with 57 percent of the popular vote. The NDC retained control of the
200-member Parliament with 133 seats, while opposition parties took 67
seats. The NDC fell one seat short of commanding the two-thirds
majority required to amend the Constitution. Three seats were disputed,
including those of two opposition members and one NDC member. The
courts found in favor of one of the opposition members in 1998. The
courts initially found in favor of another opposition member in July
1997, but the NDC appealed the ruling, and the NDC MP continues to sit
while the case is under appeal. In a third case, a high court found in
favor of the NDC candidate in a Central Region constituency in November
and ordered him to assume the parliamentary seat. A subsequent
injunction blocked him from doing so. Attorneys for the opposition
candidate sought a retrial before another judge, and the case was still
pending at year's end. The opposition MP's vacating the seat would give
the NDC a two-thirds' majority in parliament. Opposition members
expressed frustration about impediments that the executive branch
imposes by its refusal to support opposition amendments to proposed
legislation. In two undisputed by-elections in March and May, voters
elected Members of Parliament from the same parties as the previous
incumbents. Parliament still is working to develop effective oversight
of the workings of the executive branch. Although all Members of
Parliament can introduce bills, not one has ever done so; however, some
have introduced motions.
In 1998 citizens elected representatives to the district assemblies
and, for the first time, unit committees, which form the basis of the
local government structure. Of the 16,000 units, elections still must
be held in the 3,724 units that failed to produce a quorum of
candidates in 1998. These elections were held on a nonpartisan basis,
as called for in the 1992 Constitution. However, opposition groups
contend that the local government system is stacked in favor of the
ruling party, which appoints approximately one-third of the district
assembly and unit committee members, as well as the district chief
executives (DCE). DCE's must be confirmed by two-thirds of the district
assembly members. In May police and military forces were highly visible
in Kintampo in the Brong Ahafo Region the day the district assembly was
to vote on a controversial nominee for the DCE. The presence of
security forces may have influenced some district assembly members to
vote in favor of the ruling party's nominee, despite an earlier
petition by the chiefs and residents of Kintampo against the
nomination.
There are no legal obstacles to the participation of women in
government; however, they constitute a small minority in government and
politics. There are 19 female parliamentarians. Several ministers and
Council of State members are women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
NGO's interested in human rights continued to grow in strength, and
there were 18 NGO's in the field at the end of the year. These NGO's
operated without government interference (see Section 2.b.). The
Government appears to cooperate with and to be responsive to human
rights NGO's, with the exception of granting access to prisons (see
Section 1.c.). Prominent NGO's include the Red Cross, Amnesty
International, the International Federation of Woman Lawyers (FIDA),
Women in Law and Development in Africa, and Ghanalert. The Government
cooperates with international humanitarian organizations, including the
International Committee of the Red Cross.
Although not an NGO, the Commission on Human Rights and
Administrative Justice's (CHRAJ) charter provides for it to investigate
alleged violations of human rights and take action to remedy proven
violations. The CHRAJ continues to hold workshops to educate the
public, traditional leaders, the police, and the military on human
rights issues. It mediates and settles cases brought to it by
individuals with grievances against government agencies or private
companies.
Parliament established the CHRAJ in 1993. By 1996 the CHRAJ had
received a total of 12,409 petitions in its offices around the country
and completed action on over 8,775. Forty percent of the cases were
resolved through mediation. On average, the CHRAJ receives between
4,000 and 5,000 new petitions a year, steadily increasing each year.
The majority of the complaints lodged with the Commission were from
those who believed that they suffered injustice as a result of abuse of
power, unfairness, and high handedness.
In October 1996, the Commission concluded its lengthy corruption
probe of high government officials. The Commission's report, which
detailed adverse findings against three public officials and exonerated
a fourth, evoked an aggressive government rebuttal and a questioning of
the scope of the CHRAJ's mandate that finally led the CHRAJ to request
in 1996 a Supreme Court interpretation of its rights and
responsibilities.
In 1997 the Government issued a white paper rejecting some of the
adverse findings against the three government officials in the CHRAJ
report and recommended that the Attorney General investigate the
CHRAJ's rights and responsibilities. The CHRAJ issued a rebuttal to the
white paper. In 1998 the Supreme Court decided in favor of the
Commission concerning its right to investigate matters preceding the
1992 Constitution; however, the Court ruled that the Commission did not
have jurisdiction to investigate property confiscated by the special
courts or tribunals during the rule of the Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC), the military force that staged President Rawlings'
first coup, and during the PNDC period.
The CHRAJ continues to investigate corruption allegations filed
against public officials. In 1997 the CHRAJ issued a report on its
investigations at the ``witches'' camps in the Northern Region. The
report detailed the living conditions of the women in the camps and
proposed their reintegration into society, involving an educational
campaign in conjunction with the Center for National Culture and the
House of Chiefs. The Commission also has provided periodic updates to
various sections of its report on prison conditions.
The Commission operates with no overt interference from the
Government. Its biggest obstacle is a lack of adequate funding. Low
salaries and poor working conditions result in the loss of many CHRAJ-
trained personnel to other government agencies that are able to pay
their employees more. In late 1998, the Commission submitted a petition
on this matter to the Government and had not received a response by the
end of 1999.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, religion, disability, language, or social status. The courts are
empowered specifically to order enforcement of these prohibitions,
although enforcement by the authorities is generally inadequate, in
part due to limited financial resources.
Women.--Violence against women, including rape and domestic
violence, remains a significant problem. A 1998 study revealed that
particularly in low-income, high-density sections of greater Accra, at
least 54 percent of women have been assaulted in recent years. A total
of 95 percent of the victims of domestic violence are women, according
to data gathered by the International Federation of Women Lawyers
(FIDA). These abuses usually go unreported and seldom come before the
courts. The police tend not to intervene in domestic disputes. However,
1998 legislation doubled the mandatory sentence for rape. The media
increasingly report cases of assault and rape. In late 1998, the police
administration established a ``women and juvenile unit'' to handle
cases involving domestic violence, child abuse, and juvenile offenses.
In the first quarter of the year, this unit recorded199 cases,
including 30 assaults on women and 9 rapes. Located in Accra, the unit
works closely with the Department of Social Welfare, FIDA, and the
Legal Aid Board. In late 1998, a series of ``mysterious'' murders of
women began to occur in the Mateheko area of Accra. Three of the 20
murders reportedly involved husbands' suspicion of their wives'
infidelity. The men subsequently were arrested but not convicted. On
several occasions, women of Accra demonstrated in a concerted effort to
attract attention to violence against women (see Section 2.b.).
In 1998 Parliament passed legislation that amended the 1960
Criminal Code to provide additional protection for women and children.
The legislation added new definitions of sexual offenses and
strengthened punishments for others. The provisions of the bill ban the
practice of ``customary servitude'' (known as Trokosi), protect women
accused of witchcraft, double the mandatory sentence for rape, raise
the age of criminal responsibility from 7 years to 12, criminalize
indecent assault and forced marriages, and raise punishments for
defilement, incest, and prostitution involving children. In August the
Cabinet endorsed the Government's proposal to appoint women to 40
percent of public office positions.
In January the CHRAJ announced its decision in the country's first
sexual harassment case, involving a flight attendant for a private
airline and her immediate supervisor. The CHRAJ determined that the 22-
year-old attendant was terminated for her refusal to submit to her
supervisor's sexual advances over a 10-month period. The CHRAJ awarded
her compensation for legal costs. The company's chief executive,
however, did not comply with the terms of the decision, and in December
the CHRAJ went back to court to seek enforcement of the judgment.
Rural women can be punished with banishment by traditional village
authorities for teenage pregnancy or suspected witchcraft. The press
reported that hundreds of women accused of witchcraft were sent to
penal villages in the Northern Region by traditional authorities, such
as a shaman. In 1997 2 villages contained 400 elderly women, and 1
village contained 2,000 women and family members, all sentenced by a
village authority who claimed to have the power to divine witches.
Although the women face no formal legal sanction if they leave, most
fear that they would be beaten to death if caught outside the penal
villages (see Section 1.a.). Forced labor also occurs at the camps for
women accused of witchcraft. Legislation passed in 1998 provides some
additional protection to women banned from their communities for
alleged witchcraft. The CHRAJ and human rights NGO's are mounting a
campaign to end this traditional practice, which violates the victims'
constitutional rights. The challenge lies not only in persuading
custodians of the witches' homes to abolish the practice, but also in
educating the community so the women will be allowed to return safely
to their homes. In 1998 FIDA had persuaded custodians to abolish the
Gambaga witches home in the Northern Region, contingent on the
performance of ``exorcism'' rites and payment of accommodation and
discharge fees. However, a few months later, there was an increase in
the number of alleged witches banished to the home, largely due to the
communities' belief that these women were responsible for an outbreak
of cerebrospinal meningitis which claimed many lives in the region.
Women continue to experience societal discrimination. Women in
urban centers and those with skills and training encounter little overt
bias, but resistance to women entering nontraditional fields persists.
Only about one quarter of university students are women, although
women's enrollment is increasing. Women, especially in rural areas,
remain subject to burdensome labor conditions and traditional male
dominance. Traditional practices and social norms often deny women
their statutory entitlements to inheritances and property, a legally
registered marriage (and with it, certain legal rights), and the
maintenance and custody of children.
Women's rights groups are active in educational campaigns and in
programs to provide vocational training, legal aid, and other support
to women. The Government also is active in educational programs, and
the President and First Lady are among the most outspoken advocates of
women's rights. However, a presidential aide spoke out against anti-
Trokosi activists as being insensitive to indigenous cultural and
``religious'' beliefs and practices.
Children.--Within the limits of its resources, the Government is
committed to protecting the rights and welfare of children. There is
little or no discrimination against female children in education, but
girls and women frequently drop out of school due to societal or
economic pressures. The Government actively campaigns for girls'
education and in 1997 established a girls' education unit within the
basic education division of the Ghana Educational Service. Although the
percentages of girls enrolled in school increased from 1996,
participation is still low. Statistics for 1995 (the most recent
available) show that from grades 1 to 6, 46 percent of pupils are
girls; from grades 7 to 9, this drops to 43 percent. In grades 10 to
12, girls drop to 36 percent of students, and at the university level
to 23 percent. Enrollment of women at the university level has
increased by 5 percent from 1993 to 1998.
A 1997 country report by the Ghana National Commission on Children
further substantiated the gap between enrollment of boys and girls,
particularly at the high school level. In the eight districts examined,
there were 22,418 boys and 14,318 girls enrolled at the high school
level. In the report, officials attribute the lower female enrollment
to the fact that many girls marry early or become pregnant.
There are several traditional discriminatory practices that are
injurious to the health and development of young females. In
particular, female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned
by international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is a serious problem. According to one study, as
many as 30 percent of women may have undergone this procedure. Most
observers believe 15 percent to be more likely. A Ministry of Health
survey conducted between 1995 and 1998 found that FGM is practiced
among nearly all the northern sector ethnic groups. Officials at all
levels have spoken out against the practice, and local NGO's are making
some inroads through their educational campaigns to encourage
abandonment of FGM and to retrain practitioners. There were no reports
of arrests in 1999. Five persons reportedly were arrested in 1998 for
practicing FGM. One woman was arrested for performing FGM on two
teenage girls in the Upper East Region. Another practitioner was jailed
for performing FGM on three teenage girls. Two individuals were
arrested for FGM involving five girls in the Upper East Region. In
another case, a 60-year-old woman was arrested for performing FGM on 8
girls. In almost all of the cases, the victims actively sought out the
practitioners, sometimes without their parents' knowledge, in a quest
to become ready for marriage. Two practitioners were sentenced to a
total of 8 years of hard labor.
Members of the legal community advocate legislation to close
loopholes in the FGM law, including extending culpability to family
members and others who aid in carrying out FGM and to Ghanaians who
commit the crime outside the country's borders. Any person who conceals
information about an instance of FGM would be liable. In addition, FGM
would be banned no matter how medically safe the procedure is made--
dispelling a belief by some that FGM is acceptable as long as the
girls' health is protected. Traditional chiefs became more outspoken in
their opposition to the practice of FGM.
Although the Constitution prohibits slavery, it exists on a limited
scale. Trokosi, a traditional practice found among the Ewe ethnic group
and in part of the Volta Region, is an especially severe abuse and a
flagrant violation of children's and women's rights. It is a system in
which a young girl, usually under the age of 10, is made a slave to a
fetish shrine for offenses allegedly committed by a member of the
girl's family. In rare instances, boys are offered. The belief is that,
if someone in that family has committed a crime, such as stealing,
members of the family may begin to die in large numbers unless a young
girl is given to the local fetish shrine to atone for the offense. The
girl becomes the property of the fetish priest, must work on the
priest's farm, and perform other labors for him. Because they are the
sexual property of the priests, most Trokosi slaves have children by
them. Although the girls' families must provide for their needs such as
food, most are unable to do so. There are at least 2,510 girls and
women bound to various shrines in the Trokosi system, a figure that
does not include the slaves' children. Even if released, generally
without skills or hope of marriage, a Trokosi woman has continued
obligations to the shrine for the duration of her life. When the fetish
slave dies, the family is expected to replace her with another young
girl for the fetish shrine.
In 1998 Parliament passed legislation that banned the practice of
Trokosi in comprehensive legislation to protect women and children's
rights. Human rights activists believe that the goal of eradicating the
Trokosi practice is achievable with the new law. NGO's, such as
International Needs, and government agencies, like the CHRAJ, have been
campaigning against Trokosi for several years and are familiar with the
locations of the fetish shrines and the numbers of women and children
enslaved. Activists know the community leaders and fetish priests and,
thus, know with whom to negotiate. The CHRAJ and International Needs
have had some success in approaching village authorities and fetish
priests at over 116 of the major and minor shrines, winning the release
of 2,190 Trokosi slaves to date and retraining them for new
professions. The organizations continue to work for additional
releases.
There were reports that trafficking in children occurred, including
children being sold into slavery either for forced labor or sexual
exploitation (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
Another traditional practice that violates the rights of children
is forced childhood marriage, which became illegal under the Children's
Act.
Child prostitution, although illegal, also exists.
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution specifically provides
for the rights of the disabled, including protection against
exploitation and discrimination. In practice the disabled are not
discriminated against in any systematic or overt manner. The
Constitution alsostates that ``as far as practicable, every place to
which the public has access shall have appropriate facilities for
disabled persons.'' However, in practice this provision has yet to be
implemented.
Religious Minorities.--Tension arose between ethnic Ga
traditionalists and members of some charismatic churches over the
annual ban on drumming and noise-making by those Christian churches
prior to the Ga Homowo (harvest) festival. Traditionalists believed
that their time-honored customs should be accorded due respect, while
some Christians resented the imposition of taboos, which they believed
infringed on their right to worship. The Government advocated mutual
coexistence and understanding and alerted the population that police
resources were insufficient to protect all churches during the several-
week ban on drumming. No suspects were charged following attacks on
three churches in 1999 and one church in 1998.
On May 15, a group of men allegedly hired by the Ga traditional
council entered the Living Light Ministry at Darkuman-Nyamekye in Accra
during a worship service and began forcibly to remove music equipment.
Some members of the congregation recognized individuals in the group
and pleaded with them to leave the equipment, which they eventually
did. There were no casualties.
On May 29, a group of heavily armed men identified as Ga Wulome
council guards disrupted services at the Mount Zion prayer center at
Abeka in Accra, wounding five members of the congregation. They stole
the church's collection for the day and vandalized the church facility.
On May 30, a group of armed men attacked worshippers at the Odorkor
branch of the Apostolic Faith mission in Accra. One member of the
congregation was knocked unconscious and several others sustained minor
injuries. The attackers seized musical equipment and allegedly stole
money from members of the congregation. Police were called but did not
respond, claiming that they were guarding other churches. At mid-year
the committee of inquiry concluded its report on the May 1998 attack on
the Lighthouse chapel. The report called for greater dialog between
communities holding divergent beliefs.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although the Government plays
down the importance of ethnic differences, its opponents occasionally
complain that it is dominated by the Ewe ethnic group from the eastern
part of the country. The President and some of his close advisers are
Ewe, but most ministers are of other ethnic origins. In the 1997
International Foundation for Electoral Systems report on public
opinion, 25 percent of the respondents said that they felt
discrimination because of their tribal origins.
During the year, there were several violent confrontations between
and within ethnic groups related to chieftaincy issues, particularly
those of succession and land. In January a chieftancy dispute in Juaso
in the Ashanti Region resulted in the death of a policeman, several
injuries, the burning of the police station and the arrest of over 60
persons (see Section 1.a.).
In February a decades-old chieftancy dispute between two Volta
region ethnic groups (Guans and Akans) led to a violent clash over the
deaths and subsequent funerals of their respective chiefs and their
actual burial sites. Two persons lost their lives and six were injured.
Elders from both factions were arrested and detained and await
prosecution.
On August 4, two factions clashed in a chieftancy dispute in
Teshie, a suburb of Accra. At least five persons sustained gunshot
wounds and one person was stabbed. One chief's residence was set afire.
Property worth tens of thousands of dollars was destroyed. At immediate
issue was which faction has the authority to perform customary rites to
usher in the celebration of the ethnic Ga Homowo festival, a festival
thanking the gods for providing food during the year. Since the 1995
death of the former chief, both factions had claimed to be the
legitimate heir. The dispute currently is pending before the Ga
traditional council.
A similar incident occurred on August 7 at Oshiye in the Ga
district of Accra. Six civilians and two army officers were injured.
One of the factions reportedly was led by an off-duty army sergeant,
who, according to one report, enlisted the aid of over a dozen well-
armed, off-duty soldiers, who clashed with inhabitants. The case is
before the courts.
In 1994-95, an estimated several thousand citizens died in the
north in a conflict driven by chieftancy and land issues dating from
precolonial times. In 1998 a potential flare-up was averted following
the murder of a member of one ethnic group by a member of another
ethnic group.
In 1995 the Government created a permanent negotiating team made up
of religious leaders, NGO representatives, Council of State members,
and other interested parties to help resolve the continuing tensions
between the Konkomba and other ethnic groups in the north. The
Permanent Peace Negotiating Team (PPNT) is a facilitative body whose
primary purpose is to mediate disputes.
In 1996 a series of highly publicized ``peacemaking'' ceremonies
were held at which tribal leaders pledged to solve their differences
through negotiations. In 1997 in response to reports of latent
insecurity, the PPNT extended its activities to some northern parts of
the Volta Region and supervised a peace accord among all parties to the
conflict there. Since 1997 there have been organized seminars and
workshops designed to promote dialog between two feuding factions. The
Government has a ban on firearms in the Northern Region and northern
part of the Volta Region. Government officials, Members of Parliament,
and other prominent opinion leaders regularly call for peaceful
coexistence. In February after 14 years of animosity, the Bimobas and
the Konkombas of the East Mamprusi District of the Northern Region held
a pacification and reconciliation ceremony. In August the Northern
Region Youth and Development Association, an umbrella group of all the
ethnic groups in the area, organized a workshop on building peace at
the grassroots level.
In January two factions of Kumasi's ethnic Moshie community signed
a peace agreement at the behest of the then-regional minister. However,
the long-standing dispute resurfaced on December 24 after the Supreme
Court had ruled on the Moshie leadership issue December 15. One man
died from a stab wound and another was injured.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom
of association. This right is restricted formally, as the Trades Union
Ordinance confers broad powers on the Government to refuse to register
a trade union; however, the Government has not interfered with the
right of workers to associate in labor unions and has encouraged
pluralism in labor organizations. The Industrial Relations Act (IRA),
initially enacted in 1958 and amended in 1965 and 1972, governs trade
unions and their activities. A draft labor law, which is scheduled to
be presented to Parliament in 2000, is designed to reconcile
contradictory and outdated labor laws and conform to ILO standards. The
percentage of workers belonging to unions appears to be decreasing from
9 percent in 1998 as more of the workforce enters the informal sector
where there is no union activity. In August the Ghana Federation of
Labor (GFL) was inaugurated. The GFL is intended to serve as an
umbrella organization for several other labor unions, which were either
previously part of or not encompassed by the Trades Union Congress
(TUC), the original federation. The TUC, the largest labor organization
in the nation, consists of 17 national unions.
Led by experienced union leaders, the TUC has been a vocal and
constructive critic of the Government's economic policies when it felt
it to be necessary. Civil servants have their own union, the Civil
Servants Association, which operates outside of the TUC umbrella.
The law recognizes a right to strike, but there have been no legal
strikes since independence. Under the IRA, the Government established a
system of settling disputes, first through conciliation, then through
arbitration. A union may call a legal strike if the Government does not
call for formal arbitration. However, no union has ever gone through
the complete process. There were numerous unsanctioned strike actions
during the year, none of which met the requirements for a legal strike
detailed in the IRA. The IRA prohibits retribution against strikers,
and this law is enforced. The Government convened a committee to
investigate reports that a gold-miners' strike in May was instigated by
persons not employed by the mine. The committee completed its report in
September, but the conclusions were not made public by year's end.
Unions have the right to affiliate with international bodies. The
TUC is affiliated with the Organization of African Trade Union Unity
headquartered in Accra and is also a member of the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The IRA
provides a framework for collective bargaining and some protection
against antiunion discrimination. Trade unions engage in collective
bargaining for wages and benefits for both private and state-owned
enterprises without government interference. However, the Government,
labor, and employers negotiate together through a tripartite commission
to set minimum standards for wages and working conditions. The law
requires employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination to
reinstate workers fired for union activities. No union leaders have
been detained in recent years for union or other activities.
There is legislation that authorizes export processing zones
(EPZ's), and a few EPZ's are in operation. Existing labor law applies
in any EPZ, including the right to organize.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits slavery, and the law also prohibits forced or bonded labor,
including that performed by children; however, at least 2,510 women and
girls are bound to shrines through the localized Trokosi system (see
Section 5). Forced labor also occurs at the camps in the north for
women accused ofwitchcraft (see Section 5). Apart from the Trokosi
system, it is difficult to determine the extent to which forced or
bonded labor by children is practiced. There have been newspaper
reports of children being sold into slavery for either sexual
exploitation or labor, such as 10- to 12-year-old boys toiling in the
service of fisherman in exchange for a yearly remittance to their
families. A June report described this practice as rampant in 156
fishing villages along the Afram River and settlements along the Volta
Lake in the Afram plains (see Section 6.f.). The International Labor
Organization (ILO) continues to urge the Government to revise various
legal provisions that permit imprisonment with an obligation to perform
labor for offenses that are not countenanced under ILO Convention 105.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Labor legislation sets a minimum employment age of 15
years and prohibits night work and certain types of hazardous labor for
those under 18 years of age. In practice child employment is
widespread, and young children of school age often perform menial tasks
during the day in the market or collect fares on local buses. An ILO
survey conducted in three rural districts between 1992 and 1993
concluded that 11 percent of school age children were employed for
wages and another 15 percent work without remuneration (see Section
6.f.). The migration of children from rural to urban areas is
increasing, due to economic hardship. Children are driven to the
streets to fend for themselves, increasing child labor and the school
dropout rate. Another ILO study in 1992 and 1993 found that almost 90
percent of the surveyed street children in Accra did not attend school.
Observance of minimum age laws is eroded by local custom and economic
circumstances that encourage children to work to help support their
families. A 1996 ILO survey revealed that the economic activity of more
than 75 percent of children between ages 5 and 14 takes place in the
context of a family enterprise.
In late 1998, the President signed into law legislation to provide
additional child labor protection and strengthen the punishment for
violators under a comprehensive children's act. The act incorporates
the existing labor legislation's minimum age for employment and
prohibitions on night work and hazardous labor. In addition, the
legislation allows for children age 15 years and above to have an
apprenticeship whereby the craftsmen and employers have the obligation
to provide a safe and healthy work environment along with training and
tools. Fines and imprisonment for violators are increased considerably.
The Government has also presented ILO Child Labor Convention 182
(concerning the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor) to the
Cabinet for approval.
The law prohibits forced or bonded labor, including that performed
by children; however, at least 2,510 women and girls are bound to
shrines through the Trokosi system (see Section 6.c.).
Officials only occasionally punish violators of regulations that
prohibit heavy labor and night work for children. Inspectors from the
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare are responsible for enforcement of
child labor regulations. They visit each workplace annually and make
spot checks whenever they receive allegations of violations.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1991 minimum standards for
wages and working conditions were set by a tripartite commission
composed of representatives of the Government, labor, and employers. In
June the daily minimum wage increased from about $.55 (2,000 cedis) to
about $.80 (2,900 cedis), but is still insufficient to provide a decent
standard of living for a single wage earner and family. Furthermore,
there is widespread violation of the minimum wage law. In most cases,
households have multiple wage earners, and family members engage in
some family farming or other family-based commercial activities.
The law sets the maximum workweek at 45 hours, with one break of at
least 36 consecutive hours every 7 days. Through collective bargaining,
however, the basic workweek for most unionized workers is 40 hours. In
July the Government began compensating extra duty hours only for
overtime actually worked, in accordance with labor equity, rather than
as an automatic salary supplement.
In 1996 Spintex workers filed petitions with the CHRAJ, the
Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare, and the Department of Labor
concerning working hours. They have withdrawn the case from
administrative review and, instead, taken the case to court. Hearings
were in process at the end of 1997, but no decision has been made.
There were no known developments in this case during the year.
Occupational safety and health regulations exist, and the Labor
Department of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare occasionally
imposes sanctions on violators. However, safety inspectors are few and
poorly trained. They take action if matters are called to their
attention, but lack the resources to seek out violations. Workers have
the right to withdraw themselves from dangerous work situations without
jeopardy to continued employment, although they rarely exercise this
right.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons.
Trafficking in persons reportedly occurred. Its most common form
involved teenage girls from the rural areas being sent by relatives to
work in the cities as housemaids for little remuneration. Often a
guarantee is given that after several years' service, the housemaid
will be sponsored to train in dressmaking or hairdressing. However,
often an excuse is found to fire the housemaid before such
apprenticeship begins. Over 100 boys were reportedly contracted out to
Lake Volta fishermen (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.). There were also
reports of children abducted to work either in the country or in
neighboring countries. Women were lured into prostitution in Cote
d'Ivoire and Togo, as well as Germany and the Netherlands. Citizens
were reportedly lured to the Middle East, particularly to Lebanon, to
work illegally in menial jobs. Traffickers in persons of other
nationalities also reportedly used Accra as a transit point to Europe.
____
GUINEA
Guinea is a constitutional republic in which effective power is
concentrated in a strong presidency. President Lansana Conte has ruled
since 1984, when he led the only successful coup d'etat in the
country's history, first as head of a military junta, and since 1994 as
a civilian president elected in 1993. Guinea held its first multiparty
legislative elections in 1995, delivering more than 60 percent of
National Assembly seats to President Conte's Party of Unity and
Progress (PUP). The PUP is one seat short of the number required to
amend the Constitution. Although the PUP continues to dominate all
three branches of government, opposition parties have on occasion
persuaded PUP Members of Parliament, including the National Assembly
leadership, to vote with the opposition on specific legislative
matters. Conte won a second 5-year term in a December 1998 election
that was marred by violence and civil unrest before and after election
day, widespread and diverse irregularities that tended to favor the
incumbent, and the arrest and detention of major opposition candidates
during the vote-counting process. Nevertheless, the election was much
more transparent and fair than the 1993 election. In the 1998
presidential election, the Government continued to dominate the
electoral process and did not create an independent electoral
commission as initially demanded by both opposition parties and ruling
party dissidents; instead, it struck a compromise with the opposition
and formed a High Council for Electoral Affairs, composed of
representatives from many parties, but with authority limited to local
vote counting and the transmission of results. A disproportionate
number of public sector positions, including senior military and
cabinet posts, are held by members of the President's own minority
ethnic group, the Soussou. The judiciary is subject to executive
influence, particularly in politically sensitive cases.
The gendarmerie and the national police share responsibility for
internal security and sometimes play an oppressive role in the daily
lives of citizens. Members of the elite Presidential Guard are
accountable to almost no one except the President. Members of the
security forces frequently committed human rights abuses.
About 85 percent of the country's population of 7.1 million engage
in subsistence agriculture. Annual recorded per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) was about $540 in 1997. More than 80 percent of export
earnings come from mining, particularly bauxite, gold, and diamonds.
Other exports include coffee and fruit. There has been modest economic
growth in recent years, due in part to substantial assistance from
international financial institutions. However, growth continued to be
hindered by widespread corruption and limited but increasing
transparency in government; in particular, corruption at the port and
customs offices hampers effective collection of nonmining receipts.
The Government's human rights record was generally poor; although
there were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remained
in many others. The Government's tight and sometimes partisan control
of the electoral process, both in the 1998 presidential election and
for upcoming local and national legislative elections, its refusal to
create an independent electoral oversight mechanism, and its
prohibition of nongovernmental broadcast media, reflectively restricted
citizens' right to change their government. Major human rights abuses
include: Extrajudicial killings; disappearances; use of torture by
police and military personnel; police abuse of prisoners and detainees;
inhuman prison conditions and frequent deaths due to these conditions
and lack of medical care; and prolonged pretrial detention. Members of
the security forces committed abuses with impunity. There was arbitrary
arrest and detention. The Government failed to ensure access by
attorneys to clients in prison, maintained the executive branch's
influence over the judicial system and the electoral process and
infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government restricted
freedom of speech and of the press. The private print press criticized
the Government, but the Government continued to monopolize the
broadcast media, including radio, the most important medium of mass
communication. The Government imposes cumbersome requirements for
official recognition on associations, and infringes on freedom of
movement. Other major human rights abuses included: Restrictions on
freedom of assembly; violence and societal discrimination against
women; prostitution and genital mutilation of young girls; ethnic
discrimination and interethnic violence; child labor; and vigilante
actions by victims or others.
Rebels from Sierra Leone and armed attackers from Liberia committed
a number of killings and other abuses, including the burning of homes.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces
committed fewer killings than the previous year. On October 11,
security forces killed two students when using unauthorized lethal
force to bring a violent protest over an increase in gasoline and
transportation prices under control. During the year there were fewer
violent riots and instances of government overreaction, compared with
1998.
In December 1998, a soldier posted at Camp Alpha Yaya near Conakry
died of injuries sustained in a beating ordered by his battalion
commander, Panival Sama Bangoura, to punish him for having tried to
vote outside the camp. Bangoura was reprimanded, and, on June 22, was
transferred from the capital to Kankan, where he is chief of the third
military region. A woman died of injuries inflicted by members of the
security forces during suppression of riots after the soldier's body
was returned to his hometown, Labe (see Section 3). Deaths in custody
due to inhuman prison conditions and inadequate medical treatment
remained frequent (see Section 1.c.).
In 1998 security forces clashed with residents of Conakry's Ratoma
section during riots over the Government's destruction of illegally
constructed buildings that left 100,000 persons homeless, mostly
members of the Puhlar ethnic group (see Section 5). One gendarme and 8
civilians were killed; 40 persons were injured, and 59 were arrested,
including 3 members of the National Assembly (see Sections 1.c. and
1.d.). Of those arrested, 24 subsequently were tried and sentenced to
prison terms and fines. However, by early 1999, all of the persons
imprisoned in connection with these riots had been released.
In late 1998, government officials used excessive force and killed
a number of persons both in suppressing opposition party political
rallies before the December 14 presidential election and in suppressing
antigovernment demonstrations, riots, and interethnic violence in the
wake of the election. On November 28, 1998, Jean Traore, subprefect of
Banian in the southeastern region, shot and killed one man and wounded
two other persons while attempting to disperse a gathering of
supporters of the Rally of the Guinean People (RPG), an opposition
party. Persons in the crowd then beat and killed Traore. Shortly after
the election, members of the security forces reportedly shot and killed
two RPG supporters in the largely pro-RPG town of Siguiri.
A mutiny by rebellious soldiers in February 1996 resulted in
between 30 and 50 civilian deaths. In the subsequent trial of 30 to 40
alleged mutineers (March-August 1998), all defendants were given a
chance to present their responses to government charges and were
sentenced in October 1998 (see Section 1.e.). On March 22, 31 soldiers
accused of participation in the mutiny were discharged from military
service.
Government authorities continued to block efforts by human rights
groups and NGO's to investigate political killings that took place in
the 1970's under then-President Sekou Toure. However, NGO's
representing the victims who died in Camp Boiro, the Conakry Prison
where hundreds of political prisoners and intellectuals were detained
or killed under the Toure regime, successfully walled off a cemetery in
November 1998 to protect victims' burial plots from urban encroachment.
In December 1998, at the climax of the presidential election
campaign, between four and six persons reportedly died during violence
in Conakry between members of the Soussou, Puhlar, and Malinke ethnic
groups (see Section 3).
Sierra Leonean rebels killed a number of civilians and members of
the security forces in crossborder raids during the year, as they had
done in 1998. Rebels from Sierra Leone killed two Guineans and
seriously wounded eight in an April 19 attack on the border village of
Mola, prompting villagers to blame and burn an adjacent refugee camp.
On May 13, Sierra Leonean rebels killed two Guineans in the village of
Dinde, near Forecariah. On May 25, rebels attacked the village of
Tassine, killing four civilians and two soldiers, abducting five
persons, and mutilating others. Despite a May 24 cease-fire in Sierra
Leone, Sierra Leonean rebels again attacked Mola on May 25; they killed
seven civilians and one soldier, cut off the arms or hands of at least
five civilians, and abducted others. On September 10, armed attackers
from Liberia killed 31 civilians in villages in Macenta prefecture. The
Government blamed the Liberian Government for the attack, but the
Liberian Government denied responsibility.
Many victims of crime fear that they may never receive justice
because of judicial corruption and may resort to exacting their own
form of retribution through vigilante violence. Somesuspected
criminals, notably thieves and rapists, are beaten to death or burned
by their victims or others after being soaked with a flammable liquid.
b. Disappearance.--Opposition leaders, local NGO's, and the
independent press routinely report cases of politically motivated
temporary disappearances that usually ended with the eventual release
of the prisoners who were held by security forces.
In months after the February 1996 mutiny, hundreds of soldiers and
civilians disappeared during neighborhood sweeps conducted by armed
members of the security forces, who often were masked to hide their
identities. Dozens of soldiers were interrogated and transferred to
judicial authorities for legal proceedings related to the mutiny.
Prosecutors later released 63 detainees for lack of evidence; the
others were sentenced in October 1998 (see Section 1.e.). Baba Sarr, a
relative of reported mutiny ringleader Major Gbago Zoumanigui, remains
missing since his detention following the mutiny. During the year, many
of the persons missing after the 1996 mutiny were in self-imposed
exile, according to family members.
Sierra Leonean rebels reportedly abducted a number of civilian
hostages during crossborder raids in Faranah in November 1998, and in
the villages of Tassine and Mola in May (see Section 1.d.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Penal Code and the Constitution prohibit torture and
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, both civilian and
military security forces often use torture and beatings to extract
confessions and employ other forms of brutality, including holding
prisoners incommunicado without charges and under inhuman conditions.
Local human rights organizations and former detainees stated that some
prisoners are bound and hung by their feet before being beaten. There
were no reported judicial proceedings against officers suspected of
committing abuses. Many citizens view the security forces as corrupt,
ineffective, and even dangerous. Police ignore legal procedures, and
extort money from citizens at roadblocks (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).
Refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone report that some soldiers demand
sex in exchange for entry into the country. There are also reports of
sexual assaults on refugees (see Section 2.d.).
Defendants in the Ratoma riots' trial in 1998 reported neglect and
torture during their detention at their trial proceedings in 1998 (see
Section 1.a.). All since have been released.
Soldiers arrested for the 1996 mutiny reported being tortured at
the Kassa prison by military personnel. According to the defendants,
police temporarily transferred the soldiers from the Koundara prison to
Kassa for interrogation and torture (see Section 1.a.).
Prison conditions are inhuman and life threatening. Family members
and friends are responsible for feeding prisoners. Guards often
demanded bribes in exchange for letting food through to those
incarcerated. Standards of sanitation remained poor, and there were
several dozen deaths due to malnutrition and disease. A former inmate
held in the central prison in Conakry reported in 1998 being housed
with between 60 and 80 prisoners in 1 cell, with 1 toilet and no beds.
Prisoners reported threats, beatings, and harassment by guards. There
are credible reports from prisoners that female inmates are subject to
harassment and sexual assault by guards.
The Organisation Guineenne de Defense des Droits de L'Homme et du
Citoyen (OGDH) determined that prisoners in at least one major prison,
located in N'Zerekore, suffered more from neglect and lack of resources
than from mistreatment. According to the OGDH, the N'Zerekore prison is
a converted grain warehouse built in 1932 for 70 prisoners, but it
currently houses 120. There is no electricity or running water.
The independent press, a local human rights organization, and a
former prisoner reported in previous years that inmates routinely are
beaten and subjected to other forms of abuse at the prison in Koundara
in the north. Although the Minister of Justice has criticized inhuman
prison conditions during televised visits to prison facilities, no
concrete action has yet been taken to improve conditions.
The Government permits prison visits by local humanitarian and
religious organizations, which offer medical care and food for those in
severe need. A former prisoner reported that without this assistance
those who do not have families or friends would starve to death.
On November 10, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
signed a detention accord with the Government for satisfactory access
to prisoners. The ICRC, which had been negotiating for the accord over
a 2-year period, regarded the agreement as a positive step by the
Government.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention remain persistent threats despite procedural provisions in
the Penal Code designed to safeguard detainees. In practice
administrative controls over the police are ineffective, and security
forces rarely follow the Penal Code.
The Penal Code requires that the Government issue a warrant before
an arrest can be made and charge detainees before a magistrate within
72 hours. However, many detainees are incarcerated for longer periods
before being charged. After being charged, the accused may be held
until the conclusion of the case, including a period of appeal. Release
on bail is at the discretion of the magistrate who has jurisdiction.
The Constitution proscribes incommunicado detention. The law provides
for access by attorneys to their clients, but authorities frequently do
not respect this provision.
On March 11, military troops entered the University of Kankan and
arrested 800 students following a student riot that began after 1
student was killed in a car accident. Some of the students were beaten;
however, all were released within a few days.
Bar Association attorneys, the independent press, and government
sources describe a parallel system of justice run by unidentified
uniformed personnel who conduct midnight arrests, detain suspects, and
use torture in secret prisons to obtain confessions before transferring
detainees to prosecutors (see Section 1.c.). In previous years, a
member of a political opposition party, a soldier, a local human rights
organization, and former prisoners all reported that the Government
imprisons for political reasons persons considered a threat to state
security at Kassa prison, allegedly located in a former French colonial
structure on an island off the coast of Conakry. The Government denies
the existence of the Kassa Prison and states that prisoners identified
as political detainees have been incarcerated for criminal acts and are
located in other prisons. In 1998 foreign diplomats visited the
military installation on Kassa Island, where they saw nothing that
resembled a prison or detention center.
Security forces detain citizens at roadblocks and extort money from
them (see Section 2.d.).
On November 15, 1998, at the start of the presidential campaign,
the prefects of Mandiana, Kerouane, Macenta, and Nzerekore arrested RPG
supporters in those prefectures. On March 16, after a short trial on
charges of incitement to violence, 13 RPG members, including 4 National
Assembly representatives, were released from detention in Kankan for
time served; 36 other RPG supporters detained in Baro were released on
March 18.
On December 12, 1998, while suppressing interethnic violence in
Conakry (see Section 1.a.), members of the security forces arrested and
detained Marcel Cros, a leader of the minority PDA party and close
advisor of Alpha Conde, leader of the RPG opposition party, on illegal-
weapons charges. After a lengthy investigation, the Government dropped
all charges and released Cros on February 10. Cros reported that he was
permitted visits from his family and his lawyers while in detention in
Conakry's central detention facility and said that he had been treated
no worse than other prisoners.
On December 14, 1998 (Election Day), security forces reportedly
arrested 30 RPG poll watchers in Boffa and 80 poll watchers of the
Union for Progress and Renewal (UPR) opposition party in Gaoual and
Koundara prefectures. The opposition poll watchers, some of whom were
accused of being mercenaries by the security force members who arrested
them, were released the day after the election.
On December 15, 1998, members of the security forces arrested Alpha
Conde, the presidential candidate of the RPG opposition party, at the
town of Lola on the Liberian border; the Government had closed the
border there since December 9, 1998, as an election security measure.
The Government detained Conde incommunicado until December 30, 1998,
when it charged him with trying to leave the country illegally,
resisting arrest, engaging in illegal foreign currency transactions,
and training an armed force to overthrow the Government. During the
year, foreign officials and diplomats, including the Senegalese
Minister of Justice, and several foreign diplomats visited Alpha Conde
in detention. Conde's lawyers reported that they had generally free
access to their client as well as to the dossier of his case. Conde's
doctor, but not his family members, alsohad access to him. During a
July 21-22 visit by French President Jacques Chirac, the Government
announced a mid-September trial date for Conde, but, the trial did not
begin by year's end.
On December 28, 1998, security forces detained about 20 persons
during their suppression of rioting in the town of Labe following the
return of the body of a soldier, who had died of injuries suffered
during a beating ordered by his commander to punish him for trying to
vote outside the military camp where he was posted (see Sections 1.a.
and 3).
The Government does not practice forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
judiciary's independence; however, judicial authorities routinely defer
to executive authorities and the executive branch in politically
sensitive cases. Magistrates are civil servants with no assurance of
tenure. Due to corruption and nepotism in the judiciary, relatives of
influential members of the Government often are, in effect, above the
law. In 1996 the Cabinet stated that it would pursue those who violate
the law but avoid punishment due to judicial corruption, including the
autonomous Presidential Guard; however, no action has been taken.
Judges often do not act independently, and their verdicts are subject
to outside interference. Influential persons often intervene on behalf
of their relatives to prevent a negative judgment from being carried
out.
The judiciary includes courts of first instance, the two Courts of
Appeal, and the Supreme Court, the court of final appeal. Since 1988
civilian courts have rendered all judgments involving civilians under
the Penal Code. A military tribunal prepares and adjudicates charges
against accused military personnel, to whom the Penal Code does not
apply. The Government announced in 1996 the creation of a Discipline
Council for dealing with civil servants who abuse their positions as
government employees, but by year's end, the Council still had not
prosecuted any cases.
In 1997 Minister of Justice Maurice Zogbelemou Togba activated a
special state security court to try alleged participants in the
February 1996 military mutiny. Togba defended the Special Court's
legality, citing statutes predating the 1992 Constitution. Members of
political opposition parties and the independent press maintained that
the Court is unconstitutional, arguing that the Fundamental Law of 1992
superseded related statutes. They also maintained that because the
State presents evidence as well as makes final judgment, the Court
infringes on the prisoners' due process rights. In October 1998, the
special security court concluded its trials of the alleged mutineers.
Of the 96 persons over whom the court exercised jurisdiction, 4 never
were charged, 13 were released because the time they already had served
in detention exceeded their sentences, 2 were released because of
illness or immunity, 34 were acquitted, and 43 were sentenced to prison
terms ranging from 3 to 20 years. The 20-year sentences were given to
members of the armed forces who had fled the country and who were tried
in absentia.
The judicial system is plagued by numerous problems, including a
shortage of qualified lawyers and magistrates and an outdated and
restrictive penal code. The Penal Code provides for the presumption of
innocence of accused persons, the independence of judges, the equality
of citizens before the law, the right of the accused to counsel, and
the right to appeal a judicial decision. Although in principle the
Government is responsible for funding legal defense costs in serious
criminal cases, in practice it rarely disburses these funds. The
attorney for the defense frequently receives no payment.
The Government provided counsel for dozens of soldiers charged in
connection with the February 1996 mutiny and the quasi-independent Bar
Association started a permanent legal defense fund. Defense lawyers for
the soldiers incarcerated in connection with the 1996 mutiny complained
that they had difficulty obtaining permission to meet with their
clients, that prison guards eavesdropped on their conversations and
denied family visits to the detainees, and that the Government reduced
their clients' salaries by as much as 60 percent to pay for prison
meals.
Many citizens are wary of judicial corruption and prefer instead to
rely on traditional systems of justice at the village or urban
neighborhood level. Litigants present their civil cases before a
village chief, a neighborhood leader, or a council of wise men. The
dividing line between the formal and informal justice systems is vague,
and authorities may refer a case from the formal to the traditional
system to ensure compliance by all parties. Similarly, if a case cannot
be resolved to the satisfaction of all parties in the traditional
system, it may be referred to the formal system for adjudication. The
traditional system discriminates against women in that evidence given
by women carries less weight (see Section 5).
Vigilante action by victims or others sometimes resulted in the
beating to death of suspected criminals (see Section 1.a.).
At year's end, the Government held an unknown number of political
prisoners. Such prisoners are individuals incarcerated for allegedly
politically motivated acts, such as protests, meetings, and campaigns;
but arrested and convicted under criminal laws such as those applying
to creating disorder, inciting violence, and corruption. Some of these
individuals consequently received disproportionately harsh punishment
due to their political affiliation. Members of political opposition
parties and a local human rights organization state that dozens of
persons also are being detained or have disappeared for political
reasons (see Sections 1.b. and 1.d.).
The Government denies holding any political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
home, and judicial search warrants are required by law; however, police
frequently ignore these procedures. Police and paramilitary police
often ignore legal procedures in the pursuit of criminals. Private
citizens frequently are detained at nighttime roadblocks set up by
police and the military for purposes of security and extortion (see
Section 2.d.).
It is believed widely that security officials monitor mail and
telephone calls. Local businesses, including foreign companies, often
complain of intimidation and harassment by public officials and
authorities.
Sierra Leonean rebels burned homes, stole livestock and other
goods, and took civilian hostages, during numerous crossborder raids in
1999 and 1998. Attackers from Liberia burned homes in Guinean villages
on September 10 (see Section 1.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of expression, subject to certain limitations; however, despite
government statements in support of free speech and a free press, the
Government employs a broad range of restrictions on these rights. The
Government prohibits what it considers seditious talk or chants in
public, has established defamation and slander as criminal offenses,
and prohibits communications that personally insult the President, or
incite violence, discrimination, or hatred, or that disturb the public
peace. Opposition members of the National Assembly arrested in
connection with the Ratoma riots were detained and convicted under
these laws in 1998.
The Government publishes an official newspaper, Horoya, and
operates the official television and radio (ORTG) stations. Reporters
for the official press, who are government employees, practice self-
censorship in order to protect their jobs. Several younger broadcast
journalists reported critically about the Government and posed critical
questions at official press conferences.
While the only daily newspaper L'Horoya is owned and operated by
the state, there is a vocal private press that is critical of the
President and the Government. For example, the weekly satirical
newspaper Le Lynx publishes front-page cartoons lampooning the
President and senior government officials. Five private newspapers (Le
Lynx, La Lance, L'Oeil, L'Independant, and L'Independant Plus) publish
weekly in Conakry, and up to 10 other publications appear sporadically,
although hampered by technical and financial difficulties. One
newspaper, L'Espoir, is affiliated with the governing political party,
and several other newspapers are affiliated with opposition parties.
Other newspapers offer news and criticism of both the Government and
the opposition.
In contrast to 1998 and 1997, the Government did not detain or
expel journalists during the year.
The Government owns and operates all domestic broadcast media
including radio, which serves as the most important means of informing
the public. Many citizens listen regularly to foreign-origin short-wave
radio, and access to foreign television satellite broadcasts is
growing. The Government does not restrict access to or distribution of
foreign television programming via satellite or cable, although
relatively few citizens can afford these services.
The country has had full Internet access since 1997. At year's end,
there were three domestic service providers, two strictly private and
one affiliated with SOTELGUI, a private telephone company that holds a
monopoly on international telephone lines. The Government did not
restrict Internet access. Storefrontoperations offering Internet access
were common throughout downtown Conakry. However, a lack of reliable
telephone lines inhibited home Internet access, even for the few who
could afford it.
The state-owned media are not impartial; they provide extensive and
almost invariably favorable coverage of the Government and ruling
party, while providing little coverage of opposition party activities.
The state-owned broadcast media monopoly did not give opposition
candidates equal coverage or allow them equal access during the 1998
presidential election campaign (see Section 3).
Political tracts occasionally circulate in Conakry and other urban
areas. Some tracts support the Government, while others specifically
criticize senior officials. Foreign publications, some of which
criticize the Government, often are available.
The Ministry of National Education and Scientific Research
exercises limited control over academic freedom through its influence
on faculty hiring and control over the curriculum. In general teachers
are not subject to classroom censorship.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law restricts
freedom of assembly, and the Government exercises its power to thwart
unwanted political activity. The Penal Code bans any meeting that has
an ethnic or racial character or any gathering ``whose nature threatens
national unity.'' The Government requires notification 72 hours prior
to public gatherings, otherwise the events are considered illegal.
The Government bans all street marches except funerals. The law
allows local authorities to cancel a demonstration or meeting if they
believe that it poses a threat to public order. They may hold event
organizers criminally liable if violence or destruction of property
ensues.
On October 11, students protested in street demonstrations
increased gasoline prices and transport fares and threw rocks at taxis
and minibuses. In suppressing the violent demonstration, security
forces shot and killed two students.
During the July 21-22 visit of French President Chirac, large
crowds lined the streets of Conakry, many holding ``Free Alpha''
placards in support of jailed opposition party leader Alpha Conde. The
demonstration remained peaceful, and security forces did not intervene.
In 1998 prior to the December presidential elections, security
forces clashed with political party demonstrators on several occasions.
In November and December 1998, ruling party supporters and government
officials repeatedly attempted to prevent opposition party meetings in
the capital and several provincial towns (see Section 1.a.). During the
week following the 1998 presidential election, security forces in
Conakry repeatedly used force to break up demonstrations protesting the
Government's conduct of the election. Some of these demonstrations were
already violent before security forces intervened; some were not.
Freedom of association is protected by law; however, the Government
imposes, cumbersome requirements to obtain official recognition.
Political parties must provide information on their founding members
and produce internal statutes and political platforms consistent with
the Constitution before the Government recognizes them. There are
approximately 46 legally recognized political parties; deputies of 9
different parties are represented in the National Assembly.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion and permits religious communities to govern themselves without
state interference, and the Government generally respects these rights
in practice. The quasi-governmental National Islamic League (NIL)
represents the country's Muslims, who make up 85 percent of the
population. The Government requires that all recognized Christian
churches join the Association of Churches and Missions in order to
benefit from certain government privileges, such as tax benefits and
energy subsidies. Missionary groups are required to make a declaration
of their aims and activities to the Ministry of Interior or to the
National Islamic League.
The NIL states that it supports peaceful coexistence with other
religious denominations and actively attempts to facilitate dialog to
eliminate ethnic and religious tensions. Although the Government and
the NIL have spoken out against the proliferation of Shi'a
fundamentalist sects, which they alleged were ``generating confusion
and deviation'' within Guinean Islam, they have not restricted these
groups. Foreign missionaries and church-affiliated relief agencies
operate freely.
Government support of the powerful, semi-official NIL has led some
non-Muslims to complain that the Government uses its influence to favor
Muslims over non-Muslims, although non-Muslims are represented in the
Cabinet, administrative bureaucracy, and the armed forces. Conversions
of senior officials to Islam, such as that of the Defense Minister, are
ascribed to the NIL's efforts to influence the religious beliefs of
senior government leaders. The Government refrains from appointing non-
Muslims to important administrative positions in certain parts of the
country, in deference to the particularly strong social dominance of
Islam in these regions.
In April for the first time, the Government required government
ministers to take an oath on either the Koran or the Bible, which
provoked criticism from those who saw the gesture as incompatible with
the secular nature of the State.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides citizens with
the right to travel freely within the country and to change their place
of residence and work; however, authorities infringe on these rights in
some respects. The Government requires all citizens to carry national
identification cards, which they must present on demand at security
checkpoints. Travelers face harassment by police and at military
roadblocks, particularly late at night. The private press and local
NGO's reported that travelers often are pressured to pay bribes to
allow passage. Government officials state that the corruption is being
perpetrated by a few rogue soldiers; however, abuse at official
checkpoints is systematic.
Although the Government permits foreign travel for its citizens, it
retains the authority to limit it for political reasons.
From December 9 to December 20, 1998, the Government closed all
land borders by decree as a security measure related to the
presidential election. Following an August 13 release into Guinea of
humanitarian workers held hostage in Kolahun, Liberia, by a dissident
group, the Government closed its border with Liberia (see Section 1.d.)
As of year's end, the border remained officially closed.
The Government cooperates fully with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program, other humanitarian
organizations, and donor countries to assist refugees. The Government
provides first asylum in accordance with U.N. and Organization of
African Unity conventions. On June 19, the UNHCR released the results
of its census, stating that approximately 480,000 Liberian and Sierra
Leonean refugees were registered with UNHCR for assistance by the
international community. The Government claims that many more refugees
are present in the urban areas of the country. Refugees account for
half or more of the populations of the forest region cities of
N'Zerekore, Gueckedou, and Macenta. According to the UNHCR, more than
200,000 Sierra Leoneans entered Guinea since January 1998 and are
mostly in the Forest region.
The Government has provided school buildings, access to local
medical facilities, and land for farming to assist those designated as
refugees. However, relief organizations report that some local
authorities have demanded portions of donated fuel and food from
delivery convoys. The security forces' closure of a road in the forest
region in June and July 1998, in response to a crossborder raid by
Sierra Leonean rebels, briefly prevented the UNHCR and NGO's from
delivering supplies to refugees near the border.
The Government generally has been hospitable toward refugees.
Reports that police and border patrol guards demanded bribes before
allowing refugees into the country and that some border officers
demanded sex from women who lacked money to pay bribes, have become
rare, an improvement over previous recent years.
International NGO's stated that refugees are subject to arbitrary
arrests, but they conclude that the harassment is not targeted
specifically at refugees. The UNHCR reports that detainees, who often
are held for having insufficient identification or being suspected
rebels, are charged before a magistrate within 72 hours as required by
law. UNHCR officials reported being denied access to refugees that
security forces suspected of being rebels. Security forces arrested
suspected rebels at the border as they tried to enter the country.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons with a valid
claim to refugee status to a country where they feared persecution,
although authorities in some instances turned suspected rebels over to
the Government of Sierra Leone. In tense periods following the
crossborder attacks on Guinean villages (Section 1.a.), the authorities
were aggressive in checking identification, temporarily detaining
persons for questioning, and transporting refugees from urban areas
(particularly Conakry) to refugee camps. At most other times, refugees
have had freedom of movement similar to that ofcitizens. In a September
16 meeting Guinean President Conte, Sierra Leonean President Kabbah,
and Liberian President Taylor, announced an agreement to share lists of
names of dissidents. Following the announcement, numerous Liberian
refugees reported that they feared expulsion from the country. At
year's end, there were no reports of expulsions.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Although the 1990 Constitution provides for a popularly elected
President and National Assembly, the ability of citizens effectively to
exercise this provision is restricted. The Government's tight and
sometimes partisan control of the electoral process and lack of an
independent electoral oversight mechanism call into serious doubt the
ability of citizens to change their government peacefully.
Although opposition political parties have been legal since 1991,
the Government has continued to dominate the electoral process; General
Conte has remained President, and his PUP party has retained a majority
in the National Assembly. The Government controlled the first
multiparty presidential election in 1993 and the first multiparty
legislative elections in 1995, limiting the opposition to a subordinate
role.
The country's second multiparty presidential election, was held on
December 14, 1998, under a somewhat improved electoral process;
however, the campaign was limited by the Constitution to the 30 days up
to 2 days before the election, and the Government continued to refuse
to establish a national election commission independent of the
Government, which opposition leaders demanded. In September 1998, the
Government and the CODEM, an umbrella group of opposition parties
formed in 1995, agreed to establish a Superior Council for Electoral
Affairs (SCEA) and local vote counting commissions, composed of CODEM
as well as government and ruling party representatives, with oversight
authority over local vote counting and transmission of local results to
Conakry. However, the Government retained exclusive control of all
registration and election procedures up to and including the casting of
votes, as well as of the national tabulation of election results.
According to the Government's tabulation of results, General Conte
was elected to a second 5-year term as President, receiving 56 percent
of the 2.7 million votes cast, while Bah Mamadou of the UNR received 25
percent and Alpha Conde of the RPG received 17 percent. Had no
candidate received a majority of votes cast, the Constitution would
have required a second election between the two leading candidates.
The election was much more transparent and fair than the 1993
presidential election. Observers from various organizations affiliated
chiefly with developing countries issued a statement that found no
fault with the election-day vote-casting process; however, observers
from European and other credible foreign organizations did not endorse
that statement, which was issued before the election results were
announced and did not address the registration, campaigning, and vote-
counting processes.
The 1998 presidential election was marred by violence and
disruption of opposition campaigning before the polling, by civil
unrest after the polling, by widespread and diverse irregularities that
tended to favor the incumbent, and by the arrest and detention of major
opposition candidates during the vote-counting process.
There were credible reports during the 1998 election campaign that
ruling party supporters and government officials used force to prevent
or disrupt opposition party meetings in Conakry and in provincial towns
during the campaign. In one such incident, a government official shot
and killed a man and wounded two other persons in a confrontation at an
RPG party meeting; the official then was attacked and killed by the
crowd (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
Violence between PUP and opposition party supporters, as well as
violent interethnic clashes with political overtones in Conakry, was
frequent and widespread during the election campaign (see Section 5).
On December 12, 1998, for example, between four and six persons were
killed, following a large pro-Conte PUP rally, as mobs with different
ethnic and political affiliations fought, and a proopposition mob
looted a marketplace before being dispersed by the security forces (see
Section 1.a.).
Opposition candidates suffered from inferior access both to state
election funds and to coverage by the state-monopolized domestic
broadcast media, although the Government allotted each candidate an
equal amount of television and radio broadcast time each day throughout
the 1998 campaign.
On election day, international observers noted a shortage of
ballots for opposition candidates in some districts of Conakry, but an
abundance of ballots for President Conte. There were nocharges of
widespread, systematic obstruction of pollwatchers, but opposition
pollwatchers were often absent from heavily pro-Conte areas, suggesting
at least selective obstruction. Opposition party officials charged that
security forces arrested and detained over 100 opposition pollwatchers
on election day (see Section 1.d.); manipulated voting procedures in
some areas; and overlooked irregularities in voter registration and in
ballot-counting procedures.
Members of the armed forces were required to vote on the premises
of the military installations to which they were posted and were
subject to strong pressures to vote for General Conte. Approximately
200 soldiers assigned to Camp Alpha Yaya in Conakry attempted to vote
outside the camp, and many were beaten severely by order of their
battalion commander, Panival Sama Bangoura; one soldier died of
injuries sustained in this beating (see Section 1.a.).
The Government postponed the announcement of its tabulation of the
election results from December 16 to December 17, 1998. During the
interim, there was violence and looting in Conakry, PUP and opposition
supporters clashed violently in Mamou, and members of the security
forces shot and killed two RPG supporters in Siguiri (see Section
1.a.). On December 15, 1998, members of the security forces arrested
RPG presidential candidate Alpha Conde (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.).
From December 17 until December 20, 1998, gendarmes were posted to
confine two other presidential candidates to house arrest.
On December 28, 1998, antigovernment violence occurred in Labe, the
hometown of the soldier who had been beaten and killed for trying to
vote outside the army camp to which he was posted, after his body was
returned to the town. A crowd burned the local office of the ruling PUP
party and a vehicle belonging to the state-owned broadcast media
monopoly and damaged a house owned by a PUP officer. In suppressing
this violence, members of the security forces arrested about 20 persons
and killed 1 woman (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.).
Members of the PUP continued to hold 60 seats in the unicameral
National Assembly, 1 short of the supermajority required to amend the
Constitution.
The President continues to hold the power to appoint the governors,
prefects, and their deputies to administer regions and subregions
respectively. Most of these officials are members of the PUP or of
parties allied with it. However, reorganization of these offices in
August 1998 reflected a growing sense of accountability to the public
by government officials regarding the performance of their official
duties. The prefects and governors who retained their jobs or received
promotions were those who had been rated as above average
administrators by the Minister of the Interior in an open letter in the
private press. All the prefects and governors who lost their jobs had
received an unsatisfactory rating.
However, opposition party officials and the independent press
continued to charge that the Government used public funds to build its
electoral base within traditional opposition strongholds in
anticipation of the 1998 presidential elections.
Although initially scheduled for December, local and communal
elections were postponed, perhaps to coincide with June 2000
legislative elections. Local governments generally have limited
autonomy. Although they have some financial resources with which to
fund local programs, most of their funds are controlled by the central
Government. However, local government staff members, such as deputy
prefects, are hired and can be fired by local authorities and are not
considered central government employees.
Women are underrepresented in the Government. Only 2 women hold
seats in the 26-member Cabinet, in the low-profile Ministry of Social
Affairs and Promotion of Women, and the Ministry of Youth, Sports, and
Culture. There are only 9 female deputies in the 114-member National
Assembly. There are few women at senior levels below minister, and
there are no women in the senior ranks of the armed forces. Women also
play a minor role in the leadership of the major political parties.
The Cabinet and armed forces leadership includes representatives of
all major ethnic groups. However, a disproportionate number of senior
military officers are Soussou, the President's ethnic group.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Local NGO's primarily interested in human rights issues include:
The Guinean Organization for the Defense of Human Rights; the Guinean
Human Rights Association; the Children of the Victims of Camp Boiro;
S.O.S. Burial Grounds; the Association of Victims of Repression;
Humanitarian Assistance for Prisons; Defense ofPrisoners' Rights; Women
Jurists for Human Rights; the Committee for the Defense of Civic
Rights; and the Coordinating Committee on Traditional Practices
Affecting Women's and Children's Health. Government officials are
generally cooperative and responsive to their views. Various officials
have blocked private efforts to memorialize victims of the Sekou Toure
regime that ruled Guinea from independence until 1984.
In 1998 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
conducted a seminar on human rights in conjunction with the Ministry of
Security for members of the security forces and civil servants.
A human rights office within the Ministry of Defense, International
Humanitarian Rights, has conducted over 100 human rights seminars since
1994 to teach military personnel about human rights recognized by
international and regional agreements.
On November 10, the ICRC signed a detention accord with the
Government for full access to prisoners. The ICRC, which had been
negotiating for the accord over a 2-year period, described the
agreement as a positive step by the Government.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that all persons are equal before the law
regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, language, beliefs, political
opinions, philosophy, or creed; however, the Government does not
enforce these provisions uniformly.
Women.--Violence against women is common, although estimates differ
as to the extent of the problem. Wife beating is a criminal offense and
constitutes grounds for divorce under civil law. However, police rarely
intervene in domestic disputes.
Although the Government has made regular statements in the media
against sexual harassment, women working in the formal sector in urban
areas complain of frequent sexual harassment. The social stigma
attached to rape prevents most victims from reporting it. The
Government has not pursued vigorously criminal investigations of
alleged sexual crimes.
The Constitution provides for equal treatment of men and women, and
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Women's Promotion works to advance
such equality. However, women face discrimination, particularly in
rural areas where opportunities are limited by custom, and the demands
of child-rearing and subsistence farming. Women are not denied access
to land, credit, or businesses, but inheritance laws also favor male
heirs over females. Government officials acknowledge that polygyny is
practiced commonly, although it is prohibited by law. Divorce laws
generally tend to favor men in awarding custody and dividing communal
assets. Legal evidence given by women carries less weight than that
given by men (see Section 1.e.). The Government has affirmed the
principle of equal pay for equal work, but in practice women receive
less pay than men in most equally demanding jobs.
Children.--The Constitution provides that the Government has a
particular obligation to protect and nurture the nation's youth, and
the Government allocates a significant percentage of the budget to
primary education. The President appoints a Minister of Youth and a
cabinet minister to defend women's and children's rights. The
Government provides free, compulsory primary school education for 8
years. Approximately 50 percent of all eligible students are enrolled
in primary school, including 66 percent of eligible boys but only 35
percent of eligible girls. The Government spent 25 percent of its
national operating budget on education in 1997.
Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is very widespread. It is widely practiced in all
regions and among all religious and ethnic groups. FGM is illegal under
the Penal Code, and senior officials and both the official and private
press have spoken against the practice; however, there have been no
prosecutions for violations of the Code. FGM is performed on girls and
women between the ages of 4 and 70, but exact figures on this procedure
are difficult to establish due to its private nature. The Coordinating
Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting Women's and Children's
Health (CPTAFE), a local NGO dedicated to eradicating FGM and ritual
scarring, cited a recent decline in the percentage of females subjected
to FGM, estimating the figure to be between 65 and 75 percent. Expert
estimates vary between 65 and 90 percent. The lower figure, if
accurate, would represent a decline over recent years due to education
of thepopulation by women's rights groups about the health risks
involved with the practice. However, infibulation, the most dangerous
form of FGM, still is performed in the forest region. Despite diseases
resulting from crude and unsanitary surgical instruments and deaths
resulting from the practice, the tradition continues, seriously
affecting many women's lives. FGM also increases the risk of HIV
infection since unsterilized instruments are shared among participants.
The Government has made efforts to educate health workers on the
dangers of this procedure and supports the CPTAFE's efforts. The CPTAFE
reports high rates of infant mortality and maternal mortality due to
FGM. In March 1997, working in collaboration with the World Health
Organization, the Government initiated a 20-year strategy to eradicate
FGM.
A growing number of men and women oppose FGM. Urban, educated
families are opting increasingly to perform only a slight symbolic
incision on a girl's genitals rather than the complete procedure. In
November the CPTAFE held a large public ceremony celebrating the
``laying down of the excision knife'' in which some traditional
practitioners of FGM pledged to discontinue the practice. However, most
of those who perform FGM oppose its eradication since it is quite
lucrative for them.
The CPTAFE, in conjunction with the Government, local journalists,
and international NGO's, also is promoting an education campaign to
discourage underage marriage. Although such marriages are prohibited by
law, parents contract marriages for girls as young as 11 years of age
in the forest region.
Prostitution exists in the informal economic sector and employs
girls as young as 14 years of age. The Government does not take action
even if prostitution of minors is brought to its attention and does not
monitor actively child or adult prostitution.
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that all
persons are equal before the law. There are no special constitutional
provisions for the disabled. The Government has not mandated
accessibility for the disabled, and few disabled persons work, although
some develop opportunities in the informal sector.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population is
ethnically and regionally diverse. No single ethnic group constitutes a
majority nationwide. The largest ethnic groups are the Puhlar, also
called Peuhl or Fulani (about 40 percent of the population), the
Malinke (about 30 percent), and the Soussou (about 20 percent). Each
group speaks a distinct primary language and is concentrated in a
distinct region: The Soussou in lower Guinea; the Puhlar in middle
Guinea; and the Malinke in upper Guinea.
While the Constitution and the Penal Code prohibit racial or ethnic
discrimination, ethnic identification is strong. Mutual suspicion
affects relations across ethnic lines, in and out of government.
Widespread societal ethnic discrimination by members of all major
ethnic groups is evident in private sector hiring and buying patterns,
in urban neighborhoods that tend to be segregated ethnically, and in
the relative paucity of interethnic marriage, even in cities. The
proportion of public sector positions occupied by Soussous,
particularly at senior levels, is perceived widely as exceeding their
share of the national population.
The ruling PUP party, although generally supported by Soussous, has
transcended ethnic boundaries more effectively than the major
opposition parties, which have readily identifiable ethnic and regional
bases; the UNR's main base is the Puhlar, while the RPG's main base is
the Malinke. Soussou preeminence in the public sector and Malinke
migration into the traditional homelands of smaller ethnic groups in
the Forest region have been major sources of political tensions that
sometimes have erupted into violence. In June 1998, President Conte
fired the non-Soussou Secretary-General of Labor and Public Services as
well as several non-Soussou directors in his department, replacing them
with members of his ethnic group, the Soussou.
Both the February-March 1998 riots in protest of demolitions in
Conakry's Ratoma neighborhood of mainly Puhlar population (see Section
1.a.) and the December 1998 riots in Conakry (see Section 3) were as
much incidents of interethnic violence between Soussous and Puhlar, as
they were incidents of political violence between the Government and
opposition party supporters. The soldier beaten to death by order of
his commander for having tried to vote outside his army post in the
presidential election and many participants in the antigovernment
violence that occurred in that soldier's hometown of Labe in December
1998were members of the Puhlar ethnic group (see Sections 1.a. and 3).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of employees to form independent labor unions and prohibits
discrimination based on union affiliation. Only an estimated 5 percent
of the work force is unionized. Most union members are employees of the
Government, national utilities (electric, water, and telephone
companies), or foreign-controlled companies.
The Labor Code states that all workers, except military and
paramilitary personnel, have the right to create and participate in
organizations that defend and develop their individual and collective
rights as workers. It requires elected worker representatives for any
enterprise employing 25 or more salaried workers.
The National Confederation of Guinean Workers (CNTG) was the sole
trade union before the Labor Code was enacted. Although there are now
other trade unions and labor confederations, the CNTG remains the
largest confederation.
The CNTG is funded indirectly by the State, although dissident
members seek to increase the Confederation's freedom from government
control. Independent unions and confederations have gained popularity,
such as the Free Union of Teachers and Researchers of Guinea, the
Professional Union Federation for Education, and the National
Organization for Free Trade Unions of Guinea. Several dissident groups
within the CNTG left the Confederation in 1996 citing corruption among
its leadership. These groups joined with some independent unions to
form the United Syndicates of Guinean Workers.
The Labor Code grants salaried workers, including public sector
civilian employees, the right to strike 10 days after their
representative union makes known its intention to strike. It prohibits
strikes in sectors providing ``essential services'' (hospitals, radio
and television, army, and police).
After a nationwide public-school teachers' strike immobilized the
education sector for 2 weeks beginning in April 1997, in August 1997
President Conte granted an 8 percent pay raise for all state employees,
including teachers, who also received the right to claim seniority
benefits for any past training or internships.
Unions may affiliate freely with international labor groups. The
Government continues to designate the CNTG to represent workers in the
International Labor Organization conference.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Under the Labor
Code, representative workers' unions or union groups may organize in
the workplace and negotiate with employers or employer organizations.
The law protects the right to bargain collectively concerning wages and
salaries without government interference. Work rules and work hours are
established by the employer in consultation with union delegates. The
Code also prohibits antiunion discrimination. Union delegates represent
individual and collective claims and grievances with management.
Individual workers threatened with dismissal or other sanctions have
the right to a hearing before management with a union representative
present and, if necessary, to take the complaint to the Conakry Labor
Court, which convenes weekly to hear such cases. In the interior, civil
courts hear labor cases.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
specifically forbids forced or compulsory labor, and there is no
evidence of its practice. The Labor Code specifically forbids forced
and bonded labor by children, and the Government enforces this
prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--According to the Labor Code, the minimum age for
employment is 16 years. Apprentices may start to work at 14 years of
age. Workers and apprentices under the age of 18 are not permitted to
work at night, for more than 12 consecutive hours, or on Sundays. The
Labor Code also stipulates that the Minister of Labor and Social
Affairs must maintain a list of occupations in which women and youth
under the age of 18 cannot be employed. In practice enforcement by
ministry inspectors is limited to large firms in the modern sector of
the economy. The Ministry of Planning estimated in 1997 that in rural
areas, approximately 66 percent of children between the ages of 7 and
14 wereemployed; the rate jumped to 91 percent in the 15 to 19 age
group. In urban areas, approximately 19 percent of children between the
ages of 7 and 14 were employed; the rate jumped to 50 percent for
children between the ages of 15 and 19. Child labor in factories is not
a prevalent problem because of the low level of manufacturing. Working
children are found mostly in the informal sector areas of subsistence
farming, petty commerce, and small-scale mining.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and enforces
this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code of 1988 provides
for the establishment by decree of a minimum hourly wage; however the
Government has not done so. Prevailing wages were often inadequate to
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. There are
also provisions in the Code for overtime and night wages, which are
fixed percentages of the regular wage.
According to the Labor Code, regular work is not to exceed 10-hour
days or 48-hour weeks, and there is to be a period of at least 24
consecutive hours of rest each week, usually Sunday. Every salaried
worker has the legal right to an annual paid vacation, accumulated at
the rate of at least 2 workdays per month of work. In practice the
authorities enforce these rules only in the relatively small modern
urban sector.
The Labor Code contains provisions of a general nature regarding
occupational safety and health, but the Government has not elaborated a
set of practical workplace health and safety standards. Moreover, it
has not issued any of the ministerial orders laying out the specific
requirements for certain occupations and for certain methods of work
that are called for in the Labor Code. The Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs is responsible for enforcing labor standards, and its
inspectors are empowered to suspend work immediately in situations
hazardous to health. However, enforcement remained more a goal than a
reality. Labor inspectors acknowledge that they cannot even cover
Conakry, much less the entire country, with their small staff and
meager budget.
Under the Labor Code, workers have the right to refuse to work
under unsafe conditions without penalty. Nevertheless, many workers
fear retaliation should they refuse to work under unsafe conditions.
Employees in high-risk professions, such as night guards, drivers, and
police, have protested conditions without result.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to,
or from the country.
______
GUINEA-BISSAU*
A military coup in May resulted in minor changes in the Government
of National Unity that was set up in February under the November 1998
Abuja peace accords, drove President Bernardo Vieira into exile in
Portugal, and ultimately led to the country's second multiparty
national elections on November 28. The Government of National Unity
inaugurated in February conducted the November elections with the
assistance of a U.N. peace-building office (UNOGBIS) in accordance with
a schedule established prior to the May coup, and initiated efforts to
reverse the civil war's devastating effects. The November elections
were considered generally free and fair by international observers,
although they reported some irregularities. The elections significantly
changed the composition of the 102-seat National Assembly, and the top
two contenders among 12 candidates for President faced a runoff
election on January 16, 2000. General Ansumane Mane, who began a
rebellion in June 1998 after Vieira fired him as Armed Forces Chief of
Staff and blamed him for illegal arms trafficking to rebels in the
Casamance region of Senegal, played a role in the interim government as
the head of a self-declared military junta. Mane and the Junta
consistently declared that they would stay out of politics once a new
civilian government was elected, but 2 weeks before the elections a
``Magna Carta'' was published demanding a 10-year role for the Junta.
The Junta denied authoring the ``Magna Carta'' and repeated its
commitment to return to the barracks after the elections; however,
adequate and timely payment of soldier and veteran benefits is a
continuing concern. The Constitution provides for an independent
judiciary; however, it is subject to political influence and
corruption. The judiciary, which ceased to function at the onset of
fighting in June 1998, resumed minimal responsibilities with the
inauguration of a government of national unity in February.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
*On June 14, 1998 the United States Embassy suspended operations in
the midst of heavy fighting in Bissau and all official personnel in the
country were evacuated. This report is based on information obtained by
embassies in neighboring countries and from other sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The police, under the direction of the Ministry of the Interior,
have primary responsibility for the nation's internal security.
However, following the June 1998 revolt, the police became ineffective,
as the Military Junta, Economic Community of West African States
Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping forces, and troops
defending President Vieira were better equipped and openly carried arms
on highly visible patrols and checkpoints. Following Vieira's ouster in
May, the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and efforts of the interim
government to reinstate the rule of law, the police resumed many of
their responsibilities; however, lack of resources and training
continue to hamper their effectiveness. The armed forces are
responsible for external security and may be called upon to assist the
police in internal emergencies. A clear majority of soldiers joined the
rebellion against President Vieira. Those who remained loyal, numbering
no more than 300, generally took a secondary role to Senegalese and
Guinean troops who entered the conflict at Vieira's request. ECOMOG
peacekeeping forces were introduced and all Senegalese and Guinean
troops were withdrawn by the end of March as agreed in the Abuja
accords. ECOMOG forces were withdrawn in June following the defeat of
loyalist forces and Vieira's departure to exile. The police, the
military (both loyal and rebel), the Senegalese, and the Guineans were
responsible for serious human rights abuses.
The population of 1.2 million relies largely upon subsistence
agriculture and the export of cashew nuts. Both activities were
affected negatively by the fighting. Annual per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) prior to 1998 has been estimated at $840. Due to the
conflict, GDP declined by 28 percent in 1998 but was expected to reach
80 percent of pre-1998 levels by the end of the year. Exports of cashew
nuts returned to 70 percent of preconflict levels. Commercial banks and
other monetary institutions, which had ceased operations with the
outbreak of hostilities in June 1998, reopened in July. The country
remains burdened by heavy external debt and massive underemployment.
There continued to be serious problems in the Government's human
rights record; however, the human rights situation improved during the
year. Citizens were allowed to vote in generally free and fair
elections. However, government forces, particularly under President
Vieira, committed extrajudicial killings. The police and loyalist
forces continued to use beatings, physical mistreatment, other forms of
harassment, and arbitrary arrest and detention by police. The
Government did not punish any members of the security forces for
abuses. Prison conditions are poor. The Government at times used
incommunicado detention. The judiciary is subject to political
influence and corruption. The Government infringed on citizens' privacy
rights. The Government at times limited freedom of thepress, and
journalists practiced self-censorship. The Government at times
restricted freedom of movement. Violence and discrimination against
women are problems. Female genital mutilation is widely practiced.
Child labor and some forced child labor persist.
The conflict that ended with the May coup caused massive civilian
dislocation and hardship, but by June most of the 350,000 internally
displaced persons had returned to their homes. Over 1,000 persons who
sought refuge in neighboring countries repatriated spontaneously, and
another 1,000 who fled are receiving assistance from international
organizations to repatriate. About 1,800 refugees remain in Guinea and
720 remain in Gambia.
An estimated 2,000 persons were killed during the 11-month
conflict. Reports continue of deaths and injuries from land mines and
unexploded shells that remain in populated areas.
Rebel forces were responsible for killings, beatings, other forms
of harassment, detention, robbery, and looting.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Political and
extrajudicial killings occurred.
Troops loyal to or allied with President Vieira killed an unknown
number of civilian noncombatants prior to the May coup.
Prior to the May coup, President Vieira took no action to encourage
forces allied with him to minimize the loss of life among prisoners of
war and the civilian population. During the May coup, reports indicate
that loyalist forces based in the Marinha district of the capital
Bissau fired at advancing rebel forces and killed 60 civilians who had
sought refuge in a nearby mission school. Overall, an estimated 2,000
persons were killed during the 11-month conflict.
No suspect has yet been named in the August 22 murder of Nicandro
Barreto, Justice Minister under President Vieira. Barreto was strangled
at his home in Bissau.
The Interior Ministry never released the results of an internal
investigation into the police shootings of two African deportees
following demonstrations in 1996; one of the deportees died. To date no
one has been charged with the shootings.
The 1992 death of Ussumane Quade, an army officer beaten to death
while in police custody, remains unsolved. Two police officers were
arrested in connection with the death in 1997, but neither was ever
charged formally and both were released.
A mass grave uncovered on October 8 contained the remains of 28
persons and was believed to include those of former Vice President
Paolo Correia, former Attorney General Viriato Pa, and military
officers sentenced to death in 1985 by a military tribunal on charges
of an attempted coup.
Rebel forces loyal to General Mane committed numerous killings. The
attack by rebel troops on the presidential palace in May reportedly
left 70 persons dead. Reports indicate that indiscriminate rebel
shelling in civilian neighborhoods killed noncombatants.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits cruel and inhuman punishment,
and evidence obtained through torture or coercion is invalid; however,
prior to the May coup, the Government often ignored these provisions,
and security forces beat, mistreated, and otherwise abused persons.
Security and police authorities historically have employed abusive
interrogation methods, usually in the form of severe beatings or
deprivation. The Government rarely enforced provisions for punishment
of abuses committed by security forces.
Forces loyal to Vieira engaged in widespread harassment, including
stopping civilians and subjecting them to degrading body searches
without cause. After the fighting in January, there were reports that
Senegalese soldiers entered the Simao Mendes hospital in Bissau and
removed a junta soldier who had been wounded in the conflict. The
soldier was returned the next morning with several cuts and what
appeared to be cigarette burns, as well as gangrene, which may have
been related to his original combat wound. The soldier died within a
few days.
Human rights monitors reported several incidents in which police
accused of rape or the mistreatment of prisoners prior to the May coup
were not prosecuted.
There were credible reports that rebel soldiers beat and harassed
civilians suspected of government sympathies.
Prison conditions are poor but generally not life threatening.
Beatings and deprivation were used as a means of coercion. The June
1998 rebellion effectively stopped a program aimed at halting such
methods. Prison authorities had very little control over inmates, many
of whom simply left during the day. Following a request in 1998 by the
Interior Minister for international donor assistance to rehabilitate
the prisons, the European Union renovated two of them. However, many
prisons were damaged during the fighting, the inmates escaped, and have
not been recaptured.
The Human Rights League was given access to most prisoners,
including 600 loyalist troops detained as prisoners of war following
the May coup.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Security forces
arbitrarily arrested and detained persons.
The law provides for procedural rights, such as the right to
counsel, the right to release if no timely indictment is brought, and
the right to a speedy trial. In practice the judicial system generally
failed to provide these rights.
Police detained suspects without judicial authority or warrants,
occasionally through the device of house arrest. Prior to the May coup,
the Government held detainees without charges or trial for extended
periods of time, sometimes incommunicado. The authorities did not
routinely observe bail procedures.
Following the May coup, the Government detained as prisoners of war
about 600 of the loyalist forces who had defended Vieira; 180 of these
soldiers were released immediately, and another 50 were released within
a month. More than 385 remain in detention. On October 7, the Attorney
General announced that 80 of these would be released soon, but they
remained in detention at year's end.
The Government does not use forced exile. Following the May coup,
the Military Junta allowed President Vieira safe passage to leave the
country for Gambia to receive medical treatment, reportedly with the
understanding he would return to Guinea-Bissau to stand trial on
charges of corruption and human rights abuses. After leaving the
country, Vieira traveled to Portugal and was granted asylum. In
October, the Attorney General traveled to Portugal to present evidence
of human rights abuses by Vieira and to request his return to Guinea-
Bissau to stand trial. The Government of Portugal stated that it had
not received a request for Vieira's extradition.
In October former President Luis Cabral, who had been living in
exile since being deposed in a 1980 coup, was issued a passport, and he
returned to Guinea-Bissau in November.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, judges are trained and paid poorly, and
sometimes are subject to political pressure and corruption. The Supreme
Court is especially vulnerable to political pressure, as its members
are appointed by the President and serve at his pleasure. The judiciary
is reluctant to decide cases of a political nature. Cases against
several former and current members of the Government were delayed. The
Supreme Court failed to deal impartially with highly charged political
cases. In 1997 the Court took up the issue of the constitutionality of
the manner in which the President named his new Government. The
decision ultimately rendered was in favor of allowing the Government to
remain in office, but was issued only after the President brought
significant pressure to bear on the Court.
Trials involving state security are conducted by civilian courts.
Under the Code of Military Justice, military courts try only crimes
committed by armed forces personnel. The two Senegalese who, prior to
the rebellion, were supposed to be tried in a military court in
violation of the law escaped or were released during the fighting in
1998; the Government is not pursuing the case. The Supreme Court is the
final court of appeal for both military and civilian cases. The
President has the authority to grant pardons and reduce sentences.
Citizens who cannot afford an attorney have the right to a court-
appointed lawyer.
Traditional law still prevails in most rural areas, and urban
dwellers often bring judicial disputes to traditional counselors to
avoid the costs and bureaucratic impediments of the official system.
The police often resolve disputes.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Home, or Correspondence.--
The Constitution provides for the inviolability of domicile, person,
and correspondence; however, the Government does not always respect
these rights. The police do not always use judicial warrants and have
forced entry into some private homes.
Loyalist forces reportedly searched private residences in Bissau
without cause and without warrants. Loyalist forces allegedly were
guilty of theft from both private homes and stores.
International and domestic mail at times was opened; however, this
violation was by poorly paid postal employees in search of money or
other valuables, not by security personnel. Limited mail service
resumed in June after a 1-year shutdown following the destruction of
the country's main post office building during the 1998 rebellion.
Rebel forces allegedly stole from private homes and stores.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and the press; however, the Government at times
limited these rights in practice, and journalists continued to practice
self-censorship.
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in June 1998, the print media
consisted of one independent daily, three independent weeklies, one
government-owned biweekly, and one independent monthly. All of the
newspapers were published sporadically due to financial constraints.
The national printing press, the only facility for publishing
newspapers in the country, often lacked the raw materials to publish
them. In late August, sporadic publication of one government-owned
biweekly and one independent monthly resumed.
Prior to the rebellion, there were three independent radio stations
and one government-controlled station in Bissau. In addition Radio
Portugal and Radio France International broadcasts were received from
Lisbon and Paris. There were also three community radio stations run by
the indigenous NGO Action for Development. One independent station
rebroadcast the British Broadcasting Corporation and another
rebroadcast the Voice of America.
The government-controlled national radio transmits from Radio
Mavegro facilities that it took over in June 1998. The Voice of the
Military Junta broadcasts from facilities that formerly broadcast Radio
Bombolom, whose owner sympathized with the rebels. Neither Radio
Pidjiguiti nor the NGO-assisted community stations have resumed
operations.
Unlike the previous year, there were no reports of harassment of
journalists by government or allied troops, by rebel forces, or by
ECOMOG troops. Many foreign journalists were able to circulate and
report on the fighting and associated political developments.
Academic freedom generally was observed until the outbreak of
fighting. Schools and research institutions that ceased to function
after the June 1998 rebellion reopened in most parts of the country in
March.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respected this
right in practice. Government approval is required for all assemblies
and demonstrations. Prior to the June 1998 rebellion and following the
May coup, the Government approved all such requests. There were no
public assemblies or demonstrations between June 1998 and May.
Following the May coup, numerous organizations held rallies, some of
which were critical of the Government. In November and December,
unarmed soldiers conducted unannounced 1-day protests of nonpayment of
salaries by blocking roads and access to schools and businesses.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respected this right in practice. The Government did not
prohibit or discourage the formation of associations; however, all
private associations were required to register with the Government.
There were no reports of associations being denied registration.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respected this right in practice. While
religious groups must be licensed by the Government, no applications
were refused. There are no recent reports that any applications have
been made. Various faiths, including Jehovah's Witnesses, continued
missionary activities during the year. The Government includes members
from all major religious groups. There were no indications that either
the Government or the rebel forces attempted to interfere with
religious freedom following the outbreak of fighting.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Prior to the June 1998 uprising, the
Government generally did not restrict movement within the country,
foreign travel, or emigration; however, checkpoints and police
harassment occurred frequently. After the outbreak of fighting, vehicle
traffic was curtailed severely. Both government and rebel forces
blocked the road from Bissau to the interior and interfered with the
free movement of traffic. The Government carefully controlled movement
within Bissau, prohibiting most traffic. Movement in the interior was
less restricted but still subject to occasional interference by both
government and rebel forces. The land borders with Senegal were closed
to travelers during the early stages of the conflict. Later, Senegal
allowed humanitarian convoys to transit the border. Land borders with
Guinea generally remained open. The national airport, which had
remained under rebel control after the outbreak of fighting, was
reopened to commercial traffic in May.
Passports are issued by the Minister of the Interior. In February
the issuance of passports resumed, after having ceased with the
outbreak of hostilities in June 1998. Citizens have the right to return
and are not subject to political revocation of their citizenship.
The conflict that ended with the May coup caused massive civilian
dislocation and hardship, but by June most of the 350,000 internally
displaced persons had returned to their homes. Over 1,000 persons who
sought refuge in neighboring countries or Europe repatriated
spontaneously, and another 1,000 who fled are receiving assistance from
international organizations to repatriate. About 1,800 refugees remain
in Guinea and 720 remain in Gambia.
Prior to the conflict, the Government allowed refugees to stay if
they feared persecution at home. There are no formal provisions to
recognize refugee status, but it was granted on a case-by-case basis.
No refugees were deported forcibly to a country where they feared
persecution. Foreign refugees who fled Bissau with the outbreak of
fighting are believed to have done so voluntarily. The Government
provided first asylum to refugees from the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra
Leone, and the Casamance region of Senegal. A January 1998 U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) census revealed the presence of just
under 5,000 Senegalese refugees in Guinea-Bissau. The majority of these
were found along the country's western border with Senegal. Prior to
the outbreak of hostilities, the UNHCR established a refugee camp south
of the border region at Jolomete, which housed about 700 refugees.
After the May coup, the UNHCR continued efforts to relocate these
refugees, most of whom were displaced internally when the fighting
erupted within Guinea-Bissau.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
In November voters were able to choose their government freely for
the second time in the nation's history. The African Party for the
Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), the country's
only legal party from 1974 to 1991 and the majority party in the
National Assembly until the November elections, won 24 of the 102 seats
in the National Assembly, while opposition parties gained a majority.
The Partido de Renovacao Social (PRS) won 38 seats, and the Resistencia
da Guine-Bissau (RGB) won 29 seats, while 4 other parties will split
the remaining 11 seats. The elections, which included candidates from
13 parties, as well as several independents, were judged to be
generally free and fair by international observers, although they
reported some irregularities. Local elections have been promised since
1995, but they had not been held by year's end, and no substantive
progress has been made to prepare for them.
In preparation for the elections, the National Electoral
Commission, with the assistance of the UNOGBIS, conducted a voter
registration program among the estimated 1.2 million population.
Compared with 395,000 voters registered for the country's first
multiparty elections in 1994, the current rolls show 525,367 voters.
About 400,000 persons voted in the November 28 elections.
PRS leader Koumba Yala and interim President Malan Bacai Sanha of
the PAIGC led a field of 12 candidates for president. Neither candidate
secured an absolute majority as required by law, and Yala and Sanha
will face each other in a second round of voting on January 16, 2000.
The inauguration of the new government is expected to follow soon
thereafter.
Joao Bernardo Vieira, who had been elected President in the
country's first multiparty elections in 1994, fled to exile in Portugal
following the May coup. He had ruled the country since taking power in
a 1980 coup. Prior to the November 28 elections, the PAIGC held 62 of
100 seats in the National Assembly, where 4 other parties were
represented.
General Mane and the Junta consistently declared that they would
stay out of politics once a new civilian government was elected, but 2
weeks before the elections a ``Magna Carta'' was published demanding a
10-year role for the Junta. The Junta denied authoring the ``Magna
Carta'' and repeated its commitment to return to the barracks after the
elections; however, adequate and timely payment of soldier and veteran
benefits is a continuing concern.
Women are underrepresented in the National Assembly, where they
occupy only 9 of the 102 seats. In the Government of National Unity
inaugurated in February, 1 of 10 cabinet ministers was a woman.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government did not interfere with the Guinea-Bissau Human
Rights League (LGDH), and international human rights groups continued
to investigate human rights abuses without government harassment.
International and nongovernmental human rights groups, which
effectively ceased operations with the outbreak of hostilities in June
1998, resumed activities following the inauguration of a government of
national unity in February.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution and law prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sex, race, and religion. However, in practice, the Government does not
enforce these provisions effectively.
Women.--Physical violence, including wife beating, is an accepted
means of settling domestic disputes. Although police intervene in
domestic disputes if requested, the Government has not undertaken
specific measures to counter social pressure against reporting domestic
violence, rape, incest, and other mistreatment of women.
Discrimination against women persists, although officially it is
prohibited by law. Women are responsible for most work on subsistence
farms and have limited access to education, especially in rural areas.
Women do not have equal access toemployment. Among certain ethnic
groups, women cannot own or manage land or inherit property.
Children.--The Government allocates only limited resources for
children's welfare and education.
Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is widely practiced within certain ethnic groups,
especially the Fulas and the Mandinkas. The practice is increasing as
the population becomes more Muslim, and is being performed not only on
adolescent girls, but also on babies as young as 4 months old. The
Government has not outlawed the practice. However, it has formed a
national committee, which is conducting a nationwide education campaign
to discourage it. International NGO's, including the Swedish group
Radda Barnen and Plan International, as well as several domestic NGO's,
such as Friends of Children and Sinim Mira Nasseque, are working
through the national committee to eliminate FGM. The efforts of both
domestic and international groups, largely suspended after the outbreak
of fighting in June 1998, resumed in many parts of the country in
February.
People with Disabilities.--There is no legislation mandating
accessibility. The law does not prohibit discrimination against the
disabled specifically, and the Government does not ensure equal access
to employment and education. The State has made some efforts to assist
disabled veterans through pension programs, but these programs do not
address adequately veterans' health, housing, and food needs.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides all
civilian workers with the freedom to form and join independent trade
unions. However, the vast majority of the population works in
subsistence agriculture. Most union members are government or
parastatal employees; only a small percentage of workers are in the
wage sector and are organized.
The Government registers all labor unions. There are 11 labor
unions registered and operating. All unions are officially independent
of the Government, but seven unions are affiliated with the National
Trade Union Confederation (UNTG), which retains close informal ties
with the PAIGC. The law does not favor UNTG-affiliated unions over
others. The Constitution provides for the right to strike and
protection for workers from retribution for strike activities.
The only legal restriction on strike activity is the requirement
for prior notice. Legal strikes have been conducted by several unions,
with no retribution against the strikers in the past; there were no
strikes during the year.
Both enforcement of the law and the functioning of the formal
economy, which largely ceased after the outbreak of hostilities in June
1998, returned to preconflict levels following the inauguration of a
government of national unity in February.
All unions are able to affiliate freely with national
confederations and international labor organizations of their choice.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution does not provide for or protect the right to bargain
collectively, and there were no instances of genuine collective
bargaining. Most wages are established in bilateral negotiations
between workers and employers, taking into consideration the minimum
salaries set annually by the Government's Council of Ministers.
The Government's provisions for the protection of workers against
antiunion discrimination have very little effect due to low union
membership. Although the Government adopted no laws to establish penal
sanctions against employers practicing such discrimination, no workers
have alleged antiunion discrimination, and the practice is not believed
to be widespread.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by law, and
these prohibitions generally are enforced in the formal sector;
however, children often are forced by their parents or guardians to
work as street traders or agricultural laborers in the informal sector
(see Section 6.d.). The Government has not taken action to combat such
practices.
In 1996 the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Ansumane Mane, was
arrested after several children died in an explosion that occurred when
they were forced to prepare shell cases for sale to Casamance rebels.
Mane was placed under house arrest, but never formally charged; he
ultimately was pardoned and reinstated by President Vieira.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The General Labor Act of 1986 established a minimum age of
14 years for general factory labor and 18 years for heavy or dangerous
labor, including all labor in mines. These minimum age requirements
generally are followed in the small formal sector, but the Ministry of
Justice and Labor does not enforce these requirements in other sectors.
Children in cities often work in street trading, and those in rural
communities do domestic and field work without pay. The Government does
not attempt to discourage these traditional practices.
Forced or compulsory labor by children is not permitted by law;
however, while this prohibition generally is enforced in the formal
sector, such labor occurs in the informal sector (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government's Council of
Ministers annually establishes minimum wage rates for all categories of
work but does not enforce them. The lowest monthly wage is
approximately $15 (9,000 cfa francs). This wage is insufficient to
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family, and
workers must supplement their income through other work, reliance on
the extended family, and subsistence agriculture. The maximum number of
hours permitted in a normal workweek without further compensation is
45, but the Government does not enforce this provision. With the
breakdown of the formal economy in June 1998, most of the country
returned to barter, and both the Government and the private sector
lacked the funds to pay salaries. Following the inauguration of a
government of national unity in February, activity in the formal
economy started to return to preconflict levels, and the Government was
able to pay most salary arrearages.
The Ministry of Justice and Labor establishes legal health and
safety standards for workers, with the cooperation of the unions, which
are then adopted into law by the National Assembly. However, these
standards are not enforced, and many persons work under conditions that
endanger their health and safety.
Workers do not have the right to remove themselves from unsafe
working conditions without losing their jobs. In view of high
unemployment, a worker who left for such reasons would be replaced
readily.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to,
or from the country.
______
KENYA
Kenya is a republic dominated by a strong presidency. President
Daniel Arap Moi, who has led the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) and
served as President since 1978, was reelected most recently in 1997, in
the country's second general election since the restoration of
multiparty politics in 1991. Since independence in 1963, no president
ever has left office in consequence of an election, and KANU has
controlled both the presidency and the national legislature
continuously, although other parties were illegal only from 1982 to
1991. KANU again won a majority in the 1997 legislative elections and
at year's end, after KANU victories in all by-elections held during the
year, KANU members held 118 of 222 seats in the unicameral National
Assembly. While there were numerous flaws in the 1997 elections,
observers concluded that the vote broadly reflected the popular will.
In addition to his role as President, Moi is the commander in chief of
the armed forces and he controls the security, university, civil
service, judiciary, and provincial, district, and local governance
systems. The judiciary is subject to executive branch influence.
In addition to the armed forces, there is a large internal security
apparatus that includes the police Criminal Investigation Department
(CID), the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS, formerly the
Directorate of Security and Intelligence, DSI), the National Police,
the Administration Police, and the paramilitary General Services Unit
(GSU), which details members on a rotating basis to staff the 700-man
Presidential Escort. The CID investigates criminal activity and the
NSIS collects intelligence and monitors persons whom the State
considers subversive. Members of the security forces continued to
commit serious human rights abuses.
The large agricultural sector provides food for local consumption,
substantial exports of tea, coffee, cut flowers, and vegetables, and
approximately 70 percent of total employment. Although many sectors
continued to be dominated by state-owned monopolies, the nonfarm
economy includes large privately owned light manufacturing, commercial,
and financial sectors. Tourism was second only to tea exports as the
largest single source of foreign exchange. Since 1997 major
international financial institutions have suspended nonproject
assistance due to widespread government corruption associated with a
lack of transparency and accountability. During the year, annual per
capita gross domestic product remained virtually unchanged in real
terms, at an amount equivalent to about $278. The spread of HIV/AIDS,
which was estimated to have infected about 14 percent of the adult
population, as well as drought and famine in some rural areas during
the year, exacerbated economic problems.
The Government's overall human rights record was generally poor,
and serious problems remained in many areas; while there were some
signs of improvement in a few areas, the situation worsened in others.
Security forces committed an increased number of extrajudicial
killings, and continued to torture and beat detainees, use excessive
force, rape, and otherwise abuse persons. Prison conditions remained
life threatening. Police arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The
Government arrested and prosecuted a number of police officers for
abuses; however, most police who perpetrated abuses were neither
investigated nor punished. Lengthy pretrial detention is a problem, and
the judiciary is subject to executive branch influence. The authorities
infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government limited freedom
of speech and of the press, and carried on a campaign of harassment,
intimidation, and economic pressure against newspapers that often were
critical of the Government. Police repeatedly harassed and arrested
journalists. However, the Government partially relaxed its domination
of domestic broadcast media. The Government repeatedly restricted
freedom of assembly, and police used force to disperse demonstrators
and protestors. The Government restricted freedom of association.
Police disrupted public meetings, and security forces harassed and
arbitrarily detained political dissidents, including opposition party
legislators. The Government at times interfered with the activities of
religious groups. Police shot and killed five unarmed worshippers at a
mosque, and the Government published a report accusing several
religious denominations and other groups of satanism. Citizens' ability
to change their government peacefully has not yet been demonstrated
fully. The Government continued to limit the independence of its
Standing Committee on Human Rights, and the President continue to
criticize nongovernmental human rights organizations. Violence and
discrimination against women and abuse of children remained serious
problems. Female genital mutilation (FGM) remained widespread, child
prostitution increased as economic conditions deteriorated, and the
spread of AIDS created many orphans. There was some discrimination
against the disabled, and discrimination and violence against religious
and ethnic minorities remained problems. The Government continued to
exacerbate ethnic tensions by discriminating against many ethnic
groups; interethnic tensions continued to result in numerous violent
conflicts and some deaths. There were reports of an increasing number
of ritual murders associated with traditional indigenous religious
practices, which contributed to growing public concern about satanism.
The Government continued to limit some worker rights. Child labor
remained a problem, and there were instances offorced child labor.
Violence by mobs and by nongovernmental armed groups from neighboring
countries also resulted in many deaths.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces
continued to use lethal force and committed a number of extrajudicial
killings. According to government figures, police killed 63 suspected
criminals and another 151 suspects/detainees died in police custody
from January to October. However, the nongovernmental Kenyan Human
Rights Commission (KHRC) reported that police killed 187 persons from
January to September (compared to 164 persons during the same period in
1998), including at least 24 by torture. The Independent Medico-Legal
Unit, which observes and performs postmortems on suspected victims of
torture, recorded 39 cases of death from ``internal hemorrhage due to
external trauma'' (i.e., torture) of individuals in police custody
during the first 8 months of the year. Police lacked restraint in
employing lethal force, and the Government generally failed to take
appropriate action against members of the security forces accused of
extrajudicial killings. Although Assistant Commissioner of Police
Stephen Kimenchu apologized to citizens at a human rights meeting in
December 1998 for police torture and abuse, which he said occurred at
the behest of politicians, the Police Commissioner's office withdrew
the apology 2 days later.
In January police opened fire on a crowd of rice farmers in Mwea
who were protesting the rice purchasing and selling practices of the
National Irrigation Board, a state-owned entity that monopolizes rice
distribution; police killed two of the farmers.
In March police shot and killed Ibrahim Kullow Hussein and nearly
killed his brother, apparently while arresting them for robbery. The
surviving brother, who denied the robbery charges, accused police of
taking him and his brother to a remote location to execute them
summarily.
In June police in Mombasa shot and killed two suspected criminals,
Victor Polo and Vincent Odhiambo, during an arrest.
On August 13, police killed five Muslim worshipers in the Anas Bin
Malik Mosque in Chai village, near Mombasa. A dozen policeman went to
the mosque during a religious ceremony to arrest a man accused of
assault. One policeman, Peter Ndirangu, entered the mosque to make the
arrest. An altercation ensued, and other police officers shot
indiscriminately through the windows and killed Imam Mohamed Ali
Mwatakucha, Said Ali Mwajefwa, Ali Mohamed Mwadida, Neru Bakari Marika,
and Alfan Matano Mwagoga. As the worshippers fled, someone slashed
Ndirangu with a farm tool, killing him. Muslim leaders accused police
officials of taking two of the victims, who they believe survived the
mosque shooting, to a remote location, and of killing them. Post mortem
studies indicate that at least two of the worshipers died from gunshot
wounds to the head, fired from a distance of less than 6 feet. The
Government charged two police officers, Julius Mugambi M'nabere and
Stephan Musau Kilonzo, with murder. The case is pending before the
court.
In September police ambushed, shot and killed two armed men as they
arrived at a bank in downtown Nairobi; the police had been informed in
advance that they intended to rob the bank.
Most police killings occurred during the pursuit of criminal
suspects; however, a number involved innocent bystanders. Ahluwalia
Subir Ahluwalia died in April when police, responding to his family's
report of a burglary at their home, opened fire on him, his mother, and
sister as they rushed Ahluwalia's father to the hospital for gunshot
wounds suffered at the hands of the robbers. The family claims that,
although it was late at night and the police could not see the victims,
the police began shooting without warning. On September 15, Mwanzia
Mutuku, a Nairobi bank worker, was shot and killed when police raided
and opened fire on a night club below Mutuku's apartment.
Some of the persons who died in police custody apparently were
victims of torture. According to the KHRC, David Muragi, a grammar
school student, died at home on February 3 after spending a night in
the Rumuriti town prison. Before dying, he told his family that a
police officer had beaten him. Police claimed that a mob had beaten
Muragi for theft prior to his arrest. Elijah Kimani Mwaura's family
alleged that police beat him to death in February while he was in
custody in the Webuye police station. Francis Muchai claims to have
witnessed two Kiambu police officers torture and beat to death Peter
Kariuki on July 17 while he was in police custody. The 25-year-old
Kariuki was arrested for theft a few hours earlier. According to press
reports, four warders at the Kamiti Maximum Security Prison beat
Kennedy OukoNyanoti in July, then dropped him off at a hospital, where
he lay in a coma for 6 days before dying. On July 9, Jacob Anaseti
(also known as Jacob Wanyoni Masese) and Ramadhani Barula (also known
as Ramadhan Bakari) died of internal bleeding while in police custody
in Bungoma; they were among 78 passenger van touts arrested during a
countrywide strike by passenger van drivers (see Section 6.a.).
Ephantus Njagi Nguthi died in late December 1998 from a fractured skull
and other injuries that he reportedly received while in custody in
Matanya, Laikipia district. Police reportedly had beaten his testicles.
Two officers were arrested in the case.
In December 1998, Godwin Mukhwana, a member of the Presidential
Escort, reportedly shot and killed Jamal Abedi and Henry Musyoka, the
driver and tout of a passenger van driver, after their vehicle blocked
a Presidential Escort vehicle; Mukhwana was arrested and charged with
two counts of murder on December 16, 1998. The case was pending at
year's end.
At year's end, several other cases of 1998 extrajudicial killings
remained unresolved. Police opened an investigation into the June 1998
shooting death of Pastor Simeon Kiti Mwangoma (or Mwangalee) by Kilifi
police, but took no further action; police maintain Mwangoma was the
leader of a notorious gang. Police opened no investigation into the
1998 police shooting death of Simon Githinji Kigera, also a policeman,
in Nairobi; police maintain they shot in self defense. The State opened
no investigation and took no other action in the death of Vincent
Nyumba Kiema due to a police beating; in the death after torture by
army personnel of Sheik Mohammad Yahyah; and in the death in police
custody in Kitui of Muthoka Mukele after he apparently was beaten. Army
officer Aden Almi and police officers Faneis Malaba Mbiya and Kennedy
Bitange faced charges of murder in connection with the death in police
custody in Garissa of Ali Hussein Ali; the case was pending at year's
end. The trial of the suspects in the 1998 murder of Seth Sendashonga
was ongoing at year's end. In separate cases, Kitui authorities charged
assistant chief Simeon Mwandingga with inciting the 1998 mob killing of
Kamwila Kamungu, and another assistant chief, Josephine Matalu, with
instigating the 1998 beating death of Kiema Mwisuve (see Section 5).
There were no known developments in the case of the 1998 death of
Alfred Kang'ethe after beatings by the Uthiru police.
A public inquest into the January 1997 death of Catholic lay
brother Larry Timmons in Njoro had not concluded at year's end. The
inquest into the death of University of Nairobi student Solomon Muruli
resulted in a court ruling that he most likely committed suicide.
Inquests also continued into the 1997 deaths in police custody of Moses
Macharia Gicheru and Lomurodo Amodoi. There were no investigations into
the 1997 deaths in police custody of Joseph Muangi Muiruri, Irungu
Kimani, Noah Njunguna Ndung'u, Joseph Ndung'u Njoroge, James Gitau
Kuanju, or Julius Mwangi Njoroge.
There were no effective police investigations into many other cases
of extrajudicial killings by members of the security forces. The
authorities usually attribute the absence of an investigation into an
extrajudicial killing to the failure of citizens to file official
complaints. However, the form required for filing complaints is
available only at police stations, which often lack the forms or are
not forthcoming in providing them. There also is considerable public
skepticism of a process that assigns the investigation of police abuse
to the police themselves.
Hundreds of prisoners died in custody due to life-threatening
prison conditions, including inadequate food and medical treatment (see
Section 1.c.). The Government recorded 196 deaths in prisons from
January to October.
Interethnic violence in rural areas continued to cause many deaths
(see Section 5).
Mob violence increased. According to the KHRC, 157 persons were
killed in mob violence between January and September, compared with 139
such deaths in all of 1998. The Government recorded 183 deaths due to
mob violence between January and September. Human rights observers
attribute mob violence to a lack of public confidence in the police and
the judicial process. The great majority of mob violence victims, who
died by lynching, beating, or burning, were persons suspected of
criminal activities, including robbery, cattle rustling, and membership
in terror gangs. However, the social acceptability of mob violence also
provided cover for personal vengeance under the guise of ``mob
justice.'' On November 9, a group of about 100 students at the Sang'alo
Institute of Science and Technology beat and killed the Institute's
principal, whom the students accused of mismanagement.
Occasionally, mobs killed members of their communities on suspicion
that they practiced witchcraft (see Sections 2.c. and 5). There were no
known statistics about the number of deaths during the year due to mob
violence against persons suspected of practicing witchcraft, which
resulted in 16 deaths in 1998.
In January in the town of Moyale, near the Ethiopian border, a
group of armed men in uniform shot and killed an Islamic cleric,
assistant kadi Haji Hassan Muhammad, who reportedly sympathized
publicly with the Oromo ethnic insurgency in Ethiopia. Residents of the
area have long alleged that members of the armed forces of the
Government of Ethiopia often cross into the country to kill or kidnap
alleged sympathizers of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).
b. Disappearance.--George Matata, a student protest leader at
state-owned Moi University in Nairobi, reportedly disappeared on
October 20; students rioted to protest his reported disappearance and
authorities briefly closed the university. Matata reappeared a few days
later and claimed that police in Eldoret had abducted, tortured, and
released him; however, no evidence in support of that allegation was
reported. There were no other reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution states that ``no one shall be subject to
torture or degrading punishment or other treatment;'' however, security
forces continued to use torture and physical violence as methods of
interrogation and to punish both pretrial detainees and convicted
prisoners. Although police authorities periodically issue directives
against the use of torture by police, the problem persists. Human
rights organizations and the press highlighted scores of cases of
torture, and several cases of indiscriminate beating of groups of
persons by police during the year. Common methods of torture practiced
by police included hanging persons upside down for long periods,
genital mutilation, electric shocks, and deprivation of air by
submersion of the head in water. The KHRC counted 24 torture related
deaths in the first 9 months of the year (see Section 1.a.).
There were numerous allegations of police use of excessive force
and torture. The KHRC recorded 323 cases of police brutality in the
first 9 months of the year. Detainees routinely claimed that they had
been tortured, making it difficult to separate real from fabricated
incidents. Among the more credible allegations of police torture
reported by the KHRC and the press were the cases of: Jeremiah Kasuku,
who was assaulted and illegally detained in January in Keiyani by GSU
officers and District Officer S. Kepketch (see Section 1.d.); Peter
Macendu, who was whipped and beaten unconscious by six policemen in
February in Kerugoya; Julius Muhoro Mugo, who was tortured for 2 days
by CID officers sometime before March; Duncan Ndwega, a CID officer,
who was tortured by the Flying Squad (a quick response, antitheft unit
of the police force) in April; Geoffrey Mbuthia Nduati, who claims that
police unleashed dogs on him while he was in custody in September in
Nyeri's Karatina Police Station; and Johnnes Musyoka Kimonyi, who
attributes his loss of eyesight to beatings by police in Buru Buru.
In February David Makali, the editor of Expression Today, a
Nairobi-based newspaper, reportedly was kidnaped by a group of
unidentified men who drove him to Karura Forest outside Nairobi and
tortured him there. Makali later identified one of his assailants as a
man shown in press photographs engaged in beating the Reverend Timothy
Njoya during a protest march on June 10, and asserted credibly that he
is a member of the Jeshi la Mzee group of KANU Youth organized and
employed by Fred Gumo of the Office of the President (see Section
2.a.). Makali's assailants allegedly demanded information about the
whereabouts of the author (then in hiding) of an article published in
Expression Today that asserted the complicity in drug trafficking of
senior government officials including Gumo.
According to organizations that work with street children, police
also beat and abuse street children (see Section 5). The WEMA Street
Girls Center sought to press charges against two Mombasa police
officers for raping a 13-year-old street girl in May. The girl
identified the officers, Mwinge Chula and Peter Ndwiga, who were
arrested in May and await trial.
Residents of Balessa and El Hadi in the north credibly accused
security forces, both army and police, of beating or torturing
residents of those villages on May 22-23, during an operation to flush
out OLF insurgents who crossed the border from Ethiopia. A group of
five persons, including a Catholic priest and two nurses who visited
Balessa and El Hadi on May 23, documented the beatings and torture of
six of the most seriously injured persons both through photographs and
in detailed written accounts of the victims' oral statements; some of
this evidence was published in a Nairobi newspaper, together with
letters of protest from village leaders, on May 29. Although a military
team dispatched to investigate the incident found no evidence to
substantiate the claims, the army's rules of engagement for joint
security operations reportedly permitted the use of nonlethal force,
including beatings, to obtain from noncombatants information needed to
achieve operational objectives.
Police repeatedly used excessive force in breaking up
demonstrations and beat citizens (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.).
During the vote counting following a January 16 National Assembly
by-election in Eastern province, police used wooden clubs and tear gas
to disperse a crowd outside the vote counting hall that was protesting
the announcement of a narrow victory by the KANU candidate based on the
counting of contested ballot boxes (see Section 3); police then entered
the vote counting hall and beat opposition members of the National
Assembly and the leading opposition candidate in the election.
On January 30-31, police in Nairobi used tear gas, beatings with
wooden clubs, stones, and rubber bullets to disperse a demonstration by
university students that became violent after being blocked by police;
the students were protesting senior government officials' transfer of
public land in Karura Forest near Nairobi for free or at prices far
below market prices to persons who had allegedly supported KANU
financially in the 1997 elections (see Sections 2.b. and 3). Severe
police beatings injured dozens of students, including several who were
hospitalized.
On February 26, police used tear gas and police dogs to block
National Assembly Members of Parliament (M.P.'s) and farmers from
holding a rally in Eldoret (see Section 2.b.).
On April 13, in Nyanza province, police beat and then arrested
opposition M.P. James Orengo, who was speaking publicly in a town
market place against unaccountable transfers of public land by
provincial and county government officials (see Sections 1.d., 2.a. and
2.b.); police also used tear gas to disperse Orengo's audience.
Squads of ``KANU Youth,'' including the Jeshi la Mzee squad
allegedly organized and paid by Fred Gumo of the Office of the
President, and Nairobi police used beatings and tear gas to disrupt a
peaceful rally staged by various religious and civil society groups on
June 10 to protest the Government's handling of the constitutional
review process (see Section 3). Presbyterian Reverend Timothy Njoya was
one of several persons who were beaten and seriously injured. After the
KANU Youth initiated violence, police joined them in beating
protesters, whereupon students and unemployed youths joined the
protest, which degenerated into street battles and looting.
On June 20, in Machakos, police resorted to tear gas and force to
break up a public meeting held by KANU and opposition M.P.'s to discuss
issues of concern to the Kamba ethnic group (see Sections 2.b. and 5).
In a separate event the same day, the Meru police chief, in an attempt
to stop M.P.'s from holding a public meeting, reportedly punched and
kicked opposition M.P. James Orengo (see Section 2.b.).
On October 21, police used force to disperse a demonstration by
students of the Kabete Technical Insititute protesting an allegedly
illegal allocation of public land to a local church; the demonstration
became violent and students threw rocks at police after the police
prevented the students from leaving the campus and then entered the
grounds of the Institute (see Section 2.b.).
During the year the Government investigated some allegations of
police use of excessive force and torture, and prosecuted several
police officers. According to the Government, 12 police officers were
charged and sentenced during the first 9 months of the year, and the
Government recorded only five reported cases of torture during that
same period. In October the High Court awarded Elias Mbabu
approximately $70,000 (4.8 million shillings) for police brutality he
suffered in 1994. The court also ordered the arrest of the offending
officers.
Caning continued to be used as punishment in cases such as rape
(see Section 5).
Prison conditions are often life threatening, due both to a lack of
resources and to the Government's unwillingness to address deficiencies
in the penal system. Prisoners are subjected to severe overcrowding,
inadequate water, poor diet, substandard bedding, and deficient health
care. Police and prison warders subject prisoners to torture and
inhuman treatment (see Section 1.a.). Rape of both male and female
inmates, primarily by fellow inmates, is a serious problem, as is the
increasing incidence of AIDS. Disease is widespread in prisons and the
death rate is high. Prisons do not have resident doctors, and only one
prison had a doctor permanently assigned. Prisoners sometimes are kept
in solitary confinement far longer than the maximum 90 days allowed by
law.
According to the Government, 196 prisoners died in jails during the
first 9 months of the year, compared with 536 in 1998 and 631 in 1997,
due chiefly to anemia, heart attack, malaria, typhoid fever, dysentery,
tuberculosis, and AIDS. The country's 83prisons are severely
overcrowded, averaging 30 percent above holding capacity, with a daily
average of 33,610 inmates in 1998 (latest available figures).
Officially, men, women, and children are kept in separate cells.
However, there are reports of men and women being placed in cells
together. Women sometimes lack access to sanitary napkins and often
have only one change of clothes, leaving them naked during washing of
their laundry. Young teenagers frequently are kept in cells with adults
in overcrowded prisons and detention centers. Youth detention centers
are understaffed, and inmates have minimal social and exercise time.
Some young inmates remain for years in the centers, as their cases
await resolution. Prisoners and detainees report that they frequently
are denied the right to contact relatives or lawyers (see Section
1.e.).
In July press reports highlighted the substandard conditions in the
prisons. Although in August Shariff Nassir, who was then Minister for
Home Affairs and in charge of the prison system, stated that prisons
were heavily congested and that the Government intended to present a
bill to Parliament to improve prison conditions, no action was taken by
year's end.
The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison
conditions, although some independent NGO's work with the Government in
evaluating torture cases and performing autopsies on deceased
prisoners. In October officials of Kimiti Maximum Security Prison
denied U.N. Special Rapporteur for Torture Nigel Rodley access to that
facility, despite a government agreement to grant him full access (see
Section 4). The Government apologized and claimed that this happened
because Rodley had arrived at the prison at a time different from his
scheduled appointment. There were reports of torture at Kamiti Prison;
however, Rodley had not released his report by year's end.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Despite constitutional
protections, police continued to arrest and detain citizens
arbitrarily. The Constitution provides that persons arrested or
detained shall be brought before a court within 24 hours in noncapital
offenses and within 14 days in capital cases. The Penal Code
specifically excludes weekends and holidays from this 14-day period.
The law does not stipulate the period within which the trial of a
charged suspect must begin. Suspects often are held for weeks, even
months, before being brought to court. The Government has acknowledged
cases in which persons have been held in pretrial detention for several
years.
The KHRC reported that murder suspect Timothy Karani has been in
custody in Embu for 12 years without being charged, a claim that the
Government has neither confirmed nor denied.
The law provides that families and attorneys of persons arrested
and charged are allowed access to them, although this right often is
not honored. Family members and attorneys may visit prisoners only at
the discretion of the State. This privilege often is denied. For those
who have been charged, it often is possible to be released on bail with
a bond or other assurance of the suspect's return.
The Community Service Order Act passed by Parliament in 1998
subjects those convicted and sentenced to less than 3 years to
community service rather than custodial sentence, thus potentially
reducing the prison population; however, the Government has yet to
implement the act.
Police arrested and briefly detained many students in connection
with the late January ecological and political protests against
nontransparent transfers of public land in Karura Forest by senior
government officials (see Sections 1.c. and 3). Police released the
students soon after the protest without charging them.
On February 2, police arrested three opposition M.P.'s who were
prominent critics of the Karura Forest land transfers (see Sections
1.c. and 3): James Orengo, Njehu Gatabaki, and David Mwenje. The
Government charged them with inciting riots in connection with violence
that arose from late January protests against those land transfers.
On February 7, 81 members of the small traditional Mungiki
religious order of the largely pro-opposition Kikuyu ethnic group were
arrested and held without bail until March 16, on charges of coercing
members to take illegal oaths to oppose the Government, holding illegal
meetings, and possessing offensive weapons (see Section 2.c.).
On April 13, police in Nyaza province beat and arrested prominent
opposition M.P. James Orengo, who introduced a motion of no confidence
in President Moi in the National Assembly in 1998 (see Section 1.c.).
Orengo and his supporters were arrested while he spoke publicly in a
town market against nontransparent transfers of public land by
provincial and county officials and were charged with disturbing the
peace and with malicious damage to property. Orengo was released on
bail the next day, followingprotests by other opposition M.P.'s. The
case was pending at year's end.
In September CID officers arrested opposition M.P. George Kapten
for defaming a public official. He had accused the President of being
at the heart of a major financial scandal, in an interview published in
August in Finance Magazine. Kapten was released on bail, but in
November he was charged for subversion in connection with the same
interview; he died at his home on December 25 (see Sections 1.e. and
2.a.).
Police arrested a number of journalists on charges of publishing
information ``likely to cause alarm to the public'' (see Section 2.a.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is subject to
executive branch influence. The President has extensive powers over
appointments, including those of the Chief Justice, the Attorney
General, and Appeal and High Court judges. The President also can
dismiss judges and the Attorney General upon the recommendation of a
special presidentially appointed tribunal. Although judges have life
tenure (except for the very few foreign judges who are hired by
contract), the President has extensive authority over transfers.
The court system consists of a Court of Appeals, a High Court, and
two levels of magistrate courts, where most criminal and civil cases
originate. The Chief Justice is a member of both the Court of Appeals
and the High Court, which undercuts the principle of judicial review.
Military personnel are tried by military courts-martial, and verdicts
may be appealed through military court channels. The Chief Justice
appoints attorneys for military personnel on a case-by-case basis.
There were some indications of executive interference. Several
cases involving opposition M.P.'s have been ongoing for years, with the
courts repeatedly postponing the hearings, thereby requiring the M.P.'s
to appear periodically in court or risk fines or imprisonment. In early
August, the courts fined several publishers of small, pro-opposition
weeklies for printing without proper licensing (see Section 2.a.); the
courts had not invoked this colonial-era law in many years. Opposition
M.P. George Kapten was charged in September with defamation of a public
official, and in November with subversion, for stating that President
Moi was the prime suspect in the Goldenberg financial scandal,
involving businesspersons who reportedly defrauded the Government of
hundreds of millions of dollars with the apparent complicity of senior
government officials (see Section 1.d.).
Judges who ruled against the Government in the past sometimes were
punished with transfer or nonrenewal of contracts, although during the
year no retaliatory action against justices was reported.
However, judges occasionally demonstrated independence. For
example, in June Justice Richard Kuloba acquitted Merekoi Ole Kokoyo of
murder charges and criticized the Attorney General's office for not
presenting any evidence, creating unwarranted delays, and making
unjustified requests for adjournment.
Another problem has been the Attorney General's constitutional
power to discontinue proceedings in private prosecution cases. Arguing
that citizens must first notify his office before initiating private
prosecution, Attorney General Amos Wako has used this authority on a
number of occasions to terminate cases against government officials.
President Moi's appointment of chief public prosecutor Bernard
Chunga as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court upon Zachaeus Chesoni's
death in September was widely criticized in the legal community as
tending further to reduce the independence of the judiciary; Chunga was
widely perceived as having been zealous in prosecuting critics of the
Government, and as having primary loyalties to the President
personally. After Moi's 1998 appointment of Chunga as lead counsel of
the Commission on Ethnic Clashes, the Commission was less vigorous in
calling witnesses to testify about the role of government officials in
instigating and allowing ethnic violence (see Section 5).
The judiciary faced many accusations of corruption. In March Chief
Justice Zaccheus Chesoni was accused of taking a $450,000 (30 million
shilling) bribe to rule in favor of a plaintiff in a case. Soon
thereafter, a businessman accused Justice Richard Kuloba of taking a
$75,000 (five million shilling) bribe. In 1998 the Chief Justice
appointed a special judiciary commission chaired by Justice Richard
Kwach to report on the problems of the judiciary. The Kwach Commission
cited ``corruption, incompetence, neglect of duty, theft, drunkeness,
lateness, sexual harassment, and racketeering'' as common problems in
the judiciary. The Commission recommended amending the Constitution to
allow for the removal of incompetent judges, introducing a code of
ethics,improving the independence of the judiciary, overhauling the
Judicial Services Commission (the administrative branch of the
judiciary), and shifting prosecutorial responsibilities from the police
to the judiciary. Upon receipt of the report, the Chief Justice in late
1998 appointed another commission to investigate modalities of
implementing the Kwach Commission's recommendations for improving the
judiciary. No action was taken on those recommendations by year's end.
There are no customary or traditional courts in the country.
However, the national courts use the customary law of an ethnic group
as a guide in civil matters affecting persons of the same ethnic group
so long as it does not conflict with statutory law. This is done most
often in cases that involve marriage, death, and inheritance issues and
in which there is an original contract founded in customary law. For
example, if a couple married under national law, then their divorce is
adjudicated under national law, but if they married under customary
law, then their divorce is adjudicated under customary law. Citizens
may choose between national and customary law when they enter into
marriage or other contracts; thereafter, however, the courts determine
which kind of law governs the enforcement of the contract.
Civilians are tried publicly, although some testimony may be given
in closed session. The law provides for a presumption of innocence, and
for defendants to have the right to attend their trial, to confront
witnesses, and to present witnesses and evidence. Civilians also can
appeal a verdict to the High Court and ultimately to the Court of
Appeals. Judges hear all cases. In treason and murder cases, the deputy
registrar of the High Court can appoint three assessors to sit with the
High Court judge. The assessors are taken from all walks of life and
receive a sitting allowance for the case. Although the assessors render
a verdict, their judgment is not binding. Lawyers can object to the
appointments of specific assessors.
Defendants do not have the right to government-provided legal
counsel, except in capital cases. For lesser charges, free legal aid is
not usually available outside Nairobi or other major cities. As a
result, poor persons may be convicted for lack of an articulate
defense. Although defendants have access to an attorney in advance of
trial, defense lawyers do not always have access to government-held
evidence, as the Government can plead the State Security Secrets Clause
as a basis for withholding evidence. Court fees for filing and hearing
cases are high for ordinary citizens. The daily rate of at least $25
(2,000 shillings) for arguing a case before a judge is beyond the reach
of most citizens.
Critics of the Government--politicians, journalists, lawyers, and
students--have been harassed through abuse of the legal process. In a
1997 study of the judiciary, the International Bar Association found
``a persistent and deliberate misuse of the legal system for the
purpose of harassing opponents and critics of the Government.''
Authorities continued during the year to arrest opposition M.P.'s and
student leaders (see Sections 1.b. and 1.d.), and a number of
opposition M.P.'s, student leaders, and human rights activists still
had one or more court cases pending, often for months or even years.
In July the High Court dismissed a legal challenge to President
Moi's 1997 reelection filed by Mwai Kibaki, chairman of the Democratic
Party; Kibaki's brief alleged that Moi had rigged the election through
the Electoral Commission (see Section 3). The High Court dismissed
Kibaki's electoral petition on the grounds that he had failed to comply
with a legal requirement to serve a copy of the petition on the
President personally, despite acknowledging the factual accuracy of
Kibaki's claim that presidential security consistently had denied him
personal access to Moi. In December the Court of Appeal upheld the High
Court's decision on the same grounds.
In August the Court of Appeal sentenced Post on Sunday editor Tony
Gachoka to 6 months in prison for contempt, stemming from articles he
wrote in February alleging that Supreme Court Chief Justice Zaccheus
Chesoni and other members of the judiciary took large bribes to rule in
favor of businesspersons implicated in the Goldenberg scandal. The
court refused to allow Gachoka to present oral evidence. Among the
panel of seven judges he faced were three he accused by name in his
writings. The contempt prosecution of Gachoka was initiated by Attorney
General Amos Wako, whom Gachoka also had identified in his published
writings, as having conspired to cover up the Goldenberg scandal.
Because the highest court had original jurisdiction over the case, the
editor could not appeal its decision (see Section 2.a.). However, the
President pardoned Gachoka, who was released on November 3, after
serving 74 days of his sentence.
In November the High Court suspended the court martial of an army
major accused of stealing stationery on the grounds that the army had
denied him his choice of attorney--opposition M.P. James Orengo. In
response the army contended that the constitutionalright to
representation by counsel of one's choice did not extend to members of
the armed forces.
Gachoka was the only political prisoner reported during the year.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--At times authorities infringed on citizens' privacy
rights. Although the Constitution provides that ``no person shall be
subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry by
others on his premises,'' it permits searches without warrants ``to
promote the public benefit.'' The Police Act permits police to enter a
home forcibly if the time required to obtain a search warrant would
``prejudice'' their investigation. Although security officers generally
obtain search warrants, they occasionally conduct searches without
warrants to apprehend suspected criminals or to seize property believed
to be stolen.
During the year, Nairobi police searched the offices of several
tabloid publications and one NGO, the National Convention Executive
Council, without warrants. The police continued repeatedly to conduct
massive warrantless searches (``sweeps'') for illegal immigrants and
firearms in residential neighborhoods of major cities (see Section
2.d). The KHRC recorded 3,280 arrests during sweeps between January and
August. Residents complained that police who entered homes on the
pretense of searching for weapons often asked for radio, television,
and video receipts and permits and demanded bribes to refrain from
confiscating those items in the absence of such documents.
Security forces have monitored closely the activities of
dissidents, following or otherwise harassing them. They employ various
means of surveillance, including a network of informants to monitor the
activities of opposition politicians and human rights advocates. Some
opposition leaders, students, journalists and others continued to
report that the Government subjected them to surveillance, telephone
wiretaps, or interference with written correspondence.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government broadly
interprets several existing colonial-era laws to restrict free
expression. Reforms passed in late 1997 have improved the degree of
freedom of speech and of the press, which while still limited is
substantially greater than either 5 or 10 years ago, and the number of
periodicals critical of the Government continues to grow. During the
year, the Government also partially relaxed its domination of domestic
broadcast media. Nonetheless, the Government sporadically harassed
elements of the print media; there were also several incidents of
harassment and beating of journalists. Police repeatedly dispersed
demonstrators to prevent criticism of the Government (see Sections 1.c.
and 2.b.). Some independent periodicals reported that the business
community came under pressure from the Government to refrain from
advertising in these magazines, keeping some on the edge of insolvency.
In spite of these pressures, the press, civic organizations, and the
opposition continued to present their views to the public, particularly
in the print media. Government pressure led journalists to practice
some self-censorship.
On the whole, the print media remained candid and independent.
There is a large variety of weekly tabloid publications highly critical
of the Government. Reporting in these tabloids ran the gamut from
revealing insider reports to unsubstantiated rumor mongering.
The mainstream print media include four daily newspapers that
report on national politics. The largest newspaper, the Nation, is
independent and often publishes articles critical of government
policies. The second largest newspaper, the East African Standard, is
controlled by an investment group with close ties to the Government and
the ruling KANU party. It is generally, although not automatically,
supportive of the Government. The third daily newspaper, The People,
formerly a weekly, is owned by an opposition politician and is highly
critical of the Government. The fourth daily, the Kenya Times, which
has a small circulation and is struggling to keep afloat financially,
reflects KANU party views.
A pattern of sporadic government harassment of the print media
continued. On December 20, President Moi, speaking to delegates to a
KANU conference in Nairobi, criticized The Nation and The People
newspapers, stating that they practiced ``terrorism and distortion.''
Moi advised the delegates not to buy those newspapers. Moi was widely
quoted as saying that the media are the worst enemies of democracy.
Moi's remarks were broadcast nationally on state-owned radio. Energy
Minister Lotodo told a gathering of political supporters that no
journalist ``should set foot'' in West Pokot (an area of intense cattle
rustling), andthat any journalist who went there risks harsh
punishment. An assistant minister in the Office of the President, Fred
Gumo, a member of the Luhya ethnic group, threatened in February to
have journalists who publish articles critical of his ethnic group
beaten. A few days earlier, a group of thugs abducted, beat, and
released Expression Today editor David Makali (also a Luhya), saying
that they were angry about and sought to find the author of an article
that Makali published in February, which asserted that government
officials were complicit in narcotics trafficking. Makali subsequently
identified one of his aggressors, and asserted that he has been
employed by Gumo (see Section 1.c.), but later withdrew a request that
Gumo and the alleged assailants be prosecuted. In May the Kenya Union
of Journalists and the Media Institute issued a statement that alleged
that during the preceding 12 months there had been a ``steady rise in
cases of open violence against journalists by state agents and lately,
by gangs of the payroll of powerful individuals.''
The Government also has attempted to intimidate the pro-opposition
press by selective prosecution of journalists under a colonial-era
section of the Penal Code that criminalizes the publication of
information likely to cause fear or alarm. Johan Mwangi Wandeto, a
journalist for the People, was arrested on March 8 for publishing a
story that alleged that bandits held up the presidential escort. People
journalist Mohammed Sheikh was arrested in June for publishing an
``alarming'' article. The editor of The Dispatch, Maneno Mwikwabe, is
facing similar charges for articles he wrote in 1998.
Harassment of the tabloid press continued. In early July, police
raided the offices of the Nairobi printing firm Junior Graphics and
confiscated films and four printing plates for The Concord Weekly, the
Weekly Express, the Metropolitan, the Dispatch and the Citizen. The
Concord publisher Paul Kimani subsequently faced charges of publishing
without proper licensing. In August police raided the offices of the
Metropolitan, arresting employees Oliver Litodo and Mula Mulamula for
similar reasons. Police made a sweep of Nairobi print media vendors in
September, confiscating sexually oriented magazines.
A weekly and a biweekly publication--the Post on Sunday and
Finance--which were refused registration in 1998, continued publishing
in early 1999 without apparent restraint. However, The Post on Sunday
was forced to suspend publication in August, following the conviction
of its editor Tony Gachoka and the associated fine of about $14,000
(Ksh 1 million) imposed on the publication (see Section 1.e.). On
August 20, Gachoka received a 6-month jail sentence from the Court of
Appeal for contempt of court (libel against the judges), stemming from
articles he wrote accusing government officials of corruption (see
Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
CID officers arrested opposition M.P. George Kapten, and he was
subsequently charged with defaming a government official and with
subversion, in connection with an interview, published in August in
Finance Magazine, in which he indicated that President Moi was
implicated in the Goldenberg finance scandal (see Section 1.d.).
The Government maintained tight control over the electronic
broadcast media--particularly radio, the principal news medium for most
citizens. It controls the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), which
operates the country's premier radio, broadcast television, and cable
television networks. KBC stations do not criticize the Government and
give a large share of news time to government or KANU party functions
and scant coverage to opposition activities. KANU supporters also own
three other television networks--Kenya Television Network (KTN), which
airs news programs with somewhat more balanced political coverage,
Stellavision, and Citizen TV, which began broadcasting during the year.
The KTN is restricted to the Nairobi metropolitan area. Citizen Radio
covers much of central Kenya, whereas Citizen TV can be viewed only in
parts of Nairobi. Their news programs during the year were quite
objective. Family TV and Radio, a Christian broadcasting network, began
broadcasting television and radio in the Nairobi metropolitan area in
midyear. Nation Radio began broadcasting in October, and Nation
Television followed in December, providing independent media coverage.
The Government continued to delay action on a large number of radio
and television license applications through most of the year,
reflecting the arbitrariness of the broadcast licensing process. The
Ministry of Information, Transport, and Communication, formerly the
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, explained that it was waiting
for the recommendations on media liberalization from the Attorney
General's Task Force on Press Law. That Task Force made its initial
report in December 1998, but still has several outstanding issues to
resolve, including the manner of selection of the 13-member Media
Commission, which would act as an independent body issuing broadcast
licenses. In 1997 the Government issued four broadcast licenses, three
to friends of the ruling KANU and one to the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC). In May 1998, after a delay of 7 years, the
Governmentfinally issued a radio and television broadcast license to
the Nation Media Group, the country's largest media organization.
However, it restricted the license area to Nairobi, and it delayed
issuing broadcast frequencies until late the same year. Nation Media
Group received in 1999 authorization for radio broadcasts in Nairobi,
Mombasa, Kisumu, and Nakuru, and began radio transmission to Nairobi in
October and television broadcasts to the capital in December. Nation
also sued the Government for permission to broadcast radio and
television nationwide, but the case was still before the courts at
year's end. The Ministry for Information, Transport and Communication
has licensed a total of 12 television and 20 radio stations to date,
although only 5 private television stations (KTN, Citizen, Family,
Nation, and Stellavision) and 7 private radio stations (Citizen,
Family, Sayare Rehema, Capital, Nation Radio, BBC Nairobi, and BBC
Mombasa) are operational. In 1998 the Ministry approved radio and
television broadcast licenses for a Muslim group and for a Christian
group. In March the Ministry of Information, Transport, and
Communication licensed four religious organizations to operate a radio
station and three television stations: one Islamic station, and three
Christian stations in the coastal, central and western regions. At
year's end they had been assigned broadcasting frequencies, but had not
yet begun to broadcast.
The KBC remained the only domestic source of current information
for most persons outside the Nairobi area. This continued severely to
limit the ability of opposition leaders and other critics of the
government to communicate with the electorate.
During the 1997 election campaign the Electoral Commission directed
that the KBC accord equal treatment to all political parties; however,
this directive was not implemented fully. KBC coverage remained heavily
biased in favor of KANU and President Moi. Moreover, the KBC's limited
coverage of the opposition was generally negative, compared with
uniformly positive coverage of KANU. Opposition politicians accused the
Government of using similar tactics in the year's by-elections.
Representatives of the international media remained free to
operate.
The Government does not restrict access to the Internet. There are
about 20 domestic Internet service providers, which generally are
privately owned. Internet access is limited only by economic and
infrastructual factors, and is fairly widespread in urban areas.
A total of 79 publications remained banned, including such works as
``The Quotations of Chairman Mao Zedong'' and Salmon Rushdie's
``Satanic Verses.'' The courts lifted the ban on the Catholic
periodical Inooro in 1997, and in December 1998 lifted the ban on
opposition leader Kenneth Matiba's ``Return to Reason.'' The 1997
reforms eliminated sedition as a ground for censorship of publications,
and directed that a board be established to review existing, and
future, publication bans. The Prohibited Publications Review Board was
established in 1998.
Despite constitutional provisions for free speech, school
administrators and the security forces continued to limit academic
freedom. They frequently took harsh action against even peaceful
student demonstrations, whether over political or bread-and-butter
issues, forcefully dispersing and sometimes arresting students (see
Sections 1.c., and 2.b.). Although private universities were not
prohibited and some existed, the State owned, subsidized, and
administered most universities and other institutions of higher
education, and most post-secondary students attended institutions
owned, administered, and subsidized by the State, due in part to their
lower fees. President Moi, as chancellor of all state universities,
appoints the vice chancellors, who managed the institutions under the
supervision of the Ministry of Education. A number of student activists
have been expelled from universities in recent years because of
political activities, and most have been refused readmission. Student
leaders report that government security forces sometimes follow them
(see Sections 1.c. and 1.f.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricts the
right in practice. The Public Order Act, which the Government used for
many years to control public gatherings and to restrict this right, was
amended in 1997; the requirement that public meetings be licensed was
replaced by the less restrictive requirement that organizers notify the
local police in advance of planned public meetings. In 1998 government
disruptions of public meetings declined significantly; however, this
improvement was not sustained during the year. Authorities repeatedly
disrupted public demonstrations about which organizers duly informed
the police in advance; government officials claimed that the organizers
lacked authorization to hold public gatherings, whereas there no longer
appeared to be any basis in domestic law for requiring specific
authorization. In September President Moi stated that government
officials should deny ``permits'' (for public demonstrations) to
politicianswho use public rallies to abuse other leaders; however,
officials now have legal authority to cancel planned public gatherings
only if there are simultaneous meetings previously scheduled for the
same venue, or if there are specific security threats.
Some public assemblies that police dispersed, such as many
assemblies of passenger van drivers and touts during their work
stoppage in July, were already violent before police disrupted them
(see Section 6.a.). However, other public assemblies that police
disrupted, including some student and political protest demonstrations,
either were nonviolent or became violent only after police forcibly and
egregiously restricted their attempted exercise of freedom of assembly
(see Section 1.c.); however, demonstrating students repeatedly
initiated violence.
In mid-January, during the vote counting following a National
Assembly by-election in Eastern province, police forcibly dispersed a
nonviolent although verbally abusive crowd outside the vote counting
hall that was protesting perceived election-rigging (see Sections 1.c.
and 3). In late January, police in Nairobi forcibly dispersed a
demonstration by university students protesting the nontransparent
transfer of public land in Karura forest by senior government
officials; the demonstration became violent after police blocked its
march (see Sections 1.c. and 3). In February police forcibly blocked
opposition M.P.'s and farmers from holding a rally in Eldoret (see
Section 1.c.). On April 13, in Nyanza province, police forcibly
dispersed an assembly in a town marketplace of persons who were
listening to a speech by opposition M.P. James Orengo (see Sections
1.c., 1.d., and 2.a.). In June in Nairobi police and groups of hired
``KANU Youth'' violently disrupted a march by religious and NGO leaders
protesting the Government's handling of the constitutional review
process; only after the police and KANU Youth initiated violence did
this peaceful protest grow and become violent (see Sections 1.c., 2.c.,
and 3.). Also in June, police in Machakos forcibly broke up a public
meeting organized by a group of KANU and opposition M.P.'s to discuss
issues of concern to the Kamba ethnic group; police said that the
participants had no permission to gather (see Section 1.c.). Also in
June, the Meru police chief, in an unsuccessful attempt to stop M.P.'s
from holding a public meeting, reportedly punched and kicked opposition
M.P. James Orengo (see Section 1.c.). On July 11, police used tear gas
to break up several impromptu gatherings that four opposition M.P.'s
held in Embu and Meru, saying they had no permission to hold a public
meeting. Also in July, police in Nakuru disrupted gatherings of
supporters of the political group Saba Saba Asili, and police in Keiyo
disrupted a public meeting organized by opposition M.P. Tabitha Seii.
In October police in Kabete forcibly dispersed a demonstration by
students of the Kabete Technical Institute protesting an allegedly
illegal allocation of public land; the demonstration became violent
after the police forcibly blocked a planned student march off the
campus (see Section 1.c.).
The Government continued to use the Societies Act to restrict
freedom of association. The act requires that every association be
registered or exempted from registration by the Registrar of Societies.
For years after opposition parties again were legalized in 1992, the
Government refused to act on a number of political party registration
applications. However, since the enactment of reform legislation in
1997, the Government has acted on some long-pending applications,
increasing the number of registered political parties from 12 to 23.
However, the Government continued to refuse to reverse its 1994 denial
of registration of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), which was involved
in a number of violent confrontations with police in 1992 (see Sections
2.c. and 5). The United Democratic Movement and Saba Saba Asili
political parties still are awaiting registration, the latter since
1997.
The Government continued to criticize publicly and intimidate
NGO's, many of which it accuses of being ``subversive'' and of working
with the opposition to overthrow the Government. The Government NGO
Coordination Board under the NGO Act registers NGO's. The Government
has used this structure to put pressure on the nongovernmental National
NGO Council. In 1997 the Board directed the Council to compile a list
of ``political NGO's,'' presumably to carry out President Moi's threat
to deregister all ``political NGO's,'' but the Council refused. In
March President Moi again publicly stated that NGO's were trying to
destabilize the country by channeling foreign funds to antigovernment
student and labor organizations and using foreign funds to organize
seditious mass protests. In early April, the Office of the President
instructed all district governments to monitor NGO's within their
districts with a view to ensuring that NGO's either advance government-
approved objectives or cease to operate; however, NGO's did not
subsequently report an increase in government monitoring (see Sections
4 and 6.a.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
however, while groups generally were allowed to worship freely,
theGovernment at times interfered with other activities by religious
groups.
The Government requires religious organizations to register with
the Registrar of Societies, which reports to the Office of the Attorney
General. The Government allows traditional indigenous religious
organizations to register, although many choose not to do so. Once
registered, religious organizations enjoy tax-free status and clergy
are not subject to duty on purchased goods. Religious organizations
generally receive equal treatment from the Government; however, some
small splinter groups have found it difficult to register due to their
inability to define their status as more than an offshoot of a larger
religious organization. The Government has not granted registration to
the Tent of the Living God, a small Kikuyu religious group banned
during the single party-era.
The Government at times disrupted public meetings that religious
groups organized or participated in for political reasons. On June 10,
police and hired groups of KANU Youth violently broke up a
demonstration arranged by Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim
organizations to protest the Government's intention to have Parliament
revise the Constitution. Police and KANU Youth beat some clergy
participating in the demonstration, including the Reverend Timothy
Njoya (see Sections 1.c., 2.b., and 3).
In March the Government for the first time issued broadcasting
licenses to religious organizations; three Christian stations and one
Islamic station were licensed, but did not begin broadcasting during
the year (see Section 2.a.).
Muslim leaders continued to charge that the Government is hostile
toward Muslims. Muslims complain that non-Muslims receive better
treatment when applying for proof of citizenship. According to Muslim
leaders, government authorities more rigorously scrutinize the
identification cards of persons with Muslim surnames and require them
to present additional documentation of their citizenship (i.e., birth
certificates of parents and, sometimes, grandparents). The Government
has singled out the overwhelmingly Muslim ethnic Somalis as the only
group whose members are required to carry an additional form of
identification to prove that they are citizens. Ethnic Somalis must
produce upon demand their Kenyan identification card and a second
identification card verifying screening. Both cards also are required
in order to apply for a passport. Although this heightened scrutiny
originated as an attempt to deter illegal immigration, a senior
official of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims alleged that it
increasingly affects all Muslims.
Despite 1997 legal reforms and the subsequent registration of a
large number of political parties, the Government refused to reverse
its 1994 denial of registration of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) on
the grounds that the IPK had been involved in a number of violent
confrontations with police in 1992 (see Section 2.c). On March 6,
Muslim groups demonstrated in Machakos against alleged religious
persecution by city authorities. The Muslims claimed that the municipal
authorities had confiscated equipment used by the Ukunda Muslim
Propagation Group. The town clerk claimed that the group had conducted
open-air meetings without seeking authority from the city council and
had disparaged Christianity verbally, although permission to assemble
publicly no longer is required by domestic law, and the Constitution
provides for freedom of speech (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). In August
police killed five Muslim worshipers in the Anas Bin Malik Mosque in
Chai village, near Mombasa (see Section 1.a.). In December some Muslim
leaders objected to the Government's announcement that it would
demolish a mosque in the town of Embu in the central highlands;
however, the Islamic community was divided over this issue, because the
mosque was built under controversial circumstances (see Section 5).
The Government continued to arrest and prosecute members of a
religious group based in the largely pro-opposition Kikuyu ethnic group
(see Section 5). On February 7, 81 members of the small traditional
Mungiki order were arrested and refused bail (see Section 1.d.). The
Government accused them of requiring adherents to take illegal oaths,
holding illegal meetings, and possessing offensive weapons. They were
released in mid-February. The Government also continued to deny
registration to another small Kikuyu religious group, the Tent of the
Living God, whose leader the Government arrested in the late 1980's.
The Tent's membership has diminished greatly since opposition political
parties again were legalized in 1992.
Purporting to practice witchcraft reportedly is a criminal offense
under colonial-era laws; however, persons generally are prosecuted for
this offense only in conjunction with some other offense, such as
murder. Witchcraft traditionally has been a common explanation for
diseases of which the causes were unknown. Although many traditional
indigenous religions include or accommodate belief in the efficacy of
witchcraft, they generally approve of harmful witchcraft only for
defensive or retaliatory purposes and purport to offer protection
against it. Thepractice of witchcraft is widely understood to encompass
attempts to harm others not only by magic, but also by covert means of
established efficacy such as poisons.
In August the Government presented to Parliament and thereby
effectively published the 1994 report of Presidential Commission of
Inquiry into Devil Worship, which President Moi appointed in 1994 in
response to public concern, articulated chiefly by Christian clergy,
about a perceived resurgence of witchcraft, ritual murders, and other
ostensibly ``satanic'' practices associated with aspects of traditional
indigenous religions (see Section 5). The widely-publicized document
included numerous reports of ritual murder, human sacrifice, and
cannibalism, and of feats of magic allegedly done by using powers
acquired through such acts. It also reported that ``satanists'' had
infiltrated nonindigenous religious groups including Jehovah's
Witnesses, the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints
(Mormons), and the Church of Christ Scientist (Christian Scientists) as
well as other organizations including the Masonic Order (Freemasons)
and the Theosophical Society, making them ``doorways'' to satanism.
Most members of the commission were senior members of mainline
Christian churches; a deputy director of the CID also served on the
commission.
It was learned during the year that the State dropped cattle
rustling charges against Francis Tulel, the secretary of the Catholic
Peace and Justice Commission for Eldoret Diocese, shortly after
arresting him in April 1998.
In January in Moyale, a town near the Ethiopian border, a group of
armed men in uniforms shot and killed an Islamic cleric, assistant kadi
Haji Hassan Muhammad, who reportedly sympathized publicly with the OLF
(see Section 1.a.).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--By law citizens may travel freely within
the country and there were no reported violations of this right.
However, police routinely stop vehicles and check vehicles' safety and
drivers' documents on roads throughout the country. Many vehicles often
are in disrepair, and many drivers often lack required documentation.
Police often demand bribes at such checkpoints.
The Government does not restrict emigration or foreign travel.
However, the law requires a woman to obtain her husband's or father's
permission in order to obtain a passport (see Section 5). However, in
practice, adult women often are able to circumvent this restriction by
claiming to be unmarried. Civil servants and M.P.'s must get government
permission for international travel, which is granted routinely.
Many of the rural residents displaced by the violent ethnic clashes
in Rift Valley in 1991-93 still have not returned to their homes and
remain displaced in urban areas. Some of the several thousand persons
displaced by ethnic clashes in Rift Valley in 1998, and in the Pokot-
Marakwet region throughout the year, have not returned to their homes
due to fear of renewed violence (see Section 5).
The Government offers first asylum and provided it to the
approximately 180,000 refugees registered by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), who lived in official UNHCR camps.
An undetermined number of refugees live outside the camps in cities and
rural areas. Somalis accounted for about 80 percent of the total
refugee population, followed by large numbers of Sudanese, and a
scattered number of other nationalities from across the region.
Approximately 2,000 refugees, mostly of Ethiopian or Somali ethnic
background, were repatriated during the year. Police periodically
performed nighttime sweeps in urban areas in part to round up illegal
immigrants and refugees who remain outside the designated camps
illegally (see Section 1.f.); police arrested about 2,000 persons
during a single August sweep in Mombasa and more than 600 during a
September 2 sweep in Nairobi. However, many persons arrested in sweeps
bribe their way out of detention. Those with refugee status are sent to
refugee camps. Very few are prosecuted, and fewer still are
repatriated.
The law provides for the grant of asylum or refugee status in
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, since 1991 the
Government has suspended the process by which it once ruled on
applications for refugee status or asylum. Since then, a handful of
affluent individuals effectively have purchased refugee status but, for
all practical purposes, an official asylum or refugee application
process has ceased to exist. The UNHCR provides qualified applicants
with refugee status mandate letters, which government officials
recognize, pending enactment of legislation that the Government has
drafted to reestablish a mechanism for granting refugee status or
asylum.
Since 1997 the UNHCR, at the direction of the Government, has
closed five refugee camps near the coastal city of Mombasa andrelocated
over 7,000 camp residents against their wishes to camps near the Somali
and Sudanese borders. In August the UNHCR transported 480 Somali
refugees from Mombasa to a camp in Kakuma.
On July 5 and again on August 22, the Government closed the border
with Somalia; it subsequently intensified its nighttime sweeps in urban
areas in an effort to stem inflows of weapons, illegal goods, and
persons. The border remained officially closed at year's end. However,
many applicants for refugee status continued to enter the country
overland from Somalia.
Incidents of rape of women and young girls in refugee camps
continued to occur (see Section 5). Acts of violence, including
carjackings and banditry, occur sporadically in and around the camps
and the Dadaab camps near the Somali border, and resulted in several
injuries to refugees. There was an incident of ethnic violence among
Sudanese refugees of different clans in the Kakuma camp in the
northwest (see Section 5).
President Moi repeatedly has made public statements blaming
refugees for increases in violent crime and arms smuggling and
repeatedly has issued decrees ordering refugees to leave the country.
Pursuant to these decrees, authorities often have confiscated UNHCR
letters that affirm their status from refugees and issued deportation
orders. Nevertheless, there were no reports of the forced expulsion
from the country of persons with a valid claim to refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government through free and fair multiparty elections; however, their
ability to do so has not yet been demonstrated fully. The National
Assembly has never had an opposition majority. The December 1997
general elections, despite numerous logistical and other flaws,
generally reflected the will of the electorate. They were marked by
much less violence and intimidation, less fraud, and less overt use of
government resources to assist KANU candidates, than the 1992 polls;
due to greater fragmentation, the opposition was widely perceived to
pose less of a challenge to Moi's reelection than it had in 1992.
Opposition candidates won 60 percent of the vote, but these votes were
split among four main and several fringe parties, thereby enabling Moi
to win reelection for another 5-year term and giving KANU a narrow
majority in the unicameral National Assembly. KANU victories in 1998
and 1999 by-elections (four caused by the deaths of sitting opposition
M.P.'s and one by a defection to KANU) increased KANU's majority in the
National Assembly to 118 of 222 seats. The High Court required one by-
election by overturning a 1997 opposition victory; the court continued
not to take action on any opposition challenges to KANU victories in
1997.
During the year, courts dismissed on technical grounds a legal
challenge to Moi's 1997 reelection filed by Mwai Kibaki, chairman of
the opposition Democratic Party, who contended that Moi's reelection
was rigged; the courts refused to hear Kibaki's challenge on the
grounds that he had failed to fulfill a legal requirement to serve a
petition on President Moi personally, while acknowledging the factual
veracity of Kibaki's claim that presidential security consistently
denied him personal access to Moi (see Section 1.e.).
At the local level, the President exercises sweeping power over the
administrative structure. The President appoints both the powerful
provincial and district commissioners and a multitude of district and
village officials. In elections many local officials actively assist
the ruling KANU. There were allegations of partisan electoral abuses by
local officials in several of the by-elections in late 1998 and 1999.
At the national level, the Constitution authorizes the President to
dissolve the legislature and prohibits debate on issues under
consideration by the courts. This prohibition, in conjunction with a
ruling by the Speaker of the Assembly that the President's conduct is
inappropriate for parliamentary debate, has limited the scope of
deliberation on controversial political issues. M.P.'s are entitled to
introduce legislation, but in practice it is the Attorney General who
does so. The President significantly influences the legislative agenda.
However, in November the National Assembly amended the Constitution to
give the National Assembly the power to hire its own staff and to vote
its own budget, despite President Moi's long-expressed opposition to
this amendment.
The Government continued to use both physical beatings and
arbitrary arrest and prosecution to harass and intimidate opposition
M.P.'s and to restrict their freedom of speech and assembly (see
Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., and 2.b). The Government's domination of
domestic broadcast media, especially outside major urban centers,
continued to restrict severely the ability of opposition politicians to
communicate with citizens, especially with inhabitants of rural areas
(see Section 2.a.).Several credible reports indicate that in recent
years, including 1997, KANU electoral campaigns received substantial
financing derived from the nontransparent transfer of state assets
organized by the Office of the President with the knowledge of
President Moi. There were credible detailed reports that senior
government officials transferred public land in Karura Forest for free
or at far-below-market prices to persons who financially or otherwise
supported KANU in the 1997 elections, including employees of the Office
of the President, such as advisor Joshua Kulei, and members of Moi's
informal circle of advisors drawn predominantly from his Kalenjin
ethnic group. The recepients reportedly resold that land at much higher
prices to the National Social Security Fund and to private developers.
Companies linked to Rashid Sajjad, one of KANU's principal financiers,
reportedly received particularly large amounts of land in Karura
Forest. These nontransparent transfers of public land in Karura Forest
were the subject of several protest demonstrations during the year,
including a student demonstration in January, in connection with which
police arrested three opposition M.P.'s (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
Such transfers of public lands were not limited to Karurua Forest. In
February the mayor of Mombassa, Najib Balala, lost central government
support and resigned his office after various problems reportedly
including his unsuccessful efforts to block nontransparent transfers of
public land in Mombassa; the land reportedly was transferred to Rasid
Sajjad and to a clergyman of the African Inland Church, of which
President Moi is a member. KANU reportedly also had received
nontransparent financing in recent years in connection with large,
unrecorded, and therefore duty-free imports of sugar by Sajjad.
Opposition parties lacked comparable sources of election campaign
financing.
Reforms enacted in 1997 ameliorated the lack of independence of the
presidentially appointed Electoral Commission, which oversees
elections, by nearly doubling its size to include members nominated by
the opposition. Five parliamentary by-elections were held during the
year, with KANU winning all the seats. Vote buying occurred and
reportedly was widespread, police prevented some opposition politicians
from holding political rallies during some by-election campaigns, and
police forcibly dispersed a crowd protesting perceived election rigging
outside a hall where votes were being counted (see Sections 1.c., 2.a.,
and 2.b.). During an April by-election, KANU Youth members reportedly
stoned and injured opposition M.P. Charity Ngilu, who was detaining a
KANU Youth member she had caught distributing money at a polling place.
KANU candidates benefitted materially from targeted preelection
government spending on public works and free government food handouts
in by-election districts, from more ample campaign financing, and from
preferential coverage on state-owned radio, which remained, in most
rural areas, the only domestic radio and the principal medium of public
communication (see Section 2.a.). Although the voting process generally
went fairly smoothly and was run efficiently, after the September by-
elections the Electoral Commission called on authorities to investigate
allegations of vote buying and fraud.
Since 1996 a broad coalition of NGO's and religious organizations
has mobilized public opinion in support of a reform of the Constitution
to reduce the power of the presidency. In 1997 the National Assembly
enacted the Constitution of Kenya Review Act, which was amended in 1998
to create a Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) to recommend changes
in the Constitution. In late January, the Government announced that it
would convene the CRC in February; however, the constitutional reform
process stalled in mid-February, when political parties were unable to
agree how seats on the CRC should be divided among the parties. In
1998, when the legislation creating the CRC was enacted, KANU and
opposition party leaders had agreed that the KANU would have five seats
and opposition parties would have eight; however, in February the KANU
insisted on having a majority of the seats, to reflect its majority in
the Parliament. On February 21, the Catholic Archbishop of Nairobi
publicly accused KANU of deliberately derailing the constitutional
review process; President Moi denied that KANU was to blame, warned
against ``dancing to the tune of foreigners,'' attacked NGO's for
subversive and antisocial activities, and noted that the National
Assembly had full authority to amend the Constitution. In May Moi
proposed that the constitutional reform process be transferred to the
KANU-dominated National Assembly. On June 10, in Nairobi, religious
groups, NGO's, opposition parties, and students demonstrated against
Moi's proposal; police and squads of KANU Youth including the Jeshi la
Mzee squad allegedly organized by assistant minister Fred Gumo of the
Office of the President brutally dispersed the demonstration and
widespread rioting ensued (see Sections 1.c., 2.b., and 2.c.). Although
demands by religious leaders and NGO's to restart the stalled
constitutional reform process mounted during the second half of the
year, Moi continued to insist that only the National Assembly was
competent to review the Constitution, and the constitutional reform
process remained stalled at year's end. However, in December the
National Assembly created a Parliamentary Select Committee to review
the existing Act and help form a Commission; a church-led group formed
the next day, creating a parallel process.
In August county council elections in Garissa County reportedly
were marred by fighting between members of the Aulyan and Abduwak clans
of the Somali ethnic group, during which persons were killed (see
Section 5).
Elected local councils exist, but the executive branch of the
central Government has arrogated most of the revenues and functions
that they had at independence. Although rural and municipal councils
are authorized by law to provide a wide range of health, education, and
infrastructure services, in practice their functions have been reduced
to some oversight of nursery schools, secondary and tertiary roads,
markets, and natural resources such as forests. Most councils lack
sufficient financial autonomy and revenues to perform adequately even
these limited services.
Although there are no legal restrictions, traditional attitudes
circumscribe the role of women in politics. Women are underrepresented
seriously at decision making levels in the Government. The new National
Assembly included eight female M.P.'s (four elected and four
nominated), up from seven in the last session. The Women's Political
Caucus, formed in 1997, continued to lobby over issues of concern to
women and to increase the influence of women on government policy. A
constitutional amendment that would have reserved one-third of
parliamentary seats for women was defeated in 1997. However, in 1998
the National Assembly reserved for women one-third of the 25 seats on
the Constitutional Review Commission.
Although the President's Cabinet included persons from many ethnic
groups, approximately one-third of the ministers were either Kalenjin
or Luhya. At year's end there were only two ministers from the
country's largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu, and no minister from the
third-largest ethnic group, the Luo; both the Kikuyus and the Luos tend
to support opposition parties. The President continued to rely on an
inner circle of advisors, drawn largely from his Kalenjin ethnic group.
However, in April Moi appointed to the long-vacant position of vice
president a person affiliated with the largely pro-opposition Kikuyu
ethnic group (see Section 5). There is one nominated Asian M.P.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The number of human rights organizations continued to grow. These
include NGO's such as the Kenya Antirape Organization, the Legal Advice
Center, the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, the Protestant
National Council of Churches of Kenya, the Center for Governance and
Development, People Against Torture, the Independent Medico-Legal Unit
(IMLU), and the Release Political Prisoners pressure group. An array of
legal organizations, including the International Commission of Jurists-
Kenya, the International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA)-Kenya, the
Law Society of Kenya, and the Public Law Institute, advocate human
rights.
Several NGO's maintain comprehensive files on human rights abuses.
A number of attorneys represent the poor and human rights defendants
without compensation, although they can handle only a small percentage
of those who need assistance, and are concentrated chiefly in Nairobi
and other large cities.
The President instructed government officials to monitor NGO's
carefully, and government officials including the President continued
to intimidate, and threaten to disrupt human rights organizations and
other NGO's (see Section 2.b.). In March President Moi publicly alleged
that FIDA-Kenya supported prostitution and other things that he
considered social evils, and said that this was proof that NGO's were
interested in subverting and destroying African moral values. According
to a KBC news report, he added that he soon would reveal a list of
names of subversive NGO's and their antisocial activities; however, the
President did not release such a list by year's end.
The Government allowed human rights organizations to witness some
autopsies of persons who died in police custody. The Attorney General's
Office generally responded in detail to foreign embassies' human rights
inquiries.
The KHRC produces a ``Quarterly Human Rights Report'' (formerly the
``Quarterly Repression Report'') that catalogs the human rights
situation in the country, as well as special reports on pressing human
rights issues. During the year, it published a report on women refugees
in Kenya. The Institute for Education in Democracy and other NGO's
monitor elections in cooperation with the Electoral Commission and
diplomatic missions.
The 10-member Government Standing Committee on Human Rights
established in 1996 is empowered to ``investigate alleged violations of
constitutional freedoms,'' including abuse of power by public
officials. It is tasked with drafting recommendations on human rights
problems and providing these to the government agencies under whose
purview the problems fall. However, it issubordinate to the Office of
the President, its chairman is a longstanding KANU loyalist, it has
received sufficient funds to fill only 8 of its 27 authorized staff
positions, and it has been relatively inactive. Since its inception,
the Committee has maintained a low profile and kept its distance from
most contentious human rights problems. In October the chairman of the
Committee asked the National Assembly to enact legislation giving the
Committee greater autonomy and independence; no such legislation was
enacted by year's end. In December the Committee launched a human
rights journal, Haki Zetu.
In October 1998, the Parliament passed a resolution to create an
Ombudsman's office that would be charged with addressing complaints
about inefficiency, corruption, nepotism, and abuse of power by public
servants. As of year's end, the Attorney General had not drafted a bill
to turn the resolution into law.
The Government generally facilitated a 10-day fact-finding visit in
September by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture; however, officials
at the Kamiti Maximum Security Prison denied him access (see Section
1.c.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of a
person's ``race, tribe, place of origin or residence or other local
connection, political opinions, color, or creed;'' however, government
authorities did not enforce effectively many of these provisions. There
is credible evidence that the Government sponsored large-scale ethnic
violence during the early 1990's; there are some indications that some
government officials have at least tolerated and in some instances
instigated ethnic violence on a smaller scale during the late 1990's.
Women.--Violence against women is a serious and widespread problem.
According to the Government, 1,329 cases of rape were reported to the
police during the first 9 months of the year, compared to 903 in all of
1998. The available statistics probably underreport the number of
incidents, as social mores deter women from going outside their
families or ethnic groups to report sexual abuse.
The law carries penalties of up to life imprisonment for rape,
although actual sentences are usually no more than 10 years. The rate
of prosecution remains low because of cultural inhibitions against
publicly discussing sex, fear of retribution, disinclination of police
to intervene in domestic disputes, and unavailability of doctors who
otherwise might provide the necessary evidence for conviction.
Moreover, wife beating is prevalent and largely condoned by much of
society. Traditional culture permits a man to discipline his wife by
physical means and is ambivalent about the seriousness of spousal rape.
There is no law specifically prohibiting spousal rape. Throughout the
year, the media reported a steady stream of cases of violence against
women, including widespread spousal abuse. The Nation, a leading
Nairobi daily, for several months reserved a full page in each issue
for coverage of domestic violence. The resulting publicity and public
criticism often forced the police to take punitive action against the
perpetrators.
There were continued incidents of rape of refugee Somali women at
the Dadaab refugee camps, where women were assaulted outside camp
perimeters in the course of gathering firewood, and occasionally within
the camps themselves (see Section 2.d.). A KHRC report noted a yearly
average of over 100 reported cases of rape among refugee women. The
UNHCR initiated a program to distribute firewood to refugees. The
program reduced the incidence of rape outside the camps, but such
crimes remain a problem.
Women experience a wide range of discriminatory practices, limiting
their political and economic rights and relegating them to second class
citizenship. The Constitution extends equal protection of rights and
freedoms to men and women, but only in 1997 was the Constitution
amended to include a specific prohibition of discrimination on grounds
of gender. However, constitutional provisions allow only males
automatically to transmit citizenship to their children. The Government
has not passed domestic enabling legislation to implement international
conventions on women's rights. The Task Force on Laws Relating to
Women, established by the Attorney General in 1993, has yet to make its
report. Parliament passed in May a motion on gender equality, although
the resolution has no power of law.
Levels of education and literacy for men and women differ widely.
Although the number of boys and girls in school is roughly equal at the
primary level, men substantially outnumber women in higher education.
Seventy percent of illiterate persons in the country are female.
Women continue to face both legal and actual discrimination in
other areas. For example, a married woman legally is required toobtain
the consent of her husband before obtaining a national identity card or
a passport.
The Law of Succession, which governs inheritance rights, provides
for equal consideration of male and female children; however, in
practice most inheritance problems do not come before the courts. Women
often are excluded from inheritance settlements, particularly if
married, or given smaller shares than male claimants. Moreover, a widow
cannot be the sole administrator of her husband's estate unless she has
her children's consent.
Most customary law disadvantages women, particularly in property
rights and inheritance. For example, under the customary law of most
ethnic groups, a woman cannot inherit land, and must live on the land
as a guest of male relatives by blood or marriage.
Women make up about 75 percent of the agricultural work force, and
have become active in urban small businesses. Nonetheless, the average
monthly income of women is about two-thirds that of men, and women hold
only about 5 percent of land titles. Women have difficulty moving into
nontraditional fields, are promoted more slowly than men, and bear the
brunt of layoffs. Societal discrimination is most apparent in rural
areas. Rural families are more reluctant to invest in educating girls
than in educating boys, especially at the higher levels.
The nation's best known women's rights and welfare organization,
Maendeleo Ya Wanawake (``Development of Women'' in Swahili) was
established as a nonpolitical NGO during the colonial era, but now is
aligned closely with the ruling party. A growing number of women's
organizations are active in the field of women's rights, including
FIDA, the National Council of Women of Kenya, the National Commission
on the Status of Women, the Education Center for Women in Democracy,
and the League of Kenyan Women Voters.
Children.--The system of free education in the early years of
Kenya's independence has given way to a ``cost-sharing'' education
system in which students pay both tuition and other costs. These are a
heavy burden on most families. Although the law mandates that schooling
be available for all up to grade 12, there is a very high dropout rate
in part because of large educational expenses. There are an estimated 4
million children between 6 and 14 years of age who are out of school.
The legally mandated universal schooling also does not occur in
practice because of a shortage of schools. The health care system for
school children, which once provided periodic medical checkups and free
milk, is now defunct. Human Rights Watch released in September a report
on corporal punishment in Kenya, which cited widespread excessive
caning and abuse of pupils by teachers. According to September press
reports, teachers at the Mobamba Secondary School in Kisii so severely
beat a student that the boy died of internal injuries.
Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is practiced by certain ethnic groups and remains
widespread, particularly in rural areas. The press reported severe
injuries to several girls from the practice of FGM. Health officials
estimate that as many as 50 percent of females nationwide have suffered
FGM. According to Maendeleo Ya Wanawake, the percentage is as high as
80 to 90 percent in some districts of Eastern, Nyanza, and Rift Valley
provinces. FGM usually is performed at an early age. President Moi has
issued two presidential decrees banning FGM, and the Government
prohibits government-controlled hospitals and clinics from practicing
it; however, no law bans FGM.
Economic displacement and the spread of AIDS continued to fuel the
problem of homeless street children. The number of Nairobi's street
children is over 50,000, and the Government estimates that their
numbers grow at 10 percent per year. These children often are involved
in theft, drug trafficking, assault, trespassing, and property damage.
According to a 1997 Human Rights Watch report, street children face
harassment as well as physical and sexual abuse from the police and
within the juvenile justice system. They are held in extremely harsh
conditions in crowded police station cells, often without toilets or
bedding, with little food, and inadequate supplies. They often are
incarcerated with adults and frequently beaten by police. In May the
director of a Mombasa street girls center sought to sue two police
officers accused of raping a 13-year-old street girl (see Section
1.c.).
The problem of child rape and molestation is growing. There are
frequent press reports of rape of young girls by middle-aged or older
rapists. There were repeated reports of molestation or rape of children
by schoolteachers, mostly in rural areas. Legally, a man does not
``rape'' a girl under age 14 if he has sexual intercourse with her
against her will; he commits the lesser offense of ``defilement.'' The
penalty for the felony of rape can be life imprisonment, while the
penalty for defilementis up to 5 years' imprisonment. Men convicted of
rape normally receive prison sentences of between 5 and 20 years, plus
several strokes of the cane.
Child prostitution is a major problem in Nairobi and Mombasa, often
connected with the tourist trade. Child prostitution has grown
considerably due both to economic contraction and to the spread of
AIDS, which has created many orphans. Residents in Kisumu have formed
the Organization for the Protection Against Child Prostitution to
combat the growing problem.
There were reports that children were killed for body parts by
persons practicing healing rituals associated with traditional
religions.
People With Disabilities.--Government policies do not discriminate
officially against the disabled with regard to employment, education,
or state services. However, disabled persons frequently are denied
licenses to drive. There are no mandated provisions of accessibility
for the disabled to public buildings or transportation.
Religious Minorities.--About 38 percent of the population are at
least nominally Protestant Christians, and about 28 percent are Roman
Catholic. Between 10 and 20 percent of the population, concentrated in
the coastal, eastern and northern regions, practice Islam.
Muslims increasingly perceive themselves to be treated like second-
class citizens in a country that is predominantly Christian. Some
Muslims believe that not only the Government but also the business
community deliberately have impeded development in predominantly Muslim
areas, notably the coastal region. They also believe that the national
business community, dominated by largely Christian ethnic groups from
inland ``up-country'' areas including the Kikuyu, deliberately
allocates to non-Muslims most of the jobs it creates in predominantly
Muslim areas including the coastal area. Capricious assertion of
authority by largely Christian security forces in the bandit-infested
northeast, which is largely Islamic, has long contributed to Muslim
mistrust. In recent years, the absence of effective government in
southern Somalia and the OLF insurgency in southern Ethiopia have
strained Christian-Muslim relations further by causing the Government
to increase security force presence and operations in northeast, where
many security force members may find it hard to distinguish Kenyan
Muslims from ethnically and culturally similar members of Somali
militias or the OLF (see Sections 1.a and 1.c.).
There continued to be instances of sporadic violence between
Christians and Muslims. In April a large fight broke out between
Christians and Muslims in Eldoret. The two sides exchanged insults and
then fought during simultaneous open-air prayers held in the town
square. Although some persons reportedly were stabbed with knives, no
fatalities were reported. In December following the Government's
announcement that it intended to demolish a mosque in a town in a
predominantly Christian region, some Muslim leaders in the coastal
region threatened publicly to destroy all Christian churches in
predominantly Islamic areas; however, the Islamic community was divided
on this issue (see Section 2.c.).
During the year there were reports of ritual murders associated
with aspects of traditional indigenous religions. The victims,
generally teenaged children, reportedly were killed and parts of their
bodies removed for use in traditional rituals by persons seeking
renewed youth or health. The Report of the 1994 Presidential Commission
of Inquiry into Devil Worship, presented to the Parliament in August,
contained similar reports from recent years (see Section 2.c.).
Mob violence against persons suspected of practicing witchcraft
resulted in the deaths of at least 16 persons in 1998. In one instance
a mob in a Kisii village beat and burned to death 10 rumored
``witches.'' Some local Christian ministers praised the perpetrators
for ``saving'' the villages from Satan. No statistics on the number of
mob killings of suspected witches during the year were known. However,
unsubstantiated accusations of the practice of witchcraft or satanism
appeared increasingly common.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population of
almost 29 million was divided into more than 40 ethnic groups, among
which there were frequent and credible allegations of discrimination,
as well as sporadic interethnic violence. In general each ethnic group
has a distinct primary language and is concentrated in a distinct
region; however, the languages of some groups are very similar to the
languages of related ethnic groups. In private business and in the
public sector, members of virtually all ethnic groups commonly
discriminated in favor of other members of the same group when able to
do so. Neighborhoods in large cities tended to be segregated
ethnically, although interethnic marriage hasbecame fairly common in
urban areas. Political cleavages tended to correlate with ethnic
cleavages.
According to the 1989 government census, the Kikuyu are the largest
ethnic community, constituting 21 percent of the population. Luhya,
Luo, Kamba, and Kalenjin follow, each with more than 11 percent of the
population.
Ethnic-regional differences continue to pose obstacles to political
and economic liberalization. Members of President Moi's Kalenjin ethnic
group (a coalition of nine small ethnic groups) and other traditionally
pastoral Nilotic ethnic groups are represented disproportionately and
hold key positions in the Government, the ruling KANU party, the GSU
and the Presidential Escort. Many members of these groups appear to
believe that economic and political liberalization would be likely to
harm their groups, and to favor other groups. The Kikuyu and the
closely related Kamba, Meru, and Embu groups make up more than a third
of the country's population; members of these groups also dominate much
of private commerce and industry and have tended to support opposition
parties since they again were legalized in 1992. The Kikuyu, the
largest, best-educated, and most prosperous ethnic group, dominated the
country under its first president, Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu.
It is estimated credibly that during the 1990's more than 400,000
persons were forced to relocate or were displaced within the country by
ethnic violence, fear of ethnic violence, or dispossession. Most of
these expulsions occurred between 1991 and 1994; during those years,
disproportionately many of the victims were members of the relatively
prosperous Kikuyu and related ethnic groups who had lived outside the
home regions of those groups. Many of the victims were not only
displaced but also dispossessed of land or businesses, and remain
without restitution or compensation; several thousands were killed.
There is substantial evidence that senior members of the Moi Government
organized and funded much of this ethnic violence and large-scale
dispossession. Some observers viewed this violent interethnic
redistribution of wealth as a means of building or funding a political
coalition to prevent the Kikuyus and related groups from regaining
control of the State after the Government's need for external financing
forced it to accede in 1991 to donors' demands to relegalize opposition
parties and to hold multiparty elections in 1992. Ethnic violence
entailing somewhat smaller numbers of expulsions that victimized
various ethnic groups including Luos and Luyhas occurred in the coastal
region in late 1997 and in the Rift Valley region in early 1998; local
authorities generally did little to stop this violence and appear to
have instigated much of the 1997 violence in the coastal region.
In August a presidential Commission on Ethnic Clashes, a
government-appointed panel of three judges formed in 1998, submitted to
President Moi its report on the cause of ethnic clashes that occurred
in the Rift Valley in 1992 and 1997, the Coast province in 1997, and
the areas of Molo and Laikipia in 1998. Many of the hearings were
public, and witnesses often directly accused local politicians of
abetting the combatants, although they rarely provided other than
hearsay evidence. However, key churches and NGO's claim that a number
of witnesses were prevented from testifying, especially after, half way
through the investigation, the Government changed the Commission's
aggressive prosecutor John Nyagah Gacivih to the more progovernment
Deputy Attorney General Bernard Chunga (see Section 1.e.). At year's
end, the Government had not released the report or announced that it
was taking any formal action on its findings.
Attacks and revenge counterattacks, part of a longstanding pattern
of cattle rustling, continued between Pokots and Marakwets/Keiyos in
Trans Nzoia in the northwest, Boranas and Somalis in North Eastern
province, Ormas and Somalis in Eastern Province, and Kuria and Luos in
the west, resulting in scores of deaths (see Section 1.a.). At least 40
persons were killed in a March 4 cattle raid by Pokots on Turkana in
the Turkwell Gorge area. At least 15 persons were killed in an October
24 cattle raid by Pokots on the Marakwet village of Tot; raiders killed
10 women and children waiting for polio vaccinations at a health
clinic. Also in October in the Rift Valley members of the Njemps and
Turkana ethnic groups fought each other and burned each others' houses
after some inebriated Turkana men reportedly killed an Njemps herdsman.
Members of the coastal Bajuni, Mijikenda, and Digo communities
accused the Government of denying them their rights to land, and of
favoring members of inland ``up-country'' ethnic groups, who migrated
to the coast largely during the period when Kenyatta was president.
The Government has singled out the overwhelmingly-Muslim ethnic
Somalis as the only group whose members are required to carry an
additional form of identification to prove that they are citizens. They
must produce upon demand their Kenyan identification card and a second
identification card verifyingscreening. Both cards also were required
in order to apply for a passport. The continued presence of Somali
refugees has exacerbated the problems faced by citizens of Somali
ethnicity (see Sections and 2.c. and 2.d.). In February fighting
between members of different clans of Sudanese in Kakuma refugee camp
wounded 20 persons (see Section 2.d). In August, during county council
elections in Garissa county, there was fighting between the Aulyan and
Abduwak clans of the Somali ethnic group, between which there were
longstanding tensions over grazing and water rights (see Section 3). A
resurgence of fighting between the same clans in December reportedly
caused hundred of families to flee the area.
There is widespread resentment among citizens of African ethnicity
toward Asians living in the country. The Asian community constitutes
between 0.5 and 1 percent of the total population and consists of
second and third generation Asians with full citizenship and a smaller
body of recent immigrants. Many African Kenyans resent persons of Asian
descent for their affluence, and for their reluctance to assimilate
African culture and to employ blacks, particularly in management
positions. They also see Asians as taking jobs and commercial
opportunities away. The involvement of some Asians in corrupt
activities with government officials further fuels popular resentment.
Politicians, both opposition and ruling party, from time to time appeal
to majority prejudices by attacking Asian citizens, accusing them of
exploiting and usurping the natural inheritance of African citizens. In
June opposition Democratic Party secretary general Joseph Munyao, in a
speech that purportedly represented official party policy, accused
Asians of ``fleecing'' the country and warned that their KANU
connection would not ``last forever'' and they would be ``called to
account when their time comes.'' Although President Moi on occasion
formally has rejected racist diatribes, at times he has resorted to
racial attacks and slurs.
During the year, police sweeps for illegal immigrants targeted and
caught many persons from the Indian subcontinent (see Sections 1.f. and
2.d.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides that all workers,
except for central government civil servants, including medical
personnel and university academic staff, are free to join unions of
their choice. In practice, workers employed in export processing zone
(EPZ) firms, and those working in many restaurants and small firms,
face dismissal if they join unions. Since 1980, when the Kenya Civil
Servants Union was deregistered for political reasons, civil servants
also have been denied union membership. However, the new head of the
civil service announced in August that the Government may reregister
the union. The law provides that as few as seven workers may establish
a union, so long as the objectives of the union do not contravene the
law, and that another union is not representing the employees in
question already.
Unions must apply to and be granted registration by the Government.
The Government also may deregister a union, but the Registrar of Trade
Unions must give the union 60 days to challenge the deregistration
notice. An appeal of the Registrar's final decision may be brought
before the High Court.
There are currently 36 unions representing approximately 600,000
workers, about one-third of the country's formal-sector work force. All
but four of these unions are affiliated with the one approved national
federation--the Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU). The major
exception is the 260,000-member Kenya National Union of Teachers, which
represents more than one-third of all unionized workers. The COTU
leadership generally does not pursue workers' rights vigorously. As a
result, most union activity takes place at the shop steward level and
not at the industrial level where most labor-related decisions are
made, thereby placing the average worker at a disadvantage in disputes
with management. Many COTU unions have evolved into de facto ethnic
groupings.
The Government created COTU in 1965 as the successor to the Kenya
Federation of Labor and the Kenya African Workers' Congress. The 1965
decree establishing COTU gives the President the power to remove COTU'S
three senior leaders from office and grants nonvoting membership on the
executive board to representatives of the Ministry of Labor and of
KANU. Although the board is composed of the leadership of affiliated
unions, it is common for political parties, especially KANU, to provide
funding and other support for the election of senior union officials.
For the past few years, leaders from affiliated unions have sought to
bring about democratic reforms in the election of union leaders,
independence from the Government, and establishment of links with any
political party that supports worker rights. The reelection of the COTU
leadership in 1996 indicated that there would be no major changes in
the near future. Prior to the 1997 nationalelections, some trade union
leaders began pushing the COTU to take part in the election reform
dialog. The COTU leadership took a progovernment position.
The Trade Disputes Act permits workers to strike, provided that 21
days have elapsed following the submission of a written letter to the
Minister of Labor. By law members of the military services, police,
prison guards, and members of the National Youth Service may not
strike. Other civil servants, like their private sector counterparts,
can strike following the 21-day notice period (28 days if it is an
essential service, such as water, health, education, or air traffic
control). During this 21-day period, the Minister may mediate the
dispute, nominate an arbitrator, or refer the matter to the Industrial
Court, a body of five judges appointed by the President, for binding
arbitration. Once a dispute is referred to mediation, factfinding, or
arbitration, any subsequent strike is illegal. Moreover, the act gives
the Minister of Labor broad discretionary power to determine the
legality of any strike.
The Minister has used this power to declare strikes by bank workers
and teachers illegal, although the required notice had been given. In
late 1997, the Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT) called a
nationwide strike, which the Government quickly settled with pay
increases of over 200 percent spread over 5 years, rather than risk
antagonizing the influential teachers before the election. The
Government's failure to implement the second phase of the promised pay
hikes in 1998 resulted in a late 1998 strike by the KNUT. The
Government declared the strike illegal. Security forces dispersed
meetings of striking teachers, arrested many teachers and KNUT
officials, and closed KNUT offices. The strike ended after 15 days when
the Government refused to renegotiate. Towards the end of the year, the
Government and the KNUT were again in negotiation regarding
implementation of the agreed-upon salaries. Relations between the KNUT
and the Government continue to fester, and anticipated downsizing of
the civil service is expected to add further fuel to simmering labor
disaffection.
The Government's response to wildcat strikes in the past has been
severe. During the year, there were considerably fewer strikes. In June
police used a heavy hand to end a work stoppage by private mini-bus
operators. Police did not intervene in a September strike by Nairobi
city hall employees. Workers' rights groups continue to raise the
general problem of the Government's harshness towards labor with the
International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee on Freedom of
Association.
Internationally, the COTU is affiliated with both the Organization
of African Trade Union Unity and the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions. Many of its affiliates are linked to international
trade secretariats.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While not
having the force of law, the 1962 Industrial Relations Charter,
executed by the Government, the COTU, and the Federation of Kenya
Employers, gives workers the right to engage in legitimate trade union
organizational activities. Both the Trade Disputes Act and the charter
authorize collective bargaining between unions and employers. Wages and
conditions of employment are established in negotiations between unions
and management. In 1994 the Government relaxed wage policy guidelines
to permit wage increases of up to 100 percent and renegotiation of
collective agreements. Collective bargaining agreements must be
registered with the Industrial Court in order to ensure adherence to
these guidelines.
The Trade Disputes Act makes it illegal for employers to intimidate
workers. Employees wrongfully dismissed for union activities generally
are awarded damages in the form of lost wages by the Industrial Court;
reinstatement is not a common remedy. More often, aggrieved workers
have found alternative employment in the lengthy period prior to the
hearing of their cases.
Legislation authorizing the creation of export processing zones
(EPZ's) was passed in 1990. The EPZ authority decided that local labor
laws, including the right to organize and bargain collectively would
apply in the EPZ's, although it grants many exemptions in practice. For
example, the Government waived aspects of the law that prevent women
from working in industrial activities at night. In practice, workers in
EPZ firms face dismissal if they join unions (see Section 6.a.). Labor
and some government officials continued to criticize health and safety
conditions in the EPZ's.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
proscribes slavery, servitude, and forced labor, including forced and
bonded labor by children; however, under the Chiefs' Authority Act, a
local authority can require persons to perform community services in an
emergency. The ILO Committee of Experts has found that these and other
provisions of the law contravene ILO Conventions 29 and 105 concerning
forced labor.There are some cases, mostly in rural areas, of children
being loaned as workers to pay off debts.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Employment Act of 1976 makes the employment in
industry of children under the age of 16 illegal. The act applies
neither to the agricultural sector, where about 70 percent of the labor
force is employed, nor to children serving as apprentices under the
terms of the Industrial Training Act. Ministry of Labor officers
nominally enforce the minimum age statute, and the Government is making
efforts to eliminate child labor, working closely with the COTU and the
ILO's International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor. The
problem received considerable media attention during the year.
Children often work as domestic servants in private homes. Forced
or bonded labor by children is prohibited by law; however, there were
some instances in which it occurred (see Section 6.c.). There are many
instances of children working in the informal sector, mostly in family
businesses. Children usually assist parents on family plots rather than
seek employment on their own. However, deteriorating economic
conditions have given rise to more child labor in the informal sector,
which is difficult to monitor and control, and is a significant
problem. Significant percentages of workers on coffee, sugar, and rice
plantations are children. In addition, there has been an increasing
number of underage children employed in the sex industry (see Section
5). In view of the high levels of adult unemployment and
underemployment, the employment of children in the formal industrial
wage sector in violation of the Employment Act is less common but not
unknown.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum wage for blue-
collar workers in the wage sector has 12 separate scales, varying by
location, age, and skill level. The lowest minimum wages were $41
(2,886 shillings) per month in the largest urban areas and $22 (1,540
shillings) in rural areas. These rates are exclusive of a mandated 15
percent housing allowance as well as traditional benefits.
The minimum wage is insufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. The annual 2 percent wage increase has
a limited impact on worker income. Most workers relied on second jobs,
subsistence farming, informal sector opportunities, or the extended
family for additional support.
The Regulation of Wages and Conditions of Employment Act limits the
normal workweek to 52 hours, although nighttime employees may be
employed for up to 60 hours per week. Some categories of workers have a
shorter workweek. As is the case with respect to minimum wage
limitations, the act specifically excludes agricultural workers from
its purview. An employee in the nonagricultural sector is entitled to 1
rest day per week. There are also provisions for 21 days of annual
leave and sick leave. The law also provides that the total hours worked
(i.e., regular time plus overtime) in any 2-week period for night
workers may not exceed 144 hours; the limit is 120 hours for other
workers. Workers in some enterprises claimed that employers forced them
to work extra hours without overtime pay. The Ministry of Labor is
tasked with enforcing these regulations, and there are few reports of
violations.
The Factories Act of 1951 sets forth detailed health and safety
standards; it was amended in 1990 to include agricultural and other
workers. The 65 health and safety inspectors attached to the Ministry
of Labor's Directorate of Occupational Health and Safety Services have
the authority to inspect factories and work sites. As a result of the
1990 amendments, the Directorate's inspectors now may issue notices
enjoining employers from practices or activities that involve a risk of
serious personal injuries. Previously, only magistrates were vested
with this authority. Such notices can be appealed to the Factories
Appeals Court, a body of four members, one of whom must be a High Court
judge. The number of factory inspections has increased significantly
since 1992. A new section stipulates that factories that employ at
least 20 persons have a health and safety committee with representation
from workers. However, according to the Government, less than half of
the very largest factories have instituted health and safety
committees. The vast majority of factories have yet to comply with the
new provision. Workers are not forced by law to remain in hazardous
conditions; however, many would be reluctant to remove themselves
because of the high unemployment problem and the resulting risk of loss
of their job.
f. Trafficking in persons.--Although there are no laws that
specifically prohibit trafficking in persons, there are potentially
applicable laws against kidnaping and abduction. There were no reports
that persons were trafficked in, to, or from the country during the
year. In past years, there has been anecdotal evidence that citizens
were trafficked to Saudi Arabia under the guise of employment
opportunities, and that South Asians were trafficked into the country
to work in sweatshops.
______
LESOTHO
Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy with King Letsie III as Head
of State. Under the 1993 Constitution, the King fills a ceremonial
role, has no executive authority, and is proscribed from actively
taking part in political initiatives. Prime Minister Pakalitha
Mosisili, the leader of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) party,
took office in June 1998 and is the Head of Government. In the May 1998
elections the LCD won 79 seats in the expanded 80-member Parliament.
The Basotho National Party (BNP) won the one remaining seat. Over 700
foreign and national election observers concluded that the election met
international standards for a transparent, multiparty election. The
Langa Commission, a group of election auditors from the Southern
African Development Community (SADC), reported that while there was no
evidence to substantiate charges of electoral fraud, mismanagement of
polling data made it impossible to confirm that fraud did not occur.
However, opposition parties claimed that the election result was
fraudulent and launched a prolonged and aggressive protest at the royal
palace in Maseru in August 1998. Opposition leaders urged the King--who
had staged a coup in 1994--to dissolve the newly elected Parliament and
install a government of national unity on the basis of their claim that
the LCD rigged the election. In September and October 1998, the armed
opposition protesters used violence to destabilize the Government,
disarm the police, intimidate workers and business owners, shut down
government and business operations, and facilitate a junior officer
rebellion in the army in September. The army rebels, who were armed,
aligned themselves with the opposition protesters. This resulted in a
virtual coup and severely strained relations between the Head of State
and the Government. The palace vigil and protests resulted in
politically motivated killings, injuries, violence, arson, and
destruction. These events also precipitated intervention by a SADC
military task force in September 1998 to quell the army mutiny and
return society to a state of law and order. In the past, the judiciary
had been subject at times to government and chieftainship influence;
however, there were no credible reports of the use of such influence
during the year.
The security forces consist of the Lesotho Defense Force (LDF), the
Lesotho Police Service (LPS--previously known as the Royal Lesotho
Mounted Police--RLMP), and the National Security Service (NSS). The
Prime Minister is the Minister of Defense, with direct authority over
the LDF and the NSS. The police force is under the authority of the
Minister of Home Affairs. In 1996 and 1997, the Parliament passed the
Lesotho Defense Act (1996), Regulations for Military Justice (1997),
and amended the Royal Lesotho Mounted Police Force Act. This
legislation was designed to bring these services under direct civilian
control. However, the politicized armed services have a history of
intervening in the country's politics and government. The LDF ruled the
country with two successive military regimes from 1985-90, and 1990-93.
In September 1998, a SADC task force put down an army rebellion,
arrested LDF rebels, and disarmed the remaining soldiers. Fifty army
personnel were accused of fomenting mutiny in September 1998 and
charged in December 1998 with the capital offense of mutiny and high
treason: they were brought before courts-martial hearings in January.
This is the first instance in which a court-martial prosecuted LDF
soldiers for infractions against the Defense Act. The LDF continues to
be the subject of a national debate on the structure, size, and role of
the military. The NSS and the LPS also are undergoing comprehensive
restructuring. There were allegations that the members of the security
forces on occasion committed human rights abuses.
Lesotho is a landlocked country surrounded by South Africa and
almost entirely dependent on its sole neighbor for trade, finance,
employment, and access to the outside world. About 65,000 men, a large
proportion of the adult male work force, work in mines in South Africa.
Miners' remittances account for slightly over one-third of gross
national product (GNP). Real GNP grew an estimated 8 percent during
1998, with inflation estimated at less than 7 percent. However, real
GNP declined to negative 7 percent during the year, partly as a result
of the destruction caused by the 1998 crisis. Per capita GNP was
approximately $790. State-owned organizations predominate in the
agroindustrial and agribusiness sectors, but private sector activity
dominates in the small manufacturing and construction sectors. The
opposition protest and SADC intervention resulted in a wave of
political violence and arson that destroyed nearly 80 percent of the
commercial infrastructure in Maseru and other towns and villages.
Thousands of jobs were lost, and many entrepreneurs went bankrupt.
Hundreds of millions of dollars in losses were sustained. Under the
traditional chieftainship structure, land use and tenure is controlled
by the traditional chiefs and formally owned by the Kingdom (i.e.,
``crown lands'').
The Government generally respected many of the human rights of its
citizens; however, there continued to be problems in some areas. There
were unconfirmed allegations of torture by security forces, and
credible reports that the police, at times, used excessive force
against detainees. Prison conditions are poor, and lengthy pretrial
detention is a problem. There are long delays in trials; the RLMP
members charged with treason in a February 1997 police mutiny have
remained in the maximum securityprison for 18 months without
significant progress toward finishing the trials in their cases. The
security forces infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Discipline
within the security services was undermined severely during the 1998
crisis. Clashes with SADC forces initiated by armed opposition
supporters and army mutineers in September 1998 resulted in the death
of 9 members of the South African National Defense Force, 60 LDF
soldiers, and more than 40 citizens allied with the opposition. A total
of 33 members of the RLMP face sedition and high treason charges
following their involvement in the February 1997 police mutiny, which
reflected entrenched mistrust and political competition between the
Government and some elements within the police force, and an uneasy
institutional rivalry between elements of the police and the army. The
LDF ultimately quelled the police mutiny. This step away from active
partisan engagement in politics to a more professional civil/military
relationship was reversed by the junior officer mutiny in 1998, which
undermined the integrity of the security forces. Domestic violence
remained common, and women's rights continued to be restricted
severely. Societal discrimination against the disabled is common.
Government enforcement of prohibitions against child labor is lax in
commercial enterprises that involve hazardous working conditions. The
Government restricts some worker rights. Smugglers use the country as a
transit point for trafficking in persons.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
In February 1998, police fired on a group of protesting textile
workers, killing 2 persons and injuring more than 20 others (see
Section 6.a.). Two police officers were arrested and held briefly for
the shooting; however, they were released when no one came forward to
lodge a formal complaint. Both officers were transferred from the
capital to rural districts.
During the 1998 opposition palace protest, violence between
protesters and police, between antagonistic political factions, and
between policemen and soldiers resulted in approximately nine
fatalities, including one police officer and eight civilians--four of
whom were opposition supporters, and numerous injuries. These deaths
were the result of gunshot wounds and fatal beatings sustained during
enforcement actions and during violent clashes among political party
supporters. Between September 21 and 28, 1998, nine South African
soldiers were killed while suppressing the army mutiny. Over 50 LDF
soldiers and 40 civilians allied with the opposition died in firefights
with SADC troops. In January the LDF soldiers accused of fomenting the
army mutiny were brought before a court-martial; 9 of the accused
soldiers were released due to insufficient evidence, 3 were acquitted,
and 38 soldiers were charged with the capital offense of mutiny and
high treason. The courts-martial were ongoing at year's end.
In March the Government began investigating the 1994 palace coup
and the alleged involvement of military personnel in the killing of the
Deputy Prime Minister; 14 members of the LDF were arrested and charged
with involvement in the killing. Four of the soldiers also are facing
courts-martial for their role in the 1998 army mutiny. The trials for
the killing of the Deputy Prime Minister have been delayed until the
courts-martial are completed.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution expressly prohibits torture or inhuman or
degrading punishment or other treatment, and the Government generally
respects these provisions; however, there were credible reports that
the police at times used excessive force against detainees. Opposition
leaders and defense lawyers claimed that the LDF soldiers accused of
mutiny were tortured by government and prison officials, although
evidence to support such allegations was not provided.
Prison conditions are poor. Prison facilities are overcrowded and
in disrepair, but conditions do not threaten the health or lives of
inmates. Amnesty International representatives visited the LDF soldiers
accused of mutiny being held in the maximum security prison in Maseru
and reported that cells were infested with insects, and there was a
lack of ventilation, light, proper bedding, and adequate sanitation
facilities. In January the Judge Advocate ordered prison officials to
improve conditions in the cells in which the soldiers accused of mutiny
were beingheld. As a result, the soldiers received cots and better
food. Women are housed separately from men, and juveniles are housed
separately from adults. Rape in prison reportedly is not a problem.
In January 50 soldiers accused of involvement in the 1998 mutiny
revolted in prison. One soldier escaped, but the revolt was quelled
with the use of only minimum force. In June 41 LDF soldiers revolted
after prison officials refused to allow them to have food or drinks
from outside the prison on the grounds that contraband goods were being
smuggled into the prison. Again, the revolt was quelled with minimum
force and no casualties.
Prison conditions are not monitored independently, although Amnesty
International was permitted to visit the maximum security prison in
Maseru in October 1998.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and there were no reports of
such abuses. However, opposition leaders alleged that the Government
engaged in ``political victimization'' by arresting their supporters
for allegedly unlawful acts and punishing alleged mutinous soldiers
with incarceration during the 1998 crisis. During the crisis, a number
of persons were arrested for arson, looting, and possession of stolen
property and unlawful firearms. Some of the persons searched and
arrested were opposition supporters; however, there was no clear
evidence that authorities exclusively targeted opposition supporters.
The domestic legal and nongovernmental organization (NGO) communities
are concerned that pretrial detainees, such as those alleged to have
been involved in 1998 arson and looting incidents, can be held for long
periods of time before trial; however, efforts have been made to
improve the judicial administration and reduce the backlog of cases.
Some persons arrested in interior districts in January for looting,
arson, and possession of stolen goods in connection with the 1998
crisis, were tried and sentenced to fines or incarceration.
Members of the legal community remained concerned that 33 alleged
police mutineers, who were arrested in February 1997, continued to be
held without significant progress toward completion of their trials.
Charges were filed against the mutineers in early 1998, but their
trials were delayed until late 1998. The trials were ongoing at year's
end. Government officials indicate that the trials were delayed by
other priority concerns related to 1998 opposition cases in which the
Government was accused of electoral fraud, and by the unanticipated
departure of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
Pretrial detainees on remand form a significant portion of the
prison population. Because of serious backlogs of the court caseloads,
the period of pretrial remand for some suspects can last months or even
years.
In 1997 the Government repealed the provisions of the Internal
Security Act (ISA) of 1984 that allowed for investigative detention.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in the past, magistrates appeared to be
subject at times to government and chieftainship influence. Opposition
parties alleged that the High Court was biased against them in relation
to cases they filed following the May 1998 elections; however, court
officials indicated that the opposition cases failed to succeed due to
a lack of evidence to support their claims.
The judiciary consists of the Court of Appeal (which meets semi-
annually), the High Court, magistrates courts, and customary or
traditional courts (which exist largely in rural areas to administer
customary law).
The High Court also provides procedural and substantive advice and
guidance on matters of law and procedure to military tribunals;
however, it does not participate in arriving at judgments. Military
tribunals operating under the 1996 Defense Act have jurisdiction only
over military cases, such as the trial of alleged army mutineers.
Decisions by military tribunals can be appealed only to a special
courts-martial appeal court, which is composed of two judges from the
High Court, one retired military officer with a legal background, and
the registrar of the High Court. In January the defense lawyers for the
accused army mutineers asked the judge advocate to dismiss all charges,
alleging that the court-martial hearings were unconstitutional on the
grounds that the proceedings were overly subject to inappropriate
command influence and lacked judicial independence. The adjudication
panelists were the same LDF officers who were rounded up at gunpoint
during the mutiny and held incommunicado in the maximum security
prison. The judge advocate denied thelawyers' request. In June upon
review, the Chief Justice also denied the request, as did the Court of
Appeals in October.
Persons detained or arrested in criminal cases and defendants in
civil cases have the right to legal counsel; however, there is no
system to provide public defenders. The Ministry of Justice and the NGO
community maintain a few legal aid clinics. The authorities generally
respect court decisions and rulings. There is no trial by jury.
Criminal trials normally are adjudicated by a single High Court judge
who presides, with two assessors serving in an advisory capacity. In
civil cases, judges normally hear cases alone. The 1981 Criminal
Procedures and Evidence Act, as amended in 1984, makes provision for
granting bail. Bail is granted regularly and generally fairly. There is
a large case backlog, which leads to lengthy delays in trials. In
September 1998, a Molotov cocktail attack on the High Court destroyed
case files and other important documents and further hampered the
operations of the courts.
In civil courts, women and men are accorded equal rights; however,
in traditional and customary courts, certain rights and privileges
accorded to men are denied to women. When traditional law and custom
are invoked in a court case, a male plaintiff can opt for customary
judgments by a principal chief rather than a civil court, and the
judgment is binding legally. This system greatly disadvantages women.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Authorities infringed on citizen's privacy rights.
Although search warrants are required under normal circumstances, the
1984 Internal Security Act (ISA) provides police with wide powers to
stop and search persons and vehicles and to enter homes and other
places without a warrant. There are no prohibitions against monitoring
telephone conversations. The security services are believed to monitor
routinely telephone conversations of Basothos and foreigners,
ostensibly on national security grounds. Following the 1998 opposition
palace protest, police searched the homes of numerous opposition
members and others for weapons and contraband.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice. There are several independent
newspapers--including one controlled by the Roman Catholic Church, one
controlled by the Lesotho Evangelical Church, and four English-language
weeklies--that routinely criticize the Government. The official state-
owned or state-controlled media consist of one radio station, a 1-hour
daily newscast on a local television channel, and two weekly
newspapers, which all faithfully reflect official positions of the
ruling party. There are four private radio stations but no private
local television station. South African and global satellite television
and radio broadcasts are widely available. Despite serious damage to a
number of news publications caused by arson and looting in September
1998, these news organizations resumed publishing within months.
There is a lack of free access to government information, which
often is described as a limitation on the free press; however, there
are no other barriers that affect press coverage of government
activities. In 1998 the National Press Association objected to rules
established by the Independent Electoral Commission, which barred
reporters from entering polling stations on election day.
The Government respects academic freedom. Although the Government
owns and administers the country's only university, the academic staff
represents the full political spectrum and is free to express its
views.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
this right in practice. Under a 1993 revision of the ISA, a public
meeting, rally, or march no longer requires prior police permission,
only advance notification. Political party meetings and rallies are
held regularly and are unhindered by the Government; however, the
Government did not approve an opposition protest march to commemorate
the 1-year anniversary of the 1998 crisis. The Government allowed other
events related to this anniversary to take place, including religious
observances.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice. In addition to
the LCD, the Basotholand Congress Party (BCP), and the BNP, there were
nine smaller registered political parties.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens generally are able to move
freely within the country and across national boundaries. The
Government places no obstacles in the way of citizens who wish to
emigrate.
In September 1998, numerous serious incidents and threats to the
safety of citizens by opposition supporters who carried out assaults,
car-jackings, attacks on residences, and sniper attacks led thousands
of foreigners and ruling LCD supporters to flee to South Africa in the
weeks immediately following the SADC military intervention. The
presence of SADC forces during the year helped to maintain a relative
peace. Almost all citizens had returned by year's end; however, a large
number of the foreigners who fled moved their residences across the
border and commute to their jobs in Lesotho.
The law provides for the granting of refugee/asylee status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In 1994 the Government allowed about 25
refugees registered with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to
study in the country. They were expected to return to their countries
of first asylum after completing their studies, but had not done so by
year's end. Other than these students, there is no resident refugee
population. The Government provides first asylum; however, the issue
did not arise during the year.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
In the first multiparty democratic elections in 1993, after more
than 20 years of undemocratic authoritarian and military rule, the BCP
came to power with complete control of the National Assembly. Despite
its landslide electoral victory, the BCP Government was forced to
contend with a number of challenges to its power, including a violent
opposition destabilization campaign based on allegations that the BCP
had won by fraud. These challenges culminated in August 1994 when King
Letsie III unconstitutionally suspended the Parliament and installed a
ruling council. Many Basotho responded by demonstrating their support
for the democratically elected BCP government. Organized labor and
others held two national demonstrations--``stayaways''--to express
support for the ousted government, and there were numerous rallies at
the National University. As a result of both local and international
pressure, the King reversed himself, and the BCP regained control of
the Government.
A 1994 Memorandum of Understanding between King Letsie III and
Prime Minister Dr. Ntsu Mokhehle, which was brokered by South Africa,
Botswana, and Zimbabwe, called for the reinstatement of the King's
father, Moshoeshoe II, who had been deposed by the previous military
Government and exiled in 1990, and for measures to broaden
participation in the political process. In early 1995, Moshoeshoe II
was reinstated as King. In January 1996 upon the death of his father,
King Letsie III was sworn in again as King. The formal coronation of
King Letsie III was held in October 1997. The 1994 suspension of the
Constitution by Letsie, although short-lived, highlighted the fragility
of rule within the constitutional monarchy.
The 1998 crisis was similar to that of the 1993-94 post-electoral
period. In both cases, opposition party members alleged electoral
fraud, suborned army supporters, sought the King's involvement, and
effectively overthrew the elected Government. However, in 1998 the King
did not take an active role in the opposition campaign, as he did in
1994, and, based on the 1994 Memorandum of Understanding, Prime
Minister Mosisili asked SADC to intervene militarily to stabilize the
situation.
In the May 1998 elections, the LCD won 79 of 80 parliamentary
seats. The BNP won the other seat. International observers concluded
that the elections met international standards for a multiparty
election and reflected the will of the voters. Despite the opposition
coalition claims, the Langa Commission, composed of international
observers from four southern African countries, reported no definitive
findings of vote rigging or fraud. However, post-election management of
electoral and polling station data was poor. Consequently, the
Commission stated that the documentation was in such disarray that it
couldnot prove that fraud had not occurred, and this encouraged the
opposition to charge that errors short of fraud could have affected the
results.
In October 1998, the LCD and the newly formed opposition alliance
agreed to hold new elections within 2 years as a means of resolving the
ongoing political crisis. Local elections, scheduled to be held late in
1998, were postponed because of the 1998 crisis. Negotiations under
SADC supervision resulted in the December 1998 establishment of the
Interim Political Authority (IPA) with a mandate to prepare for new
elections within 18 months (i.e., in the first half of 2000). The IPA
made little progress in meeting its objectives to resolve political
disputes or achieve a national consensus on an electoral model.
However, in November an arbitration award broke the IPA deadlock. Under
the arbitration award, the Parliament is to expand from 80 to 130
seats. In the next election only, candidates will compete for 80
constituency seats and 50 proportional representation seats.
Thereafter, the number of constituency seats and proportional
representation seats is to be equal. National multiparty elections are
not expected to be held until sometime in late 2000.
There are no legal impediments to women's participation in
government or politics, but women remain underrepresented. There are 2
women in the 80-member House of Assembly and 7 women in the 33-member
Senate. A woman serves as the Minister of Environment, Women, and Youth
Affairs. In October the Parliament unanimously elected the first female
Speaker of the House Assembly.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government did not hinder the activities of nongovernmental
human rights groups, which operated freely and criticized the
Government. The Government did not impede or object to an October 1998
Amnesty International visit to investigate human rights abuses.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language,
Disability, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, color,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, birth, or other status, and the Government generally respected
these prohibitions in practice. However, the Constitution also
recognizes customary law as a parallel legal system, and women's
inheritance and property rights are restricted severely under the
traditional chieftainship system.
Women.--Domestic violence, including wife beating, occurs
frequently. Dependable statistics are not available, but the problem is
believed to be widespread. In Basotho tradition, a wife may return to
her ``maiden home'' if physically abused by her husband. Under common
law, wife beating is a criminal offense and defined as assault.
However, few domestic violence cases are brought to trial. Beatings and
violence against women perpetrated by husbands or other male relatives
occur frequently; however, increasingly it is considered socially
unacceptable behavior. A national conference held in March 1998 on the
empowerment of women noted that of 100 cases of human rights abuses, 90
percent of the victims were women who were victims of domestic
violence, rape, and sexual harassment.
There were credible reports that the country is used as a transit
point for trafficking in persons (see Section 6.f.).
Both law and custom under the traditional chieftainship system
severely limit the rights of women in areas such as property rights,
inheritance, and contracts. Women have the legal and customary right to
make a will and sue for divorce. However, under customary law, a
married woman is considered a minor during the lifetime of her husband.
She cannot enter into legally binding contracts, whether for
employment, commerce, or education, without her husband's consent. A
woman married under customary law has no standing in civil court and
may not sue or be sued without her husband's permission. Government
officials publicly have criticized this customary practice, which
discriminates against women. The tradition of paying a bride price
(lobola) is common. Polygyny is practiced by a very small percentage of
the population.
Women's rights organizations have taken a leading role in educating
women about their rights under customary and common law, highlighting
the importance of women participating in the democratic process. In
1998 the Government created a Ministry of Gender Affairs.
Children.--The Government has not addressed adequately children's
rights and welfare, although it has devoted substantial resources to
primary and secondary education. Education is not compulsory even at
the primary levels, and some 25 percent of children do not attend
school, particularly in rural areas, where children are involved in
subsistence activities in support of their family's welfare, or where
families cannot afford the costs associated with school attendance (for
example, fees for purchase of uniforms, books, and materials). The
problem of school nonattendance affects boys disproportionately more
than girls. In traditional rural Basotho society, livestock herding by
young boys is a rite of passage and a prerequisite to manhood in the
community.
There is no pattern of societal abuse against children, but many
children work at a relatively young age (see Section 6.d.). Familial
stress, poverty, the spread of HIV/Aids, and divorce have led to a rise
in child homelessness and abandonment, creating a growing number of
street children. There were credible reports that the country was used
as a transit point for trafficking in persons (see Section 6.f).
People with Disabilities.--Discrimination against physically
disabled persons in employment, education, or provision of other
government services is unlawful; however, societal discrimination is
common. The Government has not legislated or mandated accessibility to
public buildings for the disabled.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Most citizens speak a common
language and share common historical and cultural traditions. Small
numbers of Asians (primarily ethnic Chinese and Indians) and South
African whites are active in the country's commercial life. Economic
and racial tension between the Chinese business community and the
Basotho remained a problem.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Under the law, workers have the right
to join or form unions without prior government authorization, with the
exception of civil servants. The Labor Code prohibits civil servants
from joining unions. The Government regards all work by civil servants
as essential. In a 1997 judgement by the High Court concerning a
petition filed by the Lesotho Union of Public Servants (LUPE) against
the registrar of law, the Chief Justice dismissed the LUPE's
application to form a union on the grounds that it was not consistent
with the Labor Code. The LUPE filed an appeal with the Appeals Court,
but it had not been heard by year's end.
Under the 1993 Labor Code, prepared with the assistance of the
International Labor Organization (ILO), all trade union federations
require government registration. There are two small trade union
federations that rarely cooperate with one another: the Lesotho Trade
Union Congress and the Lesotho Federation of Democratic Unions. Unions
are not affiliated formally or tied to political parties.
The labor and trade union movement is very weak and fragmented.
There are several small unions in the public and industrial sectors,
but there is no unified trade union congress. There are cases of unions
competitively organizing small numbers of workers in the same sector.
Overall, unionized workers represent only about 10 percent of the work
force. Consequently, efforts toward collective bargaining and
tripartite policymaking are not amenable to strong trade union
influences.
There is credible evidence that some employers inhibit union
organizers from access to factory premises to organize workers or to
represent them in disputes with owners or managers. There were reports
that some employers harassed union organizers and intimidated members
and that union activists frequently were fired (see Section 6.b.).
A large percentage of the male labor force works in the gold and
coal mines of South Africa. The majority of the remainder is engaged
primarily in traditional agriculture. A majority of Basotho mine
workers are members of the South African National Union of Mineworkers
(NUM); however, as a foreign organization, the NUM is not allowed to
engage in union activities.
No legally authorized strike has occurred since independence in
1966. Civil servants generally are not allowed to strike, and all
public sector industrial actions are, by definition, unauthorized. In
the private sector, the Labor Code requires an escalating series of
procedures to be followed by workers and employers before strike action
is authorized. In past years, some small unions and their members have
undertaken wildcatstrikes or spontaneous industrial actions without
following the procedures for dispute resolution. In February a wildcat
strike took place in the textile sector. Legal protection for strikers
against retribution has not always been enforced in cases of illegal
strikes. Security forces violently suppressed some wildcat strikes in
the textile, garment, and construction industries in 1994, 1996, and
1998. In February 1998, police fired shotguns into a group of workers
protesting at a textile plant for better wages and conditions of work,
killing 2 workers and injuring more than 20. Two police officers were
arrested and held briefly for the shooting; however, they were released
when no one came forward to lodge a formal complaint. Both officers
were transferred from the capital to rural districts.
There were no instances of governmental restrictions on
international affiliations or contacts by unions or their members.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--All legally
recognized trade unions in principle enjoy the right to organize and
bargain collectively; however, in practice the authorities often
restrict these rights. Employers usually are not cooperative in this
area. Employees often are threatened with expulsion and loss of
employment if they join unions. There is credible evidence that some
employers in the textile and garment sector engage in the use of
blacklists to deny employment to workers who have been fired by another
employer within that sector. There were reports that some employers
harassed union organizers. Although there was some collective
bargaining between unions and employers to set wage and benefit rates,
employers generally continued to set wage rates through unilateral
action.
Lesotho has several industrial zones, in which mostly textile and
apparel firms manufacture for export. All national labor laws apply in
these industrial zones; however, employers in the zones do not always
respect these rights in practice. Employers reportedly harassed and
intimidated union organizers, and prevented them from entering the
zones. There were reports that union activists often were fired. There
were also reports that many companies in the zones pay below minimum
wage, enforce long hours, lock in workers until orders are finished,
refuse payment for sick leave, and deduct wages when employees are
found talking or take more than one break a day.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The 1987 Employment
Act prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
children, and there is no credible indication that such labor is
practiced. There were credible reports that the country was used as a
transit point for trafficking in persons (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment in commercial or
industrial enterprises is 14. However, reportedly children under 14 are
employed in the textile and garment sector and in family-owned
businesses. According to a 1994 study by a foreign government, as much
as 15 percent of the textile work force of some 15,000 persons may be
children between the ages of 12 and 15. The Ministry of Labor denies
the validity of this report. The ILO was not able to confirm
allegations of illegal child labor after visiting all 14 of the
country's garment producers in 1994 in response to a complaint by trade
unions in the textile and clothing industry.
There are statutory prohibitions against the employment of minors
in commercial, industrial, or non-family enterprises involving
hazardous or dangerous working conditions, but enforcement is very lax.
The Ministry of Labor and Employment's Inspectorate is severely
understaffed. Youths under 18 years of age may not be recruited for
employment outside of the country. In traditional society, rigorous and
occasionally dangerous working conditions for the country's young
livestock herdboys are considered a prerequisite to manhood, essential
to the livelihood of families, and a fundamental feature of local
culture beyond the reach of labor laws. The Government specifically
prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and there were no
reports that it occurred (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In general, wages are low. The
monthly minimum wage for unskilled labor is $68 (320 maloti), and $131
(616 maloti) for a heavy vehicle operator. Minimum wages for workers in
lower skilled jobs are insufficient to ensure a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. Most wage earners supplement their
income through subsistence agriculture or remittances from relatives
employed in South Africa. Many private employers paymore than minimum
wages in an effort to attract and retain motivated employees. However,
there is also reason to believe that some employers, especially in
export sectors, treat the minimum wage as a maximum wage. This
situation is made possible by the high levels of unemployment and
underemployment, which provide a large pool of surplus unskilled labor
that bids down wage rates and threatens job security for workers who
make demands for better wages and conditions of work.
The Labor Code spells out basic worker rights, including a maximum
45-hour workweek, a weekly rest period of at least 24 hours, 12 days of
paid leave per year, and paid public holidays; however, employers do
not always respect these rights in practice. There are reports of
employers locking in workers until an order is finished without
overtime pay and of employers refusing sick leave. Workers generally
are unable to obtain an expeditious hearing in court on their
complaints. The labor court has a large backlog of industrial dispute
cases on the docket; there is only one labor judge to deal with cases
filed as early as 1995.
The Labor Code requires employers to provide adequate light,
ventilation, and sanitary facilities for employees and to install and
maintain machinery in a manner designed to minimize the risk of injury.
However, in practice employers generally follow these regulations only
within the wage economy in urban areas, and the Ministry of Labor and
Employment enforces the regulations haphazardly. The Labor Code does
not explicitly protect the right of workers to remove themselves from
hazardous situations without prejudice to employment. However, Labor
Code sections on safety in the workplace and dismissal imply that
dismissal in such circumstances would be illegal.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons, and there were credible reports that illegal immigrant
smugglers, primarily from South and East Asia, take advantage of the
country's undersupervised borders to pass persons temporarily through
the country to transportation hubs in South Africa for onward movement
to Europe and North America. It is not clear to what extent these
organizations are recruiting or transporting persons illegally for
involuntary servitude, slavery, or forced or bonded labor. It is
suspected that most of the persons who are moved by these criminal
organizations are primarily economic immigrants seeking employment in
North Atlantic countries. There is no evidence of forced or bonded
labor or servitude in the country resulting from these activities.
______
LIBERIA
Liberia is a centralized republic, dominated by a strong
presidency. Although the Constitution provides for three branches of
government, there is no effective system of checks and balances, and
presidents traditionally have wielded extraordinary power. Americo-
Liberians, descendants of freed African-American slaves from the United
States and the Caribbean who make up about 5 percent of the population,
dominated the country's government through the True Whig party until
1980. In 1980 Sergeant Samuel K. Doe, a member of the indigenous Krahn
ethnic group, seized power in a military coup. Doe was killed by rebels
in 1990 early in the 7-year-long, ethnically divisive civil war, which
was ended by the Abuja Peace Accords in 1996. Forces led by Charles G.
Taylor, who is of both indigenous and Americo-Liberian ancestry,
emerged dominant. In July 1997, Taylor won the presidential election,
and his National Patriotic Party (NPP) won three-quarters of the seats
in the Legislature. The elections were administratively free and
transparent, but were conducted in an atmosphere of intimidation, as
most voters believed that Taylor's forces would have resumed fighting
if he had lost. Most other leaders of the former warring factions
subsequently left the country. The bicameral Legislature exercised
little independence from the executive branch. The judiciary is subject
to political influence, economic pressure, and corruption.
The regular security forces included: The Armed Forces of Liberia
(AFL); the Liberia National Police (LNP), which has primary
responsibility for internal security; the Antiterrorist Unit (ATU),
composed of an elite special forces group; and the Special Security
Service (SSS), a large, heavily armed executive protective force. There
also are numerous irregular security services attached to certain key
ministries and parastatal corporations, the responsibilities of which
appear poorly defined. The national army, which fought against Taylor's
faction during the civil war, has yet to be downsized and restructured
as required by the Abuja Peace Accords, although a restructuring plan
exists. Only a few contingents have been deployed to maintain security
in parts of rural areas. The many newly created security services
absorbed Taylor's most experienced civil war fighters, including
undisciplined and untrained loyalists. While civilian authorities in
Monrovia generally maintained control of the security forces,
frequently they acted independently of government authority,
particularlyin rural areas. Members of the security forces committed
numerous serious human rights abuses.
Liberia is a very poor country with a market-based economy that has
yet to recover from the ravages of the civil war. Average per capita
income is estimated at only a small fraction of the prewar level. Prior
to 1990, the cash economy was based primarily on iron ore, rubber,
timber, diamond, and gold exports. Unemployment of 85 percent, a 15
percent literacy rate, the internal displacement of civilians in Lofa
and Nimba counties, and the absence of infrastructure throughout the
country continued to depress productive capacity, despite the country's
rich natural resources and potential self-sufficiency in food.
Government officials and former combatants continued to exploit the
country's natural resources for personal benefit. Extortion is a
widespread phenomenon in all levels of society.
The Government's human rights record remained poor, and there were
serious problems in many areas. The security forces committed many
extrajudicial killings. They were accused of killing or causing the
disappearance of citizens from Lofa county. Security forces tortured,
beat, and otherwise abused or humiliated citizens. The Government
investigated some of the alleged abuses by the security forces, but in
all cases in which officers were charged, they either were treated
leniently or exonerated. Prison conditions were harsh and sometimes
life threatening. Security forces continued at times to use arbitrary
arrest and detention, and lengthy pretrial detention remained common.
The judicial system, hampered by political influence, economic
pressure, inefficiency, corruption, and a lack of resources, was unable
to ensure citizens' rights to due process and a fair trial. In some
rural areas where the judiciary had not been reestablished, clan
chieftains administered criminal justice through the traditional
practice of trial-by-ordeal; at times the authorities tacitly condoned
this practice. Over 1 dozen political prisoners remained in jail.
Security forces violated citizens' privacy rights, conducted
warrantless searches, harassment, illegal surveillance, and looted
homes. The Government restricted freedom of the press and assaulted,
threatened, and intimidated journalists into self-censorship. Security
forces restricted freedom of movement, using roadblocks to extort money
from travelers and returning refugees. Security forces frequently
harassed human rights monitors. Violence and discrimination against
women remained problems. The education and care of children remained
widely neglected, and female genital mutilation (FGM) continued to
increase. Societal ethnic discrimination remained widespread, ethnic
differences continued to generate violence and political tensions, and
the Government continued to discriminate against indigenous ethnic
groups that had opposed Taylor in the civil war, especially the
Mandingo and the Krahn ethnic groups. Forced labor, including by
children, persisted in rural areas. Child labor remained widespread,
and there were reports of forced child labor. Ritualistic killings also
persisted.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces
continued to commit extrajudicial killings during the year. Human
rights organizations estimate the number of extrajudicial killings to
be approximately 100; however, there were no convictions of the
perpetrators. Beginning in August when it appointed Paul Mulbah as the
new director of the LNP, the Government stepped up its efforts to curb
these and other abuses by members of the security forces.
There were credible reports that government forces as well as
members of the Loma ethnic group harassed and intimidated members of
the Mandingo ethnic group, including the burning of mosques. There are
credible reports that during the incursions and counter-attacks in Lofa
county, hundreds were killed and thousands of citizens plus refugees
from Sierra Leone were forced to flee the area. In July Sierra Leonan
refugees began to leave two refugee camps in northern Lofa country
because of the instability and harassment by security forces. Many
walked for days to reach the help of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) in Bomi county, which transported them to a refugee
camp near the border with Sierra Leone. Lofa county residents
complained of constant harassment and intimidation by the police and
paramilitary forces used by the Government to quell the incursions.
In May a human rights organization reported that a security officer
was beaten to death and called for an investigation. The LNP stated
that the officer had died in a traffic accident. President Taylor later
told a press conference that the officer died while in detention. No
one was charged in connection with the officer's death.
A U.N. team visited in May to investigate the September 1998
violence. No government forces were arrested. The Government arrested
14 Krahn civilians in 1998 and tried them for sedition. Thirteen were
convicted in 1999 and are serving 10-year terms. Nine Krahn AFL
soldiers were arrested and were standing trial at year's end. Five
other Krahn arrested in 1998 in connection with the September 1998
violence were not charged by year's end.
The President Pro Tempore of the Senate told the Inter-
parliamentary Union that the investigation into the 1997 killings of
opposition political leader Samuel Saye Dokie and three family members
continued. However, authorities did not report any results from a
promised investigation.
There was no follow-up in investigations of the 1998 extrajudicial
killings of Mannah Zekay, John Nimely, or others reported during that
year.
There was no report released by the Government following its
November investigation of the reported killing of as many as 30
Mandingos in Lofa county in August. Although the authorities
subsequently arrested 19 persons, they did not charge anyone with a
crime. Mandingo residents of Lofa county continued to be afraid to
return to their homes.
Reports of ritualistic killings, in which human body parts used in
traditional rituals are removed from the victim, continued to occur.
The number of such killings is difficult to ascertain, since police
often described deaths as accidents even when body parts have been
removed. Deaths that appear to be natural or accidental sometimes are
rumored to have been the work of ritualistic killers. Most reported
ritual killings were from the southeastern counties. In August the
Government sent a high-level national police delegation to investigate
alleged ritual killings in Harper, Maryland county.
b. Disappearance.--Security forces produced suspects whom they had
held without charge when the courts issued writs of habeas corpus on
the applications of human rights organizations. Their disappearances
were often the result of prolonged illegal detention at the Gbartala
base (see Section 1.c.). There were a number of reports that ethnic
Mandingos disappeared following the violence in Lofa county in April
and August. Eyewitnesses gave a detailed account, stating that all the
men in a Lofa county village were taken away by government security
forces. It is not known whether the missing individuals were killed or
fled to Guinea or other parts of the world. There were no reports by
year's end that the Government carried out its promised investigation
of the incident.
There were no developments in the 1998 disappearance case of market
woman Nowai Flomo.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and other degrading
treatment; however, government security forces sometimes tortured,
beat, and otherwise abused and humiliated citizens. In several cases,
security forces produced suspects whom they had held without charge
when the courts issued writs of habeas corpus on the applications of
human rights organizations. The detainees charged that they were
tortured while in detention at a security training base in Gbatala.
Victims reported being held in water-filled holes in the ground, being
injured when fires were kindled on grates over their heads, being
urinated on, and suffering beatings and sexual abuse. In October human
rights organizations called for the closure of the base because of the
reports of torture there. The number of credible claims of such
treatment indicates a pattern of abuse at the base. The Government did
not report any results of its promised investigation by year's end.
An assistant minister for public security and some security force
members were dismissed and tried and convicted of aggravated assault
after being charged with forcibly removing amagistrate from his
courtroom and torturing him because they took exception to a court
ruling.
In March in Dambala, a village near the border with Sierra Leone, a
group of armed soldiers reportedly beat and detained men, raped women,
and looted homes.
Government security personnel assaulted and injured a few
journalists (see Section 2.a.).
Members of the security forces, as well as the ATF, AFL, and the
SSS were implicated in numerous reports of harassment, intimidation,
and looting. Beginning in August, new LNP director Mulbah took steps to
investigate and discipline officers accused of human rights abuses. For
example, in October citizens of the southeastern county of Maryland
reported harassment and intimidation by officers, including a shooting
and beatings of local citizens (see Section 1.e.). In response the
director dispatched a team of LNP inspectors to investigate. In October
two SSS officers were found guilty in an SSS investigation and
imprisoned for harassing and intimidating citizens.
Security force personnel in rural areas were paid and provisioned
inadequately and often extorted money and goods from civilians. There
were many credible reports that security forces harassed returning
refugees, displaced persons, and refugees from Sierra Leone, especially
in the border areas. Numerous abuses occurred following the incidents
in Lofa county in April and August (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).
Government security personnel were involved in the looting of 1,450
tons of food intended for Sierra Leonean refugees, theft of vehicles
belonging to international organizations and nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) and the personal property of foreigners and
citizens. The international community publicly decried the Government's
support for the Revolutionary United Front rebels in the civil war in
Sierra Leone.
During the first half of the year, the police manhandled numerous
petty traders and confiscated money and goods in various market areas,
while attempting to prevent small traders from operating outside areas
designated for them. Paul Mulbah, the police director appointed in
August, took steps to end these abuses.
Clan chieftains continued to use the traditional practice of trial-
by-ordeal to resolve criminal cases in rural areas. Although the
Supreme Court ruled that trial-by-ordeal--commonly the placement of a
heated metal object on a suspect's body in an attempt to determine
whether the defendant is telling the truth--is unconstitutional, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs continued tacitly to condone the practice
in an unknown number of cases during the year. A lawsuit filed in 1994
for injuries resulting from trial-by-ordeal was still pending before
the Supreme Court at year's end.
The widow of an Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) soldier reported that
after her husband was killed on duty at the Liberia-Guinea border
during the April incident, she was beaten severely and abducted by
members of the Mandingo ethnic group and taken to Guinea. She later
escaped and returned to the country.
Prison conditions were harsh and in some cases life threatening.
There were credible reports of unofficial detention facilities in which
detainees were held without charge and in some cases tortured. The
Government did not provide detainees or prisoners in official
facilities with adequate food or medical care. Cells at Monrovia
Central Prison are overcrowded, mostly with detainees awaiting trial.
Only about 10 percent of the total prison population have been
convicted of criminal offenses. Convicted prisoners and detainees
awaiting trial are not confined in separate facilities. Many of the
detainees have been subjected to lengthy pretrial detention, and in
some cases, the period of detention approximates the length of sentence
for the crime in question. Similar conditions exist in the Barclay
Training Center military stockade. In some counties, the structure that
serves as a jail is a container with bars at one end.
In a number of cases, human rights groups and interested
individuals achieved the release of prisoners. In November a legal aid
organization obtained the release without bail from Monrovia Central
Prison of a pregnant woman charged with theft. The woman, who was 8
months pregnant, had been detained without trial since July.
Women, who constitute about 5 percent of the prison population,
were held in separate cells. Their conditions are comparable to that of
the male prisoners and detainees. There were no separate facilities for
juvenile offenders.
The Government permits the independent monitoring of prison
conditions by local human rights groups, the media, and the ICRC. The
ICRC is allowed to visit prisoners in prison facilities and police
detention centers without third parties present and to make regular
repeat visits. However, visits to unofficial detention centers often
are denied. For example, despite requests made by NGO's to the Defense
Ministry, no independent monitor has been allowed to visit the Gbatala
base in which victims have been detained illegally and tortured.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, security forces
continued at times to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily. The
Constitution provides for the rights of the accused, including warrants
for arrests, and the right of detainees either to be charged or
released within 48 hours). Although the Government generally adheres to
these standards, warrants were not always based on sufficient evidence,
and detainees, especially those without the means to hire a lawyer,
often were held for more than 48 hours without charge. In some cases,
persons were detained secretly at unofficial detention centers (see
Section 1.c.).
The Constitution provides for the right of a person who is charged
to receive an expeditious trial; however, lengthy pretrial and
prearraignment detention remained a serious problem (see Section 1.c.).
Five detained soldiers awaiting court-martial for desertion during the
September 1998 incident have been incarcerated in the stockade since
November 1998. Should they be convicted, the maximum sentence would be
6 months' imprisonment.
The police have only limited logistics and forensic capabilities
and cannot adequately investigate many crimes, including murder cases.
When the courts release known criminals for lack of evidence, police
officers often rearrest them on specious charges.
Authorities charged journalists with contempt and detained some
journalists (in one case for more than the legal limit of 48 hours),
without charge (see Section 2.a.).
The Government did not use forced exile, but the security forces
frequently harassed and threatened opposition figures and human rights
activists to the point that a number of them departed the country due
to fear for their personal safety or that of their families. An
internationally renowned human rights activist was forced to leave the
country for fear of his life by various security officials. In January
17-year-old child rights advocate Kimmie Weeks fled the country to
avoid harassment by security personnel disturbed by his charges that
the Government was training child soldiers. Several times during the
year, President Taylor publicly alleged that some of these opposition
figures had gone abroad to conspire in the overthrow of his Government.
The effect of such statements was to keep numerous prominent opposition
figures and former warlords out of the country throughout the year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Although the Constitution provides
for an independent judiciary, judges are subjected to political,
social, familial, and financial pressures, leading to the corruption of
the judiciary. Some judges and magistrates are not lawyers. The
judiciary determined that it is not feasible to retire immediately all
judicial personnel who are not legally trained but intends to replace
those currently sitting by lawyers as they retire. The Supreme Court
ruled that members of the bar must be graduates of a law school and
pass the bar examination. The executive branch continued to exert undue
influence on the judiciary. Early in the year, the President's personal
aide-de-camp prevented the execution of a Supreme Court decision
against a major bank. The aide reportedly feared that its failure would
injure the country's fragile economy. The Court was not able to enforce
its decision, at least partially because the plaintiff did not inform
the Court that its decision was not executed.
The judiciary is divided into four levels, with the Supreme Court
at the apex. All levels of the court system in Monrovia, including the
Supreme Court functioned erratically. In 1997, for the first time in
the country's history, a juvenile court system was established for all
13 counties. However, by year's end, the only functioning juvenile
court was in Monrovia. The Monrovia juvenile court has heard 50 cases
since its inception. A criminal court established in late 1997
specifically to handle armed robbery cases remains ineffective. The
Government's efforts to revitalize the court system outside Monrovia
continued to be troubled by lack of trained personnel, infrastructure,
and lack of adequate funding. Although judges were assigned throughout
the country, in some cases they were unable to hold court due to lack
of supplies and equipment. Several localities reverted to traditional
forms of justice administered by clan chieftains (see Section 1.c.).
Under the Constitution, defendants have due process rights that
conform to internationally accepted standards. However, in practice
these rights are not always observed. Defendants have the right to a
public trial and timely consultation with an attorney. However, there
is no effective system to provide public defenders, especially in the
rural areas. Courts regularly received bribes or other illegal gifts
out of damages that they awarded in civil cases. Defense attorneys
often suggested that their clients pay a gratuity to appease judges,
prosecutors, and police officers to secure favorable rulings.
There are 13 political prisoners. In September 1998, following
Operation Camp Johnson Road, the Government arrested 9 Krahn members of
the armed forces and 19 civilians, including some senior Krahn leaders,
on charges that included treason and sedition. The Government dropped
charges against 5 of the civilian suspects in return for their
testimony as state witnesses; the trial of the remaining 14 civilian
defendants was completed in April. One defendant was acquitted, and the
13 others were convicted of treason and sentenced to 10 years'
imprisonment (see Section 1.e.).
The jury trial was public and attended by international observers.
Some observers believed that the defendants did not receive due process
and that the jury was influenced significantly by ethnic ties. The
military trials of nine Krahn AFL officers remained in progress at
year's end.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right of privacy and
the sanctity of the home; however, authorities regularly infringed on
these rights. The Constitution provides that the police must obtain a
warrant, or have a reasonable belief that a crime is in progress, or is
about to be committed, before entering a private dwelling. In practice
police and paramilitary officers frequently entered private homes and
churches without warrants to carry out arrests and investigations.
Since Mulbah's appointment as LNP director, the LNP took some steps to
address the culture of impunity in the police force, but very little
has been done to control the military and paramilitary forces'
gratuitous acts of random cruelty against civilians.
The security forces harassed and threatened opposition figures and
their families by conducting illegal surveillance. In some cases, they
entered the homes of opposition figures, usually at night. Former
combatants also harassed citizens with little fear of reprisal for
their actions. In July approximately 100 former combatants stormed the
home of a democracy advocate while he was out of the country, looting
his home and terrorizing his family. No charges were brought against
any of the former combatants. This incident and several other illegal
entries prompted an opposition party leader to suspend the community
development project that she sponsored. Several journalists and human
rights activists resided in the homes of friends or relatives for
months at a time due to fear that the security forces might follow
through with their threats against them. These incidents of harassment
increased significantly in the immediate aftermath of the violence in
Lofa county in April and August, particularly against members of the
Mandingo ethnic group. In rural areas, armed security forces illegally
entered homes, most often to steal food, money, or other property (see
Section 1.c.). This problem was especially prevalent in remote parts of
Lofa county during the year.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government restricted
this right in practice. Security agents threatened and assaulted
journalists and intimidated many journalists into practicing self-
censorship.
With some notable exceptions, government officials are grudgingly
tolerant of the press. However, they frequently rebuked the media
publicly for what they considered negative reporting of events.
Security personnel sometimes interpreted such criticism as a license to
harass, threaten, and even assault targeted persons. Some media
executives suspended journalists for broadcasting or writing news
articles that were critical of security forces. At times such news
reporting that criticized the Government brought threats of violence,
closure, or directives from powerful government figures to advertisers
that they should discontinue business with that media outlet.
Government officials stated that there were no journalists in jail.
Government officials criticized journalists who used the Internet
to express opinions that the authorities considered detrimental. Many
persons believed that the Government blocked Internet access during the
latter half of the year.
Journalists generally are left to print or say what they dare,
provided that they are willing to face strong criticism and the
possible consequences. Sometimes journalists are brash and even
provocative, but they also go through periods of self-censorship after
they receive threats, whether perceived or genuine. Government security
personnel assaulted and injured a few journalists and security agents
confiscated or destroyed some equipment (see Section 1.a.). Journalists
were charged with contempt, some were detained (in one known case, more
than the legal limit of 48 hours without charge), and some sought
asylum outside the country (see Section 1.d.). In July a consignment of
The African Observer was seized upon arrival at Roberts International
Airport because it contained an article that authorities considered
critical of the Government.
No action was taken during the year in the case of the police
forces' 1998 flogging of journalist Hassan Bility.
The Ministry of Information, Culture, and Tourism did not apply fee
regulations regarding yearly licensure for media outlets uniformly. It
changed the deadline for fee payments, and although it allowed some
delinquent media outlets to pay their fees late, it did not accept late
payment from one newspaper with the result that the newspaper had to
cease publication. Authorities considered a former editor now in exile
of the newspaper to be antigovernment and believed that his successors
were carrying on his tradition.
There is still only one printing facility capable of producing
newspapers, and its management is subject to pressure from the
Government. Several editors of the independent media practice self-
censorship in order to stay in business and keep their advertisers (who
also respond to official pressure). To meet costs of production, the
typical newspaper's eight pages include two or three pages of
advertisements or paid announcements, further reducing the amount of
news reported. Some articles included are the result of ``cadeaux,''
gifts or money that supplement reporters' meager salaries. Production
costs force publishers to set the prices of their newspapers beyond the
means of most citizens.
Reporters investigated human rights violations and corruption
issues, but in some cases, practiced self-censorship due to fear for
their physical safety. Several incidents heightened that fear. For
example: Repeated detainment and assault (requiring hospital treatment)
of a freelance reporter for suspicion of treason because of casual
contacts with a member of the diplomatic corps; the assault on the
editor of an independent newspaper by a security officer (with no
subsequent punishment); and the assault on a reporter who had gone to
the office of a ruling party official to seek clarification on a news
article. An investigation of the last incident by the Press Union of
Liberia determined that the assault was carried out with the party
official's acquiescence, in the presence of others, but there was no
apology or reprisal. Verbal assaults on the press by government
officials have been common but the authorities ``justified'' them as
personal opinions that they freely expressed under the Constitution.
One government official accused theentire independent media of being
paid by a Western government to write ``all kinds of lies'' against the
Liberian Government.
In some cases, there were indications that journalists were
entrapped by authorities in order to damage the reputation of the
profession in general. Authorities charged 13 journalists and several
policemen with conspiracy to confiscate and sell expired, imported
frozen poultry after the journalists went to the national port to
report on destruction of the meat. Although charges against the
policemen were dropped quickly, the journalists were suspended from
their jobs and the press union for several months until a grand jury
refused to indict them due to lack of evidence.
In Monrovia 10 newspapers were published during the year, although
some publish very irregularly. Two are dailies, and five generally
appeared once or more a week. One is published by the Public Affairs
Bureau of the Ministry of Information, Culture, and Tourism, and one
sometimes is published by the communications network owned by the
President. The others are produced independently and vary in their
political balance.
In addition to the high price of newspapers and the high rate of
illiteracy (between 70 and 85 percent), which limits their circulation,
newspaper distribution is limited to the Monrovia area by high
transportation costs and the poor state of roads elsewhere in the
country. Television is limited to those who can purchase sets, the
generators, and fuel to provide electricity. For those persons and
businesses with satellite capability, the Cable News Network is
available. Radio is the primary means of mass communication.
Of the seven radio broadcasting stations, two are owned privately
(one of these also broadcasts television programs); one is operated by
the Catholic Archdiocese; one is an evangelical Christian station; one
(Star Radio) is a noncommercial station managed locally but funded
primarily through international organizations; one is owned by
President Taylor (Liberia Communications Network); and one is the
national station (Liberia Broadcasting System). Due to the economic
situation in the country and the dependence on generators requiring
expensive fuel purchases, most of the stations limited broadcasting
hours and in some cases ceased operation for short periods.
At the end of the year, the Government continued its refusal to
renew Star Radio's short-wave frequency allocation. Although the
station, which is allowed to broadcast locally via FM, is politically
neutral and now has local management, there has been no change in the
government's policy toward the station. The Government's limitation of
Star Radio to FM broadcasts prevented its broadcasts from reaching
audiences outside the immediate Monrovia area. The only radio station
with a short-wave frequency strong enough to reach all parts of the
country is owned by the President. Radio Veritas, operated by the Roman
Catholic Archdiocese, has a short-wave frequency but a limited
broadcast area and antiquated equipment.
Call-in radio talk shows are popular and frequently a forum for
both government and opposition viewpoints. Interviews with prominent
persons are broadcast frequently. In August former combatants looted a
civil rights activist's home in reaction to his comments on a popular
radio talk show (see Section 1.f.). Members of a church, whose tenets
include free sex among its members, even among members of the same
family, were indicted for incest and other crimes after describing
their beliefs and practices in detail on the same show. At year's end,
they were free on bail pending trial.
Academic freedom continues to be generally respected at the
University of Liberia; however, President Taylor replaced the previous
university president with a member of the ruling party. At times
students reported professors' opinions to various government officials.
Although university administrators have been concerned about the
militancy of the student groups on campus, which include a high
percentage of former combatants, actual physical violence has been
rare. Security forces were not called to intervene on campus.
Students occasionally protested about the lack of resources, which
they blamed more on central government appropriation practices than on
the university administration.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice. The Government used
objective criteria to approve or disapprove permits for public
meetings. The approval process appeared to be administered fairly.
Approvals for marches and gatherings sometimes were made contingent
upon rerouting or changes in venue. In September there were clashes
between public high school students who protested the Government's
failure to pay their teachers and the police. The students attempted to
close some public schools. The new LNP director intervened personally
and the situation was calmed after only a relatively small number of
injuries inflicted by both sides and scattered property damage.
The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice. Registration
requirements can be onerous but do not appear to be discriminatory
towards any specific group.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
however, there were some exceptions.
There is no established state religion. However, government
ceremonies invariably open and close with prayer and may include hymn
singing. The prayers and hymns are usually Christian but occasionally
are Muslim. Although Islam is gaining adherents, as much as 40 percent
of the population practice either Christianity or elements of both
Christianity and traditional indigenous religions. Although religious
ritual killings reportedly occur, there is little reliable information
available about them, their perpetrators, their victims, or the
religious faiths that are involved (see Section 1.a.).
All organizations, including religious groups, must register their
articles of incorporation with the Government, along with a statement
of the purpose of the organization. However, traditional indigenous
religious groups generally need not and do not register. The
registration is routine, and there have been no reports that the
registration process is either burdensome or discriminatory in its
administration.
Early in the year, President Taylor dismissed all but one of his
cabinet ministers after they failed to accompany him to a church
service. Explaining his action, Taylor initially stated that anyone who
did not know God could not serve in his Government. Subsequently Taylor
stated that religion is a private matter, but that cabinet ministers
are required to be present at public ceremonies that the president
attends. Some days later, Taylor rescinded both actions and reinstated
the ministers at the urging of several persons and organizations.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement throughout the country as well as the right to leave or enter;
however, the Government restricted this right in practice. Security
forces' maintained checkpoints where travelers routinely were subjected
to arbitrary searches and petty extortion. Security forces also
extorted money from returning refugees.
The law includes provisions for granting refugee/asylee status in
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. During the year, the
Government provided first asylum to 120,000 Sierra Leonean persons
living along the western border of the country; it granted asylum to
these persons in 1998. The Government continued to cooperate with the
Office of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
humanitarian organizations in attempting to assist these asylees.
However, inaccessibility due to poor road conditions and the limited
capacity of local NGO's severely restricted the amount of relief
assistance that could be provided. Violence in Lofa county in April and
August led to the suspension of assistance by local and international
NGO's in that area (see Section 1.a.).
In April government security personnel looted Voinjama, in northern
Lofa county, in the wake of a purported attack by Liberian dissidents
who had taken refuge in Guinea. Mandingo residents of Voinjama then
fled to Guinea because of the incident and remained unwilling to return
because of their fearof harassment by the Liberian security forces. No
one was punished. In August in Kolahun, northern Lofa county, where in
the aftermath of another incursion from Guinea, security forces once
again looted stores of food intended for Sierra Leonean refugees. The
refugees, fearing the dissidents and the security forces, migrated
south towards another established refugee camp in Sinje (see Section
1.c.). The Government cooperated with the UNHCR's efforts to assist the
migration to the new location. International donors remained unwilling
to send any further assistance to Lofa county, and international and
domestic NGO's are reluctant to resume operations there because of
security concerns. The Government and the UNHCR established a second
refugee camp in Sinje, a location easily accessible from Monrovia, to
accommodate the refugees from Lofa county.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for the right to vote in free and fair
elections, and citizens exercised this right in 1997 in elections that
international observers deemed free and transparent; however, the
elections were conducted in an atmosphere of intimidation, as most
voters believed that military forces loyal to Charles Taylor would have
resumed the civil war if Taylor lost the election. Since the
legislative elections were held on the basis of proportional
representation, Taylor's National Patriotic Party won control of the
legislature by the same 75 percent majority that Taylor received in the
popular vote for the Presidency. The 1997 legislative and presidential
elections were held under a special election law in accordance with the
terms of the Abuja Peace Process.
The Legislature did not exercise genuine independence from the
executive branch. Opposition legislators, who held only one-quarter of
the seats in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, generally
were more docile than some independent members of the ruling NPP. In
March Senator Charles Brumskine, an NPP member, fled the country
expressing fear for his life, after stating that the NPP had forced him
to resign from his position as President Pro Tempore of the Senate. He
later resigned his senatorial seat and has not returned to the country.
A few weeks later, the ruling party manipulated the committee structure
such that five opposition figures lost their chairmanships.
Congressional committees failed to develop expertise in their
respective areas of responsibility. No major legislation was enacted
during the year. However, the House of Representatives succeeded in
blocking the demolition of the Barclay Training Center military
stockade.
The State is highly centralized. The President appoints the
superintendents (governors) of the 13 counties. Municipalities and
chieftaincies are supposed to elect their own officials, but elections,
postponed in 1998 due to lack of funds and disorganization, were not
held during 1999 for the same reason. However, a by-election was held
in November to fill the seat vacated by Senator Brumskine. Local
governments at all levels have no independent revenue base and rely
entirely on the central government for funds. Education, health
services, and public works are provided by the central Government.
Local officials serve mainly to lobby the central Government.
There are no restrictions on the participation of women in
politics; however, women remained underrepresented in government and
politics. The number of women in high-ranking positions in the Taylor
Administration and in the various political parties is low. Only 5 of
the 26 Senators and 5 of the 64 members of the House of Representatives
are women. Of the 20 cabinet positions, 2 are held by women, a woman
serves as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and a woman chairs the
National Reconciliation Commission. There are no women's caucuses, but
the ruling party has a women's organization.
Muslims also are underrepresented in government; only one cabinet
minister is a Muslim.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Taylor Administration permitted domestic and international
human rights groups to operate largely without interference; however,
members of the security forces frequently harassed domestic democracy
and human rights activists, and forced somehuman rights activists to
live with friends for months due to fear (see Section 1.f.). Frequently
government officials criticized domestic human rights groups publicly.
In July an internationally known human rights activist returned to
Liberia from study abroad for an extended visit but left abruptly after
threats were made against him by members of the security forces. The
Government routinely criticized these actions and pledged to
investigate them and punish the perpetrators.
In November in response to reports of torture at the Gbatala base,
President Taylor stated that the persistent reports of human rights
abuses were the result of human rights organizations trying to get
funding from the international community (see Section 1.c.). In July
former combatants terrorized the family of an activist who was away
from home at the time (see Section 1.f.). Legislators from the
southeast countries sued a child rights advocacy group for defaming the
reputation of the counties in its report on forced child labor (see
Section 5).
Domestic human rights organizations are underfunded, understaffed,
and their personnel lacked adequate training. There are two coalitions
of human rights groups: The National Human Rights Center of Liberia has
12 member organizations, while 6 other groups joined together to form
Network. Both of these organizations sought to increase public
discussion of human rights problems.
Some human rights groups paid regular visits to detainees at police
headquarters and prisoners at the Monrovia Central Prison. Several
domestic human rights organizations have established branches outside
of the capital and perform similar monitoring functions there. No
discernible pattern of government interference with these activities
emerged.
The government's Human Rights Commission, created in 1997, remained
inactive throughout the year. It received no funding from the
Government, and the Senate again failed to confirm the appointments of
three of its five commissioners.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on ethnic
background, race, sex, creed, place of origin, or political opinion,
but discrimination exists. There are no laws against gender
discrimination, ethnic discrimination, or female genital mutilation.
Differences involving ethnic groups, notably the Krahn and Mandingo
ethnic groups, continued to contribute to serious political violence
and abuses.
Women.--Domestic violence against women is extensive but has not
been addressed seriously as a problem by the Government, the courts, or
the media. Several NGO's in Monrovia and Buchanan continued programs to
treat abused women and girls and increase awareness of their human
rights.
The status of women varies by region, ethnic group, and religion.
Before the outbreak of the civil war, women held one-fourth of the
professional and technical jobs in Monrovia. On the whole, women have
not recovered from the setbacks caused by the civil war, when most
schools were closed, and they could not carry out their traditional
roles in the production, allocation, and sale of food.
Women married under civil law can inherit land and property.
However, women married under traditional law are considered the
properties of their husbands and are not entitled to inherit from their
husbands or retain custody of their children if their husbands die. In
July 600 women from a coalition of women's organizations marched on
Capitol Hill in Monrovia in support of legislation that would provide
women in traditional marriages with inheritance rights. There continued
to be few programs to help former combatants reintegrate into society,
and there were none specifically to benefit former female combatants.
However, several women's organizations advanced family welfare issues,
helped promote political reconciliation, and assisted in rehabilitating
both former female combatants and women who were victims of the civil
war.
Throughout the year, professional women's groups--including
lawyers, market women, and businesswomen--remained vocal about their
concerns. Government officials often responded negatively to public
criticism. There were credible reports of harassmentand possible
surveillance of outspoken critics (see Section 1.f.).
Children.--The Government generally was unable to provide for the
education and health of children. Due to the poor condition of
government schools, most children who attended school went to private
institutions. Since many private schools had to be refurbished due to
wartime damage, school fees were increased significantly, thereby
making education unattainable for many school-age children. In both
public and private schools, families of children often were asked to
provide their own books, pencils, and paper. No data was available on
either school enrollment or government expenditure on education.
Young persons were victimized seriously during the civil war. An
estimated 50,000 children were killed; many more were wounded,
orphaned, or abandoned. Nearly all youths witnessed terrible
atrocities, and some committed atrocities themselves. About 21 percent
(4,306) of the combatants who disarmed under the provisions of the
Abuja peace accords were child soldiers under the age of 17. Many
youths remain traumatized, and some still are addicted to drugs. The
number of street children in Monrovia and the number of abandoned
infants increased significantly following disarmament. NGO's and the
U.N. Children's Fund continued retraining and rehabilitation programs
for a limited number of former child fighters. A new juvenile court
established in Monrovia in 1997 lacked the funds and personnel to
function effectively (see Section 1.e.). Children continued to be
incarcerated with adults, and there were long delays in deciding cases
involving minors.
Child advocacy groups reported forced child labor in the rural
areas of the country (see Section 6.c.). Local government officials in
three of the counties cited sued one of the groups for defamation. At
year's end, the case still was pending.
Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
international public health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, traditionally was performed on young girls by
northern, western, and central ethnic groups, particularly in rural
areas. Prior to the onset of the civil war in 1989, approximately 50
percent of women in rural areas between the ages of 8 and 18 were
subjected to FGM. In some instances, female health professionals in the
groups participated in the practice to the extent of providing
postoperative care.
The war totally disrupted traditional village life. Most of the
population fled to neighboring countries or became displaced within the
country. Social structures and traditional institutions, such as the
secret societies that often performed FGM as an initiation rite, also
were undermined by the war. While many experts believe that the
incidence of FGM had dropped to as low as 10 percent by the end of the
war, traditional societies are reestablishing themselves throughout the
country, and the increase in the incidence of FGM continued. The most
extreme form of FGM, infibulation, is not practiced. The Government has
taken no action against FGM.
In January a well-known 17-year-old child rights activist fled the
country to evade persistent harassment of himself, his family,
teachers, and high school classmates by security personnel (see Section
1.f.).
People with Disabilities.--As a result of the civil war, a large
number of persons have permanent injuries, in addition to those
disabled by accident or illness. It is illegal to discriminate against
the disabled, but in practice they do not enjoy equal access to public
buildings. No laws mandate accessibility to public buildings or
services.
Religious Minorities.--Some tensions exist between the major
religious communities. Although the law prohibits religious
discrimination, Islamic leaders complained of discrimination against
Muslims. There are some Muslims in senior government positions.
However, many Muslims believe that they are bypassed for desirable
jobs. Many Muslim business proprietors believe that the Taylor
Government's decision to enforce old statutes prohibiting doing
business on Sunday discriminates against them. Many Muslims were
alliedwith factions that opposed President Taylor during the recent
civil war and still belong to opposition parties.
Discrimination against followers of other organized religions
spills over into areas of individual opportunity and employment.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although the Constitution bans
ethnic discrimination, it also provides that only ``persons who are
Negroes or of Negro descent'' may be citizens or own land. Many persons
of Lebanese and Asian descent who were born or lived most of their
lives in the country are denied full rights as a result of this racial
distinction.
The country, although small, is ethnically diverse. The population
of about 3 million is made up of 16 indigenous ethnic groups and the
Americo-Liberian minority--descendants of freed African slaves from the
United States and the Caribbean--which until 1980 dominated the
government and the public sector through the True Whig party. The
indigenous ethnic groups generally speak distinct primary languages and
they are concentrated regionally. No ethnic group constitutes a
majority of the population.
Many members of the predominantly Muslim Mandingo minority
encountered hostility when they sought to return, after the end of the
civil war, to their villages in Lofa, Bong, and Nimba Counties. Many
Mandingos were unable to reoccupy their homes, which had been taken
over by squatters. Members of the Loma, Gio, and Mano minorities
generally held all Mandingos responsible for atrocities committed by
the Ulimo-Mandingo faction during the civil war. The lack of competent
security forces and a fully functioning judiciary in these areas
prevented many Mandingos from seeking redress. The violence in April
and August in Lofa renewed ethnic tensions (see Section 1.a.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution states that workers,
except members of the military and police, have the right to associate
in trade unions, and workers are allowed to join unions in practice.
The Constitution also states that unions are prohibited from engaging
in partisan political activity. Government interference in union
activities, especially union elections and leaderships struggles, was
common both before and during the civil war.
Although most economic activity was interrupted by the war, unions
proliferated. Thirty-two functioning unions are organized loosely under
two umbrella groups--the Federation of Liberian Trade Unions and the
Congress of Liberian Trade Unions--with the common objective of
protecting the rights of their 60,000 members, who largely were
unemployed. The actual power that the unions exercised was extremely
limited. Since the country's work force is largely illiterate, economic
activities beyond the subsistence level were very limited and the labor
laws tend to favor management.
The Constitution is silent on the right to strike, but labor laws
provide for this right. A decree passed by the People's Redemption
Council in 1984 outlawed strikes, but it was not enforced during the
year. Due to the destruction of the economy and the estimated 85
percent unemployment rate, strikes were infrequent.
During the year, the Government strictly enforced the union
registration requirements that fell into disuse during the war.
Public school teachers in several locations, including Monrovia,
went on strikes or ``go-slows'' to protest the Government's failure to
pay their salaries. On April 12, the Firestone rubber plantation
agricultural workers' union went on strike over a proposed wage
increase. The strike was settled 7 weeks later.
Labor unions traditionally have been affiliated with international
labor groups such as the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions.
The United States suspended Liberia's status as a beneficiary under
the generalized system of preference (GSP). The programwas suspended in
1990 as a result of the Doe government's failure to provide
internationally recognized workers' rights.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--With the
important exception of civil servants, workers (including employees of
public corporations and autonomous agencies) have the right to organize
and bargain collectively. In the past, agreements were negotiated
freely between workers and their employers without government
interference. These rights were largely moot because of the lack of
economic activity.
There were no export processing zones. All those previously
existing were destroyed during the civil war.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor including that performed by children; however,
this prohibition was widely ignored in many parts of the country, such
as rural areas where farmers were pressured into providing free labor
on ``community projects'' that often benefited only local leaders. The
Government denied allegations that unpaid laborers were forced to
harvest crops on President Taylor's private farm. There were reports of
forced child labor (see Section 5).
Some former combatants, including some in the security forces were
accused of forcing children to work. Early in the year, a child rights
advocacy group released a report on forced child labor in the
southeastern counties. The advocacy group's report and that of another
prominent human rights group contradicted an earlier government report
that failed to find any conclusive evidence of forced child labor.
Subsequently legislators from three counties sued the child rights
advocacy group for defaming the counties' reputations. At year's end,
the case still was pending.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor by
children (see Section 6.c.). Child advocacy and human rights groups
reported child labor, but the Government denied that it existed (see
Section 6.c.).
The law prohibits the employment of children under the age of 16
during school hours in the wage sector, but enforcement traditionally
is lax. Throughout rural areas, but particularly where there were no
schools, small children continued to assist their parents as vendors in
local markets or on the streets, to take care of younger brothers and
sisters, and to work on family subsistence farms.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Law provides for a
minimum wage, paid leave, severance benefits, and safety standards, but
enforcement was targeted solely against profitable firms that generally
observed these standards. Due to the country's continued economic
problems, most citizens were forced to accept any work they could find
regardless of wages or working conditions.
The 1977 Labor Law requires a minimum wage of approximately $0.25
(10 ld) per hour not exceeding 8 hours per day, excluding benefits, for
unskilled laborers. The law requires that agricultural workers are to
be paid $1.50 (60 ld) for an 8-hour day, excluding benefits. Skilled
labor has no minimum fixed wage, but industrial workers usually
received three or four times the wage paid to agricultural workers. The
much-sought-after minimum wage jobs provided a minimal standard of
living for a worker and family. However, there were very few such jobs.
Families dependent on minimum wage incomes also engage in subsistence
farming, small-scale marketing, petty extortion, and begging.
The Ministry of Labor did not have the resources to monitor
compliance with labor laws.
The Labor Law provides for a 48-hour, 6-day regular workweek with a
30-minute rest period per 5 hours of work. The 6-day workweek may
extend to 56 hours for service occupations and to 72 hours for miners,
with overtime pay beyond 48 hours.
Prior to 1990, there were government-established health and safety
standards, enforced in theory by the Ministry of Labor. During the war,
these regulations were not enforced. Even under the Labor Law, workers
did not have a specific right to remove themselves from dangerous
situations without risking loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
in, to, or from the country.
______
MADAGASCAR
Madagascar held its second presidential election under the 1992
Constitution in 1996, following the impeachment of then-President
Albert Zafy earlier that year. The election was accepted widely as free
and fair, and the winner, former Second Republic President Didier
Ratsiraka, took office in February 1997. An extensive revision of the
1992 Constitution was approved narrowly in a March 1998 constitutional
referendum. While observers from the International Foundation for
Election Systems concluded that the referendum generally was free and
fair, it was marred by significant difficulties in compiling voter
lists, distributing electoral cards, and other problems, which led to
charges of fraud and manipulation. Although power remains formally
divided between the President, his Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and a
bicameral legislature (Senate and National Assembly), the revised
Constitution significantly strengthened the presidency and weakened the
National Assembly. National Assembly elections held in May 1998
generally were accepted as free and fair; however, there were a number
of credible complaints of electoral fraud. A number of institutions
provided for in the revised Constitution, including the Senate, a
restructured judiciary, and autonomous provincial governments, still
were pending at year's end. The judiciary is subject to executive
influence.
The State Secretary of the Ministry of Interior for Public Security
and the national police, which are under the State Secretary, are
responsible for law and order in urban areas. The Ministry of Armed
Forces oversees the army, the air force, the navy, and the gendarmerie.
The gendarmerie has primary responsibility for security except in major
cities and is assisted in some areas by regular army units in
operations against bandit gangs and cattle thieves. After a number of
years of decline, the military force has stabilized at about 22,000
troops, including the gendarmerie. There also are local traditional
laws called dina that are enforced by village-level law enforcement
groups, particularly in areas where the Government's presence is weak.
There continued to be occasional reports that police, gendarmes, and
dina authorities committed human rights abuses.
Madagascar is a very poor country. The economy relies heavily on
agriculture. Agricultural exports, led by shrimp, grew 4.3 percent with
vanilla, coffee, cloves, and pepper all registering increases. Textiles
were another major export. The smuggling of vanilla, gold, precious
stones, and cattle continued to be major concerns. Overall economic
performance improved, but nearly three-fourths of the population of
about 14.7 million still live in poverty. Foreign assistance remains a
major source of national income. Living standards are low, with the
annual per capita gross domestic product estimated at $266. Inflation
rose from 4.8 percent in 1997 to 7 percent in 1998. Unemployment and
underemployment, especially among youth, remained high, although there
was significant job growth in the capital during the year. The
Government made progress on economic reform, including privatization.
The Government generally respected citizens' human rights in
several areas; however, a number of problems remained. Prison
conditions were harsh and life threatening. In some prisons, women
experienced physical abuse, including rape. Lengthy pretrial detention
remained a major problem, and suspects often were held for periods that
exceeded the maximum sentence for the alleged offenses. The Government
continued a major effort to reduce the number of preventive detainees.
Dina authorities imposed summary justice--including several
executions--in rural areas where the Government's presence was weak,
although, overall, government efforts to bring dina authorities under
closer regulation and scrutiny continued to show results. There
virtually was no political violence during the year. Women continued to
face some societal discrimination. Some prisoners were used as forced
labor. There were reports of trafficking in women and girls.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by government forces; however, harsh
prison conditions and the authorities' failure to provide adequate food
and medical treatment contributed to an undetermined number of deaths
in custody (see Section 1.c.).
There were no developments in the 1994 beating death of radio
journalist Victor Randrianirina, who had reported on alleged sapphire
smuggling.
Village dina authorities continued to mete out summary justice, and
there were several cases of dina executions in the southeast.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
person; however, there were occasional reports that police or other
security forces mistreated prisoners or detainees.
In February four policemen were convicted of raping a woman at a
police station in November 1998, and sentenced to fines and prison
terms of 1 to 1\1/2\ years.
Village dina authorities continued to mete out summary judgment.
Dina authorities continued to use torture to gain confessions.
Prison conditions remain harsh and life threatening. Prisoners'
diets are inadequate, and family members must augment daily rations.
Prisoners without relatives nearby sometimes go for days without food.
Prison cells average less than 1 square yard of space per inmate. The
authorities do not provide adequate medical care. The prison population
of approximately 19,200 suffers a range of medical problems that are
treated rarely or inadequately, including malnutrition, infections,
malaria, and tuberculosis. These conditions have caused an unknown
number of deaths. There were instances in which prisoners were used as
forced labor (see Section 6.c.).
Women in prisons suffer abuses, as do children who sometimes are
confined with them. Gender segregation is not absolute, and rapes by
other prisoners were reported.
The Government permits prison visits by the International Committee
of the Red Cross, religious and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's),
lawyers, and investigative journalists.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides for due process for accused persons, but in practice the
authorities do not always observe legal safeguards against arbitrary
arrest and detention. In particular, excessive investigative detention
of suspects results in the denial of due process. However, as the
result of international pressure, some long-term detainees were
released.
By law a criminal suspect must be charged, bound over, or released
within 3 days of arrest. An arrest warrant may be obtained but is not
always required. Defendants in ordinary criminal cases have the right
to be informed of the charges against them, must be charged formally
within the specified time permitted, and must be allowed access to an
attorney. Court-appointed counsel is provided for indigent persons
accused of crimes that carry a minimum 5-year jail sentence. An
attorney or the accused may request bail immediately after arrest,
after being formally charged, or during the appeals process, but bail
is rarely granted in the case of violent crimes.
Of a prison population of approximately 19,200, about two-thirds of
persons held in custody were in pretrial detention. Despite existing
legal safeguards, investigative detention often exceeds 1 year, and 3
or 4 years' detention is common, even for crimes for which the maximum
penalty may be 2 years or less. The accused may wait years in prison
only to be exonerated ultimately in court. The Ministry of Justice
continued a program to reduce excessive pretrial detention through case
reviews and expedited judgments. Over 500 detainees have been tried and
an indeterminate number of others freed.
Although the law allows detainees to sue the Government for damages
in cases of unlawful detention, no such suits were reported. By law
persons accused of subversive activity may be detained incommunicado
for 15 days and are subject to indefinite detention if considered
necessary by the Government; however, this law was not invoked during
the year.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The revised Constitution provides
for an autonomous judiciary; however, implementing legislation has not
yet been passed, and the High Constitutional Court is subject to the
President's influence.
The judiciary has three levels of jurisdiction: local courts for
civil and criminal cases carrying limited fines and sentences; the
Court of Appeals, which includes a criminal court for cases carrying
sentences of 5 years or more; and the Supreme Court. The judiciary also
includes courts designed to handle specific kinds of cases such as
cattle theft. The High Constitutional Court is an autonomous court that
undertakes technical reviews of laws, decrees, and ordinances, and
certifies election results. The establishment of a number of
decentralized courts also provided for in the Constitution awaits the
creation of theSenate, which depends on the as-yet-unscheduled
elections of autonomous provincial councils.
The judiciary remained under the control of the Ministry of
Justice. Salaries of magistrates were raised to improve their
performance, but reports of corruption in the judiciary persist.
Although efforts are underway to address the problem, a large backlog
of cases remained, which contributed to excessive investigative
detention.
Trials are public, and defendants have the right to an attorney, to
be present at the trial, to confront witnesses, and to present
evidence. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence under the Penal
Code.
The right of traditional village institutions to protect property
and public order is codified in the Constitution as well as in earlier
laws. Civil disputes within and between villages sometimes are
addressed by local traditional laws called dina. Dina also are
established in some urban areas. In practice, dina deal with criminal
cases because of the isolation of many rural areas and the
ineffectiveness of the police and the judiciary outside major urban
centers. Punishments based on dina were at times severe, including
several cases of executions (see Section 1.a.).
Decisions based on dina are not subject to codified safeguards for
the accused, but in some instances they may be challenged at the
appeals court level. Some cases also have been referred to the Office
of the Mediator (ombudsman), which investigates and may seek redress
from formal judicial authorities. An interministerial committee that
includes the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Armed Forces was
established to improve the surveillance of dina authorities and assure
their adherence to the law. The Ministry of Justice has moved away from
its earlier permissive approach to dina and emphasized their
subordination under the formal judicial system.
The Government continued to combat crime and insecurity in isolated
rural regions by augmenting the gendarmerie--traditionally responsible
for law and order in rural areas--with army units. Military courts are
integrated into the civil judicial system and differ only in the kinds
of cases tried and in the inclusion of military officers on jury
panels. Such courts have jurisdiction over some cases involving
national security, including acts allegedly threatening the nation and
its political leaders; invasion by foreign forces; and rioting that
could lead to the overthrow of the Government. Defendants in military
cases, as in civil law, enjoy an appeals process that reexamines points
of law rather than the facts of the case. A civilian magistrate,
usually joined on the bench by a panel of military officers, presides
over military trials.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and
government authorities generally respect these prohibitions in
practice. Violations are subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, at times the Government
pressures the media to curb its coverage of certain events and issues.
Opposition politicians rarely are given access to state-run media;
while they do have access to private media, these do not provide the
nationwide coverage of state media. In addition, journalists practice
self-censorship.
On December 28, 1998, Christian Chadefaux, editor in chief of
L'Express de Madagascar, and Harry Rahajason, a reporter with
L'Express, were sentenced to 3-month prison terms for defamation. On
March 26, the Court of Appeals acquitted both journalists.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
this right in practice; however, local authorities sometimes deny
requests by political opposition groups to assemble or march in
specified locations.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
Religious groups must register and obtain authorization from the
Ministry of Interior. In January 1998, an organization widely perceived
to be affiliated with the Reverend Sun Myung Moon was refused
registration, apparently due to concerns about its use of mind-control
practices.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice; however, fear of
crime effectively restricts travel to some places, especially at night.
The country does not have a law governing refugees nor has it
ratified the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, the Government cooperates
closely with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in processing the
small number of refugees or asylum seekers. There were no reports of
the forced expulsion of persons with recognized or pending claims to
refugee status. The issue of provision of first asylum has never
arisen.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government through direct
universal suffrage by secret ballot. Didier Ratsiraka was elected to a
5-year term as President in 1996 in the second presidential election
held under the 1992 Constitution. In May 1998, the National Assembly's
150 members were elected to 5-year terms. In November communal
elections were held in which the President's party, AREMA, won 40
percent of the mayoral races. The elections were peaceful and well-
organized; however, there were numerous reports of fraud. In December
the High Constitutional Court recognized serious irregularities and
reordered elections in five communes.
Under the Constitution, the President has primary responsibility
for national defense and foreign policy, while the Prime Minister is
the head of government and responsible for domestic policy. The
President selects the Prime Minister at will. The Constitution gives
the President the right to dissolve the National Assembly for cause.
The revised Constitution retains the possibility of censure by a two-
thirds majority of the National Assembly and Senate. The Senate was not
established pending the creation of autonomous provinces. In September
1998, the Prime Minister pledged publicly that all of the institutions
called for in the Constitution would be created by March 2000. Under
the revised Constitution, two-thirds of the Senate's members are to be
elected within the autonomous provinces, and one-third of the members
are to be appointed by the President.
There are no legal impediments to women's participation in
government or politics, but in practice they are underrepresented in
both areas. The Government of 31 ministers and state secretaries
appointed in July 1998 includes 4 women. Women make up less than 7
percent of National Assembly deputies (10 of 150).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials usually are cooperative and
responsive to their views.
The Government is open to visits by international human rights
groups and to domestic and international election observers.
The Constitution provides for an independent office to promote and
protect human rights. In 1994 the National Assembly assigned that role
to the Office of the Mediator (ombudsman), which relies on moral
suasion to correct abuses. The Office publishes annual reports on its
activities and distributes brochures to educate citizens on their
rights and responsibilities. Its reports have outlined the rights of
women and children and focused public attention on the potential for
human rights violations under dina.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits all forms of discrimination and outlaws
groups that advocate ethnic or religious segregation. No specific
government institutions are designated to enforce these
antidiscrimination provisions.
Women.--Violence against women is not widespread. Police and legal
authorities intervene when physical abuse is reported. No law deals
specifically with violence against women except rape. Spouses can be
tried for nonrape abuses, generally under civil law.
The law neither prohibits nor condones prostitution. The law
prohibits incitement of minors to debauchery. The Government criticizes
sexual tourism; however, while it attempts to investigate allegations
of exploitation, a lack of resources hampers effective action.
In urban areas, where many women manage or own businesses or hold
management positions in state industries, there is relatively little
societal discrimination against women. According to one government
official, women own 30 percent of formal sector companies and 53
percent of informal sector companies. However, discrimination against
women in rural areas remains a problem. A number of NGO's focus on the
civic education of women and girls to ensure that rights and legal
protections are understood fully and acted upon as appropriate.
Under a 1990 law, wives have an equal voice in selecting the
location of a married couple's residence, and they generally receive an
equitable share of common property on divorce. Widows with children
inherit half of joint marital property. A tradition known as ``the
customary third'' is occasionally observed in some areas. Under this
custom, the wife has a right to only one-third of a couple's joint
holdings. However, a widow receives a pension, while a widower does
not.
Children.--While official expenditures on children's welfare are
low, the Government increased the spending levels of the Ministries of
Health and Education despite continued fiscal austerity. These levels
are not sufficient to maintain adequate public services under current
economic conditions. The Government provides education through the
secondary or vocational level, and it is compulsory through the age of
14. Although figures vary depending upon the source, approximately 65
percent of primary-school-aged children apparently are enrolled in
school. However, only 29 percent of working children go to school:
rural children drop out to help on family farms, and urban children
work as domestics (see Section 6.d.).
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children, although child
labor continues to be a pervasive problem (see Section 6.d.), and
children sometimes are imprisoned with adults (see Section 1.c.).
People with Disabilities.--There is no systematic discrimination
against disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision
of other state services. There is no law mandating access to buildings
for persons with disabilities. The National Assembly passed a law to
define the rights of the disabled in February 1998, but implementing
regulations had not been issued by year's end.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Malagasy, who are of mixed
Malayo-Polynesian, African, and Arab heritage, include 18 distinct
groups differing in regional and ancestral affiliation. Although there
are some linguistic differences, nearly all speak a dialect of the
Malagasy language. None of these groups constitutes a majority of the
population. There are significant minorities of Chinese and Indo-
Pakistani heritage, as well as a large number of resident French
nationals.
A long history of military conquest and political consolidation
raised the political and economic status of highland ethnic groups of
Asian origin above that of coastal groups of more African ancestry.
Centralized administration and economic planning since independence has
reinforced the concentration of economic and political power in the
central highlands, where the capital is located. These policies feed
enduring tension between coastal and highland peoples. Ethnicity,
caste, and regional solidarity often are factors in hiring practices.
An Indo-Pakistani community has resided in the country since the
early part of the century. Traditionally engaged in commerce, this
community now numbers about 20,000. Relatively few of these individuals
have made successful claims to Malagasy nationality, which is
customarily acquired through a native-born Malagasy mother. Indo-
Pakistani merchants are mistrusted widely. In past years, their shops
have been looted during civil disturbances.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the 1995 Labor
Code provide workers in the public and private sectors with the legal
right to establish and join labor unions of their choosing without
prior authorization; however, essential service workers, including
police and military personnel, may not form unions. Unions are required
to register with the Government, and registration is routinely granted.
About 80 percent of the labor force of 5 million is engaged in agrarian
production. Union members account for only about 5 percent of the total
labor force.
There are a number of trade union federations, many of which are
affiliated formally with political parties. Neither public nor private
sector unions have played a major political or economic role in recent
years. The Government exercises very limited control over organized
labor.
The Labor Code and the Constitution include the right to strike.
This right extends to export processing zones (EPZ's). Workers in
essential services have a recognized but restricted right to strike,
although in practice short strikes took place without reprisal. The
Code requires workers to exhaust conciliation, mediation, and
arbitration procedures before striking, but this has not been a
significant deterrent to legal strikes in practice.
Short and generally nondisruptive strikes took place over fiscal
and administrative issues in some cities.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) has noted a number of
instances in which the Government has failed to bring law and
regulation into conformity with existing conventions or otherwise
submit texts for ILO review, including those addressing forced labor,
freedom of association, safe-guarding of machinery, hygiene in commerce
and offices, and weight limits. In most instances, these failures
indicated legislative inertia rather than abuses.
Unions freely join and participate in international bodies and may
form federations or confederations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Both the Labor
Code and the Constitution provide for the right to bargain
collectively. The Code states that collective bargaining may be
undertaken between management and labor on the initiative of either
party; however, collective bargaining agreements are rare in practice.
The Government is often involved in the bargaining process, in part
because of the large percentage of public employees who are union
members.
The Labor Code prohibits discrimination by employers against labor
organizers, union members, and unions. In the event of antiunion
activity, unions or their members may file suit against the employer in
civil court. Labor laws apply uniformly throughout the country;
however, the Government's enforcement of labor laws and regulations is
hampered by lack of staff and financial resources. Approximately 35
inspectors from the Ministry of Labor visit industrial work sites with
some regularity, but most often only those located near the capital.
There are many EPZ's which are, in practice, firms operating under
special import and export rules. Such firms are required to follow all
pertinent labor laws and regulations, including minimum wage laws.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
explicitly prohibits forced labor, and generally it is not known to
occur; however, there were instances of prisoners being illegally
``hired out'' by prison officials to private enterprise. There also
apparently has been systematic use of detainees and prisoners as
personal servants by a substantial number of magistrates, judiciary
officials, and local government figures. Some prison officials or
judicial authorities have engaged in the falsification of records to
ensure a supply of unpaid labor for themselves or other government
officials. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children
and enforces this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code defines a child as any person under the age
of 18 years. The legal minimum age of employment is 14 years, and work
by individuals under the age of 18 is prohibited at sites where there
is apparent and imminent danger. The Government enforces child labor
laws in the small formal economic sector through inspectors of the
Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, and Social Laws. Nevertheless, child
labor continues to be a pervasive problem: nearly one in three children
aged 7 to 14 works. In the large agricultural sector, young children
work with parents on family farms at much younger ages. In urban areas,
many children work as petty traders, casual transport workers, and
beggars.
The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor and the authorities
enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
Education is compulsory to the age of 14. While approximately 65
percent of primary-school-aged children apparently are enrolled, only
29 percent of working children attend school (see Section 5).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code and implementing
legislation prescribe working conditions and wages, which are enforced
by the Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, and Social Laws. The law makes
separate provisions for agricultural and nonagricultural labor.
The Government sets the minimum wage of approximately $25 (FMG
139,860) per month for the nonagricultural private sector. This wage
does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family
and must be supplemented by subsistence agriculture, petty trade,
support from relatives, or employment of other family members. Minimum
wage rates are not always respected, since high unemployment and
widespread poverty lead workers to accept wages at lower levels.
The standard legal workweek in nonagricultural and service
industries is 40 hours, and 42\1/2\ hours in agriculture. At least one
24-hour rest period each workweek is mandated. The Labor Code sets
rules and standards for worker safety and worksite sanitation. Ministry
of Civil Service, Labor, and Social Laws officials monitor labor
conditions; however, they usually are able to cover only the capital
region effectively. If violators do not remedy cited violations within
the time allowed, they may be sanctioned legally or assessed
administrative penalties. In some sectors, safety equipment is not used
due to the expense of protective clothing and other safety devices.
There have been no published reports on occupational health hazards or
accident trends. There is no explicit right for workers to leave
dangerous workplaces without jeopardizing their employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking; however,
there were reports that women and girls were trafficked to the nearby
islands of Reunion and Mauritius for prostitution. No arrests or
convictions have been made in connection with the trafficking. While
the Government expresses concern, it lacks the resources to address
this issue effectively.
____
MALAWI
On June 15, the Republic of Malawi held its second democratic
presidential and parliamentary elections since independence in 1964.
(The first were held in 1994.) Independent observers concluded that the
election was ``free and substantially fair''; however, there was
limited opposition access to media and problems in registration, and
the opposition appealed the result to the courts. Constitutional power
is shared between a popularly elected president and the 193-member
National Assembly. President Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic
Front (UDF) party was reelected to serve a second 5-year term,
defeating Gwanda Chakuamba, the joint presidential candidate of the two
leading opposition parties, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and the
Alliance for Democracy (AFORD). The UDF has 99 seats in the National
Assembly, the MCP has 65, and AFORD has 29. There is no clear-cut
ideological difference among the three political parties. The
Government respects the constitutional provisions for an independent
judiciary; however, the judicial system is inefficient and lacks
resources.
The National Police, headed by the Inspector General of Police
under the Ministry of Home Affairs, are responsible for internal
security. The police occasionally called on the army for support. There
continued to be credible allegations that the police committed human
rights abuses.
The country is very poor, with a narrow economic base characterized
by a small and highly concentrated industrial sector, low levels of
foreign and domestic investment, and few mineral resources. Agriculture
dominates the economy, contributing about 87 percent of export
earnings, 36 percent of gross domestic product, and employing over 80
percent of the labor force. Three crops--tobacco, tea, and sugar--
generate about 78 percent of export earnings, with tobacco providing by
far the largest share. There is little industry and mining, and no
known economically viable deposits of gemstones, precious metals, or
oil. The country is a landlocked nation, and freight and insurance
costs constitute over 40 percent of its import bill--a serious
impediment to economic development and trade. The Government continues
to divest its ownership of public enterprises. Wealth remains
concentrated in the hands of a small elite. In 1998 per capita income
was approximately $200. Average annual inflation was 29.7 percent in
1998, up from 9.1 percent in 1997.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
in many areas; however, serious problems remained. There were instances
of extrajudicial killings, including deaths of detainees while in, or
shortly after release from, police custody. The police are known to
beat and otherwise abuse detainees and to use excessive force in
handling criminal suspects. Prison conditions remained harsh and life
threatening and resulted in a large number of deaths. Arbitrary arrest
and detention are common, and lengthy pretrial detention is a serious
problem. An inefficient and understaffed judicial system and limited
resources called into question the ability of defendants to receive a
timely, and in many cases, fair trial. Security forces at times
infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
The print media are able to report freely; however, there were a
few exceptions, and there was some self-censorship. The four private
radio stations experienced relative freedom in broadcasting
international news and entertainment programming; however, the state-
owned Malawi Broadcasting Corporation continued to control news
coverage and editorial content at its two radio stations. The
constitutionally mandated Human Rights Commission (HRC) met for the
first time in February. Violence against women is common. Women
continued to experience severe societal discrimination. The Government
took steps in its economic development programs to assist disadvantaged
women. Abuse of children remained a problem. Child labor also is a
problem. Mob violence triggered by anger over high levels of common
crime resulted in summary executions of alleged criminals.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings; however there were extrajudicial
killings stemming from the deaths of detainees while in, or shortly
after release from, police custody. These deaths involved possible use
of excessive force or possible negligence.
On August 25, former Eritrean detainees in Ethiopia obtained
fraudulent Malawian visas and traveled to Malawi with government-issued
travel documents. They were returned forcibly to Ethiopia after
refusing an offer to travel to Eritrea. One former detainee was shot
and killed, and at least six others were wounded in a confrontation
with police in Lilongwe. No action was taken against the police.
A large number of prisoners died largely due to harsh prison
conditions (see Section 1.c.).
Frustrated by inadequate law enforcement and rising crime, angry
mobs sometimes resorted to vigilante justice in beating, stoning, or
burning suspected criminals to death. The police identified 146 cases
during the year, and they made some attempts--largely unsuccessful--to
identify and arrest those responsible. In September police in Lilongwe
successfully rescued a car thief caught in the act by a crowd of
vigilantes.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of disappearances.
c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, police continued to beat and
otherwise abuse detainees and to use excessive force in handling
criminal suspects. The Inspectorate of Prisons is an investigative body
mandated by the Constitution. Knowledgeable NGO's consider that the
findings of its October 1997 Inspectorate of Prisons report--the most
recent document of its kind--remain indicative of prison conditions.
That report notes that techniques used by police included beatings,
physical assault, and the use of wire instead of handcuffs to restrain
prisoners and to force confessions. These abuses sometimes are hidden
by keeping a prisoner in police custody until wounds heal before
turning the prisoner over to the prison system for remand. The
mistreatment is partly due to the mistaken belief of many police
officers that the law requires them to present a case (not just
charges) to the court within 48 hours of arrest. Lack of financial
resources for appropriate equipment, facilities, and training also
contributed to mistreatment.
There have been some marginal improvements in police conduct
resulting from training in investigative interviewing skills and from
workshops aimed at changing officers' attitudes. While higher ranking
officials demonstrated familiarity with new standards for the humane
treatment of prisoners, their subordinates commonly employed
unacceptable techniques. The Government continued to seek community
involvement in its comprehensive reform of the police. In February the
National Assembly passed the Community Service Act, which permits some
offenders to provide community service in place of imprisonment. As of
year's end, there were Community Service Act pilot programs in four
cities.
Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening.
Overcrowding, inadequate nutrition, substandard sanitation, and poor
health facilities remained serious problems. According to the 1997
Inspectorate of Prisons report, harsh conditions and inadequate health
care contributed to the deaths from disease of over 200 inmates over a
20-month period from January 1996 to August 1997. The Government
reported that during the year, 260 prisoners and suspects died in
police cells and prisons, including those attempting to escape. While
not kept in separate facilities, women are segregated within the prison
compound and tended by female guards. Only four prisons have separate
facilities for juveniles. In the other prisons, juveniles are
incarcerated with adults.
The Inspectorate of Prisons, domestic nongovernmental organizations
(NGO's), and international NGO's are permitted to make visits to
monitor prison conditions without government interference.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution grants
the accused the rights to challenge the legality of detention, to have
access to legal counsel, and to be released or informed of charges by a
court of law within 48 hours; however, these rights seldom are
respected in practice. Police often resort to beatings to obtain
information deemed necessary to their cases. In cases where the court
determines that a defendant cannot afford to supply his own counsel,
legal services are provided by the Government. With few persons able to
afford legal counsel, the country's five public defenders were not
sufficient to represent all indigent detainees in atimely manner. Bail
frequently is granted to reduce prison overcrowding. Its use often
bears only a tenuous relationship to the merits of an individual's
situation. At the end of the year, approximately one-third of the 7,324
prison inmates consisted of detainees awaiting trial. Police are
accused of arbitrary arrests due to political motives.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice; however, the judicial system is handicapped by serious
weaknesses, including poor record keeping, a shortage of attorneys and
trained personnel, a heavy caseload, and a lack of resources.
The Constitution provides for a High Court, a Supreme Court of
Appeal, and subordinate magistrate courts. The Chief Justice is
appointed by the President and confirmed by the National Assembly. The
President appoints other justices, following a recommendation by the
Judicial Service Commission. All justices are appointed until the age
of 65 and may be removed only for reasons of incompetence or
misbehavior, as determined by the President and a majority of the
Parliament.
By law defendants have the right to a public trial but not to a
trial by jury. In murder cases, the High Court nevertheless used juries
of 12 persons from the defendant's home district. Defendants also are
entitled to an attorney, the right to present and challenge evidence
and witnesses, and the right of appeal. However, the judiciary's
budgetary and administrative problems effectively denied expeditious
trials for most defendants.
In July the High Court concluded a training program for 48 lay
magistrates. Traditional court judges, absorbed into the magistrate
court system, also receive some training in court procedure and the
body of law that they administer. In August the High Court began a 2-
month refresher-training program for traditional court judges.
Juvenile offenders have special rights under the Constitution,
including the right to be separated in custody from adults, to be
treated in a manner that recognizes their age and the possibility for
rehabilitation, and to be exempt from the punishment of life
imprisonment without the possibility of release. However, the
protection they are accorded in principle is often denied in practice,
and many juvenile offenders are incarcerated with adults.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Government authorities generally respected
constitutional provisions that protect these rights; however, army and
police forces, in carrying out sweeps for illegal weapons, did not
always obtain search warrants as required by law.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice; however, there were some
exceptions. Limited self-censorship still exists, in part due to habits
that evolved during the country's 30-year single party political
system, which ended in 1994. A broad spectrum of political and
ideological opinion is presented in the country's two dozen newspapers,
usually without government interference. However, the Government still
threatened and harassed members of the media. In June an editor and
senior reporter of the opposition weekly Malawi News were arrested and
detained for 3 days following publication of a story on protests
against the June 15 presidential and parliamentary election results.
The story quoted the chant of an angry group calling for the army to
take over the Government. The two journalists posted bail and at year's
end were awaiting trial on charges of ``publishing an article
prejudicial to public safety'' and ``inciting to mutiny.'' The latter
charge carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.
The state-owned Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) dominates the
radio market with its two stations, transmitting in major population
centers throughout the country. News coverage andeditorial content are
clearly progovernment. The MBC consistently denied opposition
candidates access to the media during the presidential and
parliamentary election campaigns. The Government began limited
television broadcasting in March with editorial control similar to that
on MBC radio.
There are four private radio stations. One commercial station began
broadcasting in Blantyre in August 1998. A second commercial station
began broadcasting in Blantyre in March. There is a rural community
radio station run by local women, with the help of the Malawi Media
Women's Association (MAMWA). A religious station broadcasts in the
capital and its environs.
In November 1998, Parliament passed a communications bill that
established the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA), an
independent body that issues broadcasting licenses for radio,
television, and Internet service providers. Currently, there are only a
limited number of Internet service providers, and service is expensive.
In May President Muluzi appointed the MACRA's first nine-member board.
There were no restrictions on academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this
right in practice. Authorities routinely granted official permits,
which are required by law for large meetings.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice. The Government requires
organizations, including political parties, to register with the
Registrar General in the Ministry of Justice. There were no reports of
groups being denied registration during the year.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Religious
groups must register with the Government. There were no reports that
the Government refused to register any religious group. Foreign
missionaries experienced occasional delays in renewing employment
permits, but this apparently was the result of bureaucratic
inefficiency rather than deliberate government policy (see Section
6.e.).
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens have freedom of movement and
residence within the country, and the right to leave and return.
The Government, with one exception, cooperated with the office of
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in managing the refugee
community. According to the UNHCR, Malawi hosted over 1,400 refugees,
primarily from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes
region, at the country's refugee center in Dowa. Although the
Government grants refugee status, the law does not accept refugees for
resettlement and does not permit them to work or study. Asylum
applicants are granted hearings to make their case for asylum status.
The Government also invoked the principle of first country of asylum
against many of the Rwandans and Congolese who either had requested
asylum in another country or had the opportunity to do so. Although
there were no reports of bona fide refugees seeking first asylum being
turned away, NGO sources continue to express concern that some of those
found not to be bona fide refugees--primarily Congolese--were rejected
because of poor quality translation or ambiguous questions that trapped
or misled otherwise qualified refugees. In August the Government denied
the UNHCR access to a group of 25 Eritreans in detention for attempting
to enter the country, reportedly as tourists, with fraudulent visas.
Police shot and killed one detainee in their custody (see Section
1.a.). The Government forcibly returned the remaining 24 Eritreans to
Ethiopia.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens are able to exercise their constitutional right to vote in
periodic elections. There is universal suffrage for citizens 18 years
of age and older. International election observers found the June
presidential and parliamentary elections to be free and substantially
fair; however, the electoral process was flawed, as opposition access
to the broadcast media was limited; there were registration problems in
some areas of the country;and the Electoral Commission at times
displayed bias in favor of the ruling party. The opposition appealed
the outcome of the presidential vote, and at year's end the case still
was pending before the High Court.
President Muluzi, First Vice President Justin Malewezi, and a 28-
member cabinet exercise executive authority. The second vice presidency
remains vacant. The executive exerts considerable influence over the
legislature; the legislature follows the parliamentary system, and
consequently a number of cabinet ministers also sit as Members of
Parliament (M.P.'s). Although the Government and opposition have never
reached agreement on the applicability of the 1997 High Court ruling
that cabinet ministers cannot simultaneously sit as M.P.'s., the issue
currently is not a topic of debate. At year's end, the Electoral
Commission anticipated holding elections for local government councils
in each of Malawi's 27 districts during 2000. Although the Government
does not prevent the operation of opposition political parties, the
parties continue to allege that the Government uses bribery and other
inducements to encourage opposition party divisions and defections of
key personnel to the ruling party.
There are no laws that restrict the participation of women or
minorities in the political process; however, there are very few women
in prominent government positions, and women are underrepresented in
politics and in positions of authority in general. Four of the 28
cabinet members are women; women hold 17 of the 193 seats in the
National Assembly. During the year, a citizen of European origin and
several of Asian descent were elected to the National Assembly.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups
operated without government restriction, training civic educators,
advocating changes to existing laws and cultural practices, and
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.
Government officials generally are cooperative and responsive to their
views.
The Ombudsman is mandated by the Constitution to investigate and
take legal action against government officials responsible for human
rights violations and other abuses. The Ombudsman's freedom of action
is circumscribed by legislation that requires a warrant and a 3-day
waiting period to gain access to certain government records. In August
the High Court in Blantyre issued an injunction preventing the
Ombudsman from investigating the June dismissal of four MBC employees.
(The employees allege that they were dismissed because of their
political views.) In addition to the injunction, the High Court ruled
that the Ombudsman's activities are subject to judicial review. The
Ombudsman appealed this ruling. At year's end, the employees were free
on bail, and the trial was still pending.
The Constitution provides for a National Compensation Tribunal
(NCT) to adjudicate claims of criminal and civil liability against the
former government. As of February, the NCT had registered over 8,700
claims, of which approximately 25 percent had been resolved. The NCT's
lack of funds limits its ability to settle claims. The constitutionally
mandated Human Rights Commission (HRC) is charged to: monitor, audit,
and promote human rights provided for under the Constitution; and to
carry out investigations regarding violations of any human rights. The
HRC's five commissioners, who were appointed by the President,
officially met for the first time in February but took no significant
action during the year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution specifically provides for equal rights for women;
forbids discrimination based on language, culture, or religion; and
generally provides for equality and recognition before the law for
every citizen. In practice the capacity of government institutions to
assure equal rights for all citizens is limited.
Women.--Spousal abuse, especially wife beating, is common. Society
has begun to take the problem of violence against women seriously. The
press published frequent accounts of rape and abuse, and the judiciary
continued to impose heavier penalties on those convicted of rape.
However, domestic violence seldom isdiscussed openly by women,
reportedly even among themselves, and in part due to the lack of
resources there are no confidential shelters or facilities for
treatment of women who suffer physical or sexual abuse. Police do not
normally intervene in domestic disputes.
Under the Constitution, women have the right to full and equal
protection by law and may not be discriminated against on the basis of
sex or marital status; however, in practice discrimination against
women is pervasive, and women do not have opportunities equal to those
available to men. Women have significantly lower levels of literacy,
education, formal and nontraditional employment opportunities, and
access to resources to increase agricultural productivity.
Women, especially in rural areas, historically have been unable to
complete even a primary education, and are therefore at a serious
disadvantage in finding employment. Accepted economic and social
practice hampers the ability of women and girls to gain an education.
The literacy rate among women between the ages of 15 and 45 is less
than 37 percent. Male literacy in the same age group is about 45
percent. Girls drop out of school more frequently than boys do, and in
the final year of primary school, only about 25 percent of students are
girls. Despite recent significant gains in girls' access to education,
large gaps remain between girls' and boys' achievement levels. However,
there have been signs of improvement in education for girls. Girls
entered first grade in the same proportion as boys during the year,
although the percentage of female secondary school entrants is down
from the previous year (39 percent).
Women often have less access to legal and financial assistance, and
wives are often victims of discriminatory inheritance practices in
which the majority of the estate is taken unlawfully by the deceased
husband's family. Women are usually at a disadvantage in marriage,
family, and property rights, but they have begun to speak out against
abuse and discrimination. Households headed by women are represented
disproportionately in the lowest quarter of income distribution. In a
country where 85 percent of the population is rural, the majority of
farmers are women; 70 percent of the rural female population farm full
time. Typically, women work more hours than men to complete the same
farm tasks because they rarely have comparable tools and equipment and
remain responsible for all household tasks. Women have limited access
to agricultural extension services, training, and credit. Some progress
has been made in all of these areas with gender training for
agricultural extension workers and the gradual introduction of rural
credit programs for women. The participation of women in the limited
formal labor market is particularly constrained; they constitute less
than 5 percent of managerial and administrative staff.
Women face significant health problems. The country has a high
maternal mortality rate. HIV/AIDS is a major threat, and females in the
15 to 24 age bracket are three to four times more likely to be HIV
positive than men.
The Law Commissioner has undertaken a review of legislation that
discriminates against women and has proposed legislation to bring the
law into compliance with new constitutional standards. By year's end,
61 of 65 relevant laws had been reviewed. In 1997 Parliament passed an
affiliation bill that raised the minimum level of child support. In
1998 Parliament passed a wills and inheritance bill that increased
widows' rights.
The Government addresses women's concerns through the Ministry of
Gender, Youth, and Community Services. The National Commission on Women
in Development coordinates government and NGO activities. The Gender
Initiative Network, an informal association of women's NGO's, attempts
to bring together the largely urban women's rights activists and the
overwhelming rural majority to discuss common interests; however, it
did not take specific initiatives during the year.
Children.--The Constitution provides for equal treatment of
children under the law, and the Government greatly increased spending
on children's health and welfare. The Government established free
primary education for all children in 1994, although education is not
compulsory. Well over half of the country's children live in poverty,
mostly in rural areas. Children in rural households headed by women are
among the poorest. A few charitable organizations attempted to reduce
the number of child beggars in urban areas and find alternative care
for them. The problem of street children worsened as the number of
orphans whose parents died from HIV/AIDS increased. In 1995 there
werean estimated 140,000 children who had lost their mother to AIDS,
and this figure is expected to increase to 300,000 by 2000. Such
children and other orphans normally are cared for by extended family
members.
Only one-third of children have easy access to safe drinking water.
Infant mortality is high. Child malnutrition is a serious problem.
There are societal patterns of abuse of children. A few small
ethnic groups practice female genital mutilation, which is widely
condemned by international health experts as damaging to both physical
and psychological health. The Government took no action against FGM
during the year. The media also have begun to report on the sexual
abuse of children, especially in relation to traditional practices of
initiation. While rites to initiate girls into their future adult roles
are still secret, information suggests that abusive practices are
widespread and quite damaging. Also, the belief that children are
unlikely to be HIV positive contributes to the sexual abuse of minors.
People with Disabilities.--The Government has not mandated
accessibility to buildings and services for the disabled, but one of
the national goals in the Constitution is to support the disabled
through greater access to public places, fair opportunities in
employment, and full participation in all spheres of society. There are
both public and privately supported schools and training centers, which
assist individuals with disabilities. There are also several self-
supporting businesses run by and for persons with disabilities. In
December 1998, President Muluzi established a new cabinet-level
position, the Minister of State Responsible for Persons with
Disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Malawians of African heritage
are members of indigenous tribes and are not discriminated against by
government or society. There is no legal discrimination against
citizens of Asian heritage, although societal tensions exist between
the communities of African and Asian origin.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1996 Labor Relations Act (LRA)
governs labor issues. Workers have the legal right to form and join
trade unions; however, union membership is low due to the small
percentage of the work force in the formal sector (about 12 percent),
the lack of awareness of worker rights and benefits, and a resistance
on the part of many employees to joining unions. Only 13 percent of
persons employed in the formal sector belong to unions. Accurate
statistics on the numbers of union members are not available.
Unions must register with the Registrar of Trade Unions and
Employers' Organizations in the Ministry of Labor and Vocational
Training (MOLVT). Army personnel and police may not belong to trade
unions, but other civil servants are allowed to form unions. There are
no unusually difficult registration procedures. Unions are independent
of the government, parties, and other political forces.
Although there are no restrictions on the number of union
federations, the country has only one, the Malawi Congress of Trade
Unions (MCTU). All unions are affiliated with it.
Mechanisms for protecting internationally recognized worker rights
are weak. There are serious manpower shortages at the Ministry of
Labor; as a result, there are almost no labor standards inspections.
The LRA allows members of a registered union to strike only after
all dispute settlement procedures established in a collective agreement
and conciliation procedures have failed. The law requires a notice in
writing to the employer and the MOLVT at least 7 days before a strike.
The law also forbids the temporary replacement of labor, and allows
peaceful picketing during strikes. However, members of a registered
union in ``essential services'' do not have the right to strike.
Essential services are specified as services whose interruption would
endanger the life, health, or personal safety of the whole or part of
the population; they are determined by the Industrial Relations Court
upon application by the Minister of Labor. The law provides similar
procedures for lockouts.Laws do not specifically prohibit retaliation
against strikers. There is no prohibition on actions against unions
that are not registered legally. Arbitration rulings are legally
enforceable.
Unions may form or join federations, and have the right to
affiliate with and participate in international workers' organizations,
with the permission of the Government.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have the
right to organize and bargain collectively. The LRA requires that at
least 20 percent of employees (excluding senior managerial staff)
belong to a union before such a union can engage in collective
bargaining at the enterprise level. The LRA requires at least 15
percent union membership for collective bargaining at the sector level.
The law provides for the establishment of industrial councils in the
absence of collective agreements for sector-level bargaining.
Industrial council functions include wage negotiation, dispute
resolution, and industry-specific labor policy development. Collective
agreements are binding legally, and both parties must deposit them with
the Registrar of Trade Unions.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers and
requires that employers reinstate workers dismissed because of union
activities.
Parliament approved legislation to establish export-processing
zones (EPZ's) in 1995. At year's end, 25 firms held licenses to operate
under EPZ status, and all were operational. The full range of labor
regulations applies to the EPZ's.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor, and such labor is not generally used. There are
allegations that some large agricultural estates engage in the
practice. The law does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded
labor by children.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution defines children as persons less than 16
years of age. It prohibits the employment of children in work that is
hazardous, harmful, or interferes with their education. Primary
education is free and universal, but not compulsory. Budgetary
constraints largely preclude minimum work age and child labor law
enforcement by police and MOLVT inspectors. There is significant child
labor on tobacco and tea farms, subsistence farms, and in domestic
service. There is no special legal restriction on children's work
hours, largely due to extreme poverty and longstanding cultural
tradition. The law does not prohibit forced and bonded labor by
children specifically; however, forced and bonded labor in general is
prohibited by law. Nonetheless, at least one local NGO has reported
that in urban areas it is not uncommon to find young girls working as
domestic servants, receiving little or no wages, and existing in a
state of indentured servitude (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The MOLVT sets separate urban
and rural minimum wage rates based on recommendations of the Tripartite
Wage Advisory Board composed of representatives of labor, government,
and the private sector. The urban minimum wage amounts to about $0.58
(MK24.80) per day, including $0.07 (MK3) for rent; in all other areas
it is roughly $0.41 (MK17.50) per day, including $0.04 (MK2) for rent.
These minimum wage rates, the result of a revision in August 1998
following a 40 percent devaluation of the currency, remain insufficient
to provide a worker and family with a decent standard of living. Wage
earners tend to supplement their incomes through farming activities.
The MOLVT lacks the resources to enforce the minimum wage effectively.
However, the minimum wage largely is irrelevant for the great majority
of citizens, who earn their livelihood outside the formal wage sector.
The maximum legal workweek is 48 hours, with a mandatory weekly 24-
hour rest period. The laws require payment for overtime work and
prohibit compulsory overtime. In practice employers frequently violate
statutory time restrictions.
The law protects foreign workers in correct legal status. Illegal
foreign workers are subject to deportation.
In November 1998, the Government issued a revised ``policy
statement'' and new guidelines for the issuance and renewal of
[expatriate] employment permits that underscored its desire to make
such permits readily available to foreigners. The 1998 guidelines
mandated that processing times for temporary employment permit (TEP)
applications not exceed 40 working days. Nonetheless, slow and
inconsistent processing of TEP applications caused concern and
sometimes hardship to businessmen, teachers, health workers, and
missionaries. Foreign firms continue to complain that processing times
for TEP applications exceed the 40-day maximum mandated in the 1998
policy statement.
The Workers' Compensation Act includes extensive occupational
health and safety standards. Enforcement of these standards by the
MOLVT is erratic. Workers--particularly in industrial jobs--often work
without basic safety clothing and equipment. Workers dismissed for
filing complaints about workplace conditions have the right to file a
complaint at the labor office or sue the employer for wrongful
dismissal. Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous
work situations without jeopardy to continued employment. However,
given the low level of education of most workers and the high level of
unemployment, they are unlikely to exercise this right.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons. A court ruling during the year acquitted a local
businesswoman of luring three Malawian girls to the Netherlands and
subsequently forcing them into prostitution.
______
MALI
Mali is a constitutional democracy now implementing
decentralization following local elections. President Alpha Oumar
Konare was reelected to a second 5-year term in 1997. A collective of
12 opposition parties boycotted the 1997 presidential and legislative
elections, which were administratively flawed but considered generally
free and without evident fraud, and claimed that the elections were
unconstitutional because the Government failed to carry out annual
updates of electoral lists. However, some opposition candidates chose
to participate by running as independents. The ruling Alliance for
Democracy in Mali (ADEMA), led by President Konare, dominates the
National Assembly, which includes representatives of opposition and
ADEMA-aligned parties. Local elections took place in May and June in
682 rural communities, completing elections held in 19 urban
communities the previous year. Council members elected their mayors
between August 28 and September 6, and newly elected mayors took over
local administration between September 9 and September 15. The
Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but in practice the
Government continues to exert influence on the judiciary.
Security forces are composed of the army, air force, Gendarmerie,
the National Guard, and the police. The army and air force are under
the control of the civilian Minister of the Armed Forces and Veterans,
as are the Gendarmerie and the National Guard. The police are under the
Ministry of Territorial Administration and Security. The police and
gendarmes share responsibility for internal security. The Government
completed the process of integrating elements of former Tuareg rebel
forces into its armed forces.
Mali is a very poor country with a market-based economy. Most of
the work force is employed in the agricultural sector, particularly
farming and animal husbandry. The country's principal exports are
cotton, livestock, and gold. There is a very small industrial sector,
largely based on the manufacture of textiles, beverages, and processed
food products. The gross national product is approximately $251 per
capita, which provides most of the population with a low standard of
living. The economy depends heavily upon foreign assistance.
Desertification and social limitations, including a current estimated
literacy rate of roughly 20 percent and a high population growth rate,
contribute to poverty. Poor infrastructure, minimal foreign investment,
administrativeinefficiency, and corruption are also important factors
in limiting economic growth.
The Government generally respected its citizen's human rights in
many areas; however, problems remained in several others. There was one
incident of politically motivated disappearance. Prison conditions
remained poor. Unlike the previous year, there were no instances of
arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the judicial system's large
case backlog resulted in long periods of pretrial detention and lengthy
delays in trials. The judiciary continued to be subject to executive
influence. Unlike the previous year, there were no instances in which
freedom of assembly was limited. Societal discrimination against women
persists, and social and cultural factors continued to limit sharply
economic and educational opportunities for most women. Violence against
women and children, including spousal abuse and female genital
mutilation (FGM), is widespread. There were several serious incidents
of societal violence related to political or ethnic tension. Political
change in the country's volatile northern region was followed by
sectarian violence in isolated villages. There was an incident during
the June rural election in which five government officials were
kidnaped and two voting stations were destroyed by a group that tried
to disrupt the election. In a separate incident, clashes between Kounta
and Arab communities resulted in 33 deaths and several injuries. In
June and July, two violent incidents occurred between Fulani herders
and Sarakole farmers in the Kayes region. A dozen persons were killed,
and several were wounded. In both incidents, parliamentary and
government mediation have helped in easing the tension between the
communities in conflict.
Small-scale traditional family-based child labor is frequently
employed in agriculture and domestic areas. Malian children were
trafficked sold into forced labor in Cote D'Ivoire; the Government
arrested several traffickers. Hereditary servitude relationships link
different ethnic groups.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by security forces during the year.
There were no developments in the 1994 deaths of the Swiss
Cooperation Mission director and his two Malian colleagues, who were
killed by an army patrol in Niafunke. A government mission of inquiry
into their deaths determined that the actions were unwarranted and
unjustified. However, to date, the Government has taken no action to
expedite the case, which remains on file at a regional court.
In the evening prior to the June 1998 municipal election in Segou,
individuals seeking to disrupt the elections threw a grenade into the
courtyard of the regional representative of the electoral commission,
killing the deputy chief commissioner's adult daughter and wounding
several other persons. Several persons were arrested and charged with
assault and attempt to kill; the case is still under judicial
investigation. On October 12, the detainees were released provisionally
to await arraignment and trial.
b. Disappearance.--In July a group of nomads in the Cercle of
Menaka disrupted voting in the local elections by kidnaping five
officials and destroying voting materials, citing an unfair drawing of
the voting area's boundaries (see Section 3). The officials were
released unharmed after the Government permitted the kidnapers to
depart for a neighboring country.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the
authorities generally respect these provisions.
Amnesty International (AI), in reports released in November 1997
and in October 1998, cited allegations by former detainees and an
independent witness that members of the security forces had tortured
them in order to extract confessions in some cases. Although senior
government officials voiced skepticism about these reports, the
Government invited AI to continue its monitoring and reporting
activities (see Section 4). In the two cases on which AI's allegations
of torture chiefly focused, the case of the 1997 election day bombing
of the Bamako market and the case of military officers accused of
planning a coup (see Section 1.e.), the defendants were released soon
after their convictions, either because the President pardoned them or
because the court imposed short sentences including the time that they
already had been detained.
Some police and gendarmes extort bribes at vehicle checkpoints (see
Section 2.d.).
Prison conditions are poor. Prisons continue to be characterized by
overcrowding, inadequate medical facilities, and limited food supplies.
They remain below minimum international standards. In Bamako juvenile
offenders usually are held in the same prison as adult offenders but
are kept in separate cells. Women are housed in the same prison
facility as men but live in a separate compound. In regional prisons
outside the capital, men and women are housed in the same building but
in separate cells. In these facilities, children share cells with adult
prisoners of the same sex. In late 1997, the Justice Minister made a
fact finding tour of the prison system, which led to the closing of the
colonial-era Kidal prison with its prisoners given daytime jobs in the
remote northern desert town. In 1998 the Minister initiated an overall
review of prison conditions. In December 1998, the Justice Minister
confirmed that poor prison conditions persist; the Democracy Forum held
that same month concluded that although poor, prison conditions were
improving. The Judiciary Forum meeting of civil society representatives
held in March concluded that prison conditions remained poor. However,
the Democracy Forum in December noted that the Government had taken
some steps to improve the condition of detainees, including opening
separate facilities for reeducation of young offenders and education
for guards in the rights of detainees. During the year, women and
children initially detained in the central prison of Bamako were
transferred to the new detention center inaugurated by the government
in December 1998.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
Several organizations, including the Malian Association of Human
Rights, the Malian Association of Women Jurists, and other
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) visited prisoners and are working
with women and juvenile prisoners to improve their conditions. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to visit
imprisoned leading members of the former government.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides that suspects must be charged or released within 48 hours and
that they are entitled to counsel; however, in practice detainees are
not always charged within the 48-hour period. Moreover, administrative
backlogs and insufficient lawyers, judges, and courts often cause
lengthy delays in bringing persons to trial. In extreme cases,
individuals have remained in prison for several years before coming to
trial. For example Abdoulaye Diallo had been detained since 1995 prior
to his conviction in March 1998 for embezzlement during his tenure as
Minister of Health under the regime of General Moussa Traore, who was
President until 1991. He was sentenced for crimes of bloodshed to 3
years' imprisonment, which included time spent in custody. He was
absolved of economic crimes.
Judicial warrants are required for arrest. Local lawyers have
estimated that about half of prison inmates are pretrial detainees.
This judgment was confirmed in March during the Judiciary Forum
seminar. Limited rights of bail or the granting of conditional liberty
exist, particularly for minor crimes and civil matters. On occasion the
authorities release defendants on their own recognizance.
In 1997 former President Traore, his wife Mariam, and former
customs commissioner Douah Abraham Sissoko, who were placed under
detention following the fall of the Traore regime in 1991, remained
under detention and were charged with ``economic crimes,'' including
``abuse of a position of power'' and ``illicit enrichment.'' They had
been convicted and sentenced to death in 1993, but President Konare
commuted their sentences to prisonterms in December 1997. The trial in
their cases and similar cases involving five other senior officials of
the Traore regime began in October 1998. Traore, his wife Mariam, and
Sissoko were convicted and sentenced to death in January; they are
currently serving life sentences.
The Government does not practice forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the executive branch continues to exert
influence over the judicial system. The Ministry of Justice appoints
and has the power to suspend judges; it supervises both law enforcement
and judicial functions. The President heads the Superior Judicial
Council, which oversees judicial activity.
The Supreme Court has both judicial and administrative powers. The
Constitution established a separate Constitutional Court that oversees
issues of constitutionality and acts as an election arbiter. The
Constitution also provides for the convening of a High Court of Justice
with the power to try senior government officials in cases of treason.
Except in the case of minors, trials are public, and defendants
have the right to be present and have an attorney of their choice.
Defendants are presumed innocent and have the right to confront
witnesses and to appeal decisions to the Supreme Court. Court-appointed
attorneys are provided for the indigent without charge. The village
chief in consultation with the elders decides the majority of disputes
in rural areas. If these decisions are challenged in court, only those
found to have legal merit are upheld.
Women and minorities are not discriminated against in courts.
AI in an October 1998 report described the arrest in 1996,
detention in 1997, and ultimate trial and conviction in March of seven
military officers, including former minister Mady Diallo, who were
accused of plotting to overthrow the Government. The report concluded
that there were irregularities throughout the process, that confessions
were provided under duress, and that the entire process and the
subsequent sentences were politically motivated. However, the
prosecution described the officers' claim that they were engaged in
labor union activities within the officer corps as a veiled attempt to
organize a coup. The accused were released in March 1998, having
already served in detention most of the prison terms to which they were
sentenced. Diallo originally said that he would appeal the court's
verdict, but he did not pursue the matter after release.
There were no other reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
home, and the Government respects this right in practice. Police
searches are infrequent and require judicial warrants. However,
security forces maintain physical and technical surveillance of
individuals and groups believed to be threats to internal security,
including surveillance of telephone and written correspondence of
individuals deemed to be a threat to national security.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice.
There are approximately 40 private newspapers and journals, in
French, Arabic, and local languages. There are five daily newspapers:
four are privately owned, of which one is allied with the ruling party
and one is government controlled.
The Government controls one television station and one of many
radio stations, but all present a wide range of views, including those
critical of the Government, the President, the Prime Minister, and
other politicians. However, there are no private television stations
that broadcast domestically produced programs. The legal framework for
private television has been in place since 1992; however, the
Government still is developing the fee schedules. Radio KLEDU has had
an approved application on record since 1992, but it also is awaiting
announcement of the fee schedules and examining its financial base
beforestarting private television broadcasting. The Government made
little progress toward private television licensing during the year.
The relative expense of newspapers and television, coupled with a
low literacy rate, makes radio the most prevalent medium of mass
information and communication. There are as many as 15 private radio
stations in Bamako, and there are approximately 40 additional stations
throughout the country.
The Government does not censor print, broadcast, or electronic
media, which often offer editorials critical of the Government and
opposition alike. Laws passed in 1993 regulate the press and provide
for substantial criminal penalties, including imprisonment, for libel
and for public injury to the Head of State, other officials, and
foreign diplomats; these laws leave injury undefined and subject to
judicial interpretation. However, the current Government never has
prosecuted journalists on criminal libel charges. No journalists were
arrested on libel charges during the year.
Domestic reception and distribution of foreign satellite and cable
television is permitted and fairly widespread, especially in Bamako.
Five domestic servers provide access to the Internet. Licenses to
operate Internet servers are granted freely and are not prohibitively
expensive.
Academic freedom generally is respected; however, in April security
forces made a mass arrest of students attending a meeting on the campus
of an institute of higher education (see Section 2.b.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
this right in practice; however, there were a few exceptions. The law
requires groups that wish to hold public meetings to obtain the mayor's
permission; such permission is granted routinely. In February and
March, students demonstrated on the campus of the National University
to protest against the holding of exams. About a dozen of the
demonstrators were detained by police, but later released without
charge.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
however, the Government does not officially recognize the Baha'i Faith.
The law allows for religious practices that do not pose a threat to
social stability and peace. The Constitution declares the country a
secular state.
The Government requires that all public associations, including
religious associations, register with the Government. However,
registration confers no tax preference and no other legal benefits, and
failure to register is not penalized in practice. The registration
process is routine and is not burdensome. Traditional indigenous
religious are not required to register.
In 1989 a previous government refused an application for
registration submitted by a Baha'i group, although there was and still
is no state law prohibiting the practice of the Baha'i Faith. The
absence of official recognition does not appear to have restricted
materially the practice of the Baha'i Faith in the country. Although
the Government still does not officially recognize the Baha'i Faith, it
does not restrict the practice of the religion either in law or in
practice.
Muslims make up about 90 percent of the population, and the vast
majority of Muslims are Sunni. Most of the remainder of the population
practice traditional indigenous religions or no religion. There is a
small Christian minority, and the Christian community is about evenly
split between Catholic and Protestant denominations.
Foreign missionary groups operate in the country, and Muslims and
non-Muslims may proselytize freely.
The Minister of Territorial Administration and Security can
prohibit religious publications that he concludes defame another
religion, but there were no reports of instances in which publications
were prohibited.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice. The
Government generally does not restrict internal movement and does not
restrict international travel. However, police routinely stop and check
both citizens and foreigners to restrict the movement of contraband and
to verify vehicle registrations. Some police and gendarmes use the
occasion to extort bribes.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
in assisting refugees. A June 1998 law conforms to the provisions of
the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol. As a follow-up to this law, in December 1998 the
Government created a national committee in charge of refugees. The
committee began operations in January with institutional assistance
from the UNHCR. The Government provides first asylum for refugees.
According to both UNHCR and government estimates, there were 6,000
Mauritanians living in western Mali at year's end. However, the UNHCR,
Mauritania, and Mali have never agreed on recognition of the refugee
status of these persons, who have lived in Mali for nearly a decade.
Members of these pastoralist, border groups historically make cross-
border migrations. Throughout 1998 the UNHCR provided some limited
material assistance and incentives to pastoralists of Mauritanian
origin to return to Mauritania, and this program reduced the number
from approximately 10,000 at the end of 1998 to the estimated 6,000
still residing in the country. In June the UNHCR completed its
assistance to such persons, which consisted of community support at
their living sites as opposed to repatriation assistance. Mauritanians
are free to register for refugee status, although few actually do.
Mali hosted approximately 1,900 urban refugees as of November;
four-fifths are from Sierra Leone and 90 percent are in Bamako. The
Government opened a transit center located 120 miles from Bamako, where
it hosts approximately 100 of the most vulnerable refugee and asylum
applicants. The center has a capacity of approximately 300 persons, but
that could be expanded to hold 900.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government and did so for
the first time in 1992. In 1997 citizens elected President Alpha Oumar
Konare to a second 5-year term by secret ballot in elections that were
open to all and free of evident fraud and manipulation. Konare won 96
percent of the vote, but voter turnout was reportedly 20 to 25 percent;
most opposition parties boycotted the election, citing flaws in the
voter registration system. The opposition continued to charge that the
Government failed to carry out constitutionally mandated annual
electoral list revisions and that, therefore, the elections should be
declared invalid.
Under the Constitution, the President is Chief of State and
Commander in Chief of the armed forces and is elected for a term of 5
years with a limit of two terms. The President appoints the Prime
Minister. Additionally, the President appoints other members of the
Government and sets limits on their powers. He names civil servants
(national directors, regional government delegates, and others) and
high military officers as mandated by the Constitution. The President
also promulgates laws within 15 days, following transmission to the
Government of a final adopted text. He can veto and return legislation
to the National Assembly for reconsideration. There is no provision for
the National Assembly to override a presidential veto. The President
may submit all questions of national interest to referendum after
consultation with the Constitutional Court. He exercises the power of
pardon and can grant amnesty. The President may dissolve the National
Assembly and call for new elections, although not in the year following
legislative elections. Theoretically, he can declare a state of
emergency and rule by decree, although President Konare has never done
so.
National Assembly members were elected in 1992 and 1997. The
Constitutional Court cancelled the results of the initial 1997
legislative elections, citing flaws in the electoral process. These
elections were repeated later in 1997, and the results were
implemented. Citing problems in the voter registrationprocess, a
collective of 18 opposition parties boycotted these elections, which,
although administratively flawed, were considered by most independent
observers to be generally free and without evident fraud. ADEMA holds
130 of 147 seats in the National Assembly, with 12 held by allied
parties and 5 held by opposition parties.
The Government instituted far-reaching administrative reforms
during the year. As of September 16, governing authority is shared by
elected mayors in the 701 communes (including the 19 cities), and
appointed officials (``commissaire du gouvernement'') who are the
representatives of the central Government in the District of Bamako,
the regions and the cercles (districts roughly equivalent to counties).
Local governments benefit from central government subsidies, but they
also are able to collect local taxes to support their operations.
Decentralization is still a controversial issue. The process has
changed traditional power relationships between government and governed
and has relieved formerly powerful civil servants of their authority.
The new administrators often are inexperienced and undereducated.
Despite governmental pressure to move ahead with decentralization, the
nonparliamentary opposition says that the Government is moving too
fast, and should implement the process step by step as administrators
lack adequate funding to govern effectively.
After local elections in June 1998, held to choose council members
for the 19 urban communities, the long-awaited rural elections were
carried out in May and June. Several opposition parties that had
boycotted earlier elections participated in the rural elections, with
considerable success. On election day, a group of nomads in the Cercle
of Menaka disrupted the voting by kidnaping five officials and
destroying voting materials, citing an unfair drawing of the voting
area boundaries (see Section 1.b.). In two communities (Kidal and
Bourem), council members could not elect a mayor due to intercommunity
disputes.
There are no restrictions, legal or otherwise, on voting by women
or minorities; however, women are underrepresented in politics. A total
of 18 women hold seats in the 147-member National Assembly, compared
with 3 elected in 1992. Six cabinet members are women. Members of
historically marginalized pastoralist ethnic minorities, including the
Fulani and the Tauregs, occupy seats in both the Cabinet and National
Assembly. The President of the Assembly is Fulani (see Section 5).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Independent human rights organizations--including the Malian
Association for Human Rights (AMDH), a smaller Malian League of Human
Rights, and a local chapter of Amnesty International (AI)--operate
openly and without interference from the Government. The ICRC has
offices in Bamako, Timbuktu, and Gao.
Since 1994 the Government has held an annual Democracy and Human
Rights Forum in December to which it invited citizens to voice
discontent and grievances against the Government publicly in the
presence of the media and international human rights observers. The
events are well attended by local citizens from all walks of life and
discussion is free and open. Held on December 10, the Democracy Forum
convened to review the previous year's work and to make recommendations
to the Government. The topics for discussion included judicial reform,
access to education, and violence against women. The Forum called on
the Government to make these issues a priority in the coming year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on social origin,
color, language, sex, or race, and the Government respects these
provisions in practice. However, social and cultural factors give men a
dominant role.
Women.--Violence against women, including wife beating, is
tolerated and common.
Women's access to jobs in the professions and government, and to
economic and educational opportunities traditionally has been limited.
A 1995-96 national demographic and health survey found that 81 percent
of women (compared with 69.3 percent of men) between the ages of 15 and
49 received no education. Women constitute 15 percent of the labor
force. The Government, the country's major employer, pays women the
same as men for similarwork. Women often live under harsh conditions,
especially in rural areas, where they perform difficult farm work and
do most of the childbearing. Despite legislation giving women equal
rights regarding property, traditional practice and ignorance of the
law prevent women from taking full advantage of this reform. In 1996
the Government launched a 4-year national plan of action for the
promotion of women. The plan, financed by national, regional, and local
community budgets, seeks to reduce inequalities between men and women
in six target areas, including education, health, and legal rights.
Despite its initial 4-year mandate, the plan is not close to
completion; however, it continues to influence government project
development.
Traditional practice discriminates against women in inheritance
matters.
There are numerous active women's groups that promote the rights of
women and children. Women have very limited access to legal services.
They are particularly vulnerable in cases of divorce, child custody,
and inheritance rights, as well as in the general protection of civil
rights.
Children.--Although by law primary education is compulsory through
the sixth grade, only 50 percent of children receive a basic education.
Literacy rates among females remain low due to a low degree of
adherence to this requirement, a lack of primary schools, cultural
tendencies to place less emphasis on education for girls, and the fact
that most of the population live in rural areas.
There is no constitutional or legal provision to protect the
interests and rights of children, and there is no juvenile court
system. However, the Malian Social Services Department investigates and
intervenes in cases of reported child abuse or neglect. According to
local human rights organizations, reported cases are rare; however,
statistics are unreliable.
There were credible reports that children were sold into forced
labor in Cote d'Ivoire (see Section 6.c.).
Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is still common, especially in rural areas, and
is performed on girls at an early age. According to a 1995-96 national
demographic and health survey, at least 93.7 percent of adult women
have undergone this mutilation. The Government has not proposed
legislation prohibiting FGM. The Government is pursuing a program of
public awareness rather than legal prosecution of women involved in the
practice. It supports educational efforts to eliminate the practice
through seminars and conferences and provides media access to
proponents of its elimination. In 1997 the Ministry for the Promotion
of Women created a National Committee Against Violence Towards Women
that links all the NGO's active in preventing FGM. Throughout the year,
various NGO's campaigned against FGM and in October 1998, the National
Committee adopted a draft action plan against sexual mutilation for
submission to the Ministerial Council and after further revision was
presented early in the year. The Ministerial Council accepted the
recommendations and the Government instituted a two-phased plan to
eliminate excision by 2008. The first phase, scheduled for 1999-2004,
is one of education and dissemination of information. The second phase,
scheduled for 2004-08 is projected to adopt legislation and legally
enforce such ordinances.
People with Disabilities.--There is no specific legislation
protecting the rights of the physically or mentally disabled, nor
mandating accessibility. The Government does not discriminate against
the physically disabled in regard to employment, education, and other
state services; however, the Government has not taken special provision
for the disabled in these areas. There is no societal discrimination
against the disabled; however, in view of the high unemployment rate,
the physically disabled are often unable to find work.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population of about 10
million is ethnically, culturally, and regionally diverse. Major
ethnic-cultural groups include: the Mande, concentrated in the
southwest, which constitutes about half the population and includes the
Bambara ethnic group; the Malinke; the Voltaic, concentrated in the
south andcomprising the Bobo and Senoufo groups; the Sudanic,
concentrated in the central regions and comprising the Sarakole,
Songhai, Dogon, and Bozo groups; and the pastoralist, comprising the
Tuaregs and Moors of the northeast and the Peul (or Fulani) of the
central region.
Longstanding tensions between the long-marginalized Moor and Tuareg
pastoralist groups and the more populous nonpastoralist groups have
been a leading source of political instability and violence, including
the Tuareg rebellions of the early 1990's. In June and July, there were
two violent incidents between Fulani herders and Sarakole farmers in
the western region of Kayes bordering Senegal and Mauritania, over
natural resource management. A dozen persons were killed and several
were wounded. Clashes between Arab and Kounta communities resulted in
the death of 33 persons, with several others wounded. In both cases,
traditional and parliamentary mediators have negotiated peace between
the parties in conflict.
No single ethnic group predominates in either the private sector or
the public sector. All three presidents since independence have been
affiliated with the Bambara group, which accounts for roughly half of
the country's population, but no ethnic group holds disproportionate
numbers of government positions or predominates in the military or
civil service. Political parties, by and large, do not have readily
identifiable ethnic bases, but some reflect regional constituencies.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
specifically provide for the freedom of workers to form or join unions
and protect freedom of association. Only the military, the Gendarmerie,
and the National Guard are excluded from forming unions. Virtually all
salaried employees are organized. Workers have established independent
unions for teachers, magistrates, health workers, and senior civil
servants, and most are affiliated with the National Union of Malian
Workers (UNTM) confederation. The UNTM has maintained its autonomy from
the Government. The umbrella union, UNTM, held a warning strike on July
20-21. Subsequently, government workers received a 7 percent salary
increase.
There are two major labor federations, the UNTM and the Syndicated
Confederation of Malian Workers (CSTM). The UNTM, formerly the only
major labor body, split in late 1997, dividing the country's 12 labor
organizations into 2 federations.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, although there
are restrictions in some areas. For example civil servants and workers
in state-owned enterprises must give 2 weeks' notice of a planned
strike and must enter into negotiations with the employer and a third
party, usually the Ministry of Labor. The Labor Code prohibits
retribution against strikers, and the Government respects this
requirement in practice.
Unions are free to associate with and participate in international
bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The growth of
independent unions has led to more direct bargaining between these
unions and their employers. However, wages and salaries for workers
belonging to the UNTM unions are set by tripartite negotiations between
the Ministry of Labor, labor unions, and representatives of the
federation of employers of the sector to which the wages apply. These
negotiations usually set the pattern for unions outside the UNTM. The
Ministry of Labor acts as a mediator in labor disputes. The 1997 split
in the UNTM did not change the basic procedures of these negotiations.
Neither the Constitution nor the Labor Code addresses the question
of antiunion discrimination, but there have been no reports or
complaints of antiunion behavior or activities. If the parties cannot
come to agreement, the dispute goes to the Labor Court for decision.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
children; however, Malian children were sold into forced labor in Cote
d'Ivoire by organized traffickers (see Section 6.f.).
Although there have been no other reports of forced or bonded child
labor in Mali, apprenticeship, often in a family member's or a parent's
vocation, begins at an early age, especially for children unable to
attend school.
There were some reports that the de facto slavery long reported to
have existed in northern salt mining communities has evolved toward
wage labor in recent years; however, reliable current evidence about
labor conditions in those remote facilities remained unavailable.
Hereditary servitude relationships link different ethnic groups,
particularly in the north. For example there is a hereditary service
relationship between members of the Bellah ethnic group and Tuareg
populations.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The 1996 Labor Code has specific policies that pertain to
child labor. The Labor Code prohibits forced or bonded child labor;
however, Malian children were sold into forced labor abroad by
organized traffickers, and apprenticeship begins at an early age (see
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). The authorities enforce the Labor Code
provisions through the use of labor inspectors. Inspectors from the
Ministry of Employment, Public Service, and Labor conduct surprise
inspections and complaint-based inspections. However, resource
limitations restrict the frequency and effectiveness of oversight by
the Labor Inspection Service and the Service operates only in the
modern sector.
The Labor Code permits children between the ages of 12 and 14 to
work up to 2 hours per day during school vacations with parental
approval. Children between the ages of 14 and 16 may work up to 4\1/2\
hours per day with the permission of a labor inspector, but not during
nights, holidays, or Sundays. Children between the ages of 16 and 18
may work in jobs that are not physically demanding; males may work up
to 8 hours per day and females up to 6 hours per day.
These regulations often are ignored in practice. Moreover, the
Labor Code has no effect on the vast number of children who work in
rural areas, helping with family farms and herds, and in the informal
sector, for example, as street vendors. These children are not
protected by laws against unjust compensation, excessive hours, or
capricious discharge.
Education is free and in principle is open to all, although the
majority of students leave school by the age of 12. While primary
school is compulsory, it is only available to one-half of the children.
Child labor predominates in the agricultural sector and, to a lesser
degree, in crafts and trades apprenticeships, and cottage industries.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code specifies
conditions of employment, including hours, wages, and social security,
but in practice many employers either ignore or do not comply
completely with the regulations. The national minimum wage rate, set in
1994, is approximately $40 (21,000 CFA francs) per month. Workers must
be paid overtime for additional hours. The minimum wage does not
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. The
minimum wage is supplemented by a required package of benefits,
including social security and health care. While this total package
could provide a minimum standard of living for one person, in practice
most wage earners support large extended families and must supplement
their income by some subsistence farming or work in the informal
sector.
The normal legal workweek is 40 hours (45 hours for agricultural
employees), with a requirement for at least one 24-hour rest period.
The Social Security Code provides a broad range of legal protection
against hazards in the workplace, and workers' groups have brought
pressure on employers to respect parts of the regulations, particularly
those affecting personal hygiene. However, with high unemployment,
workers often are reluctant to report violations of occupational safety
regulations. The Labor Inspection Service of the Ministry of Labor
oversees these standards but limits enforcement to the modern, formal
sector. Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous work
situations and request an investigation by the Social Security
Department, which is responsible for recommending remedial action where
deemed necessary.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons. There were instances of Malian children sold into forced labor
in Cote d'Ivoire. For example children recruited by Malians in the
border town of Sikasso were promised jobs in Cote d'Ivoire, transported
across the border, and then sold for approximately $20 to $40 (10,000
to 20,000 CFA francs) to Malians and Ivorians who brokered them
throughout the plantations of north-central Cote d'Ivoire. The
Government is taking steps to halt this trafficking and repatriate the
children to Mali. In August five children were returned to their
families from Cote d'Ivoire. However, there were no arrests or
prosecutions of traffickers in these cases.
______
MAURITANIA
Mauritania is a highly centralized Islamic Republic dominated by a
strong presidency. The 1991 Constitution provides for a civilian
government composed of a dominant executive branch, a senate, and a
national assembly. President Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya has governed
since 1984, first as head of a military junta, and since the 1992
multiparty election as head of a civilian government. In December 1997,
Taya was reelected President, receiving over 90 percent of the vote.
The election, contested by four opposition candidates but boycotted by
the five-party Opposition Front coalition, was widely regarded as
fraudulent. Most opposition parties also boycotted earlier
parliamentary elections but participated in senate elections in 1994
and 1996; they gained only one seat. In the country's first multiparty
elections to the 79-member National Assembly held in 1996, 1 opposition
and 6 independent candidates were elected; candidates of the ruling
Republican, Democratic and Social Party (PRDS) won 72 seats. The
outcome of these elections was marred by fraud on all sides and
pervasive government intervention. The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is subject to significant
pressure from the executive through its ability to influence judges.
The Government maintains order with regular armed forces, the
National Guard, the Gendarmerie, and the police. The Ministry of
Defense directs the armed forces and Gendarmerie; the Ministry of
Interior directs the National Guard and police. The armed forces are
responsible for national defense. The National Guard performs police
functions throughout the country in areas in which city police are not
present. The Gendarmerie is a specialized paramilitary group
responsible for maintenance of civil order in and outside metropolitan
areas. Security forces are under the full control of the Government and
are responsible to it. Some members of the security forces committed
human rights abuses.
Mauritania, with an estimated population of 2.5 million, has a
generally market-oriented economy based on fishing, mining, subsistence
farming, herding, and a small commercial sector. Fish and iron ore are
the country's main export-earners. Drought, desertification, and insect
infestation have contributed to rapid urbanization, extensive
unemployment, pervasive poverty, and a burdensome foreign debt.
Continued drought in 1997-98 fueled urbanization, further straining
government finances. The concentration of much of the country's wealth
in the hands of a small elite, including the President's tribe and
related Moor tribes, as well as a lack of transparency and
accountability in certain areas of governance, also impedes economic
growth. Annual per capita national income is estimated at $440.
Mauritania receives foreign assistance from bilateral and multilateral
sources.
The Government's human rights record remained generally poor; there
was some improvement in a few areas, but problems remain in others.
Democratic institutions remain rudimentary, and the Government
circumscribes citizens' ability to change their government. Police used
excessive force, beat or otherwise abused detainees, and used arbitrary
arrest and detention, incommunicado prearraignment detention, and
illegal searches; however, reports of police abuses decreased during
the year. The Government failed to bring to justice most officials who
committed abuses, although some were sanctioned during the year. Prison
conditions remained harsh and unhealthy, although there were some
improvements. Pretrial detention is often very lengthy. Although the
Government instituted judicial programs and training, the executive
continued to exercise significant pressure on the judiciary, and in
practice the right to a fair trial was restricted. At times the
Government restricted freedom of speech. While the Government tolerates
a critical independent press, it continued to censor individual
editions and banned one paper for a period of 3 months without official
explanation other than to cite the Constitution, which prohibits
material that undermines national sovereignty, territorial integrity,
or national unity. The Government restricted freedom of assembly in one
instance and at times restricted freedom of association. The leader and
other officials of a major opposition party arrested at the end of 1998
were tried and acquitted of all charges in March in what was considered
a fair trial. The Government limits freedom of religion. The Government
continued to refuse to recognize officially some nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's). A ministry-level High Commission for Human
Rights, Poverty Alleviation, and Integration created in 1998
facilitated the work of international NGO's. Societal discrimination
against women continued, and female genital mutilation remained a
serious problem despite government efforts to halt the practice. Ethnic
tensions continued to ease, but the largely southern-based ethnic
groups, including the Halpulaar (also called Fulani orPeuhl), Soninke,
and Wolof ethnic groups, remained underrepresented in political life
and some of their members feel excluded from effective political
representation. Child labor in the informal sector is common.
The Government continued efforts to resolve a serious abuse from
the 1989-91 period, in which approximately 70,000 members of southern
ethnic groups were expelled or fled to neighboring countries, by
encouraging returns and facilitating the work of local and
international organizations to continue the integration projects
initiated by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The
UNHCR has determined that the majority of the refugees had returned
home and that there were no longer impediments to the rest returning.
It therefore terminated its program at the end of 1998. Informed
observers advise that following the large-scale returns of previous
years of up to 65,000 persons, refugees continued to return in small
numbers during the year. Under the land reform program intended to
provide land to the landless and to increase land under cultivation,
some of the returnees as well as other members of the southern ethnic
groups who had never left Mauritania failed to regain access to all of
the land they previously had held. Some returnees also failed to regain
the houses they had occupied before their expulsion, and there were
varying reports about their success in obtaining other homes. There
were claims that the Government favored the dominant White Moor ethnic
group in its redistribution, reportedly leaving some Southerners
landless.
The Government failed to address fully another major abuse from the
1989-91 period, when 503 members of the military, almost entirely from
the Halpulaar and Soninke ethnic groups of the south, were killed,
tortured, and maimed. The Government in earlier years gave pensions to
the documented widows of those killed, but not to undocumented
individuals claiming to be additional wives. In 1996 the Government
extended pension benefits to some of those who survived the purge.
There were no indications of further action on alleged wives who lack
documentation. A 1993 amnesty law precludes legal pursuit of those
responsible for the killings, and the Government does not acknowledge
responsibility or wrongdoing nor has it provided honorable discharge
papers to survivors or other compensation to families of those killed.
The issue resurfaced with the July 3 arrest in France, under the
International Convention against Torture of a Mauritanian captain
undergoing training at the French Army College who was accused by two
political refugees of having tortured them. The arrest sparked a lively
debate among opinion leaders from all ethnic groups, covered
extensively in the press, on how to further national reconciliation.
A system of officially sanctioned slavery in which government and
society join to force individuals to serve masters does not exist;
however, there continued to be unconfirmed reports that slavery in the
form of forced and involuntary servitude persists in some isolated
areas. Unofficial, voluntary servitude persists with many former slaves
continuing to work for former masters for food, shelter, and clothing,
although they were under no legal compulsion to do so. Many persons
including some persons from all ethnic groups still use the caste
designation of slave.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
There was one known extrajudicial killing by the security forces.
Toward the end of the year, police in an antidrug brigade arrested a
young man and beat him severely. The judge before whom he was brought
to be charged released him to his family, but he died a few days later.
In November the two police officers responsible were brought before a
disciplinary body and fired, but were not prosecuted.
Extrajudicial killings from past years remained unresolved,
principally the 1990-91 deaths while in military custody of 503
military personnel and civilians detained in the investigation of an
alleged coup attempt. The individuals were largely Halpulaar but
included a few Soninke. In 1993 the Government began to provide pension
benefits to some of the widows and families of those killed, and in
1996 the Government recognized the prior government service of some of
the civilian survivors and began to pay them pensions. The military has
not released the results of its 1991 internal investigation, and in1993
Parliament passed an amnesty bill to preclude legal pursuit of those
responsible. The Government has not acknowledged responsibility or
wrongdoing nor has it provided honorable discharge papers to survivors
to facilitate alternative employment and their reintegration into
society. The Government has considered applications from civil servants
who had lost their jobs during the events of 1989-91 and has employed a
small number.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other forms of cruel or
inhuman punishment; however, the police reportedly continue on occasion
to beat criminal suspects while in custody. Police have used undue
force in controlling public crowds and breaking up peaceful
demonstrations (see Section 2.b.). There was one case in March in which
a man who reportedly tried to rob someone was beaten severely by his
intended victim who then brought him to the police station where he
died 3 days later, having received no medical treatment. No official
action was taken against the police.
In November an airport policeman shot a taxi driver during the
course of an argument over payment of a fee. The taxi driver was
hospitalized and the policeman was arrested and charged, and is now in
prison. In a separate case in July, two policemen in Nouakchott who had
assaulted a man who had been harassing a neighbor were removed from the
force.
During the year, the Director of Security traveled to each region
of the country to meet with police forces to inform their members that
the Government would not tolerate the use of torture or undue force and
that violators would be prosecuted. The Government has continued its
in-service training of police and other security personnel, which has
shown some positive results. Reports of the use of excessive force,
requests for payoffs, or other abusive behavior decreased during the
year, and some violators were sanctioned.
On July 3, two Halpulaar political refugees in France charged
Mauritanian Captain Ely Ould Dah, a Black Moor, in France as part of a
military cooperation program, with having tortured them during the
1990-91 events. A French judge in Montpellier had Ould Dah arrested
under the International Convention against Torture. The arrest sparked
a lively debate among opinion leaders from all ethnic groups, which was
covered extensively in the press, on how to further national
reconciliation (see Section 4).
Prison conditions remained harsh and do not meet minimum
international standards, although improvements continued during the
year. Sanitation facilities remained inadequate and reportedly have
contributed to diseases such as tuberculosis, diarrhea, and
dermatological ailments. Medical supplies, mainly provided by an
international NGO, remained insufficient. Some prisoners received
special treatment based on family and position. Prisoners with high-
level connections and families to bring them food, medicines, and
reading material fared better than the less privileged or Africans from
other countries. New guard force management continued to enforce
instructions against beatings and torture. However, there were reports
of beatings of detainees at the Commissariat outside of the prison. The
current overall prison population is approximately 1,352, of whom 658
are in Nouakchott, including, 34 women and 31 minors held in separate
facilities. Conditions at the women's and children's centers continued
to be better than in the men's prisons. Female prisoners were moved to
a considerably upgraded new facility in May that contained a communal
garden. An NGO working in the prison provided a program of education
and micro-enterprise projects. An international NGO is in the process
of establishing facilities for educational and sports activities at the
children's center. The Government is cooperating with an NGO to seek
funding to provide training for female guards to replace the male
guards currently at the women's prison. A new wing was added to the
men's prison in Nouakchott in 1998, increasing its overall intended
capacity to 300. It currently is housing double that number. Plans are
underway to build a new prison in Nouakchott, and reported plans to
build a new prison in Akjoujt have been dropped. The current prison
continues to be used for those awaiting trial; the new facility is to
house those already convicted. A doctor and nurse assigned to the men's
prison also provide medical care forthe women's and children's prison,
but the infirmary remains understaffed.
The new prison administration instituted in August 1997 has
improved markedly the conditions of prison food, health, hygiene, and
family contacts. In May detainees at the men's prison engaged in a
hunger strike to demand further improvements, including speedier
trials. Prison officials met with the protesters and on June 7
established a commission to review the prison situation and seek ways
to improve conditions. Based on the commission's recommendations,
prison administrators have included in next year's budget request an
increase of 2\1/2\ times the current expenditures per prisoner in order
to provide for improved food and nutrition, medical services and
supplies, and new bedding and cleaning supplies.
The Government permits prison visits by diplomats and human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
stipulates that authorities cannot arrest, detain, prosecute, or punish
anyone except as provided for under the law; however, at times police
arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. The actual application of
the constitutional safeguards continued to vary widely from case to
case.
The law requires that courts review the legality of a person's
detention within 48 hours of arrest. The police may extend the period
for another 48 hours, and a prosecutor or court may detain persons for
up to 30 days in national security cases. Only after the prosecutor
submits charges does a suspect have the right to contact an attorney.
Human rights activists report that police showed greater respect
for legally mandated procedures and that prison administration improved
considerably. However, pretrial detention after arraignment is often
prolonged. An estimated 30 to 50 percent of those in prison have not
yet been tried, or were awaiting sentencing following their trials. The
Government and an NGO sponsored a 10-day seminar for 50 police officers
in May to inform them of the rights of children and the legal treatment
of detained suspects.
Some indicted detainees are released before trial without
explanation; familial, tribal, or political connections may explain
some of these cases. There is a provision for granting bail, but it is
used rarely.
Ahmed Ould Daddah, leader of the opposition party Union of
Democratic Forces-New Era (UFD-A), and two other party members, who had
been arrested in mid-December 1998 for having repeated charges that the
Government had agreed to bury Israeli nuclear waste on Mauritanian
soil, were released in January after 5 weeks detention. They were tried
and acquitted in March. The defendants were represented well by
counsel, and the trial generally was considered to have been conducted
fairly in accordance with legal procedures.
There continued to be occasional reports of arbitrary arrests and
intimidation committed by security forces, particularly of returned
refugees in communities in the south along the Senegal River. Police
detained protesters in January (see Section 2.b.). There were conflicts
between the Government and communities along the river over the
redistribution of land under the land reform program, particularly
among communities with returned refugees. The land reform program was
designed to provide land to the rural landless and to increase land
under cultivation, particularly land made irrigable from the Senegal
River Valley Authority (OMVS) project created and managed by
Mauritania, Senegal, and Mali. The reform has met with resistance from
those who had part of their traditional landholdings that had lain
fallow confiscated. Some persons, including returned refugees, were
arrested when they attempted to reclaim all of their traditional land.
In the village of Medina-Fenai, villagers were arrested and held in
prison for 4 days before release in July. In some cases the fallow land
was granted to wealthy Moors who developed commercial agricultural
enterprises. A net redistribution of land from southerners to both
Black Moors and White Moors displaced from the northern and central
regions by desertification since the 1970's may have occurred; however,
this program is designed specifically to avoid leaving any rural family
landless and provides land to landless persons from all ethnic groups
(see Section 1.f.).
There were no reports of forced exile. The Government continued to
welcome the return of any citizens who had been expelled or who had
fled during 1989-91.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Although the Constitution provides
for the independence of the judiciary, in practice the executive branch
exercises significant pressure on the judiciary through its ability to
appoint and influence judges. In addition poorly educated and poorly
trained judges who are susceptible to social, financial, tribal, and
personal pressures limit the judicial system's fairness. However, the
Government is carrying out a program to improve judicial performance
and independence. An education program is ongoing to upgrade judicial
personnel and to train them, among other subjects, in the application
of the revised commercial laws.
There is a single system of courts with a modernized legal system
that conforms with the principles of Shari'a (Islamic law). The
judicial system includes lower-, middle-, and upper-level courts, each
with specific jurisdictions. Departmental, regional, and labor
tribunals are the principal instances at the lower level. The 53
departmental tribunals, composed of a president and magistrates with
traditional Islamic legal training, hear civil cases involving sums
less than $49 (10,000 UM) and family issues, for example, domestic,
divorce, and inheritance cases. Thirteen regional tribunals accept
appeals in commercial and civil matters from the departmental tribunals
and hear misdemeanors. Three labor tribunals, composed of a president
and two assessors (one who represents labor and one who represents
employers), serve as final arbiters for labor disputes. At the middle
level, three courts of appeal, each with two chambers (a civil and
commercial chamber, and a mixed chamber) hear appeals from the regional
courts and have original jurisdiction for felonies. Nominally
independent, the Supreme Court is headed by a magistrate appointed to a
5-year term by the President. The Supreme Court reviews decisions and
rulings made by the courts of appeal to determine their compliance with
the law and procedure. Constitutional review is within the purview of a
six-member Constitutional Council, composed of three members named by
the President, two by the National Assembly President, and one by the
Senate President. Annual review of judicial decisions is undertaken by
the Supreme Council of Magistrates, over which the President presides;
the president and senior vice president of the Supreme Court, the
Minister of Justice, three magistrates, and representatives from the
Senate and National Assembly are members of this Council. The annual
review is intended to determine whether courts applied the law
correctly and followed proper procedures. The most recent review was
used as a basis for evaluating the reform process, providing for
retraining of judges, and making reassignments based on their
qualifications.
The Constitution provides for due process and the presumption of
innocence until proven guilty by an established tribunal. All
defendants, regardless of the court or their ability to pay, have the
legal right to representation by counsel during the proceedings, which
are open to the public. If defendants lack the ability to pay for
counsel, the court appoints an attorney from a list prepared by the
National Order of Lawyers, who provides defense free of charge. The law
provides that defendants may confront witnesses, present evidence, and
appeal their sentences, and these rights generally are observed in
practice.
Because Shari'a provides the legal principles upon which the law
and legal procedure are based, courts do not in all cases treat women
as equals of men. For example, the testimony of two women is necessary
to equal that of one man. In addition, in awarding an indemnity to the
family of a woman who has been killed, the courts grant only half the
amount that they would award for a man's death. There are no female
magistrates. However, for commercial and other modern issues not
specifically addressed by Shari'a, the law and courts treat women and
men equally.
With international assistance, the Government continued a program
to improve judicial performance and independence, which consists of
organizing all laws and statutes into a single reference text and
training officials throughout the justice system. Legislation passed on
July 24 created separate tribunals for specific types of disputes with
a magistrate for each chamber in order to streamline pretrial
procedures and improve judicial accountability. A commission consisting
of a chairman and 11 members of the concerned departments was
established on June 7 by the Minister of Justice to review the prison
situation and to seek ways to improve it (See Section 1.c.). Based on
legislation passed in June, investment,administration, commerce, civil,
and arbitrage banking codes are being revised. Government prosecution
of security officials during the year mitigated somewhat the persistent
popular dissatisfaction with the judicial system and the belief that
security officials can commit abuses with impunity.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law requires judicial warrants in order to execute
home searches, but the authorities reportedly often ignore this
requirement.
Government surveillance of dissidents and the political opposition
is believed to continue, although the extent to which the Government
used informants is unknown. An attempt by government prosecutors to
enter taped telephone conversations as evidence in the March trial of
Ahmed Ould Daddah was ruled inadmissible by the judge because they had
been obtained illegally.
There were a number of unconfirmed reports that the Government
confiscated the farmland of members of southern ethnic groups in or
near the Senegal River valley and redistributed it to members of the
dominant White Moor ethnic group, leaving southern farmers landless,
forcing a number of them into the cities, and impelling some to flee
the country. The Government began implementation of the 1983 land
reform law in 1990. The reform aimed at providing land for landless
persons, including victims of desertification in the northern and
central regions (both White Moors and Black Moors) and also, in recent
years, for returning southerners who had been expelled in 1989-91. The
reform also aimed to increase the amount of land under cultivation by
leasing uncultivated land to those with the means to cultivate it. The
unconfirmed reports of confiscations may reflect abuses in the
program's implementation; the proper implementation of the land reform
does not leave families landless, and the program is not explicitly
discriminatory. However, there may have been a net redistribution of
land from southerners to Moors under that program, since the south has
been less affected by desertification than the more northerly regions
historically inhabited by the Moors. There were also some reports that
some southerners who had been expelled or fled from the country during
1989-91 were unable either to regain possession of the land they had
farmed before 1989 or to gain possession of other land from the
Government (see Section 1.d.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, but the Government continues to
restrict these rights through prepublication press censorship by the
Interior Ministry. NGO's and the privately owned press openly
criticized the Government and its leaders. Antigovernment tracts,
newsletters, and petitions circulated widely in Nouakchott and other
towns.
The Press Law requires publishers to submit copies of newspapers to
the Ministries of Interior and Justice before distributing them. The
Ministry of the Interior reviews all newspaper copy prior to
publication and usually authorizes sales and distribution within 2 to 3
days. However, the Press Law provides that the Minister of the Interior
can stop publication of material that discredits Islam or threatens
national security. The authorities seized eight individual issues of
different journals and suspended one (Le Calame) for 3 months from
April 6 to July 5. In April the Government suspended the accreditation
and censured the journal of a correspondent for the British
Broadcasting Corporation and El Hayat. The Government provided no
specific reasons for the seizures or the censure other than to cite
Article 11 of the Constitution, which prohibits materials that
undermine national sovereignty, territorial integrity, or national
unity.
On August 11, police detained Sidi Mohamed, the editor of a local
newspaper, and held him in the civil prison in Nouakchott for several
hours for questioning regarding an anonymous article published the
previous day that was critical of recent decisions by the Supreme
Council of Magistrates. This was the first detention of a journalist in
the country.
All newspapers must register with the Ministry of the Interior.
There are over 400 journals and newspapers registered with the Ministry
of the Interior, a third of which do not publishregularly, some never
having issued an edition. However, there are only around 20 privately
owned newspapers that publish on a regular basis, including 7 new
French language newspapers and 4 new Arabic publications. These
journals are weeklies and reach limited audiences. There is also one
French language magazine that registered during the year but has yet to
appear. The Government issues press cards to journalists and requires
that they show this identification for participation in official press
events. Private journals reported openly and critically on both the
opposition and the Government and published party declarations and
tracts without government censure or restraint during the municipal
elections. Publications are exempt from all taxes on materials used to
produce newspapers, journals, or books for the private press. On August
9, President Taya met with representative journalists from three major
press associations to discuss press issues.
All broadcast media (radio and television) and two daily
newspapers, Horizons and Chaab, are government-owned and operated.
Radio is the most important medium in reaching the public, and the
official media strongly support government policies. During the January
municipal elections campaign, the Government provided all candidates
with equal access to its two newspapers and to the electronic media,
allowing citizens to hear and read criticism of the Government in these
media in addition to in the private press. Opposition parties' access
to government radio broadcast facilities at other times is limited.
Citizens can receive foreign television broadcasts including from
France and from Arab countries. The Government continued to deny
private applications to establish domestic radio stations. However, the
Government allowed domestic FM rebroadcasting of Radio France
International programming, including news about the country that often
covers opposition parties.
There are five domestic Internet servers, which operate without
governmental restrictions. Connections were upgraded and service was
expanded to Nouadhibou, the major commercial center, and to five
regional capitals.
Academic freedom generally is respected, and there were no cases
when the Government prevented research or publication or censored
lectures. The one university is government funded and operated.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
this right; however, there was one occasion when it restricted public
gatherings. In November it refused a permit to the opposition FPO,
which sought to protest upgrading relations with Israel. The law
requires that all recognized political parties and NGO's apply to the
local prefect for permission for large meetings or assemblies.
Permission generally is granted freely, and there were no reports
during the year that the Government restricted such gatherings.
Peaceful although unauthorized demonstrations in Nouakchott on
January 11 to protest the arrest of opposition leaders Ahmed Ould
Daddah, Mohamedden Ould Ichidou, and Mohameden Ould Babah led to the
detention for 2 hours of several participating lawyers, university
professors, students, journalists, artists, and human rights activists
on the grounds that they were inciting intolerance and violence and
disturbing order, peace, and public safety. Although the demonstration
was authorized, the participants ultimately proceeded to a different
location that was not authorized.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
Government circumscribes the efforts of some groups by denying them
official recognition. All political parties must register with the
Ministry of the Interior. The number of political parties, labor
unions, and NGO's continued to increase. Some 22 political parties and
a wide array of NGO's, many of them highly critical of the Government,
functioned openly, issued public statements, and chose their own
leadership. The Government has not yet granted some NGO's official
standing but did not prevent them from functioning. Among these are the
Mauritanian Association for Human Rights (AMDH) and SOS-Esclaves (an
antislavery NGO), which the Government claims are potentially divisive
in that they appeal to specific ethnic groups, namely the southern and
Black Moor communities respectively.
Following diplomatic confrontation with Iraq, resulting from
Mauritania's opening full diplomatic relations with Israel, the
Government accused Iraq of undertaking subversive action againstit,
fomenting violent antigovernment demonstrations, and financing the
Taliaa (Vanguard) political party. The Government disbanded the Taliaa
party, whose officials had been meeting with Iraqi Ba'ath party
representatives, citing constitutional prohibitions against
``cooperation with a foreign party; accepting foreign funds for
political propaganda and carrying out illegal acts.''
The Government recognizes three trade union confederations, in
addition to independent federations and a number of nonaffiliated
unions (see Section 6.a.).
Since September 1998, the Government has recognized 75 new NGO's
and associations, bringing the total of such organizations to over 600.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution established Mauritania as
an Islamic republic and decrees that Islam is the religion of its
citizens and the State, and the Government accordingly limits freedom
of religion.
All but a small number of citizens are Sunni Muslims and are
prohibited by their religion from converting to another religion.
Shari'a law, proclaimed under a previous government in 1983, includes
the Koranic prohibition against apostasy, but it has never been
enforced. The small number of known apostates from Islam suffered no
social ostracism, and there were no reports of societal or governmental
attempts to punish apostates.
Although the Government provides a small stipend to the imam of the
Central Mosque in the capital city of Nouakchott, mosques and Koranic
schools normally are supported by their members and other donors.
In addition to privately-run Koranic schools that nearly all
children attend, the public schools include classes on religion. These
classes teach both the history and principles of Islam and the
classical Arabic of the Koran. Although attendance of these religion
classes is nominally required, many students, the great majority of
whom are Muslims, decline to attend these classes for diverse ethno-
linguistic and religious reasons. They are nevertheless able to advance
in school and ultimately to graduate with diplomas, provided that they
compensate for their failure to attend the required religion classes by
their performance in other classes.
Although there is no legal codification of a prohibition against
proselytizing by non-Muslims, in practice the Government prohibits
proselytizing by non-Muslims under Article 11 of the Press Act, which
bans the publication of any material that is against Islam or
contradicts or otherwise threatens Islam. The Government views any
attempts by Christians to convert Muslims as undermining Mauritanian
society. There are no known non-Muslim groups engaged in proselytizing;
foreign Christian NGO's limit their activities to humanitarian and
development assistance.
Christian churches have been established in Nouakchott, Atar,
Zouerate, Nouadhibou, and Rosso. The expatriate community of Christians
and the few citizens who are considered Christians from birth practice
their religion openly and freely in these churches. The possession of
Bibles and other Christian religious materials in private homes is not
illegal.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement and residence within all parts of the territory, and provides
for the freedom to enter and leave. Historically there were few
restrictions on travel in Mauritania's nomadic society. With
urbanization and automobile travel, the Government set up regular road
checkpoints where the Gendarmerie checks the papers of travelers, and
reportedly often solicit bribes. The Government imposed no nighttime
curfews. Early in the year, in response to civil society complaints,
the Government reduced the number of official Gendarmerie checkpoints.
Of the approximately 70,000 members of largely southern-based
ethnic groups who were expelled by Mauritania or fled to Senegal and
Mali during the 1989-91 crisis, and of those born abroad since then,
the UNHCR documented 33,248 returnees to four provinces along the
Senegal River. Both the UNHCR and the Government agree that many others
have returned on their own to the larger towns and cities. Many more
returnees among nomads,who are difficult to document, and urban
dwellers are not included in UNHCR's figures. Informed observers
estimate that the actual number of returnees ranges between 40,000 and
65,000. Many entire villages as well as almost all Peulh (nomadic
herders of the Halpulaar ethnic group) have returned. The Government
has stated since 1993 that any Mauritanian outside the country may
return. However, the Government, the countries of asylum, and the UNHCR
have signed no tripartite repatriation agreement. Under the UNHCR-
funded, 2-year ``Special Plan for Rapid Integration'' (PSIR), which
began to assist returnees in mid-1996, the Mauritania Red Crescent, the
UNHCR, and NGO's have undertaken 223 small agriculture, water, health,
education, and construction projects in 130 villages to assist
returnees. Considering its mission completed, the UNHCR terminated its
Rapid Integration program for refugees at the end of December. The
UNHCR estimates that there are 15,000 to 20,000 Mauritanian refugees
remaining in Senegal. They still formally are under UNHCR protection
but no longer are provided assistance since the UNHCR sees no
impediment to their return to Mauritania. The UNHCR terminated its
program at the end of 1998.
Cooperation by local authorities in addressing restitution and
citizenship matters varies greatly, depending on individual officials
and the returnee's region (see Sections 1.d. and 1.f.). Repatriation
efforts have achieved greater results in the Trarza and Brakna regions
than in Gorgol and Guidimaka to the east. However, observers noted that
the situation in Gorgol has improved considerably. Many returnees
received their original homes, some property, and all or a portion of
their land. Timely restoration of identity papers has varied, and some
of those repatriated who returned in 1995 have not yet received
identification cards. In some regions, persons lacking identity cards
could not travel freely.
The law provides for the grant of refugee status in accordance with
the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol. The Government grants such status in accordance with
these provisions and on the basis of UNHCR recommendations. There is,
however, no legislation providing for this practice. The Government,
which has cooperated with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees since 1989 signed a headquarters
agreement with the UNHCR in May. In recent years, the Government has
provided first asylum to refugees from neighboring countries. The
Government also has accepted the UNHCR's registration of some 200
asylum seekers, mostly from Sierra Leone and Liberia. There were no
reports of refugees being forced to return to a country where they
feared persecution.
Mauritania is host to over 50,000 nationals of other West African
countries who seek refuge and employment, primarily in Nouakchott and
Nouadhibou. An estimated 60 percent of Mauritania's small craft
fishermen are Senegalese. There is a population of approximately 300
Sierra Leoneans living in Nouakchott. Some arrived more than 10 years
ago and are fully employed. Approximately 225 of these have been
granted refugee status and receive UNHCR assistance. The Sierra
Leoneans held protest demonstrations at the U.N. compound on several
occasions throughout the year demanding increased assistance and
refugee status for all of them.
About 2,000 Malian former refugees who could repatriate have
remained in the country and largely have integrated with the local
population. Nearly all these Malian refugees are Moors. The UNHCR no
longer considers them refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government, but the Government circumscribes it in practice. The 1992
multiparty election of a civilian president ended 14 years of military
rule, but both the opposition and international observers concluded
that the elections were fraudulent. Although civilians fill all
ministerial-level positions, some members of the Military Council that
ruled from 1984 to 1992, in addition to President Taya, remained in
positions of power within the executive branch, the National Assembly,
the armed forces, and government-owned enterprises. The armed forces
continued to provide potentially critical support to the regime. The
Government denied elements of the opposition the opportunity to receive
full access to government media and to compete on an equal footing.
The country's first multiparty legislative elections were held in
1996. Only 1 opposition and 6 independent candidates were elected to
the 79-member National Assembly; candidates of the ruling PRDS party
won the remaining 72 seats. The outcome of theelections was marred by
fraud on all sides and pervasive government intervention to support
candidates from the ruling PRDS party. After the Government announced
that presidential elections would take place on December 12, 1997, the
anniversary of the 1984 coup, a coalition of five opposition parties
announced on June 26, 1997, that it intended to boycott the election
unless certain demands were met. These requirements included enhanced
media access, an opposition role in election preparation, creation of
an independent electoral commission, enlarging the commission charged
with electoral list revision, and provision of official copies of the
voting report from each polling station to representatives of each
candidate. The Government granted the opposition full access to its
media but did not meet the other demands, and four opposition parties
declined to participate in the election. However, five individuals,
including for the first time a Halpulaar, ran for president. All
received equal treatment in the official electronic and print media as
well as extensive coverage in the private press. President Taya won an
overwhelming victory, although his opponents fared much better in the
cities than in the rural areas. The official turnout of 75 percent and
the winning percentage of 90 percent were inflated, since many
individuals voted more than once. The Government distributed four voter
registration cards to some persons, including government employees,
instructing them to vote repeatedly for the incumbent. The opposition
also distributed multiple voter registration cards to some persons,
instructing them to vote repeatedly. The April 1998 Senate elections
were boycotted by the opposition. Of the 18 seats up for election, the
ruling PRDS gained all but 1, which was won by an independent
candidate. Similarly, in the January-February municipal elections, some
of the opposition boycotted the elections, which had a very low voter
turnout and resulted in overwhelming majorities for the ruling party
candidates. The Government determined that there were widespread abuses
in several communities and held new elections in those communities. In
the second round, fraud was limited but voter turnout remained very low
and progovernment candidates virtually swept the races, aided by the
continued boycott of some opposition parties.
Elections are held by secret ballot. At polling places on election
day, registered citizens receive a package of color-coded cards,
containing one card for each candidate. Each citizen votes by
depositing into a sealed ballot box, alone inside a closed booth, an
envelope containing one of these cards. The unused cards are discarded
on the floor. Although voters could in theory take the unused cards out
of the polling place with them, the ready availability of many unused
cards on the floor makes unused cards worthless as evidence of how a
voter has voted and effectively eliminates the potential for abuse in
such a multiple ballot system. A countrywide census, taken at the end
of 1998, which was aimed at registering all citizens and standardizing
the current complex system of names, also was aimed in part at
providing the basis for free and fair elections. Tabulation of the
results of the census, which are to form the basis of identity cards
and voter registration, was not expected to be completed until 2000.
The country is divided into 12 provinces that are divided further
into prefectures. The Government appoints the Walis (governors) and
Hakems (prefects). Municipal councils are elected by general ballot and
they elect their mayors, usually the head of the majority party's list.
Most government services are provided by the central government. The
elected councils are responsible for some public services, such as
sanitation, and have fiscal autonomy and taxing power. Their
administrative staff is independent of the Government. The councils
elect the national Senate.
Women have the right to vote, and formed the majority of voters in
the 1997 presidential election, but are underrepresented in government.
Women occupy some senior government positions, including three cabinet
posts, one secretary-general, two senior presidential advisors
(including a Halpulaar), and four senior advisors to ministers. Women
are well represented in the Secretariat of Women's Affairs, including a
number of Halpulaar women. There are three female members of the
National Assembly (including one Haratine and one Soninke from the
Forgeron caste, a caste of lower status than the former slave caste),
but there are no female senators.
Haratines, Halpulaars, Soninkes, and Wolofs are underrepresented in
senior government positions. Of the Government's 20 ministerial posts,
4 incumbents are Haratine, 2 are Halpulaar, 1 is Soninke, and 1 is
mixed White Moor/Soninke; the remaining 12 are of either White Moor or
mixed White Moor/Haratine ethnicity (see Section 5). The full 28-member
Cabinet, including secretaries of state, has 4 Haratines, 3
Halpulaars,1 Soninke, and 1 mixed White Moor/Soninke. The 56-member
Senate has 3 Haratines, 4 Halpulaars, 3 Soninkes, and the remaining 46
are of either White Moor or mixed White Moor/Haratine heritage. The 79-
member National Assembly has 2 Haratines, 7 Halpulaars, 2 Soninkes, and
1 Wolof.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There is an increasing number of human rights organizations. Some
operate with official government registration, but others do not have
this authorization. The oldest is the Mauritanian League for Human
Rights, an independent, government-recognized body. A second
organization, the Mauritanian Human Rights Association (AMDH), is still
unrecognized (see Section 2.b.). While not affiliated with the
opposition, it has many opposition members. The AMDH has been more
critical of the Government than the League, particularly on the
unresolved abuses of the 1989-91 period.
Other organizations, including 14 unregistered associations, also
address human rights issues. The pan-African organization,
International Study and Research Group on Democracy and Economic and
Social Development in Africa (Gerddes-Africa), established a branch in
Mauritania in 1994. Two other groups, SOS-Esclaves and the National
Committee for the Struggle Against the Vestiges of Slavery in
Mauritania, focus their efforts on overcoming the country's vestiges of
slavery (see Section 6.c.). SOS-Esclaves was particularly active in
claiming that slavery remains pervasive and appealing to national and
international audiences to contribute to its eradication. SOS-Esclaves
leader Boubacar Ould Messoud traveled freely abroad in June and made
such claims during a speaking tour. He returned to the country in July
without incident. SOS-Esclaves also has intervened effectively in the
past with government authorities to push resolution of some of the
cases, in particular child custody and inheritance cases, brought to
the organization by former slaves.
Attention to the events of 1989-91 resurfaced following the arrest
on July 3 of Captian Ely Ould Dah in France. Ould Dah, who had been
undergoing training at the French Army College, was accused by two
Mauritanians resident in France of torturing them in 1990. He was
arrested under the International Convention Against Torture despite a
general amnesty passed by the Parliament in 1993. The Government
reacted strongly to what it considered an infringement on its
sovereignty by a French court and refused entry to a French prosecutor
who sought to gather information to support the charges. The arrest
sparked public debate on ways to further national reconciliation (see
Section 1.c.).
The Committee of Solidarity with the Victims of Repression in
Mauritania is concerned with the plight of the 1989 expellees. The
Consultative Group for the Return of the Refugees was founded to
promote the return of the remaining Mauritanian refugees in Senegal.
The Collective of Worker Victims of the 1989 Events seeks redress for
government employees who lost their jobs in the events of 1989. The
Committee of the Widows and the Collective of Survivors focus on the
sufferings of the victims of the 1990-91 military purge and their
families. The Collective of Survivors of Political Detention and
Torture was established in 1996 to seek redress for abuses committed
during the 1986-87 period. These, and other groups of individuals with
common concerns, function openly and actively, but their efforts are
circumscribed somewhat because they are not recognized officially (see
Section 2.b.). The Coalition of Human Rights NGO's is an umbrella
organization for 12 of these organizations; it represents the group in
various forums, including representations to foreign embassies. It
includes all the organizations previously mentioned.
The only international association concerned with human rights to
visit the country during the year was the International Committee of
the Red Cross.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equality before the law for all
citizens, regardless of race, national origin, sex, or social status,
and prohibits racial or ethnic propaganda. In practice the Government
often favors individuals on the basis of ethnic and tribal affiliation,
social status, and political ties. Societal discrimination against
women, strongly rooted in traditional society, is endemic, although the
situation is improving.
Women.--Human rights monitors and female lawyers report that
physical mistreatment of women by their husbands is rare. The police
and judiciary occasionally intervene in domestic abuse cases but women
in traditional society rarely seek legal redress, relying instead upon
family and ethnic group members to resolve domestic disputes. The
incidence of reported rape is low. It occurs, but newspaper accounts of
attacks are rare.
Women have legal rights to property and child custody, and, among
the more modern and urbanized population, these rights are recognized.
By local tradition, a woman's first marriage, but not subsequent
marriages, requires parental consent. In accordance with Shari'a,
marriage and divorce do not require the woman's consent, polygyny is
allowed, and a woman does not have the right to refuse her husband's
wish to marry additional wives. In practice polygyny is very rare among
Moors but common among other ethnic groups. Arranged marriages are also
increasingly rare, particularly among the Moor population. Women
frequently initiate the termination of a marriage, which most often is
done by husband or wife by repudiation rather than divorce. It is also
common in Moor society for a woman to obtain, at the time of marriage,
a contractual agreement that stipulates that her husband must agree to
end their marriage if he chooses an additional wife. The rate of
divorce among Moors is estimated to be 37 percent and the remarriage
rate after divorce is 72.5 percent.
Women still face some legal discrimination. For example the
testimony of two women is necessary to equal that of one man and the
value placed on women's lives in court-awarded indemnities is only half
the amount awarded for a man's death (see Section 1.e.). However, women
do not face legal discrimination in areas not specifically addressed by
Shari'a. The Secretariat for Women's Affairs works with many NGO's and
cooperatives to improve the status of women. A booklet published late
in 1996 advises women of their rights. On October 6, the Council of
Ministers ratified the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The Government entered
reservations over requirements of CEDAW that contradict the Shari'a,
such as in inheritance cases in which women receive half the portion of
a man.
There are no legal restrictions on the education of girls and
women. Girls constituted 48.8 percent of all children enrolled in
school in 1998. Some 84 percent of school-age girls attended elementary
school in 1998-99, up from 44.8 percent in 1990 (compared with 88
percent for boys, up from 58.3 percent). At the secondary level, female
students constituted 37.4 percent of those enrolled. Despite the
increases, enrollment in eastern Mauritania, the Brakna, and along the
Senegal River remained at a lower level. The Government introduced a
special countrywide program in 1995-96 to boost female enrollment at
the elementary level. Women made up 17 percent of the university's
1998-99 enrollment, compared with 9 percent in 1990. Women also
constituted 30.5 percent of students enrolled in technical schools,
compared with 2 percent in 1990. The literacy rate for women is 36
percent compared with 50 percent for men.
The Government seeks to open new employment opportunities for women
in areas that traditionally were filled by men, such as health care,
communications, police, and customs services. Women became more
involved in the fishing industry and established several women's
fishing cooperatives. For the first time, women were hired by the army
to serve as police inspectors and customs officials.
The law provides that men and women receive equal pay for equal
work. While not universally applied in practice, the two largest
employers, the civil service and the state mining company, respect this
law. In the modern wage sector, women also receive generous family
benefits, including 3 months of maternity leave.
Children.--The Government does not require attendance at school,
primarily because it lacks the financial resources to provide
educational facilities and teachers throughout the country, especially
in remote areas. However, the Government has made universal primary
education a priority and has targeted the year 2000 to achieve that
goal. The Government has doubled the percentage of its budget devoted
to education in the past 10 years and has increased the rate of primary
school attendance from 45 percent in 1986 to 86 percent in 1999. In
addition almost all children, regardless of sex or ethnic group, attend
Koranic school from the ages of 5 to 7 and gain at least rudimentary
skills inreading and writing Arabic in addition to memorizing Koranic
verses.
The law makes special provision for the protection of children's
welfare, and the Government has programs to care for abandoned
children. However, these programs are hampered by inadequate funding.
Local NGO's estimate that there are over 150 street children. The
Government relies on foreign donors in such areas as child
immunization. Moreover, it does not enforce existing child labor laws,
and children perform a significant amount of labor in support of family
activities (see Section 6.d.). Following public criticism and
government action against families that send their young sons to work
abroad as camel jockeys, there were no reports of this practice during
the year.
Traditional forms of mistreatment of females continue, mostly in
isolated rural communities, but these practices appear to be on the
decline. Such mistreatment consists of forced feeding of adolescent
girls (gavage) and female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely
condemned by international health experts as damaging to both physical
and psychological health. Experts previously estimated that between 60
and 70 percent of women experienced gavage, but now conclude that less
than 25 percent of Moor women have experienced gavage, which is
practiced only among the Moors. The change in figures appears to
reflect both prior overestimation and a decline in the practice in
recent years. The Government continued intensive media and educational
campaigns against FGM and gavage during the year.
FGM is performed most often on young girls, often on the seventh
day after birth and almost always before the age of 6 months, and it is
practiced among all ethnic groups except the Wolof. A March 1996 report
by the United Nations Population Fund and a study published in 1997 by
Jeune Afrique Economie cited Mauritania as a country in which 25
percent of the women undergo FGM. Among Halpulaar women, over 95
percent undergo FGM. A broad, foreign-funded study still is underway to
obtain more precise data. The Government projects the study's
completion by the end of 2000. Preliminary results of the foreign-
funded study indicate that 66 percent of those who perform FGM
recognize that the practice is detrimental to women's health, and 54
percent of imams agree that the practice is dangerous. Local experts
agree that the least severe form of excision is practiced, and not
infibulation, the most severe form of FGM. The practice of FGM has
decreased in the modern urban sector.
It is the clear public policy of the Government, through the
Secretariat of Women's Affairs, that FGM should be stopped, and the
Government bars hospitals from performing it. Public health workers and
NGO's educate women to the dangers of FGM and to the fact that FGM is
not a requirement of Islam. For example a 1996 officially produced
Guide to the Rights of Women in Mauritania (with religious endorsement)
stresses that Islam does not require FGM and that if medical experts
warn against it for medical reasons, it should not be done. The
campaign against FGM appears to be changing attitudes towards the
practice, according to several women's rights experts.
A 10-day seminar in May conducted by NGO's and the Government for
approximately 50 police, judges, and sociologists was aimed at
sensitizing them to the rights of children and the special
consideration necessary when detaining juvenile suspects.
People with Disabilities.--The law does not provide specifically
for the disabled, and the Government does not mandate preference in
employment or education or public accessibility for disabled persons.
However, it does provide some rehabilitation and other assistance for
the disabled. Nongovernmental organizations have become increasingly
active in raising public awareness of issues affecting the disabled.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic minorities and low-caste
individuals among all ethnic groups confront societal discrimination.
Ethnic and cultural tension and discrimination arise from the
geographic and cultural line between traditionally nomadic Arabic-
speaking (Hassaniya) Moor herders and Peuhl herders of the Halpulaar
group in the north and center, and sedentary cultivators of the
Halpulaar (Toucouleur), Soninke, and Wolof ethnic groups in the south.
Although culturally homogeneous, the Moors are divided among numerous
ethno-linguistic clan groups and are racially distinguished as Beydane
and Haratine, or White Moors and Black Moors, though it is often
difficult to distinguish between the two groups by skin color. The
majority of what are known asBlack Moors are Haratine, literally ``one
who has been freed,'' although some Black Moor families never were
enslaved. The Halpulaar (the largest non-Moor group), the Wolof, and
the Soninke ethnic groups are concentrated in the south. ``White''
Moors, large numbers of whom are dark-skinned after centuries of
intermarriage with members of Sub-Saharan African groups, dominate
positions in government and business. The southern Halpulaar, Soninke,
and Wolof ethnic groups are underrepresented in the military and
security sectors.
A number of accounts indicate that redistribution of southern
farmland to Moors since the acceleration of desertification in the
1970's has contributed to tensions between Moors and southern-based
ethnic groups. Although much of the government's redistribution of land
has been from southerners to southerners, some Moors have been
resettled in the south. Ethnic tensions surfaced dramatically in the
mass expulsions of southern-based ethnic groups--mostly Halpulaars--in
1989-90 and the purge of Halpulaars from the military in 1991. Few
regained their positions.
The Constitution designates Arabic along with Pulaar, Soninke, and
Wolof as Mauritania's national languages. However, successive
governments--both civil and military--have pursued various policies of
``Arabization'' in the schools and in the workplace. Non-Arabic-
speaking ethnic groups have protested this policy, as have Arabic-
speaking groups that want their children to obtain a bilingual Arabic-
French education. In April the National Assembly approved educational
reforms to replace the separate track Arabic-French system of
education, which had been in place for the past 20 years, with a
unified system for all citizens in which both French and Arabic would
be the language of instruction for all students. Under the separate
track system, Moors generally attended Arabic language schools, while
Halpulaars, Soninke, and Wolof attended French-language schools. The
Government concluded that the separate track system had contributed to
ethnic divisions. Reversion to the previous unified system, with all
students attending the same schools, is expected to promote social
cohesion. The reform also provides for English and civics to be
introduced at an early stage. The promotion of other national
languages, previously included at the elementary level, was moved to
the university level.
Ethnic divisions and tensions contribute significantly to political
divisions and tensions. Some political parties tend to have readily
identifiable ethnic bases, although political coalitions among them are
increasingly important. An acceleration of desertification during the
1970's that destroyed much of the traditional economic basis of Moorish
society, and an upsurge of Arab nationalism among White Moors during
the 1980's, contributed to explosive ethnic violence precipitated by a
dispute with Senegal during 1989-91; this violence entailed the
expulsion or flight of many non-Moors living in the south and
occupation of much of their land by Moors, including Black Moors.
Interethnic bitterness and hostility persists, and continues to be
aggravated by climatic, land, and population pressures.
A number of accounts suggest that some members of the long-dominant
White Moor community, which traditionally enslaved a darker skinned
groups, may continue to expect or desire servility on the part of
members of the generally darker Black Moors and southern ethnic groups,
and that such attitudes may impede efforts to build a nondiscriminatory
society and to eliminate the vestiges and consequences of slavery,
goals to which both the Government and major opposition parties are
committed. There are indications that racism on the part of some White
Moors may have contributed both to the persistence of vestiges and
consequences of past White Moor enslavement of Black Moors, and to the
expulsions and reported dispossession of members of darker southern
ethnic groups with no tradition of servility to White Moors. However,
southern-based ethnic groups and Black Moors have manifested little
racial solidarity socially or politically, and racial differences did
not contribute either to historical slavery or to the persistence of
its vestiges and consequences among southern-based ethnic groups.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom
of association and the right of citizens to join any political or labor
organization. All workers except members of the military and police are
free to associate in and establish unions at the local and national
levels.
Prior to the 1993 amendment of the Labor Code, which repealed
provisions restricting trade union pluralism, the government-controlled
labor confederation, the Union of Mauritania Workers (UTM), was the
only labor confederation allowed by law. Since 1993 seven new trade
union organizations have been recognized, including two confederations
and four federations. The oldest of the three confederations, the Union
of Mauritanian Workers (UTM), still is viewed by many workers as
closely allied with the Government and the ruling Parti Republicain
Democratique et Sociale (PRDS). It has lost ground to The General
Confederation of Mauritanian Workers (CGTM), which was recognized in
1994 with 23 member unions, and the Free Confederation of Mauritanian
Workers (CLTM), which was founded in 1995 and recognized in 1998. The
CGTM is not affiliated with any party, although most of its members
tend to favor the opposition. The CLTM is associated with the
opposition party, Action for Change.
The Government provides funds to the confederations in proportion
to their memberships. All three confederations supplied representatives
to the country's four labor tribunals, and were included in most
government deliberative or consultative bodies. Several independent
trade unions, in particular three for teachers at the elementary,
secondary, and university levels, also were active. The three
confederations continued to hold seminars under foreign embassy and
other sponsorship to educate their members on responsible trade
unionism and democratic labor relations, and then replicating them in
more remote areas of the country. Discussions at the seminars were
open, and sometimes were critical of the Government, which facilitated
the seminars by providing logistical support and participating in
opening and closing sessions.
The bulk of the labor force is in the informal sector, with most
workers engaged in subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry; only
25 percent are employed in the wage sector. However, nearly 90 percent
of industrial and commercial workers are organized. The law provides
workers with the right to strike, and there were several strikes and
partial work stoppages. Most strikes were settled quickly due to
limited worker and union resources. In 1997 authorities arrested
secondary school teachers who threatened to strike and later cut their
salaries.
The law provides for tripartite arbitration committees composed of
union, business, and government representatives. Once all parties agree
to arbitration, the committee may impose binding arbitration that
automatically terminates any strike.
International trade union activity increased. The Government
included CGTM, UTM, and CLTM representatives in its delegation to the
International Labor Organization (ILO) in June, and the ILO conducted
an extensive series of training workshops in which the confederations
participated as they did in 1997.
Unions are free to affiliate internationally. The UTM participated
in regional labor organizations. The CGTM and UTM are both members of
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (CFTU). The UTM
has been accepted into the Organization of African Trade Union Unity
(OATUU), but the CGTM's application was not accepted, as the OATUU only
accepts one member union from each country.
In recognition of the steps the Government has taken to afford
internationally recognized worker rights, the U.S. Government on
September 1, restored to Mauritania preferential tariff benefits under
the GSP, which had been suspended in 1993.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides that unions freely may organize workers without government or
employer interference. General or sectoral agreements on wages, working
conditions, and social and medical benefits are negotiated in
tripartite discussion and formalized by government decree. Wages and
other benefits also can be negotiated bilaterally between employer and
union and the results of such negotiations are filed with the
Directorate of Labor.
Laws provide workers with protection against antiunion
discrimination and employees or employers may bring labor disputes to
three-person labor tribunals administered jointly by the Ministries of
Justice and Labor with the participation of union and employer
representatives.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government
prohibits forced and bonded labor, including by children, but does not
enforce this prohibition effectively in specific cases (see Section 5).
Mauritanians continue to suffer the effects and consequences of the
practice of slavery over generations and of caste distinctions
including the traditional existence of a slave caste in both Moor and
Southern communities. Slavery was abolished officially three times in
Mauritania, most recently by the post-independence government in 1980.
Even before 1980, the practice of slavery among the traditionally
pastoralist Moors had been greatly reduced by the accelerated
desertification of the 1970's; many White Moors dismissed their former
Black Moor slaves because the depletion of their herds left them unable
either to employ or to feed slaves. However, widespread slavery was
also traditional among ethnic groups of the largely nonpastoralist
south, where it had no racial origins or overtones; masters and slaves
alike were black. The South has suffered less from desertification, and
some reports identify it as the region in which vestiges and
consequences of slavery may persist most strongly.
A system of officially sanctioned slavery in which government and
society join to force individuals to serve masters does not exist.
There has been no open trading in slaves for many years. However, there
continue to be unconfirmed reports that slavery in the form of forced
and involuntary servitude may persist in some isolated areas.
Unofficial voluntary servitude persists, with some former slaves
continuing to work for former masters in exchange for monetary or
nonmonetary benefits such as lodging, food, or medical care. Many
persons, including some from all ethnic groups, still use the
designation of slave in referring to themselves or others. The reasons
for the persistence of such practices appear to be economic,
psychological, and religious, although they vary widely and may be
quite different among pastoralist or formerly pastoralist Moors from
what they are among the southerners and the less numerous
nonpastoralist Moors. Poverty, persistent drought, and a weak economy
provide few economic alternatives for many and leave some former slaves
vulnerable to possible exploitation by former masters. There are
reports that some former slaves in some sedentary communities have
continued to work for their former masters or others in order to retain
access to the land they traditionally farmed, although the law provides
for distribution of land to former slaves and this law has been
enforced in many cases. In addition to their usual compensation, some
former slaves, who continue to work for former masters also receive
gifts on important family occasions such as births, marriages, and
deaths. Deeply embedded psychological and tribal bonds also make it
difficult for many individuals who have generations of forebears who
were slaves to break their bonds with former masters or their tribes.
Finally, because of religious instruction in the past, some individuals
continue to link themselves to former masters for fear of religious
sanction if that bond is broken.
Adults cannot be obliged by law to remain with former masters nor
can they be returned if they leave. However, adult females with
children may have greater difficulties and may be compelled by
pressures other than physical force to remain in a condition of
servitude. For example, in some cases, especially where the former
master claims to be the father, former masters refuse to allow children
to accompany their mothers. In other cases, the greater economic
responsibility of supporting a family may be the principal impediment
to a woman seeking a new life. Children's legal status is more tenuous
than that of adults. There have been no reports of sales or
``transfer'' of children or other individuals from one employer or
master to another since 1996, when there were occasional confirmed
cases of transfers; however, reports of sales are rare, cannot be
confirmed, and are confined to past years.
The legacy of caste distinctions continues to affect the status and
opportunities available to various groups. In some groups, for example,
individuals of a higher caste who seek to marry someone of a lower
caste may be barred by the community, and in Soninke communities
members of the slave caste cannot be buried in the same cemetery as
other castes.
NGO positions on the existence of slavery are not uniform. For
example, SOS-Esclaves in an April 1997 report characterized slavery as
a persistent social reality, whose occurrence among disadvantaged
classes is far from negligible. The Organization of African Unity's
(OAU) African Commission on Human and People's Rights report issued in
June 1997 disputed the conclusions of the April 1997 SOS-Esclaves
report. Whileallowing for the possibility of isolated cases of slavery
in the remote countryside, the Commission concluded that slavery does
not exist as an institution, and the persistence of vestiges of slavery
was the more convincing explanation of social relations. Anti-Slavery
International has stated that there is insufficient evidence one way or
the other to conclude whether or not slavery exists, and that an in-
depth, long-term study was required to determine whether the practice
continues.
Problems related to the vestiges and consequences of slavery
usually enter the public domain in judicial cases, most often in the
form of child custody and inheritance disputes, between former masters
and former slaves or their descendants. However, court adjudication of
such cases is rare. Several inheritance disputes between Haratines and
the descendants of their former master were adjudicated in court in
recent years. Most such disputes were decided in accordance with the
law, as the courts ruled that the descendants of the former slaves
should inherit their property. However, in some cases involving land
tenure, courts reportedly did not uphold the property rights of former
slaves. No further action is known to have been taken on such a 1994
land case in which a court ruled against a Black Moor of slave
background in favor of a White Moor former master.
In a 1995 case, the Supreme Council of Magistrates removed a
magistrate from the bench because he ruled, contrary to the law, that a
former master, rather than the former slave's descendants, should
inherit the possessions of a former slave. In December 1996, the
Supreme Council of Magistrates removed the magistrate in Kankossa from
the bench because he refused to accept the provisions of the 1980 law
abolishing slavery. The Government censured for a human rights-related
cause at least one of the other three judges removed at the same time.
The removal of these magistrates reinforced for other judges that the
provisions of the 1980 law apply.
A case involving a former master, who was awarded custody of three
children in early 1997 because he was deemed to be the father was
resolved by mediation during the year with the children living with
their mothers in Nouakchott. Determination of such cases is problematic
in a country where there are polygyny, ``secret'' marriages, no written
records, and divorce by repudiation. The courts are prepared to pursue
the concept of genetic testing to determine paternity, but no such
cases have yet been brought.
Three NGO's, SOS-Esclaves, the National Committee for the Struggle
Against the Vestiges of Slavery in Mauritania, and the Initiative for
the Support of the Activities of the President, had as their focus
issues related to the history of slavery in Mauritania. Of these, SOS-
Esclaves was particularly active in bringing to public attention cases
in which it found the rights of former slaves to have been abridged and
in assisting former slaves in their difficulties with former masters.
Other human rights and civic action NGO's also follow this issue
closely. The independent press, which includes journals that are
published by Haratines and southern-based ethnic groups who emphasize
issues of importance to these ethnic groups, is also quick to report
any incident that comes to its attention in which the rights of former
slaves have not been respected.
The Government focuses on education, literacy, and agrarian reform
as the main means to eradicate the vestiges of slavery and deal with
its consequences. The Government has raised the level of primary school
attendance from 45 percent in 1986 to 85 percent this year. Classes are
fully integrated, including boys and girls from all social and ethnic
groups. In recent years, the Government's record in cases in which an
individual's civil rights were adversely affected because of status as
a former slave was weak. When complaints were filed with the Government
to remedy cases involving detention of individuals against their will,
the Government intervened in accordance with the law, although
sometimes only after considerable prodding and passage of time. On May
21, the Government created a new cabinet post, the Commissariat for
Human Rights, Poverty Alleviation, and Integration. A major focus of
the commissariat is to address the vestiges and consequences of
slavery.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code states explicitly that children must not be
employed before the age of 14 in the nonagricultural sector unless the
Minister of Labor grants an exception due to local circumstances. The
Government has a functional labor inspectorate empowered to refer
violations directly to the appropriate judicial authorities. The
Government lackssufficient resources to enforce existing child labor
laws (see Section 5). The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor
by children but does not enforce this prohibition effectively in
certain specific cases (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
Education is not compulsory and, for financial and other reasons,
15 percent of elementary school-age children do not regularly attend
government schools. Labor law specifies that no child under the age of
13 may be employed in the agricultural sector without the permission of
the Minister of Labor, nor under the age of 14 in the nonagricultural
sector. The law states that employed children between the ages of 14
and 16 should receive 70 percent of the minimum wage, and that those
between the ages of 17 and 18 should receive 90 percent of the minimum
wage.
Young children in the countryside commonly pursue herding,
cultivation, fishing, and other significant labor in support of their
families' activities. In keeping with longstanding tradition, many
children serve apprenticeships in small industries and in the informal
sector. There is no child labor in the modern industrial sector.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum monthly wage for
adults is $48.36 (9,872 ouguiya). It is difficult for the average
family to meet minimum needs and maintain a decent standard of living
at this salary.
The standard, legal, nonagricultural workweek may not exceed either
40 hours or 6 days without overtime compensation, which is paid at
rates that are graduated according to the number of supplemental hours
worked. Domestic workers and certain other categories work 56 hours.
The Labor Directorate of the Ministry of Labor is responsible for
enforcement of the labor laws, but in practice inadequate funding
limits the effectiveness of the Directorate's enforcement.
The Ministry of Labor is also responsible for enforcing safety
standards but does so inconsistently, due to inadequate funding. In
principle workers can remove themselves from hazardous conditions
without risking loss of employment; in practice, they cannot.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to,
or from the country.
______
MAURITIUS
The Republic of Mauritius, a parliamentary democracy since 1968, is
governed by a prime minister, a council of ministers, and a national
assembly. The President, who is nominated by the Prime Minister and
confirmed by the National Assembly, serves as Head of State, with
largely ceremonial powers. Fair and orderly national and local
elections, supervised by an independent commission, take place at
regular intervals. There are numerous political parties, and partisan
politics are open and robust. The judiciary is independent.
A paramilitary Special Mobile Force under civilian control is
responsible for internal security. This force, commanded by the
Commissioner of Police, is backed by a general duty police force. Both
forces are largely apolitical, but were criticized for being
inadequately trained to prevent and control rioting that broke out
nationwide in February. While human rights violations are infrequent,
members of the security forces committed some serious abuses.
The economy is based on labor-intensive, export-oriented
manufacturing (mainly textiles), as well as sugar and tourism. The
standard of living is high, with a per capita gross domestic product of
approximately $3,300 (82,500 rupees) per year. The Government is
diversifying the economy by promoting investment in new sectors such as
information technology and financial services.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens,
but problem areas remain. Police shot and killed three protesters
during riots in February, and judicial inquiries were ongoing in at
least eight cases of deaths in police custody. There continued to be
occasional reports that police abused suspects and detainees, and
delayed their access to defense counsel. Although the law to establish
a national human rights commission to investigate complaints against
the police, including allegations of police brutality, went into effect
in February, the commission was not established by year's end. In some
cases, police restricted freedom of assembly. Violence and
discrimination against women and abuse of children continued to be
problems. Interethnic tensions led to violence on at least two
occasions. Child labor remains a problem. The Government continued to
prepare a curriculum for human rights education for introduction in the
schools; however, it did not meet the original goal of introducing such
a curriculum in the primary grades during the year. There were reports
that women and children were trafficked to the country.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--A judicial inquiry
is ongoing into the February death in police custody of a popular
Creole singer, Kaya. Kaya's death sparked 3 days of rioting in February
during which police shot and killed three protesters, one police
officer died of cardiac arrest, and shops, homes, and churches were
burned and looted, resulting in an estimated $50 million (1,250 million
rupees) in damages. A second inquiry is investigating the death of
another Creole musician, who was shot and killed by police during the
February riots.
On March 23, the Prime Minister responded to a parliamentary
question and stated that eight detainees had been found dead in police
cells between January 1, 1998 and February 28, 1999. The deaths were
under investigation at year's end. Three persons died in prison in
August and November (see Section 1.c.).
Little progress was made in resolving the cases of two persons who
died in police custody, one in 1996 and one in 1994. In 1994 three
police officers were charged with manslaughter but found not guilty. An
April 1998 preliminary inquiry into the 1996 case did not result in any
charges being filed against police officers. Human rights lawyers
asserted that the police were attempting to conceal the facts
surrounding the deaths and were not conducting thorough, unbiased
investigations.
On May 23, seven persons died in a fire at a Chinese social club in
Port Louis set by predominantly Muslim demonstrators who were
protesting the result of a soccer game (see Section 5).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and inhuman punishment, and
authorities generally respected it; however, there continued to be
complaints of abuses by the police. The most common form of alleged
police abuse is the use of force to coerce a suspect to sign
aconfession. Police on occasion used force and tear gas to disperse
protesters, resulting in a few injuries (see Section 2.b.). A judicial
inquiry is ongoing into the circumstances behind the death in police
custody of the popular singer Kaya (see Section 1.a.).
In response to the eight reported deaths in police custody between
January 1, 1998, and February 28, 1999 (see Section 1.a.), the
Commissioner of Police announced plans to establish a central
investigation bureau under the supervision of the national human rights
commission, to investigate complaints against police.
While the law to establish the national human rights commission
went into effect on February 23, the commission had not been
established by year's end. The Attorney General and the Minister of
Human Rights announced that they still were searching for the
appropriate former Supreme Court judge to chair the commission, a
condition stipulated by the law. The commission is to have three other
members, of whom one must be a lawyer or a judge with 10 years of
experience and the other two must have experience in the human rights
field. The commission is to investigate abuses by any public servants,
but cannot investigate complaints that are already the subject of an
inquiry by the Ombudsman, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the
Public Service Commission, or the Disciplined Forces Service
Commission. The commission is to have the authority to visit centers of
detention or prisons to assess living conditions and make
recommendations on conditions. The commission first is to try to
resolve complaints through conciliation. If not successful, the
commission can forward cases to the Director of Public Prosecutions (if
criminal in nature), to the service commissions for disciplinary
measures, or to the responsible authority in question.
Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards.
In August a recently sentenced prisoner hung himself in the
infirmary of the central prison. In November another prisoner in the
central prison hung himself. Also in November, a recently arrested
prisoner was found dead in his cell in a prison just outside of Port
Louis, reportedly due to respiratory problems. Police investigated the
deaths and there were no reports of abuse or neglect.
The Government has permitted prison visits by foreign diplomats,
the national Ombudsman, a team from the United Nations Commission for
Human Rights, and the press. The Government stated that it would
investigate conditions and treatment in police holding cells; however,
it did not begin an investigation by year's end.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally
observes these prohibitions. In most cases, suspects are provided
prompt access to family and defense counsel; however, police at times
delayed suspects' access to defense counsel. Minors and those who did
not know their rights were more likely not to be provided prompt
access.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government does not use
it.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respects this
provision in practice.
The judicial system consists of the Supreme Court, which has
appellate powers, and a series of lower courts. Final appeal may be
made to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom. There are no political
or military courts.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and an
independent judiciary vigorously enforces this right. Defendants have
the right to private or court-appointed counsel. The 1995 Dangerous
Drugs Act, which would permit law enforcement authorities to hold
suspected drug traffickers for up to 36 hours without access to bail or
legal counsel, is undergoing judicial review and has not been
implemented. Attempts to introduce new legislation to permit
authorities to withhold access to bail or counsel from suspected drug
traffickers for 36 hours failed because of public opposition.
There are no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these provisions, and violations are
subject to legal sanction. Both human rights lawyers and police
authorities stated that illegal entry by the intelligence apparatus had
ceased. The acting Commissioner of Police stated that police do not use
illegal wiretaps on telephones.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice. Debate in the National Assembly is
lively and open. On April 26, a Supreme Court judge issued an
interlocutory order requiring Parliament to readmit the leader of the
opposition, who had been expelled for alleged unruly behavior during
the April 6 parliamentary session. In his decision, the judge
criticized the Speaker of Parliament for publishing officially a false
account of the parliamentary proceedings in question and for not
following proper procedures in suspending the opposition leader. The
judge also suggested that a government minister had perjured himself in
an affidavit filed in support of the Speaker.
More than a dozen privately owned newspapers presented varying
political viewpoints and expressed partisan views freely. The
Government has the ability to counter press criticism by using strict
libel laws; however, the Government has not invoked these measures to
inhibit the press. Libel suits between private parties are common.
The government monopoly in broadcasting local news and programming
continued, but it was undermined by a Supreme Court decision in 1997.
This decision resulted in the opening of broadcasting to private
parties with the exception of local news programming, which remained
under government control pending passage of legislation for complete
liberalization. One private news organization began local news
broadcasts in July 1998 on the Internet, thereby circumventing the ban
on private party television or radio local news broadcasts. Foreign
international news services, such as the United Kingdom's Sky News,
France's Canal Plus, and Cable Network News, are available to the
public by subscription.
The state-owned Mauritius Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) was
criticized after the February riots for not adequately covering the
disturbances, while the privately owned print media covered the events
extensively. A communique released by the MBC in March stated that it
would have been ``out of the question'' for MBC to cover the riots
live, because of fears that such coverage would needlessly dramatize
the events and lead viewers to believe that a ``full civil
insurrection'' was taking place in the country. The opposition
Mauritian Socialist Movement/Militant Mauritian Movement Federation, in
a judicial challenge to the results of a September 19 by-election,
formally accused the MBC of providing biased coverage favoring the
Government's candidate during the by-election campaign; the MBC
rejected this charge. The Supreme Court postponed a hearing on this
matter, which was scheduled for November. The hearing was not
rescheduled by year's end.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
respected this right in practice; however, police permission is
required for demonstrations and mass meetings and such permission was
refused in certain cases this year. While groups have the right to
challenge denials, some of those who went ahead with demonstrations
after a denial or never asked for police permission to gather at all
were confronted with a heavy police response. After police refused to
allow the Unemployed Workers' Movement and the Rodrigues Government
Employees Association on the island of Rodrigues to hold a second
demonstration in April, the group gathered anyway, and police used tear
gas to disperse the protesters and arrested eight persons. In July
leaders of the Federation of Civil Servants gathered outside Government
House, which houses the National Assembly and ministerial offices, to
deliver a letter to the Minister of the Public Sector. A team from the
police's special Support Unit arrived and forcibly dispersed the
protesters, slightly injuring three persons in the process.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
While the Government generally is secular in both name and
practice, it has favored the Hindu majority of the population. The
Government spent approximately $3 million (75 million rupees) in 1998
to expand a road going to the Hindu pilgrimage site for the annual Maha
Shrivaratree festival. The Government couched the expense in terms of
public safety, since the large portable shrines carried by the pilgrims
had caused significant traffic hazards. In February 1998, the Prime
Minister declared a national holiday for all Hindus who celebrated Maha
Shrivaratree.There were outspoken protests by those who were not Hindu
or did not have ``Hindu-sounding'' last names and were, therefore, not
eligible for the paid holiday.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
In August six Congolese refugees were stopped by immigration
authorities and detained. The six requested political asylum, which the
Government refused to grant. The Government does not grant political
asylum to refugees in general on the grounds that the country is small,
has limited resources, and does not wish to become a haven for large
numbers of refugees. The Government allowed the six Congolese refugees
to remain in the country while their attorney sought asylum for them in
another country; all had been granted political asylum in another
country by year's end. In November the Government allowed a Seychelles
citizen and his family seeking refugee status in another country to
remain in the country. The U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees had not
made a determination regarding their status as refugees by year's end.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice.
Free and fair national elections based on universal suffrage were held
in 1995, and a free by-election was held in September. The September
by-election was held without violence and was won by the Government's
candidate. The opposition judicially contested the result, alleging
that the Government abused the state apparatus to favor its candidate
and ``corrupted'' voters. In December 1998, the National Assembly
passed legislation granting voting rights in the general elections to
the 300 residents of the island of Agalega. Previously, they had not
been represented in the National Assembly. This leaves only the
residents of the island of Saint Brandon without suffrage. There only
are about 100 fishermen on 6- to 12-month contracts living on Saint
Brandon.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Of the 66
National Assembly seats, 5 are held by women.
In the National Assembly, up to eight members are appointed through
a ``best loser'' system to ensure that all ethnic groups are
represented. There are four such members.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups are organized and actively
investigate and publish their findings on human rights cases. They
operate without government restriction. Government officials cooperated
with and responded to the views of human rights groups.
The constitutionally mandated ombudsman investigates complaints of
human rights abuses. A national human rights commission, provided for
by a 1998 law, had not been established by year's end. (see Section
1.c.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis
of race, caste, place of origin, political opinion, color, religion, or
sex. The Government generally respected these provisions. The
Government continued to prepare a curriculum for human rights education
to be introduced into social studies courses at the primary and
secondary levels; however, it did not meet the original goal of
introducing such a curriculum in the primary grades during the year.
Women.--Violence against women, particularly spousal abuse, is a
problem according to the Ministry of Women's Rights and Family Welfare,
attorneys, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). The Protection
from Domestic Violence Act, partially enacted in 1997, came into full
force in March 1998 with the criminalization of domestic violence, and
the updated law provides the judicial system with greater powers to
combat this problem. Between January and June, 310 protection orders
against abusive partners were issued, and a total of 843 protection
orders have been issued since 1997. According to officials, the number
of reported spousal abuse cases has risen in the last 4 years,primarily
due to a greater awareness of women's rights and the Government's
readiness to enforce them. Nevertheless, many victims still choose not
to prosecute their attacker, primarily due to cultural pressures. A
UNICEF-funded study reported that there were 1,013 cases of domestic
violence between November 15, 1997 and May 15, 1998. Women were the
victims in 974 of these cases with alcohol being a contributing factor
in 56 percent of the cases.
Since women often depend on their spouses for financial security,
many remain in abusive situations for fear of being unable to provide
for their children as single parents. While a magistrate can order a
spouse to pay child support, some spouses have stopped working in order
to avoid payment. However, in July 1998, several amendments to the
Criminal Code were enacted that made it a crime to abandon one's family
or a pregnant spouse for more than 2 months, not to pay court-ordered
food support, or to engage in sexual harassment.
Traditionally women have played subordinate roles in society, and
societal discrimination continues; however, women have access to
education, employment, and government services. The Minister of Women,
Family Welfare, and Child Development stated in August that 25.8
percent of managers are women.
Children.--The Government placed strong emphasis on the health and
welfare of children and displayed a commitment to expand educational
opportunities for children. Education is mandatory until the age of 12,
and the Government has set a goal to increase this to age 15 once 60
new schools are authorized and built. In July 1998, the legislature
passed additional provisions to the Protection of the Child Act,
thereby making certain acts compromising the health, security, or
morality of children a crime.
Although incidents of child abuse are reported, private voluntary
organizations claim that the problem is more widespread than is
acknowledged publicly. Most government programs are administered by the
state-funded National Children's Council and the Child Development Unit
at the Ministry of Women, Family Welfare, and Child Development, which
provides counseling, investigates reports of child abuse, and takes
remedial action to protect affected children. In 1998 there were 2,897
reported cases of child abuse, including physical abuse, neglect, and
sexual abuse. Between January and May, 1,375 cases were reported, a 429
case increase over the same time period in 1998.
People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
government services. The law requires organizations that employ more
than 10 persons to set aside at least 3 percent of their positions for
the disabled. There is no law mandating access to public buildings or
facilities. The law does not require that work sites be accessible to
the disabled, making it difficult for persons with disabilities to fill
many jobs.
Religious Minorities.--Tensions between the Hindu majority and
Christian, Creole, and Muslim minorities persist and resulted in at
least two violent confrontations during the year. This tension and
violence has both religious and ethnic elements. In April the head of
the Catholic diocese invited all other religious heads to meet to
discuss solutions to the tensions, but none accepted. After a second
invitation, the head of Hindu House responded favorably. The outcome of
their meeting included an invitation to the President to establish an
interreligious council.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Tensions among the Hindu,
Creole, Muslim, European, and Chinese communities persist and resulted
in at least two violent confrontations during the year. In February
there were several days of rioting and interethnic confrontations after
a popular Creole singer died in police custody. Protests by members of
the Creole community against suspected police misconduct in the case
escalated into full-scale rioting and violent confrontations between
ethnic groups, resulting in four deaths and approximately $50 million
(1,250 million rupees) in property damage (see Section 1.c.).
On May 23, fans rioted when a historically Creole team defeated a
historically Muslim team for the national soccer championship. That
night seven persons died in a fire set at a Chinese social club in Port
Louis by predominantly Muslim demonstrators who rioted after the soccer
game. The precise motives for the arson attack remain unclear, but
observers believe that the social club was targeted because it
permitted gambling, served alcoholic beverages, and allegedly permitted
prostitution from its location near the city's main mosque.
As a result of the ethnic violence that occurred in February and
May, several initiatives were taken to improve relations between ethnic
groups. After meeting in April, the heads of the Catholic Diocese and
the Hindu House recommended that the President establish an
interreligious council; however, such a council had not been created by
year's end. The President established a Committee for the Promotion of
National Unity, which consists of 20 members from a wide cross section
of the public and private sectors. The committee has sponsored a
variety of activities to promote goodwill between ethnic groups. The
Mauritian Council of Social Service, which serves as an umbrella group
for NGO's in the country, created a conflict resolution working group
to address ethnic tensions. A citizen based abroad established the
Mauritius Peace Initiative to facilitate contact between domestic
community leaders and international conflict resolution experts.
The Rodrigues Government Employees Association is suing the Public
Service Commission and the Government for placing different service
conditions on those civil servants who were born and live on Rodrigues,
an island 360 miles off the country's east coast with a population of
36,000, compared with civil servants who were born on the main island
of Mauritius and work on Rodrigues. The Supreme Court heard the case at
the end of November, but had not issued a decision by year's end.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution explicitly protects
the right of workers to associate in trade unions, and there is an
active trade union movement. More than 335 unions represent over
125,000 workers, or about 25 percent of the work force. Many unions are
small, having fewer than 1,000 members. Eight major labor federations
serve as umbrella organizations for these smaller unions. With the
exception of members of the ``disciplined force,'' namely, the police
and the Special Mobile Force, and persons in state services who are not
public officers such as contractors, workers are free to form and join
unions and to organize in all sectors including in the export
processing zone (EPZ). Although only 12.5 percent of EPZ workers are
unionized, these workers are covered by national labor laws. The
Mauritian Labor Congress asserts that union membership is low in the
EPZ in part because employers in the EPZ intimidate employees and
restrict access to union organizers. Labor unions are independent of
the Government, and they have pressed wage demands, established ties to
domestic political parties, and addressed political issues.
Under the Industrial Relations Act (IRA), unions have the legal
right to strike; however, in practice the IRA requires a 21-day
cooling-off period, followed by binding arbitration, which has the
effect of making most strikes illegal. The IRA states that worker
participation in an unlawful strike is sufficient grounds for
dismissal, but workers may seek remedy in court if they believe that
their dismissals are unjustified. There were no major strikes during
the year.
Under the law, unions may establish ties with international labor
bodies, and some unions have done so.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
protects the right of employees to bargain collectively with their
employers. Minimum wages for nonmanagerial level workers are set by the
National Remuneration Board (NRB), whose chairman is appointed by the
Minister of Labor; however, most unions negotiate wages higher than
those set by the NRB. Almost 13 percent of the labor force works for
national or local government. The IRA prohibits antiunion
discrimination. There is an arbitration tribunal that handles any such
complaints.
Approximately 91,559 persons work in the EPZ. While there are some
EPZ-specific labor laws, such as provisions allowing EPZ employers to
request up to 10 hours per week of paid overtime from their employees,
workers in these firms enjoy the same basic protections as workers in
other firms.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor, including that by children, is prohibited by law, and is not
practiced.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment of children is 15
years; however, children unable to attend secondary school often seek
apprenticeships in the trades. The Government has set a goal to
increase mandatory education to 9 years of schooling in January 2000.
Six vocational schools were opened in January 1998 to train students
who fail the primary education certificate exam taken by students at
the end of the sixth year of primary education.
The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcement and conducts
frequent inspections. According to the Ministry of Women, Family, and
Child Development, 2,000 children between the ages of 12 and 14 were
employed or looking for work in 1998. Child labor in homes, on farms,
and in shops is common on the relatively isolated island of Rodrigues.
Forced or bonded labor involving children is prohibited by law and does
not exist (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government administratively
establishes minimum wages, which vary according to the sector of
employment, and it mandates minimum wage increases each year based on
inflation. The minimum wage for an unskilled worker in the EPZ is about
$12.74 (320 rupees) per week, while the lowest weekly wage for a non-
EPZ worker is about $15.48 (389 rupees). This sum is below the level
needed to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family,
but the actual market wage for most workers is much higher due to a
labor shortage and collective bargaining. The standard legal workweek
in the industrial sector is 45 hours. In the EPZ, an employee may work
an additional 10 hours per week, although at a higher hourly wage (see
Section 6.b.).
There are more than 12,200 legal foreign workers. Since they often
do not speak English, French, or Creole, it is difficult for them to
demand their rights, which are the same as those of citizen employees,
including the right to belong to a union. However, there were cases in
which foreign workers obtained local legal counsel to redress their
grievances.
The Government sets health and safety standards, and Ministry of
Labor officials inspect working conditions and ensure compliance with
the 1988 Occupational Safety, Health, and Welfare Act. The small number
of inspectors limits the Government's enforcement ability; however,
through voluntary compliance, the number of occupational accidents has
been cut by two-thirds since the Act's passage. Workers have the right
to remove themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardy to
continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
children, but does not specifically mention trafficking in adults.
There were reports from the nearby island of Madagascar that women and
children were trafficked to the islands of Reunion and Mauritius for
prostitution.
______
MOZAMBIQUE
Mozambique's constitutional Government, headed by President Joaquim
Chissano, held its second general multiparty elections in December (the
first multiparty elections were held in 1994). President Chissano was
reelected and his party, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
(FRELIMO), won 133 seats in the 250-seat Assembly of the Republic, with
the remaining 117 seats going to the opposition coalition of the
Mozambique National Resistance--Electoral Union (RENAMO-UE). The
elections were peaceful and orderly; however, they were marred by
allegations of vote-counting irregularities. Chissano and the
leadership of FRELIMO, which has ruled the country since independence
in 1975, dominate policymaking and implementation. The Assembly is a
multiparty parliament that provides increasingly useful debate on
national policy issues and generates some proposals independently.
During legislative sessions, the Assembly's FRELIMO majority influenced
the executive branch on some policy issues. Opposition parties in the
Assembly, working together with FRELIMO, were able to develop and enact
some legislation on a bipartisan basis. The Constitution provides for
an independent judiciary; however, the executive branch dominates the
judiciary, which lacks adequate resources, and is chronically
understaffed, susceptible to corruption, and largely ineffectual.
The forces responsible for internal security under the Ministry of
Interior include: the Criminal Investigation Police (PIC), the
Mozambican National Police (PRM), and the Rapid Reaction Police. The
State Information and Security Service reports directly to the
President. The military continued to suffer from a lack of money and
long term strategy. Many former military personnel of all ranks work in
other government security forces. Members of the security forces
committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
Mozambique is a very poor country. Approximately 80 percent of the
population are employed in agriculture, mostly on a subsistence level,
and approximately 75 percent of the population live in poverty. The
primary exports are shrimp, sugar, cotton, and cashew nuts. The
transition to a market economy continued during the year. In 1998 the
gross domestic product (GDP) was about $3.4 billion, up over 10 percent
in each of the last 3 years. Inflation was less than 5 percent in 1998.
The economy and government budget remained heavily dependent on foreign
aid. The economy had a $204 million trade deficit in 1998, down from
$377 million deficit in 1995. Annual per capita income was
approximately $180. High unemployment and underemployment in the formal
and informal sectors continued. Corruption continued to be a problem in
the public and private sectors.
The Government's human rights record, although poor in numerous
areas, continued to show improvements in several others. Police
continued to commit numerous abuses, including extrajudicial killings,
excessive use of force, torture, and other abuses. Police officers
tortured and beat persons in custody, and abused prostitutes and street
children. Prison conditions remain extremely harsh and life-
threatening; many prisoners died due to the harsh conditions. Police
continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention, and lengthy pretrial
detention was common. Fair and expeditious trials were not possible due
to an inefficient, understaffed, and underfunded judiciary, which is
dominated by the executive and subject to corruption. The Government
generally respected freedom of the press; however, there were some
limitations. Media outlets owned by the Government and State
enterprises largely reflected the views of factions within the ruling
party; however, the number and diversity of independent media
increased, and their criticism of the Government, its leaders, and
their families largely is tolerated. Human rights violations received
extensive coverage in both government and independent media during the
year. Both the Government and the law imposed some limits on freedom of
association. The Government, at times, infringed on freedom of
movement. The country's movement toward decentralization and expanding
democracy progressed; the voter registration process was successful
with 85 percent of the estimated eligible population registering to
vote in the general elections. Domestic violence against women as well
as widespread discrimination against women in employment and property
rights, remained problems. The abuse and criminal exploitation of
street children increased in urban areas, and child prostitution
remained a problem. Discrimination against the disabled, child labor,
and forced child labor remained problems. The media reported a few
cases of trafficking in women and children. Occasional mob violence
resulted in several deaths.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings; however, there were a few reports of
extrajudicial killing. In March relatives of a detainee accused police
of killing him in Beira central prison. Authorities attributed the
man's death to an unspecified illness; an eyewitness testified in March
that he saw police beating the victim on the way to the prison. The
case was referred by the Mozambican Human Rights League (LDH) to the
Attorney General's office, but still was pending at year's end.
In October a new organization, Human Rights and Democracy (DHD),
published a critical assessment of human rights conditions (see Section
4); among the complaints were alleged police killings.
Extremely harsh prison conditions and torture resulted in the
deaths of some persons in custody (see Section 1.c.).
In 1998 a journalist in Cabo Delgado province reported that an
accused thief, Cabral Manica, died while in police custody because of
torture. The police officer allegedly responsible for Manica's death
was convicted in June and sentenced to 3 months in prison.
There was no investigation into the 1998 death in police custody of
Intipa Faque in the northern province of Nampula; nor was any action
taken against the officers responsible.
The Government reportedly investigated the police killing of a
demonstrator during a labor strike at a security services company in
1998; however, no report was released publicly, nor was any action
taken against the officers responsible (see Section 6.a.).
An investigation was ongoing at year's end into the 1997 police
killing of Eduardo Machava, allegedly for refusing a shakedown attempt.
Police denied wrongdoing in the 1997 killings of Abel Zefanias dos
Anjos and Crescensio Sergio Muchange, and reportedly have not yet
referred either case to the criminal investigation branch.
Occasional mob and vigilante killings continued in both urban and
rural areas due to general public frustration with rising crime. In
August a man in Maputo was caught stealing from a residence and was
beaten by a crowd until the police intervened. Another man was beaten
to death by a mob in a Maputo suburb after breaking into a residence.
Some of the hundreds of thousands of landmines still in the ground
after decades of civil war caused 12 deaths during the year.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances; however, police were responsible for unexplained
disappearances of prisoners.
The fate of thousands of citizens who disappeared during the civil
war still remains unresolved.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution expressly prohibits torture and cruel or
inhuman treatment; however, the police continued to commit serious
abuses and torture, beatings, death threats, physical and mental abuse,
extortion, and unexplained disappearances of some prisoners remained
problems. From January to September, the LDH reported 78 complaints of
torture, including several instances involving the mistreatment of
women, beating, illegal detention, and death threats.
Corruption in the police forces extends throughout the ranks, and
the PRM used violence and detention to intimidate persons from
reporting abuses.
Journalists continued to report that police extorted money from
street vendors, many of whom are widowed and divorced women, sometimes
beating the women, and often stealing their merchandise. There also
were reports of police abuse of prostitutes and street children (see
Section 5).
The national budget allocated more funding for the hiring and
training of police, as well as for higher salaries. New standards for
the police force were imposed, requiring a minimum educational level of
the tenth grade. A new police academy is scheduled to be opened in
early 2000 to provide some university level training to police
officers. Human rights training is becoming mandatory for all security
officers, with human rights groups like the LDH teaching some of the
courses. The LDH's president noted in October that there had been
overall improvement in police performance.
There was some sporadic political violence related to the December
elections, attributable to both RENAMO-UE and FRELIMO supporters (see
Section 3).
Prison conditions in most of the country are extremely harsh and
continued to pose a threat to inmates' health and lives. A LDH report
released in January on the Beira central prison found that conditions
remain significantly below minimum international standards. Latrine
facilities are primitive; in some prisons, inmates must keep human
waste in their cells until they persuade or bribe attendants to remove
it. Food is substandard and scarce. Most prisoners receive only one
meal per day on a regular basis. There are many deaths in prison, the
vast majority due to illness and disease. In March after being
transferred to Maputo Central Hospital, three minor prisoners died due
to illness and an alleged lack of food while imprisoned. While the
health problems of most inmates remain unattended, the Ministry of
Health made specific efforts to address some of the more serious
diseases in the prison system, including cholera, tuberculosis, and
HIV/AIDS-related illnesses.
The Beira chapter of the LDH visited Beira central prison in
December 1998, and January, and found that torture, death threats by
agents of the State, extortion, physical and mental abuse, and
unexplained disappearances of some prisoners still are problems. There
are reported cases in which inmates complained of extortion, and of
denial of visitation rights and medical care. During its visit the LDH
noted a marked drop in the number of complaints from inmates from a
high of 700 during a previous visit in 1998, to 300. In September a
woman's prison, which included a prison school, was opened in Ndlavela.
In October the Ministry of Justice held a 4-day symposium on prison
reform, seeking ways to improve conditions and the rehabilitation of
inmates. In connection with the symposium, Justice Minister Jose Abudo
admitted that the penal system was ``imperfect and lacking, beset with
serious structural problems that demanded profound reforms.''
In November 1998, a newspaper reported the discovery of a
clandestine prison in Buzi District, Sofala Province, where police
allegedly detained prisoners in underground cisterns. Local authorities
denied the existence of this illegal prison.
Two National Directorates of Prisons (DNP's), one under the
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and the other under the Ministry of Interior
(MOI), operate prisons in all the provincial capitals. The DNP's also
hold prisoners at an agricultural penitentiary in Mabalane and
industrial penitentiaries in Nampula and Maputo. According to
nongovernmental organization (NGO) sources, MOI inmates generally are
unconvicted suspects who may have beeninterviewed by a judge but not
sentenced, some of whom have been held for years (see Section 1.d.).
MOJ inmates generally have been tried and sentenced in a conventional
legal process. In most prisons, inmates under MOJ jurisdiction are
imprisoned with those under MOI jurisdiction. Military and civilian
prisoners are held in the same prisons.
Detention facilities remained severely overcrowded, generally
housing four to six times the number of prisoners that they were built
to accommodate. During the year, Beira central prison held 653
prisoners in a prison built to hold 200; Manica held 1,000 in a prison
built to hold 300; Tete held 405 in a prison built to hold 90.
Inhambane provincial prison held 150 in a prison built to hold 75;
Nampula held 400 in a prison built for 70; and Pemba held 413 in a
prison built for 90. Maputo central prison, built to hold 800 inmates,
held 2,300, of whom 1,570 were awaiting trial. However, the Maputo
Machava maximum security prison, with a capacity of 600, held
considerably less than that.
Minors are incarcerated with adult inmates. During a visit to the
Beira central prison in August, the Minister of Coordination of Social
Action found 25 minors detained there. However, the LDH reported
noticeably fewer minors held in detention nationwide. At times Maputo
city prison houses children as young as 3 years of age, brought there
by mothers sentenced for long periods for crimes.
International as well as domestic human rights groups may have
access to prisoners at the discretion of the MOJ and MOI; however,
officials sometimes cite unsanitary conditions or security risks as
reasons to delay or cancel visits.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides that the duration of preventive imprisonment be set by law;
however, the police continued to arbitrarily arrest and detain citizens
in practice. Under the law, the maximum preventive imprisonment is 48
hours, during which time a detainee has the right to have his case
reviewed by judicial authorities, after which he can be detained up to
another 60 days while the case is investigated by the PIC. In cases
where a person is accused of a very serious crime carrying a sentence
of more than 8 years, he may be detained up to 84 days without being
charged formally. If a court approves, such detainees may be held for
two more periods of 84 days each without charge while the police
complete the investigation process. The law provides that if the
prescribed period for investigation has been completed and no charges
have been brought, the detainee must be released. In many cases, the
authorities either are unaware of these regulations or ignore them,
often also ignoring a detainee's constitutional right to counsel and to
contact relatives or friends.
In February police detained a Pakistani imam for questioning in
connection with the criminal investigation of the murder and
decapitation of a young black man (see Section 2.c.). An investigating
magistrate released the imam on bail after 8 days in detention, but
ordered him to remain in the country for further questioning. In August
the Imam was rearrested and remained in detention at year's end pending
a trial.
In 1998 a radio journalist, Fernando Quinova, was detained without
charge after reporting on Radio Mozambique that a prisoner died while
in the custody of the police (see Section 2.a.). Quinova escaped from
prison, but was rearrested on March 2, and charged with slandering the
police and illegally leaking documents: neither charge exists under the
Penal Code. On March 8, Quinova was freed after the media publicized
his plight. In May the Cabo Delgado provincial court convicted a police
commander of illegally detaining Quinova. The commander was fined
approximately $44 (546,000 meticais) and ordered to pay Quinova
approximately $240 (3 million meticais) in compensation.
Many persons complained that security officials often detained them
for spurious reasons and demanded identification documents; many
officers also demanded bribes to permit persons to continue toward
their destinations. The media reported that citizens in Nampula
province complained to authorities that police detained persons for not
carrying identification documents, and demanded money when they could
not produce documents. Many victims lived in areas where there was no
notary public available to validate their documents. Many victims chose
not to seek police assistance because of their usual demand for bribes
or a lack of confidence that the police would help.
Most citizens also are unaware of their rights, particularly those
provided by the Constitution, the law, and the Penal Process Code. As a
result, detainees can spend many weeks, months, and even years in
pretrial status. The bail system remains poorly defined, and prisoners,
their families, and NGO's continue to complain that police and prison
officials demand bribes to release prisoners.
Under the Penal Code, only those suspects caught in the act of
committing a crime can be held in detention. Justice Ministry officials
say that some police lack adequate training and do not know how to
charge a person properly with a stated crime. An unfortunate detainee
thus may be subjected to indefinite detention. The National Directorate
of Prisons reported that there are an estimated 7,500 persons in the
prison system, 4,758 of whom were detainees who had not been charged.
In response to this problem, a legal enforcement commission convened in
May and ordered cases of detainees to be reviewed so that those who had
served their time or were being held illegally (without charge) could
be released. In Beira alone, 230 prisoners were released from the
central prison during May and June. The DHD report on human rights
conditions released in October gave particular emphasis to the problem
of arbitrary arrest and detention (see Section 4).
Drug cases are subject to a special regime. A 1996 law specifies
that the legal period of preventive detention in drug trafficking cases
is 10 days. The same law authorizes a long period of investigation--up
to 9 months--in cases involving drug smuggling, drug production and
transfer, and criminal association.
The Constitution expressly prohibits exile, and the Government does
not use exile as a form of punishment.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution formally
established an independent judiciary and specifically states that the
decisions of the courts take precedence over all other authorities and
individuals and must be obeyed; however the executive, and by extension
the FRELIMO party, continued to dominate the judiciary, which is
understaffed and manned by inadequately trained appointees. The DHD
report on human rights conditions released in October gave particular
emphasis to problems in the judiciary (see Section 4).
The President appoints the President and Vice President of the most
important tribunal, the Supreme Court. Supreme Court nominations
initially are prepared by the Supreme Higher Magistrate's Council
(CSMJ), the body responsible for overseeing professional behavior among
magistrates. The CSMJ, generally all FRELIMO party members, submits a
list of qualified persons to the President of the Republic. The
president then submits his choices to the National Assembly for
approval. No assembly approval is needed for other judicial
appointments.
There are two complementary formal justice systems: The civil/
criminal system, and the military system. Civilians are not under the
jurisdiction of, or tried in, military courts. A 1991 law empowered the
Supreme Court to administer the civil/criminal system; it also hears
appeals, including military cases, although the Ministry of Defense
administers the military courts. Below the Supreme Court there are
provincial and district courts. There also are courts that exercise
limited, specialized jurisdiction, such as the administrative court,
customs court, fiscal court, maritime court, and labor court. The
Constitution called for the creation of a Constitutional Council, but
the Government has not yet passed implementing legislation. In the
absence of this body, the Supreme Court is tasked with ruling on issues
of constitutionality, as it did when assessing the eligibility of
presidential candidates for the general elections. In November the
Supreme Court overruled the National Election Commission and allowed
the United Front of Mozambique (FUMO) party to participate in the
RENAMO-UE coalition (see Section 3). Persons 16 years old and younger
fall under the jurisdiction of a court system for minors. Through this
legal channel, the Government can send minors to correctional,
educational, or other institutions. As with the provincial and district
courts, the specialized and minor court systems are ineffective due to
a lack of qualified professionals.
In August Supreme Court Chief Justice Mario Mangaze complained that
only 25 percent of citizens had access to the official judicial system.
Outside the formal court system, a number of local customary courts
adjudicate matters such as estate and divorce cases. These courts are
staffed by respected local arbiters who have no formal training but who
exercise a substantial judicial and executive role, particularly in the
area of arbitration.
Persons accused of crimes against the State are tried in regular
civilian courts under standard criminal judicial procedures. The law
provides definitions of crimes against the State, such as treason,
terrorism, and sabotage. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction
over members of Parliament and other persons who are immune from trial
in the lower courts. Early in the year, an administrative judge was
arrested and detained for shooting a homeless man and is now on trial
in the Supreme Court.
A judge may order a closed trial because of national security
interests or to protect the privacy of the plaintiff in cases
concerning rape.
In regular courts, all accused persons are in principle presumed
innocent and have the right to legal counsel and the right of appeal;
however, authorities do not always respect these rights. The great
majority of the population is either unaware of these rights or does
not possess the means to obtain any form of legal counsel. Although the
law specifically provides for public defenders, such assistance is not
available in practice, particularly in the rural areas. Some NGO's,
such as LDH, the Government's National Institute for Legal Assistance,
and the Mozambican Association of Women in Judicial Careers, continued
to offer limited legal counsel at little or no cost to both defendants
and prisoners.
A lack of licensed attorneys exacerbates the judicial system's
weakness. There are an estimated 200 licensed attorneys in the country;
the vast majority work in Maputo. There continued to be a shortage of
qualified judicial personnel, with only 20 to 30 nationwide. There are
appeals courts in all provinces, but few of these courts are staffed by
formally trained judges, despite the fact that the Judicial Magistrates
Statute requires a law degree. Some districts have no formal courts or
judges at all. Several donor initiatives to remedy these shortages were
continued or completed, including Danish and World Bank-financed
training of district court judges and public prosecutors.
In 1998 while speaking at the opening of the Supreme Court session,
Chief Justice Mangaze complained that a number of judges and others
responsible to the courts are guilty of unacceptable practices,
including corruption and bribe taking, chronic absence, unequal
treatment, and deliberate delays and omissions in handling cases.
Justice Mangaze also presides over the Higher Magistrate's Council
(CSMJ), which expelled 23 judges for corruption since 1995. A Ministry
of Justice official estimated that 16 judges have been removed from
office since 1998, including three judges whose cases were heard during
the year. In 1998 the National Assembly passed a law, which was
implemented during the year, that speeds the implementation of CSMJ
decisions affecting judges who appeal charges of misconduct, thus
removing them from the bench more swiftly.
In November 1998, a young man accused of stealing from his employer
was beaten, bound, and left in the sun by his employer, who accused him
of stealing. His resulting injuries were so severe that both of his
arms had to be amputated. The judge hearing the case was criticized
widely by the press and public for only imposing a $40 (500,000
meticais) fine against the employer, who later absconded.
The Penal Code contains legal guidelines for the judicial treatment
of minors and forbids the imprisonment of minors below the age of 20;
however, there are many documented reports that some judges ordered the
incarceration of minors in common prisons without trial (see Section
1.c.).
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right of privacy and
expressly forbids the use of surveillance techniques, and the
Government generally respected these provisions. By law police need a
warrant to enter homes and businesses. There were no documented reports
of such search activity; however, some political groups suspected that
their telephones were tapped by government intelligence agencies, and
claimed that security forces kept watch on their activities.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution, the 1991 Press
Law, and the 1992 Rome Peace Accords provided for freedom of expression
and of the press, and the Government generally respected these
provisions; however, limitations on these freedoms are permitted if
they relate to the media's obligations to respect the Constitution,
human dignity, and imperatives of foreign policy and national defense.
A media watchdog organization expressed concern that the vagueness of
``imperatives of foreign policy and national defense'' could lead to
unwarranted restrictions. While criticism of the President is not
prohibited, the 1991 Press Law holds that in cases of defamation
against the President, truth is not a sufficient defense against libel.
This law has not been tested in court; however, the President
experienced considerable verbal and written criticism during the year--
especially during the course of the electoral campaign--without
invoking this clause.
Police harassment and detention of radio journalist Fernando
Quinova continued in the beginning of the year (see Section 1.d.).
Quinova was released in March after the media publicized his plight in
the northern province of Cabo Delgado. The National Journalists Union
and Radio Mozambique provided legal counsel. In May a police commander
was convicted of illegallydetaining Quinova. Another officer was
convicted and sentenced to 3 months imprisonment in June for the death
in custody of Cabral Manica, which Quinova reported. In April the Tete
district court absolved the newspaper Fax Do Interior, of charges of
defamation, which had been levied in 1997. In June a Maputo court
dismissed a suit of libel brought by an opposition politician against
the state-owned newspaper Domingo.
Government and state-owned media largely reflected the views of the
ruling party, but many such media sources also carried significant
criticism of the Government's handling of the local election
administration. Media ownership is diversified--the U.N. Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Media Project estimated
that 34 percent of the country's media were public, 36 percent were
private commercial, and 28 percent were private nonprofit (church
affiliated); however, the public category includes the country's only
daily newspapers, the only Sunday newspaper, and the only weekly
newsmagazine. Two progovernment newspapers--Noticias and Domingo--
together with a third sports-oriented weekly are owned by a single
corporation, Noticias Sarl, in which state-owned enterprises hold
majority shares. Both evidenced blatant bias in favor of the ruling
party, FRELIMO, during the election period; however Domingo continued
pushing for reform of the justice system. In June one fairly modern
government-owned printing press in Maputo was privatized.
A large number of periodicals and broadcasting entities have been
licensed since 1992 and the independent media criticisms of government
leaders and their families largely is tolerated. An independent
publisher started a daily newspaper in Maputo during the year, but was
forced to limit publications to one per week due to financial
constraints. There were four independent weekly newspapers published in
Maputo, and five other independent weekly journals published in
provincial capitals. According to a survey by the Panos Institute, the
nine weekly newspapers had a combined total circulation of 45,910.
There are an additional 20 printed periodicals with a combined
circulation of 34,000. There also are eight periodicals that
transmitted daily editions electronically, with a combined subscription
of more than 1,500. The second oldest faxed daily, Imparcial, is owned
by RENAMO. Websites were developed during the year for several
independent media. Only a small minority of the population receives
news directly through either television or the print media.
While the Government no longer owns most radio and television
stations, government stations are the only broadcasters capable of
countrywide transmission; however, there are local and independent
broadcasts in almost all urban areas. Government media are showing
greater transparency in reporting and some independence of editorial
content. Radio Mozambique, the public's most important source of
information, is government owned, but its news coverage is considered
unbiased and fair. Radio Mozambique receives the largest single subsidy
from the state budget of any public company. It broadcasts in
Portuguese and 18 indigenous languages; its external service broadcasts
in English as well as in Portuguese for citizens in neighboring South
Africa. Radio Mozambique regularly broadcasts public debates that
include a variety of participants with differing opinions.
In addition to Radio Mozambique, there are 16 independent
(primarily church-supported) and state-supported radio stations, most
using local languages in addition to Portuguese, which have spread to
over a dozen cities. One such station, Radio Terra Verde, is linked
directly to the principal opposition party. Radio Terra Verde (RTV) is
second only to Radio Mozambique's youth-oriented Radio Cidade in
popularity, outside of broadcast times for soccer matches. Foreign
radio programs, including the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC),
Radio France International (RFI), Radio Diffusao Portugal (RDP)-Africa,
and the Voice Of America (VOA) reach all major population centers and
report local news via Mozambican-based part-time reporters; the BBC and
the RFI carry news in Portuguese but broadcast most of the day in
English and French, respectively.
TV Mozambique moved into a new Portuguese-built studio in 1998 and
began broadcasting during the year. During the elections, TV Mozambique
was biased towards the ruling party. Portuguese Television for Africa
(RTP Africa) offers a second source of televised news to all parts of
the country reached by TVM. Privately owned television transmission
continued to be limited to Maputo; transmissions from Quelimane did not
begin during the year due to financial constraints. International
television news via cable in Maputo and via satellite is available
nationwide.
A media development report released by UNESCO expressed concern
about the strong concentration of national and local media in Maputo
city and province, mirroring lopsided socio-economic development
nationwide. Furthermore, a 1997 census revealed that 60.5 percent of
citizens over age 15 are illiterate in any language and 70 percent of
the population over 5 years of age do not speak Portuguese, which
further limits the reach of the media beyond Maputo.
Article 19, a United Kingdom-based NGO, reported that the
independent media are constrained by the high cost of newsprint,
distribution, and equipment. It claimed that publications close to the
Government have an advantage in securing exemptions from customs
duties. In September UNESCO's Media Diversity Project announced that it
would assist 24 private sector print and faxed journals from all
provinces to lower their paper costs and strengthen their ability to
negotiate better commercial arrangements with the now privatized Cegraf
printing press in Maputo; however, this arrangement had not been
finalized at year's end.
The National Union of Journalists (SNJ) continued to work with the
Austrian Institute for North-South Development to improve working
relationships between journalists and police officers. The SNJ defended
the state-owned Diario de Mozambique journalists' right to strike for
back pay and benefits in Beira.
Final debate on recommendations that membership in the media
watchdog committee, the Higher Council of Social Communications (CSCS),
be redefined to eliminate majority control by governmental appointees
was deferred for another year. The CSCS was among the several
organizations, including a joint operation by the LDH and Article 19,
which monitored media fairness during the December presidential and
parliamentary elections. The CSCS did not issue an evaluation of the
elections by year's end.
The Prime Minister's weekly press conferences are important
opportunities for journalists to discuss politics and government
policies; however, they were suspended during the electoral campaign.
The Prime Minister's information office seeks to facilitate
international press access to key government officials and to provide
policy guidance on how new media should be regulated. The Prime
Minister's information office continues to monitor press content
informally.
There are no formal restrictions on academic freedom. Private
educational institutions, both church-related and secular, are well
established and continued to expand in several cities. A new Islamic
University announced in 1998 is not yet in active development. Students
from Catholic University again served as election monitors during the
year.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
this right in practice. The law regulates public demonstrations but
does not apply to private gatherings held indoors and by individual
invitation, nor does it cover religious gatherings or election
campaigning.
The law specifies some time limitations on the exercise of the
right to gather or demonstrate peacefully. The law states that marches,
parades, and processions cannot be held on Saturdays, Sundays,
holidays, or between 5:00 p.m. and 12:30 a.m. on other days. The law
provides for possible exceptions to this regulation, if justified, but
such decisions are not made in an open and established manner. Further,
the law states that any organizers of gatherings or demonstrations must
submit a notice to civil and police authorities with at least 10
signatures, for the holding of any such demonstration, along with a
justification of the purpose of the gathering. The law stipulates that
the Government must reply to any such request within 2 days of
receiving the request, and that no reply within this period shall be
understood to mean governmental acceptance. During the election
campaign, political parties were not required to request authorization
to hold political rallies.
The law provides for freedom of association; however, both the
Government and the law imposed some limits on this right. Legislation
promulgated in 1991 sets forth the process for the registration of
political parties. There are over 20 registered, active political
parties. Under 1992 legislation, a political party must demonstrate
that it has no racial, ethnic, or religious exclusiveness and secure at
least 2,000 signatures of citizens in order to be recognized.
The Government requires nonpolitical groups such as NGO's and
religious organizations to register. In 1998 the Government issued a
decree regulating the registration and activates of foreign NGO's.
NGO's must register their presence and scope of work with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry then issues permits to those NGO's
whose programs the Government decides complement its priorities.
Observers believe that these new requirements worsen the already
lengthy bureaucratic process that NGO's must follow to work in the
country. Although the registration process is not always transparent
and can take many months, the authorities rarely reject applications
from new associations. The law forbids religious parties from
organizing;however, there were no reports of government attempts to
impede the right of association for political purposes during the year.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides that all
citizens have the freedom to practice or not to practice a religion,
and gives religious denominations the right to pursue their religious
aims freely, and the Government generally respects these rights in
practice.
The 1989 Law on Religious Freedom requires religious institutions
and missionary organizations to register with the Ministry of Justice,
reveal their principal source of funds, and provide the names of at
least 500 followers in good standing. No particular benefits or
privileges are associated with the registration process. The Government
requires foreign missionaries to register with the Office of Religious
Affairs in the Ministry of Justice, but routinely grants visas and
residence permits to them.
In February police detained a Pakistani imam for questioning in
connection with a murder (see Section 1.d.). The media reaction to the
detention sparked sharp public debate (see Section 5).
The law governing political parties specifically forbids religious
parties from organizing, and any party from sponsoring religious
propaganda.
The Constitution gives religious groups the right to own and
acquire assets, and these institutions are allowed to operate schools.
While virtually all places of worship nationalized by the State in 1977
have been returned to the respective religious organizations, the
Catholic Church and certain Muslim communities complained that some
other properties such as schools, health centers and residences
unjustly remain in state hands, and continued to press for the return
of such properties. The Government claimed that all ``erroneously''
nationalized properties have been returned. These complaints and the
Government's responses to them have been aired in the press and debated
in Parliament. The Conference of Catholic Bishops repeatedly raised
this issue in its regular periodic meetings with the President, noting
that many properties remain in state hands. In April an independent
newsletter published a list of properties that the Government has
failed to return, including Catholic schools and seminary properties in
Inhambane, Maputo, Niassa, and Zambezia provinces, and a Muslim school
in Sofala province. In 1998 the Catholic Church successfully negotiated
for the return of many educational, social, and residential facilities
that had remained in state hands.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
to live anywhere within national territory and to travel within the
country and abroad; however, at times authorities infringed on these
rights.
Police traffic checkpoints occasionally affected freedom of
movement, sometimes for security concerns. In an effort to reduce
harassment and confiscation of travelers' possessions at the borders,
customs supervisors levied disciplinary fines and fired abusive customs
agents. In large cities, the police often stop foreign pedestrians and
order them to present original passports or resident papers, sometimes
refusing to accept notarized copies, and fining those who failed to
show proper documents (most persons do not like to carry the originals
of documents due to the risk of theft). Police also detained local
citizens routinely for failure to carry identity papers and demanded
bribes (see Section 1.d.).
The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Mozambique
continued to offer shelter to approximately 370 refugees from 7 African
countries and Cuba in cooperation with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR). The Government operates two transit centers near
Maputo. Niassa and Tete provinces have scattered groups of transients
from Burundi, Rwanda, Angola, Somalia, and Liberia. Due to the
heightened conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, there were
additional refugees in Niassa province. Refugee camp conditions
continued to be poor, and some refugees claim to fear attack by fellow
refugees on the basis of ethnicity. The UNHCR makes alternative shelter
available to those who feel threatened. The Government offers first
asylum, and offered it to some refugees during the year.
There were three cases of voluntary repatriation and no reports of
the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to elect their
representatives in universal, direct, secret, and periodic elections,
and in December citizens freely exercised their right to vote in the
country's second multiparty general elections that international
observers considered to be generally free and fair; however, the
elections were marred by allegations of vote counting irregularities.
President Chissano was returned to office with approximately 52 percent
of the vote, and the ruling FRELIMO party won 133 of the 250 assembly
seats. The largest opposition group, RENAMO-UE, made a strong showing
in the elections, winning 117 seats in the Assembly and 48 percent of
the presidential vote. Prior to the election, FRELIMO party members
held all Cabinet positions and provincial governorships, since the
President appoints governors. New cabinet members and governors had not
been appointed by year's end.
In September in an extraordinary session, the Assembly amended the
electoral law by consensus to permit the general elections to be held
on December 3-4. In November the Supreme Court overruled the National
Election Commission and allowed the FUMO party to join the RENAMO-UE
opposition coalition (see Section 1.e.).
Voter registration commenced on July 20 for 60 days. Despite some
minor technical difficulties, including long lines and missing
equipment, the registration process ran smoothly. Approximately 85
percent of the eligible voting population registered to vote. The 6-
week campaign period was marked by some sporadic violence attributable
to both FRELIMO and RENAMO-UE supporters (see Section 1.c.), although
at significantly reduced levels than during the 1994 elections. Leaders
of both parties called for an end to the violence.
According to international and domestic observers, the voting
process was transparent, peaceful and orderly with approximately 75
percent of the population participating; however, international and
domestic observers complained of a lack of full access to the vote
count and the opposition coalition RENAMO-UE charged that there was
fraud in the vote-counting process. There were a significant number of
ballots on which preferences were unclear, largely due to illiteracy,
which required interpretation by the Electoral Commission. The
Commission also did not count tally sheets from several hundred polling
stations at both the provincial or national level due to mathematical
errors, omissions, and other problems. International observers were not
given full access to the process of examining the contested ballots and
tally sheets, or to the vote counting. RENAMO-UE charged that this
affected them disproportionately because tally sheets were discarded
from provinces where RENAMO-UE support was strong. RENAMO-UE took this
issue and several others to the Supreme Court on December 23, and a few
days later the Court unanimously rejected RENAMO-UE's complaints,
acknowledging that there were some minor irregularities but concluding
that these did not change the results of the elections.
Article 19 and the LDH monitored media coverage of the national
electoral campaign. Radio Mozambique generally presented balanced
coverage, whereas TVM was biased towards the ruling party. The
government-supported newspapers Noticias, Diario de Mozambique, and
Domingo demonstrated pro-government partisanship. The National Election
Commission was criticized for categorizing these government-supported
newspapers as private-sector media, thereby exempting them from the
electoral law's requirement that public media provide fair and balanced
treatment of all parties during the electoral campaign.
There are no legal restrictions hindering women's involvement in
government; however, women are underrepresented in government and
politics. Cultural factors inhibit women's effectiveness in public life
(see Section 5). There were 62 women in the 250-member National
Assembly, one female Cabinet minister, and three female vice ministers,
before the December elections. The new National Assembly was not sworn
in by year's end, nor had the President appointed a new Cabinet.
FRELIMO's policy mandates that at least 30 percent of the party's two
governing bodies must be women. During the year, the Political
Commission met this mandate, while the Central Committee fell short by
about 2 percent.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no legal obstacles to the formation of domestic human
rights groups, although registration procedures applying to NGO's are
onerous and expensive (see Section 2.b.). In October a new
organization, the DHD, published the first edition of what is to be an
annual report on human rights conditions in the country. The report's
critical assessment gave particular emphasis to problems in the
judiciary, conditions in prisons, and arbitrary arrest and detention of
citizens. Among the complaints were alleged police killings, domestic
violence, labor disputes, andland title conflicts. The DHD and the LDH
conduct human rights education seminars and workshops for a wide range
of audiences including political parties, security agencies,
businesses, and NGO's.
The Government responded to human rights-related inquiries from
Amnesty International, Transparency International, the LDH, and the DHD
on a case-by-case basis. Other rights-oriented groups also have had
contact with the Government.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution forbids discrimination based on race, sex,
religion, or disability; however, in practice discrimination against
women and the disabled persists.
Women.--Although official statistics are not kept, according to
health officials, women's groups, and other sources, domestic violence
against women--particularly rape and beating--is widespread. Many women
believe that their spouses have the right to beat them, and cultural
pressures discourage women from taking legal action against abusive
spouses. There is no law that defines domestic violence as a crime;
however, domestic violence can be prosecuted under other crimes such as
rape, battery, and assault. During the year, the NGO Women, Law, and
Development (MULEIDE) registered 300 requests for assistance in cases
involving domestic violence, of which 70 were forwarded to the courts.
The police normally do not intervene in domestic disputes. Hospitals
usually do not ascribe evidence of physical abuse to domestic violence.
The DHD report on human rights conditions released in October gave
particular emphasis to the problem of domestic violence (see Section
4).
A group of women's NGO's, including Women in Law and Development,
Mozambican Women in Education, Women in Judicial Careers, and the
FRELIMO-sponsored Mozambican Women's Organization, support the
organization Everybody Against Violence, which serves as a monitoring
and educational group for issues of domestic violence and sexual abuse
of women and children, including counseling of victims and mediating
within families. The organization continued to expand during the year.
All NGO's actively opposing domestic violence worked to involve police
in education, enforcement, and identifying domestic violence as a
public order problem.
Despite constitutional provisions for the equality of men and women
in all aspects of political, economic, social, and cultural life, the
civil and commercial legal codes contradict one another and the
Constitution. Under the law of the Family and Inheritance, the husband
or father is the head of household, and both wives and daughters must
obtain male approval for all legal undertakings. For example, a woman
must have the written approval of her husband, father, or closest male
relative in order to start a business. Without such approval, a woman
cannot lease property, obtain a loan, or contract for goods and
services. The legal domicile of a married woman is her husband's house,
and she may work outside the home only with the express consent of her
husband. While it appears that these legal restrictions on women's
freedom are not enforced commonly, especially in the informal economy,
they leave women open to extortion and other pressures.
Family law provides that a married couple's assets belong to the
husband, who has full authority to decide on their disposition. When a
husband dies, his widow is only fourth in line (after sons, fathers,
and brothers) to inherit the household goods. A contradictory provision
of the law states that a widow is entitled to one-half of those goods
that are acquired during the marriage, but in practice women rarely
know of or demand this right.
Customary law varies within the country. In some places, it appears
to provide women less protection than family law, and unless a marriage
is registered, a woman has no recourse to the judicial branch for
enforcement of the rights provided her by the civil codes.
A new Land Law was adopted in 1997; sections pertaining to rural
areas came into force in 1998, and those related to urban areas became
effective during the year. The law is expected to have a significant
effect on women, who are the primary cultivators of family land. Under
customary law, they often had no rights to the disposition of the land.
The revised Land Law specifically permits women to exercise rights over
community land held through customary rights. However, domestic NGO's
such as the Rural Women's Development Association and Rural Mutual
Assistance Association have cautioned that a considerable investment of
time and education would be necessary before the new rights granted to
women would supersede traditional practice.
The Constitution grants citizenship to the foreign-born wife of a
male citizen, but not to the foreign-born husband of a female citizen.
Women continued to experience economic discrimination in practice.
Women constitute slightly more than half the population but are
responsible for two-thirds of economic production, according to the
1997 census. The Presidential Minister for Social and Economic Affairs
reported that women in the workplace receive lower pay than men for the
same work. According to Members of Parliament who debated the proposed
revision of the Labor Law, women are subject to sexual harassment and
to discrimination in hiring because of potential absences on maternity
leave; although the Labor Law entitles a woman to 60 days of maternity
leave, employers often violate this right. The Government continued to
target maternal and child health and focused on immunizations for women
in childbearing years and for young children. The Ministry of Health
estimates that the rate of maternal mortality is 662 per 100,000.
Numerous other health and community development NGO's also emphasize
programs to improve women's health and increasingly are looking to
combat the spread of HIV/AIDS and related health problems.
Children.--The Government has made children's rights and welfare a
priority, but admits that some children are in trouble. Primary
education is not compulsory. More than 1000 new primary schools opened
during the year throughout the country; however, schools are
overcrowded, and there is much corruption in the school system.
Newspapers frequently reported that the parents of school children had
to bribe teachers, or that girls exchanged, or were forced to exchange,
sex with teachers for passing grades. The 1997 census estimated that
some 50 percent of children of ages 6 through 10 are in primary school.
Only a fraction of children continue with secondary studies.
An NGO, the Association for Mozambican Children (ASEM), opened 2
alternative-learning centers during the year for more than 900 children
who were not able to return to their regular schools after being
expelled from their homes or because they had left school to work.
During the year, the Government supplied ASEM with textbooks.
Girls continued to have less access to education than boys above
the primary level: 42 percent of students in grades 1 through 5 were
girls, and 40 percent of students in grades 6 through 10 were girls.
The percentage increased to 48.4 percent for grades 11 and 12. However,
there are only 82 public secondary schools nationwide, of which only 18
offer classes through grade 12. About 76 percent of females over 15
years of age are illiterate. Outside the main cities, secondary schools
are fewer, and where boarding is required for attendance, the number of
female students drops significantly. In a case that gained national
attention in 1998, residents of Morrumbene district in Inhambane
Province demanded the exclusion of girls from the dormitories at the
Cambine secondary school. In the absence of separate boarding
facilities, local residents blamed schoolgirls for immoral behavior in
the community and pressured authorities to comply with the illegal
demand, which effectively prevented many girls from attending the
school. The few out-of-town girls who remained to study were forced to
live in unprotected shacks.
NGO's and the Government took some steps to protect and reintegrate
into families or other supervised conditions an estimated 3,000 street
children in the Maputo metropolitan area. Street children sometimes are
beaten by police and frequently are victims of sexual abuse. Some
remedial government programs continued, including programs on
education, information dissemination, health care, and family
reunification. The 1997 census found that the mortality rate for
infants was 145 per 1,000, and for children under the age of 5 it was
116 per 1,000. The Maputo City Social Action Coordination Office
continued its program of rescuing abandoned orphans and assisting
single mothers who head families of three or more persons. The same
group offered special classes to children of broken homes in local
schools. Other NGO groups sponsored food, shelter, and education
programs in all major cities. The Association for Mozambican Children,
in Beira, also provided counseling to parents who have expelled
children from their homes, usually when a wife has children
unacceptable to a new husband.
Social workers found that some parents of disabled children in
several districts, including the populous towns of Gorongosa and Dondo,
did not permit their children to leave their homes. In 1998 social
workers made similar findings in Sofala. Provincial social action
officials continued their educational campaign to reverse traditional
attitudes toward disabled children.
Authorities in several provinces took steps to combat child
prostitution; however, sexual abuse and exploitation of children below
the age of 15 continued (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). In Sofala
province, where child prostitution flourishes along the Beira
development corridor (frequented by truck drivers,businessmen, and
tourists), the Government established information centers in affected
areas to provide information to families and friends of children who
are raped and exploited, and counseled them on how to deal with the
police, public prosecutors, and judges.
In May an Africa-wide conference on child soldiers was held in
Maputo to consider the reintegration of child soldiers into civil
society. The resulting ``Maputo Declaration'' called for an end of the
use of child soldiers and for pressure to be placed on nations in
violation. The conference was supported by the Government, political
parties, and religious organizations. The NGO Restore Hope was
successful in obtaining a promise from the Defense Ministry that former
child soldiers would not be conscripted.
There were reports that children often were used as bargaining
chips to settle financial and other disputes in rural areas (see
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). According to Domingos do Rosario, a
sociologist with the Cultural Patrimony Department, children sometimes
were used as labor to settle outstanding economic accounts in rural
areas.
There are numerous reports that children are incarcerated with
adults in prisons throughout the country (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution states that ``disabled
citizens shall enjoy fully the rights'' that it provides for; however,
the Government provided few resources to implement this provision.
Representatives of disabled groups and wounded veterans frequently
protested that societal discrimination continues against the disabled.
Victims of landmine detonations are among the most visible disabled
citizens. About 1.9 percent of citizens are physically or mentally
disabled.
Disabled women protested in 1998 that the Government only provided
four schools nationwide for hearing and vision impaired persons and for
the physically and mentally disabled. There are few job opportunities
for disabled persons in the formal sector, although the 1997 census
reported that 55 percent of disabled persons worked or held a job.
Social workers found that some parents of disabled children in
several districts, including the populous towns of Gorongosa and Dondo,
did not permit their children to leave their homes. Provincial social
action officials continued their educational campaign to reverse
traditional attitudes toward disabled children.
The Government continued to rely on NGO's to assist the disabled.
Founded in 1991, the Association of Mozambican Disabled addresses
social and economic needs of the disabled. Smaller NGO's also have
formed, notably the Association of Handicapped Military and
Paramilitary Mozambicans, which represents disabled demobilized
soldiers, and the Association of Blind and Visually Impaired
Mozambicans. There is a new organization in Pemba for hearing-impaired
persons.
On June 23, the Cabinet issued a resolution that approved the first
national policy on disabled persons, and laid out principles and
strategies aimed at encouraging their active participation in the
country's socio-economic development. The plan is scheduled to be
implemented in 2000 and would address, in part, concerns of the
disabled regarding access to public buildings and the government
infrastructure.
A major concern of the disabled is accessibility to buildings and
transportation. The only provisions that the Government has enacted for
accessibility to buildings and transportation for the disabled were in
the electoral law governing the country's first multiparty elections,
which addressed the needs of disabled voters in the polling booths.
Special access facilities are rare.
Religious Minorities.--Relations among communities of different
faiths generally are amicable, especially at the grassroots level.
However, there has been a longstanding racial division within the
Muslim community, particularly between black and Indian Muslims.
In February the police detained and questioned a Pakistani imam in
connection with a murder (see Sections 1.a and 2.c.). In April a state-
owned newspaper stated in a series of poorly documented articles that
the imam had confessed to the crime. The newspaper's allegations
unleashed an intense debate in Parliament and the media and included
accusations that the press was anti-Muslim, that black Muslims and
Indian Muslims harbored racial prejudices against each other, and that
Indian Muslims were involved in drug trafficking and organized crime.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There was no systematic
persecution or discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity;
however, the FRELIMO Government traditionally has included at all
levels a large number of southerners, mostly from the Shangaan ethnic
group, which has engendered complaints from residents of other parts of
the country. There also were complaints against the Government that it
favors economic development in the southern part of the country over
other areas. To address such complaints, the Government has taken some
steps to correct the imbalance since the 1994 elections by appointing
provincial governors native to their respective provinces. The
Government also includes in senior positions persons originally from
the northern part of the country.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides that all
workers are free to join or refrain from joining a trade union, and
workers enjoy these rights in practice. Labor relations are governed by
the 1991 Labor Law, which protects workers' rights to organize and
engage in union activities, and the 1985 Labor Law which was revised
and promulgated in 1998. Some observers fear that free trade zones
created under the revised 1998 law would refuse to honor existing
rights.
Until 1992 the only trade union federation was the Organization of
Mozambican Workers (OTM), which was affiliated with, and dominated by,
the FRELIMO party. Three unions broke away from the OTM in 1992, and by
1994 had formed their own central union, the Free and Independent Union
of Mozambique (SLIM). In January the Ministry of Labor recognized this
second central union as a legal entity, known as the Confederation of
Free and Independent Unions of Mozambique (CONSILMO). CONSILMO is
permitted to participate in national negotiations on the minimum wage
with the Consultative Labor Commission, a body including
representatives from labor, private employers, and Government. CONSILMO
maintained the SLIM's working relationship with the OTM, and includes
the powerful 28,000-member Sinticim construction trades union, an early
champion of the rights of female workers.
In 1994 the OTM declared itself free of commitments to any
political party, companies, or religious groups, and ruled that members
affiliated with any political party could not hold elected union
offices. Independent unions maintain that the OTM is not independent of
the Government. A new organization, the Committee of Women Workers,
protested the industrial trend of laying off women before men whenever
possible, citing the loss of 120 jobs in Sofala alone during the year.
The Constitution explicitly provides for the right to strike, with
the exception of civil servants, police, military personnel, and other
essential services (which include sanitation, fire fighting, air
traffic control, health care, water, electricity, fuel, post office,
telecommunications, and grave digging). In January unskilled
construction workers struck at the Mozal Aluminum smelter project in
protest of certain allegedly unsafe working conditions, and to protest
their perception of a wage disparity with marginally more skilled
workers brought in from South Africa. The dispute lasted a few days and
was resolved after a pledge by Mozal managers to heighten job site
occupational safety.
Provisions of the 1991 Labor Law forbid retribution against
strikers, the hiring of substitute workers, and lockouts by employers.
Specific labor disputes generally are arbitrated through special
workers' committees, formally recognized by the Government.
Two members of the workers' committee of a security services
company were suspended from their duties after giving advance
notification of a January 1998 strike action to company management. The
law specifies that strikers must notify police, government, union, and
employers 48 hours in advance of intended strikes. The firm charged the
two with illegally representing employees who were protesting the
company's failure to answer a wage and benefits appeal made in late
1997 and with allegedly assaulting company managers. Their case has not
yet been resolved.
The Constitution and labor legislation give unions the right to
join and participate in international bodies. The OTM is a member of
the Organization of African Trade Union Unity and the Southern African
Trade Union Coordinating Council.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Law
protects the right of workers to organize and engage in collective
bargaining. It expressly prohibits discrimination against organized
labor. In 1991 the Government decreed that it would no longer set all
salary levels. Negotiation of wage increases was left in the hands of
existing unions. The Consultative Commission on Labor met periodically
to negotiate changes in the minimum wage. In 1998 for the first time
since independence, the country's banks, which are entirely privatized,
signed a collective bargaining agreement, regulating the labor
relationship between bank management and staff.
The law provides for the creation of export processing zones
(EPZ's); however, no firms began production in an EPZ during the year.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor is prohibited by law; however, while there were no reports of
such practices in the formal economy, there were reports that persons
were trafficked into neighboring countries (see Section 6.f.). The law
does not prohibit forced and bonded labor by children specifically, and
such practices occur, especially within an extended family. Children in
rural areas sometimes are used as labor to settle economic accounts,
with their families delegating their children to work limited periods
of time (see Sections 5, 6.d., and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Ministry of Labor regulates child labor, although
there are no specific child labor statutes. In rural areas, children
sometimes work alongside their parents or independently in seasonal
harvests on commercial plantations. Employers normally do not pay
children wages for such work, but compensate them with gifts such as
school supplies and books.
In the wage economy, the minimum working age is 18 years. The
recently revised Labor Law sets the minimum age at 15. Children between
the ages of 15 and 18 may work with the permission of their parents and
the Ministry of Education. Children younger than the age of 15 are not
permitted to work. The minimum wage laws apply and the maximum workweek
for children is 38 hours.
Because of high adult unemployment in the formal sector, estimated
at around 50 percent, few children are employed in regular wage
positions; however, children, including those under age 15, commonly
work on family farms or in the urban informal sector, where they
perform such tasks as ``guarding'' cars, collecting scrap metal, or
selling trinkets and food in the streets. The informal labor sector is
unregulated. Children also are employed in domestic positions, and in a
September newspaper survey, labor union representatives noted the
growing presence of children in construction jobs.
Primary education is not compulsory, and less than 50 percent of
school-age children attend classes. Children not in school frequently
are employed in the agricultural and casual labor sectors.
The law does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by
children, and such practices are known to occur in rural areas (see
Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The industrial minimum wage of
approximately $35 (450,000 meticais) per month, is set by ministerial
decree, although the level is recommended through an administrative
process. There is also an agricultural minimum wage of about $24
(305,000 meticais), which is set by ministerial decree after informal
consultation with agricultural unions. Neither minimum wage is
considered sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for an
average worker and family, and many workers must turn to a second job,
if available; maintain their own gardens; or depend on the income of
other family members to survive. The OTM calculates that the real
minimum wage fell 33 percent in the past decade.
The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing the minimum wage
rates in the private sector, and the Ministry of Finance in the public
sector. Violations of minimum wage rates usually are investigated only
after workers register a complaint. It is customary for workers to
receive benefits such as transportation and food in addition to wages.
There is an obligation for workers or employers to participate in a
social security scheme, although they voluntarily may create and
contribute to private accounts or plans with the National Institute of
Social Security, to cover retirement, unemployment compensation, and
emergency benefits. Worker complaints grew of employers deducting
socialsecurity contributions from wages but failing to pay them into
accounts.
The standard legal workweek is 44 hours, with a weekly 24-hour rest
period.
In the small formal sector, the Government has enacted health and
environmental laws to protect workers. However, the Ministry of Labor
enforces these laws ineffectively, and the Government only occasionally
has closed firms for noncompliance. The Labor Ministry reported 730
industrial accidents during the year, with 36 deaths. Most of these
accidents were blamed on unsafe practices or the lack of safety
equipment. During the parliamentary debate in 1998 on revision of the
Labor Law, delegates noted that there continued to be significant
violations of labor legislation in many companies and services. Workers
have the right to remove themselves from work situations that endanger
their health or safety without jeopardy to their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no specific laws that
prohibit trafficking in persons, although trafficking can be addressed
under labor, immigration, and child welfare laws; however, there were
credible reports that there is some trafficking in persons, primarily
women and children, to South Africa and Swaziland. Both countries
apparently offer economic opportunities that attract poor women and
children, who sometimes are victimized by traffickers. On occasion, the
media reported that citizens worked in foreign countries for low wages
or in poor conditions. In August there were several press reports about
the discovery of a group of Mozambican women held against their will in
a brothel in South Africa. The women had been recruited in Mozambique
to work as domestic servants, and after they arrived in South Africa
they were forced to work as prostitutes. There have been other credible
reports that citizens were lured into South Africa by Nigerian and
other organized crime syndicates based in South Africa by promises of
jobs and decent wages, and then held as near-slaves on farms and other
enterprises.
There were reports that children in rural areas often were used as
bargaining chips to settle financial and other disputes in rural areas
(see Sections 5 and 6.c.). Families delegate their children to work
limited periods of time to settle economic debts.
______
NAMIBIA
Namibia is a multiparty, multiracial democracy. President Sam
Nujoma, leader of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO),
was reelected in November 30-December 1 general elections, which
international and domestic observers agreed were free, but included
some instances of government harassment of the opposition and unequal
access to media coverage and campaign financing. Although the
Constitution formerly limited the President to two terms in office, in
November 1998, the National Assembly passed a bill to amend the
Constitution to permit President Nujoma to run for a third term.
President Nujoma won 77 percent of the vote and SWAPO won three-
quarters of the seats in the National Assembly. In the wake of an
August attack by the Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA), President Nujoma
invoked Article 26 of the Constitution to declare a state of emergency,
which for more than 3 weeks suspended certain fundamental
constitutional freedoms. The judiciary is independent.
The police, including the paramilitary Special Field Force,
supervised by the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Namibian Defense
Force (NDF), supervised by the Ministry of Defense, share
responsibility for internal security. Approximately 2,000 NDF soldiers
were sent to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC) in 1998 and
remained there throughout the year. The civilian authorities generally
maintain effective control over the security forces; however, members
of the police force committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
Namibia's modern market sector produces most of its wealth, while a
traditional subsistence agricultural sector (mainly in the north)
supports most of its labor force. The principal exports are diamonds
and other minerals, cattle, and fish. Mining, ranching, and fishing--
the mainstays of the market sector--still are controlled largely by
white citizens and foreign interests. However, government policy has
been to ``Namibianize'' the fishing sector, so that an increasing
number of indigenous entrepreneurs are able to participate, and to
provide opportunities for black citizens in the potentially lucrative
and labor-intensive tourism industry. Per capita annual gross domestic
product is $1,860. However, there remains a wide disparity between
income levels of black citizens and white citizens. White citizens have
an average per capita income of $14,000 a year, while many of the
poorest black citizens earn just $165 a year. Unemployment was nearly
40 percent and affected primarily the black majority.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were serious problems in several areas.
Members of the security forces committed several extrajudicial
killings. The Government did not account for the whereabouts of some
persons detained by the security forces. Security forces beat suspects
during arrest and while in custody during operations in the Caprivi
region. Security forces beat citizens and Angolan refugees during
security operations in both Kavango and Caprivi that were the result of
fighting between Angola government troops and National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) forces along the border with
Angola. There were other reports of police mistreatment of suspects in
detention. Prison conditions remain harsh, but the Government took some
steps to improve conditions. The Government arbitrarily arrested and
detained citizens under the state of emergency. Lengthy pretrial
detention is a problem. A large court backlog continues to lead to
lengthy delays of trials.
In the wake of the August attack by the CLA, President Nujoma
declared a state of emergency pursuant to Article 26 of the
Constitution, and granted security forces wide-ranging powers. Many of
the fundamental freedoms contained in the Constitution were suspended,
including freedom from detention without trial, search and seizure
without a warrant, and confiscation of property. The decree also
limited freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, and other political
rights. In practice, these measures generally were confined to the
Caprivi region, although several suspects were detained outside the
region. The Government announced the termination of the state of
emergency at midnight on August 25.
The Government still refuses to provide a full accounting of
missing detainees who were in SWAPO camps before independence. In 1997
the Government rejected a request by the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission to hold hearings in Namibia. High-level
government officials continued to use abusive language in responding to
criticism of ruling party and government policies. The Prime Minister
singled out for criticism a human rights lawyer who provided to the
media photographic evidence that security forces seriously beat his
client. The President and other high-level government and ruling party
officials made a number of verbal attacks on the press, nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's), and opposition parties. There continued to be
pressure on journalists who worked for government-owned media outlets
not to report critically on the Government. There continued to be a ban
on all public demonstrations that did not have prior police approval.
The authorities continued to deport military-age Angolan illegal
immigrants and Angolan refugees without judicial review, as required by
the law. This led the National Society for Human Rights (NSHR) to
charge the police with assisting the Angolan Government in its
conscription efforts. More than 1,000 refugees, of the 2,500 persons
who fled heavy-handed security force operations in the Caprivi region
in 1998, remained in Dukwe refugee camp in Botswana. Attempts by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to repatriate
some of the refugees were suspended after the CLA attack on August 2.
The refugees told the UNHCR that they feared ongoing security
operations and possible retribution by security forces should they
return to Caprivi.
Although violence against women and children, including rape and
child abuse, continued to be serious problems, the President, members
of his Cabinet, and parliamentarians have spoken out forcefully on
these problems, which received significant attention at all levels of
government. Courts are handing down much more severe sentences to
convicted rapists and child abusers; however, problems remain with
court testimony by vulnerable witnesses. Women married under customary
law continued to experience serious legal and cultural discrimination.
In a June 1998 speech to traditional chiefs, President Nujoma called on
the leaders to protect the rights of women in rural areas. However,
relatively little has been done to elevate women to high-level
positions in government and the ruling party, despite promises by the
President to nominate more women. Racial and ethnic discrimination and
glaring disparities in education, health, employment, and working
conditions continued, despite sustained efforts by the Government to
reduce them. Discrimination against indigenous persons persists,
especially in remote rural areas where indigenous persons often are
unaware of their rights.
Members of the Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) committed serious
abuses, including several extrajudicial killings. UNITA rebels from
Angola reportedly were responsible for a number of civilian deaths in
the country. Elements of the Armed Forces of Angola (FAA) beat Namibian
citizens and Angolan refugees, and committed at least one rape.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Members of the
security forces committed several extrajudicial killings. In November a
police officer in Okahandja beat to death while in custody a student
arrested for disorderly conduct. The police officer responsible was
placed on administrative leave and the criminal case against him was
pending at year's end.
During security operations undertaken in response to a CLA attack
in August, government forces killed eight CLA rebels, and members of
the security forces--particularly the paramilitary police Special Field
Force (SFF)--shot civilians and beat suspects during arrest and while
in custody. Several civilians were killed or injured during fighting in
neighborhoods of the Caprivi regional capital of Katima Mulilo and in
subsequent security operations throughout the region. On August 8,
security forces shot and killed Gilbert Tubaze Simasiku, a mentally-
impaired man who was walking along a street in Katima Mulilo and
apparently failed to heed a security officer's request to stop.
Simasiku died on August 9. On August 16, security forces shot and
killed Dr. Lucas Ilonga on the compound of the Katima Mulilo state
hospital. Ilonga apparently was running to respond to an emergency
medical case and was mistaken for a CLA rebel by police. Despite
promises by high-level officials, the Government took no action--either
to enforce internal disciplinary measures or to press criminal
charges--against perpetrators in the security forces by year's end.
Several weeks before the August CLA attack, an officer of the SFF
shot and killed a civilian named James Chilunda in the Caprivi village
of Singalamwe on July 18, after an altercation between two SFF officers
and villagers. The SFF officer was arrested on murder charges and is
out on bail awaiting trial.
In September two soldiers deployed with the NDF contingent in the
DROC were convicted and sentenced by a Namibian court martial for
killing two Congolese civilians in separate incidents in late 1998 and
early during the year.
In 1997 the Government admitted that since 1994 security forces
along the northern border with Angola had killed seven civilians. One
NDF officer was charged with murder and another was found guilty of
culpable homicide; however, investigations into the other killings
reportedly were dropped.
On August 2, CLA rebels attacked military, police, and other
government installations around Katima Mulilo. The attack resulted in
the deaths of three soldiers, three police officers, and several
civilians. Security forces responded by killing or capturing many of
the rebels.
UNITA rebels from Angola reportedly were responsible for a number
of civilian deaths in the country.
b. Disappearance.--During the Caprivi state of emergency, security
forces detained hundreds of persons without giving public notice for 2
weeks, but did publish a list of detainees 1 day after the 2-week
constitutional deadline. Immediately before publishing its list of
detainees, the Government deported 99 noncitizens to their countries of
origin and released from detention 105 citizens. Those 204 persons were
not enumerated on the final list. The NSHR charged that security forces
failed to account for all those who were detained, and cited four
specific individuals who were not accounted for: Louis Ndilwa Mbanga,
who was detained on August 4; Kester Silemu Kabunga and Martin Sabo
Chainda, who were detained on August 23; and Fidelis Sinvula, who was
detained on August 25 (also see Section 1.d.).
Human rights organizations, political parties, and the public
continued to call for a full accounting of unexplained disappearances
of persons detained by SWAPO prior to independence. In 1996 President
Nujoma released the long-promised, official SWAPO memorial book, known
as the Heroes Book, which lists the names of nearly 8,000 persons who
died during the liberation struggle. Local human rights organizations
harshly criticized the book, characterizing it as an unconvincing
cover-up, and declared that the listing was fraught with inaccuracies
and omissions regarding those who died or disappeared in SWAPO
detention camps.
In 1997 the Government formally rejected a request by the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission to hold hearings in Namibia
on disappearances of persons that occurred on both sides during the
liberation struggle.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution provides that ``no persons shall be
subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment''; however, in practice, prisoners sometimes were beaten or
otherwise mistreated by police, especially by members of the SFF. In
November a police officer in Okahandja beat to death while in custody a
student arrested for disorderly conduct (see Section 1.a.). In October
1998, security forces moved into the Caprivi region to break up an
armed secessionist movement. There were reports that the SFF beat and
detained civilians and looted property, and that the regular police
shot and wounded civilians fleeing arrest. Caprivian refugees in
Botswana claimed that security forces engaged in extrajudicial killings
and rape. In December during security operations in Kavango and Caprivi
due to an outbreak of fighting between Angolan government troops and
UNITA in the Kavango region on the border with Angola, Namibian
security forces beat and otherwise abused citizens and Angolan
refugees.
Security operations during the year in the Caprivi region included
widespread abuse of civilians and detainees. Beatings with rubber
whips, called sjamboks, and with rifle butts were inflicted during some
arrests and while some detainees were incarcerated. Former
parliamentarian Geoffrey Mwilima was arrested on August 4 on suspicion
of supporting the CLA. During his arrest, security forces beat him
severely with rifle butts and sjamboks, resulting in a broken jaw and
extensive whip lacerations on his back. A diabetic, Mwilima also
initially was denied medical care and food. The Legal Assistance Center
(LAC) is to represent Mwilima and others in a suit against the
Government. Human rights groups reported other cases as well. Security
forces arrested NSHR activists Gabriel Mwilima and Joseph Muchali on
August 2 and 6, respectively. Mwilima reportedly was beaten severely
during his arrest. On August 19, Chrispin Sinfua was arrested on
suspicion of supporting the CLA. According to press accounts, members
of the security forces tied Sinfua's hands and feet and whipped him
with sjamboks. Security forces apparently determined that Sinfua had no
connection to the rebel attack and released him on August 23. Sinfua
plans to bring a civil suit against the Government. As detainees were
brought to court for bail hearings in late September, many exhibited
evidence of extensive injuries inflicted by police during their
detention, including detainees Oscar Lupalezwi, Stephan Ntelamo, and
Allen Sameja. All three identified their abusers as police sergeant
Patrick Liswani and two constables named ``Haipa'' and ``Oupa.''
Neither the executive or judicial branches of government had taken
action against the police officers by year's end.
During an August fact-finding mission to the region, Defense
Minister Erkki Nghimtina admitted that the security forces had
committed abuses and promised that they would not continue. On August
17, after criticism from human rights groups, the Government announced
that it had granted the Namibian chapter of the Red Cross access to the
detainees. The Red Cross released its findings concerning detainee
welfare only to the Government. A Defense Ministry spokesman confirmed
that several incidents were being investigated internally and stated
that if abuse was found to have been committed, internal military
disciplinary action would be taken. A police spokesperson separately
confirmed that the Police Complaints and Discipline Unit had initiated
investigations into abuse of detainees, although no further action was
taken against those responsible by year's end.
In response to a case brought by a human rights NGO, the Supreme
Court found in July that the use of leg irons at any time was
unconstitutional and ordered security forces to discontinue their use.
In several instances, supporters of the ruling party broke up
opposition rallies, which at times led to injuries (see Section 3). For
example, on November 25, SWAPO supporters in the town of Swakopmund
threw rocks at a COD meeting site, injuring several persons. In some
instances, police took no action to prevent the attacks or restore
order, while in other cases, such as in Swakopmund, police officers
intervened in attempts to restore order. SWAPO officials were unable or
unwilling to restrain such attacks.
In December during fighting between Angolan government troops and
UNITA in the Kavango and Caprivi regions along the border with Angola,
elements of the FAA beat Namibian citizens and Angolan refugees, and
abused women. In December Namibian police discovered FAA soldiers
raping an Angolan refugee woman near Rundu. No action was taken against
the officers responsible.
Prison conditions are harsh, although the Government focused
greater attention on rehabilitation programs and vocational training
for inmates. Human rights organizations continued tocomplain about
prison overcrowding. In 1995 the Government created a Ministry of
Prisons and Correctional Services, charged with administering the
country's prisons and jails. The Government also made efforts to
separate youthful offenders from adult criminals, although in many
rural areas juveniles continued to be held with adults. There are
several pilot programs that provide alternatives to incarceration for
juvenile offenders.
The Government continued to grant NGO's regular access to prisons
and prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution forbids
arbitrary arrest or detention except in situations of national
emergency, and the Government generally respected these provisions in
practice. According to the Constitution, persons who are arrested must
be informed of the reason for their arrest and must be brought before a
magistrate within 48 hours of their detention. Those accused are
entitled to defense by legal counsel of their choice, and those who
cannot afford a lawyer are entitled to state-provided counsel. However,
in practice many accused persons in remote and rural areas are not
represented by counsel, primarily due to resource constraints. A trial
must take place within ``a reasonable time,'' or the accused must be
released. Human rights organizations have criticized the length of time
that pretrial detainees were held, which have stretched up to 1 year in
some cases. Under a state of emergency, the Constitution permits
detention without trial, although the names of detainees must be
published in the government gazette within 14 days, and their cases
must be reviewed within 1 month by an advisory board appointed by the
President.
In the wake of the August 2 CLA attack in Katima Mulilo, security
forces detained hundreds of persons suspected of involvement with the
CLA, or thought to be supportive of Caprivi independence. Security
forces detained some persons merely for questioning. At an August 31
press conference, the NSHR released a detailed list with the name,
ethnic group, and date of detention of each of the 278 detainees, but
expressed concern that its list was incomplete. Detainees were
overwhelmingly from the Mafwe ethnic group of CLA leader Mishake
Muyongo. While most detentions under the state of emergency occurred in
the Caprivi region, on August 7-8, Albert Sibeya and Martin Sichimwa
Mutumba were arrested in Ongwediva in north-central Namibia. The NSHR
protested the use of emergency measures to detain suspects outside of
the Caprivi region, and a lawyer for the two detainees announced that
he would bring a constitutional case to have the arrests thrown out.
While detainees theoretically are allowed access to legal counsel even
under emergency rules, the Government initially denied Caprivi
detainees this right. This right was limited further in practice
because, for the first 2 weeks of detention, the Government is not
obliged to reveal where detainees are being held. On August 17, the day
after the constitutionally prescribed deadline, a list of 103 detainees
was published in the government gazette. The Government also declared
that 99 noncitizen state of emergency detainees had been deported to
their countries of origin. Just prior to publishing its list, the
Government released a large number of detainees. The names of those
detainees, some held as long as 2 weeks, were not published.
The NSHR charged that NAMPOL was assisting Angolan authorities in
rounding up and extrajudicially deporting military-age Angolans in
northern border towns. There were also reports that Zambians in the
Caprivi region were suffering extrajudicial deportation (see Section
1.b.).
Some traditional leaders reportedly continued to detain and
imprison persons accused of minor offenses without recourse to police
or judicial review. In response the Government instructed traditional
leaders on the legal limits of their authority.
The Government generally does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice.
The formal court system has three levels: 30 magistrates' courts,
the High Court, and the Supreme Court. The latter also serves as the
court of appeals and as a constitutional review court.
Most rural citizens first encounter the legal system through the
traditional courts, which deal with minor criminal offenses such as
petty theft and infractions of local customs among members of the same
ethnic group. The Traditional Authorities Act delineates which offenses
may be dealt with under the traditional system.
The constitutional right to a fair trial with a presumption of
innocence until proven guilty generally is afforded by the judiciary.
However, this right is somewhat limited in practice by long delays in
hearing cases in the regular courts and the uneven application of
constitutional protections in the traditional system.
The lack of qualified magistrates, other court officials, and
private attorneys has resulted in a serious backlog of criminal cases,
which often translated into delays of up to a year or more between
arrest and trial, contravening constitutional provisions for the right
to a speedy trial. Many of those awaiting trial are treated as
convicted criminals.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides all citizens with the right
to privacy and requires arresting officers to secure a judicial warrant
before conducting a search, except in situations of national emergency.
Apart from searches conducted under the state of emergency in the
Caprivi region, government authorities generally respected these rights
in practice, and violations were subject to legal action.
Under the Namibian Central Intelligence Service (NCIS) Bill passed
by the National Assembly in 1997, the NCIS is authorized to conduct
wiretaps, intercept mail, and engage in other covert activities, both
inside and outside the country, to protect national security. However,
wiretaps and covert surveillance require the consent of a judge. There
were reports in 1998 that the NCIS requested footage from the Namibian
Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) of a demonstration in the northern town
of Katima Mulilo. It was reported that the intelligence service was
seeking to identify demonstrators from the tapes. The NBC denied that
the government-run station provided videotapes to the intelligence
service.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, subject to ``reasonable
restrictions'' in situations such as a state of emergency, and the
Government generally respected these rights; however, there continued
to be instances of abusive responses by the nation's political leaders
to editorial criticism and increased reports of government pressure on
reporters who worked for the government-owned media.
Reporters for independent newspapers continue to criticize the
Government openly and do not engage in self-censorship. During the
year, high-level government officials publicly attacked journalists,
human rights groups, and opposition politicians in response to
perceived criticism of the Government or ruling party. The NSHR issued
a report citing 20 such incidents. While such verbal attacks may have
been calculated to quiet criticism, they do not appear to have had a
major impact on the aggressive style of the independent media or the
work of human rights groups or opposition political parties. NGO's
involved in media issues maintained that reporters working for the
government-owned newspaper were subjected to indirect and direct
pressure not to report on certain controversial topics. In August the
Government forbade the newspaper The Namibian to cover the situation in
DROC. This blackout was lifted after several days in response to public
criticism. The government-run New Era newspaper gave some coverage to
opposition parties and views critical of the government, although it
sometimes avoided controversial issues. A libel suit brought by a
senior government official against the New Era in September 1998 was
being watched closely by human rights groups. During the Caprivi state
of emergency, the NDF and police gave daily press briefings, but were
criticized for providing some incorrect information.
The government-owned NBC operates most radio and television
services. The NBC provided some coverage to opposition points of view.
Media observers believe that NBC reporters exercise considerable self-
censorship on certain controversial issues, such as human rights abuses
in Caprivi, allegations of corruption, the question of missing SWAPO
detainees, and the amendment of the Constitution to allow President
Nujoma to run for a third term. Despite these complaints, the NBC gave
some coverage to viewpoints critical of government policies.
There are five private radio stations, one private television
station in the town of Rehoboth, and a private cable and satellite
television service that broadcasts the Cable News Network, the British
Broadcasting Corporation, and a range of South African and
international news and entertainmentprograms. The ruling SWAPO party
owns 51 percent of this cable service. There are no restrictions on the
private ownership of satellite dishes, and the use of satellite dishes
and cable television is growing. There are no restrictions on Internet
access or use. There are growing numbers of Namibian web pages, and one
of the independent newspapers has a popular web site.
In October 1997, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting
(MOIB) issued new regulations that require foreign journalists who seek
to visit the country to provide 1 month's advance notice to the MOIB,
stating the purpose of their proposed visit. Journalists are required
to schedule appointments with government officials through the MOIB and
request permission to visit areas under the control of the Ministry of
Environment and Tourism. Additionally, journalists must obtain a
temporary work permit from the Ministry of Home Affairs. The MOIB
reaffirmed the regulations in May 1998, but there have been no reports
of complaints from journalists. Several major conferences in the
country attracted large numbers of international journalists. In
November 1998, two foreign journalists were arrested and held overnight
for entering the country to cover the secession story without a work
permit. The Ministry of Home Affairs also temporarily seized their
videotapes. In December security forces near Rundu seized the camera of
a foreign national citing security concerns due to fighting in Angola.
The Government respects academic freedom. During the year, there
were numerous seminars held at universities and other venues in
Windhoek on controversial issues. There were no reports of interference
with, or harassment of, these activities.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, except in situations of national
emergency; while in the past the Government generally has respected
this right in practice, in 1997 the President announced a ban on all
public demonstrations that did not have prior police approval. The ban
was enforced selectively in late July 1997 when police in the northern
town of Okanguati broke up private meetings between a public interest
law firm and its clients, Himba tribesmen, who were opposed to the
construction of the Epupa Dam, which the Government supports (see
Section 5). In August 1997, the High Court struck down the 1989 law
used by the President to justify the ban. Organizers of public meetings
still are required to obtain prior police approval; however, in
practice many public gatherings took place without such approval and
without interference. Under the Caprivi state of emergency, the
Government had the authority to restrict public gatherings, although
there were no cases in which the police denied a meeting request.
Various organizations, including political parties, civic and religious
groups, women's organizations, students, the unemployed, and former
combatants held large meetings and public gatherings without Government
interference.
In several instances, supporters of the ruling party broke up
opposition rallies (see Section 3). In some instances, police took no
action to prevent the attacks or restore order, while in other cases,
such as in Swakopmund, police officers intervened in attempts to
restore order. SWAPO officials were unable or unwilling to restrain
such attacks.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, even in times
of national emergency, and the Government generally respected this
right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, except in situations of national emergency, and in the past the
Government has respected them in practice; however, the forced return
in May 1998 of a recognized refugee and human rights activist, Dr.
Manuel Neto, to Angola, seriously damaged the Government's record on
refugee issues. According to local human rights groups, the Ministry of
Home Affairs violated a court decision that barred Neto's deportation.
The refoulement resulted in strong criticism of the Government by
international human rights groups. The authorities continued to deport
military-age Angolan illegal immigrants without judicial review, as
required by the law. The NSHR charged the police with assisting Angolan
authorities in rounding up illegal immigrants who had come to Namibia
to avoid being conscripted into the Angolan army. There also were
reports of extrajudicial deportations from the Caprivi region of
illegal Zambian and Angolan immigrants following the secessionistcrisis
in that region. In December authorities forcibly returned to Angola
fifty Angolan refugees who were fleeing the fighting in southern
Angola; there was no judicial review of this action.
The Government cooperates with the UNHCR on the granting of refugee
status to asylum seekers. A law containing provisions for dealing with
refugees in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol was passed in 1998 and signed
into law by the President in March. The Government's eligibility
committee continued to meet on a regular basis to consider asylum
requests. The Government also assisted in the voluntary return of
Angolan asylum seekers in late 1997. Illegal immigrants continued to be
detained. There was a report in June 1998 that children were imprisoned
temporarily during a raid on homes of illegal immigrants.
Namibia is a first asylum country and continues to permit asylum
seekers to enter the country. According to the UNHCR, there are more
than 8,000 refugees and asylum seekers at the Osire camp, 90 percent of
whom are from Angola. The rest are from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and other African countries.
Government officials interview asylum seekers. Those granted refugee
status generally are not permitted to work, live outside the Osire
refugee camp, or attend schools, including the University of Namibia.
Schools have been established at the Osire refugee camp. Residents of
the camp are not supposed to leave the unfenced facility, but many
travel to Windhoek and other towns on personal business and to sell
handicrafts. More than 3000 Angolan refugees entered the country in the
latter part of the year, and initially took refuge in and around a
police station in the town of Kahenge. Attempts to bus these refugees
to the Osire camp were hampered initially due to resource constraints.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens exercised their right to change their government by
electing a President and National Assembly for the second time since
independence during the November 30-December 1 general election, which
international and domestic observers agreed was generally free and
well-administered despite some irregularities. Observers noted
instances of harassment of opposition members during the campaign, and
unequal access to media coverage and campaign financing were problems.
Nevertheless, voter turnout was over 60 percent and the election
proceeded peacefully. Sam Nujoma, leader of the ruling party SWAPO, was
reelected; although the Constitution formerly limited the President to
two terms in office, in November 1998, the National Assembly passed a
bill to amend the Constitution to permit President Nujoma to run for a
third term. President Nujoma won 77 percent of the vote and SWAPO won
55 of 72 elected National Assembly seats. Four opposition parties won a
total of 17 seats in the National Assembly, including the Congress of
Democrats (COD) party, which won the largest number of opposition
votes, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), the United Democratic
Front, and the Monitor Action Group.
The Constitution establishes a bicameral Parliament and provides
for general elections every 5 years and regional elections every 6
years.
The Directorate of Elections makes special efforts to keep voters
informed by printing posters and distributing useful and informative
voter guides with lists of government and opposition candidates. In the
period prior to the election, all parties were afforded broadcast
advertising time on the government-run national television and radio
stations to promote their platforms. Debates between candidates also
were broadcast on television and radio. Election observers noted that
the allocation of free broadcast time, while in accordance with
parliamentary rules, provided substantially more time for SWAPO. The
parliamentary rules governing public campaign financing provided a
similar advantage for SWAPO.
Opposition parties generally are able to undertake political
activity such as holding party conferences and public rallies, and
advertising; however, in several instances, supporters of the ruling
party broke up opposition rallies. For example, on November 25, SWAPO
supporters in the town of Swakopmund threw rocks at a COD meeting site,
injuring several persons. COD recruiters complained that they were
chased away from schools by members of the SWAPO youth wing. In some
instances, police took no action to prevent the attacks or restore
order, while in other cases, such as in Swakopmund, police officers
intervened in attempts to restore order. SWAPO officials were unable or
unwilling to restrain such attacks.
The Government took further steps in July 1998 to ensure free and
fair elections by creating an independent electoral commission and
naming a broad-based group of respectedindividuals to the commission.
The Government also named a well-respected former journalist as the new
Director of Elections.
Leaders of the opposition have criticized the ruling party for its
decision to amend the Constitution to permit the President to seek a
third term. Ambassador Ben Ulenga, the High Commissioner to Great
Britain and also a high-level ruling party official, resigned in 1998
from his diplomatic post after he was unsuccessful in getting the
ruling party to debate the third term issue. With his resignation, he
lost his pension and other work-related benefits. In March Ulenga
formed the COD opposition party, and in the general election the COD
won approximately 10 percent of the vote and seven seats in the
National Assembly. While opposition parties were allowed to hold
meetings and campaign freely, the COD periodically was attacked in
public statements by both government and SWAPO officials who accused
members of the COD of being ``traitors,'' ``hooligans,'' and ``puppets
of a racist plot by white citizens''. At a SWAPO public rally on May 6,
Minister of Home Affairs Jerry Ekandjo referred to a ``war'' against
the COD. In April the COD complained publicly that Namibian Central
Intelligence Service (NICS) officials were following party leaders and
discouraging persons from attending COD rallies. Shortly after the
COD's March inaugural meeting, Director General of the Namibia Central
Intelligence Service, Peter Tsheehama, was quoted as admitting that
intelligence agents were following the party closely. Tsheehama
subsequently denied that he said this, although the newspaper stood by
the quote.
Prior to the general election, the ruling SWAPO party held 53 of
the 72 elected National Assembly seats, and opposition parties held 19
seats. When former DTA chief (and leader of the Caprivi secessionist
movement) Mishake Muyongo fled to Botswana in 1998, he forfeited his
seat under parliamentary rules. In addition, another DTA politician
from Caprivi resigned his seat. Both seats were filled by the DTA with
other party members, in accordance with the Constitution.
Members of the National Assembly are elected on a party list system
on a proportional basis.
In 1997 the ruling SWAPO party voted to change the voting procedure
under the Local Authorities Act to require that local elections be held
on a party list instead of a ward system. While it was believed that
this change would favor the ruling SWAPO party, opposition parties
competed fully in local elections held in February 1998, capturing 19
of 45 municipalities. There also were major gains for women, as they
won 131 seats, roughly 40 percent of all local council elected
positions. In February 1998, a national conference in Windhoek brought
together locally elected female officials from all over the country.
Women increasingly are involved in the political process; however,
women remain seriously underrepresented in government and politics
despite promises by SWAPO to increase the number of women on the
party's appointed central committee. There are 2 female ministers and 3
female deputy ministers out of a total of 42 ministerial and deputy
ministerial positions. In addition, two women hold cabinet-level
positions, as Director of the Department of Women Affairs in the Office
of the President and Director of the National Planning Commission.
Another woman serves as Ombudswoman. Women hold 15 of 98 parliamentary
seats in the National Assembly. In 1996 female legislators formed a
Women's Caucus in Parliament to review legislation for gender
sensitivity.
Historic economic and educational disadvantages have served to
limit the participation of the indigenous San ethnic group in politics,
although virtually all of the country's other ethnic minorities are
represented in Parliament and in senior positions in the Cabinet.
Members of smaller ethnic groups hold the offices of Prime Minister,
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Speaker of the
National Assembly.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
During the year, high-level government officials continued to use
abusive language in responding to criticisms of the ruling party and
government policies by nongovernmental organizations. Following the
publication in newspapers of graphic photos that showed abuse of
Caprivi detainees, Prime Minister Hage Geingob issued a public
statement criticizing lawyers from the Legal Assistance Center (LAC), a
well-respected indigenous NGO with a long record of opposing apartheid
and fighting for the rights of the most underprivileged elements in
society. The LAC also has drawn criticism from government officials for
providing legal counsel to the Himba people, a traditional semi-nomadic
group that opposes construction of the Epupa dam. Government officials
also have attacked verbally the NSHR and the Breakingof Walls of
Silence (BWS) movement, which acts as an advocate for former detainees
imprisoned by SWAPO prior to independence. Some observers believe that
government attacks on BWS head Reverend Ngeno Nakamhela resulted in
Nakamhela's removal from his position as secretary general of the
Council of Churches of Namibia (CCN). Despite abusive remarks by
government officials, no action was taken to suppress NGO's.
The deportation of Angolan human rights activist Dr. Manuel Neto in
May 1998 also came shortly after Dr. Neto had announced the formation
of the Angolan League for Human Rights (LADH), an NGO closely aligned
with the NSHR. The NSHR is a frequent critic of the Government, and in
1997 the Government briefly opposed the granting of consultative status
at the U.N. Economic and Social Council to the NSHR. Nevertheless, the
NGO was granted consultative status.
Despite the verbal attacks on the LAC, local NGO's such as the LAC,
the NSHR, the BWS Movement, and those working with indigenous groups,
continue to criticize government policies freely. In addition, human
rights organizations such as the Media Institute for Southern Africa,
the Center for Applied Social Sciences, and the Human Rights
Documentation Center worked openly on a variety of human rights issues
affecting the press, women, ethnic minorities, and other groups. In
June 1998, the Namibian Nongovernmental Organization Forum (NANGOF)
publicly criticized ``growing sentiments and practices of political
intolerance'' by the nation's political leadership. In the period prior
to the general election, the CCN and the NANGOF organized a domestic
observer effort in cooperation with the directorate of elections.
Representatives of international human rights organizations
traveled to the country and discussed human rights issues with
governmental and nongovernmental representatives on several occasions;
however, in 1998 President Nujoma accused ``foreigners'' of interfering
in Namibia's affairs on several occasions, and in June of that year
threatened to ``deport'' or ``get rid of'' foreign nationals who
``disturb the peace in Namibia.''
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, creed,
gender, or religion, and specifically prohibits ``the practice and
ideology of apartheid.'' During the year there was a significant
improvement in the attention paid to women's issues and the rights of
the disabled.
Women.--Violence against women, including beating and rape, is
widespread. Traditional attitudes regarding the subordination of women
exacerbate problems of sexual and domestic violence. However, there
continued to be an improvement in the attention paid to the problems of
rape and domestic violence. Government ministers joined in public
protests against violence. The President, members of his Cabinet, and
parliamentarians continued to speak out against violence. Longer prison
sentences have been handed down to convicted rapists and abusers,
although a problem remained with respect to vulnerable witnesses in
rape and abuse cases. Police stated that more women came forward to
report cases of rape and domestic violence. After extensive
consultations with NGO's and prominent women, in March the government
introduced a bill in Parliament to combat rape. The Combating of Rape
Bill was debated extensively on the floor of the National Assembly and
then sent to a parliamentary committee, which is to allow private
citizens to comment on aspects of the bill. Observers anticipate
passage of the bill in 2000. A Ministry of Justice official announced
in June 1998 that a special course in gender sensitivity would be
introduced at the newly inaugurated police training center. Centers for
abused women and children in Oshakati, Windhoek, Keetmanshoop, Walvis
Bay, and Rehoboth are staffed with specially trained female police
officers to assist victims of sexual assaults. Safe houses are opening
in Mariental, Swakopmund, and Tsumeb.
In 1996 the President elevated the head of the Department of Women
Affairs to cabinet rank. The passage in that year of the Married
Persons Equality Act also prohibited discriminatory practices against
women married under civil law. Women married in customary (traditional)
marriages continue to face legal and cultural discrimination. In 1998
Oshiwambo chiefs denounced traditional practices that permit family
members to confiscate the property of deceased men from their widows
and children. Efforts are underway to address this problem, and it has
been reduced considerably.
In June 1998, President Nujoma addressed traditional leaders and
made a forceful case for better treatment of women in traditional
communities.
Children.--The Constitution enumerates children's rights, including
those in the area of education and health. In previous years, the
Government devoted 31 percent of the national budget to education and
an additional 15 to 20 percent towards health. However, in practice,
outmoded policies and laws and an untrained work force lead to
inadequate attention to child welfare. Many San children do not attend
school, and it is difficult for the Government to afford basic
protections to children living on remote commercial farms.
Child abuse is a serious and increasingly acknowledged problem. The
authorities vigorously prosecuted cases involving crimes against
children, particularly rape and incest. Courts handed down stiffer
sentences against child rapists, and the Government provided training
for police officials to improve the handling of child sex abuse cases.
Centers for abused women and children are working actively to reduce
the trauma suffered by abused children. The LAC has launched a national
campaign to revise legislation on child maintenance. The Child
Maintenance Bill was sent to the Cabinet for discussion, and the
Cabinet referred the bill back to the Ministry of Justice for further
comment. The bill would enable women to break out of the cycle of
marital dependence and escape domestic violence by requiring divorced
spouses to provide maintenance allowances for their children. However,
the bill is still far from being tabled in Parliament.
The Government expanded programs to separate juvenile offenders
from adults in the criminal justice system. Separate facilities for
child offenders have been established in Windhoek and Mariental.
People With Disabilities.--While discrimination on the basis of
disability is not addressed in the Constitution, the Labor Act of 1992
prohibits discrimination against disabled persons in employment.
However, enforcement in this area is weak.
The Government legally does not require special access to public
buildings for the disabled, and many ministries remain inaccessible to
the disabled. However, some municipal governments have installed ramps
and special curbing for the disabled at street crossings. Disability
issues received greater attention during the year, with wider press
coverage of the human rights problems that confront persons with
disabilities. In December 1998, the Government launched a campaign to
expand economic opportunities for and change attitudes about persons
with disabilities.
Indigenous People.--The Bushmen, also known as the San people, the
country's earliest known inhabitants, historically have been exploited
by other ethnic groups. The Government has taken a number of measures
to end societal discrimination against the San, including seeking their
advice about proposed legislation on communally-held lands and
increasing their access to primary education. However, little has been
done to bring San representatives into the Government, and many San
children do not attend school. Reports from the NSHR and in the press
claim that civilians from the Mafwe and Khoe San ethnic groups were
targeted for harassment during the police campaign against Caprivi
separatists.
By law all indigenous groups participate equally in decisions
affecting their lands, cultures, traditions, and allocations of natural
resources. However, Bushmen and other indigenous citizens have been
unable to exercise fully these rights as a result of minimal access to
education and economic opportunities under colonial rule, and their
relative isolation.
In 1997 authorities arrested 73 members of the Hei//om Bushmen
community for blocking the gates to a national game park. The Bushmen
were protesting in support of the return of their ancestral lands,
which had been seized in order to create the park. The Hei//om
maintained that their previous requests to discuss the case with
government officials had been ignored. The protesters were released on
bail, and the case was dropped later in the year.
In 1997 the Government unilaterally announced plans to expand a
prison in the West Caprivi Game Park on land claimed by the Kxoe ethnic
group. The expansion would deny access by members of the Kxoe ethnic
group to revenues from community-based tourism projects on their lands.
The projects are an important mechanism for empowering the Kxoe to
benefit from tourism activities in their community. However, there is
some question regarding the Kxoe's right to occupy that land. As of
year's end, no final decision on the prison expansion had been
announced.
The Government plans to build a hydroelectric dam on the Kunene
River that would flood ancestral graves and grazing areas of the semi-
nomadic Himba people. The project is highly controversial. The
Government has made repeated efforts to consult with Himba leaders
regarding the project, but many of the Himba chiefs remain adamantly
opposed to the project. Government leaders have criticized harshly
those opposed to the project, terming them ``enemies of development.''
The Traditional Authorities Act, which came into effect in 1995,
defined the role, duties, and powers of traditional leaders. The act
provided that customary law is invalid if it is inconsistent with
provisions of the Constitution. It enumerated the types of crimes that
may be dealt with in traditional courts. The act assigned to
traditional leaders the role of guardians of culture and tradition, and
also mandated that traditional leaders elected to Parliament choose
between their traditional and elected offices before the end of 1996.
This provision has not been enforced, and several traditional leaders
remain in Parliament.
The Government's power to confer recognition or withhold it from
traditional leaders, even in opposition to local preference, is
especially controversial because of the leaders' influence on local
events including local police powers. In some cases, the Government has
withheld recognition from genuine traditional leaders who have sympathy
for the political opposition. This has been especially true in the Khoe
San and Mafwe communities in the Caprivi and in the Herero community.
Mafwe chief Boniface Mamili fled the country with other Caprivi
separatists in late 1998. Despite opposition from the Mafwe community
itself, Minister of Local Government Nicky Iyambo ruled that Mamili had
forfeited his position, and in March the Government installed a rival
chief. In June 1998, a number of traditional leaders boycotted the
inauguration of the Traditional Leaders' Council, claiming that the
installation was illegal, as some of the leaders chosen by the
Government did not represent their communities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution prohibits
discrimination based on race and other factors and specifically
prohibits ``the practice and ideology of apartheid.'' In July 1998,
Parliament passed amendments to the 1991 Racial Discrimination
Prohibition Act that strengthened the act and the penalties for
discriminatory practices. The act codified certain protections for
those who cite racial discrimination in the course of research or in
trying to reduce racial disharmony. Nevertheless, as a result of more
than 70 years of South African administration, societal, racial, and
ethnic discrimination persists. There were several reported cases of
black farm workers suffering discrimination in remote areas at the
hands of white farm owners. In two instances, black farm workers were
not allowed to vote in the general election after white farm owners
barred mobile election teams from their property. Increasing references
in 1998 to white citizens as ``foreigners'' by senior government
officials were contrary to professed government efforts to promote
national reconciliation. Many non-whites continued to complain that the
Government was not moving quickly enough in education, health, housing,
employment, and access to land.
Some citizens complained that the SWAPO-led government provided
more development assistance to the numerically dominant Ovambo ethnic
group of the far north than to other groups or regions of the country.
In 1997 leaders of the ``Baster'' community in Rehoboth reached an
understanding with the Government and dropped their demand that the
Government return the community's ``traditional lands'' that had
reverted to the central Government upon independence.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom
of association, including freedom to form and join trade unions, and
the Government respects this right in practice. The 1992 Labor Act
extended that right to public servants, farm workers, and domestic
employees. However, farm workers and domestic servants working on rural
and remote farms often are ignorant of their rights and as a result,
suffer abuse. Trade unions have no difficulty registering, and there
are no government restrictions on who may serve as a union official.
The Ministry of Labor expressed concern in their annual report released
in September over the growing number of trade unions. The Labor
Commissioner reported in the Ministry's annual report that it would
apply to the Labor Court for deregistration of organizations that have
not complied with the statutory requirements in the Labor Act. The
announcement caused concern among some observers, who worried that the
Government would use the process to target independent unions not
affiliated with the ruling party. Nounion has been dissolved by
government action. In 1997 government employees held vigorously
contested union elections.
Unions are independent of the Government and may form federations.
The two principal trade union organizations are the National Union of
Namibian Workers (NUNW) and the Namibia Federation of Trade Unions
(NFTU). Prior to independence, the NUNW formerly was affiliated with
SWAPO, but claims that its affiliation had ended at independence;
however, the NUNW was invited to nominate candidates for SWAPO's
National Assembly slate, and the NUNW was nominated by SWAPO and
elected to the National Assembly. In 1997 the mine workers union
established the Mine Workers Union Investment Company to supplement
union dues. The NFTU, launched in October 1998 and made up of several
large public service, teachers, mining, and maritime unions, is more
critical of the Government. Less than 20 percent of full-time wage
earners are organized.
Except for workers providing essential services such as jobs
related to public health and safety, and workers in the export
processing zones (EPZ's), workers enjoy the right to strike once
conciliation procedures have been exhausted. There are EPZ's at the
Walvis Bay and Oshikango industrial parks and a number of single-
factory EPZ's outside of these parks. Under the Labor Act, strike
action can be used only in disputes involving specific worker
interests, such as pay raises. Disputes over worker rights, including
dismissals, must be referred to a labor court for arbitration. The
Labor Act protects workers engaged in legal strikes from unfair
dismissal.
Unemployment, which is nearly 40 percent, remained a significant
problem and affected primarily the black majority. Apartheid-era
attitudes among some employers contributed to a divisive, 10-week
strike at a major mining firm in 1997. The atmosphere at the three mine
sites was tense and occasionally violent. Although the confrontation
was defused temporarily by high-level government intervention, the mine
filed for bankruptcy.
Trade unions are free to exchange visits with foreign trade unions
and to affiliate with international trade union organizations. Unions
have exercised this right without interference.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1992 Labor
Act provides employees with the right to bargain individually or
collectively. Collective bargaining is not practiced widely outside the
mining and construction industries. However, as unions become more
active, informal collective bargaining is becoming more common. The
Ministry of Labor cited lack of information and basic negotiation
skills as factors hampering workers' ability to bargain with employers
successfully.
The Labor Act provides a process for employer recognition of trade
unions and protection for members and organizers. The law also empowers
the Labor Court to remedy unfair labor practices and explicitly forbids
unfair dismissals, which may be appealed to the Labor Court. The
Government expects to redraft the 1992 Labor Act to close existing
loopholes that allow employers to exploit workers.
The Labor Act applies to the EPZ in Walvis Bay with certain
exceptions. Some trade unionists continued to challenge the
constitutionality of the agreement reached by government and NUNW
representatives codified in the Export Processing Zone Act of April
1995 because it precludes strikes and lockouts. Under the agreement,
labor-related issues in the EPZ are referred to a special EPZ dispute
settlement panel composed of employers and workers for expeditious
resolution. With only a few businesses operating in the Walvis Bay EPZ,
the effectiveness of this agreement in securing the rights of workers
in the EPZ could not be determined.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced and bonded labor by adults and children; however, during the
year, there were ongoing reports in the media that farm workers
(including some children on commercial farms) and domestic workers
often receive inadequate compensation for their labor and are subject
to strict control by employers. Ministry of Labor inspectors sometimes
encountered problems in gaining access to the country's large,
privately-owned commercial farms in order to investigate possible labor
code violations.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Under the 1992 Labor Act, the minimum age for employment
is 14 years, with higher age requirements for night work and for
certain sectors such as mining and construction. Ministry of Labor
inspectors generally enforce minimum age regulations, but children
below the age of 14 often work on family and commercial farms and in
the informal sector. The 1991 census, which reported on the status of
children, estimated that 13,800 children under 15 years of age were in
the labor force. Of this total, 41 percent were working as unpaid
laborers on family and commercial farms. Boys in rural areas
traditionally start herding livestock at the age of 7. According to
1991 figures, approximately 2 percent of farm workers were children
(mainly from the San ethnic group). There were also reports that
Angolan and Zambian children, who are not protected by the Labor Act,
worked on communal and cattle farms in border areas. The Government
prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, some children
worked without compensation on commercial farms (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no statutory minimum
wage law. In Windhoek's non-white urban area townships, many workers
and their families have difficulty maintaining a minimal standard of
living. White citizens earn significantly more on average than do black
citizens, in large part because whites own most of the country's
productive resources and have had access to education that enables them
to take advantage of the skilled labor shortage.
After independence, the standard legal workweek was reduced from 46
to 45 hours, and requires at least one 24-hour rest period per week. An
employer may require no more than 10 hours per week of overtime. The
law mandates 24 consecutive days of annual leave, at least 30 workdays
of sick leave per year, and 3 months of unpaid maternity leave.
However, in practice these provisions are not observed or enforced
rigorously by the Ministry of Labor. In 1996 two important NGO
studies--one of farm workers and the other of domestic employees--
highlighted the extremely poor conditions that some employees encounter
while working in these occupations.
The Government mandates occupational health and safety standards.
The Labor Act empowers the President to enforce these standards through
inspections and criminal penalties. The law requires employers to
ensure the health, safety, and welfare of their employees. It provides
employees with the right to remove themselves from dangerous work
situations; however, some workers do not have this right in practice.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the law does not specifically
prohibit trafficking in persons, it does prohibit slavery, kidnapping,
forced labor, including forced prostitution, child labor, and alien
smuggling, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked in,
to, or from the country.
______
NIGER
Niger is in transition following its second military coup d'etat in
3 years. On April 9, 2 days after the Supreme Court annulled the
results of the February 7 local elections, President Ibrahim Mainassara
Bare, who came to power by a coup d'etat in January 1996, was
assassinated by members of his presidential guard. Several days after
Bare's assasination, a group of military officers led by Major Daouda
Malam Wanke asserted control over the Government, called the
assassination an ``unfortunate accident,'' and subsequently suspended
the Constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, and created three
bodies to oversee a 9-month transition to a democratically elected
government. Major Wanke's transition plan was supported by members of
11 of the country's opposition parties. The military officers retained
effective control of the country during the interim period through the
National Reconciliation Council (CRN), which was led by Major Wanke.
The CRN appointed Ibrahim Assane Mayaki as Prime Minister, formed a
cabinet with civilian members of political parties, traditional chiefs,
and former government leaders, and scheduled a first round of
presidential elections for October 17, and a presidential runoff and
legislative elections for November 24. The National Consulative Council
consisted of members of political parties, civil society, traditional
chiefs, and former government leaders and addressed fundamental
questions, such as the role of political parties, the Electoral Code,
and a new Constitution. The National Consultative Council was created
to fill the role of the dissolved National Assembly; however, this body
was limited to making recommendations and was not granted legislative
powers. On July 18, citizens voted in a popular referendum and approved
a new Constitution that provides for power sharing between the
President and Prime Minister and granted amnesty to perpetrators of the
1996 and 1999 coups. Tandja Mamadou was elected President in November
with 60 percent of the vote in an election that was considered by
international observers to be generally free and fair. In the November
24 National Assembly elections, the National Movement for the
Development of Society and the Democratic and Socialist Convention
(MNSD/CDS) coalition backing Tandja won 55 of the 83 seats in the
Assembly. Tandja was inaugurated on December 22 and was expected to
appoint a new Prime Minister at the beginning of 2000. The judiciary
remains subject to executive interference.
Security forces consist of the army, the Republican Guard, the
gendarmerie (paramilitary police), and the national police. The police
and gendarmerie traditionally have primary responsibility for internal
security. However, since the 1996 coup, the army has had a much more
prominent role. The April coup was led by a small group of junior army
officers and resulted in early retirement for more senior members of
the armed forces. Some members of the security forces committed serious
human rights abuses.
The economy is based mainly on traditional subsistence farming,
herding, small trading, and informal markets. Less than 15 percent of
the economy is in the modern sector. Uranium is the most important
export. Per capita income is about $200. Drought, deforestation, soil
degradation, low literacy, a depressed uranium market, high import
prices, and burdensome debt further weakened the already troubled
economy. The country is heavily dependent on foreign assistance, most
of which was suspended after the April coup d'etat.
The Government's human rights record remained poor, and the
Government continued to commit serious abuses. The 1996 coup, the
fraudulent 1996 presidential elections, the disputed February local
elections, and the April coup effectively disenfranchised citizens,
preventing them from exercising their right to change their government;
however, citizens finally were able to exercise this right late in the
year in generally free and fair elections. Security forces assassinated
the Head of State, committed other extrajudicial killings, beat and
abused persons, intimidated and injured independent election officials,
and destroyed election results and equipment. Security forces on
occasion intimidated opposition political figures and violated laws
governing searches, treatment of prisoners, and length of detention.
Prison conditions remained poor, and arbitrary arrest and detention
remain problems. The overloaded judicial system and delays in trials
resulted in long periods of pretrial confinement. There were several
prison disturbances, one of which led to the deaths of 29 persons in
detention. The judiciary also is subject to executive influence.
Security forces infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Bare
Government restricted freedom of speech and of the press; however, the
transition government significantly reduced the extent of such abuses.
The Bare Government continued to ban some peaceable meetings and
demonstrations and intimidated the private press; however, the
transition government significantly reduced the extent of such abuses.
The Government restricted freedom of movement. Domestic violence and
societal discrimination against women continued to be serious problems.
Female genital mutilation (FGM) persists, despite government efforts to
combat it. There is societal discrimination against the disabled and
ethnic minorities. The Government restricts some worker rights.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Members of the
presidential guard on April 9 assassinated President Ibrahim Mainassara
Bare. They also killed his driver and one bodyguard. At least five
other persons were injured seriously by stray gunfire. Major Daouda
Malam Wanke, commander of the presidential guard, became President of
the National Reconciliation Council and Head of State. The transition
government insisted that Bare was killed in an ``unfortunate
accident,'' and all coup perpetrators were granted amnesty by the July
Constitution.
At the Niamey central prison on August 29, prison guards forced 74
rebellious inmates into a 324 square foot cell. When the prisoners
objected to the overcrowding, the guards used tear gas, killing 29
prisoners by asphyxiation. The Minister of Justice promised a full
investigation and the reform of the prison and justice systems. The
prison supervisor and one guard were arrested as a result of the
deaths. At year's end, one guard remained in prison and the other was
released provisionally while he awaits judicial proceedings (see
Section 1.c.).
In January a Nigerien-Algerian team of security forces attacked a
camp of alleged Islamic fundamentalists in the northwestern corner of
Niger, killing between 4 and 15 persons and arresting a number of
wealthy merchants suspected of supporting the alleged fundamentalists.
The attack reportedly was an attempt to prevent the fundamentalists
from escaping to Algeria.
The Lake Chad area continues to be patrolled by Nigerian-Nigerien-
Chadian joint military forces while armed Kanouri, Toubou, Peul
(Fulani), and Arab militias fight among themselves. The region is very
insecure, and it is difficult to confirm reports; however, there have
been other allegations of extrajudicial killings by the security forces
and armed militias.
Despite such incidents, the August 1998 peace agreement with the
Toubou ethnic group's Democratic Front for Renewal (FDR) generally has
been respected.
In February a mass grave containing 149 bodies alleged to be those
of missing Toubou former rebels was discovered in the far eastern
region of Bosso. The missing men had been expelled from Nigeria to
Niger as part of a Chad-Niger-Nigeria joint military operation. When
last seen by their families in October 1998, the Toubous were in the
custody of the Nigerien armed forces. The Government acknowledged the
existence of the mass grave. Domestic and international human rights
groups called for an independent investigation but so far, none has
been forthcoming.
No charges were brought against the member of the presidential
guard who shot and killed a member of the Republican Guard in February
1998; he was released from custody during the year. No charges were
brought against the leaders of a Republican Guard May 1998 mutiny; they
also were released from custody during the year.
Disagreements over land use between sedentary farmers and herders
as well as among different groups of herders led to several incidents
of mob violence and killings, particularly in the Tillaberry Department
along the Malian border and the Lake Chad region.
On July 26, the Security Coordinating Committee called upon the
Government to take necessary action in response to the deteriorating
security situation in the North Tillaberry pastoral zones. Frequent
attacks by Tuaregs from the Malian side of the border, which were
countered by Peul self-defense militias, resulted in the deaths of at
least 150 persons as well as incidents of rape, kidnaping, and theft of
20,000 head of cattle.
Unlike the previous year, there were no reports of violence related
to the Tuareg ethnic insurgency in the north, which effectively ended
with the November 1997 supplemental peace accord.
In January two men accused of armed robbery were killed by
vigilantes in the Zongo neighborhood of Niamey. No action was taken
against the vigilantes.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances; however, conflict between Tuaregs based in Mali and
Peul self-defense militias led to kidnapings (see Section 1.a.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, on
occasion police beat and otherwise abused persons. In January a taxi
driver accused of stealing a package worth $400 (225,000 CFA francs)
was arrested and detained for 8 days without charge. He was suspended
from a bar by his ankles and fists and beaten, sustaining severe
injuries. Eventually he was released, but no charges were brought
against the abusive prison guards.
In November hundreds of university students held a sit-in on the
Kennedy Bridge in Niamey to press claims for payment of their
scholarships, which they reportedly had not received for 2 years.
Police officials used tear gas to disperse students from the bridge; at
least 20 students were injured (see Section 2.b.).
According to local press reports, on March 13 the publishing
director of La Voix du Citoyen was ambushed and beaten by military
personnel. Neither police personnel nor military personnel conducted an
investigation of this alleged attack.
Police extorted bribes at checkpoints (see Section 2.d.).
Prison conditions are poor. Prisons are underfunded and
understaffed. They are overcrowded and diet, health, and sanitary
conditions are very poor. In August four inmates died when a prison
roof collapsed on them in the Diffa (far eastern) region. Prisoners are
segregated by sex, but minors and adults are incarcerated together.
Family visits are allowed, and prisoners can receive supplemental food
and other necessities from their families. Corruption among prison
staff is rampant.
Anger at the comparatively expeditious treatment and amnesty of
those accused of ``political'' crimes such as destroying election
results led to several prison riots, including one that resulted in 29
deaths (see Section 1.a.).
In September 74 prisoners escaped from prison in Zinder following
protests over conditions in the prisons and delays over legal
proceedings. The prisoners reportedly set fire to tires then broke
through the main gates of the jail. Police personnel caught several of
the escaped prisoners during the first days following the escape;
however, the majority of the escaped prisoners were not caught.
Following the breakout, police personnel arrested 200 persons suspected
of harboring the escapees (see Section 1.d.).
There are reliable reports that prisoners who have financial means
leave prison for the day and serve their sentences in the evenings or
claim illness and serve their sentences in the national hospital.
Human rights monitors, including the International Committee of the
Red Cross, have unrestricted access to prisons and detention centers
and visit them.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention are problems. Although the Constitution prohibits arbitrary
arrest and detention, and laws officially prohibit detention without
charge in excess of 48 hours, police violate these provisions in
practice. If police fail to gather sufficient evidence within the
detention period, the prosecutor gives the case to another officer, and
a new 48-hour detention period begins. Police, acting under authority
given them by the Security Law, conduct sweeps to detain criminals and
ensure that identity documents are in order.
On May 29, former Minister of Defense, Yahaya Tounkara, was placed
under house arrest after reading a declaration calling for an
investigation into Bare's assassination. Military forces blocked the
entrance to his house for several days; however, they were subsequently
discharged.
On September 17, five members the RDP were arrested and held at the
State Documentation Center (CDE), the intelligence center, for
questioning. No charges were brought against them. All five were
released before the October election campaign.
In August the editor of Le Canardo newspaper was arrested and held
for questioning due to his refusal to comply with a ban on the
publication of Le Canardo. No charges were brought against him and he
was released after several hours (see Section 2.a.).
In September police officials arrested 200 persons suspected of
harboring 74 escaped prisoners from Zinder; they were released within
several days (see Section 1.c.).
In October 100 soldiers in Maradi mutinied and took several
government officials hostage, reportedly due to nonpayment of a
promised salary supplement; there were no reported deaths among the
hostages. The mutinous soldiers later were dismissed by the transition
government.
In October Yusuf Bashar, the former Nigerien ambassador to Libya,
was arrested without charge upon his return to the country from his
post. He was released several days later. Press reports alleged that
the transition government considered Bashar too close to the late
President Bare.
The judicial system is seriously overloaded. There are no statutory
limits on pretrial confinement of indicted persons. Detention
frequently lasts months or years. Some persons have been waiting as
long as 8 years to be charged. Of the 644 prisoners in Niamey's central
prison 515 are awaiting trial or had no charges brought against them.
The law provides for a right to counsel, although there is only one
defense attorney known to have a private practice outside the capital.
A defendant has the right to a lawyer immediately upon detention. The
State provides a defense attorney for indigents. Bail is available for
crimes carrying a penalty of less than 10 years' imprisonment.
Widespread ignorance of the law and lack of financial means prevent
full exercise of these rights.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and there were no reports of its
use.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, it is subject to executive
interference. Although the Supreme Court on occasion has asserted its
independence, human rights groups assert that family and business ties
influence the lower courts and undermine their integrity. Judges
sometimes fear reassignment or having their financial benefits reduced
if they render a decision unfavorable to the Government.
Defendants and prosecutors may appeal a verdict, first to the Court
of Appeals, then to the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals reviews
questions of fact and law, while the Supreme Court reviews only the
application of the law and constitutional questions. There are also
customary courts.
Traditional chiefs can act as mediators and counselors and have
authority in the realm of customary law as well as status under modern
law where they are designated as auxiliaries to local administrators.
They are charged with collecting local taxes and receive stipends from
the Government but do not have police or judicial powers and can only
mediate, not arbitrate, disputes under customary law. Customary courts,
located only in large towns and cities, try cases involving divorce or
inheritance. They are headed by a legal practitioner with basic legal
education who is advised by an assessor knowledgeable in the society's
traditions. The judicial actions of chiefs and customary courts are not
regulated by code, and defendants may appeal a verdict to the formal
court system. Women do not have equal legal status with men and do not
enjoy the same access to legal redress (see Section 5).
Defendants have the right to counsel, to be present at trial, to
confront witnesses, to examine the evidence against them, and to appeal
verdicts. The Constitution affirms the presumption of innocence. The
law provides for counsel at public expense for minors and indigent
defendants charged with crimes carrying a sentence of 10 years or more.
Although lawyers comply with government requests to provide counsel,
they generally are not remunerated by the Government.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law requires that police have a search warrant,
normally issued by a judge; however, human rights organizations report
that police often conduct routine searches without warrants. Police may
search without warrants when they have strong suspicion that a house
shelters criminals or stolen property. The State Security Law also
provides for warrantless searches.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the transition government
generally respected this right in practice, although the Bare
government did not. In June the transition government created the
National Communications Oversight (ONC) group to provide for
independence of the media and ethics in journalism.
The Government publishes a French-language daily newspaper, Le
Sahel, and its weekend edition. There are about 12 domestically
published private French-language weekly or monthly newspapers, some of
which are affiliated loosely with political parties. The private press
remained relatively assertive in criticizinggovernment actions;
however, there were several attempts by the former government to stifle
freedom of the press. Foreign journals circulate and report freely.
However, strict accreditation requirements imposed on journalists by
the 1997 press law remained in place. In the February local elections
campaign, opposition parties did not receive the same media access that
the RDP enjoyed.
In July the ONC censured the editor of the Canardo newspaper and
banned its publication because the editor was allegedly not a licensed
professional journalist. When the editor did not comply, he was
arrested on August 31 and held for questioning for several hours before
being released (see Section 1.d.). In November the President of the ONC
announced a new amendment for election campaign media access. The
amendment prohibited incendiary rhetoric on racial or ethnic grounds
and prohibited the publication of any declaration by dissenting groups
within a political party or associated with defection of members of a
party in favor of another party.
On September 10, the ONC announced the creation of the Media Access
Control Committee for the presidential elections in collaboration with
the Independent Electoral Commission, the Minister of Justice, the
president of the lawyer's union, and political parties. The committee
is charged with ensuring that all presidential candidates get equitable
and free access to the public media and monitor coverage in the private
media. Prior to the presidential and legislative elections in November,
all of the country's political parties reportedly received free and
equitable access to the public media.
Since literacy and personal incomes are both very low, radio is the
most important medium of public communication. The government-owned
radio Voix du Sahel transmits 14 hours per day, providing news and
other programs in French, Hausa, Djerma, Tamashek, Fulfulde, Kanouri,
and several other local languages. Several private radio stations
broadcast on FM in Niamey, including Radio France International, Africa
Number One, Radio et Musique, Radio Souda, Radio Tenere, and Anfani;
the last four are locally owned and feature popular news programs in
local languages, including Djerma and Hausa.
These private radio stations generally were less critical of
government actions than the private newspapers were. Radio Afani
remained the domestic station most critical of the Bare and transition
governments. Radio et Musique tried to present news coverage that
includes opposition as well as government points of view. The other
private domestic radio stations are smaller and offer little domestic
news programming.
The government-operated multilingual national radio service
provided equitable air time for all political parties since the
transition government assumed power.
On August 1, 1998, the Government's Superior Council on
Communication prohibited domestic broadcasting services from
rebroadcasting programs of foreign origin, such as Voice of America
(VOA), British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and Deutsche Welle
programs without a time delay that would enable the Government to hold
local broadcasters responsible for the programs' content. However,
domestic affiliates of international services generally did not comply
with this prohibition, and the Government apparently did not enforce
it.
Television is a far less important medium than radio. Government-
owned Tele-Sahel broadcasts about 4 hours every evening, with
programming emphasizing news in French and other major national
languages. There are no private television broadcasting stations,
apparently because they would not be commercially viable in the
country's economy. The director of a private radio station operates a
wireless cable television service for the capital, offering access to
international channels.
SONITEL, the state-owned telephone monopoly, is the country's only
Internet service provider. There are no private Internet service
providers because government regulation of the telecommunications
sector sets prices at prohibitive levels; several individuals hope to
enter the Internet service provider market after an anticipated
deregulation of the sector. The Government does not restrict access to
the Internet through SONITEL, although technical difficulties often do.
The news coverage of the state-owned media reflects government
priorities. Presidential activities and conferences dealing with
development issues always are reported. Analysis or investigative
reporting on domestic topics is extremely rare. During the February
local elections campaign, state media gave much more coverage to the
ruling party than to all opposition parties combined. The transition
government gave equal access and coverage to political parties and
their views; at least 16 major and minor political parties had access
to the state press during the preelection period.
Academic freedom is respected. In November university students
protested nonpayment of their scholarships (see Sections 1.c. and
2.b.).
b. Freedom of Assembly and Association.--The Constitution provides
for freedom of assembly; however, the Bare government on occasion
banned peaceable meetings and demonstrations, and the transition
government suspended political party activity during the first days
following the coup. The Government retains the authority to prohibit
gatherings either under tense social conditions or if advance notice
(48 hours) is not provided. Political parties legally are permitted to
hold demonstrations, and there were no reports of political parties
being denied permission for demonstrations during the year.
In November hundreds of university students held a sit-in
demonstration on the Kennedy Bridge in Niamey to press claims for
payment of their long overdue scholarships. Police officials used tear
gas to disperse students from the bridge, injuring at least 20 students
(see Section 1.c.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association with the
limitation that citizens may not form political parties based on
ethnicity, religion, or region, and the Government respects these
provisions in practice. There are 24 political parties.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The new Constitution, provides for ``the
right of the free development of each individual in their . . .
spiritual, cultural and religious dimensions,'' and the Government
supports the freedom to practice one's religious beliefs, as long as
persons respect public order, social peace, and national unity.
Religious organizations must register with the Interior Ministry.
This registration is a formality and there is no evidence that it ever
has been denied.
Islam is the dominant religion and is practiced by over 90 percent
of the population. Christians (including Jehovah's Witnesses) and
Baha'is practice freely. The cities of Say, Kiota, Agadez, and
Madarounfa are considered holy by the local Islamic communities, and
the practice of other religions in those cities is not as well
tolerated as in other areas. No religious group is subsidized
officially, although the Islamic Association has a weekly broadcast on
the government-owned (and the only) television station. Christian
programming generally is broadcast only on special occasions such as
Christmas.
The State must authorize construction of any place of worship.
Foreign missionaries work freely, but their organizations must be
registered officially as associations.
There were instances during the year in which local police stated
that they were not confident that they could ensure the safety of
foreign missionaries.
On April 15, the Assemblies of God Church in Niamey was notified by
the mayor's office that it must close until the ``new order'' is
established, presumably until a democratically elected government is in
place in early 2000. The church has been in its location since 1996 and
has had an ongoing problem with one of it neighbors. The neighbor, who
is from another Christian group, has been trying actively to have the
church closed since its establishment. The church has been trying to
find an amicable solution to maintain its good relationships in the
community while protecting its interests against attacks by the
neighbor. The police and local authorities had been responsive and
supported the church's right to exist in the neighborhood. The
authorities ordered the church to close; however, this order was not
enforced and the church remained open (see Section 5).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for freedom of movement
and does not restrict either emigration or repatriation; however,
authorities imposed some restrictions on these rights. Some ministers
of the former government were prohibited from leaving the country
pending inquiries into their financial affairs. International election
monitors were prohibited from traveling to polling stations throughout
the country during the February local elections. In addition security
forces at checkpoints monitor the travel of persons and the circulation
of goods, particularly near major population centers, and sometimes
demand extra payments. Attacks by bandits on major routes to the north
have declined considerably. Among the Hausa and Peul in the east, some
women are cloistered and may leave their homes only if escorted by a
man and usually only after dark (see Section 5).
The law does not provide for granting asylum or refugee status in
accordance with the standards of the U.N. Convention Relating tothe
Status of Refugees. However, the Government cooperates with the office
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. In accordance with
U.N. principles, the Government offers first asylum. To date it has
offered asylum to several thousand persons from neighboring countries
as well as smaller numbers from distant countries. A few Chadian
refugee families remain in the country.
There were no reports of the forced repatriation of persons to a
country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their
government; however, the January 1996 coup, the fraudulent 1996
presidential election, the disruption of February local elections, and
the April coup effectively disenfranchised citizens, preventing them
from exercising this right. The July Constitution provides for a
semipresidential system with the President as head of state and the
Prime Minister as head of government. The President must choose the
Prime Minister from a list of three presented by the majority party or
coalition in the National Assembly. Seven candidates qualified for the
first round of presidential elections held on October 17. Since no
candidate received 51 percent of the vote, a second round was held on
November 24. In the second round, Tandja Mamadou was elected President
with 60 percent of the vote in an election that was considered by
international observers to be generally free and fair. Reportedly 39
percent of the country's population participated in the election. In
the November 24 National Assembly elections, the National Movement for
the Development of Society and the Democratic and Social Convention
(MNSD/CDS) coalition backing Tandja won 55 of the 83 seats in the
Assembly. Five of the country's 11 political parties are represented in
the National Assembly. Tandja was inaugurated on December 22 and was
expected to appoint a new Prime Minister at the beginning of 2000.
In February local elections were held to start the process of
decentralization, which had been initiated before 1996. Communities
were to elect municipal, departmental, and regional councils giving
localities more autonomy to manage their affairs. All political parties
participated in the elections. Although security forces tried to impede
the movement and access of international observers before the voting
began, the observers judged the elections to be free and fair in their
technical conduct; however, the more serious disruptions occurred in
the compilation and publication of the results. After the vote counts
(which clearly showed that the presidential RDP party would not have an
overwhelming majority), the results were transferred to the Independent
Election Commission (CENI) offices where security forces broke in,
destroyed results and equipment, and in some cases injured workers. As
each polling station had political party representatives present during
the vote count, actual results could have been reconstructed; however,
the Government acknowledged problems but deferred to the constitutional
chamber of the Supreme Court to rule on the results and to the judicial
system to deal with any irregularities.
On April 6, the Supreme Court, holding to a strict interpretation
of the law, only validated those results for which original, signed
official records were available. To replace the missing vote tallies,
voting would have to be repeated in about 4,000 polling stations,
approximately 40 percent of the total. On April 8, the Government
called on the public to respect the decision of the court and to remain
calm. It also promised to take the necessary measures to identify and
punish those responsible for the ``troubles.''
On April 9, President Ibrahim Mainassara Bare, who came to power by
a coup d'etat in January 1996, was assassinated by members of his
presidential guard. Several days after Bare's assasination, a group of
military officers led by Major Daouda Malam Wanke (commander of the
presidential guard) asserted control over the Government, called the
assassination an ``unfortunate accident,'' and subsequently suspended
the Constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, and created three
bodies to oversee a 9-month transition to a democratically elected
government. Major Wanke's transition plan was supported by members of
11 of the country's opposition parties. Major Wanke and his military
officers retained effective control of the country during the interim
period through the CRN. The CRN formed a cabinet with civilian members
of political parties, traditional chiefs, and former government
leaders, and scheduled a first round of presidential elections for
October 17, and a presidential runoff and legislative elections for
November 24. The National Consultative Council consisted of members of
political parties, civil society, traditional chiefs, and former
government leaders and addressed fundamental questions, such as the
role of political parties, the Electoral Code, and a new Constitution.
The National Consultative Council was created to fill the role of
thedissolved National Assembly; however, this body was limited to
making recommendations and was not granted legislative powers.
On July 18, a new Constitution was approved by 90 percent of the 31
percent of the population that voted in the referendum. It reiterates
rights granted under the 1992 and 1996 constitutions. The Constitution
provides for a political system with checks and balances, a
representative one chamber national assembly, and an independent
judiciary. Citizens 18 years of age and over can vote, and voting is by
secret ballot. The Prime Minister is no longer subordinate to the
President; however, the Prime Minister must be chosen from a list of
three candidates submitted to the President by the majority of the
National Assembly.
The Constitution also granted a general amnesty to the perpetrators
of the 1996 and 1999 coups; the amnesty is scheduled to be approved in
the first session of the next National Assembly, which was expected to
meet in January 2000. The Constitution also allowed governmental
authorities to remain in place until new elections were held.
Women traditionally play a subordinate role in politics. The
societal practice of husbands' voting their wives' proxy ballots
effectively disenfranchises many women. This practice was used widely
in presidential and National Assembly elections.
Women are underrepresented in government. Only one woman won a seat
in the new National Assembly and there are two female ministers in the
Government.
The Government supported greater minority representation in the
National Assembly, but no seats in the National Assembly are reserved
for ethnic minorities. President Tandja is the country's first
president who is not from either the Hausa or the Djerma ethnic groups,
which make up about 56 percent and 22 percent, respectively, of the
country's population (see Section 5). Although there are some questions
about President Tandja's ethnicity, he is reportedly half Peul and half
Kanouri. All major ethnic groups are represented in the Government.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Several independent human rights groups and associations normally
operate without government hindrance, and they publish findings and
conclusions that often are highly critical of the Government in their
own publications and in the small independent press. Notable among the
associations are the Nigerian Association for the Defense of Human
Rights (ANDDH); Democracy, Liberty, and Development (DLD); the Nigerien
League for the Defense of Human Rights (LNDH); the Association for the
Protection and Defense of Nigerien Human Rights (ADALCI); the Network
for the Integration and Diffusion of the Rights in the Rural Milieu
(RIDD-FITLA); the Niger Independent Magistrates Association (SAMAN);
and the Association of Women Jurists of Niger. There are several other
women's rights groups. The International Committee for the Red Cross is
active in the country. The Government invited international observers
to the February municipal elections and the October and November
presidential and legislative elections. During the February elections,
some international observers were prevented by RDP authorities from
traveling to polling places throughout the country. However, during the
October and November elections, about 200 international observers
monitored polling stations throughout the country, reportedly with no
intervention.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, and
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex, social
origin, race, ethnicity, or religion. However, in practice there is
discrimination against women, children, ethnic minorities, and disabled
persons, including limited economic and political opportunities.
Women.--Domestic violence against women is widespread, although
firm statistics are lacking. Wife beating is reportedly common, even in
upper social classes. Families often intervene to prevent the worst
abuses, and women may (and do) divorce because of physical abuse. While
women have the right to seek redress in the customary or modern courts,
few do so, due to ignorance of the legal system, fear of social stigma,
or fear of repudiation. Women's rights organizations report that
prostitution is often the only economic alternative for a woman who
wants to leave her husband.
Despite the Constitution's provisions for women's rights, the deep-
seated traditional belief in the submission of women to men results in
discrimination in education, employment, and property rights.
Discrimination is worse in rural areas, where women do much of the
subsistence farming as well as child-rearing, water- and wood-
gathering, and other work. Despite constituting 47 percent of the work
force, women have made only modest inroads in civil service and
professional employment and remain underrepresented in these areas.
Women's inferior legal status is evident, for example, in head of
household status: A male head of household has certain legal rights,
but divorced or widowed women, even with children, are not considered
to be heads of households. Among the Hausa and Peul in the east, some
women are cloistered and may leave their homes only if escorted by a
male and usually only after dark. In 1994 the Government considered a
draft family code intended to eliminate gender bias in inheritance
rights, land tenure, and child custody, as well as end the practice of
repudiation, which permits a husband to obtain an immediate divorce
with no further responsibility for his wife or children. However, in
June 1994 when Islamic associations criticized the draft code, the
then-Government suspended discussions. The Government has taken no
further action on the family code, although on August 13, it ratified
the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women. Some Islamic groups criticized the treaty and complained
that they were not consulted beforehand. Women's groups have so far
been silent, allegedly due to fear of reprisals. The same Islamic
militant groups worked against the family code, and reportedly
threatened women who supported the code with physical harm.
Children.--Although the Constitution provides that the State
promote children's welfare, financial resources are extremely limited.
The minimum period of compulsory education is 6 years; however, only
about 32 percent of children of primary school age attend school, and
about 60 percent of those who finish primary schools are boys. The
majority of young girls are kept at home to work and rarely attend
school for more than a few years, resulting in a female literacy rate
of 7 percent, compared with 18 percent for males.
Secondary school students in May conducted two violent
demonstrations to protest the nonpayment of their stipends. Students
used rocks, burned tires, and stopped traffic. There were no reported
injuries and classes resumed within a few days.
Tradition among some ethnic groups allows young girls from rural
families to enter into marriage agreements on the basis of which girls
are sent by the age of 10 or 12 (or younger) to join their husband's
family under the tutelage of their mother-in-law. There are credible
reports of underage girls being drawn into prostitution, sometimes with
the complicity of the family.
Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is practiced by several ethnic groups in the
extreme west and far eastern areas of the country. Clitoridectomy is
the most common form of FGM. FGM is not illegal, but the Government is
engaged firmly in an effort to eliminate the practice. The Government
is working closely with a local NGO, the United Nations Children's
Fund, and other donors to develop and distribute educational materials
at government clinics and maternal health centers.
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution mandates that the State
provide for the disabled; however, the Government has yet to implement
regulations to mandate accessibility to buildings and education for
those with special needs. Regulations do not mandate accessibility to
public transport, of which there is little. Societal discrimination
against persons with disabilities exists.
Religious Minorities.--At times Muslims have not been tolerant of
the rights of minority religions to practice their faith. On April 19,
1998, Catholic and Protestant churches in Maradi, in the south central
region on the Nigerian border, were attacked by a group of
demonstrators who allegedly included some local Shi'ite Muslims. Some
injuries to parishioners were reported and altars and religious
artifacts were damaged or destroyed. Police responded within 40 minutes
and arrested some of the demonstrators.
In mid-November 1998, members of a Baptist mission encountered
problems with some members of the local Muslim community in Say, one of
the Islamic holy cities and site of the Islamic University. Baptist
missionaries had been active in the region for over a year and were
well accepted by the population until they considered building a
church. At that time, some local community members threatened to burn
down the missionaries' houses unless they left Say by the end of the
week. When the Baptist mission members reported this threat to the
authorities,they were told that, while it was within their rights to be
there, the local police force could not ensure their safety. The
missionaries continued to work in the Say region, but they decided to
postpone their church-building plans.
On August 20, members of the Southern Baptist Mission in Say
received threats of physical harm from members of a local Islamic
association unless they left the city by the end of the week. The
missionaries have been receiving periodic threats since November 1998
when they announced their intention to build a church in Say, which is
considered an Islamic holy city. The missionaries reportedly left Say
following these threats and permanently relocated to another location
in the country (see Section 5).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Hausa and Djerma ethnic
groups make up about 56 percent and 22 percent, respectively, of the
country's population of more than 10 million. These two groups also
dominate government and business. Tandja Mamadou is the country's first
president who is neither Hausa nor Djerma. Ethnic minorities--Tuareg,
Peul, Toubou, Kanouri, and Arab--continue to assert that the Hausa and
Djerma discriminate against them. However, the Government recently has
increased education and health care for ethnic minorities. It supports
the April 1995 peace accord calling for special development efforts in
the north where the Tuareg population is dominant. However, nomadic
people, such as Tuaregs and many Peul, continue to have less access to
government services, and the suspension of foreign assistance has
limited the Government's ability to fulfill its commitments to former
rebel areas.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides formal
recognition of workers' longstanding right to establish and join trade
unions. However, more than 95 percent of the work force is employed in
the nonunionized subsistence agricultural and small trading sectors.
The National Union of Nigerian Workers (USTN), a federation made up
of 38 unions, represents the majority of salary earners; most are
government employees, such as civil servants, teachers, and employees
in state-owned corporations. The USTN and affiliated National Union of
Nigerian Teachers (SNEN) profess political autonomy, but like most
unions, have informal ties to political parties. There is also a small
breakaway union confederation, and independent teachers' and
magistrates' unions. However, police, water, and forest worker unions,
shut down by the Government in 1996 because of their ``paramilitary
nature,'' remain suspended. The customs workers union, suspended in
1996 for the same reason, was dissolved in 1997.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, except for
security forces and police, although the police held a 2-day work
stoppage in July to protest nonpayment of salaries. In 1994 the
National Assembly passed a strike law specifying that labor must give
notice and begin negotiations before work is stopped; that public
workers must maintain a minimum level of service during a strike; that
the Government can requisition workers to provide minimum service; and
that striking public sector workers not be paid for the time they are
on strike. The latter condition already prevailed in the private
sector.
During the year, labor continued to challenge the Government on
various issues affecting workers. The USTN called many short strikes,
generally of 1 to 3 days' duration, to support demands for: Payment of
several months' wage arrears; the repeal of a new mandatory retirement
law; the removal of the Minister of Finance; cancellation of salary
reductions for civil servants and an increase in income tax rates; and
an end to government plans to privatize several state enterprises. Many
of these objectives were achieved in cooperation with the transition
government.
The USTN is a member of the Organization of African Trade Union
Unity and abides by that organization's policy of having no formal
affiliations outside the African continent. However, it enjoys
assistance from some international unions, and individual unions such
as the teachers union are affiliated with international trade union
secretariats.
b. The Right to Bargain Collectively.--In addition to the
Constitution and the Labor Code, there is a basic framework agreement,
negotiated by the USTN's predecessor, employers, and the Government
that defines all classes and categories of work, establishes basic
conditions of work, and defines union activities. In private and state-
owned enterprises, unions widely use their right to bargain
collectively with management without government interference for wages
over and above the statutory minimum as well as for morefavorable work
conditions. Collective bargaining also exists in the public sector.
However, since most organized workers, including teachers, are
government employees, the Government is involved in most bargaining
agreements. The USTN represents civil servants in bargaining with the
Government, and agreements between labor and management apply uniformly
to all employees.
The Labor Code is based on International Labor Organization
principles. It protects the right to organize and prohibits antiunion
discrimination by employers. Labor unions reported no such
discrimination.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, except by legally convicted
prisoners. The code does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded
labor by children; however, there were no reports that it occurred.
Although slavery is prohibited by the Constitution, there were a few
media reports that slavery still is practiced by the Tuareg and Arab
minorities, particularly in remote northern regions. During the year,
one traditional chief was arrested based on charges that he practiced
slavery. While there is a traditional indentured servant caste, it
could not be confirmed that these individuals are forced into
servitude.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Child labor in nonindustrialized enterprises is permitted
by law under certain conditions. Children under the age of 14 must
obtain special authorization to work, and those 14 to 18 years of age
are subject to limitation on hours (a maximum of 4\1/2\ hours per day)
and types of employment (no industrial work) so that schooling may
continue. Minimum compulsory education is 6 years, but far fewer than
half of school-age children complete 6 years of education.
The law requires employers to ensure minimum sanitary working
conditions for children. Law and practice prohibit child labor in
industrial work. Forced or bonded labor by children is not prohibited
specifically; however, there were no reports of its use (see Section
6.c.). Ministry of Labor inspectors enforce child labor laws. Child
labor is practically nonexistent in the formal (wage) sector, although
children work in the unregulated agricultural, commercial, and artisan
sectors, and some, especially foreign youths, are hired in homes as
general helpers and baby sitters for very low pay. Rural children (the
majority) regularly work with their families from a very early age--
helping in the fields, pounding grain, tending animals, getting
firewood and water, and other similar tasks. Some children are kept out
of school to guide a blind relative on begging rounds. Others sometimes
are employed by marabouts (Koranic teachers) to beg in the streets.
There is no official recognition of this labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code establishes a
minimum wage for a salaried worker of each class and category within
the formal sector. The lowest minimum wage is $42 (24,565 CFA) per
month. Additional salary is granted for each family member and for such
working conditions as night shifts and required travel. Minimum wages
are not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for workers
and their families. Government salaries are substantially in arrears,
which was a significant factor in stimulating strikes during the year.
Most households have multiple earners (largely in informal commerce)
and rely on the extended family for support.
The legal workweek is 40 hours with a minimum of one 24-hour rest
period. However, for certain occupations the Ministry of Labor
authorizes longer workweeks of up to 72 hours. There were no reports of
violations.
The Labor Code also establishes occupational safety and health
standards. However, due to staff shortages, inspectors focus on safety
violations only in the most dangerous industries: Mining; building; and
manufacturing. Although generally satisfied with the safety equipment
provided by employers, citing in particular adequate protection from
radiation in the uranium mines, union workers are in many cases not
well informed of the risks posed by their jobs. Workers have the right
to remove themselves from hazardous conditions without fear of losing
their jobs.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
in, to, or from the country.
______
NIGERIA
The military regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar implemented its
program of transition to democratic civilian government begun in June
1998 with the election and subsequent inauguration of retired General
Olusegun Obasanjo on May 29 as President. Formally, the Government
remained a military dictatorship for the first 5 months of the year,
with all decisionmaking authority vested in the Provisional Ruling
Council (PRC), headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces,
General Abubakar. The PRC ruled by decree, without a constitution or
collaborative legislature. In accordance with Abubakar's transition
program, members of the new civilian government were chosen in four
elections held over a 3-month period. Elections for local government
leaders were held in December 1998, those for state legislators and
governors in January, and those for national legislators and president
in February. Three loosely structured parties emerged to contest these
elections, with the People's Democratic Party (PDP) winning the
presidency and most governorships and state assemblies in the
southeastern and middle parts of the country, as well as several
northern states. A largely Yoruba-based party, the Alliance for
Democracy (AD), won the governorships and state assemblies in the
southwestern states, and the All Peoples Party (APP) won several
northern states and a few middle-belt states. The elections, most
notably the presidential election, were marred by fraud and
irregularities perpetrated by all contesting parties, but most
observers agreed that the election of Obasanjo as President, despite
the observed fraud, reflected the will of the majority of voters.
Before transferring power to the civilian administration, the Abubakar
Government signed into law on May 5 (effective May 29) a new
Constitution based largely on the suspended 1979 Constitution; this new
Constitution prescribes a democratic federal nation consisting of 36
states and a federal capital territory. The Constitution provides for
an independent judiciary; however, in practice the judicial branch
remains susceptible to executive and legislative branch pressure,
influence by political leaders at both the state and federal levels,
and suffers from corruption and inefficiency.
A federal national police force is tasked with law enforcement.
Local and state police forces are prohibited by the Constitution.
Internal security is the duty of the State Security Service (SSS). The
SSS was scaled down drastically and reformed under Abubakar, and its
profile continued to decline under Obasanjo. Until the advent of the
civilian administration in May, special paramilitary anticrime squad
``Rapid Response Teams'' operated in every state. Under Obasanjo the
military personnel dispatched to these units returned to their
barracks, but the units remained intact in most states, staffed by
regular policemen but with a reduced role and a less menacing presence.
After the transfer to civilian rule on May 29, the Obasanjo Government
abruptly retired all military officers who had held political posts and
began to dismiss some categories of senior police commanders. It also
began major reforms and restructuring of the security services. While
under Abubakar the army occasionally was deployed to trouble spots,
under Obasanjo the army was used less frequently to quell internal
disorder, and the degree of civilian control over the Rapid Response
Teams and the national police force improved. Members of the security
forces, including the police, anticrime squads, and the armed forces
committed numerous, serious human rights abuses, but did so less
frequently under the Obasanjo Government.
Most of the population of approximately 120 million was rural and
engaged in small-scale agriculture. Agriculture accounted for less than
40 percent of gross domestic product but employed more than 65 percent
of the work force. Although the great bulk of economic activity is
outside the formal sector, recorded gross domestic product per capita
was $260. Much of the nation's wealth had been concentrated in the
hands of a tiny military, political, or commercial elite through
corruption and nontransparent government contracting practices. Crude
oil exports provided the preponderance of both national foreign
exchange earnings and government revenues. During the year the economy
was static, with growth still impeded by grossly inadequate
infrastructure, endemic corruption, and general economic mismanagement.
Many direct controls on the private sector have been removed, but a
huge and inefficient public sector continues to dominate and inhibit
the formal sector. Government revenue rose following the doubling of
world oil prices, but much of the gain was offset by production-site
shut-downs due to ongoing community unrest in the oil-producing areas,
which decreased oil production. The chronic fuel shortages that
afflicted the country for several years largely ended by mid-year,
mostly because the Government spent more than $400 million
(approximately 40 billion naira) to subsidize fuel imports. The
Government reintroduced fertilizer subsidies and announced a phased,
potentially lengthy privatization process.
There continued to be serious problems in the Government's human
rights record; however, there were marked improvements inseveral areas
during the year. After 16 years of military rule, citizens had the
opportunity to choose their government in elections. National police,
army, and security forces committed numerous extrajudicial killings and
used excessive force to quell civil unrest under both the Abubakar and
Obasanjo governments, although they did so less frequently than under
the Abacha regime. Disappearances remained a problem. Army, police, and
security force officers regularly beat protesters, criminal suspects,
detainees, and convicted prisoners; however, there were no reports of
torture of political dissidents. The Government took steps to curb
torture and beating of detainees and prisoners, including the dismissal
and arrest of senior officials well known for beating detainees. Prison
conditions were harsh and life threatening, and along with the denial
of food and medical treatment, contributed to the death of numerous
inmates. The Government released several thousand prisoners in an
attempt to ease prison congestion. In May the Government repealed the
State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree of 1984 (Decree 2), which
had allowed prolonged arbitrary detention without charge; however,
police and security forces continued to use arbitrary arrest and
detention, and prolonged pretrial detention remains a problem. After
Obasanjo's inauguration, the Government ceased to use military
tribunals to try civilians and announced the release of all known
political prisoners and most known political detainees. The judiciary
is subject to political influence, and is hampered by corruption and
inefficiency. The Government continued to prove incapable of providing
citizens with the right to a speedy, fair trial. The Government
continued to infringe on citizens' privacy rights. Under both Abubakar
and Obasanjo the Government generally respected freedom of speech and
of the press; however, there were a few exceptions. Security force
beatings of journalists, government seizures of newspaper print runs,
and harassment of newspaper printers, advertisers, and distributors
declined significantly. The Government significantly relaxed its
restrictions on the rights of freedom of association, assembly, and
movement. The Government restricts freedom of religion in certain
respects. The National Assembly convened in June and began
deliberations on national policies and legislation. In June the
Government established a governmental panel to review cases of human
rights violations dating back to independence (1960). The panel
received approximately 11,000 petitions for redress by alleged victims
of human rights abuses.
Domestic violence against women remained widespread and permitted
by traditional and customary law. Discrimination against women remained
a problem. Female genital mutilation (FGM) remained widely practiced,
and child abuse and child prostitution were common. Localized
discrimination and violence against religious minorities persisted.
Ethnic and regional discrimination remained widespread and interethnic
and regional tensions often became violent. Numerous persons were
killed in various local ethnic conflicts throughout the country. Some
members of the Ijaw ethnic group in the oil-producing Niger Delta
region who seek greater local autonomy continued to commit serious
abuses, including killings and kidnapings. In March 130 persons were
killed in Kafanchan in intercommunal rioting between Hausa and local
minorities. In July ethnic clashes occurred in Kano and Sagamu,
resulting in approximately 200 deaths. The Government took steps to
improve worker rights; however, some persons, including children, were
subjected to forced labor. Child labor is increasing. Trafficking in
persons for purposes of forced prostitution and forced labor is a
problem. There was an increase in vigilante violence throughout the
country, particularly in Lagos, where suspected criminals were
apprehended, beaten, and sometimes killed.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--National police,
army, and security forces committed numerous extrajudicial killings and
used excessive force to quell civil unrest under both the Abubakar and
Obasanjo Governments, although they did so less frequently than under
the Abacha regime. While under both Abubakar and Obasanjo the
Government largely ceased using lethal force to repress nonviolent,
purely political activities, when protests or demonstrations were
perceived as becoming violent or disruptive, or in the apprehension and
detention of suspected criminals, police and security forces committed
numerous extrajudicial killings. The State anticrime task forces, as
during the Abacha period, remained the most egregious human rights
offenders. Neither the task forces, the police, nor the armed forces
were held accountable for excessive, deadly use of force or the death
of individuals in custody. They operated with impunity in the
apprehension, illegal detention, and sometimes execution of criminal
suspects. Since taking office, President Obasanjo largely resisted
pressure to call in military troops to quell domestic unrest, which
reduced the risk that the armed forces would overreact or harass
civilians. Instead, Obasanjopreferred to let the police deal with
clashes between rival ethnic groups. However, the police forces often
have a difficult time restoring order; as a result, military troops
sometimes are deployed to reinforce the police. Multinational oil
companies and Nigerian oil producing companies subcontract police and
soldiers from area units. Such deployment is done most frequently to
protect the oil facilities in the volatile Niger Delta region.
Police and military personnel used excessive and sometimes deadly
force in the suppression of civil unrest and interethnic violence,
primarily in the oil and gas regions of the country, where there has
been an upsurge in confrontations between increasingly militant youths,
oil companies, and government authorities. For example, in December
1998, about 4,000 Ijaw activists met and issued the ``Kaiama
Declaration,'' which demanded that all government armed forces withdraw
from Ijaw areas, that oil companies stop all production by December 30,
and emphasized that the Delta region belonged to the Ijaw. In response
to a perceived threat, the Government deployed additional armed forces
in Bayelsa State and declared a state of emergency there. The state of
emergency was lifted on January 4. At least 20 Ijaw died in the clashes
between Ijaw youth protesters and military troops in Yenagoa, Bayelsa
State between December 30 and January 4. On January 4, soldiers killed
at least four civilians in Delta State in the Niger Delta region after
attacks on oil production facilities by members of the surrounding
communities. On January 6, the military commandeered privately owned
helicopters that normally are leased to foreign oil companies and used
these helicopters to quell community protests in two Ijaw villages in
Delta State by allegedly firing indiscriminately at villagers from the
helicopters. Official figures indicate that security forces killed
approximately 35 persons before the state of emergency protests in
Bayelsa and Delta States ended on January 10; there were some reports
of higher figures. No one has been held accountable. The soldiers
allegedly also beat and raped Bayelsa State residents, detained Ijaw
members, and aggressively manned military checkpoints (see Sections
1.c., 1.d., 1.f., and 2.d.). The soldiers involved in the December 1998
and January attacks in Bayelsa and Delta States were not held
accountable, nor were there any official inquiries. During an attack
that occurred on April 19 and 20, state security personnel attached to
an oil flow station owned by the international company Agip in Bayelsa
State killed 8 members of the Ijaw ethnic group after a boat carrying
approximately 22 persons allegedly disobeyed their orders to stop. The
boat allegedly was going to a destination other than the flow station.
(In May Agip apparently broke precedent by agreeing out of court to pay
compensation for policemen acting on its behalf who shot and killed
several persons.)
The use of excessive force to suppress protests was not confined to
conflicts pertaining to oil company activities. On April 14, police in
Lagos reportedly shot and killed at least seven persons as a violent
riot (resulting in some police injuries) broke out during the attempted
demolition of a vegetable market in the Ketu area of northeast Lagos.
One press report put the death toll as high as 22 persons. On August
20, police reportedly killed six students and injured others when they
fired into a group of demonstrating college students in Osogbo, Osun
State. The students allegedly were protesting the nonpayment of
teachers' wages, which forced the closure of four universities in the
state (see Section 2.a.). When their protest became disruptive and
threatened the security of the state secretariat buildings, the police
fired into the crowd.
Police, military, and anticrime taskforce personnel committed
numerous extrajudicial killings in the apprehension and detention of
suspected criminals. For example, on April 14, army personnel stationed
in Ijebu Ode, Ogun State, killed approximately 20 motorcycle taxi
(okada) drivers in a revenge rampage after 1 of their colleagues
allegedly was murdered by a taxi driver. On June 29, police at the
Sapele police station in Ughelli, Delta State executed approximately
six men accused of armed robbery. The men were arrested and detained on
June 25; all were executed extrajudicially. The family of one of the
executed men, Adetaye Agbah, filed a petition against the offending
divisional police officer at the station, but as of year's end no
charges were filed. On August 30, four civilians reportedly were killed
and six others injured in an incident in Warri, Delta State in which
soldiers fired into a crowd of clashing youths. Two rival factions of
Itsekiri youths were involved in a political dispute that became
violent, prompting soldiers to fire into the crowd. The soldiers were
part of an army contingent dispatched to Warri, Delta State to quell
ethnic violence. On September 1, members of Yobe State's anti-crime
task force (``Operation Flush-Out'') killed four brothers suspected of
armed robbery. The task force was unable to apprehend the criminals in
the act, but while searching the vicinity of the robbery, they
encountered the four persons. The task force suspected the four youths,
briefly interrogated them, and then executed them extrajudicially. No
legal action was taken against these security officials by year's end.
Under Obasanjo violence and lethal force at police roadblocks and
checkpoints was reduced greatly, largely due to the reduction in
roadblocks in most areas (with the notable exception of Lagos).
Obasanjo's order to reduce checkpoints and roadblocks also affected the
National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), and resulted in a
decrease in the use of violence and lethal force at NDLEA checkpoints
and roadblocks.
Criminal suspects died from unnatural causes while in official
custody, usually as the result of neglect and harsh treatment. On
January 2, a man died while in the custody of the Lagos police special
antirobbery squad. Godfrey Opuoru died in his jail cell following days
of intense interrogation and abuse by officers and police squad
members, according to a report from a reputable civil liberties
organization. Members of the squad were attempting to obtain a
confession from him concerning a stolen vehicle. The Civil Liberties
Organization (a reputable human rights organization) filed a petition
with the National Human Rights Commission and the Justice Oputa Panel
concerning his case, but there has been no action yet against the
officers of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad who allegedly killed him.
Harsh and life threatening prison conditions and denial of proper
medical treatment contributed to the death of numerous inmates (see
Section 1.c.).
In October the investigation into the murder of Newswatch editor
Dele Giwa on October 19, 1986 reportedly was reopened (see Sections
1.c. and 2.a.). The Government offered no new developments in the death
of journalist Bagauda Kaltho. Kaltho's family reportedly has filed a
petition with the Justice Oputa panel.
In September Obasanjo gave his approval for the prosecution of
Hamza Al-Mustapha and Sergeant Rogers Mshiella for the murder of
Kudirat Abiola and other offenses (see Sections 1.e and 2.a.). The
Federal Government continues to investigate and detain former Abacha
government officials and family members, including former Minister of
the Interior Capital Territory Jerry Useni, former National Security
Advisor Ismaila Gwarzo, Abacha's wife Maryam, Abacha's son Mohammed,
and Colonel Ibrahim Yakassai, for the killings of prominent
prodemocracy activists in Lagos. In November the case of Hamza Al-
Mustapha, Mohammed Abacha, Mohammed Rabo Lawal, Lateef Shofalan, and
Mohammed Aminu for the murder of Kudirat Abiola, a prominent
prodemocracy activist and the wife of Moshood Abiola, was moved to
Lagos High Court. They were charged with murder, a capital crime.
Sergeant Rogers, the alleged killer, is listed as a prosecution
witness. At year's end, the Government had not discussed whether he
would receive immunity for any of his alleged crimes.
Former Army Chief of Staff Ishaya Bamaiyi was detained on October
13 for questioning about his involvement in the attempted murder of
Guardian newspaper publisher Alex Ibru on February 2, 1996. Bamaiyi
challenged his detention without charge and won a reprieve in the Abuja
court in early November. The Government arraigned Bamaiyi in the Lagos
magistrate court on November 15, the same day that Bamaiyi's appeal for
release was to be heard in Abuja. Mustapha, former Lagos police
commissioner James Danbaba, and Colonel Yakubu, also were charged in
the attempt on Ibru. At year's end, the defendents were being held at
Kiri Kiri maximum security prison. The Government has detained other
Abacha-era security officials, such as Brigade General Ibrahim Sabo,
the former Director of Military Intelligence, who allegedly oversaw the
torture of hundreds, perhaps thousands of persons.
Destructive societal violence claimed many lives. Vigilante groups
in large cities, particularly Lagos and Kano, committed numerous
extrajudicial killings of suspected criminals. These groups were
particularly active from March to July after an upsurge in violent
crime in the waning days of the Abubakar regime and in the first months
of the Obasanjo Government. The vigilante groups were more than mobs
intent on administering immediate street justice to criminals caught in
the act. They were fairly well organized and engaged in lengthy
attempts to apprehend criminals days after the alleged offenses were
committed. There also were numerous reports of angry street mobs
apprehending and killing suspected criminals. The practice of
``necklacing'' (death in which a gasoline-soaked tire is place around a
victim's neck or torso and then ignited, burning the victim to death)
criminals caught in the act continued in cities throughout the country.
During the year, there was an upsurge in lethal interethnic and
intraethnic violence throughout the country. During May and June, the
Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Urhobo ethnic groups clashed in the Delta State
town of Warri, leaving approximately 200 persons dead. Disputes about
the location of a local government headquarters, in addition to
widespread disaffection and bitterness caused by perceived government
neglect of the area, reportedly caused the violence. On July 17,
violence erupted between the majority Yoruba population and the
minority Hausapopulation in the southern city of Sagamu, Ogun State.
The clash began after a Hausa woman reportedly failed to observe the
customs of a traditional Yoruba festival by breaking a taboo against
being outdoors when the festival parade begins (see Section 5.). Irate
Yorubas apparently chased the offending woman and killed her, after
which Hausas retaliated. The ensuing 3-day period of violence left
approximately 100 persons, mostly Hausas, dead. This incident ignited
reciprocal violence on July 21 in the northern, predominantly-Hausa
city of Kano, with the Hausa majority attacking the Yoruba minority.
Approximately 80 persons died over a 4-day period; the majority of the
victims were Yorubas. On July 26, violence between two Igbo communities
erupted in Otuacha, Anambra State resulting in 120 deaths. Although the
cause for the clash was unclear, local newspapers blamed a longstanding
land dispute. From June through August, violent confrontations between
the Ilaje and Ijaw ethnic groups occurred in Ondo State, resulting in
approximately 30 deaths. Land disputes also appeared to be a reason for
these clashes (see Section 5). Violence on November 1 and 2 between
Ijaw and Ilaje youths in Lagos left at least 19 persons dead. The
violence was due partly to territorial disputes in nearby Ondo State,
as well as to confrontations between suspected Ijaw armed robbers and
members of the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC), a Pan-Yoruba group that
sometimes engages in vigilante patrols in Lagos. Seven members of the
Bayelsa police were killed in Odi the following week, apparently in
response to the previous week's skirmishes. On November 20, government
troops killed several Ijaw youths in the same area. According to police
reports, soldiers killed 162 persons during the month's clashes in Odi;
however, local communities insist that more than 500 persons were
killed. The Inspector General of Police, Musiliu Smith, ordered an
investigation of the number of civilians killed by soldiers in Odi to
resolve conflicting reports, and on November 23, Senate President Chuba
Okadigbo led a legislative fact-finding mission to Odi. By year's end,
the investigation of the Odi incident had produced no results. Twelve
police officers were among the persons killed during November's
violence in Odi. On November 25, fighting between Yoruba and Hausa
traders in Ketu, a Lagos suburb, resulted in over 100 deaths. Most of
those killed died of machete wounds, but many of the deaths and
injuries occurred as victims were doused with gasoline and set on fire.
In an effort to quell the violence, President Obasanjo ordered police
to ``shoot-on-sight'' members of the OPC. As of year's end, there were
no reports of police killings as a result of this order.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
Members of minority ethnic groups in the oil-producing areas
kidnaped foreign and local oil company employees throughout the year to
press their demands for more redistribution of wealth generated by
joint ventures with the state-controlled petroleum corporation and for
specific projects in their areas. The incidence of kidnaping increased
during the year, with approximately 50 such incidents occurring. On
June 6, Ijaw youths kidnaped 48 oil company employees, including many
foreigners, reportedly as a response to an ongoing dispute over a
Texaco oil spill in July 1998 in Bayelsa State. In exchange for
agreements to discuss compensation, on June 13 they were all released
unharmed and without ransom.
In addition to the political rationale for kidnaping, there were
numerous instances of strictly criminal kidnaping, in which the
perpetrators' sole objective was ransom for the release of the victims.
During the year, kidnapings by criminals to extort money overtook in
number those perpetrated for ``political'' reasons. In February Ijaw
youths took several foreigners hostage in Warri. On March 3, armed men
took a foreigner hostage from an offshore dredging vessel. In March a
hostage was released after the payment of a $53,000 (5.25 million
naira) ransom by an international oil company. On June 27, the group
``Enough is Enough in the Delta'' hijacked an oil company helicopter,
kidnaping several foreigners on board. Ransom for the pilots and
passengers was set at $150,000 (15 million naira) by one hostage-taking
group, and $80,000 (8 million naira) by another--the disparity in
ransom demands reportedly arose because the two groups holding hostages
were not communicating with each other. In all instances, after
negotiations between the captors and the oil firms during which the
firms usually paid ransoms and promised improved conditions, the
victims were released unharmed. The victims were detained normally for
periods of 2 days to 2 weeks and generally were treated well during
their detention. Another reportedly was beaten. With limited manpower
and capabilities, the police and armed forces rarely are able to
confront the perpetrators of these acts, especially in the volatile
Delta region.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The 1979 Constitution (suspended), the 1989 Constitution
(never implemented), and the new Constitution (effective May 29)
prohibit torture and mistreatment of prisoners and provide criminal
sanctions for such abuses; however, although there were no reports of
torture of political dissidents during the year, army, police, and
security force officers regularly beat protesters, criminal suspects,
detainees, and convicted prisoners. Police regularly physically
mistreated civilians in attempts to extort money from them. Detainees
often were kept incommunicado for long periods of time. These practices
continued, but at a decreased level, after Obasanjo took office on May
31. The Evidence Act of 1960 prohibits the introduction into trials of
evidence obtained through torture. The Government took steps to curb
torture and beating of detainees and prisoners and arrested persons,
and plans to try senior security officials that engaged in such
practices under the previous regime.
In January army personnel dispatched to Delta State to quell ethnic
violence reportedly abused civilians and looted property. Also in
January, military officers allegedly raped Ijaw and Ikwerre women in
Bayelsa and Rivers States; however, the Government continues to deny
these allegations. Army personnel, who reportedly fired on the town of
Kaiama, killed many persons, destroyed many buildings, looted property,
and drove away the town's population of about 10,000 residents (see
Sections 1.a. and 2.d.). In November army troops burned down the town
of Odi in Bayelsa State, forcing residents to flee (see Sections 1.a.
and 2.d.). According to the media and human rights organizations, in
September and October military personnel allegedly raped Choba
residents. According to the President and the army Chief of Staff,
these rapes could not have occurred because the military reportedly was
not in Choba at the time. However, local residents say that soldiers
hired to protect oil company facilities were in the area. On April 6,
members of Lagos State's anticrime task force severely beat members of
the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) when
they assembled at the Lagos headquarters of an oil company to protest
the dismissal of several union workers (see Sections 2.b. and 6.b.).
Police, using riot gear, attacked the reportedly peaceful protesters,
injuring many persons seriously. There also were numerous reports of
beatings of citizens by members of special task forces established to
ensure the cleanliness of cities that hosted soccer matches during the
World Youth Championship (Nigeria '99), held during the months of April
and May.
On June 25, members of the Lagos State anticrime task force
reportedly beat and detained 16 civilians and 1 journalist in an
attempt to extort money from them for their release. In August police
in Lagos arrested a reporter on theft charges and detained him for 6
days, during which time they physically abused him and paid other
prisoners to do likewise.
In November former army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Ishaya
Bamaiyi was arraigned in Lagos Magistrate Court in Ikeja for the
attempted murder of Guardian publisher Alex Ibru. Also charged in the
February 1996 murder attempt were the former Military Administer of
Zamfara State Colonel Jubril Yakubu, former Lagos State Police
Commissioner James Danbaba, Hamza Al-Mustapha, and Mohammed Rabo Lawal
(see Sections 1.a. and 2.a.).
Jerry Needam, Editor of the Ogoni Star Newspaper, was arrested on
October 11 and detained by the State Intelligence Bureau (SIIB) in Port
Harcourt (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). On October 22, police reportedly
beat Needham in an effort to force a confession and letter of apology
from him. While incarcerated Needham also was denied needed medical
treatment for typhoid fever and malaria. Needam was released on bail on
November 2. At year's end, no hearing had occurred.
In the numerous ethnic clashes that occurred throughout the year
(see Sections 1.a. and 5), thousands of persons were beaten and injured
severely. Police and security forces failed to respond to many criminal
acts in a timely manner.
Prison and detention conditions remained harsh and life
threatening. Most prisons were built 70 to 80 years ago and lack
functioning basic facilities. Lack of potable water, inadequate sewage
facilities, and severe overcrowding resulted in unhealthy and dangerous
sanitary conditions. Disease was pervasive in the cramped, poorly
ventilated facilities, and chronic shortages of medical supplies were
reported. Prison inmates were allowed outside their cells for
recreation or exercise only irregularly and many inmates had to provide
their own food. Only those with money or whose relatives brought food
regularly had sufficient food; petty corruption among prison officials
made it difficult for money provided for food to reach prisoners. Poor
inmates often relied on handouts from others to survive. Beds or
mattresses were not provided to many inmates, forcing them to sleep on
concrete floors, often without ablanket. Prison officials, police, and
security forces often denied inmates food and medical treatment as a
form of punishment or to extort money from them. Harsh conditions and
denial of proper medical treatment contributed to the deaths in
detention of numerous prisoners. During the year, a reputable human
rights organization estimated that at least one inmate dies per day in
the Kiri Kiri prison in Lagos alone. According to the nongovernmental
organization (NGO), dead inmates promptly are buried in mass graves on
the prison compound, usually without their families having been
notified. A nationwide estimate of the number of inmates who die daily
in the country's prisons is difficult to obtain because of poor (if not
nonexistent) record keeping by prison officials.
Both the Abubakar and Obasanjo Governments acknowledged the problem
of overcrowding in the prisons as the main cause of the harsh
conditions common in the prison system. Approximately 41,000 inmates
were held in a system of 147 prisons with a maximum designed capacity
of 33,348 prisoners. The majority of prisoners are so-called awaiting
trial persons (ATP's), who have not been charged (see Section 1.d.).
Both the Abubakar and the Obasanjo administrations focused on
prison reform. In January the Ministry of the Interior claimed that the
Presidential Committee on Prisons Decongestion released 2,433 prisoners
after September 1998. In April the Abubakar administration released 646
prisoners, and in August the Obasanjo Government released another 1,403
prisoners.
Throughout the year, the Government allowed both international and
domestic NGO's occasional access to prisons. It did not allow them
continuous access to all prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The new Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the Government
rarely observed these prohibitions. Under the Abubakar and Obasanjo
administrations, police and security forces continued to use arbitrary
arrest and detention; such practices decreased somewhat after
Obasanjo's inauguration in May, but still continued.
On May 26, in anticipation of the implementation of the new
Constitution, Head of State Abubakar announced (in Decree 63) that all
prior military decrees that were inconsistent with the law of the new
Constitution were repealed. This included the State Security (Detention
of Persons) Decree (Decree 2 of 1984), which had allowed the Government
to detain without charge persons suspected of acts prejudicial to state
security or harmful to the economic well-being of the country. When
invoked, Decree 2 suspended the detainee's civil liberties and
precluded judicial review. It authorized the Chief of Staff or the
Inspector General of Police to detain persons for up to 3 months
without charge. This 3-month detention often was renewed indefinitely,
and under this procedure, in the past many persons were detained for
several years without trial.
The Abubakar Government claimed in March that no one was being
detained under Decree 2, and that no one had been deprived of his
liberty on account of Degree 2 under his administration. However, a
civil rights group reported in May that 31 members of the Shi'a Muslim
Brotherhood Group were being detained under Degree 2 and had been for
over 2 years. Regardless of whether Degree 2 was cited as their reason,
police and security forces arbitrarily detained numerous persons. For
example, during the violence that affected Bayelsa and Delta States in
January (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5), military officials detained
numerous ethnic Ijaw youths. Police arrested student protesters in
January (see Section 2.a.). On April 18, Ibadan police arrested Lanre
Arogundade, a senior member of the editorial board of the ``Vanguard''
newspaper and chairman of the Lagos Council of the Nigerian Union of
Journalists (NUJ), and detained him illegally for 10 days before
charging him with an offense (see Section 2.a). The journalist
reportedly disagreed with a progovernment faction of journalists, and
his arrest was encouraged by this opposing faction. After being
detained for approximately 2 months on what widely were regarded as
trumped-up murder charges, the reporter was released. A human rights
group reported in August that 29 suspected members of the Oodua
People's Congress (a pan-Yoruba group that repeatedly clashed with the
Government) were detained illegally in Lagos State. In September
soldiers deployed to Cross River State allegedly detained 10 village
chiefs after the chiefs discontinued the practice of providing free
crayfish to the soldiers for consumption.
Police and security forces were empowered to make arrests without
warrants if they believed that there was reason to suspect that a
person had committed an offense; they often abused this power. Under
the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedures Rules of the 1999
Constitution (based on those of the 1979 constitution), police may
arrest and detain persons for 24 hours before charging them with an
offense. The law requires an arresting officer to inform the accused of
charges at thetime of arrest and to take the accused persons to a
station for processing within a reasonable amount of time. By law
police must provide suspects with the opportunity to engage counsel and
post bail. However, police generally did not adhere to legally mandated
procedures under both the Abubakar and Obasanjo Governments. Suspects
routinely were detained without being informed of the charges, denied
access to counsel and family members, and denied the opportunity to
post bail for bailable offenses. There was no functioning system of
bail, so many suspects were held in investigative detention. In August
police detained 25 citizens in Ondo State for their suspected
involvement in ethnic hostilities between the Ijaw and Ilaje groups.
All 25 were detained for a month while the police investigated the
matter further. On October 11, Jerry Needham was arrested and detained
by the SIIB in Port Harcourt without charge for over 15 days (see
Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
Lengthy pretrial detention remained a serious problem. According to
the new Constitution, persons charged with offenses have the right to
an expeditious trial. However, in practice this right was not honored
(see Section 1.c.). The judicial system remained hampered by serious
backlogs, endemic corruption, and undue political influence (see
Section 1.e.). Estimates of the percentage of so-called ATP's (see
Section 1.c.) in the prison population range from 60 to 74 percent of
the estimated 41,000 detainees. For example, in Ikoyi prison, over 90
percent of inmates, or over 1,500 individuals, are ATP's. In the Kiri
Kiri maximum-security prison in Lagos, approximately 1,000 of the 1,605
inmates were ATP's; approximately 2,100 of the 2,300 prisoners at the
Kiri Kiri medium-security prison were ATP's. Many prisons held 200 to
300 percent more persons than they were designed to hold, and many of
the ATP's had been detained for periods far longer than the maximum
allowable sentence for the crimes for which they have yet to be tried.
Police cited their inability to transport detainees to trial on their
scheduled trial dates as one reason why so many of the detainees were
denied a trial.
Persons who happen to be nearby when a crime is committed normally
are held for interrogation for periods ranging from a few hours to
several months. Even after their release, those detained are asked to
return repeatedly for further questioning. Police and members of the
NDLEA continued the practice of placing relatives and friends of wanted
suspects in detention without criminal charge to induce suspects to
surrender to arrest, although this was done much less often than under
the Abacha regime (see Section 1.f.).
On a number of occasions security forces beat and detained
journalists (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
Both the Governments of Abubakar and Obasanjo continued to release
political detainees from previous regimes. Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, leader
of the Muslim Brotherhood, who had been detained since 1996 on charges
of seditious publishing, was released in January. On March 4 and March
23, the Government announced the release of most of its remaining
political detainees. During the year, all political detainees are
believed to have been released. On March 4, eight armed forces officers
and six civilians detained since December 1997 for an alleged coup plot
against the Government of General Sani Abacha were released (see
Section 1.a.). Lieutenant General Oladipo Diya, Deputy Head of State to
Abacha, was among those released. Also on March 4, 17 armed forces
officers detained since 1995 for an alleged coup plot against Abacha
were released. Colonel Lawan Gwadabe and Colonel Babatunde Bello-
Fadile, both accused of fomenting the 1995 plot, were among that group.
On March 24, the Government released eight more armed forces officers
held since 1990 in connection with an alleged coup attempt during that
year in which one person was killed. Turner Ogboru, a civilian relative
of one of the alleged coup plotters, was released in 1998. Ogburu, a
lawyer arrested in 1990 for allegedly participating with his brother,
Great Ogboru, in the 1990 coup attempt, was convicted by a special
military tribunal that year, granted a pardon in 1993, ordered
released, and then rearrested in 1995. In addition in mid-June
Obasanjo's Government released over 100 persons who had been suspected
of improper acts that resulted in the failure of several banks during
Abacha's regime. Many of these suspects had been detained for periods
of 4 years without being charged.
Four political detainees remained in custody. Two retired armed
forces officers alleged to have participated in the 1990 coup plot,
Trooper Innocent Ofem Anang and Lance Corporal Lucky Iviero, still were
being detained. There was no apparent reason why these two men remained
in custody, since six of their alleged coconspirators, who had been
sentenced to life imprisonment, were released in March. Also, the
Government reportedly pardoned all alleged coup plotters in 1992.
In July Abacha's presidential security officer who is widely
believed to have orchestrated killings, torture, and hundreds of
extrajudicial detentions brought suit against the FederalGovernment
because he was detained without being charged with a crime (see Section
1.a.). The suit later was dropped.
The 1999 Constitution prohibits the expulsion of citizens, and the
Government does not use forced exile. Many citizens who had lived
abroad due to fear of persecution under the Abacha regime returned to
the country during the year, especially after the civilian government
of Olusegun Obasanjo was inaugurated on May 29.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Both the suspended 1979
Constitution and the never implemented 1989 Constitutions, as well as
the new Constitution promulgated on May 29, provide for an independent
judiciary; however, in practice, the judiciary remained subject to
executive and legislative branch pressure, influence by political
leaders at both the state and federal levels, and suffers from
corruption and inefficiency. During the first 5 months of the year,
under the military regime, both the Head of State (Abubakar) and the
Provisional Ruling Council exerted undue influence on the judiciary. In
addition understaffing, inefficiency, and corruption continued to
prevent the judiciary from functioning adequately. Citizens encountered
long delays and frequent requests for small bribes primarily due to a
lack of sufficient resources necessary for the court system.
Under the new Constitution, the regular court system is composed of
federal and state trial courts, state appeals courts, the Federal Court
of Appeal, and the Federal Supreme Court. There also are Shari'a
(Islamic) and customary (traditional) courts of appeal for each state
and for the federal capital territory (Abuja). Courts of the first
instance include magistrate or district courts, customary or
traditional courts, Shari'a courts, and for some specified cases, the
state high courts. The nature of the case usually determines which
court has jurisdiction. In principle customary and Shari'a courts have
jurisdiction only if both plaintiff and defendant agree. However, in
practice fear of legal costs, delays, and distance to alternative
venues encouraged many litigants to choose these courts.
Criminal justice procedures call for trial within 3 months of
arraignment for most categories of crimes. Understaffing of the
judiciary, inefficient administrative procedures, petty extortion,
bureaucratic inertia, poor communication between police and prison
officials, and inadequate transportation continued to result in
considerable delays, often stretching to several years, in bringing
suspects to trial (see Section 1.d.).
Trials in the regular court system are public and generally respect
constitutionally protected individual rights, including a presumption
of innocence, the right to be present, to confront witnesses, to
present evidence, and to be represented by legal counsel. However,
there is a widespread perception that judges easily are bribed or
``settled,'' and that litigants cannot rely on the courts to render
impartial judgements. Most prisoners are poor and cannot afford to pay
the very real costs associated with moving their trials forward. As a
result they remain in prison.
Some courts are understaffed. Judges frequently fail to show up for
trials, often because they are pursuing other means of income. In
addition court officials often lack the proper equipment, training, and
motivation for the performance of their duties, again due in no small
part to their inadequate compensation.
There are no legal provisions barring women or other groups from
testifying in civil court or giving their testimony less weight.
However, the testimony of women is usually accorded less weight in
Shari'a courts.
Under the Abubakar Government, military tribunals continued to
operate outside the constitutional court system, but they were used
less and less frequently as military rule waned; the tribunals
officially were disbanded by the implementation of the new Constitution
and the return to civilian rule. The tribunals had in the past been
used to try both military personnel and civilians accused of various
crimes. There was a report in March of a student accused of armed
robbery who was tried and executed by a military tribunal in
southeastern Nigeria. Human rights groups assert that these tribunals
failed to meet internationally accepted standards for fair trial. In
most cases before the tribunals, the accused had the right to legal
counsel, bail, and appeal, although some tribunals substituted a
presumption of guilt for the presumption of innocence, and conviction
rates in the tribunals reportedly exceeded conviction rates in the
regular courts. The decisions of the tribunals were exempt from
judicial review. At year's end, none of the tribunals were operating.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
The Movement for the survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the
Saro-Wiwa family continued to petition President Obasanjo, the Minister
of Justice, and the Oputa Human Rights panel to reverse the verdict of
the Autu Tribunal that convicted Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni-9 in October
1995. At year's end, the Government had not responded to the appeal to
clear the names of Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni activists, who were executed
by the regime of Sani Abacha in November 1995.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The new Constitution prohibits arbitrary interference
with privacy, family, home, or correspondence; however, although
government authorities generally respect these prohibitions,
authorities continued at times to infringe on these rights.
Police and security forces continued the practice of placing
relatives and friends of wanted suspects in detention without criminal
charge to induce suspects to surrender to arrest, although this was
done much less frequently than under the Abacha regime. There were
calls by human rights groups for the police to end the practice.
Members of the armed forces looted property, destroyed buildings,
and drove away many persons from their homes (see Sections 1.a., 1.c.,
and 2.d.).
In October the governor of Zamfara signed into law two bills passed
by the state legislature aimed at instituting Islamic (Shari'a) law in
the state; at year's end, the bills had not been implemented. After the
bills passed, the sale of alcohol was banned in Zamfara state, and the
Government announced that only those persons with beards would win
government contracts (see Section 2.c.); however, the Federal
Government has disregarded the ban on alcohol sales on military
installations.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The 1979 Constitution that
provided for freedom of speech and of the press remained suspended
during the first 5 months of the year, but under Abubakar the
Government significantly relaxed the restrictions on freedom of speech
and of the press that had been instituted during the regime of Sani
Abacha; the new Constitution promulgated in May restored these
freedoms, and under both Abubakar and Obasanjo, the Government
generally respected these rights; however, there were a few exceptions.
Although there is a large and vibrant private domestic press that
is frequently critical of the Government, the Government also owns or
controls many publications. Under Abubakar, all newspapers and
magazines legally were required to register with the Government in
accordance with the Newspaper Registration Board Decree 43 of 1993;
however, most papers refused to register and were not punished for
doing so. Shortly before Abubakar transferred the Government to the
civilian administration in May, he abrogated Decree 43 and its
registration requirements, based on his conviction that the press would
fare better if it were monitored by its own control mechanism. This
mechanism was the Nigerian Press Council, which was charged with the
enforcement of professional ethics and the sanctioning of journalists
who violated these ethics. However, the Press Council soon became a
subject of controversy, with most journalists describing it as a subtle
means of censorship.
The degree creating the Nigerian Press Council (Decree 60) was
signed into law in the last days of the Abubakar regime and immediately
was criticized by the media as ``an undisguised instrument of
censorship and an unacceptable interference with the freedom of the
press.'' Decree 60 replaced the abrogated Decree 43 and attempted to
put control of the practice of journalism into the hands of a body of
journalists who received payment from the Government. The NUJ, the
professional association of all Nigerian journalists, and the Newspaper
Proprietors Association of Nigeria (NPAN), rejected the creation of the
Press Council. Claiming that the Decree establishing the Press Council
contained similar provisions to the abrogated Decree 43, the NPAN
called the Decree unconstitutional and a violation of press freedom, as
there already were enough laws concerning the operation of the press.
The Decree, which virtually made members of the council employees of
the Government, also contained a number of provisions inimical to the
operation of a free press. It gave the Press Council the power to
accredit and register journalists and the power to suspend journalists
from practicing. Like the abrogated Decree 43, Decree 60 required that
publications be registered by the council annually through a system
entitled ``Documentation of Newspapers.'' In applying for registration,
publishers were expected to submit their mission statements and
objectives and could be denied registration if their objectives failed
to satisfy the council. The penalties for practicing without meeting
the council's standard were a fine of $2,500 (250,000naira) or
imprisonment for a term not to exceed 3 years. The Decree also
empowered the council to approve a code of professional and ethical
conduct to guide the press and to ensure compliance by journalists.
Under the Decree, publishers were expected to send a report of the
performance of their publications to the council; failure to do so was
an offense that carried a fine of $1,000 (100,000 naira). The Nigerian
Press Council continued after Obasanjo's inauguration. In fact,
Information Minister Dapo Sarumi expressed the view of the new civilian
Government that the council would continue to operate, and said that
``It is in line with journalists'' demand.'' At year's end, the Council
had not yet begun operating, but remained on the books in principle.
The new Constitution also removed the Mass Media Commission (included
in the 1995 draft Constitution), which aimed at regulating the conduct
of journalists and restricting the circulation of newspapers and
magazines to their states of operation.
On October 11, Jerry Needham, editor of the Ogoni Star newspaper,
was arrested, detained without charges, and reportedly abused by the
SIIB in Port Harcourt, before being released on November 2 (see
Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). In November soldiers at a hospital in Port
Harcourt prevented reporters from interviewing those persons injured in
clashes in Bayelsa State. On a number of other occasions security
forces also beat and detained journalists (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
There were no reports of harassment of advertisers or printers.
However, on February 6 the police and SSS agents raided a printing
company in search of allegedly offensive pamphlets and calendars, and
reportedly seized 80,000 copies of a magazine that they believed to be
``inciting'' and ``capable of undermining the peace and security of the
nation.'' The laws cited for the seizure dealt with national security
issues. According to the Government, the ``news'' seizure was by
mistake and was not directed at the media, and ultimately there did not
appear to be any clear rationale for seizing that particular magazine.
There were no other reports of press seizures. General Abubakar
encouraged a free flow of information from his office by making himself
available for ``on the spot'' interviews.
The press, which was at the forefront of the fight for democracy,
cautiously welcomed the advent of the civilian Government of President
Obasanjo, given Obasanjo's reputed dislike for the press and his choice
of Media Adviser and Information Minister, both of whom were nonmedia
practitioners. However, the initial skepticism diminished and a cordial
working relationship evolved as the administration maintained an open
policy toward the press. Obasanjo granted several interviews to members
of the press and participated in three press forums. The sense of
freedom from retribution enjoyed by journalists encouraged them to
expose corrupt government officials, including the former Speaker of
the House of Representatives, who resigned after the press broke the
story of his falsifying his age and qualifications (see Sections 1.e.
and 3).
There were a few arrests made in the killing and attempted killing
of journalists in previous years (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
There are two national, daily, government-owned newspapers in
English, the New Nigerian and the Daily Times. The New Nigerian has an
additional Hausa edition. Some of the states of the federation have
daily and/or weekly state-owned newspapers in English. There is a
national radio broadcast station, the Federal Radio Corporation of
Nigeria (FRCN), which broadcasts in English, Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, and
other languages. State radio stations broadcast in English and local
languages. The National Television Station (NTA) is federally owned,
and many states also operate television stations. The majority of the
country's print publications and television and radio broadcasting
outlets are privately owned.
President Obasanjo appointed several purportedly radical persons to
prominent positions in government-owned newspapers, radio programs, and
television programs in an attempt to reflect the democratic nature of
the country. In addition several managers of certain media
organizations, which generally were regarded as government mouthpieces
and propaganda machines, were replaced with professionals whose
abilities to deliver objective journalism had been demonstrated in the
past.
Because newspapers and television are relatively expensive and
literacy is not universal, radio remained the most important medium of
mass communication and information. The Government continued to
prohibit nationwide private radio broadcasting during the first 5
months of the year. However, before the transfer of power to Obasanjo,
this prohibition was lifted and 10 applications for radio and
television licenses were submitted to the National Broadcasting
Commission for approval. There were indications that Obasanjo was not
opposed to the issuance of these licenses. However, at year's end, no
new licenses had been issued.
There are nine privately owned television stations in the
southwest, most of which broadcast domestic news and political
commentary. The Press Law of 1993 requires local television stations to
limit programming from other countries to 40 percent. In March 1999 the
Nigerian Broadcasting Commission (NBC) considered terminating licenses
of several television operators that contravened this requirement by
broadcasting more foreign programs than local. The Press Law of 1993
also restricts the foreign content of satellite broadcasting to 20
percent, but the Government did not restrict access to, or reception
of, international cable or satellite television. The Government did not
restrict Internet access, although unreliable and costly digital
telephone service limited access and hindered service providers. All
Internet service providers were privately owned.
The Government controls state-owned media to varying degrees.
However, under Abubakar state-owned media outlets exercised a much
greater measure of editorial freedom than under the Abacha regime, and
this freedom continued under Obasanjo. Following the appointment of a
new Director General for the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), it
began to broadcast several public-interest programs. For example, the
NTA 2 and Channel 5 began broadcasting 24-hours a day to compete with
other independent broadcasters.
While private television and radio broadcasters remained
economically viable on advertising revenues alone, despite the
restrictions that the Government imposed on them, government-sponsored
broadcasters complained that government funding and advertising were
inadequate for their needs.
Under both Abubakar and Obasanjo, journalists and editors of state
media did not fear suspension for their editorial decisions, although
some self-censorship lingered. During the election period all
candidates and parties had opportunities to express their views via the
media.
After the advent of the civilian regime, foreign journalists who
sought to enter the country to cover political developments more easily
obtained visas. Many of the obstacles that previously frustrated
foreign journalists were removed. Officials in the Ministry of
Information responsible for accrediting foreign journalists became more
accommodating.
On January 13, police arrested 22 students for protesting against
tuition increases at Obafemi Awalowo University and expressing
displeasure with decaying conditions at the country's tertiary
educational institutions. The students were released later in the
month.
Throughout the Abacha regime, there was no academic freedom for
students or academic staff, and under Abubakar, there were numerous
student protests, strikes, and demonstrations. However, under Obasanjo,
the new Federal Minister for Education, the President, and the National
Assembly took some concrete steps to address the significant education
problems that the Government inherited from the country's previous
military regimes and sought to restore academic freedom. For example,
setting precedent within the country, Obasanjo engaged in direct dialog
with representatives of the Academic Staff Union of Universities and
representatives of the Student Union to discuss educational reform.
After Obasanjo became President, the level of unrest on university
campuses apparently subsided. However, in August police reportedly
killed student protesters and injured others (see Section 1.a.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The 1999
Constitution provides citizens with the right to assemble freely; and
the Government, especially the civilian regime of Obasanjo, generally
respected this right, although some limits remained, particularly under
Abubakar.
Throughout the year, the Government nominally required organizers
of outdoor public functions to apply for permits, although both
government authorities and those assembling often ignored this
requirement. The Government retained legal provisions banning
gatherings whose political, ethnic, or religious content might lead to
unrest. Open-air religious services away from places of worship
remained prohibited in most states due to religious tensions in various
parts of the country (see Sections 1.a., 2.c., and 5).
There were no reports that the Government or security forces denied
permits for peaceful public meetings; nor were there reports that they
prohibited or disrupted such meetings.
In early January, government authorities declared a state of
emergency, and under it severely restricted freedom of assembly in
Bayelsa State and in the Niger River Delta, in response to continued
violence by members of the Ijaw ethnic minority who sought greater
local autonomy. Freedom of assembly also was restricted during numerous
curfews imposed in various citiesduring periods of ethnic unrest.
Curfews were imposed in the cities of Sagamu, Kano, Warri, and Port
Harcourt in response to interethnic and political violence (see Section
1.a.).
In January police arrested student protesters (see Section 2.a.).
On April 6, police and security agents from the anti-robbery squad
``Operation Sweep'' dispersed members of the National Union of
Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers using tear gas and firing weapons
into the air. The union members were protesting outside of the Chevron-
Nigeria oil headquarters outside Lagos (see Section 6.b.).
The 1999 Constitution provides for the right to associate freely
with other persons in political parties, trade unions, or special
interest associations, and the Government respected this right in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The new Constitution provides for freedom
of religion, including belief, practice, and religious education;
however, the Government restricted this right in practice in certain
respects. The Constitution prohibits state and local Governments from
adopting an official religion; however, it also provides that states
may elect to use Islamic (Shari'a) customary law and courts. The
Constitution also provides that the Federal Government is to establish
a Federal Shari'a Court of Appeal and Final Court of Appeal; however,
the Government had not yet established such courts by year's end. In
1987 the Government instituted a ban (still in effect at year's end) on
religious organizations on campuses of primary schools, although
individual students retain the right to practice their religion in
recognized places of worship.
About half the population is Muslim, about 40 percent Christian,
and about 10 percent practice traditional indigenous religions or no
religion. Religious tensions between Muslims and Christians and between
Sunni and the small number of Shi'ite Muslims occasionally erupted into
violence (see Sections 1.a. and 5). Both the Federal Government and
state governments continued to discourage and criticize public
proselytizing of minority beliefs in areas of Muslim or Christian
majorities, in the belief that it stimulates religious tensions,
although they do not outlaw it. Although distribution of religious
publications remained generally unrestricted, there is a lightly
enforced ban on published religious advertisements. There were only
minor restrictions on religious television and radio programming. Most
religious programs appeared to be broadcast without controls.
In predominantly Muslim communities, local governments commonly
used zoning regulations to stop or slow the creation of non-Muslim,
usually Christian, churches. Typically, a small section of a city was
designated for non-Muslims to build their places of worship. In several
cases, citizens in these enclaves reported that they were discriminated
against by not receiving police protection or waste removal service.
Missionaries reported that law enforcement officials harassed them when
they proselytized outside of their designated zones.
On December 18 Muslim youths attacked and looted 14 Christian
churches in Ilorin, Kwara State. At least two more churches were looted
on December 19, seriously injuring a clergyman (see Section 5). The
Government's response was limited to pleas for calm and understanding,
and there was no attempt to prosecute the perpetrators.
Muslim Brotherhood leader Ibrahim El-Zakzaky was released by
General Abubakar in January. The Federal Government continued to settle
property claims by El-Zakzaky for compensation for his home and mosque,
which were razed by law enforcement officers 2 years ago. In May the
predominantly Shi'a Muslim Brotherhood published a list of 96 of its
followers who still were in prison or awaiting trial on charges that
vary from preaching without a license to homicide. According to police
records, the majority of the 96 prisoners were charged with, or
convicted of, unlawful assembly.
On October 8, the governor of Zamfara Ahmed Sani signed into law
two bills passed by the state legislature aimed at instituting Islamic
(Shari'a) law in the state; the bills were scheduled to take effect in
January 2000. Other northern officials, including many from Kano,
Niger, Sokoto, Jigawa, Borno, Yobe, Kaduna, and Katsina States, began
to echo the call for Shari'a in their states; however, at year's end,
only Kano and Niger had initiated action in their respective state
assemblies on the issue. According to the Zamfara governor, Shari'a
only is supposed to apply to Muslims; however, school children are now
being segregated by sex in Zamfara schools and preparations were
underway for separate transportation and health facilities for men and
women. The Zamfara governor also disbursed public funds to refurbish
mosques and pronounced that only those persons with beards would win
government contracts. The implementation of Shari'a is expected to be
challenged constitutionally, butconstitutional challenges can only
occur after Shari'a has been implemented.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The 1999 Constitution entitles citizens
to move freely throughout the country and reside where they wish, and
in general, the Government respected this right; however, police
occasionally restricted this right by setting up roadblocks and
checkpoints where security and law enforcement officials routinely
engaged in extortion, violence, and excessive use of force (see Section
1.a. and 1.c.). For example, following the security crackdown in
Bayelsa State from December 30, 1998 to January 3, military units
continued to man checkpoints very aggressively, reportedly strip-
searching some travelers in search of scars and tattoos that would
identify them as members of the Egbesu cult (see Sections 1.a. and
1.c.).
The 1999 Constitution also prohibits the denial of exit or entry to
any citizen; and the Government generally respected this law. However,
the law provides that women are required to obtain permission from a
male family member before having an application for a passport
processed.
Both the Abubakar and the Obasanjo Governments welcomed the return
of prominent human rights and prodemocracy activists who fled the
country during the regime of General Sani Abacha. The impediments to
travel under the Abacha regime for the most part were eliminated.
Unlike the previous year, there were no reports that Government denied
passports to political figures or journalists, detained such persons
entering or leaving the country, or interrogated citizens who were
issued visas to foreign countries.
During periods of civil unrest, numerous persons were displaced
temporarily from their villages. For example, during the January 10
violence in Bayelsa State, approximately 10,000 persons fled their
villages (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). The villagers returned once the
violence ceased. According to local human rights NGO's, at least 10,000
Odi residents fled into neighboring states during the November military
exercise (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
The Government cooperated with the Lagos office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian agencies in
assisting refugees through the National Commission for Refugees and its
Federal Commissioner. Regulations governing the granting of refugee
status, asylum, and resettlement are outlined in Decree 52 of 1989,
which incorporates many aspects of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Eligibility Committee
established under Decree 52 reviews refugee and resettlement
applications. A representative from the UNHCR participates in this
committee. The issue of the provision of first asylum has not arisen
since the establishment of the National Commission for Refugees under
Decree 52.
At year's end, there were 8,958 recognized refugees: 13 from
Angola, 23 from Benin, 1,313 from Cameroon, 1,665 from Sierra Leone,
1,505 from Chad, 115 from Sudan, 135 from Ghana, 3,954 from Liberia,
and 453 from other countries. Of these, the UNHCR repatriated 50 Sierra
Leonians and 89 Liberians. It resettled 3 Cameroonians, 3 Chadians, 5
Sudanese, 13 Liberians, and 17 from other countries.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Rights of Citizens to
Change Their Government
For the first time since 1983, citizens had the opportunity to
exercise their right to change their government. General Abdulsalami
Abubakar oversaw a transition to civilian rule that included elections
for local governments (in December 1998), state governors and
assemblies (in January), and national legislators and the president (in
February). Voter apathy and widespread fraud marred the legislative
elections; however, the turnout increased for the presidential race a
week later, which proceeded peacefully with reports of only a few
violent incidents. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)
certified former president Olusegun Obasanjo's victory over Chief Olu
Falae with a reported 62 percent of the votes.
Irregularities occurred at each stage of the electoral process,
particularly the presidential nominating convention and election where,
for example, large sums of money were offered by both political camps
to delegates to vote against political opponents. During the
presidential election, international observers and foreign diplomats
witnessed serious irregularities in procedures. All three parties
engaged in the local purchase of false ballots and fraudulent tally
sheets so that there were vast discrepancies between what observers saw
and inflatedtallies in some areas. In addition there were
administrative problems such as late delivery of voting materials at a
large number of polling stations. Those areas with the worst problems
were the southern tier of states in the Niger Delta region, several
states in Igboland, and a handful of north central states. The
production of ``ghost votes'' in these states amounted to as much as 70
or 80 percent of the total reported votes. Although all parties engaged
in attempts to rig the vote, the PDP machine in the Delta and Igboland
was responsible for the worst excesses. These votes may have added an
estimated 15 percent to Obasanjo's total figure; however, observers
believe that even if they were thrown out, he still would have
maintained roughly a 15 percent lead over Falae's total. International
observers confirmed the results and stated that, despite widespread
fraud, Obasanjo's victory reflected the will of most voters. Although
Falae initially protested the election results, eventually he dropped
his legal challenge. Obasanjo, 109 senators, 366 members of the
National Assembly, and 36 governors and state assemblies assumed office
on May 29. The President, Vice President, and other national and state
officials serve 4-year terms. The next elections are scheduled for
2003. INEC issued a report on the conduct of the election in July that
documented the fraud. INEC is working with several international
electoral assistance organizations to help improve the process in 2003;
however, no INEC officials have faced disciplinary action as result of
their involvement in corrupt activities.
Prior to leaving office in May, Abubakar promulgated a new
Constitution that outlaws the seizure of the Government by force and
contains provisions for the removal of the President, Vice President,
ministers, legislators, and state government officials for gross
misconduct or medical reasons. The Government's first test case
occurred in July when the Speaker of the House, Sanusi Buhari, resigned
after press reports revealed that he was under the legal age limit to
hold office and that he falsified his academic credentials (see Section
2.a.). He resigned after a National Assembly investigation confirmed
the reports. In addition he was convicted by the Abuja High Court in
early August for lying under oath. Although the fine of $20 (about
2,000 naira) was criticized widely as too low, most citizens agreed
that the system worked. Several other public officials were subjected
to close scrutiny by the press, public, and legislative investigators.
The political system remains in transition. The three branches of
the new Government acted independently during the President's first
months in office. Despite his party's substantial majority in the
legislature, the President was not able to exercise authority without
legislative oversight and inclusiveness. The Senate and the House of
Representatives took the screening of government ministers,
ambassadorial appointments, budget review, and other executive
initiatives seriously and amended the Government's budget request and
various personnel procedures. They also rejected several ministerial
and ambassadorial appointments. Obasanjo created several commissions to
investigate past government contracts and human rights abuses, which
were overwhelmed with applications to present evidence of wrongdoing
(see Section 4). However, the judicial branch remained weakened by
years of neglect and politicization.
Abubakar's military Government, which consulted with a selected
group of constitutional and legal experts around the country to revise
the 1979 and 1995 Constitutions, promulgated the 1999 Constitution on
May 5. The constitution-writing process was criticized for not being
open to enough participants and for not being subjected to wider debate
on the country's federal structure, revenue allocation and power-
sharing formulas, and minority ethnic groups' rights.
Although the Constitution allows the free formation of political
parties, only three parties were registered with the INEC. The
Constitution requires parties to have membership in two-thirds of the
country's 36 states.
There were no legal impediments to political participation or
voting by women; however, men continued to dominate the political
arena. NGO's continued to protest the underrepresentation of women in
the political process, and women were underrepresented in the new
civilian Government. Only 6 women were appointed as ministers out of a
total of 56 positions. Three women were among the Senate's 109 members
(compared with 8 in the last government) and only 12 women were elected
to the 366-member National Assembly. Women's rights groups pushed
local, state, and the Federal Government (and state and local levels as
well) to adopt a 30 percent affirmative action program; however, these
efforts were to no avail.
There are no legal impediments to participation in government by
members of any ethnic group. The Constitution requires that government
appointments reflect the country's ``federal character.'' However, with
over 250 ethnic groups, not everygroup can be represented in the
Government. The federal- and state-level ministers generally are
selected to represent the country's regional, ethnic, and religious
makeup. President Obasanjo attempted to create an ethnically inclusive
Government. The 56-member Cabinet and 109 ambassadorial slots were
allocated to an equal number of candidates from each state to achieve a
regional balance. Despite this effort, northerners and southeasterners
criticized the new Government for favoring westerners or ethnic
Yorubas.
Middle-belt and Christian officers dominate the military hierarchy.
In June Obasanjo retired all military officers that held political
office, which meant that a disproportionate number of northern Hausa
officers--who dominated the upper ranks under the previous military
regimes--left the service.
Section 4. Government Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government permitted local human rights groups to operate and
did not interfere with their activities; nor did it detain, intimidate,
or harass their members. Criticisms of the Government's past human
rights record were abundant in various media. High-level government
officials noted that the human rights community assisted in the
advancement of democracy.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is active, with
offices in Abuja and Lagos under the direction of a regional delegate.
Its primary human rights activities during the year involved the
training of prison officials on human rights, sanitation, and prisoner
health.
During the year, the Government cooperated extensively with both
national and international human rights groups. For example, between
March 30 and April 1, General Abubakar's Government hosted the third
West African Human Rights Forum in Abuja. The event was sponsored by
and held at the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Secretariat. Representatives from other governments, all of the ECOWAS
member states, and several NGO's attended. Participants reported that
the panels and discussions were very frank, open, and productive. In
addition the Government permitted the ICRC to visit prisons to provide
training and to give advice on how to improve the human rights of
prisoners.
The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), established by the
Abacha regime in 1996, enjoyed greater recognition by and coordination
with NGO's, but still lacks credibility as an independent monitoring
body.
The National Human Rights Commission was established by decree in
1996. It is tasked with monitoring and protecting human rights in
Nigeria. The commission is chaired by a retired Chief Justice of the
Nigerian Supreme Court, Paul Nwokedi, and includes eight other members.
The NHRC also is represented in some states by state-level affiliates.
The NHRC is supposed to work hand-in-hand with NGO's that are devoted
to human rights issues. While during the year the commission achieved
such things as a syllabus for human rights education for primary and
secondary schools and universities (yet to be instituted), since its
inception, the NHRC has been denied adequate funding to do its job
properly. President Obasanjo reportedly promised to increase its
funding but had not done so by year's end. The NHRC is a permanent
commission of the Government.
The Justice Oputa panel is a one-time panel that was established in
June by President Obasanjo to investigate human rights abuses dating to
1960. The Oputa panel can recommend courses of action to the justice
system for perpetrators of past abuses, something the NHRC does not do.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The 1999 Constitution provides citizens with the right to freedom
from discrimination based on ``community, place of origin, ethnic
group, sex, religion, or political opinion.'' However, customary and
religious discrimination against women persisted, occasional religious
violence persisted, social discrimination on the basis of both religion
and ethnicity remained widespread, and ethnic and regional tensions
continued to contribute to serious violence both between groups of
citizens and between citizens and the security forces.
Women.--Reports of spousal abuse are common, especially those of
wife beating in polygynous families. Police normally do not intervene
in domestic disputes, which seldom are discussed publicly. The Penal
Code permits husbands to use physical means to chastise their wives as
long as it does not result in ``grievous harm,'' which is defined as
loss of sight, hearing,power of speech, facial disfigurement, or other
life threatening injuries. A women's rights group has estimated that
spousal abuse occurs in 20 percent of adult relationships. In more
traditional areas of the country, courts and police are reluctant to
intervene to protect women who accuse their husbands formally if the
level of alleged abuse does not exceed customary norms in the areas.
Rape, prostitution, and sexual harassment continue to be problems.
Prostitution is not illegal; pandering is. In some parts of the
country, women continue to be harassed for social and religious
reasons. Purdah, the Islamic practice of keeping girls and women in
seclusion from men outside the family, continued in parts of the far
north.
There is an active market for trafficking in women to Europe, and
elsewhere, for illicit purposes (see Section 6.f.).
Women experience considerable discrimination as well as physical
abuse. There are no laws barring women from particular fields of
employment, but women often experience discrimination because the
Government tolerates customary and religious practices that adversely
affect them. The Nigerian NGO's Coalition (NNC) expressed concern about
continued discrimination against women in the private sector,
particularly in access to employment, promotion to higher professional
positions, and in salary inequality. There are credible reports that
several businesses operate with a ``get pregnant, get fired'' policy.
Women remain underrepresented in the formal sector but play an active
and vital role in the country's important informal economy. While the
number of women employed in the business sector increases every year,
women do not receive equal pay for equal work and often find it
extremely difficult to acquire commercial credit or to obtain tax
deductions or rebates as heads of households. Unmarried women in
particular endure many forms of discrimination.
While some women have made considerable individual progress, both
in the academic and business world, women remain underprivileged.
Although women are not barred legally from owning land, under some
customary land tenure systems only men can own land, and women can gain
access to land only through marriage or family. In addition many
customary practices do not recognize a woman's right to inherit her
husband's property, and many widows were rendered destitute when their
in-laws took virtually all of the deceased husband's property. Widows
are subjected to unfavorable conditions as a result of discriminatory
traditional customs and economic deprivation.
``Confinement'' is the most common rite of deprivation to which
widows are subjected, and it occurs predominately in eastern Nigeria.
Confined widows are under restrictions for as long as 1 year and
usually are required to shave their heads and dress in black garments.
In other areas, a widow is considered a part of her husband's property,
to be ``inherited'' by his family. Polygyny continues to be practiced
widely among all ethnic groups and among Christians as well as Muslims
and practitioners of traditional persuasions. Women are required by law
to obtain permission from a male family member to get a passport (see
Section 2.d.). The testimony of women is not equal to that of men in
Shari'a courts (see Section 1.e.).
Women are discriminated against in access to education for social
and economic reasons. The literacy rate for males is 58 percent but
only 41 percent for females. Rural women are even more disadvantaged
than their urban counterparts. Only 42 percent of rural girls are
enrolled in school compared with 72 percent of urban girls. In the
north, Muslim communities favor boys over girls in deciding which
children to enroll in secondary and elementary schools. In the south,
economic hardship also restricts many families' ability to send girls
to school and, instead, they are directed into commercial activities
such as trading and street merchandizing.
A visiting Hausa woman in the southwest part of the country who
violated a religious taboo against women's viewing a Yoruba festival
was killed by a mob (see Sections 1.a., and 5-Religious Minorities).
In October the governor of Zamfara signed into law two bills passed
by the state legislature aimed at instituting Islamic (Shari'a) law in
the state. As a result, in Zamfara State plans for separate
transportation and health facilities for men and women already had
begun to be implemented by year's end (see Section 2.c.).
A national network of women's rights NGO's described the
Government's 1998 report on the implementation of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) for
the period 1986-94 as ``inaccurate'' in its positive portrayal of the
status of women. The NGO coalition for a shadow report on the
implementation of CEDAW (NGO CEDAW Coalition) issued an alternative
report in March critical of the Government's failure to remove legal
impediments and social discrimination faced by women.
Children.--Public schools continued to be inadequate, and limited
facilities precluded access to education for many children. The
Constitution's general provisions call for the Government, ``when
practical,'' to provide free, compulsory, and universal primary
education; however, despite the President's commitment to compulsory
education, compulsory primary education rarely was provided,
particularly in the north (see Section 6.d.). While the Government
increased spending on children's health in recent years, it seldom
enforced even the inadequate laws designed to protect the rights of
children. The Abubakar Government promised to improve children's
welfare, but there was no action on the commitment during the first
half of the year.
Cases of child abuse, abandoned infants, child prostitution, and
physically harmful child labor practices (see Section 6.d.) remained
common throughout the country. Although the law stipulates that ``no
child shall be ordered to be imprisoned,'' juvenile offenders are
incarcerated routinely along with hardened adult criminals. The
Government only occasionally criticized child abuse and neglect, and it
made little effort to stop customary practices harmful to children,
such as the sale of young girls into marriage. There were credible
reports that poor families sell their daughters into marriage as a
means of supplementing their income. Young girls often are forced into
marriage as soon as they reach puberty, regardless of age, in order to
prevent the ``indecency'' associated with premarital sex.
In October the governor of Zamfara signed into law two bills passed
by the state legislature aimed at instituting Islamic (Shari'a) law in
the state. As a result, school children are now being segregated by sex
in Zamfara schools (see Section 2.c.).
There was evidence of trafficking in children (see Section 6.f.).
The Government publicly opposes FGM, which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health. The Government took no legal action against the
practice; in the past, government officials (notably in the Ministry of
Health) supported the campaign against FGM, which was spearheaded by
private groups. FGM still was practiced extensively in all parts of the
country but was more predominant in the southern and eastern zones; it
was practiced among all ethnic and religious groups. According to an
NNC study, an estimated 33 percent of all households practice the
procedure. Current estimates place the prevalence of FGM at between 40
and 50 percent of all females, although estimates vary. Studies
conducted by the U.N. Development Systems and the World Health
Organization estimated the FGM rate at approximately 60 percent among
the nation's female population. However, according to local experts,
the actual prevalence may be as high as 90 percent. Nevertheless, most
agree that the number of females now subjected to FGM is declining.
Indigenous forms of FGM vary from the simple removal of the
clitoral hood or labia minora to excision of the clitoris and the most
dangerous form, infibulation. The age at which females are subjected to
the practice varies from the first week of life until after a woman
delivers her first child. The Ministry of Health, women's groups, and
many NGO's sponsored public awareness projects to educate communities
about the health hazards of FGM. The press repeatedly criticized the
practice.
People with Disabilities.--While the Government called for private
business to institute policies that ensured fair treatment for the
disabled, it did not enact any laws requiring greater accessibility to
buildings or public transportation, nor did it formulate any policy
specifically ensuring the right of the disabled to work. Novelist
Chinua Achebe, who is confined to a wheelchair after an automobile
accident, returned to the country in early September and vowed to push
the Government on accessibility issues for the disabled.
Religious Minorities.--The law prohibits religious discrimination.
Nonetheless, reports were common that government officials
discriminated against persons practicing a religion different from
their own, notably in hiring or awarding contracts. Private businesses
frequently are guilty of informal religious discrimination in their
hiring practices.
Religious differences often correspond to regional and ethnic
differences. For example, the northern region is overwhelmingly Muslim,
as are the large Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups of that region. Many
southern ethnic groups are predominantly Christian. Consequently, at
times it is difficult to distinguish religious discrimination and
tension from ethnic and regional discrimination and tension, which is
pervasive.
Religious tensions underscored what were predominantly ethnic
confrontations throughout the year. The Hausa-Yoruba clashes in the
cities of Sagamu and Kano represented conflicts between the Muslim
Hausa and the religiously diverse Christian Yorubas. There were regular
clashes in northern Nigeria between Shi'a Muslim groups and Sunni
Muslims. Sporadic incidents of attacks on individual religious leaders
were reported, but the nature and perpetrators of the attacks varied,
and there was not a pattern of one religious group attacking another
(see Section 1.a.).
A Hausa woman who violated a religious taboo against women's
viewing a Yoruba festival was killed by a mob (see Sections 1.a. and 5-
Women).
Churches were burned and Christian homes and businesses were
vandalized in the north, and in other areas of the country. On December
18 and 19, Muslim youths attacked and looted 16 Christian churches in
Ilorin, Kwara state. The attacks were perpetrated by a mob of
approximately 1,000 Muslim youths that inflicted serious property
damage and severely injured at least one Christian cleric. Police
eventually restored order, and Kwara State officials pleaded for calm
and tolerance among religious groups, but there was no attempt to
prosecute the perpetrators.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population of
about 120 million is ethnically diverse, and consists of more than 250
groups, many of which speak distinct primary languages and are
concentrated geographically. There is no majority ethnic group. The
three largest ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani of the north, the Yoruba
of the southwest, and the Igbos of the southeast, together make up
about two-thirds of the population. The fourth largest group, the Ijaw,
claims a population of 12 million.
The 1999 Constitution prohibits ethnic discrimination by the
Government. In addition the Constitution mandates that the composition
of the federal, state, and local Governments and their agencies, as
well as the conduct of their affairs, reflect the diverse character of
the country in order to promote national unity and loyalty. This
provision was designed as a safeguard against domination of the
Government by persons from a few states or ethnic and sectional groups.
These provisions were included in response to previous domination of
the Government and the armed forces by northerners and Muslims. The
Government of Olusegun Obasanjo was an example of this diversity.
Obasanjo is a Yoruba from the southwest, the Vice President is a
northerner, and the Senate President is an Igbo. The Obasanjo
Government's ministerial and ambassadorial appointments were made by
selecting an equal number of nominees from each state and then
balancing key positions and deputy slots among the different regions
and ethnic groups. For example, the Minister of Defense is from one of
the middle-belt states, while his deputy is a southwestern Yoruba. The
Senate used its oversight role to reject many of Obasanjo's
ambassadorial appointments and insisted on three nominees from each
state for each appointment. The political parties also engaged in
``zoning,'' the practice of rotating positions within the party among
the different regions and ethnicities to ensure that each region and
ethnicity is given adequate representation. Nonetheless, claims of
marginalization by members of southern minority groups and Igbos
continued. The ethnic groups of the Niger Delta, in particular,
continued their calls for high-level representation on petroleum issues
and within the security forces. Northern Muslims, who lost previously
held positions within the military hierarchy, accused the Obasanjo
Government of favoring southerners. Traditional linkages continued to
impose considerable pressure on individual Government officials to
favor their own ethnic groups for important positions and patronage.
Societal discrimination on the basis of ethnicity is widely
practiced by members of all ethnic groups and is evident in private
sector hiring patterns, de facto ethnic segregation of urban
neighborhoods, and a continuing paucity of marriages across major
ethnic and regional lines. There is a long history of tension among the
diverse ethnic groups. In July at least 100 persons were killed during
intercommunal fighting in the southern city of Sagamu between Hausas
and Yorubas after a Hausa failed to observe the customs of a
traditional Yoruba festival (see Section 1.a.). When the bodies of the
Hausa victims were returned to the northern, predominantly Hausa, city
of Kano a week later, another round of ethnic clashes broke out,
resulting in another 80 deaths and extensive property damage. Many
Yorubas and other non-Hausa residents of Kano attempted to escape the
rioting and sought refuge in police stations and army barracks. No
Hausa-Yoruba violence related to that reciprocal bloodletting was
reported in Lagos, the country's largest and most cosmopolitan city
with a large Hausa minority. However, there were repeated clashes
between predominantly Hausa truck drivers transporting herds of cattle,
Fulani herders, andLagosian tanker-truck drivers, all vying for access
to the same roads. In late November, fighting between Yoruba and Hausa
traders in the market area of Ketu, a Lagos suburb, resulted in over 50
deaths, apparently over the issue of the collection of fees and the
allocation of stalls (see Section 1.a.).
The competing aspirations and tensions among the smaller ethnic
groups related to the control and powers of subnational governments
occasionally erupted into violence. Clashes occurred between rival
ethnic groups in Delta, Rivers, Benue, Cross River, Bayelsa, Osun,
Kaduna, Plateau, and Taraba States, often resulting in fatalities. For
example, in May approximately 130 persons died in Kafanchan, Kaduna
State during a sharp disagreement over a chiefdom dispute. Clashes
between the Jokun and the Tiv in Benue and Taraba States occurred
sporadically throughout the year and resulted in several hundred
deaths. The dispute between the two groups has existed for years and
stems mainly from contested land claims. The ongoing Government review
of boundaries for state and local government areas sparked several
communal clashes, most notably in Ife-Modakeke, Osun State and in
Warri, Delta State.
The Ijaw ethnic group continued to be involved in disputes with the
Ilaje group of Ondo and northern delta states, with the neighboring
Itsekiri and Urhobo groups in the Warri area of Delta State, and with
tribal elders and government forces. The conflict between the Ilaje and
Ijaw resulted in the most deaths, with hundreds killed. The clashes
resulted from a dispute over the moving of a local government
headquarters to Ilaje territory and the construction of what the Ilaje
believed to be an Ijaw traditional religious shrine on Ilaje territory.
Skirmishes between the Ilaje and Ijaw residents in Lagos resulted in
five deaths in July. The trouble around Warri, a regional headquarters
town for many international oil companies, began with another
relocation (in 1997) of a local government headquarters from Ijaw to
Isekiri territory. Protests over this relocation escalated into
periodic violence in which at least 200 persons died. The violence
spread to include fatal clashes between rival youth groups, including
those of Urhobo ethnicity. In May at least 1,300 Itsekiri were
displaced and at least 50 persons died during an Ijaw raid on the
village of Ugborodo in Escravos. In September the Delta State assembly
passed a bill relocating four local government area headquarters (three
to Ijaw territory and one to Itsekiri). Military and police units were
deployed to prevent disturbances. Meanwhile, dissatisfaction with
tribal elders who accepted ``settlement'' money from the Government to
quiet community protests over oil spills or perceived problems with the
local oil companies led to increased expulsions of tribal elders from
villages in Bayelsa State by youth groups.
There were unconfirmed reports that members of the armed forces
beat and raped members of ethnic minorities (see Section 1.c.).
According to MOSOP, after General Abubakar came to power in June
1998, the repression of the Ogonis came to an abrupt end. The Ogoni, an
ethnic group indigenous to Rivers State (one of the oil-producing
areas), maintains that the Government sought to deprive the group of
its land and wealth, and seized Ogoni property without fair
compensation, ignored the environmental impact of oil production on
Ogoni land, and failed to provide adequate public services, such as
water and electricity. The conflict between the Ogoni and the
Government had resulted in a significant amount of repression; however,
the previous repression of the Ogoni eased significantly under the
Governments of Abubakar and Obasanjo. During the year, all Ogoni
political detainees were released from detention and allowed access to
the remains of executed leaders (see Section 1.d.). The curfew in
Ogoniland was removed, and the military task force dispatched to
Ogoniland was disbanded, although a police presence remained. Ogoni
leaders met with General Abubakar throughout the beginning of the year;
President Obasanjo met less frequently with them. In December the
Rivers State government issued a white paper that favored the Eleme--an
Ogoni clan. The Orikras were ordered to pay compensation to the Eleme
for the villages that they had destroyed.
Other ethnic minorities, particularly in Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa,
and Akwa Ibom States, have echoed Ogoni claims of environmental
degradation and government indifference to their development. Groups
such as the Ijaw, Itsekiri, Urhobo, and Isoko grew increasingly vocal
in expressing their unhappiness about their perceived economic
exploitation and the environmental destruction of their homelands, and
incidents of ethnic conflict and confrontation with government forces
increased in the delta area, particularly after the Ijaw Youth Council
issued the Kaiama Declaration in December 1998 (see Section 1.a.).
Other ethnic groups saw the Kaiama Declaration, which terms the entire
delta the property of the Ijaw, as threatening their rights. Disparate
organizations of youths from a variety of ethnic groups continued to
take oil company personnel hostage in the delta region (see Section
1.b.). In August a foreign company evacuated its foreign employees from
Bayelsa State after youths seized several oil platforms, helicopters,
and foreign hostages.
The same company evacuated its staff from the town of Warri after
protesters demanding employment for more local persons overran its
offices. As a result of this violence, many oil companies employed
local police, and in some cases military troops, to protect their
facilities and personnel. Local youths claimed that these ``militias''
engaged in extrajudicial killings and other human rights abuses, in
some cases with the support of foreign oil companies (see Section
1.a.).
The Government introduced the Niger Delta Development Commission
bill to the legislature in August. The bill and the proposed commission
were criticized heavily by a wide range of Niger Delta groups, which
subsequently demanded amendments to the bill to increase the government
resources committed to the area and grant more local autonomy over the
expenditure of these resources. The amendments also sought to change
the composition of the commission by including NGO's and removing
officials from states that these groups perceived to be outside the
Niger Delta region. The Senate and House passed two different versions
of the bill in December. The main differences included the proposed
location of the commission headquarters (the Senate favored Yenagoa,
Bayelsa State, and the House favored Port Harcourt, Rivers State), as
well as differing formulas for funding the commission. At year's end,
the Senate differences had not been resolved. However, the bill had
been amended from its original version to incorporate some local
demands.
In September the Government began an investigation into all
contracts previously awarded under the auspices of the Oil and Minerals
Producing Areas Development Commission. This commission, established in
1992 during the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida, widely was
regarded as corrupt and ineffective in improving the conditions of
Niger Delta residents.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution promulgated in May
gives all citizens the right freely to assemble and associate and to
belong to any political party, trade union, or any other association
for the protection of their interests. Prior to the new Constitution
taking effect, Abubakar's Government had enacted Decrees 1 and 2 in
February; these Decrees repealed several Abacha-era Decrees that
limited freedom of association and were not subject to legal challenge.
These included: Decree 4 of 1996, which required unions to pay 10
percent of members' dues to the Nigerian Labor Congress (NLC), forced
the merger of 41 unions into 29, and proscribed professional union
organizers from holding NLC positions (effectively eliminating most
general secretaries from contention); Decree 26 of 1996, which provided
the labor minister with broad authority to dissolve unions, required
the inclusion of ``no strike'' clauses in collective bargaining
agreements, and prohibited professional labor leaders from holding
senior positions in unions or the NLC; and Decree 29 of 1996, which
prohibited NLC and union affiliation with international labor bodies
(except the Organization of African Trade Union Unity and the
Organization of Trade Unions of West Africa) without the express
permission of the Labor Minister.
Workers, except members of the armed forces and employees
designated as essential by the Government, may join trade unions.
Essential employees include police, firefighters, central bank
employees, security printers (printers of currency, passports, and
government forms), and customs and excise staff. The Teaching Essential
Services Decree issued in 1993 included education in the essential
service list, but it did not proscribe education sector unions.
According to the President of the Nigerian Labor Congress, total
union membership is approximately 4 million. Approximately 10 percent
of the total work force belong to unions. With the exception of a small
number of workers in food processing enterprises, the agricultural
sector, which employs the bulk of the work force, is not unionized.
Most of the informal sector and practically all small businesses remain
nonunionized.
Since 1978 the Government has mandated a single trade union
structure with service and industrial unions grouped under the NLC. The
trade union movement is composed of two groups consisting of junior and
senior staff workers. The junior staff workers--primarily blue collar
workers--are organized into 29 industrial unions with a membership of
over 4.5 million persons and are affiliated with the NLC. Twenty-one
unions make up the Senior Staff Consultative Association of Nigeria
(SESCAN), which has a membership of over 600,000. SESCAN--which is
composed primarily of white-collar workers--has never been officially
sanctioned by the Government and is prohibited from affiliating with
the NLC. SESCAN began the legal process to achieve government
recognition. In accordance with Abubakar's liberalization scheme, the
NLC held free elections for its executive council in January. Under
Abacha Executive Council members were government appointees and most
prominent laborleaders were prohibited from holding executive positions
within the NLC.
After the repeal in February of the Abacha-era decrees, the right
to strike was restored to workers. There were several strikes
throughout the year, and labor seminars and labor-related activities
proceeded without undue interference from police or security
authorities, although an occasional march or rally resulted in police
stepping in to disperse marching workers perceived to be a threat to
government facilities. In March the NLC ordered a nationwide work
stoppage for all of its public sector employees until respective state
governments paid--or agreed to pay--a new national minimum wage
approved by Abubakar. For 9 weeks, beginning April 13, all primary and
postprimary schools nationwide were shut down following a prolonged
strike action ordered by the Nigeria Union of Teachers, again in
protest over nonpayment of wages. Another weeklong strike by teachers
ended on June 22 after President Obasanjo released approximately $45
million (4.5 billion naira) for the payment of a newly established
minimum wage. On August 10, members of the NLC marched on the National
Assembly to protest demands by legislators for what the NLC perceived
to be exorbitant furniture allowances.
On April 6, members of Lagos State's anticrime task force severely
beat members of the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers
(NUPENG) when they assembled at the Lagos headquarters of an oil
company to protest the dismissal of several union workers (see Section
1.c.).
There are no laws prohibiting retribution against strikers and
strike leaders, but strikers who believe that they are victims of
unfair retribution may submit their cases to the Industrial Arbitration
Panel (IAP) with prior approval of the Labor Ministry. The IAP's
decisions are binding on all parties but may be appealed to the
Nigerian Industrial Court (NIC). Union representatives have described
the arbitration process as cumbersome and time consuming and not an
effective deterrent to retribution against strikers.
With the repeal of Decree 29 of 1996, the NLC and labor unions are
now free to affiliate with international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The labor laws
provide for both the right to organize and the right to bargain
collectively between management and trade unions. Collective bargaining
continues in many sectors of the economy. Complaints of antiunion
discrimination may be brought to the Ministry of Labor for mediation
and conciliation. The Labor Minister may refer unresolved disputes to
the IAP and the NIC (see Section 6.a.). Union officials have questioned
the independence of the NIC in view of its refusal in previous years to
resolve various disputes stemming from the Government's failure to
fulfill contract provisions for public sector employees. Union leaders
also have criticized the arbitration system's dependence on the Labor
Minister's referrals. The Labor Minister made no referrals to the IAP
since assuming office, and the NIC is moribund due to the Government's
failure to appoint members to the body.
The Government of President Obasanjo has directed each state
administration to establish its own salary structure on the basis of
its ability to pay and with reference to the national minimum wage (see
Section 6.e.). The Government's decision was taken without consultation
with the civil service unions. Several state governments complained
that they could not afford to pay the $40 (3,800 naira) monthly minimum
wage to their employees and individually were attempting to agree to a
state-specific minimum wage.
An export-processing zone remains under development in Calabar,
Cross River State, while a second is planned for Port Harcourt, Rivers
State. Workers and employers in such zones are to be subject to
national labor laws.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The 1974 Labor
Decree and the 1999 Constitution prohibit forced or compulsory labor,
and it generally is not known to occur; however, trafficking in women
and children for purposes of forced prostitution and forced labor is a
problem (see Section 6.f.). In addition, forced labor has been used in
``Environmental Saturday'' community clean-up projects that continued
until Obasanjo abolished them in July. ``Environmental Saturday'' was
observed the last Saturday of every month in Lagos and was purportedly
a community-based clean-up effort. However, uniformed ``sanitation
police'' had the power (and regularly exercised it) to invade citizens'
homes and force them to clean the areas surrounding their homes until
the police deemed them clean. Widespread harassment of citizens by
police was reported on ``Environmental Saturdays.''
Although employment of persons under 18 years of age generally is
prohibited, except for agriculture and domestic work, the Government
does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The 1974 Labor Decree prohibits employment of children
less than 15 years of age in commerce and industry and restricts other
child labor to home-based agricultural or domestic work. The law
further stipulates that children may not be employed in agricultural or
domestic work for more than 8 hours per day. The Decree allows the
apprenticeship of youths at the age of 13 under specific conditions.
Primary education is compulsory, although this requirement rarely
is enforced. Studies indicate declining school enrollment due to
continuing deterioration of public schools and to increased economic
pressures on families. The lack of sufficient primary school
infrastructure has ended some families' access to education, forcing
them to place children in the labor market. Growing economic
difficulties have led to a substantial increase in the use of children
in commercial activities aimed at enhancing meager family income. The
use of children as beggars, hawkers, and bus conductors is widespread
in urban areas. The use of children as domestic servants is common.
According to an ILO statement in 1998, the incidence of child
prostitution also is growing (see Section 5).
The 1974 Labor Decree and the 1999 Constitution prohibit forced or
compulsory labor, a prohibition that extends to children, although they
are not mentioned specifically in the laws; however, there continue to
be cases of trafficking in children as indentured servants or for
criminal activities such as prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
Private and government initiatives to stem the growing incidence of
child employment continue but have not been effective. During the year,
the Government formulated a national program of action in support of
child rights, survival, protection, development and participation;
however, the program had accomplished nothing by year's end. The Labor
Ministry has an inspections department whose major responsibilities
include enforcement of legal provisions relating to conditions of work
and protection of workers, but the Ministry only conducts inspections
in the formal business sector in which the incidence of child labor is
not significant.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The 1974 Labor Decree set a
minimum wage, which is reviewed on an ad hoc basis. The last review of
the private sector minimum wage, held in 1991, raised the lowest
monthly salary to about $5.30 (530 naira)--a level since rendered
meaningless by inflation and depreciation of the naira--which does not
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Effective
in September 1998, the Abubakar Government raised the benchmark minimum
wage in the federal civil service to $62 (6,200 naira) per month, an
increase from the previous level $9.40 (940 naira). However, in
December 1998, the Government announced that, given its poor oil
revenue forecast, it could no longer afford to pay the new federal
wages. The minimum wage consequently was reduced early in the year to
$30 (3,000 naira) per month. The Government took the decisions to
increase federal salaries in August 1998 and to reduce them in December
1998 without prior consultations with labor (see Section 6.a.). Many
state government employees, after the establishment of the federal
minimum wage, lobbied for the same wage. However, several state
governments maintained that they could not afford to pay this wage. The
issue of the minimum wage caused several labor disruptions throughout
the year.
The 1974 Labor Decree called for a 40-hour workweek, prescribed 2
to 4 weeks annual leave, and stipulated that workers must be paid extra
for hours worked over the legal limit. The Decree also stated that
employees who work on Sundays and statutory public holidays must be
paid a full day's pay in addition to their normal wages. There is no
law prohibiting excessive compulsory overtime.
The 1974 Labor Decree contains general health and safety
provisions, some of which are aimed specifically at young or female
workers. While it requires that the factory inspectorate of the
Ministry of Labor and Employment inspect factories for compliance with
health and safety standards, this agency often neglects safety
oversight of construction sites and other nonfactory work. The Decree
also requires employers to compensate injured workers and dependent
survivors of those killed in industrial accidents. The Labor Ministry,
which is charged with enforcement of these laws, has been largely
ineffective in identifying violations. The Government has failed to act
on various ILO recommendations since 1991 toupdate its moribund program
on inspection and accident reporting. The Labor Decree does not provide
workers with the right to remove themselves from dangerous work
situations without loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is an active and growing market
for trafficking in women and children to Europe for illicit purposes.
The nature and scope of the trade remained unknown, but immigration and
police officials throughout Europe reported a steady flow of Nigerian
women entrapped and sold into prostitution in Europe, particularly the
Netherlands, Italy, and the Czech Republic. Italian authorities
deported several hundred sex workers to Nigeria during the year;
Spanish authorities deported 16. Other European countries deported
similar numbers. Nigerian Interpol claimed that women usually entered
the sex trade independently, were not controlled by syndicates, and
were economically motivated. However, there is evidence that Nigerian
crime syndicates may use indebtedness, threats of beatings and/or rape,
physical injury to the victim's family, arrest, and deportation to
persuade those forced into sex work from attempting to escape. The
police reported that the women's families often condoned their entry
into the trade. The Dutch intercepted what they suspect may have been
the organized smuggling of up to 12 children during a 5-month period
from November 1998 to March. There was at least one documented case of
the trafficking in children to work as indentured servants in the
United States. There also is evidence of trafficking of children to the
United States and Europe, mostly for the reunification of children with
their undocumented parents abroad.
According to a press report from the Niger Delta region, there is
an active trade in child laborers, some of whom are exported to
Cameroon, Gabon, Benin, and Equatorial Guinea to work in agricultural
enterprises, others of whom are coerced into prostitution. In January
Cote D'Ivoire authorities repatriated 11 10- and 11-year-old girls from
Abidjan to Lagos. Authorities also have identified a trade route for
traffickers of children for labor through Katsina and Sokoto to the
Middle East and East Africa. The eastern part of the country and some
southern states such as Cross River and Akwa Ibom have been the focus
of trafficking of children for labor and, in some cases, human
sacrifice.
Nigeria remains a destination for the trafficking of Togolese
children.
The Assistant Inspector of General of Police is investigating
allegations of the collusion of customs officials in trafficking. Some
of the returnees have alleged that immigration officials actively
connive with syndicates.
There is no law that makes trafficking in persons a crime. There is
government and societal acknowledgement that trafficking in women is a
continuing problem, particularly to Western European cities. Police
attempts to stem the trafficking of persons include extended jail
sentences and public humiliation, primarily of victims. In April the
Federal Criminal Investigation Department paraded a group of 47 females
and 17 male victims before the press in Lagos. When a group of 62
undocumented women were deported in October from Italy, they were met
by police, local media, their parents and village chiefs, and promptly
arrested. There is an absence of punishment for traffickers. Only a few
awareness campaigns have been mounted.
______
RWANDA
The largely Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which took power
following the civil war and genocide of 1994, is the principal
political force and controls the Government of National Unity headed by
President Pasteur Bizimungu and Vice President and Minister of Defense
General Paul Kagame. Prime Minister Pierre Rwigema runs the Government
on a daily basis and is responsible for relations with the National
Assembly. Political party activity was suspended by agreement among the
parties for the duration of the transition period, originally scheduled
to end in July. However, in June the Government announced the extension
of the transition period for another 4 years. In March local elections
occurred for the first time in 10 years. The judiciary is subject to
executive influence and suffers from a lack of resources, inefficiency,
and some corruption.
The Minister of Defense is responsible for external security and
military defense; the Minister of Internal Affairs is responsible for
civilian security matters as well as supervision of the prisons and the
soon-to-be-created national police. The security apparatus consists of
the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and the Gendarmerie, which is made up
largely of RPA soldiers. Civilian police and armed civilian local
defense units with limited arrest powers work throughout the country.
The formerly problematic security situation in the northwest, which had
improved significantly in late 1998, remained generally calm. Members
of the security forces committed serious human rights abuses, although
the total declined from the previous year.
Rwanda is a very poor country, and 70 percent of the population
live in poverty. The 1994 genocide destroyed the country's social
fabric, human resource base, institutional capacity, and economic and
social infrastructure. Per capita annual income is $240, with an
estimated 88.5 percent of citizens living on less than $2 per day and
45 percent on less than $1 per day. Subsistence agriculture occupies
more than 90 percent of the labor force. The principal exports are
coffee and tea. Small-scale commercial activities are increasing, but
the industrial and tourism base remains limited.
The Government's human rights record remained poor, and the
Government continued to be responsible for numerous, serious abuses.
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. The security
forces committed many fewer extrajudicial killings within the country
than in 1998; however, there were many reports, some of which were
credible, that Rwandan army units operating in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DROC) committed deliberate extrajudicial killings and
other serious abuses. There were allegations of a small number of
disappearances. Security forces beat suspects. Prison conditions
remained harsh and life threatening and, according to the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 1,148 prisoners died in custody from
curable illnesses (malaria, dysentery, etc.). Most of the 130,000
prisoners housed in jails and local prisons are accused of
participating in the 1994 genocide. Security forces used arbitrary
arrest and detention, and prolonged pretrial detention was a problem.
The judiciary is subject to executive influence on occasion and does
not always ensure due process and expeditious trials. Genocide trials
continued at a slow pace, but the Government's emphasis on group trials
resulted in more suspects being tried than in the previous two years.
The Government released 6,748 detainees whose files were incomplete,
who were acquitted, or who were ill or elderly. The Government
restricted freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and
movement. An average of 500 refugees per week returned to Rwanda from
the DROC. Government security forces generally did not harass them. The
Government was hostile toward some nongovernmental human rights
organizations (NGO's). In January a law established the National Human
Rights Commission. Violence and discrimination against women are
problems. Discrimination based on ethnic status persists, as does child
labor.
Insurgents committed several killings.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The RPA committed
significantly fewer extrajudicial killings inside the country than in
1998, due to its success in largely suppressing the insurgency in the
northwest, as it pushed Hutu rebels including the former Rwandan armed
forces (ex-FAR) and the Interahamwe militia inside the territory of the
DROC.
In Mushubati commune, Gitarama prefecture on January 21, the RPA
flushed five infiltrators with three firearms out of the woods. Two of
the infiltrators were shot and killed, two were captured, and one
escaped. On February 17, the RPA killed four insurgents in Ruhengeri.
The body of one was put on display at the Nyarutovu internally
displaced persons (IDP) camp for several hours, and the camp population
was lined up to view the body. In Gisenyi prefecture on August 28,
members of a local defense unit(LDU) shot and killed a woman inside the
Nkamira transit camp at night. Apparently the woman was mentally
unbalanced and was acting strangely when LDU members challenged her.
The improvement in the security situation in the northwest led to a
corresponding decline in alleged reprisals by the RPA. However, a human
rights group reported that 49 persons, mostly women and children, were
killed by the army on May 4 and 5, after fleeing into Volcanoes
National Park.
Harsh prison conditions contributed to the deaths of 1,148 inmates
during the year. Some deaths in custody were due to mistreatment or
abuse by corrupt prison officials (see Section l.c.).
Since the start of the current war in the DROC in August 1998, RPA
troops have participated on the side of the Congolese rebel movement
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) against the DROC
Government. There have been many reports, some of which were credible,
that RPA soldiers massacred civilians in the DROC. The Government
denied these claims. It declared a unilateral cease-fire in the DROC in
May. However, RPA soldiers repeatedly participated in battles after the
declaration. It is unknown who initiated the hostilities.
There was widespread reporting throughout the year of killings and
other human rights abuses by both pro- and anti-government forces,
including the RPA, in the conflict in the DROC. Verification of these
reports was extremely difficult, particularly those emanating from
remote areas and those affected by active combat, primarily in eastern
Congo. Independent observers often found access difficult due to
hazardous security conditions as well as frequent impediments imposed
by authorities. Both pro- and anti-government forces extensively used
propaganda disseminated via local media, including charges leveled
against imposing forces, further complicating efforts to obtain
accurate information regarding such events.
In early January, there were detailed credible reports that RCD and
Rwandan forces massacred a large number of civilians in Makabola in the
eastern DROC between December 31, 1998, and January 1. The RCD stated
that it had ordered an investigation into these allegations. No results
of the RCD's investigation were made public during the year, except for
RCD claims that some of the supposed victims had fled into the bush and
later returned to Makabola. A Catholic missionary news agency reported
that on November 22, Rwandan and RCD troops shot and killed an abbot
and other persons attending a Catholic mass. There were other reports
of extrajudicial killings committed either by elements of the RCD,
which the RPA materially supported and in some respects often directed,
or in which direct involvement by RPA soldiers was not clear to persons
who found it difficult to distinguish between RCD and RPA forces. Some
of these reports of RPA killings surfaced in Kinshasa media directly or
indirectly controlled by the DROC Government; however, other such
reports emerged through international religious or humanitarian
organizations and were based on the accounts of multiple witnesses or
photographic or other evidence. The reported extrajudicial killings of
civilians by RCD and Rwandan forces in the DROC often reportedly were
committed in reprisal for guerrilla attacks on RCD or Rwandan forces.
Lightly armed civilian local defense units were formed, but these
units are not a professional security force. An NGO attributed 10 to 12
deaths to members of LDU's. Most appear to have been the result of
personal quarrels.
During the year, there were no substantive new developments
regarding reports of mass killings of Hutus inside the DROC in 1997 by
forces allegedly including both RPA and elements of the Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL).
In April in Ruhengeri prefecture men wielding traditional weapons
killed at least five persons, including a newly elected sector official
and three officials elected to the development committees in their
townships.
In February in Ndusu commune, Ruhengeri, insurgents killed four
villagers. In late July, suspected Interahamwe killed a family of four
with machetes in their home (between Ruhengeri and Gisenyi). It is
believed that the family was killed because they could implicate
Interahamwe members in involvement in the 1994 genocide.
In March DROC-based Rwandan Hutu Interahamwe rebels killed 12
tourists and rangers in an Ugandan park. Ethnic Hutu rebels were said
to be responsible for the killings of 30 ethnic Tutsis in a December 23
attack on Tamira village, Gisenyi prefecture.
The National Demining Office (NDO), an independent unit of the RPA,
reported that between April and September, two persons were injured
seriously in Mutura commune from land mine explosions and another
seriously injured in Gaseke commune also in Gisenyi prefecture. One
young child was killed by a land mine in Cyangugu on September 21.
These mines were believed to be leftover from the 1990-94 conflict
between the former government and the RPA.
On April 14, Roman Catholic Bishop Augustin Misago was arrested on
charges of genocide, a week after President Bizimungu, with Misago in
the audience, accused Misago publicly at a memorial service marking the
fifth anniversary of the genocide. Misago was the Bishop of Gikongoro.
He is charged with planning the genocide, failure to provide assistance
to persons in danger, and incitement to murder. Specific charges
include turning over three priests to those who were committing
genocide and ignoring the pleas for help of 30 young schoolgirls
seeking refuge in the church. The girls later were killed. Misago is
the highest-ranking Catholic clergyman and the first bishop to be
charged with genocide. After a number of delays, his trial finally
began in Kigali on September 14. More than 20 other Catholic priests
and nuns face similar accusations and awaited trial at year's end.
Courts continued adjudicating cases arising from the 1994 genocide
(see Section l.c.). In April a court cleared former local official
Ignace Banyaga of taking part in the genocide. On April 29, a Swiss
military tribunal sentenced Fulgence Niyonteze, a former bourgmestre in
Gitarama prefecture, to life imprisonment for murder, incitement to
murder, and war crimes committed during the 1994 genocide. The five
judges of the tribunal found him guilty of inciting citizens at a
meeting to kill Tutsis, ordering the murder of two others in a nearby
bishop's residence, and kidnapping Tutsi refugees to have them killed.
In June Major Anne Marie Nyirahakizimana became the first female
former FAR officer to receive the death penalty. In a military court in
Gitarama presided over by Lt. Col. Jackson Rwahama, Nyirahakizimana and
civilian Pastor Athanase Ngirinshuti were found guilty of genocide and
other crimes against humanity committed in Kigali urban prefecture and
Gitarama prefecture in 1994. The defendants, along with the Government
and the Free Methodist Church, were ordered to pay compensation of more
than $31.4 million (11 billion Rwandan francs).
In June former Radio Milles Collines broadcaster Valerie Bemeriki
was arrested on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. She
allegedly incited persons to kill with her inflammatory radio
broadcasts. In July a court in Kibuye sentenced 9 persons to death and
16 to life imprisonment on genocide-related charges.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), established
in Arusha, Tanzania, to try organizers of the 1994 genocide, increased
the pace of its work during the year. Six new judges were sworn in and
construction of the third trial chamber was completed in February. Mali
and Benin signed agreements with the ICTR to accept in their countries
prisoners convicted by the ICTR. Former Information Minister Eliezer
Niyitegeka and former Health Minister Casimir Bizimungu were arrested
in Nairobi and sent to Arusha in February on ICTR warrants; their
trials were pending at year's end. In April three other former
ministers were arrested in Cameroon on ICTR warrants. Following a
guilty plea, Omar Serushago was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment on
February 5 for genocide and crimes against humanity in the killing of
37 persons. Former Mayor Ignace Bagilishema surrendered in South Africa
in February and was sent to Arusha, where his trial began in September
on seven counts of genocide. The ICTR found former prefect of Kibuye
Clement Kayishema guilty on four counts of genocide and sentenced him
to life imprisonment in May. Also in May, businessman Obed Ruzindana
was found guilty on one count of genocide and sentenced to 25 years in
prison. Some citizens were displeased by the ``lenient'' sentences. In
August the prosecution added rape charges to the indictment of Former
Minister of Family and Women's Affairs, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, for
crimes committed by her subordinates. Nyiramasuhuko in 1997 became the
first woman to be indicted by an international court for genocide. Hutu
militia leader Georges Rutaganda was convicted of genocide in December
and sentenced to life in prison. The trial of Alfred Musema was
completed, but no judgment was issued by year's end. Elizaphan
Ntakirutimana, a preacher indicted by the ICTR for allegedly inciting
the massacre of hundreds of Tutsi seeking refuge in his church, fled
the country, and the ICTR is pursuing efforts to bring him to trial.
Tribunal officers arrested a number of former ministers wanted for
their role in the genocide, all of whom have been transferred to the
detention center in Arusha to await trials.
Former chairman of the Mouvement Democratique Republican (MDR)
political party Bonaventure Ubalijoro was arrested in March for
presumed involvement in massacres of Tutsis in the 1960's.
b. Disappearance.--Returning refugees from northeast DROC were
taken in government buses to a transit center in the disused Technical
and Agricultural School (ETAG), after it reopened as a school, to
theNkamira transit center, both in Gisenyi. Based on interviews with
returnees, one domestic human rights group reported that between
January and June several returnees who went to the ETAG center failed
to arrive at their communes. It is unclear why they failed to arrive,
or if they settled elsewhere in the country.
There were reports that persons arrested and detained in areas of
the DROC controlled by antigovernment forces were transferred to Rwanda
and remained unaccounted for at year's end.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The fundamental law prohibits torture; however, an NGO
credibly reports that beatings at the time of arrest are common, and
some released detainees reported that they had been tortured. An August
18 report from local and international media claimed that the police
beat and arrested six university students who, along with other
students, were marching to the Prime Minister's office. The students
were Anglophone Tutsis protesting French-language instruction in
schools and universities.
One domestic human rights group made credible claims that
``scores'' of detainees interviewed for one of its reports showed
wounds of mistreatment.
In May 178 RPA soldiers, including 12 officers, were dismissed from
the RPA for chronic indiscipline and criminal offenses.
Former government Minister Pauline Nyiramesuhuko, who already was
charged with genocide in 1997, was charged in August with rape for
crimes committed by her subordinates (see Section 1.a.).
Prison conditions are harsh and life threatening. The ICRC has
registered about 124,000 prisoners. However, the Ministry of Justice,
routinely refers to the prison population as 130,000. The prison
population has remained stable since early 1998. The ICRC registered
4,888 new detainees and stated that 6,748 were released. The ICRC feeds
inmates in the 19 main prisons and also provides additional expertise
and logistical and material support to improve conditions for inmates.
Overcrowding is a chronic problem, and sanitary conditions are
extremely poor. There were some reports that prison conditions were
beginning to improve with the transfer of prison administration to the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Government does not provide adequate
food or medical treatment. Harsh prison conditions and malnutrition
contributed to the deaths of numerous inmates. Some deaths in custody
were due to mistreatment or abuse by corrupt officials. Most of the
1,148 deaths were the result of curable diseases, suspected AIDS, or
the cumulative effects of severe overcrowding. The Ministry of Internal
Affairs launched a vigorous anticorruption campaign. The Ministry
dismissed no fewer than 9 of the country's 19 prison directors, who
subsequently were jailed on corruption charges. Hundreds of children
are incarcerated with adults throughout the prison system (see Section
5).
The ICRC, human rights organizations, diplomats, and journalists
have regular access to the prisons. The ICRC extended its visits to
communal jails in areas of the country that previously had been
insecure and to some gendarmerie-supervised jails that its delegates
had not been permitted to enter for several months.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Fundamental Law
provides legal safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention;
however, authorities rarely observed them in practice. The justice
system collapsed during the war and genocide of 1994. With help from
the international community it is being rebuilt slowly and is beginning
to function more normally. The Government does not have the capacity to
ensure that provisions in the Constitution are enforced or that due
process protections are observed.
In general the law requires that authorities investigate, then
obtain a judicial warrant before arresting a suspect. The police may
detain persons for up to 48 hours without a warrant; formal charges
must be brought within 5 days of arrest. These provisions are widely
disregarded. The law permits preventive detention if authorities
believe that public safety is threatened or that the accused might
flee. There is no bail, but the authorities may release a suspect
pending trial if they are satisfied that there is no risk that the
person may flee.
Over 90 percent of the 130,000 individuals presently incarcerated
are awaiting trial on genocide charges. Some have been in jail since
1994. The Government does not have the capacity to process cases within
a reasonable time frame. In March 1997, the Government, with extensive
assistance from donors, established mobile groups whose mandate is to
establish or complete files, which indicate the basis for charges, for
all prisoners. While these groups have handled over 60,000 cases,
approximately 40,000 prisoners remain without files. In December the
NationalAssembly amended the law to permit the continued detention of
genocide suspects through mid-2001.
In April in Kibuye prefecture, judicial officials delayed the
release of 1,000 genocide suspects who have no case files due to fear
that the community had not been sensitized sufficiently to receive the
suspects peacefully. However, the Government continued to release
prisoners who were elderly, ill, or had no file. Many of the 6,748
detainees released were those without case files. Rearrests because of
community criticism were rare. This change was attributed to improved
enforcement by the Ministry of Justice of the laws governing arrest and
to recognition of the fact that the existing prison caseload is already
more than the system can handle.
An international human rights organization reported in detail an
alleged incident in September in which some RPA members in the
northwest of the country detained several civilians suspected of theft,
and beat them so severely over a period of several days that one later
died. International human rights organizations have received credible
reports of military detention facilities to which they have no access
and in which civilians are sometimes detained.
Exile is not practiced.
e. Denial of fair public trial.--The Fundamental Law provides for
an independent judiciary; however, the Government did not respect this
provision fully. The judiciary is subject on occasion to executive
influence and suffers from inefficiency, a lack of resources, and some
corruption. There were occasional reports of corruption, mostly of
bribery of officials, ranging from clerks to judges. In October a 12-
member commission charged with fighting corruption in the judiciary
held its first meeting. It is chaired by the Minister of Justice and
charged with investigating all activities involving corruption and
educating citizens on methods that can be used to fight corruption.
The Fundamental Law provides for a system of communal courts,
appeals courts, and a Supreme Court of six justices. The President
nominates two candidates for each Supreme Court seat, and the National
Assembly may choose one or reject both (the latter is not known to have
ever happened). In June, after a third Supreme Court justice left his
post, the President requested and received the resignations of the
remaining three justices. A new Supreme Court was sworn in in July.
The law provides for public trials with the right to a defense, but
not at public expense. The shortage of lawyers and the abject poverty
of most defendants make it difficult for many defendants to obtain
representation. International NGO's such as Avocats Sans Frontiers (ASF
or Lawyers Without Borders) provide defense and counsel to many of
those in need, but it is estimated that less than 50 percent of
prisoners have defense counsel. The Government does not have sufficient
prosecutors, judges, or courtrooms to hold trials within a reasonable
time.
The judiciary is focused on resolving the enormous genocide
caseload of some 130,000 prisoners. The Government increased its use of
group trials as one method of reducing the caseload. It also embarked
on a nationwide campaign to explain ``gacaca'' (a form of traditional
participatory justice modernized to try genocide suspects) ahead of its
expected implementation. According to a draft bill, lawyers are not to
be permitted to participate officially, and gacaca ``judges'' are to be
elected by their communities.
Verified figures for the number of genocide suspects tried were not
available, though a Ministry of Justice official noted that the number
was greater than the total tried during the previous two years. A U.N.
Children's Fund/Ministry of Justice report states that between January
and June, 86 genocide trials were held and 634 prisoners were judged.
Of these, 64 received the death penalty; 191 were sentenced to life in
prison; 225 received various prison terms; 24 received other penalties;
and 130 were acquitted. The vast majority of trials met international
standards. The human rights organization Liprodhor also actively
monitors trials and interviews released prisoners. No public executions
occurred.
In 1996 the National Assembly passed the Organic Genocide Law, a
portion of which is designed to encourage confessions in exchange for
reduced sentences for the vast majority of those involved in the
genocide. With assistance from donors and NGO's advertising widely the
confession provisions, to date, over 15,000 prisoners have confessed.
However, only a small number of confessions have been processed due to
the lengthy administrative review and hearing and the lack of officials
to process the confessions through the system.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and
authorities generally respected these prohibitions. Forced conscription
has been practiced by the RPA, particularly after the RPA entered the
conflict in the DROC. Citizens who served in the military may be
recalled to compulsory duty at any time.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Fundamental Law provides for
freedom of the press; however, the Government restricted this right in
practice. The Government intimidated journalists whose reporting was
contrary to official views. Most journalists practice self-censorship
due to fear of government reprisals. On February 26, John Mugabi,
editor of the monthly newspaper Newsline, was jailed on a complaint of
libel filed by Lt. Col. Frank Rusagara, Secretary General of the
Ministry of Defense, after Mugabi refused to reveal the source(s) for
an article that alleged that Rusagara took a bribe on a helicopter
deal. Mugabi was released provisionally on May 21 with several
conditions placed on his freedom of movement and travel. A second
journalist, Amiel Nkulizi, was released in August after more than 2
years in prison without a hearing.
On September 8, Helena Nyirabikali, a female journalist who worked
for the state-owned weekly newspaper Imvaho for over 15 years, was
arrested on genocide charges. The Government accused her of writing
articles that incited ethnic hatred. The human rights organization
African Rights mentioned her in a report as being one of the Rwandan
women who played a big role in the genocide. Nyirabikali joined several
other journalists in prison on genocide charges.
The Government continued to fail to act on the Rwandan Journalist
Association's request for a license. Without a license, the Association
legally may not act on behalf of its members or apply for assistance
from NGO's or other donors.
Media sources are limited. There are several privately owned
newspapers, which publish weekly in English, French, or Kinyarwanda.
There is no daily newspaper. The Government owns the only national
radio station and the only television station, which has 5 hours of
programming per day. The British Broadcasting Corporation broadcasts on
FM from Kigali in several languages. In November the German
broadcasting service Deutsche Welle signed an agreement with the
Government to open an FM station in Kigali.
The Government is the sole Internet service provider.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The fundamental
law provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the authorities
restrict this right in practice. They legally may require advance
notice for outdoor rallies, demonstrations, and meetings.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
Government restricts this right in practice. Private organizations are
required to register but, with few exceptions (see Section 2.a.), the
Government generally grants licenses without undue delay.
The National Revolutionary Movement for Democracy and Development
(MRND), and the Coalition for Defense of the Republic (CDR), both
implicated in planning and executing the 1994 genocide, were banned by
law.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
There is no state religion. On February 12, the Security Council of
Kigali city, in cooperation with representatives of churches and
religious groups currently operating, decided that no religious group
would be allowed to function unless it was registered with the
Government. The sub-prefect and the chief of urban and security
services decided to meet three times a year to evaluate and combat
those who involve themselves in religious groups with intentions other
than prayer. In March communities elected several members of the
religious group ``temperance'' to local committees. When some persons
refused to take the oath of office because their religion forbids
swearing, government officials barred them from office, and the
communities elected replacements. In Kibuye prefecture in October, 40
persons were briefly arrested for refusing to serve on night patrols on
religious grounds.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights; however, the Government restricted them in practice. Citizens
must show identification when requested. In mid-June security forces
rounded up some 400 to 500 ``suspicious persons'' in a Kigali
neighborhood. Those with proper identification and foreigners in legal
status were released. The police sent some 110 persons from other parts
of the country back to their home communes.
Over 600,000 persons were displaced in the northwest in late 1998
and moved into camps as a result of insurgent activities and government
military operations to halt them. During late 1998 and the first half
of 1999, the displaced persons were moved into 183 villages under the
Government's policy of villagization. Although the Government claimed
that the move to villages was voluntary, observers believe that many
persons were compelled to move.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and provided first asylum to a number of
refugees. The vast majority were Congolese refugees who fled their
country during unrest in 1996. Several hundred Burundians still are
awaiting compensation for their property seized in 1997 when the
Government revoked their refugee status, granted in the 1970's.
There were reports in March that the RCD would expel Rwandans from
the Masisi and Rutshuru regions in the DROC, on accusation that they
were causing insecurity there. No mass expulsion occurred. After a rate
of return of over 3,000 per month through May, the weekly rate of
return of Rwandan refugees from northeast DROC fluctuated between 200
and 760. It is likely that the RPA and RCD put pressure on some of the
refugees to return to Rwanda; however, returnees interviewed by the
UNHCR said that their return was voluntary.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government by
democratic means. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is the dominant
political force in the country. Following the genocide of 1994,
political parties agreed to form a government of national unity based
on the 1992-93 Arusha Accords. This agreement laid the basis for the
apportionment of ministries and other offices. The RPF brought
representatives of four other opposition parties into the Government
after its military victory in 1994, but none of the officials was
elected. Political parties also agreed to suspend political activities
for a period of 5 years, by which time the transition to elected
government was to have been complete. This 5-year period was to end in
July; however, the Government announced in June the extension of the
transition period by 4 years. The announcement did not mention
political party activities; the parties continue to observe the
suspension. A National Assembly is functioning, with nine political
entities represented, including the RPA. Assembly members, known as
deputies, were chosen by the political bureaus or executive committees
of their respective parties. Between March and May, the ``political
forum'', composed of party officials (many of them members of the
Government) expelled and replaced 21 of the 70 deputies from several
parties, the first time the political forum took such action.
The central Government appoints officials at the commune and
prefecture levels. From March 29 to 31, the Government held elections
for local development committees at the cell level (the smallest
geographic jurisdiction) and sectors (the next-largest jurisdiction).
The committees are to propose, select, and implement development
projects financed by the limited resources available to them. Prior
campaigning was prohibited. On election day, residents of each of the
nearly 9,000 cells met and nominated fellow cell residents as
candidates. Voters (residents age 18 and over) voted by lining up
behind the candidate of their choice for 8 of the 10 seats on the
committee. Elections at the sector level were indirect; the persons
elected at the cell level became the voting pool and elected 8 of the
10 members of their sector committee from among their own number. The
other two seats on each cell and sector committee went automatically to
the cell or sector presidents of the separately elected women's and
youths' committees. Political parties did not participate in this
election.
No legal restrictions hinder the participation of women in
political life; however, women remain underrepresented in politics and
in the Government, including the Cabinet, the National Assembly, and
the local committees elected in March. There are 15 female assembly
members and 2 female cabinet members. The Batwa ethnic group also is
largely underrepresented.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A variety of domestic human rights groups operate without
government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on
human rights violations. However, none has the resources to conduct
extensive human rights monitoring. Local NGO activities often are
limited to receiving and compiling reports from citizens about human
rights abuses and conducting selective investigations. Reports are
published occasionally; statements criticizing specific incidents are
more common. Only one or two local human rights NGO's are viewed as
strictly impartial.
The Government was cooperative and responsive to the reports of
some international human rights NGO's. It was hostile towards others
whose reporting was perceived as biased and inaccurate.
The ICRC operates normally and is active in visiting prisons.
In January the National Assembly passed a law establishing the
National Human Rights Commission and selected the members in May. The
Commission obtained training for its members and hosted several human
rights seminars.
Cooperation between the government and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda generally improved. In October the Government named
Martin Ngoga, chief prosecutor in Butare prefecture, as the
Government's representative to the ICTR. The Government chided the
Tribunal for its slow pace but welcomed the completion of the third
trial chambers and expressed interest in holding one of the genocide
trials in Rwanda. Protection mechanisms for witnesses in Rwanda
continued to be the subject of discussion between the ICTR and the
Government. After years of operating without a framework agreement, an
agreement was signed on June 3, spelling out some aspects of protection
measures, but concentrating largely on the ICTR staff's privileges and
immunities.
However, the Government expressed disappointment with some of the
ICTR'S decisions (see Section l.a.). It strongly criticized the ICTR
when it dropped charges and, in March, released Bernard Ntuyahaga, who
was accused of murdering the former Prime Minister and 10 Belgian
peacekeepers assigned to protect her in 1994. After Ntuyahaga
subsequently was arrested again by Tanzanian authorities in March,
Rwanda and Belgium both submitted extradition requests. He remained in
jail in Tanzania at year's end. In November the Government temporarily
suspended cooperation with the ICTR and briefly denied a visa to its
chief prosecutor following the appeals judges' ruling that due to
lengthy delays and other procedural errors, ICTR detainee Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza must be freed. Barayagwiza is a former leader of the most
extreme Hutu party who was charged with multiple counts of genocide and
other crimes against humanity in 1996. In December the judges agreed to
reconsider their decision on the basis of the chief prosecutor's
promise to introduce additional evidence.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides that all citizens are equal before the
law, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, origin,
ethnicity, clan, sex, opinion, religion, or social standing. However,
the Government provides only limited enforcement of these provisions.
Women.--Violence against women is common. Wife beating and domestic
violence occur frequently. Cases normally are handled within the
context of the extended family and rarely come before the courts.
Despite constitutional provisions, women continue to face
discrimination. Women traditionally perform most of the subsistence
farming and play a limited role in the modern sector. They have limited
opportunities for education, employment, and promotion. The 1992 Family
Code generally improved the legal position of women in matters relating
to marriage, divorce, and child custody but does not meet the
constitutional commitment to gender equality. For example, it formally
designates men as heads of households. In October the National Assembly
passed a law on matrimonial regimes and inheritance that allows women
to inherit property from their husbands and fathers and allows couples
to choose the type of property rights they wish to adopt (i.e., joint
ownership, community property, etc.).
The Ministry of Gender and Women in Development is charged with
handling issues of particular concern to women. The Minister is an
active advocate for women's rights. Since the 1994 genocide a large
number of women's groups has emerged. These organizations are extremely
active in promoting women's issues, particularly problems faced by
widows, orphaned girls, and households headedby children. Addressing
social and cultural barriers to the equality of women is a major focus.
Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and
welfare. It attempts to provide education and health care to every
child. Over 85 percent of the children who were separated from or lost
their parents during the 1994 genocide and the massive repatriation in
1996 have been reunited with family members or placed in foster homes.
According to the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), of the 28,946
unaccompanied children once housed in its centers, 24,907 have been
reunited with their families or placed in foster homes.
All families must pay school fees to enroll a child. The Government
routinely waived fees for orphans. UNICEF estimates that over 60,000
children age 18 or younger head households in the country. The
Government worked closely with local and international NGO's to secure
assistance for children in such situations. The Government regularly
held sessions with local officials to sensitize them to the needs of
households headed by children and emphasize the additional
responsibility officials bear in connection with this group.
The public schools cannot accommodate all children of primary
school age. Private schools are too distant or too expensive to serve
as an alternative for many children. Entry to secondary school is by
examination. A 1996 sociodemographic survey released in July 1998,
conducted by the Government and the U.N. Population Fund, found that
59.6 percent of the population age 6 and over had primary education.
Only 3.9 percent had completed secondary school and 0.2 percent had
university education. UNICEF estimates that these figures are still
accurate. The highest percentage of those with no education is in the
30-and-over age group, indicating a trend toward increased educational
levels in recent years.
Although the Penal Code prohibits the imprisonment of children with
adults, the ICRC reported that 298 children, most of whom are age 2 or
younger, are incarcerated with their mothers. The UNICEF/Ministry of
Justice report claims that as of year's end, 3,030 minors were
incarcerated on genocide-related charges, but few had been tried for
their offenses. The ICRC reported that approximately 570 children who
were under age 14 at the time of their arrest are incarcerated on
genocide-related charges. Some 25 children under the age of 14
currently are incarcerated. In August 60 children accused of
participating in the genocide were released from a child detention
center.
In May communal police rounded up street children in Kigali. There
were rumors that the children were to be forced to join the RPA and
sent to the DROC for battle; however, the children actually were taken
to a shelter in Gikongoro.
By mid-April reports estimated that a total of 2,200 street
children had been taken to a solidarity camp in Gikongoro where they
learned hygiene, civic education, the dangers of narcotics, and methods
of protection against sexually transmitted diseases. In April 270
street children of school age were returned to their families after the
camp. The families were required to take their children directly to a
school. Some 300 others are to receive vocational training. The
Kimisagara street children's center in Kigali retains 130 orphans who
are to attend primary school while awaiting adoption.
People with Disabilities.--Although there are no laws restricting
persons with disabilities from employment, education, or other state
services, in practice few disabled persons have access to education or
employment. No laws or provisions mandate access to public facilities.
Indigenous People.--Less than 1 percent of the population belongs
to the Batwa ethnic group. The Batwa, survivors of the Twa (Pygmy)
tribes of the mountainous forest areas bordering the Democratic
Republic of Congo, exist on the margins of society and continue to be
treated as inferior citizens by both the Hutu and Tutsi groups. The
Batwa have been unable to protect their interests, which center on
access to land and housing. Few Batwa have gained access to the
educational system, resulting in their minimal representation in
government institutions. There is no reliable information on specific
human rights abuses perpetrated against the Batwa population since the
1994 upheaval.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Before April 1994, an estimated
85 percent of citizens were Hutu, 14 percent were Tutsi, and 1 percent
were Batwa (Twa). However, Hutus and Tutsis are not clearly distinct
groups, since the two have intermarried for generations. The subsequent
mass killingsand migrations probably affected the ethnic composition of
the population, but the extent of the changes is unknown.
Large-scale interethnic violence in the country between Hutus and
Tutsis has erupted on three occasions since independence in 1962,
resulting on each occasion in tens or hundreds of thousands of deaths.
The most recent and severe outbreak of such violence, in 1994, involved
genocidal killing of much of the Tutsi population under the direction a
Hutu-dominated government and implemented in large part by Hutu-
dominated armed forces (now the ex-FAR) and Interahamwe militia; that
genocide ended later the same year when a Tutsi militia operating out
of Uganda overthrew that government and established the current
Government. The Government has called for national reconciliation and
committed itself to abolishing policies of the former government that
had created and deepened ethnic cleavages. It eliminated references to
ethnic origin from the national identity card. The Government has not
addressed statutorily the problem of ethnic quotas in education,
training, and government employment, but discrimination against the
Tutsi minority effectively ceased with the change of government in
1994. Some Hutus accuse the Government of favoring Tutsis in government
employment, admission to professional schooling, recruitment into the
army, and other matters. Some organizations also complain that in
hiring, the government favors English-speaking Tutsis over French-
speaking Tutsis.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right to create professional associations and labor unions, and the
Government usually respects this right in practice. In practice the
labor movement has been hampered due to the massive disruptions caused
by the 1994 genocide. Although preconflict labor law technically
remains in effect, the Government is unable to implement its
provisions. Unions are only slowly regrouping and asserting themselves.
Union membership is voluntary and open to all salaried workers,
including public sector employees. There are no restrictions on the
right of association, but all unions must register with the Ministry of
Justice for official recognition. There are no known cases in which the
Government denied recognition. Unions are prohibited by law from having
political affiliations, but in practice this is not always respected.
Union activists complain that employers threaten to fire employees who
attempt to organize or join unions.
Organized labor represents only a small part of the work force.
More than 90 percent of workers are engaged in small-scale subsistence
farming. About 7 percent work in the modern (wage) sector, including
both public and private industrial production, and about 75 percent of
those active in the modern sector are members of labor unions.
Until 1991 the central union of Rwandan workers (CESTRAR) was the
only authorized trade union organization. With the political reforms
introduced in the Constitution, the CESTRAR officially became
independent of the Government and the later-outlawed MRND political
party. Unions outside the CESTRAR have been registered.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, except for
public service workers. Procedures to conduct a legal strike as
stipulated in the Labor Code are cumbersome and, according to a CESTRAR
officer, never followed. A union's executive committee must approve a
strike, and a union must try to resolve its differences first with
management according to steps prescribed by the Ministry of Public
Service and Labor.
Labor organizations may affiliate with international labor bodies.
The CESTRAR is affiliated with the Organization of African Trade Union
Unity and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution provides for collective bargaining, although only the
CESTRAR had an established collective bargaining agreement with the
Government. In practice since most union members are in the public
sector, the Government is involved intimately in the process (see
Section 6.e.).
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, and there were no
reports of such discrimination. No formal mechanisms exist to resolve
complaints involving discrimination against unions.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced labor, and there were no reports that it occurred in practice,
apart from work details composed of prisoners, which are common and
generally involved rebuilding houses, clearing land, or other public
maintenance duties. Although the law does not specifically prohibit
forced and bonded labor by children, such practices are not known to
occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Except in subsistence agriculture, the law prohibits
children under age 18 from working without their parents' or guardians'
authorization, and they generally may not work at night. The minimum
age for full employment is 18 years, and 14 years for apprenticeships,
providing that the child has completed primary school. The Ministry of
Public Service and Labor has not enforced child labor laws effectively.
The law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by
children; however, such practices are not known to occur (see Section
6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Public Service
and Labor sets minimum wages in the small modern sector. The
Government, the main employer, effectively sets most other wage rates
as well. There is no single minimum wage; minimum wages vary according
to the position. The minimum wages paid are insufficient to provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family. Often families
supplement their incomes by work in small business or subsistence
agriculture. However, in practice, workers accept less than the minimum
wage.
Officially, government offices have a 40-hour workweek. In 1993
negotiations were held between the unions, the government, and
management to reduce the workweek from 45 to 40 hours in the private
sector as well. The law controls hours of work and occupational health
and safety standards in the modern wage sector, but labor inspectors
from the Ministry of Public Service and Labor enforce them only
loosely. Workers do not have the right to remove themselves from
dangerous work situations without jeopardizing their jobs.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
in, to, or from the country.
______
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
The Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe is a multiparty
democracy. The Government is composed of an executive branch and a
unicameral legislature (the National Assembly). The President appoints
the Prime Minister, who in turn appoints the ministers of the
Government. Miguel Trovoada, leader of the Independent Democratic
Alliance (ADI), was reelected President in 1996 for a second 5-year
term in an election deemed generally free and fair by international
observers, despite allegations of an unconstitutional modification of
the voter lists between the first and second rounds. In the November
1998 legislative elections, the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome
and Principe (MLSTP) won an outright majority with 31 of 55 seats, and
holds all 10 seats in the Cabinet. The judiciary is independent.
The Minister of National Defense, Security, and Internal Order
supervises the military services and the police. Many members of the
military are part-time farmers or fishermen. Since a military mutiny in
1995, the Government and international donors have dedicated resources
to improving soldiers' living conditions. No defense expenditures have
been used for lethal weapons since the advent of multiparty democracy
in 1990.
The economy is based on the export of a single product, cocoa,
produced in an archaic, state-run system of plantations called
``rocas.'' The Government has privatized some of the state-held land
but had limited success in privatizing state-owned enterprises. The
Government faltered in its efforts at structural adjustment, and the
economy continues to face serious difficulties. While the inflation
rate has fallen to 10 percent per year and the currency has stabilized,
the country remains highly dependent on foreign aid, and external debt
is six times gross domestic product. Per capita income is less than
$350 per year, and the economy is stagnant. Unemployment, although
difficult to quantify, remained very high.
The Government continued to respect the rights of its citizens. The
principal human rights problems continued to be an inefficient judicial
system, harsh prison conditions, violence and discrimination against
women, and outdated plantation labor practices that limit worker
rights.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture or cruel and inhuman
punishment. There were no reports of violations during arrests or
interrogations.
Prison conditions are harsh but not life threatening. Human rights
monitors are not known to have requested permission to make prison
visits; it is believed that the Government would permit such visits if
requested.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government
observes these prohibitions.
Exile is not used as a punishment. All those exiled under the one-
party regime of 1975-1990 are free to return, and several prominent
politicians have done so.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the judiciary has returned verdicts against
both the President and the Government. The legal system is based on
Portuguese and customary law, with the Supreme Court at the apex. The
Government has important powers relating to the judiciary, including
setting salaries for judges and all ministerial employees in accordance
with standard government salaryguidelines. Government salaries are
extremely low, and the authorities are concerned that judges may be
tempted to accept bribes. The authorities maintain that they continue
to respect the independence of the judiciary.
The Constitution provides for the right to fair public trial, the
right of appeal, and the right to legal representation. In practice,
however, the judicial infrastructure suffers from severe budgetary
constraints, inadequate facilities, and a shortage of trained judges
and lawyers, causing long delays in bringing cases to court and greatly
hindering investigations in criminal cases.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the integrity of the
person and the right to privacy of home, correspondence, and private
communication. The Government does not engage in intrusive practices,
such as surveillance of persons or the monitoring of communications.
The judicial police are responsible for criminal investigations and
must obtain authorization from the Ministry of Justice to conduct
searches.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of expression and freedom of the press, and the Government
generally respects these rights in practice. One government-run and
three independent newspapers and newsletters are published
sporadically, usually on a monthly or bimonthly basis.
Television and radio are state operated. While there are no
independent local stations, there are no laws forbidding them. The
Voice of America, Radio International Portugal, and Radio France
International rebroadcast locally. The law grants all opposition
parties access to the state-run media, including a minimum of 3 minutes
per month on television. In September President Trovoada criticized
cronyism in the state media and encouraged potential operators to enter
the private broadcasting sector.
All parties freely distribute newsletters and press releases giving
their views and criticizing the Government, the President, and one
another. There were no reports of government censorship or threats of
censorship from any group, nor any reports of efforts by national
security forces to suppress criticism.
The Government does not restrict access to or use of e-mail, the
Internet, or satellite phones. However, the only domestic Internet
server is a joint venture in which the Government's Post and
Telecommunications Office is a partner, and the cost of Internet access
remains high, so access remains limited in practice.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice. The Government requires that requests for authorization for
large-scale events be filed 48 hours in advance and usually grants the
appropriate permits.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
freedom, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
Domestic law contains no specific provisions for granting refugee
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N Convention Regarding the Status
of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. However, the authorities
traditionally have welcomed those seeking refuge or asylum. No requests
for first asylum were reported during the year, but in theory the
Government would be prepared to grant such requests. There were no
reports thatpersons were forced to return to a country where they
feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens exercised this right for the first time in 1991 in free
and fair presidential and legislative elections, and subsequently in
the 1994 and 1998 legislative elections, and the 1996 presidential
elections. These elections resulted in the peaceful transfer of power
between political party coalitions. Voter participation has exceeded 80
percent in recent elections. International observers noted that the
1998 legislative elections were free and transparent. Each of the three
principal political parties has significant representation in the
unicameral National Assembly. Elections are by secret ballot on the
basis of universal suffrage for citizens 18 years of age or older. In
the 1998 legislative elections, the MLSTP won an outright majority with
31 out of 55 seats and filled all 10 Cabinet positions.
The Constitution provides for the election of the President, who as
Head of State names the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister appoints
members of the Government.
There are no restrictions in law or in practice on the
participation of women in politics. However, women are underrepresented
in politics and government. Women currently hold 3 of 55 seats in the
National Assembly, 1 of 12 seats in the Cabinet, and 1 of 4 seats on
the Supreme Court. One woman was a presidential candidate in the 1996
elections and received 16 percent of the first-round vote.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A small number of local human rights groups have formed since 1991
and operate without restriction or governmental interference. There
were no known requests by international human rights groups to visit
the country.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for the equality of all citizens
regardless of sex, race, racial origin, political tendency, creed, or
philosophic conviction. However, the Government has not sought actively
to enforce these provisions.
Women.--While the extent of the problem is unknown, violence
against women occurs, and medical professionals and officials report
firsthand experience in dealing with violence, including rape. They
also report that although women have the right to legal recourse--
including against spouses--many are reluctant to bring legal action or
are ignorant of their rights under the law. Traditional beliefs and
practices also inhibit women from taking domestic disputes outside the
family.
While the Constitution stipulates that women and men have equal
political, economic, and social rights, and while many women have
access to opportunities in education, business, and government, in
practice women still encounter significant societal discrimination.
Traditional beliefs concerning the division of labor between men and
women leave women with much of the hard work in agriculture, with most
child-rearing responsibilities, and with less access to education and
to professions. Female literacy is approximately 62 percent; male
literacy is approximately 85 percent.
Children.--A number of government and donor-funded programs have
been established to improve conditions for children. There has been
improvement in maternity and infant care, in nutrition, and in access
to basic health services, especially in urban areas. Mistreatment of
children is not widespread. There are few social protections for
orphans and abandoned children.
People With Disabilities.--The law does not mandate access to
buildings, transportation, or services for persons with disabilities.
There are no reports of discrimination against the disabled.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom
of association and the right to strike. Few unions exist in the very
small modern wage sector. Independent cooperatives, on the other hand,
have taken advantage of the government land distribution program to
attract workers and in many cases to improve production and incomes
significantly. Public sector employees still make up the great majority
of wage earners. Strikes are legal, including those by government
employees and other essential workers. There are no laws or regulations
that prohibit employers from retaliating against strikers.
There are no restrictions barring trade unions from joining
federations or affiliating with international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution provides that workers may organize and bargain
collectively. However, due to its role as the principal employer in the
wage sector, the Government remains the key interlocutor for labor on
all matters, including wages. There are no laws prohibiting antiunion
discrimination.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced and bonded labor, and it is not known to exist. The Government
prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and such practices are
not known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Employers in the modern wage sector generally respect the
legally mandated minimum employment age of 18 years. The Ministry of
Justice and Labor is responsible for enforcing this law. In subsistence
agriculture, on plantations, and in informal commerce, children do
work, sometimes from an early age. The Government prohibits forced and
bonded labor by children, and the prohibition is respected (see Section
6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Working conditions on many of
the state-owned plantations--the largest wage employment sector--verge
on the medieval. There is no legally mandated minimum wage. The average
salary for plantation workers does not provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family, and the real value of their pay is
constantly eroded by high rates of inflation. In principle, workers and
their families are provided free (but inadequate) housing, rudimentary
education for their children, and health care, as well as the privilege
of reduced prices and credit at the ``company store.'' These
arrangements are intended to subsidize food and clothing. However,
corruption is widespread, and international lending institutions have
criticized the Government for ineffective administration of these
subsidies. Workers often are forced to pay higher prices on the
parallel market to obtain the goods theoretically provided at a
discount as part of their compensation.
The legal workweek is 40 hours with 48 consecutive hours mandated
for a rest period, a norm respected in the modern wage sector. The 1979
Social Security Law prescribes basic occupational health and safety
standards. Inspectors from the Ministry of Justice and Labor are
responsible for enforcement of these standards, but their efforts are
ineffective. Employees have the right under the law to leave unsafe
working conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to,
or from the country.
______
SENEGAL
Senegal is a moderately decentralized republic dominated by a
strong presidency. President Abdou Diouf, who has been in office since
1981, was reelected to a 7-year term in 1993. Credible international
observers reported favorably on the registration, campaigning, and
polling phases of that election, and stated that observed
irregularities in those phases did not materially affect the outcome;
however, in the vote tabulation phase, the National Tabulation
Commission could not reach consensus and its head resigned, indicating
pressure from the Government. Members of the President's Socialist
Party (PS) have occupied the presidency and dominated the unicameral
legislature since independence from France in 1960, although opposition
parties have been legal. In 1998 the Government amended the
Constitution to create a second legislative chamber, a Senate, in which
the President appoints one-fifth of the members, and an electoral
college consisting largely of elected local and regional government
officials choosing most of the others. In protest of this electoral
system, most of the opposition parties boycotted the first senatorial
elections held by the Government in January. The ruling Socialist Party
won all seats in this election and the Government formally inaugurated
the Senate in February. In May 1998, the PS won 50 percent of votes
cast and 93 of 140 seats in elections for an expanded National
Assembly. Unlike previous elections, these were supervised by a
National Election Observatory (ONEL), independent of the Government.
Although the elections were marred by violence and by persistent flaws
in the electoral system, and although most international observers were
not permitted to monitor them, they apparently were generally freer and
significantly more transparent than previous elections. This included
both the 1993 national elections and the country's first regional and
local elections held in 1996, which were characterized by
irregularities and fraud. Prior to the elections in March 1998, the
Senegalese Democratic Party quit the Cabinet. In July 1998, President
Diouf appointed a 32-member cabinet that included only 1 minister from
an opposition party. The Government continued to implement
decentralized regional and local administrations. Sporadic fighting
continued in the Casamance area in the southern part of the country
between the Government and the secessionist Movement of Democratic
Forces in the Casamance (MFDC). In January the Government and the
leadership of the MFDC began a new peace initiative with a meeting
between President Diouf and MFDC head Abbe Augustine Diamacoune
Senghor. The MFDC leadership then held a conference--the ``days of
reflection''--in Banjul, the Gambia, in June to develop a unified
position for advancing the peace process. On December 26, the
Government and MFDC leaders met in the Gambia to begin negotiations on
the future of the Casamance. During these talks, the two parties agreed
to an immediate ceasefire in the Casamance. The parties also agreed to
meet face to face at least once a month to negotiate a peaceful future
for the region. At year's end, neither side had a concrete proposal to
bring to the negotiating table; however, the parties developed a
framework for discussion. The judiciary is independent, but subject in
practice to government influence and pressure.
The armed forces are professional and generally disciplined. They
traditionally remain aloof from politics and are firmly under civilian
control. The paramilitary gendarmerie and the police are less
professional and less disciplined. Some members of the security forces,
the gendarmerie, and the police continued to commit serious human
rights abuses.
The country is predominantly agricultural with about 70 percent of
the labor force engaged in farming. Recorded gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita is estimated at about $600 a year, but this excludes a
large informal economy. Since the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994,
the Government has implemented a series of economic policy reforms to
enhance competitiveness by dismantling monopolies, liberalizing
markets, and privatizing several state-owned industries. Recorded GDP
per capita has grown at an average rate of between 2 and 3 percent a
year since 1995. Exports account for about one-third of recorded GDP,
and are led by fish and fish products, phosphates and fertilizers,
tourism, and peanuts. The Government continued to receive external
assistance from international financial institutions and other sources,
and such assistance represents an important part of the national
budget.
The Government respected the rights of its citizens in some areas,
but its human rights record was marked by serious problems in other
areas. The Socialist Party's continued domination of political life
calls into question the extent to which citizens can meaningfully
exercise their right to change the Government. The ONEL improved
transparency in the May 1998 legislative elections; however, persistent
flaws in the electoral system remain. The Government's creation of a
second legislative chamber, no members of which are to be elected
directly by the citizenry and one-fifth of the members of which are to
be appointed by the President, also reduced the ability of citizens to
change their Government and increased the presidency's domination of
the State. There were reports that security forces committed
extrajudicial killings and were responsible for disappearances. Police
tortured and beat suspects during questioning, and arbitrarily arrested
and detained persons.
Prison conditions are poor, and lengthy pretrial detention is a
problem. The Government rarely tries or punishes members of the
military, gendarmerie, or police for human rights abuses. The judiciary
is subject to government influence and pressure and suffers from low
salaries and insufficient resources. In the past, the police sometimes
infringed on citizens' privacy rights. There were several instances in
which the Government limited freedom of assembly. Domestic violence and
discrimination against women, female genital mutilation, and child
labor remained problems, although during the year the Government
enacted important legal reforms to provide greater protection for women
and children. Mob violence also is a problem.
Rebel MFDC forces reportedly were responsible for killings and
torture.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed reports of political killings by government officials;
however, government forces reportedly were responsible for
extrajudicial killings, including some civilian deaths. The incidence
of violence in the southern Casamance region declined in the first half
of the year after President Diouf and Abbe Diamacoune, leader of the
MFDC rebel group, held a meeting in January in the regional capital of
Ziguinchor to open dialog on a peaceful solution to the conflict. This
calm continued to be marred by occasional acts of violence allegedly
carried out by government forces. According to local press reports, on
April 1, acting on a lead, government security forces stormed a house
in the town of Thionck Essyl in the department of Bigona in search of
suspected MFDC members. They shot and killed a young man who was
fleeing from the house. This same report claimed that the deceased and
his family had no connection with the separatist rebels.
In its annual report issued in July, the African Assembly for the
Defense of Human Rights (RADDHO-a local human rights organization)
claimed that on June 3, in response to a rocket launch attack by MFDC
rebels on civilian targets in Ziguinchor, including the airport,
government security forces took action to locate rebels in the
surrounding area. During this clean-up operation, the security forces
killed several persons suspected of rebel activity and also arrested
several others whose whereabouts are now unknown. The RADDHO report
further claimed that in a follow-up operation, government security
forces used artillery fire to dislodge MFDC rebels in the areas of
Nyassia, Niaguiss, and Mandina Mancagne. In the process, the security
forces hit civilian targets and killed several civilians (see Section
1.g.).
While there were no new reported cases of death caused by civilian
authorities this year, cases from previous years remained unsolved. In
December 1997, a child was shot and killed in the Hann area of Dakar
when police opened fire on a group that was demonstrating against an
eviction order. In February 1998, police officers from the Thiaroye
station in Dakar arrested and beat a young man after he tried to flee
during an identity verification check. The young man died before
receiving medical care, and the authorities listed the cause of death
as natural. With the help of RADDHO, families of both of the deceased
individuals filed legal complaints. According to RADDHO, the
investigations in both cases still are pending, and in the latter case,
did not begin until a full year after the death.
Forces belonging to the MFDC separatist group also were suspected
of causing civilian deaths during the year. In a report on the
Casamance published in June, Amnesty International (AI) charged that
the MFDC rebels committed killings and torture of dozens of civilians.
According to AI, MFDC guerillas, who belong mainly to the Diola ethnic
group, occasionally targeted members of other ethnic groups, such as
the Mandingo, Balante, Manjak, and Mancagne, whom they viewed as
unsympathetic to their cause. AI also charged that MFDC shelling killed
civilians (see Section 1.g.). According to AI, the MFDC also executed
government security forces it had taken prisoner.
In January three members of the MFDC allegedly attacked several
persons in Gambissara, killing a Mauritanian merchant and his son.
In its annual report, AI reported that in February MFDC rebels
killed seven fishermen in the village of Saloulou and, in a separate
incident, killed six persons in the village of Singuere. In both cases
the rebels allegedly killed the villagers because of their support for
government authorities.
MFDC rebels allegedly shelled civilian targets between April and
June, injuring 11 persons and killing 6 (see Section 1.g.).
In a February 1998 report, AI alleged that several mass graves for
victims of extrajudicial killings exist in Niaguis and at Niamalang
bridge. According to AI, an unknown number of civilians have been
killed by civilian authorities or soldiers and have been buried
secretly in these mass graves since the early 1990's. There has been no
independent confirmation of these allegations.
On many occasions vigilante groups and mobs lynched suspected
thieves. According to press reports quoting a government official,
vigilante violence increased during the year. In July alone, the
Government recorded 30 cases of mob violence against suspected thieves
in Dakar. During the year there was also at least 1 credible report of
the use of ``necklace punishment,'' whereby a gasoline filled tire was
put over the head of the mob's victim and set on fire. This and other
types of mob violence generally remain unpunished.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances during the year. However, there were several credible
reports of disappearances in connection with the conflict in the
Casamance. In its 1999 annual report, RADDHO accused security forces of
responsibility for the disappearance of seven civilians in June after a
military clean-up operation following a rebel mortar attack in
Ziguinchor (see Section 1.a.).
RADDHO also alleged that following fighting in the Casamance in
April, the military rounded up 15 suspected MFDC rebels and detained
them for several days. Most of the suspected rebels were released after
4 days; however, three persons remained unaccounted for at year's end
(see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
In September a group of Casamance professionals helped family
members of two missing individuals file legal complaints against
security forces for abduction. According to the complaint, on July 18,
security forces took a young man, Alexis Etienne Diatta, from his house
in the Tile central area of Ziguinchor. The abduction was witnessed by
his father, who was beaten when he tried to stop it. The father claims
that a military authority told him that Alexis was taken for having
treated rebels in his job with the Red Cross. On August 4, a group of
soldiers allegedly abducted Jean Diandy and Gaston Sagna. According to
Sagna, who was released shortly thereafter, the soldiers took Diandy to
the military camp in Ziguinchor. The families of both Diatta and Diandy
reported the disappearances to civilian authorities, who were
unsuccessful in finding any trace of either person. Government
investigations into both disappearances reportedly are underway.
RADDHO also alleged that government security forces abducted two
civilians in September and December 1998 respectively. Their
whereabouts remain unresolved.
Disappearances reported in previous years by RADDHO and AI remain
unresolved.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--There are credible reports that police and gendarmes often
beat suspects during questioning and pretrial detention, in spite of
constitutional prohibitions against such treatment. The press
repeatedly reported instances of torture perpetrated by police, usually
beatings, and the problem remained a serious public concern. The 1999
AI report charged that security forces committed torture in the
Casamance in 1998 (see Section 1.a).
On March 7 and 15, police officials forcibly dispersed unauthorized
student demonstrators who were calling for more government scholarships
from the campus of Dakar University. According to press reports and
student witnesses, after breaking up the demonstrations police stormed
student dormitories, beat up the occupants, and smashed windows and
other property (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.).
In June police forcibly dispersed a demonstration by opposition
political parties and slightly injured an opposition leader (see
Section 2.b.).
According to RADDHO, prison officials beat at least some of the 15
suspected MFDC rebels who were detained by police after fighting broke
out in the Casamance in April (see Sections 1.b. and 1.d.).
Government action to resolve the October 1998 case of alleged
rough, abusive, and inhuman treatment of RADDHO's Casamance regional
office head, Ankilling Diabone, by security forces remained pending
during the year. According to RADDHO, the Government opened an
investigation that it could not complete without interviewing Diabone,
who went to France and has declined to return.
Despite stronger legal provisions against torture put in place in
1997, the Government rarely undertakes investigations or prosecutes
officials allegedly responsible for such acts. Those cases that are
pursued often take years before final judgment is reached. There has
been no progress in the case of the two police officers arrested in
1996 for torturing a suspect by spraying paint thinner on his buttocks
and setting him on fire.
The special AI report on the Casamance issued in June charged the
MFDC with beatings and other acts of violence against civilians.
According to AI, dozens of civilians, including women and children were
killed, tortured, and subjected to inhuman treatment by the MFDC.
Prison conditions are poor. Prisons remain overcrowded, and food
and health care are inadequate. However, there have been no reports of
deaths in prison as a result of these conditions.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors. Local human rights groups such as RADDHO, the National
Organization for Human Rights (ONDH), and the International Prison
Observatory sometimes visit prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the authorities at
times violate these constitutional prohibitions.
The law specifies that warrants, issued by judges, are required for
arrests. However, laws also grant the police broad powers to detain
prisoners for lengthy periods. Police officers may hold without charge
a person suspected of a crime for 48 hours after arrest and for up to
96 hours if ordered by a public prosecutor. This period may be doubled
in the case of crimes against the security of the State. The prosecutor
decides whether to forward the case to an investigating judge who may
open an investigation. At this point, the suspects are charged
preliminarily and may be held or released on their own recognizance.
There is a system of bail, but it rarely is used. During the initial 48
hours of detention the accused has no access to family or an attorney,
but has the right to demand a medical exam. Government-sponsored
legislation passed in January enhanced the rights of the accused by
according the right to an attorney after this initial period of
detention. Previously this right was accorded only after formal charges
were filed. The accused may be held in custody for 6 months, and the
investigating magistrate can certify that an additional 6-month
extension is required. Such extensions may be reviewed by a court on
appeal. The new legislation also gave judges the right to order release
pending trial without the prosecutor's consent.
Police rarely are prosecuted for violations of arrest and detention
procedures, and the authorities may detain a prisoner for long periods
of time while they investigate and build a case against a suspect. The
authorities routinely hold prisoners in custody unless and until a
court demands their release. Despite the 6-month limitation on
detention, the time between the charging phase and trial averages 2
years. In a 1998 effort to improve the administration of justice the
Government recruited 48 law school graduates to be trained as
magistrates over a 2-year period.
On April 8, military personnel arrested three soldiers who
participated in a demonstration several days earlier protesting the
Government's failure to pay them for their recent military service in
the Central African Republic (see Section 2.b.).
Following fighting in the Casamance in late April, the military
rounded up 15 persons with Diola names on suspicion of involvement with
the MFDC. All but three of these prisoners were released within 4 days;
however, three remained unaccounted for at year's end (see Sections
1.b. and 1.c.).
A July 1998 work-to-rule strike by electrical union workers that
caused severe power outages resulted in charges of sabotage against the
union and the arrests of union leader Mademba Sock and 26 other
persons. They were held incommunicado for 3 days and detained for 5
days without charges. A subsequent trial resulted in a judge sentencing
Sock and one of his aides to 6 months' imprisonment for conspiracy to
disrupt law and order, but dismissing charges against 25 others after
they had been detained for 5 months. Sock and the aide appealed their
convictions after the sentence handed down by the lower court had been
served almost fully. The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction. Sock
and the aide were released in January after serving their 6-month
sentences.
On February 12, the Government released 123 suspected MFDC members
who had been detained in Dakar, Ziguinchor, and Kolda without trial,
some for several years, on grounds of compromising or plotting against
the security of the State. The courts ordered their release following
the January meeting between President Diouf and MFDC leader Abbe
Diamacoune, which was thebeginning of an effort to establish a peace
process in the Casamance. The MFDC had demanded the release of all
political detainees in connection with the Casamance conflict as a
condition for dialog. According to an AI report issued in June, 110
suspected MFDC rebels remained without trial in prisons throughout the
country; however, on December 30 the Government released 44 persons who
had been detained in connection with the Casamance conflict.
In January the National Assembly passed legislation to eliminate
the law that held ``acts or maneuvers aimed at casting discredit on
government institutions'' as criminal offenses punishable by
imprisonment of 3 to 5 years and a fine of up to $2,500 (1.5 million
CFA francs). Legal experts considered this provision to be a legal
instrument that the Government could use to jail political dissenters.
On a few occasions in the past the Government had jailed opposition
leaders under this provision, apparently on the basis of their
political activities.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and it is not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for a
judiciary independent of the executive, the legislature, and the armed
forces; however, magistrates are vulnerable to outside pressures due to
low pay, poor working conditions, and family and political ties. Also,
the Minister of Justice and subordinate authorities have extensive
authority to influence judicial procedures by keeping the accused in
pretrial detention.
The legal system is based on French civil law and is composed of
ordinary courts and a number of higher and special courts, including
the three created in May 1992 to replace the Supreme Court: The Council
of State for Administrative Questions; the Constitutional Council; and
the Court of Final Appeal. These courts remain understaffed, and many
of the special courts, including one to deal with unlawful enrichment
and others to try government officials for treason and malfeasance, are
dormant. Muslims have the right to choose customary law or civil law
for certain civil cases, such as those concerning inheritance and
divorce. However, customary law decisions are rendered by civil court
judges. There is a separate system of military courts for members of
the armed forces and the gendarmerie. The right of appeal exists in all
courts except military courts and the special Unlawful Enrichment
Court. Military courts may try civilians only if they are involved in
violations of military law committed by military personnel.
In principle the accused is innocent until proven guilty, and when
brought to trial it is the State's burden to prove that the accused is
guilty of the charges. Trials are public, and defendants have the right
to be present in court, to confront witnesses, to present evidence, and
to have an attorney. However, some defendants are denied legal
assistance at public expense due to a lack of funding. Evidentiary
hearings may be closed to the public and the press, but the defendant
and his lawyer have access to all evidence presented and may introduce
their own evidence before the investigating judge decides to refer the
case to the prosecutor for trial. A panel of judges presides over
ordinary courts for both civil and criminal cases; in criminal cases
citizens also serve on the panel.
There were no reports of political prisoners at year's end. In
March a court in Dakar sentenced Talla Sylla, leader of the Jeff Jel
opposition party, to 6 months in jail for having insulted the Head of
State. Two other charges, inciting insurgency and spreading false news,
were dropped. Sylla had been arrested and jailed in 1998 after telling
a political rally that ``the Socialist Party is led by Abdou Diouf
whose policies are criminal and detrimental to the survival of our
people.'' Sylla was released shortly after sentencing due to the length
of his pretrial detention.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary invasion of the
home, and there was little government interference in the private lives
of citizens. The law requires search warrants, and only judges may
issue them. However, in past years, during high-profile or politically
charged investigations, police often proceeded without the required
search warrants. There were no reports of this during the year.
There were no reports that government officials monitored mail or
telephone communications without judicial authorization.
MFDC rebels sought to collect supplies and money from civilians.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--RADDHO reported in July that government security
forces hit civilian targets with artillery fire and killed several
civilians (see Section 1.a.).
According to RADDHO, MFDC rebels fired rockets at civilian targets
in Ziguinchor in June (see Section 1.a.).
MFDC rebels allegedly shelled civilian targets between April and
June, killing 6 and injuring 11 civilians (see Section 1.a.).
In its annual report published in July, RADDHO alleged that MFDC
rebels were responsible for the widespread and indiscriminate use of
land mines in the Casamance. According to RADDHO the rebels planted the
mines in an effort to terrorize both the government security forces and
the civilian population. Although it was difficult to determine the
extent of their use in the Casamance, RADDHO claimed that up to 80
percent of the arable land in the areas of Ziguinchor, Sedhiou,
Oussouy, and Bignona were unusable due to the land mines. RADDHO also
estimated that between 1997 and 1998 land mines killed and injured some
500 civilians in the Casamance.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice. Laws prohibit the press from the
expression of views that ``discredit'' the State, incite the population
to disorder, or disseminate ``false news.'' In 1997 the Dakar
Prosecutor General charged the publisher and three journalists of Sud
Quotidien, a privately owned daily newspaper, with ``disseminating
false news'' and ``insulting the Head of State.'' The paper had
criticized President Diouf for attempting to influence the judiciary by
holding a nationally televised awards ceremony to honor two businessmen
5 days before the Court of Appeals was due to return its decision on a
defamation case those businessmen had brought against the newspaper's
parent company, Sud Communication. This defamation suit resulted in a
fine of $800,000 (500,000,000 CFA francs), which was upheld in June by
the final Court of Appeals. However, neither the plaintiff nor the
Government made any effort to enforce this decision. The separate but
related criminal case against the three Sud Communication journalists
still was pending trial, and the three accused remained free on bail.
A broad spectrum of thought and opinion is available to the public
through regularly published magazines and newspapers, including foreign
publications. Political and economic views expressed in the independent
press often are critical of the Government and its programs. While
publishers are required to register prior to starting publication, the
Government routinely approves such registrations.
Radio, being relatively inexpensive, remained the most important
medium of mass information and the main source of news for citizens
outside urban areas. Five privately owned radio stations broadcast
within the country; of these, four are owned by citizens of the
country. There are also three international stations that rebroadcast
within the country. In January a new independent station in Dakar, 7
FM, began broadcasting nationwide. Another independent and locally
owned station, Diamono, began broadcasting in the Dakar region only,
along with two community-owned radio stations in Pikine and Keur Momar
Sarr. All of the locally owned stations broadcast national news and
political commentary. Some of them often were critical of the
Government, and no harassment was reported. Prior to December, the
state radio and television company retained a monopoly in the
allocation of frequencies and licensing of private radio stations, and
independent stations had to pay fees to the state company, which
infringed on the principle of free competition. However, in December
the Government transferred this authority from the state company to an
independent agency.
A government monopoly controls local television, an important
source of news. While there are no privately owned domestic television
stations, French-owned pay television is available but offers no local
news.
On August 1, in the city of Thies, some followers of a local
Islamic leader belonging to the Mouride Brotherhood set fire to the
bedroom of the local correspondent of a Dakar-based daily newspaper.
They allegedly were angry over an article that the journalist had
written that was published on July 30. The article reported that the
religious leaders had initiated a failed mediation between two rival
local leaders of the ruling Socialist Party. While the Government
opened an investigation, there were no arrests or criminal charges
brought against those responsible. The journalist initially pressed
civil charges butlater withdrew them after reportedly reaching an out-
of-court settlement.
At year's end, at least seven Internet service providers operated
in the country. The Government did not restrict access to the Internet.
A personal account with unlimited access time cost about $18 (10,000
CFA francs) per month. Several cybercafes in the capital city, Dakar,
provided short-term access to the Internet that was used by many
persons unable to afford personal accounts.
Academic freedom is generally respected. However, student meetings
on part of the campus of the University of Dakar are banned informally
(see Section 2.b.), ostensibly to prevent militant student groups from
disrupting classes and studies. In March on two occasions, police
forcibly dispersed, and destroyed the property of, students
demonstrating on the campus of Dakar University in favor of increased
scholarships (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). In December police personnel
also forcibly dispersed similar protests by students demanding
immediate payment of scholarships (see Section 2.b.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and while the Government
generally respected this provision in practice, there were several
instances in which the Government limited this right. The Government
requires prior authorization for public demonstrations, which it
usually grants. Meetings by students on the academic campus of the
University of Dakar are banned informally, but this prohibition does
not extend to the dormitory areas of the campus.
In March and December police officials forcibly dispersed two
unauthorized student demonstrations (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a).
In April between 40 and 50 recently returned from duty with
MINURCA, the U.N. multinational peacekeeping force in the Central
African Republic, barricaded one of Dakar's main thoroughfares,
bringing traffic to a halt for 3 hours; the soldiers demanded payment
of the allowances to which they were entitled for their military
service in MINURCA. Several days later, military police agents arrested
three soldiers who participated in this protest (see Section 1.d.).
During the year, the Government frequently denied authorization for
public demonstrations by unions or political parties. On February 3,
police dispersed a sit-in at the Ministry of Communication organized by
the National Journalists' Union (SYNPICS). The leadership of SYNPICS
claimed that it had complied with all legal procedures for holding the
demonstration. On June 30, police forcibly dispersed a demonstration
organized by opposition political parties to demand the resignation of
the newly appointed president of the National Observatory of Elections.
Police detained and subsequently released four opposition leaders,
including members of the National Assembly, slightly injuring one of
them.
The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the
Government generally respects this provision in practice. Citizens who
wish to form associations must register with the Ministry of Interior.
Business-related associations register with the Ministry of Commerce.
By law and in practice, the Ministry of Interior must register such
groups as long as the objectives of the association are stated clearly
and they do not violate the law.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice. Some
public employees, including teachers, are required by law to obtain
government approval before departing the country, although this is not
regularly enforced in practice.
At times, usually during sweeps for MFDC rebels, the security
forces temporarily restricted access to the Casamance region or areas
within it. The security forces also regularly maintained checkpoints in
the Ziguinchor region to screen for MFDC rebels and arms transports.
Security forces generally allowed travelers to proceed after checking
documents and searching vehicles.
In January after President Diouf's meeting in Ziguinchor with the
MFDC leader Abbe Diamacoune, the Government announced that it had
lifted controls on his movement, although it continued to provide him
with a close security escort, stating that it was for his own
protection. In June the Government allowed Abbe Diamacoune and other
members of the MFDC rebels to travel unhindered to Banjulin the Gambia
for a conference-the ``days of reflection''-on the peace process in the
Casamance. At that conference, the MFDC set out as one of its
preconditions for a continued dialog with the Government the
unrestricted movement of its leader. In July the Minister of Interior
met with Abbe Diamacoune in Ziguinchor and presented him with a valid
Senegalese identity card and passport. In late July, Abbe Diamacoune
again traveled to Banjul to meet with MFDC military leaders.
The law includes provisions for granting refugee or asylee status
in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Since 1989 as a
country of first asylum, Senegal has hosted Mauritanian refugees. The
Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
organizations in providing assistance for refugees. The UNHCR reported
no significant protection problems for these refugees. While no formal
repatriation agreement exists with the UNHCR, the two governments have
cooperated to permit repatriation for several years. As a result, the
UNHCR terminated its assistance programs for Mauritanian refugees at
the end of 1998, although it continued to provide protection services.
The Mauritanian refugees generally live in dispersed locations along
the length of the Sengalese-Mauritanian border and are allowed free
movement within Senegal. However, most of these refugees are unable to
obtain current refugee documents from the authorities and sometimes
encounter administrative difficulties when using their expired refugee
application receipts issued in 1989. Due to the lack of a formal and
supervised repatriation, and in the absence of an up-to-date
registration program, the exact number of remaining Mauritanian
refugees is difficult to establish. The UNHCR estimates that under
30,000 remain in the country.
In June 1998, following the military rebellion in Guinea-Bissau,
the country accepted up to 2,000 refugees, approximately 700 of whom
the Government housed in a camp in Thies with the support of the UNHCR.
After a coup d'etat brought an end to a standoff in that conflict in
May, the UNHCR closed the camp and organized a repatriation, which
returned over 800 refugees from Guinea-Bissau to their country. Others
returned on their own, while several hundred chose to remain in
Senegal, living with relatives or on their own.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the constitutional right to change their Government
through periodic multiparty elections; however, the Socialist Party's
domination of political life--it has held power since independence--and
irregularities and fraud in elections have called into question the
extent to which citizens can meaningfully exercise this right. The
Government's creation of a second legislative chamber, no members of
which are to be directly elected by the people and one-fifth of the
members of which are to be appointed by the President, further reduced
the ability of citizens to change their Government and increased the
presidency's domination of the State.
In 1998 the National Assembly passed legislation proposed by the
Government to increase its membership from 120 to 140 in order to
equalize the number of deputies elected by simple majority vote in the
districts and by proportional representation nationwide. In the May
1998 parliamentary elections, the ruling PS received 50.1 percent of
the votes cast and secured 93 of the 140 seats. There are 35 legally
registered parties. The 32-member Cabinet that President Diouf
appointed in July 1998 included only 1 minor opposition leader.
Also in 1998, the National Assembly passed a bill that created a
second legislative chamber, a 60-member Senate. Forty-five of its
members are elected by an electoral college on the basis of dual
proportional and majority systems and regional slates. The electoral
college has 13,920 members consisting of elected local government
officials and members of the National Assembly. The President appoints
12 members of the Senate and the remaining 3 are elected from slates
representing several associations of expatriate Senegalese. Most major
opposition parties decided to boycott the first Senate election held in
January under this electoral system because the ruling party's
domination of elected local and regional offices gave opposition
parties little chance of winning Senate seats. With the exception of
two minor party members who filled an appointed seat, the new Senate,
inaugurated in February, is entirely made up of PS members.
In 1997 the Government created the National Observatory of
Elections to supervise and oversee elections. The ONEL was established
as a temporary, independent oversight body empowered to order
bureaucrats to obey the law and to take legal action against
individuals and parties who violated it. The Interior Ministry remains
responsible for the actual organization andimplementation of the
elections, which is done through a directorate of elections. The ONEL
significantly improved the level of transparency of the May 1998
National Assembly elections, despite persistent flaws in the system.
The Government disbanded the ONEL after its mandate expired with the
submission of its final postelection report to President Diouf. This
comprehensive report identified areas for improvement to make the
process more transparent, including an overhaul of the elections rolls
and better control over the activities of the commissions responsible
for voter registration and distribution of voter cards. The Government
and opposition parties agreed to revise the election rolls but
continued to disagree on proper procedures. Constitution of the
election rolls in preparation for the presidential elections in
February 2000 continued to generate political controversy during the
year.
In April President Diouf established a new ONEL as required by the
election law and appointed a retired army general as its president. The
major opposition parties opposed this appointment, alleging in a legal
complaint brought before the Council of State that President Diouf had
violated the election law, which excludes from membership in the ONEL
members of groups supporting, or direct relatives of, at least one
candidate in the election. The opposition claimed that the general
headed a group organized to support the reelection of President Diouf.
After several months of legal proceedings and contentious public
debate, the general, who denied membership in the group, resigned
before the Council of State issued its legal ruling in the case.
President Diouf subsequently appointed another ONEL president, Louis
Pereira De Carvahlo, who was sworn in on July 30.
During the year, the ONEL investigated and took legal action in
several highly publicized cases of document fraud related to the voter
registration process. Due to the existence of the ONEL, the Government
more stringently enforced the section of the electoral code governing
the distribution of voter cards. The electoral code requires each
person to pick up a voter card. However, this section of the code was
not always enforced; in practice third parties were allowed to pick up
voter cards, and they sometimes did not distribute them to the proper
voter. At year's end, voters are required to pick up their own voter
cards at sites that are monitored by members of ONEL and the political
parties.
In December the ruling PS Government proposed introducing
legislation that would amend the electoral code. The proposed changes
would halt distribution of voter cards 48 hours prior to election day
and would decrease the number of monitors present at each polling
station. Due to strong opposition to these proposals, the Government
had not yet introduced this legislation at year's end.
In 1996 the PS won control of all 10 regional governments and many
local governments in the country's first subnational level elections,
which were marked by credible allegations of widespread fraud and
procedural irregularities, gerrymandering, illegal fundraising, and
voter list manipulations. Due in part to the flaws in these elections,
the Government's decentralization program has had limited success in
defusing the secessionist rebellion in the Casamance region (see
Section 5), which continued to give rise to many abuses (see Sections
1.a. and 1.c.). Officials chosen in these widely flawed elections also
made up the bulk of the 13,920-member Electoral College that chose most
members of the newly created Senate in January.
Elections are held by balloting that is described officially as
secret but may permit voters to leave the polling place with evidence
of how they voted. At polling places on election day, registered
citizens receive a package of ballot papers, one for each candidate.
Each citizen votes by depositing into a sealed ballot box, alone inside
a closed booth, an envelope containing one of these ballots. In the
same booth, a trash receptacle is provided in which the voter may
privately dispose of the unused ballots; however, polling officials
cannot readily ensure that this is done. Nevertheless, despite apparent
potential for abuse, this balloting system has not been the subject of
complaints or reports of abuse in recent elections.
Women are underrepresented in the political process. While there
are no legal impediments to their participation in government and
politics, cultural and educational factors hamper them. In addition
political parties often rank women low on party lists, making it
difficult for them to be elected to the National Assembly or to be
appointed ministers. Only 5 of the 32 ministers in the President's
Cabinet are women, and there are only 2 women in the 19-member Economic
and Social Council, the Government's policymaking body. During the
year, a woman, Marieme Wane Ly, formed and headed a political party. In
the past, no women headed political parties. Only 18 female deputies
hold seats in the 140-member National Assembly. There are only 10 women
in the newly elected 60-seat Senate. Women's lower representation
reflects not only a disparity in education (see Section 5) but also
cultural factors.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials generally are cooperative and
receptive to their views.
In the most recent national elections in May 1998, the Government
declined offers of organizational and monitoring assistance from
international organizations.
In 1997 the Government enacted a law to strengthen the National
Committee on Human Rights. The Committee includes members from the
Government and civic organizations, including private human rights
groups. It may on its own initiative investigate human rights abuses,
including torture, but it did not investigate any cases of abuse during
the year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that ``men and women shall be equal in
law'' and prohibits discrimination based on race, religion, sex, class,
or language. However, discrimination against women is pervasive, and
the Government frequently does not enforce antidiscrimination laws.
Women.--There are credible reports that violence against women,
usually wife beating, is common. Several women's groups have formed to
address this problem. Police usually do not intervene in domestic
disputes, and most people are reluctant to go outside the family for
redress. In contrast, the law and society view rape as a very serious
crime, and the law stipulates that persons convicted of rape may be
imprisoned for up to 10 years. If the victim is a minor, her age is
considered an aggravating circumstance. Rape trials often result in
convictions. In January the Government passed legislation amending the
criminal law to make sexual harassment a crime punishable by
imprisonment of up to 3 years and a fine of $88 (500,000 CFA francs).
The legislation also increased the potential fine to $833 (500,000 CFA
francs) and the length of imprisonment for domestic violence to 5
years.
Despite constitutional protections, women face extensive societal
discrimination, especially in rural areas where Islamic and traditional
customs, including polygyny and Islamic rules of inheritance, are
strongest, and women generally are confined to traditional roles. By
law, women have the right to choose when and whom they marry; however,
in some areas, traditional practice can restrict a woman's choice.
There is no minimum age of consent to marry, marriages are sometimes
arranged in some communities, and in polygynous unions women do not
have the right of notification or approval prior to a subsequent
marriage. In the countryside, women perform much of the subsistence
farming and child rearing and have limited educational opportunities.
Although the Government has committed itself to equalizing male and
female primary school enrollment, there is still much social and
official discrimination against women in educational opportunities.
Only 23 percent of females over 15 years of age are literate, while the
rate for males over age 15 is 43 percent.
It is estimated that only 20 percent of women are engaged in paid
employment. Moreover, traditional practices make it difficult for women
to obtain bank credit. Due to the fact that legally men are considered
heads of household, women pay higher taxes than men for equal wages and
employers pay child allowances to men and not women. Women usually
marry young (the majority by age 16 in rural areas) and average 5.7
live births (down from 7 in 1995). About half of all women live in
polygynous unions.
In urban areas, women encounter somewhat less discrimination and
are active in government, political life, the legal profession, and
business. About 14 percent of lawyers are women. Urban women are more
likely to take advantage of the Government's efforts to increase
respect for women's legal rights to divorce, alimony, and child
support, and to seek education and employment. In general urban women
receive equal pay for equal work.
In September 1998 the Ministry of Family, Social Action, and
National Solidarity announced plans to create a national center for
women's rights. The decision arose from a ministry-sponsored workshop
on the promotion of the legal status of women and elimination of all
forms of discrimination. The Observatoire National des Droits de la
Femme (ONDF), as the center is to be called, has as its mandate the
``control, protection, and promotion of the status of women and girls;
information, education, and awareness.'' It is to have members from
both the Government and civil society.
Children.--The Ministry of Family, Social Action, and National
Solidarity, established in 1990 (formerly the Ministry of Women,
Children, and the Family, and renamed in 1998), is responsible for
promoting children's welfare. Numerous organizations assist the
Ministry in support of children's rights, including the Ministry of
Health, which maintained a nationwide effort focusing on child
survival. The Government continues to increase the number of classrooms
and encourage more children, particularly females, to enter and stay in
school. The law requires that children attend school until age 12, but
this is not enforced due to a shortage of schools. Organized street
begging by children who are Koranic students results in a significant
interruption of their education, and many children work in their
family's fields (see Section 6.d.).
In January the Government passed legislation banning the practice
of female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health. The law made FGM a criminal offense carrying a
jail term ranging from 6 months to 5 years for persons directly
practicing FGM or ordering it to be caried out on a third person. Most
human rights organizations considered the law to be a decisive step
towards greater protection of women. However, a few women's rights
activists criticized the new legislation because they perceived it as
being dictated by Western donors. A few Muslim religious leaders also
criticized the law because they consider FGM to be a religious
practice. While the Government sponsors programs to educate women
regarding the dangers of FGM, other critics of the new law contended
that these programs should have been more widespread prior to
implementation of the ban. On July 27, the public prosecutor in
Tambacounda ordered the arrest of the grandmother and mother of a 5-
year-old girl following a complaint filed by the girl's father alleging
that the two women had ordered FGM performed on his daughter. The FGM
practitioner also was charged.
FGM is not practiced by the country's largest ethnic group, the
Wolofs (representing 43 percent of the population), but it is performed
on girls belonging to some other ethnic groups. Infibulation, the most
extreme and dangerous form of FGM, is practiced by members of
Toucouleur and Peulh ethnic groups, particularly those in rural areas.
Unsubstantiated recent studies estimate that between 5 and 20 percent
of girls undergo the procedure.
In January the Government passed a law mandating longer jail terms
of up to 10 years for convicted pedophiles.
People With Disabilities.--There are no laws that mandate
accessibility for the disabled, and in practice most persons with
disabilities are generally unable to participate in many occupations
due to physical barriers and a lack of equipment and training
opportunities that would make such participation possible.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country is ethnically
diverse. The largest ethnic groups are the Wolof (more than 40 percent
of the country's population), the Pular (also called Peuhl or Fulani,
nearly 25 percent), and the Serer (more than 15 percent). Other smaller
groups include the Diola, Mandink, and Soninke. Each group has its own
primary language although French and Wolof are widely used as secondary
languages. While general regions of origin can be identified for most
ethnic groups, these regional separations are no longer distinct.
In most of the country, ethnic and regional tensions have not
contributed significantly to recent human rights abuses, and opposition
to the Government has generally taken the form of nonviolent political
parties that have not had readily identifiable ethnic or regional
bases. This has not been true in the Casamance region, the part of the
country to the south of The Gambia. Casamance is substantially less
arid, less Islamic, and less Wolof than the rest of the country to the
north of The Gambia. Resentment on the part of Casamance groups
including the Diola of domination by northerners including the Wolof
reportedly has contributed significantly to the secessionist MFDC
rebellion in the Casamance region, which began in 1982 and has
continued to give rise to many human rights abuses (see Sections 1.a.
and 1.c.). Flaws in the country's first local and regional elections,
held in 1996, have reduced the effectiveness of the Government's
ongoing decentralization program in accommodating aspirations for
greater regional and ethnic autonomy.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
provide all workers with the right of association, and they are free to
form or join unions.
Any group of workers in the same occupation, similar trades, or the
same professions may form a union. While the Ministry does not always
grant initial recognition to a union, once it gives recognition, the
Ministry virtually never withdraws it. However, the Government may
disband a union if its activities deviate from its charter. The Labor
Code does not apply to the informal and agricultural sectors where most
persons work.
Although they represent a small percentage of the working
population, unions wield significant political influence because of
their ability to disrupt vital sectors of the economy. The small
industrial component of the total work force of 4 million is almost
totally unionized. The only union in the agrarian sector is one
representing workers at a privately owned sugar company. Some farmers
are organized into the National Farming Association, an advocacy
organization.
The National Confederation of Senegalese Workers (CNTS), the
largest union organization, has close ties to the ruling Socialist
Party, and union members hold a considerable number of government
positions. One is a PS minister, and several others hold PS seats in
the Assembly. While ostensibly an independent organization, the
umbrella CNTS consistently supports government policies.
The rival to the CNTS is the National Union of Autonomous Labor
Unions of Senegal (UNSAS). The UNSAS is a federation of strategically
important unions such as those formed by electrical workers,
telecommunication workers, teachers, water technicians, and hospital,
railroad, and sugar workers.
The Constitution and the Labor Code provide for the right to
strike, but with restrictions. Unions representing members of the civil
service must notify the Government of their intent to strike no less
than 1 month in advance, and private sector unions must make a similar
notification 3 days in advance. The Government or the employer can use
the time to seek a settlement to the dispute but cannot stop the
strike. There were numerous legal strikes during the year. In late
June, a loose confederation of nine trade unions called the country's
first nationwide strike since 1993. Workers demanded a salary increase,
lower taxes, and the creation of a national health fund. The 2-day
strike was peaceful and the Government acceded to most of the workers'
demands. Regulations prohibit employers from retaliating against legal
strikes, and these regulations are enforced through the labor court.
The Labor Code permits unions to affiliate with international
bodies. The CNTS is active in regional and international labor
organizations and is the dominant Senegalese member of the Organization
of African Trade Union Unity.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides unions with the right to organize and to bargain collectively,
and these rights are protected in practice. There are also legal
prohibitions governing discrimination by employers against union
members and organizers. Employers found guilty of antiunion
discrimination are required to reinstate workers. There were no known
instances in which workers were prevented from exercising the right to
organize and bargain collectively. The Ministry of Labor can intervene
in disputes between labor and management if requested, and it plays a
mediation role in the private and state enterprise sectors.
Labor laws apply to all industrial firms including those in the
Dakar industrial free trade zone.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--There were no
reports of forced labor, which is prohibited by law. The Constitution
prohibits child labor of all kinds, and the Government enforces this
ban in the formal sector. There is no evidence that forced or bonded
child labor takes place in the informal or agricultural sectors.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution bans child labor of all kinds, and the
Government enforces this ban in the formal sector, which is under the
purview of the labor law. There is no evidence that forced or bonded
child labor takes place in the informal or agricultural sectors (see
Section 6.c.). However, instead of attending school, many children work
in their family's fields.
The minimum age for employment is 16 years for apprenticeships and
18 for all other types of work. Inspectors from the Ministry of Labor
closely monitor and enforce these restrictions within the small formal
wage sector, which includes state-owned corporations, large private
enterprises, and cooperatives. However, children under the age of 16
frequently work in the much larger traditional or informal sectors,
such as family farms inrural areas or in small businesses, where the
Government does not enforce minimum age and other workplace
regulations.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Legislation mandating a monthly
minimum wage has been in force since the country's independence in
1960. The Ministries of Labor and Finance determine wage rates after
negotiating with the unions and management councils. As a result of
negotiations held in September, the minimum wage increased by 7
percent. At $0.37 (223.7 CFA francs) per hour it is still not adequate
to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
Within the formal sector, the law mandates a standard workweek of
40 to 48 hours for most occupations, with at least one 24-hour rest
period and 1 month per year of annual leave; enrollment in government
systems for social security and retirement; safety standards; and a
variety of other measures. These regulations are incorporated into the
Labor Code and are supervised by inspectors from the Ministry of Labor.
However, enforcement is uneven, especially outside the formal sector.
There is no explicit legal protection for workers who file
complaints about unsafe conditions. While there are legal regulations
concerning workplace safety, government officials often do not enforce
them. In theory workers have the right to remove themselves from unsafe
working conditions, but in practice the right seldom is exercised in
circumstances of high unemployment and a slow legal system.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to,
or from the country.
______
SEYCHELLES
President France Albert Rene and the Seychelles People's
Progressive Front (SPPF) have governed since a 1977 military coup. In
the 1990's, the SPPF guided the country's return to a multiparty
political system, which culminated in 1993 in the country's first free
and fair presidential and parliamentary elections since 1977. President
Rene and the SPPF won in 1993 and again in 1998 elections. In 1998 Rene
was reelected president with 67 percent of the ballots cast. The SPPF
won 30 of the 34 National Assembly seats, 24 by direct election and 6
by proportional representation. The President and the SPPF dominate the
country through a pervasive system of political patronage and control
over government jobs, contracts, and resources. The judiciary is
subject to executive interference.
The President has complete control over the security apparatus,
which includes a national guard force, the army, the Presidential
Protection Unit, the coast guard, the marines, and the police. There is
also an armed paramilitary Police Mobile Unit. Security forces on
occasion were responsible for some human rights abuses.
The economy provides the country's 80,410 residents with an average
per capita income of more than $6,800 per year and generally adequate
social services. The Government in recent years has diversified the
economy by increasing the revenues received from fishing rights and
investing in the fish processing sector with foreign joint partners in
order to move the economy away from its heavy reliance on tourism.
Manufacturing now has surpassed tourism as the most important economic
activity. However, no significant investments were made during the
year. Overall growth remained sluggish largely due to shortages of
foreign exchange and the pervasive presence of inefficient state
enterprises. There was no progress toward privatization during the
year. The country's application to join the World Trade Organization
has forced it to consider reforming its trade and foreign exchange
regimes; however, it has made few substantive changes to date.
The human rights situation improved somewhat; however, problems
remained in several areas. President Rene, whose party dominates the
legislature, continued to wield power virtually unchecked. Security
forces arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens; however, such
actions were limited to detention during the weekend in order to avoid
compliance with the Constitution's 24-hour ``charge or release''
provision. The Government failed to investigate or punish those
involved in the violations of citizens' human rights during a law
enforcement crackdown in1998. The judiciary is inefficient, lacks
resources, and is subject to executive influence. Violence against
women and child abuse remained problems. Discrimination against foreign
workers also was a problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution expressly forbids torture, and there were
no reported instances of the use of torture by the police or the army.
However, the Government has failed to investigate or punish those
members of the security forces who allegedly tortured suspects in
custody in 1998. Several cases have been brought against the Government
and the army by individuals who claimed to have been detained illegally
and tortured. The Supreme Court has postponed hearing these cases until
2000. In November a citizen fled to another country and sought refugee
status, claiming that members of the security forces harassed him
because they believed that he maintained documentation of human rights
abuses by the security forces.
One high-ranking officer and a constable were found guilty of
assault after an incident on March 4, 1998, at the interisland quay in
Victoria. Both are serving their sentences at the Long Island prison.
As a result, the Special Supporting Unit of the police is now on duty
at Long Island prison to maintain order with two convicted police
officers among the prison population. Conditions at the Long Island
prison are Spartan. Family members are allowed monthly visits, and
prisoners have access to reading but not writing materials.
There is no regular system of independent monitoring of prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides that persons arrested must be brought before a magistrate
within 24 hours with allowances made for boat travel from distant
islands. The law provides for detention without charge for up to 7 days
if authorized by court order. Defense attorneys assert that extended
periods of detention under harsh conditions are used to extort
confessions from suspects. While there have been fewer cases of
arbitrary arrest or detention during the year, the police continued in
some instances to detain individuals on a Friday or Saturday in order
to allow for a longer period of detention without charge, thereby
avoiding compliance with the Constitution's 24-hour ``charge or
release'' provision. The police released such persons on a Monday
before the court could rule on a writ of habeas corpus.
Detainees have the right to access to legal counsel, but security
forces, in hopes of eliciting a confession or other information,
sometimes withhold this right. Free counsel is provided to the
indigent. Bail is available for most offenses.
Several persons have brought civil cases against the police for
unlawful arrest or entry, with limited success. The military's Chief of
Staff was subpoenaed in November 1998 to appear in court to answer
charges of contempt of the Supreme Court concerning the continued
illegal detention of a man who had been ordered released by the court.
This case and several others, involving claims for damages related to
illegal detention and torture, are expected to be heard by the court in
2000.
There were no cases of forced exile. Following the 1977 coup, a
number of persons went into voluntary exile, and others were released
from prison with the condition that they leave the country immediately.
A number of these former exiles who returned to the country were able
to reacquire their property; however, several claims remain in the
court system.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, it is inefficient, lacks resources, and
is subject to executive interference.
The judicial system includes magistrates' courts, the Supreme
Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Court of Appeal.
Criminal cases are heard by magistrates' court or the Supreme
Court, depending on the gravity of the offense. A jury is used in cases
involving murder or treason. Trials are public, and the accused is
considered innocent until proven guilty. Defendants have the right to
counsel, to be present at their trial, to confront witnesses, and to
appeal. The Constitutional Court convenes weekly or as necessary to
consider constitutional issues only. The Court of Appeal convenes three
times per year for 2 weeks in April, August, and October to consider
appeals from the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court only.
Defendants generally have the right to a fair trial. All judges are
appointed for 7 years and can be reappointed by the President on the
recommendation of the Constitutional Appointment Committee. All sitting
judges were hired from other Commonwealth countries, and none are
citizens, with the exception of the Chief Justice, who is a naturalized
citizen. The Seychelles Bar Association has criticized the Government
for not advertising domestically that judicial positions are available,
since 30 citizens practice law either domestically or abroad. Some
observers criticized expatriate judges for a perceived lack of
sensitivity on issues such as human rights. Legal organs of the
Government, such as the Attorney General's Office and the Ombudsman,
are reluctant to pursue charges of wrongdoing or abuse of power against
senior officials.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy and
freedom from arbitrary searches. The law requires a warrant for police
searches, and the authorities generally respected this requirement in
practice. While in 1998 soldiers reportedly forcibly entered homes, and
seized and detained citizens, no such incidents were reported during
the year. The law requires that all electronic surveillance be
justified on the grounds of preventing a serious crime and be approved
by a judge. The Government maintains telephone surveillance of some
political figures.
Some members of opposition parties claimed that they lost their
government jobs because of their political beliefs and are at a
disadvantage when applying for government licenses and loans.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, but it also provides for
restrictions on speech ``for protecting the reputation, rights, and
freedoms of private lives of persons'' and ``in the interest of
defense, public safety, public order, public morality, or public
health.'' Both freedom of speech and of the press thus are constrained
by the ease with which civil lawsuits can be filed to penalize
journalists for alleged libel. In most instances, citizens speak
freely, including in Parliament.
The Government has a near monopoly in the media, owning the only
television and radio stations, the most important means for reaching
the public, and The Nation, the only daily newspaper. The official
media adhere closely to the Government's position on policy issues and
give the opposition and news adverse to the Government only limited
attention. While both opposition parties publish an assortment of
newsletters and magazines, only one significant opposition newspaper,
the weekly Regar, is in circulation. Government officials have sued
Regar for libel eight times in the last 4 years. The most recent suit,
filed in March by the Minister of Land Use and Habitat for $190,000
(SRS 1 million) in damages, is scheduled to be heard in February 2000.
Sixty percent of the requested damages are for trespassing by Regar
photographers and 40 percent are for moral harm. The Minister obtained
a court order forbidding Regar to publish photographs of his house,
which was under construction at the time.
In February the National Assembly again rejected a motion presented
by the leader of the opposition to reduce the license fee for a private
radio or television station from $151,200 (SRS 800,000) per year to
that of a newspaper publishing license, $760 (SRS 4,000) plus a bank
guarantee of $19,000 (SRS 100,000). The motion was refused allegedly
because the majority members feared the threat of defamation to the
Government, not because of the political competition that an opposition
radio station would generate.
Academic freedom is limited due to the fact that one cannot reach
senior positions in the academic bureaucracy without demonstrating at
least nominal loyalty to the SPPF. There are no universities; secondary
school teachers largely are apolitical.
The Government controls access to the Polytechnic, the most
advanced learning institution.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and the
Government respected these rights in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement, and there was no known abridgment of domestic or
international travel. However, although it was not used to refuse a
passport application, the 1991 Passport Act allows the Government to
deny passports to any citizen if the Minister of Defense finds that
such denial is ``in the national interest.'' While the resident
departure tax of $95 (SRS 500) is payable in local currency, government
foreign exchange regulations and the foreign exchange shortage hinder
many citizens from being able to afford foreign travel, although they
might have sufficient means in local currency. According to a new law
in effect since May, citizens cannot possess any foreign exchange
unless in possession of a receipt from a licensed foreign exchange
vendor. Additionally, banks are providing only $95 (SRS 500) to a
maximum $400 (SRS 2100) to those departing the country because of the
extreme foreign exchange shortage.
There were no known requests for asylum, and there are no refugees
in the country. The Immigration Act does not discuss asylum. There are
no known instances of persons being forcibly deported to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens exercised the right to change their government in the 1993
and 1998 National Assembly and presidential elections, which were
judged by international and national observers to have been free and
fair, despite the fact that President Rene and the SPPF dominated the
elections.
A joint Commonwealth and Francophone observer group for the 1998
elections noted that the elections took place on a more level playing
field than in 1993. The group's principal criticism was that the
Government adopted a program of accelerated means-testing for social
benefits during the final week of the campaign and approved a number of
new applications in an attempt to increase political support. The group
urged an improvement in the effective separation of state and party
political functions.
The President's SPPF party continues to utilize its political
resources and those of the Government to develop a nationwide
organization that extends to the village level. The opposition parties
have been unable to match the SPPF's organization and patronage, in
part because of financial limitations. The Government substantially
reduced funding for political parties in the budget, from $1.8 million
(SRS 9.5 million) per year to $95,000 (SRS 500,000). Under the
allocation system, the SPPF would receive $4,940 (SRS 25,690) per
month, the Seychelles National Party (SNP) $1,900 (SRS 9,880), and the
Democratic Party $950 (SRS 4,940). It is expected that funding is to be
reduced further in the 2000 budget.
In the March 1998 parliamentary elections, the SNP--then known as
the United Opposition--won one directly elected seat and two
proportionally elected seats, thereby becoming the leading opposition
party. Former Prime Minister James Mancham's Democratic Party won only
one proportional seat, and Mancham lost the role of leader of the
opposition to the SNP's Wavel Ramkalawan. While critics often had
alleged that Mancham's ties to the SPPF were too close and prevented
him from openly criticizing the Government, Ramkalawan has played
effectively the role of chief government critic as leader of the
opposition.
There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women in
politics; however, women are underrepresented in government and
politics. Women hold 3 of the 12 ministerial positions and 8 of the 34
seats in the National Assembly, 6 by direct election and 2 by
proportional election. There are no legal restrictions on the
participation of minority groups in politics. All members of the
Cabinet are members of the SPPF.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Two private human rights related organizations, the first of their
kind in the country, were launched in December 1998. The Friends for a
Democratic Society pledged to focus on raising awareness of individual
rights in a democracy, but has thus far proved to be an inactive
organization. The Center for Rights and Development (CEFRAD) has
published a 5-year action plan that stresses respect for human rights,
participation in a civil society, and sensible approaches to
development. CEFRAD also established ties with other national and
international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). Historically, both
the churches and some NGO's have been strong voices for human rights
and democratization, and the Government has not interfered with their
activities. There were no known requests by international human rights
groups to visit the country.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution affirms the right to be free from all types of
discrimination, but it does not prohibit discrimination based on these
factors specifically. Nevertheless, in practice there is no overt
discrimination in housing, employment, education, or other social
services based on race, sex, ethnicity, nationality, or religious
identification.
Women.--Violence against women, particularly wife beating, remains
a problem. Police seldom intervene in domestic disputes, unless the
dispute involves a weapon or major assault. The few cases that reach a
prosecutor often are dismissed, or, if a case reaches court, the
perpetrator is usually given only a light sentence. There is growing
societal concern about domestic violence and increased recognition of
the need to address it. Probation services again recorded fewer
domestic violence cases against women. However, a survey of six church
parishes conducted by the Association for the Promotion of Solid Humane
Families, an NGO, revealed that 25 percent of those surveyed stated
that they have been victims of domestic violence, confirming the
general belief that the problem is more widespread than official
statistics indicate. Participants in the NGO survey stated that alcohol
was one of the main causes of domestic violence.
The society is largely matriarchal, with 75 percent of births out-
of-wedlock in 1998. There were no reports of societal discrimination
against unwed mothers, and fathers are required by law to support their
children. The age of consent was lowered from 16 to 14 in 1993, and 13
percent of all births in 1998 occurred to women under 20 years of age.
Girls are not allowed to attend school when they are pregnant, and many
do not return to school after the birth of a child. There is no
officially sanctioned discrimination in employment, and women are well-
represented in business. Inheritance laws do not discriminate against
women.
Children.--Children have legal protection from labor and physical
abuse and are required to attend school. Free public education is
available through the secondary level. Since January parents
contributed up to two-thirds of the cost of post-secondary education
and training based on their income for both in country and overseas
schools. Children are encouraged to attend school to the tenth grade.
According to government figures, all children between the ages of 6 and
16 attend school, and the enrollment of boys and girls is roughly
equal. In 1995 the Government created an institutional framework for
aiding children, and, in June 1998, the National Assembly established
an 18-member family tribunal to hear and determine all matters relating
to the care, custody, access, and maintenance of children; only
paternity cases remain under the courts. The tribunal became
operational in November 1998 after the Minister of Employment and
Social Affairs appointed the members. Between November 1998 and June,
more than 2,000 cases were presented to the tribunal.
Sexual abuse of young girls, usually in low-income families, is a
serious problem. Although only 50 cases of sexual abuse were reported
as of July 31, Ministry of Health data and press reports indicate that
there are a significant number of rapes committed against girls under
the age of 15. Very few child abuse cases actually are prosecuted in
court. The strongest public advocate for young victims is not the
Government but a semiautonomous agency, the National Council for
Children. There is criticism that the police fail to investigate
vigorously charges of child abuse.
People with Disabilities.--The Government does not discriminate
against persons with disabilities in housing, jobs, or education.
However, there is no legislation providing for access to public
buildings, transportation, or government services.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The education gap between
Creoles and citizens of white or Asian origin is narrowing. The
Government is attempting to reduce this gap through universal access to
public education.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Under the 1993 Industrial Relations
Act (IRA), workers have the right to form and join unions of their
choosing. Police, military, prison, and fire-fighting personnel may not
unionize. Under the act, the former government-controlled union, the
National Workers Union, lost its monopoly position. Between 15 and 20
percent of the workforce is unionized.
There are two unions: One dominated by the SPPF, the Seychelles
Federation of Workers Union (SFWU), and one independent, the Seychelles
Workers Union (SWU). Another independent union, the Public Service
Union, was disbanded in 1997 after repeated discrimination against the
union's office holders, according to one independent unionist. An
attempt to organize an independent union incorporating employees from
both governmental ministries and government-owned entities was thwarted
by government legal action.
Unions can affiliate freely with international bodies. However, the
independent SWU was not invited by the Government to join the
tripartite delegation to the annual meeting in June of the
International Labor Organization (ILO).
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The IRA
provides workers with the right to engage in collective bargaining.
However, in practice free collective bargaining normally does not take
place. The Government has the right to review and approve all
collective bargaining agreements in the public and private sectors.
There is little flexibility in setting wages. In the public sector,
which employs 57 percent of the labor force, the Government sets
mandatory wage scales for employees. Wages in the private sector
generally are set by the employer in individual agreements with the
employee, but in the few larger businesses, wage scales are subject to
the Government's right of review and approval. Private employers
historically have paid higher wages than the Government in order to
attract qualified workers. However, economic problems during the year
led to downward pressures on wages.
The 1987 and 1995 Employment Acts constitute the basic labor law.
They authorize the Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs to
establish and enforce employment terms, conditions, and benefits.
Workers frequently have obtained recourse against their employers
through the ministry.
While the law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers
against union members, there was widespread discrimination against the
members of the independent public sector union, the Public Service
Union, before it was disbanded in 1997.
There are 18 companies that participate in an export processing
zone known as the Seychelles International Zone (SITZ). The SITZ is
bound only by the Seychelles Trade Zone Act and is not obliged to
adhere to property, tax, business, immigration, and labor laws,
including the Employment Act. One of the companies based in the SITZ,
Indian Ocean Tuna (IOT), discharged workers who had come in from
Madagascar. IOT claimed that the workers were engaging in prostitution,
and they were sent back to Madagascar. The workers alleged that they
were being mistreated and were not receiving their salaries.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to exist. There are no
reports of children being subjected to forced or bonded labor.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Article 31 of the Constitution states that the minimum age
for employment is 15, ``subject to exceptions for children who are
employed part time in light work prescribed by law without harm to
their health, morals, or education.'' It is a criminal offense
punishable by a fine of $1,130 (SRS 6,000) to employ a child under the
age of 15.
Children are encouraged to attend school until the 10th grade. The
National Youth Service was disbanded in January and replaced with a
noncompulsory fifth year of secondary school. After completing
secondary school, students can go on to the Polytechnic School for
Vocational Training, abroad for university studies, or to
apprenticeship or short-term work programs. Children in the latter
program receive a training stipend, which is below the minimum wage.
The Government enforces child labor laws through inspections by the
Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs.
The Government does not prohibit forced and bonded labor by
children, but such practices are not known to occur.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The complicated minimum wage
scale is administratively regulated by the Government; it covers the
public and state-owned sectors and differentiates among various job
classifications. The Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs enforces
minimum wage regulations. The official minimum wage is $360 (SRS 1,900)
per month. Trade unions contend that government entities pay some
workers less than the legal minimum wage. Even with the free public
services that are available, primarily health care and education,
independent labor unions dispute that a single salary at the low end of
the pay scale provides a worker and family with a minimum standard of
living.
In recent years, there has been a growing trend in government
policy to admit foreign workers, primarily from China, India, the
Philippines, and Madagascar, to work in the construction and commercial
fishing sectors, because few citizens chose to work in these sectors.
Although it is difficult to determine the living and working conditions
of these workers, there is strong evidence that the labor laws are
flouted routinely with the Government's knowledge and acquiescence.
These workers are paid lower wages and forced to work longer hours than
citizens.
The legal maximum workweek varies from 45 to 52 hours, depending on
the economic sector, while government employees work shorter hours.
Each full-time worker is entitled to a half-hour break per day and a
minimum of 21 days of paid annual leave. Workers are permitted to work
overtime up to 60 additional hours per month. The Government generally
enforces these regulations. Foreign workers do not enjoy the same legal
protections.
The Government issued comprehensive occupational health and safety
regulations in 1991. The Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs has
formal responsibility for enforcing these regulations; however, the
Ministry of Health seeks a role in this area. An ILO team, which
visited in early 1995, found serious deficiencies in the management and
effectiveness of government monitoring and enforcement efforts.
Occupational injuries are most common in the construction, marine, and
port industries. A worker who removes himself from a potentially
dangerous situation on the job is considered to have resigned. Safety
and health inspectors rarely visit job sites. In 1997 there were 5
deaths and 169 on-the-job injuries officially reported. The Ministry
had not released later statistics by year's end.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to,
or from the country.
______
SIERRA LEONE
Sierra Leone is a constitutional republic with a directly elected
president and a unicameral legislature; however, due to continuing
civil conflict, the democratically elected government did not control
the whole country effectively at any time during the year. This
situation continued even after a cease-fire went into effect on May 24,
following talks in Lome, Togo, and the July 7 signing of a peace accord
by the Government and insurgents led by the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF), who had fought successive governments since 1991. The
President's party, the Sierra Leone People's Party, has had a majority
in the Parliament since the 1996 elections. In May 1997 RUF forces and
those of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) overthrew the
elected government in a coup, driving it into exile in Guinea. The RUF/
AFRC junta was itself driven out of Freetown by forces of the Economic
Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG),
led by the armed forces of Nigeria, in February 1998. The Government
was restored to power in March 1998, but fighting between government
and RUF/AFRC elements continued. In January after months of
increasingly serious skirmishes, particularly in the northern and
eastern parts of the country, rebels attacked Freetown once again.
According to U.N. and health officials' estimates, between 5,000 and
6,500 combatants and civilian residents were killed in and near the
capital before the rebels were driven out by government and ECOMOG
forces. Rebel forces abducted additional thousands of persons, mostly
women and children, during their retreat; the insurgents wounded or
maimed hundreds of others. Large sections of central and eastern
Freetown were destroyed, and tens of thousands of persons were left
homeless. Government-insurgent fighting, albeit on a significantly
reduced scale, continued after the July Lome Accord. After the accord
was signed, there was growing tension and some fighting between the
AFRC and RUF rebel factions; even the October 3 return to Freetown of
the RUF and AFRC leaders did not end it. During the last months of the
year there were several armed clashes between forces of the former RUF
and AFRC and between elements of each. In late December, RUF field
commander Sam Bockarie fled from Kailahun to Liberia after claiming
that RUF leader Foday Sankoh had targeted him for death. By the end of
the year only some 4,000 of the estimated 45,000 former combatants had
disarmed and entered the demobilization process. The U.N. Security
Council approved a 6,600 member peacekeeping operation, the U.N.
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Kenyan and Indian peacekeeping
forces began arriving in December, even as the Nigerian, Guinean,
Ghanaian, and Malian ECOMOG components were preparing to leave Sierra
Leone. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program
called for in the Lome Accord includes provisions to protect the human
rights of the former combatants. The officially independent judiciary
functioned only in part of the country and only during part of the year
but demonstrated substantial independence in practice when it did
function.
Among the Government's security forces, the police officially had
primary responsibility for internal order. However, due to the
continuing insurgency, the newly constituted army, the Civil Defense
Forces (CDF), and ECOMOG shared de facto responsibility with the police
in security matters. Both government and ECOMOG forces committed
serious human rights abuses.
Sierra Leone is an extremely poor country, with a market-based
economy and a per capita income of less than $100 per year. Only an
estimated one-fifth of adults are literate. Although the country is
rich in natural resources and minerals (particularly diamonds, gold,
rutile, and bauxite) and has large areas of fertile land suitable for
farming, the 9-year insurgency brought mineral extraction and
agricultural production almost to a standstill. There is little
manufacturing, and there are few exports; approximately 70 per cent of
the Government's budget comes from foreign assistance. Years of
fighting, corruption, and mismanagement resulted in a crumbling
infrastructure.
The Government's human rights record was characterized by serious
problems. Both government forces and ECOMOG forces operating in support
of the Government committed extrajudicial killings and summarily
executed suspected rebels and their collaborators. Government, CDF, and
ECOMOG forces at times beat noncombatants. Prison and jail conditions
remained harsh and sometimes life threatening. Government and ECOMOG
forces continued occasionally to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily.
Prolonged detention and long delays in trials, due to the inability of
the judicial system to function, remained problems. The Government
restricted freedom of speech and of the press, and harassed, arrested,
and detained journalists for their coverage of security-related issues.
Violence and discrimination against women and prostitution remained
problems. Prior to the Lome Accord, CDF units inducted child soldiers.
Female genital mutilation continued to be a widespread practice.
Discrimination against ethnic minorities persists. There was some
forced labor in rural areas. Child labor persists. There were a few
cases of vigilante-style extrajudicial killings by citizens,
particularly in Freetown following the January attack. Before the
signing of the Lome Accord, AFRC and RUF rebels committed numerous
egregious abuses, including brutal killings,abductions, deliberate
mutilations, and rape. The rebels continued the particularly vicious
practice of cutting off the ears, noses, hands, arms, and legs of
noncombatants as a deliberate terror tactic and to punish those
unwilling to cooperate with the insurgents. The victims ranged from
small children to elderly women; in some cases, one limb was cut off,
in others two limbs, typically two hands or arms. Many died from their
wounds before they could obtain any form of medical treatment. Rebel
forces abducted civilians, missionaries, aid workers from
nongovernmental agencies, U.N. personnel, and journalists; ambushed
humanitarian relief convoys; raided refugee sites; and extorted and
stole food. Junta forces continued the longstanding practice of
abducting villagers (including women and children) and using them as
forced laborers, as sex slaves, and as human shields during skirmishes
with government and ECOMOG forces. Boys were forced to become child
soldiers. Rebel forces used rape as a terror tactic against women.
Rebel atrocities prompted the internal displacement of hundreds of
thousands of civilians. As many as half a million persons have fled to
neighboring countries to escape the civil conflict and remain outside
the country on their own or in refugee camps, primarily in Guinea and
Liberia. After the May cease-fire, insurgents committed similar abuses,
particularly in the north and northwest of the country. Although the
number of such reported abuses decreased, they still included murder,
rape, mutilation, and abduction.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Both government/CDF
forces and ECOMOG forces operating in support of the Government
summarily executed suspected rebels and suspected rebel collaborators.
These abuses were particularly serious during the January attack on
Freetown and the ultimately successful effort to drive rebel forces
from the city. During the fighting in Freetown, on January 13 ECOMOG
troops summarily executed 22 rebel captives on Aberdeen bridge, and CDF
members executed 6 alleged rebels in Kingtom. In early February ECOMOG
forces summarily shot at least six suspected rebel collaborators in
Freetown. At least several others were killed in the course of house-
to-house checks by ECOMOG for rebel collaborators and infiltrators in
Freetown. On February 3, an ECOMOG officer summarily executed Abdulai
Jumah Jalloh, news editor of the African Champion newspaper, in central
Freetown, after a CDF officer identified him as an arsonist responsible
for setting houses on fire in Kissy.
Hundreds of civilians killed by AFRC and RUF insurgent forces in
the conflict were executed deliberately for political motives.
Insurgent forces targeted government officials, human rights activists,
religious leaders, and lawyers as they entered Freetown. Journalists
were also particular targets. On January 10, Associated Press
television producer Myles Tierney was shot to death in the center of
Freetown, while a colleague, West Africa bureau chief Ian Stewart, was
wounded. In addition to Tierney, Sierra Leonean journalists James
Ogogo, Jenner Cole, Mohamed Kamara, Paul Abu Mansaray, Alpha Amadu Bah
Bash, Muniru Turay, and Mabay Kamara were sought out and killed during
the January battles in Freetown. Surviving journalists told the Paris-
based Reporters Without Borders that in some cases, when rebels failed
to find journalists at home, they killed close relatives instead.
In early February, the bodies of two cabinet Ministers, Minister of
State for Public Affairs Mohamed B. Sesay and Minister of State for the
Northern Region, Y.M. Koroma, were found in Kissy; they had been
identified and abducted by rebel forces in January. Also in January,
rebels killed the manager of the fund-raising center for the Sierra
Leone Red Cross, S.W. Smith.
Police were also particular targets. Insurgents executed over 250,
by some estimates as many as 500, police and some members of their
families in Freetown in January. When Lunsar was recaptured by ECOMOG
forces in February, they discovered that over 130 of the 170 police in
the city were executed, most on the town football field.
Deliberate mutilations by rebel forces, mostly during their
withdrawal from Freetown in January, ultimately resulted in dozens of
deaths during the year (see Section 1.c.). Over the course of the
decade-long conflict, rebel mutilations caused hundreds if not
thousands of deaths.
Some victims of rebel kidnap attempts also were killed (see Section
1.b.).
There were a few cases of vigilante-style killings by citizens,
particularly in Freetown following the January attack. For example in
January youths in Kenema burned alive three rebel infiltrators.
b. Disappearance.--AFRC and RUF forces continued the RUF's
longstanding practice of kidnaping youngsters and women and compelling
them to work for the troops and, at times, act as ``shields'' in
battles with government and ECOMOG forces. Women also were forced to
act as sexual slaves (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.). According to the
U.N. Children's Fund, after the January attack on Freetown and the
surrounding areas alone, families registered more than 3,800 children
missing or abducted; by November there were 2,400 still registered as
unaccounted for. The United Nations estimates that rebel forces
abducted some 20,000 persons, throughout the country, during the 1991-
99 period. Only about 1,000 of them have been released and gone through
a formal reintegration process. Other thousands have escaped, but the
United Nations believes that thousands still remain prisoners despite
the Lome Accord's directive that all captives and prisoners of war be
released.
In addition to demanding ransom payments for civilians they
abducted, AFRC/RUF insurgents kidnaped religious workers and foreigners
as bargaining chips and in an attempt to extort money. On January 10,
the rebels abducted two Italian missionary priests, the Reverends
Maurizio Boa and Giuliano Pini, in Freetown; the pair were released
several days later. In mid-January, they abducted Archbishop Joseph
Henry Ganda in Freetown; he escaped captivity a week later along with
five other abducted missionary priests, including Father Mario Guerra,
who was abducted in November 1998. On January 14, they abducted six
Sisters of Charity from Freetown; they shot one, Sister Aloysious Maria
from India, on January 22, and two others, Kenyan Sister Carmeline and
Bangladeshi Sister Sweva, were killed during later fighting between the
rebels and ECOMOG forces. Sister Hindu, a fourth captive nun, who was
shot during the fighting, died on February 5 in Conakry from her
wounds. Rebels abducted Father Vittorio Mosele on February 12 from
Kambia; he subsequently was held in Makeni until being released on
April 6.
Rebel forces also abducted 13 Indian businessmen resident in
Freetown, including the honorary consul of Japan, on January 25 from
Wellington. One was killed during the kidnaping; two more were murdered
during captivity, and another was wounded seriously; the remaining nine
businessmen were released on January 29 along with the three surviving
Sisters of Charity.
On January 25, the rebels seized two European journalists near the
capital but released them over the succeeding 2 days.
On August 4, a splinter group of the AFRC abducted over 30
individuals, including personnel from the U.N. Observer Mission in
Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), ECOMOG officers, aid officials, journalists,
and Makeni Bishop Giorgio Biguzzi, in the Occra hills northeast of
Freetown. The delegation members, who had come to discuss the fate of
civilian captives held by the AFRC, subsequently were released over
several days; the last hostages were freed on August 10, with some 200
women and children previously held hostage whom the delegation had
sought to release. Bishop Biguzzi and 15 colleagues also were caught in
fighting between AFRC and RUF factions in Makeni in mid-October. They
emerged unharmed several days later, but during the fighting their
personal possessions were stolen by the combatants.
In December forces loyal to RUF field commander Sam Bockarie
detained two foreign Medecins sans Frontieres workers, Belgian national
Patrick Cloos and German national Klaus Lippold, for over a week in
Kailahun. The two were released shortly before Bockarie and a number of
his followers fled to Liberia on December 16.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, government,
and CDF and and ECOMOG forces operating in support of the Government,
occasionally beat and detained noncombatants, particularly during the
January attack on Freetown.
In January ECOMOG forces beat two Italian missionary priests
suspected of being mercenaries before learning that rebel forces had
abducted the pair.
AFRC and RUF forces continued to use rape as a terror tactic
against women. Rebel forces also were responsible for many cases of
deliberate mutilation, including the chopping off of hands, arms, ears
and legs; attempted and successful decapitations; and severe cuts with
machetes. The victims have ranged from babies 10 months old to elderly
men and women. U.N. officials and humanitarian organizations estimated
that hundreds if not thousands of individuals, including children, had
one or both limbs amputated over the decade-long conflict, including
dozens in the January attack on Freetown alone. During the overall
course of the conflict, it was estimated that for every one of these
wounded who eventually succeeded in securing medical aid, at least
three or four died en route from their wounds, shock, and the hazards
of the journey or from lack of adequate medicalassistance. During the
fighting in Freetown rebels inflicted machete wounds on the president
of the Sierra Leone Red Cross, Mohamed Jalloh; they also amputated the
left hand of Soloman Conteh, the organization's director of programs
and operations and also wounded a driver. The proportion of those
surviving mutilations during the fighting in Freetown in January
increased because of the proximity of medical facilities. Insurgents
tortured abducted Archbishop John Henry Ganda with lighted cigarettes
during his captivity in January.
Prison conditions and those in police lockup facilities generally
are harsh; at best they are Spartan, and at worst life threatening. The
Pademba road maximum security prison, which was designed for 325
prisoners, routinely houses hundreds more. Diet and medical care were
inadequate, and only a handful of toilets were available for use.
Although male and female quarters were separate, adults and juveniles
were incarcerated together. Convicted felons, those in the middle of
the judicial process, and those who had not yet been charged formally
also were incarcerated together. Other prison facilities were equally
rudimentary; the holding cells in police offices are even further from
compliance with international standards.
The Government allowed the International Committee for the Red
Cross (ICRC), U.N. human rights officials, and other observers to visit
the prisons, assess conditions, and see inmates.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--Government and ECOMOG
forces continued at times to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily.
Although the Constitution and law provide for a speedy trial, in
practice the lack of judicial officers and facilities often produced
long delays in the judicial process. Due to the civil conflict, the
judicial system did not function in some parts of the country at any
time during the year and functioned in other parts of the country only
during part of the year. Many criminal suspects were held for months
before their cases were examined or formal charges were filed.
ECOMOG forces at times detained noncombatants, particularly those
suspected of having collaborated with or supported the insurgents, for
periods of weeks or longer. In some cases they were released only after
their families paid a sum to free them. Several journalists were
arrested in the spring in separate incidents (see Section 2.a.).
In the first major evidence of friction within the rebel ranks, in
late August AFRC members detained a group of RUF commanders and aides
near the same Occra hills location where the August 4 abduction (see
Section 1.b.) occurred. The group, some members of which were
mistreated badly, was released on September 5.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of fair public trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice; however, the judiciary functioned only in part of the country
and only during part of the year, but demonstrated substantial
independence in practice when it did function.
The judicial system consists of the Supreme Court, appeals courts,
and a high court whose justices are chosen by the Head of State. Local
courts administer traditional law with lay judges; appeals from these
lower courts move to the superior courts.
Although there are often lengthy delays between arrest, detention,
the impositions of charges, and judicial proceedings, trials are
usually free and fair. Traditional justice systems continued to
supplement the central government judiciary extensively in cases
involving family law, inheritance, and land tenure, especially in rural
areas.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution and law prohibit such practices, and
government authorities generally respected these prohibitions.
Throughout the year, there were numerous instances in which rebel
forces invaded, looted, and destroyed private property and terrorized
civilians. Although at times the homes and businesses associated with
members of the former government and supporters of the elected
Government were particular targets, many homes of ordinary citizens
also were looted, burned, or destroyed.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--The CDF continued to accept, train, and induct
children into its ranks until in June it pledged to stop the practice.
AFRC and RUF rebel forces routinely committed numerous serious
abuses, and sought to coerce, intimidate, and terrorize those who
either refused to cooperate with them or supported the Government. Both
in Freetown and the country they massacred groups of persons fleeing
fighting; maimed and cut off the limbs and ears of noncombatants;
kidnaped children and women to work for them and men to carry
equipment; raped women as a means of punishment and to inspire fear and
cooperation. They forced individuals to commit atrocities under penalty
of their own mutilation or death; commandeered relief supplies; and
vandalized religious institutions, hospitals, and schools. Both during
their attack on Freetown and their retreat from the city, rebels used
civilians as human shields, leading to many civilian casualties.
After many residents fled into the bush following the January
attacks on Wellington, near Freetown, rebels made forays into the bush
to rape young girls who sought refuge there. Insurgents killed at least
125 civilians in Songo, near the capital, as they retreated under
ECOMOG attack mid-April. When retreating from Masiaka in May, rebels
performed amputations on and decapitated civilians; abducted scores of
women and children; and detained others for forced labor. In mid-August
rebel troops attacked commercial vehicles and relief trucks along two
major highways west and north of Masiaka and a relief truck near
Lunsar, looting relief food and supplies.
During the January fighting in Freetown, rebels tried to force
residents to ``celebrate'' their ``liberation'' with street
demonstrations; they burned the homes of those who refused and on
occasion those who complied. During their retreat from the city, the
insurgents looted and deliberately set on fire large sections of
eastern Freetown. Up to 90 percent of the housing in the Kissy and
Calaba town areas was damaged or destroyed, as were numerous mosques,
churches, and businesses, and a significant percentage of the housing
in Wellington was destroyed. An estimated 200,000 persons in and near
Freetown were made homeless in the January fighting. Rebels attacked
and looted the Catholic mission at Madina in Kambia district on
February 1; when Kambia itself was attacked in February, rebels burned
down city buildings, the city hospital, a polio rehabilitation center,
a secondary school, and the residence of the Xaverian missionary
sisters. As ECOMOG forces advanced in early May, retreating rebel
forces burned virtually the entire town of Masiaka as well as nearby
villages.
In early October RUF/AFRC commanders prevented an Irish
nongovernmental organization (NGO), Concern Worldwide, from resuming
relief activities on the road between Magburaka and Matatoka. Also in
October in Makeni, rebel forces looted supplies and vehicles belonging
to a team from Medecins Sans Frontieres as they were attempting to
survey the needs of the population there.
In October serious fighting between factions of the former RUF and
the AFRC broke out between Makeni and Lunsar, resulting in
approximately 150 combatant and 50 civilian deaths and the displacement
of hundreds of civilians. On November 20, armed former combatants
ambushed a bus in the Kambia district, looted the passengers, and
abducted several of them. In late November, hundreds of civilians fled
across the border to Guinea to escape the continued factional fighting
and banditry in the northwestern part of the country.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government restricted
these rights in practice. The Government attempted to regulate the
press through registration and attempted to control the publication of
information on security-related topics. It also took action against the
writers and publishers of articles considered unfavorable to the
Government. For example, on February 24, plainclothes police officers
arrested the managing editor of the Standard Times, Phillip Neville,
after he published an article concerning Vice President Albert Joe
Demby. He was released on March 8. British Broadcasting Corporation
Freetown correspondent Winston Ojukutu-Macaulay was detained by ECOMOG
forces on April 20, following an earlier broadcast of his story on
ECOMOG vehicle impoundment, but was released later the same day. On May
5, three journalists, Ahmed Bob Kande, Thomas Gbou, and Mohamed
Massaquoi, were arrested by ECOMOG following the publication of an
article in the New Storm newspaper concerning the ECOMOG force
commander; they were released after paying bail of $2,500 (5 million
leones) a week later. Managing Editor Jonathan Leigh of the Independent
Observer newspaper was arrested by ECOMOG on May 17
followingpublication of an article on ECOMOG, and The Democrat
newspaper's editor, Joseph Mboka, was detained on May 18 after an
article about recent government-rebel fighting in Kabala. On June 10,
ECOMOG forces raided the Independent Observer's offices and arrested
six employees after displaying a cache of arms said to have been found
in the newspaper's offices; editor Jonathan Leigh surrendered to the
police in Freetown on June 15. On July 6, the state prosecutor dropped
charges of spying and arms possession, which had been made against
Leigh and Independent Observer staff writer Jerry Tryson. On August 27,
CID officials arrested and threatened to deport Cameroonian national
Emmanuel Sanossi, the editor of The Reporter newspaper, following the
publication of an article on government weapons purchases.
Over 50 newspapers were published in Freetown alone, covering a
wide spectrum of interests. Their number fluctuated weekly; many
contained sensational, undocumented stories and repeated items carried
by other newspapers. Newspapers openly and routinely criticized the
Government and its officials, as well as the rebel forces.
Due to low levels of literacy and the relatively high cost of
newspapers and television, radio remained the most important medium of
public information. Several government and private radio and television
stations broadcast; both featured domestic news coverage and political
commentary.
The government-controlled Sierratel communications company provided
Internet access in Freetown, although the condition of its land lines
often made internet connectivity problematic.
The rebels shot and killed several journalists during the January
fighting in Freetown (see Section 1.a.). On August 20, three high-
ranking RUF members ransacked the offices of For Di People newspaper
and assaulted its editor, Paul Kamara, after he published an article
critical of the lifestyle of rebel leaders in Freetown.
The Government generally respected academic freedom. All
institutions of higher learning were wholly or partly closed during the
year; most had been looted, burned, or used as quarters by rebels, and
there have not yet been funds to restore infrastructure.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respected this
right in practice. The Government was not known to deny requests to use
public areas for meetings or demonstrations, many of which took place
throughout the year.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association and the
Government respected this right in practice. There were numerous civic,
philanthropic, and social organizations, and the registration system
was routine and apparently nonpolitical. No known restrictions were
applied to the formation or organization of more than a dozen
opposition political parties.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respected this right in practice.
Insurgent forces targeted religious leaders for attack, including
Christians and Muslims, both because of their position in the religious
community and their support for the Government. During the January RUF/
AFRC invasion, which occurred during Ramadan, the Freetown population
was terrorized and virtually deprived of religious freedom. Muslims who
were found praying in mosques were forced to drink alcoholic beverages,
and some of those who refused to partake were beaten. Others reportedly
were shot and killed. Three churches and two mosques were set on fire
and burned down in Freetown during the January attack.
Rebel forces targeted Roman Catholic priests and nuns in
particular, largely on the assumption that the church would pay ransom
for their return. Another reason is that the rebels saw the use of the
church's radio network by ECOMOG troops during the January RUF/AFRC
invasion as church support for the Government.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice.
Citizens were required to get a police clearance within 72 hours before
international travel, but such clearances were issued nonrestrictively;
the Government did not attempt to limit citizens' departure or return
for political or discriminatory reasons. According to occasional
reports, troops manning roadblocks attempted to extort food or money
from travelers.
More than 1 million citizens--more than one-quarter of the
population--still either are displaced internally or have fled the
country to escape the continuing insurgency. More than 500,000 persons
remain in refugee camps in Guinea and Liberia; others remain in The
Gambia, Cote D'Ivoire, Ghana, and other African nations, while still
others are in countries outside Africa. In October an estimated 3,000
refugees returned to the Kailahun area from Liberia, in part to escape
fighting there. At least 150 persons drowned at sea in March when their
overloaded watercraft capsized when they were returning home after
having fled fighting.
There is no formal process for granting political asylum or refugee
status. The Government cooperated with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees and other organizations on repatriation matters and continued
to provide first asylum to over 5,000 Liberians who had fled to Sierra
Leone because of conflict in their home country in earlier years of the
decade. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to
countries where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their
government, and the 1996 elections won by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and his
Sierra Leone People's Party were the first free and fair multiparty
elections in the country in 30 years. Several political parties were
represented in the unicameral legislature and in the cabinet. Locally
elected councils and a traditional chieftancy system controlled local
government. Preparations for local elections, which were to have taken
place early in the year, were postponed because of continued fighting.
In July the Parliament ratified a bill allowing the RUF to transform
itself into a political party, as called for in the Lome Accord, and in
November the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP) received a
provisional registration certificate from the interim National Election
Commission.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are
relatively few women in senior government positions: Only 2 of the 18
cabinet positions were filled by women, and of the 80 members of the
unicameral legislature, only 7 were women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of domestic and international human rights groups operated
without government restriction, investigating and publishing their
findings on human rights cases. Government officials were generally
cooperative and responsive to their views. Representatives of various
local and international NGO's, foreign diplomats, the ICRC, and U.N.
human rights officers were able to monitor trials and to visit prisons
and custodial facilities. Following allegations that it aided rebel
forces, the ICRC was asked in January to suspend operations in the
country. However, President Kabbah in June asked for the organization's
return, and it subsequently resumed operations.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination against women and
provides for protection against discrimination on the basis of race and
ethnicity, except for the long-time prohibition against citizenship for
persons with a non-African father. This provision effectively blocks
citizenship for much of the sizable Lebanese community and for other
persons with non-African fathers.
Women.--Violence against women, especially wife beating, is common.
The police are unlikely to intervene in domestic disputes except in
cases involving severe injury or death. Domestic violence is not
recognized as a societal problem. However, rape is recognized as a
societal problem punishable by up to 14 years' imprisonment. There is a
significant amount of prostitution: many women, especially those
displaced from their homes and with few resources, resort to it to
secure income for themselves and their children. Rebel forces used rape
as a terror tactic (see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.) and forced women and
girls to act as sexual slaves (see Sections 1.b., 6.c., and 6.f.).
The Constitution provides for equal rights for women, but in
practice women face both legal and societal discrimination. In
particular their rights and status under traditional law vary
significantly depending on the ethnic group to which they belong. The
Temne and Limba tribes of the north afford greater rights to women to
inherit property than does the Mende tribe, which givespreference to
male heirs and unmarried daughters. However, in the Temne tribe, women
cannot become paramount chiefs. In the south, the Mende tribe has a
number of female paramount chiefs. Women are nevertheless very active
in civic organizations and NGO's, were instrumental in pressuring the
previous government to allow free and fair multiparty elections in
1996, and were vocal representatives of civil society during the peace
talks in Lome.
Women do not have equal access to education, economic
opportunities, health facilities, or social freedoms. In rural areas,
women perform much of the subsistence farming and have little
opportunity for formal education. The average educational level for
women is markedly below that of men: only 6 percent are literate. At
the university level, men predominate. Women are very active in civic
and philanthropic organizations, and a significant number are employed
as civil servants.
Children.--Although the Government is committed to improving
children's education and welfare, it lacks the means to provide basic
education and health services for them. The law requires school
attendance through primary school; however, schools, clinics, and
hospitals throughout the country were looted and destroyed during the
8-year insurgency, and most were not rebuilt. A large number of
children receive little or no formal education. Schools are financed
largely by formal and informal fees, but many families cannot afford to
pay them. In July senior officials of the Ministry of Education were
charged with embezzling approximately $500,000 (1 billion leones),
which was to have gone to pay arrears in teachers' salaries. The
Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children's Affairs has primary
responsibility for children's issues.
The recruitment for military service by the CDF and the kidnaping
and forced conscription of children into rebel forces were serious
problems. An estimated 5,000 youthful soldiers served alongside adults
during the civil conflict; some observers place the number at almost
double that figure. Children, both on the CDF and AFRC sides, fought
alongside their fathers and other family members. While the CDF forces
accepted children as volunteers, this practice ended with the signing
of the Lome Accord. However, most children who join the insurgent ranks
do so under duress. For years rebels kidnaped young boys and girls to
serve them and augment their forces and to perform as sexual slaves
(see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.). In some cases they have forced these
children to commit atrocities involving family members. However, even
children who escape and wish to leave the ranks sometimes are rejected
by their families and communities because of their perceived
involvement in rebel activities.
Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is widely practiced among all levels of society,
although with varying frequency. The form practiced is excision. Some
estimates of the percentage of women and girls who undergo the practice
range as high as 80 to 90 percent. While UNICEF estimates the
percentage of females who have undergone this procedure to be as high
as 90 percent, local groups believe that this figure is overstated. No
law prohibits FGM. A number of NGO's are working to inform the public
about the harmful health effects of FGM and to eradicate it; however,
an active mass campaign by secret societies countered the well-
publicized international efforts against FGM.
People With Disabilities.--Questions of public facility access and
discrimination against the disabled are not public policy issues. No
laws mandate accessibility to buildings or provide for other assistance
for the disabled. Although a few private agencies and organizations
attempted to train the disabled in useful work, there was no government
policy or program directed particularly at the disabled. There does not
appear to be outright discrimination against the disabled in housing or
education. However, given the high rate of general unemployment, work
opportunities for the disabled are few.
Some of the many individuals who were maimed in the fighting, or
had their limbs amputated by rebel forces, are receiving special
assistance from various local and international humanitarian
organizations. Such programs involve reconstructive surgery,
prostheses, and vocational training to help them acquire new work
skills. The Lome Accord also called for the creation of a special fund
to implement a program for rehabilitation of war victims, although the
fund had not yet been established by year's end.
National/Ethnic/Racial minorities.--The country's population is
ethnically diverse and consists of at least 13 ethnic groups. These
groups generally all speak distinct primary languages and are
concentrated outside urban areas. However, all ethnic groups use Krio
as a second language,little ethnic segregation is apparent in urban
areas, and interethnic marriage is common. The two largest ethnic
groups are the Temne in the northern part of the country and the Mende
in the southern part; each of these groups is estimated to make up
about 30 percent of the population.
Ethnic loyalty remained an important factor in government, the
armed forces, and business. Complaints of corruption within ethnic
groups and ethnic discrimination in government appointments, contracts,
military commissions, and promotions were common. There did not appear
to be a strong correspondence between ethnic or regional and political
cleavages. Ethnic differences also did not appear to contribute
appreciably to the RUF rebellion, the 1997 coup, or the civil conflict
during the year. No ethnic or regional base of voluntary popular
support for the rebels was identifiable, and they controlled territory
by terror and coercion rather than by popular consent.
Residents of non-African descent face institutionalized political
restrictions. The Constitution restricts citizenship to persons of
patrilineal Negro-African descent. This constitutional restriction
effectively denies citizenship to many long-term residents, notably the
Lebanese community.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of association, and, in practice workers had the right to join
independent trade unions of their choice. About 60 percent of the
workers in urban areas, including government workers, are unionized,
but attempts to organize agricultural workers and mineworkers have met
with little success. All labor unions by custom join the Sierra Leone
Labor Congress (SLLC), but such membership is voluntary. Police and
members of the armed services are prohibited from joining unions. There
are no reliable statistics on union membership, but the membership
numbers have declined as a percentage of all workers with the virtual
collapse of the small manufacturing sector.
The Trade Union Act provides that any five persons may form a trade
union by applying to the registrar of trade unions, who has statutory
powers under the act to approve the creation of trade unions. The
registrar may reject applications for several reasons, including an
insufficient number of members, proposed representation in an industry
already served by an existing union, or incomplete documentation. If
the registrar rejects an application, his decision may be appealed in
the ordinary courts, but applicants seldom take such action.
Workers have the right to strike, although the Government can
require 21 days' notice. Union members may be fired for participating
in even a lawful strike. No strikes were reported during the year. No
laws prohibit retaliation against strikers.
Unions are free to form federations and to affiliate
internationally. The SLLC is a member of the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1971
Regulation of Wages and Industrial Relations Act provides the legal
framework for collective bargaining. Collective bargaining must take
place in trade group negotiating councils, each of which has an equal
number of employer and worker representatives. Most enterprises are
covered by collective bargaining agreements on wages and working
conditions. The SLLC provides assistance to unions in preparations for
negotiations; in case of a deadlock the government may intervene.
No law prohibits retribution against strikers. An employee fired
for union activities may file a complaint with a labor tribunal and
seek reinstatement. Complaints of discrimination against trade unions
are made to a tribunal. Individual trade unions investigate alleged
violations of work conditions to try to ensure that employers take the
necessary steps to correct abuses.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced and bonded labor, including that performed by
children; however, forced labor remains a problem. Under the Chiefdom's
Council Act, individual chiefs may impose compulsory labor and may
require members of their villages to contribute to the improvement of
common areas. This practice exists only in rural areas. There is no
penalty for noncompliance. The last Saturday in each month is declared
a national cleanup day; in Freetown traffic is proscribed before 10:00
a.m. so that all residents may clean their immediate areas. There was
some compulsory labor, possibly including labor by children in rural
areas.
The AFRC/RUF rebels forcibly impressed young boys and girls into
their ranks and forced them into involuntary servitude and to perform
as sexual slaves. Many later became fighters with the rebel forces.
Women were also forced to act as sexual slaves (see Sections 1.b., 5,
and 6.f.).
Rebel forces also forced civilians to labor as porters and workers
in diamond fields under insurgent control months after the signing of
the peace accord. On October 4, rebel forces seized a commercial bus on
the Freetown-Bo highway and, after releasing the elderly on board,
forced some 40 young male and female passengers to carry looted goods
from the vehicle into the bush.
d. Status of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment.--The
minimum age for employment is officially 18 years, although children
between the ages of 12 and 18 years may be employed in certain
nonhazardous occupations, provided they have their parents' consent. In
practice this law is not enforced because there is no government entity
charged with the task. Children routinely assist in family businesses
and work as petty vendors. In rural areas, children work seasonally on
family subsistence farms.
Because the adult unemployment rate remains high, few children are
involved in the industrial sector. Foreign employers have hired
children to work as domestics overseas at extremely low wages and in
poor conditions. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation is responsible for reviewing overseas work applications to
see that no one under the age of 14 is employed for this purpose.
The law requires school attendance through primary school. However,
there is a shortage of schools and teachers, due both to inadequate
government funding of public education and to the widespread
destruction of educational facilities by rebel forces (see Section 5).
Many children consequently enter the work force with few skills and
with limited, if any, literacy. The Constitution prohibits forced and
bonded labor, including that by children; however, such practices exist
(see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--A 1997 law set the minimum wage
at approximately $11 (21,000 leones) per month; it has not been
adjusted since then. The minimum wage is not sufficient to provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family. Purchasing power
continues to decline through inflation. Most workers support an
extended family, often including relatives who have been displaced by
the insurgency in the countryside, and it is common both to pool
incomes and to supplement wages with subsistence farming.
The Government's suggested workweek is 38 hours, but most workweeks
for those who are employed exceed that figure.
Although the Government sets health and safety standards, it lacks
the funding to enforce them properly. Trade unions provide the only
protection for workers who file complaints about working conditions.
Initially a union makes a formal complaint about a hazardous working
condition. If this complaint is rejected, the union may issue a 21-day
strike notice. If workers remove themselves from dangerous work
situations without making a formal complaint, they risk being fired.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law prohibits trafficking in
persons. There were no reports of persons being trafficked to or from
the country; however, rebel forces kidnaped young boys and girls,
forcibly impressed them, and compelled the children to serve them and
to perform as sexual slaves (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). Women also were
forced to act as sexual slaves (see Sections 1.b., 5, and 6.c.).
______
SOMALIA \1\
Somalia has been without a central government since its last
president, dictator Mohamed Siad Barre, fled the country in 1991.
Subsequent fighting among rival faction leaders resulted in the
killing, dislocation, and starvation of thousands of persons and led
the United Nations to intervene militarily in 1992. In a conference in
Cairo, Egypt, in December 1997, all parties except two signed the so-
called ``Cairo Declaration.'' The Declaration provided for a 13-person
council of presidents, a prime minister, and a national assembly. A
national reconciliation conference held early in 1998 in Baidoa
produced no significant results. There were no further attempts at
national reconciliation during the year; however, in September during a
speech before the U.N. General Assembly, Djiboutian President Ismail
Omar Guelleh announced an initiative on Somalia to facilitate
reconciliation under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority
for Development. Serious interclan fighting occurred in part of the
country, notably in the central regions of Bay and Bakool, in the
southern regions of Gedo and Lower Juba, and around Kismayo. Hussein
Aideed is the leader of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), which
continued to assert that it was the government of the entire country.
There were occasional skirmishes between the SNA and other militias,
including with forces supporting the breakaway former financier of the
Aideed faction, Osman Atto, and with the Somali Salvation Alliance
(SSA), led by Ali Mahdi. On June 11, Marehan and Habr Gedr militiamen
captured the southern town of Kismayo from a rival militia led by
General ``Morgan'' of the Majereteen subclan. Also in June the
Rahanweyn Resistance Army regained control of the Bay and Bakool
regions from Hussein Aideed. No group controls more than a fraction of
the country's territory. International efforts to forge a peace accord
achieved little during the year. There is no national judicial system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The United States does not have diplomatic representation in
Somalia. This report draws in part on non-U.S. Government sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Leaders in the northeast proclaimed the formation of the
``Puntland'' state in July 1998. The Puntland's leader publicly
announced that he did not plan to break away from the remainder of the
country. In the northwest, the ``Republic of Somaliland'' continued to
proclaim its independence within the borders of former British
Somaliland, which had obtained independence from Britain in 1960 before
joining the former Italian-ruled Somalia. Somaliland has sought
international recognition since 1991. Somaliland's government includes
a parliament, a functioning civil court system, executive departments
organized as ministries, six regional governors, and municipal
authorities in major towns. The ban in Puntland and Somaliland on all
political parties remained in place. After the withdrawal of the last
U.N. peacekeepers in 1995, clan and factional militias, in some cases
supplemented by local police forces established with U.N. help in the
early 1990's, continued to function with varying degrees of
effectiveness. Repeated intervention by Ethiopian troops helped to
maintain order in Gedo region, a base of support for a local radical
Islamic group called Al'Ittihad. In Somaliland over 70 percent of the
budget was allocated to maintaining a militia and police force composed
of former troops. Police and militia committed numerous human rights
abuses.
Insecurity, bad weather, and crop-destroying pests helped worsen
the country's already dire economic situation. In May Saudi Arabia
lifted a 16-month ban against the export of livestock, which before the
ban accounted for more than half the trade from some ports, somewhat
improving matters. The country's economic problems caused a serious
lack of employment opportunities and led to pockets of malnutrition in
Mogadishu and some other communities.
Serious human rights abuses continued throughout the year. Many
civilian citizens were killed in factional fighting, especially in the
Bay and Bakool regions between supporters of Hussein Aideed, most of
whom came from the Habr Gedr subclan, and the Rahanweyn Resistance
Army. There were numerous reports of human rights abuses by the Aideed
forces. Key human rights problems remained the lack of political rights
in the absence of a central authority; some disappearances; harsh
prison conditions; arbitrary detention; the judicial system's reliance
in most regions on some combination of traditional and customary
justice, Shari'a (Islamic) law, and the pre-1991 Penal Code;
infringement on citizens' privacy rights; some limits on the freedoms
of assembly, association, and religion; restrictions on freedom of
movement; discrimination against women; and the abuse of women and
children, including the nearly universal practice of female genital
mutilation (FGM). Abuse and discrimination against ethnic minorities in
the various clan regions continued. There is no effective system for
the protection of worker rights, and there were isolated areas where
minority group members were forced to labor for local gunmen.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Political violence
and banditry have been endemic since the revolt against Siad Barre, who
fled the capital in January 1991. Since that time, tens of thousands of
persons, mostly noncombatants, have died in interfactional and
interclan fighting. Although reliable statistics were not available, a
number of persons were killed during the year. In January during a
fight for control of Kismayo, militia from the Habr Gedr/Marehan
alliance shot and ran over nine Majereteen prisoners. In February in
retaliation, Majereteen militia killed eight Marehan businessmen. An
attempt in March by a warlord to collect taxes at a roadblock in north
Mogadishu turned into an interclan battle that left at least 40 persons
dead. In April fighting between militia loyal to Mohamed Qanyareh Afreh
and soldiers loyal to Islamic courts (see Section 1.e.) in south
Mogadishu resulted in the deaths of at least 30 civilians and injuries
to almost 50 others. In late April and early May, fighting between
forces loyal to Hussein Mohamed Aideed and forces from the Rahanwein
Resistance Army for control of the town of Baidoa resulted in the
deaths of several dozen civilians and numerous injuries.
Although many civilians died as a result of fighting during the
year, politically motivated extrajudicial murder was uncommon. The
numerous extrajudicial killings during the year generally centered on
conflicts over land or over job disputes. Militia working for Islamic
courts in the south occasionally executed without trial persons
suspected of criminal acts (see Section 1.e.).
In July members of Ali Mahdi's Abgal sub-clan allegedly killed
Osman Jeyte, a well-known comedian. The reason for the killing remained
unclear, and there was no investigation.
In August members of a Mogadishu militia fired on a demonstration
by the Ismail Jumale Center for Human Rights in north Mogadishu,
killing one person and injuring another (see Section 2.b.).
In March a foreign worker with a religious organization was killed
near the southern port of Ras Kaimboni. There was a report that the
local deputy police chief and deputy military commander for Al'Ittihad
were responsible; however, there no investigation and no arrests were
made by year's end. In September a senior UNICEF official was killed,
and as a result, the U.N. suspended activities in the south for 5 days.
In September a well-known businessman, Haji Aboullahi Korehey, was
killed during a battle between rival factions in the southern town of
Kismayo.
In February unknown persons killed Dr. Singh Bohgal, a Kenyan
veterinarian. There was no investigation.
There was an increase during the year in attacks within Ethiopian
territory by armed groups opposed to the Government of Ethiopia,
supported by Eritrea, operating out of Somalia. These attacks took the
form of landmine incidents and hit-and-run attacks by guerrillas and
bandits armed with small arms and grenades. In response the Ethiopian
Government conducted military incursions into Somalia. Some civilians
and combatants were killed as a result of these attacks and in
confrontations between Ethiopian government forces and the guerrillas,
although the total number of deaths could not be confirmed. In August
Ethiopian troops fired on a group of Somali civilians protesting
Ethiopia's occupation of their border town, killing two persons.
No investigation was conducted into a 1998 attack by militia
fighters on a World Food Program Convoy that killed two persons.
The investigation into the 1997 killing of a Portuguese doctor
still was pending at year's end.
In 1997 a War Crimes Commission in Hargeisa in Somaliland began
investigating the murder in 1988 of at least 2,000 local residents,
including women and children, by Siad Barre's troops. Heavy rains in
1997 revealed numerous mass graves in the Hargeisa area. During the
year, the War Crimes Commission continued to record eyewitness accounts
and other evidence.
b. Disappearance.--There were no known reports of unresolved
politically motivated disappearances, although cases easily might have
been concealed among the thousands of refugees, displaced persons, and
war dead. Kidnaping remained a problem, particularly for relief workers
and critics of faction leaders. In February gunmen kidnaped two Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF) officials and a senior Al'Ittihad official.
Reportedly the gunmen, believed to be militiamen loyal to Habr Gedr,
handed over the OLF officials to the EthiopianGovernment. There was a
report that in April a veterinarian in Hagar was kidnaped by unknown
persons and released unharmed later after paying a ransom. In May
businessman Ali Shire Mohammed was kidnaped by unidentified militiamen
in South Mogadishu. He was released later, reportedly after paying a
ransom. Kidnaping also was a major concern in the northeast, where
gunmen hijacked a number of vessels on the high seas and, in some
cases, kidnaped the crews or passengers (see Section 1.d.). In March
the crew of a foreign fishing vessel held since December 18, 1998, was
released after a ransom was paid to their captors. In late April,
gunman kidnaped two Finnish tourists sailing off the coast of Puntland,
but released them a week later unharmed. In June gunman kidnaped four
German nationals from their yacht off the coast of Puntland and
demanded a ransom; however, in July they were released when their
captors were attacked by Puntland militia.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--There were no reports of the use of torture by warring
militiamen against each other or against civilians. Many incidents of
torture probably are unreported. Although reliable statistics were not
available, a large number of persons were injured as a result of
interfactional and interclan fighting (see Section 1.a.).
In April a domestic human rights group accused fighters loyal to
warlord Hussein Aideed of routinely raping women in 15 villages in
southern Qoroley district.
In August members of a Mogadishu militia fired on a demonstration
by the Ismail Jumale Center for Human Rights in north Mogadishu,
killing one person and injuring another (see Section 2.b.).
There were several bomb explosions during the latter half of the
year in Hargeisa, Somaliland, including an explosion on December 21 at
the U.N. Development Program office in Hargeisa. Somaliland police
attributed the bombings to disgruntled persons who had failed to get
jobs with various international organizations, and reported that a
number of persons had been arrested in connection with the bombings.
There were no reports of the use of harsh physical punishments by
Shari'a courts, which in past years included public whippings,
amputations, and stoning (see Section 1.e.).
There was an increase in attacks within Ethiopia by armed
opposition groups operating out of Somalia (see Section 1.a.). These
attacks took the form of landmine incidents and hit-and-run attacks by
guerrillas and bandits armed with small arms and grenades (see Section
1.a.).
Prison conditions varied by region. Conditions at the south
Mogadishu prison controlled by the Aideed forces improved markedly in
1997 after the start of visits by international organizations; however,
conditions at the north Mogadishu prison of the Shari'a court system
remained harsh and life threatening. Conditions elsewhere reportedly
were less severe, according to international relief agencies. A prison
established by the Mursade subclan at the border between north and
south Mogadishu reportedly holds hundreds of prisoners. Conditions are
described as adequate. The costs of detention are paid by the
detainees' clans. In many areas, prisoners are able to receive food
from family members or from relief agencies.
The Jumale Center for Human Rights visited prisons in Mogadishu
during the year. The government of Puntland permits prison visit by
independent monitors; however, no such visits occurred during the year.
Somaliland authorities permit prison visits by independent monitors;
however, it is not known if any such visits occurred during the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--In the absence of
constitutional or other legal protections, various factions and armed
bandits continued to engage in arbitrary detention, including the
holding of relief workers. The crews and passengers of vessels on the
high seas were hijacked frequently and held for ransom (see Section
1.b.).
In Somaliland a special security committee that includes the mayor
of Hargeisa and local prison officials can order an arrest without a
warrant and sentence persons without a trial. In July the mayor of
Hargeisa sentenced five men to prison terms ranging from 3 months to 1
year for heckling during a speech organized by the Government and the
leaders of the Council of Elders. At the end of July, the Parliament
abolished the emergency law that established the special security
committees. The five men were released from prison in August.
In December Somaliland authorities arrested five persons in Boroma,
Somaliland and accused them of acts of subversion afterthey
demonstrated against the Government on issues of employment, education,
and reintegration assistance (see Section 2.b.).
Lengthy pretrial detention in violation of the 1991 Penal Code was
reported in Somaliland and Puntland.
In August in Puntland the regional administration detained three
journalists reportedly for writing articles critical of the government
(see Section 2.a.).
In February two Ethiopians were detained and deported, allegedly
for engaging in Christian missionary activities in Somaliland. At the
end of May, seven Ethiopians were arrested in Somaliland, allegedly for
attempting to proselytize Christianity (see Section 2.c.).
None of the factions used forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--There is no national judicial
system.
Some regions have established local courts that depend on the
predominant local clan and associated faction for their authority. The
judiciary in most regions relies on some combination of traditional and
customary law, Shari'a law, the penal code of the pre-1991 Siad Barre
government, or some combination of the three. For example in Bosasso
and Afmedow criminals are turned over to the families of their victims,
which then exact blood compensation in keeping with local tradition.
Shari'a courts continued to operate in several regions of the country,
filling the vacuum created by the absence of normal government
authority. Shari'a courts traditionally ruled in cases of civil and
family law, but extended their jurisdiction to criminal proceedings in
some regions beginning in 1994. In the northwest, the self-proclaimed
Republic of Somaliland adopted a new constitution based on democratic
principles, but continued to use the pre-1991 Penal Code. A U.N. report
issued in September noted a serious lack of trained judges and of legal
documentation in Somaliland, which caused problems in the
administration of justice. In Bardera courts apply a combination of
Shari'a law and the former penal code. In south Mogadishu, a segment of
north Mogadishu, the Lower Shabelle, and parts of the Gedo and Hiran
regions, court decisions are based solely on Shari'a law. The five
Islamic courts operating in Mogadishu are aligned with different
subclans, raising doubts about their independence. The courts generally
refrained from administering the stricter Islamic punishments, like
amputation, but their militias administered summary punishments,
including executions, in the city and its environs. With the collapse
in December 1998 of the Shari'a courts in north Mogadishu headed by
Sheikh Ali Dere, the application of physical punishment appears to have
ceased.
The right to representation by an attorney and the right to appeal
do not exist in those areas that apply traditional and customary
judicial practices or Shari'a law. These rights more often are
respected in regions that continue to apply the former government's
penal code, such as Somaliland.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Looting and forced entry into private property
continued, with the Bay, Bakool, and Lower Juba regions being
especially hard hit. Following the June capture of Baidoa by the
Rahanweyn Resistance Army, a few Rahanweyn families reportedly were
evicted from their houses in South Mogadishu.
Most properties that were occupied forcibly during militia
campaigns in 1992-93, notably in Mogadishu and the Lower Shabelle,
remained in the hands of persons other than their prewar owners.
Approximately 40 percent of the population, or almost 300,000
persons, have been displaced internally as a result of interfactional
and interclan fighting.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The print media consist largely of
short, photocopied dailies, published in the larger cities and often
linked to one of the factions. Several of these newspapers nominally
are independent and are critical of the faction leaders.
Somaliland has two independent daily newspapers, one government
daily, and an independent English-language weekly. Treatment of
journalists in Somaliland reportedly improved during the year.
In Puntland, Abulkadir Ali and Mohamed Deeq of the newspaper Sahan,
and Ahmed Mohamed Ali of the newspaper Riyaq were arrestedby the
regional administration, reportedly for writing articles critical of
the Government.
Most citizens obtain news from foreign news broadcasts, chiefly the
British Broadcasting Corporation, which transmits a daily Somali-
language program. The major faction leaders in Mogadishu, as well as
the authorities of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, operate
small radio stations.
There is no organized higher education system in most of the
country. In January a university opened in north Mogadishu, and about
200 students attended classes during the year. On November 4, Amoud
University opened in Boroma, Somaliland. A second university is
scheduled to be opened in Hargeisa, Somaliland in 2000.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Many clans and
factions held meetings during the year without incident, although
usually under tight security. Although citizens are free to assemble in
public, the lack of security effectively limits this right in many
parts of the country. Few public rallies took place during the year
without the sponsorship of an armed group. In August the Ismail Jumale
Center for Human Rights organized a rally in north Mogadishu to protest
the killing of Osman Jeyte, a well-known comedian (see Section 1.a.).
Members of a Mogadishu militia fired on the demonstration, killing one
person and injuring another.
In December Somaliland authorities arrested five persons in Boroma,
Somaliland, and accused them of acts of subversion after they
demonstrated against the Government on the issues of employment,
education, and reintegration assistance.
Some professional groups and local NGO's operate as security
conditions permit.
The 1997 Somaliland Constitution established the right of freedom
of association; however, political parties are banned in Somaliland.
Puntland's leadership banned all political parties for 3 years,
beginning in August 1998.
c. Freedom of Religion.--There is no constitution and no legal
provision for the protection of religious freedom, and there were some
limits on religious freedom.
Somalis overwhelmingly are Sunni Muslim. Some local administrations
have made Islam the official religion in their regions, in addition to
establishing a judicial system based on Shari'a law (see Section 1.e.).
The Somaliland judicial system recognizes elements of Shari'a law as
well as the pre-1991 Penal Code and traditional law (Xeer) (see Section
1.e.).
In March the Minister of Religion in Somaliland issued a list of
instructions and definitions on religious practices. Under the new
rules, religious schools and places of worship are required to obtain
the Ministry of Religion's permission to operate. Entry visas for
religious groups must be approved by the Ministry, and certain
unspecified doctrines are prohibited.
Local tradition and past law make it a crime to proselytize for any
religion except Islam. Christian-based international relief
organizations generally operate without interference, as long as they
refrain from proselytizing. In February two Ethiopians were detained
and deported, allegedly for engaging in Christian missionary activities
in Somaliland. At the end of May, seven Ethiopians were arrested in
Somaliland, allegedly for attempting to proselytize Christianity.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Freedom of movement continued to be
restricted in most parts of the country. Checkpoints manned by
militiamen loyal to one clan or faction inhibit passage by other
groups. In the absence of a recognized national government, most
citizens do not have the documents needed for international travel.
As security conditions improved in many parts of the country,
refugees and internally displaced persons continued to return to their
homes. Approximately 17,000 Somali refugees were returned from Ethiopia
under the auspices of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
during the year. Despite sporadic harassment, including the theft of
UNHCR food packages by militiamen and attacks on World Food Program
convoys, repatriation generally took place without incident. The
repatriation of refugees to Somaliland from Ethiopia continued during
the year; however, there were several interruptions in the repatriation
process due to misunderstandings among the refugees about their
reintegration packages, allegations of corruption in the contracts for
transport of the refugees, and inertia on the part of both the
Somaliland authorities and the Ethiopiangovernment. Nevertheless,
approximately 9,000 refugees had returned to Somaliland by year's end.
However, despite the relative stability in many parts of the country,
many citizens still flee to neighboring countries, often for economic
reasons. During the year, most migrants left from the northeast and
traveled via boat to Yemen. Hundreds of such migrants drowned during
the year in accidents at sea.
The number of Somali refugees in Kenya remained at approximately
124,000 at year's end, down from more than 400,000 at the height of the
humanitarian crisis in 1992. In Ethiopia the number of Somali refugees
fell to 180,000 by October from over 200,000 a year earlier. Djibouti
hosted approximately 21,500 Somali refugees in camps at year's end.
As there is no functioning central government, there is no policy
of first asylum nor are there any laws with provisions for the granting
of refugee or asylee status. A small number of Ethiopian refugees
remained in the country, mostly in the northeast near Bosasso. The
authorities in Somaliland have cooperated with the UNHCR and other
humanitarian assistance organizations in assisting refugees. There were
no reports of the forced expulsion of those having a valid claim to
refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
In the absence of a widely supported effective national government,
recognized either domestically or internationally, citizens cannot
exercise this right. In most regions, local clan leaders function as de
facto rulers. Although many such groups derive their authority from the
traditional deference given clan elders, most face opposition of
varying strength from political factions and radical Islamic groups.
In the Republic of Somaliland, the existence of which was endorsed
by clan elders in 1991 and 1993, a clan conference led to a peace
accord early in 1997. This accord demobilized militia groups,
established a constitution and bicameral parliament with proportional
clan representation, and elected a president and vice president from a
slate of candidates. The Hargeisa authorities have established
functioning administrative institutions in virtually all the territory
they claim, which equals the boundaries of the Somaliland state that
achieved international recognition in 1960. Political parties are
banned in Somaliland.
In March 1998, Puntland was established as a regional government
during a consultative conference with delegates from six regions,
including traditional community elders, the leadership of political
organizations, members of legislative assemblies, regional
administrators, and civil society representatives. Representatives of
Puntland-based subclans chose Abdullahi Yussuf as President. Puntland
has a single chamber quasi-legislative branch known as the Council of
Elders, which plays a largely consultative role. Political parties are
banned in Puntland.
Although several women were important behind-the-scenes figures in
the various factions, women as a group remained seriously
underrepresented in government and politics. No women held prominent
public positions, and few participated in regional reconciliation
efforts.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Several local human rights groups were active during the year. They
investigated the causes of conflict in the Mogadishu area, protested
the treatment of prisoners before the Shari'a courts, and organized
periodic peace demonstrations. In August the Ismail Jumale Center for
Human Rights organized a rally in north Mogadishu to protest the
killing of well-known artist Osman Jeyte (see Section 2.b.). Women's
NGO's played an important role in galvanizing support in the country
for the initiative on Somalia launched by Djiboutian President Ismail
Omar Guelleh.
In Hargeisa in Somaliland, local NGO's appeared to operate freely
and without harassment during the year.
Several international organizations operated in the country during
the year including the Red Cross, Care, the Halo Trust, and various
demining agencies. In June Save the Children opened an office in
Hargeisa to promote child protection and improve non-formal education
among returned refugees.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Societal discrimination against women and widespread abuse of
children continued to be serious problems. The 1997 Somaliland
Constitution contains provisions that prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sex and national origin.
Women.--Violence against women exists, although there are no
reliable statistics on its prevalence. Women suffered
disproportionately in the civil war and in the strife that followed.
For example, there were reports that fighters loyal to Hussein Aideed
routinely raped women in southern Qoroley district (see Section 1.c.).
Women are subordinated systematically in the country's overwhelmingly
patriarchal culture. Polygyny is permitted, but polyandry is not. Under
laws issued by the former government, female children could inherit
property, but only half the amount to which their brothers were
entitled. Similarly, according to the tradition of blood compensation,
those found guilty in the death of a woman must pay only half as much
to the aggrieved family as they would if the victim were a man.
Several women's groups in Hargeisa in Somaliland actively promote
equal rights for women and advocate the inclusion of women in
responsible government positions.
Children.--Children remain among the chief victims of the
continuing violence. Boys as young as 14 or 15 years of age have
participated in militia attacks, and many youths are members of the
marauding gangs known as ``morian,'' or ``parasites or maggots.'' Even
in areas with relative security, the lack of resources has limited the
opportunity for children to attend school. There are three secondary
schools in Somaliland and more than three secondary schools in
Mogadishu; however, only 10 percent of those few children who enter
primary school graduate from secondary school. Schools at all levels
lack textbooks, laboratory equipment, and running water. Teachers are
trained poorly and paid poorly. The literacy rate is less than 25
percent. The Somaliland authorities drafted a national education policy
during the year.
Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
international experts as damaging to both physical and psychological
health, is a near-universal practice. Estimates place the percentage of
women who have been subjected to FGM at 98 percent. Infibulation, the
most harmful form of FGM, is practiced. The practice was illegal in
1991, when the Siad Barre government collapsed, and in Somaliland it
remains illegal under the Penal Code (see Section 1.e.); however, the
law is not enforced. While U.N. agencies and NGO's have made intensive
efforts to educate persons about the danger of FGM, no reliable
statistics are available on their success.
People With Disabilities.--In the absence of a functioning state,
no one is in a position to systematically address the needs of those
with disabilities. There are several local NGO's in Somaliland that
provide services to the disabled.
Religious Minorities.--Non-Sunni Muslims often are viewed with
suspicion by members of the Sunni majority. There is strong social
pressure to respect Islamic traditions, especially in Islamist enclaves
such as Luuq in the Gedo region. There was an increase in religious
intolerance among Muslims by Al'Ittihad. In north Mogadishu, Al'Ittihad
forcibly took over two mosques. There reportedly have been other mosque
takeovers in Puntland and Lower Shabelle.
There was an influx of foreign Muslim teachers into Hargeisa in
Somaliland to teach in new private Koranic schools. These schools are
inexpensive and provide basic education; however, there were reports
that these schools required the veiling of small girls and other
conservative Islamic practices not normally found in the local culture.
There is a small, low-profile Christian community. Christians face
societal harassment if they proclaim their religion.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--More than 80 percent of
citizens share a common ethnic heritage, religion, and nomadic-
influenced culture. The largest minority group consists of ``Bantu''
Somalis, who are descended from slaves brought to the country about 300
years ago. In most areas, members of groups other than the predominant
clan are excluded from effective participation in governing
institutions and are subject to discrimination in employment, judicial
proceedings, and access to public services.
Members of minority groups are subjected to harassment,
intimidation, and abuse by armed gunmen of all affiliations.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1990 Constitution provided
workers with the right to form unions, but the civil war and factional
fighting negated this provision and shattered the single labor
confederation, the then government-controlled General Federation of
Somali Trade Unions. In view of the extent of the country's political
and economic breakdown and the lack of legal enforcement mechanisms,
trade unions could not function freely.
The new Constitution of Somaliland established the right of freedom
of association, but no unions or employer organizations yet exist.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Wages and work
requirements in the traditional culture are established largely by ad
hoc bartering, based on supply, demand, and the influence of the clan
from which the worker originates. As during past years, labor disputes
sometimes led to the use of force or kidnaping (see Section 1.d.).
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The pre-1991 Penal
Code prohibits forced labor; however, local clan militias generally
forced members of minority groups to work on banana plantations without
compensation.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Formal employment of children was rare, but youths
commonly are employed in herding, agriculture, and household labor from
an early age. The lack of educational opportunities and severely
depressed economic conditions contribute to child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There was no organized effort by
any of the factions or de facto regional administrations to monitor
acceptable conditions of work during the year.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The pre-1991 Penal Code prohibits
trafficking, and there were no reports of persons being trafficked in,
to, or from the country.
______
SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa is a multiparty parliamentary democracy in which
constitutional power is shared between the President and the
Parliament, which includes the National Assembly and the National
Council of Provinces. President Thabo Mbeki leads the African National
Congress (ANC) party, which holds 266 seats in the 400-seat National
Assembly. The Parliament was elected in free and fair elections on June
2; the Parliament, in turn, elected the President during its first
sitting on June 14. The country's governing institutions and society
continued to consolidate the democratic transformation initiated by the
historic 1994 elections. The Government includes ministers from the
African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) but
is dominated by the ANC, which gained in parliamentary strength in the
June elections. The Democratic Party (DP) replaced the New National
Party (NNP) as the official opposition in the National Assembly. The
judiciary, including the Constitutional Court, is independent.
The South African Police Service (SAPS) has primary responsibility
for internal security, although the Government continues to call on the
South African National Defense Force (SANDF) to provide support for the
SAPS in internal security situations. The SAPS continued its major
restructuring and transformation from a primarily public order security
force to a more accountable, community service oriented police force;
however, it remained understaffed, overworked, and undertrained. The
SANDF and the SAPS border control and policing unit share
responsibility for external security. The Government formed a Special
Directorate of Investigations (SDI), dubbed ``the Scorpions,'' in mid-
year to coordinate efforts against organized crime. The civilian
authorities generally maintain effective control of the security
forces. However, some members of these forces committed human rights
abuses.
The economy continues to undergo important fundamental changes as
the Government attempts to shift towards the manufacturing and services
sectors and away from a historical focus on mining and commodities
exports. The gross domestic product is $133 billion, of which
manufacturing accounts for 20 percent, services 41 percent, and mining
6.5 percent. Agriculture, though only 5 percent of the gross national
product, is an important source of export earnings. Since the fall of
apartheid, foreign investors have used the country as a base of
operations for economic expansion into the Sub-Saharan region. The
economy is driven largely by market forces, although some sectors such
as banking and mining remain tightly controlled by a handful of
powerful corporations. Although a privatization program is underway,
the State holds majority stakes in the telecommunications, transport,
and power sectors. The Government's Growth, Employment, and
Redistribution macroeconomic program largely has been successful in
controlling inflation and instilling discipline in government spending.
Ownership of wealth remains highly skewed along racial lines. The
disparity between skilled and unskilled workers is considerable, as is
the income distribution gap between white and black, and urban and
rural citizens. Official unemployment is approximately 25 percent,
though figures are debated widely. A significant number of citizens,
particularly blacks, are employed in the largely retail-oriented
informal sector. The numerous social and economic problems that
developed largely during the apartheid era are expected to persist for
many years.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, problems remain in several areas. Some members of
the security forces committed human rights abuses, including killings
due to use of excessive force, and there were deaths in police custody.
In addition to killings by security forces, there were more than 200
political and extrajudicial killings, but although political violence
remained a problem, it was reduced slightly from 1998 levels, both in
KwaZulu-Natal and countrywide. Security forces were responsible for
torture, excessive use of force during arrest, and other physical
abuse. The Government has taken action to investigate and punish some
of those involved. Prisons are seriously overcrowded. The judiciary is
overburdened, and lengthy delays in trials and prolonged pretrial
detention are problems. Discrimination against women, violence against
women and children, and discrimination against the disabled remained
serious problems. Child labor, including instances of children forced
into prostitution, is a problem. Vigilante violence and mob justice
increased during the year. Trafficking in persons is a problem.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), created to
investigate apartheid-era human rights abuses, make recommendations for
reparations for victims, and grant amnesty for full disclosure of
politically motivated crimes, continued its work on a large backlog of
amnesty and restitution applications following the release of its 1998
report.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police use of lethal
force during apprehensions resulted in numerous deaths, and deaths in
police custody also remain a problem. The Government's Independent
Complaints Directorate(ICD) investigates deaths in police custody and
deaths as a result of police action. The ICD reported 450 deaths as a
result of police action between January and November. Of these deaths,
192 occurred while in police custody, and 258 occurred as a result of
police action. These figures represented a decrease compared with the
estimated 789 deaths as a result of police action that occurred in
1998. The ICD's report lists the subcategories under deaths in police
custody, which include natural causes, suicide, injuries in custody,
injuries prior to custody, and possible negligence. The ICD experienced
some resistance to its activities from the SAPS; for example, members
of the SAPS refused to appear in identity line-ups or to make
statements; however, cooperation on the part of the SAPS reportedly
improved by year's end.
In January police opened fire with rubber bullets on a group of
protestors with Muslims Against Global Oppression (MAGO) in Cape Town,
killing one protestor and injuring several others (see Sections 2.b.
and 2.c.).
In October the trial of Dr. Wouter Basson, the head of the chemical
warfare program under the former apartheid government, began. Dr.
Basson faces 61 charges including 30 counts of murder, fraud, and
narcotics trafficking. His trial was ongoing at year's end.
The TRC denied amnesty to the killers of Steve Biko and Chris Hani,
and granted it to the killers of Sizwe Kondile, Dr. Fabian Ribeiro,
Piet Ntuli and Griffiths Mxenge, and to 10 right-wing activists
responsible for a series of bombings that killed 21 persons. Other
amnesty applications involving killings remained pending (see Section
4).
In September a black lieutenant killed 6 white officers at an army
base in Tempe before he was shot and killed. A Government investigation
into the possibility that the shootings were the result of racial
tensions on the base was ongoing at year's end.
The South Africa Institute for Race Relations, a nongovernmental
organization (NGO) that follows political and extrajudicial killings,
reported 204 politically motivated killings during the first 7 months
of the year, most of which occurred in the province of KwaZulu-Natal,
compared with 219 for the same period in 1998.
On January 23, the general secretary of the United Democratic
Movement (UDM), Sifiso Nkabinde, was killed in Richmond, KwaZulu-Natal.
Within hours of the killing, 11 persons associated with the ANC were
killed and several others wounded in what appeared to be a retaliatory
attack. Seven persons were arrested in connection with the Nkabinde
killing. All seven were denied bail and remained in detention awaiting
a trial scheduled for March 2000. One person was arrested for the
retaliatory attack--he also was denied bail, and is scheduled to appear
in court in March 2000. In March one ANC member and four UDM members
were killed in Cape Town; reportedly as the result of both political
and economic competition. On November 2, a prominent Zulu leader and
ANC member, Prince Cyril Zulu, was killed by unknown persons. It is not
known whether this was a politically motivated killing; no suspects
were arrested by year's end.
A peace process continued between the IFP and the ANC, the two
parties most closely associated with the political violence in KwaZulu-
Natal. In May 3 weeks before the general elections, a special
provincial bilateral IFP-ANC Peace Committee signed a provincial peace
code of conduct. Although violence in KwaZulu-Natal remained higher
than in other provinces, resulting in dozens of deaths during the year,
there was an improved level of overall tolerance during campaigning and
voting, attributable to the IFP-ANC talks as well as an increased
police presence. Complaints to the committee concerned primarily
posters being removed or defaced, individuals being threatened because
of political affiliations, and other incidents of intimidation. There
are several theories to explain the violence in KwaZulu-Natal,
including a legacy of ``warlordism'' that fuels interparty conflict,
and the actions of criminal elements involved in a Mafia-like illegal
trade in drugs, arms, and wildlife. Some have blamed an undefined
``third force,'' which allegedly combines criminal and conservative
elements determined to undermine the new political order. Observers
warn that the fact that the province has not yet been demilitarized and
disarmed promotes the area's violence.
Violence in Richmond was reduced significantly during the year due
largely to the replacement in 1998 of the regular police force in the
area with a special, larger ``public order police'' force.
Taxi drivers in crime-ridden neighborhoods were responsible for a
continuing series of attacks on rivals. Conflict between warring taxi
companies resulted in gun battles and other street violence, frequently
resulting in deaths and injuries to bystanders. The SAPS began an
investigation of the Cape Town taxi rivalries that caused approximately
13 deaths as of July and a large number of injuries. No arrests were
announced at year's end.
Vigilante action and mob justice remained problems. In Northern and
Mpumalanga Provinces, a vigilante group called Mapogo A Mathamaga has
grown in membership and has opened offices in at least nine cities,
including Pretoria. Mapogo members attackedand tortured, including
beating with clubs and whips, suspected criminals and drug dealers.
Some members of the Cape Town-based People Against Gangsterism and
Drugs (PAGAD), an Islamic-oriented, community-based organization that
called for stronger action against crime and drugs, engaged in acts of
intimidation and violence against suspected drug dealers, gang leaders,
and critics of its violent vigilantism. Gun battles erupted between
this group and other gangs, but its earlier tactics of mass marches and
drive-by shootings largely were replaced by pipe-bomb attacks, none of
which resulted in deaths during the year (see Section 1.c.). Homes of
suspected drug dealers and gangsters were targeted, as were homes of
anti-PAGAD Muslim clerics, academics, and business leaders. In January
a high-profile anti-PAGAD task force policeman was killed as he drove
home after a police search of a farm suspected of being a hideout for
PAGAD-affiliated persons. At year's end, there were 55 cases pending
against over 100 PAGAD members in Western Cape courts. In December a
court convicted one PAGAD member for murder. Another PAGAD member was
acquitted of murder charges amid allegations of witness intimidation,
including the killing of a witness.
The murders of farm families in rural parts of the country have
received considerable media attention. Between January and March, there
were approximately 228 attacks on farms and smallholdings, usually by
black assailants, which resulted in 31 killings of farm owners, most of
whom were white. There is widespread concern that white farmers are
being targeted for racial and political reasons, although no evidence
exists that the murders are part of an organized political conspiracy,
and statistics indicate that crimes against farmers occur at
approximately the same rate as crimes against the general population.
There were incidents of abuse and killings of black farm laborers
by their white employers. NGO's claim that rural police and courts
refuse to arrest whites in many incidents, and the Human Rights
Commission (HRC) criticized the ``unfair collusion between the farmers,
the police prosecution services, and the magistrates,'' citing several
cases in which farmers attacked their employees without penalty.
There were occasional reports of killings linked to the continued
practice of witchcraft in some rural areas. In the Northern Province,
where traditional beliefs regarding witchcraft remain strong, officials
reported dozens of killings of persons suspected of witchcraft. The
Government has instituted educational programs to prevent such actions.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances caused by government authorities or agents.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution's Bill of Rights prohibits torture and
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and provides for the right to
be free from all forms of violence from either public or private
sources; however, some members of the police tortured and otherwise
abused suspects and detainees through beatings and rape. The ICD
reported 24 cases of torture and 8 cases of rape perpetrated by
security forces between April and November; the Government investigated
these allegations and prosecuted some offenders. In April the British
Broadcasting Corporation broadcast a documentary that showed police
officers beating and abusing four suspected criminals. Two of the
officers were suspended and a trial against them was ongoing at year's
end. There also were reports of police abuse of detainees awaiting
deportation (see Section 2.d.). Broad efforts to reform police
practices have reduced such activities substantially, and the ICD
investigates reports of police misconduct and corruption (see Section
1.a.). NGO's continued to conduct human rights education programs for
the SAPS. In 1993 the SAPS Training Division initiated a human rights
program and has trained 6,000 NGO and SAPS instructors who are, in
turn, expected to train 90,000 police officers through 2001.
In January police opened fire with rubber bullets on a group of
MAGO protesters who attempted to attack a government building in Cape
Town, killing one protester and injuring several others (see Sections
1.a., 2.b., and 2.c.). In April police fired rubber bullets at teen-age
protestors who were marching to a political rally. In August police
used rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse a group of students whose
peaceful demonstration led to looting (see Section 2.b.).
Following the killing of an anti-PAGAD task force police officer in
January (see Section 1.a.), police, while searching the homes of two
senior PAGAD members, allegedly roughed-up the son of PAGAD's national
coordinator.
In 1998 police at a Guguletu police station severely beat a Cape
Town journalist, Thabo Mabaso, after he went to the station to report a
traffic accident. The officers responsible were initially suspended,
then reinstated and transferred to another police station pending their
trial scheduled for February 2000.
Security personnel in detention centers beat refugees and robbed
them of money and personal belongings (see Section 2.d.)
The SAPS continued to undergo sweeping, mostly positive changes,
including the institution of reforms designed to create partnerships
between local police forces and the communities that they serve. The
SAPS finalized the merger of the country's 11 former police forces into
a single organization. Resignations and retirements of senior police
officials have permitted the infusion of new personnel at senior
levels, from both inside and outside the SAPS; these appointments also
have served to further affirmative action within the SAPS. However, the
SAPS has been left with deficiencies in midlevel leadership, and an
institutional memory that has been harmful to its overall performance.
The SAPS continued to be understaffed, overworked, and undertrained.
The first intake of new recruits since 1994 occurred in 1998.
The TRC granted amnesty to apartheid-era government officials
responsible for the 1988 bombing of Khotso House in which 20 persons
were injured, and to Jeffrey Benzien, a former police officer
responsible for torturing anti-apartheid activists (see Section 4).
There were a number of bombings during the year, which resulted in
numerous casualties, including at least 80 pipe-bomb explosions in Cape
Town for which no organization claimed responsibility. For example, in
January a pipe-bomb exploded at the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront
injuring 3 persons, and another pipe-bomb exploded at the downtown
headquarters of the Cape Town police, injuring 11 persons. In November
a pipe-bomb exploded at a crowded Cape Town beachfront restaurant
injuring 48 persons. On December 23 a bomb exploded outside of a Cape
Town restaurant injuring seven police officers. In December, the
national coordinator of PAGAD, his wife, and two other members of PAGAD
were arrested and charged with, among other things, possession of
equipment for explosive devices; however, none of the charges
specifically were in connection with the bombings. The wife was
released on bail, and trials were ongoing at year's end.
There were incidents of abuse, including killings, of black farm
laborers by their white employers, and NGO's claim that rural police
and courts refuse to arrest whites in many incidents (see Section 1.a).
Vigilante action and mob justice resulted in attacks on suspected
criminals and drug dealers, some of whom were tortured (see Section
1.a.).
Xenophobia is a growing problem. There were a number of violent
attacks on foreigners, particularly refugees and asylum seekers. In
December 1998, the U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), the
National Consortium on Refugee Affairs, and the HRC launched a campaign
called ``Roll Back Xenophobia'' to raise public awareness of the
situation and rights of refugees and the difference between refugees
and economic migrants. The campaign has produced several publications
and organized several public relations events.
The trial of two suspects arrested for a series of bombings in
January 1997, including a mosque in Rustenberg that injured two
persons, was ongoing at year's end (see Section 5).
Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards;
however, overcrowding remains a serious problem.
In 1997 the Government commissioned the first of several planned
``C-MAX'' prisons in Pretoria. C-MAX prisons are designed to hold the
country's most dangerous criminals. Human rights groups have raised
serious concerns regarding C-MAX facilities, including the Government's
criteria for transferring prisoners from other prisons to a C-MAX
facility and the restrictive, solitary conditions of the prisons
themselves. No additional C-MAX prisons had begun operations by year's
end.
Parliament passed legislation in late 1998 to restructure the
prison service and bring prison law in line with the Constitution.
Parts of the Correctional Services Act went into effect in February,
but the sections relating to treatment of prisoners still had not been
implemented at year's end. A Judicial Inspectorate for prisons began
operations during the year, and a number of civilian prison visitors
were appointed throughout the country.
Juveniles between the ages of 14 and 18 accused of serious crimes,
including murder or rape, sometimes are placed in pretrial detention in
prisons with adult offenders (see Section 5).
The Government permits independent monitoring of prison conditions,
including visits by human rights organizations.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Bill of Rights
prohibits detention without trial, and the Government generally
respects this right in practice. It also provides that every detained
person has the right to be informed promptly of the reasons for the
detention; to be advised promptly of the right to remain silent and the
consequences of waivingthat right; to be charged within 48 hours of
arrest; to be detained in conditions of human dignity; to consult with
legal counsel at every stage of the legal process; to communicate with
relatives, medical practitioners, and religious counselors; and to be
released (with or without bail) unless the interests of justice require
otherwise.
Courts and police generally respected these rights; however, there
was a growing problem with bringing detainees to trial expeditiously.
According to the HRC, prisoners wait on average for 6 months to be
tried in the regional courts and 6 months to 1 year in the high courts;
however, in extreme cases detention can extend up to 2 years. This
problem primarily is the result of an understaffed, underfunded, and
overburdened judiciary (both magistrates and prosecutors), with more
cases than can be handled efficiently (see Section 1.e.). Parliament
passed laws in 1997 mandating minimum sentences and refusing bail in
most cases for certain serious offenses, which raised concern among
some human rights groups about judicial independence and civil
liberties (see Section 1.e.).
There were no reports of forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent and impartial judiciary subject only to the Constitution
and the law, and the Government respects this provision in practice.
Under the Constitution, the Constitutional Court is the highest
court for interpreting and deciding constitutional issues, while the
Supreme Court of Appeal is the highest court for interpreting and
deciding other legal matters. Generally magistrates' courts and high
courts are the courts of original jurisdiction in criminal cases.
Judges try criminal cases. The jury system was abolished in 1969.
The presiding judge or magistrate determines guilt or innocence. In
1998 Parliament passed the Magistrates Court Amendment Act, which made
it compulsory to have a panel of lay assessors hear cases along with a
magistrate in cases involving murder, rape, robbery, indecent assault,
and assault leading to serious bodily harm. The two assessors may
overrule magistrates on questions of fact. Magistrates also are
required to use their discretion in using assessors in an advisory
capacity in bail applications and sentencing. The Office of the
National Director of Public Prosecutions (the so-called super Attorney
General) exercises national control over prosecution policy, and
applies a consistent national policy for the prosecution of offences.
In 1998 Parliament established nine provincial directors and offices to
coordinate and streamline prosecutions.
The Bill of Rights provides for due process, including the right to
a fair, public trial within a reasonable time of being charged, and the
right to appeal to a higher court. It also gives detainees the right to
state-funded legal counsel when ``substantial injustice would otherwise
result.'' In practice the law functions as intended. However, a general
lack of information on the part of accused persons regarding their
rights to legal representation, and the Government's inability to pay
the cost of those services are continuing problems. There was public
concern about the capacity of the criminal justice system to deal with
the high level of crime, as well as the continuing political violence
in KwaZulu-Natal and elsewhere. The resurgence of vigilante justice
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.) reflects these concerns.
In 1997 parliament passed laws that provided minimum sentencing
guidelines and provided for the refusal of bail in most cases for
certain serious offenses. Some human rights groups expressed concern
with parts of these new laws, stating that they would harm judicial
independence and limit civil liberties. The law mandating minimum
sentences came into force in 1998 and was used in December in the
sentencing of a PAGAD member on charges of murder (see Section 1.a.)
However, in October a Cape Town High Court Judge, when exercising his
discretion, chose not to follow minimum sentencing guidelines in a rape
case. The new bail law was upheld by the Constitutional Court.
The Government and legal bodies have acted to redress historic
racial and gender imbalances in the judiciary and the bar. The ranks of
judges, magistrates, senior counsels, and attorneys are more reflective
of society, although they still fall far short of a representative
composition. On August 30, the Justice Minister criticized the
judiciary for retaining vestiges of apartheid. He noted that the High
and Constitutional Courts still were staffed mostly by whites--of 187
judges, 142 are white--and had light caseloads, while the Magistrates
courts were ``hopelessly underresourced.''
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
In 1994 the Redistribution of Land Rights Act established the
Constitutional Land Court and the Commission on Restitution of Land
Rights. The Court's mission is to settle cases previously vetted and
evaluated by the Commission. Claims only can be filed for land
dispossessions following the promulgation of the Natives Land Act of
1913, although this does not include dispossessions that occurred in
1913, which marked the year of the Government's most significant land
redistribution in favor of whites. The various forms of compensation
offered to claimants are the return of the original land, a deed to
another piece of land, financial remuneration, or preferential access
to government housing. A deadline of December 31, 1998, was set for
receiving claims. There is no deadline for completion of the claim
settlements, and the pace at which cases are moving is slow. As of
December 1998, 63,455 cases had been received, of which 4,000 were
accepted and are under investigation. Only 795 claims had been resolved
by year's end. A provision passed by Parliament in late 1997, which
allows the Ministry of Land Affairs to offer settlements without first
going to court, has expedited the resolution process.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. However, these rights can be limited by law under
some circumstances. Several apartheid-era laws that remain in force
pose a potential threat to the media. In addition, the Constitution
bans the advocacy of hatred based on race, ethnicity, gender, or
religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm. Nevertheless,
the press freely criticized both the Government and the opposition.
Several laws from the apartheid era remain in effect that permit
the Government to restrict the publication of information about the
police, the national defense forces, prisons, and mental institutions.
While these laws have not been enforced regularly, journalists perceive
them to be a threat to the freedom of the press. Another law, the
Criminal Procedure Act, could be used to compel reporters to reveal
their sources. In June the South African National Editors' Forum
(SANEF) launched a media campaign to compel changes to legislation that
restrict the free flow of information. In July SANEF and the Government
reached an informal agreement to introduce safeguards to prevent the
use of the Criminal Procedure Act against journalists; however, in
September the ICD stated that the Provincial Director of Public
Prosecutions decided to invoke a section of the Criminal Procedure Act
against an unnamed person. The Act reportedly was not invoked
officially during the year; however, SANEF continues to push for a
formal amendment of the Act that would ensure this agreement.
The Government used both legislative and structural means to
encourage greater racial, ethnic, and gender diversity in the ranks of
the media. The media offer a broad range of news, opinion, and
analysis. Coverage of news and expression of opinion is vigorous.
However, high-ranking government officials on occasion have reacted
sharply to media criticism of government programs and problems, going
so far as to accuse journalists, particularly black journalists, of
disloyalty. A few journalists fear that the Government would like to
control the media. A larger number of journalists believe that the
Government's sensitivity and its reaction to criticism cause self-
censorship in the media.
Three publishing conglomerates own 80 percent of the newspapers in
South Africa. All newspapers except one are independent. The
independent Sowetan had the greatest circulation with an estimated
readership of 1.2 million. Print media reaches only about 20 percent of
the population due to illiteracy, the lack of newspapers in rural
areas, and the cost of newspapers. The majority of the population
receive the news through radio broadcasts.
The state-owned South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC)
continues to own and control the majority of the television and radio
outlets. In December the SABC became a limited company increasing the
potential for private ownership and greater editorial independence; the
process of splitting the corporation into commercial and public
services is scheduled to begin in April 2000. The SABC is managed by
black citizens, provides broadcasting in the country's main African
languages, and offers balanced news coverage of the Government and the
leading opposition parties. The SABC maintains editorial independence
from the Government; however, the summary dismissal of several of the
SABC's most senior journalists in late 1998 and early in the year
raised concern about its tolerance for dissenting voices. During the
period preceding the June elections, a number of opposition leaders
accused the SABC of marginalizing their parties in its coverage of the
campaign; however, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), the
government agency that regulates broadcasters, ruled that there was no
evidence of biased reporting by the SABC.
The first commercial television station, E-TV, began broadcasting
in October 1998. Most of E-TV's schedule consists of newscasts and
foreign-produced programs. Majority ownership of E-TV is held by Midi
Television, a black-owned consortium composed of anumber of South
African associations and syndicates representing workers, women, and
disabled persons.
In addition to E-TV, the SABC competed with two pay-per-view
broadcasters, M-NET and Multichoice, several commercial radio
broadcasters, and a large number of low-power, not-for-profit community
radio stations. The IBA has issued more than 100 community radio
licenses since 1994; many of the licensees continue to experience
startup and personnel-retention problems. Nevertheless, community radio
provides radio access for the first-time to thousands of historically
marginalized citizens, providing special event information and news
tailored for specific interest groups.
In 1997 a black-owned consortium acquired control of the country's
leading black-oriented newspaper, the Sowetan, and of a major,
traditionally white-oriented publishing business, Times Media Limited.
These acquisitions made inroads into the historic monopoly of white
citizens over the print and electronic media. Black citizens also are
gaining access to the media through community radio and in upper level
management positions at the SABC. In the spring, the HRC launched an
investigation into racism in the media; the investigation focused
journalists on the issue of subliminal racism, while creating some
concern that it would have an intimidating effect on freedom of the
press. The HRC monitored the media to assess whether allegations of
racism are used to co-opt black journalists and to pressure white
journalists into changing their reporting. The HRC's final report was
delayed pending public hearings on the report scheduled for March 2000.
In a landmark judgement in September 1998, the Supreme Court ruled
that if journalists could prove that they had taken all the steps
necessary to verify that the information they obtained was genuine and
the articles published as a consequence were reasonable and not
negligent in their reporting of the facts, journalists would not be
liable if the information obtained was defamatory.
There are several government agencies with media-related
responsibilities. The IBA, created in 1994 to dismantle the
Government's monopoly of electronic media and serve as a regulatory
agency for the broadcast media, lost some of its independence in 1998
when it was placed under the Minister of Post, Telecommunications, and
Broadcasting. The Board of Censors reviews and passes judgment on
written and graphic materials published in or imported into the
country. The Board has the power to edit or ban books, magazines,
movies, and videos. It regularly exercises that power, although with
restraint. The Government Communications and Information Services,
coordinates and facilitates communications with the citizenry through
its Directorate for Media Diversity and Development, which began
operations in March.
There are no restrictions on academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
this right in practice.
In January in Cape Town, the Government denied MAGO, a group
believed to be associated with the radical Islamic-based political
group Qibla, a permit to march in protest of U.S. and British air
strikes against Iraq. Despite the denial, MAGO members demonstrated on
January 7 and 8 and attempted to attack a government building in which
a foreign dignitary was speaking. In attempts to disperse the
demonstration, police arrested several protesters and opened fire on
the protesters with rubber bullets, killing one protester and injuring
several others. On January 13, the Government denied a permit to Qibla
to demonstrate against Israel's occupation of Jerusalem on the last
Friday of Ramadan; however, a magistrate overturned the denial and
Qibla was permitted to march.
In April police fired rubber bullets at a group of teenage
protestors who were marching to a political rally in Umtata to
commemorate the fifth anniversary of South Africa's first democratic
elections (see Section 1.c). In August a group of secondary school
students marched in protest of an ongoing labor dispute between
teachers and the government. When some of the marchers began looting
and vandalizing property, the police used teargas and rubber bullets to
disperse the demonstration (see Section 1.c.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
Members of PAGAD complained that they were the target of police
brutality. There was no indication that police targeted PAGAD members
for investigation because of their religious affiliation. Some
religious communities believe that the Government is too lenient in
regards to PAGAD.
In January the Government denied MAGO, a group believed to be
associated with the radical Islamic-based political group Qibla, a
permit to march (see Section 2.b.). MAGO members demonstrated despite
the denial; police arrested several protesters, and fired rubber
bullets that killed one protestor and injured several others (see
Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Also in January, the Government denied a
permit to Qibla to demonstrate; however, a magistrate overturned the
denial (see Section 2.b.).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
The law does not contain provisions for the granting of refugee or
asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In November 1998, the
National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces passed the
Refugees Act--framework legislation that codified the country's
obligations under the U.N. Convention and its Protocol; however, the
act had not gone into effect by year's end. The Refugees Act stipulates
that no persons shall be expelled, extradited, or returned to any other
country if they face persecution due to race, religion, or political
affiliation, or when ``his or her life, physical safety, or freedom
would be threatened.'' The act also stipulates that designated refugees
lose their status if they voluntarily return to their country of
origin, take citizenship of another country, or if the circumstances
that caused their flight from the country of origin change. However,
the act stipulates that in order to renew their temporary residency
permits, asylum seekers must return to the town in which they
originally lodged their application to be recognized as refugees.
Permits that are lost, stolen, or destroyed are not renewed. If found
without a valid permit, asylum seekers are subject to arrest,
detention, and deportation. However, until the Act goes into effect,
the more restrictive Alien's Control Act of 1991 remains in effect. The
Alien's Control Act does not differentiate between refugees and aliens,
and does not take into account commitments made by Government in
signing international conventions governing the treatment of refugees.
The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. The Government provides first
asylum, granting applicants the right to work and study. There were
9,536 applications for refugee status submitted during the year. Of
those applications, 524 were accepted, 3,185 were rejected, and 1,193
were cancelled. The rest still were outstanding at year's end.
Recognized refugees include refugees from Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Liberia, Somalia,
and Sudan.
About 70 percent of the thousands of illegal immigrants deported
during the year came from Mozambique. Illegal immigrants are processed
for deportation at a central facility, and sent back to Mozambique and
Zimbabwe by weekly trains. Inadequate security on the trains allows
many deportees to jump from the train en route, perpetuating the
illegal immigration problem. Despite numerous procedural safeguards,
efforts to combat a mounting illegal immigration problem occasionally
resulted in the wrongful deportation of aliens legally in the country.
However, no persons were returned forcibly to countries where they
feared persecution. There also were credible reports of overcrowded,
unhygienic detention facilities; beatings by security personnel in
detention centers; and the theft of money and personal possessions from
refugees by security personnel.
Xenophobia led to a number of violent attacks on foreigners,
particularly refugees and asylum seekers (see Section 1.c.).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens exercised the right to change their government in June
elections that observers deemed to be free and fair. There was an
improved level of overall tolerance during the campaigning and voting
period over the 1994 elections, attributable to IFP-ANC talks, as well
as an increased police presence. Complaints primarily concerned posters
being removed or defaced, individuals being threatened because of
political affiliation, and other incidents of intimidation.
The new Constitution went into effect in February 1997. Under its
terms, the country retains a bicameral parliament, an executive state
presidency, and an independent judiciary, including a constitutional
court.
The 400-member National Assembly was retained under the
Constitution. A National Council of Provinces (NCOP), consisting of six
permanent and four rotating delegates from each of the nine provinces,
replaced the former Senate as the second chamber of Parliament. The
NCOP, created to give a greater voice to provincial interests, must
approve legislation that involves shared national and provincial
competencies according to a schedule in the Constitution. An 18-member
Council of Traditional Leaders, which the Constitution accords an
advisory role in matters of traditional law and authority, was
inaugurated in 1997.
Two parties, the ANC and the IFP, continued to share executive
power, although the ANC dominated the Government and gained in
parliamentary strength in the June elections. The ANC fills 24 of the
27 cabinet positions. In June the ANC leader, President Thabo Mbeki,
succeeded Nelson Mandela as Head of State. As a result of the June
elections, the Democratic Party (DP) replaced the New National Party
(NNP) as the official opposition in the National Assembly. In addition
to the ANC, IFP, DP, and NNP, the National Assembly includes the UDM,
the African Christian Democratic Party, the Freedom Front, the Pan
Africanist Congress, the United Christian Democratic Party, the Federal
Alliance, the Afrikaner Unity Movement, the Azanian People's
Organization, and the Minority Front.
There are no legal impediments to women's participation in
government; however, women are underrepresented in government and
politics. Of the 400 National Assembly members 119 are women, while in
the NCOP, 17 of the 54 permanent delegates are women. Women currently
occupy three of four parliamentary presiding officer positions (speaker
and deputy speaker of the National Assembly, chair of the NCOP). Women
hold 8 of 27 ministerial positions, as well as 8 of 13 deputy
ministerial slots.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights groups operate without government restriction,
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.
Government officials generally are cooperative and responsive to their
views. Many organizations participate in governmental bodies that seek
to gather public input and to fashion policies related to human rights.
The government-created HRC is tasked with promoting the observance
of fundamental human rights at all levels of government and throughout
the general population. The HRC also has the power to conduct
investigations, issue subpoenas, and hear testimony under oath. While
commissioners were named in late 1995, the HRC's powers were not
determined formally until May 1996. Its operations have been hampered
by red tape, budgetary concerns, the absence of civil liberties
legislation, several high-level staff resignations, and concerns about
the HRC's broad interpretation of its mandate.
The Office of the Public Protector investigates abuse and
mismanagement by the Government, and acts as an office of last resort
where citizens report unfair treatment by government organizations.
Such complaints generally take the form of concerns over lost pension
checks or unfair hiring practices. The office handles an increasing
number of complaints but is hampered by severe resource constraints.
Under its 1995 enabling legislation, the TRC was empowered to look
into apartheid-era gross human rights abuses committed between 1960 and
1994, to grant amnesty to perpetrators of a broad range of politically
motivated crimes, and to recommend compensation for victims of human
rights abuses. Due to the volume of work, the TRC's original 2-year
mandate was extended to allow the continuation of amnesty hearings, and
the TRC continued to operate freely throughout its fourth year. Its 5-
volume report was released in 1998, and a codicil is to be added upon
completion of the amnesty process. In its report, the TRC found that
apartheid was a crime against humanity, that the former apartheid
regime was responsible for most of the human rights abuses during the
era of its rule, and that the ANC and other liberation movements also
committed abuses during their armed struggle. Following a court
challenge in 1998, findings on former State President F.W. De Klerk
were excised from the report, pending a hearing that has yet to be
scheduled. Former President P.W. Botha was subpoenaed to testify in the
TRC's amnesty hearings but refused and was convicted of contempt in
1998. In June the Cape Town High Court overturned his conviction on
procedural grounds.
By January approximately 7,120 amnesty applications had been filed
with the TRC. By year's end 700 cases remained outstanding, 300 of
which remained unheard. An estimated 80 to 90 percent of all
applications were from persons already incarcerated. In October the TRC
began amnesty hearings on 10 former members of the Umkhonto we Sizwe,
the armed wing of the ANC, for their role in a series of bar bombings
in Durban in 1986. A decision still was pending at year's end. A
decision on amnesty for the killer of ANC activist Ruth First still was
pending. The applications for amnesty by the killers of South African
Communist Party (SACP) leader Chris Hani and black consciousness leader
Steve Biko were denied. Amnesty was granted to the killers of human
rights lawyer Griffiths Mxenge, anti-apartheid activist Sizwe Kondile,
ANC member Dr. Fabian Ribeiro, and minister Piet Ntuli, and to Jeffrey
Benzien, a former police officer who tortured anti-apartheid activists.
In December the TRC granted amnesty to 10 right-wing activists
responsible for a series of bombings, which killed 21 persons and
wounded almost 200, leading up to the 1994 elections. The TRC granted
amnesty to a former Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok; the former
Commissioner of Police, General Johan van der Merwe; the former head of
the Vlakplaas police unit, Eugene de Kock; and 16 others for their
roles in the 1988 bombing of Khotso house, a church headquarters in
Johannesburg, which injured more than 20 persons. The TRC is still
considering Vlok's amnesty applications forother offenses. The TRC
granted amnesty to all applicants in the bombing of the Congress of
South African Trade Unions (COSATU) House. The TRC granted amnesty to
De Kock and General John Coetzee, head of the Security Branch from 1980
to 1983 and National Police Chief from 1983 to 1987, for their roles in
the bombing of ANC offices in London in 1982. In December De Kock was
granted amnesty for his role in the murder of the ``Cradock Four'' in
1985. In 1998 a Cape Town High Court overturned a blanket amnesty from
the TRC for 38 high-profile ANC leaders, declaring there was no
provision in the law for group amnesties. Twenty-nine of the leaders
resubmitted individual amnesty applications, which the Committee
declared to be invalid in March because the applications did not
provide details of specific acts for which amnesty was being requested.
The TRC report called for a reconciliation summit to be scheduled
during the year, but had not received a formal response from the
Government by year's end. The TRC also called for increased counseling
services for victims of trauma, and consideration of a mechanism for
restitution, such as a wealth tax. The Cabinet and Parliament have yet
to approve the TRC's recommendations for an overall payment formula for
reparations, which include monetary compensation as well as community
support and legal and symbolic reparations. The Government had not
resolved any of these matters by year's end; however, the processing of
financial reparation applications from eligible victims continued
through year's end. In 1998 interim assistance was given to those
considered to be in the greatest financial difficulty. The TRC
officially expressed concern regarding delays in implementing
reparation measures along with doubt about the level of government
support for reparation funding.
In March the Director of Public Prosecutions revealed that his
office had established a special unit to set up a process for
proceeding against those who had failed to ask for amnesty or to whom
amnesty had been denied. The unit would establish uniform criteria on
which cases should be prosecuted; the criteria would include the
strength of evidence available as well as the ``implications for
national reconciliation.'' The case against Dr. Basson is the first,
and at year's end only, case to be pursued by this unit (see Section
1.a.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of race,
religion, disability, ethnic or social origin, color, age, culture,
language, sex, pregnancy, or marital status. Legal recourse is
available to those who believe that they have been discriminated
against; however, entrenched attitudes and practices, as well as
limited resources, limit the practical effect of these protections.
Women.--There is a high rate of violence against women including
rape, assault and battery, and domestic violence. Approximately 23,900
women reported being raped between January and June. Police sources
believe that a majority of rapes still are unreported. Entrenched
patriarchal attitudes towards women are a significant factor in
underreporting. Abused women have difficulty getting their cases
prosecuted effectively and also often are treated poorly by doctors,
police, and judges.
The Domestic Violence Act, passed by Parliament in 1998 and enacted
in December, defines victims of domestic violence, facilitates the
serving of protection orders on abusers, provides places of safety for
victims, allows police to seize firearms at the scene and arrest
abusers without a warrant, and compels medical, educational, and other
practitioners working with children to report abuse immediately. The
Prevention of Family Violence Act of 1993 defines marital rape as a
criminal offense, and it allows women to obtain injunctions against
their abusive husbands and partners in a simpler, less expensive, and
more effective manner than under previous legislation. However, the
implementation process is inadequate, as the police generally are
unwilling to enforce the act. As a consequence, a limited number of
women pressed complaints under the law, despite government and NGO
efforts to increase public awareness of it. Parliament began
considering additional legislation to remedy these and other defects.
While some progress has been made, the number of shelters for
battered women remained insufficient. The SAPS continued to operate new
units that deal specifically with domestic violence, child protection,
and sexual violence, and which are intended, in part, to increase
victims' confidence in the police, thereby leading to increased
reporting of such crimes. However, these units often were hampered by a
lack of training among officers.
Discrimination against women remains a serious problem despite
legal and constitutional protections, particularly in areas such as
wages, extension of credit, and access to land. Progress was made in
bringing customary law in line with constitutional provisions. The
Recognition of Customary Marriages Bill, passed by Parliament in 1998,
recognizes customary marriages, both monogamous and polygynous, but it
does not address religious marriages, which are not recognized under
law; however, the bill was not enacted into law by year's end. The bill
includes a number of safeguards for women and children, including
requiringa minimum age of 18 and the consent of both spouses to enter
into such marriages and a court decree to dissolve them. The bill also
addresses inequities of property arrangements under some customary
laws. The 1998 Maintenance Bill, which, except for one section, was
enacted into law in November, tightens procedures for child support
payments and improves the ability of caregivers, most of whom are
women, to collect maintenance payments from partners. Other
legislation, such as the Employment Equity Act, and the Basic
Conditions of Employment Act, counter discrimination against women in
the workplace. The 1997 Interim Protection of Informal Land Act
protects persons who have insecure and informal rights and interests in
land; many women are in this category. There are 12 known women's
private investment companies in the country.
A number of governmental and nongovernmental organizations monitor
and promote women's rights. The Office on the Status of Women, located
in the Deputy President's office, coordinates departmental gender
desks, which develop strategies to ensure integration of gender
concerns in policy and planning. The Commission on Gender Equality
(CGE), a constitutionally mandated body, is authorized to investigate
allegations of gender discrimination and make recommendations to
Parliament on any legislation affecting women. As with some of the
other statutory watchdog bodies, the CGE continued to be hampered by a
lack of funding. The Women's National Coalition, an umbrella
organization of women's groups from labor, political parties, trade
unions, and religious, cultural, and professional bodies, monitors and
promotes women's equity and issues of interest to women.
Polygyny continues to be practiced by several ethnic groups.
Exacting a bride price (``lobola'') also is a traditional practice of
some ethnic groups.
Children.--The Constitution stipulates that children have the right
``to security, education, basic nutrition, and basic health and social
services.'' The Government remains committed to providing these
services and has made some progress toward developing the mechanisms
for delivering them, including improvements in the provision of
education and a campaign against child abuse. However, the demand for
such services far outstrips the resources available.
The Schools Act and the National Education Policy Act, passed by
Parliament in 1996, provide greater educational opportunities for
disadvantaged children--traditionally black children--through a uniform
system for the organization, governance, and funding of schools. It
mandates compulsory education from ages 7 to 15 and ensures that
children cannot be refused admission to public schools due to a lack of
funds. Approximately 95 percent of school-age children are enrolled in
school. The school funding formula, based on norms and standards tied
to physical resources and performance, devotes 75 percent of
nonpersonnel resources toward the 40 percent most needy schools.
However, the availability and quality of primary schooling still is a
problem, especially in rural areas where schools may not be easily
accessible or children may have to work (see Section 6.d.). To address
this problem, the Government is building many new schools, introducing
basic skills development and prevocational training into the curriculum
and, in some cases, developing plans to provide food for disadvantaged
children.
Student populations on university campuses are becoming more
representative of the general population, with previously all-white
universities reaching out to recruit students from black and colored
communities. The enrollment of black students has risen to between 30
and 40 percent at prestigious universities, including the University of
Pretoria.
Social programs known as ``Presidential Initiatives,'' which were
included in the former Reconstruction and Development Program,
continued to receive government support. These initiatives offer free
health care to pregnant women and to children under 6 years of age and
provide nutritious meals for primary school children.
In December a Cape Town High Court ruled that children in squatter
camps have a constitutional right to housing, and thus, are entitled to
state-provided shelter. The High Court also ruled that children have a
constitutional right to family, and therefore, have the right to be
accompanied by their parents in state-provided shelter. The Government
requested leave to appeal the case to the Constitutional Court due to
the significant resource implications of this ruling.
Violence against children remains widespread. While there has been
increased attention to the problem by the Government, the public, and
the media, a lack of coordinated and comprehensive strategies to deal
with such crimes continues to impede the delivery of needed services to
young victims. Reports of child rape have increased significantly, as
have reports that men are committing rape due to a growing myth that
having sexual intercourse with a virgin can cure HIV/AIDS.
Traditional circumcision rituals still are practiced on teenage
boys in rural areas of the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal and resulted
in the hospitalization, mutilation, or death of several youths.
Child prostitution is on the rise, primarily in Cape Town, Durban,
and Johannesburg. There reportedly has been an increase in the number
of children who live on the streets, and observers believe that this
has contributed to the growing number of child prostitutes. The child
sex industry increasingly has become organized, with children either
being forced into prostitution or exploited by their parents to earn
money for the family. In March the Parliament passed the Child Care
Amendment Bill, which prohibits the commercial sexual exploitation of
children. The Bill is scheduled to be implemented in January 2000.
Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, still is practiced in some rural areas of the
Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, although it is not thought to be
widespread. There is no legislation that addresses FGM; however, a
person who subjects another to FGM is subject to the common-law offense
of assault.
Parliament passed legislation in 1995 prohibiting the detention of
unconvicted juveniles in prisons, police cells, or lock-ups. A 1996 law
gave courts limited discretion to detain in prison 14 to 18-year-old
children who were awaiting trial for serious crimes such as murder or
rape. The measure was expected to be temporary pending the
establishment of ``places of safety'' for the detention of juveniles.
However, due to delays in the establishment of such centers, provisions
of the 1996 law lapsed in 1998. Amid concerns that dangerous juvenile
offenders were being released to return to the streets, additional
legislation was passed in 1998 to regulate limited pretrial detention
of juvenile offenders accused of serious crimes. The law states that
any child under the age of 14 must be released within 24 hours into the
custody of a parent or guardian when possible.
People With Disabilities.--The Constitution prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability. Society is increasingly open
to the concept of persons with disabilities as a minority whose civil
rights must be protected. The Government attempts to ensure that all
government-funded projects take account of the needs of disabled
citizens. However, in practice government and private sector
discrimination against the disabled in employment still exists.
According to an NGO, the Affirmative Action Monitor, fewer than two-
thirds of companies target the disabled as part of their affirmative
action programs. The law mandates access to buildings for the disabled,
but such regulations rarely are enforced, and public awareness of them
remains minimal. The Employment Equity Act requires private firms with
more than 50 workers to create an affirmative action plan with
provisions for achieving employment equity for the disabled. The
National Environmental Accessibility Program, an NGO comprising
disabled consumers as well as service providers, has established a
presence in all nine provinces in order to lobby for compliance with
the regulations and to sue offending property owners when necessary.
Religious Minorities.--Relations between the various religious
communities generally are amicable. However, there is a concern among
Christians about the perceived growing influence of Islam. Reports of
violence perpetrated by PAGAD have fueled these concerns. PAGAD
portrays itself as a community organization opposed to crime,
gangsterism, and drugs; however, it is known for its violent
vigilantism (see Section 1.a.). PAGAD also claims to be a multifaith
movement, even though its orientation is Islamic and the vast majority
of its members are Muslim. PAGAD is most active in the Western Cape,
but also has branches elsewhere in the country. Surveys indicated that
some two-thirds of Muslims supported PAGAD soon after its inception in
1995, but that figure has dropped significantly since; the vast
majority of Muslims no longer support PAGAD. While PAGAD continues to
lose support when it is linked to violent acts, it gains sympathy when
high-profile incidents occur that are perceived by the Muslim community
to have been acts of discrimination against Muslims.
PAGAD members disrupted prayers at mosques led by anti-PAGAD
clerics. PAGAD also targeted the homes of anti-PAGAD Muslim clerics,
academics, and business leaders.
In January 1997, a mosque in Rustenberg was bombed in a series of
bombings that also struck a post office and general store and injured
two persons. Authorities arrested two suspects for the bombings, but
their trials still were pending at year's end.
In December 1998, a synagogue in Wynberg was bombed. Four suspects
have been arrested, and their trials still were pending at year's end.
Indigenous People.--The Constitution provides for the recognition
of ``the institution, status, and role of traditional leadership,'' and
requires the courts to ``apply customary law when that is applicable,
subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals
with customary law.''
The Constitution further permits legislation for the establishment
of provincial houses of traditional leaders and a National Council of
Traditional Leaders, to deal with matters relating to traditional
leadership, the role of traditional leaders, indigenous and customary
law, and the customs of communities that observe a system of customary
law. Six provinces have established houses of traditional leaders.
Under the terms of the Constitution and implementing legislation, the
National Council of Traditional Leaders was inaugurated in 1997. The
Council is to advise the Government on matters related to traditional
authorities and customary law. However, much work remains to be done to
integrate traditional leadership and customary law into the formal
legal and administrative system.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution and Bill of
Rights prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, ethnic or social
origin, and culture. The Government continued efforts to reorganize and
redesign the educational, housing, and health care systems to benefit
all racial and ethnic groups in society more equally. The Government
has instituted an effective affirmative action program, and, under the
Employment Equity Act, also requires private firms with more than 50
employees to institute affirmative action programs. According to a 1996
Department of Labor survey, 82 percent of private sector firms already
have instituted affirmative action programs.
According to the Affirmative Action Monitor, affirmative action
policies have had little impact on the top echelons in business. Based
on a consultants' survey in 1996, one-third of the organizations with
no affirmative action program did not intend to implement one. Twelve
percent of the companies surveyed stated that they had experienced a
drop in standards or deterioration in quality of work due to
affirmative action. However, the country's black majority increasingly
is making inroads into the previously all-white entrepreneurial sector
through pooled investments and acquisitions. The armed forces have
struggled with the process of integrating blacks into the predominantly
white officer corps.
Xenophobia led to a number of violent attacks on foreigners,
particularly refugees and asylum seekers (see Section 1.c. and 2.d.).
The continued killings of mostly white farm owners by black
assailants created concern that the white farmers were being targeted
for racial and political reasons (see Section 1.a.) There also were
reports that white employers abused and killed black farm laborers, but
avoided penalty due to collusion with the authorities (see Section
1.a.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom
of association and the right to strike, and these rights are given
statutory effect in the 1996 Labor Relations Act (LRA). All workers in
the private sector are entitled to join a union. Most workers in the
public sector, with the exception of members of the National
Intelligence Agency, and the Secret Service, also are entitled to join
a union. In May the Constitutional Court struck down the prohibition on
members of the National Defense Force joining a union, although they
may not strike. No employee can be fired or discriminated against
because of membership in or advocacy of a trade union. Union membership
in the private sector has continued to decline steadily in the last few
years as a result of job layoffs and declining employment, including in
sectors that have been heavily unionized, such as mining. However, some
public sector unions have experienced growth. Total union membership is
approximately 3.4 million persons, nearly 35 percent of those employed
in the wage economy.
The largest trade union federation, COSATU, is aligned formally
with the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African
Communist Party (SACP). About 20 ANC members of the Cabinet have a
COSATU leadership background, and the current premier of Gauteng, the
country's richest province, is a former COSATU general secretary.
COSATU's largest rival, the Federation of Unions of South Africa
(FEDUSA), is an apolitical, multiracial federation that was formed in
1997 by merging several smaller worker organizations. A relatively
minor labor federation, the National Council of Trade Unions, while
officially independent of any political grouping, has close ties to the
PAC and the Azanian Peoples Organization.
The LRA seeks to create an industrial relations regime that is
stable and recognizes that basic worker rights need to be protected.
The act protects workers against unfair dismissal, recognizes their
right to form trade unions, provides for the right to strike, and
establishes a simple set of procedures that protect striking workers
from the threat of dismissal. Essentially, for a strike to proceed, all
that is required is that a dispute be referred for conciliation. There
is no time limit on conciliation efforts; however, if conciliation
fails to resolve the dispute, or lasts more than 30 days, a trade union
is entitled to advise an employer of intent to strike so long as it
gives 48-hours notice to a private sector employer or 7-daysnotice to a
state employer. Organized labor also has the right to engage in
``socioeconomic protest,'' whereby workers can demonstrate, without
fear of losing their jobs, in furtherance of broader social issues. The
LRA also allows employers to hire replacement labor for striking
employees, but only after giving 7 days' notice to the striking trade
union. Employers have the right to lock out workers if certain
conditions are met.
The LRA applies to public sector as well as private sector workers.
Public sector employees, with the exception of essential services and
the three components of the security services, also are provided with
the right to strike. While this right first was asserted in the Public
Sector Labor Relations Act of 1993, the LRA simplifies and rationalizes
collective bargaining in the public sector and the resort to industrial
action.
Wage negotiations between the Government and public sector unions
led to a number of strikes by public sector employees during the year.
In April 18,000 employees of 18 long distance bus companies went on
strike, and in August 26,500 members of the Communications Workers'
Union went on strike against Telkom, the Government's
telecommunications parastatal.
The Government does not restrict union affiliation with regional or
international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law defines
and protects the rights to organize and bargain collectively. The
Government does not interfere with union organizing and generally has
not interfered in the collective bargaining process. The LRA
statutorily provides for ``organizational rights,'' such as trade union
access to work sites, deductions for trade union dues, and leave for
trade union officials, which strengthens the ability of trade unions to
organize workers.
Union participation as an equal partner with business and
government in the National Economic Development and Labor Council, a
tripartite negotiating forum, ensures a direct voice for labor in the
formulation of economic, social, and labor policy.
The LRA allows for the establishment of workplace forums that are
intended to promote broad-based consultation between management and
labor over issues such as work organization, corporate downsizing, and
changes in production processes. The forums, in order to receive
statutory protection, can be established by trade unions only in
businesses with more than 100 employees. Although trade unions in a few
factories have established workplace forums, the intent of the law is
to build wide support within the trade union movement and business for
such cooperative workplace relationships.
To further reduce the adversarial nature of labor relations, the
LRA also created a Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and
Arbitration (CCMA). Since its inception in 1996, the CCMA has resolved
many disputes referred to it successfully and remains critical to the
emergence of a less confrontational business climate. The CCMA also
gradually is beginning to play an interventionist role by getting
involved in disputes before they deteriorate into a full-fledged strike
or lockout. A labor court and a labor appeals court are other important
creations of the LRA. The labor court has jurisdiction to resolve
disputes that the CCMA is unable to mediate to the satisfaction of both
parties. Notwithstanding the existence of the CCMA and specialist
courts for labor disputes, the thrust of industrial relations is to
minimize the need for judicial intervention in labor relations, leaving
it to the contending parties themselves to resolve disputes whenever
possible.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor by
either adults or children is illegal under the Constitution; however,
there were reports that children were forced into prostitution (see
Section 5). Smugglers use the country as a transit and destination
point for trafficking in persons for purposes of forced prostitution
and forced labor (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of minors under the age
of 15. Children between 15 and 18 years of age may not be employed in
jobs that risk their ``well-being, education, physical or mental
health, or spiritual, moral, or social development.'' However, the law
gives discretionary powers to the Minister of Welfare to exempt certain
types of work to allow individual employers or groups of employers to
hire children under certain conditions (for example, on weekends and
holidays when they are not in school). This is a common practice in the
agricultural and informal sector. Child labor also is used on a more
regular basis in the informal economy.
According to the NGO Network Against Child Labor, an estimated
200,000 children, some as young as 5-years-old, work in ruralareas,
mostly in the agricultural sector. This figure does not include unpaid
domestic work or children working in the informal sector. Child
laborers from Zimbabwe and Mozambique work in the country on commercial
farms, for the taxi industry, or as domestic servants. Child
prostitution is a growing problem in metropolitan areas (see Section
5). Child labor figures for the informal sector nearly are impossible
to quantify, since the Government has yet to identify the size of the
informal sector's contribution to employment and the economy in
general. The Government has stated that it is committed to abolishing
child labor through new legislation and improving the enforcement of
current child labor laws.
In 1998 the Ministry of Defense adopted a policy that raised the
minimum age of enlistment into the National Defense Force from 17 to
18; however, this policy does not become law until passage of the
Defense Act, which still was under consideration by Parliament at
year's end.
Forced or bonded labor by children is illegal under the
Constitution; however, there were reports that children were forced
into prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legally mandated
national minimum wage. Instead, unionized workers in the formal sector
of the economy set wage rates on an industry-by-industry basis through
annual negotiations with employer organizations. Such wages generally
are sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. In those sectors where workers are not organized sufficiently
to engage in the collective bargaining process, the Basic Conditions of
Employment Act, which went into effect in December 1998, gives the
Minister of Labor the authority to set wages, including, for the first
time, for farm laborers and domestic workers. However, income
disparities between skilled and unskilled workers and the income
distribution gap between rural and urban workers mean that many workers
are unable to provide a decent standard of living for themselves and
their families.
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act, which went into effect in
December 1997, standardizes time-and-a-half pay for overtime,
establishes a 45-hour workweek and longer maternity leave for women (4
months instead of 3). A ministerial determination exempted businesses
employing fewer than 10 persons from certain provisions of the act
concerning overtime and leave.
Occupational health and safety issues are a top priority of trade
unions, especially in the mining and heavy manufacturing industries.
Although attention to these issues has increased significantly,
including passage in 1993 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act,
the country's industrial and mining processes are dangerous and
sometimes deadly. Government attempts to reduce mining fatalities
culminated in the 1996 Mine Health and Safety Act, which went into
effect in January 1997. The act provides for the right of mine
employees to remove themselves from work deemed dangerous to health or
safety. Moreover, it establishes a tripartite mine health and safety
council and an inspectorate of mine health and safety tasked with
enforcing the act and monitoring compliance with its provisions. The
Act specifically makes it an offense for a company to discriminate
against an employee who asserts a right granted by the act (for
example, to leave a hazardous work site) and requires mine owners to
file annual reports that provide statistics on health and safety
incidents for each mine being worked.
There are no laws or regulations in other industries that permit
workers to remove themselves from work situations deemed dangerous to
their health or safety without risking loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Alien Control Act prohibits
trafficking in persons; however, South Africa is a destination point
for the trafficking of persons from Mozambique, Thailand, and other
countries. In August there were reports that women and girls from
neighboring countries, particularly Mozambique, were lured into South
Africa by Nigerian and other organized crime syndicates based in the
country with the promise of jobs and decent wages, and then held as
near-slaves on farms and other enterprises. In August a group of
Mozambican women were discovered being held against their will in a
brothel. The women apparently had been recruited in Mozambique to work
as domestic servants, but upon arriving in the country were forced to
work as prostitutes. Women from Thailand, and a few women from Cambodia
and China, were being smuggled into the country for prostitution by
Chinese and South African organized crime syndicates. While many of
these women come willingly, some claim that they were tricked into
coming, or that they were forced to continue working as prostitutes
until they had paid off the cost of their transport.
South Africa is also a transit point for a large trafficking
network operating between developing countries and Europe, the United
States, and Canada. Migrants from foreign countries, particularly
China, India, the Middle East, former Eastern Bloc countries and other
African countries, are lured to South Africa with stories of money and
jobs in the West. Once in the countrythey are provided with
documentation and accommodation before being moved on to final
destinations where they are forced into prostitution, drug dealing, or
other criminal activity or forced to work in factories as virtual
slaves until they pay off the debt of their travel expenses.
Traffickers apparently have identified the country as one in which
fraudulent documents are easy to obtain and in which direct flight and
shipping routes are available to most countries in the developed world.
Government efforts to deal with trafficking through its police
services are hampered by corruption, lack of training, and
understaffing. The courts generally deal with trafficking through
deportations and fines, rather than exacting criminal penalties.
Reportedly there were some arrests and prosecutions during the year for
trafficking, but no convictions.
______
SUDAN
The 1989 military \1\ coup that overthrew Sudan's democratically
elected government brought to power Lieutenant General Omar Hassan Al-
Bashir and his National Salvation Revolution Command Council (RCC).
Bashir and the RCC suspended the 1985 constitution, abrogated press
freedom, and disbanded all political parties and trade unions. In 1993
the RCC dissolved itself and appointed Bashir President. In 1996 Bashir
won highly structured national elections as President, while a National
Assembly with 275 of 400 members popularly elected in a deeply flawed
process replaced the transitional national assembly. The opposition
boycotted the electoral process. Despite the adoption of a new
Constitution through a referendum in June 1998, the Government
continued to restrict most civil liberties. Since 1989 real power has
rested with the National Islamic Front (NIF), founded by Dr. Hassan al-
Turabi who became Speaker of the National Assembly in 1996. In November
1998, the NIF renamed itself the National Congress (NC); NIF/NC members
and supporters continue to hold key positions in the Government,
security forces, judiciary, academic institutions, and the media. On
December 12, Bashir declared a 3-month state of emergency, dismissed
Turabi, and disbanded Parliament 2 days before it was to vote on a bill
introduced by pro-Turabi legislators to reduce Bashir's presidential
powers. The judiciary is subject to government influence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The United States does not have diplomatic representation in
Sudan. This report draws in part on non-U.S. Government sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The civil war, which is estimated to have resulted in the death of
2 million persons, continued into its seventeenth year. The principal
insurgent faction is the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the
political wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The SPLA
remains the principal military force in the insurgency. In April 1997,
the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army, which broke away from the
SPLA in 1991, and several smaller southern factions concluded a peace
agreement with the Government. However, the SPLM/SPLA and most
independent analysts regard the 1997 agreement as a tactical government
effort to enlist southerners on the Government's side. The 1997
agreement remains largely unimplemented, and there was significant
fighting between progovernment and antigovernment elements of the
Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) during the year. The SPLM/
SPLA and its northern allies in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)
carried out military offensives in areas along the borders with
Ethiopia and Eritrea and in large parts of the south during the year.
As in 1998, neither side appears to have the ability to win the war
militarily. There was limited progress toward peace during theyear.
Government and SPLM/SPLA delegations met with mediators from the
Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) in Nairobi from July
18-23 and participated in IGAD-mediated peace talks. The Bahr El Ghazal
cease-fire, which began on July 15, 1998, was extended by both the
Government and the SPLM in January, in April, and again in July. On
August 10, the government offered a comprehensive cease-fire, which it
extended in October through January 15, 2000. The SPLM similarly
extended its cease-fire through the same dates, but effectively limited
its offer to the humanitarian cease-fire as agreed to in Bahr El
Ghazal. The Government and the SPLM met in Oslo May 25-26 and agreed in
principle to the establishment of cross-line rail and road corridors
for the delivery of humanitarian relief. Surveys were made during the
year of possible routes.
In addition to the regular police and the Sudan People's Armed
Forces, the Government maintains an external security force, an
internal security force, a militia known as the Popular Defense Forces
(PDF), and a number of police forces, including the Public Order Police
(POP), whose mission includes enforcing proper social behavior,
including restrictions on alcohol and ``immodest dress.'' In addition
to the group of regular police forces, there is the Popular Police
Force, which is made up of nominees from neighborhood popular
committees for surveillance and services, and which acts with police
powers for political and social ends. Members of the security forces
committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
Civil war, economic mismanagement, over 4 million internally
displaced persons in a country of an estimated 27.5 million persons,
and, to a lesser extent, the refugee influx from neighboring countries
have devastated the country's mostly agricultural economy.
Approximately 80 percent of the labor force is engaged in agriculture.
Exports of gum Arabic, livestock, and meat accounted for more than 50
percent of export earnings. Private investment in the oil sector led to
significant increases in oil production during the year. Reforms
beginning in the early 1990's aimed at privatizing state-run firms and
stimulating private investment failed to revive a moribund economy that
is saddled with massive military expenditures and a huge foreign debt
of approximately $21.5 billion. Per capita national income is estimated
at $900 per year.
The Government's human rights record remained extremely poor, and
it continued to commit numerous, serious abuses. Citizens do not have
the ability to change their government peacefully.
Government forces were responsible for extrajudicial killings and
disappearances. Government security forces regularly tortured, beat,
harassed, arbitrarily arrested and detained, and detained incommunicado
opponents or suspected opponents of the Government with impunity.
Security forces beat refugees, raped women, and reportedly harassed and
detained persons on the basis of their religion. Prison conditions are
harsh, prolonged detention is a problem, and the judiciary is largely
subservient to the Government. The authorities do not ensure due
process and the military forces summarily tried and punished citizens.
The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government
still does not fully apply the laws of war to the southern insurgency
and has taken few prisoners of war (POW's).
The easing of restrictions on press freedom, which began in 1997,
ended as the Government repeatedly suspended publications that
criticized or disagreed with the government line, and detained
journalists. Moreover, all journalists continue to practice self-
censorship. The Government continued to restrict severely freedom of
assembly, association, religion, and movement. In the context of the
Islamization and Arabization drive, pressure--including forced
Islamization--on non-Muslims remained strong. Fears of Arabization and
Islamization and the imposition of Shari'a (Islamic law) fueled support
for the civil war throughout the country. There are no independent
human rights organizations.
Violence and discrimination against women and abuse of children
remained problems. Prostitution is a growing problem, and female
genital mutilation is widespread. Discrimination and violence against
religious minorities persisted, as did discrimination against ethnic
minorities and government restrictions on worker rights. Child labor is
a problem, and slavery remained a problem. Trafficking in persons
continued. Government security forces were responsible for forced labor
(including forced child labor), slavery, and the forced conscription of
children.
Cooperation with U.N.-sponsored relief operations was mixed. The
Government allowed U.N. teams to perform humanitarian assessments in
the Nuba Mountains on two occasions. Government forces periodically
obstructed the flow of humanitarian assistance. Problems with relief
flights in the south centered on the Government's frequent denials of
aircraft clearances to the U.N.'s Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS),
particularly for Western Upper Nile.
Insurgent groups continued to commit numerous, serious abuses. The
SPLM/SPLA continued to violate citizens' rights, despite its claim that
it was implementing a 1994 decision to assert civil authority in areas
that it controls, and in many cases, has controlled for many years. The
SPLM/SPLA was responsible for extrajudicial killings, beatings, rape,
arbitrary detention, forced conscription, and occasional arrests of
foreign relief workers without charge. The SPLM/SPLA again failed to
follow through on its promise to investigate a 1995 massacre. A local
Red Crescent worker and three government officials who were
accompanying an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) team in
the south were killed while in the custody of the SPLA. SPLM/SPLA
officials were guilty of, or complicit in, theft of property of
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) and U.N. agencies operating in
the south. The ICRC reported in 1996 that the SPLA had begun to observe
some basic laws of war; it takes prisoners on the battlefield and
permits ICRC visits to some of them. However, the SPLA did not allow
the ICRC to visit prisoners accused by the insurgent group of treason
or other crimes, or those held in Southern Blue Nile State.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--In their attacks on
insurgent forces, government troops killed a large number of civilians
(see Section 1.g.). There were credible reports that government forces
pursued a scorched earth policy aimed at removing populations from
around the newly built oil pipeline and other oil production
facilities, which reportedly resulted in some deaths. On numerous
occasions, the Government bombed civilian facilities resulting in a
number of civilian deaths, including children (see Section 1.g.).
Explosions by government-laid landmines resulted in some deaths (see
Section 1.g.). There were reports that during raids on civilian
settlements government forces killed a number of persons (see Section
1.g.).
According to Human Rights Watch, at least three persons, Abdallah
Chol, Hassan Abu Adhan, and Gladino (Sam) Okieny, reportedly died as a
result of torture while in police custody. They had been detained in
connection with the June 30, 1998 Khartoum bombings. There was no
investigation into their deaths, nor were any police officers held
accountable. University of Khartoum law student Mohamed Abdelsalaam
Babeker was found dead on October 4, 1998, in a university dormitory,
after being arrested by NIF security forces. An autopsy indicated that
the cause of death was a brain hemorrhage allegedly caused by a head
wound. A case was filed against an unknown person and the police
reportedly conducted an investigation, but released no information. At
year's end, the case was stalled due to failure to identify the
defendants.
There was no investigation into the January 1998, reports of
reprisal killings of Dinka men by government forces.
In July two State Ministers and numerous civilians reportedly were
killed in Unity State during fighting between progovernment and
antigovernment militias. It is widely believed that the Government
provided direct support to the militia loyal to Paulino Matip. Both
militias assert that the other was responsible for the killings. In May
a barge operated by the U.N. World Food Program was attacked near the
town of Adok resulting in the death of one persons and injuries to
three others (see Section 1.g.). The area was the scene of fighting
between progovernment and antigovernment militias, and it is not clear
who was responsible for the attack.
Insurgent forces reportedly committed political and other
extrajudicial killings, particularly in areas of active conflict;
however, details generally were unavailable. Sometime before March 30,
a local Red Crescent worker and three government officials who
accompanied an ICRC team near the town of Kong in the south were killed
while in the custody of the SPLA under circumstances that remain
unclear. The four were riding in an ICRC vehicle with two foreign ICRC
workers on February 18 when they were detained by the SPLA. The two
foreign workers were released on March 12. The SPLM alleges that the
four were killed in crossfire during a rescue attempt. The SPLM neither
arranged for the return of the bodies nor permitted an independent
investigation.
Rebel forces killed a large number of civilians during their
attacks on government forces (see Section 1.g.). Insurgent forces laid
landmines indiscriminately on roads and paths that killed and maimed
both soldiers and civilians. Prisoners reportedly have died while in
SPLA custody due to poor prison conditions (see Section 1.c.). There
are reliable reports that rebel forces that captured villages along the
border with Ethiopia in 1997 carried lists used to identify leading
government figures whom they killed summarily.
The SPLM/SPLA again failed to follow through on its promise to
investigate a 1995 massacre.
Ongoing fighting between ethnic Dinkas and Didingas in the New Cush
and Chukudum areas in eastern Equatoria led to a number of deaths (see
Section 5). On January 16, in Chukudum local Didingas led by an SPLA
captain killed a Dinka SPLA captain and several officers. The killing
led to an outbreak of violence among Dinka and Didinga refugees in the
Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya. The fighting, which began on January 26,
resulted in at least six deaths and numerous injuries. In October Dinka
SPLA soldiers killed a Didinga chief. On November 8, gunmen attacked an
aid vehicle carrying members of the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation
Agency (SRRA), the humanitarian wing of the SPLM/SPLA, outside of the
town of New Cush and killed two persons, apparently in retaliation for
the October killing. Later that evening, Dinka SPLA soldiers killed
another SRRA official, apparently in reaction to the vehicle attack. No
one has been held accountable for the killings.
In February fighting between Arab pastoralists and African Masaleet
tribes in Darfur led to more than a hundred deaths (see Section 5).
b. Disappearance.--There were continued allegations that the
Government was responsible for the arrest and subsequent disappearance
of persons suspected of supporting rebels in government-controlled
zones in the south and the Nuba mountains. Persons arrested by
government security forces often were held for long periods of time in
unknown locations without access to their lawyers or family members.
There were reports that during raids on civilian settlements
government forces abducted persons, including women and children (see
Section 1.g.). Observers believe that some of the abductees were sold
into slavery, while others were used as forced labor or drafted into
the military. In some cases, observers believe that the abductees were
eventually released or ransomed, and that in other cases some abductees
were killed.
In 1996 the Government established the Special Commission to
Investigate Slavery and Disappearances in response to a resolution
passed by the 1995 U.N. General Assembly. The commission technically
still is functioning, but has yet to produce a final report. In May the
Government formed the Committee for the Eradication of the Abduction of
Women and Children. The committee and UNICEF jointly sponsored a
workshop on abductions from July 27-29, during which the committee
recognized abduction as a problem that the Government could and should
address. The committee formed mechanisms to identify and return
abductees. Several high-ranking Government officials participated in
the activities of the committee. These mechanisms resulted in the
identification and release of several hundred abductees, although the
abductees had not been returned to their homes by year's end.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The new Constitution, implemented early in the year,
prohibits torture; however, the Government's official and unofficial
security forces continued to torture and beat suspected opponents and
others. Security forces tortured youths, student leaders, and others
whom they deemed opponents of the Government. The Government reportedly
harassed, detained, and tortured lawyers whom they viewed as political
opponents (see Section 1.e.). In 1997 the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Torture described torture as a fairly extensive problem. Refugees also
were subjected to beatings and mistreatment (see Section 2.d.). There
continued to be reports that security forces regularly harassed and at
times used threats and violence against persons on the basis of their
religious beliefs and activities (see Section 2.c.). Security forces
used excessive force, including beatings and tear gas, to disperse
unapproved demonstrations (see Section 2.b.). Members of the security
forces rarely, if ever, were held accountable for such abuses.
According to Amnesty International, journalist Mohamed Abd Al-Seed,
who was arrested and detained by security forces for more than a month
in April and May (see Section 1.d.), required medical treatment for
infected wounds on his arms and legs as a result of being tortured
severely while in detention.
There were reports that security forces continued to torture
persons in ``ghost houses,'' places where security forces detain
government opponents incommunicado under harsh conditions for an
indeterminate time with no supervision by the courts or other
independent authorities with power to release the detainees.
Government forces were responsible for injuring many civilians
during attacks on insurgent forces, during raids on civilian
settlements, and while bombing civilian targets (see Section1.g.). The
explosions of government-laid landmines resulted in a number of
injuries (see Section 1.g.). Soldiers were responsible for raping women
(see Section 1.g.).
In December police in Khartoum State injured five persons during a
conflict over a church school (see Section 2.c.).
The Criminal Act provides for punishments including flogging,
amputation, and crucifixion--the public display of a body after
execution. In a case involving ethnic clashes in the Darfur region in
the west (see Section 5), an emergency court sentenced 10 persons to
hanging and subsequent crucifixion. At year's end, the sentence had not
been carried out pending confirmation of the High Court of Appeal and
presidential approval.
In June a Khartoum court ordered that 25 students from Ahlia
University be flogged; they were charged with disturbances, and
``obscene acts.'' The obscene acts apparently referred to the actions
of the female students in wearing trousers (see 1.f.).
On June 30, 1998, almost a dozen bombs exploded around Khartoum, in
an alleged plot to mar official celebrations of the 1989 NIF coup.
According to Human Rights Watch, at least three persons detained in
connection with the June 30, 1998, Khartoum bombings reportedly died as
a result of torture while in custody. According to Amnesty
International, Reverend Lino Sebit reportedly confessed to involvement
in the Khartoum bombings as a result of his torture and mistreatment
(see Section 1.d.). .
The Government's ``scorched earth'' policy resulted in a number of
injuries (see Section 1.g.).
According to Amnesty International, nine men convicted of bank
robbery and imprisoned were deprived of food and sleep, forced to do
heavy exercise in the heat, and had cold water thrown over them during
winter by prison officials. One of the convicted robbers was ultimately
acquitted, but prison officials tortured him so severely while in
detention that he was blinded.
Insurgent forces were responsible for a number of civilian injuries
and for raping women (see Section 1.g.). Insurgent forces laid
landmines indiscriminately on roads and paths that killed and maimed
both soldiers and civilians (see Section 1.g.). There are credible
reports of beatings and other punishment of prisoners by the SPLA
rebels, but the only verifications have been reports by the ICRC and
others who have been to SPLM prisoner war camps in earlier years.
Conditions in government prisons remain harsh, overcrowded, and
life threatening. Built before the country's 1956 independence, most
prisons are maintained poorly, and many lack basic facilities such as
toilets or showers. Health care is primitive, and food is inadequate.
Minors often are held with adults. There was a report that 16 children
who were living with their imprisoned mothers died during the year of
diseases. Female prisoners are housed separately from men; rape in
prison reportedly is rare. Prison officials arbitrarily denied family
visits. High-ranking political prisoners reportedly often enjoy better
conditions than other prisoners do.
The Government does not permit regular visits of prisons by human
rights monitors. No independent domestic human rights organizations
monitor prison conditions.
Prisoners reportedly have died while in SPLA custody due to the
poor prison conditions. The SPLM allowed the ICRC to visit some POW's
during the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The new Constitution
implemented early in the year, prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention
without charge; however, the Government continued to use arbitrary
arrest and detention in practice. Legal provisions under the 1992 and
1995 National Security Acts and Criminal Code effectively set a fairly
simple process to detain anyone for 3 months. A presidential
determination, supported by a magistrate, may serve to detain a person
for an additional 3 months. Allegations continue that some persons are
detained indefinitely.
The law allows for bail, except for those accused of crimes
punishable by death or life imprisonment. In theory the Government
provides legal counsel for indigent persons in such cases; however,
reports continue that defendants do not always receive this right, and
that counsel in some cases only may advise the defendant and may not
address the court. In some cases, courts have refused to allow certain
lawyers to represent defendants. For example, in October 1998 the court
ruled that leading human rights lawyer Ghazi Suleiman could not
represent the accused in the Khartoum bombings trial.
Authorities continued to detain political opponents of the
Government during the year. As a result, many political activists
reportedly keep overnight bags packed. Human rights activist Ghazi
Suleiman was detained frequently (on at least fouroccasions--see
Sections 1.e. and 2.b.), as were known leaders of banned political
parties. On June 6, 84 persons were detained in Omdurman at the
inauguration of a new political party, the Democratic Forces Front,
(DFF--see Section 2.b.). In November authorities arrested several
members of the government-aligned United Democratic Salvation Front who
criticized the Government for its actions in the Unity State;
reportedly all four were released later.
A number of journalists were detained during the year, including
Mohamed Abd Al-Seed, who was arrested and detained in April for more
than a month; the editors in chief of the newspaper Al-Rai al-Akher and
reportedly two other editors in chief, who were arrested and detained
in June; and the chief editor and editorial director of Al Rai Al Aam,
who were arrested and detained in May for a day (see Section 2.a.).
There were reports that refugees were subject to arbitrary arrest
(see Section 2.d.). Security forces also detained persons because of
their religious beliefs and activities (see Section 2.c.). Generally,
detentions based nominally on religion were of limited duration;
because the practice of religion is not technically illegal, detainees
could not be held formally on those grounds indefinitely. However, the
Government often resorted to accusing, at times falsely, those arrested
for religious reasons of other crimes, including common crimes and
national security crimes, which resulted in prolonged detention. In
November authorities arrested a religious leader who criticized the
Government for being insufficiently Islamic, and several of his
followers. Reportedly, all were released later without charge.
In 1998 the Government arrested Catholic priests Hillary Boma and
Lino Sebit and 18 other persons, charged them with involvement in the
Khartoum bombings in 1998, and brought them before a military court for
trial. Boma, Sebit, and the other defendants in the case have been held
for a long period of time in an unknown location without outside
contact, including with their families and lawyers. In December all of
the defendants were released by presidential decree.
Persons arrested by government security forces often were held for
long periods of time in unknown locations without access to their
lawyers or family members. For example, journalist Mohamed Abd Al-Seed,
who was arrested on or about April 14, was held without charge until
May 26. During most of that period he was held incommunicado (see
Section 1.e.).
In late December, the Government announced that it would release
all political detainees. Those involved in the June 30 bombing case and
the February 1998 Gezira bombing case were released as part of this
amnesty in December.
In February the SPLA detained a local Red Crescent worker, three
government officials, and two ICRC members who were riding in an ICRC
vehicle near the town of Kong in the south. The government officials
and the Red crescent worker were killed while in the custody of the
SPLA sometime before March 30 under circumstances that remain unclear
(see Section 1.a.).
In October two U.N./OLS employees were detained for a day by SSIM
militia forces in Toch. There had been active conflict in the area and
the local commander's actions apparently were taken independently.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is not independent
and is largely subservient to the Government. The Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, formerly elected by sitting judges, is nominated by a
Judiciary Committee and appointed by the President. As the senior judge
in the judicial service, the Chief Justice also controls the judiciary.
On occasion, some courts display a degree of independence. Appeals
courts on several occasions overturned decisions of lower courts in
political cases, particularly public order courts.
The judicial system includes four types of courts: Regular courts,
both criminal and civil; special mixed security courts; military
courts; and tribal courts in rural areas to resolve disputes over land
and water rights and family matters. In November 1998, Parliament
passed a bill to form a constitutional court, which was passed into law
in December 1998, and the court's seven members were named that month.
Constitutional Court Justices are appointed by the President. Within
the regular court system there are civil and criminal courts, public
order courts, which hear only minor public order issues, appeals
courts, and the Supreme Court.
The new Constitution implemented early in the year provides for
fair and prompt trials; however, it resulted in no changes in practice.
The 1991 Criminal Act governs criminal cases, and the 1983 Civil
Transactions Act applies in most civil cases.
Military trials, which sometimes are secret and brief, do not
provide procedural safeguards, sometimes have taken place with no
advocate or counsel permitted, and do not provide effective appeal from
a death sentence. Other than for clemency, witnesses may be permitted
to appear.
Trials in regular courts nominally meet international standards of
legal protections. For example, the accused normally have the right to
counsel, and the courts are required to provide free legal counsel for
indigent defendants accused of crimes punishable by death or life
imprisonment. However, in practice these legal protections are applied
unevenly. Persons arrested by government security forces often were
held for long periods of time in unknown locations without access to
their lawyers or family members. In the June 1998 bombings case,
leading human rights lawyer Ghazi Suleiman was rejected by the court as
a member of the defense team, reportedly because he had been requested
by the defense counsel rather than by the defendants. Journalist
Mohamed Abd Al-Seed, who was arrested in April, was held for over a
month: during most of that period he was held incommunicado (see
Section 2.a.).
In 1989 the Special Courts Act created special three-person
security courts to deal with a wide range of offenses, including
violations of constitutional decrees, emergency regulations, some
sections of the Penal Code, as well as drug and currency defenses.
Special courts, on which both military and civilian judges sit, handle
most security-related cases. Attorneys may advise defendants as
``friends of the court'' but normally may not address the court.
Lawyers complain that they sometimes are granted access to court
documents too late to prepare an effective defense. Sentences usually
are severe and implemented at once; however, death sentences are
referred to the Chief Justice and the Head of State. Defendants may
file appellate briefs with the Chief Justice.
The Government dissolved the respected Sudanese Bar Association in
1989 and reinstated it with an NIF-controlled leadership. In 1997
elections for the leadership of the Bar Association, an NIF-associated
group won overwhelmingly amid accusations of blatant fraud. Lawyers who
wish to practice must maintain membership in the Bar Association. In
April leading human rights lawyer Ghazi Suleiman was banned from the
Bar Association's club property, arrested, and subsequently prosecuted
for disturbing the peace in connection with his attempts to hold a
symposium entitled ``The Role of the Advocate in His Society.'' He was
found not guilty on appeal. Human rights monitors report that the
Government continued to harass, detain, and torture members of the
legal profession whom it viewed as political opponents.
The Government officially exempts the 10 southern states, whose
population is mostly non-Muslim, from parts of the Criminal Act;
however, the act permits the possible future application of Shari'a law
in the south, if the State assemblies so decide. No reports cited
court-ordered Hudood punishments, other than lashings, in government-
controlled areas of the south. Fear of the imposition of Shari'a law
remained a key problem in the rebellion.
Parts of the south and the Nuba mountains fell outside effective
judicial procedures and other governmental functions. According to
credible reports, government units summarily tried and punished those
accused of crimes, especially for offenses against civil order.
Magistrates in SPLM/SPLA-held areas follow a penal code roughly
based on the 1925 Penal Code. In rural areas outside effective SPLM
control, tribal chiefs apply customary laws. In 1996 the SPLM
proclaimed a civilian structure to eliminate the conduct of secret and
essentially political trials such as those conducted by military
commanders in previous years. The SPLM has a judicial system of county
magistrates, county judges, regional judges, and a court of appeals.
While officials have been appointed for most of these positions, the
court system did not function in many areas due to lack of
infrastructure, communications, funding, and an effective police force.
Some cases were heard at the magistrate and county levels. The SPLM
recognizes traditional courts or ``Courts of Elders,'' which usually
hear matters of personal affairs such as marriages and dowries, and
base their decisions of traditional and customary law. Local chiefs
usually preside over traditional courts. Traditional courts are
particularly active in Bahr El Ghazal. The SPLM is in the process of
conducting a needs assessment for the courts.
There are political prisoners in the country, although the
Government maintains that it holds none. The Government usually charges
political prisoners with a crime, allowing the Government to deny their
status as political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The new Constitution implemented early in the year
provides for the inviolability of communication and privacy; however,
the Government routinely interferes with its citizens' privacy.
Security forces frequently conducted night searches without warrants,
and they targeted persons suspected of political crimes. During student
demonstrations in late September (see Section 2.b.), riot police
reportedly broke into private homes to search for demonstrators. Some
residents of Khartoum filed lawsuits against the riot police for
violating their privacy and damaging property; however, the status of
the lawsuits was unclear at year's end. In the north, security forces
also targeted persons suspected of making alcoholic beverages, which
are illegal.
Security personnel routinely opened and read mail and monitored
telephones. The Government continued to restrict the ownership of
satellite dishes by private citizens through use of its licensing
requirement.
A Muslim man may marry a non-Muslim, but a Muslim woman cannot
marry a non-Muslim, unless he converts to Islam (see Section 5);
however, this prohibition is not observed or enforced universally,
particularly in the south and among Nubans. Non-Muslims may adopt only
non-Muslim children; no such restrictions apply to Muslim parents.
Various government bodies have decreed on different occasions that
women must dress according to modest Islamic standards (see Sections
l.c. and 5). On June 13, 24 Nuban students of Ahlia University in
Khartoum were arrested while picnicking in a Khartoum park. The
students reportedly obtained appropriate permits to hold a picnic. The
following day, the students were taken to a public order court and
reportedly sentenced to fines of up to approximately $20 (50,000
Sudanese pounds) and floggings, because they committed ``obscene
acts'', apparently because female students were wearing trousers and
the students were performing traditional Nuban dances that involved men
and women dancing together. The sentences reportedly were carried out
immediately after the trial. The students subsequently won an appeal
and had their fines returned.
Non-Muslim prison inmates were pressured to convert to Islam, as
were PDF trainees, children in government-controlled camps for vagrant
minors, and persons in government-controlled peace camps (see Sections
1.g and 2.c.).
There were credible reports that government forces pursued a
scorched earth policy aimed at removing populations from around the
newly built oil pipeline and other oil production facilities.
The Government continued to raze squatter dwellings in Khartoum
during the year, but also continued efforts to implement procedures to
grant title and move squatters in advance of demolition. In October the
First Vice President directed that the demolition of churches and other
Christian facilities in Khartoum be suspended and that a committee be
formed under the Second Vice President to review the issue (see Section
2.c.).
A wide network of government informants conducted pervasive
surveillance in schools, universities, markets, workplaces, and
neighborhoods. The Government disbanded political parties and prevented
citizens from forming new political groups (see Section 2.b.). As a
result of the adoption of the new Constitution and the passage of a new
political parties law in December 1998, political parties are now
legal. As of the end of the year, there were 17 registered parties. The
Government continued to dismiss military personnel summarily as well as
civilian government employees whose loyalty it considered suspect. The
government committee set up in 1995 to review cases of persons
summarily dismissed since the 1989 coup continued to function in
theory; however, it has released no results since May 1996.
Government-instituted neighborhood ``popular committees''--
ostensibly a mechanism for political mobilization--served as a means
for monitoring households' activities. These committees caused many
citizens to be wary of neighbors who could report them for
``suspicious'' activities, including ``excessive contact'' with
foreigners. The committees also furnished or withheld documents
essential for obtaining an exit visa. In high schools, students
sometimes were pressured to join pro-regime youth groups.
Government forces burned and looted villages and stole cattle (see
Section 1.g.).
The Government continued to conscript citizens forcibly, including
high school age children (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
As a result of the prolonged war, approximately 4 million persons
are displaced internally (see Section 2.d.).
The insurgent SPLM/SPLA generally is not known to interfere with
privacy, family, home, or correspondence in areas that it controls,
although correspondence is difficult in war zones; however rebel
factions continued to conscript citizens forcibly including high school
age children (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
There were unconfirmed reports that the SPLA forcibly recruited
Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda for service in their forces.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law In
Internal Conflicts.--Since the civil war resumed in 1983, an estimated
2 million persons have been killed, and 4 million displaced internally
as a result of fighting between the Government and insurgents in the
south. Although there were numerous deaths during the year, observers
believe that there were fewer deaths than in 1998. The civil war
continued despite limited cease-fires, and all sides involved in the
fighting were responsible for abuses in violation of humanitarian
norms. At year's end, the Government controlled virtually all the
northern two-thirds of the country, but was limited to garrison towns
in the south. Government bombings continued despite unilateral
declarations of a cease-fire. The town of Yei, the center of SPLM civil
administration, was bombed repeatedly, killing at least one person,
injuring several persons, and damaging the clearly marked Norwegian
People's Aid-run hospital on March 5. The Government also repeatedly
bombed the towns of Bentiu, Maridi, and Kajo Keji. On May 13, bombs
from government aircraft reportedly struck a women's Koranic school in
the town of Tahdaye in the east, killing 7 persons and wounding 25
others. Whatever its intended targets, government aerial bombing is so
inaccurate that it puts civilians at risk regularly. On May 22,
government artillery fire reportedly struck the town of Talkuk in the
east, resulting in 5 dead and 17 wounded.
The Government reportedly violated the cease-fire on a number of
occasions by carrying out raids and attacks on civilian settlements
particularly in the Bahr El Ghazal. These raids were accompanied by
killings, abductions, rapes, the burning and looting of villages, the
theft of cattle, and significant displacement of civilian populations.
For example, there was a report that in February government soldiers
attacked the airstrip at Akoch in northern Bahr El Ghazal, killed 30
persons, raped women, abducted persons, stole cattle, and burned the
village center. There was a report that in March soldiers attacked the
towns of Alal Non and Akoch in northern Bahr El Ghazal, killing 86
persons and abducting 182 women and children. There were reports that
in July the army attacked the towns in Ruweng county, burning several
churches, abducting hundreds of persons, and killing dozens of
civilians.
There are frequent allegations that government or government-
associated forces have implemented a scorched earth policy along parts
of the oil pipeline and around some key oil facilities. Those forces
allegedly have destroyed villages and driven out inhabitants in order
to create an uninhabited security zone.
Victims of government bombings, and of the civil war in general,
often flee to government-controlled ``peace camps.'' Some NGO's
reported that persons in the peace camps were subject to forced labor
and at times pressured to convert to Islam.
Government forces routinely killed rebel soldiers captured in
battle. Only a small group of prisoners captured before the 1989 coup
and a few soldiers taken in the east in 1998 and during the year
reportedly are held as POW's in government-controlled areas. In some
cases, the Government does not concede that it holds POW's. The
Government has not granted the ICRC access to the POW's.
Government restrictions in practice limited or denied travel by
nongovernmental relief organizations to many areas long controlled by
insurgents. The U.N.'s OLS, a coalition of relief and aid NGO's,
generally was allowed to operate in the south; however, at several
points during the year, the Government denied flight clearances to the
OLS to areas of Western Upper Nile, which exacerbated suffering there
caused by fighting between progovernment and antigovernment militias.
From June 21-24 and from September 15-29, U.N. teams conducted
humanitarian assessment visits to rebel-held areas of the Nuba
Mountains. From October 7-12, the U.N. conducted a humanitarian
assessment in government-held areas of the Nuba Mountains; however, the
U.N. has not yet been permitted to begin a humanitarian aid program for
the Nuba Mountains.
Government forces in the south raped women, and forcibly
conscripted men and boys (see Sections 1.f. and 6.c.). Government
forces routinely displaced, killed, and injured civilians, and
destroyed clinics and dwellings intentionally during their offensive
operations.
The Government used landmines, including the laying of belts of
mines around garrison towns, which resulted in the killing and maiming
of both soldiers and civilians. During a March visit by Special
Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, both the
Government and the SPLM agreed to cease using anti-personnel mines. At
year's end, it was not clear to what degree the two sides were living
up to their commitment. Insurgent forces continued to lay landmines
indiscriminately on roads and paths that killed and maimed both
soldiers and civilians.
In July two State Ministers and numerous civilians reportedly were
killed in Unity State during fighting between progovernment and
antigovernment militias. Both militias assert that the other was
responsible. On May 18, a barge operated by the U.N. World Food Program
was attacked near the town of Adok. One person on the barge was killed,
while three others were injured. The area was the scene of fighting
between progovernment and antigovernment militias, and it is not clear
who was responsible for the attack.
Northern Muslim opposition groups under the 1995 NDA umbrella
structure, which includes the SPLA, took military action against the
Government. The NDA attacked government garrisons, the oil pipeline,
and strategic points near the Ethiopian and Eritrean borders.
The SPLA has taken a number of prisoners over the years. The ICRC
regularly visited many of these prisoners, although it did not have
access to prisoners held in Southern Blue Nile State. Prisoners
reportedly have died while in SPLA custody due to extremely poor prison
conditions, although there is no evidence of the massacres alleged by
some in the north.
There are credible reports of SPLA taxation and diversion of relief
supplies. The SPLM leadership repeatedly has committed itself to
eliminating these problems; however, in practice, it appears unable to
impose consistently those commitments on its representatives in the
field.
Insurgent forces in the south raped women and forcibly conscripted
men and boys (see Section 1.f. and 6.c.). Insurgent forces also
routinely displaced, killed and injured civilians, and destroyed
clinics and dwellings intentionally.
Although details generally were unavailable, there were credible
reports of civilian casualties as a result of conflict between Dinka
and Didinga tribes around the town of Chukudum (see Sections 1.a. and
5). Some of the Dinka incidents reportedly involved members of the
SPLA.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The new Constitution implemented
early in the year provides for freedom of thought and expression, and
freedom of the press ``as regulated by law;'' however, the Government
severely restricts freedom of speech and of the press. Government
suspensions of newspapers, intimidation, and surveillance, facilitated
in part by an informer network, continued to inhibit open, public
discussion of political issues. Journalists practice self-censorship.
As a result of a limited easing of press restrictions that the
Government began in 1997, some lively discussions of domestic and
foreign policy were published in the press. Nonetheless, the Government
still exercised control of news reporting, particularly of political
topics and criticism of the Government, through the National Press
Council. The Press Law was amended at mid-year, creating the National
Press Council (formerly the National Council for Press and
Publications). The Press Council applies the Press Law and is directly
responsible to the President, with the power to suspend any newspaper
for 2 months and individual journalists for 2 weeks if it considers
that they violated press guidelines. The Press Council consists of 21
members: 7 selected by the President, 5 from the National Assembly, 7
directly elected by journalists from the Journalists' Union, and 2
selected by the Journalists' Union leadership.
The Government and the Press Council routinely suspended
publications. The independent Al Rai Al Akhar was shut down on January
11 for 2 days, on June 22 for 2 days, on July 5 for 3 days, on July 26
for 2 days, on August 17 for 1 week, on September 9 for 1 week, and
suspended indefinitely by presidential decree on September 19. On July
5, the daily newspapers Alwan, and Al Bayan were suspended for 3 days,
and Al Bayan was suspended again on August 10 for 3 days. On August 31,
Al Rai Al Aam was suspended for 2 days.
On November 7, riot police broke up a press conference in the
office of human rights activist Ghazi Suleiman (see Section 2.b.).
Journalists often were arrested or detained. Freelance journalist
Mohamed Abd Al-Seed was detained from about April 14 to May 26 and
reportedly tortured (see Section 1.c.). The chief editor and editorial
director of Al Rai Al Aam were arrested on May 24 for ``crimes against
the State.'' Both were released on bail that evening, and no further
steps were taken regarding their case. The editor in chief of the
newspaper Al-Rai al-Akher was arrested and detained in June for
``harming national security and dissemination of false information,''
after publishing a speech by the president of the National Democratic
Alliance that called for resistance to the Government. There were
reports that the editors in chief of two other newspapers, Elsharee
Elsyasi and Al-Ousbou, also were arrested at the same time.
All journalists, even in the privately owned Arabic daily press,
still practice self-censorship. There are nine daily newspapers, and a
wide variety of Arabic and English publications are available; however,
they are subject to censorship.
Radio and television are controlled directly by the Government and
are required to reflect government and NIF/NC policies. Television has
a permanent military censor to ensure that the news reflects official
views.
The Government often charged that the international, and
particularly the Western, media have an anti-Sudan and anti-Islam bias.
In spite of the restrictions on ownership of satellite dishes,
citizens have access to foreign electronic media; the Government does
not jam foreign radio signals. In addition to domestic and satellite
television services, there is a pay cable network of six channels,
which directly rebroadcasts uncensored Cable News Network (CNN), the
London-based, Saudi-owned Middle East Broadcasting Corporation (MBC),
Dubai-TV, and Kuwait-TV. Early in the year, the Government reportedly
reached agreement with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) to
allow FM radio broadcasting; however, such broadcasting had not begun
by year's end. Rebel movements have provided relatively few
opportunities for journalists to report on their activities.
Academic freedom does not exist. The Government used political
criteria whenever possible in appointing new faculty members. In
November the daughter of a prominent academic and outspoken government
opponent, Dr. Farouq Kadouda, was beaten unconscious by unknown
persons. A note was left next her body stating that the attack was a
``warning;'' Dr. Kadouda received numerous anonymous threats of
violence and retaliation should he continue to speak out against the
government.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The declaration
of the state of emergency and of martial law on June 30, 1989
effectively eliminated the right of assembly, and the Government
severely restricted this freedom. The authorities permitted only
government-authorized gatherings and routinely denied permission for or
disrupted gatherings that they viewed as politically oriented. Islamic
orders associated with opposition political parties, particularly the
Ansar and Khatimia, regularly are denied permission to hold large
public gatherings. In April the Muslim Brotherhood, a registered
political party, announced that it was denied permission to hold
symposiums in Khartoum and Omdurman. On June 6, 84 persons were
detained in Omdurman at the inauguration of the Democratic Forces Front
(DFF). Eleven politicians present were charged with illegal assembly,
disturbing public order, and causing a nuisance. They were released on
bail and later acquitted. On November 7, riot police broke up a press
conference in the office of human rights activist Ghazi Suleiman. At
the press conference, leaders of the DFF, the New Democratic Movement,
and the Naserite Movement discussed a memorandum they planned to hand
to the President that called for expediting reconciliation between the
Government and the opposition, restoration of democracy, a new
constitution, an interim government, and the organization of free and
fair elections. The Government dispersed several unapproved
demonstrations during the year, often with excessive force that
included beatings and tear gas.
The Government severely restricted freedom of association. In
December 1998 implementing legislation linked to the new Constitution
that in theory would allow the existence of political parties passed
into law. As a result, there are now 17 officially registered political
parties; however, the legislation included restrictions that
effectively prohibit traditional political parties if they are linked
to armed opposition to the Government.
Professional association members accused the Government of
manipulating the elections held by many associations. In November 1997,
journalists severely criticized the Government's manipulation of
journalists' union elections to ensure victory by progovernment
candidates.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The new Constitution, implemented early in
the year, provides for freedom of religion but states that ``Shari'a
and custom are the sources of legislation;'' however, the Government
severely restricts freedom of religion in practice. The Government
treats Islam as the state religion and has declared that Islam must
inspire the country's laws, institutions, and policies.
Religious organizations are subject to the 1994 Societies
Registration Act, which replaced the controversial 1962 Missionary
Societies Act. It theoretically allows churches to engage in a wider
range of activities than did the Missionary Act, but churches are
subject to the restrictions placed on nonreligious corporations.
Religious groups, like all other organizations, must be registered in
order to be recognized or to gather legally. The Government also
requires that houses of worship be approved. Registered religious
groups are exempt from most taxes. Nonregistered religious groups, on
the other hand, find it impossible to construct a place of worship or
to assemble legally. Registration reportedly is very difficult to
obtain in practice, and the Government does not treat all groups
equally in the approval of such registrations and licenses. In recent
years, the Roman Catholic Church has not been given permission to build
new churches, although other Christian groups have received permission.
The Government permits non-Muslims to participate in services in
existing and otherwise authorized places of worship. The Government
continued to deny permission for the construction of Roman Catholic
churches; however, it permitted some makeshift structures to be used.
There is a longstanding dispute between the Episcopal Church and the
Government. In September the Episcopal Church stated that the
Government had moved to seize a portion of the property on which church
offices in Omdurman stand. A government-run health care center had
operated on the site since 1973. The Church claims that it has a
freehold title to the land, while the Government claims that it is a
leasehold. The Church claims that the courts would not act
independently of the Government in the case. At year's end, the
Government reportedly had delayed moves to seize the property. In
December police injured five persons in a clash in northwest Khartoum
over an Episcopal Church school. Local authorities claim that the
school was built without a proper permit, and they were trying to
confiscate it despite a court ruling in favor of the church.
Government authorities, using soldiers for security, reportedly
have razed approximately 30 religious buildings with bulldozers since
1990. In June local press reports indicated that an agreement was
signed between the Human Rights Committee of the National Assembly and
the Minister of Engineering Affairs of Khartoum State not to remove
schools or houses of worship during slum demolitions unless adequate
alternative sites were found. Nonetheless, State Minister for External
Relations Gabriel Rorege reportedly wrote a letter of complaint asking
for action by the chairman of the Religious Dialogue, Ahmed Abdel
Rahman Ahmed, to prevent confiscations of schools in the displaced
areas. In October the First Vice President directed that demolition of
churches and other Christian facilities in Khartoum be suspended and
that a committee be formed under the Second Vice President to review
the issue.
While non-Muslims may convert to Islam, the 1991 Criminal Act makes
apostasy (which includes conversion to another religion) by Muslims
punishable by death. In mid 1998, the Government began prosecution of
an apostasy case against Faki Koko, a Nuban who was accused of
converting from Islam. Faki Koko reportedly was released during the
year, and allowed to leave the country for health reasons without
charge or trial, although his current status and location remain
unclear.
Although the Government considers itself an Islamic government,
restrictions often are placed on the religious freedoms of Muslims,
particularly against those orders linked to opposition to the
Government. Islamic orders such as the Ansar and the Khatimia regularly
are denied permission to hold large public gatherings. In April the
Muslim Brotherhood, a registered political party, announced that it was
denied permission to hold symposiums in Khartoum and Omdurman. In
November a religious leader was arrested, along with some followers,
allegedly for accusing the Government of being insufficiently Islamic.
Authorities continued to restrict the activities of Christians,
followers of traditional indigenous beliefs, and other non-Muslims, and
there continued to be reports of harassment and arrest for religious
beliefs and activities. Catholic priests report that they routinely are
stopped and interrogated by police. Security forces also detained
persons because of their religious beliefs and activities (see Section
1.d.).
According to Human Rights Watch, local officials in western
Kordofan detained and beat Christians, burned down Christian churches,
and lashed Christian youths.
The Government charged Reverend Hillary Boma and Reverend Lino
Sebit along with 18 other persons with involvement in the June 1998
Khartoum bombings, but released them in December (see Sections 1.d. and
1.e.). The charges were viewed widely as unsubstantiated and possibly
designed to intimidate Christians and the political opposition.
Muslims may proselytize freely in the north, but non-Muslims are
forbidden to proselytize. Foreign missionaries and religiously oriented
organizations continue to be harassed by authorities, and their
requests for work permits and residence visas are delayed. A foreign
priest was deported in August. The priest reportedly was summoned by
the immigration department on July 15 and told to leave the country
within 2 weeks. No reason was given for his expulsion. The Government
is least restrictive of Christian groups that historically have had a
presence in the country, including Copts, Roman Catholics, and Greek
Orthodox, and is more restrictive of newer arrivals.
Various government bodies have decreed on different occasions that
women must dress according to modest Islamic standards. This, at the
least, entails wearing a head covering. For example, in January the
governor of Khartoum State announced that women in public places and
government offices and female students and teachers would be required
to conform to what is deemed an Islamic dress code. However, none of
these decrees have been the subject of legislation, and enforcement of
the dress code regulations was uneven. In June a Khartoum court ordered
that 25 students from Ahlia University be flogged; they were charged
with disturbances, and ``obscene acts.'' The obscene acts apparently
referred to the actions of the female students in wearing trousers (see
1.f.).
Children who have been abandoned or whose parentage is unknown--
regardless of presumed religious origin--are considered Muslims and can
be adopted only by Muslims. Non-Muslims may adopt only other non-Muslim
children. No equivalent restriction is placed on adoption by Muslims of
orphans, or other abandoned children. These children are considered by
the State to be both Sudanese citizens and Muslims, and therefore can
be adopted only by Muslims. In accordance with Islamic law, Muslim
adopted children do not take the name of their adoptive parents and are
not automatic heirs to their property.
PDF trainees, including non-Muslims, are indoctrinated in the
Islamic faith. In prisons, government-supported Islamic NGO's offer
inducements to and pressure non-Muslim inmates to convert. Some NGO's
reported that persons in the government-controlled peace camps were
subject to forced labor and at times pressured to convert to Islam (see
Section 1.f.). Children, including non-Muslim children, in camps for
vagrant minors are required to study the Koran, and there is pressure
on non-Muslims to convert to Islam (see Section 5). Some children from
Christian and other non-Muslim families, captured and sold into
slavery, were converted forcibly to Islam.
The Government bombed villages in the Nuba mountains, at times
striking hospitals, schools, mosques, Christian churches, and religious
services (see Section 1.g.). On May 13, bombs from government aircraft
reportedly struck a women's Koranic school in the town of Tahdaye in
the east, killing 7 persons and wounding 25 others. There was a report
in July that the army attacked the towns in Ruweng county, burning
several churches, abducting hundreds of persons, and killing dozens of
civilians (see Section 1.a.)
The Government requires instruction in Islam in public schools in
the north. In public schools in areas in which Muslims are not a
majority, students have a choice of studying Islam or Christianity.
In rebel-controlled areas, Christians, Muslims, and followers of
traditional indigenous beliefs generally worship freely, although it
appears that many of the region's Muslim residents have departed
voluntarily over the years. The SPLM officially favors secular
government; however, the SPLM is dominated by Christians, and local
SPLM authorities often have a very close relationship with local
Christian religious authorities. In February Protestant missionaries in
the town of Panlit in Bahr El Ghazal in the south reportedly baptized
children studying at a Catholic school without their clear
understanding or consent. SPLM authorities subsequently detained and
later released some of the school's teachers for their roles in the
incident.
Government and SPLM/SPLA delegations participated in IGAD-mediated
peace talks in Nairobi, Kenya from July 18-23. The delegations
continued discussions of the role of religion in national affairs and
the predominantly non-Muslim southern region's right to self-
determination. Further meetings are expected to take place in 2000.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The new Constitution implemented early
in the year provides for freedom of movement and residence, and exit
from and entry into the country; however, the Government restricted
these rights in practice. The Government restricted freedom of movement
by denying exit visas to some categories of persons, including
policemen and physicians. The Government also maintained lists of
political figures and other citizens not permitted to travel abroad.
Women may not travel abroad without permission of their husbands or
male guardians. Some former political detainees were forbidden to
travel outside Khartoum. Movement generally was unhindered for other
citizens outside the war zones, but travelers who failed to produce an
identity card at checkpoints risked arrest. Foreigners needed permits,
which were difficult to obtain and often were refused, for domestic
travel outside of Khartoum; however, foreign diplomats could travel to
many locations under government escort. Foreigners must register with
the police on entering the country, seek permission to move from one
location to another, and reregister at each new location within 3 days
of arrival. Foreign NGO staff sometimes had problems obtaining entry
visas or work or travel permits once they had entered the country.
Insurgent movements also required that foreign NGO personnel obtain
permission before traveling to areas that they control, although they
generally granted such permission. NGO workers who have worked in
government-held territory encountered problems receiving permission to
work or travel in insurgent-held territory.
Tens of thousands of persons, largely southerners and westerners
displaced by famine and civil war, continued to live in squatter slums
in the Khartoum area. The Khartoum State government plans to upgrade
conditions in some camps, requiring the movement of populations to
other areas so that roads may be built or enlarged and services
established. The Khartoum State government is in contact with foreign
NGO's and U.N. agencies concerning this effort. During the year, the
Government razed thousands of squatter dwellings in Khartoum (see
Section 1.f.). Many of those displaced were moved to ``planned''
settlement areas, but in most cases those areas had no greater services
than the squatter camps and were further from areas of economic
activity.
Approximately 372,900 Sudanese are refugees in neighboring
countries. Refugees fled to Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic. In
November as a result of fighting between Dinka's and Didingas in the
east (see Section 5), hundreds of refugees fled into neighboring Kenya
and Uganda. Up to 4 million persons are displaced internally due to the
civil war.
The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee or asylee
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperated
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
humanitarian assistance organizations and accorded refugees relatively
good treatment. The UNHCR estimated that there were approximately
391,500 refugees, primarily from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Chad, Uganda, the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia. Approximately 150,000
refugees are in camps and the rest are scattered in urban areas
throughout the country. The Government provides first asylum, although
no statistics were available for the year.
There were no reports of the forcible repatriation of refugees,
regardless of their status. Some reports cited mistreatment of
refugees, including beatings and arbitrary arrests. Refugees could not
become resident aliens or citizens, regardless of their length of stay.
The Government allowed a large number of refugees to work.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens had no genuine opportunity to change their government
peacefully. The National Islamic Front (NIF) renamed itself the
National Congress (NC) in November 1998. On December 12, President
Bashir declared a 3-month state of emergency, dismissed the speaker of
the National Assembly, Dr. Turabi, and disbanded Parliament 2 days
before it was to vote on a bill introduced by pro-Turabi legislators to
reduce Bashir's presidential powers. Bashir suspended the Parliament on
the grounds that it was necessary for the unity of the country. Many
observers believed that the move would effectively reduce the influence
of the NIF/NC and Dr. Turabi.
A new national Constitution, which provides in theory for a wide
range of rights, was passed by referendum in June 1998, and was
implemented early in the year. There was widespread skepticism about
the Government's claims that the constitutional referendumpassed with
96.7 percent approval and 91.9 percent participation. Critics of the
new Constitution charged that it neither was drafted nor passed with
truly national participation. Some critics also objected to the
statement that ``Islamic law'' would be among ``the prevalent sources
of law'' in regard to amending the Constitution. The new Constitution
resulted in few changes in practice.
In 1989 the National Salvation Revolution Command Council (RCC)
abolished all political parties and detained the major party leaders
for a short period. In 1990 the RCC rejected both multiparty and one
party systems and, 2 years later, established an entirely government-
appointed Transitional National Assembly, based on a Libyan-style
political structure with ascending levels of nonpartisan assemblies.
The essentially powerless appointed legislature was replaced following
the 1996 elections by an elected National Assembly in which 125 of the
400 members were appointed from the National Congress. Opposition
parties boycotted the election. In December 1998, implementing
legislation linked to the new Constitution passed into law that would
allow the existence of political parties. As a result, there are now 17
officially registered political parties; however, the legislation
included restrictions that effectively prohibit traditional political
parties if they are linked to armed opposition to the Government. The
Government continued routinely to deny permission for and disrupt
gatherings that it viewed as politically oriented (see Section 2.b.).
The federal system of government was instituted in 1995 and slowly
is developing a structure of 26 states, which the Government considers
a possible inducement to the insurgents for accommodation through a
principle of regional autonomy; however, southerners are
underrepresented in the Government. This underrepresentation remained a
key obstacle to ending the rebellion. State elections were held in the
16 northern states and 6 of 10 southern states in June. All the
registered opposition parties boycotted the elections, apparently
objecting to being allowed only 3 days to register and only 7 to 12
days to campaign. Elections in two of the southern States (Lakes and
Warab) were not completed because of insecure conditions, according to
the Government.
Women have the right to vote, but are underrepresented in
government and politics. The Minister of Manpower is the only woman in
the Cabinet. There are two female State ministers in the Ministry of
Social Planning. Seats in the National Assembly are set aside for
representatives of women's organizations and for female student
representatives. A total of 25 women are members of the 400-seat
National Assembly.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Due to government restrictions on freedom of association (see
Section 2.b.), there are no independent domestic human rights
organizations; however, individual human rights activists operate in
anonymity. There are two local NGO's that address health concerns
related to the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) (see Section
5). A representative of Human Rights Watch visited the country during
the year to attend the July 27-29 workshop on abductions.
Government-supported Islamic NGO's pressured imprisoned non-Muslims
to convert to Islam.
The Human Rights Advisory Council, a government body whose
rapporteur is the Solicitor General for Public Law, continued its
active role in addressing human rights problems within the Government.
The Parliamentary Human Rights Committee also was particularly vocal in
its public criticisms of the indefinite suspension of the daily
newspaper Al Rai Al Akhar by presidential decree on September 19 (see
Section 2.a.). In May 1998, the Government formed the Committee for the
Eradication of the Abduction of Women and Children, which in turn
formed mechanisms to identify and return abductees (see Section 1.b.).
In September 1998, the U.N. named a new Special Rapporteur on
Sudan, Leonardo Franco. Franco visited the country for approximately 2
weeks in February. U.N. Special Representative for Children and Armed
Conflict Olara Otunnu visited for approximately 1 week in March. U.N.
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and Expression Abid Hussein
visited for 1 week in September, as did a delegation from the U.N.
Human Rights Commission.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
A governmental decree prohibits discrimination based on religion or
sex. Redress is provided through the administrative courts or the labor
office. The 1992 General Education Act stipulates equal opportunity in
education for the disabled. Mechanisms for social redress, especially
with respect to violence against womenand children, are weak. The new
Constitution implemented early in the year prohibits discrimination
based on race, sex, or religious creed; however, it has resulted in no
changes in practice.
Women.--Violence against women continues to be a problem, although
accurate statistics do not exist. Many women are reluctant to file
formal complaints against such abuse, although domestic violence is a
legal ground for divorce. The police normally do not intervene in
domestic disputes. In particular, displaced women from the south were
vulnerable to harassment, rape, and sexual abuse. The Government did
not address the problem of violence against women, nor was it discussed
publicly. The punishment for rape under the Criminal Act varies from
100 lashes and 10 years imprisonment to death. In most cases,
convictions are not announced, but observers believe that sentences are
often less than the maximum provided for by law.
Prostitution is a growing problem, although there is no sex tourism
industry. There are no specific laws regarding sexual harassment.
Some aspects of the law, including certain provisions of Islamic
law as interpreted and applied by the Government, and many traditional
practices, discriminate against women. Gender segregation is common in
social settings. In keeping with Islamic law, a Muslim woman has the
right to hold and dispose of her own property without interference.
Women are ensured inheritance from their parents; however, a daughter
inherits half the share of a son, and a widow inherits a smaller
percent than do her children. It is much easier for men to initiate
legal divorce proceedings than for women. These rules only apply to
Muslims and not to those of other faiths, for whom religious or tribal
laws apply. Although a Muslim man may marry a non-Muslim, a Muslim
woman cannot marry a non-Muslim unless he converts to Islam. Women
cannot travel abroad without the permission of their husbands or male
guardians (see Section 2.d.).
A number of government directives require that women in public
places and government offices and female students and teachers conform
to what the Government deemed an Islamic dress code. This, at the
least, entailed wearing a head covering. However, enforcement of the
dress code regulations was uneven. In June a Khartoum court ordered
that 25 students from Ahlia University be flogged; they were charged
with disturbances, and ``obscene acts.'' The obscene acts apparently
referred to the actions of the female students in wearing trousers (see
Section 1.f.).
There are credible reports that government and government-
associated forces seized and sold women for work as domestic servants
(see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
Children.--Education is compulsory through grade eight, although
local inability to pay teachers' salaries reportedly has resulted in
declining attendance. Boys and girls are treated similarly in the
educational system.
A considerable number of children suffered serious abuse, including
enslavement and forced conscription in the war zones (see Sections 1.f.
and 6.c.). There continued to be credible reports that government and
government-associated forces seized children for purposes of forced
labor (see Section 6.c.).
The Government forcibly conscripted young men and boys into the
military forces. The Government officially requires that young men,
typically of ages 17 to 19, must enter military service to be able to
receive a certificate on leaving secondary school. Such a certificate
is a requirement for entry into a university, and the decree
effectively broadened the conscription base.
The Government operates camps for vagrant children. Police
typically send homeless children who have committed crimes to these
camps, where they are detained for indefinite periods. Health care and
schooling at the camps generally are poor; basic living conditions
often are primitive. All the children in the camps, including non-
Muslims, must study the Koran, and there is pressure on non-Muslims to
convert to Islam (see Section 2.c.). Teenagers in the camps often are
conscripted into the PDF.
As many as 3,000 Ugandan children, abducted from northern Uganda by
the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan armed opposition group,
were held in the southern part of the country. These children were
forced to become soldiers or sexual slaves. The Government actively
supported the LRA. In December in Nairobi, Kenya, the Governments of
both countries signed an accord agreeing, among other things, to cease
supporting rebel groups and to return abductees; however, it was not
clear at year's end if the accord was still in effect due to an LRA
excursion into Uganda from Sudan in late December.
FGM, which is widely condemned by international health experts as
damaging to both physical and psychological health, is widespread,
especially in the north. An estimated 90 percent or more of females in
the north have been subjected to FGM, with consequences that have
included severe urinary problems, infections, and even death.
Infibulation, the most severe type of FGM, is also the most common
type. Usually it is performed on girls between the ages of 4 and 7. It
is performed often by traditional practitioners in improvised,
unsanitary conditions, causing severe pain, trauma, and risk of
infection to the child. No form of FGM is illegal under the Criminal
Code; however, the health law forbids doctors and midwives from
performing infibulation. Reportedly women displaced from the south to
the north increasingly are imposing FGM on their daughters, even if
they themselves have not been subjected to it. The Government neither
arrested nor prosecuted any persons for violating the health law
against infibulation.
Two local NGO's, with funding from the U.N. and a government
agency, are involved actively in efforts to eradicate FGM, which they
describe as a ``harmful practice.'' A small but growing number of
urban, educated families are abandoning the practice completely. A
larger number of families, in a compromise with tradition, have adopted
the least severe form of FGM as an alternative to infibulation.
People With Disabilities.--The Government does not discriminate
against disabled persons but has not enacted any special legislation or
taken other steps, such as mandating accessibility to public buildings
and transportation for the disabled. The 1992 General Education Act
requires equal educational opportunities for the disabled.
Religious Minorities.--Muslims predominate in the north, but are in
the minority in the south, where most citizens practice traditional
indigenous religions or Christianity. There are from 1 to 2 million
displaced southerners in the north who largely practice traditional
indigenous religions or Christianity. About 500,000 Coptic Christians
live in the north. Traditionally there have been amicable relations
between the various religious communities, although there were a small
number of clashes.
On February 6, clashes took place at the University of Khartoum
when Christian students attempted to hold a Christian book exhibition.
Some Muslim students, calling themselves the ``Islamic Movement,''
reportedly attacked the exhibit and burned some books. Injuries were
reported on both sides. The Islamic Movement claimed that a mosque on
the campus had been defiled and criticized what they described as a
humiliation of Islam by allowing Christianity into the University.
However, other Muslim students issued statements criticizing the attack
on the Christian students. The book exhibition, which was scheduled in
February, subsequently was postponed by the university administration.
There were press reports in March that on two occasions a group of
Muslims calling itself Al D'awa Wa Tabligh gathered at an Orthodox
church in Khartoum and launched verbal attacks against the church and
Christianity. On one of the occasions, police reportedly arrested 30
Muslims.
There are reliable reports that Islamic NGO's in war zones withhold
food and other services from the needy unless they convert to Islam.
In government-controlled areas of the south, there continued to be
credible evidence of prejudice in favor of Muslims and an unwritten
policy of Islamization of public institutions, despite an official
policy of local autonomy and federalism. In the past, some non-Muslims
lost their jobs in the civil service, the judiciary, and other
professions. Few non-Muslim university graduates found government jobs.
Some non-Muslim businessmen complained of petty harassment and
discrimination in the awarding of government contracts and trade
licenses. There also were reports that Muslims receive preferential
treatment for the limited services provided by the Government,
including access to medical care.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The estimated population of
27.5 million is a multiethnic mix of over 500 Arab and African tribes
with scores of languages and dialects. The Arabised Muslim culture in
the north and central areas and the non-Muslim African culture in the
south are the two dominant cultures. Northern Muslims, who form a
majority of about 16 million, traditionally have dominated the
Government. The southern ethnic groups fighting the civil war (largely
followers of traditional indigenous religions or Christians) total
approximately 6 million and seek independence, or some form of regional
self-determination, from the north.
The Muslim majority and the NIF/NC-dominated Government continued
to discriminate against ethnic minorities in almost every aspect of
society. Citizens in Arabic-speaking areas who do not speak Arabic
experienced discrimination in education, employment, and other areas.
The use of Arabic as the language of instruction in higher education
discriminated against non-Arabs. For university admission, students
completing high school are required to pass examinations in four
subjects: English language; mathematics; Arabic language; and religious
studies. Even at the university level, examinations in all subjects
except English language were in the Arabic language, placing nonnative
speakers of Arabic at a disadvantage.
In March at a grassroots organized peace conference in Wunlit, Bahr
El Ghazal, representatives of the Nuer and Dinka tribes signed a peace
covenant. The Dinka and the Nuer are the two largest tribes and had
been on opposite sides of the war since 1991. The Wunlit accord
provides concrete mechanisms for peace, including a cease-fire, an
amnesty, the exchange of abducted women and children, and monitoring
mechanisms. The Wunlit accord greatly reduced conflict between the
Dinka and Nuer tribes during the year.
Although details generally were unavailable, there were credible
reports of civilian casualties as a result of ongoing fighting between
ethnic Dinkas and Didingas in the New Cush and Chukudum areas in
eastern Equatoria (see Section 1.a.). The January killing of a Dinka
SPLA captain and several officers led to an outbreak of violence among
Dinka and Didinga refugees in the Kakuma refugee Camp in Kenya, which
resulted in at least six deaths and numerous injuries. The October
killing of a Didinga chief led to a series of retaliatory attacks.
In February there was significant fighting between Arab
pastoralists and African Masaleet tribes in Darfur. Traditional
disputes over grazing and water rights were behind some of the
fighting; however, the Government reportedly exacerbated the conflict
by providing Arab pastoralists with arms. As a result of the fighting,
more than 100 persons were killed, more than 40 were injured,
approximately 50 villages were burned, and more than 1,000 families
were displaced. Members of the Masaleet tribes were affected most
heavily.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The RCC abolished the pre-1989 labor
unions, closed union offices, froze union assets, forbade strikes, and
prescribed severe punishments, including the death penalty, for
violations of its labor decrees. The Government dismissed many labor
leaders from their jobs or detained them, although most of those
arrested later were freed.
The new Constitution implemented early in the year provides for the
right of association for economic and trade union purposes; however, it
has resulted in no changes in practice.
The Sudan Workers Trade Unions Federation is the leading blue-
collar labor organization with about 800,000 members. In 1992 local
union elections were held after a delay to permit the government-
controlled steering committees to arrange the outcomes. The elections
resulted in government-approved slates of candidates voted into office
by prearranged acclamation. In 1997 largely the same leadership was
reelected.
There were some teacher strikes over the nonpayment of salaries in
many areas. In some cases, the strikes lasted for months.
Unions remained free to form federations and affiliate with
international bodies, such as the African Workers' Union and the Arab
Workers' Union.
The U.S. Government in 1991 suspended Sudan's eligibility for trade
benefits under the generalized system of preferences because of its
violations of worker rights.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--A 1989 RCC
constitutional decree temporarily suspended the right to organize and
bargain collectively. Although these rights were restored to labor
organizing committees in 1996, government control of the steering
committees meant in practice that the Government dominates the process
of setting wages and working conditions. The continued absence of labor
legislation allowing for union meetings, the filing of grievances, and
other union activity greatly reduced the value of these formal rights.
Although local union officials raised some grievances with employers,
few carried them to the Government. The law does not prohibit antiunion
discrimination by employers. The newConstitution implemented early in
the year provides for the right of organization for economic or trade
union purposes; however, it resulted in no changes in practice.
Wages are set by a tripartite committee comprising representatives
of the Government, labor unions, and business. Specialized labor courts
adjudicate standard labor disputes.
In 1993 the Government created two export processing zones (EPZ's);
it later established a third at Khartoum International Airport. During
the year, only the EPZ at Khartoum International Airport was open. The
labor laws do not apply in the EPZ's.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Although the law
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, slavery persists, particularly
affecting women and children. The taking of slaves, particularly in war
zones, and their transport to parts of central and northern Sudan,
continued. There were frequent and credible reports that Baggara
raiders, supported by PDF and regular government troops, took women and
children as slaves during raids in Bahr El Ghazal during the year. The
Government did not take any action to halt these practices and
continued to support some Baggara tribal militias. There were reports
that during attacks on civilian settlements government forces abducted
a number of persons including women and children (see Section 1.g.).
Credible reports persist of practices such as the sale and purchase of
children, some in alleged slave markets. These practices all have a
pronounced racial aspect, as the victims are exclusively black
southerners and members of indigenous tribes of the Nuba mountains.
There were reports that local authorities took actions to prevent
slavery. The Government denies involvement or complicity in slavery,
and states that hostage taking often accompanies tribal warfare,
particularly in war zones not under government control. The new
Constitution implemented early in the year prohibits slavery and forced
labor, but resulted in no changes in practice.
In May 1998, the Government formed the Committee for the
Eradication of the Abduction of Women and Children (see Section 1.b.).
These mechanisms resulted in the identification and release of several
hundred abductees, although they had not been returned to their homes
by year's end.
The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, the
Government does not enforce it effectively. There continued to be
credible reports that government or government-associated forces took
hundreds of children as slaves.
Both the Government and rebel factions continued to conscript men
and boys forcibly into the fighting forces (see Sections 1.f. and 5).
Conscripts face significant hardship and abuse in military service. The
rebel factions continued to force southern men to work as laborers or
porters.
Approximately 3,000 Ugandan children were forced to become soldiers
or sex slaves for the LRA, a Ugandan armed opposition group in the
south, which is actively supported by the Government (see Section 5).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum age for workers is 16 years; however,
the law is enforced loosely by inspectors from the Ministry of Labor
and only in the official or wage economy. Children as young as 11 or 12
years of age worked in a number of factories, particularly outside the
capital, including the factories at Um Ruwaba that produce edible oils.
In addition severe poverty has produced widespread child labor in the
informal, unregulated economy. In rural areas, children traditionally
assist their families with agricultural work from a very young age. The
new Constitution implemented early in the year provides that the State
protect children from exploitation; however, it resulted in no changes
in practice.
Child labor exists in SPLM/SPLA-held areas, particularly in the
agricultural sectors. Child labor in such areas is exacerbated by a
lack of school, extreme poverty, and the lack of an effective legal
minimum age for workers.
The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, the
Government does not enforce it effectively, and there were credible
reports that children are taken as slaves (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legislated minimum wage is
enforced by the Ministry of Labor, which maintains field offices in
most major cities. Employers generally respect the minimum wage.
Workers who are denied the minimum wage may file a grievance with the
local Ministry of Labor field office, which then is required to
investigate andtake appropriate action if there has been a violation of
the law. In January the minimum wage theoretically was raised from
approximately $9 (24,000 Sudanese pounds) per month to approximately
$11 (3,000 Sudanese dinars or 30,000 Sudanese pounds) per month;
however, most government offices continue to pay the old rate. The
Sudanese Workers Trade Union Federation requested the Minister of
Finance to execute the increase retroactively, and the Minister
promised to increase the minimum wage when submitting the next
Government budget for the year 2000. The current minimum wage is
insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for an average
worker and family.
The workweek is limited by law to six 8-hour days, with a day of
rest on Friday, which generally is respected.
Legal foreign workers have the same labor rights as domestic
workers. Illegal workers have no such protections and, as a result,
typically work for lower wages in worse conditions than legal workers.
Although the laws prescribe health and safety standards, working
conditions generally were poor, and enforcement by the Ministry of
Labor is minimal. The law does not address the right of workers to
remove themselves from dangerous work situations without loss of
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the law does not specifically
prohibit trafficking in persons, it does prohibit slavery and forced
labor; however, slavery persists, particularly affecting women and
children (see Section 6.c.). The taking of slaves, particularly in war
zones, and their transport to parts of central and northern Sudan,
continued. Credible reports persist of practices such as the sale and
purchase of children, some in alleged slave markets. Libyans have been
implicated in the purchase of Sudanese slaves, particularly women and
children who were captured by government troops.
There are credible reports that government and government-
associated forces seized and sold women for work as domestic servants.
There were unconfirmed reports that the SPLA forcibly recruited
Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda for service in their forces.
Approximately 3,000 Ugandan children were forced to become soldiers
or sex slaves for the LRA, a Ugandan armed opposition group in the
south, which is actively supported by the Government (see Section 5).
There were also reports in past years that the LRA had sold and traded
some children, mostly girls, or provided them as gifts, to arms dealers
in Sudan.
The new Constitution implemented early in the year prohibits
slavery and forced labor, but resulted in no changes in practice. In
May 1998, the Government formed the Committee for the Eradication of
the Abduction of Women and Children (see Section 1.b.). The committee
formed mechanisms to identify and return abductees, which have resulted
in the return of approximately 200 persons.
______
SWAZILAND
Swaziland is governed as a modified traditional monarchy with
executive, legislative, and limited judicial powers ultimately vested
in the King (Mswati III). The King rules according to unwritten law and
custom, in conjunction with a partially elected parliament and an
accompanying structure of published laws and implementing agencies.
Parliamentary and municipal elections were held in 1998 and introduced
increased representative government; however, political power continues
to rest largely with the King, and his circle of traditional advisors,
including the Queen Mother. The 1968 Constitution was suspended by the
present King's father in 1973. Based upon the 1973 decree, the King has
the authority to issue decrees that carry the force of law, and
exercised this authority with the introduction of the 1998
Administrative Order. The 1973 decree also bans political parties,
meetings, and processions except in local ``Tinkhundla'' administrative
centers or as authorized by the police. There are public demands to
lift the 1973 decree. That question is among the issues on which a
Constitutional Review Commission (CRC), appointed by the King in 1996,
was expected to make recommendations after carrying out a nationwide
program of civic education and receiving submissions from individual
citizens. However, in October the King again extended the deadline for
the CRC to complete its task, and CRC members who resigned in 1997 to
protest the CRC's terms of reference and slow progress did not rejoin
the CRC. The judiciary is independent; however, the King has certain
judicial powers.
Both the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force and the Royal Swaziland
Police operate under civilian control and are responsible for external
and internal security. Some communities, questioning the ability of
National Police to deal with enforcement at the community level, have
formed community police. There were reports of conflicts between
national and community police. Members of both the National Police and
the community police committed some human rights abuses.
Swaziland has a free market economy, with relatively little
government intervention. The majority of citizens are engaged in
subsistence agriculture, although a relatively diversified industrial
sector now accounts for the largest component of the formal economy.
The economy relies heavily on the export sector, especially on the wood
pulp, soft drink concentrate, and sugar industries, which are composed
primarily of large firms with mostly foreign ownership. The country
depends heavily on South Africa from which it receives almost all of
its imports and to which it sends the majority of its exports. A quasi-
parastatal organization established by royal charter maintains large
investments in major sectors of the economy, including industry,
agriculture, and services. This parastatal normally requires
partnership with foreign investors and international development
agencies.
There continued to be serious human rights problems, although there
was some marginal improvement in a few areas. Citizens still are not
able to change their government. Police continued to torture and beat
some suspects. Police forcibly dispersed demonstrators who sought to
disrupt voting activity. The Government generally failed to prosecute
or otherwise discipline officers who committed abuses. Prison
conditions improved with the opening of new facilities, but the
Government continued to use a nonbailable offense provision. The
Government infringed on citizen's privacy rights. The Government
continued to limit freedom of speech and of the press, restraints
continued on news coverage by government-owned broadcast houses, and
all media practiced some self-censorship, although journalists spoke
out on key issues. Parliament indefinitely deferred a media council
bill that would have limited freedom of the press further by
establishing a government media council. The Government restricted
freedom of assembly and association and retained prohibitions on
political activity, although numerous political groupings operated
openly and voiced opinions critical of the Government, which received
prominent press coverage. However, the police on occasion harassed
political activists. There are some limits on freedom of movement.
Legal and cultural discrimination and violence against women, as well
as abuse of children, remained problems. Some societal discrimination
against mixed race and white citizens persisted. The Government
restricts workers' rights. In October Parliament passed a new
Industrial Relations Act (IRA) and forwarded it to the King to sign
into law. The new IRA would remedy many of the inequities in the
existing labor law and bring the country into substantial conformity
with international labor conventions. There were reports of trafficking
in persons, particularly women and girls, from Mozambique.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by government
agents.
Three bombings took place between August and November 1998,
apparently timed to coincide with major state events. Targetsincluded
the base of a Swaziland Electricity Board power line, an abandoned
bridge over the Lusushwana river, and at the offices of the Deputy
Prime Minister. The final bombing killed one person. Although a
previously unknown group claimed responsibility for the bombings, the
existence of the group was unconfirmed and the perpetrators remained
unidentified and their motives unknown.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--There were credible reports by criminal defendants of the
use of torture during interrogation. Police sometimes beat criminal
suspects and occasionally used the ``tube'' style of interrogation, in
which police suffocate suspects through the use of a rubber tube around
the face and mouth. The Government generally failed to prosecute or
otherwise discipline police officers for such abuses. An internal
complaints and discipline unit investigates reports of human rights
abuses by the police, but no independent body has the authority to
investigate police abuses. However, courts have invalidated confessions
induced through physical abuse; for example, in September 1998, the
High Court awarded a former prisoner approximately $7,000 (42,000
emalangeni) in damages for cruel and unusual punishment suffered while
incarcerated in 1992-94.
In November a bomb destroyed an office building in the township of
Mahlanya used by local politicians, although there were no casualties.
The perpetrators of the bombing remained unknown at year's end.
Overcrowding and generally poor prison conditions were alleviated
markedly through the opening of new institutions including a modern
correctional facility for women. In 1998 foreign diplomats and
representatives of international agencies toured the prisons, including
maximum-security institutions, and reported favorably on improved
medical care, nutrition, sanitation, and vocational training. While
these facilities meet minimum international standards, the use of
nonbailable provisions led to less favorable conditions, including
continued overcrowding in government remand centers where suspects are
held during pretrial detention and often are released for time served
after being sentenced (see Section 1.d.). Women and juveniles are held
in separate prison facilities.
The Government routinely has permitted prison visits by diplomats,
journalists, human rights monitors, and representatives of
international organizations, and some prison visits by journalists and
political figures occurred during the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law requires
warrants for arrests in most circumstances, except when police observe
a crime being committed or have reason to believe that a suspect may
flee. Detainees may consult with a lawyer of their choice and must be
charged with the violation of a statute within a reasonable time,
usually 48 hours, or, in remote areas, as soon as the judicial officer
appears. The authorities generally respected these rights in practice.
In September an editor of an independent newspaper was arrested for
criminal defamation after reporting that the King's latest fiancee was
a high-school dropout (see Section 2.a.).
The Government continued to limit provisions for bail for crimes
appearing in the Nonbailable Offenses Order, which became effective in
1993 and was strengthened by Parliament in 1994. The Order currently
lists 11 offenses. The mere charge of the underlying offense, without
any evidentiary showing that the suspect is involved, is sufficient to
employ the nonbailable provision. The Minister of Justice may amend the
list by his own executive act.
The Government does not use forced exile. There are no barriers to
prevent the return of dissidents.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent;
however, the King has certain judicial powers.
Judicial powers are vested in a dual system, one independent and
based on Western law, the other based on a system of national courts
that follows unwritten traditional law and custom. In treason and
sedition cases, the King can circumvent the regular judiciary by
appointing a special tribunal, which may adopt rules and procedures
different from those applied in the High Court; however, this power was
used last in 1987.
The Western judiciary consists of the Court of Appeal (composed
entirely of expatriate, usually South African, judges), the High Court,
and magistrate courts, all of which are independent of executive and
military control and free from intimidation from outside forces. The
expatriate judges, often distinguished members of their respective
bars, serve on the basis of 2-year renewable contracts. Local judges
serve indefinitely on goodbehavior. In magistrate courts, defendants
are entitled to counsel at their own expense. Court-appointed counsel
is provided in capital cases or when difficult points of law are at
issue. There are well-defined appeal procedures up to the Court of
Appeals, the highest judicial body.
Most citizens who encounter the legal system do so through the
traditional courts. The authorities may bring ethnic Swazis to these
courts for relatively minor offenses and violations of traditional law
and custom. In traditional courts, defendants are not permitted formal
legal counsel but may speak on their own behalf and be assisted by
informal advisers. Sentences are subject to review by traditional
authorities and can be appealed to the High Court and the Court of
Appeals. The public prosecutor legally has the authority to determine
which court should hear a case, but in practice the police usually make
the determination. Accused persons have the right to transfer their
cases from the traditional courts. Delays in trials are common.
In November 1998, the King issued an administrative order that
strengthened the judicial powers of traditional chiefs appointed by the
King. The order provides for chiefs' courts with limited civil and
criminal jurisdiction and authorizes the imposition of fines up to
approximately $50 (300 emalangeni), and prison sentences of up to 3
months. Accused persons are required to appear in person without
representation by a legal practitioner or advocate. However, chiefs'
courts only are empowered to administer customary law ``insofar as it
is not repugnant to natural justice or morality,'' or is inconsistent
with the provisions of any law in force. The order provides that
defendants may appeal decisions of the chief's court to regional appeal
courts and to the higher courts of appeal. Appeals in criminal matters
can be taken to the Judicial Commissioner as a last resort, and the
High Court is the court of last resort for civil matters. Human rights
organizations and the press expressed serious concern over issuance of
the order.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law requires a warrant from a magistrate before
police may search homes or other premises, and police generally respect
this requirement in practice. However, police officers with the rank of
subinspector or higher have the right to conduct a search without a
warrant if they believe that evidence might be lost through the delay
in obtaining a warrant. Searches without warrants occur occasionally.
In April police ransacked the properties of a suspected narcotics
trafficker without first obtaining a proper warrant. Warrants later
were issued, but the High Court Judge ruled that they were authorized
improperly. A majority of the seized property, including personal
items, cash, and automobiles, was returned, except for the items being
used in the prosecution of a criminal case.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government limits freedom of
speech and of the press through a continuing formal ban on political
parties and occasional harassment of journalists. The Government also
has discouraged critical news coverage of the royal family, and
journalists practice self-censorship in regard to the immediate royal
family and national security policy.
In September an editor of an independent newspaper was arrested for
criminal defamation after reporting that the King's latest fiancee was
a high-school dropout. After being released on bail, the editor was
fired from his job. In response to the scandal, the Ministry of Public
Service drafted antidefamation statutes, which were pending approval by
the Attorney General and Parliament at year's end.
In general, both government-owned and independent newspapers
covered a wide variety of sensitive topics and criticized government
corruption, inefficiency, and waste, frequently using harsh invectives.
However, the Government uses the same media to rebut such allegations.
With some exceptions, the Government continued to withhold its
advertising from the country's only independently-owned daily
newspaper. The Prime Minister's office distributes a free weekly
circular reporting on government policy and activities. The government-
owned television and radio stations--the most influential media in
reaching the public--generally followed official policy positions.
Government broadcast facilities retransmit Voice of America and British
Broadcasting Corporation news programs in their entirety.
The Minister of Public Service promised to consult with journalists
before reintroducing the Media Council Bill, which was deferred
indefinitely in May 1998. The bill as proposed originally would have
created a media council with powers to punish journalists and
publishers who did not comply with strict licensing requirements.
Private companies and church groups own several newsletters,
magazines, and one radio station that broadcasts throughout the region,
but these generally avoid political controversy.
The practice of self-censorship and the prohibition of political
gatherings limit academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
restricts freedom of assembly. King Sobhuza's 1973 decree prohibits
meetings of a political nature, processions, or demonstrations in any
public place without the consent of the Commissioner of Police. The
authorities did not routinely grant permission to hold such meetings,
but they did not rigidly enforce the 1973 decree. Political
organizations, including the People's United Democratic Movement
(PUDEMO) and the Swaziland Youth Congress (SWAYOCO), often met without
the required permission and without repercussions. However, the threat
of police intervention pursuant to terms of the 1973 decree remains.
Several traditional forums exist for the expression of opinion,
including community meetings, national councils, and direct dialog with
area chiefs. However, these local channels are not meant as a vehicle
for political change; they often depend on the whims of leaders and are
not consistently effective channels for expressing political dissent.
The Government restricts freedom of association. King Sobhuza's
1973 decree prohibits political parties. The 1996 IRA restricts the
ability of trade union organizations to participate in the social and
political affairs of the nation (see Section 6.a.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--There are no formal constitutional
provisions for freedom of religion; however, the Government respects
freedom of religion in practice. Followers of all religious faiths are
free to worship without government interference or restriction.
New religious groups or churches are expected to register with the
Government upon organizing in the country. Government permission is
required for the construction of new religious buildings.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens may travel and work freely
within the country; however, under traditional law, a married woman
requires her husband's permission to apply for a passport, and
unmarried women require the permission of a close male relative. A
citizenship law passed in 1992 removed several ambiguities relating to
citizenship and nominally enabled nonethnic Swazis to obtain passports
and citizenship documents. However, individuals seeking these documents
sometimes experienced lengthy processing delays, in part due to
occasional prejudice that mixed-race and white Swazis are not real
Swazis. Political dissenters often have their citizenship questioned
and can experience difficulty in obtaining travel documents.
The Government treats several thousand ethnic Swazis living across
the border with South Africa as virtually indistinguishable from local
Swazis and routinely grants them travel and citizenship documents.
The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee or asylee
status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates
fully with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as well as
the various nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) involved in the care
of refugees. The UNHCR officially recognizes several hundred refugees
in the country, the majority coming from east and central Africa. The
issue of provision of first asylum has not arisen in recent years.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens are not able to exercise this right. The King retains
ultimate executive and legislative authority, and political parties are
prohibited. Passage of legislation by Parliament requires the King's
assent to become law, which he is not obliged to give. When Parliament
is not in session, the King may legislate by decree under his residual
emergency powers. The King chooses the Prime Minister and, in
consultation with the Prime Minister, also chooses the Cabinet, many
senior civil servants, and the heads of government offices.
Citizens elect most members of the lower house of parliament.
Parliamentary elections were held by secret ballot in October 1998 for
53 of the 55 elected seats in the 65-seat lower house (the King
appoints the remaining 10 members), and a by-election was held in
December 1998 for 1 of the 2 remaining constituencies. The final
remaining constituency held its by-election in October. The continuing
ban on political parties and restrictions on political activity
prompted some politicalgroupings and trade unions to call for a boycott
of the 1998 elections by their members. Members of the Swaziland
Federation of Trade Union who participated in the electoral process
were threatened with disciplinary measures by the labor federation.
Election officials reported that approximately 200,000 of the 400,000
eligible citizens registered for the parliamentary elections, and that
approximately 120,000 citizens voted, although critics questioned that
figure.
There was no formal international observer presence, but there was
intensive coverage by local and foreign media, and resident diplomats
were granted accreditation to observe the proceedings freely.
Candidates or their representatives also were allowed to monitor the
elections. Election procedures generally were carried out in an orderly
fashion. However, the decision to open polling stations for further
voting a week after the election because of torrential rains led to
irregularities, including persons being found with multiple copies of
registration certificates. Alleged irregularities led to legal
challenges in four constituencies, and the High Court overturned the
result in one constituency as a result. Opposition political groupings
remained highly critical of the entire electoral process, due to the
continuing formal ban on organized political party activity.
In the days leading up to the 1998 elections, the police searched
dozens of homes, including those of trade union leaders and opposition
political figures ostensibly in response to some of the bombing
incidents that occurred between August and November 1998 (see Section
1.a.). No one was arrested or detained.
As provided under law, the House of Assembly nominated 10 members
from the public at large to serve in the upper house or Senate. The
King appointed the additional 20 Senate members. The Cabinet of
Ministers, sworn in on November 20, 1998, included only three elected
Members of Parliament, with the balance drawn from appointed members of
the House and Senate.
Elections were held by secret ballot without major difficulties in
August 1998 to select new municipal councils in 11 cities and towns
across the country. Approximately 70 percent of all eligible voters
registered to vote, but only 22 percent of registered voters actually
cast ballots. Citizens voted largely without interference or
intimidation, except for scattered incidents in Mbabane where
representatives of PUDEMO opposed to participation in the election
attempted to deter voting activities.
Pressure has been building for several years to modernize the
political system, and both the King and the Government recognize that
there is a need for political reform, including the drafting of a new
constitution and, specifically, a bill of rights. In 1996 the King
appointed a 30-member Constitutional Review Commission (CRC), with the
stated purpose of examining the suspended 1968 Constitution, carrying
out civic education, determining citizens' wishes regarding a future
system of government, and making appropriate recommendations on a new
constitution. The CRC compiled a constitutional framework, including
portions of the 1968 Constitution still in force, the 1973 decree as
currently amended, and the 1992 Establishment of Parliament Order. The
CRC distributed this framework nationwide as a starting point for
discussion. However, the CRC made very limited progress due to members
resigning to protest the Commission's terms of reference, and multiple
internal disputes. In October the King again extended the deadline for
the CRC to complete its task.
Human rights organizations, church groups, labor unions, and other
NGO's conducted their own active programs of constitutional and human
rights civic education.
Women generally have full legal rights to participate in the
political process; however, women are underrepresented in the
Government and politics. There are 4 women in the 65-member House of
Assembly formed after the October 1998 elections, 4 women in the 30-
seat Senate, and 2 women among the 16 ministers in the Cabinet. A woman
serves as Secretary to the Cabinet and the head of the civil service.
Three women serve as principal secretaries, the most senior civil
service rank in the ministries. There are 3 women on the 30-person
Constitutional Review Commission. However, in accordance with societal
practice, widows in mourning (for periods that can vary from 6 months
to 3 years) are prevented from appearing in certain public places and
from being near the King and, as a result, can be excluded from voting
or running for office.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government permits domestic human rights groups to operate.
Human rights groups often have spoken out on a number of occasions,
criticizing the lack of accountability and transparency in government
circles. There were no visits by international human rights
organizations, although foreign diplomats and local representatives of
international agencies were invited to tour correctional facilities
(see Section 1.c.). The Government solicited and obtained expert
assistance from the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1997 to
form a tripartite committee charged with redrafting national industrial
relations legislation.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The 1980 Employment Act forbids employers to discriminate on the
basis of race, religion, sex, or political affiliation. Under the act,
employees may bring suit against employers for discrimination, and
there also are provisions for criminal prosecutions; however, there is
no record of any suits or prosecutions. The act reportedly has been
used on occasion to bring moral suasion to bear against employers.
Legal and cultural discrimination against women remains a problem.
Mixed race citizens sometimes experience societal discrimination.
Women.--Violence against women, particularly wife beating, is
frequent, despite traditional strictures against this practice. Women
have the right to charge their husbands with assault under both the
Western and the traditional legal systems, and urban women frequently
do so, usually in extreme cases when intervention by extended family
members fails to end such violence. Rural women often have no
alternative but to suffer in silence if family intervention does not
succeed, because the traditional courts can be unsympathetic to
``unruly'' or ``disobedient'' women and are less likely than the modern
courts to convict men for wife beating. Rape is also common and is
regarded by many men as a minor offense, while women are inhibited from
reporting such crimes by a sense of shame and helplessness, especially
where incest is involved. Even in the modern courts, sentences
frequently amount to no more than several months in jail, a fine, or
both. The Legal Code provides some legal protection from sexual
harassment, but its provisions are vague and largely ineffective.
Several NGO's provide support for victims of abuse or discrimination.
Women occupy a subordinate role in society. In both civil and
traditional marriages, wives are treated as minors legally, although
those who marry under civil law may be accorded the legal status of
adults, if stipulated in a signed prenuptial agreement. A woman
generally requires her husband's permission to borrow money, open a
bank account, obtain a passport, leave the country, gain access to
land, and, in some cases, take a job. Unmarried women require a close
male relative's permission to obtain a passport (see Section 2.d).
Despite the 1980 Employment Act that required equal pay for equal work,
men's average wage rates by skill category usually exceed those of
women.
The dualistic nature of the legal system complicates the issue of
women's rights. Since traditional marriage is governed by uncodified
law and custom, women's rights often are unclear and change according
to where and by whom they are interpreted. Couples often marry in both
civil and traditional ceremonies, creating problems in determining
which set of rules applies to the marriage and to subsequent questions
of child custody and inheritance in the event of divorce or death. In
traditional marriages, a man may take more than one wife. A man who
marries a woman under civil law legally may not have more than one
wife, although in practice this restriction sometimes is ignored.
Traditional marriages consider children to belong to the father and to
his family if the couple divorces. Children born out of wedlock are
viewed as belonging to the mother. Under the 1992 Citizenship Act, a
woman does not pass citizenship automatically to her children.
Inheritances are passed through male children only.
Changing socioeconomic conditions, urbanization, and the increasing
prominence of female leaders in government and civic organizations are
breaking down barriers to equality. Women routinely execute contracts
and enter into a variety of transactions in their own names. The
Government has committed itself to various women's initiatives, and the
Ministry of Home Affairs coordinates women's issues. For example, the
Government established a task force to address domestic gender issues
and has held workshops for journalists in 1998 on gender sensitivity,
while the Ministry of Education has launched an initiative to promote
gender sensitization of school curriculums.
Children.--The Government is concerned with the rights and welfare
of children, and a number of laws directly address children's issues.
The Government does not provide free, compulsory education for
children. The Government pays teachers' salaries while student fees pay
for books and the buildings' fund. Supplemental money sometimes must be
raised for building upkeep, including teachers' housing. However, the
country has a 99 percent primary school enrollment rate. A government
task force educates the public on children's issues.
Child abuse is a problem. Children convicted of crimes sometimes
are caned as punishment. Female children sometimes suffer sexual abuse,
including by family members. There is a growing number of street
children in Mbabane and Manzini.
People With Disabilities.--The Ministry of Home Affairs has called
for equal treatment of the disabled; however, there are no laws that
protect the rights of the disabled or that mandate accessibility for
the disabled to buildings, transportation, or government services. A
governmenttask force was established in 1997 to address issues
affecting persons with disabilities, and in December 1998 the Minister
of Health and Social Welfare announced that a bill giving preferential
treatment to disabled persons for building access and other needs was
in the final stages of preparation for submission to the Parliament.
The bill has yet to be introduced in Parliament; however, all new
government buildings under construction include improvements for the
disabled, including accessibility ramps.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1996 IRA permits workers in all
elements of the economy, including the public sector, to join unions
and allows unions to associate freely in the context of traditional
trade union concerns. However, it imposes criminal penalties for union
activity outside core union concerns, specifically on social or
political issues, and provides that the Government may suspend or close
down unions that focus too much on such noncore labor matters. It
prohibits trade union federations (but not individual unions) or their
officers from engaging in any act that ``causes or incites'' the
slowdown or cessation of work or economic activity, or from acting in
any way that might be construed as a ``restraint of trade,'' with 5
years'' imprisonment the maximum penalty for such violations. Employers
face equivalent penalties for unauthorized lockouts.
The 1996 IRA confines unions and employer organizations to single
industries, and does not permit organization across economic and
industrial sectors, contrary to ILO Convention 87.
The main trade union federation is the Swaziland Federation of
Trade Unions (SFTU). A second trade union federation is the Swaziland
Federation of Labor, which broke away from the SFTU in 1993 and gained
formal recognition from the Government in 1994.
Unions are free to draw up their own constitutions within the
framework of the 1996 IRA. The act specifies a number of provisions,
which must be addressed in a constitution, including the election of
officers by secret ballot. The Labor Commissioner must approve the
union constitution, and can strike out or amend provisions that violate
the law. The Government may dissolve unions that fail to maintain
proper registration with the Labor Commissioner without recourse to
judicial review. There is no collusion between the Government and
business in relation to worker rights.
The 1996 IRA details the steps to be followed when disputes arise,
including what determines a legal or illegal strike. The act empowers
the Government to mediate employment disputes and grievances and to
enjoin a union from striking. When disputes arise, the Government often
intervenes to try to reduce the chances of a strike, which may not be
called legally until all avenues of negotiation have been exhausted,
and a secret ballot of union members has been conducted. The law
prohibits strikes in ``essential'' services, which include electricity,
water, fire fighting, health, sanitation, telephone, telegraph, and
broadcasting, as well as many civil service positions.
In recent years, there have been a number of strikes, usually over
wages and benefits, or the dismissal of fellow workers. Although the
Government maintained that all outstanding issues already had been
addressed, the SFTU continued to press for action on the 27 demands it
presented in 1994, including calls for fundamental political change.
These demands addressed a wide range of issues, including recognition
of affirmative action, a national uniform minimum wage, an end to
discrimination against women, the provision of better housing for
workers, inclusion of worker representatives in constitutional
discussions, and the lifting of the 1973 Decree that suspended the
Constitution and outlawed political parties.
The ILO Committee of Experts (COE) has noted discrepancies between
the 1996 IRA and ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and ILO
Convention 98 on the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively. The
COE concerns include the powers accorded government officials to
control union activity and the strictures on the ability of workers to
form unions and associate with other unions at home and abroad. With
ILO assistance, a tripartite drafting committee that included
government, labor, and business representatives reached agreement on a
comprehensive revision of the 1996 IRA designed to bring labor law into
full conformity with international conventions. In July 1998, the
Cabinet approved the draft bill, and in December the Parliament
formally passed the bill and forwarded it to the King to sign into law.
The draft IRA, if signed into law by the King, would bring the country
into substantial conformity with international labor conventions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1996 IRA
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively and outlaws
antiunion discrimination. Collective bargaining is widespread;
approximately 80 percent of the formal private sector is unionized. The
law obliges employers to recognize a union when it achieves over 50
percent membership among employees. Employers must allow
representatives of legallyrecognized unions to conduct union activities
on company time. The Industrial Court may refuse to register collective
bargaining agreements in the event of nonobservance of any requirement
of the 1996 IRA. The 1996 IRA prohibits trade union federations or
their officers, but not individual unions, from inciting any slowdown
of work or economic activity or acting in any way that might be
construed as a restraint of trade. It provides equivalent penalties to
employers in the case of unauthorized lockouts.
Disputes are referred to the Labor Commissioner and the Industrial
Court, if necessary. Although many employers resist recognition and
force the issue to the Industrial Court, the Court generally rules in
favor of the unions in these cases. In the case of unfair dismissal,
the Court may order reinstatement and compensation for the employee, as
well as fine the employer. Union leaders made credible charges that
management in various industries dismissed workers for union activity.
The Government sometimes instigates such dismissals.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced labor, including by children; however, there were reports that
persons, particularly women and girls, were trafficked from Mozambique
(see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The 1980 Employment Act prohibits the hiring of a child
below the age of 15 in an industrial undertaking, except in cases where
only family members are employed in the firm, or in technical schools
where children are working under the supervision of a teacher or other
authorized person. Legislation limits the number of night hours that
can be worked on schooldays, and limits children's work-hours overall
to 6 per day or 33 per week. Employment of children in the formal
sector is not customary; however, children below the minimum age
frequently are employed in the agricultural sector, particularly in the
eastern cotton-growing region. Children also are employed as domestic
workers, and as herd boys in rural areas. The Ministry of Labor is
responsible for enforcement, but its effectiveness is limited by
personnel shortages.
The law prohibits forced labor, including by children; however,
there were reports that children, particularly girls, were trafficked
from Mozambique (see Section 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is a legally mandated
sliding scale of minimum wages depending on the type of work performed.
These minimum wages generally provide a worker and family with a decent
standard of living. The minimum monthly wage for a domestic worker is
approximately $30 (180 emalangeni), for an unskilled worker $47 (280
emalangeni), and for a skilled worker $75 (450 emalangeni).
Labor, management, and government representatives have negotiated a
maximum 48-hour workweek in the industrial sector, except for security
guards who work up to six 12-hour shifts per week. The Employment Act
and the Wages Act entitle all workers to 1 day of rest per week. Most
workers receive a minimum of 12 days annual leave. The Labor
Commissioner enforces standards in the formal sector. There are
extensive provisions allowing workers to seek redress for alleged
wrongful dismissal; these provisions frequently are brought into play.
There also are penalties for employers who conduct unauthorized
lockouts.
Extensive legislation protects worker health and safety. The
Government sets safety standards for industrial operations, and it
encourages private companies to develop accident prevention programs.
Recent growth in industrial production has necessitated more government
action on safety issues. However, the Labor Commissioner's office has
conducted few safety inspections in recent years because of staffing
deficiencies. Workers have no formal statutory rights to remove
themselves from dangerous work places without jeopardizing their jobs;
nor do any collective bargaining agreements address the matter.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons, and, although not well documented, there were reports from
Mozambique that persons, specifically women and children, were
trafficked from Mozambique to Swaziland. The country apparently offers
economic opportunities that attract poor women and children, who
sometimes are victimized by traffickers.
______
TANZANIA
The United Republic of Tanzania amended its Constitution in 1992 to
become a multiparty state. In 1995 the nation conducted its first
multiparty general elections for president and parliament in more than
30 years. The ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), continued to
control the Union Government, winning 186 of the 232 elective seats in
Parliament. The CCM presidential candidate, Benjamin Mkapa, won a four-
way race with 61.8 percent of the vote. The islands of Zanzibar are
integrated into the United Republic's governmental and party structure;
however, the Zanzibar Government, which has its own president and
parliament, exercises considerable autonomy. Elections for the
President and Parliament of Zanzibar also were held in 1995.
International observers noted serious discrepancies during the vote-
counting process, calling into question the reelection of CCM incumbent
Dr. Salmin Amour Juma as Zanzibar's President. In the period since that
election, the Zanzibari authorities met calls for new elections by
opposition parties with reprisals. In response, most donors halted
economic aid to Zanzibar. The national judiciary is formally
independent but suffers from corruption, inefficiency, and executive
interference.
The police have primary responsibility for maintaining law and
order. They formerly were supported by citizens' anticrime groups and
patrols known as ``Sungusungu.'' The Sungusungu remain active in rural
areas, but have virtually disappeared from urban areas. There are also
Sungusungu groups composed of refugees in most refugee camps that act
as quasi-official security forces. The military is composed of the
Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF). The People's Militia Field
Force is a division of the TPDF. Security forces regularly committed
human rights abuses.
Agriculture provides 85 percent of employment. Cotton, coffee,
sisal, tea, and gemstones account for most export earnings. The
industrial sector is small. Economic reforms undertaken since 1986,
including liberalization of agricultural policy, the privatization of
state-owned enterprises, the rescheduling of foreign debt payments, and
the freeing of the currency exchange rate, helped to stimulate economic
growth, as has the decline in the rate of inflation. In 1999 the gross
domestic product (GDP) was $8019 million. The GDP growth rate was 4
percent and per capita GDP equaled $252. While the Government has
attempted to improve its fiscal management, pervasive corruption
constrains economic progress.
The Government's human rights record was poor, and there continued
to be serious problems. Although the 1995 multiparty elections
represented an important development, citizens' right to change their
government in Zanzibar is circumscribed severely by abuses of and
limitations on civil liberties. Although new opposition parties on the
mainland and Zanzibar were competitive in many races in 1995 and in by-
elections since that time, winning in various constituencies, police
often harassed and intimidated members and supporters of the political
opposition. Police committed extrajudicial killings and beat and
otherwise mistreated suspects. Soldiers attacked civilians, police in
Zanzibar beat citizens, and there were reports that police in Zanzibar
used torture, including floggings. Police also beat demonstrators.
Throughout the country, prison conditions remained harsh and life
threatening. Arbitrary arrest and detention, and prolonged detention
remained problems. The inefficient and corrupt judicial system often
did not provide expeditious and fair trials. Pervasive corruption,
which was documented in the Warioba Commission's 1997 report, continued
to have a broad impact on human rights. The Government infringed on
citizens' privacy rights and limited freedom of speech and of the
press, and freedom of assembly, association, and movement. Significant
resentment and hostility led to attacks on some refugees. The
Government obstructed the formation of domestic human rights groups.
Violence and discrimination against women remained serious problems.
Abuse of children, female genital mutilation, and child prostitution
were problems. The Government continued to infringe on workers' rights
and child labor persisted. There were some instances of forced labor,
and there were reports of trafficking in children. Mob justice remained
severe and widespread.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings; however, authorities were responsible
for a number of extrajudicial killings. In February two police and two
paramilitary soldiers were accused of beating a prisoner in detention
to death. The police were not able to explain his death. No information
was available on whether an investigation was conducted or any action
taken against those responsible.
In October in retaliation for a theft, TPDF soldiers in Dodoma
attached a village, killing one civilian. No information wasavailable
on whether an investigation was conducted or any action taken against
those responsible.
In February members of the quasiofficial citizens' anticrime group
known as Sungusungu killed five persons accused of murdering witches in
Shinyanga. At year's end, the case still was under investigation by
local authorities.
Several prisoners died during the year as a result of harsh prison
conditions including inadequate nutrition, medical care, and sanitation
(see Section l.c.).
In 1998 riots broke out in Mwembechai when police attempted to
disperse a crowd of Muslims protesting the arrest of a popular Muslim
leader. The police opened fire on the protesters, killing three persons
and wounding several others. Subsequently, 23 Members of Parliament
(M.P.'s) demanded parliamentary discussion of police brutality in
connection with the incident, but the National Assembly Speaker denied
the request, saying that it was an internal police matter. No further
action was taken in connection with the matter during the year.
Police have not yet explained the deaths of six detainees in the
town of Morogoro who were electrocuted at the end of 1997. Police
buried the bodies in two graves instead of returning them to their
families.
There were no developments in the 1993 police killing of a member
of the opposition party Civic United Front (CUF) on the island of
Pemba. After a lengthy investigation, authorities charged the policeman
who fired the shots with involuntary manslaughter; the officer remains
free on bail. CUF leaders complained that in 1996 the President and
Attorney General of Zanzibar blocked the prosecution of the police
officer. Nearly 7 years after the event, a trial still is pending.
Instances of mob justice against suspected criminals continued to
claim dozens of lives. Throughout the year, the media reported numerous
incidents in which mobs killed suspected thieves, who were stoned,
lynched, beaten to death, or doused with gasoline and set on fire. Such
events are so common that they often are grouped together in newspapers
with reporting on car accidents and other mishaps. Many instances never
are reported. The widespread belief in witchcraft has led, in some
instances, to the killing of alleged witches by their ``victims,''
aggrieved relatives, or mobs. The Government estimated in 1998 that in
the Mwanza region alone at least 50 persons are killed every year by
those who believe them to be witches. Government officials criticized
these practices and some arrests were made; however, most perpetrators
of witch killing or mob justice elude arrest, and the Government has
not taken preventive measures.
There is a growing concern over violence allegedly perpetrated by
some Burundian and Rwandan refugees (see Section 1.c.). Local officials
complained that refugees committed killings and robberies. In a well-
publicized case, Burundian refugees were accused of killing a local
schoolteacher in May.
On August 7, 1998, terrorists bombed the U.S. Embassy in Dar Es
Salaam, killing 11 persons and injuring more than 85 others. The
Government cooperated with international efforts to apprehend the
suspects; one suspect had been arrested by year's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the use of torture and inhuman
or degrading treatment; however, the police regularly threaten,
mistreat, or occasionally beat suspected criminals during and after
their apprehension and interrogation. Police also use the same means to
obtain information about suspects from family members not in custody
(see Section 1.f.). There were reports that police in Zanzibar use
torture. Although government officials usually criticize these
practices, the Government seldom prosecutes police for such abuses. In
October the Inspector General of Police, for a period of 1 week,
ordered the whipping of bus drivers and conductors for rampant
violations of traffic laws, a punishment similar to one ordered in
1998.
In June a relief worker accused a local government official of
raping her. The Government investigated the incident, but found that
there was insufficient evidence to prosecute the accused official.
Repeated reports indicate that the police used torture, including
beatings and floggings, in Zanzibar, notably on Pemba island. Both the
Zanzibar and Union Governments have denied these charges. In April the
Chief of Defense Forces, General Robert Mboma, fired 18 members of the
Tanzanian People's Defense Force for beating civilians in Zanzibar.
There were reports of numerous incidents in which soldiers attacked
civilians, prompting the Chief of the Defense Forces to remind troops
that their role was to defend, and not harass, civilians. No other
action was taken against those responsible for abuses.
In April more than 200 members of the opposition party NCCR-Maguezi
staged a peaceful demonstration to protest police actions (see Sections
2.b. and 3). As they assembled, field force unit officers clubbed
demonstrators and injured some. In July Muslims staged a peaceful
demonstration protesting a government ban on Muslim school uniforms in
public schools; they were dispersed with tear gas and clubs (see
Section 2.b.). The rioters were charged later with unlawful
demonstration and threatening the peace. Vice President Omar Ali Juma
said publicly that the force used to combat the demonstrators was
excessive and disproportional.
Pervasive corruption is a serious problem in the police force (see
section 1.d.). In June the Inspector General of Police fired 150 police
officials, the majority for corruption.
The People's Militia Laws, as amended by Parliament in 1989, bestow
quasilegal status on the traditional Sungusungu neighborhood and
village anticrime groups. Participation in these groups was compulsory
prior to the 1995 election. In the past, these groups were criticized
for using excessive force with criminal suspects. While largely
moribund since 1995, the Sungusungu still exist, particularly in rural
areas. As a result of the President's 1997 initiative to have
government law enforcement officials work cooperatively with
Sungusungu, members of Sungusungu were given additional benefits on a
par with those given to members of the People's Militia, including the
right to arrest persons. In return members of Sungusungu were to be
held accountable for any abuses; however, none were held accountable
for abuses during the year.
As a result of increased criminal activity allegedly perpetrated by
some Burundian refugees, there is significant hostility and resentment
against Burundian refugees. In May in Kasulu, approximately 50
Burundian refugee women collecting firewood allegedly were attacked and
raped by villagers in reprisal for the killing of a local teacher (see
Section 1.a.). Eleven men were arrested for the rape and the trial was
ongoing at year's end.
There is growing concern over violence allegedly perpetrated by
some armed Burundian and Rwandan refugees. Local officials reported
incidents of banditry, armed robbery, and violent crime, perpetrated by
refugees in the areas surrounding refugee camps. Women and girls in
refugee camps suffered a high level of rape and gender abuse
perpetrated by other refugees. There were also reports that some
refugees engage in vigilante justice within camps, beating and
torturing other refugees (see section 2.d.).
Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. Government
officials acknowledged that prisons are overcrowded and living
conditions are poor. The prisons were designed to hold 21,000 persons,
but the actual prison population is estimated at 43,000 persons. The
Government is expanding prisons, but its efforts have not kept pace
with the growing number of prisoners. Some prisoners are paroled or
receive suspended sentences as a means of relieving overcrowding. The
Government did not release statistics on the prison expansion program
or on the exact extent of the overcrowding during the year. The daily
amount of food allotted to prisoners is insufficient to meet their
nutritional needs, and even this amount is not always provided. In 1998
the Commissioner of Prisons stated that his department received
inadequate funds for medicine and medical supplies. Prison dispensaries
only offer limited treatment, and friends and family members of
prisoners generally must provide medication or the funds with which to
purchase it. Serious diseases, such as dysentery, malaria, and cholera,
are common and result in numerous deaths. In January a prisoner who was
denied medical treatment for almost a month died en route to a
hospital. Another person died at a bus stop within minutes of being
released from Segerea prison. Convicted prisoners are not allowed to
receive food from the outside and often are moved to different prisons
without notification to their families. There are credible reports that
guards beat and abuse prisoners.
The Warioba Commission reported that wardens give favorable
treatment to certain prisoners at the expense of others. In May 56
detainees in a Dar Es Salaam prison refused to attend court proceedings
in protest of harassment by police officials. They said that the police
demanded bribes for visitation rights and demanded sexual favors from
female prisoners. Pretrial detainees are held together with those
serving sentences but are allowed to receive food from the outside.
Women sent to remand prison report being forced to sleep naked and
being subjected to sexual abuse by wardens.
In April the Tanzania Prisons Service, in cooperation with the
University of Dar Es Salaam and the Raul Wallenberg Institute,held a 5-
day seminar in Arusha to address the problem of prison overcrowding. No
action was taken on the seminar's resolutions during the year.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been
permitted to monitor prison conditions. The Government also granted
permission to a local nongovernmental organization (NGO) to visit
prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention are problems. The Criminal Procedure Code, amended in 1985,
requires that a person arrested for a crime, other than a national
security charge under the Preventive Detention Act, be charged before a
magistrate within 24 hours; however, in practice the police often fail
to comply. The 1985 amendments also restricted the right to bail and
imposed strict conditions on freedom of movement and association when
bail is granted. Because of backlogs, an average case takes 2 to 3
years or longer to come to trial. Observers estimate that only about 5
percent of persons held in remand ultimately are convicted, and in many
cases, those convicted already had served their full sentences before
their trial was held.
The code provides for a right to defense counsel. The Chief Justice
assigns lawyers to indigent defendants charged with serious crimes such
as murder, manslaughter, and armed robbery. There are only a few
hundred practicing lawyers in the country and most indigent defendants
charged with lesser crimes do not have legal counsel. In many cases,
accused persons are denied the right to contact a lawyer or talk with
family members. Bribes often determine whether bail is granted or even
whether a case is judged as a civil or criminal matter. There are
reports of prisoners waiting several years for trial because they could
not pay bribes to police and court officials. Authorities acknowledge
that some cases have been pending for several years.
Under the Preventive Detention Act, the President may order the
arrest and indefinite detention without bail of any person considered
dangerous to the public order or national security. This act, as
amended in 1985, requires that the Government release detainees within
15 days of detention or inform them of the reason for their detention.
A detainee also is allowed to challenge the grounds for detention at
90-day intervals. The Preventive Detention Act has not been used for
many years; however, despite a landmark ruling by the Court of Appeal
in 1991 that the Preventive Detention Act could not be used to deny
bail to persons not considered dangerous to society, the Government
still has not introduced corrective legislation. The Law Reform
Commission recommended that the act be repealed; however, the President
said that repeal was unnecessary if the law was not being used. In
October a court charged a popular Muslim leader arrested for allegedly
inciting violence against Christians with seditious intention and
denied him bail because it reportedly feared that he might commit the
same crime again. The Government has additional broad detention powers
under the Regions and Regional Commissioners Act and Area Commissioners
Act of 1962. These acts permit regional and district commissioners to
arrest and detain for 48 hours, persons who may ``disturb public
tranquillity.''
Police continued to make arbitrary arrests, although less
frequently than in the previous year. The police occasionally arrest
relatives of criminal suspects and hold them in custody without charge
for as long as several years in an attempt to force suspects to
surrender. Such detainees who manage to get their cases before a judge
usually are set free; however, some were rearrested immediately when
they left the courtroom.
According to the Warioba Commission report, police arrest innocent
persons, accuse them of fictitious crimes, and withdraw or reduce the
charges upon payment of bribes. There have been several complaints that
police regularly hide their badge numbers while on duty so that
complainants cannot report abuses. During the year, the Government
dismissed over a dozen police officers from the force for abuse of
power, and some police officers have been charged and prosecuted;
however, the impact of these efforts was limited.
In June a journalist with the Daily Mail was detained at the
central police station in Dar Es Salaam for 2 hours for questioning
(see Section 2.a.). Two journalists were arrested during the year on
charges of sedition; one was held without bail for approximately 1 week
(see Section 2.a.). In October authorities arrested and detained
opposition leader Augustine Mrema for making derogatory statements
about President Mkapa's wife and the NGO she operates. Mrema was also
charged with sedition for statements he made about former President
Julius Nyerere. In November authorities arrested opposition leader
Reverend Christopher Mtikila and a boy for distributing audiocassettes
which contained derogatory statements about Nyerere. The boy was
released on bail, but Mtikila remained in detention pending a trial at
year's end. In December authorities arrested and detained the regional
chairman of the Chadema party and a Chadema candidate after their party
held a rally challenging the results of a local by-election. They
werecharged with inciting the public to violence, blocking the road,
and burning tires.
In September police arrested a popular Muslim leader charged with
preaching in violation of a law prohibiting incitement against other
religions (see Section 2.c.). Soon after, the police banned a rally
scheduled by Muslims to protest his arrest (see Sections 2.b. and
2.c.).
In April 160 demonstrators with the opposition party NCCR-Maguezi
were arrested and charged with holding an unlawful demonstration (see
Sections 1.c., 2.b. and 3).
Since the 1995 election, police in Zanzibar, particularly on Pemba,
regularly have detained, arrested, or harassed CUF members and
suspected supporters. Despite orders from the Union Government's
Inspector General of Police, officers in Zanzibar continued these
activities. In 1997 and 1998, police arrested 18 CUF officials,
including M.P.'s, and charged them in June with treason for attempting
to overthrow the Zanzibar Government. Several sources, including the
detainees themselves, report that they do not receive adequate medical
care, including basic malaria prophylaxis; however, the ICRC visited
the 18 officials and reported that they were being treated adequately.
Their hearing was postponed repeatedly by government prosecutors, and
the trial was pending at year's end. The Government continued to arrest
opposition politicians for acts that it regarded as seditious (see
Sections 2.b. and 3).
The Government does not used forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, it suffers from executive interference,
corruption, and inefficiency. Nevertheless, the higher courts
increasingly have demonstrated independence from the Government. Senior
police or government officials no longer pressure or reassign judges
who make unpopular rulings. For example, in June the Chief Justice of
the Court of Appeal denied the Government's appeal against an
injunction granted to the National Women's Council, thereby permitting
the Council's continued operation. However, independent observers
continued to criticize the judiciary, especially at lower levels, as
corrupt and inefficient, and questioned the system's ability to provide
a defendant with an expeditious and fair trial. The Warioba Commission
found that pervasive corruption affected the judiciary from clerks to
magistrates. Clerks took bribes to decide whether or not to open cases
and to hide or misdirect the files of those accused of crimes.
Magistrates often accepted bribes to determine guilt or innocence, pass
sentences, withdraw charges, or decide appeals. The Government
initiated efforts as early as 1991 to highlight judicial corruption,
and the Chief Justice continued a campaign against corruption in the
judiciary. During the year, several magistrates resigned after the
Chief Justice was presented with credible evidence of their corruption.
The legal system is based on the British model, with modifications
to accommodate customary and Islamic law in civil cases. Christians are
governed by customary or statutory law in both civil and criminal
matters. Muslims may apply either customary law or Islamic law in civil
matters. The court system consists of primary courts, district courts,
the High Court, and the Court of Appeal. Advocates defend clients in
all courts, except in the primary courts. There is no trial by jury. In
addition to judges, there are district (or resident) magistrates. The
law also provides for commercial courts, land tribunals, housing
tribunals, and military tribunals. Military courts do not try
civilians, and there are no security courts. Defendants in civil and
military courts may appeal decisions to the High Court and Court of
Appeal.
Zanzibar's court system generally parallels that of the mainland
but retains Islamic courts to adjudicate Muslim family cases such as
divorce, child custody, and inheritance. Islamic courts only adjudicate
cases involving Muslims. Cases concerning Zanzibar constitutional
issues are heard only in Zanzibar's courts. All other cases may be
appealed to the national Court of Appeal.
Criminal trials are open to the public and to the press; courts
must give reasons on the record for holding secret proceedings.
Criminal defendants have the right of appeal.
Bail is set on a discretionary basis by judges based on the merits
of each case. However, there is no bail in murder or armed robbery
cases. In October a popular Muslim leader charged with sedition was
denied bail (see Section 2.c.). The presiding magistrate stated that
this was done for the Muslim leader's protection. In November the High
Court in Dar Es Salaam ordered the release on bail of two journalists
who previously had been denied bail on the grounds that their life
would be in danger if released (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
While juvenile courts have existed in principle since 1964, there
was not a separate facility for young offenders until 1997; however,
the court is underutilized and many juvenile offendersstill are tried
in adult courts. In 1998 a magistrate ordered prosecutors to stop
prosecuting juveniles in adult courts; however, because of the huge
backlog in the country's only juvenile court, some cases continue to be
sent through the traditional court system where they are processed
faster.
There were no reports of political prisoners on the mainland. At
year's end, there were 18 political prisoners in Zanzibar.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution generally provides for these rights;
however the Government continued to interfere with these rights. During
the years in which Tanzania was a one-party state, the CCM penetrated
all levels of society through local cells, varying in size from single
family homes to large apartment buildings and containing from 10 to 200
persons. Unpaid party officials served as 10-cell leaders with
authority to resolve problems at the grassroots level and to report to
authorities any suspicious behavior, event, or noncompliance with
compulsory night patrol service in the neighborhood. In 1993 elections
were held for new grassroots leaders to replace the CCM 10-cell leaders
in nonparty business. Few voters participated in these elections, which
were boycotted by the opposition, and the 10-cell leaders retained
nearly all of their power and influence, particularly in rural areas.
However, since the 1993 elections the role of the cells has diminished
considerably, particularly in areas where opposition parties are
strong. While in the past CCM membership was necessary for advancement
in political and other areas, CCM membership is now voluntary.
Nonetheless, some government employees, particularly in Zanzibar, who
supported opposition candidates have lost their jobs, and some students
have been expelled from school because of their families' political
affiliation (see Section 3).
A political agreement between the CCM and the main opposition
party, the CUF, was signed in June to make the political process in
Zanzibar fairer (see Section 3); however, at year's end, nothing had
been done to redress the situation.
The Criminal Procedures Act of 1985 authorizes police officials,
including the civilian anticrime groups, to issue search warrants;
however, the act also authorizes searches of persons and premises
without a warrant if necessary to prevent the loss or destruction of
evidence connected with an offense or if circumstances are serious and
urgent. In practice police and members of other security services
rarely requested warrants, and often searched private homes and
business establishments at will.
The security services reportedly monitor telephones and
correspondence of some citizens and foreign residents.
The police threaten, mistreat and occasionally beat, and arrest
relatives of criminal suspects and detain them without charge in an
effort to force suspects to surrender (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
National employment directives stipulating the nature of employment
and location of residence give authorities the right to transfer
citizens to another area to ensure their productive employment (see
Section 2.d.).
In July Muslims protested a government ban on Muslim school
uniforms in public schools (see Sections 1.c., 2.b. and 2.c.)
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government limited
these rights in practice. Various laws, such as the Newspaper Act and
the Broadcasting Act, limit the media's ability to function
effectively. Government ministers and the Registrar of Newspapers
pressure journalists to practice self-censorship. The Government also
denied political opponents unrestricted access to the media. In January
the Government lifted the ban on two newspapers, Majira and Mtanzania;
however, in July the Government again banned Majira for 1 week for
publishing information on proposed salaries for government ministers
and Members of Parliament. In 1998 the Government banned the printing,
publication, and circulation of the Chombeza, Arusha Leo, and Kasheshe
newspapers for publishing abusive cartoons. When two new tabloids took
their place, the Government also closed them.
In June a journalist with the Daily Mail was detained at the
central police station in Dar Es Salaam for 2 hours for questioning
after he published a report on overcrowding at the central police
station. Two journalists were arrested during the year on charges of
sedition; one of the journalists was sentenced upon first appearing in
court, but the second, who was indicted for not revealing a source, was
held without bail for approximately 1 week. In December a Magistrate's
Court sentenced the Reverend Christopher Mtikila to 1 year in prison
for allegedly seditious comments he made in 1997.
Except in Zanzibar, citizens generally enjoyed the right to discuss
political alternatives freely. Opposition political party members and
others openly criticize the Government and ruling party in public
forums; however, persons using ``abusive language'' against the
country's leadership may be subject to arrest, and the Government used
this provision to detain some opposition figures.
On Zanzibar the Government controls radio and television, and also
implements a restrictive policy with regard to print media. In 1998 a
Zanzibar government minister threatened three newspapers because of
their allegedly negative reporting. Soon thereafter, amendments to the
Zanzibar News Act further circumscribed journalists' freedom of action,
by giving authorities greater protection for the harassment, detention,
and interrogation of journalists. In March the Zanzibar Director of
Information Services reportedly banned a local freelance journalist
from working on the island, allegedly because he invented stories about
the Government. Private mainland newspapers are widely available, and
many residents can receive mainland television.
The press on the mainland is, on the whole, lively and outspoken.
Even the government-owned newspaper occasionally reports events that
portray the Government in an unflattering light. There are 9 daily
newspapers and 15 other newspapers in English and Kiswahili, along with
another dozen periodicals, some of which are owned or influenced by
political parties, both the CCM and the opposition. The rising cost of
newsprint resulted in the closure of 15 newspapers in 1996. There is no
official censorship, but throughout the year the Government continued
to pressure newspapers to suppress or change articles unfavorable to
it. In October the Government revoked the registration of 291
publications that had not published during the last 3 years.
Private radio and television stations broadcast in Dar Es Salaam
and in a few other urban areas, although their activities may be
circumscribed. The Government reportedly does not censor news reports,
but attempts to influence their content. Some journalists, such as
those in Zanzibar, exercise self-censorship on sensitive issues.
Journalists who report arrests can be charged with obstructing police
activity under the 1964 Police Act. The authorities occasionally
prevent television cameramen from filming the swearing in of an
opposition Member of Parliament.
The Union Government sought to maintain some control over the
private media with the establishment in 1997 of a code of conduct for
journalists and a media council. With the leadership of the local
chapter of the Media Council for Southern Africa and the Association of
Journalists and Media Workers, journalists forced the Government to
agree to a voluntary code of ethics and establishment of a Media
Council intended to preserve and expand media freedom. The Council was
inaugurated formally on August 16, 1997, although it began operating in
1995. Thus far, it has proved ineffectual except as a sounding board
for complaints against the media.
Academic freedom largely is respected in practice. Academics,
increasingly outspoken in their criticism of the Government, stepped up
their calls for reform during the year.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Government
limits this right in practice. Political parties that seek to hold
rallies must give the police 48 hours' advance notice. Police have the
authority to deny permission on public safety or security grounds or if
the permit seeker belongs to an unregistered organization or political
party. Authorities arrested citizens for assembling without the
appropriate permit. In September police banned a rally scheduled by
Muslims to protest the arrest in September of a popular Muslim leader
(see Sections 1.d and 2.c.).
Opposition parties generally are able to hold rallies; however, CUF
meetings on Zanzibar have been restricted far more than other parties,
although since the signing of a political agreement between the CUF and
the CCM (see Section 3), the CUF successfully held several rallies. In
February police dispersed an opposition procession. In April field
force unit officers used clubs to disperse a peaceful demonstration by
members of the opposition party NCCR-Maguezi, injuring several persons
(see Section 1.c). Later, 160 demonstrators were arrested and charged
with holding an unlawful demonstration (see Section 1.d.). In July
police used tear gas and clubs to disperse a peaceful demonstration by
Muslims protesting a government ban on Muslim school uniforms in public
schools (see Section 1.c.). The rioters were charged later with
unlawful demonstration and threatening the peace. Also in July the
Government threatened to take disciplinary action against the CUF for
demonstrating with a coffin marked with President Mkapa's name;
however, no action was taken against them by year's end. In December
authorities arrested and detained the regional chairman of the Chadema
party and a Chadema candidate after their party held a rally
challenging the results of a local by-election (see Section 1.d.).
Police continue to break up meetings attended by persons thought to
be opposed to the Zanzibar Government. In Pemba security forces broke
up gatherings and intimidated opposition party officials.
The Government continued to arrest opposition politicians for
holding meetings, distributing information, and other acts that it
regarded as seditious (see Sections 1.d. and 3).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
Government limits this right in practice. The Registrar of Political
Parties has sole authority to approve or deny the registration of any
political party and is responsible for enforcing strict regulations on
registered or provisionally registered parties. The Constitution and
other legal acts stipulate that citizens cannot establish new political
parties; candidates must be members of 1 of the 13 registered political
parties. The Electoral Law prohibits independent candidates; requires
all standing M.P.'s to resign if they join another party; requires all
political parties to support the union with Zanzibar; and forbids
parties based on ethnic, regional, or religious affiliation. Parties
granted provisional registration may hold public meetings and recruit
members. They have 6 months to submit lists of at least 200 members in
10 of the country's 25 regions, including 2 regions in Zanzibar, in
order to secure full registration and to be eligible to field
candidates for election. Unregistered parties are prohibited from
holding meetings, recruiting members, or fielding candidates. In
October the Registrar of Political Parties called the registration
provisions too restrictive, stating that if the letter of the law was
adhered to, not a single party would fulfill its registration
requirements. Therefore, given the difficulties that all parties faced,
it would be unfair to deregister any one party; no party was
deregistered during the year.
The most prominent unregistered party is the Reverend Christopher
Mtikila's Democratic Party, which advocates the dissolution of the
union and the expulsion of minorities from the mainland. Despite his
party's lack of government recognition, Mtikila was able to publicize
his views through his legally registered church and through ongoing
lawsuits against the Government.
Under the Societies Ordinance, the Ministry of Home Affairs must
approve any new association. Several NGO's have been formed in the last
few years to address the concerns of families, the disabled, women, and
children. The Government suspended registration of new NGO's in 1997,
pending the enactment of new NGO legislation, which was scheduled for
late 1997; however, such legislation was not introduced and details of
the proposed legislation (which is viewed as restrictive) still were
being discussed within the Government, with some input from NGO's, at
year's end. The result of this delay is that new registrations have
been suspended. The Government continued to harass the National Women's
Council for allegedly engaging in political activity contrary to its
charter. In June the Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal ruled against
the Government's appeal on an injunction, thereby permitting the
Council's continued operation (see Section 1.e.).
A number of professional, business, legal, and medical associations
only have begun to address political topics. The Government withheld
registration from an NGO called Defenders of Human Rights in Tanzania
(see Section 4) for more than 3 years before finally denying it
registration in during the year. A youth group also has been denied
registration on the grounds that there already was a youth organization
affiliated with the CCM. The Government continued to refuse
registration of the African Human Rights and Justice Protection Network
on the grounds that it was politically oriented (see Section 4).
Opposition leaders complain that the Zanzibar Government is even more
restrictive in registering societies than the Union Government.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion and the Government generally respects this right in practice,
subject to measures that it claims are necessary to ensure public order
and safety. The Government does not penalize or discriminate against
any individual on the basis of religious beliefs or practices; however,
individual government officials are alleged to favor persons who share
the same religion in the conduct of business.
The Government requires that religious organizations register with
the Registrar of Societies at the Home Affairs Ministry. In order to
register, religious organizations must have at least 10 followers and
must provide a constitution, the resumes of their leaders, and a letter
of recommendation from their District Commissioner. Christian groups
also must provide letters of recommendation from the leaders of three
registered Christian churches or from a Christian Council of a similar
denomination. Muslim groups also must have letters from the leaders of
three registered mosques. These additional requirements apply to other
religious organizations in the same manner. There were no reports that
the Government refused to register any religiousgroups that met these
criteria. Registered religious organizations do not pay taxes.
The law prohibits preaching if it incites persons against other
religions. Following riots in Mwembechi in 1998 (see Section 1.c.), the
Government charged that some religious leaders were inciting their
adherents to violence. The Prime Minister stated that the Government
would further restrict individuals and organizations that were so
involved. The Vice President also stated that the Government would
ensure that religion was not used to destabilize the country. The
Ministry of Home Affairs subsequently sent 22 religious organizations a
letter demanding that they show cause why they should not be
deregistered and expelled from the country. The Ministry had not acted
to deregister these organizations by year's end, although the threat to
do so remained. In September police arrested a popular Muslim leader
for inciting his followers against other religions. A week later, the
police canceled a planned Muslim demonstration to protest his arrest.
In October the Muslim leader was charged with seditious intent and
denied bail (see Section 1.e.).
In July police used tear gas and clubs to disperse a peaceful
demonstration by Muslims protesting a government ban on Muslim school
uniforms in public schools (see Section 1.c.).
The Government failed to respond to growing tensions between the
Muslim and Christian communities. The Government appears to recognize
that a problem exists, but it chose not to take action. The Government
cancelled two meetings with Muslim and Christian leaders aimed at
improving relations between the two communities. Even senior Muslim
officials in the Government appear unwilling to address the problem,
aside from general criticism of those who would foment religious
conflict.
National and regional parole boards, constituted in 1998, were
dissolved when it was found that they did not include Muslim members,
and the Government named new boards in January. It was disclosed in
February that the Government was investigating reports that the
National Muslim Council of Tanzania was receiving millions of dollars
from unknown sources in the Middle East and was considered a possible
``security risk.''
Christians are governed by customary or statutory law in both civil
and criminal matters. Muslims may apply either customary law or Islamic
law in civil matters. Zanzibar's court system generally parallels the
mainland's legal system but retains Islamic courts to adjudicate cases
of Muslim family law, such as divorce, child custody, and inheritance.
The Government has banned religious organizations from involvement
in politics.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government imposes some limits on
these rights. Short-term domestic travel is not restricted, but
citizens must follow the Human Resources Deployment Act of 1983, which
requires local governments to ensure that every resident within their
area of jurisdiction is engaged in productive and lawful employment.
Those not employed were subject to transfer to another area where
employment was available. The National Employment Service Act,
implemented in April, repealed the Human Resources Deployment Act of
1983. The new act provides for training of youths to be self-employed,
without having to be moved to other areas. In October the Dar Es Salaam
regional commissioner publicly called for renewed efforts to round up
beggars and send them out of the city.
Passports for foreign travel may be difficult to obtain, mostly due
to bureaucratic inefficiency and officials' demands for bribes.
Citizens can return without difficulty.
Mainlanders are required to show identification to travel to
Zanzibar; however, Zanzibaris need no special identification to travel
to the mainland. Mainlanders are not allowed to own land in the
islands, except in partnership with foreign investors. There is no
prohibition against mainlanders working in the islands; however, in
practice, few mainlanders are hired.
The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The
Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. The
Government traditionally has maintained a generous open border policy
both with regard to neighboring countries' refugees and to persons
seeking political asylum. However, following an influx of Rwandan
refugees in early 1995, the Government temporarily closed its borders
with Rwanda and Burundi. Nevertheless, tens of thousands of asylum
seekers were able to enter the country. In 1998 Rwandans again were
allowed to seek asylum in Tanzania. During the year, a relatively small
number of Rwandans who feared for their safety were granted asylum by
the Government and appeals by others who petitioned for asylum are
pending. The Government continues tooffer first asylum to over 400,000
refugees from Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The UNHCR facilitated the voluntary repatriation of Burundi
refugees until August when efforts were abandoned due to growing
insecurity in Burundi.
Refugee camps in the west were plagued by food shortages,
overcrowding, and malaria outbreaks during the year. Women and girls in
refugee camps suffered a high level of rape and gender abuse
perpetrated by other refugees. There were reports that some refugees
engage in vigilante justice within camps, beating and torturing other
refugees.
Significant resentment and hostility against Burundian refugees is
a problem (see Section 1.c.). In May in Kasulu, approximately 50
Burundian refugee women collecting firewood allegedly were attacked and
raped by villagers in reprisal (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
There is a growing concern over violence allegedly perpetrated by
some armed Burundian and Rwandan refugees. Local officials reported
incidents of killings, banditry, armed robbery, and violent crime,
perpetrated by refugees in the areas surrounding refugee camps (see
Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
A multiparty political system was introduced officially in 1992,
and in 1995 for the first time in more than 30 years, citizens
exercised their right to change their government through national
elections for president and parliament. The CCM, with huge advantages
over opposition parties in membership and access to resources,
including its own daily Kiswahili language newspaper, retained 186 of
232 elective seats in Parliament and won the presidency. Despite the
Government's tactics to restrict or delay the activities of its
opponents, the opposition achieved occasional success in judicial
challenges and received about 38 percent of the vote. In late 1996,
following its loss in a by-election, the Government issued new
directives limiting political activity and fund raising on the grounds
of maintaining order. On the mainland, the seven by-elections that were
held during the year were marred on occasion by violence. Tight
security was employed at polling places. Opposition candidates did not
win any of the seven by-elections held during the year.
The Government continued to harass its opponents and arrested
opposition politicians for holding meetings, distributing information,
and other acts that it regarded as seditious (see Sections 1.d. and
2.b.). In advance of a Dar Es Salaam by-election in July, government
officials harassed opposition supporters, and some violent incidents
took place after the election, when opposition supporters accused the
CCM of rigging the voting. In April members of the opposition party
NCCR-Maguezi held a peaceful demonstration at the U.N. offices in Dar
Es Salaam to protest what they believed were antiopposition activities
by the police force. Field force unit officers used clubs to disperse
the demonstration, injuring several persons (see Sections 1.c and
2.b.). A total of 160 demonstrators were arrested and charged with
holding an unlawful demonstration (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). In
December authorities arrested and detained the regional chairman of the
Chadema party and a Chadema candidate after their party held a rally
challenging the results of a local by-election (see Section 1.d.).
In May popular opposition leader and M.P. Augustine Mrema was
prohibited from running for reelection by a High Court injunction that
stated that he was ineligible to run because he had changed political
parties, and had not yet been designated formally as chairman of his
new party.
The Constitution of Zanzibar provides citizens with the right to
change their government peacefully; however, this right has been
circumscribed severely. The 1995 presidential election in Zanzibar was
flawed seriously. Government-owned broadcast media in Zanzibar were
biased in favor of the CCM incumbent President Salmin Amour Juma. The
government party intimidated and harassed the opposition and did not
permit opposition rallies until 2 months prior to the election. In
addition, registration was limited to persons who had maintained the
same residence for 5 years, which disenfranchised many voters. CUF
Party members also were detained by police when they attempted to
campaign in rural areas. Election observers in Zanzibar were denied
access to the tabulation of votes from polling stations. After 4 days,
the Zanzibar Electoral Commission, appointed by the Amour government,
announced that Amour had won by 0.5 percent of the vote. Figures
tabulated by the CUF showed a similarly close victory for its
candidate. After efforts by the international community to reconcile
discrepancies in the vote counting, observers concluded that the
official results may have been inaccurate. The Zanzibar and Union
Governments both rejected calls to overturn the result and conduct a
new election for the presidency of Zanzibar.
In the 4 years since the election, government security forces and
CCM gangs harassed and intimidated CUF members on both main Zanzibar
islands, Pemba and Ugunja. Because the CUF won all 20 seats on Pemba,
Pembans living on Ugunja were regarded as CUF supporters and as a
result were harassed. The CUF accused police of detaining dozens of its
members including several local leaders. Many CUF supporters left
Ugunja for Pemba or the mainland; however, citizens' safety is not
assured in Pemba, where security forces dispersed gatherings and
intimidated persons. Some Zanzibar government employees who voted for
the opposition in a late 1997 by-election lost their jobs, and students
on Pemba report expulsions from school because of their families'
political affiliations. Almost all international donors have suspended
direct assistance to Zanzibar in response to the authorities' human
rights abuses. Under pressure from the international community, the
ruling CCM party and the main opposition party, the CUF, signed a
political agreement in June to make the political process in Zanzibar
fairer; however, the provisions of the agreement were not fully
implemented by year's end and observers believe that the Government did
not act in good faith in the period following the signing of the
agreement.
There are no legal restrictions in law on the participation of
women in politics and government; however, in practice women are
underrepresented in government and politics. Eight of 232 elected
members of the Union Parliament are women. In addition, 37 female
members of the CCM and opposition parties were appointed to Parliament
to seats reserved for women in order to meet the legal requirement that
at least 15 percent of Members of Parliament be women. The President
has set a goal that women constitute 30 percent of parliamentarians
elected in 2000. Three of the Cabinet's 27 ministers are women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government has obstructed the formation of local human rights
groups. Persons seeking to register human rights NGO's, such as the
Defenders of Human Rights in Tanzania and the Tanzania Human Rights
Education Society, complained that the Ministry of Home Affairs
continued to delay action on their applications (see Section 2.b.).
This hampered their access and efforts to monitor violations of human
rights. The Government continued to refuse registration of the African
Human Rights and Justice Protection Network on the grounds that it was
politically oriented. The Government had withheld registration from the
NGO Defenders of Human Rights in Tanzania for more than 3 years before
finally denying it registration in during the year. In June the
Government reinstated the National Women's Council, an NGO that it had
deregistered in 1997 (see Section 2.b.).
Government officials have said that international human rights
groups are welcome to visit the country. Amnesty International visited
during the year. There were discussions, both within the Government and
among NGO's, concerning the formation of a human rights commission;
however, there are sharp differences on how independent it should be.
There had been no action on this matter by year's end.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on nationality,
tribe, origin, political affiliation, color, or religion.
Discrimination based on sex, age, or disability is not prohibited
specifically by law but is discouraged publicly in official statements.
Discrimination against women and religious and ethnic minorities
persisted.
Women.--Violence against women remained widespread. Legal remedies
exist in the form of assault provisions under the Criminal Code;
however, in practice these provisions are difficult to enforce. The
Marriage Act of 1971 makes a declaration against spousal battery, but
does not prohibit it or provide for any punishment. Traditional customs
that subordinate women remain strong in both urban and rural areas and
local magistrates often upheld such practices. Women may be punished by
their husbands for not bearing children. It is accepted for a husband
to treat his wife as he wishes, and wife beating occurs at all levels
of society. Cultural, family, and social pressures prevent many women
from reporting abuses to the authorities. Nonetheless, in 1998 the
Ministry of Home Affairs noted that an average of 10,000 cases of wife
beating are reported annually. In 1998 the Ruvuma regional crime
officer noted that a large number of women are killed by their husbands
or commit suicide as a result of domestic battery. Women in refugee
camps suffered a high level of rape and gender abuse perpetrated by
other refugees (see section 2.d.). Government officials frequently make
public statements criticizing such abuses, but action rarely is taken
against perpetrators. In 1998 in response to intensified concern about
violence against women, Parliament passed into law the Sexual Offenses
Special Provisions Bill which, among other things, provides for life
imprisonment for persons convicted of rape andchild molestation.
Several persons were prosecuted for rape and battery under this law
during the year.
Several NGO's provide counseling and education programs on women's
rights problems, particularly sexual harassment and molestation. In
June the Government reinstated the National Women's Council, an NGO it
had deregistered in 1997 (see Section 2.b.).
Although the Government advocates equal rights for women in the
workplace, it does not ensure these rights in practice. In the public
sector, which employs 80 percent of the salaried labor force, certain
statutes restrict women's access to some jobs or hours of employment.
For example, in general, women may not be employed between 10 p.m. and
6 a.m. (see Section 6.e.). While progress on women's rights has been
more noticeable in urban areas, strong traditional norms still divide
labor along gender lines and place women in a subordinate position.
Discrimination against women is most acute in rural areas, where women
are relegated to farming and raising children, and have almost no
opportunity for wage employment. Custom and tradition often hinder
women from owning property such as land, and may override laws that
provide for equal treatment. Male colleagues sometimes harass women
seeking higher education, and authorities largely have ignored the
practice.
The overall situation for women is less favorable in Zanzibar,
which has a majority Muslim population. Women there, and on many parts
of the mainland, face discriminatory restrictions on inheritance and
ownership of property because of concessions by the Government and
courts to customary and Islamic law. While provisions of the Marriage
Act provide for certain inheritance and property rights for women, the
application of customary, Islamic, or statutory law depends on the
lifestyle and stated intentions of the male head of household. Thus
far, the courts have upheld discriminatory inheritance claims,
primarily in rural areas. Under Zanzibari law, unmarried women under
the age of 21 who become pregnant are subject to 2 years' imprisonment.
Children.--Government funding of programs for children's welfare
remained miniscule. The Government has made some constructive efforts
to address children's welfare, including working closely with the U.N.
Children's Fund and other international and local organizations to
improve the well being of orphans and neglected children. Child labor
is a problem (see Section 6.d.). A 1998 study funded by the
International Labor Organization (ILO) reported a growth in child
prostitution, including forced prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and
6.f.).
The law provides for 7 years of compulsory education through the
age of 15; however, it is no longer free. Fees are charged for books,
enrollment, and uniforms, with the result that some children have been
denied an education. The primary school dropout rate is between 30 and
40 percent. The literacy rate is approximately 70 percent; however, for
girls it is only 57 percent compared with 80 percent for boys. In the
past, girls who became pregnant were expelled from school. Despite a
1996 law to permit pregnant girls to continue their education following
maternity absences, the practice of forcing pregnant girls out of
school remains in effect. The rate of girls' enrollment in school is
lower than that of boys, and generally declines with each additional
year of schooling. In some districts, there was a decline in attendance
as the result of early marriage, often at the behest of parents.
Nevertheless, there have been across the board increases in the rate of
girls' participation since 1990.
Although the Government officially discourages female genital
mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by international health
experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health, it still
is performed at an early age in approximately 20 of the country's 130
main ethnic groups. According to a 1996 health survey conducted by the
Bureau of Statistics, FGM affects 18 percent of the female population.
In some ethnic groups, FGM is compulsory, and in others, a woman who
has not undergone the ritual may not be able to marry. Government data
show this to be a problem that varies by region, with the most affected
regions being Arusha (81 percent of women), Dodoma (68 percent), Mara
(44 percent), Kilimanjaro (37 percent), Iringa (27 percent), Tanga/
Singida (25 percent), and Morogoro (20 percent). FGM is almost
nonexistent in the rest of the country. Government officials have
called for changes in practices that adversely affect women, and in
1998 Parliament passed into law the Sexual Offenses Special Provisions
Bill, under which several persons were prosecuted for FGM during the
year. Some local government officials have begun to combat the practice
and convicted and imprisoned some persons who performed FGM on young
girls. Seminars sponsored by various governmental organizations and
NGO's are held regularly in an attempt to educate the public on the
dangers of FGM and other traditional practices. These practices include
the tradition of inherited wives, which critics contend contributes to
the spread of HIV/AIDS, and child marriages, which are sanctioned with
parental consent under the Marriage Act of 1971 for girls 12 years of
age or older. Whilesome authorities believe that FGM is declining, a
1996 government report has suggested that it is on the rise, especially
in the central region. In 1998 the Dodoma Traditional Practices and
Beliefs Committee, supported by a World Health Organization grant,
began a program to eliminate FGM in the Dodoma region.
People with Disabilities.--The Government does not mandate access
to public buildings, transportation, or government services for the
disabled. Although there is no official discrimination against the
disabled, in practice the physically disabled effectively are
restricted in their access to education, employment, and provision of
other state services due to physical barriers. The Government provides
only limited funding for special facilities and programs.
Religious Minorities.--Muslim-Christian relations are fragile and,
particularly since the Mwembechi riots in 1998, Muslims are sensitive
to perceived discrimination. Mainland Tanzania is 60 percent Christian
and 40 percent Muslim, whereas Zanzibar is 97 percent Muslim. The
Muslim community claims to be disadvantaged in terms of its
representation in the civil service, government, and parastatals, in
part because both colonial and early post-independence administrations
refused to recognize the credentials of traditional Muslim schools. As
a result, there is broad Muslim resentment of certain advantages that
Christians are perceived to enjoy in employment and educational
opportunities. Muslim leaders have complained that the number of Muslim
students invited to enroll in government-run schools still was not
equal to the number of Christians. In turn, Christians criticize what
they perceive as lingering effects of undue favoritism accorded to
Muslims in appointments, jobs, and scholarships by former President Ali
Hassan Mwinyi, a Muslim. Despite these perceptions, there does not
appear to be a serious widespread problem of religious discrimination
in access to employment or educational opportunities.
A few leaders in the Christian and Muslim communities appear to be
fomenting religious tension between their groups. A small Christian
group, Biblia ni jibu, attempted to promote Christianity by confronting
Muslims at public gatherings, which often resulted in localized
violence. There is a growing division between secular and extremist
Muslims. For example, Muslims who drink, or who marry Christians are
criticized sharply by extremist Muslims. Members of the extremist
Muslim community also accused secular Muslims in the Government of
supporting a Christian regime rather than protecting Muslim interests.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In the past, the Government
discriminated against the Barabaig and other nomadic persons in the
north. These ethnic groups continued to complain of past government
discrimination because of efforts to make them adopt a more modern
lifestyle and to restrict their access to pastoral land that was turned
into large government wheat farms.
The Asian community, which is viewed unfavorably by many African
citizens, has declined by 50 percent in the past decade to about 50,000
persons. There are no laws or official policies that discriminate
against Asians; however, as the Government places greater emphasis on
market-oriented policies and privatization, public concern regarding
the Asian minority's economic role has increased. This has led to
demands for policies of ``indigenization'' to ensure that privatization
does not increase the Asian community's economic predominance at the
expense of the country's African population.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Both the Constitution and the 1955
Trade Union Ordinance refer to the right of association for workers;
however, workers do not have the right to form or join organizations of
their choice. The 1991 Organization of Tanzania Trade Unions Act
created the Organization of Tanzania Trade Unions (OTTU), renamed the
Tanzania Federation of Trade Unions (TFTU) in 1995, as the only trade
union organization. Although it still has not been registered formally,
the TFTU acts in all but juridical proceedings under its new name. The
TFTU has little influence on labor policy. The TFTU consists of 11
independent trade unions that have the right to leave the TFTU and to
collect their own dues, 5 percent of which are contributed to the
federation. Only 1 of these 11 independent unions, the Tanzanian
Teacher's Union, is registered. Unions exist in the workplace, but the
absence of registration makes relations with employers difficult.
Overall, only about 10 to 15 percent of the country's 2 million
wage earners are organized. Although the TFTU nominally represents 60
percent of workers in industry and government, in some sectors it
deducts dues from workers' pay whether or notthey are members. All
workers, including those classified as ``essential'' service workers,
are permitted to join unions, but essential workers are not permitted
to strike.
There are no laws prohibiting retribution against legal strikers;
however, workers have the legal right to strike only after complicated
and protracted mediation and conciliation procedures leading ultimately
to the Industrial Court, which receives direction from the Minister of
Labor and Youth Development. If the TFTU is not satisfied with the
decision of the Industrial Court, it may then conduct a legal strike.
The mediation and conciliation procedures can prolong a dispute by
months without resolving it. Pending a resolution, frustrated workers
have staged impromptu, illegal wildcat strikes and walkouts. The last
major strike took place in 1998 at Muhimbili Medical Center when more
than 70 percent of the doctors and nurses went on strike for higher pay
and better working conditions. In 1998 the Zanzibar Government pledged
to review the island's labor laws in an effort to improve industrial
relations and minimize labor disputes; however, at year's end, there
was no progress on this issue.
In 1998 the regional ILO representative called on the Government to
ratify conventions on freedom of association, minimum working age,
equal opportunity, and freedom from discrimination. The Government
still had not responded to the ILO at year's end.
The TFTU expanded upon its forerunner's membership in regional and
pan-Africanist trade union organizations by joining the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions in 1996.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining is protected by law but does not apply to the public sector.
The Government sets wages for employees of the Government and state-
owned organizations administratively, although privatization and
reductions in public sector employment have reduced such employees to
about 5 percent of the work force.
Although the TFTU negotiates on behalf of most private sector
employees with the Association of Tanzanian Employers, collective
agreements must be submitted to the Industrial Court for approval. The
ILO has observed that these provisions are not in conformity with ILO
Convention 98 on Collective Bargaining and the Right to Organize. The
Security of Employment Act of 1964 prohibits discriminatory activities
by an employer against union members. Employers found guilty of
antiunion activities are required under the law to reinstate workers.
The Warioba Commission found that bribes may determine whether a worker
dismissed from his job actually is reinstated.
There are no export processing zones (EPZ's) on the mainland, but
there are three in Zanzibar. Working conditions are comparable to those
in other areas. Labor law protections apply to EPZ workers.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, which also applies to children
(although such labor by children is not prohibited specifically);
however, such practices occur. In some rural areas, villagers still are
obligated to work in the village community gardens or on small
construction projects, such as repairing roads. There were reports of
children forced into prostitution by parents or guardians in need of
extra income, and children reportedly are trafficked to work in mines
and other businesses (see Section 6.f.). The Government is working with
NGO's to establish a specific prohibition against child labor. In 1999
the Government drafted a National Child Labor Elimination policy
designed to bring national law into compliance with international
conventions, and in December the Government invited labor organizations
and NGO's to comment on the draft law.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--By law children under the age of 12 are prohibited from
working in the formal wage sector in both urban and rural areas, and
the Government enforces this prohibition; however, the provision does
not apply to children working on family farms or herding domestic
livestock. Children between the ages of 12 and 15 may be employed on a
daily wage and on a day-to-day basis, but they must have parental
permission and return to the residence of their guardian at night.
Approximately 250,000 children engage in child labor.
The minimum age for work of a contractual nature in approved
occupations is set at 15 years. The law prohibits a young person from
employment in any occupation that is injurious to health and that is
dangerous or otherwise unsuitable. Young persons between the ages of 12
and 15 may be employed in industrial work but only between the hours of
6 a.m. and 6 p.m., with some exceptions. The Ministry of Labor and
Social Welfare and Youth Development is responsible for enforcement,
but the number of inspectors is inadequate. The effectiveness of
government enforcement reportedly has declined with increased
privatization.
Approximately 3,000 to 5,000 children engage in seasonal employment
on sisal, tea, tobacco, and coffee plantations. Children working on
plantations generally receive lower wages than their adult
counterparts, although they may be in comparable jobs. Work on sisal
and tobacco plantations is particularly hazardous and detrimental to
children. From 1,500 to 3,000 children work in unregulated gemstone
mines. Girls often are employed as domestic servants, mostly in urban
households under abusive and exploitative conditions. In the informal
sector, children assist their parents in unregulated piecework
manufacturing.
The Constitution does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded
child labor, and there were reports of children forced into
prostitution by their parents or their guardians, and children
reportedly are trafficked to work in mines and other businesses (see
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is a legal minimum wage
for employment in the formal sector. The TFTU often negotiates higher
minimum wages with individual employers, depending on the financial
status of the business. The legal minimum wage is approximately $21
(17,500 shillings) per month. Even when supplemented with various
benefits such as housing, transport allowances, and food subsidies, the
minimum rate may not always be sufficient to provide a decent standard
of living for a worker and family, and workers must depend on their
extended family or on a second or third job. Despite the minimum wage,
many workers, especially in the small but growing informal sector, are
paid less.
There is no standard legal workweek; however, a 5-day, 40-hour
workweek is in effect for government workers. Most private employers
retain a 6-day, 44- to 48-hour workweek. In general, women may not be
employed between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Several laws regulate safety in the
workplace. An occupational health and safety factory inspection system,
set up with the assistance of the ILO, is managed by the Ministry of
Labor and Social Welfare and Youth Development; however, its
effectiveness is limited. Labor standards are not enforced in the
informal sector.
TFTU officials have claimed that enforcement of labor standards is
effective in the formal sector, but no verification studies have been
performed. Workers may sue an employer through their TFTU branch if
their working conditions do not comply with the Ministry of Labor's
health and environmental standards. Workers who make such complaints
have not lost their jobs; however, workers do not have the right to
remove themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardizing their
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking,
and there were reports that children are trafficked away from their
families to work in mines and other business entities. Reportedly
senior government officials are involved in the practice. There were
also reports of children forced into prostitution by parents or
guardians in need of extra income.
______
TOGO
Togo is a republic dominated by President General Gnassingbe
Eyadema, who has ruled since 1967, when he came to power in a military
coup. Although opposition political parties were legalized following
widespread protests in 1991, Eyadema and his Rally of the Togolese
People (RPT), strongly backed by the armed forces, have continued to
dominate the exercise of political power. Eyadema used his entrenched
position to repress genuine opposition and to secure another 5-year
term in an election held in June 1998, which, like previous multiparty
elections, was marred by systematic fraud. Serious irregularities in
the Government's conduct of the election strongly favored the incumbent
and appear to have affected the outcome materially. Despite the
Government's professed intention to move from authoritarian rule to
democracy, institutions recently established ostensibly to accomplish
this transition, did not do so in practice. For example, when the
recently created independent National Electoral Commission effectively
disbanded without declaring the winner of the June 1998 election, the
new Constitutional Court did not challenge the Interior Ministry's
announcement that Eyadema had been reelected, even though the Court
ruled that the Ministry had usurped the Commission's exclusive legal
authority to validate election results. Eyadema and his supporters
maintain firm control over all facets and levels of the country's
highly centralized government and have perpetuated the dominance of
northern ethnic groups, including Eyadema's Kabye ethnic minority,
throughout the public sector, especially in the military. In the March
legislative elections, which were boycotted by the opposition, the
President's Rally for the Togolese People (RPT) won all but 2 of the 81
seats in the National Assembly; moreover, the elections were marred by
procedural problems and significant fraud, particularly
misrepresentation of voter turnout. The executive branch continues to
influence the judiciary.
The security forces comprise the army (including the elite
Presidential Guard), navy, air force, the Surete Nationale (including
the national police), and the Gendarmerie. Approximately 90 percent of
the army's officers and 70 percent of its soldiers come from the Kabye
ethnic minority. Although the Minister of the Interior is in charge of
the national police, and the Defense Minister has authority over most
other security forces, all security forces effectively are controlled
by President Eyadema. Members of the security forces continued to
commit serious human rights abuses.
About 80 percent of the country's estimated population of 4.25
million is engaged in subsistence agriculture, but there is also an
active commercial sector. The main exports are phosphates, cotton, and
cocoa, which are the leading sources of foreign exchange. Per capita
gross domestic product remains less than $400 a year. Economic growth
continues to lag behind population growth. The economy is impeded by a
large and inefficient state-owned sector, high (albeit declining)
spending on the security forces, widespread corruption, and lack of
government budget and fiscal discipline. Most major bilateral donors
have suspended their aid due to the Government's weak democratization
efforts and poor human rights record. Some international financial
institutions have also halted budgetary assistance to the Government.
The Government's human rights record continued to be poor; while
there were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remain.
Legislative elections did not reflect the will of the electorate and
once again the government thwarted citizens' right to change their
government. Security forces were responsible for extrajudicial
killings, but there were fewer than in the previous year. Security
forces also used beatings, and arbitrary arrests and detentions. The
Government did not, in general, investigate or punish effectively those
who committed such abuses, nor did it prosecute openly those persons
responsible for extrajudicial killings and disappearances in recent
years. Prison conditions remained very harsh, and prolonged pretrial
detention was common. The Government continued to influence the
judiciary, which is understaffed and overburdened, and did not ensure
defendants' rights to fair and expeditious trials. Some detainees wait
years to be judged. Security forces infringed on citizens' privacy
rights. The Government and the security forces restricted freedom of
speech and of the press, often using investigative detention to harass
journalists and political opponents. The Government maintained an
overbearing security presence and restricted freedom of assembly,
association, and movement. The National Commission for Human Rights
(CNDH) continued to be dominated by supporters of the President, and
the Government restricted and impeded the work of independent human
rights groups. Violence and societal discrimination against women and
female genital mutilation (FGM) among some ethnic groups are problems.
Discrimination against the disabled persists. Although there is a 1998
law that prohibits female genital mutilation, the Government has not
enforced it. Discrimination based on ethnicity remains a problem. The
Government limits workers' rights to collective bargaining. Trafficking
in women for the purpose of forced prostitution and trafficking in
children for forced labor remained problems.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Members of the
security forces committed fewer extrajudicial killings than in the
previous year.
On January 10, gendarmes raided the Akodessewa-Kpota shantytown
neighborhood in Lome and set fires that reportedly killed two children.
The gendarmes reportedly were searching for arms caches and rebel
hideouts on the eve of a major national holiday parade (see Section
1.f.).
An Amnesty International (AI) report issued in May stated that
hundreds of bodies--presumably many members of the opposition--were
thrown into the sea around the time of the June 1998 Presidential
election (see Sections 1.b. and 4).
Several cases of extrajudicial killings from previous years
remained unresolved. There was no development in the August 1998
killing of Liman Doumongue, deputy secretary general of the National
Association of Independent Unions of Togo (UNSIT), a pro-opposition
labor federation. In May UNSIT wrote a letter to President Eyadema
requesting an independent investigation into the killing. The September
1998 killing of Koffi Mathieu Kegbe, a local activist in the opposition
Action for Renewal Committee (CAR) party, was still under
investigation. There were no new developments in the 1998 killings of
the Togolese Human Rights League founding member Dr. Tona Pierre Adigo,
and businessman Malou Borozi. There has been no public investigation
into the June 1998 killing of the child, Ayele Akakpo. The Government
claims that the August 1998 attack on UFC Secretary General Fabre's
residence was carried out by coup plotters from Ghana. There were no
new developments in the 1997 deaths in detention of Dosseh Danklou and
Agbodjinshie Yakanou, and the 1997 killing in Ghana of former Togolese
diplomat and dissident Ferdinand Romuard also remained unsolved. There
was also no progress in the cases of the 1996 deaths of Captain
Philippe Azote, Anthony Dogbo, Woenagno, Amouzou Adjakly, and Komlavi
Yebesse. Nor were there further developments in the 1995 killing in
Ghana of former government official Felix Amegan and opposition leader
Lieutenant Vincent Tokofai, the 1994 killing of National Assembly
Member Gaston Edeh, or the 1992 killings of the Transitional Parliament
Members Marc Atidepe and Tavio Amorin.
The January 9 arrest by the Gendarmerie of an army warrant officer,
Amy Kpeto, came after he allegedly told the newspaper, Tingo-Tingo,
about a mass grave for ``military democrats'' at the Agoueve shooting
range and about hit men within the army. There has been no independent
verification of such a mass grave, and Kpeto reportedly confessed to
lying to Tingo-Tingo (see Section 3).
b. Disappearance.--There were no specific reports of politically
motivated disappearances during the year. However, an Amnesty
International report issued in May reported that hundreds of bodies--
presumably those of opposition members--were thrown into the sea around
the time of the June 1998 presidential election (see Section 4).
According to AI, the corpses were found and buried by Beninese
fishermen. The Government strongly denied the accusations and initiated
legal proceedings against AI. The independent Benin Human Rights League
reported that bodies were dropped along the coastal waters by military
aircraft, although other official sources in Benin denied that this
event happened. In July the Government agreed to an independent
international investigation, but no steps were taken by year's end.
AI also reported that on August 20, 1998 two young men, Komlan Edoh
and Kodjo Kouni, were beaten and arrested by security forces in a
northwest suburb of Lome, then taken to a nearby military camp, after
which they disappeared. Their arrest occurred just days after what the
Government claims was a border incursion from Ghana; AI suspects the
arrests and disappearances to be politically motivated.
There was no investigation into the mass burials of 1997 and 1998
reportedly in the vicinity of Lome.
There were no developments in the 1994 disappearance of David
Bruce, a high-level foreign ministry employee sympathetic to the
opposition, or in the disappearance of Afougnilede Essiba, Adanou Igbe,
Kobono Kowouvi, and another companion, all four of whom were arrested
by soldiers at an armed security checkpoint in Adetikope in 1994. In
1994 the Government began an investigation of the Bruce disappearance
but has not reported any results.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and physical abuse of prisoners
and detainees; however, security forces often beat detainees
immediately after arresting them. Some suspects have claimed credibly
to have been beaten, burned, or denied access to foodand medical
attention. Security forces used tear gas and batons to disperse
demonstrators (see Section 2.b.).
Security forces reportedly tortured a human rights monitor (see
Section 4).
Security forces harassed, intimidated, and beat journalists (see
Section 2.a.). On April 19, the Gendarmerie arrested Romain Koudjodji
Attisso, publisher of the newspaper, Reporter des Temps Nouveaux.
Authorities charged him with falsely accusing the Gendarmerie unit in
Aneho of torturing Victor Mensah, an Action for Renewal Party (CAR)
activist (see Section 2.a.).
On March 16, security forces in Lome beat university student Gerard
Amedjro and a female friend allegedly after the latter refused to
undress for them.
Between May 19 and May 27, security forces allegedly beat and
tortured Ameen Ayodele, a member of the Nigerian section of AI (see
Section 4). Border police first suspected Ayodele of drug trafficking,
but when he produced an AI identification card, they accused him of
spying for the human rights organization. According to AI, Ayodele was
confined to a cell, stripped of his clothing and deprived of food.
During his incarceration, his jailers allegedly took him to the beach
and threatened to execute him and dump his body in the sea.
Five young men who traveled from Lome to Kara in late August to
hold discussions on the Lome Framework Agreement (see Section 3) said
that they were detained and beaten on two occasions by police,
gendarmes, and military personnel in Kara. Authorities maintained that
their wounds resulted when they resisted arrest.
Impunity remains a problem, and the Government did not publicly
prosecute any officials for these abuses.
Prison conditions reportedly remained very harsh, with serious
overcrowding, poor sanitation, and unhealthy food. Lome's central
prison, built for 350 prisoners, housed 850 or more at any one point
during the year, according to a reliable witness. Medical facilities
are inadequate, and disease and drug abuse are widespread. Despite
these problems, for the third consecutive year there were no reported
deaths of prisoners due to disease or inadequate medical facilities.
Prison guards in the overcrowded civil prison of Lome charge prisoners
a small fee to shower, use the toilet, or have a place to sleep.
Prisoners reportedly have to pay $2.50 (1,500 CFA francs) to guards
before being allowed to visit the infirmary if sick. The children of
convicted adults often are incarcerated with the female inmates, who
are housed separately.
Although international and local private organizations have access
to prisons for monitoring purposes, the ICRC did not visit the prisons
during the year. At year's end, the Government was studying an ICRC
proposal for a prisons visit.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention remain problems. The law allows authorities to hold arrested
persons incommunicado without charge for 48 hours, with an additional
48-hour extension in cases deemed serious or complex. In practice
detainees can be, and often are, detained without bail for lengthy
periods with or without the approval of a judge. Family members and
attorneys officially have access to a detainee after the initial 48- or
96-hour detention period; however, authorities often delay, and
sometimes deny, access.
Judges or senior police officials issue warrants. Although
detainees have the right to be informed of the charges against them,
police sometimes ignore this right. The law stipulates that a special
judge conduct a pretrial investigation to examine the adequacy of
evidence and decide on bail. However, a shortage of judges and other
qualified personnel, plus official inaction, have resulted in lengthy
pretrial detention--in some cases several years--and confinement of
prisoners for periods exceeding the time they would have had to serve
if they had been tried and convicted. For example, Kokou Alowou and
Dela Atidepe were arrested in 1993, charged with armed robbery and
manslaughter, and are still awaiting trial. An estimated 50 percent of
the prison population are pretrial detainees. The Government continued
to use brief investigative detentions of less than 48 hours--but much
more in the case of Roland Comlan Kpagli, who was arrested for
violation of the Press Code on December 23--to harass and intimidate
opposition activists and journalists for alleged defamation of
government officials (see Section 2.a.). The Government at times has
resorted to false charges of common crimes to arrest, detain, and
intimidate opponents.
Members of the security forces arrested and detained journalists
without charging them with any offense (see Section 2.a.).
Members of the security forces also detained human rights monitors
and activists (see Sections 2.b. and 4).
On April 26, security forces detained Union of Forces for Change
(UFC) activist Abevi Abbey for distributing leaflets that urged the
public to participate in UFC-sponsored Independence Day demonstrations.
On May 3, Apedo Mensa Tengue, Francois Gayibor, and Brice Santana
of the Togolese Association for the Defense and Promotion of Human
Rights (ATDPDH) were arrested on suspicion of having supplied AI with
politically motivated accusations of widespread extrajudicial killings
committed in 1998 (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.). A local representative
of AI, Koffi Nadjombe, subsequently was arrested on the same charge.
All four men were released in mid-June (see Section 4).
On June 15, the authorities released five persons who had been
detained since November 1997 following riots in Sokode in the wake of
the sudden death under suspicious circumstances of Djobo Boukari, a
former U.N. official and potential presidential candidate. On July 2,
the authorities freed 10 other persons, including pharmacist Bozoura
Gandi, a cofounder with Boukari of the Togolese Association for the
Struggle Against the Manipulation of Conscience (ATLMC). These 15
persons, who included 3 school-age children and a police officer, were
never granted a hearing or trial or formally sentenced. Gandi was
transferred from the Sokode prison to the Kara prison in 1998. He had
been charged with killing two persons suspected of poisoning Boukari.
Gandi's supporters in Sokode and many opposition politicians regarded
him as a political detainee.
Following the release of Gandi, Tengue, Gayibor, and Nadjombe (see
Section 1.d), journalist Roland Comlan Kpagli was the only political
detainee at year's end. He was being held on a charge under the Press
Code of publishing false information about a raid on December 7 by
security forces on a student demonstration. He remained in jail at
year's end.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government respects this
prohibition.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice the executive branch
continued to exert control over the judiciary. A majority of the
members of the Supreme Council for the Magistrature are supporters of
President Eyadema. Judges who belong to the pro-Eyadema Professional
Association of Togo Magistrates (APMT) reportedly receive the most
prestigious assignments, while judges who advocate an independent
judiciary and belong to the National Association of Magistrates (ANM)
are marginalized. In December 1998, APMT member Abdoulaye Yaya was
named to succeed Awa Nana as President of the Appeals Court, and
consequently, as Chairperson of the National Electoral Commission.
The Constitutional Court stands at the apex of the court system.
The civil judiciary system includes the Supreme Court, Sessions (Court
of Assizes), and Appeals Courts. A military tribunal exists for crimes
committed by security forces, but its proceedings are closed. In June
when President Eyadema named a new cabinet, he appointed former
Interior Minister General Seyi Memene to replace a civilian justice
minister.
The court system remained overburdened and understaffed (see
Section 1.d.). Magistrates, like most government employees, are not
always paid on time. The judicial system employs both traditional law
as well as the Napoleonic Code in trying criminal and civil cases.
Trials are open to the public, and judicial procedures generally are
respected. Defendants have the right to counsel and to appeal. The Bar
Association provides attorneys for the indigent. Defendants may
confront witnesses, present evidence, and enjoy a presumption of
innocence. In rural areas, the village chief or council of elders may
try minor criminal and civil cases. Those who reject the traditional
ruling may take their cases to the regular court system, which is the
starting point for cases in urban areas.
Impunity for those who commit abuses, particularly those close to
Eyadema, remains a problem. In early October, the President's son,
Emmanuel Gnassingbe, who was arrested in late August for the shooting
death of the occupant of a taxi following a roadside quarrel, was
released without trial. The court released him because the family of
the victim reportedly refused to press charges.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
There have been no reported developments in the case of members of
the radical opposition group MO5, who were convicted and sentenced to
prison for the 1994 attack on a state-owned electrical station.
Although the crime appeared to have been politically motivated, the
state prosecutor did not apply the December 1994 general amnesty law to
this case; at last report, they remained in prison.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the sanctity of
residences, the secrecy of correspondence and telecommunications, and
prohibits searches and seizures not prescribed by law; however,
security forces often infringed on these rights. In criminal cases, a
judge or senior police official may authorize searches of private
residences. In political and national security cases, the security
forces need no prior authorization. Police conductedsearches without
warrants, searching for arms caches as well as for criminals, often
under the guise of searching for identity cards. Armed security
checkpoints exist throughout the country, and security forces regularly
search vehicles, baggage, and individuals in the name of security.
On January 10, gendarmes raided the Akodessewa-Kpota shantytown
neighborhood in Lome and set fires. The gendarmes were reportedly
searching for arms caches and rebel hideouts. The neighborhood is
inhabited mainly by recently arrived immigrants, many from Ghana, and
economic migrants from within the country (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
On May 14, police ransacked the home of Koffi Nadjombe, a member of
AI's Togo chapter, searching for evidence that Nadjombe had
collaborated in the preparation of a report alleging gross human rights
violations by security forces (see Sections 1.d. and 4). Similarly,
they searched the house of Apedo Tengue on May 3.
Citizens believe that the Government monitors telephones and
correspondence, although no proof of this has been produced. The police
and Gendarmerie perform domestic intelligence functions. The Government
maintains a system of informers on the university campus (see Section
2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government restricts
these rights in practice. The Government repeatedly harassed and
intimidated print media journalists through threats, detentions, and
criminal libel prosecutions. Police and gendarmes occasionally harassed
newspaper vendors. Advertisers reportedly often were intimidated as
well. Few opposition newspapers are distributed outside the Lome area,
particularly not in areas known to be ruling party strongholds.
However, despite government interference, there is a lively press,
most of which is heavily politicized and some of which is often highly
critical of President Eyadema. About 16 privately owned newspapers
published with some regularity. The only daily newspaper, Togo-Presse,
is government-owned and controlled. A private Lome-based newspaper,
Crocodile, was published daily during part of the year, before changing
to a twice a week schedule.
A Press and Communication Code was adopted by the National Assembly
in January 1998. Article 1 declares that the media are free; most of
the remaining 108 articles, some of them the subject of strenuous
objections by opposition legislators, restrict media freedom. Article
62 makes the intentional publication of false information a criminal
offense, punishable by fines of $900 to $1,800 (500,000 to 1 million
CFA francs). Articles 90 to 98 make defamation of state institutions or
any member of certain classes of persons, including government
officials, a crime punishable by imprisonment for up to 3 months and
fines of up to $4,000 (2 million CFA francs). Article 89 makes it a
crime, punishable by up to 3 months in prison for a second offense, to
``offend the honor, dignity or esteem'' of the President and other
government leaders. The law also provides that editors and publishers,
including legislators with parliamentary immunity, are liable for
crimes committed through the press.
There is no prepublication censorship of print media in law or
practice. However, security forces frequently threatened or detained
print media journalists and interfered with the distribution of
newspapers.
On April 12, security forces seized copies of the pro-opposition
newspaper, Le Combat du Peuple. The newspaper's editor, Messan Lucien,
reported that the Minister of Communication and Civic Education, Koffi
Panou, ordered the police to seize the publication out of concern that
an article might be insulting to President Eyadema.
On April 14, a police officer invaded the offices of the newspaper
Tingo-Tingo, beat the employees, damaged a computer, and seized a
photocopier and a computer. Two of the journalists were admitted to a
hospital. This violence apparently was in retaliation for an
unflattering reference to the officer in the newspaper. President
Eyadema reportedly paid for the damages to this newspaper.
On April 19, the Gendarmerie arrested Romain Koudjodji Attisso,
publisher of the newspaper Reporter des Temps Nouveaux. Authorities
charged him with falsely accusing the Gendarmerie unit in Aneho of
torturing Victor Mensah, an Action for Renewal Party (CAR) activist
(see Section 1.c.). The photograph published in the newspaper showed
Mensah with casts on both arms. Koudjodji was jailed at the central
prison from April 20 until June 29. While in jail, Koudjodji wrote a
letter to President Eyadema asking for forgiveness. At his June 14
trial, his attorneys argued that the Gendarmerie arrested and tortured
Mensah, who required hospital treatment for his injuries. Koudjodji was
sentenced to 2 months in jail and ordered to pay $1,600 (1 million CFA
francs). Unable to pay the fine, Koudjodjiclosed his paper;
subsequently he started another newspaper (L'Evenement).
On April 21, the Government issued a communique warning journalists
against capitalizing on misinformation as a means of earning their
living. The communique stated that photomontages and defamatory and
insulting articles on peaceful citizens, national and international
officials, as well as established institutions, all served to undermine
President Eyadema's efforts to restore peace in the subregion.
On April 28, two journalists of the very short lived, private
newspaper, Le Nouveau Combat, who had been detained since August 1998
on charges of publishing false information, were found guilty, fined
$1,600 (approximately 1 million CFA francs), and given a 3-month
suspended sentence. Elias Hounkanly and Agbeko Amewoubo were accused of
slandering the President and his wife. They published reports alleging
that the widow of the late Zairean President Mobutu Sesi Seko had
accused the Togolese First Lady, Badagnaki Eyadema, of stealing trunks
of jewelry in Lome while Mobutu was heading into exile in 1997. In the
same issue, the journalists wrote that President Eyadema begged for a
congratulatory message from French President Jacques Chirac on his
controversial June 1998 election victory. In October Elias Hounkanly
founded a new proopposition weekly, L'Exile.
Since newspapers and television are relatively expensive, radio is
the most important medium of mass communication. In addition to two
government-owned stations including Radio Lome, there are 11 private
radio stations in the country. Two of these, radio Avenir and Galaxy
FM, are associated with the ruling RPT party.
Prior to the adoption of the 1998 Press Code, the Government did
not permit private radio stations to broadcast news programming. Some
private radio stations recently have begun to broadcast some domestic
news, but they offered little of the political commentary and criticism
of the Government that is widespread in the print media. However, Radio
France International is heard 24 hours a day through an FM repeater and
Africa Numero-1 also has an FM repeater in Lome. During the year, a
private station, Kanal FM, became a Voice of America affiliate and
carries several hours of news, music, and commentary daily.
The government-owned and controlled Television Togo is the only
television station in Lome and in most of the country. A small private
television station has begun local broadcasts in Aneho with limited
programming.
The Constitution mandates equal access to state media; however, the
official media, consisting of two radio stations, the nation's one
television station, and its one daily newspaper, heavily slanted their
content in favor of the President and the Government. The High
Authority for Audio-Visual and Communications (HAAC) is charged with
providing the equal access to the state media mandated by the
Constitution. Although it is nominally independent, in practice it
operates as an arm of the Government. It is dominated by Eyadema
supporters and has not increased opposition access to the government-
controlled media. A new organization, the Togolese Media Observatory
(OTM) was established in November and will seek both to protect press
freedom and to improve the professionalism of journalists. OTM's board
and membership include both government and private journalists.
The January 9 arrest by the Gendarmerie of an army warrant officer,
Ame Kpeto, who had made critical statements about government officials
at a military assembly months earlier, illustrated the military's lack
of tolerance for political dissent within its ranks. The Minister of
Defense said that Warrant Officer Kpeto had refused a transfer and was
considered a deserter. Kpeto's arrest came after he allegedly told the
newspaper Tingo-Tingo about a mass grave for ``military democrats'' at
the Agoueve shooting range, and about hit men within the army. There
has been no independent verification of such a mass grave, and Kpeto
reportedly confessed to lying to Tingo-Tingo. Charged with slandering
the honor of the army, Kpeto reportedly was transferred to the civil
prison of Lome where he awaited a civil trial at year's end.
The Government was not known to restrict access to the Internet.
There were about 15 Internet service providers in the country at year's
end. Most Internet users are businesses rather than households. Access
to the Internet and fax machines also is possible through many small
stores and cafes in Lome and other cities.
At the country's sole university, academic freedom is constrained
by concern among professors about potential harassment by the
Government or antiopposition militants and the lack of a faculty-
elected rector. Opposition student groups reportedly are intimidated by
an informer system that has led in the past to government persecution.
The only officially tolerated student groups, HACAME and UGESTO, are
pro-Eyadema. However, an independent student organization (CEUB) has
had longstanding unofficial recognition and its elected representatives
have participated on university committees. In contrast to prior years,
security forces did not violently restrict freedom of assembly on the
university campus.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Under the
Constitution, citizens are free to assemble; however, the Government
restricts this right in practice. Although opposition political parties
were able to hold public meetings in Lome, authorities systematically
interfered with the freedom of political opponents attempting to
assemble in the central and northern regions. Government officials
prohibited and security forces forcibly dispersed some public
demonstrations critical of the Government.
In March security forces reportedly broke up UFC rallies and warned
activists in Blitta, Vo, Ave, and Zio prefectures against boycotting
the legislative elections. In late August, in Kara, authorization was
denied to organizers of an information meeting on the July 29 Framework
Agreement on Democratic Transition in Togo; moreover, the organizers
were arrested (see Section 1.c).
Nonetheless, most opposition rallies and protest marches were well
attended and incident-free including an April 27 UFC independence day
rally, a May 22 march through Lome for the liberation of human rights
activists arrested in the wake of the AI report, the August 14 UFC
rallies in Lome led by Gilchrist Olympio, and a November 8 march by
teachers and students protesting delayed salary payments.
During the March legislative election campaign, a temporary
``mobile security force'' of gendarmes, police, and prefectorial police
were deployed and functioned effectively. In July and August, they also
protected UFC leader Gilchrist Olympio during his brief visits to Lome
from his self-imposed exile in Ghana.
Under the Constitution, citizens have the right to organize
associations and political parties; however, the Government restricted
this right in practice.
Few opposition party offices and no pro-opposition newspapers
operate in most towns in the central and northern regions.
Political parties are able to elect officers and register. There
are many nongovernmental organizations (NGO's); they are required to
register with the Government.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
New religious organizations are required to register with the
Ministry of Interior, and scores of applications await adjudication;
however, these groups appear to practice their faiths without
hindrance. In January the Catholic Church declined an invitation to
participate in a ``day of national liberation'' service, organized by
the Government. The Government criticized the Church for ``not
contributing to national reconciliation,'' but it took no further
action.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights; however, the Government restricts these rights in practice.
Armed security checkpoints and arbitrary searches of vehicles and
individuals are common. The lack of discipline of some soldiers manning
roadblocks and their actions, such as frequent demands for bribes
before allowing citizens to pass, impede free movement within the
country.
The Government continued to employ strict documentation
requirements for citizens who apply for a new passport or a renewal.
Beyond the normal identity papers, applicants were asked to provide an
airline ticket, business documents, an invitation letter, a parental
authorization letter (even for adults), proof of study grant for
students, and a husband's permission for a married woman (see Section
5). In 1997 the Government transferred the Passport Office from the
police to the Gendarmerie, which falls under the Defense Ministry. The
Government maintains that its intent was to take passport issuance away
from corrupt police officials. The strict passport application
requirements and a shortage of blank passports (in anticipation of a
new bar-coded passport scheduled to be issued in 2000) prevented or
significantly hindered some citizens travel abroad. However, a national
identity card can be used for travel to other member countries of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
The Government provides first asylum. There is no law that provides
for granting refugee or asylee status in accordance with the provisions
of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees, and routinely accepts the decision
of the UNHCR office located in Lome in determining refugee status. The
Government hosts roughly 12,000 refugees, mainly Kokomba and Bassari
from Ghana.
The UNHCR estimates that approximately 6,000 Togolese refugees
still remained outside the country at year's end.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for the right of citizens peacefully to
change their government; however, the Government restricts this right
in practice. In the June 1998 presidential election, as in virtually
all previous elections since Eyadema seized power in 1967, the
Government prevented citizens from exercising this right effectively.
The Interior Ministry declared Eyadema the winner with 52 percent of
the vote; however, serious irregularities in the Government's conduct
of the election strongly favored the incumbent and appear to have
affected the outcome materially.
Although the Government did not obstruct the functioning of
political opponents openly, the President used the strength of the
military and his government allies to intimidate and harass citizens
and opposition groups. The Government and the State remained highly
centralized: President Eyadema's national government appointed the
officials and controlled the budgets of all subnational government
entities including prefectures and municipalities, and influenced the
selection of traditional chiefs.
What were to have been the second multiparty legislative elections
of Eyadema's 32-year-long rule were held on March 21. However, the
opposition boycotted the election, in which the ruling party won all
but 2 of the 81 seats in the National Assembly. Those two seats went to
little-known Independent Party candidates. The legislative elections
were marred by procedural problems and significant fraud, particularly
misrepresentation of voter turnout.
The opposition set several conditions before it would take part in
the legislative elections. Chief among them was a settlement of the
dispute over the seriously flawed June 1998 presidential election in
which the vote count was stopped and President Eyadema declared the
winner by the Interior Minister.
Under international pressure, the Government began preliminary
discussions with the opposition which, according to an agreement
reached on Christmas eve 1998, were to be followed by formal
negotiations, in the presence of international facilitators. When the
parties disagreed over UFC insistence that formal negotiations occur
outside of the country, the Government scheduled a first round of
legislative elections on March 7 and a runoff on March 21. The
Government argued that the mandate of the outgoing legislature expired
in March and that elections had to be held to avoid a constitutional
vacuum. When the opposition did not register candidates, the Government
proposed a 2-week postponement; however, the opposition parties
maintained their position in favor of a boycott. The elections
proceeded and virtually the only candidates to run were those from the
RPT.
In February the Council of Ministers passed a decree requiring
security forces to vote 3 days before the general population. The
Government explained that it wanted the security forces to monitor
polling places on election day; however, the opposition viewed the
decision as a ploy to influence civilian voting, boost voter turnout,
and identify opposition elements within the security forces. Some
15,000 military, gendarmes, police, customs officials, and firemen
voted on March 18. Opposition party members of the National Electoral
Commission stated that the special voting procedures for security
forces violated the Electoral Code because it occurred before the end
of campaigning, and that the vote count occurred 72 hours after the
vote instead of immediately afterwards. With the opposition boycott,
voter participation became the main issue. According to the Government,
about 65 percent of the population participated while the opposition
stated that the figure could not be more than 10 percent. The rump
progovernment National Electoral Commission, absent the commission's
opposition party members (who also boycotted the process), reported
that turnout reached about 37 percent in the opposition stronghold of
Ave, and as much as 95 percent in Kozah prefecture in the north, where
the ruling party has greater support. The opposition took no part in
the revision of voter rolls, the distribution of voter cards, the
monitoring of the vote, and the counting of the ballots. National
election observer organizations did not participate, and international
observation was sporadic.
The Government invited a few international observers to comment on
the organization and management of the election. There were no
independent observers present when the military voted on March 18. Even
though RPT candidates ran unopposed in most districts, there were
reports of intimidation and evidence of fraud to boost statistics on
voter participation in what were essentially one-party elections. In
Tchaoudjo, where voting started at 6 a.m., polling place officials did
not allow delegates of an independent party to participate in the
supervision work until 9 a.m. These delegates watched ballot boxes
being stuffed. In Agou independent party delegates claimed that they
saw individuals voting more than 10 times.
Foreign diplomats observed voting at close to 200 polling stations,
mainly in and around Lome, but also in Yoto prefecture. Turnout was
below the levels reflected in official results for most of these
locations.
Although the Constitution provides for universal suffrage and
secret ballot, there was clear evidence of stuffed ballot boxes and
doctored voter registers. At one polling station in the town of
Tabligbo, for example, 46 voters were reported by polling officials to
have voted by 10:40 a.m. However, the same officials, when questioned
about the number of envelopes in the ballot box, admitted that it
contained 145 ballots. The officials explained that the extra 99
ballots were ``absentee ballots,'' but they could produce no
documentation for these absentee voters. Elsewhere in Yoto prefecture,
diplomats observed 11 transparent ballot boxes in as many polling
stations that had clear evidence of stacked ballots.
On April 9, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the RPT had
swept virtually all the National Assembly seats. The official tally
showed that the elections had attracted 107 candidates for 81 seats. Of
the 2,412,027 registered voters, 1,592,661 voted, according to the
Court, for a turnout of 66 percent. The Court rejected a dozen
complaints and annulled the results in two districts. However, new
elections were never held in these districts.
The National Assembly has little power or influence on President
Eyadema and has limited influence on the Government. Aside from
controlling its own programs and activities and the ability to request
amendments, the National Assembly largely acts as a rubber stamp for
the President and the Government.
After the election, the Government announced that it would continue
to pursue dialog with the opposition. On May 21, 2 months after the
election, President Eyadema nominated a new prime minister, Eugene
Koffi Adoboli, a former U.N. official who is not a member of the ruling
party. In June the RPT and opposition parties met in Paris, in the
presence of facilitators representing France, Germany, the European
Union, and La Francophonie, to agree on security measures for formal
negotiations in Lome. On July 19, the long-awaited dialog between the
Government and the opposition commenced. After 10 days, all sides
signed an accord called the ``Lome Framework Agreement.'' The accord
included a pledge by President Eyadema that he would respect the
Constitution and not seek another term as President after his current
one expires in 2003. The President also agreed to dissolve the National
Assembly in March 2000 and hold new legislative elections to be
supervised by an independent national election commission. The
legislative elections are to use the single-ballot method to protect
against some of the abuses of past elections. The accord also provided
for the status of former heads of state, political leaders, and the
opposition. In addition, the accord addressed the rights and duties of
political parties and the media, the safe return of refugees, and the
security of all citizens. The accord also contained a provision for a
compensation plan for victims of political violence.
As called for in the Lome Framework Agreement, a joint
implementation committee (JIC) began meeting on August 10 to implement
the agreement's provisions. However, when the UFC, CAR, and CDPA
opposition parties left the JIC to protest an effort by the RPT to
accord a weaker role to the new independent election commission (CENI)
vis-a-vis the Constitutional Court, its work virtually came to a halt
between August 26 and October 4. On October 4, an agreement was reached
with the RPT whereby the CENI would monitor, collect, tally, and
announce the results of the next legislative elections. The
Constitutional Court would resolve district-level election disputes
that the CENI itself cannot resolve by consensus. In December the JIC
sent new electoral code legislation to the Government establishing the
new CENI. At year's end, the Government had approved the bill and sent
it to the National Assembly.
In 1998 the National Assembly voted on a decentralization plan, but
the plan's implementation has been slow. The country is divided into 5
economic and administrative regions, 30 prefectures, and 4
subprefectures. Administratively, the prefect, nominated by the
Interior Minister, is the primary representative of the central
government in each prefecture. Some government agencies have regional
representatives. Within the prefecture, a council elected from the
districts advises the prefect and manages programs. Each city has a
mayor elected by a municipal council. The last mayoral elections were
held before 1990. Throughout the country the terms of mayors have
expired; however, they remain in office and continue to serve without a
new mandate.
There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women or
members of ethnic minorities in politics or government. However, both
women and members of southern ethnic groups were underrepresented in
government. Although many women are members of political parties, there
were only 2 female ministers in the Government and 5 female members of
the currently 79-member National Assembly. No ethnic group, including
the President's, was overrepresented conspicuously in the Cabinet.
Section 4. Government Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are several local private human rights groups, including the
Togolese Human Rights League (LTDH), the Center of Observation and
Promotion of the Rule of Law (COPED), the African Center for Democracy,
Human Rights, and Protection of Detainees (CADEPROD), and the new
Togolese Association for the Defense and Protection of Human Rights
(ATDPDH), which was formed in January. In general the Government allows
groups to investigate alleged violations of human rights; however, the
Government occasionally threatens or hinders the activities of human
rights activists, and is inconsistent about following up on
investigations of abuses. Years of government threats and intimidation
of human rights leaders, combined with a lack of results from human
rights initiatives, have led some human rights monitors to end their
public activities. A Minister for the Promotion of Democracy and Rule
of Law was appointed in 1998, and he has promoted initiatives to
establish a human rights resource center and develop a civic education
curriculum for schools.
In May Amnesty International (AI) issued a report on political
violence in Togo entitled ``Togo: Reign of Terror.'' According to the
report, the security forces during and after the June 1998 presidential
election campaign killed hundreds of persons, including members of the
opposition and members of the army. Corpses, some handcuffed and some
in military uniform, washed up on the beaches of Togo and Benin for
days afterwards, according to the report. The report was based on an AI
delegation's interviews with Beninese and Togolese fishermen, as well
as Togolese coastal farmers. Those questioned told of unusual movements
of planes and helicopters flying out to sea. The report also said that
under President Eyadema, ``scores of civilians and military personnel
have been detained for months, even years, without charge or trial.''
The Government vigorously disputed the report's findings and
threatened to sue AI. In criticizing AI, the Government also noted that
no journalist or foreign observer who monitored the June 1998 election
reported bodies washing ashore. (The Togolese newspaper L'Aurore in its
August 13, 1998 edition, mentioned some bodies washing up on the
Togolese and Beninese shores.) The Government stated that the UFC and
CDPA opposition parties directed the AI report, a charge denied by
those groups and by AI. The Government stated that those groups and AI
timed the report to appear in May while international facilitators were
in Lome to prepare for the national reconciliation talks. The Defense
Minister, Brigadier General Assani Tidjani, met with an AI delegation
in November 1998 to discuss the allegations, but he said that AI
distorted the information that it obtained. The AI report elicited
mixed reactions in Benin. The government-appointed Beninese Human
Rights Commission stated that, according to its investigations, there
were no Togolese corpses thrown along the beaches in Benin. The
independent Benin Human Rights League affirmed the contrary, that dead
bodies were dropped along the coastal waters by military aircraft.
The Government alleged that the ATDPDH collaborated with AI. The
president of the ATDPDH, Apedo Mensa Tengue, and a member of the
organization, Francois Gayibor, were arrested on May 3 and charged with
complicity with an international organization in the defamation of the
country. On May 14, police arrested Koffi Nadjombe, a member of AI's
Togo chapter, and his wife, and searched their residence (see Section
1.f.). The Government accused Nadjombe of collaborating in preparing
the report. AI demanded the release of Tengue (a member of the CDPA
party), Gayibor, and Nadjombe. On May 28, a delegation of the National
Human Rights Commission (CNDH, an official government body) called on
Justice Minister Bitokotipou Yagninim to ensure that the detainees
received proper treatment and that they were given due process. A
member of the CNDH ensured by his frequent presence that the detainees
were not mistreated while in custody.
On May 21, the authorities refused entry to AI's executive
director, Pierre Sane, 2 hours after he attempted to enter Togo from
Ghana. Sane was seeking to visit with government officials. The
Secretary of State for Security, General Sizing Walla, said the report
had agitated many persons, and that the country could not tolerate the
situation further degenerating. On May 22, more than 1,000 opposition
activists peacefully demonstrated for the release of Tengue, Gayibor,
and Nadjombe.
AI reported on June 9 that a member of its Nigerian section, Ameen
Ayodele, was detained, tortured, and threatened with execution by
security forces between May 19 and 27 (see Section 1.c.). Ayodele, who
was traveling from Ghana to Nigeria via Togo, was suspected of drug
trafficking. During an initial interrogation, he presented his AI
membership card as a means of identification because he said that his
other documents had been stolen. The border police arrested him on
suspicion of spying for AI in advance of Pierre Sane's visit. Ayodele
spent 9 days in a confined cell, naked and deprived of food. Ayodele
says that he was beaten and tortured, while his jailers interrogated
him about his involvement with AI. One morning, according to his
account, he was taken to a beach where his guards threatened to execute
him and dump his body in the sea.
The Government admits to holding Ayodele on suspicion of drug
trafficking and detaining him for more than a week to determineif he
had swallowed any drugs. He was released on May 27. It stated that the
June 9 AI accusation was timed to derail sensitive discussions between
the ruling party and the opposition in Paris. On June 18, the human
rights activists arrested in the AI affair were released, pending the
outcome of further investigation into the charge (against three of
them) of incitement to civil unrest. On July 21, on the eve of French
President Chirac's visit, the Government consented to the establishment
of an international, independent investigation commission to examine
AI's allegations; however, at year's end, no action had been taken to
establish such a commission.
During the year, the International Committee of the Red Cross,
which withdrew its permanent representative in 1997, conducted seminars
on international humanitarian law for senior officers of the armed
forces and senior members of the Government.
In April the Ministry for the Promotion of Democracy and the Rule
of Law, headed by Harry Octavianus Olympio, a cousin of Gilchrist
Olympio, opened an information and documentation center on human
rights. The National Assembly voted in 1996 to enact a ministerial
decree to reorganize the government-sponsored and government-funded
National Human Rights Commission (CNDH). The majority of commissioners
are supporters of the President. In a report issued in July on its
activities, the CNDH recognized that violations of human rights by
government employees were common, and attributed them to ignorance of
the law and of officials' responsibilities to the public, as well as to
the country's poverty.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of ethnic
group, regional or family origin, sex, religion, social or economic
status, or personal, political, or other convictions. However, the
Government does not provide effective redress for discrimination
complaints. Members of President Eyadema's Kabye ethnic group and other
northern ethnic groups dominate much of the public sector, especially
the military.
Women.--Violence against women continues to be a problem. Although
mechanisms for redress exist within both the traditional extended
family and formal judicial structures, the police rarely intervene in
domestic violence cases. Wife beating has been estimated to affect an
estimated 10 percent of married women. There is some trafficking in
young women for the purpose of forced prostitution or for forced labor
as domestic servants (see Section 6.f.), but the Government reportedly
exercised more vigilance at border crossings to counter such
trafficking.
Despite a constitutional declaration of equality under the law,
women continue to experience discrimination, especially in education,
pension benefits, inheritance, and as a consequence of traditional law.
A husband legally may restrict his wife's freedom to work or control
her earnings. The Government requires a married woman to get her
husband's permission to apply for a passport (see Section 2.d.). In
urban areas, women and girls dominate market activities and commerce.
However, harsh economic conditions in rural areas, where most of the
population lives, leave women with little time for activities other
than domestic and agricultural fieldwork. Under traditional law, which
applies to the vast majority of women, a wife has no maintenance rights
in the event of divorce or separation and no inheritance rights on the
death of her husband.
There is a Ministry of Feminine Promotion and Social Protection,
which, along with independent women's groups and related NGO's,
campaigns actively to inform women of their rights.
Children.--Although the Constitution and family code laws provide
for the protection of children's rights, in practice government
programs often suffer from a lack of money, materials, and enforcement.
The Government provides free education in state schools. School
attendance is mandatory for both boys and girls until the age of 15.
There are social programs to provide free health care for poor
children.
Although the law protects children, there are many practices that
point to a pattern of discrimination against children, especially
girls. In education, about 61 percent of children 6 to 15 years of age
attend school, mostly boys. Of the total 6 to 15 age group, about 89
percent of the boys and 66 percent of the girls start primary school;
about 39 percent of the boys and 13 percent of the girls reach
secondary school; about 3 percent of the boys and 0.6 percent of the
girls reach university level. Literacy rates are 57 percent for adult
men and 31 percent for adult women. About one-third of the national
budget is spent on education.
Orphans and other needy children receive some aid from extended
families or private organizations but less from the State. There are
few juvenile courts, and children are jailed with adults. In rural
areas, traditionally the best food is reserved for adults, principally
the father.
There are confirmed reports of international trafficking in
children, particularly girls, for the purpose of forced labor, which
amounts at times to slavery (see Section 6.f.).
Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, continues to be practiced. Approximately 12
percent of all girls and women have undergone FGM. Most of the larger
ethnic groups do not practice FGM. However, among the practicing groups
rates range from 40 to 98 percent. In theory women and girls are
protected by the Constitution from FGM, and in 1998 the Government
enacted a law prohibiting the practice. However, by year's end, the
Government had not brought any cases to court. Traditional customs
often supersede the legal systems among certain ethnic groups. The
Government continued to sponsor seminars to educate and campaign
against FGM.
People with Disabilities.--The Government does not mandate
accessibility to public or private facilities for the disabled.
Although the Constitution nominally obliges the Government to aid
disabled persons and shelter them from social injustice, the Government
provides only limited assistance in practice. There is no overt state
discrimination against disabled persons and some hold responsible
government positions. However, the disabled have no meaningful recourse
against private sector discrimination.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population of
more than four million includes members of some 40 ethnic groups that
generally speak distinct primary languages and are concentrated
regionally in rural areas. Major ethnic groups include the Ewe (between
20 and 25 percent of the population), the Kabye (between 10 and 15
percent), the Kotokoli (between 10 and 15 percent), the Moba (between
10 to 15 percent), and the Mina (about 5 percent). The Ewe and Mini are
the largest ethnic groups in the southern region, where abundant
rainfall and access to the sea have been conducive to farming and
trade; the Kabye are the largest group in the drier, landlocked, less
populous, and less prosperous northern region.
Although prohibited by law, societal discrimination on the basis of
ethnicity is practiced routinely by members of all ethnic groups. In
particular, discrimination against southerners by northerners and
against northerners by southerners is evident in private sector hiring
and buying patterns, in patterns of de facto ethnic segregation in
urban neighborhoods, and in the relative paucity of marriages across
the north-south ethnic divide. There are no effective impediments to
the extension of such discrimination into the public sector, where the
centralization of the State allows little scope for regional or ethnic
autonomy, except through the circumscribed authority of traditional
rulers and dispute resolution systems.
The relative predominance in private sector commerce and
professions by members of southern ethnic groups, and the relative
predominance of the public sector and especially the security forces by
members of President Eyadema's Kabye group and other northern groups,
are sources of political tension. Political parties tend to have
readily identifiable ethnic and regional bases: The ruling RPT party is
much stronger among northern ethnic groups than among southern groups,
while the reverse is true of the UFC and CAR opposition parties.
In previous years, north-south tensions repeatedly have erupted
into violence of a clearly interethnic character. Majority ethnic group
members in each region have harassed and attacked members of ethnic
groups originating from the other region, forcing them back to their
home region. In recent years, during times of crisis, many Lome
residents sent family members to their native villages for security
reasons. Some also sent family members to neighboring Ghana and Benin.
In addition, due to the congruence of political divisions and ethnic
and regional divisions, human rights abuses motivated by politics had
the potential to carry ethnic and regional overtones (see Section 3).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides most
workers with the right to join unions and the right to strike. Security
forces, including firemen and policemen, do not have these rights;
government health care workers may join unions but may not strike. The
work force in the formal (wage) sector is small, involving about 20
percent of the total work force, of whom from 60 to 70 percent are
union members or supporters.
The Constitution also prohibits discrimination against workers for
reasons of sex, origin, beliefs, or opinions. There is no specific law
prohibiting retribution against strikers.
There are several major trade union federations. These include the
National Confederation of Togolese Workers (CNTT)--which is closely
associated with the Government, the Labor Federation of Togolese
Workers (CSTT), the National Union of Independent Syndicates (UNSIT),
and the Union of Free Trade Unions.
Federations and unions are free to associate with international
labor groups. The CNTT and the UNSIT are affiliates of the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The CSTT is an
affiliate of the World Labor Confederation.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
nominally provides workers with the right to organize and bargain
collectively. All formal sector employees are covered by a collective
bargaining agreement; however, the Government limits collective
bargaining to producing a single nationwide agreement that must be
negotiated and endorsed by representatives of the Government as well as
of labor unions and employers. This agreement sets nationwide wage
standards for all formal sector employees. The Government participates
in this process both as a labor-management mediator and as the largest
employer in the formal sector, managing numerous state-owned firms that
monopolize many sectors of the formal economy. Individual groups in the
formal sector can attempt through sector-specific or firm-specific
collective bargaining to negotiate agreements more favorable to labor,
but this option rarely is used.
The Labor Code prohibits antiunion discrimination. The Ministry of
Labor is charged with resolving labor-related complaints, but does not
always do so effectively.
A 1989 law allows the establishment of export processing zones
(EPZ's). Many companies have EPZ status, and more than 30 are in
operation. The EPZ law provides exemptions from some provisions of the
Labor Code, notably the regulations on hiring and firing. Employees of
EPZ firms do not enjoy the same protection against antiunion
discrimination as do other workers.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law does not
specifically address the question of forced or bonded labor, including
that performed by children, and children sometimes are subjected to
forced labor, primarily as domestic servants. The Government has
acknowledged the international trafficking of children, particularly
girls, who are sold into various forms of indentured and exploitative
servitude, which amounts at times to slavery (see Section 6.f). This
traffic often results in the children being taken to other West and
Central African countries, especially Gabon and Nigeria, to the Middle
East, or to Asia. In rural areas, parents sometimes put young children
into domestic work in other households in exchange for sums as low as
the equivalent of $25 to $35 (CFA 15,000 to 20,000). Children sometimes
are trafficked abroad by parents misled into allowing them to depart
under false pretenses (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits the employment of children under
the age of 14 in any enterprise. Some types of industrial and technical
employment require a minimum age of 18. Inspectors from the Ministry of
Labor enforce these age requirements but only in the formal sector in
urban areas. In both urban and rural areas, particularly in farming and
petty trading, very young children traditionally assist in their
families' work. Under the Constitution, school is mandatory for both
sexes until the age of 15, but this requirement is not enforced
strictly (see Section 5). However, the law does not prohibit forced and
bonded labor by children, and it is a significant problem (see Section
6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets minimum
wages for different categories, ranging from unskilled labor through
professional positions. Less than the official minimum wage often is
paid in practice, mostly to less-skilled workers. Official monthly
minimum wages range from approximately $25 to $39 (14,700 to 23,100 CFA
francs) per month. A 5 percent wage increase in 1996 was the first
since 1987, despite a 50 percent currency devaluation in 1994. There
has been no wage increase since 1996. Many workers cannot maintain a
decent standard of living for themselves and their families at the
official minimum wages, and many must supplement their incomes through
second jobs or subsistence farming. The Ministry of Labor is ostensibly
responsible for enforcement of the minimum wage system but does not
enforce the law in practice. The Labor Code, which regulates labor
practices, requires equal pay for equal work, regardless of sex.
However, this provision generally is observed only in the formal
sector.
Working hours of all employees in any enterprise, except for those
in the agricultural sector, normally must not exceed 72 hours per week;
at least one 24-hour rest period per week is compulsory, and workers
must receive 30 days of paid leave each year. The law requires overtime
compensation, and there are restrictions on excessive overtime work.
However, the Ministry of Labor's enforcement is weak, and employers
often ignore these provisions.
A technical consulting committee in the Ministry of Labor sets
workplace health and safety standards. It may levy penalties on
employers who do not meet the standards, and employees ostensibly have
the right to complain to labor inspectors of unhealthy orunsafe
conditions without penalty. In practice the Ministry's enforcement of
the various provisions of the Labor Code is limited. Large enterprises
are obliged by law to provide medical services for their employees and
usually attempt to respect occupational health and safety rules, but
smaller firms often do not.
Workers have the legal right to remove themselves from unsafe
conditions without fear of losing their jobs. However, in practice some
reportedly cannot do so.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--While trafficking in women for the
purpose of forced prostitution or nonconsensual labor as domestic
servants exists, the majority of trafficking is of children. During the
year, 750 children were intercepted and 21 traffickers were arrested at
the borders. In June police arrested three groups of child traffickers
at border crossings. A local NGO focusing on trafficking issues
estimated that 85 percent of traffickers in the country are women. In
one case, two Ghanaian women were taking six children, ages 6 to 14,
from the town of Tsevie to Cote d'Ivoire where they were to be resold
for $350 to $530 ((CFA 225,000 to 350,000)) to work on plantations or
as house servants. Police caught Beninese traffickers who were taking
39 children, including some as young as 2 years old, from Benin to Cote
d'Ivoire. In January 31 children were returned from Gabon due to the
efforts of an association of Togolese Muslims residing in Gabon.
In countries such as Cote d'Ivoire or Gabon, these children are
extensively exploited. They are fed poorly, crudely clothed, and
inadequately cared for, and are neither educated nor permitted to learn
a trade.
The Government has conducted public awareness campaigns, with the
help of the U.N. Children's Fund and NGO's, such as WAO-Afrique. In
March the prefect of Bassar criticized child trafficking as a ``new
form of slavery'' and warned his constituents that child traffickers
and parents who turn their children over to traffickers could face
prison sentences of between 1 and 10 years. In May the Interior
Ministry and the NGO Plan International conducted a workshop for border
police and other law enforcement officers on child trafficking trends
and judicial remedies.
______
UGANDA
President Yoweri Museveni, elected to a 5-year term in 1996 under
the 1995 Constitution, continued to dominate the Government. He has
ruled since 1986 through the National Resistance Movement (NRM),
legislatively reorganized and renamed as ``The Movement'' in 1995. The
Constitution provides for a 276-member unicameral parliament and an
autonomous, independently elected president. The Constitution formally
extended the one-party movement form of government for 5 years and
severely restricted political activities. A national referendum on the
role of multiple political parties is scheduled for 2000, following a
1-year campaign period. The Parliament acted with increasing
independence and assertiveness during the year, although Movement
supporters remained in control of the legislative branch.
Parliamentarians were elected to 5-year terms in 1996. The 1996
presidential and parliamentary elections were peaceful and orderly, but
election conditions, including restrictions on political party
activities, led to a flawed election process. The judiciary generally
is independent, but is understaffed and weak; the President has
extensive legal and extralegal powers.
The Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) is the key security force.
The Constitution provides for civilian control of the UPDF, with the
President designated as commander in chief. The UPDF was more active,
in part due to the continued instability in the north and west but
mostly because of the country's involvement in the conflict in the
neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC). UPDF soldiers and
members of local defense units (LDU's) assist the police in rural
areas, although the LDU's continued to operate without a legal mandate.
The Internal Security Organization (ISO) remained under the direct
authority of the President. Although the ISO primarily is an
intelligence-gathering body, its operatives occasionally detained
civilians. The Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), under UPDF
control, also detained civilians suspected of rebel activity. The
police are organized as a national force under the authority of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. The UPDF, police, LDU's, and the DMI all
committed serious human rights abuses.
The economy grew at a rate of approximately 7 percent during the
year. Annual gross domestic product is $330 per capita; foreign
economic assistance provides approximately 48 percent of government
revenues. The agriculturally based economy continued to rely on coffee
as its chief export. Foreign investment slowed amid growing corruption,
a troubled macroeconomic reform process, and concerns about regional
security in the wake of the country's intervention in the DROC. The
privatization process slowed significantly, following a series of
mismanagement and corruptionscandals that led to parliamentary
investigations and to the resignation of the Minister of State in
charge of the process in late 1998. The financial sector was shaken
badly by mismanagement that led to the closure of several banks and a
general loss of depositor confidence. The stock exchange remained
severely underutilized.
The Government's human rights record was poor, and there continued
to be numerous, serious problems; however, its record improved in a few
areas. Movement domination of the political process limited the right
of citizens to change their government. Security forces used excessive
force, at times resulting in death. Government forces committed or
failed to prevent some extrajudicial killings of suspected rebels and
civilians. Police, UPDF, LDU, and DMI forces regularly beat and
sometimes tortured suspects, often to force confessions. A highly
publicized judicial commission of inquiry into police corruption
uncovered numerous serious abuses committed by senior officers,
resulting in the arrest of several officers on charges of extortion.
Prison conditions remained harsh and life-threatening. Members of the
security forces sometimes arbitrarily arrested and detained civilians.
There were a number of cases in which the Government detained and
charged UPDF and LDU members for human rights abuses. Authorities used
incommunicado detention and detention in unregistered and unofficial
places of remand without notification to family members. Despite
measures to improve the discipline and training of security forces, and
despite the punishment of some security force officials guilty of
abuses, abuses by the security forces remained a problem throughout the
country. Prolonged pretrial detention remained a problem. Poor judicial
administration, lack of resources, a large case backlog, and lengthy
trial delays circumscribed due process and the right to a fair trial.
The UPDF at times infringed on citizens' privacy rights; it often
invaded citizens' homes without warrants. The Government demonstrated
continued respect for freedom of speech and of the press; however,
there were some instances in which restrictions continued. The
Government restricted freedom of assembly and association, and the
constitutional restrictions on political activity effectively limit
these rights further. Security forces continued to harass Muslims.
There were some limits on freedom of movement. The Movement
Secretariat, supported with government funds, oversaw internal
organizational activity, strategy, and mobilization, and the Government
continued its Movement political education courses. Domestic violence
against women, rape, and abuse of children remained serious problems.
Discrimination against women, the disabled, and ethnic minorities
persisted.
The Government worked with NGO's to combat the practice of female
genital mutilation (FGM), which occurred on a limited basis. Violence
against ethnic minorities was a problem. There were some limits on
worker rights. Forced labor, including by children, occurred, and child
labor was common, mostly in the informal sector. There have been
reports of trafficking in persons. Vigilante justice also was a
problem.
Insurgent forces committed numerous serious abuses, although on a
significantly reduced scale. The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a
rebel group active in the west, killed, tortured, maimed, and abducted
many persons, including children. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), led
by Joseph Kony and supported by the Government of Sudan, operated in
the north from bases in southern Sudan. The LRA continued to kill and
abduct civilians, including children, although such abuses decreased
considerably from the previous year. Rwandan Hutu rebels, the Uganda
National Rescue Front-II (UNRF-II), and the Uganda Salvation Front/Army
(USF/A) also claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks that resulted
in fatalities.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed reports of politically motivated killings by government
forces; however, members of the security forces and the police
committed extrajudicial killings. In the course of official operations,
police, UPDF, LDU, and DMI personnel sometimes used excessive force,
resulting in deaths (see Section 1.g.). In January 15 UPDF soldiers in
Kabarole district allegedly killed 5 youths between the ages of 13 and
19. The soldiers were arrested at the end of January, and three of the
soldiers appeared in a Kampala court in March on murder charges. Their
cases still were pending at year's end, as was an investigation of the
other 12 soldiers. In May police shot and killed an unarmed youth after
mistaking him for a robber. In July police reportedly beat to death a
prisoner in Soroti (see Section 1.c.). There was a report that UPDF
soldiers in Kole county, Apac District engaged in murder, torture, and
looting in July. The matter was reported to the Minister of Security,
but could not be confirmed. In August UPDF soldiers executed two rebel
suspects in Lira; a UPDF inquiry is ongoing. On September 9, UPDF
troops conducting a pacification campaign in the Karamojaregion opened
fire on members of two Karamojong clans that were engaged in a gun
battle. Reports suggest that hundreds of Karamojong warriors were
killed in this incident. There was no investigation into this incident
by year's end. On October 10, a man died after having been beaten by
the police while in custody the previous day (see Section 1.c.).
Muslim groups complained of extensive mistreatment by security
officials in Kampala and in the west. There were unconfirmed reports
that some Muslims suspected of being ADF rebel collaborators or
involved in terrorist activities died as a result of torture by DMI
officials (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
A judicial commission of inquiry into corruption in the police
force began operation in May and was ongoing at year's end. During the
course of the investigation the commission uncovered incidents of
killings, brutality, theft, and robbery by police in general, and by
the CID in particular. The commission's proceedings were open to the
public and received extensive press coverage. The commission report had
not been submitted to the Government by year's end.
Harsh conditions, some intentional mistreatment, and lack of
adequate medical treatment caused many deaths in prison (see Section
1.c.).
The LDU commander responsible for the August 1998 death of two
civilians in Kyankwanzi while in custody was arrested and remained in
detention awaiting trial at year's end.
Police continued investigations into the June 1998 incident in
which police fired on students at the Kabalega secondary school,
killing one student; into the January 1998 death in police custody
after being tortured of a 25-year-old suspect accused of stealing a
bicycle in Tororo; and into the August 1998 incident in which a prison
official in Masaka beat to death a suspect on remand for defaulting on
tax payments. There were no prosecutions in connections with these
incidents by year's end. On February 1, the Uganda Human Rights
Commission (UHRC) referred for prosecution the case of three police
officers accused of killing four robbery suspects in 1998.
Investigations into the 1997 deaths by torture of Paul Kollo and
Stephan Baryakaijika were completed, and the government-sponsored UHRC
heard the cases. In February the UHRC handed the cases over to the
courts for prosecution (see Section 1.c.). A suspect arrested for the
1997 killing of Modesta Kabaranga, a leading organizer for the
Democratic Party, still was on remand awaiting trial at year's end.
There has not yet been a police investigation in the 1997 killings of
Abdullah Buwuula, Mubarek Mawejje, and Amir Sinai at year's end.
The rebel ADF committed at least 350 extrajudicial killings,
including that of children (see Section 1.g.). The LRA was responsible
for the killing of approximately 30 civilians, including children (see
Section 1.g.). Rwandan Hutu rebels were responsible for the killing of
19 persons, including the killings of 9 persons in March in the Bwindi
Impenetrable Forest park (see Section 1.g.). UNRF-II, USF/A, and the
Citizens Army for Multiparty Politics (CAMP) may have been responsible
for the death of civilians (see Section 1.g.).
Vigilante justice was a problem (see Sections 1.c. and 5).
Authorities rarely prosecuted persons engaged in mob violence, which
frequently resulted in death. A police official announced in September
that vigilante justice was occurring at a rate of two incidents per
day. On January 2, four of eight suspected thieves were lynched when a
mob broke into the Nyaburara subcounty jail in Kabarole district. On
February 2, a UPDF soldier was lynched in Luwero district after being
accused of robbery. On May 25, a suspected thief was burned to death by
a mob in Mukono, central Buganda. On August 11, a thief was beaten into
a coma by a mob in Kampala after grabbing money from a vehicle.
Urban bombings remained a problem. On February 14, two bomb blasts
killed 4 persons and injured 35 others in Kabalagala. On April 11, a
bomb exploded at Kampala's old taxi park, killing 3 persons and
injuring 13 others. On April 24, a bomb blast injured six persons at a
bar in Makindye. On May 7, a bomb exploded in a Kampala marketplace,
killing one person. On May 30, a bomb blast in a suburb of Kampala
killed three persons and injured nine others. The ADF is suspected of
involvement in these bombings.
There was a growing number of reports of ritual murders of
children. On February 15, a 2-year-old child was murdered after being
kidnaped from his home. His body was found burned and coated with a
traditional medicine. On July 23, a traditional healer and his
assistant were sentenced to death for the April 4 murder and mutilation
of a girl in Mukono district.
b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of politically
motivated disappearances due to action by government forces; however, a
number of Muslims whom the authorities suspected of supporting the ADF
insurgency still are missing and it is believed that they were detained
by security officials (see Section 1.c.).
ADF, LRA, and UNRF-II rebels abducted civilians. Both the ADF and
the LRA abducted civilians for training as guerrillas; most victims
were children and young adults. NGO's estimated that the ADF abducted
over 800 persons, including children. The LRA abducted approximately
250 persons, including young girls abducted as sex and labor slaves
(see Sections 6.c.and 6.f.). Amnesty International reported in 1998
that without child abductions, the LRA would have few combatants. While
some later escaped or were rescued, the United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF) estimated that 4,802 children abducted by the LRA since 1987
remain missing, and approximately 100 children abducted by the ADF
remain missing (see Section 1.g.). The UNRF-II abducted 56 persons.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits ``any form of torture, cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment''; however, security
forces commonly beat and sometimes tortured criminal suspects, often to
force confessions. On May 17, a former security guard who was charged
with terrorist activity told a Kampala court that he was tortured by
the police at Kampala's central police station. UPDF forces in the
north on occasion beat and abused civilians, although there were
significantly fewer reports of such abuse during the year.
In January a UPDF officer in Jinja tortured a photographer who
attempted to take a picture after the officer had pointed his gun at a
civilian. The officer subsequently was arrested and detained at
Makindye barracks. In February family members found the badly mutilated
body of Patrick Ocan, who last was seen in UPDF custody. There was an
unconfirmed report that in July UPDF soldiers in Kole county, Apac
district, engaged in murder, torture, and looting (see Section 1.a.).
On October 9, police beat a man while in custody in Buwenge, Jinja
District; the man died after being released the following day.
In September antiriot police fired guns to disperse a strike
attempt at the Sugar Corporation of Uganda, although there were no
reported casualties as a result of police action (see Section 6.a.).
The police occasionally treat criminal suspects in an inhuman and
degrading manner. On May 11, a newspaper published a picture of a naked
woman being shaved forcefully by a group of men in military uniform.
Kandida Lakony subsequently claimed that she was the woman in the
picture, and that UPDF soldiers in Gulu were responsible. Kandida was
arrested in June and charged with giving false information to the
police. In highly publicized testimony in August, Kandida alleged that
during her detention she was forced to remain naked in a cell for 2
days. During the trial, army officials from the north stated that women
regularly are punished at army facilities by having their heads shaved
with blunt razors. In October a court rejected Kandida's claims, found
her guilty of giving false information to the police, and sentenced her
to 12 months' imprisonment. Her case was under appeal at year's end.
The newspaper's senior editorial staff was charged with sedition for
having printed the story (see Section 2.a.).
Muslim groups complained of extensive mistreatment by security
officials in Kampala and in the west. There were unconfirmed reports
that DMI officials tortured some Muslims detainees (see Section 1.a.).
There continued to be unconfirmed reports that UPDF mobile forces
regularly beat civilians and raped women (see Section 1.g.).
During the conflict with the LRA, government forces used threats to
compel citizens to leave their homes and move to areas under government
protection (see Sections 1.f. and 1.g.).
LDU's, which frequently lack training, often mistreat prisoners and
detainees. For example, on February 9, two teenaged girls reportedly
were raped by two LDU personnel at Kabujogera police post in Fort
Portal. The accused were arrested pending a police investigation. In
August an LDU member shot and wounded a businessman in Kisenyi, a
suburb of Fort Portal. The LDU member reportedly was apprehended and
detained by the UPDF.
The Government investigated some cases of abuse, and tried and
punished some offenders. In May the Government launched a Judicial
Commission of Inquiry into police corruption, which remained ongoing at
year's end (see Section 1.a.). TheCommission probed a wide range of
police abuses, including abuses committed by senior police officials.
The inquiry resulted in the arrests of several police officers on
charges of abuse, rape, extortion, and robbery including a police
officer accused of raping a 16-year-old girl. In September three police
officers were arrested on charges of torturing and extorting money from
persons in Mbale.
The police Human Rights Desk, established in 1998 received 620 new
complaints, including allegations of excessive force, torture, assault,
rape, and murder. Of these, 205 cases were resolved, some resulting in
disciplinary actions including reductions in rank, fines, halted
promotions, and dismissals. A total of 50 cases were referred to the
criminal courts.
In conjunction with the UHRC, the police force continued a training
program for police officials to foster respect for internationally
recognized human rights standards. The UHRC and NGO's conducted similar
programs with UPDF officials throughout the year.
The investigations into the 1997 torture of Corporal Twasha
Kaushera and the 1997 deaths by torture of Paul Kollo and Stephan
Baryakaijika were completed, and the cases were heard by the UHRC. In
February the Commission handed the cases over to the courts for
prosecution (see Section 1.a.). On March 10, the UHRC awarded $400
(600,000 shillings) to Mary Iripoit for torture, degradation, and
deprivation of her personal liberty at the hands of a former ISO
officer in Soroti in August 1998.
The ADF continued to maim civilians, and loot and burn private
homes. The LRA engaged in looting and destruction of private property.
The ADF and LRA also abducted children to be guerrillas and tortured
them by beating them, forcing them to witness atrocities, forcing them
to march until collapse, and denying them adequate food, water, or
shelter (see Section 1.g.).
There were numerous instances in which mobs attacked suspected
thieves and other offenders caught in the commission of crimes (see
Section 1.a.). Often motivated by widespread distrust of the justice
system, these mobs engaged in stonings, beatings, and other forms of
mistreatment, such as tying suspects' wrists and ankles together behind
their backs, stripping suspects of their clothes and parading them
through the streets, or forcing suspects to hop painfully on the sides
of their ankles. Vigilantes also have stripped prostitutes who dress
``indecently'' or ``provocatively.''
Urban bombings remained a problem, and resulted in numerous
casualties (see Section 1.a.). Bombs were detonated in Iganga, Busia,
Ntungamo, Makindye, a new taxi park in Kampala, and a marketplace in
Kampala, injuring numerous persons but causing no fatalities. The
Uganda Peoples Freedom Movement claimed responsibility for the nonfatal
bombing in Iganga, and the USF/A claimed responsibility for the
nonfatal bombing in Busia. The ADF is suspected of involvement in the
other bombings.
Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. Conditions
for the estimated 5,000 inmates in local police cells and in the 162
local prisons particularly were bad. Authority over the local prison
system, formerly operated by the Ministry of Local Government, was
scheduled to be transferred to the state-funded and operated prison
system, run by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1998. The transfer
had not taken place by year's end due to funding problems and lack of
enabling legislation. Both civilian and military prisons have high
mortality rates from overcrowding, malnutrition, diseases spread by
unsanitary conditions, and HIV/AIDS.
No accurate estimates are available on the number of deaths in
detention due to the harsh conditions and lack of medical care,
although many such deaths have occurred. The UHRC reported severely
inadequate medical services, seriously unhygienic conditions, and a
situation of ``semi-starvation'' among prisoners in many prisons. Of a
group of 30 persons arrested for treason in 1986 and held in Luzira
prison, 29 have died of various diseases including malaria, meningitis,
and cholera. In April a court in Masindi heard that five inmates died
in detention. There were no reports of the cause of death. On June 28,
Matia Kiwanuka Mulama, an inmate of Buikwe prison in the eastern part
of the country, reportedly was found dead after having been tortured by
the chief warden. A district police official confirmed reports that
Mulama's body was left at Kawolo hospital mortuary with its eyes gouged
out (see Section 1.a.). A police investigation was ongoing at year's
end.
The harsh conditions largely result from the Government's seriously
inadequate funding of prison facilities. Most of the prisons grow
maize, millet, and vegetables, although the UHRC accused prison farms
of overworking inmates. Prisoners received only $.0007 (1 shilling) per
day for their labor, a rate established in the early 1960's. Prison
conditions come closest to meeting minimum international standards in
Kampala, where prisons provide medical care, running water, and
sanitation;however, these prisons also are among the most overcrowded.
By one estimate, the country's prisons--all of which predate
independence in 1962--hold about three times their maximum planned
capacity. Human rights groups, including the Uganda Law Reform
Commission and the Uganda Prisoners Aid Foundation, continued to call
for expanded noncustodial sentencing--an effort generally blocked by
strongly punitive attitudes among judges, in part motivated by fear of
accusations of corruption if prisoners appear to be treated leniently.
Although the law provides for access to prisoners by their families,
ignorance of this right and fear of prison authorities often limit
family visits. The UHRC reported that it had received allegations that
officers in charge of police cells sometimes demanded bribes to allow
visits.
Women have segregated wings with female staff in most, but not all
prisons. According to human rights advocates, rape generally is not a
problem, although female prisoners also suffer from severely
substandard conditions. Due to lack of space in juvenile facilities,
juveniles often are kept in prisons with adults. The central prison
system maintains one juvenile prison and four lower security remand
homes. School facilities and health clinics in all five institutions
are defunct; prisoners as young as age 12 perform manual labor from
dawn until dusk. Severe overcrowding also is a problem at juvenile
detention facilities and in women's wings. The remand home in Kampala,
designed for 45 inmates, holds 120 children.
The central prison system continued to work with NGO's and the
donor community to improve prison buildings, water and sanitation
systems, food, and uniforms. Progress has been marginal.
Government agencies have sponsored or participated in numerous
conferences on the justice system and prison conditions, and worked
closely with international and domestic human rights organizations on
prison reform efforts.
Media access to prisons remained limited, but the Government
permitted full access to prisons by the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) and local NGO's, principally the UHRC, the Foundation
for Human Rights Initiative, and the Uganda Prisoners' Aid Foundation.
UHRC access to prison facilities initially was granted in mid-1997;
since that time, the organization has carried out numerous prison
visits and reported on its findings publicly. Prison authorities
require advance notification of visits, a process that often is subject
to administrative delays.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Members of the security
forces at times arrested and detained citizens arbitrarily. According
to the Constitution, a suspect must be charged within 48 hours of
arrest and be brought to trial or released on bail within 120 days (360
days for a capital offense). If the case has been committed to the
court before the expiration of this period, the Constitution does not
limit pretrial detention. The Constitution also provides that detainees
should be informed immediately of the reasons for their detention;
however, in practice the authorities enforced none of these procedural
protections. Some laws conflict with the Constitution, for example, the
Public Order and Security Act of 1967 (the Detention Order), which
provides for unlimited detention without charge; however, these laws
never have been invoked formally by the Government. Legal and human
rights groups, including the UHRC, sharply criticized the excessive
length of detention without trial--in many cases amounting to several
years--for alleged offenses under other laws, which both violated the
constitutional rights of the detainees and contributed substantially to
prison overcrowding.
Arbitrary arrest is a problem. In particular, arbitrary mass
arrests known as ``panda gari'' were conducted following bomb scares.
On April 28, UPDF soldiers, LDU personnel, and police arrested 200
persons in Fort Portal following an 8-hour security operation. On May
2, a combined UPDF, LDU, and police force detained approximately 500
persons in Mbarara during a security operation. On July 28,
approximately 70 persons were arrested in Kampala in a joint operation
mounted by police and LDU's. Most persons arrested were released within
24 hours.
In September President Museveni called for the arrest of homosexual
individuals who engaged in ``abominable acts'', 2 weeks after a rumored
``wedding'' between two men. Subsequently, the two men were called in
by the police for questioning. Police arrested and detained at least
one person during the year because of sexual orientation, although the
charges eventually were dismissed.
On October 28, approximately 200 people were arrested by police and
ISO officers in Kampala in order to prevent a planned strike by taxi
drivers (see Section 6.a.). All were released later.
Police at times harassed and detained journalists and opposition
politicians (see sections 2.a. and 3). In January officials detained an
opposition Member of Parliament, Wasswa Lule, afterhe made public
remarks suggesting that President Museveni should be investigated for
corruption. Lule was released the following day without charge. Also in
January, police detained for 48 hours three officials from the
Foundation for African Development during a seminar in Moyo district.
In November police briefly detained a district chair of the Uganda
Young Democrats for campaigning against the multiparty referendum. He
was released the following day without charges.
Complaints from Muslim groups regarding arrests targeted at young
Muslims on suspicion that they supported rebel groups continued during
the year. There were reports that most of the 30 to 40 Muslim men
believed to be detained at the end of 1998 were released during the
year; however, no details were available.
The rearrest of Muslim suspects following either their release on
bail or acquittal was a problem. Following their acquittal on murder
charges in June, 28 members of the Islamic Tabliq group were rearrested
and charged with the same offense. Another group of 53 treason suspects
was granted bail in June but later rearrested and detained.
On June 28, opposition politician Karuhanga Chapaa, arrested in
1998 for remarks made at a public seminar, was convicted of sedition
and sentenced to a fine of approximately $35 (50,000 shillings) (see
Section 2.a.).
Although they have no legal authority to make arrests, LDU's
continued to arrest citizens on a regular basis.
Pretrial detainees comprise nearly three-fourths of the prison
population. The average time in pretrial detention is from 2 to 3
years. Over 10,000 of the 16,000 persons being held in the central
prisons are pretrial detainees, and the problem is particularly serious
in the local government-run prisons, which hold a total of 6,649
detainees. A census of the central prison population conducted in March
indicated that at least one-sixth of the inmates were being detained
beyond constitutional limits. Congestion and delay in the legal system
have resulted in an increasing number of detainees each year. In
November more than 400 prisoners held without trial since at least 1997
staged a protest at Luzira prison in Kampala. The prisoners refused to
return to their cells until they received assurances from the director
of public prosecutions that their cases would be brought to court.
In September the Human Rights and Peace Center Prisons Project
reported that 31 Congolese and Sudanese refugees arrested in March 1997
on suspicion of aiding West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) rebels still had not
been charged with a crime (see Section 2.d.). The UHRC heard several
cases during the year brought by prisoners challenging the length of
their detention. At least one prisoner was awarded monetary
compensation for being detained beyond the constitutional limit.
NGO's monitoring prison conditions reported that, unlike in past
years, there were no detentions of civilians in military barracks;
however, security forces held civilians in unofficial, unregistered
places of remand, mostly on suspicion of collusion with rebel groups
and participation in terrorist attacks (see Section 1.c.).
The Constitution does not prohibit forced exile; however, the
Government does not use exile as a means of political control. A
presidential amnesty for former LRA and WNBF rebels was superceded in
December when Parliament enacted an amnesty law covering all current
and former rebels. In October 146 former UNRF II rebels were released
from prison.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the President has extensive legal and
extralegal powers that influence the exercise of this independence. The
President nominates, for the approval of Parliament, members of the
Judicial Service Commission, which makes recommendations on
appointments to the High Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme
Court. The courts remained understaffed and weak.
The highest court is the Supreme Court, followed by (in descending
order) the Court of Appeal (which also functions as the Constitutional
Court for cases of first instance involving constitutional issues), the
High Court, the chief magistrate's court, and local council (LC) level
three (subcounty) courts, LC level 2 (parish) courts, and LC level 1
(village) courts. A minimum of six justices may sit on the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeal or Constitutional Court. In addition
there are a few specialized courts that deal with industrial and other
matters. The Industrial Court (IC), which arbitrates labor disputes, is
structurally parallel to the chief magistrate's court. There is also a
military court system.
Although once considered a useful innovation, the LC courts often
are thought to be sources of injustice due to such factors as bribery
and male dominance in rural areas. The LC courts have authority to
settle civil disputes, including land ownership and payment of debts,
and criminal cases involving children. These courts, often the only
ones available to villagers, frequently exceed their authority by
hearing criminal cases, including murder and rape. LC court decisions
may be appealed to magistrate's courts, but often there are no records
made at the village level, and many defendants are not aware of their
right to appeal.
The civilian judicial system contains procedural safeguards,
including the granting of bail and the right of appeal to higher
courts; however, an inadequate system of judicial administration and a
lack of resources, resulting in a serious backlog of cases, have
circumscribed the right to a fair trial for many years. The courts,
like other branches of government, were impaired by a 4-year civil
service hiring freeze, which was relaxed only somewhat in 1998. As a
result, criminal cases may take 2 or more years to reach the courts.
The case backlog remains extremely large, in particular, the backlog of
criminal cases in the High Court, which has increased every year since
1993. Attorneys working in the Office of the public prosecutor can be
assigned several new cases each day. Some courts continued to observe
the constitutionally prescribed limits on pretrial detention, but that
practice was not widespread.
Many defendants cannot afford legal representation. The
Constitution requires that the Government provide an attorney for
indigent defendants accused of capital offenses, but there is rarely
enough money to retain adequate counsel. The Uganda Law Society (ULS)
operates legal aid clinics in four regional offices. It assists
military defendants as well as civilians. The local chapter of
Federacion Internacional de Abogadas (FIDA) and the Foundation for
Human Rights Initiative also practice public-interest law from offices
in Kampala. In March the Law Development Center established a legal aid
clinic to address cases involving children and those accused of petty
crimes. A public defense service also was established in March, but did
not receive any government funding. It relied solely on donor support.
The military court system does not assure the right to a fair
trial. Although the accused has the right to retain legal counsel,
military defense attorneys often are untrained and may be assigned by
the military command, which also appoints the prosecutor and the
adjudicating officer. The sentence passed by a military court, which
can include the death penalty, may be appealed to the High Command but
not to the High or Supreme Courts. A court-martial appeals process was
established in 1997.
The Government continued to arrest and charge persons for treason,
especially captured rebel fighters, in numbers greater than the
judicial system could manage. In the past, numerous human rights abuses
were committed in connection with treason cases, including political
detention, detention without charge, detention in unregistered and
unofficial places of remand, and mistreatment, including torture. There
were reports that at times such abuses continued during the year. At
the end of the year, prison officials put the number of those on remand
on the charge of treason at 309, none of whom were children. Detainees
included members of the Islamic Tabliq group suspected of supporting
ADF rebels. Between August and December, 892 suspected WNBF members
were acquitted of treason charges and released. On October 12, the
Government released, without condition, 147 persons detained since 1997
on suspicion of belonging to the rebel UNRF-II. In November more than
400 prisoners held without trial since at least 1997 held a protest at
Luzira prison (see Section 1.d.).
The number of political prisoners is unknown but believed to be
small. Bright Gabula Africa, whose death sentence for treason was
upheld by the Supreme Court in 1995, remains imprisoned pending the
outcome of his appeal to the Advisory Committee on the Prerogative of
Mercy, a largely autonomous constitutional body that recommends whether
presidential clemency powers should be exercised in a given case.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the protection of
privacy, which the Government generally observes; however, there were
some exceptions. The law requires that police have search warrants
before entering private homes or offices, and the police generally
observed this law in practice; however, in its effort to combat rebels
in the north, the UPDF often invaded private homes without warrants.
LDU's arrest citizens without authority. The police sometimes searched
vehicles without prior warrants. Prison officials routinely censor
prisoners' mail.
The Government required that employees in the President's office
register their political affiliation in writing (see Section 3).
During the conflict with the LRA, government forces used threats to
compel citizens to leave their homes and move to areas under government
protection (see Section 1.g.). Hundreds of thousands of persons remain
internally displaced as a result of rebel activity (see Section 2.d.).
There were unconfirmed reports in the north that the Sudan People's
Liberation Army (SPLA), supported by UPDF forces, forcibly recruited
Sudanese refugees for service in Sudan.
Female members of the police force are required to obtain
permission from the police Inspector General before getting married.
Male police officers are not subject to the same restriction.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--Reports of violations of humanitarian law
continued to decrease in the north, but remained a problem in the west.
In the north, government forces continued their policy of maintaining
so-called protected villages with UPDF detachments nearby as a means of
protecting civilians and denying support to the LRA. Although
substantial NGO and donor community assistance has improved the overall
conditions in the villages, conditions still remain poor. This policy
of maintaining protected villages continues to be attacked by
parliamentarians from the area, although less vehemently than before
since many persons have returned to their home villages; however, while
the UPDF did not coerce persons to remain in most protected villages,
in February two new protected villages, Patika A and Patika B, were
created near the Sudanese border and villagers in the surrounding area
were forced to evacuate their homes and move to these villages.
The UHRC opened an investigation into a 1998 incident in which UPDF
forces, while combating suspected LRA rebels, reportedly killed 30
Acholi children abducted by the LRA in Ogok village, Kitgum district.
In December the Parliament offered a 6-month amnesty to rebel
fighters. Under the terms of the amnesty, rebels would have 6 months
from the date President Museveni signed the amnesty to give themselves
up and turn in their weapons. Museveni's signature was pending at
year's end.
In the west and southwest, the ADF continued to attack civilian
targets, trading centers, and private homes, resulting in hundreds of
deaths and abductions. The ADF killed at least 350 persons and abducted
an estimated 200 children, half of whom remain missing (see Sections
1.a. and 1.b.). In May ADF rebels killed four persons in Kibale
National Park. On August 24, ADF rebels in Kabarole district killed
eight persons and kidnaped one person who remained unaccounted for at
year's end. On September 6, ADF rebels killed five persons, including a
2-year-old child, in Kabarole district. In December ADF rebels attacked
Katojo prison in the west and abducted or freed 365 prisoners. The
rebels killed five persons, including two civilians, during the attack.
Subsequently, several dozen inmates returned to the prison; it remains
unclear whether the ADF forced some prisoners to leave the prison.
In the north, forces of the LRA, led by Joseph Kony, continued to
attack civilian targets, as well as some refugee camps. After a year of
few major attacks, the LRA began a series of assaults on civilian
targets in late December. Attacks by the LRA during the year caused
about 30 deaths and the destruction of homes and property. The LRA
abducted about 250 civilians, some of whom later were released. No new
incidents of mutilation were reported. The LRA continued to abduct
children and, at clandestine bases, terrorized them into virtual
slavery as guards, concubines, and soldiers (see Sections 6.c. and
6.f.). In addition to being beaten, raped, and forced to march until
exhausted, abducted children were forced to participate in the killing
of other children who attempted to escape. UNICEF estimated the number
of abducted children still held captive by the LRA at almost 5,000;
other estimates vary widely (see Sections 1.b. and 6.f).
In March Rwandan Hutu rebels killed 19 persons, including 9 persons
who were killed in an attack in the Bwindi Impenetrable Forest national
park. UNRF-II killed 7 persons and abducted 56 civilians, mostly school
children, in an attack in Arua district in mid-January. USF/A and CAMP
each were responsible for the death of one civilian. There were no
reports of new attacks by the WNBF (see Section 1.b.).
At year's end, approximately 560,000 citizens remained displaced
internally by violence in the north and west (see Section 2.d.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights; however, there were instances in which the
Government infringed on these rights. Police at times harassed
journalists by holding them at police stations for several hours of
questioning. Three editors of the Monitor newspaper were arrested in
May and charged with sedition and publication of false news in
connection with a case in which a woman, Kandida Lakony, claimed to
have been abused by the UPDF (see Section 1.c.). Their case was pending
before the courts at year's end. A correspondent for the Luganda-
language edition of the New Vision newspaper was arrested in April
after filing a story on corruption in Bugiri district. On June 22, the
news editor of privately owned Simba radio was detained and questioned
for 4 hours by the police and Internal Security Organization operatives
after the station published stories on the murder of three Makerere
University students. In November the police detained and questioned the
editor of the Monitor and two reporters after the Monitor published a
story alleging that Angolan insurgent leader Jonas Savimbi had visited
the county.
In January officials detained an opposition Member of Parliament
after he made public remarks suggesting that President Museveni should
be investigated for corruption (see Section 1.d.). On June 28,
opposition politician Karuhanga Chapaa, arrested in 1998 for remarks
made at a public seminar, was convicted of sedition and sentenced to a
fine of approximately $35 (50,000 shillings--see Section 1.d.). In
November police briefly detained a district chair of the Uganda Young
Democrats for campaigning against the multiparty referendum (see
Section 1.d.)
The New Vision, a government-funded daily newspaper with a daily
circulation of 40,000 (and up to 10 readers sharing each copy), and the
government-controlled Radio Uganda, continued to play major roles in
the media. These news sources were of a fairly high quality and
sometimes included reporting critical of the Government.
The media generally are free and outspoken, with widespread
availability of privately owned publications. The independent Monitor
newspaper, with a daily circulation of 28,000, demonstrated strong and
consistent independence. The East African, a Nairobi, Kenya-based
weekly publication that provides extensive reporting on the country,
continued to circulate without government hindrance.
The editor of the Crusader, an independent newspaper that
subsequently went bankrupt, was detained in 1998 and charged with
``promoting sectarianism,'' following the publication of reports
critical of some government policies in the President's home tribal
area of Ankole. In November the Government withdrew the charges against
him.
The cases against journalists Muasazi-Namiti, Hassan Kato, Charles
Onyango-Obbo, and Andrew Muanda for disseminating false information
were dismissed for lack of evidence.
The Government controls one television station and Radio Uganda,
the radio station with the largest audience. At year's end, there were
more than 15 radio stations throughout the country. There are four
local television stations and more than a dozen private television
stations available via satellite. The number of independent media
broadcast sources increased during the year. Several independent media
outlets broadcast daily political talk shows in several languages,
often very critical of the Government and individual officials,
including the President. High-ranking officials often participated in
these programs and debated issues with political opponents. There was
no censorship of these programs.
The Press and Media Law, which took effect in 1995, requires
journalists to be licensed and to meet certain standards, including
holding a university degree. The law provides for a Media Council that
can suspend newspapers and deny access to state information. Government
officials do not enforce the law vigorously; 3 years after its
enactment, its provisions have not been used against any journalist.
Uncensored Internet access is widely available in major cities
through three commercial service providers, although the cost for
connectivity is prohibitive for all but the most affluent
noninstitutional users. There also are at least three cyber cafes in
Kampala and several NGO's offer Internet access.
A considerable degree of academic freedom exists at the two public
and six private universities, with no government interference in
teaching, research, or publication. Students and faculty have sponsored
wide-ranging political debates in open forums on campus.
Political education and military science courses known as ``Chaka
Mchaka'' continued during the year. These courses are criticized as
indoctrination in Movement political philosophy. There continued to be
reports that the techniques used in some of the courses included
intimidation, and physical and mental abuse. There also were reports
that some instructors demanded payment for the courses, and that
persons were coerced to take them.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for some degree of freedom of assembly for non-political
groups; however, the Government restricts this right in practice. The
Constitution bans political parties from holding national conventions,
issuing platforms, endorsing candidates, or opening branch offices
outside the capital until 2000. The Constitution also forbids other
activities that would interfere with the Movement system, an elastic
provision that the Government, in the past, has interpreted adversely
to political groups' interests. Police interfered with several seminars
organized by FAD, including one in January in Moyo district in which
three FAD officials were detained for 28 hours (see Section 1.d). On
June 5, the Free Movement, a civic organization advocating pluralism,
defied police orders not to hold an anti-referendum seminar in Mbarara.
Policemen and plainclothes security officials stormed the meeting and
ordered the organization to call it off. After a heated exchange, the
seminar was allowed to go on.
In November police briefly detained a district chair of the Uganda
Young Democrats for campaigning against the multiparty referendum (see
Section 1.d.). Nevertheless, on January 11, opposition leaders met
without hindrance in Kampala to discuss a common position on the 2000
referendum. On February 20, the Democratic Party National Council held
a meeting in Rubaga to elect new officers. On July 31 a faction of the
Uganda People's Congress Party held a national delegates conference in
Kampala without interference. On September 4, the Uganda Young
Democrats held a meeting in Jinja without interference. On November 27,
police prevented the Feparty political party from holding a rally in
Kampala; however the party was allowed to hold a rally on December 15.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
Government restricts this right in practice. NGO's are required to
register with the Nongovernmental Organizations Board, which includes
representation from the Ministry of Internal Affairs as well as other
ministries. The Government generally approves NGO registration;
however, the Government continues to refuse registration to the Uganda
National NGO Forum, a broad consortium of domestic and international
NGO's.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution protects freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
however, security forces continued to harass and detain Muslims. There
is no state religion. Foreign missionary groups, like foreign
nongovernmental organizations, must register with the Government. There
were no reports that the Government refused to grant registration to
any foreign missionary groups. Permits are necessary for the
construction of facilities, including religious facilities. There were
no reports that the Government refused to grant such permits to any
religious organization. Mosques operate freely, Koranic schools are
common, and Muslims occupy positions of authority in local and central
government. Prisoners are given the opportunity to pray on the day
appropriate to their faith. Muslim prisoners usually are released from
work duties during the month of Ramadan.
In 1998 approximately 100 Muslim men were detained and some were
tortured, on suspicion that they supported rebel groups. Many of those
detained were released, but the whereabouts of some remain unknown (see
Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.d.). There was no clear indication that
religion was the sole factor in their arrests.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice,
although there were some limits. Some local officials reportedly
demanded payment of fees for permission to change a place of residence.
A married woman must obtain her husband's written permission on her
passport application if children are traveling on her passport (see
Section 5).
During the conflict with the LRA, government forces used threats to
compel citizens to leave their homes and move to areas under government
protection (see sections 1.f. and 1.g.).
At year's end, approximately 560,000 citizens remained displaced
internally by violence in the north and west.
There are no laws that provide for the granting of refugee and
asylee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol;
however, the Government does grant such status in practice. The
Government cooperates with the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and with other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees. As it has done repeatedly in past years, the Government
continued to provide first asylum as well as land for temporary
resettlement to citizens from neighboring countries, extending this
practice to approximately 196,000 refugees during the year, including
Sudanese, Congolese, Rwandans, and Somalis. The majority of refugees
continue to be from southern Sudan, but there are smaller numbers from
other neighboring countries as well. In early January, UPDF troops in
Kisoro district forcibly repatriated several hundred refugees out of a
group of approximately 3,000 Congolese Hutu refugees (see Section
1.d.).
The Government maintained security in refugee camps during the
year. While there were no reports of large-scale attacks by rebel
groups on the camps, there were several instances of attacks and
abductions by rebels directed at refugees, causing serious injuries and
death. For example, on June 4, suspected LRA rebels abducted 30
refugees from the Mahazi refugee camp in Adjumani district. On June 10,
ADF rebels abducted at least 15 Ugandan refugees from Manipopia village
in north Kivu, Congo (see Section 1.g.).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Movement domination of the Government and the political process,
and some restrictive constitutional provisions, limited citizens'
effective exercise of the right to change their government. The
President dominates the Government, and Movement supporters remained in
control of the Parliament, although the legislature conducted business
in a more independent and assertive manner during the year. The 1996
presidential and parliamentary elections were peaceful and orderly, but
election conditions, including restrictions on political party
activities, led to a flawed election process.
The Government maintained, at government expense, the Movement
Secretariat, an organization that roughly parallels government
institutions and is limited to those professing support for the
Movement. Political education classes called Chaka Mchaka continued to
be offered to the public (see Section 2.a.). The Government prohibited
all non-Movement political gatherings, required that employees in the
President's office register their political affiliation in writing (see
Section 1.f.), and attempted to break up political meetings not
sanctioned by the Movement (see Section 2.b.). The Constitution bans
political parties from holding national conventions, issuing platforms,
endorsing candidates, or opening offices outside of the capital. A
referendum is scheduled to be held in 2000 to consider lifting these
restrictions.
Authorities at times harassed and arrested opposition politicians.
In January officials detained an opposition Member of Parliament after
he made public remarks suggesting that President Museveni should be
investigated for corruption (see Section 1.d.). On June 28, opposition
politician Karuhanga Chapaa, arrested in 1998 for remarks made at a
public seminar, was convicted of sedition (see Section 1.d.). In
November police briefly detained a district chair of the Uganda Young
Democrats for campaigning against the multiparty referendum (see
Section 1.d.)
Universal suffrage is accorded to adults 18 years of age and older.
Contrary to the Constitution, the right to vote was denied to prisoners
in the 1998 local government elections. Ten seats in Parliament are
reserved for members of the UPDF.
The Constitution provides for five seats in Parliament for
representatives of persons with disabilities, as well as five seats for
youth representatives, and three seats for representatives of organized
labor (see Section 5). Individual parliamentarians who claim non-
Movement party affiliation fully participate in the legislature.
Women play a visible role in national affairs; however, they are
underrepresented in government and politics. The Government used quotas
in an aggressive effort to place women in positions of authority. Women
continued to make stronger contributions in Parliament and inside the
Movement. The Vice President is a woman, as are 5 ministers and 11
junior ministers in the President's 60-member Cabinet. In addition, 39
of the nation's 45 districts selected a woman to fill a National
Assembly seat reserved for women by the provisions of the Constitution.
By-elections for female parliamentarians have not yet been held in six
new districts created in 1997. Women additionally won 6 nonreserved
seats for the 276-member Parliament in the 1996 election.
Five seats are reserved in Parliament for the disabled.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Numerous human rights groups are active. Among them are: The
Foundation for Human Rights Initiative; a chapter of FIDA; the
Prisoners' Aid Foundation, which monitors prison conditions; the
National Organization for Civic Education and Election Monitoring,
which deals with problems related to civil society and political
rights; Human Rights Focus, based in the northern town of Gulu; the
National Association of Women's Organizations of Uganda (NAWOU), an
umbrella group; the International Federation of Human Rights; and the
Human Rights and Peace Center, based at Makerere University. These
groups operate without government restriction, investigating and
publishing their findings on human rights cases. Hurinet, a human
rights network and an umbrella organization for nine human rights
organizations active in the country, also continued to be active.
The Government continued to refuse registration to the Uganda
National NGO Forum, a broad consortium of domestic and international
NGO's (see Section 2.b.).
The Government allowed visits by international human rights NGO's,
including Amnesty International and the ICRC. The Government also
cooperated with the UNHCR.
Government officials generally were cooperative and responsive to
NGO views. They frequently attended conferences and seminars hosted by
NGO's on social problems. The Government continued to cooperate with
NGO's on legal and prison reforms.
The Constitution established the UHRC as a permanent independent
body with quasijudicial powers. Under the Constitution, the UHRC may
subpoena information and order the release of detainees and the payment
of compensation for abuses. The UHRC Human Rights Court continued to
function, and received 1260 complaints during the year, including ones
in which the accused were senior government leaders and military and
police officials. Of these complaints, 913 were resolved; 276 were
referred to the criminal courts; 400 were referred to other bodies,
such as the Inspector General of Government; 171 were dismissed because
they occurred before 1995; 22 were found not to be human rights
violations; and 44 were resolved through mediation and intervention. At
year's end, 100 cases were under review and 122 still were pending at
year's end. On March 10, the UHRC awarded $400 (600,000 shillings) to
Mary Iripoit for torture, degradation, and deprivation of her personal
liberty at the hands of a former ISO officer in Soroti in August 1998.
The UHRC does not have the power to intervene in cases pending before a
court. The UHRC inspected numerous detention facilities and publicly
reported on its findings. The UHRC's 1998 report was submitted as
required by law to the Speaker of Parliament; however, it did not
release it publicly by year's end. The President appoints the UHRC's
eight-member board.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on these factors;
however, the Government does not enforce the law effectively in matters
of locally or culturally accepted discrimination against women,
children, people with disabilities, or certain ethnic groups. Race was
not a factor in national politics. The continued instability in the
north led to violations of the rights of some Acholi, an ethnic group
that comprises a significant part of the population. Most violations of
Acholi rights resulted from LRA actions.
Women.--Violence against women, including rape, remained common.
There are no laws that specifically protect women from battery,
although there is a general law concerning assault. The Government
continued to implement the Children's Statute, which provides extensive
protection for families and children; however, implementation proved
exceedingly difficult due to manpower and judicial constraints, and in
reality, little was done to enforce the statute's provisions. Law
enforcement officials, reflecting general public opinion, continued to
view wife beating as a husband's prerogative and rarely intervened in
cases of domestic violence. Women remained more likely to sue for
divorce than to file assault charges against their husbands. These
problems received growing public attention. Numerous women's rights
NGO's sponsored conferences, empowerment sessions, and training
programs throughout the country. In a prominent 1997 case in which an
Asian woman, Renu Joshi, allegedly was murdered by her relatives,
including her husband, court proceedings had not concluded by year's
end. Her husband (the principal defendant), remained on remand awaiting
trial at year's end. Public protests were instrumental in keeping him
in remand. Delays in bringingcapital offense cases to trial in
situations where a husband killed his wife remained common (see Section
1.d.).
Traditional and widespread societal discrimination against women
continued, especially in rural areas, despite constitutional provisions
to the contrary. Many customary laws discriminate against women in the
areas of adoption, marriage, divorce, and inheritance. In most areas,
women may not own or inherit property, nor retain custody of their
children under local customary law. Divorce law sets stricter
evidentiary standards for women to prove adultery. Polygyny is legal
under both customary and Islamic law, and a wife has no legal status to
prevent her husband from marrying another woman. Men also may
``inherit'' the widows of their deceased brothers. Women do most of the
agricultural work but own only 7 percent of the agricultural land.
There are limits on a married woman's ability to travel abroad with her
children (see Section 2.d.).
Unlike their male counterparts, female members of the police force
are required to obtain permission from the police Inspector General
before getting married (see Section 1.f.).
There are active women's rights groups, including FIDA, Action for
Development, the National Association of Women Judges (NAWJ), Akina
Mama Wa Afrika, the Forum for Women in Democracy, and NAWOU, which
promote greater awareness of the rights of women and children. FIDA is
in the 2nd year of a 3-year project to draft proposed reforms of
outdated and discriminatory laws, and the NAWJ continued to disseminate
its guidebook on women's rights and options concerning domestic
violence to women throughout the country.
An undetermined number of women were victims of abduction and rape
by rebel forces (see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.).
Children.--Although it has devoted only limited funds to children's
welfare, the Government demonstrated a commitment to improving
children's welfare. The Universal Primary Education (UPE) program
continued to expand its reach. The program is intended to provide free
education through seventh grade for a maximum of four children per
family. The UPE program remains only partially implemented due to
strained finances, instability in some areas, infrastructure problems,
and inadequate teacher training. Although the UPE program makes
education more accessible financially, parents still must pay for
books, uniforms, and some school costs. Implementation of the UPE has
caused some financial problems for the country's large, often
polygynous families. Girls and boys theoretically have equal access to
education, and lower grades are divided almost evenly by sex; however,
the proportion of girls in higher school grades remains low since
families traditionally have favored boys when making financially
related educational decisions. Only 53 percent of females are literate
compared with 61 percent of males. Parents' inability to afford
schooling has correlated highly with the occurrence of child labor in
rural areas (see Section 6.d.). About 55 percent of school-age children
are in school.
The Government has not yet implemented effectively the 1996
Children's Statute, which outlines broad protection for children.
Government efforts to enforce the statute's provisions were hampered by
the large proportion of the population that is below 18, manpower and
fiscal constraints on the judiciary, and cultural norms. The law
stipulates parents' responsibilities and provides extensive protection
for children in a wide variety of areas, including financial support,
foster care placement, adoption, determination of parentage, and
treatment of children charged with offenses. It also includes concise
provisions on the rights of the child, including a provision that a
child shall not be made to work or take part in any activity, whether
for pay or not, that is likely to injure the child's health, education,
or mental, physical, or moral development. However, the Government has
been unable to enforce prohibitions on child labor, particularly in the
informal sector (see Section 6.d.).
Estimates place the number of orphaned children (children missing
either parent are considered orphans) at up to 1.7 million. This large
number of orphans resulted from previous civil wars, the internal
displacement of persons, and HIV/AIDS.
Child abuse remained a serious problem, particularly the rape of
young girls (known locally as ``defilement''). Only a small fraction of
these incidents is reported, especially when the perpetrator is a
family member, neighbor, or teacher--as is often the case. Increasing
numbers of accusations reach the courts, although neither conviction
nor punishment was common. Cases were reported frequently in
newspapers, but a payment to the girl's parents often ended the matter.
Despite these obstacles, an increasing number of cases are being
prosecuted. While defilement carries a maximum sentence of death, that
punishment has never been meted out to a convicted rapist. Defilement
applies to all cases of sexual contact outside of marriage involving
girls younger than 18 years of age, regardless ofconsent or the age of
the perpetrator. The marriage of young girls by parental arrangement is
common, especially in rural areas.
Most schools use corporal punishment, although in 1997 the
Government banned the beating of secondary school students. On June 27,
a 14-year-old student, Peter Masanja of Kakungulu Memorial Islamic
Institute, died at Kibuli hospital in Kampala after a beating by the
school's director, Hamidulah Llukwago. The case was being investigated
at year's end. The Government did not release details of the
investigation of a 1996 case in which a teacher in Masaka beat to death
a 15-year-old student.
Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is practiced only by the Sabiny tribe, located in
the highly rural Kapchorwa district in the east, whose members number
fewer than 10,000. Among the Sabiny, initiation ceremonies involving
FGM have been carried out every 2 years for girls between the ages of
14 and 16 years. Such a ceremony was held in 1998. An NGO based in
Kapchorwa registered 965 females who were subjected to FGM in 1998,
nearly double the figure that the Government reported in 1996. There is
no law against the practice, but government and women's groups working
with the U.N. Population Fund continue to carry out a program to combat
the practice through education. The program has received strong
government support and some support from local Kapchorwa leaders. The
program emphasizes close cooperation with traditional authority figures
and peer counseling. Significant press attention to these ongoing
efforts brought public attention to the problem throughout the year.
The Children's Statute provides that children with disabilities be
treated and given necessary special facilities--a provision hampered in
execution by inadequate funding.
The legal recruitment age for military service is 18 years;
however, in practice, some recruiters have allowed 17-year-olds to
enlist.
The ADF and LRA abducted many children, using them as guards,
laborers, soldiers, and, in the case of the LRA, for forced sex. (see
Sections 1.g., 6.c., and 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that persons
with disabilities have ``a right to respect and human dignity'' and
requires that authorities take appropriate measures ``to ensure that
they realize their full mental and physical potential;'' however,
despite this provision, there is no statutory requirement for
government services or facilities, such as accessibility of buildings
for the disabled. Most buildings have one story, but in larger towns
with multistory buildings, there often are no elevators; even where
they do exist, they rarely are reliable. Widespread discrimination by
society and employers limits job and educational opportunities for
those with physical disabilities. In 1998 the Government appointed a
Minister of State for Disabled Persons. A Department for Disabled
Persons also exists under the Ministry of Gender, Labor, and Social
Development; however, these bodies and positions have little funding to
undertake or support any initiatives.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Civil strife in the north led
to the violation of the rights of members of the Acholi tribe, which is
largely resident in the northern districts of Gulu and Kitgum. Both
government forces and the LRA rebels--who themselves largely are
Acholi--committed abuses. LRA fighters in particular were implicated in
the killing and kidnaping of Acholi tribe members, although the number
and severity of their attacks decreased greatly compared with 1998 (see
Section 1.g.). Similar abuses were inflicted upon members of the
Bakonjo tribe in the west at the hands of ADF rebels, including ethnic
Bakonjo.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of every person to join workers' associations or trade unions,
and the law allows unionization if a majority of the work force
supports it. In practice the Government respects the right to form
unions; however, the Government has not responded yet to a 1997
application for registration by the Uganda Allied Teachers' Union.
Since 1993 the right to form unions has extended to civil servants;
however, many ``essential'' government employees are not permitted to
form unions; these include police, army, permanent secretaries in the
ministries, heads of departments and state-owned enterprises, school
principals, and other management-levelofficials. The Government has
failed to enforce the rights of some employees to join unions in
recently privatized industries and factories. Organized labor has three
reserved parliamentary seats.
The National Organization of Trade Unions (NOTU), the largest labor
federation, includes 17 unions and is independent of the Government and
political parties. Among its members are medical workers, including
doctors, and the civil service union. The NOTU's influence on the
overall economy remains small, since about 90 percent of the work force
are peasant farmers. Even in areas in which cash crops are significant,
unionization has remained practically nonexistent. NOTU membership has
declined steadily from some 500,000 in the 1970's to about 100,000.
The Constitution confirms the right to strike; however, government
policy requires that labor and management make ``every effort'' to
reconcile labor disputes before resorting to strike action. This
directive presents unions with a complicated set of restrictions. If
reconciliation does not appear to be possible, labor must submit its
grievances and notice to strike to the Minister of Labor, who usually
delegates the dispute to the Industrial Court. In previous years, in
the absence of verdicts from the IC, the Minister of Labor generally
did not permit strikes, on the basis that ``every effort'' had not been
exhausted. Frustrated laborers often went on strike anyway, protesting
credibly that they were not paid a wage adequate to live on.
There was one particularly notable strike action during the year.
On August 18, workers at the Owens Falls dam in Jinja struck over the
nonpayment of termination benefits and their employer's refusal to
renew the wage structure. In addition, on August 20, a combined force
of military police, national police, and Jinja district administration
police broke up the strike. An attempt in September to organize a
strike at the Sugar Corporation of Uganda was unsuccessful due to the
intervention of antiriot police who fired guns to disperse strikers,
although there were no casualties as a result of police action (see
Section 1.c.). Workers organized a brief sitdown strike at UGMA
Engineering also in September. On October 28, approximately 200 people
were arrested by police and ISO officers in Kampala in order to prevent
a planned strike by taxi drivers. All were later released.
Labor unions freely exercised the right to affiliate with and
participate in regional and international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively, specifying
that a workplace may be unionized if a majority of the employees
supports doing so; however, true collective bargaining takes place only
in the small private sector of the modern economy, a situation that
suffered setbacks during the year. In the modern sector, the Government
is by far the largest employer (civil service and state-owned
enterprises) and it dominates the bargaining process. The Government
has adopted a tripartite (government-employers-labor) cooperative
approach to setting wages and resolving labor disputes. Both the
Government and employers may refer disputes to the IC. The law does not
prohibit antiunion discrimination by employers, but there were no
reported incidents of government harassment of union officials.
Unionization was blocked effectively by some industries, especially in
the textile and hotel sectors. Labor organizers complained that laws
requiring a minimum of 1,000 persons in order to form a union hindered
their activities. The Government took only limited action on organized
labor complaints, but pointed out that the refusal to allow
unionization is a constitutional violation. In January the Government
facilitated consultations that led one of the largest construction
firms to agree to allow their employees to form unions. However, in
January in conjunction with the International Labor Organization (ILO),
the Uganda Textile, Garments, Leather, and Allied Union filed a
complaint against the Government for failure to support the attempts of
workers in the textile sector to exercise their right to freedom of
association.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or bonded labor, including forced or bonded labor by children;
however, a lack of resources prevented the Government from enforcing
this prohibition effectively. There is strong evidence that prison
officials hired out prisoners to work on private farms and construction
sites, where they often were overworked. Throughout the country, prison
officials routinely augmented their meager pay with crops grown by
prisoners on the prison grounds. Male prisoners performed arduous
physical labor while female prisoners produced marketable handicrafts
such as woven basketry. Children in prison perform manual labor, often
12 hours per day (see Section 1.c.). Compensation, when paid, generally
was very low, although the law demands that pretrial detainees must
receive back pay for allwork that they have performed once they are
released (see Section 1.c.).
Both the ADF and the LRA abducted civilians for training as
guerrillas; most victims were children and young adults, whom the ADF
and LRA terrorized into virtual slavery as guards, laborers, soldiers,
and, in the case of the LRA, as sex slaves (see Sections 1.b., 1.g.,
and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits employers from hiring workers below the
age of 18; however, child labor is common, especially in the informal
sector. The Ministry of Social Services is charged with enforcing the
law on child labor, but it has limited financial means to do so. Part
of the problem is demographic, because half the population is under 18
years of age. School fees have made it impossible for many parents--
particularly poor farmers, the majority of the population--to provide
their children with an education in spite of the Government's UPE
program (see Section 5). As a result, there is an incentive to leave
school and go into agricultural or domestic work in order to help meet
expenses or perform the work of absent or infirm parents, a common
situation throughout the country. The problem is acute particularly
among the large orphan population (see Section 5). Nevertheless,
according to the Ministry of Education, 93 percent of school age
children are in school.
Most working children are employed in the informal sector, often on
the subsistence farms of extended family members or as domestic
servants. In urban areas, children peddle small items on the streets,
are involved in the commercial sex industry (particularly in border
towns and in Kampala), or beg for money. Although adults do most tea
harvesting, some children were employed in this sector as well.
It is estimated that 60 percent of all land-based trade in the
country is informal. Smuggling is one of the larger informal
industries, and employs large numbers of child laborers at the borders
with Kenya and Tanzania. Children walk back and forth across the
unguarded borders, transporting small amounts of fuel, sugar, coffee,
or other commodities.
Government efforts to decrease the incidence of child labor were
boosted by a $1.5 million grant in 1998 from the ILO International
Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC).
The IPEC program was launched in July, and at the end of the year
it was working with NGO's to formulate action proposals. Government
officials acknowledged that for the IPEC to be implemented, continued
judicial and law enforcement reform were needed.
The recruitment age for military service is 18 years; however, in
practice, some recruiters have allowed 17-year-olds to enlist (see
Section 5).
The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, a
lack of resources prevented the Government from enforcing this
prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.). The ADF and LRA abducted
children and terrorized them into virtual slavery as guards, laborers,
soldiers, and, in the case of the LRA, as sex slaves.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum legal wage remained
$4 (6,000 shillings) per month, a rate set in the early 1960's. This
wage is insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family. Wages continued to be determined through negotiation
between individuals and their employers, unions, and proprietors, or
through negotiation within the boards of directors at state-owned
industries. Salaries usually are augmented by other benefits such as
housing and transport allowances, which often are equal to base wages.
The Ministry of Labor's salary scale for civil servants starts with
unskilled labor at $50 (75,000 shillings) per month, up to supervisors
at $400 (600,000 shillings) per month, plus modest increases for years
worked. All include provisions for paid overtime. The higher end of
this wage scale would provide minimal standards of living for a worker
and family, but most civil servants have great difficulty earning
enough money to pay their children's school costs. Many civil servants
and their dependents work in second jobs, grow their own food, or seek
other ways to supplement their incomes. In industries that employ
workers on an hourly basis, the normal workweek was 40 hours. Although
there was no legal maximum workweek, a time-and-a-half rate was paid
for each additional hour worked. Many industries pay workers by piece
work, which avoids overtime and circumvents the prohibition on child
labor. Many companies employ workers as ``casual laborers'' or
``contract workers'' in order to avoid providing benefits.
The condition of employee housing on the tea and sugar plantations
at the major state-owned corporations, and withinmilitary and police
barracks, was substandard. Sanitation and water facilities often are
lacking.
Building codes often are not enforced. Some structures have tripled
in height above the original foundations, leading local engineers to
express reservations about the structural integrity of these
workplaces. Factories generally are sound, but machinery almost always
lacks safeguards.
Vestiges of occupational health and safety legislation are
contained in the outdated Factories Act of 1954, the Workmen's
Compensation Act of 1964, and the Employment Decree of 1975. None of
these acts addresses present-day work hazards. The Ministry of Labor's
Department of Occupational Health is responsible for enforcement of the
limited occupational safety regulations; however in practice
inspections are rare, due primarily to lack of vehicles and funding for
inspection trips. Under the law, the maximum award payable in workers'
compensation to a disabled employee, or to the estate of employees
killed on the job is $38 (55,000 shillings). Ministry of Labor
officials recognized the inadequacy of this amount; however, new
legislation to address this problem has yet to be passed. The limited
occupational safety regulations do not protect workers who refuse to
perform dangerous work from being fired, although strong unions in
certain dangerous industries do protect such workers.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons; however, there is strong evidence that prison officials hired
out prisoners to work on private farms and construction sites, where
they often were overworked.
There were unconfirmed reports that the SPLA, supported by UPDF
forces, forcibly recruited Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda for
service in Sudan (see Section 1.f.).
Both the ADF and the LRA abducted civilians for training as
guerrillas; most victims were children and young adults whom the ADF
and LRA terrorized into virtual slavery as guards, laborers, soldiers,
and, in the case of the LRA, as sex slaves (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
In addition to being beaten, raped, and forced to march until
exhausted, children abducted by the LRA were forced to participate in
the killing of other children who attempted to escape. As many as 5,000
Ugandan children abducted by the LRA were held in the southern part of
Sudan: The Government of Sudan actively supports the LRA. In past
years, the LRA also reportedly sold and traded some children, mostly
girls, or provided them as gifts to arms dealers in Sudan.
In December in Nairobi, Kenya, the Governments of both Sudan and
Uganda signed an accord agreeing, among other things, to cease
supporting rebel groups and to return abductees; however, it was not
clear at year's end if the accord still was in effect due to the LRA
excursion into Uganda from Sudan in late December.
______
ZAMBIA
Zambia is a republic governed by a president and a unicameral
national assembly. After two decades of one-party rule, free and fair
multiparty elections in November 1991 resulted in the victory of the
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) and the election of President
Frederick J.T. Chiluba, a former trade unionist. In November 1996
elections, President Chiluba was reelected, and his party won 131 of
150 seats in the National Assembly. Constitutional amendments enacted
in May 1996 disqualified the former President, Kenneth Kaunda, the main
opposition leader, from seeking the presidency, prompting his United
National Independence Party (UNIP) to boycott the elections. The MMD's
use of government resources, including the state-owned media, put the
fairness of the elections into question, although, despite some voting
irregularities, there was no evidence of substantial or widespread vote
rigging or vote counting fraud. The Constitution mandates an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected this
provision in practice; however, the judicial system is hampered by lack
of resources and inefficiency.
The police, divided into regular and paramilitary units operating
under the Ministry of Home Affairs, have primary responsibility for
maintaining law and order. Police action generally was not politicized.
The Zambia Intelligence Security Service, under the Office of the
President, is responsible for intelligence and internal security.
Police continued to commit numerous, and at times serious, human rights
abuses.
The Government continued its free market economic reform program.
However, difficulties in privatizing major portions of the parastatal
copper mines contributed to negative economic performance, including
stagnation and increasing inflation. Balance of payments support by
foreign donors resumed as a result of greater government attention to
governance issues. Approximately 70 percent of all citizens live in
extreme poverty.
The Government's human rights record was generally poor; although
the Government took steps to address some human rights problems,
serious abuses continued in several areas. Citizens' right to change
their government was restricted in the 1996 national elections, the
last time national elections were held the police committed
extrajudicial killings, and police officers routinely beat and
otherwise abused criminal suspects and detainees. A lack of
professionalism and discipline in the police force remains a serious
problem and officers who commit such abuses do so with impunity. Prison
conditions are harsh and life threatening. A government commission of
inquiry, established in 1998 to investigate the alleged torture during
detention of suspects in a 1997 coup attempt, began work in November.
Arbitrary arrests, prolonged detention, and long delays in trials
remain problems. Police infringed on citizens' privacy rights. On at
least one occasion, the Government infringed on freedom of the press,
and it continued to control two of the country's three daily
newspapers, contrary to its 1991 campaign promise to privatize
government-owned mass media. In rare instances, the Government
restricted citizens' right of peaceful assembly and association, and in
a few instances limited freedom of movement. Human rights and civic
organizations and political parties continued to complain of government
harassment. Violence against women remained widespread. Women continued
to experience discrimination in both law and fact, including the denial
of widows' inheritance rights. Discrimination against the disabled is a
problem. Child labor is a problem in rural subsistence occupations and
some urban occupations.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by government officials during the year,
but police continued to use excessive force that at times resulted in
extrajudicial killings. Police committed at least half a dozen
extrajudicial killings. For example, in March Khondwani Musukwa died in
police custody, apparently as a result of torture. Police reportedly
were attempting to obtain information about associates of Musukwa
believed to have been involved in a crime. No action was taken against
the officers responsible for Musukwa's death. In July Sailas Mabvuto
Lungu reportedly was beaten to death by a police constable who
suspected him of driving a stolen vehicle. The officer was in detention
and awaiting trial at year's end. In August a pregnant woman died in
police custody. Police reportedly detained her in an attempt to
determine the whereabouts of her husband. The woman is believed to have
died as a result of abuse while in police custody; there was no
judicial action against the police.
A large number of prison inmates died due to illness and harsh
conditions (see Section 1.c.).
In May 1998, seven police officers of Mindolo police station in
Kitwe were arrested in connection with the death in custody of Steward
Mwantende, who they picked up in connection with suspected
housebreaking. During interrogation police reportedly beat and burned
Mwantende by lighting a fire under his legs. Mwantende died from his
injuries. The police officers were arrested and a trial continued and
did not conclude during the year (see Section 1.c.).
In November 1998, police killed eight persons in the aftermath of
the murder of former Finance Minister Ronald Penza. Police claimed that
the eight were Penza's attackers; however, it was unclear whether
Penza's attackers were among those killed by the police. The body of
one of the eight showed evidence of torture before death; others were
shot during arrest attempts. One police officer was charged with three
counts of murder, convicted, and was sentenced in March to 15 years'
imprisonment. Two other officers were arrested, but subsequently were
released; no displinary action against the officer was reported.
A police officer responsible for the 1998 shooting deaths of Theo
Mijoni and Felix and Sydney Chtama was acquitted in November on the
grounds that he was performing his duty and had not deliberately killed
Mijoni and the Chtamas.
In January the Government decided to compensate the families who
had lost houses in 1995 when army recruits destroyed 100 houses and
killed 2 persons in a village. Each family was to receive a sum
equivalent to about $40 (100,000 kwacha). The recruits reportedly were
dispersed to various units without disciplinary or judicial action.
On November 3, four gunmen shot and killed Wezi Kaunda, the son of
former President Kenneth Kaunda, in Lusaka. One suspect was arrested;
the investigation was ongoing at year's end.
In February a bomb killed a security guard at the Angolan Embassy
in Lusaka; 10 other bomb explosions occurred in the capital on the same
day.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances caused by government officials.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, police
regularly used excessive force when apprehending, interrogating, and
detaining criminal suspects (or their relatives or associates) or
illegal aliens. In most such instances, detaining officers beat
suspects and generally were not disciplined or arrested for such acts.
In March a young man detained with a group of women from the
National Pressure Group was beaten while in police custody at the
Woodlands Police Station in Lusaka (see Section 1.d.).
In June Cedrick and Mary Phiri, who were attempting to determine
the whereabouts of Phiri's brother-in-law, were taken into custody by
police in the Matero district. They were detained overnight, during
which time Cedrick was beaten with a monkeywrench on the head and back
(see Section 1.d.) and later released without being charged.
In September officers of the Emmasdale police station beat Benson
Mwale repeatedly on the buttocks; subsequently, he required medical
attention for severe lacerations. The police were attempting to force
him to disclose information relating to thefts of car windshields. In
September a file on the incident was opened by the Permanent Human
Rights Commission (PHRC), which also encouraged Mwale to sue the police
officers in their individual capacities. The police command said that
it would punish all officers involved in the incident. Later in
September, a "docket of complaint against police" was opened to
investigate the matter. This docket is process through which the public
can raise complaints against a police officer in order that legal
procedures can be instituted. No police officers were punished by
year's end.
In May 1998, seven police officers of Mindolo police station in
Kitwe were arrested in connection with the death in custody and torture
of Steward Mwantende. A trial continued and did not conclude during the
year (see Section 1.a.).
In 1997 the PHRC confirmed that police tortured seven of the
persons detained after the October 1997 coup attempt. There were
reports that state agents tortured two of the seven in order to make
them falsely implicate former President Kaunda and other politicians in
the coup attempt. In March 1998, the HRC urged the Government to hold
an inquiry into these incidents of torture. Foreign governments,
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), and other human rights
organizations also pressed the Government to investigate these
incidents of torture and to bring charges against those responsible.
Early in 1998, one of the alleged torturers was promoted.
In May 1998, the Government agreed to initiate an independent
inquiry into torture claims by the October 1997 coup attempt detainees,
and in August 1998 established a commission of inquiry made up of
treason trial judge Japhet Banda and Lusaka principal resident
magistrate Gertrude Chawatama. Due to judge Banda's treason trial
obligations, the torture inquiry could not begin until the treason
trial concluded on September 17. President Chiluba appointed two
additional members and a deputy secretary to the commission of inquiry
in September. The Commission began work in November through a series of
public hearings; such hearings continued through year's end.
The Government further promised to institute measures to monitor
continuously and reform police operations to ensure that civil
liberties are protected. It further directed the police, prisons, and
immigration departments to intensify human rights training among their
officers, which has been part of their basic training since 1997. The
Government took no action on its statements in 1998 that it would amend
the Police Act to provide for the establishment of a police complaints
authority to which members of the public could channel complaints
pertaining to police harassment and abuse.
In September the Government attempted to exclude the assistant
commissioner of police and the Drug Enforcement Commission deputy
commissioner from a lawsuit filed by opposition politician Dean
Mung'omba for torture while he was detained in the aftermath of the
1997 coup attempt. The Government stated that the two officials should
not be included in the suit because they were exercising their normal
duties under the direction of the Attorney General; however, a High
Court judge ruled that the two could be sued in their individual
capacties.
Police corruption is also a problem. There were a handful of
unconfirmed reports that police would release prisoners in exchange for
a bribe of between $100 and $150 (200,000 to 300,000 kwacha). Citizens
in private debt disputes often are detained by police in exchange for a
portion of the payment owed (see Section 1.d.). Police sometimes
committed extortion at roadblocks (see Section 2.d.) or required
document processing ``fees'' or gas money in order to commence
investigations.
The police undertake investigations of instances of police use of
excessive force and have disciplined officers found to have committed
human rights abuses. Such investigations generally are prolonged, and
outcomes are not readily apparent. Middle ranking and senior officers
are enrolled in human rights training seminars at the police academy. A
number of police officers are the subject of internal investigations
and prosecutions. Authorities arrested some police officers on such
criminal charges as murder and robbery.
In February the Government removed its reservation and ratified the
U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. At year's end, the Government had not
disciplined or prosecuted any of the individuals allegedly involved in
the torture of persons detained in connection with the 1997-98 state of
emergency.
In March unidentified assailants fired shots at a car belonging to
former President Kaunda, who was not in the vehicle.
Prison conditions are harsh and life threatening. According to
official statistics, prisons designed to hold 6,000 prisoners held over
12,000. This severe overcrowding, combined with poor sanitation,
inadequate medical facilities, meager food supplies, and lack of
potable water resulted in serious outbreaks of dysentery and other
diseases, including tuberculosis. In a report submitted to Parliament
in 1996, the Commissioner of Prisons said that 975 prisoners had died
in prison between January 1991 and December 1995 due to illness and
harsh conditions. The death rate of prison inmates remained about the
same during the year. The Commissioner of Prisons has submitted no
further such reports since 1996.
In March the Commissioner of Prisons attributed the serious
overcrowding in prisons to the slow pace at which the courts dispose of
cases. The Commissioner noted that some cases have been pending since
1991. According to the Commissioner, one judge had 50 cases pending,
while the magistrate courts had 749 cases pending.
The Magistrates and Judges' Association of Zambia expressed its
intention in March to undertake efforts to release all eligible
detainees on bail in order to reduce prison congestion. According to
the Association, Kamwala Remand Prison in Lusaka contained 636 inmates,
although it had been designed to hold only 200.
The PHRC announced in July that it would employ prison inspectors
to ensure that inmates are kept in habitable environments.
The Government generally permits prison visits by both domestic and
international monitors and by resident diplomats.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention are still problems. Criminal suspects often are arrested on
the basis of flimsy evidence or an uncorroborated accusation. Family
members or associates of criminal suspects were detained, interrogated,
and physically abused by the authorities in attempts to identify or
locate suspects. In criminal cases, the law requires that a detainee be
charged and brought before a magistrate within 24 hours. Attorneys and
family members are allowed access to pretrial detainees. In practice
the authorities hold most detainees for more than 1 month from
commission of an offense to first appearance before a magistrate. In
many cases, an additional period of 6 months elapses before a
magistrate commits the defendant to the High Court for trial. Following
committal, preparation of the magistrate court record for transmittal
to the High Court takes months, or in some cases as long as a year.
Once a case reaches the High Court for trial, court proceedings last an
average of 6 months.
Pretrial detention often is prolonged. Approximately 2,000 out of
12,000 prisoners are awaiting trial on criminal charges. In some cases
defendants have been awaiting trial for as long as 4 years. There was
some progress in holding trials; in past years, some defendants had
waited for as long as 10 years for their trials. These long delays were
a result of inadequate resources, inefficiency, lack of trained
personnel, and broad rules of procedure that give wide latitude to
prosecutors and defense attorneys to request adjournments. The High
Court Commissioner can release detainees if police fail to bring the
case to trial, although that did not occur in any case during the year.
Although there is a functioning bail system, overcrowded prisons
reflect in part the large number of detainees charged with serious
offenses for which bail is not granted. These include treason, murder,
aggravated robbery, and violations of narcotics laws. There were no
cases of constitutional bail. Indigent detainees and defendants rarely
have the means to post bail. The Government's legal aid office is
responsible for providing legal aid representation for indigent
detainees and defendants in criminal or civil cases. In practice few
receive assistance. The office had 14 attorneys and a budget of
$110,000 (250,000,000 kwacha) during the year to cover the entire
country.
Police stations frequently become ``debt collection centers,''
where police officers acting upon unofficial complaints detain debtors
without charge, indefinitely, until they pay the complainants. In
return the police receive a percentage of the payments (see Section
1.c.).
A group of 20 women affiliated with the National Pressure Group, a
lobbying body, was ``arrested'' by MMD cadres for holding an
unauthorized political meeting in March. The women were gathered in a
private home. They were taken into police custody, but were released a
day after the arrests. The members of the group were never charged. A
young man detained with the group was beaten while in police custody
(see Section 1.c.).
In May Donald Phiri was taken into police custody during an
unauthorized police search for weapons at his father's home. The search
allegedly was intended to locate arms. Phiri's father complained that
he was unable to determine his son's whereabouts for several days after
he was taken into custody. Phiri was charged with murder in September,
and his trial was pending at year's end.
In June Cedrick and Mary Phiri were taken into custody at Matero
police station by police trying to determine the whereabouts of Phiri's
brother-in-law. The two were detained overnight (see Section 1.c.) and
released without being charged.
In August Imasiku Mutangelwa, the leader of a small organization
known as the Barotse Patriotic Front (BPF), was sought by police for
questioning after he made statements supporting a separatist rebellion
in Namibia. Later the same month, Mutangelwa sought asylum in the
residence of the South African high commissioner, but his request was
denied. Mutangelwa subsequently was arrested and charged with belonging
to an unlawful society. Mutangelwa clearly had stated his affiliation
with the BPF for several months without any action being taken against
him. The case against him was referred by the Magistrate's Court to the
High Court, where it remained pending at year's end.
In August the High Court of Ndola awarded damages to a woman who
had been detained in 1997 by police trying to determine the whereabouts
of her son.
The authorities held in detention pending deportation approximately
300 illegal immigrants, principally from neighboring countries. Because
the immigration authorities lack funds for deportation, illegal
immigrants sometimes are kept in prison for extended periods.
The state of emergency imposed in October 1997 allowed the
Government to detain suspects for 28 days without charge by using a
police detention order and to detain them for the remainder of the
state of emergency under a presidential detention order. After the
lifting of the state of emergency in March 1998, the cases of coup
suspects went into normal legal proceedings 7 months after the arrests
of most suspects. A total of 7 civilians and about 90 military
personnel were detained. By the end of 1998, all civilians detained in
connection with the attempted coup and several of the military
personnel had been released. Nine of the accused were released in May
after charges were dismissed on grounds of insufficient evidence. Eight
more were acquitted, 1 sentenced to hard labor, and 59 sentenced to
death in September. The death sentences were being appealed at year's
end, and the process is expected to last several years.
The Government attempted to introduce a new state security bill in
August that would have allowed the Government to hold treason suspects
for indefinitely renewable periods of 14 days. Parliamentarians,
including two from the MMD, sharply criticized the bill, which was
withdrawn by the Government.
In 1996 the now-retired Speaker of the National Assembly ordered
the indefinite incarceration of the Post newspaper reporters Fred
Mwembe, Bright Mwape, and Lucy Sichone for contempt of the House. The
High Court later quashed the sentences, ruling that the Speaker had no
authority over private citizens. The Government appealed the case,
seeking to reinstate the detentions of the three reporters. The case
remains pending, although Mwape and Sichone since have died.
The Government does not use exile for political purposes; however,
it has used deportation and the threat of deportation for political
purposes against persons whose claims to citizenship it had refused to
recognize.
During the year, a number of citizens remained in self-imposed
political exile in foreign countries including: Liberal Progressive
Front President, Dr. Roger Chongwe, in Australia; Zambia Democratic
Congress General Secretary, Azwell Banda, in South Africa; former
editor of the defunct newspaper, Confidential, Reverend Steward Mwila,
in South Africa; and former President Kaunda's daughter, Catherine
Mwanza, in South Africa.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Government generally respected
the independence of the judiciary during the year. However, there have
been reported instances in past years in which Parliament overturned
Court rulings; the last known attempt to do this occurred in the cases
of Mwembe, Mwape, and Sichone in 1996 (see Section 1.d.). The President
nominates and the National Assembly confirms the Chief Justice and
other members of the Supreme Court. The judicial system is hampered by
lack of resources and inefficiency.
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction for all legal and
constitutional disputes. The High Court, which holds regular sessions
in all nine provincial capitals, has authority to hear criminal and
civil cases and appeals from lower courts. Magistrate courts have
original jurisdiction in some criminal and civil cases, while local, or
customary, courts handle most civil and petty criminal cases in rural
areas.
Local courts employ the principles of customary law, which vary
widely throughout the country. Lawyers are barred from participating,
and there are few formal rules of procedure. Presiding judges, who are
usually prominent local citizens, have great power to invoke customary
law; render judgments regarding marriages, divorces, inheritances,
other civil proceedings; and rule on minor criminal matters. Judgments
often are not in accordance with the Penal Code. For example they tend
to discriminate against women in matters of inheritance (see Section
5).
Trials in magistrate courts are public, and defendants have the
opportunity to confront their accusers and present witnesses. However,
many defendants are too poor to retain a lawyer, and the poor state of
the Government's legal aid department means that many citizens entitled
to legal aid find that it is unavailable. Congestion in the courts and
long delays while the accused are in custody can be tantamount to
denial of fair trials.
Courts continued to act independently and at times made statements
critical of the State. A judge in a habeas corpus hearing for
journalists from the Independent Post newspaper criticized the State
for failing to produce the accused during an initially scheduled
hearing. He further expressed his hope that the State would not detain
again immediately the individuals who were about to be released, as had
happened in previous cases. In March a Lusaka High Court judge
criticized both the prosecution and the defense for excessive delays in
an aggravated robbery case that has been in progress since 1995. The
judge expressed disappointment that the defense had not applied for
constitutional bail on grounds of excessive delay in completing the
trial and noted that the rights of the accused had been abused by this
delay.
Repeated delays in presenting a state case against journalists from
the Independent Post newspaper raised concerns that the Government was
simply delaying the case in order to intimidate the newspaper (see
Section 2.a.).
After a short-lived coup attempt on October 28, 1997, the
Government detained about 90 military personnel and a total of 7
civilians, including former President Kaunda, in connection with the
attempted coup. Charges were filed against these individuals in March
1998. President Kaunda was released after 6 months of detention, when
the Government decided not to prosecute his case. By the end of 1998,
all civilians detained in connection with the attempted coup had been
released. The treason trial concluded in September with 59 of the
accused receiving death sentences; these sentences are under appeal.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for respect for privacy and
the inviolability of the home; however, the authorities did not always
respect these rights in practice. The law requires a warrant before
police may enter a home, unless a state of emergency is in place.
Police routinely ignored this requirement and often arrested alleged
criminals at their homes without first having obtained an arrest
warrant. The Constitution grants the Drug Enforcement Commission and
the Zambian Intelligence Security Service authority to wiretap
telephones for possible cause. In 1996 the Inspector General of Police
admitted in open court that he had ordered the illegal wiretaps of the
telephone at the offices of the Post, an independent daily newspaper.
The case still is pending in court.
Police detained and abused relatives and associates of suspects; in
August a pregnant woman detained by the police looking for her husband
died in custody (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.d.).
In March police illegally searched the home of the husband of
Sylvia Masebo, a political activist, reportedly on suspicion of
narcotics activities. Masebo expressed her belief that the search was
undertaken solely to defame her.
In May police raided the home of the president of the World Baptist
Evangelical Association, Reverend Bwanali Phiri, without a warrant in
the early hours of the morning. The police said that they were looking
for weapons; they then took Phiri's son Donald and two of Phiri's
tenants into custody, reportedly on suspicion of involvement in a
murder. Phiri complained that he was unable to determine the
whereabouts of his son for several days after he was taken into
custody. Phiri's tenants were released, but Phiri was detained for 4
months without charge, then charged with murder. The case was pending
at year's end.
Roundups of suspected illegal aliens in the home or workplace
continued. According to the Government Commissioner for Refugees,
immigration officials are empowered under the law to conduct these
roundups without a warrant.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--While the Constitution provides
for freedom of expression and of the press, the Penal Code lists
various prohibited activities that may be interpreted broadly to
restrict these freedoms, and in at least one instance the Government
infringed on press freedom. Overall, the Government's record on press
freedom was mixed during the year. Over the past several years, in
response to headlines and stories of alleged corrupt practices on the
part of government officials, the Government, accused officials, and
other individuals have brought numerous libel actions against the Post
newspaper. There are currently over 80 cases filed over the course of
the last 4 years waiting to be adjudicated. The number of pending libel
cases did not increase during the year, because the journalist involved
in most of them had left the Post.
The law includes provisions for investigative tribunals to call as
witnesses journalists and media managers who print allegations of
parliamentary misconduct. Failure to cooperate with a tribunal may
result in charges of contempt punishable by up to 6 months in jail.
This is seen by the media as a clear infringement on press freedom and
a means for parliamentarians to bypass the clogged court system in
dealing with libel suits against the media.
Thirteen members of the editorial staff of the Independent Post
newspaper were arrested after the newspaper published a story pointing
out deficiencies in the country's military preparedness in relation to
neighboring Angola. The Post claimed the information contained in the
article was publicly accessible. Twelve of the staff members were
charged with espionage, but the trial was delayed several times,
raising questions about whether the Government really wanted to
prosecute, or simply intimidate, the newspaper. All of the accused
remain free on bond. Their trial started on December 22 with
prosecution testimony by an army general. In addition the Attorney
General and several members of the MMD applied for an injunction to
restrain the Post from publishing articles related to tensions between
Angola and Zambia. The injunction was thrown out in August by the High
Court deputy registrar, who said that the application had not disclosed
a cause for the requested action of prohibiting such articles (see
Section 1.e.).
In March the deputy minister for Local Government and Housing
locked a journalist in his office when the journalist came to
investigate the status of a presidential housing initiative. This
incident prompted the Zambia Independent Media Association (ZIMA) to
conduct a march for press freedom.
A government appeal of a National Assembly case initiated against
three journalists in 1996 remains pending (see Section 1.d.).
A number of privately owned newspapers question government actions
and policies, and these circulate without government interference. For
the last 3 years, the leading private daily, the Post, has had an
Internet home page that has attracted over 15,000 readers per month.
The government-controlled Times of Zambia and Zambia Daily Mail, two of
the most widely circulated newspapers, also have home pages established
in April 1996. The Government owns the sole television station, the
Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC). In addition to the
government-controlled radio station, there are three church-related
stations and one private commercial station.
The Government exercised considerable influence over the
government-owned media, which continued to follow the government line
on important issues.
In February the only commercial station resumed rebroadcasting
Voice of America (VOA) and British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
items. The station had been pressured by the Government to stop such
rebroadcasts in 1997 due to an interpretation of licensing limitations.
Multichoice, based in South Africa, provides satellite and analog
wireless subscribers with television services. These services provide
broadcasts of Cable News Network, BBC World, Sky Television, and South
African Broadcasting Corporation Africa News. They also provide three
BBC, one Radio France International, and VOA radio news broadcasts.
Neither of the services provides local news coverage. A second wireless
service, CASAT, began operations in December 1997. In 1998 Trinity
Broadcasting Network, a foreign-based church-related television
network, began 24-hour transmission from a rented studio at the ZNBC
complex.
Contrary to its 1991 campaign promises to privatize government-
owned mass media, the Government has declined to privatize the state-
owned and government-controlled Times of Zambia, the Zambia Daily Mail,
and the ZNBC radio and television stations. Opposition political
parties complain that government control of these media bodies
effectively limits their access to such means of mass communication.
Academic freedom is respected. University professors are permitted
to lecture freely, conduct research, and publish their work. The
Government is attempting to pass a university act to give greater power
to the Minister of Education to supervise universities. There is
concern among the academic community that this act would lead to
limitations on their freedom. The act was introduced into the
Parliament in September, debated, passed and forwarded to the President
for enactment. However, before the President could take action, a group
of university professors and students obtained a court injunction
blocking presidential action. The bill lapsed at the end of the year
and must be resubmitted to the Parliament if it is to be enacted.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Government
restricted this right in practice. The law requires rally organizers to
notify the police 7 days in advance of a rally. The police may advise
the organizers that the time or venue is inopportune. In practice the
police did not interfere with most peaceful rallies whose leaders
followed the prior notification rule and that could be described as
politically neutral or favorable to the Government or MMD; however,
authorities sometimes denied permission to proceed with rallies planned
by the political opposition, particularly the United National
Independence Party (UNIP).
The Zambia Independent Media Association was allowed to conduct a
march for press freedom in March (see Section 2.a.). However, in April
UNIP was denied permission to conduct a march protesting a decision of
the Ndola High Court that declared former President Kaunda stateless
due to his Malawian parentage and his failure to normalize his
citizenship status at an appropriate time. The authorities gave no
reason for denying the permission for the march, and no reason was
apparent.
Two miners were wounded when police fired shots to disperse a
meeting of the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) in Luanshya in April.
The MUZ was given a permit for the rally on April 12, but the permit
subsequently was revoked with the instruction that the meeting must be
held in an enclosed place. The MUZ was issued a second permit after
changing its meeting venue; however, on the day of the event, police
informed MUZ officials that the Inspector General of Police had
cancelled the event. The meeting went ahead, prompting the police to
disperse the group.
Two opposition political activities were thwarted by private
enterprises under suspicious circumstances. A press conference to be
conducted by the United Party for National Democrats at a Lusaka
nightclub was cancelled by the club the day before the scheduled event.
The club stated that it was not authorized to host political
activities, although no such restriction was stated during the initial
scheduling. A new political party, the Zambia Alliance for Progress,
was scheduled to launch its party officially at a sports complex in
June. The sports complex cancelled the booking shortly before the date
of theevent, also stating that it was not authorized to host political
activities. Both groups were able to hold subsequent meetings in
different locations.
A group of approximately 20 women affiliated with the National
Pressure Group was detained by police after a meeting by the group in
the private residence of one of the members (see Section 1.d.).
Requests by the University of Zambia's student union to stage a
peaceful protest over continued closure of the school were turned down
in July. Seven students subsequently were arrested on suspicion of
planning to proceed with the protest without permission. The students
were released in July.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, at
time the Government restricted this right. All organizations must apply
formally for registration to the registrar of societies. In most cases,
authorities routinely approved these applications. However, the
Registrar initially refused to register the Zambia Alliance for
Progress, citing incompatibilities between the party's constitution and
the national Constitution. The party amended its constitution and
subsequently was registered. The Government also denied the application
of a group of former servicemen who wanted to form an association. The
Government argued that an organization for ex-servicemen already
existed. There are currently 34 political parties and dozens of NGO's
registered. The Government threatened to take action against those
organizations that did not submit annual reports to the registrar of
societies. In June the Ministry of Home Affairs deregistered more than
20 NGO's that did not comply with the reporting requirement.
In prior years, the Government has harassed and arrested NGO
leaders. In 1996 authorities arrested NGO leaders, Alfred Zulu and
Ngande Mwanajiti, and charged them with receiving financing from
foreign governments. While the charges have not been dropped, they are
not being pursued, and both men remained active and free throughout the
year.
The Government pursued passage of a new NGO act during the year.
The act would create an oversight committee dominated by government
representatives. The proposed act also gives power to the Ministry of
Home Affairs to regulate NGO activities without reference to purpose.
NGO's have complained that the proposed act ignores a draft policy
formulated jointly by the NGO community and the Government. NGO's
further protest that the proposed act would restrict their freedom of
assembly severely. The act was not taken to a vote in Parliament by
year's end.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
Although a 1996 amendment to the Constitution declared the country a
Christian nation, the Government respects the right of all faiths to
worship freely in practice. There are governmental controls that
require the registration of religious groups. The Government approves
all applications for registration from religious groups without
discrimination. There were no reports that the Government rejected any
religious groups that attempted to register or obtain licenses.
Some members of the Muslim community have complained that their
religion has been discriminated against since the country was declared
a Christian nation. They contend that they are unable freely to teach
and practice Islam. However, other Muslim organizations state that they
have not experienced any restrictions on their actions. There are
mosques in the country, and the Government does not appear to hinder
Muslim worship or teaching.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides citizens with
the right to move freely throughout the country, to reside in any part
of the country, and to depart and return to the country without
restriction; however, there were instances in which authorities limited
freedom of movement.
The authorities generally respected these rights during the year,
but police roadblocks to control criminal activity continued, and
police sometimes extorted money and goods from motorists.
While there is no law specifically addressing the processing of
refugees, the Government complies with the provisions of the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there
were approximately 220,000 refugees, mainly Angolans, in the country.
The Government cooperated with the UNHCR in processing applications for
refugee status.
The Government provided first asylum to approximately 25,000
refugees during the year. The majority of these came from the
Democratic Republic of Congo in March and April due to ongoing fighting
near Zambia's northern and Luapula provinces.
In June the Government detained six Namibians allegedly connected
to a separatist movement in Namibia. The UNHCR requested access to the
six to determine whether they sought asylum. The Government indicated
that it would grant access, but it deported the six in August without
providing the UNHCR with the opportunity for an interview. The UNHCR
protested to the Government about the handling of these cases without
regard to due process; the Government did not respond.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens voted in national multiparty elections in November 1996;
however, constitutional amendments barred the best known opposition
candidate, former president and UNIP leader, Kenneth Kaunda, and his
deputy, senior chief Inyambo Yeta, from running for the presidency,
thereby restricting the right of citizens to change their government.
The amendments enacted in 1996 require both parents of presidential
candidates to be citizens by birth and disqualify tribal chiefs from
running for the presidency unless they resign their chieftainship.
UNIP boycotted the elections and destroyed many party members'
voter registration cards. Eleven political parties contested the
presidential and National Assembly elections in 1996. The Government
deregistered 14 opposition splinter parties for noncompliance with
registration procedures. Approximately 50 percent of eligible voters
registered. Of this total, almost 70 percent cast ballots. Although the
MMD's use of government resources, including the state-owned media,
during campaigns probably did not affect the final outcome, the
elections' fairness nevertheless was put into question. The
Government's failure to implement a transparent voter registration
process raised doubts among opposition parties about the Government's
willingness to have an open electoral process.
Local government elections, originally scheduled for 1995, were
held in December 1998. While the Government acted within the limits of
the law, it gave only 1 month's notice of the election date, which
prompted opposition parties to complain that they had insufficient time
to prepare campaigns. The short notice also meant that the Electoral
Commission was ill prepared to conduct a large-scale operation. As a
result, there were reports of administrative problems at polling
stations, including voting registrars sent to the wrong polling
stations, party symbols mixed up on ballots, and polling stations
under-supplied with ballots. Voter turnout was extremely low. However,
despite serious irregularities, the elections generally reflected the
will of the electorate.
Under the Constitution, the President wields broad authority. The
National Assembly ratifies major appointments and theoretically has
broad powers, but the overwhelming majority held by the MMD effectively
precludes independent action by the legislature and limits its ability
to provide a check on executive authority. During the year, Parliament
took steps to strengthen itself and to improve responsiveness to
citizen concerns. Parliament currently is establishing a system for
citizen input to bills before they are voted upon. An MMD backbencher
complained in August that the front bench frequently attempted to rush
through legislation without allowing adequate time for debate.
Criticism by two MMD backbenchers and an opposition parliamentarian
prompted the Government to withdraw a controversial state security bill
(see Section 1.d.).
The number of women in politics and government is increasing but
remains small, and women are underrepresented in Government. There are
15 female members in the 150-seat Parliament; 2 of these are ministers,
and 3 are deputy ministers. There are three ethnic Asians in Parliament
(one is a minister), and one mixed race (African-European) minister.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights and civic rights organizations generally operated
without serious government hindrance; however, the Zambian Independent
Monitoring Team (ZIMT), Committee for a Clean Campaign (CCC), the
African Human Rights Network (AFRONET), and the Foundation for
Electoral Processes claimed that official harassment, including
blocking their bank accounts continued during the year.
The Government continued to be receptive to criticism from human
rights and civic organizations in general, but on occasion government
officials accused human rights monitors of abetting crime and thwarting
the work of the police through their focus on victims of police
brutality.
Some domestic human rights organizations, including the Law
Association of Zambia, Women for Change, the Catholic Commission for
Justice and Peace, and the Zambia Civic Education Association have
continued to press for a transparent democratic electoral system.
The Government generally did not interfere with inquiries or visits
by international human rights organizations; however, Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International were not permitted to visit most of the
coup detainees during 1998.
In May 1997, the Government established an autonomous Permanent
Human Rights Commission, the PHRC. A Supreme Court justice chairs the
Commission; other members are drawn from throughout society and include
the former head of the Foundation for Democratic Processes and a
University of Zambia lecturer on human rights. The Commission
interceded on behalf of persons whose rights it believed were denied by
the Government. In order to monitor human rights abuses actively at the
local level, the Commission established human rights committees in all
provincial capitals in 1998. While there were doubts at first about its
autonomy and effectiveness, the Commission in 1997 aggressively sought
and received access to the coup detainees, exposed the torture of seven
of them, and demanded (and obtained) better medical care for them. The
Commission spoke out on behalf of other detainees and prisoners, and
the Government responded by releasing seriously ill prisoners at the
Commission's request. In July the PHRC announced that it would employ
prison inspectors to ensure that inmates are kept in habitable
environments. The Government further responded to the Commission's
recommendation by establishing in 1998 an inquiry to investigate
torture claims by detainees. The inquiry is chaired by a High Court
justice, and a principal resident magistrate is a member. The inquiry
started in November with a series of public meetings (see Section
1.c.).
The Government continued to cooperate with the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in detaining and sending to Arusha
persons whom the ICTR identified as suspected war criminals.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, tribe,
sex, place of origin, marital status, political opinion, color, or
creed. Constitutional amendments barring native born Zambians of
partial or full foreign ancestry from the presidency appear to violate
the prohibition on discrimination based on place of origin. These
amendments also prohibit traditional chiefs, who are accorded authority
and privileges as chiefs, from running for political office unless they
resign their chieftainships. A legal challenge to these amendments in
1996 was unsuccessful.
Women.--Violence against women remained a serious problem. Wife
beating and rape were widespread. According to official statistics,
over 4,700 rape cases were reported to the police between 1991 and
1998. Of these, approximately 30 percent resulted in conviction and 5
percent in acquittal. The remainder either were dismissed or remain
unresolved. The courts normally sentence defendants convicted of rape
to hard labor. Since many rape cases were not reported to police, the
actual number is considered to be much higher. Domestic assault is a
criminal offense. Although the police established a Victim Support Unit
(VSU) to attend to the problem of domestic assault in 1997, in practice
police often are reluctant to pursue reports of wife beating,
preferring instead to broker a reconciliation. TheGovernment and NGO's
expressed continued concern about violence against women, and the media
devoted considerable publicity to it during the year. The VSU handles
problems of wife beating, mistreatment of widows by the deceased
husband's relatives, and ``property grabbing.''
Both the Constitution and the law entitle women to equality with
men in most areas; however, in practice women are disadvantaged
severely in formal employment and education compared with men. Married
women who are employed often suffer from discriminatory conditions of
service. Women have little independent access to credit facilities; in
most cases, they remain dependent on their husbands, who are required
to co-sign for loans. As a result, few women own their own homes.
However, some small financial institutions reportedly are now allowing
women to sign independently for loans.
Customary law and practice also place women in a subordinate status
with respect to property, inheritance, and marriage, despite
constitutional and legislative protections. Polygyny is permitted if
the first wife agrees to it at the time of her wedding. Under the
traditional customs prevalent in most ethnic groups, all rights to
inherit property rest with the deceased man's family. The 1989
Intestate Succession Act was designed to provide women with a share of
the joint estate. Under the act, the children of the deceased man
equally share 50 percent; the widow receives 20 percent; the parents
receive 20 percent; and other relatives receive 10 percent. A 1996
``reform'' of the act places the widow's share at 20 percent, to be
divided equally with any other women who can prove a marital
relationship with the deceased man, thus granting inheritance rights to
other wives, mistresses, and concubines.
In practice ``property grabbing'' by the relatives of the deceased
man remains rampant, particularly when local customary courts have
jurisdiction. These courts often use a different law, the Local Courts
Act, to distribute inheritances without reference to the percentages
mandated by the Intestate Succession Act. Ignorance of the law on the
part of victims is also a problem. As a result, many widows receive
little or nothing from the estate. The fines that the Intestate
Succession Act mandates for property grabbing are extremely low.
Children.--The Government seeks to improve the welfare of children,
but scarce resources and ineffective implementation of social programs
continue to affect adversely the welfare of children. Education is
neither compulsory nor free. Due to poverty, both rural and urban
children often work in the informal sector to help families make ends
meet (see Section 6.d.). The number of street children in Lusaka jumped
from 35,000 in 1991 to 90,000 in 1998, partly because of the growing
number of parents who have died from AIDS. Approximately 75 percent of
all households are caring for at least one orphan and, as a result,
these children face greater risks of child abuse, sexual abuse, and
child labor. Child abuse was believed to be fairly common, but no
statistics were available.
People with Disabilities.--Persons with disabilities face
significant societal discrimination in employment and education. The
Government has taken steps to ameliorate their hardships, including
establishing a national trust fund to provide loans to the disabled to
help them start businesses, but its efforts are limited by scarce
resources. The Government has not legislated or otherwise mandated
accessibility to public buildings and services for the disabled.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of citizens to form trade unions, and approximately 60 percent of
the 300,000 formal sector workers are unionized. Eighteen of the
country's 19 large national unions, organized by industry or
profession, are affiliated with the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
(ZCTU). The ZCTU is operated democratically and, like its constituent
unions, is independent of any political party and the Government. The
Mineworkers' Union of Zambia and four other unions broke away from the
ZCTU and established a rival umbrella organization in 1994. Four of
them, including the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia, since have rejoined
the ZCTU. The Mineworkers' Union rejoined the ZCTU during the year,
leaving only the Zambia Union of Financial and Allied Workers outside
the Congress.
The 1993 Industrial and Labor Relations Act (ILRA) reestablished
the ``one union, one industry'' principle. The Bankers Union of Zambia,
although registered with the Government in 1993, has been unable to
operate because the employers recognize the existing Zambia Union of
Financial and Allied Workers. In 1993 the Ndola High Court ordered the
Government to register the Secondary School Teachers Union (SSTU) of
Zambia. The Government continues to argue that the Zambia National
Teachers Union (ZNUT) represents secondary school teachers and has
delayed recognition of the new secondary school teachers union
administratively. The SSTU sued the Government over its
nonregistration, prompting the Government to register it in 1997.
However, most teachers still belong to the ZNUT.
All workers have the right to strike, except those engaged in
essential services. In addition to the Zambia Defense Force, the
judiciary, the police, the prison service, and the Intelligence
Security Service, the ILRA defines as essential services power,
medical, water, sewerage, fire fighting, and certain mining occupations
essential to safety. It permits strikes only after all other legal
recourse has been exhausted. The ILRA prohibits employers from
retribution against employees engaged in legal union activities.
Workers engaged in illegal strikes do not enjoy this protection.
By a majority vote of its members, a union may decide on
affiliation with the ZCTU or with trade unions or organizations outside
the country. The ZCTU is a member of the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions. Labor leaders travel without restrictions to
international conferences and to visit counterparts abroad.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Employers and
unions in each industry negotiate collective bargaining agreements
through joint councils in which there is no government involvement.
Civil servants and teachers, as public officials, negotiate directly
with the Government. Collective disputes are referred first to
conciliation. If conciliation fails to resolve the dispute, the parties
may refer the case to the Industrial Relations Court, or, in the case
of employees, vote to strike. In practice the industry joint councils
function effectively as collective bargaining units.
The ILRA prohibits discrimination by employers against union
members and organizers. An employee who believes that he has been
penalized for union activities may, after exhausting any existing
administrative channels for relief, file a complaint with the
Industrial Relations Court. This court has the power to order
appropriate redress for the aggrieved worker. The complainant may
appeal a judgment of the Industrial Relations Court to the Supreme
Court. In practice the Court often orders employers to reinstate
workers found to have been victims of discrimination. This court, like
other courts, has inadequate resources to address all of the cases
before it in a timely manner.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude, but it authorizes the
Government to call upon citizens to perform labor in specific
instances, for example, during national emergencies or disasters.
Moreover, the Government can require citizens to perform labor that is
associated with traditional civil or communal obligations, as when all
members of a village are called upon to assist in preparing for a visit
by a traditional leader or other dignitary. In practice bonded labor by
adults or children is not permitted, and the labor authorities enforce
the legal proscriptions when cases violating the law are brought to
their attention (see Section 6.d.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment of children is 16
years. The Labor Commissioner effectively enforces this law in the
industrial relations sector although, because of high adult
unemployment, there is no demand for child labor in the formal sector.
The law is not enforced for those who work in subsistence agriculture,
domestic service, and informal sectors, where children under the age of
16 often are employed. In urban areas, children commonly engage in
street vending. There are an estimated 150,000 children in the
workforce. At present, acute family poverty levels and economic factors
motivate child labor.Forced or bonded labor by children is not
permitted, and the authorities enforce legal proscriptions if cases of
violations are brought to their attention (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage for
nonunionized workers is set at $0.05 (70.30 kwacha) per hour. Based on
a 48-hour workweek, the legal maximum for nonunionized workers, a
worker earning the minimum wage would receive $35 (90,000 kwacha) per
month. The minimum wage covers nonunionized workers in categories such
as general workers, cleaners, office orderlies, and watchmen. The
minimum wage is insufficient to provide a worker and family with a
decent standard of living, and most minimum wage earners supplement
their incomes through second jobs, subsistence farming, or reliance on
the extended family.
With respect to unionized workers, wage scales and maximum workweek
limits are established through collective bargaining. In practice
almost all unionized workers receive salaries considerably higher than
the nonunionized minimum wage. The minimum workweek for full-time
employment is 40 hours and is, in practice, the normal workweek. The
law requires 2 days of annual leave per month of service.
The law also regulates minimum health standards in industry, and
the Department of Mines is responsible for enforcement. Factory safety
is handled by the Inspector of Factories under the Minister of Labor,
but staffing problems chronically limit enforcement effectiveness.
There are no legislative provisions to protect a worker who refuses to
work on grounds of inadequate safety.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
in, to, or from the country.
____
ZIMBABWE
Zimbabwe is a republic in which President Robert Mugabe and his
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) have
dominated the executive and legislative branches of the Government and
have restricted political choice since independence in 1980. Although
the Constitution allows for multiple parties, opposition parties have
been subject both to financial restrictions which were relaxed only
partially in 198, and to periodic intimidation by the ruling party and
government security forces. The judiciary is generally independent, but
the Government often refuses to abide by court decisions.
The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) are responsible for maintaining
law and order. The Zimbabwe National Army and Air Force under the
Defense Ministry are responsible for external security. The Central
Intelligence Organization (CIO) under the Ministry of State Security is
responsible for internal and external security but no longer has powers
of arrest. Members of the security forces committed serious human
rights abuses.
Of a population of perhaps 12 million, nearly half live by
subsistence agriculture and about 75 percent rely directly or
indirectly on agriculture for their livelihood; however, there are also
substantial mining, manufacturing, and service sectors. The country has
abundant arable land, minerals, good infrastructure, and educated and
disciplined work force, and a strong ecotourism sector. Its chief
sources of hard currency were exports of tobacco, gold, ferro-alloys,
nickel, tourism, and remittances from citizens working in other
countries. The non-farm economy continued to be dominated by state-
owned monopolies and to suffer from mismanagement and poor governance
including government corruption, and from large fiscal deficits
exacerbated by the Government's military operations since 1998 in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC). These conditions continued to
contribute to accelerating price inflation, rapid currency
depreciation, high real interest rates, and high unemployment. Over
half the population relies on subsistence agriculture. The formal
sector unemployment rate exceeds 55 percent. In 1998, per capita gross
domestic product was approximately $425. During the year, the economy
contracted and real per capita income fell. The Government continued to
face growing pressure from urban labor groups and rural low-income
groups as the standard of living dropped. Widespread strikes and
opposition from private businesses as well as labor largely frustrated
government efforts to impose new taxes and reimpose price controls.
International experts estimated that HIV/AIDS infects one-fourth of the
adult population and has killed nearly600,000 persons and created
hundreds of thousands of orphans since the late 1980's.
The Government's overall human rights record worsened significantly
and there were serious problems in a growing number of areas. There
were incidents of police killings. Security forces tortured, beat and
otherwise abused persons. Prison conditions remained harsh, and
arbitrary arrest and detention and lengthy pretrial detention remained
problems. Executive branch officials repeatedly refused to implement
court decisions; after three Supreme Court judges called on the
President to require executive branch officials to obey the law, the
President publicly suggested that they resign. Infringements on
citizens' privacy continued. The Government announced that it would
restrict state hiring to ruling party members. The Government
intensified its restrictions on press freedom, enforcing restrictive
laws against journalists, detaining, torturing and intimidating
journalists, and monopolizing domestic radio broadcasting; the
President blocked enactment of legislation passed by the Parliament
that would have partly relaxed some legal restrictions on various human
rights including freedom of the press, and threatened to enact laws
that would further restrict press freedom. Journalists also practiced
self-censorship. The Government continued to restrict academic freedom.
The Government restricted freedom of assembly. Security forces
repeatedly used force to disperse nonviolent public meetings and
demonstrations. Although the Government generally respected religious
freedom, its retention of the colonial-era Witchcraft Suppression Law
reportedly was viewed as restrictive by some practitioners of
traditional indigenous religions. The Government at times restricted
freedom of movement. The political process remained heavily tilted in
favor of the ruling party and widespread irregularities, fraud, and
intimidation marred urban council elections. The Government effectively
frustrated a movement, initiated by a coalition of nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's), to reduce the power of the presidency through
constitutional reform. The President criticized and threatened NGO's
for promoting political liberalization and respect for human rights.
Domestic violence against women remained widespread, and traditional,
often illegal, discrimination against women continued. Abuse of
children and discrimination against the disabled remained problems.
There were increasing reports of ritual murders associated with
traditional religious practices. The President and his Government
exacerbated widespread resentment of the economically prominent
European ethnic minority. The Government increasingly violated labor
rights, further restricting the right to strike and expelling a foreign
adviser of an independent labor federation; members of the security
forces beat a labor leader.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by government security forces, but there
were reports of the use of excessive force, which resulted in deaths.
In March police instituted a system of roadblocks to apprehend
suspected criminals, known as ``Operation Hokoyo.'' Police killed two
persons when they fired at moving vehicles that had attempted to evade
the checkpoints. The police stopped using live ammunition during
searches at roadblocks after public criticism over the deaths.
On September 23, Notice Zhakata reportedly died at Norton Hospital
of injuries inflicted on him by police at the Kadoma police station,
where he was detained following an arrest and from which he reportedly
was taken, bleeding, to the hospital. According to press reports, a
medical postmortem confirmed that Zhakata died of injuries due to an
assault. According to press reports, police initially denied
responsibility for the death, but in October a police spokesperson
announced that police officers were arrested in connection with
Zhakata's death.
Harsh prison conditions and a high incidence of HIV/AIDS are widely
acknowledged to have contributed to a large number of deaths in prison;
however, no current statistics on the exact number of deaths were known
to exist. (see Section 1.c.).
In April the Vice President of Rwanda alleged that the armed forces
of Zimbabwe had trained ethnic Hutu militias that committed
extrajudicial killings and other serious human rights abuses in the
DROC and Rwanda; in April the Ministry of Defense denied these reports,
and no evidence to support them was reported.
In July the ZRP's Criminal Investigation Division reportedly
identified an unnamed official of both the ZANU-PF and the Government
as the subject of an investigation into three ritual killings committed
in 1997 (see Section 5).
Police killed eight persons during the January 19-22, 1998 food
riots. The Government conducted investigations into these cases, and
private legal actions were instituted against the police. At year's
end, those cases still were proceeding through the courts, and police
investigations were ongoing. In March a magistrate court issued an
opinion in the case of a 12-year-old girl, Kudzi Ndlovu, who was shot
in Gweru during the riot on January 20, 1998, in which he concluded
that her death resulted from a collapse in police command and
inadequate riot control procedures by the officers on the scene. Due to
the confusing and conflicting evidence about the police response in
this case, the judge was unable to find any individual officer liable
for this death. The magistrate court recommended that further ``private
investigations'' be undertaken to assist the Attorney General in
determining liability in the case. At year's end, there were no other
developments in the case.
The Attorney General continued to decline to prosecute the mayor of
Chitungwiza, Joseph Macheka, for shooting to death one man and wounding
two others who allegedly attempted to rob Macheka's liquor store during
the January 1998 food riots. Macheka was the successful ruling ZANU-PF
party candidate in a contentious mayoral election campaign against an
independent. The Attorney General determined that Macheka was acting in
self-defense and therefore, that prosecution was not in the public
interest. Legal and human rights critics accused the Attorney General
of bowing to political pressure and usurping the function of the court.
There were no developments in the gasoline bombing case involving
independent Member of Parliament Margaret Dongo, whom ZANU-PF
supporters attacked with a gasoline bomb at a by-election in
Chitungwiza in February 1998. There also were no new developments in
the case of a police officer who fired into a crowd of persons
protesting fuel price increases in Mutare in late 1998, killing one
woman. The officer has not been prosecuted.
By year's end, the Government still had not responded formally to a
report by the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) and the Catholic
Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) on atrocities committed during
the 1982-87 Matabeleland crisis, despite the release of a shortened
version that was made available in local languages. During the July 5
funeral for the former vice president Joshua Nkomo, President Mugabe
said that he regretted the "unfortunate happening" that took place in
Matabelelanad, in reference to the numerous abuses committed in that
region during the 1980's, without assigning blame or responsibility to
any government forces.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances. In November a leader of the Congolese Rally for
Democracy, a Congolese insurgent group fighting against units of the
Zimbabwean armed forces in the DROC, alleged that Zimbabwean troops
kidnaped and held as hostages 17 missionaries of the Church of Jesus
Christ on Earth of the Prophet Simon Kimbangu; however, there were no
reports of evidence that supported this allegation.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and cruel and inhuman
treatment; however, security forces tortured, beat, and otherwise
abused persons.
The ZRP showed poor training in criminal apprehension and
interrogation; officers used live ammunition at vehicle checkpoints,
which resulted in several deaths (see Section 1.a.), and during student
protests to disperse demonstrators (see Section 2.a.).
On January 12, the military police detained and subsequently
tortured and beat an editor of The Standard newspaper, Mark Chavunduka,
at Cranborne barracks following the newspaper's publication of a
January 10 story that alleged that 23 army officers had been arrested
in connection with an attempted military coup. Chavunduka credibly
alleged that government officials subjected him to prolonged
interrogations about the sources of the story until January 19, when he
was handed over to the civilian police. On that same day, police also
arrested a reporter for The Standard, Ray Choto, and took both
Chavunduka and Choto to a detention center where, they credibly
alleged, police beat them over several hours with planks, electric
cords, fists, and booted feet. Chavunduka alleged that police stripped
him, placed his head under water, and then handcuffed him and subjected
him to electric shocks on his genitals and other parts of his body
while continuing to interrogate him about the sources of his coup
story. Chavunduka also alleged that one of his eardrums was perforated
following beatings to his head during hisdetention. On January 20,
Chavunduka and Choto were seen by an army doctor at Parirenyatwa
hospital, who found that both journalists sustained injuries while in
custody. The two journalists, charged under the Law and Order
Maintenance Act (LOMA) with making a false statement likely to ``cause
fear, alarm, and despondency'' among the public (see Section 2.a.),
were released on bail and seen by private doctors on January 21, who
concluded that there was no doubt that their injuries were the result
of torture. A third doctor examined the journalists on January 23, and
also found that they were abused physically while in custody. In March
Chavunduka and Choto were treated in London (see Section 2.d.) for
physical and psychological injuries that they sustained while in the
custody of the military and civilian police in January. Two separate
High Court judges issued orders for the release of the journalists in
early January, since the military has no authority to arrest civilians.
The military refused to release the journalists, claiming defects in
the service of the court orders. On January 23, in an interview with
the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Minister of Defense Moven
Mahachi denied that the journalists were abused. Minister Mahachi
subsequently stated that the military had overreacted in the case of
the journalists due to anger over the story, which he credibly claimed
was incorrect. The Minister then reiterated his denial of any
mistreatment by the military. Chavunduka and Choto sued the military,
police, Central Intelligence Organization, and several individual
officers in the Supreme Court, seeking damages for their abuse while in
custody and challenging the LOMA's constitutionality. At year's end,
neither the State's case under the LOMA nor the journalists' suit for
the alleged mistreatment had been concluded.
On January 20 in Harare, three men, one of whom later was
identified as a police officer, reportedly assaulted Isodore Zindoga,
deputy secretary general of the Zimbabwe Confederation of Trade Unions
(ZCTU). According to Zindoga, the three men beat him unconscious with
an iron pole when he asked them why they had been following him by car.
The assault followed confrontations between the ZCTU and the Government
(see Section 6.a.); in December 1997, the ZCTU's secretary general had
been beaten unconscious by seven armed men.
In a televised address to the nation on February 6, President
Mugabe, in response to a request from Supreme Court justices that he
reaffirm his commitment to the rule of law, defended the actions of the
security forces in the case of the Standard journalists and suggested
that the justices resign (see Section 1.e.).
Police officials held incommunicado, tortured, and physically
abused three American members of the Indiana-based Harvestfield
Ministries that had a mission in the DROC, following their arrest on
March 7 at Harare International Airport, where officials discovered
undeclared weapons in their suitcases as they attempted to board a
flight to Europe. They were taken into custody and charged under the
LOMA for illegal possession of arms of war and for violating the
Aircraft Offenses Act. The Government initially accused them in court
and in the press of espionage and conspiring to commit terrorist acts
and implied that they had conspired to assassinate President Mugabe,
but ceased making those charges in July without explanation. The three
men stated that their jailers applied electric shocks to their
genitals, beat their feet with leather straps, submerged their heads
under water, and deprived them of sleep during their first few days of
interrogation. Reports written by three physicians who examined the
three men on March 13, 15 and 18 reportedly confirmed that all three
were beaten on the soles of their feet and their findings were in other
respects consistent with the abuse alleged by the prisoners. In prison
the three men were subjected to harsh conditions, including being
forced to sleep naked and shackled with leg irons, and with the lights
on 24 hours a day. In response to a court order to improve the
conditions of their imprisonment (see Section 1.e.), President Mugabe
issued an executive order stating that prison officials (rather than
courts) were competent to determine prison conditions (see Section
1.e.). In September the three were found guilty of violations of
sections of the LOMA and the Aircraft Offenses Act and were given
concurrent sentences of 21 months under the LOMA and 6 months under the
Aircraft Offenses Act. The Attorney General, in state-owned media,
criticized the court for the leniency of these sentences (see Section
1.e.). The three men were released and deported in early November,
after having been incarcerated for 8 months.
On March 16 and 17, the Chitungwiza police arrested and for the
following 6 months detained, separately, a married couple, Joyce and
Shupikai Karimazondo, in response to allegations by a neighbor that
they had killed their young domestic worker for ritual purposes (see
Sections 2.c. and 5). Mrs. Karimazondo alleged that she was chained to
rafters in the roof, subjected to electric shocks to her body, and was
beaten between her legs by members of the criminal investigations
division who sought to extract a confession of murder from her. She
alleged she was beaten further by other officers over 4 days. Another
person the police claimed had participated in the crime, John Mita,
also wasarrested, and he, too, alleged that the police assaulted him
while he was in custody. The Karimazondos and Mita were released, and
the murder charge was dropped in September after the domestic worker
was located alive and unharmed. The Magistrate Court declined the
Karimazondos' defense counsel's application to have the State prosecute
the investigating officers for misconduct and unlawful detention. Mita
stated that he was suing the Government for unlawful detention. A local
organization that treats torture victims, the Amani Trust, is
investigating these allegations. At year's end, these investigations
and legal challenges still were proceeding.
In September Notice Zhakata reportedly died at Norton Hospital of
physical abuse inflicted by police at the Kadoma police station while
he was detained there (see Section 1.a.).
Security forces repeatedly used force to disperse nonviolent
demonstrations (see Section 2.b.).
In June, CIO officer Richard Mutswiri Mutiti reportedly filed a
suit with the High Court alleging that four other CIO officials had
beaten and kicked him, doused him with a flammable petroleum
distillate, and threatened to burn him, while detaining him without
warrant at the Harare Central Police Station from June 25 to June 27,
1998. A CIO disciplinary committee reportedly had recommended the
firing of the four officials in 1998, and one reportedly resigned soon
thereafter, but three reportedly remained employed by the CIO at year's
end.
The Government generally has not pursued actively past allegations
of torture and has not prosecuted CIO or ZRP officers for such abuses.
The CIO continued to refuse to pay court-ordered damages to a 1990
torture victim (see Section 1.e.). A consortium of human rights lawyers
and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) pursued legal actions in 40
cases on behalf of persons who alleged that they had been injured by
state officials during the 1998 food riots (see Section 1.d.). Those
cases were proceeding through the legal system at year's end.
In late January, a member of the CIO was sentenced to 8 months'
imprisonment, half of which was suspended, for assaulting six
journalists in Masvingo. The CIO member had accused the journalists of
misrepresenting the security situation in the country.
Prison conditions remained harsh and have improved little since the
Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) issued its 1993 report
describing extreme overcrowding, shortages of clothing, and poor
sanitary conditions. Overcrowding and poor sanitation aggravated
outbreaks of cholera, diarrhea, and AIDS-related illnesses. Government
prison service authorities reviewed overcrowding in prisons during a
1998 workshop and concluded that exposure to HIV/AIDS was a major cause
of a large number of deaths in detention; however, no statistics are
available on the exact number of such deaths, and prison authorities
called for more research to address this growing problem, with some
arguing for early release of such terminally ill prisoners. There has
been a significant increase in the number of women incarcerated,
primarily due to harsh economic conditions. There are an estimated
1,000 women in prison, increasingly for crimes of prostitution,
embezzlement, fraud, petty theft, and abandonment of infants. Many
incarcerated women are obliged to raise their very young children in
prison if they have no one to care for them while they are detained.
The Government has established a successful community service
sentencing program to try to alleviate prison overcrowding. The Legal
Resource Foundation, in cooperation with the prison service, has
established a human rights training program for prison officials.
Officials who mistreat prisoners are punished routinely.
The Government permits international human rights monitors to visit
prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, some laws
effectively weaken this prohibition and security forces arbitrarily
arrested and detained persons repeatedly.
The law requires that police inform an arrested person of the
charges against him before he is taken into custody. Warrants of arrest
issued by the courts are required except in cases of serious crimes or
where there is the risk of evidence disappearing. The Ministry of Home
Affairs paid $112,500 (Z$4.5 million) in damages for wrongful arrest
cases in 1996, the last year for which statistics were known.
Although a preliminary hearing before a magistrate is required
within 48 hours of an arrest (or 96 hours over a weekend), the law
often is disregarded if a person does not have legal representation. A
1992 amendment to the Criminal Procedures and Evidence Act
substantially reduced the power of magistrates togrant bail without the
consent of the Attorney General or his agents. However, in practice, a
circular issued by the Attorney General giving a general authority to
grant bail has lessened the negative impact of the rule. High Court
judges grant bail independently.
Two laws dating from the British colonial era, the Official Secrets
Act and the LOMA, grant the Government a wide range of legal powers.
LOMA gives extensive powers to the police, the Minister of Home
Affairs, and the President to prosecute anyone for political and
security crimes that are not clearly defined.
In 1997 the Government proposed new legislation called the Public
Order and Security Bill (POSB), to replace the LOMA. The original POSB
was less restrictive than the LOMA only in some respects. During the
following 2 years, the Parliament significantly amended the POSB to
reflect the concerns of human rights and legal organizations, which had
protested the Government's original draft as insufficiently liberal.
Although even the amended version that the Parliament sent to President
Mugabe for his signature was similar to the LOMA in including vague
definitions of political and security crimes, harsh penalties for
failure to report the acts of others, and restrictions on freedom of
assembly, speech, and association, President Mugabe declined to sign
it, and returned it to the Parliament in early June for further
consultation and possible amendment. Mugabe reportedly wrote to the
Speaker of Parliament that he refused to sign the POSB because it was
excessively liberal, especially with respect to freedom of the press
(see Section 2.a.).
In January military and civilian police detained and physically
abused two journalists from The Standard and charged them with
violating Section 50 of the LOMA (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.). Two
separate High Court judges issued orders for the release of the
journalists in early January, since the military, which originally
arrested the journalists, has no authority to arrest civilians. The
military initially refused to release the journalists, claiming defects
in the service of the court orders, but they were released on bail
after being arraigned later the same month (see Section 1.e.).
Police also briefly detained the managing director of The Standard
in January (see Section 2.a.).
In February police detained and interrogated four journalists
associated with an independent weekly newspaper, The Mirror, and
charged two of them with violating Section 50 of the LOMA, in
connection with a story published in October 1998 that the Government
stated was false (see Section 2.a.).
At year's end, the Government reportedly was holding about 80
foreigners in Harare Remand Prison who had been there for between 2
months and 1 year without having been charged formally. Many of these
detainees reportedly were persons from the DROC claiming to fear
persecution by the Government of the DROC, which the Government of
Zimbabwe was supporting militarily against insurgent forces.
In June a CIO officer filed a suit alleging that other CIO
officials had detained him without warrant in June 1998 (see Section
1.c.).
On July 2, the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (a coalition of
human rights lawyers and NGO's) released a follow-up report to its 1998
report on the January 19-22, 1998 food riots. The report noted that the
police claimed that a total of 3,000 persons were arrested during the 3
days of rioting and 2 days of clean-up. The overwhelming majority of
those arrested were released within a 2-week period; the Rights Forum
concluded that 70 percent of those arrested could not be convicted
because of lack of credible charges or flawed arrests by the police and
army. Its report also claimed that some persons were victims of uneven
justice. For example, those arrested first received harsh sentences or
were in remand without trial. Those arrested later were released
quickly, as the system was overwhelmed.
There were no developments in the case of the Reverend Ndabaningi
Sithole, an opposition M.P. and longtime rival of President Mugabe, was
convicted and sentenced in December 1997 to 2 years' imprisonment under
the LOMA for conspiring to assassinate President Mugabe in 1995.
Sithole was expelled from Parliament following his conviction, which
was widely viewed as having been based on scant evidence (see Section
1.e.). In January 1998, Sithole filed an appeal, and the sentencing
judge called for a pardon. At year's end the appeal still was pending,
and Sithole remained free on bail.
Prolonged pretrial detention remained a problem. According to
government reports, 6,000 prisoners were pretrial detainees. In 1991
(the last year for which statistics were available), detainees spent an
average of 6 months incarcerated before their trials because of a
critical shortage of magistrates and court interpreters.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government does not use
exile as a means of political control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and in practice the judiciary remained largely
independent; however, the Government sometimes refused to abide by
judicial decisions. The President suggested that three Supreme Court
justices resign, after they requested that he require executive branch
officials to obey court orders.
The Customary Law and Local Courts Act of 1990 created a unitary
court system, consisting of headmen's courts, chiefs' courts,
magistrates' courts, the High Court, and the Supreme Court. With this
restructuring, civil and customary law cases may be heard at all levels
of the judiciary, including the Supreme Court.
Judges are appointed for life and the Constitution provides that
they can be removed from the bench only for gross misconduct, and that
they cannot be discharged or transferred for political reasons.
Magistrates, who are part of the civil service rather than the
judiciary, hear the vast majority of cases and sometimes are subject to
political pressure. Military courts deal with disciplinary or court-
martial proceedings. Police courts, which can sentence a police officer
to confinement to camp or demotion, handle disciplinary and misconduct
cases. Trials in both these latter courts meet internationally accepted
standards for fair trials; defendants in these courts have the right to
appeal to the Supreme Court. All levels of the judiciary often make
rulings disliked by the Government.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and the
judiciary rigorously enforces this right. Every defendant has the right
to a lawyer of his choosing. However, well over 90 percent of
defendants in magistrates' courts do not have legal representation. In
criminal cases, an indigent defendant may apply to have the Government
provide an attorney, but this is rarely done and rarely granted.
However, in capital cases the Government provides an attorney for all
defendants unable to afford one. Litigants in civil cases can request
legal assistance from the NGO Legal Resources Foundation. The
government-established Citizens Advice Bureau was eliminated due to
budget constraints in 1997. All litigants are represented in the High
Court. The Supreme Court has instructed magistrates to ensure that
unrepresented defendants fully understand their rights and to weigh any
mitigating circumstances in criminal cases, whether or not the accused
presents them as part of his defense.
The right to appeal exists in all cases and is automatic in cases
in which the death penalty is imposed. Trials are open to the public
except in certain security cases. Defendants enjoy a presumption of
innocence and the right to present witnesses and question witnesses
against them. Defendants and their attorneys generally have access to
government-held evidence relevant to their cases. The legal system does
not discriminate against women or minorities. However, some High Court
judges imposed lenient sentences in some cases of rape and child sexual
abuse, and local women's and legal organizations challenged these
decisions.
In January military officials who illegally had detained a
newspaper editor failed to comply with two court orders to release the
journalist (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.a.).
In a televised address to the nation on February 6, President
Mugabe criticized the judiciary for what he asserted to be interference
in political matters and implicitly threatened the members of the
judiciary by suggesting that they quit the bench if they wanted to be
involved in politics. Mugabe accused three Supreme Court judges and one
High Court judge of ``an outrageous act of deliberate impudence'' for
speaking against the illegal detention of two journalists (see Sections
1.d. and 2.a.). The President's comments came after several Supreme and
High Court judges wrote the President to urge him to reaffirm the rule
of law following the military's refusal to obey two court orders to
release journalists from The Standard, who were tortured while in
custody in January (see Section 1.c.). The justices remained on the
bench.
In early July, prison authorities failed to comply with an order
issued by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to bring to court the
three Americans who were tortured while in custody (see Section 1.c.).
In September, the Attorney General criticized the judiciary in state-
owned media for what the Government perceived to be a court's excessive
leniency in sentencing the same three persons. In response the court
ordered the Attorney General to show why he should not be held in
contempt of court, and a contempt hearing was held in early October.
In late July, the President exercised his authority under the
Presidential Powers Act to issue an executive order stating thatprison
officials (rather than courts) were competent to determine prison
conditions. The President's action effectively overrode a court order
that instructed prison officials to allow the three American prisoners
who were detained since March 7 to be housed together to enable them to
prepare a joint defense (see Section 1.c.).
In November officials of the Ministry of Defense reportedly blocked
a court official from serving a summons on five military officers in
connection with the January detention of journalists employed by The
Standard newspaper (see Sections 1.c., 1.d, and 2.a.).
The Government continued routinely to delay payment of court costs
or judgments awarded against it. For example, the CIO continued its
refusal to pay damages awarded by the High Court to a former opposition
party official whom CIO agents had tortured in 1990.
The Government repeatedly has amended the Constitution in response
to judicial rulings protective of human rights. For example, Amendment
11 (1992) changed the Constitution to allow corporal punishment of
minors after the Supreme Court ruled that caning of minors constituted
cruel and inhuman punishment. Amendment 14 (1996), which denies both
men and women the right to confer automatic residency on their foreign
spouses, was passed in response to a 1994 Supreme Court ruling
declaring that women should have the same rights as men to confer
residency and citizenship on their spouses (see Section 2.d.).
Amendments to the Constitution are not ratified by the public but are
subject only to the ZANU-PF-dominated Parliament's approval.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary interference with
these rights; however, while Government authorities generally respect
citizens' right to privacy and violations are subject to legal
sanction, the Government sometimes monitors private correspondence and
telephones, particularly international communications.
Human rights groups are concerned that Amendment 14 erodes these
constitutional rights by repealing Section 11 of the Constitution which
specifies protection for the right to the privacy of one's home and
from the compulsory acquisition of property without compensation.
About one-third of the country's most productive land is owned and
farmed by about 4,000 families belonging to the country's European
ethnic minority. The need for land reform is accepted almost
universally; however, there are problems with implementation of the
1992 Land Acquisition Act (Land Act). Under the Land Act, farmers whose
lands have been designated for acquisition and redistribution by the
State may appeal only the amount of compensation, not the initial
decision to acquire their farms. However, President Mugabe repeatedly
has said that the Government would not compensate for land, but only
for improvements, a position not sustainable under the act. Although
the President reversed that position during the Government's September
1998 land conference for international donors when government ministers
promised to abide by the act, Mugabe publicly stated in December that
the Government intended to accelerate its land reform efforts without
paying compensation for land. In the past, the act was implemented
largely along racial lines; the Government stated that black-owned
commercial farms would not be subject to acquisition. However, some of
the original 1,461 farms designated in November 1997 for compulsory
land acquisition, many of which remain on the revised list, are owned
by the black, urban elite. In some cases, land apparently was targeted
for acquisition to achieve political goals.
During the year, the Government did not expropriate any of the 841
farms designated for acquisition under the land reform program. In
February the Administrative Court annulled the acquisition orders for
520 of these 841 farms, ruling that the Government had failed to follow
proper administrative procedures for filing second acquisition notices
on the properties in November 1998. (The Government filed its first
acquisition notices in November 1997 and was required to renew the
notices after 12 months.) The court also ruled that the Government must
designate individual farms for acquisition and provide fair and full
compensation for each. After the court rulings, the Government
initially turned its attention away from the compulsory acquisition of
the 841 farms, focusing instead on 120 farms already being offered
willingly for sale by the owners. However, in December President Mugabe
publicly reaffirmed his intention to expropriate farmland from
Europeans without compensating them, and urged adoption of a draft
constitution that provided for such acquisitions for resettlement
purposes.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of expression but allows for legislation to limit this freedom
in the ``interest of defense, public safety, public order, state
economic interests, public morality, and public health,'' and the
Government restricted this right in practice.
The Government and security forces arbitrarily detained
journalists, disobeyed court orders to release journalists, refused to
punish security force members who tortured journalists, and monopolized
domestic broadcast media. The President publicly criticized the
independent press and vetoed a bill passed by the Parliament that would
have removed some legal restrictions on press freedom, and government
ministers threatened to enact laws that would restrict media freedom
still further. Journalists practice self-censorship.
Sections 44 and 50 of the LOMA criminalize and allow the Government
to suppress the publication of any ``subversive'' statement or of ``a
false story capable of causing alarm and despondency.'' An extremely
broad Official Secrets Act makes it a crime to divulge any information
acquired in the course of official duties. In addition, antidefamation
laws criminalize libel of both public and private persons alike.
Most major print media (seven English-language newspapers and one
local-language tabloid) belong to the Mass Media Trust (MMT), a holding
company heavily influenced by the ruling party. Until April the
Government, through the MMT, controlled the only two daily newspapers,
the Chronicle and the Herald. The news coverage in these newspapers
generally focused on the activities of government officials, neglected
opposition parties and other antigovernment groups, and also neglected
events or information that reflected adversely on the Government. The
government-controlled media never criticized President Mugabe. In
addition, the Ministry of Information controls the Zimbabwe Inter-
Africa News Agency wire service.
The independent press remained small relative to the MMT-owned
press. Independent newspapers that appeared regularly and had more than
3,000 subscribers were relatively few: one daily (The Daily News),
three weeklies (The Financial Gazette, the Independent, and The
Standard), and three monthlies. In 1998 a new privately owned
consortium, Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ), which was 60
percent foreign-owned in 1998 but only 40 percent foreign-owned by
year's end, launched five weeklies tailored to community-level
readership. Three of the ANZ weekly newspapers have closed due to
financial problems arising from limited advertising revenue; two
remained open at year's end. In April the ANZ launched the country's
first independent daily newspaper, The Daily News. The major
independent newspapers continued to monitor government policies and
open their pages to opposition critics, but most of them also continued
to exercise some self-censorship in reporting due to growing government
intimidation of the press and the continuing prospect of prosecution
under criminal libel laws.
The Government increasingly tolerated private media criticism of
official corruption, as a number of widely publicized reports on
malfeasance in government parastatals and ministries, notably the
National Oil Company of Zimbabwe, appeared in both independent and MMT-
owned newspapers. The Government did not prosecute any journalists or
newspapers in connection with these reports; in past years, government
prosecutions for criminal libel in connection with reporting of
government corruption had resulted in the closure of some newspapers.
However, in other respects the Government was increasingly
intolerant of freedom of the press, including reports perceived to be
critical of the military.
Between January 12 and January 21, military and civilian police
detained, tortured, beat, and otherwise abused two journalists for The
Standard, Mark Chavunduka and Ray Choto, who reported in a story
published by the Standard on January 10 that 23 army officers were
arrested in connection with an attempted military coup. Both
journalists stated that this mistreatment occurred in the context of
prolonged interrogation about their sources for the report. Military
and police officials refused repeatedly to comply with court orders to
release one of these journalists (see Section 1.e.). On January 19, the
Government charged the two journalists under Section 50 of the LOMA
with ``publishing a false story capable of causing alarm or
despondency.'' The two journalists subsequently filed suit against
members of the security forces for damages to compensate them for the
torture and illegal detention, and challenged the constitutionality of
the LOMA (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). At year's end the two
journalists remained free on bail; their court cases were still
pending.
On January 22, a Friday, police arrested and detained Clive Wilson,
managing director of The Standard. He was interrogated over the weekend
in connection with The Standard's January 10 coup story and then
released.
On January 20, in Masvingo in the southern region of the country,
CIO officers reportedly beat several journalists working for two
independent newspapers, The Zimbabwe Mirror and The Tribune, including
Tribune subeditor Ray Matikinye; the officers reportedly criticized the
journalists for publishing antigovernment stories while beating them.
On February 6, in a televised address to the nation, President
Mugabe suggested that three Supreme Court justices resign; in the wake
of the illegal detention and torture of The Standard journalists, the
three justices had requested that the President reaffirm his
Government's commitment to the rule of law by requiring executive
branch officials to obey court orders (see Section 1.e.). In the same
address, Mugabe criticized and threatened to take ``very stern
measures'' against the independent media, singling out in particular
domestic media owned by members of the country's European ethnic
minority and by white foreigners. During the days following the
President's address, MMT-owned newspapers and state-owned broadcast
media repeatedly featured editorials and opinion pieces criticizing
``white-owned'' or ``white-controlled'' media, which were characterized
as opposing the Government's land reform program and as seeking to
destabilize the Government (see Sections 1.f. and 5). During an
interview broadcast by state-owned television on February 15, Defense
Minister Moven Mahachi criticized media reporting that caused ``general
despondency'' and ``bad publicity,'' and stated that unless the media
exercised greater self-censorship, ``the Minister of Information will
enable the Government to bar some private media organizations from
operating in Zimbabwe.'' This threat generally was understood to be
directed at the ANZ.
On February 7, the chief of the Law and Order Section of the police
detained four journalists affiliated with The Mirror, an independent
weekly newspaper: owner Ibbo Mandaza; managing editor Fernando
Goncalves; reporter Grace Kwinjeh; and former editor Farai Mungazi, in
connection with a story, published in November 1998, which reported
that the army surreptitiously had repatriated and buried the headless
body of a soldier killed in the DROC. The police released Goncalves and
Mungazi after brief questioning but charged Mandaza and Kwinjeh with
violating Section 50 of the LOMA; a court released Mandaza and Kwinjeh
on bail on Feburary 9. The Government subsequently dropped the charges
against Mandaza and Kwinjeh.
In February in Harare an army sergeant based at Cranborne Barracks,
where The Standard journalist Chavunduka was tortured in February,
reportedly seized from a street vendor and publicly burned 16 copies of
The Standard; the sergeant also reportedly threatened to kill the
vendor if he continued to sell the newspaper. The lead story in the
burned issue concerned the construction of a new mansion for President
Mugabe. In late February, a police spokesperson stated that the police
would charge the sergeant with malicious injury to property.
In June President Mugabe declined to sign and thereby effectively
vetoed a bill (the POSB) passed by Parliament that the Government
originally had proposed in 1997 to replace the LOMA, but which the
Parliament had amended to relax various restrictions on human rights,
including freedom of the press. Mugabe reportedly wrote to the Speaker
of Parliament that he refused to sign the POSB because it was
excessively liberal, especially with respect to freedom of the press
(see Section 1.d.).
In November two journalists working for independent newspapers,
Basildon Peta of the Financial Gazette and Ray Choto of The Standard,
reportedly received anonymous death threats. A written death threat
reportedly was delivered to Choto's home attached to a teddy bear that
had two bullets tied on its neck. Peta reportedly received a written
death threat with three bullets.
Books and films are subject to review by the Zimbabwe Board of
Censors.
Radio remained the most important medium of public communication,
especially for the majority of the population living in rural areas.
The Government continued to control all domestic radio broadcasting
stations through the state-owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
(ZBC), supervised by the Ministry of Information. There were credible
reports that the Ministry routinely reviewed ZBC news and repeatedly
excised reports on the activities of groups and organizations opposed
to or critical of the Government, including antigovernment
demonstrations and the ZCTU. In December the ZBC, reportedly at the
order of the Ministry, stopped broadcasting a popular phone-in talk
show in which citizens increasingly had voiced criticism of the
Government.
The Government appeared effectively to control, although the State
no longer owned, all domestic television broadcasting stations. The
ZBC, under the supervision of the Ministry of Information, owns and
operates television broadcasting facilities. Following a Supreme Court
ruling that the Government's monopoly on telecommunications was
unconstitutional because it interfered with the right to freedom of
expression, the Government for the first time granted a broadcasting
license to private television station, Joy Television (Joy TV).
However, President Mugabe's nephew, Leo Mugabe, reportedly has
financial ties to Joy TV, and the ZBC reportedly exercises editorial
control over Joy TV's programming. Joy TV remained the only privately
licensed television station, and it remained restricted to broadcasting
on an available channel leased from the ZBC; creation of an independent
transmission facility remained restricted under the Broadcasting Act.
However, international television broadcasts were available freely
through private cable and satellite firms.
The Government does not restrict access to the Internet. During the
year, there were many privately owned domestic Internet service
providers.
The National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) accused the government-
influenced newspaper The Herald and the ZBC of refusing to publish
previously accepted advertising from the NCA about its proposed
constitutional process because of government orders to ban the NCA from
disseminating its alternative message on the constitutional process.
After the NCA threatened a court challenge, advertisements resumed in
the government-influenced media, but then ceased again without
explanation.
The University of Zimbabwe (UZ) Amendment Act and the National
Council for Higher Education Act curtail academic freedom by
restricting the independence of universities, making them subject to
government influence, and extending the disciplinary powers of the
university authorities against staff and students. The Ministry of
Higher Education and Technology controls the UZ and appoints its
Chancellor and Vice Chancellors; since 1998 the Ministry also has
appointed the Dean of Faculty, previously elected by the faculty, and
most members of the University Council, which previously consisted
largely of faculty members. The 1998 expansion of the Government's
control of the UZ, which had been a subject of student protests in
1998, was cited as a subject of concern to the faculty in a
parliamentary committee report in June.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of assembly; however, the Government resticted
this right in practice. The Government used laws that restrict this
right, including the LOMA, enforced those restrictions, and repeatedly
used force to break up nonviolent demonstrations by its critics.
Permits are not required for meetings or demonstrations.
On February 8, riot police reportedly used tear gas to disperse an
assembly of striking catering industry workers in Harare's tourist
hotel district (see Section 6.a.). Police maintained that the striking
caterers had tried to use force against nonstriking caterers at a
nearby hotel; strikers maintained that the police had gassed them
without any provocation.
On February 10, near the UZ campus in Harare, police used tear gas
to break up a demonstration by UZ students who voiced both financial
and political grievances.
On July 12 and 13, riot police used force to disperse
demonstrations at sites in Harare, including ZANU-PF headquarters and
the President's official residence, by an estimated 2,000 veterans and
wives of veterans of the ZANU-PF and other guerrilla forces that had
fought against Ian Smith's white settler regime during the 1970's, and
some persons who had suffered prolonged detention or imprisonment by
that regime. The veterans and former detainees were demanding financial
benefits and an audience with the President. Riot police reportedly
used tear gas, used their batons to beat many veterans and their wives
including elderly persons, and made at least 14 arrests.
During the night of September 10-11, unknown persons disrupted a
mass rally to launch a new labor-based opposition party at Harare's
Rufaro Stadium by damaging most of the stadium's electrical power
transformers; although event organizers restored power for loudspeakers
and lights by bringing in generators, the start of the meeting was
delayed by 2 hours.
On October 26, riot police used tear gas to prevent some 3,000
demonstrating UZ students from marching to the city center. The
demonstration reportedly became violent after the police obstructed its
march.
On December 11, riot police in Harare repeatedly used force,
including tear gas and baton beatings, to disperse nonviolent
demonstrations organized by the National Constitutional Assembly(NCA),
a coalition of NGO's and political parties, to protest the Government's
domination and diversion of a constitutional reform process that the
NCA had initiated (see Section 3). The demonstrators whom police gassed
and beat reportedly included women and clergy.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association for political
and nonpolitical organizations, including a broad spectrum of economic,
social, and professional groups, and the Government generally respects
this right in practice. The formation of unions and political parties
is not restricted. Organizations generally are free of governmental
interference as long as their activities are viewed as nonpolitical.
In a case brought by a women's NGO, the Supreme Court ruled
unconstitutional those sections of the 1995 Private Voluntary
Organizations Act, which had empowered the Minister of Social Welfare,
Labor, and Public Service to suspend the executive body or ``any member
of the executive committee of an organization and to appoint persons to
manage the affairs of the organization for a specified time.'' Prior to
the Supreme Court's ruling, several new NGO's set up their
organizations as ``associations'' connected with established NGO's so
that their executive bodies would not be subject to government
interference.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
however, a law that reportedly criminalizes both purporting to practice
witchcraft and accusing persons of practicing witchcraft reportedly was
viewed as restrictive by some practitioners of indigenous religions.
Although 60 percent of the population are at least nominally
Christian, many persons continue to practice, in varying degrees,
traditional indigenous religions. Belief in traditional healers
reportedly spans both rural and urban areas. Traditional healers are so
common that they are licensed and regulated. Healing is central to
traditional indigenous religion in the country. Witchcraft--widely
understood to encompass attempts to harm others not only by magic but
also by covert means of established efficacy such as poisons--
traditionally has been a common explanation for diseases of which the
causes were unknown. Although traditional indigenous religions
generally include or accommodate belief in the efficacy of witchcraft,
they generally approve of harmful witchcraft only for defensive or
retaliatory purposes and purport to offer protection against it. In
recent years, interest in healing through traditional religion and
through prayer reportedly has increased as HIV/AIDS has infected an
estimated one-quarter of the adult population, and affordable science-
based medicines effective in treating HIV/AIDS have remained
unavailable.
The 1890 Witchcraft Suppression Act (WSA) reportedly criminalizes
purporting to practice witchcraft, accusing persons of practicing
witchcraft, hunting witches, and soliciting persons to name witches;
penalties reportedly include imprisonment for as much as 7 years. The
law reportedly defines witchcraft as the practice of sorcery, without
reference to the consequences intended by the practitioner. Since 1997
the Zimbabwe National African Traditional Healers' Association
(ZINATHA) has proposed amendments to the 1890 law that would redefine
witchcraft in terms of intent to cause harm including illness, injury,
or death. However, such legislation reportedly has been opposed by
mainstream Christian churches. The existing WSA also generally was
supported by human rights groups; the Act has been used since
independence primarily to protect people, primarily women, who have
been accused falsely of causing harm to people or crops in rural areas
where traditional religious practices are strong.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights; however, there were reports that the Government at times failed
to respect them in practice.
In February the Government refused to allow two journalists who
were tortured by security forces, and who were charged with violations
of the LOMA, to travel abroad for medical treatment (see Section 2.a.).
The Government confiscated the passports of the journalists. However,
in early March, a court ruled that the Government had to return the
journalists' passports and allow them to travel overseas. The
Government complied with this order.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
in assisting refugees. The Government provides first asylum. According
to the Government, 130 asylum seekers were given refugee status, and at
least 5 persons were denied first asylum during the year. At year's
end, there were reportedly 1,492 refugees in Zimbabwe from more than 20
countries; the largest groups consisted of 244 Rwandans, 228
Burundians, 213 Somalis, 169 Sudanese, 160 Congolese (DROC), and 139
Angolans.
There were no confirmed reports of the forced expulsion of persons
having a valid claim to refugee status.
There was a press report that the Government arrested refugees from
the DROC and arbitrarily subjected them to prolonged detention in a
prison (see Section 2.d.).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Although citizens have the legal right to change their Government
democratically, in practice the political process continued to be
tilted heavily in favor of President Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party,
which have ruled continuously since independence in 1980. The ruling
party's candidates benefit from its control of the state-owned firms
that dominate the country's economy, from its control of the state-
monopolized broadcast media (see Section 2.a.), and from its near-
monopoly on overt state grants for political campaigns. In 1998 the
Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional provisions of the Political
Parties Finance Act (PPFA) that allocated state grants among political
parties in proportion to the parties' seats already in the Parliament.
In response the Government, later in 1998, amended the PPFA to allocate
campaign grants among parties in proportion to votes received in the
last general election, with a minimum of 5 percent required. There also
were credible reports of security force harassment of opposition and
independent candidates and their supporters.
On January 25, the Government announced in The Herald that the
State, by far the country's largest employer, henceforth would hire new
employees only if they were members of the ZANU-PF ruling party. By
February there were reports that the Government had begun requiring
newly hired civil servants to swear oaths of loyalty to the ZANU-PF.
The 15 constitutional amendments since 1980 have increased greatly
Mugabe's power relative to the legislature. Originally a prime minister
elected by the Parliament, he has become a directly elected president.
Constitutional Amendment 9 authorizes the President to declare
unilaterally a state of public emergency for a period of up to 14 days.
Amendment 10 grants the President sole power to dissolve Parliament and
to appoint or remove a vice president and any minister or deputy
minister. Amendment 10 also allowed the President to appoint 20 of the
150 Members of Parliament (M.P.'s), including 12 nonconstituency M.P.'s
and 8 cabinet members who sit in Parliament. The President also exerts
great influence on the process by which the country's chiefs
(traditional rulers) select 10 of their number to sit as M.P.'s. All 30
of these M.P.'s have consistently been ZANU-PF members. President
Mugabe won reelection in March 1996, receiving 93 percent of votes cast
in an election in which less than one-third of eligible persons voted;
his two main opponents withdrew from the race, alleging intimidation
and harassment of their supporters. The opposition's lack of access to
state-monopolized broadcast media and to state campaign subsidies
strongly biased the contest in favor of the incumbent, although the
election-day voting and subsequent vote tabulation were considered
generally free and fair by hundreds of NGO monitors.
In the 1995 parliamentary general elections, the ZANU-PF captured
117 of the 120 popularly elected seats. Although the legislature
remained generally subordinate to the executive branch, it has shown
some independence in some respects during the past 2 years. For example
it liberalized the PSOB legislation that the Government had introduced
in 1998 to replace the LOMA, with the result that the President, in
July, refused for the first time to sign legislation passed by the
Parliament (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). In February the Legal
Committee of the Parliament unanimously declared illegal a ban on
nationwide strikes and other mass actions that President Mugabe had
declared in November (see Section 6.a.). In 1998, following more than a
year of nationwide consultations, a Parliamentary Reform Committee
released a report that recommended that the Parliament be given greater
powers relative to the presidency, including increased legislative
oversight of the executive branch. Although the executive branch did
not act on the committee's recommendations, the Parliament proceeded
with those recommendations that were within its power to carry out.
Since late 1997, an independent group of approximately 40 NGO's,
labor unions, and political parties known as the National
Constitutional Association (NCA) has advocated the creation of a new
constitution that would reduce the power of the presidency and offer
greater protection for civil liberties. In May the President
established the Constitutional Commission (CC), whose 400 members he
appointed, to review the current Constitution and prepare a new draft
to be submitted to a national referendum in January 2000. CC
commissioners held meetings at venues throughout the country, surveying
citizens and recording their opinions on what provisions a new
constitution should contain. However, the NCA was openly critical of
the CC, asserting that itwas a government-controlled entity whose
product would not reflect the will of the populace. The NCA also
conducted town meetings and workshops around the country as part of its
public awareness campaign on constitutional reform. On December 11, the
CC released a draft constitution that would maintain a strong
presidency and might reduce the independence of the judiciary, although
it would increase Parliamentary oversight of the executive. A minority
of the commissioners publicly protested that the draft constitution did
not reflect the expressed views of the populace. In December the NCA
organized demonstrations against the Government's cooptation of the
constitutional reform process and encouraged citizens to vote against
the CC's draft constitution at the national referendum in 2000 (see
Section 2.b.).
In September, 6 months before the next scheduled parliamentary
elections, the ZCTU labor federation launched a new political party,
the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), intended to be a broadly
based opposition party capable of overcoming the poor organization and
factionalism from which opposition parties previously had suffered.
Unknown persons disrupted the founding convention of the MDC by
damaging electrical facilities at the meeting site, a stadium in Harare
(see Section 2.b.).
There are institutional problems with the management and
supervision of elections. Although the Ministry of Justice technically
administers the Electoral Act, the Registrar General's Office falls
under the Ministry of Home Affairs. With a meager budget and a tiny
staff seconded from the Ministry of Justice, the Electoral Supervisory
Commission (ESC) lacks the institutional capacity to oversee all of the
country's polling stations. Commissioners also lack authority to order
that an irregularity be corrected. Despite an attempt to computerize
the voters' roll, it contains a very large number of redundancies or
errors, including misspellings, multiple entries, and names of deceased
persons. Few opposition candidates contested the 1998 rural district
council elections. During the year, voter turnout for the rural and
urban council elections in September was minimal and courts ordered
that voting be postponed in pro-opposition areas due to irregularities
in the voter rolls. Independent NGO election observers reported
widespread fraud and intimidation in those elections where independents
challenged ZANU-PF candidates. The ESC, chaired by Bishop Peter
Hatendi, refused to supervise or monitor the September elections,
citing the Registrar General's failure to provide the ESC with a
complete list of polling stations or the report on the nomination
courts that ruled on the eligibility of candidates.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Twenty of
the 150 M.P.s are women, including the deputy speaker of the
Parliament. Three cabinet ministers with portfolios, three ministers of
state, and three deputy ministers are women. Women participate in
politics without legal restriction; however, according to local women's
groups, husbands--particularly in rural areas--commonly direct their
wives to vote for the husband's preferred candidates.
All major ethnic groups are represented in Parliament and in the
Government. However, most members of the Government and the Parliament,
as well as most ZANU-PF officials, are affiliated with the Shona ethnic
group, which makes up a majority of the population (see Section 5).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Although the Government permits local civic and human rights groups
to operate, it monitors their activities closely, in particular those
of the CCJP and Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZIMRIGHTS). Other
groups that promote human rights include the Legal Resources
Foundation, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, the Bulawayo Legal
Projects Centre (BLPC), the National Constitutional Assembly, the
Southern African Foundation of the Disabled, the Child and the Law
Project, the Musasa Project, the Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association,
the Association of Zimbabwe Journalists, the Women's Action Group,
Women and Law in Southern Africa, Women in Law and Development in
Africa, Zimbabwe Women's Resource Centre and Network, Women and AIDS
Support Network, and the Human Rights Research and Documentation Trust
of Southern Africa. These NGO's worked on human rights and democracy
issues including lobbying for revision of the Public Order and Security
Bill, increasing poor women's access to the courts, raising awareness
of the abuse of children, eliminating irregularities in voter rolls,
preserving the independence of the judiciary, and eliminating torture,
arbitrary detention and restrictions on freedom of the press and
assembly. The Foundation for Democracy in Zimbabwe (FODEZI) was
established in July 1997 as a watchdog organization to support
independent candidates. Amnesty International, Transparency
International, and the International Committee of the Red Cross operate
in the country. The Government generally does not discourage
representatives of international human rights groups from visiting the
country.
In his February 6 television address to the nation, President
Mugabe criticized human rights organizations and monnitors generally in
connection with their criticism of the torture of journalists by
security forces and the Government's refusal to obey court orders to
release those journalists (see Sections 1.e., 2.a. and 5). In
particular, Mugabe named and criticized Michael Auret, director of the
CCJP, and David Coltart, former director of the BLPC, both members of
the country's European ethnic minority. Mugabe suggested that they were
part of an international conspiracy by ``whites'' to undermine land
reform in Zimbabwe.
On September 11, the same day that the ZCTU launched a new
opposition political party, the Minister of Information publicly called
for the deportation of Georg Lemke, director of the Danish Trade Union
Council for International Development Cooperation, which had provided
technical and financial assistance to the ZCTU. The Minister alleged
that the Council was meddling in the country's internal politics. In
October the Government induced the Council to recall Lemke to Denmark
by threatening to deport him and close the Council's projects in the
country (see Sections 3 and 6.a.)
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides that ``every person in Zimbabwe'' is
entitled to fundamental rights whatever his race, tribe, place of
origin, political opinions, color, creed, or sex; however, domestic
violence and discrimination against women, abuse of children, and
discrimination against the disabled remained problems. There were
increasing reports of ritual murders associated with traditional
religious practices. The President and his Government exacerbated
widespread resentment of the economically prominent European ethnic
minority.
Women.--Domestic violence against women, especially wife beating,
is common and crosses all racial and economic lines. It extends
throughout the country and at times results in death. According to
Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF), domestic violence
accounted for more than 60 percent of murder cases tried in the Harare
High Court in 1998. The Musasa Project, a women's rights organization,
established the country's first shelter for victims of domestic
violence in Harare in 1997. Musasa is attempting to establish a second
shelter in Bulawayo for victims of domestic violence in that area. The
Musasa Project provided services to almost 3,000 clients at its Harare
office in 1998, half of whom were female victims of domestic violence;
39 percent of those who were assisted were minors, victims of child
abuse. The Musasa Project reports that 54 percent of the women
counseled for domestic violence have sexually transmitted diseases,
including many with HIV/AIDS. The media increasingly reported incidents
of rape, incest, and sexual abuse of women.
There has been a significant increase in the number of reported
rape cases countrywide; most cases involved victims who were minors and
family member abusers. Women face many obstacles in filing reports of
rape. Many police stations are not prepared to handle properly the
investigation of such cases. In addition, women are reluctant to file
reports because of the social stigma of rape. Women's groups believe
the actual number of rapes is underreported greatly. When cases go to
court, lengthy sentences for rape and wife beating generally are
imposed. A ``binding over'' order (an order to appear in court to
respond to an accusation of violent behavior) is issued based only on
actual physical abuse and not on threats of violence. Courts also do
not have the power to oust an abusive spouse from a matrimonial home.
Systematic problems and lack of education often mean that police do not
respond to women's reports or requests for assistance.
Since independence the Government has enacted major laws aimed at
enhancing women's rights and countering certain traditional practices
that discriminate against women. However, women remain disadvantaged in
society. Illiteracy, economic dependency, and prevailing social norms
prevent rural women in particular from combating societal
discrimination. The literacy rate for women over the age of 15 is
estimated to be 80 percent while the male rate is about 90 percent. The
1998 U.N. Development Program's Human Development Report noted that in
most regions of the country, fewer girls than boys attend secondary
schools. Despite legal prohibitions, women still are vulnerable to
entrenched customary practices, including the practice of pledging a
young woman to marriage with a partner not of her choosing; the custom
of forcing a widow to marry her late husband's brother; and the custom
of offering a young girl as compensatory payment in interfamily
disputes.
The Legal Age of Majority Act (LAMA) and the Matrimonial Causes Act
recognize women's right to own property independently of their husbands
or fathers. While unmarried women may ownproperty in their own names,
women married under customary law are not allowed to own property
jointly with their husbands. During the September land conference,
women's rights organizations effectively lobbied the Government to
agree to create legislation giving married women joint spousal title to
property offered under the resettlement program; however, no such
legislation had been enacted by year's end.
In August 1998, the Government denied a petition by women's groups
that one-third of land redistributed under the land reform program (see
Section 1.f.) be distributed to households headed by women, which
reportedly make up one-third of all rural households. At a press
conference, Joseph Msika, Minister Without Portfolio in charge of
resettlement, reportedly stated, ``I would have my head cut off if I
gave women land.''
The Administration of Estates Amendment Act, which came into effect
in October 1997, removed inheritance laws unfavorable to widows.
Women's groups regard the act as a major step toward ending the unfair
and unequal distribution of inherited assets for women. The President
signed the new Inheritance Amendment into law. However, in February the
Supreme Court upheld a magistrate court decision that, under customary
ethnic law, a man's claim to family inheritance takes precedence over a
woman's, regardless of the woman's age or seniority in the family; the
Court cited Section 23 of the Constitution, which allows discrimination
against women under customary law. Divorce and maintenance laws are
favorable to women, but women generally lack awareness of their rights
under the law.
Many rural women, including 150 in 1997, reportedly commit suicide
at harvest time after their husbands squander income from cash crops.
Research conducted by the Training and Research Support Centre (a
Harare-based NGO) revealed that one in three working women at all
levels were subjected to sexual harassment in the workplace, as defined
by Zimbabwean legal experts. The October 1996 to February 1997 study
was based on questionnaires from 528 working women.
Although labor legislation prohibits discrimination in employment
on the basis of gender, women are concentrated in the lower echelons of
the work force and commonly face sexual harassment in the workplace.
Several active women's rights groups, including WILDAF, the Musasa
Project, the Zimbabwe Women Lawyers' Association, the Women's Action
Group, and the Zimbabwe Women's Resource Center and Network concentrate
on improving women's knowledge of their legal rights, increasing their
economic power, and combating domestic violence. Groups that focus on
the issues of protection of women against domestic violence and sexual
transmission of HIV/AIDS included the Women and AIDS Support Network
and Musasa Project. There is a gender affairs office in the Office of
the President headed by Minister of State Oppah Rushesha.
In August the ZANU-PF Women's League voted out leaders associated
with President Mugabe. In November the Women's League threatened to
boycott the ruling party's national congress in December unless League
members were allowed to elect a woman to hold at least one of the four
top positions in the party. In December the ZANU-PF congress decided
that women would be allotted one out of every three party positions;
this decision had not been implemented at year's end.
Children.--The Government continued to demonstrate its strong
commitment to children's rights and welfare through a system of primary
health care and education overseen by the Ministry of Health and Child
Welfare. While there is no compulsory education, the country has made
considerable progress in providing education for girls, and overall
primary school attendance has increased by more than 4,000 percent
since independence. However, budget cuts and the lack of adequate
attention to AIDS prevention are eroding the Government's capacity to
address children's needs in these areas. International experts
estimated that HIV/AIDS infects one-fourth of the adult population and
has killed nearly 600,000 persons since the late 1980's, thereby
tripling the mortality rate, reducing life expectancy from 61 to 49
years, and creating hundreds of thousands of orphans. From a small
number in 1990, there were an estimated 150,000 orphans in 1995,
growing to a projected 543,000 in 2000 and 918,000 in 2005. This
rapidly growing problem is expected to put a tremendous strain on both
formal and traditional social systems. At the household level, there is
an increased burden on the extended family, which has traditional
responsibility for caring for orphans. Many grandparents are left to
care for the young, and in some cases children or adolescents are
heading families. At the provincial and national levels, the
governments are saddled with increasing demands for community orphan
projects, orphanages, health care, and school fees. The number of
street children, with the relatedproblems of theft, street violence,
drug use, and violent death, is increasing.
The Children's Protection and Adoption Act, the Guardianship of
Minors Act, and the Deceased Person's Maintenance Act protect the legal
rights of minor children, but school attendance is not compulsory at
any level. About 93 percent of children reached grade 5. However, with
the reintroduction of school fees in urban schools and rural secondary
schools, enrollment has declined. If a family is unable to pay tuition
costs, it is most often female children who leave school.
There are an estimated 12,000 homeless street children in the
country, many of them the children of former Mozambican refugees or
AIDS orphans. The number of incidents of child abuse, including incest
(long a taboo), infanticide, child abandonment, and rape is increasing.
It is not known whether the statistics reflect the fact that more cases
are occurring or only that more are being reported. There are reports
of child labor (see Section 6.d.). The Ministry of Justice's Vulnerable
Witnesses Committee established victim-friendly courts (VFC) in 1997 to
improve the judicial system's handling of child victims of rape and
sexual abuse. According to the Musasa Project, 39 percent of the 3,000
persons whom it assisted at its Harare office in 1998 were victims of
child abuse. There was a large volume of rape cases in the Harare VFC,
which led to calls by children's rights' advocates to establish
additional courts in surrounding areas. The criminal justice system has
special provisions for dealing with juvenile offenders.
Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, rarely is performed in Zimbabwe. However,
according to press reports, the initiation rites practiced by the small
Remba ethnic group in Midlands Province include infibulation, the most
extreme form of FGM.
Indigenous African churches that combine elements of established
Christian beliefs with some beliefs based on traditional African
culture and religion generally accept and promote polygyny and the
marriage of girls at young ages; they also generally approve of healing
only through prayer and oppose science-based medicine including the
vaccination of children.
There were increasingly frequent reports that children were killed
for body parts by persons practicing healing rituals associated with
traditional religions. Body parts from children reportedly were
considered the most efficacious for some such purposes.
People with Disabilities.--President Mugabe appointed a disability
activist to Parliament in 1995 to represent the needs of the disabled.
The Disabled Persons Act of 1992 specifically prohibits discrimination
against people with disabilities in employment, admission to public
places, or provision of services and is viewed by advocates of the
disabled as model legislation. However, in practice, the lack of
resources for training and education severely hampers the ability of
disabled people to compete for scarce jobs. Although the act stipulates
that government buildings should be accessible to disabled persons, for
budgetary reasons this rarely is implemented. Disabled people face
particularly harsh customary discrimination. According to traditional
belief, people with disabilities are considered bewitched, and reports
of disabled children being hidden when visitors arrive are common.
Religious Minorities.--Many persons practice elements of both
Christianity and traditional indigenous religion, either individually
or as members of indigenous African churches that combine elements of
established Christian beliefs with some beliefs based on traditional
African culture and religion.
However, there were reports of growing tensions between mainline
Christian churches and practitioners of traditional indigenous
religions. Leaders of the Christian churches reportedly opposed the
repeal or modification of the Witchcraft Suppression Act sought by
practitioners of traditional indigenous religions (see Section 2.c.).
Several leaders of Christian churches reportedly denounced a perceived
increase in ``satanism'' in the country; acts of satanism allegedly
included drinking human blood and eating human flesh.
There were increasing reports of ritual murders associated with
traditional religious practices, although the Government actively
enforces the law against all kinds of murder including ritual murders.
Gordon Chavanduka, chairman of ZINATHA, the national association of
traditional healers, reportedly stated that black-market demand for
human body parts used in making potions has increased greatly in recent
years. Some observers suggested that this development may be associated
with the spread of HIV/AIDS inthe country, and the lack of affordable
science-based medicines for treating infected persons (see Section
2.c.).
In April Crispen Sachiwo, age 38, reportedly told police that he
had been kidnaped on March 30 by four men who indicated that they
intended to kill him in order to use his body parts to make ``magic''
for sale to local businessmen. However, Crispen reportedly stated that
he was released after his kidnapers discovered that he was too old for
his body parts to be efficacious. In July Faber Chidarikire, a ZANU-PF
official and mayor of the northern town of Chinhoyi, was charged with
murdering a 13-year-old girl in 1987, but he was released on bail after
intervention by the Attorney General; there were reports that
Chidarikire cut off the girl's ear and excised her genitals. In 1995 an
examination of a severed head found in Chidarikire's car in 1994
indicated that it had been severed with a blade, not in a car accident
as Chidarikire had maintained.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to Government
statistics, the Shona ethnic group makes up 77 percent of the
population, Ndebele 14 percent, Kalanga 5 percent, Europeans 2 percent,
and other ethnic groups 2 percent. There have been tensions both
between the African majority and the European minority and between the
Shona majority and the Ndebele minority.
During the 1960's and 1970's, elements of the European minority
rebelled against British rule and established and maintained a racially
discriminatory regime, which was dismantled in 1980 only after armed
insurgencies by African groups, including the ZANU-PF, and economic
sanctions by the international community. The European community
remains economically privileged; despite government efforts at land
reform, European farmers continued to own one-third of the country's
most productive land at year's end (see Section 1.f.). Government
services are provided on a nondiscriminatory basis, the Government has
sought to expand and improve the previously ``whites only''
infrastructure in urban areas to provide health and social services to
all citizens, and all schools and churches are integrated legally.
However, social interaction between Africans and Europeans remained
relatively rare. Tensions between Africans and Europeans have been
sharpened by the Government's repeated threats to confiscate primarily
European-owned commercial farms without compensation. Sporadic illegal
occupations of white-owned farms by landless peasants continued.
On several occasions during the year, President Mugabe, members of
his Government, and state-owned or MMT-owned media publicly exacerbated
Africans' resentment of the European minority. In his February 6
television address to the nation, Mugabe subjected journalists and
human rights activists of European ancestry to explicitly racist
criticism (see Sections 2.a. and 4). The President stated that they and
other ``white persons of British extraction'' had ``been planted in our
midst to undertake acts of sabotage,'' and that their ``evil
machinations'' had pushed the Government's sense of racial tolerance to
the limit. Mugabe suggested that these Europeans' criticism of the
security forces for torturing journalists of African ethnicity and of
the Government for refusing to obey court orders to release those
journalists was part of an international conspiracy by Europeans to
frustrate the Government's land reform program. In March Mugabe
publicly stated that governments of two foreign countries with mostly
European populations sought to destabilize his Government in order to
prevent his Government from redistributing land from Europeans to
Africans (see Section 1.e.). Government ministers and state-owned and
MMT-owned media echoed Mugabe's racist remarks.
During the 1980's the Shona-dominated Government suppressed an
Ndebele insurgency and killed many Ndebele civilians in Matabeleland,
the region in which the Ndebele were concentrated. Although relations
between the Shona and the Ndebele subequently have improved, the
disproportionate number of Shona speaking teachers and headmasters in
Matabeleland schools remained a sensitive issue. Members of the Ndebele
community continued to criticize the Government's unequal distribution
of national resources and the Government's failure to compensate
victims of the 1980's Matabeleland killings.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1985 Labor Relations Act (LRA)
provides private sector workers with freedom of association and the
right to elect their own representatives, publish newsletters, and set
programs and policies that reflect the political and economic interests
of labor. Workers are free to form or join unions without prior
authorization. The LRA allows for the existence of multiple unions per
industry, provided that each is registered with the Ministry of Public
Service, Labor, and Social Welfare (MPSLSW). While the Government may
deregister individual unions, the High Court has ruled that the LRA
does not give the Minister the powerto suspend or deregister the
national umbrella labor confederation, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade
Unions (ZCTU).
Approximately 20 percent of the formal sector work force belongs to
the 33 unions that form the ZCTU. ZCTU officers are elected by
delegates of affiliated trade unions at congresses held every 5 years.
While the Government encouraged the ZCTU's formation, anticipating that
it would form the labor arm of ZANU-PF, it no longer controls the ZCTU.
The Government and the ZCTU often have clashed sharply on economic
policy, particularly the Economic Structural Adjustment Program. The
Government usually has not consulted either the ZCTU or employers
before implementing policy decisions that affect the workplace. This
lack of consultation has often resulted in reactions that disrupted
labor relations, thereby promoting uncertainty and even strikes.
Following the Government's efforts in December 1997 to impose
significant income and other tax increases without consultation, the
ZCTU organized a nationwide, 1-day work stoppage that month, and a 2-
day ``stayaway'' in March 1998. The ZCTU also led two successful
stayaways in November 1998 to protest a 67 percent increase in fuel
prices and to demand a 20 percent pay increase for private and public
sector workers. These were the two most successful labor actions in the
country's history. In a period of serious and prolonged economic
decline, the ZCTU has gained widespread support at the forefront of an
energized labor movement. In September the ZCTU was instrumental in
launching a new political party in opposition to the ruling ZANU-PF
(see Section 3). In April state-owned media announced that the
Government would negotiate with the ZCTU about labor policy only if the
ZCTU abandoned its plans to form a political organization opposed to
the ruling ZANU-PF party (see Section 3).
On January 20, Isidore Zindoga, the deputy secretary general of the
ZCTU, was beaten unconscious by four men who were following him in
Harare, one of whom Zindoga subsequently identified as a police officer
(see Section 1.c.). ZCTU secretary general Morgan Tsvangirai had
suffered a similar beating in late 1997.
The LRA allows for the formation of multiple national federations.
A second umbrella labor organization, the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade
Unions (ZFTU), was launched in October 1996 with the stated purpose of
providing an alternative of the ZCTU. The new organization states that
its goal is to work in collaboration with the Government, and it is
openly critical of the ZCTU. The ZFTU's leadership and membership
remained unclear, with key personnel changing regularly. Most observers
believe that ZFTU leaders are principally former ZCTU leaders, some of
whom were separated involuntarily from that organization. The ZFTU
largely was inactive, except for occasional public statements
criticizing ZCTU activities, and generally was not considered a viable
labor organization.
Public servants and their associations, the Public Service
Association (PSA), the Zimbabwe Teachers Association (ZIMTA), and the
Zimbabwe Nurses Association (ZINA) are not covered by the provisions of
the LRA. Instead, their conditions of employment are provided for under
the Constitution. Although civil servants constitutionally are barred
from forming unions, in 1995 ZIMTA stated its intention to affiliate
with the ZCTU and the PSA. In 1998 the PSA affiliated itself with the
ZCTU. All public servants are deemed essential and are prohibited from
striking. However, PSA members violated this law in June when they
engaged in a week-long strike, successfully securing a 25 percent pay
increase. Local government employees around the country also went on
strike in July to secure wage increases. Junior doctors and nurses in
state-run hospitals walked off the job in October and November,
refusing to return to work until the Government gave them long overdue
salary increases and promised to improve working conditions. In April
the Postmaster General announced that the state-owned Posts and
Telecommunications Corporation (PTC) had fired 700 telecommunications
engineers and technicians who had taken part in a strike. PTC workers'
committee chairman Simon Musveosve and committee secretary Peter
Manyonda were arrested and charged with inciting workers to strike
illegally and to commit sabotage. The Government alleged that the
srikers severed over 4,000 cable lines, thereby causing a massive
disruption in the country's international telecommunications. Of the
700 workers dismissed, 600 were almost immediately reinstated. The
remaining 100 were suspended, pending investigation into allegations
that these were the technicians who severed the cables. PTC was unable
to prove which technicians committed that act, and most technicians
returned to work. Ultimately only a handful of workers were fired.
Workers and employers in major industries engage in a collective
bargaining season from April to July each year, in which they negotiate
salary increases and other benefits in their respective National
Employment Councils (NEC's). The Government itself negotiates directly
with civil servants (who received a 25 percent pay increase in June),
primarily through the PSA. The empowerment of the labor movement under
the ZCTU in recent years has focused more attention on worker rights,
and most employers acknowledge that economic decline and the rising
cost of living have made annual wage increases a virtual necessity. By
the end of the 1999 collective bargaining season, workers in the 20
major industries had received wage increases averaging 34.8 percent,
with some receiving substantially more.
The 1992 Labor Relations Amendment Act (LRAA) specifies that
workers may establish independent worker committees, which exist side
by side with unions in each plant. Worker committees also must be
registered with the MPSLSW, which is free to refuse registration. Trade
union officials believe that the formation of worker committees was an
attempt to dilute union authority. However, the ineffectiveness of
worker committees demonstrated the need for the experienced worker
representation of the established trade unions.
The International Conference of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) has
criticized the labor laws for giving ``wide scope to the authorities to
declare that a given enterprise or industry constitutes an essential
service, and then impose a ban (on strikes) on it.'' The authority to
reclassify a previously nonessential service as essential was not used
in 1998 or 1999. However, President Mugabe issued a 6-month ban on all
collective job actions from November 1998 to May 1999, in the wake of
two successful national ``stayaways,'' or work stoppages, organized by
the ZCTU. In February the Legal Committee of the Parliament unanimously
declared the President's ban illegal (see Section 3), but Parliament
did not vote on the legality of the ban during the year. When the ban
expired in May, the Minister of Public Service, Labor, and Social
Welfare, Florence Chitauro, on instructions from the President, added
the ban as a permanent amendment to the revised Labor Relations Act,
which was awaiting parliamentary approval late in the year. However,
under sharp criticism and legal challenges to the amendment's
constitutionality from the ZCTU and local and international civil
society groups, the Government withdrew the amendment in June. Although
no ban on strikes was in place at year's end, government officials
stressed that the Government reserves the right to reimpose the ban at
its discretion.
Despite the expiration of the President's ban on strikes, it is
virtually impossible to conduct legal collective job action. There is
no right to strike in the Constitution. ``Essential'' employees are
prohibited by law from striking, and the Government defines 90 percent
of workers as ``essential.'' For the remaining nonessential employees
legally to conduct a strike, over 50 percent of the company's employees
must vote in favor of the action. Many employees are afraid to do so,
due to fear of management reprisals. However, if a majority vote is
obtained, the dispute is referred to the concerned government agency
for resolution. Only if the Government determines that a resolution is
not possible is the right to strike granted.
Dissatisfaction with wage negotiations led employees in several
major sectors to ignore the Government's requirements for a legal
strike; they walked off the job for up to 1 week. Strikes included
those by engineers at the posts and telecommunications company in May;
civil servants in June; municipal workers in July; junior doctors,
driving instructors, and restaurant and hotel workers in September; and
nurses in October and November. The strikes were generally peaceful,
although some violence occasionally occurred. Police used tear gas to
disperse a demonstration by striking restaurant and hotel workers (see
Section 2.b.). In most cases, employers agreed to negotiate further
wage increases as a result of the job actions.
The ZCTU and its officials are free to associate with international
labor organizations and do so actively. The ZCTU is affiliated with the
ICFTU and the Southern African Trade Union Coordinating Council.
On September 11, the same day that the ZCTU launched a new
opposition political party, the Minister of Information publicly called
for the deportation of Georg Lemke, director of the Danish Trade Union
Council for International Development Cooperation, which had provided
technical and financial assistance to the ZCTU. The Minister alleged
that the Council was meddling in the country's internal politics. The
Council ordered Lemke transferred to Denmark in October, after the
Government reportedly threatened to deport him and to close the
Council's projects in the country if the Council failed to withdraw him
voluntarily (see Sections 3 and 4). Lemke and the Danish Embassy in
Harare insisted that the Danish Trade Union Council had provided
assistance only to ZCTU, not to the new opposition party, in keeping
with the organization's mandate.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The LRA
provides workers with the right to organize. As originally written,
this act was silent on the right to bargain collectively. However, the
1992 LRAA permits unions to bargain collectively over wages. Worker
committees, which by law are not organizationally part of the unions or
the ZCTU, are empowered to negotiate with the management of a
particular plant on the conditions of labor and codes of conduct in the
workplace, except for wages. Unions, employers, and individual workers
have the right to take their grievances to the Government's Labor
Relations Tribunal (LRT) for final adjudication. The LRT maintained a
huge backlog of cases again during the year, with 1,731 cases pending
as of August 31, some of which have been awaiting a hearing for years.
The backlog is attributed to staffing shortages; only two LRT judges
have been appointed to hear the hundreds of new complaints each year.
Collective bargaining wage negotiations take place on an
industrywide basis between the relevant union and employer
organizations sitting on joint employment boards or councils. These
bodies submit their agreements to the Registrar in the MPSLSW for
approval. The Government retains the power to veto agreements that it
believes would harm the economy. However, it does not involve itself
directly in labor negotiations unless requested to do so by one of the
parties. When no trade union represents a specific sector,
representatives of the organized workers, such as the professional
associations, meet with the employer associations, under the mediation
of labor officers from the MPSLSW. Public sector wages are determined
by the Salary Service Department of the MPSLSW, subject to the approval
of an independent Public Service Commission (PSC). Each year PSC
officials meet with PSA representatives to review wages and benefits.
These reviews result in a recommendation that is forwarded to the
MPSLSW. The Minister is not required by law to accept the
recommendation.
Collective bargaining agreements apply to all workers, not just
union members. Over 80 percent of all industries are unionized. The
collective bargaining season (which runs each year from approximately
April to July), brought about wage gains in various industries. For
example, pulp and paper manufacturing employees, received an increase
of 40 to 59 percent, with a new monthly minimum wage of $57.92
(Z$2,198). Mining workers gained a 43 percent increase, with a new
minimum wage of $51.07 (Z$1,938). Banking industry employees gained 45
percent, with a new minimum wage of $101.53 (Z$3,853). Printing,
packing, and newspaper industry employees gained 23 to 40 percent, with
a new minimum wage of $52.70 (Z$2,000). Workers in the leather, skins,
taxidermy, and footwear industries gained 40 percent with a new minimum
wage of $69.14 (Z$2,624).
Employees designated as managers positions are excluded from union
membership and thus from the collective bargaining process. There were
some reports that firms designated excessive numbers of employees as
managers in order to exclude them from the collective bargaining
exercises.
The LRA prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers against
union members. Complaints of such discrimination are referred to labor
relations officers and may subsequently be adjudicated by the LRT. Such
complaints are handled under the mechanism for resolving cases
involving ``unfair labor practices.'' The determining authority may
direct that workers fired due to antiunion discrimination should be
reinstated, although this has yet to be utilized in practice.
The LRAA streamlined the procedure for adjudicating disputes by
strengthening the LRT. Labor relations officers hear a dispute; their
decision may be appealed to regional labor relations officers, after
which the LRT may hear the case. Ultimately, it may be appealed to the
Supreme Court. In 1993 the Government filled long vacant positions on
the LRT, but at year's end the LRT boards still were not staffed fully.
The Export Processing Zones Act states the LRA shall not apply to
workers in export processing zones. The ZCTU has negotiated directly
with EPZ employers to allow some unions in the EPZ, although their
number and level of activity remain low.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Compulsory labor is
prohibited by law, and there were no reports that it was practiced. The
Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and there
were no reports that it occurred (also see Section 6.d.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Legislation passed in 1997 bans employment of children
under the age of 12 and restricts employment of those between the ages
of 12 and 17 to light work during school holidays for periods not
exceeding 6 hours per day. Legislation passed in June banned the
employment of children under the age of 15. Light work is defined as
work not likely to prejudice a child's education, health, safety, rest,
or social, physical, or mental development. All hazardous employment,
overtime, and night shift work is banned for those under the age of 18.
However, there is little to no enforcement of these laws. Children work
in the agricultural sector, and there were reports that children worked
as domestics and as car-watchers on the streets. Although schooling is
not compulsory, over 90 percent of children attend school through grade
5 (see Section 5). The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by
children, and there were no reports that it occurred (see Section
6.c.).
Child labor in the formal agricultural sector, such as on tea and
coffee plantations, reportedly involves children working in the fields
after school during the planting and harvesting seasons and full-time
during school holidays. Long hours are common. Children often work
alongside their parents, and their working conditions approximate those
of adults. While some form of child labor on large commercial farms is
widespread, agricultural organizations maintain that the labor
performed is not exploitative, involuntary, contrary to law, or outside
of cultural norms that allow children to engage in field work with
their families. Anecdotal evidence suggests some school schedules and
calendars are tailored to allow children to work in the fields during
busy farming periods. Economic hardship often makes child labor
imperative for families.
About 25 percent of the adult population was estimated
authoritatively to be infected with HIV/AIDS, and the rate of infection
appeared to be accelerating. As a result, more children were forced to
work in a variety of sectors to fill the income gap left by ill or
deceased relatives. The number of children in adoptive homes or living
on the streets increased rapidly. The number of AIDS orphans is
expected to reach 543,000 by the year 2000, and 910,000 by the year
2005. The deteriorating economy also is forcing more children to work.
Although child labor in the agricultural, domestic, and informal
sectors increasingly is discussed, the Government and NGO's have been
unable to gather concrete data on the number of cases.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The maximum legal workweek is 54
hours, and the law prescribes a minimum of one 24-hour rest period per
week. Working conditions are regulated by the Government on an
industry-specific basis. The Constitution empowers the PSC to set
conditions of employment in the public sector. Government regulations
for each of the 22 industrial sectors continue to specify minimum
wages, hours, holidays, and required safety measures. In recent years,
in an effort to opt out of the wage bargaining system, the Government
mandated wage parameters and specified minimum wage increases only for
domestics and gardeners. Due to an ineffective monitoring system, many
such workers are remunerated below the minimum wage.
The minimum monthly wage for domestic servants is $19 (Z$704), and
$17 (Z$629) for gardeners. These are the basic minimum wages for other
workers. Current monthly minimum wage data for other sectors include:
$38 (Z$1,441) for the catering industry; $42 (Z$1,576) for tobacco
workers; and $52 (Z$1,981) for the garment industry. On commercial
farms, the employer may provide schooling for workers' children. The
minimum wage is not sufficient to sustain a decent standard of living
for a worker and family. Based on the most recent data, from 1998, the
ILO estimates the country's food poverty line at $105 (Z$4,000) per
month. However, escalating inflation and substantial devaluation of the
Zimbabwe dollar significantly reduced the standard of living for most
workers. Workers in sectors covered under collective bargaining
agreements received wage increases averaging 34.8 at the end of the
collective bargaining season. However, accelerating price inflation, in
excess of 60 percent on average during the year, eroded those gains. In
theory, labor relations officers from the MPSLSW are assigned to
monitor developments in each plant to assure that government minimum
wage policy and occupational health and safety regulations are
observed. In practice these offices are understaffed, cannot afford to
inspect routinely workplaces, and must rely on voluntary compliance and
reporting by employers.
According to the ZCTU, some employers take advantage of illegal
refugees for inexpensive labor. Because the job market is worse in
eastern border countries such as Malawi and Mozambique, the refugees
are willing to risk arrest and work for wages below the legal minimums
(see Section 2.d.).
Many of the basic legal protections do not apply to the vast
majority of farm, mine, and domestic workers. Health and safety
standards are determined only on an industry-specific basis. Despite
the lack of general standards, the National Social Security Authority's
statistics from 1998 show a decrease in the number of occupational
injuries and deaths. Seventy-five fatal job accidents were reported
during the first 9 months of 1998, compared with 200 in 1997.
Similarly, 4,867 occupational injuries were reported during this same
time period, compared with 14,000 in 1997. The Government designated
the Zimbabwe Occupational Safety Council to regulate safe work
conditions. The council consists of six representatives each from the
Government, employers, and trade unions. Budgetary restraints and
staffing shortages have made the council ineffective. Although workers
have a legal right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations
without jeopardy to continued employment, in practice they risk the
loss of their livelihood if they do so.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to,
or from the country during the year.
LATIN AMERICA, CANADA, AND THE CARIBBEAN
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ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
Antigua and Barbuda is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy and a
member of the Commonwealth of Nations. A prime minister, a cabinet, and
a bicameral legislative assembly compose the Government. A Governor
General, appointed by the British monarch, is the titular head of
state, with largely ceremonial powers. Prime Minister Lester B. Bird's
Antigua Labour Party (ALP) has controlled the Government and Parliament
since 1976. In the March elections, the ALP retained power by capturing
12 of 17 parliamentary seats, 2 more than it won in the previous
elections in 1994. The Governor General appoints the 15 senators in
proportion to the parties' representation in Parliament and with the
advice of the Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition. The
judiciary is independent.
Security forces consist of a police force and the small Antigua and
Barbuda Defence Force. The police are organized, trained, and
supervised according to British law enforcement practices.
The country has a mixed economy with a strong private sector.
Tourism is the most important source of foreign exchange earnings. The
country is burdened by a large and growing external debt, which remains
a serious economic problem. Per capita gross domestic product was about
$7,500 in 1998.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, problems remained in several areas. Prison
conditions are poor, and there were allegations of abuse of prison
inmates. Opposition parties complained that they received limited
coverage or opportunity to express their views on the government-
controlled electronic media. Societal discrimination and violence
against women also continued to be problems.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the
authorities generally respected these prohibitions; however, there were
allegations of abuse by prison guards.
Prison conditions are poor. Conditions at the lone, 18th-century
prison considerably worsened when a fire destroyed most of the facility
in January. Prisoners allegedly started the fire to protest random
searches by prison guards. Following earlier prison riots and serious
security breaches in 1997, the Government decided to privatize the
prison and hired a foreign security company, which replaced all prison
officials, with the exception of a small administrative staff and
women's prison officials, with its own employees.
The severe damage to the prison from the January fire required
prisoners to be scattered to a number of holding areas, including a
factory shell, a former army headquarters building, and the main police
station. The conditions in the alternative holding areas were
overcrowded and inadequate for proper detention. Repairs to the prison
continued throughout the year, and prefabricated buildings were
installed to house some prisoners. However, the facility, which holds
approximately 182 prisoners, remained overcrowded.
In addition, there were increased allegations of abuse of inmates
by prison guards. In June six prisoners were hospitalized. Prison
guards allegedly caused the injuries, which included severe bruising of
one inmate's genitalia, broken legs due to rubber bullets fired at
close proximity, broken ribs and limbs, and severe bruising of the face
and head. Two inmates allegedly suffered broken jawbones. The
Government removed the prison superintendent and investigated the
incidents of abuse; a final report was pending at year's end.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government respects
these provisions in practice. Criminal defendants have the right to a
judicial determination of the legality of their detention. The police
must bring detainees before a court within 48 hours of arrest or
detention.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice.
The judicial system is part of the Eastern Caribbean legal system
and reflects historical ties to the United Kingdom. The Constitution
designates the Privy Council in London as the final court of appeal,
which always is employed in the case of death sentences. There are no
military or political courts.
The Constitution provides that criminal defendants should receive a
fair, open, and public trial. In capital cases only, the Government
provides legal assistance at public expense to persons without the
means to retain a private attorney. Courts can reach verdicts quickly,
with some cases coming to conclusion in a matter of days.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices. Government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech, of the press, and other forms of communication.
Although the authorities generally respect these provisions in
practice, the Government has restricted opposition parties' access to
electronic media, effectively denying them equal coverage. The
Government owns one of the two general interest radio stations and the
single television station. A religious station broadcasts without
impediment. One of the Prime Minister's brothers owns the second radio
station, and another brother is the principal owner of the sole cable
television company. The government-controlled media report regularly on
the activities of the Government and the ruling party, but limit their
coverage of and access by opposition parties.
These restrictions led opposition leader Baldwin Spencer to
initiate a constitutional challenge in 1993. In 1997 the High Court
determined that the Government had denied Spencer his constitutional
right to freedom of expression and called on the Government to provide
the opposition with greater media access in the future. However, this
ruling has had limited impact in practice. The Government continues to
restrict opposition access to the media, and there continue to be
allegations of censorship. The March report of the Commonwealth
observer group that monitored the general elections noted that the
governing ALP party received the greatest share of political coverage
by the government-controlled electronic media. The report also
indicated that fair and equal access to publicly owned electronic media
did not appear to be available to opposition party figures.
However, print media, including daily and weekly newspapers, are
active and offer a range of opinion, often publishing vigorous
criticism of the Government. Nevertheless, efforts by print media to
expand into electronic media have been restricted. In 1996 a daily
newspaper attempted to start a radio station but has been unable to
secure a license to operate. The authorities charged the owners with
operating a radio station without a license. The case went to trial,
and the judge found in favor of the Government, charging the newspaper
owners with criminal conduct and finding them liable for damages. The
owners sued the State in December 1996 for illegal search and seizure
and claimed that their constitutional right to broadcast had been
violated. In December 1997, the judge ruled that constitutional rights
had not been violated, even though the owners could rightly claim
significant delay; the judge found that the Government had not been
inconsistent in this case, since it hadnot granted other licenses. In
1998 the owners appealed the case, pointing out that a progovernment
station had recently been granted a license. During the year, the
owners submitted an appeal to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom;
their case was still pending at year's end.
The police still have not issued a report of their investigations
in three possible arson attacks in 1998. On November 19, 1998, an
arsonist destroyed an opposition newspaper that published a story about
large shipments of arms and ammunition imported by the Government.
Several days later, a fire of suspicious origin badly damaged the
Ministry of Information, and shortly thereafter the opposition United
Progressive Party's outdoor convention site mysteriously was set afire.
In March a newspaper dismissed two journalists due to a controversy
surrounding a news story critical of the Government. The foreign-born
newspaper publisher dismissed the reporters for making public their
opposition to the publisher's decision not to publish the article
critical of the Government just prior to the general elections. The
Caribbean Association of Media Workers criticized the dismissals as
undermining the newspaper's editorial independence and as a threat to
press freedoms.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly. The police normally issue
the required permits for public meetings but sometimes deny them in
order to avert violent confrontations. While the authorities placed
some restrictions on demonstrations in the past, the opposition held
numerous rallies, public meetings, and a large march with no
interference.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
There were no reports of forced expulsion of anyone having a valid
claim to refugee status. The issue of provision of first asylum did not
arise. The Government assesses all claims by refugees under the
provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
In 1998 the Government accepted approximately 3,500 residents of
Montserrat who fled volcanic eruptions. This influx placed a serious
burden on the country's social services, and the Government asked the
United Kingdom for assistance in meeting these needs. Despite the
additional burdens, the Government continued to welcome Montserrat
refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for a multiparty political system
accommodating a wide spectrum of political viewpoints. All citizens 18
years of age and older may register and vote by secret ballot. The
Constitution requires general elections at least every 5 years; the
last general elections were held in March. The law obligates the
Government to hold voter registration during a fixed period (of only 5
days) each year, and parties conduct their own registration drives free
of government interference.
Except for a period in opposition from 1971 to 1976, the Antigua
Labour Party has held power continuously since 1951. The opposition has
charged that the ALP's longstanding monopoly on patronage and its
influence over access to economic opportunities make it extremely
difficult for opposition parties to attract membership and financial
support. In 1992 public concern over corruption in government led to
the merger of three opposition political parties into the United
Progressive Party.
The Commonwealth observer group that monitored the March elections
issued a report noting irregularities in the electoral process. The
report indicated that the voters' register stoodat 52,348 voters, of a
total population of approximately 69,000 persons. Since 40 percent of
the population were estimated to be below voting age, the voting rolls
appeared to be inflated. According to the observer group, the voter
registration period, which is limited to only a week every July,
appeared too restrictive and potentially disfranchises citizens, such
as persons who would reach the voting age of 18 after July but before
the elections. The observer group recommended the establishment of an
independent electoral commission to improve the voter registration
process.
There are no impediments to participation by women in government
and politics, but they are underrepresented. No women have been elected
or currently serve in the House of Representatives. Two women are
senators, which are appointed positions. Eight of the 14 permanent
secretaries (the top civil servant position in ministries) are women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
While there are no governmental restrictions, no local human rights
groups have been formed. There were no requests for human rights
investigations or inquiries from individuals or international human
rights groups during the year. In 1995 the Government created the post
of Ombudsman. During the year, the Ombudsman reviewed 220 cases, twice
that of 1998 and the highest number since the office was created. The
office of the Ombudsman generally is well regarded. The Ombudsman makes
recommendations to the Government based on investigations into
citizens' complaints; however, his recommendations often are not
implemented to the satisfaction of alleged victims of government abuse
and injustice.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, creed,
language, or social status, and the Government generally observed its
provisions.
Women.--Violence against women is a recognized social problem. It
is treated as a matter of public conscience, and there are
nongovernmental social welfare groups focused on the problem. Women in
many cases are reluctant to testify against their abusers. However,
Parliament approved domestic violence legislation in January, and
organizations such as the Government's Directorate of Women's Affairs
sought to increase women's awareness of their rights under the law.
Police generally refrain from intervening in cases of domestic
violence, and some women have charged credibly that the courts are
lenient in such cases.
While the role of women in society is not restricted legally,
economic conditions tend to limit women to home and family,
particularly in rural areas, although some women work as domestics, in
agriculture, or in the large tourism sector. Although the Government
pledged to provide better family planning services, educational
opportunities, and job training, it has been slow to implement new
programs. The Directorate of Women's Affairs exists to help women
advance in government and the professions, but progress was slow.
Children.--The Government provides education for children through
the age of 16, and children have access to health care and other public
services.
Child abuse remains a hidden problem. While the Government has
repeatedly expressed its commitment to children's rights, it has done
little to protect those rights in practice. The Government stills plans
to establish a committee on children's rights and indicated it intends
to strengthen monitoring and implementation of the U.N. Convention on
the Rights of the Child. The U.N. Children's Fund helped support a
study of the needs of children and families, and its recommendations
are being used to develop a National Plan of Action on Child Survival,
Development, and Protection.
People with Disabilities.--No specific laws mandate accessibility
for the disabled, but constitutional provisions prohibit discrimination
against the physically disabled in employment and education. There is
no evidence of widespread discrimination against physically disabled
individuals, although the Government does not enforce the
constitutional antidiscrimination provisions visibly.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to associate
freely and to form labor unions, and the authorities generally respect
these rights in practice. Approximately 70 percent of workers belong to
a union, and the hotel industry is heavily unionized. There are two
major trade unions: The Antigua Trades and Labour Union (ATLU) and the
Antigua Workers' Union (AWU). The ATLU is associated with the ruling
ALP, while the larger and more active AWU is allied rather loosely with
the opposition.
The Labor Code recognizes the right to strike, but the Industrial
Relations Court may limit this right in a given dispute. Once either
party to a dispute requests that the court mediate, there can be no
strike. Because of the delays associated with this process, unions
often resolve labor disputes before a strike is called.
Unions are free to affiliate with international labor organizations
and do so in practice.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor
organizations are free to organize and bargain collectively. The law
prohibits antiunion discrimination, and there were no reports that it
occurred. Employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are not
required to rehire employees fired for union activities but must pay
full severance pay and full wages lost by the employee from the time of
firing until the determination of employer fault. There are no areas of
the country where union organization or collective bargaining is
discouraged or impeded.
An export processing zone, first proposed in 1994, had not yet
started full operation as of year's end. The same labor laws will apply
in that zone as elsewhere throughout the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
forbids slavery and forced labor, including that by children, and they
do not exist in practice.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law stipulates a minimum working age of 16 years,
which corresponds with the provisions of the Education Act. The
Ministry of Labor, which is required by law to conduct periodic
inspections of workplaces, has responsibility for enforcement. There
have been no reports of minimum age employment violations. The
political strength of the two major unions and the powerful influence
of the Government on the private sector combine to make the Ministry of
Labor very effective in enforcement in this area. The law prohibits
forced or bonded child labor, and it is enforced effectively (see
Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wage rates, which were
established by law for various work categories in 1981, have never been
revised and generally are viewed as irrelevant to current economic
conditions. The lowest minimum wage, for domestic workers, is $0.46
(EC$1.25) per hour; the highest minimum wage, for skilled labor, is
$1.30 (EC$3.50) per hour. Most minimum wages would not provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family, but in practice the great
majority of workers earn substantially more than the minimum wage. The
Ministry of Labor periodically surveys average minimum wages paid in
various sectors; it issues these as guidelines to prevailing market
wages. The guidelines are not compulsory; the Ministry provides them to
reflect increasing wage expectations in the labor market and to offset
the failure to update the 1981 minimum wage rates. In 1999 these
guidelines indicated that employers pay an average salary of $92.60
(EC$250) per week, although the range of actual salaries varies widely,
depending on level and experience. There was consideration of
reactivating the tripartite advisory board to review the outdated 1981
rates.
The law provides that workers are not required to work more than a
48-hour, 6-day workweek, but in practice the standard workweek is 40
hours in 5 days. The law stipulates that workers receive a minimum of
12 days of annual leave. The law requires employers to provide
maternity leave with 40 percent of wages for 6 weeks of leave, while
social service programs provide the remaining 60 percent of wages. The
employer's obligation ends after the first 6 weeks, but social services
will continue to pay 60 percent of wages for an additional 7 weeks,
covering a total of 13 weeks.
The Government has not yet developed occupational health and safety
laws or regulations. Plans to incorporate comprehensive legislation on
safety, health, and the welfare of workers into the existing Labor Code
have not been implemented yet. There is no specific provision for a
worker to leave a dangerous workplace situation without jeopardy to
continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons. There were no recent reports that
persons were trafficked in, to, or from the country.
____
ARGENTINA
Argentina is a federal constitutional democracy with an executive
branch headed by an elected president, a bicameral legislature, and a
separate judiciary. In October voters elected Fernando de la Rua
President for a 4-year term; he took office on December 10, replacing
President Carlos Saul Menem. The elections were considered free and
fair. The judiciary is generally independent but is inefficient and
subject at times to political influence.
The President is the constitutional commander-in-chief, and a
civilian Defense Minister oversees the armed forces. Several agencies
share responsibility for maintaining law and order. The Argentine
Federal Police (PFA) report to the Interior Minister, as do the Border
Police and Coast Guard. The PFA also has jurisdiction in the Federal
Capital. Provincial police are subordinate to the respective governor.
Members of the police continued to commit human rights abuses.
Argentina has a mixed agricultural, industrial, and service
economy. Following 7 years of economic growth during an economic reform
and structural adjustment program, which included privatization and
trade and financial sector liberalization, the economy slowed in 1998
due in large part to a reduction in foreign capital flows. In 1999 the
country entered a recession, with gross domestic product declining an
estimated 3 percent. Unemployment rose to 13.8 percent in 1999,
compared with 12.4 percent in 1998. Income disparities are a problem.
According to a study published in the press, in 1997-98 approximately
35 percent of the population had incomes below the poverty line.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. There continued
to be instances of extrajudicial killings, torture, and brutality by
the police, although the authorities prosecuted a number of persons for
such actions. Police also arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens,
prison conditions are poor, and lengthy pretrial detention is a
problem. The judicial system is inefficient and is subject at times to
political influence and to inordinate delays in trials. There were
numerous threats--and several acts of violence--against journalists.
Police used violence against demonstrators. Violence and discrimination
against women also are problems. Child abuse and child prostitution
continued to increase. Discrimination against indigenous people
persists, and there were instances of anti-Semitism. Child labor is a
problem. In addition, the legacy of the human rights abuses of the
1976-83 military regime continued to be a subject of intense national
debate, particularly the arrest of former junta leaders on charges of
taking or seizing babies born to dissidents in detention and giving
them to supporters for adoption.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings; however, police officers were
responsible for a number of extrajudicial killings. The authorities
investigated and in some cases detained, tried, and convicted the
officers involved.
The authorities detained two police officers, Nestor Trotta and
Roberto Martini, in Buenos Aires province and placed them under
investigation for killing a youth in mid-January under unclear
circumstances. Investigators suspect that the youth and the officers
could have been involved in an illicit transaction gone awry.
In September in Ramallo, Buenos Aires province, police crossfire
killed two hostages and one bank robber during a botched bank robbery
that turned into a hostage situation. A second alleged robber died in
police custody; by year's end, the police had not released a convincing
explanation of the incident.
On December 17, a day after the Federal Government took control of
the bankrupt Corrientes provincial government, police fired tear gas
and rubber bullets into a crowd of protesters blocking a bridge,
injuring at least 40 persons in the violent demonstrations. Several
blocks away, two persons were killed; an investigation was underway at
year's end.
In July a judge convicted Alberto Dattoli, an agent of the National
Intelligence Service (SIDE), and sentenced him to 10 years in prison
for the killing of Sofia Fijman in February 1998. In front of a SIDE
building, Dattoli closed a heavy,mechanical, steel gate on the woman,
who typically fed cats in the area. Dattoli maintained that he was
trying simply to scare her and that the full closure of the gate was
accidental.
In Jujuy province, 14 police officers remained under investigation
for involvement in the January 1998 death of Carlos Andres Sutara. In
Buenos Aires province, a police officer remained under investigation
for allegedly killing Walter Repetto in January 1998.
The four police officers arrested for involvement in the January
1998 death of Juan Carlos Cardozo in Entre Rios Province remained in
protective custody at year's end; their trial was scheduled for
February 2000.
In July a court sentenced a policeman in Buenos Aires province to
10 years in jail for shooting Walter Alvarez in the back while the
latter was in the process of committing a petty theft in 1997.
In April a court convicted an ex-chief of police in Rio Negro
province and sentenced him to 26 months in prison for obstructing
justice in the investigation of the November 1997 deaths of three young
women in the town of Cipolletti. The authorities held two additional
suspects who were awaiting trial at year's end.
In Mendoza seven policemen remained under indictment in the death
of 18-year-old Sebastian Bordon in 1997. Several of these officers were
among the 134 officials dismissed by Mendoza authorities on charges of
misconduct (see Section 1.c.)
In Buenos Aires province, the investigation of the 1997 killing of
news photographer Jose Luis Cabezas closed in December 1998, but a
trial date had not been set at year's end (see Section 2.a.).
Several army officers were among 11 suspects under indictment at
year's end in the continuing judicial investigation into the alleged
coverup of the 1994 death of army recruit Omar Carrasco. In 1996 a
court convicted three soldiers of murdering Carrasco, and a fourth for
covering up the crime. In July and August, a judge in the province of
Neuquen added charges of concealing evidence and providing false
testimony against retired General Carlos Diaz and four other military
officials.
In May a court convicted four police officers for the 1993 torture
and murder of Miguel Bru, a student whose body never has been found. A
judge sentenced police officers Justo Lopez and Walter Abrigo to life
imprisonment for the crime and gave 2-year prison terms to two other
police officials for their involvement in this crime.
The five police officers indicted in September 1998 for the 1989
deaths of Raquel Laguna and Sergio Sorbellini still awaited trial at
year's end.
As of October, Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzon had charged 186
persons with various crimes committed during the ``dirty war'' that the
1976-83 military regime conducted against alleged leftists. In November
Garzon indicted the leaders of the military junta, including former
military leaders General Leopoldo Galtieri, General Jorge Videla,
Admiral Emilio Massera, and 95 other officers, including 1 active
federal judge, on charges of torture, terrorism, and genocide. In 1983
the courts sentenced Videla, Massera, and Galtieri to life in prison,
but President Menem pardoned them in 1990. In 1986-87 former President
Raul Alfonsin signed into law the ``full stop'' and ``due obedience''
laws which put an end to further trials stemming from dirty war
offenses.
Investigations continued into the 1994 bombing of the city's Jewish
Community Center (AMIA) and the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in
Buenos Aires (see Section 5).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
The Government failed to compensate the families of Adolfo Garrido
and Raul Baigorria, contrary to the recommendation of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in 1998. The court had urged
compensation in the amounts of $110,000 (for Garrido) and $64,000 (for
Baigorria) by the end of May. The two men disappeared in the province
of Mendoza in 1990 and are believed to have died in police custody, but
no one was arrested or charged in the case. The court also called on
the Government toinvestigate the disappearances and to bring those
responsible to justice.
Most reliable estimates place the number of those who disappeared
during the dirty war at between 10,000 and 15,000. In 1984 the National
Commission on Disappeared Persons (CONADEP) issued a report listing
8,961 names of such persons, based on public testimony from friends,
relatives, and witnesses. Since then the Ministry of the Interior's
Under Secretariat for Human and Social Rights, which inherited the
CONADEP files, has added over 700 new names, also based on voluntary
reporting. At the same time, other names have been removed from the
original list, either through confirmation of the death or survival of
the person who disappeared, or through the identification of duplicate
entries. The absence of documentary records of those who disappeared
means that the Government must rely on public testimony, either
voluntary or court-ordered. As CONADEP noted in its report, ``It has
been possible to determine that an important quantity of documentation
existed which has been destroyed or which is being concealed by those
responsible for the repression.''
The Under Secretariat for Human and Social Rights accepted claims
for financial compensation from families of persons who died or
disappeared during the dictatorship under a law that permits filing of
applications until May 2000. It had received over 8,000 claims as of
year's end. A law granting former prisoners of the military regime the
right to apply for compensation from the Government expired in
September 1998. Prior to the expiration date, the Under Secretariat,
which administered the law, had received over 13,000 applications, and
by the end of that year had approved over 7,000 of them.
At the urging of the human rights organization Grandmothers of the
Plaza de Mayo, judicial authorities continued to investigate the
illegal adoptions of approximately 250 to 300 children born to detained
dissidents during the dirty war. In June 1998, one of the
investigations led to the house arrest of former army General Jorge
Rafael Videla, the de facto President from 1979 to 1981. Although a
court convicted Videla for the crimes he committed during the dirty war
and sentenced him to life in prison in 1985, President Menem pardoned
him in 1990. However, it is not clear whether the 1990 pardon or the
amnesty laws extend to the crime of child abduction.
The investigation by Judge Adolfo Bagnasco and other judges into
the fate of babies whose mothers disappeared after giving birth in
detention continued. In November 1998, Judge Maria Servini de Cubria
ordered the arrest of retired Admiral (and former junta member) Emilo
Massera, also in connection with an investigation into the abduction of
babies of parents who disappeared. From prison he was moved to a
hospital for medical treatment. The judge ordered that, when released
from the hospital, Massera be placed under house arrest due to his age.
In December 1998, former navy commander Admiral Ruben Franco was
arrested on suspicion that he was a central organizer of the child
abductions. Also that month, retired navy Captain Jorge Eduardo Acosta,
formerly a senior officer at the Naval Mechanics School (site of some
of the worst atrocities of the dirty war), surrendered and was
arrested, bringing the total to nine senior officers who were arrested,
detained, or summoned before various judges investigating the child
abductions.
In January Judge Bagnasco ordered into custody former de facto
President Reynaldo Bignone (who was arrested on January 20 and held on
the Campo de Mayo army base). In addition to ordering the detention of
Massera, Franco, and Acosta, the judge also ordered the arrest of
retired Admiral Antonio Vanek, former army chief Cristino Nicolaides,
and others. All remained under house arrest at year's end, with the
exception of Acosta, who was held at a military facility.
On December 3, the authorities arrested former General Guillermo
Suarez Mason in connection with the investigation of the theft of
babies from women in torture centers. Suarez Mason was among those
President Menem pardoned in 1990, and was the ninth senior junta
official allegedly involved in kidnaping babies and changing their
identities.
On September 9, the federal appeals court issued a ruling that
confirmed the continuing house arrest of Massera, Videla, and the other
defendants; found that they had not been tried for theft of babies in
their original 1985 trial on human rights charges; that the case did
not fall under the jurisdiction of military justice, had not expired
due to the passage of time; and that the crimes in question had no time
limit under international law. The court also required that the
investigating judge question several of the defendants again.
Judicial authorities undertook several searches on military
installations for information on the theft of babies. In addition, the
Government created a reparation fund to be used by the Grandmothers of
the Plaza de Mayo in carrying out activities to find and return
children stolen from their parents during the 1976-83 military regime.
The fund authorized $600,000 (600,000 pesos) over 2 years, starting in
January.
In May a federal court in Cordoba province detained army Major
Luciano Quiroga for allegedly gathering information on judicial efforts
underway in the investigation on the military's role in the theft of
babies. Army Chief of Staff Martin Balza subsequently suspended Quiroga
and three other officials, a first step toward discharge, while
investigating the charges.
In late December, Congress voted to block former General Antonio
Bussi, who is charged with human rights abuses including torture and
deprivation of liberty during the period of the dirty war, from taking
his seat in the legislature. At year's end, the rules committee of the
Chamber of Deputies was reviewing his right to be seated.
On June 7, President Menem relieved General Eduardo Cabanillas from
command of the Army's II Corps, based on his distribution of a book
entitled ``Subversion: the Forgotten History,'' which contained harsh
criticism of the Government, the business sector, the media, and
political parties. However, early in June, a military tribunal tried
Cabanillas for human rights abuses, including torture, theft of babies,
and deprivation of due process, committed during the dictatorship. The
trial followed allegations in the press that Cabanillas was involved in
the theft of babies of women who had disappeared. While the court
dropped the charges for lack of evidence, the army chief asked for his
resignation. Cabanillas refused, stating that only the President could
remove him from his post. In July President Menem discharged Cabanillas
for insubordination.
In a disappearance case separate from the theft of babies, in
September the Supreme Court ruled that Admiral Massera personally must
pay $120,000 (120,000 pesos) to a survivor of the Tarnopolsky family,
many of whose members disappeared during the military regime.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and the Criminal Code
provides penalties for torture that are similar to those for homicide;
however, police torture and brutality remain serious problems (see
Section 1.a.). Human rights organizations described widespread police
brutality, the use of torture on suspects, and corruption within the
police forces. In June 1997, the United Nations Committee against
Torture criticized the Government for tolerating continued brutality
and the use of torture in police stations and prisons. In December
1998, the Government responded to the U.N. committee's criticism but
did not make its reply public.
In May the authorities detained three police officers in Buenos
Aires province for the alleged torture of several persons who were held
on suspicion of killing a police official. In Rosario (Santa Fe
province), the authorities imposed sanctions ranging from transfers to
suspensions on nine police officers for seriously beating two youths
who were arrested for creating a public disturbance in June. In August
several witnesses alleged torture in the city of Buenos Aires by police
who sought corroborating evidence against a suspect.
At mid-year the authorities were investigating two police officers
in Buenos Aires province for forcing prostitutes (who were minors) to
perform sexual acts to avoid being tried in the juvenile criminal
system. They indicted the officers for abuse of authority, extortion,
and failing to carry out the duties of their office, among other
offenses. In January Mendoza province undertook a wide-ranging purge of
police ranks, when the authorities relieved 100 police officials from
duty for presumed involvement in murders, torture, and abuses of civil
rights. By year's end, they dismissed 34 additional officials on
charges of misconduct. Among those discharged were eight officials
involved in the case of Sebastian Bordon (see Section 1.a.).
Police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse violent
protesters on numerous occasions, resulting in injuries (See Section
2.b.). In a number of incidents, they used deadly force (see Section
1.a.).
Police at times threatened journalists (see Section 2.a.).
The Commission for Relatives of Victims of Social and Institutional
Violence (Cofavi) works to obtain justice in instances of police
brutality.
In July the local headquarters of the Radical Civic Union (UCR)
political party in Corrientes province were firebombed and destroyed;
attackers also attacked the headquarters of a provincial opposition
party and that of the Peronists with Molotov cocktails. In mid-
September several small handmade bombs exploded outside the
headquarters in Buenos Aires of the three major presidential
candidates. An unknown group, the Argentine Resistance Command, claimed
responsibility. No one was injured.
Prison conditions are poor. Many prisons and jails are overcrowded,
and some facilities are old and dilapidated. In the Buenos Aires
provincial prisons, 3,100 prisoners awaited trial at mid-year. The
provincial government has considered various solutions, including
renting temporary warehouse quarters, and was considering building 18
new prisons in various police districts. In the provincial capital, La
Plata, 290 persons were being held for trial in an area with an
original capacity of 100. In February five prisoners were wounded in a
prison uprising in Buenos Aires province; the inmates appealed for
better conditions in the prison, which had been opened the previous
year.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Penal Code places
limits on the arrest and investigatory power of the police and the
judiciary; however, provincial police sometimes ignored these
restrictions and arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. Human
rights groups find it difficult to document such incidents and state
that victims are reluctant to file complaints because they fear police
retaliation or do not believe that their complaints would do any good.
Police may detain suspects for up to 10 hours without an arrest
warrant if the authorities have a well-founded belief that suspects
have committed, or are about to commit, a crime, and if they are unable
to identify themselves. However, human rights groups argue that this
provision of law is widely abused, and that police often ignore the
requirement that suspects must be unable to identify themselves, and
often detain suspects who in fact do have identification.
Police occasionally detain teenagers and young adults, sometimes
overnight, sometimes for an entire weekend, without formal charges.
They do not always provide such detainees with the opportunity to call
their families or an attorney. These detainees are released only upon a
complaint from relatives or legal counsel.
In April the authorities investigated three Federal Police
officials for fabricating charges against two persons in the Federal
capital. Seventeen similar cases had been reported in the preceding 5
years.
In August the Government relaxed policies on police use of weapons.
Officers may now fire at suspects without prior verbal warning in
certain situations.
The authorities in Buenos Aires province indicted several police
officials for conspiracy, hiding evidence, abuse of authority, and
hiding public documents. Then-provincial Minister of Security Leon
Arslanian relieved 1 official and suspended 19 others during the
investigation. The officials allegedly hid or destroyed report files of
about 200 crimes, with the apparent objective of reducing crime
figures.
In March the Federal Government promulgated Decree 150, which
instructs police to prevent conduct that ``without constituting
misdemeanors nor infractions in the Code of Misdemeanors, should be
avoided.'' This decree is interpreted to allow the police to detain
persons for carrying suspicious objects or potential weapons. Critics
complained that the decree revived the old police edicts that had been
in effect until the Buenos Aires City Council passed its Code of
Misdemeanors in March 1998. Human rights groups had long argued that
these edicts were used as an excuse for arbitrary detentions,
particularly of young persons, immigrants, prostitutes, and
transvestites. In a police sweep in downtown Buenos Aires 2 weeks after
the decree was promulgated, authorities detained 21 persons under
thatdecree and another law that allows police to check criminal
records. The police said that the detainees were ``intending to commit
misdemeanors,'' although none were apprehended while committing a
crime. Further massive sweeps did not occur.
The law provides for the right to bail, and it is utilized in
practice. Nonetheless, the law allows pretrial detention for up to 2
years, and the slow pace of the justice system often results in lengthy
pretrial detentions. If convicted, a prisoner usually receives credit
for time already served. Three-fourths of the inmates in the federal
prisons of the greater Buenos Aires area were reportedly in pretrial
detention. In the prison system of the province of Buenos Aires, this
figure was reported to be as high as 90 percent.
The law does not permit forced exile, and it is not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, while the judiciary is nominally
independent and impartial, its processes are inefficient, complicated,
and, at times, subject to political influence. The system is hampered
by inordinate delays, procedural logjams, changes of judges, inadequate
administrative support, and incompetence. Allegations of corruption are
widely reported, especially in civil cases. In May 1998, the Justice
Minister stated that ``the system is in crisis.''
The judicial system is divided into federal and provincial courts,
each headed by a Supreme Court with chambers of appeal and section
courts below it.
The Council of the Magistracy, created by the 1994 constitutional
reform but not established until 1997, has responsibility for
appointing and removing federal judges and administering the federal
court system. It began the process of selecting judges in several parts
of the country in September. Nonetheless, it still does not function
fully; judicial vacancies have accrued, and roughly 200 impeachment
cases against judges remain to be resolved.
Trials are public, and defendants have the right to legal counsel
and to call defense witnesses. A panel of judges decides guilt or
innocence. The law does not mandate a trial by jury. Federal and
provincial courts continued the transition to oral trials in criminal
cases, instead of the old system of written submissions. However,
substantial elements of the old system remain. For example, before the
oral part of a trial begins, judges receive written documentation
regarding the case, which, according to prominent legal experts, can
bias a judge before oral testimony is heard. Lengthy delays in trials
are a problem.
In June 1998, the Government allowed Father Juan Antonio Puigjane
to leave prison and serve the remainder of his term under house arrest.
Puigjane, a Capuchin monk, was a leader of the leftist ``All for the
Fatherland'' movement, which in 1989 assaulted the La Tablada army
barracks near Buenos Aires. Although he did not take part in the
assault and denied any foreknowledge of it, the court sentenced him to
20 years in prison. He becomes eligible for parole in 2000. Some
international human rights groups claim that Puigjane was jailed for
political reasons, but the Government maintains that he and the 19
others sentenced with him were tried and convicted properly of
involvement in a violent rebellion against a democratically elected
government.
The release of Puigjane followed the publication of a report by the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) on La Tablada, in
which the IACHR absolved the Government of the use of excessive force
in repelling the assault but concluded that the Government committed
human rights violations after the attackers had surrendered. The
Commission also found that the Defense of Democracy Act, under which
the La Tablada defendants were tried and convicted, effectively denied
them the right of appeal. In 1998 the Human Rights Committee of the
lower house of Congress drafted a bill to amend the law in this
respect, but it was unclear whether this bill, if passed into law,
would retroactively benefit the La Tablada defendants. At year's end,
the bill was still pending.
There were no other reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the
Government generally respects these prohibitions. Violations are
subject to legal sanction, although in practice, local police have the
right to stop and search individuals without probable cause.
Several highly publicized cases of unauthorized telephone wiretaps
in recent years raised public concern, and the Government introduced a
bill in Congress in 1998 to prevent such activities, including the
unauthorized recording of telephone conversations, the unauthorized
photographing or filming of private acts, and the dissemination of such
unauthorized records. A group of prominent journalists warned that the
proposed law could be used to abridge the public's right to
information, under the guise of protecting the right to privacy. The
Senate approved the bill at the end of 1998, but the Chamber of
Deputies had not taken up the bill by year's end.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice.
A number of independent newspapers and magazines publish freely,
and all print media are owned privately. Privately owned radio and
television stations broadcast freely. The Federal Government still owns
the Telam wire service, a television station, and a radio network. A
few provincial governments also own broadcast media.
Nonetheless, organizations of journalists expressed concern over a
number of developments during the year, including violence and threats
against journalists, the growing concentration of media ownership,
criticisms of the press by public officials, findings against
journalists by the Supreme Court, and the failure to bring the Cabezas
murder case to a close (see Section 1.a.).
Four provincial police were under arrest and awaiting trial in the
case of the January 1997 killing of news photographer Jose Luis
Cabezas. After the May 1998 suicide of business executive Alfredo
Yabran, a business executive suspected of instigating the murder, the
investigation closed in December 1998, with 17 persons named as
possible defendants. However, the investigating judge moved to another
position, and at year's end, a trial date had not been set.
In the spring, a court gave journalist Eduardo Kimel a year's
prison sentence (suspended) and imposed a fine of $20,000 (20,000
pesos) for comments made in a book titled ``La Masacre de San
Patricio.'' On April 16, the OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression issued a statement criticizing this ruling as an
infringement on freedom of expression.
In March the authorities discharged two police officers in the
province of Mendoza for threatening journalists.
On May 13, unknown individuals killed Ricardo Gangeme, a newspaper
editor in Chubut province. Government investigators ruled out theft as
a motive and suspect that it was a crime of vengeance. The authorities
arrested six persons for Gangeme's murder; at year's end, they had not
yet set a trial date.
In May 1988, Amnesty International stated that there was ``a
prevailing climate of intimidation against journalists,'' and an
``increasing frequency of attacks, death threats, and harassment.'' In
a report issued in September 1998, the Association for the Defense of
Independent Journalism, a group of prominent journalists, concluded
that, in view of such threats and of the authorities' failure to bring
to justice the murderers of Cabezas, ``the freedom of the press
existing in our country since 1983 is seriously compromised.'' However,
despite the chilling effect of the Cabezas murder, the press continued
to report and criticize freely.
The law provides for academic freedom, and the Government respects
this in practice. In May students protested cuts in the federal
education budget (see Section 2.b.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
and the law provide for freedom of assembly, and the Government
respects this right in practice. In March the executive branch issued a
decree that allowed the Federal Police to detain persons who took part
in ``tumultuous meetings''that disturbed public tranquility. Provincial
police clashed with public sector protesters numerous times throughout
the year; security forces typically used rubber bullets and tear gas to
disperse protests that turned violent. However, in a number of
incidents the police used deadly force against demonstrators (see
Section 1.a.).
In March a protest march during a visit by Prince Charles of the
United Kingdom turned violent and resulted in 7 police injuries and 57
arrests. In May students blocked streets in Buenos Aires for several
days, protesting cuts in the federal education budget. In May in
Resistencia, Chaco province, police used heavy batons, rubber bullets,
and tear gas to prevent public sector employees who were demonstrating
from reaching the provincial executive offices. In June President Menem
authorized the use of border police to remove a group of demonstrators
who occupied the provincial legislature in Corrientes. In July clashes
between protesters and police in Corrientes left a reported 25
demonstrators wounded. On August 11, police repelled protesters in
Tucuman province with rubber bullets and tear gas; more than 30 persons
were injured, including security officers. In December police injured
over 40 protesters (and 2 persons were killed in as yet undetermined
circumstances) in Corrientes (see Section 1.a.).
The Constitution and the law provide for freedom of association,
and the Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
Constitution states that the Federal Government ``sustains the
Apostolic Roman Catholic faith,'' and the Government provides the
Catholic Church with a subsidy of $15 million (15 million pesos), which
is administered through the Secretariat of Worship in the Office of the
Presidency. Religious organizations that wish to hold public worship
services and to obtain tax exempt status must register with the
Secretariat. Possession of a place of worship, an organizational
charter, and an ordained clergy are among the criteria the Secretariat
considers in determining whether to grant or withdraw registration.
Registered religious organizations may bring foreign missionaries
to the country by applying to the Secretariat of Worship, which in turn
notifies the immigration authorities so that the appropriate
immigration documents may be issued.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution and laws provide for
these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
In February members of the Roman Catholic Church complained that
poor immigrants had difficulty paying the costs to arrange their
residency documents and that the government immigration bureaucracy was
excessive.
A committee composed of representatives of the Ministries of
Justice, Foreign Relations, and the Interior determines grants of
refugee status, using the criteria of the 1951 U. N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. A
representative of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees may
participate in committee hearings, but may not vote. The Government has
granted refugee status to numerous persons and accepted them for
resettlement. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise
in 1999.
In March the Government granted asylum to Paraguayan former general
and coup plotter Lino Oviedo, who fled that country after the
assassination of the Vice President, in which Oviedo allegedly was
implicated.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic free and fair elections held on the basis of universal
suffrage. In October voters elected Fernando de la Rua, leader of an
opposition alliance, as President; he succeeded President Carlos Saul
Menem of the Justicialist Party on December 10.
In December President de la Rua requested and received
congressional permission to suspend all three branches of the
Corrientes provincial government and take direct federal control of the
province. Public workers, including teachers, court workers, and public
hospitals had been on strike or limiting services for much of the year,
due to the provincial government's inability to pay salaries.
There are no legal impediments to participation by women and
minorities in politics and government; however, they remain
underrepresented. The Constitution stipulates that the internal
regulations of political parties and party nominations for elections be
subject to affirmative action requirements to increase women's
representation in elective offices. A 1991 law mandates the use of
gender quotas by all political parties in national elections. A 1993
decree requires a minimum of 30 percent of all political party lists of
candidates be female. As a result, the presence of women in Congress is
increasing. About one-fourth of the 257 members of the lower house are
women. However, gender quotas do not apply in the Senate, in which
members are chosen by provincial legislatures, and membership in the
72-seat Senate is overwhelmingly male.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups
operate without government restriction, investigating and publishing
their findings on human rights cases. The Government is generally
cooperative, although not always responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution and laws provide for equal treatment for all
citizens. A 1988 law provides for prison terms of up to 3 years for
discrimination based on race, religion, nationality, ideology,
political opinion, sex, economic position, social class, or physical
characteristics.
Women.--Violence and sexual harassment against women are problems,
but the dimensions are difficult to measure. The only available
statistics are those based on the number of cases reported to police,
but the number of unreported cases is unknown. The National Council of
Women, a governmental organization created in 1992, has worked with the
U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) on the design and implementation of
software that would standardize data from numerous sources and permit a
more accurate evaluation of the scope of the problem. The council also
established a web site with information for women.
In 1994 Congress passed the Law on Protection against Family
Violence, which authorizes a judge to order an offender excluded from
the home. However, human rights groups criticized this law as
insufficient to address the problem. NGO's working in the area of
women's rights stress that women too often do not have a full
understanding of their rights. They are uncertain what constitutes
sexual harassment, what can be considered rape, or when physical and
mental abuse is considered a punishable crime.
Rape is a problem, but reliable statistics as to its extent were
not available. Marital rape and acquaintance rape are recognized by
law, as long as there is force involved, but the need for proof, either
in the form of clear physical injury or the testimony of a witness,
often presents a problem. A rapist is not prosecuted if he offers to
marry the victim and she accepts. In May Congress passed a law that
expanded the definition of punishable sexual violations beyond forcible
intercourse and increased the severity of punishments.
Public and private institutions offer prevention programs and
provide support and treatment for women who have been abused, but
transitory housing is almost nonexistent. The Buenos Aires municipal
government operates a small shelter for battered women and a 24-hour
hot line offering support and guidance to victims of violence, but few
other shelters are known to exist.
Women encounter economic discrimination and occupy a
disproportionate number of lower paying jobs. Often they are paid less
than men for equivalent work, even though this is prohibited explicitly
by law. Working women also are represented disproportionately in the
informal sector, whereeffectively they are denied work-related economic
and social benefits enjoyed by registered workers. The underemployment
rate for women was twice as high as that of men, according to
government statistics. In March 1998, President Menem signed a decree
calling for the ``design and implementation of policies, plans, and
programs to promote the incorporation of women into the work force on
an equal footing with men.''
The National Council of Women carries out programs to promote equal
opportunity for women in education and employment, encourage the
participation of women in politics, and support women's rights programs
at the provincial level.
Children.--Education is compulsory, free, and universal for
children up to the age of 15. However, adequate schooling is
unavailable in some rural areas. There are numerous health care
programs for children, although not all children have access to them.
The Ministry of Interior's Subsecretariat for Human and Social Rights
works with UNICEF and other international agencies to promote
children's rights and well-being.
There is no pattern of societal abuse of children, but
nongovernmental and church sources indicate that child abuse and
prostitution are on the rise. The National Council on Children and the
Family believes that those affected tend to be younger than previously
thought. The Council, which the Government established in 1990, works
with federal and local agencies to improve child protection programs.
In June the National Census Bureau reported that in 1998 4.5 million
children under age 14--45 percent of children in that age group--lived
in impoverished conditions. Street children can be seen in some large
cities, although there are no reliable statistics on their numbers.
People with Disabilities.--A 1994 law aimed at eliminating barriers
to disabled persons regulates standards regarding access to public
buildings, parks, plazas, stairs, and pedestrian areas. Street curbs,
commuter train stations, and some buildings in Buenos Aires have been
modified to accommodate wheelchairs, but some public buildings and
lavatories are still inaccessible to the disabled.
The law prohibits discrimination against disabled persons in
employment, education, and the provision of other state services, and
mandates access to buildings for the disabled. There was some progress
in these areas. The National Advisory Commission on the Integration of
People with Disabilities--a governmental office--and numerous
nongovernmental groups were active in defending the rights of the
disabled and helping them find employment. Since the establishment of
the National Program Against Discrimination (INADI) in 1994, the
largest single group bringing complaints has been the disabled. INADI
received approximately 300 complaints of discrimination based on
disability between December 1997 and July 1999.
Indigenous People.--The Constitution, as amended in 1994,
recognizes the ethnic and cultural identities of indigenous people and
states that Congress shall ensure their right to bilingual education,
recognize their communities and the communal ownership of their
ancestral lands, and ensure their participation in the management of
their natural resources. The National Institute of Indigenous Affairs
(INAI) is the government agency responsible for implementing these
provisions.
The principal indigenous groups--the Kollas in Salta and Jujuy, the
Mapuches in the Patagonian provinces, and the Wichis and Tobas in the
northern provinces--represent less than 5 percent of the national
population. The INAI estimates that there are 700,000 indigenous
people, most of whom reside in rural areas. However, the
nongovernmental Indigenous Association of the Argentine Republic
estimates the indigenous population at 1.5 million. Other demographers
in recent years have set the figure no higher than 450,000. To clarify
the issue, the 2000 national census is to collect information about
indigenous identity for the first time.
Census data show that poverty rates are higher than average in
areas with large indigenous populations. Indigenous people have higher
rates of illiteracy, chronic disease, and unemployment. Government
efforts to offer bilingual education opportunities to indigenous people
were hampered by a lack of trained teachers.
Since 1994 the Government has restored approximately 2.5 million
acres of land to indigenous communities. Nonetheless, somecommunities
were involved in land disputes with provincial governments and private
companies.
Religious Minorities.--There were a number of reports of anti-
Semitic vandalism, threats, and occasional instances of anti-Semitic
violence. In April the Government applied the 1988 Antidiscrimination
Law to send Ricardo Russo to prison for 2\1/2\ years for inciting anti-
Semitism.
On September 17-18, unknown vandals desecrated some 63 graves at
the Jewish cemetery in La Tablada, and in October unknown individuals
desecrated the graves of 11 children at the Jewish cemetery in Liniers,
both in Buenos Aires province. Investigations continued into vandalism
at Jewish cemeteries in Ciudadela (1998) and La Tablada (1997), but
there were no arrests. In August two Jewish families received
telephonic threats and packages containing elements of an explosive
device.
In April 1998, a court sentenced three Buenos Aires youths to 3
years in prison for assaulting a man in 1995 whom they believed to be
Jewish. It was the first instance of an oral trial under the
Antidiscrimination Law. The court found that the three had acted out of
``hatred due to race, religion, or nationality,'' and they were given
the maximum penalty provided by the law. At the sentencing in April,
some persons in the courtroom shouted anti-Semitic remarks. The
Interior Ministry's National Institute Against Discrimination, the
nongovernmental Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, and the Delegation
of Jewish-Argentine Associations filed suit demanding that the
perpetrators be identified and tried under the Antidiscrimination Law.
The defendants were released from prison in August 1998, pending an
appeal. Early in the year, the appeals court overturned the sentence,
ruling that it had not been proven that the attack was racist in
nature. The court ordered that the defendants be tried on charges of
aggravated assault, and the case is scheduled to go before the Supreme
Court.
Investigations continued into the 1992 bombing of the Israeli
Embassy in Buenos Aires and the 1994 bombing of the city's Jewish
community center (AMIA). On February 24, the chief prosecutor in the
investigation ruled that there was insufficient evidence to charge
Iranian Nasrim Mokhtari in the AMIA bombing, and on July 16, the
Supreme Court ruled that she could leave the country. The prosecutor
also ruled in February that Islamic Jihad could have been responsible
for the bombing, although he did not make a formal declaration to that
effect. Wilson Dos Santos, who reportedly had linked Mokhtari to the
bombing, again recanted his testimony from early in the year; the press
reported in July that he had offered to return and testify in exchange
for money. An investigator interviewed him in Brazil, evaluated the
proposed testimony, and rejected his offer.
In March the prosecutor in the AMIA bombing ordered the release
from detention of five former police officers, who had been detained
for (but not convicted of) a variety of crimes in conjunction with the
bombing. Their release was based upon the fact that they had served
more than half of the minimum time they could have received if
convicted. Two officers had been released previously. In May six of the
men were taken into custody again for questioning on their possible
connection to a stolen van used in the AMIA bombing. Four former police
officers and a mechanic remain in jail, charged for their involvement
in the AMIA bombing. In July the authorities brought charges against
all 17 suspects held in connection with the case. Trials had not begun
at year's end.
The AMIA center reopened in September; since then unknown persons
made bomb threats against it on several occasions.
In September the Supreme Court issued an arrest warrant for
Lebanese citizen Imad Mouyhine in connection with the Israeli Embassy
bombing. On May 5, the Interior Minister called for an investigation
into an audiotape that reportedly contained an order from a policeman
redirecting a patrol car from the area around the embassy just before
the bombing. In May the chief investigators reported that the explosion
was the result of a car bomb and formally determined that Islamic Jihad
was responsible for the bombing.
In February a youth attending an outdoor evangelical event in
suburban Buenos Aires was shot and killed by an unknown sniper who
remains at large.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right to form ``free and democratic labor unions, recognized by simple
inscription in a special register,'' and this right is observed in
practice. With the exception of military personnel, all workers are
free to form unions. An estimated 35 percent of the work force is
organized. Trade unions are independent of the Government and political
parties, although many union leaders traditionally have supported the
Justicialist Party. Most unions are affiliated with the General
Confederation of Labor. A smaller federation, the Argentine Workers'
Central, also is recognized legally.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, and this right
is observed in practice. During the year, there were scattered local
work stoppages and several unions, including transport workers,
farmers, and teachers, initiated separate nationwide labor strikes of
several days' duration.
Unions are free to join international confederations without
government restrictions; many unions also are active in international
trade secretariats.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution provides unions with the right to negotiate collective
bargaining agreements and to have recourse to conciliation and
arbitration, and these rights are observed in practice. The Ministry of
Labor and Social Security ratifies collective bargaining agreements,
which cover roughly three-fourths of the work force. In recent years,
most collective bargaining agreements have been negotiated at the plant
level. However, in September 1998 Congress passed amendments to
existing labor laws, one of which reserved to national unions the right
to represent workers at the collective bargaining table, or to delegate
this authority to lower-level unions. The new law also called for the
creation of a mediation and arbitration service within the Ministry of
Labor and Social Security to intervene in collective bargaining if
requested by labor and management; at year's end, this service had not
yet been established.
The law prohibits antiunion practices, and the Government enforces
this prohibition.
Export processing zones exist or are planned in several provinces.
The same labor laws apply within these zones as in all other parts of
the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports that it was used.
The law also prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and the
Government enforces this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits employment of children under 14 years of
age, except in rare cases where the Ministry of Education may authorize
a child to work as part of a family unit. Children between the ages of
14 and 16 may work in a limited number of job categories, but not more
than 6 hours a day or 35 hours a week. The Ministry of Labor chairs the
National Commission for the Prevention and Eradication of Child Labor,
working with government, organized labor, the business community,
religious groups, UNICEF, and NGO's. In June 1998, the Commission
adopted a national plan to eliminate child labor; it still is
developing programs to implement this plan.
A 1993 law requires that all children receive a minimum of 9 years
of schooling, beginning at age 6. The effect of the law was to raise to
15 the minimum age at which children may be employed.
Government census figures indicate that about 5 percent of children
between the ages of 6 and 14 are employed, most with older family
members. Local NGO's note that the figure is imprecise and could be as
high as 10 percent. In the greater Buenos Aires area, 12,500 children
age 14 and below are in the work force. In a 1997 report, UNICEF stated
that 252,000 children between the ages of 6 and 14 were employed--
183,500 in urban areas and 68,500 in the country, principally
harvesting tea and tobacco.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and there
were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The monthly national minimum
wage is $200 (200 pesos), which is not sufficient to provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family.
Federal labor law sets standards in the areas of health, safety,
and hours. The maximum workday is 8 hours, and the maximum workweek is
48 hours. Overtime payment is required for hours worked in excess of
these limits. The law also sets minimums for periods of rest and paid
vacation. However, laws governing acceptable conditions of work are not
enforced universally, particularly for the salaried workers in the
informal sector (roughly 40 percent of the work force).
Occupational health and safety standards still are being developed,
but federal and provincial governments lack sufficient resources to
enforce them fully. Employers are required by law to insure their
employees against accidents at the workplace, and when traveling to and
from work. However, a rash of accidents in the construction industry in
1998 led to demands that the law be strengthened. Workers have the
right to remove themselves from dangerous or unhealthful work
situations, after having gone through a claim procedure, without
jeopardy to continued employment. Nonetheless, workers who leave the
workplace before it has been proven unsafe risk being fired; in such
cases, the worker has the right to judicial appeal, but the process can
be very lengthy.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--While there are no laws specifically
addressing trafficking in persons, laws against child abuse provide
penalties for trafficking for purposes of prostitution, and other laws
prohibit alien smuggling, indentured servitude, and similar abuses.
Although there were no reports of persons trafficked in, to, or
from the country, police in Spain apprehended two Argentine citizens
whom they charged with trafficking in women for purposes of
prostitution.
______
BAHAMAS
The Commonwealth of the Bahamas is a constitutional, parliamentary
democracy and a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. Queen Elizabeth
II, the nominal head of state, is represented by an appointed Governor
General. Prime Minister Hubert A. Ingraham's Free National Movement
(FNM) has controlled the Government and Parliament since August 1992.
The judiciary is independent.
The police and the small Bahamas Defence Force answer to civilian
authority. There continue to be reports that police occasionally
committed human rights abuses.
The economy depends primarily on tourism, which accounts for nearly
two-thirds of the gross domestic product. Financial services,
particularly offshore banking and trust management, are also a major
source of revenue. While some citizens enjoy relatively high income
levels, there is considerable underemployment and poverty. According to
the Government's survey in May, the unemployment rate fell to about 7.8
percent.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
however, problems remain in several areas. There were reports that
police occasionally beat and abused detainees, and prison conditions
remain harsh. The police occasionally use arbitrary arrest, and lengthy
pretrial detention and delays in trials are problems. Violence and
discrimination against women, and violence against children also are
problems. Discrimination against the disabled and persons of Haitian
descent persists.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and other cruel and
degrading treatment or punishment; however, the police occasionally
beat and otherwise abused criminal suspects. Many of the charges of
abuse involved beatings in order to extract confessions. Police
officials continued to deny that there have been violations of
defendants' rights. According to the officials, these rights are
protected by the trial judge, who determines the admissibility of the
defendant's statement as evidence at trial.
The Police Complaints and Discipline Unit, which reports directly
to senior police officials, is responsible for investigating
allegations of police brutality. This unit determines if enough
evidence of abuse or misconduct exists in a particular case to warrant
discipline within the police system or, in some instances, criminal
prosecution by the Attorney General. Local human rights observers doubt
the police force's ability to investigate itself impartially in cases
of alleged abuse and misconduct and believe that many incidents of
improper police behavior go unreported. Police officials insist that
their investigations are fair and thorough.
In 1998 the number of complaints against the police had dropped to
212 from 275 in 1997. Of that number, 15 resulted in disciplinary
action, 76 were found to be unsubstantiated, 5 were withdrawn, and 116
were still under investigation at the end of that year. The acting
Police Commissioner stated that the 1999 figures were expected to be
lower than in 1998. Police officials believe that a continuing turnover
in personnel is the contributing factor in disciplinary cases. There
are approximately 2,200 officers to police a total population
(excluding tourists) of 293,000.
Corporal punishment--abolished in 1984--was reinstated in 1991.
Conditions at Fox Hill, the only prison, continued to improve, but
remain harsh and overcrowded. The men's maximum-security block,
originally built in 1953 to house 400 to 600 inmates, holds nearly 800
of the prison's total of over 1,400 inmates. The remaining prisoners
are housed in medium- and minimum-security units, which are currently
at, or above, maximum capacity. The prison's female population is
around 40 inmates, considerably less than the female unit's full
capacity of 200. Male prisoners are crowded into poorly ventilated
cells that generally lack regular running water. There are no
separatefacilities for inmates being held on ``remand'' (detention
pending trial or further court action), although some eventually are
segregated in a medium security wing after being processed through
maximum security. All inmates are screened for infectious diseases, and
prison officials estimate that about 7 percent of the incoming prison
population is infected with the HIV virus. Most prisoners lack beds.
Many of them sleep on concrete floors and are locked in their cells 23
hours per day. Facilities for women are less severe and have running
water. Organizations providing aid, counseling services, and religious
instruction have regular access to inmates.
The Government has provided funds for improvements in prison
facilities and prisoner rehabilitation programs. Prison officials have
instituted some technical and vocational programs, and correctional
officers are undergoing instruction to become certified trainers.
Modern training facilities are equipped with new computers, and the
prison also offers some educational and literacy programs for
prisoners. The prison is constructing a new 80-cell maximum security
building. This building, which is to have larger cells and more
extensive plumbing, should provide some relief of the overcrowding in
the existing block. Prison officials plan to renovate the current
maximum security unit once the new building is in service.
Domestic and international human rights groups were able to visit
the prison during the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, police occasionally
arbitrarily arrest and detain persons. In general, the authorities
conduct arrests openly and, when required, obtain judicially issued
warrants. The Government respects the right to a judicial determination
of the legality of arrests.
Serious cases, including those of suspected narcotics or firearms
offenses, do not require warrants where probable cause exists. Arrested
persons appear before a magistrate within 48 hours (or the next
business day for cases arising on weekends and holidays) to hear the
charges against them. They may hire an attorney of their choice, but
the Government does not provide legal representation except to
destitute suspects charged with capital crimes. Some local legal
professionals and human rights observers believe that this lack of
representation risks hasty convictions on the basis of unchallenged
evidence, particularly in the case of poor or illiterate defendants.
However, there is no statistical evidence to indicate that this is more
than an occasional problem.
The Bail Act prohibits bail for repeat offenders and those accused
of certain violent crimes. Judges tend not to grant bail to foreign
suspects, particularly on more serious offenses, since the authorities
consider foreign offenders more likely to flee if released on bail.
Judges sometimes authorize cash bail for foreigners arrested on minor
charges, but in practice, foreign suspects generally prefer to plead
guilty and pay a fine rather than pursue their right to defend
themselves, given possible delays in court cases and harsh conditions
in the prison. Attorneys and other prisoner advocates continue to
complain of excessive pretrial detention.
The authorities detained illegal immigrants, primarily Haitians and
Cubans, at the detention center located off Carmichael Road until
arrangements could be made for them to leave the country, or they
obtain legal status. Conditions at the detention center were Spartan,
but the authorities do not hold most detainees for an excessively long
period of time. Female and child detainees are housed together with the
general population and are afforded little privacy. Because of a severe
shortage of security personnel (8 guards for a detainee population that
can range between 150 and 500), prisoners have vandalized much of the
facility. Incidents of antagonism between detainees and guards are
frequent. Most of these incidents occur among the Cuban detainees, a
few of whom have been in custody for over a year. Haitians are usually
repatriated within a few days. Many detainees are provided with food
and other items by relatives and friends on a regular basis, and those
who can arrange and finance their repatriation generally are deported
much more quickly. Illegal immigrants convicted of crimes other than
immigration violations are held at Fox Hill Prison where they may
remain for weeks or months after serving their sentences, pending
deportation.
In September Hurricane Floyd severely damaged the detention center.
For safety reasons, the authorities had transferred detainees to
facilities at Fox Hill Prison before the storm. A number of detainees
escaped after the storm. At year's end, about 400 detainees were held
in quarters formerly used by female inmates at Fox Hill; although
physical conditions were better than those in the center, detainees
complained of reduced privileges available in the prison compound. A
new detention center was expected to open in the spring of 2000.
Exile is illegal and is not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
Magistrate's courts are the lowest level courts and only handle
crimes with a maximum sentence of 5 years. Trial by jury is available
only in the Supreme Court, which is the trial court that handles most
major cases. Its decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeal, with
the Privy Council in London being the final court of appeal. The
Governor General appoints judges on the advice, in most cases, of the
independent Judicial and Legal Services Commission.
The justice system derives from English common law. Trials are fair
and public. Defendants enjoy the presumption of innocence and the right
to appeal. Defendants can confront and question witnesses against them
and present evidence on their own behalf. However, the judicial system
is plagued by a large backlog of cases, and delays reportedly can last
as long as 2 years. To reduce the backlog, the Government has begun the
process of streamlining appeals, computerizing court records, and
hiring new judges, magistrates, and court reporters. The Supreme Court
established a task force to recommend further reforms in the court
system.
Despite these measures to improve efficiency, complaints persist of
excessive pretrial detention, outdated record-keeping, delayed justice
for victims, and a lack of updating laws on the books. Some judges have
been brought in from abroad who are familiar with English common law,
but lack experience regarding domestic law and procedures. There were
isolated complaints of deviations from normal, fair court proceedings--
particularly in civil matters--but there were no indications that this
was a widespread problem.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary entry, search, or
seizure, and the Government generally respects these prohibitions in
practice. The law usually requires a court order for entry into or
search of a private residence, but a police inspector or more senior
police official may authorize a search without a court order where
probable cause to suspect a weapons violation exists. Such an official
may also authorize the search of a person (that extends to the vehicle
in which the person is traveling) without a court order, should
probable cause exist to suspect drug possession.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government respects the
constitutional provision for the right of free expression, and the
political opposition criticizes the Government freely and frequently.
Three daily and several weekly newspapers, all privately owned, express
a variety of views on issues of public interest, including varying
degrees of criticism of the Government and its policies. Foreign
newspapers and magazines are readily available.
There is a government-run radio station and four privately owned
radio broadcasters. The country's sole television station, the state-
owned Broadcasting Corporation of the Bahamas (ZNS), presents a variety
of views, although opposition politicians claim with some justification
that their views do not receive as extensive coverage as those of the
Government.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the authorities respect this
right in practice. Groups must obtain permits to hold public
demonstrations; the authorities generally grant such permits.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
authorities respect this right in practice. The law permits private
associations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
in assisting refugees.
There is no legislation to govern the processing of asylum seekers,
and applications for political asylum are supposed to be adjudicated on
a case-by-case basis at the cabinet level. The UNHCR has scaled back
its involvement significantly since the beginning of 1998, leaving the
screening of asylum applicants to trained immigration officials. Since
this development, domestic and international human rights observers
have criticized the Government for failing to screen potential asylum
applicants adequately. These organizations have claimed that some
Cubans with legitimate fears of persecution were repatriated without
first having the opportunity to make a claim for asylum. However, UNHCR
continues to review Bahamian interview records of Cuban detainees and
offer advice. Although the repatriation agreement between the Bahamas
and Haiti expired at the end of 1995, the Government continued to
repatriate illegal Haitian immigrants based on the terms of that
agreement. The Government signed a repatriation agreement with Cuba in
1998. During the year, the authorities repatriated 283 illegal Cuban
immigrants and 2,886 Haitians. The authorities granted 21 persons
(including 4 minors) first asylum.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
The Bahamas is a constitutional, parliamentary democracy with two
major political parties and general elections at least every 5 years.
An elected Prime Minister and Parliament govern. The political process
is open to all elements of society, and citizens 18 years of age and
older are eligible to register and vote; voting is by secret ballot.
The two principal political parties are the ruling Free National
Movement and the opposition Progressive Liberal Party (PLP). The PLP
led the country for 6 years of internal self-government from 1967 to
1973 and held power from independence in 1973 until 1992. The FNM won
general elections in 1992 and 1997. The FNM holds 35 of 40 seats in the
House of Assembly, and the PLP holds 5. Both the ruling party and the
opposition name members to the upper house, the Senate, in compliance
with constitutional guidelines. Although it does pass legislation, the
Senate is primarily a deliberative body that serves as a public forum
to discuss national problems and policies.
There are no legal impediments to participation by women in
government and politics, but women are underrepresented. The 40-seat
House of Assembly has 6 elected female members, including the speaker
of the House, and there are 6 appointed female Senators, including the
government leader in the Senate. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Janet
Bostwick, also directs the Bahamian Bureau of Women's Affairs. Women
also head the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Labor,
Immigration, and Training. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is a
woman.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Individual human rights monitors and several domestic human rights
groups, as well as representatives of international human rights
organizations, operate freely, expressing their opinions and reporting
their findings on alleged human rights violations without government
restriction. The Government allows them broad access to institutions
and individuals.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Government generally respects in practice the constitutional
provisions for individual rights and freedoms regardless of race, place
of origin, political opinion, creed, or sex. However, the Constitution
and the law contain certain provisions that discriminate against women.
Women.--Violence against women continues to be a serious,
widespread problem. Government crime statistics do not separate
domestic violence from other incidents of violence. However, the
Government established a nationwide toll-free hot line, with two
trained volunteers on each of the inhabited islands who are oncall to
respond in the event of a crisis. Throughout the year, the Government
and private women's organizations conducted a public awareness campaign
highlighting the problems of abuse and domestic violence. In May the
Government authorized the Department of Social Services to establish
two shelters, which is the first time that it has dedicated premises to
assist battered women; they were projected to open in the spring of
2000. The Domestic Court, which deals exclusively with family issues
such as spousal abuse, maintenance payments, and legal separation,
continued to receive a high volume of cases. The court can and does
impose various legal constraints to protect women from abusive spouses
or companions. However, advocates for women's rights see a need to
improve the effectiveness of enforcement of the court's orders. They
cite a general reluctance on the part of law enforcement authorities to
intervene in domestic disputes and a lack of police training and
sensitivity in dealing with domestic violence. While police training
includes some presentations on domestic violence, law enforcement
authorities admit that the problem has not been a top priority in
training or resource allocation.
The Constitution discriminates against women by not providing them
with the same right as men to transmit citizenship to their foreign-
born spouses. Additionally, the law makes it easier for men with
foreign spouses to confer citizenship on their children than for women
with foreign spouses. Some inheritance laws also favor men over women.
For example, when a person dies without a will, the estate passes to
the oldest legitimate son, or in cases where there is no son, the
closest legitimate male relative. Prominent women of all political
persuasions continue to push for an amendment to the Constitution and
related laws to redress this situation.
Women participate fully in society and are well represented in the
business and professional sectors.
Children.--The Government places a priority on maintaining adequate
expenditures for child welfare and education. Public education is
compulsory for children through the age of 16.
Awareness of parenting and responsibility for children has
increased. However, child abuse and neglect remain serious problems,
and cases of sexual abuse involving children age 14 and under are on
the rise. The law requires that persons who have contact with a child
they believe to be sexually abused must report their suspicions to the
police. However, the same reporting requirement does not apply to cases
of physical abuse, which health care professionals believe occurs quite
frequently. The police refer reported cases of sexual and physical
abuse to the Department of Social Services, which investigates them and
can bring criminal charges against the perpetrators. The Department may
remove children from abusive situations if the court deems it
necessary. In light of increasing awareness of children's issues, in
April the Government announced that it would subsidize a home for
sexually and physically abused children. Construction of the new
facility started in October.
People with Disabilities.--The Government has constructed
additional housing units in Nassau designed specifically for the
disabled, but very few buildings and public facilities are accessible
to the disabled. Although the 1973 National Building Code mandates
certain accommodations for the physically disabled in new public
buildings, the authorities rarely enforce this requirement. The code
also fails to mandate accommodations in new private buildings, which
often lack accessibility as well. Advocates for the disabled complain
of widespread job discrimination and general apathy on the part of
private employers and political leaders towards their needs for
training and equal opportunity. They note that there is no overarching
legislation to implement and enforce equal opportunity policies in the
workplace, educational institutions, or elsewhere.
The Disability Affairs Unit of the Ministry of Social Development
and National Insurance works with the Bahamas Council for Disability,
an umbrella organization of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) that
offer services for the disabled, to provide a coordinated public and
private sector approach to the needs of the disabled. A mix of
government and private residential and nonresidential institutions
provides a range of education, training, counseling, and job placement
services for both physically and mentally disabled adults and children.
There is still no disability act, but in December 1998, a government-
sponsored conclave initiated a national task force to address issues
facing the disabled. The task force drafted proposed legislation that
it plans to introduce in 2000.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Unofficial estimates suggest
that between 20 and 25 percent of the country's roughly 290,000
inhabitants are Haitians orBahamians of Haitian descent, making them
the largest and most visible ethnic minority in the islands. While
30,000 to 40,000 Haitian citizens reside in the Bahamas legally, some
observers believe that similarly large numbers are in the country
illegally. Although Haitians and Bahamians of Haitian descent are
generally well integrated into society, interethnic tensions and
inequities persist. Some members of the Haitian community complain of
discrimination in the job market, and resentment of continued Haitian
immigration is widespread. However, reports of ethnic violence or
blatant discrimination against legally resident Haitians are scarce.
Leaders of the Haitian community approve of the Government's humane
approach to the repatriation of illegal immigrants and point to the
high number of ethnic Haitians in the public service.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides labor
unions with the right of free assembly and association. Private sector
and most public sector workers may form or join unions without prior
approval. Members of the police force, defense force, fire brigade, and
prison guards may not organize or join unions. Workers exercise the
right of association extensively, with almost one-quarter of the work
force (and one-half of the workers in the important hotel industry)
belonging to unions.
Three major umbrella labor organizations, the National Workers
Council of Trade Unions and Associations, the Trade Union Congress
(TUC), and the National Congress of Trade Unions, along with individual
labor unions, all function independent of government or political party
control.
The Industrial Relations Act requires that, before a strike begins,
a simple majority of a union's membership must vote in favor of a
motion to strike. The Department of Labor must supervise the vote.
Unions threatened several work stoppages against both public and
private employers during the year. In order to resolve trade disputes
more quickly, Parliament amended the Industrial Relations Act in 1996
to establish an industrial tribunal. According to the act, labor
disputes are first filed with the Ministry of Labor and then, if not
resolved, are turned over to the tribunal. The tribunal follows normal
court procedures for the admission of evidence, direct examination, and
cross examination. The tribunal's decision is final and only is
appealable in court on a strict question of law. Some employers
complain that the industrial tribunal is biased unfairly in favor of
employees. All labor unions have the right to maintain affiliations
with international trade union organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers freely
exercise their right to organize and participate in collective
bargaining, which the law protects. Unions and employers negotiate wage
rates without government interference.
The Constitution and the Industrial Relations Act prohibit
antiunion discrimination by employers. The act requires employers to
recognize trade unions, and it requires the reinstatement of workers
fired for union activities. Employers may dismiss workers in accordance
with applicable contracts, which generally require some severance pay.
The Government enforces labor laws and regulations uniformly throughout
the country.
Freeport is a specially designated free trade zone. Labor law and
practice in this zone do not differ from those in the rest of the
country. However, human rights advocates assert that the port authority
has allowed a Hong Kong-based company, which owns the harbor, airport,
and many major hotels in Freeport, not only to monopolize industry but
also to discourage unions.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor by all persons, including
children, and such labor does not exist in practice.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children under the age
of 14 for industrial work or work during school hours. Children under
the age of 16 may not work at night. There is no legal minimum age for
employment in other sectors, and some children work part time in light
industry and service jobs. The constitutional prohibition of forced and
compulsory labor, including that by children, is respected in practice
(see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Fair Labor Standards Act
permits the creation of a Wages Council to recommend the setting of a
minimum wage, but theGovernment never has established such a council or
a general minimum wage. However, in 1996 the Government established a
specific minimum wage of $4.12 (B$4.12) per hour for all hourly and
temporary workers throughout the public sector. In view of the high
cost of living, this wage alone would not provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. The act limits the regular workweek to
48 hours, provides for one 24-hour rest period, and requires overtime
payment (time and a half) for hours beyond the standard.
The Ministry of Labor, responsible for enforcing labor laws, has a
team of inspectors who conduct on-site visits to enforce occupational
health and safety standards and investigate employee concerns and
complaints, but inspections occur infrequently. The Ministry normally
announces inspection visits in advance, and employers generally
cooperate with inspectors to implement safety standards.
The national insurance program compensates workers for work-related
injuries. The Fair Labor Standards Act requires employers to find
suitable alternative employment for employees injured on the job but
still able to work. The law does not provide a right for workers to
absent themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to
continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.-- There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons; however, the Penal Code bans
prostitution and prohibits the detention of persons against their will
and for immoral purposes. There were no reports that persons were
trafficked in, to, or from the country.
____
BARBADOS
Barbados is a constitutional democracy with a multiparty,
parliamentary form of government and is a member of the Commonwealth of
Nations. The Queen is head of state and is represented by an appointed
Governor General. Prime Minister Owen Arthur is the head of government
and governs with an appointed cabinet. The judiciary is independent.
The Royal Barbados Police Force is charged with maintaining public
order. The small volunteer Barbados Defence Force (BDF), responsible
for national security, can be employed to maintain public order in
times of crisis, emergency, or other specific need. There continued to
be infrequent reports of abuses by police.
The economy is based on tourism, services, light manufacturing, and
agriculture, which makes it vulnerable to external economic
developments. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was about $7,350
in 1998. The country has experienced a continued strong recovery after
a recession in the early 1990's. Estimated GDP growth in the first half
of the year was 2.5 percent, and it was expected to be between 2.5 and
3 percent for the year.
The Government generally respects constitutional provisions
regarding human rights; however, there were problems in a few areas.
Principal human rights problems continued to be occasional instances of
excessive use of force by police and societal violence against women
and children.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.-- The Constitution specifically prohibits torture and
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; however, credible
reports continued that law enforcement officials sometimes used force
during detention to extract confessions from detainees.
In December 1998, the police took two foreign citizens into custody
for questioning in connection with a bank burglary. According to
eyewitnesses, both individuals were in good health when the police
apprehended them. However, 2 days later, the police took both men to
the local hospital following complaints of abdominal pain. One man
suffered severe injury to his abdomen, liver, and colon and had to
undergo extensive emergency surgery for life-threatening internal
bleeding. Doctors treated the second man for injuries to the abdomen
and groin. Both men asserted that they were beaten while in police
custody. They allegedly were taken to separate rooms, where their heads
were covered and hands taped, and they were each forced to lie down on
a desk while five to six men beat them with blunt instruments. The
police force's Criminal Investigation Department conducted an
investigation and presented a report to the Director of Public
Prosecutions in February. The authorities filed charges against five
police officers and started trial proceedings.
In February 1998, two youths were rushed unconscious to the
hospital after being held in choke holds during a police raid. In June
1998, another youth was shot in the shoulder during another alleged
raid. The police investigated both cases and submitted reports to the
Director of Public Prosecutions. After study, the prosecutor did not
advise bringing the cases to trial. The police claimed that the medical
evidence was inconclusive and, as a result, took no disciplinary action
against the police officers involved in the cases.
The majority of complaints against the police fall into the
categories of unprofessional conduct and beating or assault. While the
police force has a complaints and discipline department headed by a
superintendent to deal with matters of inappropriate police conduct,
there is no independent body to review complaints against the police.
However, in December 1998, the Attorney General instituted a working
group to make recommendations regarding the establishment of an
independent complaints authority. The group's recommendations still
were pending at year's end.
Police procedures provide that the police may question suspects,
and other persons they hold, only at a police station, except when
expressly permitted by a senior divisional officer. An officer must
visit detainees at least once every 3 hours to inquire about the
detainees' condition. After 24 hours, the detaining authority must
submit a written report to the Deputy Commissioner. The authorities
must approve and record all movements of detainees between stations.
The authorities generally adhere to these basic principles, although
officials occasionally used excessive force.
The authorities issued firearms to special foot patrols in high-
crime areas in response to public concern over violent incidents that
occurred during the year. Aside from this, the police force is still
mainly unarmed, in keeping with its British traditions.
The only prison is antiquated and overcrowded, with over 700
inmates in a structure built for 350 inmates. The Caribbean Human
Rights Network has called for reform of the penal system and advocates
the development of alternatives to imprisonment such as community
service to alleviate the problem of severe overcrowding. During the
year, government officials discussed introducing alternative,
noncustodial sentencing.
The Government allows private groups to visit prisons to ascertain
conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and imprisonment and requires detainees to
be brought before a court of law within a reasonable time, and the
Government generally respects these provisions in practice. Criminal
defendants have the right to counsel, and attorneys have ready access
to their clients.
The authorities do not use exile as a punishment or means of
political control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and it is free of intervention by other branches
of government.
The judiciary includes the Supreme Court, which consists of the
high court and court of appeal. The Governor General, on recommendation
of the Prime Minister and after consultation with the leader of the
opposition, appoints the Chief Justice and other judges. Judges serve
until the age of 65.
The Constitution provides that persons charged with criminal
offenses be given a fair public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial court, and the Government respects this right
in practice. The judicial system provides for the right of due process
at each level. The law presumes defendants innocent until proven
guilty. The Government provides free legal aid to the indigent with the
exception of a limit of about $2,150 (1,300 pounds sterling) on
expenses incurred for appeals by death row prisoners to the Privy
Council in London. Two inmates have challenged this limit and are suing
the Government on the grounds that it effectively deprives them of
their right to due process.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary entry, search, or
seizure, and the law requires warrants to be issued before privately
owned property may be entered and searched.
The Government does not routinely interfere in the private lives of
its citizens; however, the police sometimes resorted to searches of
homes without warrants. The Government does not censor mail. However,
the Government restricts the receipt of foreign publications deemed to
be pornographic. Other foreign publications of a nonprurient nature are
allowed without restriction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the authorities respect these
rights in practice. There are two independent daily newspapers, both of
which present opposition political views. The Government regularly
comes under criticism in the newspapers and on daily call-in radio
programs. There are six radio stations, two of which are owned by the
Government. The Caribbean Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) television
service (the only television source, excluding direct satellite
reception) is government owned. Although CBC is a state enterprise, it
regularly reported views opposing government policies. Critics allege
that the Government sometimes uses its influence to discourage media
reporting on sensitive issues, but the press remained vigorously
critical of the Government on a broad span of issues. The Government
prohibits the production of pornographic materials.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
observes the constitutional provisions for peaceful assembly and
private association in practice. Political parties, trade unions, and
private organizations function and hold meetings and rallies without
hindrance.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens and legal residents move freely
within the country and leave and enter it without restriction.
The Government has not formulated a policy regarding refugees,
asylees, or first asylum. The issue of the provision of first asylum
did not arise. There were no reports of forced expulsionof anyone
having a valid claim to refugee status. However, government practice
remains undefined.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have this right in law and exercise it in practice.
Political parties freely compete in fair elections by secret ballot at
least every 5 years. In the January elections, the Barbados Labour
Party won a decisive victory, gaining a 26-to-2 majority over the
Democratic Labour Party. There are no impediments to participation in
the political process, and all citizens over age 18 may vote. The Prime
Minister exercises executive power along with the Cabinet of Ministers
that he appoints, balanced by the bicameral Parliament and the judicial
system.
Although underrepresented overall, women participate in all levels
of government and politics. There are three female members of
Parliament; the Deputy Prime Minister, who also serves concurrently as
Foreign Minister, is a woman, as is the Minister of Education.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Local groups involved with human rights operate freely and without
government hindrance. The Caribbean Human Rights Network, a Caribbean-
wide human rights organization which has its headquarters and a small
staff in Barbados, investigates and reports on allegations of human
rights violations throughout the region.
The Ombudsman's office, established in 1987, hears complaints
against government offices for alleged injuries or injustices resulting
from administrative conduct. The office is proscribed from involving
itself in issues involving foreign affairs, immigration questions, and
certain other matters. Because it focuses only on administrative
conduct, it does not deal with complaints of police abuse; a separate
department within the police force deals with matter of inappropriate
police conduct.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal treatment under the law,
regardless of race, religion, or sex. The Government respects these
rights in practice.
Women.--Violence and abuse against women continued to be
significant social problems. However, women's rights groups reported
that victims of sexual assaults, domestic violence, incest, and rape
are often reluctant to report such incidents. There are public and
private counseling services for victims of domestic violence, rape,
suicide, and child abuse.
The 1992 Domestic Violence Law specifies the appropriate police
response to domestic violence, which is intended to protect all members
of the family, including men and children. It applies equally to
marriages and to common law relationships. Criminal penalties for
violent crimes are the same, regardless of the sex of the offender or
the victim. The courts heard a number of cases of domestic violence
against women involving assault or wounding. Victims may request
restraining orders, which the courts often issue. The courts can
sentence an offender to jail for breaching such an order. Human rights
monitors criticized an inconsistency in sentencing for rape, incest,
and statutory rape. They noted that the lack of sentencing guidelines
resulted in longer sentences for persons convicted of petty theft than
for incest; and lesser sentences for incest than for rape or sexual
assault of nonfamily members.
Women actively participate in all aspects of national life and are
well-represented at all levels of both the public and private sectors.
They form a large percentage of heads of household and are not
discriminated against in public housing or other social welfare
programs. The National Organization of Women (NOW) is an affiliate of a
regional women's organization called the Caribbean Women's Association.
The Business and Professional Women's club, an affiliate of the
NOW, runs a crisis center staffed by 30 trained counselors and provides
legal and medical referral services. The center also has a hot line for
clients who wish to maintain their anonymity.The Government allocated
$190,000 (bds$380,000) for a new battered women's shelter, which opened
in September.
Children.--The Government provides for compulsory education to the
age of 16. The national health insurance program provides children with
free medical and dental services for most medical conditions. The
Government is committed to children's human rights and welfare,
although violence and abuse against children remain serious problems.
The Child Care Board is responsible for monitoring and responding to
the critical welfare needs, interests, and rights of children.
Statistics from the Child Care Board show that approximately 1,000
children suffered abuse in 1998-99.
People with Disabilities.--The law does not prohibit discrimination
against the physically disabled in employment, education, or the
provision of other state services. However, in 1997 the Ministry of
Labor established the Disabilities Unit to address the concerns of the
disabled, and in early 1998 it created an advisory committee on
disabilities. The Labor Department, a unit within the Ministry that
finds jobs for the disabled, long has advocated the introduction of
legislation prohibiting discrimination. In May the Government, labor
leaders, and the private sector jointly announced as part of their
continuing social partnership an agreement to promote a code of
practice on the employment of persons with disabilities. They also
agreed to establish targets and time frames for the employment of
disabled persons in the private and public sectors.
While there is no legislation mandating provision of accessibility
to public thoroughfares or public or private buildings, the Town and
Country Planning Department sets provisions for all public buildings to
include accessibility to persons with disabilities. As a result, the
majority of new buildings have ramps, reserved parking, and special
sanitary facilities for the disabled.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers freely exercise their right
to form and belong to trade unions and to strike. Approximately 30
percent of the labor force belongs to trade unions. Overall union
membership appears to have declined slightly in recent years as some
workers moved to better-paying positions in higher-technology sectors.
There are two major unions and several smaller ones, representing
various sectors. The public service union, the National Union of Public
Workers, is independent of any political party or the Government. The
largest union, the Barbados Workers' Union (BWU), was closely
associated with the Barbados Labour Party prior to 1954. After 1954
officers of the BWU became personally associated with the Democratic
Labour Party. A new Congress of Trade Unions and Staff Associations was
inaugurated in August 1995. Most unions belong to this organization.
The law accords full protection to trade unionists' personal and
property rights. All private and public sector employees are permitted
to strike, but essential workers may strike only under certain
circumstances and after following prescribed procedures. While the
industrial relations climate generally remained stable, there were two
contentious strikes during the year, as well as several minor strikes
in the public and private sectors over wages and workplace conditions.
A 9-day general strike at the government-owned television station
challenged management's decision to discipline a station executive for
public involvement in a political campaign. Other issues included
restraints on the freedom of shop stewards to carry out union
activities and outstanding back wages. A negotiated settlement was
reached after senior government intervention. In the sugar industry
protracted industrial action over wages took place just prior to the
beginning of the sugar harvest. A modest wage increase ultimately was
granted, but only after the delay in the harvest posed a threat to the
annual output and important foreign exchange earnings.
Trade unions are free to form federations and are affiliated with a
variety of regional and international labor organizations. The
Caribbean Congress of Labor has its headquarters in Barbados.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the
authorities respected it in practice. Normally, wages and working
conditions are negotiated through the collective bargaining process,
but a tripartite prices and incomes policy accord signed in 1993
established a 2-year wage freeze. A revised (second) protocol contained
provisions for negotiated increases in basic wages and increases based
on productivity, which covered 1995-97. In May 1998, the tripartite
partners signed a third protocol covering 1998-2000, broadened to
address the needs of disabled workers and to express support for
international efforts against child labor.
Employers have no legal obligation to recognize unions under the
Trade Union Act of 1964, but most do so when a significant percentage
of their employees signify a desire to be represented by a registered
union. Several foreign-owned international data-processing companies
challenged union claims in 1997-98 to represent their workforces,
highlighting the country's need for legislation outlining the union
recognition process. While there is no specific law prohibiting
antiunion discrimination, the courts provide a method of redress for
employees alleging wrongful dismissal. The courts commonly award
monetary compensation but rarely order reemployment.
There are no manufacturing or special areas where collective
bargaining rights are legally or administratively impaired. There are
no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced, compulsory, or bonded labor, including that by
children, and there were no reports of its use.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum working age of 16 is broadly observed.
Compulsory primary and secondary education policies, which require
school attendance until age 16, reinforce minimum age requirements. The
Labor Department has a small cadre of labor inspectors who conduct spot
investigations of enterprises and check records to verify compliance
with the law. These inspectors may take legal action against an
employer who is found to have underage workers. The law prohibits
forced or bonded labor by children, and the authorities effectively
enforce it (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets and the authorities
establish minimum wages for specified categories of workers. Only two
categories of workers have a formally regulated minimum wage--household
domestics and shop assistants (entry level commercial workers).
Household domestics receive a minimum wage of about $0.75 (bds$1.50)
per hour, although in actual labor market conditions, the prevailing
wage is triple that amount. There are two age-related minimum wage
categories for shop assistants. The adult minimum wage for shop
assistants was raised by 13 percent in June 1997, to $2.13 (bds$4.25)
per hour; the juvenile minimum wage for shop assistants became $1.62
(bds$3.25) per hour. The minimum wage for shop assistants is marginally
sufficient to meet minimum living standards; most employees earn more.
The standard legal workweek is 40 hours in 5 days, and the law
requires overtime payment for hours worked in excess. The Government
accepts International Labor Organization conventions, standards, and
other sectoral conventions regarding maximum hours of work. However,
there is no general legislation that covers all occupations. Employers
must provide workers a minimum of 3 weeks' annual leave. Unemployment
benefits and national insurance (social security) cover all workers. A
comprehensive, government-sponsored health program offers subsidized
treatment and medication.
The Factories Act of 1983 sets out the officially recognized
occupational safety and health standards. The Labor Department enforces
health and safety standards and follows up to ensure that problems
cited are corrected by management. The Factories Act also requires that
in certain sectors firms employing more than 50 workers create a safety
committee. This committee can challenge the decisions of management
concerning the occupational safety and health environment. Trade union
monitors identify safety problems for government factory inspectors to
ensure the enforcement of safety and healthregulations and effective
correction by management. Government-operated corporations in
particular were accused of doing a ``poor job'' in health and safety.
The Government has promised to undertake inspections of government-
operated corporations and manufacturing plants as a priority. Workers
have a limited right to remove themselves from dangerous or hazardous
job situations without jeopardizing their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws specifically
addressing trafficking in persons. There were no reports that persons
were trafficked in, to, or from the country.
______
BELIZE
Belize is a parliamentary democracy with a constitution enacted in
1981 upon independence from the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister, a
cabinet of ministers, and a legislative assembly govern the country.
The Governor General represents Queen Elizabeth II in the largely
ceremonial role of head of state. Prime Minister Said Musa's People's
United Party (PUP) holds 26 of the 29 seats in the House of
Representatives. The Government generally respects the constitutional
provisions for an independent judiciary; however, at times the
judiciary is subject to political influence.
The Police Department has primary responsibility for law
enforcement and maintenance of order. The Belize Defense Force (BDF) is
responsible for external security but, when deemed appropriate by
civilian authorities, may be tasked to assist the police department.
Both the police and the BDF report to the Minister of National Security
and are responsible to and controlled by civilian authorities. There
were reports of abuse by the police.
The economy is primarily agricultural, although tourism has become
the principal source of foreign exchange earnings. The agricultural
sector is heavily dependent upon preferential access to export markets
for sugar and for bananas. The Government favors free enterprise and
generally encourages investment, although domestic investors are given
preferential treatment over foreign investors in a number of key
economic sectors. Preliminary estimates of 1999 gross domestic product
growth placed it at 3 to 4 percent in real terms. Annual per capita
income was $2,647.
The Government generally respected many of its citizens' human
rights; however, there were problems in several areas. Principal human
rights abuses include an instance of extrajudicial killing, occasional
brutality and use of excessive force by the police when making arrests,
poor prison conditions, allegations of arbitrary arrest and detention,
lengthy pretrial detention, political influence on and interference
with the judiciary, and judicial limits on freedom of the press.
Violence and discrimination against women, abuse of children, and
employer mistreatment of undocumented workers in the banana industry
also were problems.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
political killings by the security forces; however, there was one
instance of extrajudicial killing. In another incident, a BDF soldier
killed a Guatemalan national in what was determined to be self-defense.
On September 22, 38-year-old Daniel Tillett died while in police
custody, after being arrested for fighting in public. Although the
police initially claimed that he had passed out in his own vomit and
died, a cellmate told family members that police repeatedly beat
Tillett and forced his head into a toilet. An autopsy revealed that
Tillett had a fractured skull, water in his lungs, and a ruptured
liver. The police internal affairs and discipline division questioned
seven police officers following Tillett's death. As a result of the
investigation, the Director of Public Prosecutions is pursuing a murder
charge against one officer, who remains in police custody; the police
temporarily suspended a second officer, who awaited a final
disciplinary ruling at year's end.
The Prime Minister appointed an independent Commission of Inquiry
to investigate the June 12 fatal shooting of Guatemalan national Mateo
Paiz Ramirez by a BDF corporal. The Commission ruled the soldier had
shot Ramirez in self-defense.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture or other inhuman
punishment; however, the police occasionally used excessive force when
making arrests. The Government's newly appointed Ombudsman said in a
press interview that the majority of complaints that his office
receives are allegations of police misconduct and brutality. At year's
end, the ombudsman's office had 15 open cases involving complaints
against the police.
The Police Department's internal affairs and discipline section,
the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Ombudsman's office, and on
occasion, special independent commissions appointed by the Prime
Minister investigate allegations of abuse by officials.
On April 26, two Guatemalan men, Hector Balcarcel and Ricardo
Guzman, were detained at the Guatemala-Belize border. They were taken
into police custody. Balcarcel alleged that he was detained arbitrarily
for 5 days and tortured. His report to the Human Rights Commission and
the Guatemalan embassy claimed that he was stripped, handcuffed, burned
with a lighter and habanero peppers on his genitals, beaten with a
stick, and forced to drink his own urine. After an investigation, the
police determined that these allegations were false; however, an
internal review was underway at year's end of the allegation that the
original investigation was a whitewash.
On October 14, plainclothes policemen shot and wounded Curtis
Flowers, who allegedly brandished a toy weapon. Eyewitnesses confirmed
the police account, and the shooting was ruled to be self-defense.
On October 26, the police questioned Luis Arturo Villavicencio
Alas, a Guatemalan citizen residing in a border town in Belize and
searched his home for drugs. Villavicencio alleged that the police beat
him; the Police Commissioner ordered an investigation, and a police
tribunal fined the officer.
In June the authorities arrested a police constable and charged him
with extortion and corruptly soliciting a reward. They relieved him of
duty and at year's end, he was scheduled to stand trial in the Supreme
Court.
Prison conditions are poor. Conditions at the Hattieville
Department of Corrections--the country's only prison--have deteriorated
continually since it opened in 1993. Although designed to house 500
inmates, it currently houses 1,023 prisoners, or approximately 6
prisoners per 10-by-12 foot cell. The majority of prison accommodations
do not have showers or toilets. Instead, inmates are provided with 5-
gallon buckets. The prison psychiatrist (a newly established position)
providesmental health services for inmates. The prison includes a
separate facility for women; however, the administrative section of the
prison is situated nearby and as a result, guards and male prisoners
occasionally roam about this area. There is no separate facility for
inmates with mental illnesses. First-time offenders are housed in the
same building as those who commit capital crimes. Noncitizens
constitute approximately 15 to 20 percent of the prison population.
There are rare reports of human rights abuses at the prison in the form
of physical brutality by prison wardens. Incidents of gang and drug
related violence in the prison are on the rise. A new superintendent of
prisons was named to combat these and other problems.
The Government took steps to curb recidivism and focus on
rehabilitation. The Youth Enhancement Agency (YEA) houses over 2,100
youths between the ages of 13 and 25, who participate in rehabilitation
and job training programs. Increasingly, youthful offenders are
transferred from the main prison to the YEA facilities. A job-training
program at a citrus farm employs approximately 50 inmates. There is a
time-off program for good behavior.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention, and the Government observes
these provisions to a degree; however, accusations of arbitrary arrest
and detention were frequent. Two Guatemalan citizens alleged that they
were detained and tortured in April (see Section 1.c.).
The law requires the police to inform a detainee of the cause of
detention within 48 hours of arrest and to bring the person before a
court to be charged formally within 72 hours. In practice, the
authorities normally inform detainees immediately of the charges
against them. Bail is granted in all but the most serious cases. In
cases involving narcotics, the police cannot grant bail, but a
magistrate's court may do so after a full hearing. There are persistent
allegations that security forces hold detainees for 72 hours and
release them, but upon release, arrest them again. Many detainees
cannot afford bail, and backlogs in the docket often cause considerable
delays and postponement of hearings, resulting in an overcrowded
prison, and at times prolonged incarceration before trial.
The Constitution forbids exile, and it does not occur in practice.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respects this
provision in practice; however, the appearance of judicial independence
from the executive branch is compromised because some foreign judges
and the Director of Public Prosecutions must negotiate renewal of their
contracts with the Government and thus may be vulnerable to political
interference. In February the Government abruptly fired Supreme Court
Justice Manuel Sosa, arbitrarily voiding his 11th-hour appointment in
August 1998 by the ousted United Democratic Party (UDP) government of
Manuel Esquivel, claiming that the PUP--then in the opposition--had not
been consulted appropriately as the Constitution specified. In June the
Government appointed Sosa to the Court of Appeals.
The judiciary consists of the magistrate's courts, the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeal, and a family court that handles cases of
child abuse, domestic violence, and child support. Those convicted by
either a magistrate's court or the Supreme Court may appeal to the
Court of Appeal. In exceptional cases, including those resulting in a
capital sentence, the convicted party may make a final appeal to the
Privy Council in the United Kingdom.
Persons accused of civil or criminal offenses have constitutional
rights to presumption of innocence, protection against self-
incrimination, defense by counsel, a public trial, and appeal. Legal
counsel for indigent defendants is provided by the State only for
capital crimes. In April the Government appointed an attorney to the
Legal Aid Center to improve and strengthen legal aid services to the
public.
Trial by jury is mandatory in capital cases.
Trials in cases that come before the family court generally are
private. The convicted party in family court also may appeal to the
Supreme Court. Defendants have the right to be present attheir trial
unless the opposing party fears for his or her safety. In such a case,
the court grants interim provisions under which both parties are
addressed individually during a 5-day period.
There are lengthy trial backlogs in the judicial system. One factor
commonly cited is the low pay offered to judges, resulting in high
turnover rates. In addition, an inordinate number of significant
narcotics-related cases are taking years to resolve. In these cases,
defendants often are released on minimal bail payments. In April two
retired judges were named to the Supreme Court in a temporary capacity
to help reduce backlogs.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violators are
subject to legal action. However, there were several cases in which the
previous government exercised its power under the right of eminent
domain in an arbitrary manner. Such cases take years to resolve in the
courts.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press but also permits the authorities to
make ``reasonable provisions'' in the interests of defense, public
safety, public order, public morality, or public health. These
provisions include forbidding any citizen to question the validity of
the financial disclosure statements submitted by public officials.
Anyone who questions these statements orally or in writing outside a
rigidly prescribed procedure is subject to a fine of up to $2,500
(bz$5,000), or imprisonment of up to 3 years, or both.
A wide range of viewpoints is presented publicly, usually without
government interference, in seven privately owned weekly newspapers,
three of which are affiliated directly with major political parties.
There is no daily press. All newspapers are subject to the constraints
of libel laws.
Since the first privately owned commercial radio station began
broadcasting in 1990, other stations have been established, broadening
the audience's choices. In addition to these local stations, there are
two British military stations that broadcast news directly from London.
Popular radio call-in programs are lively and feature open criticism of
and comments on government and political matters.
There are eight privately owned television broadcasting stations,
including several cable networks in Belize City and the major towns.
The Government's Belize Information Service issues press releases and
maintains an Internet web site. Two independent television stations
produce local news and feature programs. The Belize Broadcasting
Authority (BBA) regulates broadcasting and asserts its right to preview
certain broadcasts, such as those with political content, and to delete
any defamatory or personally libelous material from political
broadcasts. In a controversial move, the BBA granted a narrow-range
frequency to the opposition UDP radio station, which limited its
broadcasts to the greater Belize City metropolitan area.
The law provides for academic freedom, and the Government respects
it in practice.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects it in
practice. Political parties and other groups with political objectives
freely hold rallies and mass meetings. The organizers of public
meetings must obtain a permit 36 hours in advance of the meetings; such
permits are not denied for political reasons and are granted routinely
in practice.
The Constitution permits citizens to form and join associations of
their choosing, both political and nonpolitical, and the Government
respects these provisions in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
The law provides for granting of asylum or refugee status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
organizations. In 1997 the UNHCR liaison office ceased all funding for
the Government's Refugee Department, which previously had relied upon
the UNHCR to pay all program costs, including salaries. The Refugee
Department officially closed on January 1; all remaining functions are
handled through a small refugee desk within the Department of
Immigration and Nationality.
The previous administration appointed members to an eligibility
committee to review applications for asylum. The committee, which
included a UNHCR representative, met on a weekly basis. In 1998 the
Government turned down 30 requests for asylum. After the 1998
elections, no applications for asylum were made. There is no
legislation that formalizes the asylum process. The Government last
honored the principle of first asylum in the case of four persons in
1995.
In the wake of the civil conflicts in Central America in the
1980's, over 40,000 predominantly Hispanic migrants came to Belize,
many of them entering illegally and living without documentation. In
May the Government instituted a 6-week amnesty initiative whereby
undocumented migrants were eligible to obtain legal residency,
provided: They lived in Belize continuously for 4 years, married a
Belizean citizen or had a stable common-law association, had Belizean
children, or, if female, were at least 4 months pregnant. In response
to UNHCR concerns, the Government amended its process, reducing the
residency requirement from 10 to 5 years, to allow these migrants to
obtain citizenship. The amnesty is expected to benefit about 5,000
UNHCR-registered asylees, as well as 13,000 others.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
Belize is a democracy governed by a national assembly with
executive direction from a cabinet of ministers headed by Prime
Minister Said Musa. The law requires national elections every 5 years.
The Government changed hands in August 1998 when the PUP won 26 of 29
seats in the House of Representatives in free and fair elections.
All elections are held by secret ballot, and suffrage is universal
for citizens 18 years of age and older. National political parties
include the People's United Party, the United Democratic Party, and the
National Alliance for Belizean Rights (NABR). The country's ethnic
diversity is reflected in each party's membership.
No laws impede participation of women in politics; however, they
are underrepresented in electoral politics due to both tradition and
socioeconomic factors. Voters elected 2 women to the 29-seat House of
Representatives, and the Speaker of the House and the President of the
Senate, both appointed, are women. Women also hold a number of other
appointive offices, including four of nine senate seats and one cabinet
position.
There are no laws impeding participation by indigenous people or
minority groups in politics. There are Mestizo, Creole, Maya, and
Garifuna representatives in Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Human Rights Commission of Belize (HRCB), a nongovernmental
organization (NGO) affiliated with regional human rights organizations
and partly funded by the UNHCR, operates without government restriction
on a wide range of issues, including migrant and agricultural workers'
rights and cases of alleged police abuse. The HRCB publishes human
rights complaints and urges police and other governmental bodies to act
upon them. The HRCB gained prominence through media reports about
itsworkshops and seminars that educate citizens about human rights.
International human rights groups operate freely as well. Government
officials generally are cooperative and responsive to their activities.
On July 13, the Government appointed the country's first Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman's office receives a daily average of half a dozen
complaints. The Ombudsman said in a press interview that the majority
of complaints that his office receives are allegations of police
misconduct and brutality. At year's end, the ombudsman's office had 15
open cases involving complaints against the police (see Section 1.c.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Belize is a multiracial, multiethnic country, and the Government
actively promotes tolerance and cross-cultural understanding.
Discrimination on ethnic or religious grounds is illegal and rare,
although ethnic tension, particularly resentment of recently arrived
Central American and Asian immigrants, continued to be a problem. The
Government continues to reserve certain professions for citizens,
granting permits and licenses to noncitizens only in specific cases.
These occupations include fishing, souvenir manufacturing, sightseeing
tours, accounting, insurance, real estate, and legal services.
b. Women.--Violence against women is a problem. A shelter for
battered women offers short-term housing. The Belize Organization for
Women and Development, an NGO, advises women on their rights and
provides counseling. Laws prohibit rape and sexual harassment, but few
offenders are charged and convicted. In October Parliament passed a law
specifically prohibiting spousal rape.
There were reports of trafficking in women for purposes of
prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
Despite constitutional provisions for equality, women face social
and economic prejudice. Women find it more difficult than men to obtain
business and agricultural financing and other resources. Most employed
women are concentrated in female-dominated occupations with
traditionally low status and wages.
The Women's Bureau in the Ministry of Human Development, Women, and
Civil Society is charged with developing programs to improve the status
of women. A number of officially registered women's groups work closely
with various government ministries in promoting social awareness
programs. Women have access to education and are active in all spheres
of national life, but relatively few hold top managerial positions.
However, women head the Belize Business Bureau, Belize Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, Belize Citrus Growers Association, several
prominent environmental NGO's, and the Belize Rotary Club. The law
mandates equal pay for equal work, but female workers often earn less
than men in similar jobs. There are no legal impediments to women
owning or managing land or other real property.
Children.--Education is compulsory for children between the ages of
5 and 14. After children finish their primary education, they may enter
a secondary school, the government-run apprenticeship program, or a
vocational institution. However, these programs have room for only
about one-half of the children finishing primary school; competition
for spaces in secondary school is intense. Education is nominally free,
but various school, book, and uniform fees put education out of reach
for many poor children.
The Family Services Division in the Ministry of Human Development,
Women, and Civil Society is devoted primarily to children's issues. The
division coordinates programs for children who are victims of domestic
violence, advocates remedies in specific cases before the family court,
conducts public education campaigns, investigates cases of trafficking
in children (see Section 6.f.), and works with the NGO's and the United
Nations Children's Fund to promote children's welfare. The National
Committee for Families and Children includes a representative from the
Ministry of Human Development, Women, and Civil Society.
During the year, the public became more aware of the Families and
Children Act, which was passed in late 1998. The National Organization
for the Prevention of Child Abuse (NOPCA) published a handbook for the
public that outlined in plain language provisions of the act. The act
allows authorities legally to remove a child from an abusive home
environment. The actremoves the limit placed on child support a parent
must pay, and it allows men to file for support, as well as women. It
requires parents to maintain and support a child until he or she
reaches the age of 18, compared with the previous law's mandate of
support up to the age of 16. The new act also accepts DNA testing as
legal proof of paternity and maternity. It requires that all adoptions
be reported to the Human Development Department of the Ministry of
Human Development, Women, and Civil Society and that prospective
parents be screened before they may adopt a child. The NOPCA instituted
a nationwide telephone help line to encourage discourse and reduce
abuse.
People with Disabilities.--The law does not specifically provide
for accessibility for disabled persons or prohibit job discrimination
against them. The Government's Disability Services Unit, as well as a
number of NGO's, such as the Belize Association of and for Persons with
Disabilities and the Belize Center for the Visually Impaired, provide
assistance to physically disabled persons. Disabled children have
access to government special education facilities, although the
requirements to enter such programs are strict.
Indigenous People.--Among the country's indigenous people, the
Mopan and Ke'kchi are grouped under the general term Maya, although
their leaders say they should be identified as the Masenal, meaning
``common people.'' The Maya have sought official recognition of their
communal claims to land, but the Government has been reluctant to
single out one ethnic group for special consideration. The Government
has designated 77,000 acres as 9 separate Mayan reserves; however,
Mayan leaders purport that the Maya have an ancestral claim to a total
of 500,000 acres. Several Mayan organizations have filed suit to force
the Government to recognize the Mayas' ancestral land rights and to
prevent further granting of logging concessions on the disputed land.
In October the Government introduced legislation to establish the
Southern Regional Development Corporation (SRDC), which would promote
development in districts of the country that are heavily populated by
Maya. Indigenous leaders opposed the first draft of the bill because
they wanted their land claims addressed first and because they believed
that their communities were represented insufficiently on the SRDC
board. At year's end, the legislation was still pending; however, on
November 23, the Cabinet approved the regional development plan that
the corporation is to implement.
The Maya have formed cultural councils and other groups to advance
their interests, sometimes with the collaboration of NGO's concerned
with environmental and indigenous issues. In 1998 one Mayan council
sought and won greater involvement by the Mayan community in an
internationally funded highway project in the southern part of the
country, the location of many Mayan communities. In response to Mayan
objections to strip logging, the Government created a broad-based
oversight committee to scrutinize the loggers' compliance with strict
environmental statutes.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--By statute and in practice, workers
are free to establish and join trade unions. Eleven independent unions,
whose members constitute approximately 11 percent of the labor force,
represent a cross-section of white-collar, blue-collar, and
professional workers, including most civil service employees. However,
several of these unions are inactive. The Ministry of Industry,
Commerce, Public Services, and Labor recognizes unions after they file
with the Registrar's Office. The law empowers members to draft the by-
laws and the constitutions of their unions, and they are free to elect
officers from among the membership at large. Unions that choose not to
hold elections may act as representatives for their membership, but the
national Trade Union Congress permits only unions that hold free and
annual elections of officers to join its ranks. Both law and precedent
effectively protect unions against dissolution or suspension by
administrative authority.
The law permits unions to strike and does not require them to give
notice before going on strike.
Although no unions are affiliated officially with political
parties, several are sympathetic to one or the other of the two main
parties (the PUP and the UDP).
Unions freely exercise the right to form federations and
confederations and affiliate with international organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for collective bargaining and unions practice it freely
throughout the country. Employers and unions set wages in free
negotiations, or, more commonly, employers simply establish them. The
Labor Commissioner or his representative acts as a mediator in
deadlocked collective bargaining negotiations between labor and
management, offering nonbinding counsel to both sides. Historically,
the Commissioner's guidance has been accepted voluntarily. However,
should either union or management choose not to accept the
Commissioner's decision, both are entitled to a legal hearing of the
case, provided that it is linked to some provision of civil or criminal
law.
The Constitution prohibits antiunion discrimination both before and
after a union is registered. Unions may organize freely, but the law
does not require employers to recognize a union as a bargaining agent.
For example, although the registered Banana Workers Union actively
advocated worker rights, it was not recognized by the banana industry's
growers association due to low membership. Some employers have been
known to block union organization by terminating the employment of key
union sympathizers, usually on grounds purportedly unrelated to union
activities. Effective redress is extremely difficult in such
situations. Technically, a worker can file a complaint with the Labor
Department, but in practice it is virtually impossible to prove that a
termination was due to union activity.
The Labor Code applies in the country's export processing zones
(EPZ's). There are no unions in the EPZ's, reflecting the general
weakness of organized labor in the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
laws forbid forced, compulsory or bonded labor, including that
performed by children, and generally it is not known to occur; however,
there were reports that women were trafficked for the purpose of forced
prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 14 years, or 17 years
for employment near hazardous machinery. Inspectors from the
Departments of Labor and Education enforce this regulation. During the
year, truancy officers, who historically have borne the brunt of the
enforcement burden, were more active. The law requires children between
the ages of 5 and 14 to attend school, but there are many truants and
dropouts. Laws prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, and the
Government effectively enforces this prohibition; however, there were
infrequent reports of trafficking in children for purposes of
prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is $1.12
(bz$2.25), except in export industries, where it is $1.00 (bz$2.00) per
hour. For domestic workers in private households and shop assistants in
stores where liquor is not consumed, the rate is $0.87 (bz$1.75) per
hour. The minimum wage law does not cover workers paid on a piecework
basis. The Ministry of Industry, Commerce, Public Services, and Labor
is charged with enforcing the legal minimum wage, which generally is
respected in practice. The minimum wage as sole source of income does
not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most
salaried workers receive more than the minimum wage.
The law sets the normal workweek at no more than 6 days or 45
hours. It requires payment for overtime work, 13 public holidays, an
annual vacation of 2 weeks, and sick leave for up to 16 days. An
employee is eligible for severance pay provided that he was employed
continuously for at least 5 years.
The exploitation of undocumented Hispanic workers, particularly
young service workers and possibly some agricultural workers, continued
to be a problem. Banana farm owners slowly are moving the housing they
provide for their workers away from the fields where poisonous
pesticides are sprayed. Health clinics in the region report that the
most frequently treated ailments are pesticide-related skin conditions.
Company-provided housing often lacks electricity and water. The
Government, the HRCB, and other concerned citizens all focus on this
problem.
A patchwork of health and safety regulations covers numerous
industries, and the Labor Department in the Ministry of Industry,
Commerce, Public Services, and Labor enforces these regulations to
varying degrees. Enforcement is not universal, and the ministries
commit their limited inspection and investigative resources principally
to urban and more accessible rural areas where labor, health, and
safety complaints have been registered. Workers have the legal right to
remove themselves from a dangerous workplace situation without jeopardy
to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the law does not specifically
prohibit trafficking in persons, it does proscribe trafficking in women
with the intent that the woman may become an inmate of or frequent a
brothel. Nonetheless, there were reports in 1998 that one or more dance
hall owners have recruited women from neighboring countries, promising
them jobs as dancers, waitresses, or domestics. Upon arrival, the
employer allegedly takes their passports, forces them to engage in
prostitution, and holds their wages. The police have investigated, but
had not made any arrests by year's end, nor had the Government taken
any other steps to address this practice.
The Ministry of Human Development, Women, and Civil Society, the
police department, and--in cases involving migrant children--the
Ministry of National Security and Immigration investigate and attempt
to remedy cases that involve trafficking in children (see Section 5).
According to a spokesperson from the Human Development Department,
there were rare reports of trafficking in children for the purpose of
prostitution; most involved migrant children.
_____
BOLIVIA
A constitutional, multiparty democracy with an elected president
and bicameral legislature, Bolivia has separate executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of government, with an attorney general
independent of all three. The judiciary, while independent, is corrupt
and inefficient. The executive and legislative branches share these
defects to some extent. The Government continued to implement
constitutional amendments to reform the judicial system, which were
passed in 1994; the reforms were partially completed by the end of
1999.
The National Police have primary responsibility for internal
security, but military forces can be called upon for help in critical
situations. The police provided security for coca eradication work
crews in the Chapare region. A special antinarcotics force (FELCN),
including the Mobile Rural Patrol Unit (UMOPAR), is dedicated to
antinarcotics enforcement. Civilian authorities generally maintain
effective control over the security forces, but some members of these
forces committed human rights abuses.
Bolivia has extensive poverty, and many citizens lack access to
such basic services as potable water, sewage, electricity and primary
health care. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is about $1,076.
The country is rich in minerals and hydrocarbons, and extensive
investments in petroleum deposits in the eastern and southern parts of
the country are expected to form a basis for strong GDP growth in the
future. However, most workers engage in traditional agriculture, and
many citizens remain barely linked to the cash economy.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, while the Government's human rights record improved
somewhat, problems remain in certain areas. Legal and institutional
deficiencies prevented the full protection of citizens' rights. There
were several suspicious deaths of persons who had been in police
custody. Unlike 1997 and 1998, there were no major clashes in the
Chapare region between security forces and illegal coca growers and no
killings there due to such confrontations. There were credible reports
of abuses by police, including use of excessive force, petty theft,
extortion, and improper arrests. Investigations of alleged official
abuses were slow. Prison conditions are harsh and at times police
arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The most pervasive human
rights abuse continued to be prolongedincarceration of detainees due to
antiquated procedures and inefficiency and corruption in the judicial
system. Other problems include government attempts to intimidate some
news media, violence and discrimination against women, trafficking in
women, abuse of children, discrimination against and abuse of
indigenous people, discrimination against Afro-Bolivians, and inhuman
working conditions in the mining industry.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of politically motivated killings.
On November 11, Miguel Angel Rivero Siles, a 17-year-old prisoner
accused of murder, suffered second and third degree burns over 80 to 90
percent of his body while in a solitary confinement cell at San
Sebastian prison in Cochabamba. He died in a hospital on November 13.
Prison authorities asserted that the fire was accidental, caused by a
candle used for illumination. Rivero told the Ombudsman's office that
he lit the candle, fell asleep, awoke to find the room on fire, and
that the prison guards were very slow to come to his assistance.
Rivero's attorney asserted that prison officials' statements were
contradictory, and at year's end prison authorities, the local
prosecutor, and the Ombudsman were conducting investigations of the
incident. The Ombudsman's preliminary investigation determined that the
fire was not accidental.
On October 23, police in Santa Cruz arrested 18-year-old Marcelo
Botelho; he died the next day in a hospital. The police said that they
arrested Botelho after he was caught stealing a watch, that his alleged
victims had beaten him, and that they had rushed him to the hospital
later that evening when they noticed that he was suffering convulsions.
However, there were allegations that the police had beaten Botelho,
although there were no eyewitness reports.
On October 21, Oscar Justiano, who was arrested and reportedly
beaten by the FELCN in December 1998, died after being sent from the
Palmasola prison in Santa Cruz to the hospital. An autopsy showed that
he died from tuberculosis and other diseases, not as a result of the
beating he suffered upon arrest. Nonetheless, his family and human
rights advocates charged the FELCN with responsibility for his death.
On May 20, police arrested Peruvian businessman Carlos Freddy Cano
Lopez for refusing to pay a disputed taxi fare. After Cano had spent
several days in jail, his cell mysteriously caught fire and Cano
suffered third degree burns over 50 percent of his body. On May 29, the
authorities transferred Cano to a hospital in Lima, Peru, where he died
on June 9. Before dying, Cano told his wife that the police had set his
cell on fire. However, the police alleged that Cano set his cell on
fire while burning incriminating photographs that he wished to conceal
from his wife. The authorities suspended the policemen in question and
their judicial case was pending at year's end.
Unlike in 1997 and 1998, there were no major clashes in the Chapare
region between security forces and illegal coca growers. The Government
neared completion of its investigation into the deaths in the violent
incidents in the Chapare in the spring of 1998 and planned to report on
it in January 2000. Out of an original list of 13 possible civilian
deaths that resulted from the clashes, in only 5 cases did it appear
that the deaths could have resulted from clashes between security
forces and illegal coca growers.
However, the Government did not complete its investigations into
the deaths in the serious and violent incidents in 1997 in the Chapare
region or the deaths in the Amayapampa confrontations in December 1996.
An investigation by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) found that security forces committed excesses resulting in the
deaths of 9 civilians and 32 persons wounded in Amayapampa and that the
Government did not act to identify and punish those responsible; the
Attorney General has yet to complete a long-promised report on these
deaths. In addition, the authorities have not recaptured the police
officer accused in 1994 of murdering coca worker Felipe Perez Ortiz;
the officer escaped from custody in September of that year. The
Government's failure to complete effective investigations and identify
and punish those responsible for either civilian or police deaths
results in an atmosphere of impunity and a condition that almost
amounts to lawlessness.
There are reports that indigenous communities burn or bury alive
alleged witches (see Section 1.c.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
The case of Juan Carlos Trujillo Oroza drew renewed attention as
the most prominent of the cases of those who disappeared during the
1971-78 de facto regime of President Hugo Banzer Suarez. Trujillo's
mother presented the case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
in June. The security forces had detained Trujillo, a 21-year-old
university student, on December 23, 1971, and he was never seen again
after February 2, 1972. Trujillo's mother first presented his case to
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on September 28, 1992. In
1996 the Government of President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada accepted
responsibility for Trujillo's arrest and disappearance and named those
responsible, but did not hold them accountable. Trujillo's mother is
seeking the return of her son's remains and punishment for those
responsible; the Government agreed to start negotiations with her, with
the goal of an amicable settlement.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and the Government
generally respects this provision; however, there were a number of
significant allegations of torture.
There were also credible allegations that military officers and
sergeants beat and otherwise mistreated military conscripts. The
Government was investigating the alleged beating by his superiors of
conscript Roger Candia Vallejos in September and November.
Victor San Unzueta alleged that security forces detained him on
June 6, 1998, took him to a supposed mobile military camp known as
Santisima Trinidad (that apparently no longer exists), and tortured
him. A human rights organization claims that there are other persons
who were also tortured at this mobile camp. However, there are no
eyewitness accounts or other evidence to support these allegations.
Human Rights Ombudsman Ana Maria Romero de Campero completed her
investigation into the November 1998 alleged army intimidation of
residents of the village of Puerto Zudanez in the Chapare. In her March
16 report, she was critical of the Government's security forces, and
urged the Government to respect citizens' human rights. She presented
her findings to the Attorney General, which noted that none of the
perpetrators of the alleged intimidation had been identified. The
military rejected the accusations of intimidation. The Ombudsman noted
a marked improvement in the conduct of coca eradication work crews with
respect to human rights in 1999.
In September the military signed a cooperation agreement with the
Ombudsman's office, and in November the military concluded an agreement
for cooperation and coordination for human rights training with the
Ministry of Justice and Human Rights.
Several police officers were fired and charged for off-duty crimes
including theft and rape, and a number were dismissed for corruption.
In general, however, the police were not disposed to investigate their
own colleagues, and prosecutors were reluctant to prosecute security
officials for alleged offenses committed while on duty. Then-Police
Chief General Jose Luis Medina reinstated 172 policemen who earlier had
been dismissed for corruption; the authorities dismissed Medina on
October 15 after less than 5 months on the job, saying that he had
failed to restructure the police force. The 172 policemen then were
suspended with pay pending an investigation directed by the new Police
Chief, General Roberto Perez. At year's end, more than half of the
suspended police officers had retired, and many others were expected to
do so. It appeared that the few who remain will be able to be
reinstated to their jobs.
Neither the technical and judicial police nor prosecutors normally
receive human rights training. However, in June foreign human rights
attorneys conducted a 2-week human rights course for 53 FELCN
investigators and National Police Internal Affairs officers. The
Congress has yet to take action on the 1995 report of its Human Rights
Commission resurrecting allegations that police officials had in past
years tortured captured terrorists and recommending that criminal
proceedings be opened against a number of named officers.
Indigenous communities in areas with little or no central
government presence impose punishment reliably reported to include the
death penalty on members who violate traditional laws or rules,
although such punishment is forbidden by the Constitution. For example,
there are reports that alleged witches are burned or buried alive.
Prison conditions are harsh. Prisons are overcrowded, and
conditions can be life threatening for inmates without money. According
to the Director General of the Penal System in the Ministry of
Government, as of June there were 8,057 prisoners in facilities
designed to hold 4,959 prisoners. Fifty-six percent of all prisoners
were held for narcotics crimes. Ability to pay can determine cell size,
visiting privileges, day-pass eligibility, and place or even length of
confinement. Cell prices range from $20 to $5,000, paid to prior
occupants or to prisoners who control cell blocks. In the poorest parts
of San Pedro prison in La Paz, for example, inmates occupy tiny cells
(3 by 4 by 6 feet) with no ventilation, lighting, or beds. Crowding in
some ``low-rent'' sections obliges inmates to sleep sitting up.
Children up to 6 years old may live with an incarcerated parent.
According to the Director General, as of March there were 665 children
living with a parent in prison. If such children have nowhere else to
go, the Government considers it more humane to support them in prison
than to leave them homeless in the streets. The standard prison diet,
according to a 1995 study, can cause anemia; the diet has not been
improved since then. There is no adequate health care within the
prisons, and it is very difficult for prisoners to get permission for
outside medical treatment. However, affluent prisoners can obtain
transfers to preferred prisons or even to outside private institutional
care for ``medical'' reasons. Drugs and alcohol are readily available
for those inmates who can pay.
Convicted juvenile prisoners are not segregated from adult
prisoners in jails. Rehabilitation programs for juveniles or other
prisoners are scarce to nonexistent. The Government has acknowledged
these problems but does not have sufficient resources to correct them
quickly.
In November prisoner Miguel Angel Rivero Siles died as the result
of a fire in his prison cell; in May Carlos Freddy Cano Lopez was
arrested and suffered severe burns after his cell mysteriously caught
fire. He died in a hospital in June (see Section 1.a.). These were the
second and third times since 1998 that prisoners had been burned in
their cells. The authorities discharged the two policemen arrested for
attempting to burn a drunken man in September 1998, but their judicial
case still was pending at year's end. On November 29, the Ombudsman and
the Ministry of Government signed an agreement that is expected to lead
to closing down several prisons determined to have inhuman conditions,
including the detention cell in La Paz where Cano Lopez was burned. The
agreement also calls for repair of other substandard prisons, including
San Sebastian prison in Cochabamba where Rivero Siles was burned.
Two other prisoners died in hospitals under circumstances that
suggested neglect by prison authorities in providing medical care. In
one case, the victim's family alleged that his death was related to a
beating he received when arrested in 1998; in the other, human rights
organizations alleged that police had beaten the victim (see Section
1.a.).
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors and
news media representatives.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There were some
instances of arbitrary arrest and detention. Arrests are carried out
openly. The law requires a valid warrant, which a court must confirm
within 48 hours. However, there were credible reports that these legal
safeguards were violated in some cases.
Denial of justice through prolonged detention remains the most
pervasive human rights problem. Judicial corruption, a shortage of
public defenders, inadequate case-tracking mechanisms, and complex
criminal justice procedures keep persons incarcerated for months, or
even years, before trial. The Constitution provides for judicial
determination of the legality of detention. Prisoners are released if a
judge rules detention illegal, but the process can take months.
Prisoners may see a lawyer, but approximately 70 percent cannot afford
legal counsel, and public defenders are overburdened. Bail exists,
except in some drug cases, and generally is granted.
According to a 1998 study, approximately 60 percent of those jailed
are still waiting for the processing of their cases to befinished, and
of those, 30 percent already had served what would have been the
maximum sentence for the crime they were accused of committing.
The Government continued to address the problem of delay of justice
by implementing the 1994 constitutional reforms to streamline the
judicial system and by taking measures to correct other deficiencies as
they come to light. Although large numbers of prisoners continued to be
released under the Personal Recognizance Law promulgated in 1996, most
prisoners still await either trial or sentencing.
The expanding public defender program pursues an active approach by
distributing concise information about human rights to the populace and
seeking to be involved in arrest cases at the earliest possible
juncture to ensure that human rights and due process are honored. The
new program of mobile public defenders who can reach the more remote
parts of the country has proven effective, obtaining the conditional or
provisional release (often on bail) of arrested persons in about 60
percent of the cases handled, and is being extended to additional
isolated regions.
Children from 11 to 16 years of age can be detained indefinitely in
children's centers for known or suspected offenses, or for their
protection, simply on the orders of a social worker. There is no
judicial review.
The 1997 abduction case of Waldo Albarracin, President of the
Bolivian Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH), continued to move
slowly through the judicial system. The authorities had yet to take any
action regarding the four police officials accused of abducting
Albarracin.
The Government does not use forced exile as a punishment.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Although the judiciary is
independent, corruption and intimidation in the judicial system remain
major problems. Poor pay and working conditions help make judges and
prosecutors susceptible to bribes. In March two of the five Supreme
Court justices who were the subjects of corruption allegations or
lawsuits were impeached, and one resigned. The Congress elected seven
new Supreme Court justices in March; no new allegations of corruption
were raised against that Court during the year.
The judicial system has four levels: Investigative, trial, and
superior courts, with the Supreme Court at the apex. Since the
establishment of the Constitutional Tribunal in 1998, the Supreme Court
hears only appeals, not constitutional issues.
Police present the case of an arrested person to a prosecutor. If
the prosecutor decides to prosecute, the case is then submitted to an
investigative court, which decides whether there is sufficient evidence
to issue an indictment; if so, the case goes to a trial court. The
trial court's decision may be appealed to superior court and,
eventually, to the Supreme Court. Cases of persons arrested under the
counternarcotics law go directly from a special prosecutor to the trial
court. The trial court's decision must be reviewed by the district
superior court, which may confirm, lower, raise, or annul the sentence,
or impose a sentence where there was none before. Both the district
prosecutor and the defense attorney may make recommendations and
comments at this stage. Superior court decisions in narcotics cases
must be reviewed by the Supreme Court, whose decision is final. Under
the Personal Recognizance Law, persons who are absolved or found
innocent in either of the two first instances may then be granted
provisional liberty while they await the mandatory higher reviews.
The authorities generally respect the constitutional provision of
the right to a fair public trial. However, the maximum time periods
permitted by law for different stages of the judicial process
frequently are exceeded. Supreme Court justices admit that it is
sometimes difficult to assemble the quorum needed for decisions, and
consequently the Court's rulings are unduly delayed.
Defendants have the right to an attorney, to confront witnesses, to
present evidence, and to appeal judicial decisions. The authorities
generally honor these rights. Although the law provides for a defense
attorney at public expense if needed, one is not always promptly
available. The highly formal and corrupt judicial system makes it
difficult for poor, illiterate persons to have effective access to
courts and legal redress.
In October the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the Judicial
Council, established in 1998 to oversee the judicial process and to
provide an impartial body to review the actions of judges, did not have
the power to dismiss judges because of an administrative finding of
malfeasance alone. Earlier in the year, the Council had investigated
numerous reports of judicial corruption, which led to the resignation
or dismissal of more than 20 judges in Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, and La
Paz. One of the dismissed judges, who allegedly accepted bribes from
narcotics traffickers, protested his dismissal to the Constitutional
Tribunal, which ruled that only a court finding of malfeasance, rather
than a finding by an administrative body such as the Council, was cause
for dismissal. The Tribunal's decision dealt a serious blow to the
Judicial Council, weakening its role as a disciplinary body.
A new Code of Criminal Procedures became law in May, with the full
changes to take effect in June 2001. The new code is expected to
facilitate more efficient investigations, transparent oral trials, and
credible verdicts. The Government has hired 49 additional staff members
to bolster rural public defense, including public defenders, legal
assistants, and social workers.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the sanctity of the home
and the privacy of citizens; although the authorities generally respect
these provisions, there were credible allegations of UMOPAR abuses
involving thefts of property. Residents in the coca-growing areas
generally are reluctant to file and pursue formal complaints. In June
the Government closed all of the human rights offices of the Ministry
of Justice and Human Rights in the Chapare region due to a lack of
funding. The Government plans to reopen two such offices in Chimore and
Eterazama with assistance from an international donor. At year's end,
final arrangements for the transfer of funds and management of this
activity were still pending. These offices accept and pursue complaints
of human rights abuses committed by anyone, including police, narcotics
traffickers, and illegal coca growers.
During the summer, there were allegations in the press that the
Government was intercepting cellular communications, tapping phone
lines, and wiretapping the offices of newspapers and television
stations. The allegations regarding media offices did not appear to be
credible.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the
fundamental right to express ideas and opinions freely by any means of
dissemination; however, there are some limitations on freedom of
speech. The Penal Code provides that persons found guilty of insulting,
defaming, or slandering public officials for carrying out their duties
may be jailed from 1 month to 2 years. If the insults are directed
against the President, Vice President, or a Minister, the sentence may
be increased by one-half. In August the authorities arrested politician
and defense lawyer Otto Ritter for allegedly slandering the President,
jailed him for several days, and then released him.
In September the La Paz City Council chose 40 persons to serve on
the La Paz Press Tribunal, an entity provided for by the 1925 Law of
Print Media, following 10 years of controversy and attempts to nullify
or amend the law. The Press Tribunal is authorized to evaluate
journalists' practices that are alleged to violate either the
Constitution or citizens' rights. Although the principal purpose of the
1925 law is to protect press freedom from censorship, several
organizations, including the Ministry of Information, asked the new
Tribunal to close down two sensationalist tabloid journals. At year's
end, the Tribunal had not taken any action concerning the two tabloids.
State-owned and private radio and television stations operate
freely. Newspapers are privately owned, and most adopt antigovernment
positions. There were credible reports of government attempts to
intimidate some news media to provide more favorable coverage.
The Government prohibits the importation of pornographic books,
magazines, or artwork.
The Government respects academic freedom, and the law grants public
universities autonomous status.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for the right of peaceful assembly, and the authorities generally
respect this right in practice. The Government routinely grants permits
for marches and rallies; however, in July the La Paz departmental
government imposed a requirement for not only a permit but also a
deposit in the event of damages, based on the estimated size of the
demonstration. The requirement was a result of a demonstration in June
that led to violent confrontations, which resulted in property damage.
Human rights groups strongly opposed this new requirement as a
restriction on the freedom of peaceful assembly. In September the Human
Rights Ombudsman challenged the requirement as unconstitutional, and in
November the policy was suspended indefinitely. In December the
Constitutional Tribunal ruled that it was unconstitutional.
As a rule, the authorities try to avoid confronting demonstrators.
However, police clashed with union and other demonstrators on some
occasions. Labor, political, and student groups carried out many
demonstrations and rallies in La Paz and other cities throughout the
year. The authorities intervened only when rallies became dangerously
violent or interfered substantially with normal civic activity.
The law provides for freedom of association, and the authorities
generally respect this right in practice. The Government requires
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) to register with the appropriate
departmental government. There were complaints against the departmental
government of La Paz for the revocation of civil registrations for
three NGO's established by the Unification Church (see Section 2.c).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom and
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Roman
Catholicism predominates, and the Constitution recognizes it as the
official religion. Non-Catholic religious organizations, including
missionary groups, must register with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Worship and receive authorization for legal religious
representation. There are 262 religious groups, mostly Protestant,
registered; at year's end, approximately 100 applications were pending.
The only minority religions in the country that have encountered
problems are Hari Krishna and the Unification Church. Hari Krishna had
registered as an educational organization instead of as a religious
organization. The Government sought to expel Hari Krishna from the
country in the mid-1980's; however, the attempt failed when the Supreme
Court declared it illegal. At year's end, Hari Krishna was in the
process of applying for registration as a religious organization. In
August the Unification Church complained of ongoing harassment by the
Government, specifically citing the August 1998 revocation by the La
Paz departmental government of three civil registrations for church-
affiliated NGO's. However, the Unification Church still is registered
legally with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship as a religious
organization.
At year's end, the Government was finalizing new regulations
regarding religious organizations, with the participation of the
religious community.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no restrictions on travel. The
law permits emigration and provides for the right to return. The
Government does not revoke citizenship for political reasons.
The law provides for the grant of asylum or refugee status in
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Human rights
organizations have objected to some aspects of draft amendments to the
Immigration Law that in their opinion could adversely affect asylees
and refugees.
The Government cooperates with the office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The Government has accepted persons for
resettlement; it received over 40 refugees in 1999 and 5 in 1998. The
issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. After the 1996
takeover of the Japanese Ambassador's residence in Lima, Peru by Tupac
Amaru terrorists, the authorities found that some MRTA activists had
used Boliviaas a safehaven and announced a more restrictive policy on
accepting Peruvian political asylees. Nonetheless, MRTA and other
terrorists continued to use the country as a safehaven and a place to
plan activities.
There were no reports of persons forced to return to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. Political parties ranging from far left to moderate
right function openly. Implementing regulations for the 1994
constitutional revisions provide for half of the congressional deputies
to be elected individually and directly, rather than from party lists.
The first national election under these regulations was held in June
1997, with attendance by international observers. Only one instance of
tampering with ballots was detected.
There are no legal impediments to women or indigenous people
voting, holding political office, or rising to political leadership.
Nevertheless, the number of women and indigenous people who have
prominent positions in politics remains small. Political parties
acceded to demands from women that they be allocated a fair share of
the candidacies in the 1997 national elections, approving a law that
every third candidate on party lists must be female. In addition, every
other candidate on municipal election ballots, beginning with the
second candidate, must be a woman--a development that has significantly
augmented female representation at that level. There are 18 women among
the 157 deputies and senators; there are no female ministers in the
Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and
responsive to their views. However, several human rights NGO's
complained that the Government blocked the access of human rights NGO
representatives and one congressman who sought to observe the violent
conflicts between illegal coca growers and security forces in the
Chapare region in spring 1998. NGO's and the Ombudsman also have
complained that Government security forces and government ministries
have refused to cooperate when NGO's or the Ombudsman are conducting
investigations. In 1998 the Government proposed a law that would have
given it broad control over international NGO's, but the draft law was
tabled later that year after negative reactions from the NGO's and
international donors; the draft has not been proposed again. The
Government criticizes human rights advocates for paying attention
exclusively to the negative aspects of the Government's performance.
APDH President Albarracin and his family have received anonymous
threats in relation to the legal case against his alleged police
abductors (see Section 1.d.). The APDH's branch office in Santa Cruz
also received anonymous threats related to its investigations involving
the security forces; unknown parties broke into its office and
destroyed its computer.
The Human Rights Ombudsman conducted numerous investigations and in
August presented a comprehensive report to Congress that was critical
of the Government. The House of Representatives Human Rights Committee
also presented its annual report in August, which criticized the
Government.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, origin, or economic or
social condition. Nonetheless, there was significant discrimination
against women, indigenous people, and the small Afro-Bolivian minority.
Women.--Violence against women is pervasive. According to the
National Police's Department of Statistics and Planning, in 1998, 57
percent of reported assaults were perpetrated against women. According
to a 1997-98 study conducted by the Pan AmericanHealth Organization and
the Ministry of Health and Social Foresight among women in three
municipalities representative of the country's three major cultural and
geographic zones, 62 percent of women reported experiencing some kind
of domestic violence or abuse at least once in their lifetime. Twenty-
one percent had suffered psychological abuse, 28 percent had suffered
non-life threatening physical violence, and 13 percent had suffered
life-threatening violence. Rape is also a serious problem that is
highly underreported.
On October 29, President Banzer signed into law the Law to Protect
Victims of Crimes Against Sexual Freedom, first proposed in 1997 as a
draft law against sexual harassment. The new Code of Criminal
Procedures (see Section 1.e.) for the first time considers sexual
harassment a civil crime, also resulting in greater protection under
the law. There are no statistics on the incidence of sexual harassment,
but the problem is generally acknowledged to exist widely in the male-
oriented society.
In 1995 the Government promulgated the Law on Domestic and Family
Violence, which makes rape a public crime and broadens the definition
of family member abuse. Public agencies state that reported incidents
of abuse have increased markedly as a result of the new law, as
citizens become more aware of the problem and of the availability of
help. A proposed law to provide benefits and protection for domestic
workers, including specific protection from physical, psychological,
and sexual aggression still was pending in the Congress at year's end.
Legal services offices devoted to family and women's rights operate
throughout the country. Family protection police units, staffed by
specially trained officers, including women, are also active.
A medical security program inaugurated in July 1996 provides free
medical care to women of reproductive age and to children under the age
of 5, based on economic need.
Prostitution is legal, and there were reports of trafficking in
women for the purpose of prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
Women generally do not enjoy a social status equal to that of men.
Many women do not know their legal rights. Traditional prejudices and
social conditions remain obstacles to advancement. Women generally earn
less than men for equal work. Young girls often leave school early to
work at home or in the economy. According to a 1997 study by the
Ministry of Education, four out of five illiterate citizens are female.
Although not effectively enforced, the national labor law is
overprotective in some aspects, limiting women to a workday 1 hour
shorter than that of men and prohibiting them from working at night.
Children.--The Government is aware of the precarious situation of
children and the need to provide legal and institutional infrastructure
for their protection. Seven Defender of Children and Adolescents
offices were opened in 1997 in La Paz to help protect children's rights
and interests. However, the Government has not given the poor situation
of children sufficient political priority to ensure that it will be
corrected quickly and effectively.
On October 27, President Banzer signed into law a new Code for
Boys, Girls, and Adolescents, which codifies many obligations the
country assumed by ratifying the U.N. Convention on Rights of the
Child. It also regulates adoptions and tightens protection against
exploitative child labor and violence against children. However,
resource constraints are expected to impede full implementation of this
law.
Although the law requires all children to complete at least 5 years
of primary school, this requirement is poorly enforced, particularly in
rural areas. The Ministry of Education and the World Bank calculated in
1997 that 26 percent of children graduated from high school. Prolonged
teachers' strikes often result in lengthy school closures, limiting
children's access to education.
The National Institute of Statistics calculated in 1998 that 24
percent of children under 3 years old were chronically undernourished.
Malnutrition levels were highest on the Altiplano in general and in the
department of Potosi in particular. A December UNICEF report on infant
mortality indicated that 85 of every 1,000 children die before they
reach 5 years of age.
Many children, particularly from rural areas, lack the birth
certificates and identity documents they need to secure social benefits
and protection. There are credible allegations that as many as 200
juveniles, for instance, are incarcerated as adults in the San Pedro
jail for lack of reliable civil documents proving their ages.
Corporal punishment and verbal abuse are common in school, and
physical and psychological abuse in the home is also a serious problem.
The rape and murder of a 10-year-old girl led to calls for the
reimposition of the death penalty for such crimes. Although laws
provide safeguards against children working, they are not enforced
effectively. According to a May study commissioned by the International
Labor Organization (ILO), approximately 369,385 children between the
ages of 7 and 14 work (23 percent of that age group), usually to help
provide for family subsistence, in uncontrolled and sometimes unhealthy
conditions (see Section 6.d.).
The old practice of ``criadito'' service still persists in some
parts of the country. Criaditos are indigenous children of both sexes,
usually 10 to 12 years old, whom their parents indenture to middle- and
upper-class families to perform household work in exchange for
education, clothing, room, and board. There are no controls over the
benefits to, or treatment of, such children, who may become virtual
slaves for the years of their indenture.
People with Disabilities.--In 1997 the Government promulgated
regulations to implement the 1995 Law on Disabilities. The regulations
require wheelchair access to all public and private buildings; duty
free import of orthopedic devices; a 50 percent reduction in public
transportation fares; and expanded teaching of sign language and
Braille. A National Committee for Incapacitated Persons was established
to oversee the law's enforcement, conduct studies, and channel and
supervise programs and donations for the disabled. The new electoral
law made arrangements for blind voters. In general, however, there are
no special services or infrastructure to accommodate people with
disabilities. A lack of adequate resources impedes full implementation
of the new law. Social attitudes keep many disabled persons at home
from an early age, limiting their integration into society.
Indigenous People.--Discrimination against, and abuses of,
indigenous people continued. The indigenous majority generally remains
at the low end of the socioeconomic scale, facing severe disadvantages
in health, life expectancy, education, income, literacy, and
employment. More than one-half of all citizens speak indigenous
dialects as their first language, and many speak no Spanish at all,
which essentially excludes them from most of the formal economy. Lack
of education, inefficient farming and mining methods, indigenous
cultural practices, and societal biases keep the indigenous people
poor. They continued to be exploited in the workplace. Some rural
indigenous workers are kept in a state of virtual slavery by employers
who charge them more for room and board than they earn. Although the
1996 Agrarian Reform Law extended the protection of the national labor
law to all paid agricultural workers, including indigenous workers, the
problem persists for lack of effective enforcement.
The Agrarian Reform Law provides for indigenous communities to have
legal title to their communal lands and for individual farmers to have
title to the land they work. The Government and indigenous leaders
jointly developed provisions of this law.
Indigenous people complain that their territories are not legally
defined and protected, and that outsiders exploit their resources.
Specific offenders allegedly are illegal coca growers and timber
pirates. Indigenous groups have taken advantage of the Popular
Participation Law to form municipalities that offer them greater
opportunities for self-determination.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There is ongoing societal
discrimination against the small Afro-Bolivian minority.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers may form and join
organizations of their choosing. The Labor Code requires prior
government authorization to establish a union, permits only one union
per enterprise, and allows theGovernment to dissolve unions; however,
the Government has not enforced these provisions in recent years. While
the code denies civil servants the right to organize and bans strikes
in public services, including banks and public markets, nearly all
civilian government workers are unionized. Workers are not penalized
for union activities. In theory, the Bolivian Labor Federation (COB)
represents virtually the entire work force; however, only about one-
half of workers in the formal economy actually belong to labor unions.
Some members of the informal economy also participate in labor or trade
organizations.
The Government completed drafting legislation for a new labor law
designed to modernize the antiquated Labor Code and to make it conform
with ILO conventions that the country already has ratified. However,
prior to submitting the draft law to Congress, the Government planned
to undertake a national dialog to gain support for labor law
modernization.
Workers in the private sector frequently exercise the right to
strike. Solidarity strikes are illegal, but the Government has neither
prosecuted those responsible nor imposed penalties. Significant strikes
centered around annual negotiations over salaries and benefits for
public employees. However, their real targets were the Government's
economic and social reform programs. Most strikes were conducted and
led by the militant Trotskyite element of the Urban Teachers Union,
which protested the Government's education reform plan, including
reform of teacher training institutions, a merit-based salary system,
and decentralization designed to give municipalities greater control
over education. Teachers' strikes shut down public schools for almost
the entire month of February (the beginning of the school year).
Unions are not free from influence by political parties. The COB
itself is a political organization directed by Marxist ideologues. Its
stated aim is to overthrow the Government's neoliberal economic
program, and it gives little attention to serious collective
bargaining. Most parties have labor committees that attempt to
influence union activity and also have party activists inside the
unions.
The law allows unions to join international labor organizations.
The COB became an affiliate of the Communist, formerly Soviet-
dominated, World Federation of Trade Unions in 1988.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers may
organize and bargain collectively. Collective bargaining, or voluntary
direct negotiations between employers and workers without the
participation of the Government, is limited but growing. The Labor Code
was written in a period in which the COB, which purports to represent
all worker groups and interests, had quasi-governmental status and the
exclusive authority to negotiate with state-owned enterprises. The
practice was for the COB and the Government to negotiate a global
agreement on salaries, minimum wages, and other work conditions each
year. With the privatization of most of these enterprises, the COB's
relevancy has diminished markedly, and the practice of direct employee-
management negotiations in individual enterprises is expanding.
The law prohibits discrimination against union members and
organizers. Complaints go to the National Labor Court, which can take a
year or more to rule due to a massive backlog of cases. The court has
ruled in favor of discharged workers in some cases and successfully
required their reinstatement. However, union leaders say problems are
often moot by the time the court rules.
In December the Labor Ministry inaugurated a telephone hot line for
citizen inquiries about labor issues.
Labor law and practice in the seven special duty-free zones are the
same as in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, including forced and bonded labor by
children. However, the practices of child apprenticeship and
agricultural servitude by indigenous workers (see Section 5) constitute
violations, as do some individual cases of household workers
effectively held captive by their employers. In addition, women were
trafficked for the purpose of prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits employment of persons under 18 years of
age in dangerous, unhealthy, or immoral work. The Labor Code is
ambiguous on conditions of employment for minors from 14 to 17 years of
age and permits apprenticeship for those 12 to 14 years old. This
practice, sometimes tantamount to bondage (see Section 6.c.), has been
criticized by the ILO. The extreme poverty of many families dictates
the involuntary employment of their children for motives of survival.
After an ILO-sponsored conference in May on the country's child labor
problems, a new National Committee for the Eradication of Child Labor
and the Protection of the Working Minor was formed. The Government also
signed a memorandum of understanding with the ILO, pledging more
attention to child labor, a 5-year plan to combat it, and adoption of
policies against its most dangerous forms.
Responsibility for enforcing child labor provisions resides in the
Labor Ministry, but it generally does not enforce them throughout the
country. Although the law requires all children to complete at least 5
years of primary school, this requirement is poorly enforced,
particularly in rural areas. Urban children sell goods, shine shoes,
and assist transport operators. Rural children often work with parents
from an early age. Children generally are not employed in factories or
formal businesses but, when employed, often work the same hours as
adults.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In conformity with the law, the
minimum wage is subject to annual renegotiation and was increased in
January by 10 percent to approximately $56 (330 Bolivianos) per month,
plus bonuses and fringe benefits. The minimum wage does not provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family, and most workers
earn more. Although the minimum wage falls below prevailing wages in
most jobs, certain benefit calculations are pegged to it. The minimum
wage does not cover members of the informal sector, who constitute the
majority of the urban work force, nor does it cover farmers, some 30
percent of the working population.
Only one-half of the urban labor force enjoys an 8-hour workday and
a workweek of 5 or 5\1/2\ days, because the maximum workweek of 44
hours is not enforced. The Labor Ministry's Bureau of Occupational
Safety has responsibility for protection of workers' health and safety,
but relevant standards are poorly enforced. Working conditions in the
mining sector are particularly bad. Although the State Mining
Corporation has an office responsible for safety, many mines, often old
and using antiquated equipment, are dangerous and unhealthy. In some
mines operated as cooperatives, miners earn less than $3 per 12-hour
day. They work without helmets, boots, or respirators in mines where
toxic gases abound; they buy their own supplies, including dynamite,
have no scheduled rest periods, and must survive underground from 24 to
72 hours continuously with little water or food. There are no special
provisions in the law defining when workers may remove themselves from
dangerous situations. Unless the work contract covers this area, any
worker who refuses to work based on the individual's judgment of
excessively dangerous conditions may face dismissal.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons, although aspects of the problem are
covered in other laws and in the Constitution. There were reports of
domestic trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution. A union
leader asserted that employment agencies lure rural indigenous women to
cities with promises of employment as domestic servants but then force
them to work without salaries to repay transport and other fees and
sometimes turn them over to houses of prostitution. There were no
reports of trafficking in persons to or from the country.
______
BRAZIL
Brazil is a constitutional federal republic composed of 26 states
and the Federal District. The federal legislative branch exercises
authority independent of the executive branch. In 1998 voters reelected
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso to a second 4-year term. The 1998
elections marked the third time since the end of military rule in 1985
that citizens freely chose their president and elected the legislative
bodies in accordance with the 1988 Constitution. All parties are able
to compete on the basis of fair and equal procedures. The judiciary is
independent but inefficient and subject to political and economic
influence.
In June the Government passed legislation creating the Ministry of
Defense and swore in the first civilian minister. The chiefs of the
army, navy, and air force gave up their separate cabinet-level
positions. Police forces fall primarily under the control of the
states. State police are divided into two forces: The civil police, who
have an investigative role, and the uniformed police, known officially
as the ``military police,'' who are responsible for maintaining public
order. Although the individual state governments control the uniformed
police, the Constitution provides that they can be called into active
military service in the event of an emergency, and they maintain some
military characteristics and privileges, including a separate judicial
system. The federal police force is very small, primarily
investigative, and plays little role in routine law enforcement. The
state police forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
Brazil has a market-based, diversified economy. The Government,
which traditionally played a dominant role in shaping economic
development, is encouraging greater private sector participation in the
economy through privatization of state enterprises, deregulation, and
removal of some impediments to competition, trade, and investment.
Industrial production, including mining operations and a large and
diversified capital goods sector, accounts for approximately 34 percent
of gross domestic product (GDP); agriculture contributes about 13
percent. Exports consist of both manufactured and primary goods. Among
the principal exports are coffee, soybeans, textiles, leather,
metallurgical products, and transportation equipment. Per capita GDP
was about $2,600 (a significant drop in dollar terms because of
currency devaluation), while the economy grew by 0.9 percent. Income
distribution remained highly skewed, and the poorest half of the
population received only 10 percent of national income while the
richest 10th received 48 percent.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there continued to be numerous serious abuses. State
police forces (both civil and uniformed) committed many extrajudicial
killings, tortured and beat suspects under interrogation, and
arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. Police were also implicated
in criminal activity of all kinds, including killings for hire, death
squad executions, and kidnapings for ransom. Prison officials often
tortured and beat inmates. The state governments concerned did not
punish most perpetrators of these abuses effectively. Police tribunals
(special courts for the uniformed police) remained overloaded, rarely
investigated cases thoroughly, and seldom convicted abusers. The
separate system of uniformed police tribunals contributes to a climate
of impunity for police officers involved in extrajudicial killings or
abuse of prisoners. Prison conditions range from poor to extremely
harsh. The judiciary has a large case backlog and often is unable to
ensure the right to a fair and speedy trial. Justice is slow and often
unreliable, especially in rural areas where powerful economic interests
influence the local judiciary. Human rights monitors on occasion face
threats and harassment. Violence and discrimination against women are
problems. Child prostitution and abuse are problems. Despite
constitutional provisions safeguarding the rights of indigenous people,
government authorities often fail to protect them adequately from
outsiders who encroach on their lands and fail to provide them with
adequate health care and other basic services in many areas.
Discrimination against Afro-Brazilians is a problem. Violence against
homosexuals is a problem. Forced labor, including forced child labor,
is a serious problem. Trafficking in women and children for the purpose
of forced prostitution is a serious problem.
The National Secretariat of Human Rights, which was established in
1997, oversees the implementation of the 1996 Action Plan to address
human rights abuses and is currently revising the plan in light of the
experiences of its first 3 years. The Government undertook several
programs to promote the protection of human rights. In an attempt to
combat widespread impunity and to protect victims of human rights
abuses, the Government passed legislation establishing a witness
protection program.
The Government's interministerial Committee for the Defense of the
Human Being (CDDPH), chaired by the National Human Rights Secretary,
continued to be an effective instrument to highlight human rights
abuses and allocate federal resources to bolster the efforts of the
states. The CDDPH was instrumental in diminishing death squad activity
throughout the country. However, because of jurisdictional and resource
limitations, the efforts of the Federal Government had an uneven and
limited impact in many of the states where human rights violations are
most common. The Government continued its interministerial campaign
against child labor, which has lowered the incidence of child labor by
roughly 24 percent since 1996.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Extrajudicial
killings continued to be a serious problem throughout the country. The
uniformed police summarily executed suspected criminals rather than
apprehend them and then filed false reports that the suspects were
resisting arrest. The Government's failure to investigate, prosecute,
and punish police who commit such acts creates a sense of impunity that
continues to encourage human rights abuses. Harsh conditions in prisons
and rioting led to the death of inmates (see Section 1.c.).
The lack of accountability and the inefficient criminal justice
system allow such impunity to continue. All crimes less serious than
murder committed by uniformed police officers against civilians remain
in the military justice system. In May an investigation into Sao
Paulo's special courts for uniformed police uncovered 1,107 ``missing''
and ``delayed'' cases against uniformed police charged with crimes
against civilians that include murder and torture. A newspaper that had
access to 300 cases under investigation found 100 murder charges among
them, some delayed for up to 12 years. Equally long delays allowed many
cases of torture and lesser charges to expire due to statutes of
limitations. This probe was the closest scrutiny ever of the special
police courts and resulted in the authorities bringing criminal charges
against two court officials.
Human rights activists believe that the 1996 law (known as the
``Bicudo'' law) giving civil courts jurisdiction over intentional
homicide committed by uniformed police officers has had limited
success. Civil prosecutors review only the most egregious and clear-cut
cases. In less prominent cases, the decision whether a policeman
committed an intentional homicide is based on a routine investigation
performed by the police force itself. Almost without exception, the
police investigators conclude that suspects were ``resisting arrest.''
In 1995--the last year before the implementation of the new law--police
courts convicted 23 percent of officers tried for homicide. In 1998
civilian courts convicted 48 percent of officers charged with homicide.
The comparable rate for civilians tried for murder in Sao Paulo is 50
percent.
Police often were members of vigilante groups and death squads that
were responsible for killings. In addition, uniformed and civil police
involvement in criminal activity is widespread. Throughout the country,
police were implicated in crimes ranging from killing for hire and
kidnaping to drug trafficking and extortion. In October the Federal
Government created a special Center to Combat Impunity, staffed by
Justice Ministry officials and Federal Police agents, due to the
widespread involvement of police, judicial, and elected authorities
throughout the country in organized crime and the intimidation of
potential witnesses, including death squad activity, which was exposed
by a federal parliamentary committee of inquiry into narcotics
trafficking. Public officials and civic leaders at every level,
including President Cardoso, have criticized the climate of impunity in
that contributes to ongoing acts of violence and crime committed by the
police.
The use of torture by police sometimes led to the death of the
victims (see Section 1.c.).
Police killings of street children continued (see Section 5).
Harsh or dangerous prison conditions, official negligence, poor
sanitary conditions, and a lack of medical care led to a number of
deaths in prisons. Inmates at juvenile detention facilitiesrioted over
20 times during the year. Four inmates were killed during one of the
riots in December (see Section 1.c.).
The office of the newly installed police ombudswoman in Rio de
Janeiro state received 427 complaints in April, its first month of
operation. Complaints against the uniformed police accounted for 70
percent of that total. Police homicides roughly doubled in Rio de
Janeiro from 1997 to 1998, where police killed 511 persons through
October of that year. According to an earlier Institute for Religious
Studies (ISER) study, Rio de Janeiro police killed half of their
victims with four or more bullets and shot the majority of victims in
either the shoulders or the head; 40 cases clearly demonstrated
execution-style deaths, where police first immobilized the victims and
then shot them at point-blank range. In 64 percent of the cases
examined, the victims were shot in the back.
According to the Sao Paulo state government, the uniformed and
civil police killed 664 persons during the year. This reflects an
increase of 28 percent over 1998. Off-duty officers were responsible
for 224 of the killings, or 34 percent. Sao Paulo's civil police killed
87 persons during the year, an increase of 47 percent from 1998.
According to the Sao Paulo police ombudsman, more than half of the
victims had no prior police records, a fact that he believes casts
doubt on police claims that most shooting victims were resisting
arrest.
The Ombudsman for Public Security in Para state reported a total of
27 cases of suspected extrajudicial killings by members of the state
police forces through November, compared with 30 cases in 1998.
Four uniformed police officers await trial in a civil court for the
highly publicized killing of three young men aged 14, 17, and 21 in Sao
Paulo on February 17 (Ash Wednesday). The officers arrested the victims
for fighting, beat them, and were seen leading them into a forested
area near where the bodies were found 2 weeks later. Each victim was
shot once in the head. The perpetrators are charged with aggravated
triple homicide, abuse of power, and hiding bodies.
The authorities arrested five uniformed police officers in the
March 31 shooting deaths of two persons, one of whom was mentally
disabled, in Sao Paulo's Jardin Alba slum. The officers, who said that
the victims resisted during a drug search, allegedly shot Jose Nunes da
Silva, a disabled 22-year-old, several times in the back. They also
killed 28-year-old Ednaldo Gomes do Nascimento, a bricklayer. Witnesses
said that the officers dragged the bodies into their police car after
the shooting and fired several shots around the area to simulate a
shootout. The authorities charged the policemen with aggravated
homicide.
The authorities accused three uniformed police officers in Sao
Paulo of the April ``lynching'' death of 20-year-old Ricardo Galvao,
who was shot, stabbed, and beaten. Galvao was last seen in a police
vehicle after being caught trying to steal a car. The police involved
were charged with homicide and awaited trial at year's end.
The authorities placed three uniformed police officers under
investigation in the August 7 killings of two men whom they suspected
of stealing their police motorcycle. The day after the motorcycle was
stolen, the officers returned to the neighborhood, out of uniform, and
harassed and threatened residents about the theft. Thiago Henrique
Prado and Joao Martins Rissi were shot in the head soon thereafter
while riding a motorcycle similar to the stolen police motorcycle. One
of the victims was found clutching his identification document, the
first item that police demand to see.
In August the authorities placed three uniformed police officers in
custody awaiting trial for killing two youths by shooting them in the
head and leaving another for dead in Sao Bernardo do Campo, Sao Paulo.
A third victim survived by feigning death and was placed in the witness
protection program. The officers awaited trial at year's end.
In December the uniformed police of the Federal District shot and
killed one person and blinded two others while attempting to disperse a
peaceful demonstration by public employees protesting for higher wages
at the headquarters of the public works administration. The leadership
of the uniformed police claimed immediately after the incident that the
police had only used rubber bullets, but the autopsy of the deceased
demonstrator showed that he had been killed by live fire. The Governor
of the Federal District, Joaquin Roriz, dismissed the secretary
forpublic security and the uniformed police's head of the special
operations battalion as a result of the incident.
In Natal in the state of Rio Grande do Norte, in February an
unidentified assailant killed Antonio Lopes, a transvestite also known
as ``Carla''. Carla had succeeded in carrying out a private
investigation of the 1996 killing of human rights activist Gilson
Nogueira, also in Natal. As a result of Carla's efforts, federal police
found the weapon used in Nogueira's killing in the home of a civil
police officer linked to the Golden Boys death squad.
In January a state judge reinstated four uniformed police who had
been suspended from the police force after being charged in the
drowning death of a transvestite prostitute in 1998. At year's end,
they still awaited trial. The four abducted two transvestite
prostitutes, took them to a nearby beach, and ordered them at gunpoint
to enter the rough surf. The surviving victim identified the assailants
and entered a privately operated witness protection program. The four
policemen claimed that they were acting under orders from superiors,
but no supervising officers were interrogated or investigated regarding
the incident.
The Supreme Military Court annulled on technicalities eight
uniformed policemen's military convictions of bodily harm and
professional negligence. The policemen were involved in the highly
publicized March 1997 killing and extortion incident in Sao Paulo's
Vila Naval neighborhood. The defendants' 1998 convictions for homicide
and abuse of authority were not affected. The police officers are to be
retried, but the courts must retry them within 4 years of the date that
the crime was committed (July 1997). The Sao Paulo state supreme court
also called for a retrial of Otavio Gambra, also known as ``Rambo.'' A
civil court had sentenced Gambra to 65 years in prison for the killing
of Mario Jose Josino in the Vila Naval incident. Human rights monitors
observed that all the annulments were based on technical grounds and
predicted that the policemen will be convicted again in the retrials.
In June a civil court absolved 4 uniformed police of murder in the
controversial 1997 killings of 3 persons during an attempt to remove
440 squatter families from Sao Paulo's ``Fazenda da Juta'' housing
project. The police operation was broadcast on television and
criticized by many for the use of excessive force. The ruling found
that the poorly prepared police fired in self defense after violent
provocation. A team of 500 well-equipped shock troops removed the
squatters easily the next day after this initial attempt failed. Both
the prosecution and defense held that the evidence did not support
charges of homicide against the officers. The investigation determined
that one officer who faced charges was not present at the scene.
In August a civil trial jury in the city of Belem acquitted 3
uniformed police officers in command of the unit responsible for the
1996 the massacre of 19 landless workers at Eldorado de Carajas in the
Amazonian state of Para. Human rights activists and President Cardoso
criticized this verdict as a significant setback in the effort to
change the climate of impunity regarding police crimes. Prosecutors
filed separate motions asking that the verdict be annulled based on the
evidence presented at the trial, that the judge be removed from the
case on grounds of bias, and for a retrial because of faulty
instructions given by the judge to the jury. At year's end, appellate
court decisions on all three motions were still pending. National Human
Rights Secretary Dr. Jose Gregori announced that he would consider
bringing federal charges against the three officers if the verdict were
not overturned. The trials of the remaining 147 uniformed police
officers under their command continue (3 police initially charged had
charges against them dropped), but prosecutors see little hope of
convictions if the acquittals of their commanding officers stand. The
start of the trial had been delayed for over a year due to procedural
appeals by several of the defendants and the change of venue of the
trial from the city of Maraba at the request of prosecutors.
In October a judge granted a prosecution motion for a change of
venue for the trial of the commanding officer and 10 other uniformed
police officers charged with intentional homicide in the August 1995
massacre of nine squatters in Corumbiara, Rondonia. Two police also
died in the incident. Two squatters also are charged with intentional
homicide for the deaths of the police. Prosecutors dropped charges
against nine police, two of the squatters, and two landowners. The
trial is scheduled to take place in the state capital of Porto Velho in
June 2000.
In November a jury in the state of Rio de Janeiro acquitted former
military policeman Valdeir Rezenda of participation in the 1993
massacre of 21 residents of the Vigario Geral neighborhood in Rio de
Janeiro. In August a jury found former military policeman Roberto Cezar
do Amaral guilty of one count of murder in the massacre. Amaral
received a 6-year sentence, most of which he already had served. In
October a jury found former uniformed policeman Adilson Saraiva da Hora
guilty and sentenced him to 72 years in prison for the massacre. Juries
acquitted former uniformed policemen William Alves and Julio Cesar
Braga in September and August, respectively. Of the 32 police initially
charged in the case, 13 have been acquitted, 4 convicted, and 13 await
trial. Two died before coming to trial. As a result of tape recordings
made among the original group of police tried while in prison, the
authorities brought charges against an additional 19 officers; at
year's end, they also awaited trial.
Retired police colonel Ubiratan Guimaraes, having exhausted his
appeals in June, is to stand trial in civil court for his role in the
deaths of 111 inmates during an October 1992 riot in Sao Paulo's
Carandiru prison. Guimaraes would be the first policeman at the rank of
colonel to face a civilian jury under the Bicudo law. On May 26, a Sao
Paulo court again delayed a hearing for 28 police charged with prisoner
beatings during the Carandiru riot. In August the judicial authorities
transferred the cases of 85 other uniformed policemen also accused of
involvement in the killings from the Sao Paulo state supreme court to a
lower court. Justice officials expect this transfer to delay the trial
by 2 more years. Due to the statute of limitations, it is likely that
the charges of assault against the prisoners will expire; however, the
remaining group may be tried for homicide.
Over one-fifth of Sao Paulo's uniformed police officers have
received some kind of community police training under the state's
community policing initiative. Initiated in December 1997, the program
is expected to take 10 years to implement fully. Under the program,
high-ranking police officials meet with citizens' consultative groups
weekly. The uniformed police also instituted a policy of ``recycling''
policemen involved in shootings, removing them from patrols for 6
months and offering them counseling.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued its
human rights training courses for high-ranking state military police
officers at the Federal Police Academy in Brasilia. A total of 800
military police have been trained in basic techniques including the
apprehension and interrogation of criminal suspects without recourse to
excessive or unnecessary force. The program is scheduled to run until
September 2000. The results then are to be reviewed by the independent
Center for the Study of Violence at the University of Sao Paulo. The
military police in Rondonia state already have incorporated the ICRC
program into their general police training program.
Death squads in which the police are involved contribute
significantly to the level of violence and lawlessness, according to
public security officials. Human rights groups reported the existence
of organized death squads linked to the police forces that target
suspected criminals and persons considered undesirable (such as street
children) in almost every state. A report on death squads issued by the
committee for human rights of the Federal Chamber of Deputies in June
highlighted death squad activity with police involvement in the states
of Bahia, Rio Grande do Norte, Mato Grosso do Sul, Mato Grosso,
Amazonas, Para, Paraiba, Ceara, Espiritu Santo, and Acre. The report
stated that death squads ``arise because of the loss of credibility in
the justice and public security institutions and the certainty of
impunity as the result of the incapacity of the institutions that have
jurisdiction in resolving the problem.'' The report indicated that
death squad activity appears to be declining except in Bahia. According
to human rights activists there, executions attributable to death
squads numbered 63 for the first 4 months of the year, compared with
104 for all of 1998 and 93 in 1997.
In October uniformed police in Salvador, Bahia, arrested Robelio
Lima dos Santos after an attempted bank robbery in which he was wounded
in the pelvis. Although dos Santos was alive when placed in a police
vehicle, he arrived at the hospital dead with three shots in his
throat. As a result of witness testimony, including that of a
photographer who took pictures of Santos while he was still alive, the
authorities arrested four uniformed police; they awaited trial at
year's end.
In August the Governor of Espiritu Santo (the state with the
highest rate of homicide), stated in a press interview thatdeath squad
activity involving the police contributed significantly to the level of
violence in the state. A state police investigation and a state
parliamentary committee of inquiry reported that an informal
organization, the ``Squad le Cocq'' involving police, judicial, and
elected authorities, including Jose Carlos Gratz, president of the
state assembly, was responsible for the vast majority of organized
crime in the state.
In Rio Grande do Norte, Maurilio Pinto de Medeiros, a civil
policeman who has occupied positions as high as the second ranking
official in the state Ministry for Public Security, is accused of
leading a death squad called the Golden Boys that is responsible for at
least 51 killings in recent years. In Amazonas, a group known as ``The
Firm,'' involved in kidnaping, torture, extortion, and child
prostitution, reportedly operated with the support of the state
secretary for public security.
An investigation instigated by the former president of the supreme
court of Acre state and carried out under the auspices of the CDDPH
amassed evidence that former Acre military police chief and former
state deputy Hildebrando Pascoal headed a crime ring and death squad in
that Amazonian state linked to at least 30 murder and torture cases
previously suspended by state authorities for lack of evidence. Charges
against Pascoal include the kidnaping--with the collusion of military
police officers from Piaui--and murder of the suspected killer of
Pascoal's brother, and the kidnaping of the victim's wife and children
in an attempt to locate the victim. A congressional committee of
inquiry also established Pascoal's control of narcotics trafficking
within the state. A witness who testified before that committee
identified the site of a mass grave in Acre that federal authorities
believe Pascoal's organization used to dispose of at least eight murder
victims. Pascoal's election to the federal Chamber of Deputies in
October 1998 conferred on him parliamentary immunity from all
prosecution. However, in October the Chamber voted to remove Pascoal's
immunity, and the police subsequently arrested him. At year's end, he
was in prison and awaited trial on charges of murder; additional
charges of narcotics trafficking and electoral violations were pending.
In 1998 human rights monitors visiting the morgue in Maceio,
Alagoas state, found that the bodies of 12 persons, who allegedly were
the victims of a death squad that included members of the police, were
missing. The authorities had been investigating the group, known as the
Uniformed Gang, because most of its members reportedly were police
officers. They arrested more than 60 police officers, and the courts
sentenced 3 policemen to 6-year prison terms for illegal possession of
machine guns. At year's end, various charges were pending in Alagoas
against many of the other 57 officers arrested in this case.
State and federal authorities in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul
failed to resolve the case of 5 uniformed policemen implicated in 11
death-squad style killings committed in 1997. A state legislator
monitoring the investigation believed that these policemen committed at
least 40 such homicides. In a separate incident, the authorities
charged one of the five with killing for hire.
The authorities also failed to conclude the investigation of the
May 1996 death squad killings in the Franco da Rocha neighborhood of
Sao Paulo, although no charges have been filed in connection with the
case. Witnesses identified five uniformed police officers as having
arrested four men who were found dead a few hours later. Franco da
Rocha is one of Sao Paulo state's poorest communities and the location
of a clandestine dumping site for the victims of death squads. Since
1993 at least 212 bodies have been found there, including 50 victims
killed by bullets to the head. Progress in the investigation has been
hampered by difficulty in identifying bodies whose heads or hands were
amputated.
Several persons were killed in conflicts involving the settlement
of disputes of land ownership and usage. The Rural Landless Worker's
Movement (MST) continued its campaign of legal occupation of lands
identified as unproductive and illegal occupation of land not yet so
designated. MST activists destroyed private property during some
occupations, including the burning of an historic farmhouse in Sao
Paulo in June. The Catholic Church's Pastoral Land Commission (CPT),
the country's foremost entity monitoring human rights in rural areas,
released in October its report on rural violence covering 1998. The
report presents a mixed picture of the overall human rights climate
relating to the country's land conflicts. Killings of landless
activists increased to 47 in 1998, compared with 30 in1997, while
attempted murders rose from 37 to 46. Cases of torture rose from 5 to
35, but less serious indicators of aggression fell sharply. The report
notes increased actions by the Government to remove activists from
illegal settlements resulting in increased confrontations and
destruction of property and homes, but also notes that the pace of
agrarian reform outstripped new MST occupations, contributing to a less
violent climate overall.
The CPT's report concludes that the climate of impunity enjoyed by
landed interests as a result of the ``fragile'' justice system and the
collusion of local political interests continues to encourage serious
human rights abuses of landless activists, including murder and
torture. However, the report also notes that the tactics of the land
reform movement have led to a self-perpetuating cycle in recent years,
whereby increased confrontation and tension have led to increased
government attention, encouraging in turn more land occupations.
In June the Government launched a toll-free service, ``Call Land
and Peace'' for citizens wishing to report situations of possible
conflict in rural areas as a result of confrontations over land issues.
Unidentified gunmen killed the brother of a local MST leader on
March 31 in Parana state. Eduardo Anghinoni was shot while visiting his
brother, MST leader Celso Anghinoni, in an MST camp in Querencia do
Norte. Local MST leaders claimed that the murder was politically
motivated and that Eduardo was the true target. The MST blamed members
of the Rural Democratic Union (UDR), a landowners' lobby, for the
killing. The police arrested three suspects in April but later released
them due to insufficient proof. At year's end, the police had made no
further progress.
In April 1998, an employee of a local landowner reportedly shot and
killed MST leader Sadi Padillo in Abelardo Luz, Santa Catarina. The
local Labor Party president charged that an armed militia paid by local
landowners had targeted MST leaders for murder. Padilla had led a group
of 300 families who occupied a local holding but who had left
peacefully after reaching an agreement with the Government's land
reform agency. The CPT reported that 26 landless activists were killed
through November of that year. In December 1998, Sao Paulo state police
reported finding the bodies of two MST members with bullet wounds in
their heads and signs of torture. They had been leaders of a group of
180 peasant families who occupied land in September near Sao Jose dos
Campos in northeastern Sao Paulo state. Such killings usually go
unpunished, because the landowners thought to be responsible for many
of them reportedly control the police in isolated areas and intimidate
local judges and lawyers with violence and threats of violence.
The Government delayed the trial of MST leader Jose Rainha from
December until March 2000, after prosecutors failed to serve proper
notice of the trial date to Rainha and his attorneys. In 1997 a court
convicted Rainha of the 1989 killings of landowner Jose Machado Neto
and police officer Sergio Narciso da Silva. In August 1998, a federal
appeals court upheld the decision of the state supreme court of
Espiritu Santo to move the retrial of MST leader Jose Rainha to the
state capital of Vitoria. A jury in the small, rural town of Pedro
Canario, Espiritu Santo, sentenced Rainha to 26 years for the killing.
The jury convicted Rainha even though the prosecution presented no
material evidence and witnesses testified to Rainha's presence 1,500
miles away from the scene of the crime. Since Rainha's sentence
exceeded 20 years, he was automatically entitled to a retrial.
A 1997 court decision sentenced police investigator Celso Jose da
Cruz to a 516-year jail term for involvement in the killings of Machado
Neto and Narciso da Silva; Cruz appealed the verdict and awaited a
retrial at year's end. Twenty-nine other policemen charged as
codefendants in the case still were awaiting trial.
According to human rights activists monitoring the case,
proceedings have stalled against the former mayor of Rio Maria, in the
state of Para, who was charged with the 1985 murder of Joao Canuto, the
first president of the rural workers' union in Rio Maria. Canuto's
daughter, Luzia Canuto, received death threats as a result of the case.
In June 1998, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
criticized the Federal Government for failing to prosecute the crime.
The four suspects charged with manslaughter in the burning of
Pataxo Indian leader Galdino Jesus dos Santos still awaited trial at
year's end. In 1998 an appellate court upheld a 1997court decision to
prosecute for manslaughter rather than murder. In 1999 a superior court
ruled that the defendants would be tried by a jury, and the defense
appealed the decision. At year's end, a ruling on the appeal was
pending. Dos Santos died in April 1997 after the suspects set him on
fire while he was asleep on a public bench.
Vigilante groups and death squads, which often included police
officials, were also responsible for killings.
The National Secretariat for Human Rights sponsors training
programs in human rights, carried out in cooperation with federal and
state entities and national and international organizations, in most
states. The Secretariat administers a human rights training program for
policemen in cooperation with Amnesty International in 10 states. Human
rights groups maintain that the effect of these programs has been
limited, at best. However, human rights activists in many states
reported increased willingness of police authorities to address their
concerns and to deal with problems brought to their attention.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
In 1995 Congress passed legislation recognizing and assigning
government responsibility for the deaths of political activists who
``disappeared'' during the military regime while in the custody of
public officials, and obligating the Government to pay indemnities of
between $100,000 and $150,000 (200,000 to 300,000 reias) to each of the
families. In September 1997, President Cardoso signed a decree awarding
reparations to the families of 43 such persons. A commission created by
the law continued to evaluate requests for, and authorize payment of,
indemnities.
In May Sao Paulo officials announced the reopening of an
investigation to identify 1,048 skeletons found in a hidden mass grave
in 1990. Before this inquiry was suspended in 1998, medical examiners
had identified the remains of five individuals who disappeared during
the military regime.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and a 1997 law prohibit torture and
provide severe legal penalties for its use; however, there are frequent
credible reports that police torture and beat criminal suspects to
extract information, confessions, or money. Victims generally are poor,
uneducated about their rights, and afraid to come forward due to fear
of reprisals. The Government estimated in 1994 that fewer than 10
percent of cases of mistreatment by police are reported.
The Government appointed Joao Batista Campelo director of the
Federal Police in June, but he resigned days later following
allegations that he had supervised the torture of a suspect during an
interrogation that he conducted in 1970.
The Sao Paulo state police ombudsman received 356 complaints
through the first 6 months of the year alleging torture, abuse, or
mistreatment. This represented a slight decrease from the same period
in 1998, when the ombudsman received 380 such complaints. Allegations
of torture or abuse represented 14 percent of all complaints received,
compared with 24 percent the previous year. The ombudsman's office
believes that many cases are not reported.
In September the Globo newspaper in Rio de Janeiro published the
results of an investigation into allegations of torture by Rio de
Janeiro state police. The police opened a total of 53 investigations
regarding complaints of torture against police authorities since the
1997 torture law came into effect. Only one of those inquiries, which
was suspended officially, had been concluded. The Globo report
identifies several patterns, including the use of electric shock,
beatings with iron bars, and sexual abuse including sodomy with foreign
objects. The report notes that the police classified such incidents as
``abuse of authority and physical assault,'' offenses far less serious
than torture. As a result of Globo's reporting, the state government
ordered an independent review of the 53 cases, and the Federal
Government established a task force to review Rio de Janeiro police
practices.
In November in Alagoas state, a court convicted eight former civil
policemen of torture and sentenced them to prison in the case of Jose
Joaquim Araujo, a suspect who was in police custody in April. The civil
police arrested him on suspicion of killinga civil policeman, but 3
days later, another person confessed to the killing. Araujo charged
that more than 20 police participated in beating him in an attempt to
force him to confess. Only 10 hours after being released from prison,
Araujo was killed. The authorities immediately dismissed nine civil
policemen and the two commanding officers of the precinct where Araujo
was held.
Sao Paulo officials were investigating allegations that
investigative police of Sao Paulo's 26th police district humiliated and
beat prisoners in May after inmates secretly audiotaped 20 police
officers and 2 guards beating them and threatening to kill them. In
response to these and other allegations, in October Sao Paulo state
authorities announced creation of a special service to receive
complaints of torture and violence committed by investigative and
uniformed police.
In July an investigator who works with police officers accused a
civil (investigative) police supervisor and two detectives of torturing
suspects in a police station in Campo Largo, Parana. The investigator
presented tape recordings of torture sessions to a police investigative
body. Police chief Marcos Antonio de Oliveira and detectives Moacir
Santos Silva and Fernando de Freitas are accused of torturing a victim,
who was recorded for 11 minutes screaming and pleading for the officers
to stop. The victim gave a deposition and underwent a medical exam to
determine the cause of various scars and wounds. The police officers
deny any involvement and accuse the investigator of inventing the
allegations of torture.
In testimony before the Federal Chamber of Deputies' human rights
committee in April 1998, a member of the National Conference of
Catholic Bishops' Prison Pastoral Commission criticized the abusive
practices of two special units of the Sao Paulo civil police--the
special operations group and the armed unit for the prevention of
robberies and assaults.
No judgment has been handed down in the case of Otavio dos Santos
Filho, who allegedly died as a result of torture at Sao Paulo's Depatri
jail. Dos Santos was beaten severely in October 1998, when he insisted
on receiving medical treatment for a kidney infection. Dos Santos'
death certificate states that he died of a general infection, but
relatives claim that photographs they took of his body show clear
evidence of torture and beatings. In December the Folha de Sao Paulo
newspaper reported that police authorities had taken no disciplinary or
investigative action regarding 107 cases of torture and beating that
took place in the Depatri jail in February 1998 and were confirmed by
the Police Medical Institute.
In 1997 civil policemen in Belem, Para state, under the command of
Captain Clovis Martins de Miranda Filho, accosted Hildebrando Silva de
Freitas, who apparently failed to pay a bribe for a liquor license for
his bar. At Captain de Miranda's direction, as many as 10 police
officers severely beat and sexually abused de Freitas. In September
1998, an internal police investigation concluded that de Freitas had
suffered severe physical injury and did not contest the testimony of
the witnesses who corroborated his account, but declared there to be no
connection between his injuries and the officers who had confronted
him. At year's end, the case was under review by the Para state
prosecutors' office. De Miranda has brought a defamation suit against
the state ombudsman for public security in Para for statements that she
allegedly made to the press regarding the case. The state has declined
to bear the costs of the ombudsman's defense.
Police violence against homosexuals continued (see Section 5).
There continue to be numerous credible reports of state police
officials' involvement in crime, including revenge killings and
intimidation and killing of witnesses involved in testifying against
police officials.
In the first 6 months of the year, the Sao Paulo state police
ombudsman received 256 complaints (representing 10 percent of total
complaints) of extortion, illicit enrichment, or corruption. These
figures represent an 181 percent increase from the same period in 1998,
when the ombudsman received 141 such allegations.
Prison conditions range from poor to extremely harsh. Severe
overcrowding was prevalent, especially in larger cities. Amnesty
International stated that the prison system was ``in crisis'' in a
comprehensive report on prisons released in June. According to Ministry
of Justice figures for 1998, 88,926 prisoners, roughly 85 percent of
the prison population, were kept in substandard conditions. Of that
total, 70,681 wereserving sentences in jailhouses and police lock-ups,
rather than penitentiaries. The situation was most critical in the
states with the largest prison populations, including Sao Paulo, Rio de
Janeiro, Bahia, Rio Grande do Sul, and Pernambuco. Most penal
authorities in these states do not have the resources to separate minor
offenders from adults and petty offenders from violent criminals.
Prison riots were frequent occurrences. Discipline is difficult to
maintain under such conditions, and prison officials often resort to
inhuman treatment, including torture.
Poor working conditions for prison guards aggravate substandard
prison conditions and encourage corruption. The director of Sao Paulo's
Carandiru prison (the largest in the country) told representatives from
Amnesty International that many cases of torture and use of excessive
force result in part from employees' working conditions. An
investigation of the more than 1,100 employees of Sao Paulo's prison at
the end of 1998 showed that 241 had criminal records themselves. The
majority of the charges against them were for crimes committed while
working at the prison and ranged from drug trafficking and threats to
assisting in escapes. The state secretary of penitentiary
administration was aware of the guards' criminal pasts and allowed them
to continue working.
Prisons do not provide adequate protection against violence
inflicted by inmates on each other. Prisoners are subject to extremely
poor health conditions as well. Scabies and tuberculosis, diseases not
common in the general population, are widespread in Sao Paulo prisons.
The Ministry of Justice estimates that 10 to 20 percent of the national
prison population is HIV positive. Denial of first aid and other
medical care is sometimes used as a form of punishment.
The Amnesty International prison report was based on 33 visits to
prisons in 10 states. In December 1998, Human Rights Watch also issued
a comprehensive report entitled ``Behind Bars in Brazil,'' based on an
intensive review of prison conditions in eight states. Both reports
meticulously detail inhuman conditions and systematic and wide-ranging
abuses of human rights throughout the prison system. Among the most
serious charges detailed are the commonplace undocumented and
uninvestigated deaths of inmates at the hands of authorities or other
prisoners, and the routine use of torture against inmates by both
guards and police officers.
Overcrowding in Sao Paulo's prisons and police detention centers,
which house roughly 40 percent of the country's prisoner population, is
a critical human rights problem. Sao Paulo's prisoners exceed the
intended capacity of the state's prisons by almost 22 percent; roughly
49,400 prisoners occupy space designed for around 40,500. Half of the
32,000 prisoners in the state's police stations and holding facilities
already have been sentenced and should be in state penitentiaries, but
remain in temporary facilities due to lack of space. Although state
prison capacity increased by 50 percent with the opening of 21 new
jails since 1998, intake of new inmates into the older facilities took
up 90 percent of the additional new capacity.
In November 1998, President Cardoso approved a law authorizing
alternative sentencing for nonviolent offenders, aimed in part at
easing prison overcrowding. In its prison report, Amnesty International
noted that the states of Rio Grande do Sul and Mato Grosso do Sul have
imposed noncustodial sentences effectively, but pointed out that in
states such as Rio de Janeiro alternative sentencing has not been
implemented effectively. In Sao Paulo, while 8 percent of convicted
criminals are eligible, only 1.3 percent serve alternative sentences.
Since 1997 the Government has created capacity for an additional 30,000
spaces, a 43 percent increase in total capacity. While the total prison
population grew 14.8 percent since 1997, prison overcrowding has
decreased by 7.3 percent. However, the Government has suspended plans
for the construction of 52 new prisons.
Women's facilities in Sao Paulo's penitentiary system are even more
overcrowded than those for men. Facilities built to accommodate 600
female inmates hold 1,055. The state's prison expansion program did not
include provisions for additional space for women.
In August a court in Minas Gerais state convicted three military
police and a jail warden of torturing prisoners who had attempted a
jailbreak from the Ibia prison in February 1998. The authorities
charged them under the 1997 law against torture, and the court
sentenced each of the accused to 4 years in prison.
A recent study by the U.N. Latin American Institute for Crime
Prevention and Treatment of Criminals reported that between 1994 and
1997, 59 individuals died and 374 were injured in 225 ``prison
incidents'' in Sao Paulo state. These numbers refer to riots only and
do not include deaths or injuries from disease or abuse.
Two prison riots on August 8 and 9 in Jundiai, Sao Paulo state,
left 3 prisoners dead and 13 wounded. During the riots, 120 private
security guards from around the city surrounded the prison and
prevented the escape of the 277 inmates (housed in a prison designed
for 120). Upon several prisoners' requests, a municipal judge
reevaluated their cases, releasing 8 who already had served their
sentences and transferring 20 to other prisons.
In May, June, July, and October a series of over 20 riots and
escapes occurred in Sao Paulo state youth detention centers, finally
leading to the closure and demolition of the ``Imigrantes'' complex,
the largest of the facilities. Before its closure, the Imigrantes
complex housed 1,200 youths, although its designed capacity was 350.
The Sao Paulo governor personally took charge of the State Foundation
for the Care of Juveniles (FEBEM) crisis in October, transferring the
minor inmates from the Imigrantes complex to other facilities and
announcing a plan to construct several smaller centers, which would
allow the state to separate violent and nonviolent juveniles. Teenage
inmates brutally tortured and killed four fellow inmates during the
biggest and most violent of a serious of riots at Sao Paulo's largest
youth detention facility (see Section 1.a.).
In April the authorities suspended four FEBEM guards from the
Tatuape complex after a Catholic priest filed a complaint charging that
guards beat 49 of 75 juvenile offenders. The priest alleged that the
minors were beaten with metal bars and wooden sticks. The incident
occurred after some of the victims escaped and were recaptured. A judge
specializing in youth offenders was investigating the case. Although
the authorities were unable to identify the individuals responsible for
this abuse, during the last months of the year they were conducting
about 30 criminal investigations of FEBEM employees for beating
inmates.
During an August 23 search of the Imigrantes FEBEM complex, a group
of judges, public prosecutors, and children's advocates found dozens of
weapons believed to be used for torturing inmates. The wooden and metal
bats were hidden behind furniture and under insulation in an
``employees only'' area. A Catholic priest involved in the
investigation said that there were 69 youths in the facility who showed
signs of torture. The president of FEBEM acknowledged the problem and
said that he would try to determine which employees were involved. The
president of the employees' union said that the weapons were hidden
simply to keep them out of the youths' hands.
It is government policy to permit prison visits by independent
human rights monitors, and state prison authorities generally observe
this policy in practice. Federal officials in the Ministry of Justice
responsible for penal matters offered full cooperation to Amnesty
International, which reported no significant problems in gaining access
to state-run prison facilities. By contrast, Human Rights Watch noted
in preparing its prison report in 1998 that gaining access to prisons
was ``surprisingly difficult,'' and that barriers ranged from outright
denial of access to the use of procedural delays. Only three states of
the eight investigated--Amazonas, the Federal District, and Rio Grande
do Norte--made their prisons completely accessible to Human Rights
Watch. In 1998 the governor of Ceara withdrew a 1997 decree that barred
members of the Catholic Church's prison ministry from entering prisons
in that state after a prison riot in Fortaleza.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally observes
this prohibition; however, police continued at times to arrest and
detain persons arbitrarily. The Constitution limits arrests to those
caught in the act of committing a crime or those arrested by order of a
judicial authority. The authorities usually respect the Constitutional
provision for a judicial determination of the legality of detention,
although many convicted inmates are held beyond their sentences due to
poor record keeping. The law permits provisional detention for up to 5
days under specified conditions during a police investigation, but a
judge may extend this period. However, groups that work with street
children claim that the police sometimes detain street youths illegally
without a judicial order or hold them incommunicado.
Human rights monitors allege that civil and uniformed police
regularly detain persons illegally to extort money or other favors,
citing the Vila Naval incident of 1997 (see Section 1.a.) as only the
most notorious example.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is an independent
branch of government; however, it is inefficient, subject to political
and economic influence, and plagued by problems relating to lack of
resources and training of officials. In many instances, lower-income,
less-educated citizens make limited use of the appeals process that
otherwise might ensure the right to fair trial.
The judicial system, with the federal Supreme Court at its apex,
includes courts of first instance and appeals courts. States organize
their own judicial systems but must adhere to the basic principles in
the Constitution. There is also a system of specialized courts that
deal with police, labor, elections, juveniles, and family matters.
Defendants in criminal cases arrested in the act of committing a
crime must be charged within 30 days of their arrest, depending on the
crime. Other defendants must be charged within 45 days, although this
period can be extended. Defendants for all but the most serious crimes
have the right to a bail hearing. Based on the police investigation
leading to the formal charges, prosecutors prepare an indictment for
the review of a judge, who determines if the indictment meets the legal
requirements to bring the accused to trial. A judge and jury try
persons accused of capital crimes, attempted homicide, or more serious
charges. A judge tries lesser crimes. Defendants have the right to
appeal all convictions to state superior courts. They further have the
right to appeal state court decisions to both the Federal Supreme Court
on constitutional grounds and to the Federal superior court to contest
whether a decision was inconsistent with the decision of a court in
another state or infringes on federal law. All defendants sentenced to
20 years in prison or more have the automatic right to a retrial in the
same court.
Special police courts have jurisdiction over state uniformed police
(except when charged with intentional homicide); the record of these
courts shows that conviction is the exception rather than the rule. A
study of police homicides in Rio de Janeiro state in 1993-96 found no
instance of a conviction in 301 cases (see Section 1.a.). These courts
(which are separate from the courts-martial of the armed forces, except
for the final appeals court) are composed of four ranking state
uniformed police officials and one civilian judge. With too few judges
for the caseload, there are backlogs, and human rights groups note a
lack of willingness by police to investigate fellow officers.
In 1996 the President signed legislation giving ordinary courts
jurisdiction over cases in which uniformed police officers are accused
of intentional homicide against civilians. However, except for the most
egregious or scandalous cases, the internal police investigation
determines if the homicide was intentional, and the police tribunal
decides whether to forward a case to a civil court for trial. As a
result, few cases are referred to the civil courts. The first case to
result in the conviction of an officer based on charges of intentional
homicide occurred in 1998, when a Sao Paulo court convicted Otavio
Gamba in the Diadema roadblock tortures and murders caught on
videotape.
In January the federal Senate formed a parliamentary committee of
inquiry to examine alleged abuses in the administration of the justice
system and to consider reform proposals. In a speech before the Order
of Brazilian Attorneys in July 1998, President Cardoso criticized the
slowness and poor administration of the justice system and said that
reform was imperative. The president of the federal Supreme Court
complained in a 1997 press interview about the volume of appeals that
by law the Supreme Court must review. It takes 8 years to reach a
definitive decision in the average case, a delay the Supreme Court
president considered unjust. At the appellate court level, a large
backlog of cases hinders the courts' ability to ensure fair and
expeditious trials.
Defendants are entitled to counsel and must be made fully aware of
the charges against them. According to the Ministry ofJustice,
approximately 85 percent of prisoners cannot afford an attorney. In
such cases, the court must provide one at public expense; courts are
supposed to appoint private attorneys to represent poor defendants when
public defenders are unavailable, but often no effective defense is
provided. Juries decide only cases of willful crimes against life,
including crimes by police; judges try all others.
The right to a fair public trial as provided by law generally is
respected in practice, although in rural areas the judiciary generally
is less capable and more subject to influence. Similarly, local police
are often less dutiful in investigating, prosecutors are reluctant to
initiate proceedings, and judges find reasons to delay when cases
involve gunmen contracted by landowners to eliminate squatters or rural
union activists.
After a series of confrontations between police and rural activists
illegally squatting on private land in the southern state of Parana in
early 1999, the CDDPH examined charges in June and July by landless
advocates that state authorities aggressively prosecuted crimes
committed by landless protesters and ignored crimes committed by police
and armed agents hired by landowners. As a result of the inquiry, the
National Human Rights Secretary publicly called on the state secretary
for public security to treat all parties in rural disputes evenhandedly
and to prosecute crimes committed by police and landowners with full
vigor.
Low pay, combined with exacting competitive examinations that in
some years eliminate 90 percent of the applicants, make it difficult to
fill vacancies on the bench. The system requires that a trial be held
within a set period of time from the date of the crime. However, due to
the backlog, old cases frequently are dismissed. According to a former
judge, this encourages corrupt judges to delay certain cases purposely,
so that they can be dismissed. Lawyers often drag out cases as long as
possible in the hope that an appeals court might render a favorable
opinion and because they are paid according to the amount of time that
they spend on a case.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for freedom from arbitrary
intrusion into the home. Wiretaps authorized by judicial authority are
permitted. The law regulating the conditions under which wiretaps may
be used appears to strike a fair balance between giving the police an
effective law enforcement tool and protecting the civil liberties of
citizens. The inviolability of private correspondence is respected.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution prohibits all
forms of censorship and provides for freedom of speech and a free
press, and the authorities respect these rights in practice.
Newspapers and magazines, which are privately owned, vigorously
report and comment on government performance. Both the print and
broadcast media routinely discuss controversial social and political
issues and engage in investigative reporting. Most radio and television
stations are privately owned; however, the Government has licensing
authority, and politicians frequently obtain licenses. Current or
former congressmen, some of whom are or were members of the committee
that oversees communications, own many television and radio stations.
It is difficult to determine how many media outlets are indirectly
controlled by politicians, since concessions often are registered in
the names of family members or friends linked to them. In addition, the
Government regularly approves transfers of concessions already granted
to other individuals with little oversight.
The penalty for libel under the 1967 Press Law--a prison term--is
considered extreme by judges and rarely is imposed. Press criticism has
described it as an archaic and authoritarian law inherited from the
military regime. In a report issued in October 1998, the National
Association of Journalists (ANJ), which represents 115 separate press
organizations, claimed that the threat of prohibitive fines and jail
sentences discouraged freedom of the press. The ANJ cited two judgments
made during the year against publishers that amounted to hundreds of
thousands of dollars and included jail terms of several months.
Complex electoral campaign laws regulate the broadcast media and
prescribe complicated arrangements to apportion the free use of
commercial radio and television broadcast time granted to political
parties during an election campaign. The short periods for rulings and
nonappeal provisions of the regulations are designed to enforce
discipline and to ensure that remedies are applied in a timely matter.
Media and free speech advocates generally accept the manner in which
the campaign laws are enforced.
Foreign publications are widely distributed; prior review of films,
plays, and radio and television programming is used only to determine a
suitable viewing age.
The National Federation of Journalists (FENAJ), the Brazilian Press
Association, and the ANJ have documented and criticized a number of
violent attacks, including killings, and threats against journalists in
retaliation for investigative reporting on organized crime, police
corruption, government fraud, and human rights abuses. The ANJ cites
impunity for crimes committed against journalists and uneven and
inappropriate application of the Press Law as impediments to the
functioning of a free press without censorship. In its annual report,
FENAJ documented 3 retaliatory homicides of journalists and 10
additional cases of death threats and assault in 1998. Charges have
been brought in none of these cases.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right to assemble peacefully, and the Government
respects this right in practice. Permits are not required for outdoor
political or labor meetings, and such meetings occur frequently.
In December police shot and killed one person and blinded two
others who were taking part in a protest organized by striking public
workers in Brasilia. Due to public criticism over use of such force by
police to control the protest, the Federal District governor demanded
the resignations of the state secretary for public security and the
chief of the uniformed police's special operations division (see
Section 1.a.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. There is
no favored or state religion. All faiths are free to establish places
of worship, train clergy, and proselytize, although the Government
controls entry into Indian lands.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no restrictions on movement,
except entry into protected Indian areas, nor are there any
restrictions on emigration or return. However, a parent is not allowed
to leave the country with children without the permission of the other
parent.
On March 31, the mayor of Corumba, Mato Grosso do Sul state,
expelled 27 indigents from the city by force only days before a visit
by the President. Human rights groups charged that the actions by the
mayor and five police officials constituted kidnaping and private
imprisonment. The mayor justified his action by saying that the town
could not support its 150 indigents and that the 27 he removed were not
really town residents. According to the media, many cities in Sao Paulo
state allow indigents to stay for only 12 hours before the city buys
them one-way tickets out of town.
In July 1997, the Government passed legislation with provisions for
asylum and refugee status intended to conform to the principles of the
1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
its 1967 Protocol. The Government provides first asylum and cooperates
with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. Voting is secret and mandatory for all literate
citizens age 18 to 70, except for military conscripts who may not vote.
It is voluntary for minors age 16 to 18, for the illiterate, and for
those age 70 and over.
Women have full political rights under the Constitution and are
increasingly active in politics and government; however, they remain
underrepresented in both fields. Cultural, institutional, and financial
barriers continue to limit women's participation in political life. The
number of female candidates for office in the 1998 national elections
roughly doubled, compared with the number in 1994, according to
statistics released by the Supreme Electoral Court. Women constituted
12.3 percent of the total candidates. However, their representation in
the national Congress decreased from 7.6 percent to 6.1 percent after
the 1998 elections; 29 women were elected to the 513-seat Chamber of
Deputies, and 5 to the 81-seat Senate. There is 1 woman in the 29-
member Cabinet. In May the President appointed the first woman to the
11-member Supreme Court.
Diverse ethnic and racial groups, while free to participate
politically, are not represented in government and politics in
proportion to their numbers in the general population.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of local and national human rights groups operate without
government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on
human rights cases. Federal officials generally are cooperative and
responsive to their views. Federal and state officials, in light of
insufficient resources, in many instances actively solicit the aid and
cooperation of NGO's in addressing human rights problems. However,
human rights monitors on occasion are threatened and harassed due to
their efforts to identify and have action taken against human rights
abusers, especially members of the state police forces (see Section
1.a.).
Established in April 1997, the Justice Ministry's National
Secretariat of Human Rights oversees implementation of a 1996 action
plan to address human rights abuses. The Secretariat administered or
sponsored programs to reduce violence among the poor, to train police
officials in human rights practices, and to combat discrimination
against blacks, women, children, indigenous people, the elderly, and
the disabled. The Secretariat was reviewing its programs in light of
its experiences in its first 2 years in order to increase its
effectiveness. In 1998 the National Human Rights Secretary, Dr. Jose
Gregori, received the U.N. human rights prize for his role in
implementing the plan and his accomplishments on behalf of human
rights, dating back to his cooperation with groups trying to restore
democracy during the period of military rule.
In December the Government released the first National Report on
Human Rights, independently prepared by the Center for the Study of
Violence at the University of Sao Paulo. The National Secretariat for
Human Rights, the University of Sao Paulo, and the U.N. Development
Program co-sponsored the preparation of the report. The report is a
comprehensive account of the human rights situation in each state, and
provides information on health, education, public security, and labor
conditions. The report also provides a list of human rights monitors
and advocates in each state.
Two attorneys working for a human rights group in Aracatuba, Sao
Paulo state, received death threats after successfully prosecuting
three police officers who were convicted of torture and homicide. The
caller gave the attorneys 15 days to leave town or they would be
killed. The lawyers asked for police protection and refused to leave
the city.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion, or nationality
is against the law, but women, blacks, and indigenous people continued
to experience discrimination. The International Labor Organization
(ILO) notes that important differences in wages exist to the detriment
of women and blacks, particularly in rural areas. The Government passed
a law in May 1997 that provides prison penalties and fines for racist
acts,including promulgation of pejorative terms for ethnic or racial
groups, use of the swastika, or acts of discrimination based on sex,
religion, age, or ethnic origin. Several individuals have been charged
with racism since the law's enactment, mostly for the use of racial
slurs.
There continued to be reports of violence against homosexuals,
although it was not always clear that the victim's sexual orientation
was the reason for the attack. In January police officials in Rio de
Janeiro reported incidents of gangs attacking patrons of known
homosexual bars and nightclubs. The Rio de Janeiro state secretariat
for public security instituted a telephone hot line, which persons
could call for information regarding acts of violence against
homosexuals. The secretariat also instituted a training course for the
police in dealing with homosexuals. The Gay Group of Bahia (GGB), the
country's best known homosexual rights organization, and Amnesty
International have in the past 6 years documented the existence of
skinhead, neo-Nazi, and ``machista'' gangs that attacked suspected
homosexuals in other cities including Salvador, Belo Horizonte, and
Brasilia. In some cases these gangs included police officers.
The GGB maintains that increasing numbers of homosexuals are being
killed because of their sexual orientation. However, the data compiled
by the GGB and its claims that violence against homosexuals is rising
cannot be confirmed, as they are based on a selective sampling of press
and other reports and because the motive for the crime is not always
clear. Information from the GGB and other homosexual rights groups
clearly indicates that transvestite prostitutes, the most visible
homosexual group, are at a greater risk of violence than other
homosexuals. Police routinely extort money from transvestites and often
beat or kill those who fail to cooperate (see Section 1.a.). Gay rights
activists in the city of Recife compiled substantial evidence of
extortion and the unlawful use of violence against transvestite
prostitutes. In past years, flagrant abuses by the police in the states
of Alagoas and Bahia have been reported.
Women.--The most pervasive violations of women's rights involved
sexual and domestic violence, which are both widespread and vastly
underreported. There is a high incidence of physical abuse of women.
Most major cities and towns have established special police offices to
deal with crimes of domestic or sexual violence against women; such
offices total over 200. Rapes reported to the police in the state of
Rio de Janeiro increased 45 percent in the period between 1994 and
1998, the last year for which data were available, according to the
state secretariat for public security. Both state authorities and
women's rights activists agree that a large number of rapes go
unreported. According to a study carried out in two middle class
neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro in 1998, only 10 percent of women who
had suffered violent attacks reported them to the police. The Sao Paulo
Center for Assistance to Female Victims of Sexual Violence reported
that 400 women sought the center's intervention in rape cases after
receiving no help from the police in 1998. In rural areas, abused women
have little recourse since there are no specialized offices available
to them. Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is
also a serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
Men who commit crimes against women, including sexual assault and
murder, are unlikely to be brought to trial. Although the Supreme Court
in 1991 struck down the archaic concept of ``defense of honor'' as a
justification for killing one's wife, courts are still reluctant to
prosecute and convict men who claim that they attacked their wives for
infidelity. Preliminary results from a study done by an academic at the
Catholic Pontifical University of Sao Paulo indicate that 70 percent of
criminal complaints regarding domestic violence against women are
suspended without a conclusion. Only 2 percent of criminal complaints
of violence against women lead to convictions. In June 1998, the
National Movement for Human Rights reported that female murder victims
were 30 times more likely to be killed by current or former husbands or
lovers than by others. The state of Rio de Janeiro opened two shelters
for victims of domestic violence during the year, bringing the total
number in the state to four.
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex in
employment or pay and provides for 120 days of paid maternity leave.
However, the provision against wage discrimination rarely is enforced.
According to statistics released in 1998 by the International
Confederation of Independent Unions, women are paid on average 44
percent less than men. According to government statistics released in
August 1998, women with a highschool education or less earn, on
average, 63 percent of the salaries earned by men with the same level
of education. Black women earned on average 26 percent of a white
male's salary. A 1998 study by a sociologist showed that women who
started working in positions in which they earned twice the minimum
wage advanced in pay after 10 years to a wage of seven times the
minimum wage. Men starting in the same positions earned 2.6 times the
minimum wage and advanced to a wage of 10.9 times the minimum wage
after 10 years. A Ministry of Labor survey reported that the average
starting salary for high school educated women in Sao Paulo was one-
third less than the average starting salary for high school educated
men.
In response to the Maternity Leave Law, some employers seek
sterilization certificates from female job applicants or try to avoid
hiring women of childbearing age. In an effort to end such practices,
President Cardoso signed a law in 1995 that prohibited employers from
requiring applicants or employees to take pregnancy tests or present
sterilization certificates. Employers who violate the law are subject
to a jail term ranging from 1 to 2 years, while the company must pay a
fine equal to 10 times the salary of its highest paid employee.
Children.--Millions of children continue to suffer from the poverty
afflicting their families, must work to survive, and fail to get an
education. Schooling is free and compulsory for the first six grades
and is available in all parts of the country. The education system does
not exclude any groups; however, 1.5 million children between 7 and 14
years of age do not attend school.
According to data released by the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) in
June, 21.1 million children and adolescents, or 35 percent, live in
poverty. More than 2.9 million children age 14 and under continue to
work; 583,000 of whom were between the ages of 5 and 9. Many of these
children work together with their parents, most often in agriculture,
under conditions approximating forced labor or debt bondage (see
Sections 6.c. and 6.d.). Many other children beg on the streets of
cities. A UNICEF report published in June estimated that 50,000
children nationwide work in garbage dumps sorting trash for re-use.
According to the most recent government figures released in
November, the number of children working has decreased steadily since
1993, while the number of children attending school has increased. The
Federal Government administers a total of 33 programs under 5 separate
ministries aimed at combating child labor. The Ministry of Labor's
program for the eradication of child labor provided supplemental income
or ``school scholarships'' to the families of 147,000 children in rural
areas who in return must attend school. According to the Government, an
additional 202,000 children living in urban areas benefit from similar
programs administered by municipalities. The city of Belo Horizonte
announced in March that a similar pilot program, cosponsored by UNICEF
and implemented in 1996, had served 1,500 children, achieved a success
rate of 92 percent. The cities of Olinda and Sao Bernardo do Campos
also started similar programs. Participating families received the
equivalent of $60 a month in return for which their children had to
attend school regularly. However, in November the Federal District
government suspended the school scholarship program, one of the
country's first, originally adopted by the previous administration and
considered by UNICEF and children's advocates as widely effective.
According to research undertaken by UNICEF, the nation
significantly lowered its rates of child mortality and malnutrition and
made progress in access to education; however, UNICEF noted that not
all the goals for progress in specific health categories for the year
2000 would be reached.
There are no reliable figures on the number of street children,
some of whom are homeless, but the majority of whom return home at
night. Disparities in the numbers of children living in the street
reported by children's rights activists indicate the difficulty of
arriving at accurate estimates. The Center for the Defense of Children
and Adolescents (CEDECA) in Belem, in the state of Para, reported that
in 1998 a total of 2,328 youths under the age of 18, totaling 0.5
percent of the youth population, spent their days in the streets.
CEDECA estimated that 97 of those youths lived permanently in the
streets. CEDECA estimated that the total number of street children in
Belem declined by 33 percent from 1993, while the number of youths
living in the streets declined by 62 percent.
In Rio de Janeiro, an organization aiding street children estimated
in 1997 that 30,000 frequent the streets by day but probably less than
1,000 sleep there. In Sao Paulo, NGO's aiding street children estimated
that some 12,000 children roam the streets by day and that from 3,000
to 5,000 of them live permanently on the streets. In Salvador, Bahia,
NGO's estimated that the number of children who sleep in the streets
was less than 1,000, although this number fluctuates widely during the
weeks between Christmas and Carnival, when children from the region are
attracted to the city by the large number of tourists and festivals.
CEDECA in Belem also noted wide fluctuations in the population of
street children as a result of the celebration of local festivals.
NGO's in Rio de Janeiro have made 28 shelters available for
homeless children, but some children prefer the freedom and drugs that
street life offers. Drug use, particularly glue sniffing and crack, is
increasingly prevalent among street children. One dose of poor quality
crack sells for $0.55 in downtown Sao Paulo. NGO's report that extreme
poverty at home or sexual abuse by fathers and stepfathers are the
principal reasons so many children choose to live in the streets. A
national study of rape cases carried out by a group of Sao Paulo
academics indicated that family members committed roughly 70 percent of
rapes within their own homes. An IBGE study reported that 47 percent of
Sao Paulo street children come from families that earn less than $200
((350 reias) per month. Nationwide, the Inter-American Development Bank
estimated that some 30 million children live below the poverty line and
increasingly come from households headed by women.
Because street children have a high rate of drug use and have been
involved in assaults and robberies, a significant portion of the public
supports harsh police measures against them, viewing the issue as one
of crime and security, not human rights. CEDECA in Salvador attributes
the vast majority of unresolved homicides of children in the Salvador
region to the action of police and death squads.
According to statistics released by the Government in November,
homicide remains the leading cause of death among 15- to 19-year-olds.
Previous statistics from UNICEF and the IBGE showed that the homicide
rate within this age group more than tripled between 1980 and 1997.
Among children between the ages of 10 and 14, homicide accounted for
5.1 percent of all deaths in 1998. According to the ISER, in Rio de
Janeiro the rate of homicides of children ages 10 to 14 rose 34.4
percent and the rate of youths ages 15 to 19 rose 30.6 percent between
1996 and 1998. During the same period, the general rate of homicide
decreased. Within a 2-month period in May and June, a total of four
youths were killed in public areas in the city of Rio de Janeiro. The
CEDECA in Belem reported a 40 percent increase in the incidence of
violence against children under the age of 18 in Para state during
1990-97. The majority of the victims were between 15 and 18 years of
age.
Trafficking in children for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
A study released in March by the Information Network for Violence,
Exploitation, and Sexual Abuse of Children and Adolescents (CECRIA), an
entity within the National Human Rights Secretariat, states that
government efforts to combat sexual exploitation of children need to be
better tailored and coordinated (see Section 6.f.). It cites 40
separate programs in the country operated by national and international
NGO's, some in partnership with government entities, but notes that
most of the programs face shortfalls in resources and personnel. In
association with the Ministry of Justice, the NGO ABRAPIA has since
1997 operated a telephone hot line to register complaints of sexual
abuse against children and adolescents. The ABRAPIA also administers
the ``SOS-child'' program in Rio de Janeiro state that registers
complaints of domestic abuse against children and provides medical and
social assistance.
In April Sao Paulo civil police identified a child prostitution
ring in the suburb of Guarulhos that exploited girls as young as age
11. The ring counted on the complicity of nightclubs, motels, hotels,
and even the girls' parents. Police claimed that the girls' parents
were involved in the scheme and received part of their daughters'
earnings.
In June federal authorities charged eight persons with operating a
child prostitution ring in the city of Teresina, capital of the state
of Piaui. Among the accused clients of the ring were police officers.
In September civil police in Alagoas uncovered a child prostitution
ring involving local judicial authorities. In October civil police in
Maranhao uncovered a childprostitution ring involving police, judicial
authorities, and elected authorities.
In October police in Campo Grande, Mato Grosso do Sul state,
arrested three persons accused of running a brothel using girls between
the ages of 13 and 16 (see Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution contains several
provisions for the disabled, stipulating a minimum wage, educational
opportunities, and access to public buildings and public
transportation. However, groups that work with the disabled report that
state governments failed to meet the legally mandated targets for
educational opportunities and work placement. A 1991 law stipulates
that all businesses with over 200 employees must reserve 2 percent of
their vacancies for the disabled. In August labor officials in the
Federal District launched an information campaign to encourage firms to
comply with the law and warned that firms not complying could be fined.
The National Human Rights Secretariat sponsored a ``City for
Everyone'' program in cooperation with municipal governments and
national and international NGO's that focused on providing better
access for the disabled to public areas and public transport. However,
little progress in elimination of architectural barriers to the
disabled has been made. In August the government in Rio de Janeiro
state mandated that bus companies must make a specific number of buses
on certain routes accessible to wheelchair users within 3 months. By
year's end, 6 percent of the cities' bus fleets had been adapted for
wheelchair use; however, no intercity or interstate buses had been
modified.
According to the Federal Ministry of Education, in 1997 only 5
percent of the estimated 6 million school age children with
disabilities had access to specialized instruction. Throughout the
country, only 43 percent of school districts offer special instruction
for disabled children. In the nine states in the northeast, only 24
percent of school districts offer special instruction.
Indigenous People.--The Constitution grants the indigenous
population of approximately 330,000 broad rights, including the
protection of their cultural patrimony and the exclusive use of their
traditional lands; however, the Government has fallen short of securing
these rights for indigenous people in practice. The Government
estimates that over half live in poverty in communities whose
traditional ways of life are threatened on a variety of fronts. The
number of indigenous citizens receiving food assistance in the southern
states of Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul exceeded the total indigenous
population at the time of the 1995 census in those states. The greatest
number of beneficiaries reside in Mato Grosso do Sul state, where
42,000 persons of a total indigenous population of 45,300 receive food
assistance.
Indigenous leaders and activists complain that indigenous peoples
have only limited participation in decisions taken by the Government
affecting their land, cultures, traditions, and allocation of national
resources. They also criticized the Government for devoting
insufficient resources for health care, other basic services, and
protection of indigenous reserves from non-Indians. Illegal mining,
logging, and ranching are serious problems on Indian land.
The National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) is responsible for the
coordination and implementation of indigenous policies. The President
appoints the head of FUNAI; it is organized into 52 regions whose
directors are appointed directly by the FUNAI president.
The 1988 Constitution charged the Federal Government with
demarcating indigenous areas within 5 years. During the year, the
Government demarcated 6 areas totaling about 3,000 square miles. At
year's end, the Government had completed demarcation of roughly 79
percent of the total area of identified indigenous territory. Of the
total of 561 identified indigenous areas, 205 remain to be demarcated
legally. Identified indigenous territory comprises 11 percent of the
national territory.
The Government estimates that 208 of the total of 561 identified
indigenous lands are used illegally by non-Indians for mining, logging,
and agriculture. Non-Indian invaders destroy the environment and
wildlife, spread disease, and provoke violent confrontations. FUNAI
admits that it does not have thenecessary resources to protect
indigenous lands from encroachment. In 1996 the Federal Government
officially demarcated a 2,500 acre indigenous area in Rio Grande do Sul
belonging to the Caingangue Indians. However, non-Indians who have
occupied the land for years continued to charge the Indians rent to
farm their land.
Due partly to the Government's failure to provide adequate medical
care as required by law, indigenous people have suffered epidemics of
malaria, measles, and tuberculosis. According to the chief of FUNAI's
medical department, 60 percent of the indigenous population suffers
from a chronic disease such as tuberculosis, malaria, or hepatitis. In
certain areas of the Amazon region, up to 80 percent of the population
are affected. Illegal mining in the Amazon has led to the doubling of
the incidence of malaria in the period 1994-98. FUNAI estimates that 75
percent of the affected population is indigenous. The infant mortality
rate among the Yanomami in 1997 was 13 percent, while infant mortality
among non-Indian residents was only 1.5 percent. According to health
workers' unions, poor working conditions and lack of resources from the
Government make it very difficult for health workers to travel into
indigenous areas to provide sufficient medical care.
FUNAI also has been unable to provide mandated health care and
other basic services. Hoping to improve the level of health care
provided to indigenous people, in June the Government transferred that
responsibility from FUNAI to the Ministry of Health.
In October police in Pernambuco arrested and then subsequently
released for lack of evidence a suspect in connection with the May 1998
killing of Francisco ``Chicao'' de Assis Araujo. Indigenous rights
activists criticized the release, noting that the suspect was
identified after extensive assistance from an eyewitness. Araujo was a
prominent campaigner for the indigenous population in his home state of
Pernambuco. He had defended the land claims of his tribe, whose lands
are being encroached upon by ranchers.
In December 1998, the Federal Government issued a decree
recognizing the original boundaries of the Raposa Serra do Sol
indigenous area in the Amazonian state of Roraima, overturning a
controversial decision made in 1996 by the Justice Minister to limit
and alter the shape of the reserve. However, in April a state court
upheld a claim brought by local landowners and economic interests and
suspended the demarcation process. Indigenous activists claim that the
Government's failure to carry out the December 1998 decree and allocate
resources for the area's final demarcation was a political concession
to local economic and political interests who then were able to
influence the state court. The demarcation of Raposa Serra do Sol has
been pending since 1992.
The Constitution provides Indians with the exclusive use of the
soil, waters, and minerals on indigenous lands, subject to
congressional authorization. In granting authorization, the
Constitution stipulates that the views of the affected communities must
be considered and that the communities also must ``participate'' in the
benefits gained from such use. However, legislation regulating mining
on indigenous lands has been pending before the Congress since 1995.
The Catholic Church-affiliated Indigenous Missionary Council (CIMI)
criticized the regulations within the legislation that would provide
for indigenous groups' approval of mining concessions and their
participation in the profits from mining, on the grounds that they do
not sufficiently address the constitutional rights of indigenous
people.
Landowners brought a civil action to the Supreme Court against a
lower court ruling in Bahia that restored demarcated land of the
Caramuru-Catarina Paraguacu reserve to the Pataxo Ha-Ha-Hae tribe. At
year's end, no trial date had been set. Some tribe members began
separate negotiations with landowners, who under FUNAI regulations may
receive ``indemnification for benefactors of good faith'' in
demarcation disputes. However, tensions remain extremely high in the
area. In November Indians occupying part of the reserve held by farmers
fired on and killed two uniformed police who had been dispatched to
dislodge them. The Indians immediately fled the area, but one was
subsequently charged with homicide. The state government dispatched
more than 150 uniformed police to secure the area.
No charges have been filed in the case of mass sterilizations
promoted among women of the Pataxo tribe of Bahia by federal Deputy and
medical doctor Roland Lavigne in exchange for votes during his 1994
electoral campaign. Pataxo women were reluctant to have children
because of the general level of poverty intheir community, and campaign
workers reportedly convinced them that sterilization was the only
effective form of birth control. CIMI claims to have confirmed
independently that Lavigne sterilized at least 56 Pataxo women over the
last 4 years. In the small settlement of Itaju do Colonia, all 10 of
the women of childbearing age of the Pataxo Ha-ha-hae tribe were
sterilized. CIMI reported that Lavigne paid campaign workers according
to the number of Pataxo women brought to area hospitals. Pataxo leaders
claimed that the sterilizations were a deliberate program of genocide
intended to eliminate their tribe and free their land for farmers who
illegally occupy the Pataxo reserve. Pataxo leaders requested federal
police protection in August after receiving threats from farmers who
are settled on their land. Federal and state authorities continue their
investigation into the case.
Religious Minorities.--Leaders in the Jewish community expressed
concern over the appearance of anti-Semitic material on Internet
websites compiled by neo-Nazi groups.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although racial discrimination
has been illegal since 1951, darker skinned citizens say that they
frequently encounter discrimination. Legislation in force since 1989
specifically prohibits, among other practices, denial of public or
private facilities, employment, or housing to anyone based on race. A
1997 amendment to this law added prohibitions against and jail terms
for the incitement of racial discrimination or prejudice and the
dissemination of racially offensive symbols and epithets. The media
reported several arrests of persons charged with using racial slurs
during the year. In April a judge sentenced a woman in the city of
Porto Alegre to 4 months in prison for using an ethnic slur against her
neighbor.
An Afro-Brazilian woman in the city of Salvador, Bahia, filed suit
against the authorities of a carnival group after they allegedly
refused to allow her to join because of her race. The publicity
surrounding the case led to other allegations of race discrimination in
the organization of Salvador's carnival activities. As a result, more
than 40 carnival groups subsequently adopted a voluntarily code
limiting their grounds for denying prospective members and prohibiting
denial on the grounds of race.
In Sao Paulo human rights activists continued to express concern
because of discrimination against blacks and poor persons from the
northeast by neo-Nazi groups in the south. A group of human rights
activists led by the chairman of the Sao Paulo state assembly's human
rights committee called for investigation into the use of the Internet
by racist organizations to disseminate illegal propaganda. The chairman
identified the National Socialist Union for Sao Paulo and the National
Front for Order and Progress as two of the groups. One human rights
activist who monitors the Internet indicated that the number of neo-
Nazi sites decreased during the year. In August 1998, a university
student in Sao Paulo was charged under the antidiscrimination law with
disseminating racially offensive materials on the Internet.
According to research carried out by the Inter-Union Department of
Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies in 1998, Afro-Brazilians had
higher rates of unemployment, earned less, and enjoyed less job
stability than white Brazilians in each of the five largest
metropolitan regions where data were gathered. In the region of
Salvador, Bahia, which has the highest percentage of Afro-Brazilians of
any metropolitan region, unemployment among Afro-Brazilians was 45
percent higher than among whites (the difference among heads of
household was 75 percent). In Sao Paulo, Afro-Brazilian unemployment
was 41 percent higher than among whites and 64 percent higher among
heads of households. Afro-Brazilian men earned on average between 62
percent and 70 percent of the average salary earned by white men in the
five regions surveyed. Afro-Brazilian women earned on average between
33.5 and 47 percent of the average salary of a white man.
According to a government-sponsored study released in April by the
Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), whites are more than
twice as likely as blacks to expand a small business successfully. When
levels of education and experience are equivalent, whites are still 33
percent more likely to expand their businesses. The IPEA study
indicates that self-employed blacks earn 64 percent less than their
white counterparts, while black business owners earned 54 percent less
than their white counterparts. Illiteracy is also a problem: 32 percent
ofblacks are illiterate, compared with 14 percent of whites. Of 30,000
students at the University of Sao Paulo in 1997, only about 1,000 were
black.
A much higher percentage of blacks are convicted by courts than
whites, according to professor Sergio Adorno of the University of Sao
Paulo's Nucleus for the Study of Violence. Adorno analyzed 500 criminal
cases judged in Sao Paulo courts in 1990 and found that 60 percent of
whites able to afford their own lawyers were acquitted, while only 27
percent of blacks who hired lawyers were found not guilty.
In September 1997, the Federal Government's Interministerial
Working Group for the Valorization of the Black Population issued 29
recommendations, including the creation of affirmative action programs
for university admissions and government hiring. The group is charged
with proposing public policies to increase the participation and access
of Afro-Brazilians in society. The National Secretariat for Human
Rights adopted some of the group's recommendations in the national
human rights program and planned to incorporate many others in its
revision of the National Human Rights Plan.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Labor Code provides for
representation of all workers (except members of the military, the
uniformed police, and firemen) but imposes a hierarchical, unitary
system funded by a mandatory union tax on workers and employers. The
sole bureaucratic requirement for new unions is to register with the
Ministry of Labor, which by court decision must accept the registration
and record it.
Under a restriction known as ``unicidade'' (one per city), the code
prohibits multiple unions of the same professional category in a given
geographical area. The 1988 Constitution freed workers to organize new
unions out of old ones without prior authorization of the Government,
but retained other provisions of the old labor code. All elements of
the labor movement as well as the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU) criticize the retention of unicidade. The
Government has promised to end unicidade, but by year's end it had not
yet introduced any such legislation.
Unicidade has proven less restrictive in recent years, as more
liberal interpretations permitted new unions to form and, in many
cases, to compete with unions and federations that already had enjoyed
official recognition. In practice, unicidade is enforced by the system
of labor courts, which retain the right to review the registration of
new unions and to adjudicate conflicts over their formation. This often
can result in complicated jurisdictional quarrels. A splinter group
used the principle of unicidade to resist a consolidation movement by
the Workers' Unitary Central (CUT) and formed its own metalworkers'
local in the ABC industrial suburbs of Sao Paulo in 1995. The dispute
lasted 3 years before a court settlement was reached. The settlement,
approved by a majority of the members of the unions involved, provided
for the reincorporation of the dissident union into the Sao Paulo ABC
metalworkers' union.
Unions are independent of the Government and of the political
parties. The leadership of major unions is distinct and independent
from that of the political parties. In general, the major unions
support left-of-center parties and in some instances form formal
alliances with left-of-center parties to advocate or carry out protest
acts regarding specific issues. Approximately 25 percent of the work
force is organized, with well over half this number affiliated with an
independent labor central. Intimidation of rural labor union organizers
and their agents continues to be a problem.
The Constitution provides workers with the right to strike (except
for the military, police, and firemen). Enabling legislation passed in
1989 stipulates that essential services must remain in operation during
a strike and that workers must notify employers at least 48 hours
before beginning a walkout. The Constitution prohibits government
interference in labor unions, but provides that ``abuse'' of the right
to strike (such as not maintaining essential services, or failure to
end a strike after a labor court decision) is punishable by law. The
Constitution specifies the right of public employees to strike, subject
to conditions enacted by the Congress. Since the Congress has yet to
pass the complementary legislation, labor and legal experts debate the
limits of the right to strike forpublic employees. In practice, the
Government has not interfered with their right to strike.
Autoworkers, truckers, doctors in public health facilities,
teachers, and municipal transit workers struck during the year.
Formerly, the courts almost automatically ruled strikes abusive; in
recent years the courts have applied the law with more discretion. The
1989 strike law prohibits dismissals or the hiring of substitute
workers during a strike, with certain exceptions, provided that the
strike is not ruled abusive.
Although the law makes no provision for a central labor
organization, three major groups have emerged: the Workers' Unitary
Central, the Workers' General Confederation (CGT), and the Forca
Sindical (FS). A fourth central, the Social Democratic Union (SDS), was
founded in September 1997. The centrals do not have legal standing to
represent professional categories of workers, but all three centrals
effectively can acquire such standing by affiliating with existing
statewide federations or nationwide confederations, or by forming new
federations and confederations.
Unions and centrals freely affiliate with international trade union
organizations. All three major centrals are affiliated with the ICFTU.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution provides for the right to organize. With government
assistance, businesses and unions are working to expand and improve
mechanisms of collective bargaining. However, the scope of issues
legally susceptible to collective bargaining is narrow. The labor court
system exercises normative power with regard to the settlement of labor
disputes, discouraging direct negotiation. The Cardoso Government made
expansion of collective bargaining one of its major objectives in the
labor sector.
In mid-1995 the Cardoso administration promulgated a provisional
measure that simultaneously ended inflation indexing of wages, allowed
for mediation of wage settlements if the parties involved so desired,
and provided greater latitude for collective bargaining. Unions have
welcomed these changes, since previously the Labor Court and the Labor
Ministry had responsibility for mediation in the preliminary stages of
dispute settlement. In many cases free negotiations set wages; labor
court decisions set them in others. Under the provisional measure,
parties now may choose mediation freely.
The ILO notes that important differences in wages continue to exist
to the detriment of women and blacks, particularly in the rural sectors
(see Section 5).
The Constitution incorporates a provision from the old Labor Code
that prohibits the dismissal of employees who are candidates for or
holders of union leadership positions. Nonetheless, dismissals take
place, with those dismissed required to resort to a usually lengthy
court process for relief. In general, the authorities do not enforce
effectively laws protecting union members from discrimination. Union
officials estimate that only 5 percent of such cases reaching the labor
court system are resolved within days through a preliminary judicial
order. The other 95 percent generally take 5 to 10 years (and sometimes
longer) to resolve.
Labor law applies equally in the free trade zones. The unions in
the Manaus free trade zone, like rural unions and many unions in
smaller cities, are relatively weaker vis-a-vis industry than unions in
the major industrial centers.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Although the
Constitution prohibits forced labor, there continue to be credible
reports of forced labor in many parts of the country. Forced labor is
most common in charcoal production and agriculture. The majority of
cases occur when employers recruit laborers from population centers and
transport them long distances to remote areas where escape is
difficult. The Catholic Church's Pastoral Land Commission reported 14
cases of forced labor in 5 different states involving more than 600
workers in 1998. The number of cases of forced labor reported to the
CPT has declined in the period 1996-98 (also see Section 6.d.).
State police acknowledge that overseers or owners of many farms
withhold pay from migrant laborers and use force to retain and
intimidate them, but assert that such violations fall within the
jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of Labor. Federal laborand police
officials state that cooperation with state police regarding labor
violations is improving but far from optimum.
The Federal Government's Executive Group to Combat Forced Labor
(GERTRAF), coordinated by the Ministry of Labor, includes
representatives from five different ministries and is administered in
six regions throughout the country, so that local enterprises cannot
rely on friendly local authorities to escape punishment. The
enforcement arm of GERTRAF is the Special Group for Mobile Inspection,
which consists of over 3,100 agents. During 1995-97, the teams carried
out more than 400 raids and uncovered more than 130,000 persons working
under conditions of varying degrees approximating forced labor. In 1998
the group carried out 64 raids and uncovered 3,531 persons working in
conditions of forced labor. Ministry of Labor officials admit that
enforcement has been hampered by the remoteness of the areas in which
forced labor is practiced and the difficulty of arriving in these areas
without alerting those employing illegal labor. However, they say that
the mobile inspectors have refined their tactics and greatly improved
their enforcement abilities.
Government officials and labor activists say that widespread
poverty, low levels of education, and lack of awareness of worker's
rights greatly complicate the effort to combat forced labor.
Additionally, freed workers are often afraid to testify against those
who recruited and supervised them and are unable to remain in the
region in order to testify. Thus the authorities often have found it
difficult to identify and locate the owners of farms or businesses that
exploit forced labor. In 1997 the CUT initiated a 24-hour hot line with
a toll-free number for reporting instances of forced labor. The
Government passed legislation in December 1998 further defining forced
labor and prescribing specific penalties for those convicted under the
law.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem (see Section 6.f.).
The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, but it is
not enforced adequately. Labor organizations continue to allege that in
mining and the rural economy thousands of workers, including minors,
are hired on the basis of false promises, and subjected to debt bondage
and to violence if they try to escape.
Trafficking in children for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Government amended the Constitution in December 1998
to raise the minimum working age from 14 to 16 years. Under the
amendment, apprenticeships may begin only at age 14. However, the
authorities rarely enforce additional legal restrictions intended to
protect working minors under age 18, and the problem is widespread.
The law requires permission of the parents for minors to work, and
working minors must attend school through the primary grades. Schooling
is free and compulsory for the first six grades, and available in all
parts of the country. The majority of children remain in school until
age 14. The law bars all minors from night work, work that constitutes
a physical strain, and employment in unhealthful, dangerous or morally
harmful conditions. However, the Government estimates that 60,000
children work in unhealthful conditions.
Despite these restrictions, official figures state that roughly 2.9
million children age 14 and under were employed, accounting for 4.2
percent of the work force. Many children are forced by economic
necessity to work alongside their parents in cane fields, cutting hemp,
or feeding wood into charcoal ovens; frequent accidents, unhealthy
working conditions, and squalor are common in these cases.
The problem of child labor is serious. The small number of
available inspectors limit enforcement of restrictions. Inspection
suffers from a lack of resources, and as with forced labor, inspectors
generally act on the basis of complaints and tips concerning the use of
child labor. Employers illegally using child labor have been fined
heavily for their offenses.
The Government's national forum for the prevention and eradication
of child labor, a program administered by the Labor Ministry in
partnership with national and international NGO's, has been effective
in significantly reducing child labor. According to government figures
released in April, the number ofchild laborers has decreased over 26
percent since 1996 (see Section 5).
A report published by the Sergipe state government in 1997 stated
that 10,000 children and adolescents between the ages of 6 and 18 were
part of the labor force in the orange-growing region, with 54 percent
between the ages of 7 and 14. Sergipe officials have acknowledged that
the problem of child labor is widespread, and the state launched a
federally funded program in May 1998 aimed at encouraging families to
keep children in school rather than at work in the orange groves.
Sugar cane growers illegally employ children and adolescents
ranging from 7 to 17 years of age, many cutting cane with machetes. The
charcoal industry, hemp cultivators in the northeast, and orange
growers all have used illegal child labor. Children also perform
various tasks in the mining and logging industries in the Amazon
region. In addition, although both the Government and the industry have
made strong efforts to eliminate it, there is still some child labor in
the shoe industry.
The private sector and particularly the Toy Manufacturers'
Foundation for Children's Rights (ABRINQ) have been active in trying to
remedy many of these abuses. ABRINQ reached an agreement with the Sao
Paulo state sugar producers to remove child labor from that industry.
In addition, ABRINQ persuaded Abecitrus, the citrus export
organization, to agree to remove child labor from its operations.
Because of ABRINQ's efforts, Volkswagen and General Motors, as well as
other automakers, are studying the role of child labor in charcoal
production, which is used to produce the cast iron and steel used in
cars. Both manufacturers agreed to cease using products in which child
labor is an element.
ABRINQ has emphasized not just ending child labor but also putting
children into good-quality schools. The shoe manufacturers in the city
of Franca, with the help of ABRINQ, virtually eliminated child labor
there and enhanced the educational opportunities of children whom they
formerly employed. A similar project with Ministry of Labor direction
has been successful in removing child labor from the shoe industry in
Rio Grande do Sul. In Mato Grosso do Sul, a government-sponsored
project has taken children from the charcoal industry there to the
classroom, with parents receiving roughly the equivalent of the child's
monthly earnings as long as the child attends school. The project,
which began with 1,000 children, has been expanded to involve nearly
2,500. In Rio Grande do Sul, encouraged by the ABRINQ model, unions
representing tobacco growers, local cigarette manufacturers, and
several international tobacco companies initiated a similar project in
April targeted at farm families who use their own children in tobacco
cultivation.
Because of the success of the program in Mato Grosso do Sul, the
Ministry of Labor expanded the program to the sugar producing regions
of Pernambuco, where 20,000 children participate, and to the hemp-
growing area of Bahia, which has a program for more than 8,000
children. In addition, the Ministry has begun a program to raise public
consciousness concerning child labor, which ministry officials consider
the key to eradication of the problem.
The law prohibits forced and bonded labor for all workers,
including children; however, enforcement varies considerably depending
on the location.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is
approximately $70 (136 reais) a month, which is not sufficient to
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. A 1997
study by the Interunion Department of Socioeconomic Studies and
Statistics concluded that the minimum wage was only slightly more than
one-fourth that is necessary to support a family of four. Many workers
outside the regulated economy, particularly in the rural northeast,
earn less than the minimum wage.
The Constitution limits the workweek to 44 hours and specifies a
weekly rest period of 24 consecutive hours, preferably on Sundays. The
Constitution provides for pay and fringe benefits and establishes new
protection for agricultural and domestic workers, although not all
provisions are enforced. All workers in the formal sector receive
overtime pay for work beyond 44 hours, and there are prohibitions
against excessive use of overtime.
Unsafe working conditions are prevalent throughout the country.
Fundacentro, part of the Ministry of Labor, sets occupational, health,
and safety standards, which are consistent with internationally
recognized norms. However, the Ministry has insufficient resources for
adequate inspection and enforcement of these standards. There are also
credible allegations of corruption within the enforcement system. If a
worker has a problem in the workplace and has trouble getting relief
directly from an employer, the worker or union can file a claim with
the regional labor court, although in practice this is frequently a
cumbersome, protracted process.
The law requires employers to establish internal committees for
accident prevention in workplaces. It also protects employee members of
these committees from being fired for their committee activities.
However, such firings do occur, and legal recourse usually requires
years for resolution. While an individual worker does not have the
legal right to depart a workplace when faced with hazardous conditions,
workers may express such concerns to the internal committee, which
would conduct an immediate investigation.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits the transport of
persons for illicit reason within and outside the country; however,
trafficking in persons, including women and children, in, to, and from
the country is a problem.
The Federal Police arrested several suspects in the capital of
Brasilia, and in the states of Goias, Rio de Janeiro, and Ceara,
involved in recruiting women to work as prostitutes in Barcelona and
other parts of Spain. The police also reported that women have been
trafficked to Japan to work as prostitutes. Women sent to Europe and
Israel by trafficking rings reportedly often are denied their liberty
and forced to work under inhumane conditions. Police officials stated
that in most cases women who are recruited by trafficking organizations
understand that they are to work as prostitutes, but that they are lied
to about working conditions and their prospective earnings. In other
cases women were told that they would work as nannies or as household
servants. Women's rights activists in the states of Para and Maranhao
reported that women from these states were recruited actively to work
as prostitutes in The Netherlands or Germany, usually for limited
periods while remaining legally in those countries with tourist visas.
During the first 6 months of the year, police in Spain apprehended 2
Brazilian traffickers and 103 Brazilian victims of trafficking in raids
across that country.
Sexual exploitation of children and child prostitution remained a
significant problem throughout the country. The CECRIA report released
in March indicated that patterns of sexual exploitation of children
correspond to the distinct economic and social profile of the country's
region. In the northern Amazonian region, sexual exploitation of
children centers around brothels that cater to mining settlements. In
the large urban centers, children, principally girls, who leave home
because of abuse or sexual exploitation often prostitute themselves on
the streets in order to survive. In the cities along the northeast
coast, sexual tourism exploiting children is prevalent, and involves
networks of travel agents, hotel workers, taxi drivers, and others who
actively recruit children and even traffic them outside the country.
Child prostitution also is developed in the areas served by the
country's navigable rivers, particularly in ports and at international
borders. In port cities, crews from cargo vessels are a primary
clientele. The report notes that although trafficking develops in part
to meet the demands of foreigners, the local population sustains it.
In October police in Campo Grande, Mato Grosso do Sul state,
arrested three persons accused of running a brothel using girls between
the ages of 13 and 16. Four of the girls were Paraguayan. The owners of
the brothel allegedly seized the girls' documents to impede their
return home and forged new documents to prove that the girls were over
age 18. One of the Paraguayan girls told the police that she was to be
auctioned at the brothel the following weekend.
______
CANADA
Canada is a constitutional monarchy with a federal parliamentary
form of government. Citizens periodically choose their representatives
in free and fair multiparty elections. The judiciary is independent.
Elected civilian officials control the federal, provincial, and
municipal police forces. The armed forces have no role in domestic law
enforcement except in national emergencies. Laws requiring the security
forces to respect human rights are observed strictly, and the courts
punish violators.
Canada has a highly developed, market-based economy. Laws
extensively protect the well-being of workers and provide for workers'
freedom of association.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. The Constitution
and laws provide effective avenues for legal redress of complaints.
Problems include discrimination against aboriginals, the disabled, and
women. There was an increase in anti-Semitic harassment. The Government
continues to take serious steps to address private acts of violence
against women.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
The controversy over the 1995 shooting death of an aboriginal
activist at Ipperwash, Ontario continued. In April a police officer was
found guilty of criminal negligence causing death in the shooting and
was sentenced to 2 years' community service under the supervision of a
parole officer (see Section 5). The officer is appealing that
conviction, while the victim's family is pursuing claims for damages in
the civil courts. Because of the ongoing civil and criminal processes
surrounding the incident, the provincial government has rejected calls
for an inquiry into the shooting. The Federal Government also has
rejected requests for an inquiry. Meanwhile, the Federal Government is
continuing the process of ceding the neighboring military base to
tribal control. As part of the agreement, the Federal Government is to
return lands appropriated in 1942 under the War Measures Act and
provide funds for community development and environmental cleanup.
A controversy arose in March 1998 after a Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP) officer shot and killed a woman and her child on the Tsuu
T'ina reservation. The officer was called to assist a tribal police
officer and a social worker, who had responded to a domestic dispute,
and fired in response to high-powered rifle fire from the woman. The
province of Alberta, where the incident took place, commissioned an
independent investigation by the British Columbia attorney general's
office that was reviewed further by a respected former Alberta judge.
The reviews determined that criminal charges against the officer were
not warranted. A separate judicial inquiry begun in 1998 continued with
the participation of reservation representatives to determine the
causes of the incident and how future incidents could be prevented.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and the Government
observes these prohibitions in practice.
In May 1998, the chief of the armed forces announced an
investigation into credible allegations made by a number of women
serving in the armed forces that, in previous years, they had been
subjected to rape, sexual harassment, and sexual abuse by their
military colleagues. In addition to a special hot line established in
1998, the Minister of Defense in June 1998 established an Ombudsman to
provide a means for conflict resolution for military members and
civilian employees who believe that they have been treated unfairly.
The Advisory Board on Canadian Forces Gender Integration and Employment
Equity was established in November 1998. The Ministry also created a
new military police complaints commission, which came into force on
December 1 and a new armed forces grievance board that is scheduled to
come into effect on March 1, 2000. The office of the Ombudsman reported
in September that one-half of the 604 cases before it had been
resolved.
Toronto police continued a review of procedures following public
complaints about the use of strip searches and body cavity searches in
several routine arrests. The review determined that there were isolated
incidents of unnecessary searches. Toronto police authorities
determined that the policy was still appropriate, but that officers
required additional training in determining when such searches are
appropriate.
An official investigation continued concerning the use by police of
pepper spray to break up demonstrations that blocked the access road to
the November 1997 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference
in Vancouver, (see Section 2.a.). At year's end, a Public Complaints
Commission inquiry continued to explore potential responsibility for
the police action, including the role of senior government officials.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors. During the year,
Ontario made changes to the facilities of the Don jail and improved
inmate services, including its units for religious foods, special
needs, health care, and psychological problems. Inquiries from the
Ontario human rights ombudsman about jail conditions declined from
1998.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes
these prohibitions.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process and vigorously enforces the right to a fair trial.
The court system is divided into federal and provincial courts,
which handle both civil and criminal matters. The highest federal court
is the Supreme Court, which exercises general appellate jurisdiction
and advises on constitutional matters.
The judicial system is based on English common law at the federal
level as well as in most provinces; in the province of Quebec, it is
derived from the Napoleonic Code. Throughout the country, judges are
appointed. In criminal trials, the law provides for a presumption of
innocence and the right to a public trial, to counsel (free for
indigents), and to appeal. The prosecution also can appeal in certain
limited circumstances.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law generally prohibits such practices, government
authorities scrupulously respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in
practice. However, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Government may
limit free speech in the name of goals such as ending discrimination,
ensuring social harmony, or promoting gender equality. The court ruled
that the benefits of limiting hate speech and promoting equality are
sufficient to outweigh the freedom of speech clause in the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.
Journalists occasionally are banned from reporting some specific
details of court cases until a trial is concluded, and these
restrictions, adopted to ensure the defendant's right to a fair trial,
enjoy wide popular support. Some restrictions on the media are imposed
by provincial-level film censorship, broadcasters' voluntary codes
curbing graphic violence, and laws against hate literature and
pornography. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides for free
speech and free press, but both the Criminal Code and human rights
legislation have established limits. Inciting hatred (in certain cases)
or genocide is a criminal offense. The Supreme Court has set a high
threshold for such cases by specifying that these acts must be proven
willful and public. The Broadcasting Act, which prohibits programming
containing any abusive comment that would expose individuals or groups
to hatred or contempt, has not yet been challenged in the courts. The
Human Rights Act also prohibits repeated communications by telephone
that expose a person or group to hatred or contempt. Human rights
groups are exploring the possibility of extending this prohibition to
the Internet, arguing that the Internet should be considered
``telephonic communications'' and therefore covered under the Human
Rights Act. At year's end, the Human Rights Tribunal was examining
whether a specific web site exposed Jews to hatred or contempt on the
basis of their race, religion, or ethnic origin.
In February 1998, the RCMP Complaints Commission announced its
decision to hold a public interest hearing on police behavior while
providing security to the APEC leaders meeting in Vancouver in November
1997. The hearing began in September 1998. RCMP officers used pepper
spray to break up small crowds of protesters who had blocked the only
access road to a meeting site and had torn down a security barricade.
The protesters allege that their right to free speech was infringed by
the RCMP's actions. The protesters also allege that the arrest of one
of their leaders prior to the meeting on charges (which subsequently
were dropped) of temporarily deafening an RCMP officer with a
loudspeaker were a further violation of the arrested individual's
rights under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The investigation
resumed in January after a suspension in November 1998 due to
allegations that the process had become tainted by political
interference from the Solicitor General. At year's end, a specially
appointed commission continues to investigate various aspects of the
incident. These points include whether actions taken by police were
justified by the security risk and whether political considerations
such as direct influence from senior political leaders may have played
a role in determining the level of RCMP response to protestors'
actions. No interim conclusions have been announced by the commission
(see Section 1.c.).
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
In July a one-person Board of Inquiry ruled that it was
discriminatory to require recitation of the Lord's Prayer in Saskatoon
public schools. Saskatchewan joined Canada under the terms of the
Saskatchewan Act, which forms part of the provincial constitution,
permitting prayer and Bible readings. As a result of the ruling, the
Lord's Prayer is not recited in Saskatoon public schools. The Saskatoon
School Board began public hearings on the issue in the fall, but the
Saskatoon Education Department has not filed a legal appeal.
In March the government-mandated Proulx task force submitted a
report on religion in schools to the Quebec National Assembly. Its 14
recommendations include abolishing Catholic and Protestant status for
public schools and creating secular public schools instead with
religion studied from a cultural perspective. Publicly funded support
services would be provided for students of all faiths. School boards
are scheduled to respond to the Quebec government by July 1, 2001.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice. The law provides for the
grant of asylum and refugee status in accordance with the standards of
the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and
extends first asylum. There were no reports of the forced expulsion of
persons with a valid claim to refugee status. Canada is a resettlement
country, and as of September the Government projected granting 40,600
to 41,800 claims for refugee status during the year.
In 1997 almost 1,000 Czech Roma claimed refugee status. The
Government continued to process these claims for refugee status and has
not forcibly deported any of the asylum claimants. During the year, 737
Czech Roma were granted asylum, while 78 were denied it.
During the summer, approximately 600 Chinese arrived illegally by
boat off the coast of British Columbia and sought refugee status. While
most of the persons from the first such boat were released pending
their refugee hearings, only a few of those released appeared for their
hearings. Because the majority of the early refugee claimants who were
released failed to appear for their hearings, a much larger percentage
of refugee claimants from subsequent boats were regarded as risks for
flight and remanded into custody pending their refugee claim hearings.
Many of those in custody have protested their detention, and legal
groups are attempting to force the Government to release all refugee
claimants pending their hearings. Detained refugee claimants have
pressed their demands through civil disobedience and hunger strikes.
During one such event in December, a refugee claimant refused to move
when directed to do so, and eventually guards forcibly removed him. Law
enforcement authorities state that he suffered minor bruises during the
incident; the refugee claimant stated that prison officials beat him
for no reason, and he has initiated a lawsuit. At year's end, the
matter was subject to a formal inquiry.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
A significant body of opinion in the Province of Quebec,
represented by the party that governed the province throughout the
year, continues to maintain that Quebec has the right to withdraw from
the confederation if that decision proves to be the democratically
expressed will of the people of Quebec, and that it is only Quebeckers
who have the right to make this decision. In response to a reference on
the question from the Federal Government, the Supreme Court ruled in
August 1998 that a unilateral declaration of independence by Quebec
would be illegal under Canadian and international law. However, the
Court added that the Federal Government and other provinces would be
obliged to negotiate Quebec's separation in good faith if a clear
majority of Quebeckers voted to separate on the basis of a clearly
phrased question. In December the Government tabled legislation in
Parliament specifying that the Parliament has the right to review any
question posed in a provincial referendum to determine whether the
question is clear and any subsequent majority vote large enough to
obligate the Government to negotiate the terms of succession. The draft
legislation also contains a list of issues that must be negotiated
including debt, assets, liabilities, minority rights, aboriginal
rights, and borders.
Women play a significant role in government and politics, although
they are underrepresented in proportion to their percentage of the
population. In the Parliament, 59 of 301 members in the House of
Commons are women, and 32 of 104 senators are women. Women hold 7 seats
in the 28-person Cabinet. In November a woman was appointed for the
first time as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive
to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides for equal benefits and
protection of the law regardless of race, national or ethnic origin,
color, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability. These
rights generally are respected in practice; however, there are some
charges of discrimination in this multicultural society.
Women.--The law prohibits violence against women, including spousal
abuse, but it remains a problem. According to Statistics Canada, 3 in
10 women currently or previously married or living in a common-law
relationship have experienced at least 1 incident of physical or sexual
violence. The health and economic costs of violence against women have
been estimated to be $2.7 billion (Can $4.2 billion) annually.
The Criminal Code prohibits criminal harassment (stalking) and
makes it punishable by imprisonment for up to 5 years. The law
prohibits sexual harassment, and the Government enforces this
provision.
Women are well represented in the labor force, including business
and the professions. Employment equity laws and regulations cover
federal employees in all but the security and defense services. In June
1998, the Human Rights Tribunal ruled that the Federal Government must
pay back wages to workers in underpaid positions (predominantly female)
under the concept of equal pay for work of equal value. The Government
appealed, based on the methodology used to calculate wages owed, but
lost and agreed to the settlement in October.
Women have marriage and property rights equal to those of men.
Women head over 85 percent of single parent households. Child support
reforms in 1996 and 1997 include: Amendments to the income tax act to
eliminate child support from the custodial parent's taxable income and
the tax deduction available to payers of child support; amendments to
the divorce act to establish fairer and more consistent child support
payments; measures to strengthen enforcement; and an enhanced income
supplement for lower-income families.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. Federal and provincial regulations protect
children from abuse, overwork, and discrimination and penalize
perpetrators of such offenses.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. Changes to the
law in 1997 strengthened tools to combat child prostitution and
prohibited female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health.
In the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's, when Maurice Duplessis was
premier of Quebec, approximately 5,000 to 6,000 children were placed in
orphanages and psychiatric institutions. Many of the 3,000 still alive
claim that they were victims of beatings, electric shock treatment, and
sexual abuse; some were labeled as mentally deficient. In the fall, the
orphans formed a Committee of Sympathizers to seek restitution for the
abuse suffered. On September 15, the head of the Roman Catholic Church
in Quebec denied that any abuse had occurred, but Premier Lucien
Bouchard apologized to the survivors and offered them approximately
$2.25 million (Can $3.3 million) or approximately $683 (Can $1,000)
each. They did not accept. A 1997 Quebec report suggested approximately
$41 to $54.7 million (Can $60 to 80 million) as appropriate
compensation from the Government, the Church, and the medical
establishment.
People with Disabilities.--There is no legal discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
state services. Nevertheless, the Government continues to receive
numerous complaints regarding societal discrimination against disabled
persons and has instituted programs to discourage such discrimination.
Disabled persons are underrepresented in the work force; they make up
2.7 percent of the federally regulated private sector work force, but
those capable of working total 6.5 percent of the population. The law
mandates access to buildings for persons with disabilities, and for the
most part the Government enforces these provisions.
Changes to the Human Rights Act and Criminal Code that came into
force in 1998 require employers and service providers to accommodate
special needs of people with disabilities, provided that it does not
constitute an undue hardship. The Criminal Code now makes the sexual
exploitation of persons with disabilities in situations of dependency a
criminal offense.
In June the province of Alberta announced that it would compensate
the nearly 500 surviving persons who were sterilized without their
consent under a policy aimed at residents of mental institutions. More
than 2,000 Albertans were sterilized between 1928 and 1972 under the
Alberta Sterilization Act, which was repealed in June 1972. By December
21, the Alberta Government had fewer than 20 sterilization claims
outstanding; officials expect all claims to be settled by early 2000.
Indigenous People.--The treatment of aboriginal people continued to
be one of the most important human rights problems facing the country.
Disputes over land claims, self-government, treaty rights, taxation,
duty-free imports, fishing and hunting rights, and alleged harassment
by police continued to be sources of tension on reserves. Aboriginal
people remain underrepresented in the work force, overrepresented on
welfare rolls and in prison populations, and more susceptible to
suicide and poverty than other population groups.
In January 1998, the Federal Government issued its response to the
1996 report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples intended to
restore aboriginal communities and restructure their relationship with
the Federal Government. The Minister of Indian Affairs read an official
``Statement of Reconciliation'' that apologized for past wrongs
committed by the Federal Government. The Aboriginal Action Plan also
includes a commitment of approximately $400 million (Can $600 million)
for aboriginal programs. The program was developed in consultation with
aboriginal political leadership but was criticized by some groups for
not going far enough to ameliorate past rights violations.
Treaty rights for aboriginals are recognized in the Constitution,
and the Government is currently engaged in discussions with aboriginal
groups on various treaty issues. A number of Supreme Court cases,
including cases regarding treaty rights in fishing and residential
school survivors, have bolstered the rights of indigenous people and
made the Federal Government responsible for settling a wide variety of
claims. The Government continued to work at resolving these issues.
The Federal Government is involved in self-government negotiations
with over 350 First Nations. Aboriginal rights in British Columbia
(B.C.) are poorly defined. Until its 1998 agreement with the Nisga'a,
B.C. had not concluded treaties with any of the aboriginal groups that
occupied the area prior to the arrival of settlers, since becoming a
province of Canada in 1871. Many of the province's more than 100
aboriginal groups have outstanding claims for land, self-government,
and other rights. In 1997 the Supreme Court strengthened the legal
position of aboriginal groups in B.C. In what is known as the
Delgamuukw decision, the Court found that the provincial and federal
governments must consult with aboriginal groups on all land use and
resource decisions affecting areas claimed as tribal homelands. This
ruling gave aboriginal groups a significant say in the use of vast
tracts of the province although title to the land never has been
established formally in treaties.
In August 1998, the Federal and British Columbia Governments
concluded a treaty with the Nisga'a people who live in northwestern
B.C. Although the treaty is not considered to be a precedent for the
more than 50 other sets of negotiations underway in B.C., the treaty is
a significant development. The treaty will result in the Nisga'a
receiving control over 765 square miles of tribal lands, a cash
settlement, fishing and timber-cutting rights, and certain rights to
limited self-government. At the same time, the treaty eventually would
end a range of special tax breaks and other benefits available under
the status quo. The treaty was ratified by the Nisga'a people in
November 1998 and by the provincial legislature in the spring. It was
debated and passed by Parliament in December. Debate within the
Parliament was heated on a number of topics, including whether the
Nisga'a should be given rights on the basis of race and the rights of
nonaboriginal people residing on tribal lands. Although the B.C.
legislature ratified the treaty, two groups expressed their intention
to challenge the treaty in court. These legal challenges include one
from a political party that contends that the treaty should have been
submitted to a referendum and one from the Gitanyow, an aboriginal band
located near the Nisga'a, who contend that the treaty awarded more than
85 percent of their traditional tribal lands to the Nisga'a. At year's
end, neither case had made legal progress.
The Stoney reserve west of Calgary gave up control of its finances
to federal Indian Affairs officials in 1997, following widespread
allegations of political corruption, financial mismanagement, sexual
assaults, and abuses connected with social service agencies. At year's
end, control of Stoney reserve finances remains under government
management--in this case by third party managers. Meetings between the
Government and the Stoney nation continue, and another meeting was
scheduled for January 2000. The Stoney reserve is 1 of 12 aboriginal
reserves where federal officials have assumed control as interim
managers.
Quebec's Indian peoples remain overwhelmingly opposed to separation
from Canada and deeply distrust the separatist government of the
province. Despite the Quebec Prime Minister's recent overtures to the
leaders of the Cree and Inuit nations, surveys indicate that most of
Quebec's 60,000 Indians would favor partition of the province in the
event of Quebec's separation from Canada. Indian leaders maintain that
a sovereign Quebec would treat Indians as another ethnic minority
instead of as sovereign nations within the territory of the province.
To address these sentiments and respond to a pending lawsuit, the
Quebec government agreed with the Cree and Mohawk tribes in 1998 to
initiate negotiations regarding longstanding grievances over timber
resources, public rights of way on tribal lands, and management of
development in the James Bay region. In March Quebec gave the Mohawks
increased fiscal rights and powers. The first summit between Quebec's
First Nations and the provincial government in 11 years was held in
June to establish a permanent policy forum to resolve ongoing issues.
During the year, the Government focused on negotiations over a
commission to set up a political entity (Nunavik) for Quebec's Inuit.
The commission, based on an agreement signed November 5, has Inuit,
Quebec, and federal representatives.
In May representatives of the Government of Newfoundland and
Labrador, the Federal Government, and the Labrador Inuit Association
initialed a land claims agreement for the Inuit. The plan provides for
land, water rights, self-government, and an economic development plan
that includes sharing revenues from subsurface developments.
In September the Supreme Court overturned Nova Scotia aboriginal
Donald Marshall's conviction for catching and selling fish eels out of
season and without a license. In doing so, the court ruled that the
18th century treaties between the aboriginals and the British Crown
gave the First Nations rights currently not accommodated by fishery
regulations. The Court ruled that the Federal Government must give
treaty beneficiaries access to the fisheries sufficient to enable them
to earn a moderate livelihood. The Court also found that this right is
subject to regulation and subsequently reemphasized this point in a
separate explanation of its decision. There was some violence against
aboriginals by nonaboriginals, following aboriginal efforts to exercise
their new rights by trapping lobsters in October prior to the normal
season. The Supreme Court's decision to interpret the 18th century
treaties liberally has encouraged aboriginals involved in a number of
court cases seeking access to economic benefits from natural resources
such as logging, mining, and energy.
The Supreme Court's clarification of the Marshall case ruled out
the possibility of aboriginals using the case to gain commercial rights
in the forestry sector. However, test cases now are progressing through
the court systems in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia that involve
aboriginals being tried on charges of illegally harvesting timber on
crown land.
Religious Minorities.--The League for Human Rights of B'nai Brith
in Canada (headquartered in Toronto) reported that there were 240
incidents of anti-Semitic harassment in 1998--a 14 percent increase
from 1997. The League attributed the increase to the movement of hate
groups from big cities to smaller towns for recruiting efforts and
other activities, as police hate crime units crack down in urban areas.
The League continues to express concern over the growth of anti-Semitic
activity on the Internet.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The narrow defeat of the 1995
Quebec sovereignty referendum left unresolved the concerns of French-
speaking Quebeckers about their minority status in Canada, while
sharpening the concerns of English-speaking Quebeckers about their
minority status. The separatist Parti Quebecois provincial government
of Quebec stated that it would hold another sovereignty referendum
onlyunder ``winning conditions.'' The Supreme Court ruled in August
1998 that a unilateral declaration of independence would be illegal,
but that the Federal Government and other provinces would be obligated
to negotiate Quebec's separation if a clear majority of Quebeckers
voted to change their relationship with Canada on the basis of a
clearly phrased referendum question (see Section 3).
Some English-speaking and native groups in Quebec assert the right
to keep parts of Quebec in Canada in the event that Quebec declares
independence. Despite personal meetings and other overtures by Quebec's
Prime Minister to aboriginals and the English-speaking community, both
groups remain distrustful of the separatist government of Quebec. Many
members of these communities fear that their rights would be infringed
by a sovereign Quebec.
The Constitution protects the linguistic and cultural rights of
minorities. Despite Canada's federal policy of bilingualism, English
speakers in Quebec and French speakers in other parts of Canada
generally must live and work in the language of the majority.
A case currently before the Supreme Court is expected to clarify
the number of students required to establish minority-language
education. A finding in favor of the minority-language claimants could
lead to demands for minority-language schools in various parts of the
country.
In Quebec language laws restrict access to English-language,
publicly funded schools through grade 11 to children whose parents were
educated in English in Canada and to short-term residents. Local law
stipulates that French is the working language of most businesses and
must be predominant in bilingual commercial signage.
The English-speaking minority of Quebec, representing 9 percent of
the population of the province and 16 percent of the population of the
city of Montreal, continues to protest restrictions placed on English-
language use. In 1997 the Quebec provincial government reestablished a
French language inspection office that had been abolished in 1993.
However, in October a Quebec court judge struck down a key section of
the province's language law that requires French lettering to be twice
as large as English lettering on commercial signs, stating that French
is no longer in jeopardy in Quebec. The Quebec provincial government is
appealing the decision, and the law remains in force until the courts
issue a final ruling. English speakers also expressed concerns over the
increasing scarceness of health services and public schooling in their
language.
Provinces other than Quebec often lack adequate French-language
schooling, which is of concern to local Francophones, although French-
language schools and French immersion programs are reported to be
thriving in all three prairie provinces.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Except for members of the armed
forces, workers in both the public and private sectors have the right
to associate freely. The Labor Code protects these rights for all
employees under federal jurisdiction, while provincial legislation
protects all other organized workers.
Trade unions are independent of the Government. Of the civilian
labor force, 29.5 percent is unionized.
All workers have the right to strike, except for those in the
public sector who provide essential services. The law prohibits
employer retribution against strikers and union leaders, and the
Government enforces this provision.
Numerous strikes occurred across the country during the year.
Notable strikes included: Calgary Herald employees in Alberta; grain
handlers in Alberta and Manitoba; Cape Breton municipal employees in
Nova Scotia; rotating strikes by doctors in British Columbia; strikes
at nearly all B.C. ports that effectively closed seaports for 10 days;
nurses in Quebec in July; and subway and bus workers in Toronto,
Ontario in April.
Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers in both
the public (except for some police) and the private sectors have the
right to organize and bargaincollectively. While the law protects
collective bargaining, there are limitations, which vary from province
to province, for some public sector workers providing essential
services.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination and requires employers
to reinstate workers fired for union activities. There are effective
mechanisms for resolving complaints and obtaining redress.
All labor unions have full access to mediation, arbitration, and
the judicial system.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor,
including that performed by children, is illegal, and there were no
known violations.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Child labor legislation varies from province to province.
The Federal Government does not employ youths under 17 years of age
while school is in session. Most provinces prohibit children under age
15 or 16 from working without parental consent, at night, or in any
hazardous employment. These prohibitions are enforced effectively
through inspections conducted by the federal and provincial labor
ministries. Education is compulsory through age 15 nationwide.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and enforces
this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Standard work hours vary from
province to province, but in all the limit is 40 or 48 a week, with at
least 24 hours of rest.
Minimum wage rates are set in each province and territory, and
range from $3.59 to $4.93 (Can $5.25 to Can $7.20) per hour. Ontario
and Alberta have a minimum wage rate for youths lower than their
respective minimums for adult workers. A family whose only employed
member earns the minimum wage would be considered below the poverty
line.
Federal law provides safety and health standards for employees
under federal jurisdiction, while provincial and territorial
legislation provides for all other employees. Federal and provincial
labor departments monitor and enforce these standards. Federal,
provincial, and territorial laws protect the right of workers with
``reasonable cause'' to refuse dangerous work.
e. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, the Government prosecutes such offenses as
violations of immigration policies. The Government is conducting a
legislative review of the Immigration Act. There have been several
widely reported cases of smuggling and trafficking, including hundreds
of Chinese who arrived illegally by ship in British Columbia during the
summer (see Section 2.d.).
____
CHILE
Chile is a multiparty democracy with a constitution that provides
for a strong executive and a bicameral legislature. Approved by
referendum in 1980 and amended in 1989, the Constitution was written
under the former military government and establishes institutional
limits on popular rule. President Eduardo Frei, a Christian Democrat,
began his 6-year term in 1994, which expires in March 2000. At that
time, Ricardo Lagos, winner of the January 16, 2000, presidential
runoff election, is to take office. International and domestic
observers found both the December 12 presidential elections and the
subsequent runoff election to be free and fair. The National Congress
consists of 120 deputies and 48 senators. The government coalition of
four major parties controlled the lower house. An opposition coalition,
including several independents and many of the 10 nonelected Senators,
shared control in the upper chamber, although the Senate president was
from the ruling coalition. Former President General Augusto Pinochet
assumed a lifetime Senate seat in March 1998. Turnover in the courts
continued to diminish strongly the influence of military-era appointees
over the constitutionally independent judicial branch.
The armed forces are constitutionally subordinate to the President
through an appointed Minister of Defense but enjoy a large degree of
legal autonomy. Most notably, the President must have the concurrence
of the National Security Council, which consists of military and
civilian officials, to remove service chiefs. The Carabineros (the
uniformed national police) have primary responsibility for public
order, safety, and border security. The civilian Investigations Police
are responsible for criminal investigations and immigration control.
Both organizations--although formally under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Defense, which prepares their budgets--are under
operational control of the Ministry of Interior. The security forces,
mainly the police, committed a number of human rights abuses.
The export-led free-market economy experienced its first setback
after years of expansion. Growth moderated and final figures were
expected to show a contraction of 1.1 percent for the year, with
inflation at 2.3 percent. The most important export remained copper;
salmon, forestry products, fresh fruit, fish meal, and manufactured
goods also were significant sources of foreign exchange. Unemployment
averaged 10.8 percent for the year. From 1987 to 1998, the percentage
of the population living below the poverty line decreased from 45 to 22
percent. Annual per capita gross domestic product was approximately
$4,500.
The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights;
however, problems remained in some areas. The most serious cases
involved killings, torture, brutality, police use of excessive force,
and physical abuse in jails and prisons. The due process rights of
detainees were not always respected. Violence and discrimination
against women and violence against children are problems.
Discrimination against the disabled and minorities persists. Indigenous
people remain marginalized. Child labor is a problem.
Almost all other human rights concerns are related to abuses
committed during the former military government. The bulk of these
abuses occurred between 1973 and 1978, although a number took place
after this period. A July Supreme Court decision expanded the
possibilities for clarifying cases involving persons who disappeared.
The court ruled that lacking legal proof of death, disappearances that
occurred in the 1973-78 period (covered by the Amnesty Law) must be
considered as continuing kidnapings, thus potentially falling outside
the amnesty period. The court's ruling stated that only after the
circumstances surrounding a disappearance are clarified, and the legal
death of the person who disappeared is proven to have fallen within the
1973-78 timeframe, can application of the Amnesty Law be considered.
Nonetheless, military authorities continued to resist a full accounting
of the fate of those who were killed and who disappeared, and some
cases continued to be stifled by the judiciary. There were several
important legal decisions made in regard to high profile investigations
of such past human rights abuses, including the Caravan of Death and
Operation Albania cases.
In October 1998, the United Kingdom detained retired General
Pinochet pending resolution of a Spanish extradition request on charges
of torture, kidnaping, genocide, and murder. A series of court rulings
by the Law Lords denied Pinochet's effort to avoid an extradition
hearing, but limited the charges against him to abuses occurring after
December 8, 1988. Pinochet's extradition hearing began on September 27.
On October 8, a British magistrate determined that Pinochet could be
extradited,but Pinochet appealed this decision. At year's end, legal
maneuvering continued, and Pinochet remained under house arrest in the
United Kingdom.
Nearly 60 human rights cases have been filed in Chile against
Pinochet and are under active investigation. However, some in the human
rights community are skeptical about the possibility of bringing
Pinochet to trial and convicting him of a crime if he were to return.
General Pinochet's continuing detention, along with advances in a
number of human rights cases and the July Supreme Court ruling,
contributed to the continuing societal reexamination and the
intensified public and private discussion of what, if anything, could
and should be done to deal with the sometimes conflicting demands for
truth, for justice, and for national reconciliation. There were renewed
efforts to reach a human rights understanding during the year,
including at a ``dialog table'' organized by Defense Minister Edmundo
Perez Yoma that brought together military officers and human rights
attorneys for the first time since the return to democracy. At year's
end, such discussions continued, and the judicial system continued to
investigate and either prosecute or close pending human rights cases.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings; however, the police killed two persons
during the year.
A police officer allegedly shot and killed University of Tarapaca
student Daniel Menco Prieto in Arica during a May 19 student
demonstration called to protest the size of the government budget
devoted to higher education. The authorities brought charges against
the police officer for the shooting; at year's end, the matter remained
in the legal system.
On September 1, the authorities arrested two San Antonio
Carabineros for their alleged responsibility in the death of Jonathan
Moya Jara. On August 8, Moya's partially clothed and lifeless body had
been found with its head buried in sand. The two Carabineros allegedly
detained Moya illegally, citing a repealed law that allowed the police
to stop, question, and detain persons based upon ``suspicion'' (see
Section 1.d.). At year's end, the case remained in the courts.
The courts sentenced four police officers in February to 10 years
and 1 day in prison for the death of taxi driver Raul Palma Salgado,
who died on January 12, 1998, while in police custody, due to torture.
The four officers are appealing the decision, and the case remained in
the courts at year's end. Palma's family has filed a $1.2 million (600
million pesos) compensation claim against the State. The Committee for
the Defense of People's Rights (CODEPU) identified Palma's death as the
third instance of suspects dying while in police custody due to torture
or excessive force since 1990.
The case of 25-year-old Claudia Alejandra Lopez, a University of
Christian Humanism Academy student shot under unclear circumstances
during 1998 demonstrations in Santiago on the anniversary of the
September 11, 1973 coup, also remained under investigation.
In December 1996, Pedro Soto Tapia, a 19-year-old military
conscript, disappeared from his regiment at San Felipe after having
written letters to his family describing mistreatment at the hands of
superior officers. In March 1997, his remains were found in a cave in
San Felipe, accompanied by what was purportedly a suicide note. On May
26, 1998, the judge handling the case closed the investigation for the
second time, ruling that he had been unable to determine the
circumstances of Soto's death. However, the case was reopened in July
when a witness appeared who claimed to have seen six persons beat Soto
Tapia on his military base on the evening of December 15. Fifteen
former recruits interviewed following the witness's claim were unable
to corroborate it. On November 9, the investigating judge again closed
the case. At year's end, Soto Tapia's family was considering its legal
options (see Section 1.c.).
After having been closed temporarily since 1996, an appeals court
reopened on November 30 the investigation into the September 1989
murder of Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) leader Jecar Nehgme.
Important advances were made in clarifying events surrounding
Operation Albania, the June 1987 killings of 12 Manuel Rodriguez
Patriotic Front (FPMR) members. Judge Hugo Dolmestch reconfirmed in
January charges of use of unnecessary violence against those implicated
in the case, denying a motion to increase the charges to aggravated
homicide. Due to a normal judicial rotation, another jurist, Milton
Juica, replaced Dolmestch in March. On October 29, the authorities
charged retired generals Hugo Salas Wenzel and Humberto Leiva with this
crime. They accused Wenzel, Director of the National Intelligence
Center (CNI) in 1986-88, of being an author of the crime, and Leiva,
CNI Subdirector in 1987, of covering up the incident. At the same time,
the authorities detained six other former CNI agents; one of whom,
Major Emilio Neira, was still on active duty. Judge Juica also
increased the charges against the 10 persons detained earlier from
unnecessary violence leading to death to kidnaping and homicide. On
November 15, the authorities also detained retired Captain Nernan
Miquell for his role in the case. In September the press reported that
unknown persons allegedly linked to the former security services
threatened Rafael Castillo, a prominent investigator for the
Investigations Police. He reportedly also received threats in August
1998 when former CNI agents were charged in the Operation Albania case
(see Section 4).
In November eight former CNI agents, including Alvaro Corbalan,
were charged with the September 1986 murder of journalist Jose
Carrasco. Five of the eight persons charged in this case also have been
named in the Operation Albania investigation. Carrasco's killing took
place 2 days after a failed assassination attempt against General
Pinochet and was widely believed to have been in reprisal for that act.
Efforts by Spanish Judge Baltazar Garzon to have former President
and retired General Pinochet extradited from the United Kingdom to
Spain for his alleged responsibility in the deaths, torture, and
disappearances that took place during the military dictatorship
continued. On January 18, a Law Lords panel convened to rehear
Pinochet's appeal that he enjoyed sovereign immunity and should be
freed immediately from house arrest and allowed to return to Chile. A
November 1998 Law Lords ruling against Pinochet had been set aside in
December of that year following an appeal that one of the deciding
judges had not revealed a potential conflict of interest involving
links with one of the parties supporting the Spanish request.
In a complex decision on March 24, the new Law Lords panel found
that General Pinochet had been arrested in connection with certain
extraditable crimes under British law, did not enjoy sovereign immunity
with respect to the alleged crimes, and that extradition proceedings
could begin. However, the panel also ruled that the extradition request
only could invoke charges of torture and conspiracy to torture related
to incidents after December 8, 1988, the date the United Kingdom
(following both Chile and Spain) ratified the International Convention
Against Torture. This initially limited the charges against Pinochet to
one 1989 case of alleged police torture leading to death and one count
of conspiracy to torture, but Judge Garzon subsequently amplified his
complaint to include many other alleged instances of abuse.
On April 15, the British Home Secretary decided to allow the
extradition process to proceed, and Pinochet's extradition hearing
began on September 27. On October 8, a British magistrate determined
that Pinochet could be extradited; the retired general appealed this
ruling. At year's end, legal maneuvering continued, and Pinochet
remained under house arrest in England.
Investigations in Spain resulted in no new action regarding
Operation Condor, an undercover operation in which several military
governments in the region, led by Chile, cooperated to eliminate
leftist opponents. Judge Garzon and a colleague had collected evidence
and taken testimony regarding human rights violations in Chile and
Argentina during the military dictatorships.
Former Chilean intelligence agent Enrique Arancibia Clavel
continued to be detained in Argentina, charged with involvement in the
1974 car bombing in Buenos Aires that killed former army chief Carlos
Prats and his wife Sofia Cuthbert. The case was reopened in 1992 as a
result of a petition filed by the Prats family containing new evidence;
Arancibia was detained in 1996. In January Arancibia petitioned for his
release based on an Argentine law stating that no one can be held in
preventive detention for more than 2 years. The court rejected
hispetition, stating that the law's release provision was not
automatic; each case had to be reviewed on its own merits.
On April 9, charges against Arancibia were broadened to include
``illicit association;'' the court also reaffirmed the Chilean
Government's right to participate in the trial as a coplaintiff. Upon
issuance of this ruling, attorneys for the Prats family asked that
General Pinochet and several former senior officials of DINA (the army
intelligence branch during the military regime), including retired
generals Manuel Contreras, Pedro Espinoza, Raul Iturriaga Neumann, and
Jose Zara Holger, and civilian Jorge Iturriaga Neumann, also be charged
in the case. (Contreras and Espinoza are serving prison terms for the
1976 killings in the United States of former Foreign Minister Orlando
Letelier and his assistant Ronni Moffitt.)
In mid-May attorneys for those newly implicated--with the exception
of Pinochet who did not have legal representation--asked to have the
statute of limitations invoked. In mid-August the Argentine judge
handling the case, Maria Servini de Cubria, sent an official request to
Pinochet in London asking that he name an attorney for this hearing.
The judge noted that if Pinochet did not name a legal representative,
one would be appointed. Arguing that it wanted to focus its energies on
the actual prosecution of Arancibia, the Chilean Government declined to
take part in this phase of the legal proceedings. In December the judge
ruled that Contreras and Espinoza could be included in the case;
Contreras and Espinoza appealed this ruling. At year's end, decisions
were pending on the other defendants who tried to invoke the statute of
limitations; oral proceedings against Arancibia had yet to begin.
On March 30, a Santiago appeals court ordered the reopening of the
case involving the 1982 death of labor leader Tucapel Jimenez and the
related 1983 homicide of carpenter Juan Alegria Mundalca. Investigating
Judge Sergio Valenzuela Pinto had closed the case on November 6, 1998,
by ruling that there was insufficient evidence to bring anyone to
trial. In reopening the investigation, the appeals court ordered the
detention of 12 persons, including retired General Ramses Arturo
Alvarez Scoglia and several former intelligence officers.
Acting on a petition by the Government's Council for the Defense of
the State, on April 9, the Supreme Court replaced Valenzuela Pinto, who
had been criticized for his handling of the case since taking it on in
1982, with Sergio Munoz Gajardo. In the months that followed, Judge
Munoz charged five other persons; the authorities held two of these
individuals and granted bail to the others. On May 27, the Supreme
Court approved a request by Munoz to send a list of questions to
Pinochet in London seeking clarification of what the retired general
knew about Tucapel Jimenez' death. At year's end, these questions had
not yet been presented to Pinochet.
In mid-September Judge Munoz ordered 2 further high-profile
detentions, bringing the total number of persons charged to 19. He
ordered retired General Humberto Gordon, former CNI director and army
representative on the military junta in 1986-88, and retired Brigadier
Roberto Schmeid, former CNI chief for Santiago, detained on complicity
charges. A September 21 Santiago appeals court ruling reduced the
charges against Gordon to involvement in covering up the crime, but did
not order him released. Two days later, in a split decision, a Supreme
Court panel reinstated the complicity charges. Gordon was released on
bail on November 12; at year's end, 16 of 19 persons implicated in the
crime were free on bail, 2 still were detained and extradition of
another from France was being sought.
The authorities took retired air force Colonel Edgar Ceballos
Jones, who led air force intelligence and the ``joint command'' in the
years following the coup, into custody following a January 25 appeals
court ruling. The court ordered Ceballos detained for his alleged role
in the 1974 death of Alfonso Carreno Diaz and the disappearance the
same year of Jose Luis Baenza Cruces. In June Ceballos filed to have
his case transferred to the military justice system; the Supreme Court
rejected this petition on September 23. Ceballos was released on bail
on October 11; at year's end, legal proceedings were continuing.
The daughter of Carmelo Soria, a Spanish citizen working for the
United Nations who was killed in Santiago on July 14, 1976, appeared
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in March,
charging the State with denial of justice in her father's case due to
an August 23, 1996, amnesty ruling closing the investigation. In 1997
the Soria family rejected a compensation offer from the Government.
On April 19, a Concepcion military court detained five former CNI
agents for the August 23-24, 1984, murders of eight MIR members. In
1997 a military court had closed the case, ruling that the deaths
occurred during an armed confrontation. However, a September 1998
Supreme Court ruling ordered the case reopened.
In a compensation case, a Santiago civil court awarded
approximately $1.2 million (600 million pesos) to the mother of five
MIR members who were killed or who disappeared between 1974 and 1976.
The compensation was awarded for ``moral damages.'' At year's end, the
Government was considering whether to appeal.
In early October, Italy requested the extradition of retired
General Manuel Contreras for his role in the attempted killing of
Bernardo Leighton. Along with another Chilean, Contreras was convicted
of the crime in absentia in Rome in 1995 and sentenced to 20 years in
prison. On December 1, Judge Juan Guzman charged Contreras, along with
former officers Marcelo Moren Brito and Armando Fernandez Larios, with
the October 1974 disappearance of Communist Party member David
Silberman Gurovich. The law precludes the extradition of any person
being processed for a local crime, although the Italian request
remained pending at year's end.
While most allegations of human rights abuses are directed at now-
retired officers, some alleged perpetrators remain on active duty. For
example, Army General Sergio Espinoza Davies, who commanded the U.N.
Observer Mission along the India-Pakistan border, was accused of being
involved in an October 1973 ``war council'' that sentenced five
socialists to death without due process. Following the U.N.'s
announcement that it would investigate the charges against him, the
Government consulted with the United Nations. The issue became moot
when General Espinoza Davies, promoted to Army Inspector General,
returned to the country in December 1998.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
The major human rights controversy involved past disappearances and
efforts by political factions and the judiciary to interpret the 1978
Amnesty Law in such a way as to achieve truth, justice, and national
reconciliation. As interpreted under the so-called Aylwin doctrine
(named after former President Patricio Aylwin), the courts should not
close a case involving a disappearance until either the body is found
or credible evidence is provided to indicate that an individual is
dead. A version of this doctrine began to take hold in the court
system, but its application was uneven, and some courts continued the
previous practice of applying the 1978 Amnesty Law to disappearances
without conducting an investigation to locate the missing person's
remains or identify the perpetrators. Of the 1,289 individuals who
disappeared under the military regime, the remains of 244 have been
found and identified; over 1,000 have yet to be found.
The agency in charge of the compensation program for the families
of those executed or who disappeared reported in mid-June that since
1992 the State had provided over $95 million in benefits. Survivor
benefits include pensions, educational subsidies, and other assistance.
In December 1998, a Supreme Court panel overruled a 1997
application of the Amnesty Law to the August 1974 disappearance of
Alvaro Miguel Barrios Duche. The Supreme Court ruled that the law only
could be applied following the completion of a full criminal
investigation and the identification of the guilty parties; it ordered
the military court to begin an investigation. This doctrine remains
controversial, and jurisprudence in this area was unsettled at year's
end.
On June 9, Investigating Judge Guzman ordered the detention of
retired General Sergio Arrellano Stark, who led the September-October
1973 Caravan of Death responsible for at least 72 killings. Guzman also
ordered the detention of former military officers Sergio Arredondo,
Marcelo Moreno, Patricio Diaz, and Pedro Espinoza (already in jail for
the Letelier-Moffitt murders). In December Judge Guzman granted
Arellano's bail request subject to appeals court approval. The appeals
court rejected Arellano's request for bail, and at year's end Arellano
was considering his legal options. Guzman charged the 5 men with
aggravated kidnaping in the disappearances of 19 persons. In July the
Supreme Court refused to dismiss the case against the former officers.
In ordering Arellano and the four others detained, Guzman resorted
to controversial interpretations of the Amnesty Law and kidnaping
statutes. The judge ruled that since the death of those 19 persons who
disappeared during the Caravan had not been proven legally, the
kidnapings must be presumed to continue and, therefore, the crime may
fall beyond the period covered by the amnesty. Consistent with this
interpretation, a proven 1973-78 death falls under the Amnesty Law;
Guzman granted amnesty to five other former officers involved in the
Caravan on these grounds.
A July Supreme Court ruling on a habeas corpus petition brought by
the detained former officers explicitly supported Guzman's detention of
the five on aggravated kidnaping charges and noted that the
investigation into the disappearances had to be exhausted prior to the
consideration of a grant of amnesty. In August family members of those
executed or who disappeared during the Caravan period petitioned the
Santiago appeals court to raise the charges against those detained to
homicide and to revoke the amnesty granted to the five other former
officers. On August 26, the appeals court declined to increase the
charges against the five detained officers and declined to charge those
not detained with homicide. In making its determination on the five
persons who were not detained, the court ruled that there was
insufficient evidence of their involvement in the murders; it did not
reaffirm the amnesty decree.
The court further ordered that Armando Fernandez Larios, one of the
five former officers granted amnesty by Judge Guzman, be charged with
aggravated kidnaping and that his extradition be sought. In March the
family of Winston Cabello Bravo, 1 of 16 persons executed in Copiapo in
October 1973 during the Caravan of Death, filed a civil suit in a
foreign country for damages against Fernandez. As of year's end, an
extradition request for Fernandez had not yet been presented.
On October 5, Judge Guzman asked the Supreme Court to send a list
of questions to General Pinochet in London seeking information on what
he knew about the Caravan of Death, the structure of the DINA, and
other human rights matters. On November 3, Guzman announced that
Pinochet's response, received a day earlier, did not directly answer
the questions. Instead, Pinochet sent back a short note stating that
his detention in the United Kingdom prevented his access to the
material necessary to respond to the questions.
On May 25, the authorities detained former DINA agent Basclay
Zapata (also known as ``El Troglo'') for his alleged involvement in the
May 1974 disappearance of two MIR members. On June 3, the Supreme Court
rejected an appeal by Zapata to be released; he remained under arrest
at year's end.
The Vicariate of Solidarity Document and Archive Foundation
reported that in the first half of 1999, courts revoked three prior
amnesty rulings. An amnesty ruling was overturned in another instance,
but the case was closed temporarily due to lack of evidence. Several
other previous cases in which amnesty was granted are being appealed.
Prior to 1998, the Supreme Court sometimes had ruled that when
judges receive criminal complaints related to actions by armed services
members in the period covered by the amnesty (September 11, 1973 to
March 10, 1978), they were required to close the case immediately
without further investigation. Court rulings in 1998 and 1999 called
this determination into question, without completely ruling out the
possibility that cases could be closed.
Military courts, in particular, continued to be prone to close
cases. Nonetheless, on January 18 the highest military court revoked a
lower military court amnesty ruling in the illegal arrest case of
Arsenio Poupin, declaring that the perpetrators of the crime had not
been identified. Vice Minister of Government at the time of the coup,
Poupin was arrested in La Moneda on September 11, 1973 and later
disappeared. While the military court did order the case temporarily
closed due to lack of evidence, the finding leaves open the possibility
of a future reopening.
In September 1998, the Supreme Court revoked an amnesty granted by
a lower court covering the 1974 disappearance of MIR member Pedro
Enrique Poblete Cordoba on the basis that the Geneva Convention (on
internal conflicts) was applicable. This is the only Supreme Court or
appeals court ruling that has interpreted the Geneva Convention as
applicable to the military era, overriding the Amnesty Decree.
In a subsequent 1998 case similar to Poblete's, the Supreme Court
declined to invoke the Geneva Convention. An August Santiago appeals
court panel also declined to address the Geneva Convention issue in a
Caravan of Death ruling, despite the plaintiffs' arguments that the
convention should be invoked.
The Social Aid Foundation of Christian Churches (FASIC), the
CODEPU, and other human rights organizations have several denial-of-
justice cases pending before the IACHR regarding previously closed
disappearance and execution cases. Denial of justice cases based on
application of the Amnesty Law also have been filed with the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). The most recent of these
was filed in April, alleging that justice had been denied in the
disappearance case of Eduardo Paredes Barrientos, an adviser to deposed
President Salvador Allende and once head of the Investigations Police.
An August 1998 Supreme Court ruling had upheld a previous amnesty
finding in Paredes' case.
In 1998 France joined Spain in seeking the extradition of General
Pinochet from the United Kingdom, based on the disappearance of three
French citizens in 1973-77. Switzerland and Belgium also filed
extradition requests for Pinochet in 1998.
Investigations of military-era detentions and disappearances of
persons at Colonia Dignidad (renamed ``Villa Baviera''), a secretive
German-speaking settlement 240 miles south of Santiago, led to an April
28 detention order issued by Judge Guzman against Paul Schaefer for the
kidnaping and disappearance of Alvaro Vallejos. Schaefer, already
wanted by the authorities on other charges, remained a fugitive at
year's end. The 34,000-acre enclave, inhabited by 350 persons, was
founded by the 78-year-old Schaefer, who immigrated from Germany in
1961 with 300 followers.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids the use of illegal pressure on
detainees; however, the CODEPU has received reports of abuse and
mistreatment by both the National Police and the Investigations Police.
When requested by other human rights organizations or family members,
CODEPU lawyers visit detainees during the interrogation (see Section
1.d.) and represent some suspected terrorists in court. The CODEPU
continues to investigate alleged use of excessive force against
detainees. The Minister of Interior asks the courts to conduct
independent investigations of credible complaints of police abuse, but
such investigations often do not result in arrests, due in part to the
reluctance of judges to pursue the issue vigorously.
The Human Rights Office of the Metropolitan Legal Aid Office, an
arm of the Justice Ministry, released a report in March noting that it
had attended 815 persons in 1998, twice the number seen the previous
year. The report further stated that the Legal Aid Office presented 70
cases to civilian or military courts in 1998; 42 cases were filed in
1997. Of the more recent cases, 48 were lodged against National Police
officers for abuses, while 7 cases involved the Investigations Police,
and 6 involved military personnel. The remainder involved various
government civilian authorities and private security guards.
In July 1998, a new law entered into effect that clarified the
illegality of any use of force against persons detained by the police.
The law provides that if a member of the police force uses torture or
unlawful coercion, either physical or mental, or orders them to be
applied, or uses them against a person under arrest or detention, the
officer would be sentenced to imprisonment. Officers who know about the
abuse and have the necessary power and authority to prevent or stop it
also would be considered accessories to the crime if they fail to do so
(see Section 1.d.).
Human rights groups continue to claim that military recruits
sometimes are mistreated. The Commission on Juvenile Rights (CODEJU), a
nongovernmental organization (NGO) claimed on November 5 that it had
received 380 complaints of recruit mistreatment in the previous 5
years. This statement followed the October 29 departure from an Iquique
military base of recruits Leonardo Guerra Leandro and Mario Jesus
Basaubre. Once home Guerra claimed that he was mistreated on the base;
Basaubre committed suicide at home on October 30. In response, the army
announced that its preliminary investigation backed the recruits'
claims of mistreatment and promised to take administrative and
disciplinary action against those allegedly involved. The army also
referred the matter to the local military prosecutor. The recruits'
families filed a criminalcomplaint charging the base's second in
command and two other soldiers with responsibility for the
mistreatment. The army stated Basaubre's suicide was the third by a
soldier during the year; there was one suicide in the ranks in 1998,
five suicides in 1997, and six in 1996.
On November 9, the investigating judge again closed the case of
Pedro Soto Tapia, a 19-year-old military conscript who alleged
mistreatment in 1996 and whose remains were found in March 1997. At
year's end, Soto Tapia's family was considering its legal options (see
Section 1.a.).
There was no new information available on the case involving 14
military conscripts who were reportedly beaten during a military
exercise in 1998. One corporal involved in the incident was removed
from the military and was awaiting trial at the end of 1998.
At year's end, the court of appeals had not yet ruled on the August
1997 filing by attorneys for Carmen Gloria Quintana that appealed
efforts by the Government to set aside a compensation award of
approximately $600,000 that the IACHR had recommended for Quintana in
1988. Army captain Pedro Fernandez Dittus set fire to Quintana and her
companion Rodrigo Rojas Denegri while they were participating in a
protest against the military regime in 1986. Rojas died 4 days later,
while Quintana survived with severe and disfiguring injuries.
In September a press report indicated that unknown persons
threatened Rafael Castillo, a prominent investigator for the
Investigations Police on Operation Albania, as well as the Letelier,
Prat, and Leighton killings.
Prisons are often overcrowded and antiquated, but conditions are
not life threatening. Food meets minimum nutritional needs, and
prisoners may supplement the diet by buying food. Those with sufficient
funds often can rent space in a better wing of the prison. Prison
guards have been accused of using excessive force to stop attempted
prison breaks. Although most reports state that the guards generally
behave responsibly and do not mistreat prisoners, several prisoners
have complained of beatings. There were 422 minors in adult prisons,
according to 1998 figures (see Section 5).
The maximum security prison housed 56 inmates until early February,
most of them charged with, or convicted of, terrorism. In February
these prisoners were transferred to other penitentiaries while repairs
were done to the facility and security measures upgraded. The prisoners
complained that they were beaten and abused during the move; the
Government denied this, but admitted that prisoners were handcuffed and
that tear gas was used. On June 6, a Santiago appeals court, while
recognizing that the inmates did not cooperate with the transfer, ruled
that prison guards used excessive force. The court ordered prison
authorities to abstain from using such force in the future. Prison
authorities appealed the finding to the Supreme Court.
On March 29, 44 prisoners were returned to the maximum security
prison; the other 12 remained in different penitentiaries. These
prisoners continue to complain that strict security measures,
restriction of visitors, hidden cameras, and rigid regulations violate
their rights. In 1997 the Ministry of Justice confirmed that there were
listening devices in prison cells but asserted that they were never
used.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The authorities
generally respect constitutional provisions for arrest and detention;
however, detainees are not always advised promptly of charges against
them, nor granted a speedy hearing before a judge. The Constitution
allows civilian and military courts to order detention for up to 5 days
without arraignment and to extend the detention of alleged terrorists
for up to 10 days. The law affords detainees 30 minutes of immediate
and subsequent daily access to a lawyer (in the presence of a prison
guard) and to a doctor to verify their physical condition. The law does
not permit a judge to deny such access; police authorities generally
observe these requirements.
In practice many detainees are not promptly advised of charges
against them and are not granted a timely hearing before a judge. At
the end of 1998, 7 percent of the general prison population of 26,449
was under investigation but not charged with a crime; 44 percent were
charged with an offense and wereawaiting trial or had been convicted
and were awaiting sentencing; and 49 percent were serving sentences.
In July 1998, a new law entered into force that eliminated the
right of the police to stop persons, demand identification, and arrest
them based on suspicion that they may have committed a crime. (This
right to arrest persons on suspicion often was used against minors.)
The new law also requires police to inform those detained of their
rights and to expedite notification of the detention to family members.
The law also deals with physical abuse by police against detained
persons (see Section 1.c.). A case filed in July 1998 involving the new
law remains in the courts.
On September 1, the authorities arrested two San Antonio
Carabineros for their alleged responsibility in the death of Jonathan
Moya Jara; prior to his death, the two policemen allegedly detained
Moya illegally, citing the repealed Suspicion Law (see Section 1.a.).
The Constitution provides for the right to legal counsel, but this
is a reality primarily for those who can afford to pay. The poor, who
account for the majority of cases, may be represented by law students
doing practical training (who often are overworked), on occasion by a
court-appointed lawyer, or by a lawyer from the Government's legal
assistance corporation. The Constitution allows judges to set bail.
There were no cases of forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution calls for a
judicial system independent of the other branches of government;
however, while the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, has
been dominated in the past by appointees of the former military regime,
turnover in the courts has led to a significant diminution of that
influence.
Cases decided in the lower courts can be referred to appeals courts
and ultimately to the Supreme Court. Criminal court judges are
appointed for life. In December 1997, constitutional reforms were
approved that set 75 as the age limit for Supreme Court justices, gave
the Senate the power to approve presidential nominees to the Court, and
increased the Court's membership from 17 to 21. Of the 21 justices on
the Supreme Court, only 3 were appointed under the military regime. The
Supreme Court prepares lists of nominees for vacancies on the Supreme
Court and appeals courts, from which the President makes nominations.
The Supreme Court continues to work with the other branches of
government on broad judicial reform.
The jurisdiction of military tribunals is limited to cases
involving military personnel. If formal charges are filed in civilian
courts against a member of the military, including the National Police,
the military prosecutor asks for, and the Supreme Court often grants,
military jurisdiction. This is of particular consequence in the human
rights cases from the period covered by the 1978 Amnesty Law. In
addition, military courts have the authority to charge and try
civilians for defamation of military personnel and for sedition.
Rulings by military tribunals can be appealed to the Supreme Court. The
army's Auditor General, Fernando Torres Silva, who was appointed during
the military regime, was replaced in April. Human rights groups had
accused Torres Silva of actively opposing investigations into cases
involving alleged abuses under the military regime.
In September 1997, President Frei signed a judicial reform law that
created the post of Attorney General and a related ministry that is
expected to be in full operation by 2003. Congress passed enabling
legislation for the Ministry in September, and the President signed it
into law on October 8. On November 17, the Senate confirmed Guillermo
Piedrabuena to a 10-year term as the first Attorney General. The
judicial reform law provides that national and regional prosecutors
investigate crimes and formulate charges, leaving judges and
magistrates the narrower function of judging the merits of evidence
presented to them. The Government has designated two regions to begin
gradual implementation of the reform. Training and administrative
preparations began during the year, with the first oral trials expected
in December 2000.
Based on the Napoleonic Code, the criminal justice system does not
provide for trial by jury, nor does it assume innocence until proven
otherwise. Criminal proceedings are inquisitorial rather than
adversarial. The Constitution provides for the right to legal counsel,
but the poor do not always get effective legal representation (see
Section 1.d.).
There were no reports of political prisoners, although the inmates
in Santiago's maximum security prison who have been convicted of
terrorist acts routinely claim to be political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanctions. A 1995 privacy law bars obtaining
information by undisclosed recording, telephone intercepts, and other
surreptitious means, as well as the dissemination of such information,
except by judicial order in narcotics-related cases.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights. The press maintains its independence, criticizes
the Government, and covers issues sensitive to the military, including
human rights. However, investigative journalism is still a rarity.
Two major media groups control most of the print media, which are
largely independent of the Government. The State is the majority owner
of La Nacion newspaper, but it is editorially independent. A new
privately owned Santiago-area daily, El Metropolitano, began publishing
in May.
The electronic media also are largely independent of government
control. The Television Nacional network is state-owned but not under
direct government control. It receives no government subsidy and is
self-financing through commercial advertising. It is editorially
independent and is governed by a board of directors appointed by the
Senate. Members reflect various political viewpoints, and the board
encourages the expression of varied opinions over the network.
Under the State Security Law of 1958, it is a criminal offense to
besmirch the honor of state institutions and symbols, such as the
Congress, the Supreme Court, the military services, the flag, and the
President. Military courts have the authority to charge and try
civilians for defamation of military personnel and for sedition, but
their rulings can be appealed to the Supreme Court. Human Rights Watch
has criticized these restrictions on freedom of expression and
information, as has the OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression; he visited the country in June and called for changes to
the law.
In 1996 Congress passed a privacy law that set penalties for those
who infringe on the private and public lives of individuals and their
families. At the time of the law's passage, journalists argued
vigorously that applying it to media reporting would have a chilling
effect on freedom of the press. As yet this privacy law has not been
applied to the media. There have been unsuccessful attempts to
incorporate language and penalties similar to those in the privacy law
into a draft press law.
On January 21, 1998, the authorities jailed two journalists in a
libel case brought against them by Supreme Court Justice Servando
Jordan under provisions of the State Security Law. They were released
on bail the following morning. Although a lower court rejected the
charges against the two journalists and an appeals court reaffirmed
this decision in June, on September 16, 1998, another appeals court
reinstated the case. The two journalists spent the night of September
16 in jail before being released on bail. The case remained in the
legal system until June 29, when the judge investigating the case
absolved the two journalists. A Santiago appeals court confirmed this
ruling on September 8. Jordan appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court
and the case was under review at year's end.
On April 13, the ``Black Book of Chilean Justice,'' by Alejandra
Matus, went on sale in Santiago. On April 14, Supreme Court Justice
Jordan, who was mentioned negatively in the book, filed charges against
Matus under the State Security Law and asked to have all copies of the
volume seized. Responding to Jordan's suit, a Santiago appeals court
judge ordered all copies of the book seized from the publisher,
Editorial Planeta, and from book stores. After seizure of the book, the
La Tercera newspaper and the Planeta publishing house each placed the
prohibited text on the Internet, using foreign servers. The book also
was published in Argentina. On May 14, the Supreme Court declinedto
order release of the seized volumes while Jordan's complaint continued
in lower courts.
After becoming aware of the lawsuit, Matus left the country. The
charges against her, and seizure of the book, were widely criticized.
The President called on the legislature to modify the State Security
Law to ensure freedom of expression and, on October 7, the Chamber of
Deputies approved modifications in the law; at year's end action still
was pending in the Senate. In early October, Matus presented her case
before the IACHR.
On June 16, Editorial Planeta general manager Bartolo Ortiz and
chief editor Carlos Orellana were detained for their role in publishing
Matus' book. They were released on bail 2 days later. The OAS Special
Rapporteur criticized their detention and the seizure of Matus' book
during his June visit. On July 30, a Santiago appeals court dismissed
the case against Ortiz and Orellana. On September 16, the Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court decision, rejecting a petition from Jordan to
overturn the appeals court finding.
The 1980 Constitution established a Film Classification Council
(CCC) with the power of prior censorship. The council has banned over
50 films and approximately 700 videos. Local and foreign film
distributors regard the CCC's screening process as insufficiently
transparent. The Lawyers Association for Public Liberties petitioned
the IACHR to object to censorship of the film ``The Last Temptation of
Christ;'' the Commission ruled against the Government and the case is
now before the Inter-American Court.
The National Television Council (CNT), created by legislation in
1989 and supported with government funding, is charged with assuring
that television programming ``respects the moral and cultural values of
the nation.'' The CNT's principal role is to regulate violence and
sexual content in both broadcast and cable television programming.
Films and other programs judged by the CNT to be excessively violent or
to have obscene language or sexually explicit scenes can be shown only
after 10 p.m. when ``family viewing hours'' end. In practice, the ever-
increasing volume of programming makes the CNT's job all but
impossible. The CNT issues occasional warnings to networks and cable
service providers and sometimes obliges them to postpone the showing of
certain films until after 10 p.m. It also occasionally levies fines. In
July the CNT fined the La Red television station for ``harming the
dignity'' of a municipal employee during a news spot. Debate continues
over the CNT's role.
The courts can prohibit media coverage of legal cases in progress
but do so rarely. Courts issued two gag orders involving criminal cases
in 1998, but both were overturned on appeal. On January 8, journalist
Paula Afani was detained for 6 hours for failing to reveal her sources
in a criminal case, but the arrest order was overturned quickly.
The press has begun using foreign Internet web sites to publish
articles when gag orders are issued.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom. In May students
demonstrated to protest the size of the Government's budget allocation
for higher education; a police officer allegedly killed one student
protester (see Section 1.a.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this
right in practice.
As is traditional in the month of September, a number of
demonstrations took place related to the anniversary of the 1973 coup,
among other issues. In an early September student demonstration near
the University of Arcis, a Carbinero was burned badly by a Molotov
cocktail allegedly thrown by an 18-year-old student who was later taken
into custody. On September 22, a court dismissed charges against the
student on grounds of insufficient evidence.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. All
denominations practice their faiths without restriction. Church and
state are officially separate; however, the Roman Catholic Church
receives official preferential treatment.
Many of the approximately 2 million Protestants, who represent
about 12 percent of the population, assert that the Government
discriminates against them, based upon differing legal status afforded
to non-Catholics. They cite the absence of Protestant armed forces
chaplains, difficulties for pastors to visit military hospitals, and
the predominantly Catholic religious education given in public schools.
To remedy this situation, the lower house of Congress unanimously
approved a bill to afford greater legal equality among all churches
late in 1997. The Senate approved an amended version of the bill in
July, and it entered into force in October. The new law allows other
religious bodies to have a status that provides that a church cannot
lose its juridical status administratively; for the Catholic Church,
the law reaffirms that it cannot have its status questioned at all.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice. For
minor children to leave the country, either alone or with only one of
their parents, they must have notarized permission from the
nonaccompanying parent(s).
The law includes provisions for granting refugee and asylee status
in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government
cooperates with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The issue
of provision of first asylum has not arisen.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
Chile is a constitutional democracy, and citizens have the right to
change their government through periodic elections. There is universal
suffrage for citizens 18 years of age and over. Free and fair
presidential elections were held on December 12, with a runoff on
January 16, 2000.
The Government still operates under some political restraints that
were imposed by the military regime. Under the 1980 Constitution,
various national institutions--including the President, the Supreme
Court, and the National Security Council (the latter acting in part on
nominations by the armed forces)--appoint an additional nine senators
(beyond those elected) to 8-year terms. Nine newly appointed
institutional senators took their seats in March 1998 along with former
President Pinochet, who became a senator-for-life. (Upon leaving office
in March 2000, President Frei becomes eligible for a seat as a senator-
for-life.) The legislative branch, with the exception of the
institutional senators, is elected freely and is independent from the
executive branch.
The former military government wrote the 1980 Constitution and
amended it slightly in 1989 after losing a referendum on whether
General Pinochet should stay in office as president. The Constitution
provides for a strong presidency and a legislative branch with limited
powers. In addition, it includes provisions designed to protect the
interests of the military and the conservative political opposition.
These provisions include limitations on the President's right to remove
military service chiefs (including the chief of the army); an electoral
system that gives the second-place party (or coalition) in each
district disproportionate representation in Congress; and the provision
for nonelected institutional senators. The Government has called for
modification of these provisions, which it views as ``authoritarian
enclaves'' left over from the previous regime; the opposition has
pledged to fight to retain what it views as important checks and
balances in the system of government; however, during the year the
opposition indicated a willingness to consider some changes.
Women have had the right to vote in municipal elections since 1934,
in national elections since 1949, and are active in political life at
the grassroots level. Women make up a majority of registered voters and
of those who actually cast ballots; however, they are underrepresented
in government and politics. There were 13 women among the 120 deputies,
2 in the 48-seat Senate, and 2 among the 20 cabinet ministers. No women
serve among the 21 Supreme Court justices. The level of female
participation in government is not increasing markedly.
The approximately 1 million indigenous people have the legal right
to participate freely in the political process, although relatively few
are active politically. One member of Congress is of indigenous
descent.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Several nongovernmental human rights organizations are active. The
Chilean Human Rights Commission, an NGO, is affiliated with the
International League of Human Rights. The FASIC is also very active on
the full range of human rights issues. The CODEPU provides legal
counsel to some claiming that they are being accused of politically
related crimes and to victims of human rights abuses. Domestic NGO's
state that the Government cooperates with their efforts to investigate
accusations of human rights violations. Many international NGO's follow
local human rights issues closely.
During the year threats occasionally were made against human rights
activists. The Government provided protection as appropriate and none
of the threats was carried out. On November 4, burglars entered the
CODEPU's offices and stole computers and printers.
In September a press report indicated that unknown persons
threatened Rafael Castillo, who had in the past investigated human
rights abuses associated with Operation Albania, as well as the
Letelier, Prat, and Leighton killings for the Investigations Police.
The unconfirmed report indicated that he also received threats in
August 1998 when former CNI agents were charged in the Operation
Albania case.
In May 1998, President Frei advocated the creation of a ``national
defender of citizens,'' a state body that would receive complaints
about abusive government acts; however, the executive branch had not
forwarded legislation to Congress to create this entity by year's end.
In April the UNCHR issued a report that criticized the Amnesty Law,
the existence of nonelected senate members, and the lack of a divorce
law. The Government cooperated with the Commission's work, providing a
submission to the group expressing its views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equality before the law, but it does
not ban specifically discrimination based on race, sex, religion, or
social status.
Women.--The most serious violations of women's rights involved
sexual and domestic violence. The public is becoming increasingly aware
of the extent of physical abuse of women. The National Women's Service
(SERNAM), created in 1991 to combat discrimination against women, found
in a 1996 study of more than 12,000 reports of domestic violence that 3
years after the Law on Intrafamily Violence went into effect, only 1 in
5 accusations resulted in judicial action. The study indicated that
spouses or domestic partners were responsible for 88 percent of family
violence, and that 63 percent of the reports involved physical attacks.
It showed that in nearly three-quarters of reported cases of domestic
violence, the accusation led to a positive change in the domestic
situation regardless of the judicial outcome. The SERNAM also conducted
courses on the legal, medical, and psychological aspects of domestic
violence for police officers and judicial and municipal authorities.
The courts may order counseling for those involved in intrafamily
violence. In 1997 there were approximately 61,000 reports of domestic
violence. The Citizens' Peace Foundation indicated that there were 993
cases of rape reported to the police in 1997, and 1,052 in 1998. It is
believed that a majority of rape cases go unreported. On July 2, a new
law took effect that increased the penalties for sexual abuse. The
legislation includes clauses to facilitate proof of the crime and
protect the privacy and safety of the woman making the charge. The new
law also overturned 100-year-old legislation that permitted a man
charged with rape to be released if he asked the victim to marry him
and she accepted.
The Constitution was amended on June 16 to emphasize the principle
of equality between men and women and now states that ``persons are
born free and equal in their dignity and rights'' (rather than using
the generic term ``men'').
Nonetheless, legal distinctions between the sexes still exist. The
law permits legal separation but not divorce, so those who wish to
remarry must seek annulments. Since annulment implies that a marriage
never existed under the law, former spouses are left with little
recourse for financial support. Although a recent law created conjugal
property as an option in a marriage, some women saw this as a step
backward, since the law on separate property (which still exists) gives
women the right to one-half their husbands' assets but gives husbands
no rights to assets of a wife. Despite heavy opposition from the
Catholic Church, the Chamber of Deputies approved a divorce bill in
September 1997; the bill still is awaiting Senate action.
Another SERNAM study in 1997 found that the average earnings of
female heads of household are only 71 percent of those of male heads of
household. Women with no schooling averaged a salary that was 87
percent of their male counterparts without schooling, while female
heads of household with university training averaged only 57 percent as
much as their male counterparts. The SERNAM has a pilot program that
provides occupational training and child care in an effort to alleviate
this disparity. The Labor Code provides benefits for pregnant workers
and recent mothers. Employers do not have the right to ask women to
take pregnancy tests prior to hiring them; legislation prohibiting this
practice took effect in November 1998.
Children.--The Government provides free education through high
school; education is compulsory from first through eighth grade.
Violence against children is a problem. A mid-year report by the
National Minors Service (SENAME) noted that it had handled the cases of
5,453 mistreated children through June; 583 of these cases were judged
severe enough to be presented to legal authorities. The SENAME reported
that cases of abuse brought to its attention totaled 9,723 in 1998 and
7,676 in 1997. In October the SENAME reported that 22 percent of child
abuse cases brought to court were dismissed without investigation;
SENAME stated that this was a large improvement over the 90 percent
figure prevalent in the 1980's. A 1996 SENAME survey indicated that
sexual abuse of minors occurs, but that few cases are reported. A
report from the La Morada Corporation for Women released in May
estimated that there are 20,000 cases of sexual abuse of children every
year. Of such cases, only 10 percent go to trial and only 3 percent
result in the accused receiving a sentence.
A 1996 U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) report stated that 34 percent
of children under 12 years of age experience serious physical violence,
although only 3.2 percent of the victims of intrafamily violence
reported to the national police family affairs unit were below the age
of 18. A 1994 Law on Intrafamily Violence was designed in part to deal
with this problem. According to UNICEF, some form of corporal
punishment is used by one or both parents in 62 percent of households.
UNICEF estimated that approximately 107,000 children between the ages
of 12 and 19 are in the work force. The Catholic Church's study
estimated that some 50,000 children under age 15 are working (see
Section 6.d.).
Investigations of child abuse at Colonia Dignidad, the secretive
German-speaking settlement 240 miles south of Santiago founded in 1961
by Paul Schaefer continued. Police conducted several unsuccessful
searches throughout the year for the 78-year-old Schaefer. In August
the authorities detained six persons, following the July appearance of
a minor missing for 2 years who last had been seen at the Colonia and
was feared to have been sexually abused by Schaefer. They released one
of these persons on September 16, after a Supreme Court decision that
he had not been involved in the crime; another received bail on October
11. Two persons, including the child's father and a former CNI agent,
had been detained earlier in the disappearance.
A joint SENAME-UNICEF study in 1995 estimated that there were 4,200
child prostitutes between the ages of 6 and 18 in the country. UNICEF
estimated in June that this figure had grown to roughly 10,000.
By law, juvenile offenders (i.e., those under the age of 18) are
segregated from adult prisoners. The Government had reduced the number
of minors in adult prisons from 6,630 in 1992 to 346 in 1997, although
this figure reached 422 by the end of 1998.
Congress approved a law in September 1998, which took effect in
late 1999, that gives illegitimate children the same legalrights (e.g.,
of inheritance) as those enjoyed by children born to a married couple.
People with Disabilities.--Congress passed a law in 1994 to promote
the integration of the disabled into society; the Government's National
Fund for the Handicapped has a small budget to encourage such
integration. The 1992 census found that 288,000 citizens said that they
had some form of disability. The disabled still suffer some forms of
legal discrimination; for example, blind persons cannot become teachers
or tutors. Although a 1994 law requires that new public buildings
provide access for the disabled, the public transportation system does
not make provision for wheelchair access, and the newest subway line in
the Santiago metropolitan area provides facilitated access for the
disabled only in some areas.
Indigenous People.--According to the 1992 census, nearly 1 million
persons, slightly less than 7 percent of the population, consider
themselves as indigenous. The Mapuches from the south constitute over
90 percent of the indigenous population, but there are small Aymara,
Atacameno, Huilliche, Rapa Nui, and Kawaskhar populations in other
parts of the country. A committee composed of representatives of
indigenous groups participated in drafting the 1993 law that recognizes
the ethnic diversity of the indigenous population and gives indigenous
people a voice in decisions affecting their lands, cultures, and
traditions. It provides for eventual bilingual education in schools
with indigenous populations, replacing a statute that emphasized
assimilation of indigenous people. However, out of the population that
identifies itself as indigenous, about one-half remain separated from
the rest of society, largely because of historical, cultural,
educational, and geographical factors. In practice, the ability of
indigenous people to participate in governmental decisions affecting
their lands, cultures, traditions, and the allocation of natural
resources is marginal. Indigenous people also experience some societal
discrimination.
The National Corporation for Indigenous Development (CONADI) was
created in 1994, and indigenous people directly elected representatives
to this body in 1995 and again in November. It advises and directs
government programs that assist the economic development of indigenous
people.
The Government announced a renewed effort in June to have Congress
approve a constitutional reform that would recognize explicitly the
existence of indigenous people and the State's responsibility for
promoting respect for their culture. However, Congress has not yet
passed the constitutional reform, which has been pending since 1991.
In August the U.N. Committee for the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination suggested that the Government consider formally
apologizing to, and compensating, indigenous people for their
historical treatment. The committee also suggested that the
Constitution be changed explicitly to outlaw racial and ethnic
discrimination.
In the first decision of its kind, a Temuco appeals court ruled on
September 10 that an indigenous employee fired from a municipal job had
been discriminated against by her immediate superior. The court based
its ruling on the Indigenous Law, which outlaws discrimination on the
basis of ``origin and culture.''
Several Mapuche families continued to object to exchanging
traditional lands for other property as part of the Ralco hydroelectric
project. The eight families involved continued to object to ENDESA's
effort to have them resettled. In a related case, on September 8 a
Santiago civil court ordered major construction on the project be
suspended pending resolution of a suit filed by two Mapuches alleging
that the preconstruction environmental impact statement was improperly
done. On October 1, an appeals court overturned the suspension on
further construction. At year's end, the matter remained before the
courts.
In early March, the authorities arrested two foreigners for alleged
participation in an indigenous demonstration against the dam in Bio Bio
province and ordered them expelled. A March 15 Supreme Court ruling
overturned the expulsion orders.
Land disputes between Mapuche Indian groups and private forestry
companies arose throughout the year, leading to several arrests of
Mapuches who committed violent acts. Beginning in May, agroup of 300
Mapuches marched 420 miles to Santiago demanding the return of land
rights and more political autonomy.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Chile assimilated a major
European migration in the 1800's and a major Middle Eastern and
Croatian migration in the early part of the 1900's. Smaller racial and
ethnic minority groups (Chileans of Asian descent and African-Chileans)
experience some societal intolerance.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form unions
without prior authorization and to join existing unions. The work force
is estimated at 5.7 million persons, of whom 3.7 million are salaried.
The latest available statistics place union membership at approximately
655,000, or roughly 12 percent of the entire work force. A 1995 law
provides government-employee associations with the same rights as trade
unions. However, this right is not enjoyed by police or military
personnel, nor by employees of state-owned companies attached to the
Ministry of Defense. Members of unions are free to withdraw from union
membership.
The 1992 Labor Code permits nationwide labor centrals, and the
Unified Workers Central (CUT), the largest and most representative of
these, legalized its status in April 1992. Labor unions are effectively
independent of the Government, but union leaders usually are elected
from lists based on party affiliation and often receive direction from
parties' headquarters. There are no restrictions on the political
activities or affiliations of unions or union officials. Registering a
union is a simple process.
Employees in the private sector have the right to strike; however,
the Government regulates this right and some restrictions remain. The
law proscribes employees of some 30 companies--largely providers of
essential services (e.g., water and electricity)--from striking; it
stipulates compulsory arbitration to resolve potential strikes in these
companies. Public officials do not enjoy this right, although
government teachers, municipal, and health workers have struck in the
past. There is no provision for compulsory arbitration in the public
sector.
Employers must pay severance benefits to striking workers and must
show cause to fire workers. Employees who believe that they have been
dismissed unfairly or dismissed because of their trade union activities
file complaints with the Ministry of Labor. If the claim is approved,
the employer must make special and additional compensatory payments.
The burden of proof rests on the employer in cases in which employees
allege illegal antiunion activity.
The CUT and many other labor confederations and federations
maintain ties to international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Despite legal
provisions for collective bargaining, most workers negotiate individual
contracts. Employers say that this is due to the workers' preference,
distrust of union leaders, and loyalty to companies. Union leaders
counter that the Labor Code--which does not allow union shops--prevents
successful organization in many sectors. Employers also may include a
clause in individual employment contracts that bars some classes of
supervisory employees from collective bargaining. Employees may object
to the inclusion of such clauses in their contracts and may appeal to
the Ministry of Labor to excise them.
The Ministry of Labor arbitrates about one-half of the complaints
it receives. Workers may take unarbitrated cases to the courts. If
complainants succeed in proving that they were fired unjustly, the
employer must pay discharged employees twice their normal severance
payment. There are no statistics available concerning the disposition
of complaints of antiunion behavior. There were allegations that
employers fire workers for union activity and attempt to avoid a
complaint by immediately paying them some multiple of the normal
severance pay.
Temporary workers--defined in the Labor Code as those in
agriculture and construction, as well as port workers and
entertainers--may form unions, but their right to collective bargaining
remains dependent on employers agreeing to negotiate with unions of
temporary workers. Similarly, inter-company unions enjoy the right of
collective bargaining only if the employer agrees to negotiate with
such a union. Labor Code sanctions against unfair bargaining practices
protect workers from dismissal only during the bargaining process.
Labor leaders complain that companies invoke the law's needs-of-the-
company clause to fire workers after a union has signed a new contract,
particularly when negotiations result in a prolonged strike.
In November the Government reactivated long-stalled labor
legislation designed to expand collective bargaining, including the
facilitation of collective bargaining for temporary workers and across
companies and sectors, among other goals. The lower chamber of Congress
approved the draft legislation, but the Senate defeated it.
Labor laws apply in the duty-free zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
the Labor Code prohibit forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known
to occur. While the Labor Code does not specifically prohibit forced
and bonded labor by children, there were no reports of such practices.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law allows children between the ages of 15 and 18 to
work with the express permission of their parents or guardians.
Children 14 years of age also may work legally with such permission,
but they must have completed their elementary education, and the work
involved may not be physically strenuous or unhealthy. Additional
provisions in the law protect workers under 18 years of age by
restricting the types of work open to them (for example, they may not
work in nightclubs) and by establishing special conditions of work
(they may not work more than 8 hours in 1 day). Labor inspectors
enforce these regulations, and compliance is good in the formal
economy.
Many children are employed in the informal economy. A government
study estimated that 15,000 children between the ages of 6 and 11 and
32,000 children between the ages of 12 and 14 are in the work force.
UNICEF estimated that approximately 107,000 children between the ages
of 12 and 19 work (see Section 5). An August 1998 Catholic Church study
estimated that 50,000 children under the age of 15 worked. The majority
of these were males from single-parent households headed by women;
among these were children who worked more than 40 hours per week and
did not attend school. The Ministry of Labor convenes regular meetings
of a tripartite group (business-labor-government) to monitor progress
in eradicating child labor. The Labor Code does not specifically
prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but such practices were
not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets minimum wages, and
the minimum wage is adjusted annually. This wage is designed to serve
as the starting wage for an unskilled single worker entering the labor
force and does not provide a worker and family with a decent standard
of living. Only 11 percent of salaried workers earn the minimum wage. A
tripartite committee comprising government, employer, and labor
representatives normally suggests a minimum wage based on projected
inflation and increases in productivity. In May 1998, Congress approved
the Government's proposal setting an escalating minimum wage through
the year 2000; the minimum monthly wage as of June 1 was approximately
$175 (90,500 pesos).
The law sets hours of work and occupational safety and health
standards. The legal workweek is 48 hours, which can be worked in
either 5 or 6 days. The maximum workday length is 10 hours, but
positions such as caretakers and domestic servants are exempted. All
workers enjoy at least one 24-hour rest period during the workweek,
except for workers at high altitudes who voluntarily exchange a work-
free day each week for several consecutive work-free days every 2
weeks.
In late 1998, Congress modified the Labor Code to provide domestic
employees the same pregnancy benefits as female employees who work
outside private homes. The same legislation prohibits employers from
requiring prospective female workers to take pregnancy tests.
Occupational health and safety are protected under the law and
administered by both the Ministries of Health and of Labor. The
Government has increased resources for inspections by over 60 percent
since 1990 and targeted industries guilty of the worst abuses. As a
result, enforcement is improving, and voluntary compliance is fairly
good. A law that became effective in 1996 increased the number of
annual occupational health and safety inspections and provided that
they be carried out by an expanded Labor Inspection Service in the
Ministry of Labor. Insurance mutual funds provide workers' compensation
and occupational safety training for the private and public sectors.
There was a 24-percent decline in reported occupational injuries in
1997, compared with the previous 5 years, although 11 percent of the
work force still submitted claims. Workers who remove themselves from
situations that they believe endanger their health and safety have
their employment protected if a real danger to their health or safety
exists.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
prohibit trafficking in persons, although it may be prosecuted under
other laws. There were no reports that persons were trafficked to,
from, or within the country.
______
COLOMBIA
Colombia is a constitutional, multiparty democracy, in which the
Liberal and Conservative parties have long dominated politics. Citizens
elected President Andres Pastrana of the Conservative Party and a
bicameral legislature controlled by the Liberal Party in generally
free, fair, and transparent elections in 1998, despite attempts at
intimidation and fraud by paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and
narcotics traffickers. The civilian judiciary is largely independent of
government influence, although the suborning or intimidation of judges,
witnesses, and prosecutors by those indicted is common.
The Government continued to face a serious challenge to its control
over the national territory, as longstanding and widespread internal
armed conflict and rampant violence--both political and criminal--
persisted. The principal participants were government security forces,
paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and narcotics traffickers. In some
areas government forces were engaged in combat with guerrillas or
narcotics traffickers, while in others paramilitary groups fought
guerrillas, and in still others guerrillas attacked demobilized members
of rival guerrilla factions. Paramilitary groups and guerrillas
attacked at increasing levels unarmed civilians suspected of loyalty to
an opposing party in the conflict. The two major guerrilla groups, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National
Liberation Army (ELN), consist of an estimated 11,000 to 17,000 full-
time combatants organized into more than 100 semiautonomous groups. The
FARC and the ELN, along with other smaller groups, exercised a
significant degree of influence and initiated armed action in nearly
1,000 of the country's 1,085 municipalities during the year, compared
with 700 municipalities in 1998. The major guerrilla organizations
received a significant part of their revenues (in the hundreds of
millions of dollars) from fees levied on narcotics production and
trafficking. Guerrillas and paramilitary groups supplanted absent state
institutions in many sparsely populated areas of the national
territory. In July 1998, then-President-elect Pastrana met with the
FARC's leader, ``Manuel Marulanda Velez,'' and agreed to a
demilitarized zone (``despeje'') in which the two sides could pursue
direct peace talks. In November 1998, the despeje was initiated in 5
southern municipalities, with a total population of approximately
100,000 persons. Security forces completed their withdrawal from the
area the following month. In January Marulanda failed to appear for the
scheduled formal inauguration of peace talks in the despeje. President
Pastrana and Marulanda met again in May and agreed on an agenda for
formal negotiations and on procedures for the creation of an
international verification commission to monitor both sides' compliance
with the terms of the despeje. However, the FARC refused to proceed
with the establishment of the commission. Formal Government-FARC peace
negotiations began in earnest in October and were underway at year's
end, following the Government's concession to the FARC that, at least
initially, there be no international verification commission. The
Government also held a series of informal discussions with the ELN
during the year, but insisted on the ELN's release of the victims of
specific mass kidnapings as a condition for undertaking formal
negotiations and for demilitarizing a zone in which the ELN could hold
its national convention. At year's end, the ELN had not complied with
the Government's request and still held captive several dozen of the
specified kidnap victims.
The civilian-led Ministry of Defense is responsible for internal
security and oversees both the armed forces and the National Police,
although civilian management of the armed forces is limited. The
security forces include armed state law enforcement, investigative, and
military authorities, including the National Police, army, air force,
navy, marines, coast guard, the Administrative Department of Security
(DAS), and the Prosecutor General's Technical Corps of Investigators
(CTI). The army, air force, navy, marines, coast guard, and National
Police fall under the direction of the Minister of Defense. The DAS,
which has broad intelligence gathering, law enforcement, and
investigative authority, reports directly to the President, but is
directed by a law enforcement professional. The police are charged
formally with maintaining internal order and security, but in practice
law enforcement responsibilities often were shared with the army,
especially in rural areas. The security forces regularly failed to
confront paramilitary groups, and members of the security forces
sometimes illegally collaborated with paramilitary forces. The armed
forces and the police committed numerous, serious violations of human
rights throughout the year.
Despite years of drug- and politically related violence, the
economy is diverse and developed. However, the economy has suffered a
recession, and there was negative growth of 5 percent in 1999 for the
first time in the country's modern history. TheGovernment has
privatized many public-sector entities and liberalized trade and
financial activity since 1991, and it plans further privatizations.
Crude oil, coal, coffee, and cut flowers are the principal legal
exports. Narcotics traffickers continued to control large tracts of
land and other assets and exerted influence throughout society, the
economy, and political life. The official unemployment rate peaked at
20 percent, a record high, although it had declined to 18.1 percent by
year's end. Inflation at year's end was 9.2 percent. The Government
passed an austere budget to address the fiscal gap, which was at 6
percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and has prepared reform
proposals in areas such as pensions and regional finance. The balance
of payments deficit was 4.5 percent of GDP. Income distribution is
highly skewed; much of the population lives in poverty. Per capita GDP
was approximately $2,100.
The Government's human rights record remained poor; there was some
improvement in several areas, and the Pastrana administration took
measures to initiate structural reform, but serious problems remain.
Government forces continued to commit numerous, serious abuses,
including extrajudicial killings, at a level that was roughly similar
to that of 1998. Despite some prosecutions and convictions, the
authorities rarely brought officers of the security forces and the
police charged with human rights offenses to justice, and impunity
remains a problem. At times the security forces collaborated with
paramilitary groups that committed abuses; in some instances,
individual members of the security forces actively collaborated with
members of paramilitary groups by passing them through roadblocks,
sharing intelligence, and providing them with ammunition. Paramilitary
forces find a ready support base within the military and police, as
well as local civilian elites in many areas.
On August 12, President Pastrana signed into law a revised Military
Penal Code, which includes provisions that unit commanders no longer
may judge their subordinates; that an independent judge advocate
general corps is to be created; and that troops are to be protected
legally if they refuse to carry out illegal orders to commit human
rights abuses. However, necessary implementing legislation had not been
passed at year's end. Also on August 12, the Government made public the
Government's national human rights plan, which includes a provision
that permits the armed forces commander to remove from service
summarily any military member whose performance in combating
paramilitary forces he deemed ``unsatisfactory or insufficient.'' The
State demonstrated an increased willingness to remove from duty
security force officers who failed to respect human rights, or ignored
or were complicit in the abuses committed by paramilitary groups. The
Government removed four army general officers from service during the
year; the generals were under investigation for collaborating with or
failing to combat paramilitary groups. A few other state security
officers were removed from service or suspended during the year. The
military judiciary demonstrated an increased willingness to turn cases
involving security force officers accused of serious human rights
violations over to the civilian judiciary, as required by a 1997
Constitutional Court ruling; however, concerns about impunity within
the military judiciary remained.
Police, prison guards, and military forces continued to torture and
mistreat detainees. Conditions in the overcrowded prisons are generally
harsh; however, some inmates use bribes or intimidation to obtain more
favorable treatment. Arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as
prolonged pretrial detention, are fundamental problems. The civilian
judiciary is inefficient, severely overburdened by a large case
backlog, and undermined by intimidation and the prevailing climate of
impunity. This situation remains at the core of the country's human
rights problems. The Superior Judicial Council (CSJ) reported in August
that 63 percent of crimes go unreported, and that 40 percent of all
reported crimes go unpunished. The use of ``faceless'' prosecutors,
judges, and witnesses, under cover of anonymity for security reasons,
continued until June 30, in cases involving kidnaping, extortion,
narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and in several hundred high-profile
cases involving human rights violations. Human rights groups accused
these courts of violating fundamental rights of due process, including
the right to a public trial. On June 30, a ``specialized jurisdiction''
replaced the anonymous regional court system. The specialized
jurisdiction prosecuted and tried cases of extortion, narcotics
trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, and serious human rights
violations, including massacres, some homicides, torture, and
kidnaping. It permitted the use of anonymous witnesses and prosecutors
in exceptional cases that potentially placed their lives in danger.
The authorities sometimes infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
Journalists practiced self-censorship. There were some restrictions on
freedom of movement. There were unconfirmed reports of security forces
harassing or threatening human rights groups. Violence and extensive
societal discrimination against women, abuse of children, and child
prostitution are serious problems. Extensive societal discrimination
against the indigenous and minorities continued. Child labor is a
widespread problem. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of
forced prostitution is a problem. ``Social cleansing'' killings of
street children, prostitutes, homosexuals, and others deemed socially
undesirable by paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and vigilante groups
continued to be a serious problem.
Paramilitary groups and guerrillas were responsible for the vast
majority of political and extrajudicial killings during the year.
Throughout the country, paramilitary groups killed, tortured, and
threatened civilians suspected of sympathizing with guerrillas in an
orchestrated campaign to terrorize them into fleeing their homes,
thereby depriving guerrillas of civilian support. Paramilitary forces
were responsible for an increasing number of massacres and other
politically motivated killings. They also fought guerrillas for control
of some lucrative coca-growing regions and engaged directly in
narcotics production and trafficking. The AUC paramilitary umbrella
organization, whose membership totaled approximately 5,000 to 7,000
armed combatants, exercised increasing influence during the year,
extending its presence through violence and intimidation into areas
previously under guerrilla control. Although some paramilitary groups
reflect rural residents' desire to organize solely for self-defense,
others are vigilante organizations, and still others are actually the
paid private armies of narcotics traffickers or large landowners.
Popular support for these organizations grew during the year, as
guerrilla violence increased in the face of a slowly evolving peace
process. The army's record in dealing with paramilitary groups remained
mixed. In some locations the army on rare occasions attacked and
captured members of such groups; in others it tolerated or even
collaborated with paramilitary groups.
The FARC and the ELN regularly attacked civilian populations,
committed massacres and summary executions, and killed medical and
religious personnel. Guerrillas were responsible for the majority of
cases of forcible recruitment of indigenous people and of hundreds of
children; they also were responsible for the majority of kidnapings.
Guerrillas held more than 1,000 kidnaped civilians, with ransom
payments serving as an important source of revenue. Other kidnap
victims were killed. In some places, guerrillas collected ``war
taxes,'' forced members of the citizenry into their ranks, forced small
farmers to sow illicit crops, and regulated travel, commerce, and other
activities. The FARC routinely committed abuses against citizens who
resided in the despeje zone. Numerous credible sources reported cases
of murder, rape, extortion, kidnaping, robbery, threats, detention, and
forced recruitment, as well as impediments to free speech and fair
trial and interference with religious practices.
Violence and instability in rural areas displaced approximately
288,000 civilians from their homes during the year. The total number of
internally displaced citizens during 1995-99 probably exceeded 1
million.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Political and
extrajudicial killings continued to be a serious problem. An estimated
2,000 to 3,000 citizens died in such acts, committed principally by
nonstate agents. Members of the security forces continued to commit
extrajudicial killings, and the number of such killings was at a level
similar to the previous year. For the first 9 months of the year, the
Center for Investigations and Popular Research (CINEP), a
nongovernmental organization (NGO), reported that security forces were
responsible for 24 extrajudicial killings in which the perpetrators
could be identified, compared with 21 during the same period in 1998.
These included deaths resulting from police abuse of authority. Most of
the accused were called before military or, increasingly, civilian
courts. There were some reports that police and former security force
members committed social cleansing killings.
According to the human rights Ombudsman's office, there were 399
massacres (defined as the simultaneous or nearly simultaneous killing
of 3 or more persons outside of combat at a single location or at
several nearby locations) during the year. An estimated 1,845 persons
were killed in these massacres. The office recorded 235 massacres in
1998, but changed the criteria for describing an attack as a massacre
during 1999. The human rights Ombudsman's office attributed culpability
for 20 killings to the state security forces.
The human rights delegate of the Attorney General's office received
586 complaints and cases during the year and concluded 285 disciplinary
investigations. Among the complaints were 136 of alleged forced
disappearances; 103 of torture; and 46 of massacres. The office
concluded investigations for alleged infractions committed in previous
years by 80 members of the security forces (including 42 members of the
National Police, 17 members of the army, and 20 members of the DAS).
The office exonerated the accused person in 32 cases and imposed
administrative sanctions (e.g. fines, suspensions, dismissals) in 38
cases, including that of 1 army captain for his role in the 1998
Barrancabermeja massacre. The office dropped 10 cases for lack of merit
in the latter phases of investigations. Additionally, the office
``archived'' 191 cases for lack of sufficient evidence. Among those
sanctioned were 8 security force officers, including 1 National Police
colonel; 11 of the 38 were sanctioned for torture, and 2 were
sanctioned for forced disappearance. The office subsequently referred
few of those who were sanctioned to the Prosecutor General for criminal
prosecution. In November the Attorney General personally ordered
Brigadier General Jaime Uscategui removed from service.
During the year, the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's
office pursued 303 criminal processes against members of the security
forces, 465 processes against members of paramilitary groups, 149
processes against guerrillas, and 86 processes against civilians. The
unit arrested 248 persons during the year, and other state entities
arrested a further 87 persons against whom the unit had cases. Another
435 arrest warrants (393 of which were issued by the unit) for persons
against whom the unit had cases remained outstanding. The office took
action against at least 12 officers for alleged serious human rights
abuses.
The National Institute for Forensic Medicine stated in a
preliminary report that 22,957 murders occurred during the year,
compared with 19,665 during 1998. This represented a marked increase,
at 55 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, from the 1998 figure of 52.8
deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. The press reported that on average, 68
persons were murdered per day. The police and the Prosecutor General's
office have insufficient resources to investigate most killings
adequately. In August the Superior Judicial Council (CSJ) reported that
63 percent of crimes go unreported, and that 40 percent of reported
crimes go unpunished.
During the year, the military judiciary convicted and sentenced 130
members of the National Police, army, and navy for possible human
rights violations. (Many of those sanctioned committed crimes that were
not human rights abuses.) Among those convicted and sentenced by
military courts were 68 members of the army, 56 of the National Police,
and 6 of the navy/marines. The military judiciary reported neither the
nature of the sentences in the 130 cases nor the circumstances of the
crimes. The Civilian Criminal Procedure Code authorizes restriction to
base as an acceptable substitute for imprisonment when military jails
or prisons are unavailable. In August 1997, the Constitutional Court
more narrowly defined the constitutional provision that crimes by state
agents unrelated to ``acts of service'' must be tried in civilian
courts (see Section 1.e.). Since then, the military judiciary has
turned 526 cases of possible human rights violations over to the
civilian judiciary for investigation and possible prosecution. Among
the cases transferred during the year were those of three full
colonels--the first time that the military judiciary turned over cases
concerning several high-ranking officers.
On March 14, members of the 4th Counterguerrilla Battalion (4th
Brigade) killed Antioquia peace commissioner (and former Vice Minister
for Youth) Alex Lopera and two other persons as they attempted to
deliver an approximately $75,000 (150 million pesos) ransom for a
kidnaping victim to the FARC's 47th front near Sonson, Antioquia. Aware
that the three were carrying a large amount of money, army Major David
Hernandez, Captain Diego Fino Rodriguez, Sergeant Edgardo Varon, and
Privates Carlos Escudero, Ferney Cardona, and Raul Gallego set up a
military roadblock, detained them, killed them, stole the ransom money,
and then pushed the victims and the vehicle into a deep crevice.
Determining that the soldiers' actions were in no way related to
acts of service, the military judiciary passed the case to the civilian
judiciary. Prosecution of all six was underway at year's end, although
Major Hernandez escaped from military detention and remained a fugitive
from justice.
On April 18, police found the body of Jewish industrialist Benjamin
Khoudari. He had been kidnaped in Bogota on October 30, 1998, and later
killed despite his family's payment of ransom. The authorities arrested
Fabio Ramiro Cassallas Gonzalez and Alvaro Guerrero Cardenas, former
guerrillas who had become army informants; they remained in detention
and under investigation at year's end. Also in April, the army arrested
Colonel Jorge Plazas Acevedo, the chief of intelligence for the army's
13th Brigade, for allegedly heading a kidnaping gang believed
responsible for the kidnaping and killing of several Jewish
industrialists, including Khoudari. The authorities arrested a
lieutenant and a sergeant under Plazas's command, and placed all three
in preventive detention in April. The military judiciary determined
that the alleged actions of the three bore no relation to acts of
military service, and therefore they should be tried in civilian
courts. (As of August, Plazas and the lieutenant remained in military
detention, but the sergeant had escaped.) In July the army retired
Plazas, and an Attorney General's disciplinary investigation of him was
underway at year's end.
Government authorities made arrests of or progressed in prosecuting
accused perpetrators of some past killings. The authorities arrested
former policemen Rafael Cespedes and Edgar Armando Daza Diaz for the
October 1998 killing of Jorge Ortega, vice president of the country's
largest labor confederation, the United Workers' Central (CUT), during
a major labor strike. One of the two men later escaped detention. An
investigation was underway at year's end (see Section 6.a.).
The Attorney General's human rights delegate exonerated soldiers of
the army's Boca Battalion, 3rd Brigade, for the July 1998 killings of
five civilians at a roadblock about 14 miles outside of Pasto, Narino
department. It concluded that the deceased, all of whom reportedly had
criminal records, had opened fire on the soldiers, wounding one
sergeant. The Third Brigade commander found, in a first-instance
military judicial decision, that there were no grounds to open an
official investigation of the soldiers, and the case was archived.
On June 30, the National Tribunal (the appellate court for the
anonymous regional civilian courts system) overturned a lower court's
March decision and sentenced army Captain Rodrigo Canas Forero to 50
years' imprisonment for his role in the April 1996 Segovia massacre.
Canas was a member of the army's 14th Brigade (at Puerto Berrio,
Antioquia) at the time of the massacre, which resulted in the deaths of
15 persons and the injury of 12 others.
On April 21, detectives from the Prosecutor General's office
captured fugitive retired Colonel Bernardo Ruiz Silva, former commander
of the army's 20th Brigade (military intelligence). Ruiz was under
investigation for allegedly organizing the November 1995 Bogota killing
of Conservative Party opposition leader Alvaro Gomez Hurtado and his
assistant. In May 1998, the army formally disbanded the 20th Brigade,
which had an egregious human rights record, including the targeted
killing of civilians. In an effort to ensure that the brigade's
successor organization, the Army Military Intelligence Center (CIME),
would not commit human rights abuses, the army prohibited it from
directly undertaking armed operations. In May 1997, the Prosecutor
General's office had detained retired army warrant officers Omar Berrio
Loaiza and Franklin Gaona Ovalle, as well as army intelligence agents
Henry Berrio Loaiza and Carlos Gaona Ovalle; they later were indicted
for the killing of Gomez Hurtado. A trial of civilian killers Hector
Paul Florez Martinez, Manuel Mariano Montero Perez, Gustavo Adolfo
Jaramillo Giraldo, and Hermes Ortiz Duran was underway at year's end.
The Superior Military Tribunal confirmed a first-instance military
court's September 1998 exoneration of five policemen for the 1995 death
of Italian tourist Giacomo Turra in a Cartagena police station.
Although the policemen claimed that Turra had died of a drug and
alcohol overdose, an autopsy by the National Institute of Forensic
Medicine determined that he was beaten to death.
The human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office formally
indicted marine Colonel Jose Ancizar Molano Padilla, then-commander of
the 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion, as well as marine Corporals Javier
Fernando Guerra, Eduardo Aristides Alvarez, and Jose Milton Caicedo for
the 1995 social cleansing killings of two alleged thieves, Sifredy and
Freddy Arboleda. All of the accused had been arrested in June 1998. A
disciplinary investigation by the Attorney General was underway at
year's end.
On November 29, the military judiciary ceased all proceedings
against the 2 army majors implicated in the investigation of the April
1991 massacre by the army of 15 bus passengers and 2 passersby at Los
Uvos. An appeal of this decision was pending at year's end. In July
1998, an anonymous regional court had sentenced three civilians to 30-
year prison terms and fined an army corporal and two civilian
informants for their roles in the massacre.
On April 14, the National Tribunal confirmed an anonymous civil
court judge's March 1998 conviction and sentencing to 18 years'
imprisonment of 1 police officer and 4 army officers for their roles in
the November 1988 Segovia massacre, in which over 100 persons were
killed or wounded. In September military proceedings against these and
various other army and police officers were dropped due to lack of
evidence. The appeals of Lieutenant Colonel Alejandro Londono Tamayo
and Lieutenant Colonel Marco Baez Garzon, on charges relating to the
November 1988 Segovia massacre, still were pending in civilian court at
year's end. Londono remained in detention, but was still on active
duty, although he has been deprived of command responsibilities. Baez
Garzon also was deprived of command responsibility, and was in military
custody in Bogota at year's end.
On April 12, the Prosecutor General's office placed retired army
Lieutenant Colonel Jose Vincente Perez Berrocal under preventive
detention to await trial for the 1987 killing of a former Liberal Party
mayor of Sabana de Torres. At the time of the killing, Perez Berrocal
was serving as commander of the 5th Brigade's Ricuarte Battalion.
Credible allegations of cooperation with paramilitary groups,
including instances of both silent support and direct collaboration by
members of the armed forces, in particular the army, continued.
Evidence suggests that there were tacit arrangements between local
military commanders and paramilitary groups in some regions, and
paramilitary forces operated freely in some areas that were under
military control or despite a significant military presence. In some
instances, individual members of the security forces actively
collaborated with members of paramilitary groups--passing them through
roadblocks, sharing intelligence, and providing them with ammunition.
On February 14, an unidentified assailant shot and killed army
Lieutenant Colonel Luis Felipe Becerra Bohorquez while he dined in a
restaurant in Cali. In October 1998, a military court had sentenced
Becerra to 12 months' imprisonment for covering up the October 1993 Rio
Frio massacre. In May 1998, the Attorney General's office had ordered
the army to separate Becerra from service, but later reduced the
punishment to issuance of a severe reprimand, because complicity in a
massacre had not yet been codified as a crime at the time of the
massacre. Becerra had remained a fugitive until his death.
There was no progress in the investigation of the September 1998
killing of congressman Jorge Humberto Gonzalez in Medellin.
The military high command, under the leadership of Defense Minister
Ramirez and General Fernando Tapias, stated repeatedly that it would
not tolerate collaboration between military personnel and paramilitary
groups, and that the army would combat paramilitary groups; however,
security force actions in the field were not always consistent with the
leadership's positions, and at least one senior army leader suggested
that the police should lead the fight against paramilitary groups. In
general, impunity for military personnel who collaborated with members
of paramilitary groups was common.
However, on April 9, President Pastrana formally retired from
service Brigadier Generals Fernando Millan Perez and Rito Alejo del
Rio; both had links to paramilitary groups. The Government stated only
that it ``was no longer convenient'' for them to continue their
military service. The military judiciary announced no new developments
during the year in its ongoing investigation of General Millan
regarding allegations that he armed and equipped a paramilitary group
in Lebrija, Santander department, in 1997. The group was believed
responsible for at least 11 killings. In October 1998, the Superior
Judicial Council had determined that Millan's alleged actions
constituted an act of service and turned the case over to the military
judiciary for prosecution, effectively cutting off the prosecutor's
investigation. Millan had denied the charges. In June the Attorney
General's office opened a disciplinary investigation of Millan.
General Del Rio, former commander of the 13th Brigade, remained
under investigation in August by the human rights unit of the
Prosecutor General's office for allegedly establishing illegal
paramilitary groups in Medellin in 1987, and in Uraba in 1996.
In May detectives of the Prosecutor General's office arrested at
the officers' club in Pereira retired army Colonel Jose Ancizar
Hincapie Betancurt for collaboration in 1993-94 with a paramilitary
group that killed 10 persons. In December 1997, the military judiciary
assigned the cases of Hincapie, 1 other army officer, and 12 others to
the civilian judiciary for processing.
According to a Human Rights Watch report released in December,
government investigators detailed direct collaboration between the
Medellin-based 4th Brigade and paramilitary forces commanded by Carlos
Castano. Repeatedly, paramilitary groups killed those suspected of
supporting guerrillas, then delivered the corpses to the army. In a
process known as ``legalization,'' the army then claimed the dead as
guerrillas killed in combat, while members of the paramilitary groups
received their pay in army weapons.
On April 9, the Attorney General suspended Brigadier General Jaime
Uscategui from his post for 90 days in connection with the July 1997
AUC paramilitary massacre of dozens of persons at Mapiripan, Meta
department. On May 20, the Prosecutor General's office ordered the
arrest of Uscategui, who presented himself to an army school, where he
was held while awaiting trial on civilian charges of multiple
aggravated homicide by omission, aggravated kidnaping by omission, and
falsification of a public document. Also in May, Uscategui submitted
his resignation letter, effective in January 2000, which was accepted
by President Pastrana in August. On August 10, the Superior Judicial
Council sent the criminal case against Brigadier General Jaime
Uscategui for dereliction of duty and falsification of public documents
to the military judiciary. The CSJ found that the charges were related
directly to acts of service, and that the alleged crimes could have
been committed only by a public servant. In November Uscategui was
released after 180 days in detention because military prosecutors had
yet to complete prosecution; the investigation continued at year's end.
Also in November, the Attorney General ordered Uscategui removed from
service for dereliction of duty in the October 1997 judicial convoy
massacre in San Juan de Arama, Meta, thereby nullifying his
resignation.
The CSJ also sent charges regarding the 1997 Mapiripan massacre
against Lieutenant Colonel Hernan Orozco (who had testified against
Uscategui in a civilian court) to the military judiciary. However, the
CSJ sent the cases against Lieutenant Colonel Lino Sanchez and
Sergeants Miller Uruena Diaz and Juan Carlos Gamarra Polo to the
civilian judiciary, on grounds that they facilitated the massacre,
which was determined not to be an act of service. On November 16, the
Prosecutor General's human rights unit formally indicted Lieutenant
Colonel Sanchez on charges of terrorism, aggravated homicide,
organization of paramilitary groups, and dereliction of duty. In a
September 1997 interview in El Tiempo newspaper, AUC paramilitary
leader Carlos Castano admitted responsibility for the Mapiripan
massacre. In June 1998, the National Police arrested suspected Meta
department paramilitary leader Rene Cardenas Galeano for his part in
organizing the attack. A specialized jurisdiction court trial of
Galeano was underway at year's end. Sanchez, Gamarra, and Urena
remained in military detention at year's end. The two private pilots
arrested in 1998 remained in civilian detention at year's end, as did
two paramilitary members. The Prosecutor General's investigation
continued; and at year's end, a total nine military, paramilitary, and
civilian alleged participants in the Mapiripan massacre were in
detention pending trial.
On August 12, the Attorney General's office, which can impose only
administrative sanctions to state agents, formally accused five
officers and three noncommissioned officers of possible complicity or
participation in the July 1997 Mapiripan massacre. Those accused are:
army officers Brigadier General Jaime Uscategui, Lieutenant Colonel
Carlos Eduardo Avila Beltran, Lieutenant Colonel Lino Sanchez Prada,
and Major Arbey Garcia Narvaez; National Police Captain Juan Carlos
Lopez Pavon; army Sergeants Miller Uruena Diaz and Juan Carlos Gamarra
Polo; and army Corporal Leonardo Montoya Rubiano. The Attorney
General's office also formally accused five local Mapiripan civilian
officials, including then-mayor Jaime Calderon Moreno, ofcomplicity in
the massacre. No arrests were made for a similar paramilitary incursion
into Miraflores, Guaviare, on October 18-20, 1997, which left at least
five persons dead.
The human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office issued an
arrest warrant for former army Captain Ciro Alfonso Vargas Lancheros
for his alleged role in the April 1996 paramilitary murder of three men
in Ciudad Bolivar, Medellin. Vargas was still at large at year's end.
On June 18, the Attorney General's office severely reprimanded army
First Sergeant Justo Gil Zuniga Labrador and Vice First Sergeant
Hernando Medina Camacho, then members of the army's 20th Brigade, for
the July 1994 killing of Senator Manuel Cepeda Vargas, leader of the
Patriotic Union (UP) party. On November 15, the army announced that it
had discharged both men from service. In testimony before the Senate,
the Attorney General stated that the Senator had been killed as the
result of a joint operation between some senior army officers and
members of paramilitary groups; the sergeants had received orders to
trail and then kill Cepeda from Brigadier General Rodolfo Herrera Luna,
the then-commander of the army's 9th Brigade, who died in 1997. Herrera
had planned the killing in conjunction with paramilitary leaders Carlos
and Fidel Castano. On December 20, a Bogota specialized jurisdiction
court sentenced former army Sergeants Zuniga and Medina to 43 years'
imprisonment each for their roles in Cepeda's murder. Both were
incarcerated at a military detention center at year's end. The court
also dropped related charges against paramilitary leader Carlos Castano
for lack of evidence.
There was no progress in the complaint against retired General
Yanine Diaz pending before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission
(IACHR). Despite the Government's attempts to bring him to justice in
the civilian court system, in June 1998, the appellate court of the
military judicial system confirmed the June 1997 decision by then-
commanding general of the army General Manuel Jose Bonett to exonerate
Yanine Diaz of all charges related to formation and activities of
paramilitary groups in the Magdalena Medio region in the 1980's.
There continued to be incidents of social cleansing--including
attacks and killings--directed against individuals deemed socially
undesirable, such as drug addicts, prostitutes, transvestites,
homosexuals, beggars, and street children. According to the National
Institute for Forensic Medicine, 279 such killings occurred during the
first 6 months of the year. The Institute did not attempt to identify
the perpetrators. CINEP reported 182 social cleansing killings during
the first 9 months of the year. It attributed 10 to the ELN, 20 to the
FARC, and 147 to social cleansing groups, some of which reportedly
often were composed of active or former security force members. The
national human rights Ombudsman attributed five massacres to social
cleansing groups during the first half of the year.
The Bogota press reported that between March and August, at least
22 prostitutes were murdered in Bogota. The human rights Ombudsman's
office implicated Bogota police in what it characterized as possible
social cleansing killings. However, the human rights unit of the
Prosecutor General's office reported at year's end that in fact only
three Bogota prostitutes were killed during that time period, in
separate, isolated incidents. Its investigations were ongoing at year's
end.
In December a court convicted Luis Alfredo Garavito Cubillos of the
killing of one boy and the attempted rape of another; Garavito had
confessed to killing more than 190 children at year's end, including
the killings of 25 children in Pereira which had previously been
attributed to Pablo Ramirez Garcia.
On November 11, a car bomb exploded in northern Bogota, killing 7
passersby and wounding 42 others. The bombing came one day after the
extradition of a narcotics trafficker to a foreign country for
prosecution; press reports speculated that the bombing was an attempt
by narcotics traffickers to pressure the Government into ceasing the
extradition of citizens for prosecution abroad. A state investigation
had reached no formal conclusions at year's end.
Paramilitary groups committed numerous extrajudicial killings,
primarily in areas where they competed with guerrilla forces for
control, and often in the absence of a strong government security force
presence. The frequency of paramilitary massacres continued to
increase. Two major paramilitary campaigns during the year involved a
series of orchestrated massacres (see Section 1.g.). The human rights
Ombudsman, whochanged his statistical methodology in 1999, attributed
153 massacres to paramilitary forces during the year, which claimed 889
victims. In 1998 (the most recent year for which such data were
available) the office received 1,221 complaints against members of
paramilitary groups for homicide. CINEP reported that paramilitary
groups were responsible for 814 extrajudicial killings during the 9
months of the year, compared with 573 in all of 1998. The Vice
President's office attributed 252 killings of civilians to paramilitary
groups during the first 4 months of the year, while the Ministry of
Defense attributed 743 such killings to paramilitary groups during the
year.
Between February 28 and March 1, approximately 20 members of a
paramilitary group massacred 9 persons in Barrancabermeja, Santander
department. When leaving the town, they reportedly passed unmolested
through a roadblock maintained by the army's 45th Battalion. On March
18, police arrested paramilitary leader Mario James Mejia (``El
Panadero'') for killing a taxi driver; he then was charged in Bogota
with leading the February 28-March 1 Barrancabermeja massacre and was
still under investigation and in detention at year's end, along with
fellow paramilitary Pedro Mateo Hurtado Moreno. Politically motivated
killings and related unrest continued in Barrancabermeja at a very high
rate throughout the year.
On April 4, a group of men claiming to be from the ACCU
paramilitary group entered San Jose de Apartado and killed Anibal
Jiminez, a member of the local peace council, a 16-year-old youth, and
another man; they wounded two other persons. In March 1997, the town
had declared itself to be a ``community of peace''--a designation that
declares all citizens of the town to be neutral and outside the
conflict--and thus no security forces were present during the attack.
Judicial authorities made progress in the May 16, 1998,
Barrancabermeja massacre case, in which paramilitary forces killed 11
persons and kidnaped and then killed 25 others. The human rights unit
of the Prosecutor General's office ordered the arrest of Guillermo
Cristancho Acosta (``Camilo'') and Alvaro Noriega (``Chamuco'') for the
crime. On November 12, Cristancho's body was found. AUC paramilitary
leader Carlos Castano ordered Cristancho's murder, reportedly after
learning that Cristancho had been extorting money from local peasants
and engaging in other common criminal activity. Cristancho Acosta
publicly had admitted ordering the killings. At year's end, the
authorities had not detained Noriega. Although still under criminal
investigation for allegedly having participated directly in the
massacre, army Corporal Rodrigo Perez Perez (of the army's Nuevo
Granada battalion) was freed from detention for lack of evidence.
However, in August the Attorney General's office administratively
punished nine security force members and ordered the suspension of six
National Police officers. In August the Attorney General ordered
dishonorable discharges for three military officers and suspensions for
five policemen for failing to halt the massacre.
The human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office opened
formal investigations of ACCU paramilitary leader Carlos Castano and 6
other AUC members for the May 1998 massacre of between 12 and 22
persons at Puerto Alvira, Meta department. Castano publicly had
declared Puerto Alvira a military objective in September 1997, and the
AUC had accepted responsibility publicly for the killings.
On August 19, the new specialized jurisdiction of the civilian
judiciary (see Section 1.e.) convicted and sentenced to 10 and 19
years' imprisonment respectively Nancy Lozano Rodriguez and Jose Edgar
Tellez for intentionally having distracted the attention of police
during the August 1989 killing of Liberal presidential candidate Luis
Carlos Galan by Medellin drug cartel-financed paramilitary groups. It
also ordered the investigation of former Congressman Alberto Santofimio
Botero for complicity in the crime. Santofimio previously had been
imprisoned for financing his 1994 Senate campaign with funds from the
Medellin drug cartel. The judge's sentence also indicated that some
police present on the occasion of Galan's murder had accepted bribes to
facilitate the crime.
During the year, a judge exonerated billionaire emerald magnate
Victor Carranza of charges of paramilitarism; he had been arrested in
February 1998 on charges of sponsoring the Eastern Plains paramilitary
self-defense group. The Prosecutor General then detained the judge on a
charge of ``corrupt practice'', and she was sentenced to 46 months'
imprisonment. Carranza remained in prison due to his prior convictions
for homicide and kidnaping. While an estimated 400 members of
paramilitary groups were believed to be in jail at year's end, known
paramilitary leaders largely remained beyond the reach of thelaw. At
the end of the year, the army reported that it had killed 26 members of
paramilitary groups and captured 102 during the year.
Paramilitary forces killed members of indigenous groups (see
Section 5).
As of August, the Prosecutor General's office was investigating and
had issued arrest warrants for Carlos Castano, Juan Carlos Gonzalez
Jaramillo (``El Colorado''), and others for the February 1998 murder of
Jesus Maria Valle, president of the Antioquia Permanent Committee for
the Defense of Human Rights, in his Medellin office. Castano was
indicted in September 1998 for the killing.
As of August, the Prosecutor General's human rights unit had
detained and indicted eight persons associated with the AUC
paramilitary group for the May 1997 murders of two CINEP workers, Mario
Calderon and Elsa Alvarado, as well as Alvarado's father. The unit also
finished its investigations of Carlos Castano and four other
paramilitary leaders, issued warrants for their arrest, and summoned
them to trial. However, Castano remained at large. Medellin narcotics
trafficker Gustavo Adolfo Upegui Lopez, suspected by many of having
been the intellectual author of the crime, remained under arrest for a
separate case.
On April 12, the Prosecutor General's Technical Corps of
Investigators (CTI) captured paramilitary leader Reynel Gomez Correa in
connection with the September 1994 ``Trujillo II'' massacre in Valle
department. On April 23, the human rights unit of the Prosecutor
General's office also issued an arrest warrant for paramilitary member
Norberto Morales Ledesma in connection with the case.
On August 13, unidentified gunmen killed renowned journalist,
political comedian, and peace and human rights activist Jaime Garzon in
Bogota. On August 5, police in Bogota arrested four hired killers from
Medellin for allegedly plotting to murder Garzon. An investigation
continued at year's end. More than 85,000 persons attended his funeral,
protesting his murder and the prevailing violence in the country.
On September 15, unknown assailants killed National University
professor and former government peace negotiator Jesus Bejarano as he
was walking to class. Police announced a joint investigation with the
Prosecutor General's office, but no new developments had been announced
by year's end.
There were no new developments in the case of the May 1998 killing
of former Defense Minister General Fernando Landazabal Reyes near his
Bogota home.
The police determined that the 1998 death of Betty Camacho, a
former member of Congress, was a common crime.
The guerrillas of the FARC, the ELN, and the People's Liberation
Army (EPL) continued to commit extrajudicial killings, often targeting
noncombatants in a manner similar to that of paramilitary groups.
According to CINEP, guerrillas committed 269 killings outside of combat
during the first 9 months of the year, while the Ministry of Defense
attributed 908 killings to guerrillas during the year. The human rights
Ombudsman attributed 22 massacres to the FARC during the first 6 months
of the year and 6 to the ELN. The Ombudsman also attributed 215
killings to the FARC, and 41 to the ELN. Local elected officials or
candidates for public office, teachers, civic leaders, business owners,
and peasants opposed to their political or military activities were
common targets. The Federation of Colombian Municipalities reported
that guerrillas killed at least 10 mayors during the year, including 1
who had fled the demilitarized zone. Guerrillas were also the principal
suspects in at least five other mayoral murders. Police and military
personnel were targeted for killings (see Section 1.g.). Guerrilla
groups also killed members of indigenous groups (see Section 5), labor
leaders (see Section 6.b.), and religious leaders (see Section 2.c.).
Some communities controlled by guerrillas also experienced social
cleansing killings of criminal or other ``undesirable'' elements.
On February 25, the FARC's eastern bloc, commanded by German
Briceno Suarez (``Grannobles''), kidnaped American citizen indigenous
activists Terence Freitas, Lahe'ena'e Gay, and Ingrid Washinawatok near
Saravena, Arauca department. The three had been working with the
indigenous U'wa tribe at the tribe's invitation. Briceno Suarez ordered
their killings; the three were shot, and their bodies were found in
Venezuela. On July 20, the Prosecutor General's office ordered the
arrest of Briceno Suarez; army efforts to apprehend him and other
FARCmembers accused of the crime had not been successful at year's end.
On December 20, the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's
office formally indicted Briceno Suarez and U'wa tribe member Gustavo
Bocota for the crimes; Bocota also remained at large at year's end. In
May the FARC announced that its members involved in the killings, whom
it did not name, would be ``punished'' by having to learn to read and
write and work on road construction projects. While there were press
reports in September that two of the FARC perpetrators were killed
during an army offensive, there was no evidence to substantiate this
claim. The Prosecutor General repeatedly complained publicly that
elements of the FARC were impeding the investigation by intimidating
witnesses. The suspects remained at large at year's end.
According to the human rights Ombudsman's office, in mid-May the
Teofilo Forero column of the FARC killed 11 civilians suspected of
paramilitary collaboration at Vereda Perlas Altas, Puerto Rico, Caqueta
department (just outside the despeje zone). The Government protested,
and on August 25, the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's
office opened investigations of the FARC's Teofilo Forero column as
well as of FARC demilitarized zone security commander Pedro Nel Daza
Narvaez, also known as ``Jairo.''
Fourteen members of the Prosecutor General's Technical Corps of
Investigators (CTI) were killed during the year in various parts of the
country. On January 7, the human rights unit of the Prosecutor
General's office issued an arrest warrant for Wilson Eusebio Garcia
Ramirez, commander of the ELN's ``Carlos Alirio Buitrago'' front, for
the September 1998 murders of CTI members Edilbrando Roa Lopez and John
Morales Patino at Mesopotania, Antioquia. The two had been
investigating a 1998 massacre of nine persons at the nearby town of
Sonson.
On July 30, the Prosecutor General's human rights unit indicted
``Arley Leal,'' commander of the FARC's 32nd Front, for the September
1998 killing of Catholic priest Alcides Jimenez Chicangana. Jimenez was
shot 18 times as he gave a sermon in a Catholic Church hours after he
led a public rally for peace. Charges against narcotics trafficker Luis
Angel Canas, who was detained in 1998 for the crime, were dropped.
In July the Prosecutor General's office indicted Nicolas Antonio
Gomez Zapata for participation in the January 1994 ``La Chinita''
massacre, which resulted in the deaths of 35 persons. In September
1998, the National Tribunal sentenced 30 members of the FARC to a total
of 2,005 years' imprisonment for the massacre. Among those sentenced
were former Apartado (Antioquia) mayor Nelson Campo Nunez and former
Patriotic Union leaders Naun de Jesus Orrego Ossa and Maria Mercedes
Usuga.
Approximately 80 cases regarding Colombia were before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights at year's end. The great majority
involved violations of the right to life. One case, the 1991 ``Las
Palmeras'' massacre, was before the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights at year's end.
The IACHR did not forward to the Inter-American Court the Patriotic
Union's 1996 complaint charging the Government with ``action or
omission'' in what the UP termed ``political genocide'' against the UP
and the Communist Party. The Government and the UP continued without
success in their efforts to reach an amicable settlement under the
auspices of the IACHR. In its October 1997 submission to the IACHR, the
Reinsertion Foundation human rights organization charged that 13
regional UP political leaders had been killed and 3 tortured during the
first 9 months of that year. The Manuel Cepeda Vargas foundation
claimed that killings of UP members continued throughout 1999.
In December Spain complied with a government request and extradited
Lubin de Jesus Morales Orozco, who was arrested in Madrid in June on
unrelated charges, for the April 1998 killing of Eduardo Umana Mendoza,
perhaps the country's best-known and most controversial human rights
lawyer. Seven others remained in detention and were undergoing civilian
judicial processing for the crime at year's end. The authorities also
undertook a preliminary investigation of Joaquin Emilio Gomez Munera
for allegedly having participated in the crime.
There were no new developments in the investigation of paramilitary
leader Gerardo Antonio Palacio for his role in the August 1995 massacre
in Chigorodo, Antioquia.
b. Disappearance.--``Forced disappearance,'' while explicitly
prohibited by the 1991 Constitution, remained an act not explicitly
outlawed under the Penal Code--although the law codifies kidnaping for
extortion and ``simple kidnaping'' as crimes--and continued to be a
problem. After supporting its passage, President Pastrana objected to
specifics of legislation codifying forced disappearance as a crime in
December and returned it to Congress for modification (see Section
1.e.). More than 3,000 cases of forced disappearance have been reported
formally to the authorities since 1977; very few have ever been
resolved.
The human rights Ombudsman's office reported receipt during 1998 of
12 complaints against the army for forced disappearance, 6 against the
National Police, and 399 against paramilitary forces. CINEP reported
309 cases of forced disappearance during the first 9 months of the
year, and attributed 112 of the cases to paramilitary groups and the
rest to unidentified actors. The great majority of victims of forced
disappearance were never seen or heard from again.
The Superior Military Tribunal designated the commander of the air
force as the special, first-instance judge in the case of retired army
General Alvaro Velandia Hurtado, the former commander of the army's
20th Brigade, who was accused of the 1987 forced disappearance,
torture, and murder of M-19 member Nydia Erika Bautista. A military
investigation was underway at year's end.
The authorities suspended police Major Manuel de Jesus Lozada
Plazas, the former deputy commander of the Government's elite
antikidnaping squads known as the GAULA, from duty and placed him on
half-pay following his arrest in March 1997. There were no reported
results from his trial in a civilian court at year's end. There also
have been no results reported in the investigation into cooperation
between these squads and illegal paramilitary groups.
Paramilitary groups were also responsible for kidnapings. The NGO
Pais Libre attributed 103 kidnapings during the year to paramilitary
groups. On May 21, AUC paramilitary forces kidnaped Liberal Senator
Piedad Cordoba, a renowned human rights advocate, from a doctor's
office in Medellin. She was released unharmed on June 4. AUC leader
Carlos Castano personally claimed responsibility for the kidnaping in a
telephone call to a national radio network, and on September 17, the
human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office formally
implicated him in its investigation. According to Human Rights Watch,
in February the ACCU paramilitary group briefly held seven agents of
the CTI; it also threatened the investigators with death.
Kidnaping was an unambiguous, standing policy and major source of
revenue for both the FARC and ELN. Pais Libre reported that there were
2,945 cases of kidnaping during the year, although 136 cases of
soldiers and police captured by guerrillas in combat were included in
these figures. This represented a substantial increase compared with a
1998 total of 2,216 kidnapings. Pais Libre said that 1,985 cases were
financially motivated, and 372 cases were politically motivated. It
attributed 728 cases to the FARC, 695 to the ELN, 167 to the EPL, 55 to
other, smaller guerrilla groups, 300 to common criminals, 6 to family
members of the victim, and 891 to unidentified perpetrators. It
attributed none to state security forces. According to Pais Libre,
politicians, cattlemen, children, and businessmen were guerrillas'
preferred victims. According to the antikidnaping ``czar'' (a
government official), 121 kidnap victims were killed during the year,
and 48 escaped their captors. 1,251 persons were freed after a ransom
payment was made on their behalf. The kidnap victims included 189
children. GAULA antikidnaping squad members and other units of the
security forces freed 454 persons during the year. Arrests or
prosecutions in any of these cases were rare.
According to a July 14 report by the human rights Ombudsman's
office, the FARC was responsible for the forced disappearance of 34
residents of the despeje zone whom it suspected of collaborating with
paramilitary groups.
On May 30, the ELN kidnaped more than 170 persons from the La Maria
Catholic Church in southern Cali during Mass. The kidnapers ordered the
parishioners to leave the church because of an alleged bomb threat,
then put them onto trucks and drove them away. The ELN released 84
persons, including some children and some elderly persons, immediately.
Among the first 84 freed was a group of 20 children who were released
into a minefield, with admonishments to ``be careful of the mines'';
the army rescued them with no casualties. On June 15, the ELN freed
afurther 33 kidnap victims but reneged on its promise to release the
remainder by June 19. Instead, it demanded ransom from their families.
All victims had been released by year's end, typically after a ransom
was paid on their behalf.
On April 12, the ELN hijacked a commercial airliner and kidnaped
its 41 occupants. According to the antikidnaping czar, 15 persons
remained in captivity at the end of the year. One, Carlos Gonzalez,
died in captivity due to a lack of needed medications. On June 6, the
ELN kidnaped nine recreational fishermen south of Barranquilla. Seven
remained in captivity at year's end.
Guerrillas continued to kidnap political leaders. The Federation of
Colombian Municipalities reported that at least 50 mayors were kidnaped
during the year, nearly all by guerrilla groups. In response to this
situation, some rural mayors fled to major cities, where they continued
to conduct municipal business via telephone and facsimile.
Despite continued pressure by the Government on the FARC to account
for three American missionaries kidnaped by FARC guerrillas in January
1993, their whereabouts and condition remained unknown.
The FARC, the ELN, and other guerrilla groups regularly kidnaped
foreign citizens throughout the year; some were released after weeks or
months of captivity, while others still were held at year's end.
On July 30, the FARC hijacked an Avior private commercial aircraft
in Venezuela, forcing it to land in eastern Colombia. Claiming
opponents of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez had hijacked the
aircraft, the FARC announced on August 8 that it had ``found'' the
missing aircraft and released its eight passengers at Saravena, Arauca
department. The FARC also allowed two crew members to return the
aircraft to Venezuela.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and criminal law explicitly prohibit
torture, as well as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment; however, police and military torture and mistreatment of
detainees continued. Of the 38 security force members sanctioned by the
human rights delegate of the Attorney General's office during the year,
11 were punished for torture committed in previous years. However, the
Attorney General's office only can sanction administratively or refer
to the Prosecutor General's office those it finds guilty. Reports of
torture by the army declined; however, reports of torture by police and
INPEC prison guards increased. Torture and abuse occurred in connection
with illegal detentions in the context of counterinsurgency operations.
The Attorney General's human rights delegate received 35 complaints
of torture by state agents, including the police, the DAS, army, and
prison officials, during the year; the office received 119 complaints
of torture in 1998. CINEP deemed the army responsible for 4 cases of
torture during the first 9 months of the year, the police for 10, and
the INPEC prison guards for 35. In the same period in 1998, CINEP
deemed the army responsible for eight reported torture cases and the
police for none. The Superior Military Tribunal reported convicting one
member of the National Police for torture during the year. It convicted
no members of the military of torture. The National Institute of
Forensic Medicine reported during the year that the bodies of 318 of
22,957 homicide victims showed signs of torture. The Ministry of
Defense reported receiving 40 complaints of human rights abuses as of
August.
The reformed Military Penal Code codifies torture as a crime and
directs that cases of torture committed by security force members be
tried in the civilian judiciary, on the grounds that torture could
never be related to acts of service (see Section 1.e.). At year's end,
the Prosecutor General's human rights office was investigating nine
members of the marine corps for torturing five fellow marines, who
reportedly claimed that they had lost their assault rifles, in December
1995. Determining that the alleged actions of Colonel Jose Ancizar
Molano (then-commander of the 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion) and eight
of his subordinates (all of whom were in detention) were in no way
related to acts of service, the military judiciary turned the case over
to the civilian judiciary for investigation and prosecution. Molano and
one of his subordinates were also under investigation for May 1995
social cleansing murders (see Section 1.a.).
On July 23, the Venezuelan Ambassador to Colombia alleged that the
3rd Army Special Forces Battalion tortured and inflicted other cruel,
inhuman, and degrading punishment against four Venezuelan citizens,
following their May 26 capture. The four were charged with trafficking
arms for the FARC, and were detained at year's end. The Venezuelan
Government also asked for an investigation in relation to five other
persons who were with these four men at the time of their capture. The
bodies of two of these five subsequently were found in a river; the
other three allegedly disappeared following the operation.
CINEP attributed 51 of the 115 cases of torture that it reported
during the first 9 months of the year to paramilitary groups.
Paramilitary groups increasingly made use of threats both to intimidate
opponents and to raise money. Letters demanding payment of a war tax
and a threat to mark victims as a military target if they failed to pay
were typical. The NGO reported that nearly half were public school
teachers, and that approximately half of all threat recipients were
residents of Antioquia department.
Guerrilla groups also tortured and abused persons. The bodies of
many persons detained and subsequently killed by guerrillas showed
signs of torture and disfigurement. For example, on April 8, FARC
members killed First Corporal Luis Felipe Benavides Pascuasa with a
machete and killed volunteer soldier Fernando Antonio Vergara Ceballos
by burning his face with acid and emasculating him; both soldiers had
surrendered to the FARC. CINEP reported four cases of torture by the
FARC and one by the Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP), a small guerrilla
movement, during the first 9 months of the year. CINEP reported that
guerrillas also made use of threats, both to intimidate opponents and
to raise money, and--like the paramilitary groups--sent letters
demanding payments of a war tax, along with threats to make persons
military targets. Guerrillas were the principal suspects in death
threats against more than 100 mayors between January and August.
On November 9, a shrapnel bomb was detonated remotely in
southwestern Bogota, near the Prosecutor General's office. Eight
persons were wounded, including Efrain Romero, a senior investigator at
the Prosecutor General's office, at whose car the device apparently was
targeted.
Prison conditions are generally harsh, especially for those
prisoners without significant outside support. Severe overcrowding and
dangerous sanitary and health conditions remained serious problems. In
December 1997, a visiting IACHR mission declared that the living
conditions in Bogota's La Picota prison constituted ``cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment of the inmates,'' and these problems continue.
Guards and prison staff frequently are untrained or corrupt. Prison
guards from the National Prison Institute (INPEC) report to the
Ministry of Justice. According to the Committee for Solidarity with
Political Prisoners, a majority of prisoners' food was provided by
outside, private sources. INPEC reported that the daily food allowance
for each prisoner was $1.44 (2,700 pesos). According to INPEC, the
country's prisons and jails held 45,064 inmates at year's end, 37
percent more than their planned capacity of 32,939. Additionally,
National Police jail cells held approximately 4,200 inmates who could
not be accommodated in prisons due to overcrowding. In a number of the
largest prisons, overcrowding was severe. Medellin's Bellavista prison,
the country's largest, was built to house 1,700 inmates; in August it
housed 6,033 inmates. Bogota's La Modelo prison and the Palmira prison
outside Cali each held more than 155 percent of their designed
capacity.
In February the Justice Ministry announced plans to build 40 new
prisons to house 20,000 persons over the next 4 years; however, by
year's end, Congress had not passed legislation that would have
provided some of the necessary funds. Only 8,000 prisoner
accommodations met international standards. No new prisons have been
constructed in the past 30 years; 17.8 percent of the country's prisons
were between 40 and 80 years old; 3.5 percent were between 80 and 201
years old; and 2.4 percent were more than 201 years old. On June 17,
President Pastrana issued a decree transferring the responsibility for
prison infrastructure to the Ministry of Justice; INPEC retained
responsibility for prisoner rehabilitation and security.
Forty-two percent of all prison inmates are pretrial detainees. The
remaining 58 percent are split roughly between those appealing their
convictions and those who have exhausted their appeals and are serving
out their terms.
There are separate prison facilities for women, and in some parts
of the country, separate women's prisons exist. Women arenot held with
men. Conditions at women's prisons are similar to those at men's
prisons, but are far less violent. In March 44 female prison guards at
Bogota's Buen Pastor prison for women protested, refusing to allow
First Lady Nohra Pullana de Pastrana to visit the prison. The guards
were protesting a judicial order allowing women's prison cell doors to
remain open at night. According to the Criminal Procedures Code, no one
under the age of 18 may be held in a prison. Juveniles are held in
separate facilities operated by the Colombian Institute for Family
Welfare (ICBF).
On March 12, prison conditions and the lack of action by the
Congress on proposed prison, judicial procedure, and penal code reforms
prompted the start of a nationwide civil disobedience campaign by
prisoners who physically prevented the entry of more prisoners into
their cells. On March 16, family members of prisoners also staged sit-
ins at six prisons around the country. In August inmates at La Picota
prison protested prison conditions by detaining 198 women and 101
children, all visiting family members, for 4 days. At year's end,
prisoners' representatives and the Government were engaged in talks
that centered on prison conditions, judicial reform and relevant
pending legislation, and maximum prison sentences. On May 5, prisoners
at the Picalena facility in Ibague rioted when prison officials tried
to initiate operations of ``restoration of control,'' sweeping the
prison for weapons, drugs, and other prohibited items. Prisoners
attacked guards with sticks and firearms and exploded a grenade that
injured two guards. Prison violence was common: According to INPEC, 199
inmates were killed in prison during the year, including 32 in La
Picota prison. Instances of abuse by and corruption among prison staff,
as well as ongoing criminal activities by inmates, were common. INPEC
estimated that 363 prisoners escaped during the first 8 months of the
year. The authorities recaptured 47 escapees during the first half of
the year.
The FARC launched several attacks against prisons holding guerrilla
prisoners, facilitating numerous escapes, including from La Rivera
prison on May 17, and from the prison at Palmira, Valle, on June 29. On
May 5, Wilson Pena Mage, deputy commander of the FARC's 14th Front,
escaped from the prison in Florencia, where he was being held on
charges of kidnaping a judge and of rebellion. On October 25, the
superintendent of La Modelo prison was fired after a television report
showed FARC prisoners staging a military parade in the exercise yard.
There are no separate facilities for pretrial detainees and
convicted prisoners. However, key narcotics traffickers and some
guerrilla leaders get special cells with many comforts, some of which--
such as access to two-way radios, cellular telephones, and computers--
allowed them to continue their illegal activities from inside jail.
Local or regional military and jail commanders did not always prepare
mandatory detention registers or follow notification procedures; as a
result, precise accounting for every detainee was not always possible.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to
have routine access to most prisons and police and military detention
centers. In April the Government ordered the departure of the ICRC's
chief delegate. ICRC operations were not affected.
The ICRC obtained more frequent access, although still on an ad hoc
basis, to prisoners held by paramilitary groups and guerrilla forces.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
includes several provisions designed to prevent illegal detention;
however, there continued to be instances in which the authorities
arrested or detained citizens arbitrarily.
The law prohibits incommunicado detention. Anyone held in
preventive detention must be brought before a prosecutor within 36
hours to determine the legality of the detention. The prosecutor must
then act upon that petition within 36 hours of its submission. Despite
these legal protections, instances of arbitrary detention continued.
Conditional pretrial release is available under certain
circumstances; for example, in connection with minor offenses or after
unduly lengthy amounts of time in preventive detention. It is not
available in cases of serious crimes, such as homicide or terrorism.
Guerrilla groups captured and held prisoner members of the army and
police and called for passage of a prisoner exchange law.On January 11,
in a radio interview, Jorge Briceno, the FARC's second-in-command,
threatened to kidnap politicians until a prisoner exchange law was
approved. Guerrillas, particularly the FARC, pressed the Government and
Congress to adopt a permanent prisoner exchange law. Initiating regular
prisoner exchanges was a top guerrilla priority during the year, and
featured prominently in the FARC's negotiating points at the peace
talks (see Section 1.g.). However, neither the Congress nor the
Government attempted to pass such legislation, and there was minimal
popular support for it. According to the Ministry of Defense, as of
August, the FARC and the ELN held 259 police and 225 army personnel
captive. During the year, guerrillas captured 235 members of the army,
94 members of the police, and 1 member of the navy.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and forced exile is not practiced
formally. However, there were repeated instances of individuals
pressured into self-exile for their personal safety. Such cases
included persons from all walks of life, including politicians, human
rights workers, slum-dwellers, business executives, farmers, and
others. The threats came from various quarters: some individual members
of the security forces, paramilitary groups, guerrilla groups,
narcotics traffickers, other criminal elements, or combinations of the
above.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The civilian judicial system,
reorganized under the 1991 Constitution, is independent of the
executive and legislative branches, both in theory and in practice;
however, the suborning or intimidation of judges, witnesses, and
prosecutors by those indicted or involved is common. The human rights
Ombudsman's office reported receipt of 1,353 complaints of denial of
the right to due legal process during 1998, the most recent year for
which statistics were available.
The judiciary includes the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of
Justice, the Council of State, the Superior Judicial Council, and lower
courts. The Prosecutor General's office is an independent prosecutorial
body that brings criminal cases before the courts. On June 30, the
National Tribunal, which had served as the first appellate court for
the regional (anonymous) courts, was replaced by a new chamber, the
specialized jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Justice serves as the
appellate court for decisions by the new chamber and lower appellate
courts, and is also the court in which elected officials, full generals
and admirals, diplomats, and judges are tried. The Council of State is
the appellate court for civil cases. The Constitutional Court is to
adjudicate cases of constitutionality and reviews all decisions
regarding motions for cessation of judicial processes. The CSJ is the
administrative arm of the judicial branch and also has the
responsibility of determining whether individual cases involving
members of the security forces are to be tried in civilian or military
courts. Jurisdictional clashes among the Constitutional Court, Supreme
Court of Justice, the Council of State, and the Superior Judicial
Council were common, due to the lack of a single supreme judicial
authority capable of deciding issues of competence or constitutional
interpretation.
On June 30, the regional court system was dismantled formally and
replaced with a new specialized jurisdiction for a period of 8 years
(with performance to be reviewed by the Congress after 4 years). On
July 1, the new system came into effect with a mandate to try certain
crimes that have the potential to impede severely normal judicial
functioning; including crimes of kidnaping, hijacking, paramilitarism,
narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and human rights abuses.
However, in a concession to the FARC, the Government removed rebellion,
the criminal charge on which most guerrillas are tried, from the list
of crimes to be tried by the specialized jurisdiction.
The specialized jurisdiction affords the protection of anonymity to
prosecutors (during the preliminary and investigative stages of a case)
and witnesses, conditioned upon the concurrence of the Prosecutor
General. Some judges, who lost the protection of anonymity under the
new system, resigned. As was the case in the regional (anonymous)
courts, specialized jurisdiction prosecutors are permitted 12 months to
investigate and develop cases, rather than the 6 months afforded to
regular civilian judiciary prosecutors.
Congress included in the legislation creating the specialized
jurisdiction two articles that state that under no circumstance are the
reports of the agencies with judicial police powers--including the DAS,
the investigative unit of the Prosecutor General's office, and the
judicial police element of theNational Police--or information provided
by confidential informants to be used as evidence in the new courts.
As part of the Ministry of Defense, the military judiciary falls
under the executive branch, rather than under the judicial branch. The
armed forces commander is also the president of the military judiciary,
which has no dedicated corps of military lawyers. The Military Penal
Code predates the 1991 Constitution and does not contemplate some
contemporary crimes. The workings of the military judiciary lack
transparency and accountability, contributing to a generalized lack of
confidence in the system's ability to bring human rights abusers to
justice.
On June 17, the Congress passed a revised Military Penal Code,
which President Pastrana signed into law on August 12. However, the
Constitution provides that any judicial reforms, including reforms of
the military judiciary, require implementing legislation to take
effect. In addition, one clause of the new law stipulates that it would
take effect no earlier than August 2000, to permit creation of an
independent corps of military lawyers and other required bureaucratic
structures. Among the provisions of the new code are that unit
commanders no longer may judge their subordinates; that an independent
judge advocate general corps is to be created; and that troops are to
be protected legally if they refuse to carry out illegal orders to
commit human rights abuses. In addition, the civilian judiciary is
granted the right to be present at military trials of military
personnel. According to the Vice President's office, in December the
Government presented Congress with draft implementing legislation for
the new code.
The reformed code directs that torture, forced disappearance,
genocide, and crimes against humanity, as codified in international
conventions to which the country is a signatory, be tried by the
civilian judiciary. However, according to the Vice President's office,
forced disappearance is not codified in any convention to which the
country is a party, so it still could not be prosecuted. On December
15, the Congress passed a reformed civilian penal code bill during the
year, but in late December, President Pastrana returned the bill to
Congress for modifications. The bill codified torture, forced
disappearance, forced displacement, and genocide as crimes, but had not
been signed into law by the President at year's end. Therefore, neither
genocide nor forced disappearance were codified as crimes in the
civilian Penal Code at year's end, and thus could not be prosecuted as
such in civilian courts. However, similar crimes such as kidnaping,
murder, and mass murder are codified in the civilian code.
A 1997 Constitutional Court decision directed the military judicial
system to relinquish to the civilian judiciary the investigation and
prosecution of grave human rights violations and other alleged crimes
not directly related to acts of service--the 1991 constitutional
standard for determining whether a case should be tried by the military
or civilian judiciary. The military judiciary demonstrated an increased
willingness during the year to turn cases of military officers,
generally of lower rank, accused of human rights violations or criminal
activities over to the civilian judiciary. The military also sent the
cases of three colonels to the civilian judiciary--the first time cases
concerning officers of that rank have been transferred to the civilian
judiciary. However, CSJ rulings indicated that it did not always
consider itself bound by the Constitutional Court's 1997 directive when
determining whether cases involving security force personnel belonged
in the military or civilian judiciaries.
The CSJ assigned most cases involving high-level military personnel
to the military courts, where convictions in human rights-related cases
were the rare exception. According to the 1991 Constitution, general-
rank officers are to be tried by the Supreme Court, but that provision
was ignored in practice. No definitive court ruling has resolved
various judicial interpretations of the provision; however, a majority
of decisions seem to suggest that this provision applies only to full
generals. In determining which alleged crimes were to be tried by
military tribunals, the CSJ also regularly employed an extremely broad
definition of acts of service, thus ensuring that uniformed defendants
of any rank, particularly the most senior, were tried in military
tribunals.
In October 1998, the CSJ determined that Brigadier General Fernando
Millan Perez's alleged organization of a paramilitary group constituted
an act of service and therefore turned General Millan's case over to
the military judiciary for prosecution (see Section 1.a.). In reaching
its decision, the CSJ determined that it was not bound by the
Constitutional Court's narrow 1997 interpretation of the 1991
constitutional standardof relation to acts of service. The CSJ's
decision effectively ended the Prosecutor General's investigation into
whether General Millan had provided weapons and intelligence to
paramilitary groups in Santander department.
In cases in which military officers were tried, convicted, and
sentenced for human rights violations, they generally did not serve
prison terms, but were confined to their bases or military police
detention centers, as permitted by law. Military prisoners remain on
active duty (and reduced pay) while in detention, but are relieved from
command responsibilities. Some perform administrative functions while
in detention. On August 3, Prosecutor General Alfonso Gomez Mendez
publicly asked military forces commander General Fernando Tapias to
explain how five military detainees, all charged with gross human
rights violations, escaped their military captors at different moments
during the year. On July 23, army Lieutenant Alberto Acosta Tarazona,
who was sentenced in November 1997 to 58 years in prison for the
torture and killing of 2 police detectives and their informant after
they sought to arrest a regional paramilitary leader, walked away from
the base where he was being held through its front gate. He remained at
large at year's end.
Judges have long been subject to threats and intimidation,
particularly when dealing with cases involving members of the armed
forces or of paramilitary, narcotics, and guerrilla organizations. The
number of instances of violent attacks against prosecutors and judges
declined in recent years; however, prosecutors, judges, and defense
attorneys continued to be subjected to threats and acts of violence.
Several faceless judges were kidnaped during the year; none was killed.
One faceless prosecutor was killed during the year, and the FARC was
responsible for the forced disappearance of a regular civilian judge in
Cartagena del Chaira after she sentenced one of its leaders to prison.
Moreover, prosecutors reported that potential witnesses in major cases
often lacked faith in the Government's ability to protect their
anonymity and were thus unwilling to testify, ruining chances for
successful prosecutions. These concerns led in 1984 to the creation of
a regional or public order jurisdiction to prosecute cases involving
the crimes of narcotics trafficking, terrorism, kidnaping, subversion,
extortion, and some cases of human rights violations; these regional
courts were in effect until June 30, when they were replaced by the
specialized jurisdiction. In the regional courts, prosecutors, judges,
witnesses, and attorneys acted under cover of anonymity for security
reasons. Given security concerns, and since testimony and evidence
typically was provided to the judge in written form, regional court
trials were not public. While a 1993 reform of the Criminal Procedures
Code addressed certain procedural shortcomings within the system,
significant problems remained. It still was difficult for defense
attorneys to impeach or cross-examine anonymous witnesses, and often
the defense attorneys did not have unimpeded access to the State's
evidence. As a result of such concerns, judges may no longer base a
conviction solely on the testimony of an anonymous witness.
Nonetheless, national and international human rights groups continue to
accuse these courts of violating fundamental rights of due process,
including the right to a public trial. Some of the most vocal
congressional critics of these courts continued to be implicated in
corruption or narcotics trafficking investigations.
The Attorney General's office investigates misconduct by public
officials, including members of the military and police. Its
constitutional mandate only provides for the imposition of
administrative sanctions; it has no authority to bring criminal
prosecutions. Although the Attorney General's office may refer cases to
the Prosecutor General's office for investigation and prosecution, it
regularly fails to do so. The Attorney General's office can draw upon a
nationwide network of hundreds of government human rights investigators
covering the country's 1,085 municipalities. However, since it cannot
impose criminal sanctions, it is incapable of adequately punishing
human rights abusers.
The Supreme Court elects the Prosecutor General for a 4-year term,
which does not coincide with that of the President, from a list of
three candidates chosen by the President. The Prosecutor General is
tasked with investigating criminal offenses and presenting evidence
against the accused before the various judges and tribunals. However,
this office retains significant judicial functions and, like other
elements of the civilian judiciary, it is struggling to make the
transition from a Napoleonic legal system to a mixed one that
incorporates an adversarial aspect.
In an attempt to deal with impunity, the Prosecutor General in 1995
created a special human rights unit as part of the regional courts
system. The unit achieved significant results; its group of 25
anonymous prosecutors handled several hundred cases involving
massacres, extrajudicial killings, kidnapings, and terrorism. These
prosecutors issued arrest warrants against members of the public
security forces, paramilitary, drug trafficking, and guerrilla
organizations. The unit arrested 248 suspects during the year, and
other state entities arrested 87 suspects against whom the human rights
unit had open cases. In July the unit's director was replaced due to
threats against his life.
The human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office
investigated, indicted, or prosecuted 303 security force members during
the year, including at least 12 officers, on a variety of charges
including homicide, torture, kidnaping, and sponsorship of paramilitary
groups. The Attorney General's office and the security forces
demonstrated a greater willingness to follow up with instructions that
those ordered arrested be removed from their duties, denied the right
to wear a uniform, or turned over to civilian judicial authorities.
However, impunity continued to be very widespread.
The Constitution specifically provides for the right to due
process. Judges determine the outcome of all trials; there are no jury
trials. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty and has
the right to representation by counsel, although representation for the
indigenous and the indigent historically has been inadequate. In August
the CSJ's administrative chamber reported that the civilian judiciary
suffered from a backlog of 3,068,739 cases (including 604,506 penal
cases), and that the number of outstanding arrest warrants was 338,000.
As of August, 223,000 motions for cessation of judicial actions
(``tutelas'') were before the Constitutional Court for its legally
mandated review.
Defendants in trials conducted by the regular courts have the right
to be present and the right to timely consultation with an attorney.
Regular court defendants and their attorneys have the right to
question, contradict, and confront witnesses against them, to present
witnesses on their own behalf, and to have access to government
evidence relevant to the case. The country's judiciaries, including
regular civilian, specialized jurisdiction, and military, continue to
be overwhelmingly Napoleonic in character; everything is processed in
writing. Direct confrontations and cross-examinations of witnesses
occurred only rarely. Defendants also have the right to appeal a
conviction to a higher court.
The Chamber of Deputies elects the Public Ministry's National
Ombudsman for Human Rights for a 4-year term, which does not coincide
with that of the President. The office has the constitutional duty to
ensure the promotion and exercise of human rights. In addition to
providing public defense attorneys in criminal cases, the Ombudsman's
34 departmental and regional offices throughout the country provide a
legal channel for thousands of complaints and allegations of human
rights violations. However, in practice, the Ombudsman's operations are
underfunded and understaffed, slowing its development of a credible
public defender system.
Within the FARC-controlled despeje zone, local FARC leaders
effectively supplanted judicial authorities. Residents of the zone
regularly were denied the right to a fair trial. The public prosecutor
at San Vicente del Caguan fled the area after receiving threats from
the FARC; the judge at Mesetas fled after his office was sacked; and
guerrillas kidnaped the judge at Cartagena del Chaira, just outside the
despeje zone, after she rendered a decision against a guerrilla.
Prosecutor General Alfonso Gomez Mendez said in July that elements of
the civilian justice system would return to the despeje zone only when
the police and army did.
The Government states that it does not hold political prisoners.
The ICRC reported that it monitored approximately 3,000 cases of
imprisoned citizens accused of terrorism, rebellion, or aiding and
abetting the insurgency, which are crimes punishable under law.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law provides for the protection of these rights;
however, at times the authorities infringed upon them. The law
generally requires a judicial order signed by a prosecutor for the
authorities to enter a private home, except in cases of hot pursuit.
The Ministry of Defense continued training publicsecurity forces in
legal search procedures that comply with constitutional and human
rights. Due to intimidation, corruption, or the absence of evidentiary
proof collected directly by prosecutors, guerrilla suspects captured by
the security forces in or out of combat and turned over to the judicial
authorities routinely were set free.
A judicial order or the approval of a prosecuting attorney is
required to authorize the interception of mail or the monitoring of
either landline or cellular telephones. This protection extends to
prisoners held in jails. However, various state authorities sometimes
monitored telephones without obtaining prior authorization. No
officials have ever been disciplined for illegal wiretapping. There
were unconfirmed reports by some human rights groups that they were
subjected to surveillance, harassment, or threats by members of the
security forces.
Guerrillas regularly forcibly recruited children and indigenous
people to serve as soldiers (see Sections 1.g. and 5). There are some
child soldiers among the paramilitary groups.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--The internal armed conflict and narcotics
trafficking are the central causes of violations of human rights and
humanitarian law. Government security forces at times violated
international humanitarian law, and continued to commit serious human
rights abuses, although the great majority of serious abuses were
committed by paramilitary groups and guerrillas.
The ICRC reported that the Government, including military
authorities, followed an open-door policy toward the ICRC and readily
incorporated Red Cross curriculums on international humanitarian law in
standard military training. The military has reduced its emphasis on
body counts as a means of assessing field performance. However,
impunity remains a problem. According to military sources, local
commanders typically preferred to transfer or discharge soldiers
accused of serious human rights violations, rather than initiate court
martial proceedings.
A preliminary investigation by the Prosecutor General of the
December 1998 confrontation between the Government and the FARC at
Santo Domingo, Arauca, was underway at year's end. Human rights
monitors charged that military aircraft had attacked the jungle
village, killing 18 civilians and wounding 25 others, while engaging
the FARC. The military strongly denied these accounts, stating that a
battle took place about 4 miles outside the town, and that deaths in
Santo Domingo were the result of a FARC truck bomb that exploded
prematurely. FARC defectors confirmed this version, according to the
Ministry of Defense.
According to the independent Advisory Committee for Human Rights
and Displacements (CODHES), some 288,000 persons were displaced
forcibly from their homes by violence during the year; approximately
308,000 persons were displaced during 1998. However, Human Rights Watch
reported that forced displacement intensified in some regions during
the year. Expectations that the Government's peace initiative might
eventually stabilize local conditions encouraged some citizens to
remain in their communities, according to CODHES. Internally displaced
citizens during 1995-99 probably exceeded 1,000,000, but the total
number--and the number of those who were displaced permanently--was
difficult to quantify. Human Rights Watch quoted the Displaced Persons
Support Group, an alliance of human rights, religious, and aid
organizations, as stating that an estimated 1.5 million persons had
been displaced by political violence since 1985. CODHES states that
some persons have been displaced for as long as 10 years, but is unable
to identify a typical timeframe for displacement. Some persons return
to their homes within days or weeks, others within months, and some
never return. Some displaced persons move several times after fleeing
their original home, making tracking difficult. The Government does not
consider persons to be displaced after 2 years. CODHES estimated that
perhaps 65 percent of displacements became permanent. Many displaced
persons lost access to health care, employment, and education (see
Section 5).
The Government's response to the needs of the displaced population
was inadequate. The Government has no systematic program to make
provisions for humanitarian assistance to the displaced, although it is
required by law to do so. The Solidarity Network was neither designed
nor prepared for emergency humanitarian assistance work, and it usually
provided such assistance only to refugees returning to the country. The
Government provides assistance through the Solidarity Network, the
Institute for Family Welfare (ICBF), the Health Ministry,and other
state entities. The Government's ability to provide assistance was
further constrained in January, when an earthquake killed approximately
900 persons and left another 100,000 homeless. In March the Government
estimated that 70 percent of humanitarian assistance received by
displaced persons had been provided by the ICRC. Private estimates were
higher. Most displaced citizens receiving ICRC emergency humanitarian
assistance received it for only 90 days. The Government also tries to
limit assistance to 90 days; however, some displaced persons in the
camps at Turbo and Pavarando, and in a stadium in Cucuta, received aid
for a longer period. The ICRC continued to expand its assistance to the
displaced. It assisted an estimated 37,000 displaced families during
the first 6 months of the year, compared with approximately 24,000
families during the second 6 months of 1998.
Many of the displaced fled to cities, which have had difficulty
integrating large numbers of persons into their infrastructure.
Conditions at the Government's two camps for displaced persons, at
Pavarando and Turbo, were poor and unhygienic; health care remained
poor and there were few educational or employment opportunities. One
NGO worker with Medecins du Monde estimated in a press report that
about 85 percent of the children under age 6 have some form of
malnutrition. The Government sometimes encouraged civilian populations
to move back to their homes before security situations had normalized.
Thousands of displaced persons also fled to Panama, Ecuador, and
Venezuela, where they often were denied refugee status, treated as
illegal immigrants, denied protection or assistance, and often returned
to Colombia. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has an
office in Bogota to address the problem and opened a field office in
Barrancabermeja in December.
A group of 83 internally displaced persons occupied the Bogota
UNHCR offices from August 2 to August 25. Two of the demonstrators
crucified themselves outside the office. The protest was intended
ostensibly to draw attention to the conditions of the country's
displaced. On December 14, approximately 60 internally displaced
persons broke into the ICRC's Bogota office and occupied the premises;
government negotiations were underway at year's end.
According to army and United Nations estimates, there were between
50,000 and 70,000 antipersonnel landmines located in 15 departments.
According to an army estimate, there have been 515 civilian and
military victims of landmines since 1996. Of these, 116 died and 399
were mutilated. During the year, 15 members of the army were killed by
antipersonnel landmines, and 7 were wounded. The armed forces
maintained approximately 20,000 landmines during the year, most of
which were used to defend static positions, and were appropriately
mapped and marked. Due to the ongoing conflict, no generalized mine
clearance program was underway at year's end; however, the army
deactivated 35 minefields during the year. Thousands of displaced
persons were unable to return to their homes due to the presence of
antipersonnel mines. There were no known civilian mine awareness
campaigns or assistance programs for civilian victims of landmines.
The human rights Ombudsman's office reported an increase in
violence against women during 1997, especially in war zones. It noted
that most female victims in zones of conflict chose not to report the
abuses they had suffered, in part due to a lack of confidence in the
efficacy of governmental institutions to address their problems. The
Ombudsman noted that female leaders of political and peasant
organizations in the Uraba-Antioquia region were increasingly the
targets of persecution, threats, torture, and executions. According to
the Ombudsman's 1997 report, there was a substantial increase in sexual
assault and murder of women that year, particularly in Meta, Arauca,
Cesar, and Sucre departments.
The Government sometimes militarized public hospitals in conflict
areas such as Uraba, Putumayo department, and southern Bolivar
department, which increased the risk that the hospitals would become
targets of guerrilla attack. Police established their headquarters at
Mongua, Boyaca, in the town's public clinic; the ELN attacked it on
four separate occasions. On rare occasions, the State discouraged
medical treatment of guerrillas. In Arauca the judiciary prosecuted,
sentenced, and imprisoned a doctor and a nurse for providing medical
treatment to guerrillas. In July after combat at Campamento, Antioquia,
the army transported two wounded policemen to a hospital, but refused
to transport also two wounded FARC members, one of whom later died.
The many paramilitary groups are diverse in their motivations,
structure, leadership, and ideology. The 1997 establishment of the
United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) as a national umbrella
organization was designed both to provide a national structure and to
develop a more coherent political culture for the nation's local and
regional paramilitary groups. The AUC paramilitary umbrella group
comprises between 5,000 and 7,000 combatants, who are members of 7
major organizations. The largest of these organizations is the ACCU,
which is based in Cordoba department and the Uraba region of Antioquia
department. The AUC also has as many as 4,000 of its own dedicated
combatants. Carlos Castano heads both the AUC and the ACCU. Although
illegal, some paramilitary groups reflected rural citizens' legitimate
desire to defend themselves from the guerrilla threat. Other groups
were actually the paid, private armies of drug traffickers or large
landowners. Many members of paramilitary groups are former security
force members or former guerrillas.
The victims of paramilitary killings were often unarmed civilians
whom the paramilitary groups believed to be guerrillas or guerrilla
collaborators. Paramilitary groups sought the death or displacement of
civilians as punishment for perceived ties to the guerrillas. In
addition to isolated and indiscriminate massacres, paramilitary groups
launched several campaigns characterized by a series of massacres
linked by time or location. Their activities also included selective
killings, kidnaping, intimidation, and the forced displacement of
persons not directly involved in the hostilities. Paramilitary groups
targeted teachers (see Section 2.a.), human rights activists (see
Section 4), labor leaders (see Section 6.a.), community activists,
national and local politicians (including President Pastrana),
peasants, and other persons whom they accused of supporting or failing
to confront guerrillas. Paramilitary forces killed members of
indigenous groups (see Section 5). Paramilitary groups continued their
efforts to deprive guerrillas of civilian support by displacing
civilian populations believed to be sympathetic to the guerrillas.
A major paramilitary offensive during January 7-10, following the
beginning of peace talks between the Government and the FARC, and
consisting of 19 separate massacres in 6 departments, left at least 143
persons dead and hundreds of others displaced. The massacres reportedly
were in response to the FARC's December 1998 attempt to take an AUC
stronghold in Nudo del Paramillo, in which 30 persons were killed. Many
of those killed by the AUC were not involved directly with guerrillas.
Although security forces had ample warning of the attacks and enough
time, during the course of 4 days, to respond, they failed to intervene
in any of the 19 massacres, and arrested only 2 suspects following the
massacres. The Government did not investigate subsequently local
commanding officers for omission, negligence, or collaboration with the
paramilitary perpetrators of the crimes.
Among these massacres was the January 9-10 massacre at El Tigre,
Putumayo, in which paramilitary forces killed at least 22, and possibly
as many as 33, persons. Approximately 80 percent of the town's
surviving population subsequently fled, after the attackers threatened
to kill anyone who stayed in the town. An initial Prosecutor General's
investigation was aborted due to death threats against the
investigators and the local police's reported inability to protect
them. On October 22, the Prosecutor General's human rights office
formally indicted paramilitary leader Luis Guillermo Millan Cordona for
the crime, as well as for establishing paramilitary groups; he remained
at large at year's end.
Also among the series of January 7-10 AUC massacres was a January 9
massacre at Playon de Orozco, Magdalena department, in which at least
27 persons were killed. Gunmen, carrying lists with the names of their
intended victims, dragged them outside a church during a Mass, and shot
them while the priests and other villagers watched.
A 300-person paramilitary group based at Vetas, Norte de Santander,
committed 15 massacres in and around the towns of La Gabarra and Tibu
between May 29 and September 1. More than 145 persons whom the
attackers claimed were guerrillas or guerrilla supporters were killed.
(There is a heavy guerrilla presence in the area.) Nearby elements of
the army's 46th Counterguerrilla Battalion (Tibu) and 5th Mechanized
Group (Cucuta), as well as police, did not intervene. On August 30, the
Government relieved from command three top regional security force
commanders--Brigadier General Alberto Bravo Silva (commander of the
army's 5th Brigade), the departmental police chief, and the head of the
regional DAS--for failure to act to prevent the August 21-22 massacre.
On September 2, Brigadier General Bravo Silva was separated from
service on orders from PresidentPastrana. The Attorney General's office
opened an investigation for possible dereliction of duty by security
force officers in the area, including those who were relieved. A police
captain who allegedly provided logistical support to the paramilitary
forces is also under investigation. The Prosecutor General's human
rights unit issued an arrest warrant for paramilitarism for Ulises
Castellanos, who allegedly participated in the Tibu massacre. In late
August, the Minister of Defense ordered an additional army battalion to
the area (to be headquartered in La Gabarra), accompanied by 69
additional police. In response to the massacres, the Prosecutor
General's human rights unit opened a new investigative subdivision,
which had implicated 14 persons in formal investigations by year's end.
The last of the original 400-plus ``Convivir'' rural self-defense
cooperatives was dismantled during the year. The cooperatives were
formed in 1994 to provide counterinsurgency intelligence to local
police and military commanders. There had been credible charges that
some Convivir cooperative members had committed serious human rights
abuses while fighting alongside, or as members of, illegal paramilitary
units. Twenty of the original Convivir cooperatives were reconfigured
as ``special service cooperatives,'' and the Government legally
recognized these groups. In November 1997 the Constitutional Court had
ruled that while the groups were a constitutional means to combat
guerrillas, they must relinquish rifles, machine guns, and other
restricted weaponry in their possession. (Although the authorities
originally intended these groups to be unarmed, they subsequently
authorized an undetermined number to carry small arms in self-defense.)
Other Convivir groups clearly were operating outside the terms of the
law, as they were armed with rifles, shotguns, machine guns, and other
weaponry, much of it authorized, sold, or otherwise provided to them by
the military. In July 1998, the Government began disbanding the
cooperatives.
On April 12, the Prosecutor General's office placed police Captain
Johnny Estrada under preventive detention while he awaited trial for
participation in forming paramilitary groups, related to the ``Convivir
El Corral,'' centered in Arauca.
Some local army and police commanders tacitly tolerated--and
sometimes aided and abetted--the activities of paramilitary groups,
despite the public pronouncements of the Government and the armed
forces high command that they intended to combat paramilitary violence.
At times, individual commanders and troops at local levels armed,
coordinated actions with, or shared intelligence with paramilitary
groups. Some military commanders effectively afforded paramilitary
groups protection by allowing them to establish their base camps in
areas generally under military control. Paramilitary groups that
received such shelter often were able to attack guerrillas with minimal
fear of reprisals. In October 1998, Vice President Gustavo Bell
admitted that despite official policy, ``some members of the armed
forces have maintained some degree of links to paramilitary groups;''
he stated that there was no evidence of an ``institutional decision''
by the armed forces to cooperate with paramilitary groups. However,
paramilitary forces find a ready support base within the local military
and the police, as well as civilian elites in many areas.
Despite the continuing significant rise in paramilitary activity
since 1992, security forces failed to give priority to confronting
these illegal groups. According to the Ministry of Defense, the
military, National Police, and CTI captured a total of 556 members of
paramilitary groups and killed more than 26 during the year. According
to the Vice President's office, state security forces captured 188
members of paramilitary groups between January and September, and
killed 37 during the same period.
The Government took some action during the year to investigate
allegations of collaboration or complicity with paramilitary groups by
members of the security forces, and to punish those responsible (see
Section 1.a.). The Prosecutor General's office and the Attorney
General's office in some instances took action in response to
collaboration with paramilitary groups by members of the security
forces.
On July 23, 1998, the Prosecutor General's human rights unit
arrested four members of the army's 17th Brigade and charged them with
sponsorship and formation of illegal paramilitary groups. The four men
were arrested on the basis of testimony from several of the members of
a paramilitary group who had surrendered to that brigade in February
1998. There was no reported progress in the case at year's end.
Paramilitary groups on occasion used landmines and sometimes forced
underage combatants into their ranks. Paramilitarygroups' respect for
the protected status of hospitals, medical personnel, and the emblem of
the Red Cross improved during the year, due in large part to
educational efforts by the ICRC. However, in July the AUC temporarily
closed the hospital at Santafe de Antioquia to all but paramilitary
patients.
Guerrilla organizations continued to pursue strategies that
routinely led them to commit abuses against citizens. Their tactics
consistently included extrajudicial killings, kidnaping, torture,
targeting of civilian populations and installations, including medical
facilities, and the forced recruitment of children as young as 10 years
old. In response to President Pastrana's August 12 call to all armed
actors to obey international humanitarian law (the rules of war), the
FARC responded that it would not abide by, and was not bound by,
international humanitarian law.
Two main guerrilla armies, the FARC and the ELN, as well as the
much smaller EPL and other groups, commanded an estimated total of
between 11,000 and 17,000 full-time guerrillas operating in more than
100 semiautonomous groups in 30 of the nation's 32 departments. These
groups undertook armed actions in nearly 1,000 of the 1,085
municipalities. Both the FARC and the ELN systematically attacked
noncombatants and violated citizens' rights through the use of tactics
such as killings, forced disappearances, the mutilation of bodies,
attacks on ambulances, and executions of patients in hospitals.
Guerrillas also killed indigenous people (see Section 5) and religious
leaders (see Section 2.a.).
Guerrillas used landmines both to defend static positions (such as
base camps, cocaine laboratories, and sites at which kidnap victims
were held) and as indiscriminate weapons of terror. Landmines planted
by guerrillas or disguised as everyday items such as soccer balls or
paint cans often resulted in the killing or maiming of civilian
noncombatants; thousands of displaced persons were unable to return to
their homes due to the presence of antipersonnel mines. The FARC used
sulfuric acid in the gas canisters that it employed as artillery.
Scores of soldiers, police, and civilians were burned indiscriminately
as a result. Although the ELN agreed to halt recruitment of children
under the terms of the June 1998 Mainz ``Heaven's Gate'' agreement,
both it and the larger FARC regularly forced children into their ranks
(see Section 5). Once recruited, child guerrillas are virtual prisoners
of their commanders and subject to various forms of abuse. Sexual abuse
of young girls is a particular problem.
On March 15, the press reported that FARC members entered the town
of Vereda Mata de Platano, Caparrapi municipality, Cundinamarca
department. The attackers forced approximately 100 residents from their
homes, forced them to lie down in the street, and shot anyone whose
name appeared on their list of alleged paramilitary collaborators. Nine
men were killed.
Between July 8 and 12, the FARC conducted a generally unsuccessful
offensive in 15 departments, which was characterized by numerous
abuses. Many of the FARC units involved undertook their attacks from
the despeje zone. According to army estimates, 289 members of the FARC
were killed during the offensive (including approximately 70 children
between the ages of 9 and 15).
On July 30-31, the FARC destroyed approximately 80 percent of the
town of Narino, Antioquia, during a massive attack. The guerrillas
killed eight civilians (including four children) and nine police
officers during or after the attack. The FARC summarily executed
several of the police officers after having captured them and also
wounded 7 police and 11 civilians. A hospital, a school, and
approximately 40 homes were among the buildings destroyed. The FARC
then declared family and girlfriends of surviving policemen to be
military targets, causing many to flee.
On September 27, the FARC killed seven persons in Barrancabermeja.
The victims were reportedly members or sympathizers of the ELN and were
among a group of squatters that had occupied a new public housing
project. Local police and army units reportedly did not intervene.
In July the FARC admitted to having killed 11 persons in the
despeje, who had disappeared at various times beginning in November
1998. The FARC accused the victims of being members of paramilitary
groups.
Between November 16 and 23, the FARC attacked 15 cities in 5
different regions across the country, causing widespread devastation.
The attack centered on the Guainia departmentalcapital of Puerto
Inirida. The attacks were viewed publicly as a rejection of President
Pastrana's call for a Christmas cease-fire. The attacks included the
use of a hand grenade attached to a dog's collar and the destruction of
a 150-year-old church.
Government forensic experts determined that, of 38 soldiers killed
during the FARC's July 8 attack on Gutierrez, Cundinamarca department,
17 were killed by ``coup de grace'' shots to the head after the
soldiers were captured.
According to the Federation of Colombian Municipalities, guerrilla
attacks damaged or destroyed the installations of 66 municipal
governments between January and July and kidnaped at least 50 mayors
during the year (see Section 1.b.)
On October 20, the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's
office issued an arrest warrant on charges of terrorism, rebellion, and
homicide for ELN front commander Luis Guillermo Roldan Posada. Roldan
was wanted for masterminding the ELN's October 1998 attack on the oil
and gas pipeline at Machuca, Antioquia. The resulting explosion killed
84 persons (including more than 38 children) and injured another 40
persons. In December two other ELN members also were indicted for the
attack.
ELN and FARC attacks on the Cano Limon-Covenas and other pipelines
caused oil spills that resulted in massive environmental damage.
Guerrilla groups also were responsible for multiple abuses of
religious and medical personnel with protected status and of the
wounded. During the July offensive, some FARC combatants wrongfully
employed the emblem of the Red Cross or disguised themselves as medical
personnel to either achieve surprise or flee combat. FARC combatants at
Campamento, Antioquia, sought refuge in a home for the elderly and
directed their offensive from the town hospital. In August the FARC
killed one civilian and kidnaped another while looting the hospital in
Dabeiba, Antioquia of medicines. The FARC previously attacked the same
hospital in May. The ELN killed several wounded members of paramilitary
groups during the first half of the year in the hospital at Saravena.
On a number of occasions, FARC guerrillas took over municipal clinics
and used them as headquarters for their attacks on civilian and
military targets.
In July 1998, then-President-elect Pastrana met with the FARC's
leader, Manuel Marulanda Velez. In order to facilitate future
negotiations, the two agreed to a demilitarized zone, in which the two
sides could pursue peace talks. The despeje zone was initiated in
November 1998 in five southern municipalities, with a total population
of approximately 100,000. By the end of December 1998, security forces
had completed their withdrawal from the area, effectively turning it
over to FARC control. Representatives of the Government and the FARC
met in January; however, the FARC suspended the negotiations after less
than 2 weeks, claiming that the Government should produce
``satisfactory results against paramilitary groups'' before talks could
resume. In May President Pastrana and Marulanda met again and agreed on
a 12-point agenda for formal negotiations and on procedures for the
creation of an international verification commission to monitor both
sides' compliance with the terms of the despeje. However, a subsequent
dispute over the issue of whether to immediately establish such a
commission deadlocked both sides, and formal talks did not begin in
earnest until October. The Government also broached peace talks with
the ELN, but refused to continue the talks until the ELN released each
of the more than 200 civilian noncombatants kidnaped in three mass
kidnapings between May and July. By year's end, most of the kidnap
victims had been freed, typically after paying ransom to the ELN;
however, the ELN was still holding a score of these kidnap victims at
year's end.
The FARC committed numerous abuses against civilians in the despeje
zone. The FARC was responsible for killings, rape, alleged cases of
forced disappearance, arbitrary detention, infringement of the rights
to free speech and fair trial (see Section 1.e.), forced political
indoctrination, and the forced recruitment of hundreds of children.
According to press reports, the FARC has stated publicly that all
persons between the ages of 13 and 60 in the despeje zone are liable
for military service with the guerrillas. The FARC also has pressured
at least one priest to leave the despeje zone and expelled another (see
Section 2.c.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of the press; however, while the Government generally respected
this right in practice, there were some significant exceptions.
Journalists regularly practiced self-censorship to avoid retaliation
and harassment. However, the privately owned print media published a
wide spectrum of political viewpoints and often voiced harsh
antigovernment opinions without fear of administrative reprisals. In
1997 the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the
Government's ban on publication of guerrilla communiques by the media.
A ban on the publication of evidence pertaining to criminal
investigations, based on the secrecy provisions of the Penal Code and
an anticorruption statute, remained in effect.
In August 1998, the dean of the Los Andes University law school and
the leading daily newspaper El Tiempo filed a legal challenge to the
1997 Constitutional Court decision upholding a 1996 law that gave the
Government unprecedented authority over the content of television
programming. The plaintiffs asserted that the law was aimed at limiting
journalistic freedom of expression. At the very end of 1998, the court
ruled that the actions of the administration of then-President Ernesto
Samper were unconstitutional and that all future licensing agreements
would be respected.
All citizens have the right to seek a judicial injunction or motion
(``tutela'') in cases involving violations of constitutional rights.
This provides all persons and organizations, including the media, with
a mechanism to criticize both governmental and private violations of
fundamental rights. In May a decision by the Supreme Court determined
that the media are obligated not only to rectify misinformation, but
also to compensate the victim for damages caused.
Journalists typically work in an atmosphere of threats and
intimidation. Fearing for their safety, journalists often refrain from
publishing or airing stories counter to the interest of paramilitary
groups, guerrillas, or narcotics traffickers. Unknown assailants killed
nine journalists during the year, although not all the murders could be
attributed directly to the journalists' work. (At least 13 journalists
were killed in 1998.) On April 11, radio announcer Hernando Rangel
Moreno was killed at a friend's home. Although he was not working for
any specific media at the time of his murder, he occasionally had
written reports critical of the paramilitary groups for the El Plato,
Magdalena local newspaper Sur Trienta Dias. A former mayor of El Plato
was charged with the killing and was in prison at year's end. On August
13, well-known radio and television political satirist Jaime Garzon was
killed while on his way to work (see Section 1.a.). On September 16, an
unidentified individual killed German Quintero Torres, the editor-in-
chief of the local newspaper El Pilon in Valledupar, Cesar. He was also
a correspondent for a regional television newscast, and vice president
of the Valledupar Journalists' Association. On October 22, unknown
assailants abducted and killed Roberto Julio Torres, a journalist for
the Sincelejo, Sucre newspaper El Meridiano, in San Onofre, Sucre. On
November 29, independent cameramen Alberto Sanchez and Luis Alberto
Rincon were killed in El Playon, Santander; they had been covering a
local fair. On December 5, Pablo Emilio Medina, cameraman for a local
television newscast, was killed in Garzon, Huila while covering a FARC
attack on the town.
In October the Organization of American States (OAS) Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression stated that the ``press freedom
situation in Colombia is a serious source of concern'' and that in
addition to the killings of journalists, ``Colombian journalists endure
constant threats and intimidation.''
According to the local NGO, Prensa Libre, 76 journalists were
kidnaped during the year. Guerrillas abducted many of them to bear
witness to crimes committed by paramilitary forces or to deliver
messages to local authorities. Prensa Libre reported that on October
16, the EPL held 60 journalists captive for 26 hours in Santander
department, where they were covering the release of kidnaped singer
Jorge Velosa. Henry Romero, a photographer for Reuters news agency, was
kidnaped by ELN guerrillas on October 30 and held for a week. On
October 30, seven journalists were abducted in Barrancabermeja,
Santander department, and released 3 days later; they were held to
record paramilitary crimes. On November 9, Jorge Utria, press officer
for Congressman Carlos Romero, was kidnapped in Curumani, Cesar
department, and released 3 days later. On November 11, the FARCkidnaped
seven journalists in Ataquez, Cesar department; again to witness
paramilitary crimes.
According to Prensa Libre, seven journalists received credible
death threats; five of them fled the country. Most of these threats
apparently were related to the journalists' work and aimed at
intimidation.
Due to the continued high number of journalists killed in past
years, in May the Prosecutor General's office created a new subdivision
to handle investigations of crimes of this type. Progress in these
investigations included the arrest in Valledupar of the alleged killers
of German Quintero.
Media ownership remains highly concentrated. Wealthy families or
groups associated with one or the other of the two dominant political
parties continued to expand their holdings of news media, and regional
firms continued to purchase local news media outlets. As a result of
the general economic downturn, large press conglomerates closed radio
stations and newspaper offices in certain provinces and implemented
staff reductions. Although the press remained generally free, economic
problems and the concentration of media ownership limited the media's
resources, causing the media to rely heavily on a smaller pool of
advertisers, including the Government, which the media often chose not
to criticize.
Despite an attempt in 1998 by some members of Congress to abolish
it, the National Television Commission continued to oversee television
programming throughout the year. Detractors charged that it was
susceptible to political influence.
The FARC restricted the movement of journalists in the despeje
through blockades and random identity checks.
The Government generally respected academic freedom, and there was
a wide spectrum of political activity throughout the country's
universities. However, paramilitary groups and guerrillas maintain a
presence on many university campuses, aimed at generating political
support for their respective campaigns. They use both violent and
nonviolent means towards political ends. Both paramilitary groups and
guerrillas also regularly targeted public school teachers at the
elementary and secondary levels for politically motivated killings. In
1998 the CPDH reported that slightly more than 10 percent of all
victims of politically motivated homicides during the year were public
school teachers.
The University of Antioquia temporarily closed its doors after the
August 7 killing of student leader Gustavo Marulanda by AUC members. He
was among six students threatened by members of paramilitary groups for
allegedly supporting guerrilla groups. On May 4, unidentified attackers
killed University of Antioquia professor Hernan Henao Delgado on the
campus and also killed the University's cafeteria administrator.
Members of paramilitary groups were widely suspected in both cases.
However, the authorities had announced no leads in either case as of
August, nor had they announced any leads in the May 6 attempted murder
of Professor Argiro Giraldo Quintero. Approximately 20 students and
professors at the University of Antioquia received death threats, and
the university was bombed twice during the year.
Three prominent university professors were killed during the year,
and one survived a failed attempt on his life. On September 15, Jesus
Antonio Bejarano, a former government peace commissioner, was killed on
the National University campus. Dr. Dario Betancur, head of the social
sciences faculty of Bogota's Universidad Pedagogica, disappeared on
April 30, and his body was found on September 3. On May 4, Dr. Hernando
Henao, an anthropologist who published on the subject of displaced
persons, was killed. On December 22, Professor Eduardo Pizarro
Leongomez, director of the political studies and international affairs
institute at the National University, was shot twice by unknown
attackers, but survived. The police and the Prosecutor General's office
were investigating this case. Many faculty members at the National
University said there was great hesitation among professors to express
views on the country's internal conflict for fear of retribution.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government respects
this right in practice. The authorities normally do not interfere with
public meetings and demonstrations and usually grant the required
permission except when they determine that there is imminent danger to
public order.
There were large demonstrations on several occasions by citizens in
favor of peace. For example, on June 6, between 70,000 and 250,000
persons demonstrated in Cali to protest the ELN kidnaping of more than
170 persons from a church (see Section 1.b.). On October 24, as many as
6 million persons marched in antiwar protests held in 15 cities around
the country.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice. Any legal organization is
free to associate with international groups in its field. Membership in
proscribed organizations, such as the FARC, the ELN, the EPL, and the
AUC, is a crime.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
freedom, and the Government respects this right in practice. Roman
Catholic religious instruction is no longer mandatory in public
schools, and a 1994 Constitutional Court decision declared
unconstitutional any official government reference to religious
characterizations of the country. Although the Catholic Church was
separated from the State by the 1991 Constitution, it retains a de
facto privileged status. The law on the freedom of religion provides a
mechanism for religions to obtain the status of recognized legal
entities. Special public recognition is required for any religion that
wishes to minister to its adherents via any public institution. The
Government permits proselytizing among the indigenous population,
provided that it is welcome and does not induce members of indigenous
communities to adopt changes that endanger their survival on
traditional lands. There is little religious discrimination.
The FARC has placed religious restrictions on persons within the
despeje zone.
The United Pentecostal Church of Colombia reported that on August
2, the FARC killed two of its preachers, Jose Honorio Trivino and
Miguel Antonio Ospina. Two other preachers and 25 evangelical church
members also were killed between January and August, mostly in areas
greatly affected by the conflict. FARC members were believed
responsible for a majority of the killings, as well as regular threats,
which forced the closure of 300 churches nationwide.
On April 30, the FARC forced Roman Catholic priest Rufino Perez to
leave the despeje zone permanently after Perez called FARC members
``murderers and thieves.'' In April the FARC attempted to expel
Catholic priest Miguel Angel Serna, who had criticized publicly the
FARC's management of the zone. The FARC allowed him to remain following
strong public criticism and intervention by both the National Bishops'
Conference and the presidency. In September a Polish priest was given
15 days to leave the despeje zone.
On May 30, the ELN kidnaped more than 170 persons, including a
Catholic priest, from the La Maria Catholic church in southern Cali
during Mass (see Section 1.b.).
On August 16, members of the EPL, a small guerrilla movement,
kidnaped Bishop of Tibu Jose de Jesus Quintero between El Tarra and
Tibu, Norte de Santander department, and freed him on September 19.
Quintero had spoken out against a rash of paramilitary and guerrilla
massacres in the area. He had been kidnaped previously by the ELN in
1997. On May 18, EPL members killed Catholic priest Pedro Leon Camacho
in nearby Cachira, Norte de Santander, after he had denounced publicly
the guerrilla group's abuses of the civilian population.
The Prosecutor General's human rights unit was investigating FARC
commander ``Arley Leal'' for the September 1998 killing of Catholic
priest Alcides Jimenez Chicangana (see Section 1.a.).
Jewish community leaders estimated that as many as 20 percent of
the country's Jewish community had fled the country as of July. Among
the principal causes was a string of kidnapings, assaults, and murders
affecting Jewish business leaders.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides citizens with
the right to travel domestically and abroad, and the Government
generally respects this right in practice, with some exceptions.
Outsiders who wish to enter Indian tribes' reserves must be invited. In
areas where counterinsurgency operations were underway, police or
military officials occasionally required civilians to obtain safe-
conduct passes; paramilitary forces and guerrillas often used similar
means to restrict travel in areas under theircontrol. On July 10,
following numerous guerrilla attacks, the Government imposed a
temporary dusk-to-dawn curfew, prohibiting road and river travel, in 10
departments, including 10 towns just outside of Bogota. Military
counterinsurgency operations, forced conscription by paramilitary and
guerrilla organizations, and guerrilla incursions often forced peasants
to flee their homes and farms, and there was a very large population of
internally displaced persons (see Section 1.g.).
According to the DAS, 65,000 citizens emigrated during the first 6
months of the year, due principally to the deteriorating security
situation and economic recession. According to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, requests for passports during the first 6 months of the year
nearly tripled in comparison with the first 6 months of 1998.
The Constitution provides for the right to asylum, under terms
established by law in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The country has had a
tradition of providing asylum since the 1920's. Since the 1970's,
Colombia has granted asylum to Argentine, Chilean, Uruguayan, and
Paraguayan citizens seeking refuge from dictatorial regimes.
The Government cooperates with the offices of the UNHCR and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and internally
displaced persons. The Government reserves the right to determine
eligibility for asylum, based upon its own assessment of the nature of
the persecution an applicant may have suffered. The issue of the
provision of first asylum did not arise during the year. There were no
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their
government, and citizens exercise this right in regularly scheduled
elections by secret ballot. In 1998 voters elected Conservative Party
candidate Andres Pastrana President in elections that were free, fair,
and transparent, despite some threats by paramilitary groups, narcotics
traffickers, and guerrillas to the electoral process. The Liberal Party
controls the legislature.
Presidential elections are held every 4 years, with the incumbent
barred for life from reelection. The Liberal and Conservative parties
have long dominated the formal political process with one or the other
winning the presidency. Public employees are not permitted to
participate in partisan campaigns. Officially, all political parties
operate freely without government interference. Those that fail to
garner 50,000 votes in a general election lose the right to present
candidates and may not receive funds from the Government. However, they
may reincorporate at any time by presenting 50,000 signatures to the
National Electoral Board. Voting is voluntary and universal for
citizens age 18 and older, except for active-duty members of the police
and armed forces, who may not vote.
There are no legal restrictions, and few practical ones, on the
participation of women or minorities in the political process; however,
both are underrepresented in official and party positions. Voters
elected 14 women to the 102-seat Senate and 19 women to the 161-seat
Chamber of Representatives in March 1998. There are 3 women in the 16-
member Cabinet, serving as Ministers of Labor, Communications, and
Foreign Trade.
Indigenous people are underrepresented in government and politics.
Two Senate seats are reserved for indigenous representatives. Blacks
also are underrepresented in government and politics. In September
1996, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional a 1993 law
that set aside two House seats for citizens of African heritage,
although the ruling nonetheless allowed the incumbents to complete
their terms in office. There is one black Senator, but there are no
black members of the Chamber of Representatives.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A large and varied nongovernmental human rights community is
active, providing a wide range of views. Among the many groups are: the
Colombian Catholic Bishops Conference, the Colombian Commission of
Jurists; the Intercongregational Commission for Justice and Peace; the
Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights; the Center for
Investigations and Popular Research; the Advisory Committee for Human
Rights andDisplacements; the Latin American Institute for Alternative
Legal Services; the Committee in Solidarity with Political Prisoners
(dedicated to defending accused guerrillas); the Association of
Families of Detained and Disappeared Persons; the Reinsertion
Foundation (focused on demobilized guerrillas); the Pais Libre
Foundation (focused on the rights of kidnap victims); and the Vida
Foundation (focused on the rights of victims of guerrilla violence).
Other international human rights organizations in the country that were
active include the ICRC (with 17 offices across the country) and Peace
Brigades International.
Although the Government generally did not interfere directly with
the work of human rights NGO's, many prominent human rights monitors
worked under constant fear for their physical safety. There were
unconfirmed reports of security forces harassing or threatening human
rights groups. Human rights groups were subjected to surveillance,
harassing phone calls, graffiti campaigns, and threats by paramilitary,
guerrilla, and other unidentified groups.
NGO's investigated and reported on human rights abuses committed by
government forces, various paramilitary groups, and the guerrilla
armies. Many NGO's expressed serious concern over the growing
paramilitary and guerrilla violence--and the Government's increasingly
apparent inability to stop either group. In particular, a number of
NGO, as well as governmental, human rights officials were alarmed by
the rapid growth and increasing political and military power of
paramilitary groups.
The human rights community remained under intense pressure during
the year. Human rights monitors were subject to a systematic campaign
of intimidation, harassment, and violence. At least seven human rights
advocates were killed during the year. In addition, approximately 20
human rights workers sought political asylum abroad, attempting to flee
the country for their own safety. Many were frightened by a February
threat against human rights activists by paramilitary leader Carlos
Castano following a paramilitary kidnaping of four human rights
workers. In March a group of Uraba merchants, cattle ranchers,
community action boards, and other entities criticized area human
rights NGO's as being sympathetic to guerrillas and opposed to the
State and its armed institutions.
The Government, through the Ministry of the Interior and DAS,
allocated approximately $4.3 million (8 billion pesos) to protecting
human rights advocates and labor activists associated with 88 different
human rights NGO's and unions. The funds were dedicated to security
measures for individuals as well as for the headquarters of the NGO's,
an emergency radio network, and funding for travel abroad for
particularly threatened individuals. However, human rights groups
accused the Government of disbursing the funds too slowly.
On September 17, unidentified gunmen killed Carlos Arturo Pareja,
the human rights Ombudsman's representative for San Juan Nepomuceno, as
he gave a radio interview. His assistant, Janes Rua Garcia, also was
killed. An investigation was underway at year's end.
On January 30, unidentified individuals pulled Everardo de Jesus
Puerta and Julio Ernesto Gonzalez, both members of the Committee for
Solidarity with Political Prisoners (CSPP), from a Medellin-Bogota bus
and killed them. The CSPP assumed that AUC members had killed the two
persons, but the authorities believed that they were killed because
they resisted robbery. The Interior Ministry announced a reward of
approximately $26,681 (50 million pesos) for information leading to the
capture of the three assailants.
On January 28, AUC members kidnaped human rights workers Jairo
Bedoya, Jorge Salazar, Olga Rodas, and Claudia Tamayo, of the Popular
Training Institute (IPC), whom they had accused of guerrilla links.
Following the kidnaping, AUC leader Carlos Castano stated that he would
begin an offensive against human rights NGO's. He declared as military
targets alleged guerrilla sympathizers who had ``infiltrated'' human
rights NGO's; he stated that legitimate human rights workers were
``valued'' and would not be targeted. He released Rodas and Tamayo
February 8, but held Bedoya and Salazar until February 18, proclaiming
them ``prisoners of war.'' On August 29, a bomb badly damaged the IPC's
Medellin headquarters. Police announced no leads in the case of the IPC
bombing nor in attacks on labor union headquarters that occurred the
same day (see Section 6.a.).
On November 28, AUC members abducted Southern Bolivar Department
peasant leaders Edgar Quiroga and Gildardo Fuentes. The paramilitary
group accused the two men of guerrilla activities,but according to
state law enforcement agencies, both men were legitimate local
activists engaged in trying to secure humanitarian assistance for the
region's internally displaced persons. A later paramilitary statement
indicated that the men had been killed. Neither had been seen or heard
from again at year's end.
The human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office indicted
seven persons for the 1997 murders of two CINEP workers, and issued
arrest warrants for Carlos Castano and four other members of
paramilitary groups (see Section 1.a.).
On April 16, the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's
office formally indicted suspected paramilitary leader Libardo Humberto
Prada Bayona for the August 1998 killing in Valledupar of Amparo Leonor
Jiminez. Jiminez was a local coordinator for the NGO ``Redepaz'' (Peace
Network) and was a journalist. She had been critical of security force-
paramilitary links.
The Ministry of Defense reported that approximately 63,000 security
force members received human rights training during the year. General
Fernando Tapias, armed forces commander, reported to the press in
August that about 90 percent of the military has gone through human
rights training. Such training is provided by the ICRC, the Colombian
Red Cross, the Roman Catholic Church, elements of the Government and
security forces, and foreign governments. Many observers credited these
programs with having done much to foster a climate of increased respect
for human rights and international humanitarian law within the military
forces in recent years.
The Government has an extensive human rights apparatus, which
includes the office of the President's Adviser for Human Rights
(currently Vice President Gustavo Bell), the Ministry of Defense human
rights office, and dependent offices for each of the armed forces. The
national human rights Ombudsman, its regional representatives and corps
of public defenders, the Attorney General's office and its delegate for
human rights and regional representatives, and the Prosecutor General's
office and its human rights unit are all independent institutions, not
subject to executive branch direction.
On August 12, President Pastrana and Vice President Bell made
public the Government's national human rights plan. The plan called for
the respect, promotion, and assurance of human rights. It promised
increased government attention to the consequences of human rights
abuses and called on all armed factions to respect international
humanitarian law. The plan asserted that security forces would combat
both guerrilla and paramilitary forces. One of the plan's most
important provisions permitted the armed forces commander to remove
from service summarily any military member whose performance in
combating paramilitary forces he deemed ``unsatisfactory or
insufficient.''
The human rights Ombudsman's office received 18,479 human rights
complaints during 1998 (a slight decrease from 1997) and concluded
investigations of 11,821 complaints that year. It also provided 37,262
free legal consultations through its corps of more than 1,000 public
defenders, many of whom work only part time.
The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) and the UNHCR
have offices in Bogota. In 1997 the UNHCHR opened a field office in
Bogota to observe human rights practices and advise the Government.
Originally scheduled to end after 1 year, the Government again renewed
the office's mandate, until April 2000. The office is tasked with
monitoring and analyzing the human rights situation throughout the
country and with the provision of assistance to the Government, civil
society, and NGO's in the field of human rights protection. It
submitted reports to the Government and to the United Nations.
Section 5. Discrimination based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution specifically prohibits discrimination based on
race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social status; however,
in practice, many of these provisions are not enforced. The killing of
homosexuals as part of the practice of social cleansing continued.
Women.--Rape and other acts of violence against women are pervasive
in society, and like other crimes, seldom are prosecuted successfully.
The quasi-governmental Institute for Family Welfare and the
Presidential Adviser's Office for Youth, Women,and Family Affairs
continued to report high levels of spouse and partner abuse throughout
the country. The ICBF conducted programs and provided refuge and
counseling for victims of spousal abuse, but the level and amount of
these services were dwarfed by the magnitude of the problem.
The National Institute for Forensic Medicine reported 40,469
instances of domestic abuse during the year, as well as 12,350 reported
sexual crimes. The Institute estimated that 95 percent of all abuse
cases are never reported to the authorities. Among the reported sexual
crimes were 2,049 cases of rape.
The 1996 Law on Family Violence criminalizes violent acts committed
within families, including spousal rape. The law also provides legal
recourse for victims of family violence, immediate protection from
physical or psychological abuse, and judicial authority to remove the
abuser from the household. It allows a judge to oblige an abuser to
seek therapy or reeducation. For acts of spousal sexual violence, the
law mandates sentences of 6 months to 2 years and denies probation or
bail to offenders who disobey restraining orders issued by the courts.
A 1997 law also made additional, substantial modifications to the Penal
Code and introduced sentences of between 4 and 40 years for crimes
against sexual freedom or human dignity, including rape, sex with a
minor, sexual abuse, induction into prostitution, and child
pornography. The law also repealed an old law that fully exonerated a
rapist if he subsequently offered to marry the victim and she accepted.
However, there was little evidence that this legislation was enforced
systematically. The National Institute for Forensic Medicine reported
19,859 cases of spousal abuse during the first half of the year. The
overwhelming majority of victims were women. The First Lady Nohra
Pullana de Pastrana is on the board of directors of the ICBF, and works
with the ``Make Peace'' program, which provides support to women and
children who were victims of domestic violence.
Trafficking in women is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
Women also faced an increased threat of torture and sexual assault
due to the internal conflict (see Section 1.g.).
The Constitution prohibits any form of discrimination against women
and specifically requires the authorities to ensure ``adequate and
effective participation by women at decisionmaking levels of public
administration.'' Even prior to implementation of the 1991
Constitution, the law had provided women with extensive civil rights.
However, despite these constitutional provisions, discrimination
against women persisted. According to figures published by the United
Nations, women's earnings for formal sector, nonagricultural work
correspond to approximately 85 percent of men's earnings for comparable
work, and women must demonstrate higher qualifications than men when
applying for jobs. Moreover, women constitute a disproportionately high
percentage of the subsistence labor work force, especially in rural
areas.
Women experience a higher rate of unemployment than men and a
higher percentage of women were employed in minimum wage jobs.
According to the National Statistics Institute, 17.2 percent of men
were unemployed as of September; during the same period, 23.3 percent
of women were unemployed. Of those working in September, 25.6 percent
of men earned the minimum wage, as did 35.1 percent of working women.
Despite an explicit constitutional provision promising additional
resources for single mothers and government efforts to provide them
with training in parenting skills, women's groups reported that the
social and economic problems of single mothers remained great. The
Constitutional Court ruled in September 1997 that pregnant women and
mothers of newborn children under 3 months of age could not be fired
from their jobs without ``just cause.'' Bearing children, the Court
ruled, was not just cause.
Children.--The Constitution formally provides for free public
education, which is compulsory between the ages of 6 and 15.
Nevertheless, an estimated 25 percent of children in this age group do
not attend school, due to lax enforcement of truancy laws, inadequate
classroom space, and economic pressures to provide income for the
family.
Despite significant constitutional and legislative commitments for
the protection of children's rights, these were implemented only to a
minimal degree. The Constitution imposes the obligation on family,
society, and the State to assist andprotect children, to foster their
development, and to assure the full exercise of these rights. A special
Children's Code sets forth many of these rights and establishes
services and programs designed to enforce the protection of minors.
Children's advocates reported the need to educate citizens with regard
to the Code as well as the 1996 and 1997 laws on family violence, which
had been drafted particularly to increase legal protection for women
and children.
The National Institute for Forensic Medicine reported 9,713 cases
of child abuse during the year; 1,161 of these cases involved sexual
abuse. An estimated 25,000 boys and girls under age 18 work in the sex
trade. In 1996 legislators passed a law prohibiting sex with minors or
the employment of minors for prostitution, and they amended that law in
1997 to provide that conviction for nonviolent sexual abuse of a child
under age 14 carries a prison sentence of 4 to 10 years. Conviction for
rape of anyone under the age of 12 carries a mandatory sentence of 20
to 40 years in prison. Although enforcement of such laws is lax, crimes
against children are being dealt with more severely than in the past.
The ICBF oversees all government child protection and welfare programs
and funds nongovernmental and church programs for children.
Trafficking in girls is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
Child labor is a significant problem (see Section 6.d.).
In conflict zones, children often were caught in the crossfire
between the public security forces, paramilitary groups, and guerrilla
organizations. Children suffered disproportionately from the internal
conflict, often forfeiting opportunities to study as they were
displaced by conflict and suffered psychological traumas. The human
rights Ombudsman's office estimated that only 15 percent of displaced
children attend school. In July the Government announced that no one
under the age of 18 could enter military service, even with the consent
of a parent; previously, individuals over 16 years of age but below age
18 could volunteer to join the military with parental permission, but
were barred from serving in combat.
The use of child soldiers by guerrillas was common, and
paramilitary groups sometimes impressed children into their ranks. In
May the FARC promised visiting Special Representative of the U.N.
Secretary General on Children in Armed Conflict Olara Otunnu that it
would stop forcing children into its ranks; however, it continued the
practice. The Roman Catholic Church reported that the FARC lured or
forced hundreds of children from the despeje zone into its ranks. It
engaged in similar practices in other areas under its control. Once
recruited, child guerrillas are virtual prisoners of their commanders
and subject to various forms of abuse. Sexual abuse of girls is a
particular problem. Although the ELN agreed to halt recruitment of
children under the terms of the June 1998 Mainz ``Heaven's Gate''
agreement, it also regularly impressed children into its ranks. A 1996-
98 human rights Ombudsman's study estimated that 6,000 children were
``linked to or members of'' guerrilla groups and reported that
approximately 2,000 children were killed during 1998. There were 15
children among the 39 FARC guerrillas killed in combat at Puerto Lleras
in July. The army killed approximately 70 children among the 289 FARC
members killed during the FARC's July 8-12 offensive. Children were
also among the preferred kidnaping targets of guerrillas (see Section
1.b.).
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution enumerates the
fundamental social, economic, and cultural rights of the physically
disabled, but serious practical impediments exist that prevent the full
participation of disabled persons in society. There is no legislation
that specifically mandates access for the disabled. According to the
Constitutional Court, physically disabled individuals must have access
to, or if they so request, receive assistance at, voting stations. The
court also has ruled that the social security fund for public employees
cannot refuse to provide services for the disabled children of its
members, regardless of the cost involved.
Indigenous People.--There are approximately 80 distinct ethnic
groups among the 800,000-plus indigenous inhabitants. These groups are
concentrated in the Andes mountains, Pacific coast lowlands, the
Guajira peninsula, and Amazonas department. The Constitution gives
special recognition to the fundamental rights of indigenous people. The
Ministry of Interior, through the Office of Indigenous Affairs, is
responsible for protecting theterritorial, cultural, and self-
determination rights of Indians. Ministry representatives are located
in all regions of the country with indigenous populations and work with
other governmental human rights organizations, as well as with NGO
human rights groups and civil rights organizations, to promote Indian
interests and investigate violations of indigenous rights. Nonetheless,
members of indigenous groups suffer discrimination in the sense that
they traditionally have been relegated to the margins of society. Few
opportunities exist for those who might wish to participate more fully
in modern life. In addition, indigenous communities suffer
disproportionately from the internal armed conflict (see Section 1.g.).
According to the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INCORA),
64,377 indigenous families live on designated Indian reserves.
Indigenous rights to their ancestral lands are by law permanent. INCORA
reports that approximately 80 percent of these lands have been
demarcated. However, armed groups often violently contested indigenous
land ownership. Traditional Indian authority boards operate some 519
reserves; the boards handle national or local funds and are subject to
fiscal oversight by the national Comptroller General. These boards
administer their territories as municipal entities, with officials
elected or otherwise chosen according to Indian tradition.
Indigenous communities are free to educate their children in
traditional dialects and in the observance of cultural and religious
customs. Indigenous men are not subject to the national military draft.
In 1998 INCORA estimated that some 40 indigenous communities had no
legal title to land that they claimed as their own, and reported that
an estimated 400 requests by indigenous communities to establish new
reserves remained outstanding at the end of that year. In 1999 INCORA
reported that some 350 requests by indigenous communities to establish
new reserves remained outstanding at year's end. According to INCORA,
more than 75 million acres have been recognized legally as Indian
lands. It is buying back much of this land, which has been settled by
mestizo peasants, and returning it to indigenous groups.
The Constitution provides for a special criminal and civil
jurisdiction within Indian territories based upon traditional community
laws. However, some observers charged that these special jurisdictions
were subject to manipulation, and that punishments rendered by such
community courts were often much more lenient than those imposed by
regular civilian courts.
Members of indigenous communities continued to be victims of all
sides in the internal conflict, and a number of them were killed. CINEP
reported the killings of 40 indigenous people, and the forced
disappearance of 19 during the first 9 months of the year; the
perpetrators were not identified. CINEP also reported nine unidentified
death threats made to entire indigenous communities during the first 9
months of the year. In August the national human rights Ombudsman
stated in his annual report that the indigenous communities most
affected by extrajudicial killings during 1998 (the most recent year
for which information was available) were the Zenu, the Etnia Zenu, the
Embera-Katio, the Korewaje, the Embera-Chami, and the Paez. The report
also stated that two indigenous persons from unidentified communities
also were killed. The report cited the State as being responsible for
two of the killings, paramilitary groups for eight, and unidentified
armed groups for the remaining two.
On January 31, unidentified attackers detained six members of the
Embera-Katio tribe in Cordoba department, and killed one. Subsequently,
they burned 14 boats belonging to the tribe. During May and June, a
further four Embera-Katio leaders were killed as guerrillas and
paramilitary forces struggled for control of southern Cordoba.
Paramilitary and guerrilla groups have been known to force
indigenous people, including children, into their ranks. Some guerrilla
groups reportedly favored indigenous people as guides and
communicators, due to their knowledge of the geography of their
historical lands and knowledge of generally unfamiliar languages.
Occidental Petroleum had returned all of its exploration
concessions to the Government by 1990, after attempts to negotiate with
the U'wa tribe broke down. The tribe had protested a 1995 award to
Occidental and Ecopetrol allowing them to explore lands claimed by the
U'wa. The U'wa had filed acomplaint before the IACHR. A 1997 OAS joint
study with a university recommended the immediate and unconditional
suspension of oil exploration or exploitation activities; clarification
of the status of U'wa territories and protected reserves; and the
development of a formal process of consultation under auspices of the
Government. The U'wa also had threatened to commit collective suicide
if their wishes were not respected. In August the Government increased
the U'wa reserve, from 100,000 acres to 1.25 million acres. The area
has estimated oil reserves of up to 1 billion barrels.
In April U'wa leader Roberto Jose Cobaria Afanador fled the
country, after receiving death threats from the FARC as part of a
campaign to intimidate U'wa who might have cooperated in the
investigation of the March killings of the three American indigenous
activists (see Section 1.a.).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to the Ministry of
the Interior, citizens of African heritage live primarily in the
Pacific departments of Choco (370,000), Valle del Cauca (1,720,257),
Cauca (462,638), and Narino (261,180), as well as along the Caribbean
coast. Although estimates vary widely, blacks represent around 10
percent of the total population.
Blacks are entitled to all constitutional rights and protections
but traditionally have suffered from discrimination. Blacks are
underrepresented in the executive branch, judicial branch, and civil
service positions, and in military hierarchies. Despite the passage of
the African-Colombian law in 1993, little concrete progress was made in
expanding public services and private investment in Choco department or
other predominantly black regions. The same law also authorized black
communities to receive collective titles to some Pacific coast lands.
However, black leaders complained that the Government was slow to issue
titles, and that their access to such lands often was inhibited by the
presence of armed groups or individuals. Unemployment among African-
Colombians ran as high as 76 percent in some communities. Choco remains
the department with the lowest per capita level of social investment
and is last in terms of education, health, and infrastructure. It also
has been the scene of some of the nation's most enduring political
violence, as paramilitary forces and guerrillas struggled for control
of the Uraba region.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution recognizes the
rights of workers to organize unions and to strike, except for members
of the armed forces, police, and those ``essential public services'' as
defined by law. However, legislation that prohibits all public
employees from striking is still in effect, even if often overlooked.
Unions, indigenous groups, debtors, students, and others brought
the country to a partial halt on August 31 with a general strike, which
ended on September 1. The Government and labor representatives began
negotiations afterward. Strikers protested the Government's inability
to confront the country's economic downturn, soaring unemployment, and
a Labor Code reform bill that would have eliminated several popular
worker benefits. Indigenous people reportedly blocked the Pan-American
highway near the Ecuadoran border, protesting an alleged lack of
Government attention to their problems. The FARC, youth gangs, and
common criminals encouraged isolated acts of violence in some parts of
the country; in the south of Bogota, the army's 13th Brigade moved in
to restore order after common criminals and youth gangs looted shops
and attacked police and other vehicles with stones. However, both
unions and the Government renounced violence.
The 1948 Labor Code (which has been amended repeatedly) provides
for automatic recognition of unions that obtain at least 25 signatures
from potential members and comply with a simple registration process at
the Labor Ministry. The law penalizes interference with freedom of
association. It allows unions to determine freely internal rules, elect
officials, and manage activities, and forbids the dissolution of trade
unions by administrative fiat. According to estimates by the Ministry
of Labor and various unions, 6 to 7 percent of the work force is
organized. According to the Colombian Commission of Jurists, 89 percent
of those organized are public sector workers. There are approximately
2,500 registered unions, 87 to 95 percent of which are organized in one
of three confederations: The center-left United Workers' Central, with
which 45 to 50 percent of unionsare affiliated; the Maoist/Social
Christian Colombian Democratic Workers' Confederation, with which
approximately 30 percent of unions are affiliated; and the Liberal
Party-affiliated Confederation of Colombian Workers (CTC), with which
12 to 15 percent of unions are affiliated. The number of unions fell
significantly during 1998 (from a 1997 total of approximately 4,900),
reflecting the effect of new legislation that encouraged the
consolidation of individual companies' unions into broader, industry-
based unions.
Before staging a legal strike, unions must negotiate directly with
management and, if no agreement results, accept mediation. By law,
public employees must accept binding arbitration if mediation fails; in
practice, public service unions decide by membership vote whether or
not to seek arbitration.
In May 1998, the International Labor Organization (ILO) expressed
serious concern at allegations of murders, forced disappearances, death
threats, and other acts of violence against trade union officials and
members. The ILO documented more than 300 murders of trade union
members during 1995-98. The ILO harshly criticized the Government for
failing, since November 1996, to provide it with information on a
single case of detention, trial, and conviction of anyone responsible
for the murder of union officials and members.
During the ILO governing body's November meeting, the Government
reached an amicable solution with the workers to accept an ILO direct
contact mission to investigate workers' charges of government
infringements of the right to free association, as well as the
continued killing of unionists and impunity for the killers. The
mission is scheduled to arrive in Bogota in February 2000 and to
deliver its findings to the ILO in March 2000.
The Government still has not addressed a number of ILO criticisms
of the Labor Code. In 1993 the ILO had complained about the following
provisions of the law: The requirement that government officials be
present at assemblies convened to vote on a strike call; the legality
of firing union organizers from jobs in their trades once 6 months have
passed following a strike or dispute; the requirement that contenders
for trade union office must belong to the occupation their union
represents; the prohibition of strikes in a wide range of public
services that are not necessarily essential; various restrictions on
the right to strike; the power of the Minister of Labor and the
President to intervene in disputes through compulsory arbitration when
a strike is declared illegal; and the power to dismiss trade union
officers involved in an unlawful strike.
Labor leaders throughout the country continued to be targets of
attacks by paramilitary groups, guerrillas, narcotics traffickers, and
their own union rivals. Killings of union members continued during the
year. According to the National Labor School, more than 2,000 union
members have been murdered since 1986, and labor leaders report
widespread societal hostility toward unions. Some of those killed were
targeted by the FARC for their membership in, or sympathy with, the
National Syndicate of Agricultural Industry Workers (Sintrainagro), a
union largely composed of demobilized EPL members. Many of the murdered
Sintrainagro members had worked in the banana industry in Uraba region.
On February 17, an unknown assailant shot and killed 72-year-old
Julio Alfonso Poveda, a founder of the United Workers' Central (CUT),
prominent member of the Colombian Communist Party, and head of the
National Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives, while he waited in
Bogota traffic. The authorities did not report any leads in the case by
year's end.
The authorities arrested former policemen Rafael Cespedes and Edgar
Armando Daza Diaz for the October 1998 killing of CUT vice president
Jorge Ortega in Bogota. One of the two men later escaped from
detention. An investigation was underway at year's end (see Section
1.a.).
On August 29, the Sincelejo, Sucre department offices of the
Association of Rural Land Users, a farm workers' union, were destroyed
by a bomb. Police defused a bomb at the Medellin office of Union of
Sindicated Labor (USO) the same day. The authorities had reported no
leads in either case at year's end.
The expired 1995 collective work convention between Ecopetrol and
the USO was replaced by a new agreement in May. The USO leadership
remained in open conflict with the Government on many issues. USO
leaders reported that its members in the oil-producing Magdalena Medio
region continued to receive deaththreats from presumed paramilitary
groups, who have accused USO officials of working with the ELN
guerrillas waging a sabotage campaign against the nation's oil
pipelines.
Unions are free to join international confederations without
government restrictions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution protects the right of workers to organize and engage in
collective bargaining. Workers in larger firms and public services have
been most successful in organizing, but these unionized workers
represent only a small portion of the economically active population.
High unemployment, traditional antiunion attitudes, a large informal
economic sector, and weak union organization and leadership limit
workers' bargaining power in all sectors.
The law forbids antiunion discrimination and the obstruction of
free association; however, according to union leaders, both
discrimination and obstruction of free association occurred frequently.
Government labor inspectors theoretically enforce these provisions, but
because there are 271 labor inspectors to cover 1,085 municipalities
and more than 300,000 companies, the inspection apparatus is weak.
Furthermore, labor inspectors often lacked basic equipment, such as
vehicles. Guerrillas sometimes deterred labor inspectors from
performing their duties by declaring them military targets. On July 9,
according to the Ministry of Labor, unidentified attackers attempted to
bomb the Antioquia department labor inspection office.
The Labor Code calls for fines to be levied for restricting freedom
of association and prohibits the use of strike breakers.
Collective pacts--agreements between individual workers and their
employers--are not subject to collective bargaining and typically are
used by employers to obstruct labor organization. Although employers
must register collective pacts with the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry
does not exercise any oversight or control over them.
The Labor Code also eliminates mandatory mediation in private
labor-management disputes and extends the grace period before the
Government can intervene in a conflict. Federations and confederations
may assist affiliate unions in collective bargaining.
Labor law applies to the country's 15 free trade zones (FTZ's), but
its standards often were not enforced in the zones. Public employee
unions have won collective bargaining agreements in the FTZ's of
Barranquilla, Buenaventura, Cartagena, and Santa Marta, but the garment
manufacturing enterprises in Medellin and Risaralda, which have the
largest number of employees, are not organized. Labor unions do not
exist in any of the zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
forbids slavery and any form of forced or compulsory labor, and this
prohibition generally is respected in practice in the formal sector;
however, women were trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution
(see Section 6.f.). Paramilitary forces and guerrilla groups forcibly
conscripted indigenous people (see Section 5). The law prohibits forced
or bonded labor by children; however, the Government does not have the
resources to enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.d.).
Although there were no known instances of forced child labor in the
formal economy, several thousand children were forced to serve as
paramilitary or guerrilla combatants (see Section 1.g.), to work as
prostitutes (see Section 5), or in some instances as coca pickers.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution bans the employment of children under the
age of 14 in most jobs, and the Labor Code prohibits the granting of
work permits to youths under the age of 18; however, child labor is a
significant problem. A 1989 decree establishing the Minors' Code
prohibits the employment of children under age 12 and stipulates
exceptional conditions and the express authorization of Labor Ministry
inspectors for the employment of children between the ages of 12 and 17
(inclusive). Children under 14 are prohibited from working, with the
exception that those between the ages of 12 and 14 may perform very
light work with the permission of their parents and appropriate labor
authorities. All child workers (anyone under the age of 18) must
receive the national minimum wage for the hours they work. Children
between the ages of 12 and 14 can work a maximum of 4hours a day;
children between the ages of 14 and 16 can work a maximum of 6 hours a
day; and children between the ages of 16 and 18 can work a maximum of 8
hours a day. All child workers are prohibited from working at night, or
performing work in which there is a risk of bodily harm or exposure to
excessive heat, cold, or noise. A number of specific occupations are
prohibited for children as well, such as mining and construction.
However, these requirements largely are ignored in practice, and only 5
percent of those children that work have filed for the required work
permits. By allowing children of ages 12 and 13 to work, even under
restricted conditions, the law contravenes international standards on
child labor, which set the minimum legal age for employment in
developing countries at 14 years.
In the formal sector, child labor laws are enforced through
periodic review by the Ministry of Labor and by the military, which
ensures compliance with mandatory service requirements. However, in the
informal labor sector and in rural areas, child labor continues to be a
problem, particularly in agriculture and mining. Children as young as
11 years of age work full time in almost every aspect of the cut flower
industry as a way to supplement family income. Even children enrolled
in school or, in some cases, those too young for school, accompany
their parents to work at flower plantations at night and on weekends.
In the mining sector, coal mining presents the most difficult child
labor problem. Many marginal, usually family-run, operations employ
their young children as a way to boost production and income; it is
estimated that between 1,200 and 2,000 children are involved. The work
is dangerous and the hours are long. Younger children carry water and
package coal, while those age 14 and up engage in more physically
demanding labor such as carrying bags of coal. These informal mining
operations are illegal. The Ministry of Labor reported that, by the end
of the year, an interagency governmental committee had removed
approximately 80 percent of child laborers from the informal mines and
returned them to school.
A Catholic Church study conducted in May stated that approximately
2.7 million children work, including approximately 700,000 who worked
as coca pickers. This represented a sharp increase from 1992, when
according to a 1997 study by Los Andes University, approximately 1.6
million children (between the ages of 12 and 17) worked. One observer
noted that the recent economic downturn might increase the number of
children working, especially in rural areas. Child participation in
agricultural work soared at harvest times. According to the Ministry of
Labor, working children between the ages of 7 and 15 earned on average
between 13 and 47 percent of the minimum wage. An estimated 26 percent
of working children had regular access to health care; approximately 25
percent were employed in potentially dangerous activities. According to
army estimates, at least 3,000 children were employed by paramilitary
groups and guerrillas as combatants (see Section 5). School attendance
by working children was significantly lower than for nonworking
children, especially in rural areas. The health services of the social
security system cover only 10 percent of child laborers. A 1996 study
by the national human rights Ombudsman of child labor in Putumayo
department found that 22 percent of the children between the ages of 5
and 18 were full-time coca pickers. In the municipality of Orito, the
figure reached 70 percent.
The Labor Ministry has an inspector in each of the 33 departments
responsible for certifying and conducting repeat inspections of
workplaces that employ children; however, this system has few resources
and covered only the 20 percent of the child work force employed in the
formal sector of the economy. In 1995 the Government established a
National Committee for the Eradication of Child Labor, made up of
representatives from the Ministries of Labor, Health, Education, and
Communications, as well as officials from various other government
offices, unions, employer associations, and NGO's. In December 1995,
the committee produced an action plan, under which various efforts to
eliminate child labor have been made. These include efforts to
eradicate child prostitution in Bogota, child agricultural labor in the
town of Cerritos in the Santander department, and child labor in the
markets of Bucaramanga and Cucuta, primarily through providing economic
incentives for parents to return their children to school.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children;
however, it is unable to enforce this prohibition effectively (see
Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets a uniform
minimum wage for workers every January to serve as a benchmark for wage
bargaining. The monthly minimum wage, set by tripartite negotiation
among representatives of business, organized labor, and the Government
was about $125 (236,460 pesos) throughout the year. The minimum wage
does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
Because the minimum wage is based on the Government's target inflation
rate, the minimum wage has not kept up with real inflation in recent
years. 70 percent of all workers earn wages that are insufficient to
cover the costs of the Government's estimated low-income family
shopping basket. However, 77 percent of all workers earn no more than,
and often much less than, twice the minimum wage.
The law provides for a standard workday of 8 hours and a 48-hour
workweek, but it does not require specifically a weekly rest period of
at least 24 hours, a failing criticized by the ILO.
Legislation provides comprehensive protection for workers'
occupational safety and health, but these standards are difficult to
enforce, in part due to the small number of Labor Ministry inspectors.
In addition, unorganized workers in the informal sector fear the loss
of their jobs if they exercise their right to criticize abuses,
particularly in the agricultural sector.
In general, a lack of public safety awareness, inadequate attention
by unions, and lax enforcement by the Labor Ministry result in a high
level of industrial accidents and unhealthy working conditions. Over 80
percent of industrial companies lack safety plans. According to the
Social Security Institute, 17 percent of industrial companies lack
safety plans. The Institute reported 50,178 work-related accidents
during the year, 491 of which resulted in deaths. The industries most
prone to worker accidents were mining, construction, and
transportation.
According to the Labor Code, workers have the right to withdraw
from a hazardous work situation without jeopardizing continued
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons.
A bill was pending before the House of Representatives in October
that would provide a prison term of 4 to 8 years and a fine up to the
equivalent of 100 times the minimum legal monthly salary for any person
who ``promotes, induces, compels, facilitates, collaborates, or in any
other way participates in the entry or exit of people into or from the
country without complying with all legal requisites.'' While intended
to combat alien smuggling in general, the law could be used to
prosecute traffickers as well. A government committee composed of
representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interpol, DAS, the
Ministry of Justice, the Attorney General's office, the Prosecutor
General's office, and the Presidency meets once every 2 months to
discuss trafficking in persons (and arms). The country is a source for
trafficking in women.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
issued a report on trafficking in persons in September, and stated that
women and girls from Colombia are trafficked to North America and
western Europe. There also were reports that women have been trafficked
to Japan in increasing numbers in recent years. The women enter Japan
on a tourist visa or an ``entertainer'' visa; they then are forced to
work as prostitutes. There were also reports that women were trafficked
to Spain for purposes of prostitution.
____
COSTA RICA
Costa Rica is a longstanding, stable, constitutional democracy with
a unicameral Legislative Assembly directly elected in free multiparty
elections every 4 years. Miguel Angel Rodriguez of the Social Christian
Unity Party (PUSC) won the presidency in the February 1998 elections,
in which approximately 70 percent of eligible voters cast ballots. The
Government respects constitutional provisions for an independent
judiciary.
The 1949 Constitution abolished the military forces. The Ministry
of Public Security--which includes specialized units such as the
antidrug police--and the Ministry of the Presidency share
responsibility for law enforcement and national security. In 1996 the
Government combined several police units within the Ministry of Public
Security, including the Border Guard, the Rural Guard, and the Civil
Guard, into a single ``public force.'' Public security forces generally
observe procedural safeguards established by law and the Constitution.
The market economy is based primarily on agriculture, light
industry, and tourism. The economy grew 8.3 percent in 1999, compared
with 6.2 percent in 1998. The central government deficit narrowed in
real terms to 3.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) compared with
3.3 percent in 1998; however, the public sector deficit widened to an
estimated 4 percent of GDP, compared with 3.3 percent in 1998. The
Constitution protects the right to private property; however, domestic
and foreign property owners encounter considerable difficulty gaining
adequate, timely compensation for lands expropriated for national parks
and other purposes. The law grants considerable rights to squatters who
invade uncultivated land, regardless of who may hold title to the
property.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens,
and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with
individual instances of abuse. Nonetheless, there were problems in a
few areas. The judicial system moves very slowly in processing criminal
cases, resulting in lengthy pretrial detention for some persons charged
with crimes. Domestic violence is a serious problem, and abuse of
children also remains a problem. Traditional patterns of unequal
opportunity for women remain, in spite of continuing government and
media efforts to advocate change. Child labor persists.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
In September 1997, a criminal court found two of three former
judicial police officers guilty of the 1994 murder of farmer Ciro
Monge; the third officer awaited trial at year's end. The court
sentenced the two men to 12 years in prison and $200,000 (50 million
colones) in fines and costs. The two convicted officers appealed the
rulings and lost; one fled the country in 1998 but was captured and
expected to be returned to serve his sentence.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits cruel or degrading treatment
and holds invalid any statement obtained through violence. The
authorities generally abide by these prohibitions. An effective
mechanism for lodging and recording complaints of police misconduct
exists. The Ombudsman's office serves as a recourse to citizens that
have complaints about violations of their civil and human rights and
about deficiencies in public and private infrastructure. It
investigates complaints and, where appropriate, initiates suits against
officials. The Ombudsman's office received 14 reports of police abuse
of authority or misconduct during the year, compared with 4 complaints
in 1998.
A large percentage of police personnel owe their appointments to
political patronage. The Rodriguez administration continued
implementation of the 1994 Police Code designed to depoliticize and
professionalize the police force. The Government's long-term plan is to
establish permanent, professional cadres, eventually resulting in a
nonpolitically appointed career force.The basic course for new police
recruits includes training using a human rights manual developed by the
Ministry of Public Security.
Prisoners generally receive humane treatment. Prisoners are
separated by sex and by level of security (minimum, medium, and
maximum). There are separate juvenile detention centers. Illegal
narcotics are readily available in the prisons, and drug use is common.
The Ombudsman's office notes that complaints about physical and
psychological abuse of prisoners by guards increased during the year.
The office received six such complaints of physical abuse, compared
with two in 1998, and six complaints of psychological abuse, compared
with four in 1998. The Ombudsman's office investigates complaints and
refers serious cases of abuse to the public prosecutor.
Penitentiary overcrowding remained a problem, with the prison
population estimated at 67 percent above planned capacity. The
Government is expanding six prisons to address this problem. In March
1996, the Supreme Court's Constitutional Chamber issued an order to the
San Sebastian prison in San Jose, giving the institution 1 year to
achieve minimally acceptable conditions for the prisoners. As of
August, occupancy in that prison was 108 percent above capacity, an
increase from 88 percent the previous year. The Government approved the
budget for a series of detention facilities in outlying provinces,
which are expected both to reduce overcrowding and to locate prisoners
closer to their families.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and law
prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally
respects these prohibitions.
The law requires issuance of judicial warrants before making
arrests. The Constitution entitles a detainee to a judicial
determination of the legality of the detention during arraignment
before a court officer within 24 hours of arrest. The authorities
generally respect these rights.
The law provides for the right to release on bail, and the
authorities observe it in practice. Generally, the authorities do not
hold detainees incommunicado. With judicial authorization, the
authorities may hold suspects for 48 hours after arrest or, under
special circumstances, for up to 10 days.
The Constitution bars exile as punishment, and it is not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution and law provide
for an independent judiciary, and the Government respects this
provision in practice. The Constitution provides for the right to a
fair trial, and an independent judiciary vigorously enforces this
right.
The Supreme Court supervises the work of the lower courts, known as
tribunals. The Legislative Assembly elects the 22 Supreme Court
magistrates to 8-year terms, subject to automatic renewal unless the
Assembly decides otherwise by a two-thirds majority. Accused persons
may select attorneys to represent them, and the law provides for access
to counsel at state expense for the indigent.
Persons accused of serious offenses and held without bail sometimes
remain in pretrial custody for long periods. Lengthy legal procedures,
numerous appeals, and large numbers of detainees cause delays and case
backlogs. There were 1,109 accused persons, representing 17 percent of
the prison population, jailed awaiting trial as of August 13.
There were no reports of political prisoners. However, one
individual is jailed for committing crimes against the State
(politically motivated acts of violence) in the 1980's. The human
rights group Families for the Defense of Political Prisoners and Human
Rights considers this person to be a political prisoner.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions; and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction. The law requires judicial warrants
to search private homes. Judges may approveuse of wiretaps in limited
circumstances, primarily to combat narcotics trafficking.
The law grants considerable rights to squatters who invade
uncultivated land, regardless of who may hold title to the property.
Landowners throughout the country have suffered frequent squatter
invasions for years. President Rodriguez made it a priority to reduce
these conflicts, increase public security, and regularize land tenure.
The Legislative Assembly is reexamining laws that give title through
adverse possession. As a result, squatter invasions are occurring with
increasing frequency in anticipation of the land tenure regularization.
On May 25, Public Security officers removed 350 squatter families,
a total of 750 persons, from a parcel of land near San Jose. On June
30, officials removed 300 squatter families, a total of around 1,500
persons, from another parcel of land near San Jose. The authorities
conducted these evictions lawfully, and there were no credible accounts
of abuses by the officers who enforced the evictions.
The case of the 1997 shootings in the Pavones region of landowner
Max Dalton and squatter Alvaro Aguilar was resolved in March when a
court absolved the accused killer of Dalton. Press reports indicated
that the investigators believed the two men shot each other; charges
were never pressed against the first suspect in the case.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. An independent press, a generally effective
judiciary, and a functioning democratic political system combine to
ensure freedom of speech and of the press.
There are 6 major privately owned newspapers, several periodicals,
20 privately owned television stations, and over 80 privately owned
radio stations, all of which pursue independent editorial policies.
While the media generally criticize the Government freely, there were
unconfirmed allegations that the Government withheld advertising from
some publications in order to influence or limit reporting. In May a
court absolved a reporter and an editor from the daily newspaper La
Nacion of libel charges.
In 1996 the Legislative Assembly passed a ``right of response'' law
that provides persons criticized in the media with an opportunity to
reply with equal attention and at equal length. Print and electronic
media continued to criticize public figures; however, media managers
have found it difficult to comply with provisions of this law. Editors
have called for a change in the press law, although media managers
generally have been successful in defending themselves and their
reporters against libel suits.
The Office of Control of Public Spectacles rates films and has the
authority to restrict or prohibit their showing; it has similar powers
over television programs and stage plays. Nonetheless, a wide range of
foreign films are available to the public. A tribunal reviews appeals
of the office's actions.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. While the
Constitution establishes Roman Catholicism as the state religion,
people of all denominations freely practice their religion without
government interference. Religious education teachers, including those
in public schools, must be certified by the Roman Catholic Episcopal
Conference. Foreign missionaries and clergy of all denominations work
and proselytize freely.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice. There are no
restrictions on travel within the country, on emigration, or the right
of return.
There is a long tradition of providing refuge to people from other
Latin American countries.
The law provides for granting asylum or refugee status in
accordance with the standards of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and the Government has
admitted approximately 5,000 persons as refugees under terms of the
convention. The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The Government makes a distinction between
political asylum and refugee status; the issue of the provision of
first asylum did not arise. The Constitution specifically prohibits
repatriation of anyone subject to potential persecution, and there were
no reports of forced expulsion of persons to a country where they
feared persecution.
The authorities regularly repatriated undocumented Nicaraguans,
most of whom entered the country primarily for economic reasons.
However, following Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the Government announced a
program of general amnesty for all Nicaraguans, Hondurans, and
Salvadorans in the country prior to November 9, 1998. By mid-August,
160,000 Nicaraguans had been processed for legal residence status,
although not all were expected to qualify. There are an estimated
150,000 Nicaraguans residing legally, and another 150,000 who have not
applied for amnesty or who entered the country after the November
deadline.
Allegations of abuse by the Border Guard periodically arise.
Although instances of physical abuse appear to have declined, there
were credible reports of extortion of migrants by border officials.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through free and fair elections held on the basis of universal suffrage
and by secret ballot every 4 years. The independent Supreme Electoral
Tribunal ensures the integrity of elections, and the authorities and
citizens respect election results. The Constitution bars the President
from seeking reelection, and Assembly members may seek reelection only
after at least one term out of office. In the 1998 elections, President
Rodriguez's Social Christian Unity Party won a plurality in the
Legislative Assembly, winning 27 of 57 seats. The National Liberation
Party (PLN) won 23 seats, the Democratic Force won 3 seats, and 4 minor
parties--the Labor Action, National Integration, Costa Rican
Renovation, and Libertarian Movement parties--each won 1 seat.
Women encounter no legal impediments to their participation in
politics. Although underrepresented overall, women are represented
increasingly in leadership positions in the Government and political
parties. Both vice presidents (who are also cabinet members), the
Minister of Justice, the Minister of Women's Affairs, and 11
legislative assembly deputies are women. Sonia Picado, leader of the
PLN, the principal opposition party, is also a woman. Former Assembly
Deputy Sandra Piszk continues as Ombudsman, a key autonomous post
created in 1993 to protect the rights and interests of citizens in
their dealings with the Government, and Linette Saborio remains the
Director General of the judicial investigative organization. The PUSC
mandated that a minimum of 40 percent of posts in party councils be
occupied by women and created the new Ministry of Women's Affairs,
headed by Dr. Yolanda Ingianna Mainieri. In 1998 female legislators
formed the Foundation of Women Parliamentarians of Costa Rica to
commemorate the 45th anniversary of the first female members of the
Assembly. The group's principal focus is promoting women's involvement
in politics, but it also works for a number of social objectives,
including the decentralization of government.
Indigenous people may participate freely in politics and
government. In practice, they have not played significant roles in
these areas, except on issues directly affecting their welfare, largely
because of their relatively small numbers andphysical isolation.
Nonetheless, they account for about 1 percent of the population, and
their approximately 20,000 votes constitute an important swing vote in
national elections. None of the 57 members of the National Assembly
identifies himself as indigenous. There are two black members of the
Assembly. The country's 100,000 blacks, largely resident on the
Caribbean coast, enjoy full rights of citizenship, including the
protection of laws against racial discrimination.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Various human rights groups operate without government restriction,
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.
Government officials are cooperative and responsive to their views. The
Costa Rican Commission for Human Rights, the Commission for the Defense
of Human Rights in Central America, and the Family and Friends of
Political Prisoners of Costa Rica monitor and report on human rights,
as does the Ombudsman's office.
The Legislative Assembly elects the Ombudsman for a 4-year,
renewable term. The Ombudsman's office is part of the legislative
branch, ensuring a high degree of independence from the executive
branch. The law provides for the functional, administrative, and
judgmental independence of the Ombudsman's office, which is held by
Sandra Piszk.
Several international organizations concerned with human rights,
including the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, are located in San Jose.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution pronounces all persons equal before the law, and
the Government generally respects these provisions.
Women.--The Government has identified domestic violence against
women and children as a serious societal problem. The authorities have
incorporated training on handling domestic violence cases into the
basic training course for new police personnel. The Law Against
Domestic Violence classifies certain acts of domestic violence as
crimes and mandates their prosecution. An old law permits a judge to
pardon a man accused of statutory rape if the perpetrator intends to
marry the victim, she and her family acquiesce, and the National
Institute for Children does not object; however, this law has not been
applied in recent years. The domestic violence law requires public
hospitals to report cases of female victims of domestic violence. It
also denies the perpetrator possession of the family home in favor of
the victim. Television coverage of this issue has increased in news
reporting, public service announcements, and feature programs. Reports
of violence against women have increased, likely reflecting a greater
willingness of victims to report abuses rather than an actual increase
in instances of violence against women. The public prosecutor, police,
and the Ombudsman all have offices dedicated to this problem. The law
against sexual harassment in the work place and educational
institutions seeks to prevent and punish sexual harassment in those
environments.
Prostitution and sex tourism are both legal. The prohibition
against trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution was made
stricter by a statute that went into effect on August 17, although
there have been only infrequent and isolated cases in the past (see
Section 6.f.).
Women constitute 50.1 percent of the population. Upon forming his
cabinet, newly elected President Rodriguez created the Ministry of
Women's Affairs. The 1990 Law for the Promotion of the Social Equality
of Women not only prohibits discrimination against women but also
obligates the Government to promote political, economic, social, and
cultural equality. In March 1996, the Government's National Center for
the Development of Women and the Family presented its 3-year National
Plan for Equality of Opportunity between Women and Men. The plan is
based in great measure on the Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth
World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995.
According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 1999
Human Development Report, women represent 31 percent of the labor
force. Most women work in the services sector, with others working in
industry and agriculture. While laws require that women and men receive
equal pay for equal work, averagesalaries for women remain somewhat
below those of male counterparts. According to 1997 UNDP data, women
occupy 45 percent of executive, management, and technical positions.
The average life expectancy for women has increased by 14 years since
the early 1970's to 79.2 years, higher than the 74.5-year average for
men.
Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and
welfare through well-funded systems of public education and medical
care. The Government spends over 5 percent of GDP on medical care. In
June 1998, the Legislative Assembly passed a constitutional amendment
increasing spending on education from 4 percent to 6 percent of GDP.
The country has a high rate of literacy (95 percent) and a low rate of
infant mortality (14 persons per 1,000). The law requires 6 years of
primary and 3 years of secondary education for all children. There is
no difference in the treatment of girls and boys in education or in
health care services. The autonomous National Institute for Children
(PANI) oversees implementation of the Government's programs for
children. In December 1996, the Assembly passed a law strengthening
PANI's role in protecting and promoting the rights of children, in
accordance with the precepts of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of
the Child.
In recent years, the PANI has increased public awareness of crimes
against children. For the period from January to June, the Institute
intervened in 2,154 cases of abandonment, 671 cases of physical abuse,
468 cases of sexual abuse, and 680 cases of psychological abuse of
children. (Psychological abuse cases increased sharply because the 1997
Code of Childhood and Adolescence redefined such abuse and increased
awareness of it.) Abuses appear to be more prevalent among poor, less-
educated families. Traditional attitudes and the inclination to treat
such crimes as misdemeanors sometimes hamper legal proceedings against
those who commit crimes against children.
In February 1996, the PANI announced a comprehensive plan to
improve the conditions of the poorest children. According to Institute
estimates, 19 percent of children between the ages of 5 and 17 are
employed in domestic tasks, while 15 percent work outside the home. The
Government, police sources, and representatives of the United Nations
Children's Fund acknowledge that child prostitution is a growing
problem. Although no official statistics exist, the PANI has identified
street children in the urban areas of San Jose, Limon, and Puntarenas
as being at the greatest risk. The PANI estimates that as many as 3,000
children in metropolitan San Jose are involved in prostitution. On July
29, the Legislative Assembly passed a law making it a crime to engage
in prostitution with minors. The Government took steps to enforce this
law, and has raided brothels and arrested clients.
People with Disabilities.--The 1996 Equal Opportunity for Persons
with Disabilities Law prohibits discrimination, provides for health
care services, and mandates provision of access to buildings for
persons with disabilities. This law is not enforced widely, and many
buildings remain inaccessible to persons with disabilities.
Nonetheless, a number of public and private institutions have made
individual efforts to improve access. The PANI and the Ministry of
Education published specific classroom guidelines for assisting
children with hearing loss, motor difficulties, attention deficit
disorder, and mental retardation.
Indigenous People.--The population of about 3.5 million includes
nearly 40,000 indigenous people among 8 ethnic groups. Most live in
traditional communities on 22 reserves which, because of their remote
location, often lack access to schools, health care, electricity, and
potable water. The Government, through the National Indigenous
Commission, completed distribution of identification cards to
facilitate access to public medical facilities. The Government also
built a medical clinic and several community health centers in
indigenous areas. The Ombudsman has established an office to
investigate violations of the rights of indigenous people.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law specifies the right of
workers to join unions of their choosing without prior authorization,
although barriers exist in practice. About 15 percent of the work force
is unionized,almost entirely in the public sector. Unions operate
independently of government control.
Some trade union leaders contend that ``solidarity'' associations,
in which employers provide access to credit unions and savings plans in
return for agreement to avoid strikes and other types of confrontation,
infringe upon the right of association. After the International Labor
Organization (ILO) Committee on Freedom of Association ruled that
solidarity associations and their involvement in trade union activities
violated freedom of association, the Government amended the Labor Code
in 1993. The following year, the ILO Committee of Experts (COE) ruled
that these and other planned changes fostered greater freedom of
association. In 1995 the COE encouraged the Government to approve
legislation to allow unions to administer compensation funds for
dismissed workers and to repeal labor code provisions restricting the
right to strike in certain nonessential public, agricultural, and
forestry sectors. In June 1998, the Rerum Novarum Workers Confederation
complained about government noncompliance with commitments to protect
worker rights but withdrew the complaint after the Rodriguez
administration asked for a reasonable period to demonstrate its
commitment to worker rights. Some labor unions did not support the
complaint because they believed that it interfered with the
administration's national reconciliation process; Rerum Novarum
considers the complaint still to be active.
There are no restrictions on the right of private sector workers to
strike, but very few workers in this sector belong to unions.
Accordingly, private sector strikes rarely occur. The Constitution and
Labor Code restrict the right of public sector workers to strike.
However, in February 1998, the Supreme Court formally ruled that public
sector workers, except those in essential positions, have the right to
strike. Even before this ruling, the Government had removed penalties
for union leaders participating in such strikes.
Unions may form federations and confederations and affiliate
internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution protects the right to organize. Specific provisions of the
1993 Labor Code reforms provide protection from dismissal for union
organizers and members during union formation. The revised provisions
require employers found guilty of discrimination to reinstate workers
fired for union activities.
Public sector workers cannot engage in collective bargaining
because the Public Administration Act of 1978 makes labor law
inapplicable in relations between the Government and its employees.
However, the Supreme Court affirmed their right to strike (see Section
6.a.). In August the Government negotiated a wage increase following a
7-day strike by public sector workers. Private sector unions have the
legal right to engage in collective bargaining.
All labor regulations apply fully to the country's nine export
processing zones (EPZ's). The Labor Ministry oversees labor regulations
within the EPZ's, but acknowledged that it has only 1 inspector for
every 30,000 workers.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there were no known instances
of such practices. Laws prohibit forced and bonded labor by children,
and the Government enforces this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution provides special employment protection
for women and children and establishes the minimum working age at 12
years, with special regulations in force for workers under the age of
15. The Legislative Assembly adopted the Code on Childhood and
Adolescence in December 1997, which includes provisions designed to
implement the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. The
Constitution and the Labor Code also provide special employment
protection for children and establish the minimum working age at 15
years. Adolescents between the ages of 15 and 18 can work a maximum of
6 hours daily and 36 hours weekly, while children under age 15 cannot
work legally. The PANI, in cooperation with the Labor Ministry,
generally enforces these regulations in the formal sector. The Ministry
of Labor reported that up to 147,000 children between 5 and 17 years of
age are employed. With help from the ILO, the LaborMinistry is working
to phase out child labor and has asked employers of children to notify
the Ministry of such employment. Due to limited government resources
for enforcement, some children work on the fringes of the formal
economy in excess of these limits. After two adolescents died from
chemical poisoning while working on banana plantations in 1993, the
authorities prohibited employment of youths under the age of 18 in the
banana industry. Nonetheless, child labor remains an integral part of
the informal economy, which employs a significant proportion of the
labor force. Laws prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, and the
Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution provides for a
minimum wage. A National Wage Council, composed of three members each
from government, business, and labor, sets minimum wage and salary
levels for all sectors. Monthly minimum wages, last adjusted in July
for the private sector, range from $132 (38,303 colones) for domestic
employees to $640 (185,653 colones) for some professionals. Public
sector negotiations, based on private sector minimum wages, normally
follow the settlement of private sector negotiations. The Ministry of
Labor effectively enforces minimum wages in the San Jose area, but does
so less effectively in rural areas. Especially at the lower end of the
wage scale, the minimum wage is insufficient to provide a worker and
family a decent standard of living.
The Constitution sets workday hours, overtime remuneration, days of
rest, and annual vacation rights. Although often circumvented in
practice, it also requires compensation for discharge without due
cause. Generally, workers may work a maximum of 8 hours during the day
and 6 at night, up to weekly totals of 48 and 36 hours, respectively.
Nonagricultural workers receive an overtime premium of 50 percent of
regular wages for work in excess of the daily work shift. However,
agricultural workers do not receive overtime pay, if they voluntarily
work beyond their normal hours. Little evidence exists that employers
coerce employees to perform such overtime.
A 1967 law on health and safety in the workplace requires
industrial, agricultural, and commercial firms with 10 or more workers
to establish a joint management-labor committee on workplace conditions
and allows the Government to inspect workplaces and to fine employers
for violations. Most firms subject to the law establish such committees
but either do not use the committees or neglect to turn them into
effective instruments for improving workplace conditions. While workers
have the right to leave work if conditions become dangerous, workers
who do so may find their jobs in jeopardy unless they file written
complaints with the Labor Ministry. Due partly to budgetary
constraints, the Ministry has not fielded enough labor inspectors to
ensure consistent maintenance of minimum conditions of safety and
sanitation, especially outside San Jose. However, the Ministry of Labor
has decided to improve the labor inspection function on a priority
basis.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in women
for the purpose of prostitution, and on August 17, a statute went into
effect that strengthens this prohibition. There have been only
infrequent and isolated cases of trafficking in women in the past (also
see Section 5). A local NGO reports that girls from Costa Rica have
been transported through Central America and Mexico to work in the sex
trade in the United States, Canada, and Europe. There were also reports
of girls from the Philippines being trafficked to Costa Rica to work in
the sex trade. Local authorities lack the resources necessary to tackle
this problem; there is little in the way of government protection, aid,
or educational campaigns for persons who have been trafficked to or
from the country.
______
CUBA
Cuba is a totalitarian state controlled by President Fidel Castro,
who is Chief of State, Head of Government, First Secretary of the
Communist Party, and commander in chief of the armed forces. President
Castro exercises control over all aspects of Cuban life through the
Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government
bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. The Communist Party is
the only legal political entity, and President Castro personally
chooses the membership of the Politburo, the select group that heads
the party. There are no contested elections for the 601-member National
Assembly of People's Power (ANPP), which meets twice a year for a few
days to rubber stamp decisions and policies already decided by the
Government. The Party controls all government positions, including
judicial offices. The judiciary is completely subordinate to the
Government and to the Communist Party.
The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security
and totalitarian control. Officers of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
(FAR), which are led by President Castro's brother Raul, have been
assigned to the majority of key positions in the Ministry of Interior
in recent years. In addition to the routine law enforcement functions
of regulating migration and controlling the Border Guard and the
regular police forces, the Interior Ministry's Department of State
Security investigates and actively suppresses opposition and dissent.
It maintains a pervasive system of vigilance through undercover agents,
informers, the rapid response brigades, and the Committees for the
Defense of the Revolution (CDR's). While the Government traditionally
used the CDR's to mobilize citizens against dissenters, impose
ideological conformity, and root out ``counterrevolutionary'' behavior,
economic problems have reduced the Government's ability to reward
participation in the CDR's and hence the willingness of citizens to
participate in them, thereby lessening the CDR's effectiveness. Other
mass organizations also inject government and Communist Party control
into citizens' daily activities at home, work, and school. Members of
the security forces committed serious human rights abuses.
The Government continued to control all significant means of
production and remained the predominant employer, despite permitting
some carefully controlled foreign investment in joint ventures with the
Government. In most cases, foreign employers are allowed to contract
workers only through state agencies, which receive hard currency
payments for the workers' labor but in turn pay the workers a small
fraction of this, usually 5 percent, in local currency. In May 1998,
the Government retracted some of the changes that had led to the rise
of legal nongovernmental business activity when it further tightened
restrictions on the self-employed sector by reducing the number of
categories allowed and by exacting relatively high taxes on self-
employed persons. In August the Government's official press reported
that the number of self-employed persons was 166,000, an increase from
the fewer than 150,000 reported in 1998, when the number of self-
employed persons was estimated to have dropped by one-fourth from 1997.
According to official figures published in December, the economy grew
6.2 percent during the year. Despite this growth, overall economic
output remains below the levels prior to the drop of at least 35
percent in gross domestic product that occurred in the early 1990's due
to the inefficiencies of the centrally controlled economic system; the
loss of billions of dollars of annual Soviet bloc trade and Soviet
subsidies; the ongoing deterioration of plants, equipment, and the
transportation system; and the continued poor performance of the
important sugar sector. The 1998-99 sugar harvest was marginally better
than the 1997-98 harvest, considered to have been the worst in more
than 50 years. For the ninth straight year, the Government continued
its austerity measures known as the ``special period in peacetime.''
Agricultural markets, legalized in 1994, provide consumers wider access
to meat and produce, although at prices beyond the reach of most
citizens living on peso-only incomes or pensions. Given these
conditions, the flow of hundreds of millions of dollars in remittances
from the exile community significantly helps those who receive dollars
to survive. Tourism remained a key source of revenue for the
Government. The system of ``tourist apartheid'' continued, with foreign
visitors who pay in hard currency receiving preference over citizens
for food, consumer products, and medical services. Citizens remain
barred from tourist hotels, beaches, and resorts.
The Government's human rights record remained poor. It continued
systematically to violate fundamental civil and political rights of its
citizens. Citizens do not have the right to change their government
peacefully. Unlike in 1998, there were no credible reports of death due
to excessive use of force by the police. However, members of the
security forces and prison officials continued to beat and otherwise
abuse detainees and prisoners. The Government failed to prosecute or
sanction adequately members of the security forces and prison guards
who committed abuses. Prison conditions remained harsh. The authorities
routinely continued to harass, threaten, arbitrarily arrest, detain,
imprison, and defame human rights advocates and members ofindependent
professional associations, including journalists, economists, doctors,
and lawyers, often with the goal of coercing them into leaving the
country. The Government used internal and external exile against such
persons, and it offered political prisoners the choice of exile or
continued imprisonment. The Government denied political dissidents and
human rights advocates due process and subjected them to unfair trials.
The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government
denied citizens the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and
association. It limited the distribution of foreign publications and
news to selected party faithful and maintained strict censorship of
news and information to the public. The Government restricts some
religious activities but permits others. Before and after the January
1998 visit of Pope John Paul II, the Government permitted some public
processions on feast days, and reinstated Christmas as an official
holiday, but it has not responded to the papal appeal that the Church
be allowed to play a greater role in Cuban society. During the year,
the Government allowed about 15 new priests to enter the country;
however, the applications of many priests and religious workers
remained pending, and some visas were issued for periods of only 3 to 6
months. The Government kept tight restrictions on freedom of movement,
including foreign travel. The Government was sharply and publicly
antagonistic to all criticism of its human rights practices and sought
to discourage and thwart foreign contacts with human rights activists.
The Government publicly stated before the Ibero-American Summit in
November that visiting delegations were free to meet with any person in
the country, and about 20 dissidents met with 9 different delegations,
including 3 heads of state. However, prior to the summit, the
Government temporarily detained a number of human rights activists to
prevent them from preparing for meetings with the visiting leaders and
also detained independent journalists to prevent them from covering the
event. Violence against women is a problem, as is child prostitution.
Racial discrimination often occurs. The Government severely restricted
worker rights, including the right to form independent unions. The
Government employs forced labor, including that by children.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of politically motivated killings. Unlike in 1998, during the
year there were no credible reports of deaths due to the excessive use
of force by the national police. Government sanctions against
perpetrators were light or nonexistent in the cases of deaths due to
excessive use of force during 1998. There were no reports of proper
investigations into the 1998 deaths of Wilfredo Martinez Perez, Yuset
Ochoterena and Reinery Marrera Toldedo.
In October 1996, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) issued its final report on the Government's July 13, 1994
sinking of the ``13th of March'' tugboat, which killed 41 persons,
including women and children. The IACHR concluded that the Government
violated the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and
found the Government legally obligated to indemnify the survivors and
the relatives of the victims for the damages caused. At year's end, the
Government still had not done so. The Government detained a number of
human rights activists to prevent them from participating in a Mass in
memory of the victims on the anniversary of the deaths (see Sections
1.d. and 2.c.).
In March the Government announced that a Havana court sentenced
Salvadoran citizen Raul Ernesto Cruz Leon to death for terrorism. The
authorities arrested Cruz Leon in September 1997 and charged him with
being the ``material author'' of the killing of an Italian tourist that
month with a bomb, one of a series of explosions in Havana. In April
the court sentenced a second Salvadoran citizen, Otto Rene Rodriguez
Llerena, to death in the same case. Neither man was executed by year's
end. The authorities also held two Guatemalan citizens in custody in
the case; they awaited trial at year's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits abusive treatment of detainees
and prisoners; however, there were instances in which members of the
security forces beat and otherwise abused human rights advocates,
detainees, and prisoners. There have been numerous reports of
disproportionate police harassment of black youths (see Section 5).
On January 26, police approached 16-year-old Yusel Vidal Mejias and
his friends, who were hanging on to a gasoline truck while riding their
bicycles at about 11:00 p.m. The youths dispersed upon seeing the
police, but police apprehended Vidal and severely beat him. Since Vidal
had no identity documents, the police took him to the local police
station, where the police told the registration official that he was a
``ninja'' (a popular expression referring to thieves who use acrobatic
maneuvers to mount a moving truck and then proceed to throw bags of
rice or beans onto another moving vehicle). Vidal's father, Jose Vidal
Crossa, told of his son's arrest by friends and neighbors, reached the
police station after midnight, and after nearly an hour's wait, secured
his son's release. The father took the boy to the nearest hospital,
where a doctor diagnosed him as having suffered ``severe contusions of
the right elbow, of the right knee, and multiple hematomas of the
back.'' On January 27, the father met with the chief of police, who
admitted that the police officer used excessive force and said that the
officer would no longer have any duties related to street patrols.
Citing a radio statement by the Director of Prisons of the Ministry of
Interior (MININT) in 1996 that no prisoner in Cuba is mistreated, the
father officially requested that the military prosecutor investigate
the case and prosecute the police officer. There was no response from
the Government as of year's end.
On August 14, police detained Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet Gonzalez,
president of the Lawton Human Rights Foundation (FLDH), and other
activists as they were going to a public park to demonstrate (see
Section 2.b.). At the police station, a policeman punched Biscet in the
face while another crushed his burning cigarette on Biscet's elbow when
Biscet said, ``God loves you.'' It was not known whether the Government
ever sanctioned the two policemen responsible for the cigarette burn
and for striking Dr. Biscet in the face.
The Government continued to subject those who disagreed with it to
``acts of repudiation.'' At government instigation, members of state-
controlled mass organizations, fellow workers, or neighbors of intended
victims are obliged to stage public protests against those who dissent
with the Government's policies, shouting obscenities and often causing
damage to the homes and property of those targeted; physical attacks on
the victims sometimes occur. Police and state security agents are often
present but take no action to prevent or end the attacks. Those who
refuse to participate in these actions face disciplinary action,
including loss of employment. During the year, there were no massive
acts of repudiation directed against the homes of particular human
rights activists; however, there were smaller-scale acts of
repudiation, known as ``reuniones relampagos,'' or ``lightning fast
meetings.''
On October 28, in a press conference at his residence, Dr. Biscet
announced plans for a protest march. Participants in the press
conference were subjected to verbal abuse from a crowd in which
observers noted the presence of security police in civilian clothes
(see Section 2.b.). On November 10, this publicly announced nonviolent
protest march from Dolores Park to Butari Park in the Lawton section of
Havana was repressed when a crowd booed, chased, and struck three
protesters. On November 12, Moises Rodriguez Quesada allowed his house
to be used for a meeting of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) (see
Section 2.b.). On November 22, a small crowd threw stones for about 30
minutes at a metal door on the side of Rodriguez's house. Independent
journalists also were subjected to acts of repudiation (see Section
2.a.).
Prison conditions continued to be harsh, and conditions in
detention facilities also are harsh. The Government claims that
prisoners have rights, such as family visitation, adequate nutrition,
pay for work, the right to request parole, and the right to petition
the prison director. However, police and prison officials often denied
these rights and used beatings, neglect, isolation, and denial of
medical attention against detainees and prisoners, including those
convicted of political crimes or those who persisted in expressing
their views. Human Rights Watch reported that in February the
Government revised the Penal Code to provide that prisoners ``cannot be
subjected to corporal punishment, nor is it permitted to employ any
means against them to humiliate them or to lessen their dignity'';
however, the revised code failed to establish penalties for committing
such acts. There are separate prison facilities for women and for
minors.
Prison officials regularly denied prisoners other rights, such as
the right to correspondence, and continued to confiscate medications
and food brought by family members for political prisoners. State
security officials in Havana's Villa Marista prison took medications
brought by family members for inmates and then refused to give the
detainees the medicine, despite repeated assurances that they would.
Prison authorities also routinely denied religious workers access to
detainees and prisoners.
The rights to adequate nutrition and medical attention while in
prison also were violated regularly. In 1997 the IACHR described the
nutritional and hygienic situation in the prisons, together with the
deficiencies in medical care, as ``alarming.'' Both the IACHR and the
former U.N. Special Rapporteur on Cuba, as well as other human rights
monitoring organizations, reported the widespread incidence in prisons
of tuberculosis, scabies, hepatitis, parasitic infections, and
malnutrition.
Prison guards and state security officials also subjected human
rights and prodemocracy activists to threats of physical violence; to
systematic psychological intimidation; and to detention or imprisonment
in cells with common and violent criminals, sexually aggressive
inmates, or state security agents posing as prisoners. In May in the
Guamajal prison in Villa Clara, a common prisoner named Soria
physically attacked political prisoner Cecilio Monteagudo Sanchez, at
the instigation of prison authorities. According to witnesses, prison
official Jose Luis Collado was responsible for this attack.
Political prisoners are required to comply with the rules for
common criminals and often are punished severely if they refuse.
Detainees and prisoners often are subjected to repeated, vigorous
interrogations designed to coerce them into signing incriminating
statements, to force collaboration with authorities, or to intimidate
victims.
Despite international appeals for their release, after 17 months of
detention without charges, the four leaders of the dissident working
group--economists Vladimiro Roca Antunez and Marta Beatriz Roque
Cabello, engineer Felix Antonio Bonne Carcasses, and lawyer Rene Gomez
Manzano--were accused of sedition in November 1998 and convicted in
March 1999 after a 1-day, closed trial. On July 16, one of the four,
Marta Beatriz Roque, began to refuse all solid food and threatened to
begin a complete hunger strike on September 2 if the Government did not
answer the appeal she filed after the trial (see Section 1.e.).
However, after promising her a quick response, the Government instead
transferred Roque to a government-owned safehouse where she was kept in
isolation for several months.
In June in the provincial prison of Guantanamo, prison authorities
placed Alexander Taureaux Balvier in solitary confinement after he
complained about the prison authorities' arbitrary decision to reduce
family visits, including those by his mother, to 5 minutes. On June 29,
common prisoners demonstrated against the mistreatment of Taureaux, and
in response, the prison authorities called in the special brigade riot
police for help. The demonstration did not become violent, and no one
was injured in the incident.
On July 5, in a note smuggled out of the Combinado del Este prison
in Havana, political prisoner Francisco Chaviano Gonzalez described the
mistreatment that he said prison officials directed at him. According
to Chaviano, prison authorities confined him to his cell without
allowing him to mix with other prisoners or to exercise in the open
court with other prisoners. He added that this was the third time
during the last 3 months that he was isolated in his cell. Chaviano
speculated that this treatment was in retaliation for a letter he wrote
to Fidel Castro criticizing the arbitrariness of his detention and
trial. In September Chaviano reportedly again was placed in isolation
after a heated conversation with a prison official.
On August 15, prison authorities in Canaleta, Ciego de Avila
province, placed Luis Campo Corrales (who was sentenced to 25 years'
imprisonment for piracy of a boat and another year for ``disrespect'')
in isolation (known as a ``punishment cell'') for reportedly
complaining about prison conditions. Witnesses reported that the cell
in which he was placed previously was occupied by a prisoner infected
with the HIV virus. According to these witnesses, prison authorities
stripped Campo of all his clothes before confining him in the cell.
In September prison authorities in Ciego de Avila forced the
parents of imprisoned journalist Joel Diaz Hernandez to submit to a
strip search following a visit to their son (see Section 2.a.).
The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison
conditions by international or national human rights monitoring groups.
The Government has refused prison visits by the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) since 1989 and continued to refuse requests to
renew such visits. Nonetheless, human rights activists continued to
seek information onconditions inside jails despite the risks to
themselves and to their prison sources.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention continued to be problems, and they remained the Government's
most effective weapons to harass opponents. The Law of Penal Procedures
requires police to file formal charges and either release a detainee or
bring the case before a prosecutor within 96 hours of arrest. It also
requires the authorities to provide suspects with access to a lawyer
within 7 days of arrest. However, the Constitution states that all
legally recognized civil liberties can be denied to anyone who actively
opposes the ``decision of the Cuban people to build socialism.'' The
authorities invoke this sweeping authority to deny due process to those
detained on purported state security grounds.
The authorities routinely engage in arbitrary arrest and detention
of human rights advocates, subjecting them to interrogations, threats,
and degrading treatment and conditions for hours or days at a time.
In January security agents temporarily detained independent
journalist Omar Rodriguez Saludes and Jose Orlando Gonzalez Bridon,
president of an independent labor organization, after they had lunch
with a group of visiting foreign former legislators. On January 14,
police temporarily detained about a dozen prodemocracy activists in
Havana to prevent them from holding a public event in honor of Martin
Luther King (see Section 2.b.). According to Human Rights Watch, in
late January, police detained several members of the FLDH, including
Dr. Biscet, the group's leader, for 4 to 6 days. The detentions
prevented the FLDH members from participating in a January 25
celebration of the first anniversary of the Pope's 1998 visit to the
country (see Section 2.c.).
In February state security officials detained a number of
prodemocracy activists in various parts of the country to prevent them
from commemorating the anniversary of the shootdown of two civilian
airplanes over international airspace by the air force in 1996 (see
Section 2.b.). In late February and early March, the Government
temporarily detained nearly 100 prodemocracy activists and placed
others under house arrest to keep them from expressing support for the
four members of the Internal Dissident Working Group during their trial
in March on charges of sedition (see Sections 1.e. and 2.b.).
On July 13, the police arrested Marcel Valenzuela Salt, a member of
the Organization of Fraternal Brothers for Dignity, and 5 other persons
while the 6 were en route to a church in Guanabacoa to attend a Mass in
honor of the 41 persons who drowned when the Border Guard sank the
tugboat ``13th of March'' (see Section 1.a.). Police officers detained
all six persons and confiscated the truck driven by Valenzuela, even
though the truck's papers clearly indicated that Valenzuela's father
was the owner. Despite various attempts to have the truck returned to
its rightful owner, police refused to do so. The truck finally was
returned to its rightful owner in November. On August 15, police
prevented human rights activists, including lawyer Leonel Morejon
Almagro, leader of the environmental group Naturpaz and founder of
Concilio Cubano, from meeting in Lenin Park, and confiscated Morejon's
car (see Section 2.b.).
On September 8, security police told a number of human rights
activists not to attend the annual procession in honor of the Virgin of
Charity (see Section 2.c.). On the same day, police prevented some
activists from meeting to discuss the formation of a forum on civil
society. On October 19, security police prevented members of various
organizations from organizing the Third Millennium Forum. These
organizations intended to present a unified position on various
domestic issues to delegations attending the Ninth Ibero-American
Summit in Havana on November 15 and 16.
On October 21, the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National
Reconciliation issued a press release alerting the international
community to the growing number of human rights activists being
detained for short periods. The Commission noted that at least 40
people were detained for brief periods during the previous 2 weeks. On
November 10, police arrested leaders of a farmers' organization that
was preparing a conference for small farmers and agricultural
operatives on November 12 in Matanzas (see Section 2.b.). These arrests
were carried out to prevent human rights activists from preparing
themselves for meetings that they hoped to have with government leaders
attending the Ibero-American Summit. Also on November 10, police told a
number of activists not to leave their homes in order to prevent them
from participating in a planned protest in a public park in the Lawton
section of Havana. On November 3, a week before the event, the
authorities detained Dr. Biscet, who had announced the planned protest
march in an October 28 press conference (see Section 2.b.). At year's
end, Biscet remained in jail and was under investigation for
``promoting public disorder.'' In the days priorto a planned meeting of
NGO's on November 12, authorities detained temporarily or placed under
house arrest approximately 150 prodemocracy activists (see Section
2.b.). On November 17, the authorities temporarily detained Biscet's
wife, Elsa Morejon. On December 9, numerous persons were detained or
told not to leave their homes on December 10, when human rights
activists planned to commemorate the 51st anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (see Section 2.b.). The same thing happened
on December 16, the day before the popular pilgrimage to the church of
St. Lazarus in the town of El Rincon outside Havana (see Section 2.c.).
The Government also arbitrarily arrested and detained independent
journalists (see Section 2.a.). Independent journalists were told not
to cover certain meetings and were prevented physically from attending
the small farmers' conference in Matanzas (see Section 2.a.).
The Penal Code includes the concept of ``dangerousness,'' defined
as the ``special proclivity of a person to commit crimes, demonstrated
by his conduct in manifest contradiction of socialist norms.'' If the
police decide that a person exhibits signs of dangerousness, they may
bring the offender before a court or subject him to ``therapy'' or
``political reeducation.'' Government authorities regularly threaten
prosecution under this article. Both the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights (UNCHR) and the IACHR have criticized this concept for its
subjectivity, the summary nature of the judicial proceedings employed,
the lack of legal safeguards, and the political considerations behind
its application. According to the IACHR, the ``special inclination to
commit crimes'' referred to in the Criminal Code amounts to ``a
subjective criterion'' used by the Government to justify violations of
the rights to individual freedom and due process of persons whose sole
crime has been an inclination to hold a view different from the
official view. On January 8, a Havana court reaffirmed the 4-year
prison term for dangerousness imposed in 1998 on Lazaro Constantin
Duran, leader of the Friends Club of an independent teachers'
organization. On January 18, independent journalist Jesus Joel Diaz
Hernandez was sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment for dangerousness (see
Sections 1.e. and 2.a.). On July 17, a police officer threatened to
arrest Merino Cabrera, a member of the Human Rights Workers' Party, for
dangerousness and warned him against continuing his activities. A few
days later, on July 27, Cabrera found a cardboard coffin on his front
door with the words: ``Rest in Peace.''
The Government also used exile as a tool for controlling and
eliminating the internal opposition. Amnesty International has noted
that the Government had changed its tactics in dealing with human
rights advocates, and that rather than arresting them and bringing them
to trial, the ``tendency'' was to detain them repeatedly for short
periods and threaten them with imprisonment unless they gave up their
activities or left the country. The Government used these incremental
aggressive tactics to compel Leonel Morejon Almagro to leave the
country on October 19.
The Government also has pressured imprisoned human rights activists
and political prisoners to apply for emigration and regularly
conditioned their release on acceptance of exile. Human Rights Watch
observed that the Government ``routinely invokes forced exile as a
condition for prisoner releases and also pressures activists to leave
the country to escape future prosecution.'' In April the Government
released independent journalist Reinaldo Alfaro Garcia, who had served
21 months of a 3-year prison sentence imposed in 1998 for
``disseminating false news,'' on the condition that he leave the
country.
Amnesty International has expressed ``particular concern'' about
the Government's practice of threatening to charge, try, and imprison
human rights advocates and independent journalists prior to arrest or
sentencing if they did not leave the country. According to Amnesty
International, this practice ``effectively prevents those concerned
from being able to act in public life in their own country.''
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for
independent courts; however, it explicitly subordinates them to the
National Assembly of the People's Power and the Council of State, which
is headed by Fidel Castro. The ANPP and its lower level counterparts
choose all judges. The subordination of the courts to the Communist
Party, which the Constitution designates as ``the superior directive
force of the society and the State,'' further compromises the
judiciary's independence.
Civil courts exist at municipal, provincial, and supreme court
levels. Panels composed of a mix of professionally certified and lay
judges preside over them. Military tribunals assume jurisdiction for
certain counterrevolutionary cases.
The law and trial practices do not meet international standards for
fair public trials. Almost all cases are tried in less thana day; there
are no jury trials. While most trials are public, trials are closed
when state security allegedly is involved. Prosecutors may introduce
testimony from a CDR member as to the revolutionary background of a
defendant, which may contribute to either a longer or a shorter
sentence. The law recognizes the right of appeal in municipal courts
but limits it in provincial courts to cases such as those involving
maximum prison terms or the death penalty. Appeals in death penalty
cases are automatic. The death penalty ultimately must be affirmed by
the Council of State.
Criteria for presenting evidence, especially in cases of human
rights advocates, are arbitrary and discriminatory. Often the sole
evidence provided, particularly in political cases, is the defendant's
confession, usually obtained under duress and without the legal advice
or knowledge of a defense lawyer. The authorities regularly deny
defendants access to their lawyers until the day of the trial. Several
dissidents who have served prison terms reported that they were tried
and sentenced without counsel and were not allowed to speak on their
own behalf. Amnesty International has concluded that ``trials in all
cases fall far short of international standards for a fair trial.''
The law provides the accused with the right to an attorney, but the
control that the Government exerts over the livelihood of members of
the state-controlled lawyers' collectives--especially when they defend
persons accused of state security crimes--compromises their ability to
represent clients. Attorneys have reported reluctance to defend those
charged in political cases due to fear of jeopardizing their own
careers.
Human rights monitoring groups inside the country estimate the
number of political prisoners at between 350 and 400 persons. The
authorities have imprisoned such persons on charges such as
disseminating enemy propaganda, illicit association, contempt for the
authorities (usually for criticizing Fidel Castro), clandestine
printing, or the broad charge of rebellion, often brought against
advocates of peaceful democratic change.
On March 1, in a 1-day trial, a court in Havana convicted the four
members of the Internal Dissident Working Group--Vladimiro Roca
Antunez, Marta Beatriz Roque Cabello, Felix Antonio Bonne Carcasses,
and Rene Gomez Manzano--of ``acts against the security of the State in
relation to the crime of sedition.'' The four had been detained since
July 1997, when they were arrested for expressing peacefully their
disagreement with the Government. In 1997 the group had sought support
from the international community for its concept of peaceful dissent
from the Government's policies and publicly distributed a paper, ``The
Homeland Belongs to All,'' which presented a moderate response to the
platform released by the Communist Party for its Fifth Party Congress.
The Working Group also made a public appeal to citizens to abstain from
participating in national elections (voting is not mandatory). On March
15, the government television station announced the following prison
sentences for the four: 5 years for Vladimiro Roca, 4 years for Felix
Bonne and Rene Gomez, and 3\1/2\ years for Marta Beatriz Roque. All
four appealed their convictions. On July 16, Roque began to refuse all
solid food and later threatened to begin a full-scale hunger strike, to
protest the Government's lack of response to her appeal. In September
she ended the hunger strike after the Government promised to respond;
however, the Government did not respond to the appeals of any of the
four by year's end.
Others convicted on political charges during the year included
independent journalists Manuel Antonio Gonzalez Castellanos, who was
sentenced on May 6 to 2 years and 7 months' imprisonment for ``contempt
for authority'' (see section 2.a.). On January 19, a court sentenced
journalist Jesus Joel Diaz Hernandez to 4 years' imprisonment for
``dangerousness'' (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
According to human rights monitoring groups inside the country, the
number of political prisoners increased slightly during the year, in
contrast to 1998 when the number of political prisoners fell after the
release of 99 prisoners in response to an appeal by Pope John Paul II
for clemency.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Although the Constitution provides for the
inviolability of a citizen's home and correspondence, official
surveillance of private and family affairs by government-controlled
mass organizations, such as the CDR's, remains one of the most
pervasive and repressive features of Cuban life. The State has assumed
the right to interfere in the lives of citizens, even those who do not
actively oppose the Government and its practices. The mass
organizations' ostensible purpose is to ``improve the citizenry,'' but
in fact their goal is to discover and discourage nonconformity. Citizen
participation in these mass organizations has declined; the economic
crisis both has reduced the Government's ability to provide material
incentives for their participation and has forced many persons to
engage inblack market activities, which the mass organizations are
supposed to report to the authorities.
The authorities utilize a wide range of social controls. The
Interior Ministry employs an intricate system of informants and block
committees (the CDR's) to monitor and control public opinion. While
less capable than in the past, CDR's continue to report on suspicious
activity, including conspicuous consumption; unauthorized meetings,
including those with foreigners; and defiant attitudes toward the
Government and the revolution.
The Department of State Security often reads international
correspondence and monitors overseas telephone calls and conversations
with foreigners. The Government controls all access to the Internet,
and all electronic mail messages are subject to censorship. Citizens do
not have the right to receive publications from abroad, although
newsstands in foreigners-only hotels and outside certain hard currency
stores sell foreign newspapers and magazines. The Government continued
to jam the U.S.-operated Radio Marti and Television Marti. Radio Marti
broadcasts generally overcame the jamming attempts on shortwave bands,
but its medium wave transmissions are blocked completely in Havana. The
Government generally succeeded in jamming Television Marti
transmissions. Security agents subjected dissidents, foreign diplomats,
and journalists to harassment and surveillance, including electronic
surveillance.
Human Rights Watch reported that in January authorities in Santiago
notified Margarita Sara Yero of the Independent Press Agency of Cuba
that she would be evicted from her home, where she had lived for 35
years (see Section 2.a.). On March 4, Mercedes Moreno, director of the
New Press Agency, criticized the security forces for their intimidating
tactics against her and her husband, a former political prisoner, that
included the illegal entry of her home (see Section 2.a.). On June 18,
a local security officer in Santiago de Cuba sent a threatening
message, through a nonpolitical family member, to Rafael Oliva Reyes,
who offered his house for purposes of conducting a solidarity fast with
the fasters of Tamarindo 34 in Havana (see Sections 2.b. and 4). On
June 24, a security agent told Alexis Rodriguez Fernandez, the national
coordinator of the Cuban Youth Movement for Democracy, that the
authorities were fully aware of his activities in Havana, such as
visiting embassies and participating in the Tamarindo 34 fast, and that
they were preparing a judicial case of dangerousness against him.
On August 23, security agents forcibly evicted Ramon Humberto Colas
Castillo, his wife Berta Mexidor Vasquez, their two children, and his
mother from their house in Las Tunas. The couple had established an
independent library in their house and worked as independent
journalists for the Libertad press agency (see Section 2.a.). In
November authorities evicted independent journalist Nestor Baguer from
his home (see Section 2.a.).
The authorities regularly search persons and their homes, without
probable cause, to intimidate and harass them. State security agents
searched the homes of hundreds of human rights advocates and
independent journalists, seizing typewriters, small cassette equipment,
personal and organizational documents, books, and foreign newspapers.
The authorities harass and target acts of repudiation at both
dissidents and their family members. At times those taking part in such
acts of repudiation invade and damage homes, as well as physically
attack occupants (see Section 1.c.). Friends and relatives of
independent journalists also are subjected to harassment (see Section
2.a.).
The authorities regularly detained human rights advocates after
they visited foreign diplomatic missions, confiscated their written
reports of human rights abuses, and seized copies of foreign newspapers
and other informational material, including copies of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). On November 5, security police
detained Jose Aquilar Hernandez of the 13th of July movement and
independent journalist Clara Morales Martinez in Havana. They were
taken to a police station where they were interrogated about a planned
November 10 march in the Lawton area of Havana. Security officers also
confiscated copies of the UDHR that they had in their possession. They
both were released the next morning.
In August the president of an independent teachers' group said that
his son lost his job because of state security interference. He claimed
that security officials infiltrated an agent among his friends; when
police found some drugs in the friends' possession, they then tried to
implicate his son. Based on this, his son, who was the only member of
the family working, lost his restaurant job. On June 28, Avila Eloina
Heredia Cervantes of the Cuban Committee for Human Rights in Ciego de
Avila lost her job at the cafeteria of the central train station in
Moron. In 1997 she had lost her job in another restaurant.
There were numerous credible reports of forced evictions of
squatters and residents who lacked official permission to reside in
Havana (see Section 5).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government does not allow
criticism of the revolution or its leaders. Laws against antigovernment
propaganda, graffiti, and disrespect of officials carry penalties of
from 3 months to 1 year in prison. If President Castro or members of
the National Assembly or Council of State are the objects of criticism,
the sentence can be extended to 3 years. Charges of disseminating enemy
propaganda (which includes merely expressing opinions at odds with
those of the Government) can bring sentences of up to 14 years. In the
Government's view, such materials as the UDHR, international reports of
human rights violations, and mainstream foreign newspapers and
magazines constitute enemy propaganda. Local CDR's inhibit freedom of
speech by monitoring and reporting dissent or criticism. Police and
state security officials regularly harassed, threatened, and otherwise
abused human rights advocates in public and private as a means of
intimidation and control.
In January a court in Moron, Ciego de Avila province, sentenced
Jesus Joel Diaz Hernandez, director of the Cooperative of Independent
Journalists of Ciego de Avila, to 4 years' imprisonment for
dangerousness. Human Rights Watch reported that Diaz was accused of
having met with delinquents and having disturbed the public order. He
was tried the day after his arrest, making it impossible for him to
prepare an adequate defense. In May a court in Holguin sentenced
independent journalist Mario Gonzalez Castellanos, Cubapress
correspondent in Holguin, to 2\1/2\ years in the Holguin prison known
as Cuba Si, for showing disrespect to Fidel Castro.
The Constitution states that print and electronic media are state
property and cannot become in any case private property. The Communist
Party controls all media--except a few small church-run publications--
as a means of indoctrinating the public. Even the church-run
publications are watched closely, denied access to mass printing
equipment, and subject to governmental pressure. On November 1, in a
televised speech, President Castro expressed his displeasure with an
article in the Pinar-based Catholic Church magazine Vitral, mentioning
the editor by name.
All media must operate under party guidelines and reflect
government views. The Government attempts to shape media coverage to
such a degree that it not only continued to exert pressure on domestic
journalists, but also sought to increase its pressure on groups
normally outside the official realm of control, such as visiting
international correspondents. Resident foreign correspondents reported
an increase in governmental pressure, including official and informal
complaints about articles, threatening phone calls, and lack of access
to officials.
In February the National Assembly passed the Law to Protect
National Independence and the Economy. This law outlaws a broad range
of activities as undermining state security, and toughens penalties for
criminal activity. Under the law, anyone caught possessing or
disseminating literature deemed subversive, or supplying information
that could be used by U.S. authorities in the application of U.S.
legislation, is subject to fines and to prison terms of 7 to 20 years.
While many activities between Cuban nationals and foreigners possibly
could fall within the purview of this new law, it appears to be aimed
primarily at independent journalists.
The new law increases the penalties and broadens the definitions of
activities covered by the 1996 Cuban Dignity and Sovereignty Act, which
already proscribes citizens from providing information to any
representatives of the U.S. Government, or seeking any information from
them, that might be used directly or indirectly in the application of
U.S. legislation. This includes accepting or distributing any
publications, documents or other material from any origin, which the
authorities might interpret as facilitating implementation of such
legislation.
No one was charged yet with violating the new law by year's end,
but all but a handful of independent journalists admitted that its very
existence had some effect on their activities and their reporting, with
some calling its passage the most effective form of harassment of the
press during the year. Many independent journalists were threatened
either anonymously or openly with arrest and conviction based on the
new law, some repeatedly over the months since the law took effect. The
Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) reported that, following the
release in January of independent journalist Lorenzo Paez Nunez after
he completed serving an 18-month prison sentence for ``disseminating
false news,'' authorities repeatedly harassed him and threatened him
with application of the new law. Cubapress director Raul Rivero
reported that the authorities picked him up outside the Havana Libre
Hotel and told him that he and Christian Liberation Movement founder
Oswaldo Paya Sardinas would be the first to feel the full consequences
of the law.
In February National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon told
foreign correspondents that under the new law, even reporters working
for accredited foreign media could be sentenced to up to 20 years in
prison if the information they publish is deemed to serve U.S.
interests. Several times during the year, the domestic press, and even
President Castro in televised speeches, specifically mentioned
correspondents from international news services and publications as
being particularly unresponsive to the Government's positions, and
possibly serving U.S. interests.
Credible reports indicated that, after several sharp attacks in the
local press, including accusations of distortion, sensationalism,
calumny, and manipulation, the Government persuaded a major
international news agency to replace its bureau chief in Havana by
promising increased access to government officials if it did so. Two
other longtime resident foreign correspondents also left under
difficult circumstances.
In January state security officials ordered visiting Radio
Netherlands correspondent Edwin Koopman to leave the country for
activities inconsistent with his journalism visa. Apparently,
activities that Koopman was conducting for Pax Christi-Netherlands came
to the Government's attention, and were given as the reason for his
expulsion.
In November security agents and government supporters seriously
damaged a Cable News Network camera during an attack on dissidents in
Dolores Park in the Lawton section of Havana. Taped coverage of the
incident appeared to indicate that the cameraman was in fact the
target. The cameraman was among the foreign news crews that arrived to
cover a march announced to call attention to human rights problems
before the Ibero-American Summit later that month. The few activists
who managed to get to the park were set upon by members of mass
organizations holding a progovernment picnic and rally in the same
place (see Section 2.b.). International coverage of the attack led to a
6-hour speech by Fidel Castro in which he described the dissidents as
criminals and their antagonists as devoted patriots.
The Government continued to jam the U.S.-operated Radio Marti and
Television Marti (see Section 1.f.).
The Government continues to subject independent journalists to
internal travel bans, arbitrary and periodic detentions (overnight or
longer), small acts of repudiation (see Section 1.c.), harassment of
family and friends, seizures of computers, office and photographic
equipment, and repeated threats of prolonged imprisonment. Independent
journalists in Havana reported a general decrease in harassment, but
there continued to be reports of constant threatening phone calls and
harassment of family members in the weeks leading up to the Ibero-
American Summit in November. Outside the capital, journalists reported
an increase in detentions, threats, and harassment during the same
period.
In Santiago de Cuba, independent journalist Santiago Santana was
detained three different times; on one occasion in September, security
officials seized his camera and two tape recorders. Human Rights Watch
reported that in January authorities in Santiago notified Margarita
Sara Yero of the Independent Press Agency of Cuba that she would be
evicted from her home, where she had lived for 35 years. The
authorities claimed that she had abandoned the house, although
neighbors confirmed that she resided there. On February 1, officials
held a public meeting in which they criticized Yero for not voting for
Communist candidates and for not participating in the local CDR;
according to press reports, she received an eviction notice the
following day. On March 4, Mercedes Moreno, director of the New Press
Agency, criticized the security forces for their intimidating tactics
against her and her husband, a former political prisoner, which
included illegal entry into her home, and citing her and her husband to
appear at different police stations in Havana. She also accused
security agents of forcing traffic police regularly to issue traffic
violations to her and her husband, with exorbitant fines.
In August in Ciego de Avila, neighbors rousted Jorge Enrique Rives,
of the Patria Agency, and his family, including elderly relatives, from
their beds and seriously assaulted them, while shouting revolutionary
slogans. Also in August, independent journalists and private library
owners Ramon Colas and Berta Maxidor, their young children (ages 9 and
13), and Colas's 73-year-old mother were evicted from their house in
Las Tunas without warning, and all of their belongings were taken to a
shelter many miles out of town. Security officials told Colas and
Maxidor that they were occupying the house, which they had lived in for
13 years, illegally. The authorities temporarily detained Colas at that
time for arguing with them.
In September the parents of imprisoned independent journalist Jesus
Joel Diaz Hernandez were harassed and forced to submit to a strip
search at the end of a strictly regulated visit to their son. In
October unknown assailants damaged the house of Cubapress correspondent
Jesus Labrador Arias in Guantanamoprovince by throwing stones at it in
the middle of the night. On October 15, an immigration officer
requested the return of the passport of Magaly de Armas, the wife of
imprisoned Internal Dissident Working Group member Vladimiro Roca
Antunez, shortly before she was scheduled to travel abroad to accept an
award on behalf of her husband and the other three imprisoned Working
Group members for a publication by the group that defended freedom of
the press (see Section 2.d.).
In November the authorities detained independent journalist and
activist for the blind Juan Carlos Rodriguez for 3 days, ostensibly to
prevent him from covering activities related to the Ibero-American
Summit. Rodriguez's wife also was called in repeatedly to her
neighborhood police station and threatened. Also in November, the
Government prevented independent journalists from covering a conference
of small farmers in Matanzas.
In November the landlord of octogenarian Nestor Baguer, dean of the
independent journalists and founder of the original Independent Press
Agency of Cuba, asked Baguer to vacate his apartment after he was
mentioned, along with several dozen other opposition members and
foreign diplomats, by Fidel Castro in a 6-hour speech. Reportedly his
landlord evicted him under pressure from members of the local CDR, who
objected to living so close to a named criminal.
Many of the detentions, house arrests, and threats that occurred
during the year were in conjunction with major events on the
dissidents' and the Government's calendars. The authorities ordered
dozens of independent journalists to remain in their homes on February
24, the anniversary of the 1996 shootdown of two civilian aircraft over
international air space by the air force. The Government also detained
or threatened many journalists before and during the March 1 trial of
the four members of the Internal Dissident Working Group, and on March
15, the day of their sentencing (see Section 1.e.). Many of the
dissidents detained and threatened prior to the Ibero-American Summit
were journalists (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). The Government ordered
several of them to return to their home provinces, including Edel
Garcia to Caibarien, or ordered them not to travel to Havana at that
time. The authorities detained journalists along with other dissidents
during protests organized by the environmental organization Naturpaz on
August 15 and September 20 (see Section 2.b.).
In Havana the authorities repeatedly detained Oswaldo de Cespedes
of the Cooperative of Independent Journalists and threatened to reopen
charges against him that date back to 1996. The authorities picked up
Jesus Zuniga, also of the Cooperative of Independent Journalists, on
his way to visit a foreign diplomatic mission, detained him for several
hours, and interrogated him frequently about alleged connections with
foreign radical groups.
In August officials denied permission to Raul Rivero, poet,
journalist, and director of Cubapress, to travel abroad to receive a
journalism prize. According to newspaper reports, when asked about
keeping Rivero from traveling, Fidel Castro replied that Rivero would
never leave the country. The authorities detained independent
journalist Angel Pablo Polanco three times in connection with his
activities with various dissident groups, and confined him to a
military hospital, ostensibly for treatment of glaucoma. He
subsequently was released.
During the year, the authorities retracted their previously granted
permission for Mario Viera, founder of Cuba Voz, to depart the country
as a refugee. In 1998 Viera's trial on charges of defaming a government
official was postponed when prodemocracy activists began demonstrating
outside the courthouse, but the charges against him were not dismissed.
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the IAPA, Reporters
Without Borders, and the Committee to Protect Journalists repeatedly
called international attention to the Government's continued practice
of detaining independent journalists and others simply for exercising
their right to free speech.
Distribution of information continues to be controlled tightly.
Access to computers is limited, e-mail is restricted tightly (see
Section 1.f.), and access to the Internet virtually is prohibited,
except to certain government offices, selected institutes, and
foreigners. The Ministry of Interior controls Internet access.
The Government prohibits all diplomatic missions in Havana from
printing or distributing publications, particularly newspapers and
newspaper clippings, unless those publications deal exclusively with
conditions in a mission's home country and it receives prior Government
approval. Many missions do not accept the validity of this requirement,
but the Government's threats to expel embassy officers who provide
published materials to Cubans have had a chilling effect on many
missions.
The Government circumscribes artistic, literary, and academic
freedoms and is reemphasizing the importance of reinforcing
revolutionary ideology and discipline over any freedom of expression.
The educational system teaches that the State's interests have
precedence over all other commitments. Academics and other government
officials are prohibited from meeting with some diplomats without prior
approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of
Education requires teachers to evaluate students' and their parents'
ideological character, and note it in records that students carry
throughout their schooling. These reports directly affect the students'
educational and career prospects. As a matter of policy, the Government
demands that teaching materials for courses such as mathematics or
literature have an ideological content. Government efforts to undermine
dissidents include denying them advanced education and professional
opportunities. Fidel Castro has stated publicly that the universities
are available only for those who share his revolutionary beliefs.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Although the
Constitution grants limited rights of assembly and association, these
rights are subject to the requirement that they may not be ``exercised
against the existence and objectives of the Socialist State.'' The law
punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons,
including those for private religious services in a private home, by up
to 3 months in prison and a fine. The authorities selectively enforce
this prohibition and often use it as a legal pretext to harass and
imprison human rights advocates.
The Government selectively continued to authorize the Catholic
Church to hold outdoor processions at specific locations on important
feast days during the year. It permitted a procession in connection
with Masses in celebration of the feast day on September 8 of Our Lady
of Charity in Havana for the second time in more than 3 decades. The
Government also authorized other denominations to hold a few public
events. In May and June, it allowed the main Protestant churches to
hold a large-scale evangelical celebration across the island (see
Section 2.c.). However, the Government also continued routinely and
arbitrarily to deny requests for other processions and events.
The authorities have never approved a public meeting by a human
rights group. On January 14, police and state security officers briefly
detained about a dozen Havana dissidents to prevent them from holding a
public event in commemoration of Martin Luther King at Butari Park in
the Lawton section of Havana. Among the activists reportedly detained
and subsequently released were Maria de los Angeles Gonzalez, Ernesto
Colas, Alberto Martinez, Pablo Nelson, Juana Gonzalez, Miriam Garcia,
Miriam Cantillo, Ofelia Nardo, Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, and Rolando
Munoz Yyobre. State security members also prevented activists Nancy
Sotolongo and Ana Maria Agramonte from leaving their homes to attend
the planned event.
Beginning on February 22, state security officers detained
prodemocracy activists in different parts of the country to prevent
them from staging activities commemorating the February 24, 1996
shootdown of two civilian aircraft over international airspace by the
air force. Security agents also warned many more activists against any
public demonstrations on February 24, and warned independent
journalists not to cover incidents on February 24. On February 22,
police detained Dr. Biscet and Munoz Yyobre at Biscet's home after he
tried to stage a demonstration outside the hospital where he formerly
worked. Female workers from the hospital physically assaulted Biscet,
allegedly on the orders of the hospital's administrator. On February
23, the authorities detained prodemocracy activists Manuel Preval,
Guillermo Diaz, Yvette Rodriguez and Ciro Roman in Santiago de Cuba;
they detained three additional activists, including independent
journalist Jesus Labrador Arias, in Manzanillo. On February 24,
security officers detained Marcos Lazaro Torres Leon, Lazaro Naranjo,
Carlos Alberto Dominguez, Victor Alfredo Gomez, Alejandro Garcia, and
Ismael Torres in Havana. There were also reports that some 10 to 12
activists may have been detained in Pinar del Rio province west of
Havana. Four of the activists in Havana shaved their heads in a protest
covered by British Broadcasting Corporation television.
In order to prevent dissidents from expressing support for the four
members of the Internal Dissident Working Group during their trial in
March (see Section 1.e.), officials detained nearly a hundred
prodemocracy activists. Among those detained were Oswaldo Paya Sardinas
of the Christian Liberation Movement, Jesus Yanez Pelletier and his
wife Marieta Menendez, Odilia Collazo of the Cuba Pro-Human Rights
Party, Illeana Sommeillan of the Support Network Group of the Four,
Leonel Morejon Almagro of Naturpaz and founder of Concilio Cubano, and
a number of independent journalists. All of those detained were
released within a few days after the trial.
In June and July, a number of activists from different
organizations carried out a 40-day liquid fast at Tamarindo 34 inHavana
and at other locations, to protest the Government's violations of human
rights and to call for an amnesty for political prisoners (see Section
4). The organizer of the event, Dr. Biscet, and his colleagues then
attempted to organize a civic forum made up of five organizations
involved in the fast. However, the Government temporarily detained
Biscet and his supporters whenever they planned any action toward this
end, including visits to other houses where sympathy fasts took place.
The Government closed a school they established on the use of
nonviolence in civic actions, and on August 14 authorities detained
Biscet as he was going to Butari Park to demonstrate. A policeman hit
him in the face after Biscet told him that ``God loves you,'' while
another policeman crushed a burning cigarette on his elbow (see Section
1.c.).
On August 15, police arrested Leonel Morejon Almagro, the leader of
the environmental group Naturpaz, as he was leaving his house to attend
a peaceful public protest planned weeks in advance that was to be
conducted under a mahogany tree that was planted in Lenin Park in 1986
at the founding of the organization. The intent was to protest the
Government's lack of interest in addressing environmental degradation,
and in particular to focus the public's attention on the imminent
construction of a new airport near Cayo Coco, which Naturpaz asserted
would damage irreversibly the nearby keys. Police also arrested five
other persons, including a 78-year-old woman. All were released later
that day. However, police impounded Morejon's car and did not return
it. Meanwhile, at Lenin Park, security forces intercepted every person
that tried to go to the mahogany tree, checked their documents
carefully, and then drove them to a location far away from the park and
their homes. Naturpaz later estimated that the police intercepted over
100 persons in this manner.
On October 28, Dr. Biscet announced in a press conference that on
November 10, the FLDH and other organizations planned to lead a
nonviolent protest march from Dolores Park to Butari Park in the Lawton
area of Havana to protest the holding of the Ninth Ibero-American
Summit in Havana. During the press conference, the Cuban flag was
displayed upside down, as an indication of opposition to the
Government. On November 3, police detained Biscet and told him that he
would be prosecuted for his disrespect toward the national flag; he was
still in jail and his case was still under investigation at year's end
(see Section 1.d.). On November 9, police detained three of his
colleagues--Jose Aguilar Hernandez, Alejandro Chang Cantillo, and
Marcel Valenzuela Salt. On November 10, at the planned protest site,
Dolores Park, the international press witnessed several hundred members
of the Communist youth organizations, including school children, having
a noisy progovernment party and rally. Three dissidents tried to stage
a protest but were booed, chased by the crowd, and struck several
times. Security agents then took away dissidents Reynaldo Gomez
Gonzalez, Juan Carlos Padura Padilla, and Pedro Castro Ponce de Leon.
In a press conference later the same day, Fidel Castro implied that the
clash was a spontaneous reaction by ordinary citizens to political acts
that they found distasteful. Castro brought to his press conference 14
persons who were at the park and who claimed that they were provoked
while enjoying a party.
On November 12, fewer than 20 individuals of the more than 90
expected to attend arrived at the house of Moises Rodriguez Quesada
near Havana airport for a 1-day meeting of domestic NGO's. Although bad
weather was a factor in the low turnout, the detention and house arrest
of about 150 persons, including the organizers of the meeting, starting
days before the event, especially of those coming from other provinces,
prevented the attendance of many. However, international press coverage
of the event provided the dissidents that attended a rare opportunity
to brief the journalists.
On November 10, security police also attempted to prevent a meeting
of the National Alliance of Independent Small Farmers, which the
organizers had planned to hold in Matanzas, by arresting the
organizers--Antonio Alonso Perez, Tomas Fernandez Tiher, and Felix
Navarro. The group nonetheless managed to hold the meeting in the house
of an independent journalist in Las Tunas, albeit with a much reduced
number of participants.
On December 4, the Government allowed human rights activists to
march silently, after attending a Mass, from the Church of Saint
Barbara to the Church of Saint Edward, a distance of about six blocks,
in the municipality of Parraga in Havana. Because of the presence of
members of a rapid response brigade, police provided security to allow
the march. Representatives of the international press were present and
interviewed a number of the marchers. This was the first protest march
ever allowed by the Government, probably because of the presence of the
international press and the Government's apparent desire to avoid an
incident such as the one at Dolores Park on November 10.
On December 9, numerous human rights supporters were detained or
told not leave their homes in order to prevent them from publicly
commemorating the 51st anniversary on December 10 of the UDHR.
The Government generally denies citizens freedom of association.
The Penal Code specifically outlaws ``illegal or unrecognized groups.''
The Ministry of Justice, in consultation with the Interior Ministry,
decides whether to give organizations legal recognition. The
authorities have never approved the existence of a human rights group.
Along with recognized churches, the Roman Catholic humanitarian
organization Caritas, Masons, small human rights groups, and a number
of nascent fraternal or professional organizations are the only
associations outside the control or influence of the State, the
Communist Party, and their mass organizations. With the exception of
the Masons, who have been established in the country for more than a
century, the authorities continue to ignore these groups' applications
for legal recognition, thereby subjecting members to potential charges
of illegal association. All other legally recognized
``nongovernmental'' groups are at least nominally affiliated with, or
controlled by, the Government.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution recognizes the right of
citizens to profess and practice any religious belief, within the
framework of respect for the law; however, in law and in practice, the
Government places restrictions on freedom of religion.
In recent years, the Government has eased the harsher aspects of
its repression of religious freedom. In 1991 it allowed religious
adherents to join the Communist Party. In 1992 it amended the
Constitution to prohibit religious discrimination and removed
references to ``scientific materialism,'' i.e., atheism, as the basis
for the Cuban State. Nevertheless, the State prohibits members of the
armed forces from allowing anyone in their household to observe
religious practices, except elderly relatives if their religious
beliefs do not influence other family members and are not ``damaging to
the revolution.''
The Government requires churches and other religious groups to
register with the provincial registry of associations to obtain
official recognition. In practice, the Government refuses to register
new denominations. The Government prohibits, with occasional
exceptions, the construction of new churches, forcing many growing
congregations to violate the law and meet in private homes. Government
harassment of private houses of worship continued, with evangelical
denominations reporting evictions from houses used for these purposes.
The Government's main interaction with religious denominations is
through the Office of Religious Affairs of the Cuban Communist Party.
The Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and
monitor the country's religious institutions, including surveillance,
infiltration, and harassment of religious professionals and laypersons.
In 1998 following Pope John Paul II's January visit, the country's
Catholic bishops appealed to the Government to recognize the Church's
role in civil society and the family, as well as in the temporal areas
of work, the economy, the arts, sports, and the scientific and
technical worlds. The Government continued to limit the Church's access
to the media and refused to allow the Church to have a legal
independent printing capability. It maintained its prohibition against
the establishment of religiously affiliated schools. Nonetheless, in
September local government authorities, for the second time since 1961,
allowed the Catholic Church to hold an outdoor procession to mark the
feast day of Our Lady of Charity in Havana. Although visibly present,
state security personnel did not harass any participants or observers
as happened during 1998. However, prior to the event, security police
told a number of human rights activists not to attend the procession.
On December 25, the Government permitted the Catholic Church to hold a
Christmas procession in Havana. The Government also granted a request
by church leaders to broadcast on state television the Pope's annual
Christmas Day message from the Vatican. As in 1998, in December the
Government also allowed Cardinal Jaime Ortega to give a 10-minute
address on the national classical music station.
In 1998 the Government announced in a Politburo declaration that
henceforth citizens would be allowed to celebrate Christmas as an
official holiday. (The holiday had been cancelled, ostensibly to spur
the sugar harvest, in 1969, and restored in 1997 as part of the
preparations for the Pope's 1998 visit.) However, despite the
Government's decision to allow citizens to celebrate Christmas as a
national holiday, it also maintained a December 1995 decree prohibiting
nativity scenes in public buildings.
The Government allowed about 15 foreign priests to enter the
country during the year, but some visas were issued only for periods of
from 3 to 6 months, and applications of many other priests and
religious workers remained pending.
The Government continued to enforce a resolution that prevented any
Cuban or joint enterprise (except those with specific authorization)
from selling computers, facsimile machines,photocopiers, or other
equipment to any church at other than official--and exorbitant--retail
prices.
On January 6, the Government closed the Bible Institute of the
United Pentecostal Church of Cuba (Apostolic) and evicted its
occupants. (In 1997 the Government had declared the United Pentecostal
Church illegal after it split from the Apostolic Church of Jesus Christ
because it disagreed with the Apostolic Church of Jesus Christ's
membership in the Cuban Council of Churches.) On February 2, the
authorities also reportedly closed local church headquarters in
Manquitas, Cabaiguan, and Sancti Spiritus. On October 8, security
agents expelled church leader Santos Osmany Dominguez Borjas from
Havana to Holguin. According to a pastor of the church, Lazaro Williams
Urbina Dupont, church members decided that all their pastors must leave
the country if they are to survive as a church.
In recent years, the Government has relaxed restrictions on some
religious denominations, including Seventh-Day Adventists and Jehovah's
Witnesses. The Cuban Council of Churches continues to broadcast a
monthly 15-minute program on a national classical music radio station,
with the understanding that the program must not include material of a
political character. The head of the Cuban Council of Churches is a
member of the government-controlled ANPP. In May and June, the
Government permitted most the country's Protestant churches--both
inside and outside the Cuban Council of Churches--to hold an
evangelical celebration. The celebration consisted of some 18 public
events across the island, 4 of which--in Baracoa, Holguin, Camaguey,
and Havana, respectively--were televised nationally. The culminating
event was a service in Havana on June 20, which attracted tens of
thousands of persons and was attended by President Castro.
State security officials visited some priests and pastors, prior to
significant religious events, ostensibly to warn them about dissidents,
in an effort to sow discord and mistrust between the churches and
peaceful prodemocracy activists. State security officers also regularly
harassed human rights advocates who sought to attend religious services
commemorating special feast days or before significant national days,
including inside churches and during religious ceremonies.
Human Rights Watch reported that in late January, police detained
several members of the FLDH, including its leader, Dr. Biscet, for 4 to
6 days. The detentions prevented Biscet and his colleagues from
participating in a January 25 celebration of the first anniversary of
the Pope's 1998 visit. On July 13, the authorities arrested Marcel
Valenzuela Salt, a member of the Organization of Fraternal Brothers for
Dignity, and five other persons as the group was en route to a church
in Guanabacoa to attend a Mass in memory of those who died in the 1994
sinking of the tugboat ``13th of March'' (see Section 1.d.). On
December 17, security police arrested Valenzuela and three other human
rights activists--Carlos Oquendo, Jose Aguilar and Diosdado Gonzalez--
who were among a crowd of persons who gathered to participate in a
pilgrimage to the Church of Saint Lazarus in El Rincon. The four were
arrested after they took off their shirts to show T-shirts on which
were printed the words, ``Release All Political Prisoners.'' The day
before the pilgrimage, security police told some human rights activists
not to attend the event.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government kept tight restrictions
on freedom of movement. The Government generally has not imposed legal
restrictions on domestic travel, except for persons found to be HIV-
positive, whom it initially restricts to sanatoriums for treatment and
therapy before conditionally releasing them into the community.
However, in recent years state security officials have forbidden human
rights advocates and independent journalists from traveling outside
their home provinces, and the Government also has sentenced others to
internal exile. On October 8, security agents expelled Santos Osmany
Dominguez Borjas, an evangelical church leader, from Havana to Holguin
(see Section 2.c.). Just prior to the Ibero-American Summit, state
security agents informed human rights activists in other provinces that
they could not travel to Havana. For example, on November 11,
authorities told Oscar Horta Medina of the Avilena Foundation for Human
Rights that he could not leave Ciego de Avila; the Government also
prohibited prodemocracy activists Nestor Rodriguez Lobaina and Santiago
Santana from leaving the province of Santiago de Cuba.
In 1997 the Council of Ministers approved Decree 217, aimed at
stemming the flow of migration from the provinces to the capital city.
Human rights observers noted that while the decree affected migration
countrywide, the decree was targeted at individuals and families from
the poor, predominantly black and mulatto eastern provinces. In March
1998, the government newspaper Granma reported that Decree 217 had
succeeded in reducing the flow of persons to the capital city.
The Government imposed some restrictions on both emigration and
temporary foreign travel. In August the Government denied an exit
permit to Osvaldo Alfonso Valdes, president of the Democratic Liberal
Party, and to Fernando Sanchez Lopez, president of the Democratic
Solidarity Party, to attend the executive committee meeting of the
International Liberal Party on September 4 in Managua, Nicaragua,
despite their payment of $800 in exit fees. No explanation was given
for the denials. In October the Government denied an exit permit to
independent journalist Raul Rivero to travel abroad to receive a
journalistic award. On October 15, an immigration officer requested the
return of the Cuban passport of Magaly de Armas, the spouse of
Vladimiro Roca Antunez, one of the four imprisoned members of the
Internal Dissident Working Group (see Section 1.e.). De Armas was
scheduled to leave the country the same day to attend the IAPA's 55th
general assembly to receive on behalf of the four prisoners an award
for ``The Country Belongs to All,'' a publication by the group that
defended freedom of the press (see Section 1.e.).
The Government allows the majority of persons who qualify for
immigrant or refugee status in other countries to depart; however, in
certain cases the authorities delay or deny exit permits, usually
without explanation. Some denials involve professionals who have tried
to emigrate and whom the Government subsequently banned from working in
their occupational field. The Government refused permission to others
because it considers their cases sensitive for political or state
security reasons. In July the Government issued Resolution 54, which
provides for the denial of exit permits to recently graduated
professionals, in particular medical professionals, until they have
performed 3 to 5 years of service in their profession. There were
reports that the Government also was denying exit permits to trained
medical personnel who already have practiced their profession for more
than 5 years, although the published regulations on the subject do not
contain such a provision. The Government also routinely denies exit
permits to young men approaching the age of military service, and until
they reach the age of 27, even when it has authorized the rest of the
family to leave. However, in most of those cases approved for migration
to the United States under the September 1, 1994, U.S.-Cuban migration
agreement, the applicants eventually receive exemption from obligatory
service and are granted exit permits. The Government has a policy of
denying exit permission for several years to relatives of individuals
who successfully have migrated illegally (e.g., merchant seamen who
have jumped ship overseas, and sports figures who have defected while
on tour abroad).
Migrants who travel to the United States must pay a total of about
$500 per adult and $400 per child, plus airfare. These government fees
for medical exam, passport, and exit visa--which must be paid in
dollars--are equivalent to about 5 years of a professional person's
accumulated peso salary and represent a significant hardship,
particularly for political refugees who usually are marginalized and
have no income. In 1996 the Government agreed to allow 1,000 needy
refugees to leave each year with reduced exit fees. However, after the
first group of 1,000 in 1996, no further refugees have been accorded
reduced fees. At year's end, 315 approved refugees remained in the
country because they were unable to pay government exit fees for
themselves and their families.
The Penal Code provides for imprisonment from 1 to 3 years or a
fine of $15 to $50 dollars (300 to 1,000 pesos) for unauthorized
departures by boat or raft. The office of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) has stated that it regards any sentence for simple
illegal exit of over 1 year as harsh and excessive. Under the terms of
the May 2, 1995 U.S.-Cuba migration accord, the Government agreed not
to prosecute or retaliate against migrants returned from international
or U.S. waters, or from the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo, as a
consequence of their attempt to emigrate illegally.
In 1994 the Government eased restrictions on visits by, and
repatriation of, Cuban emigrants. Citizens who establish residency
abroad and who are in possession of government-issued ``permits to
reside abroad'' may travel to Cuba without visas. The Government
reduced the age of persons eligible to travel abroad from 20 to 18
years and extended the period for a temporary stay abroad from 6 to 11
months. In November 1995, the Government announced that emigrants who
are considered not to have engaged in ``hostile actions'' against the
Government and who are not subject to criminal proceedings in their
country of residence may apply at Cuban consulates for renewable, 2-
year multiple-entry travel authorizations. However, during the year,
the Government announced that it would deny entry permits for emigrants
who had left the country illegally after September 1994. At year's end,
it was not clear if the Government actually was implementing such a
policy. The Constitution provides for the granting of asylum to
individuals persecuted ``for their ideals or struggles for democratic
rights against imperialism, fascism, colonialism, and neocolonialism;
against discrimination and racism; for national liberation; for the
rights of workers, peasants, and students; for their progressive
political, scientific, artistic, andliterary activities; for socialism
and peace.'' However, the Government has no formal mechanism to offer
asylum to foreign nationals. Nonetheless, the Government honors the
principle of first asylum and has provided it to a small number of
persons. There was no information available on its use during the year.
According to the UNHCR, there are about 43 foreign nationals living in
the country and seeking asylum elsewhere. There were no reports of the
forced return of persons to countries where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the legal right to change their Government or
to advocate change, and the Government has retaliated systematically
against those who sought peaceful political change. The Constitution
proscribes any political organization other than the Communist Party.
While the Constitution provides for direct election of provincial,
municipal, and National Assembly members, the candidates must be
approved in advance by mass organizations controlled by the Government.
In practice, a small group of leaders, under the direction of President
Castro, selects the members of the highest policy-making bodies of the
Communist Party--the Politburo and the Central Committee.
The authorities tightly control the selection of candidates and all
elections for government and party positions. The candidacy committees
are composed of members of government-controlled mass organizations
such as the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) and the CDR's and are
responsible for selecting candidates, whose names are then sent to
municipal assemblies that select a single candidate for each regional
seat in the ANPP. An opposition or independent candidate has never been
allowed to run for national office.
On January 11, 1998, the Government held national elections in
which 601 candidates were approved to compete for the 601 seats in the
National Assembly. The Government claimed that they were voted in by
over 93 percent of the electorate, according to the official media. No
candidates with views independent from or in opposition to the
Government were allowed to run, and no views contrary to the Government
or the Communist Party were expressed in the government-controlled
national media. The Government saturated the media and used government
ministries, Communist Party organs, and mass organizations to urge
voters to cast a ``unified vote'' where marking one box automatically
selected all candidates on the ballot form. In practice, the Communist
Party approved candidates for all offices. A small minority of
candidates did not belong formally to the Communist Party. The
Communist Party was the only political party allowed to participate in
the elections.
Although not a formal requirement, Communist Party membership is in
fact a prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional
advancement.
The Government rejects any change judged incompatible with the
revolution and ignored calls for democratic reform. Although President
Castro signed the Declaration of Vina del Mar at the Sixth Ibero-
American Summit in 1996, in which government leaders reaffirmed their
commitment to democracy and political pluralism, the Government
continued to oppose independent political activity on the ground that
the Cuban system provides a ``perfected'' form of democracy and that
pluralism exists within the one-party structure.
An unprecedented number of foreign leaders held meetings with Cuban
dissidents on the margins of the November Ibero-American Summit in
Havana. Uruguayan President Julio Sanguinetti became the first Latin
American head of state to meet with a dissident on Cuban soil. Other
heads of state or ministers who met with dissidents were: Spanish Prime
Minister Jose Aznar; Portuguese President Jorge Sampaio; Panamanian
President Mireya Moscoso; Mexican Foreign Minister Rosario Green; and
Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Eduardo Montealegre.
The Declaration of Havana issued at the conclusion of the Summit
emphasized democracy, pluralism, and human rights. In closing remarks,
several heads of state reiterated the need for greater openness in
Cuba.
Government leadership positions continue to be dominated by men,
and women remain underrepresented. There are very few women or
minorities in policymaking positions in the Government or the Party.
There are 2 women in the 24-member Politburo, 18 in the 150-member
Central Committee, and 166 in the 601-seat ANPP. Although blacks and
mulattos make up over half the population, they hold only six seats in
the Politburo.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government does not recognize any domestic human rights groups,
or permit them to function legally. The Government subjects domestic
human rights advocates to intense intimidation, harassment, and
repression. In violation of its own statutes, the Government refuses to
consider applications for legal recognition submitted by human rights
monitoring groups.
On June 7, members of several human rights organizations began a
40-day fast at Tamarindo 34 in Havana in support of respect for human
rights and the release of political prisoners. The fast reportedly
subsequently expanded to other locations in the country.
In its 1997 report, the IACHR examined measures taken by the
Government and found that they did not ``comprise the bedrock of a
substantive reform in the present political system that would permit
the ideological and partisan pluralism implicit in the wellspring from
which a democratic system of government develops.'' The IACHR
recommended that the Government provide reasonable safeguards to
prevent violations of human rights, unconditionally release political
prisoners and those jailed for trying to leave the country, abolish the
concept of dangerousness in the Penal Code, eliminate other legal
restriction on basic freedoms, cease harassing human rights groups, and
establish a separation of powers so that the judiciary would no longer
be ``subordinate to political power.''
The Government steadfastly has rejected international human rights
monitoring. In 1992 Cuba's U.N. representative stated that Cuba would
not recognize the mandate of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
(UNCHR) on Cuba and would not cooperate with the Special Rapporteur on
Cuba, despite being a UNCHR member. This policy remained unchanged and
the Government refused even to acknowledge requests by the Special
Rapporteur to visit Cuba. In April 1998, the UNCHR did not renew the
mandate of the Special Rapporteur, following as yet unfulfilled
assertions by the Government that it would improve human rights
practices if it was not under formal sanction from the UNCHR. On April
23, the UNCHR passed a resolution, introduced by the Czech Republic and
Poland, expressing concern about the human rights situation in Cuba.
In September the U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Violence Against Women
and on Mercenaries visited the island, but issued no reports by year's
end.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Cuba is a multiracial society with a black and mixed-race majority.
The Constitution forbids discrimination based on race, sex, or national
origin, although evidence suggests that racial discrimination occurs
often.
Women.--Violent crime rarely is reported in the press, and there
are no publicly available data regarding the incidence of domestic
violence and rape; however, human rights advocates report that violence
against women is a problem. The law establishes strict penalties for
rape, and the Government appears to enforce the rape law; however,
according to human rights advocates, the police do not act on cases of
domestic violence. In October 1998, a female religious worker was
abused sexually and murdered. The Government quickly ordered an
investigation and arrested one suspect. Prostitution is legal (except
for prostitution by children under 17 years of age); however, pimping
or otherwise benefiting from prostitution is a felony. Prostitution has
increased greatly in the last few years; press reports indicate that
tourists from various countries visit specifically to patronize
inexpensive prostitutes. A government crackdown on prostitution
beginning in late 1998 and continuing in 1999 appeared to have some
effect, and fewer prostitutes (known as ``jineteras'') were visible in
Havana and other major cities. This success was obtained through
placing police on nearly every major street corner where tourists are
present. Most observers believe that the Government clamped down on
prostitution to combat the perception that the island promotes sex
tourism.
The Family Code states that women and men have equal rights and
responsibilities regarding marriage, divorce, raising children,
maintaining the home, and pursuing a career. Women are subject to the
same restrictions on property ownership as men. The maternity law
provides 18 weeks of maternity leave and grants working women
preferential access to goods and services. About 40 percent of all
women work, and they are well represented in the professions.
Children.--The Constitution provides that the Government protect
``family, maternity, and matrimony.'' It also states that children,
legitimate or not, have the same rights under the law and notes the
duties of parents to protect them. Education is free and is grounded in
Marxist ideology. State organizations and schools are charged with the
``integral formation of children and youth.'' The national health care
system covers all citizens. There is no societal pattern of abuse of
children. However, child prostitution is a problem, with young girls
engaging in prostitution to help support themselves and their families.
Young girls have constituted the bulk of the prostitutes catering
primarily to foreign tourists. It is illegal for a child under 17 years
of age to engage in prostitution. The police began to enforce this law
more actively in late 1998 and continued to do so during the year, as
part of their crackdown on prostitution in general.
People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination based
on disability, and there have been few complaints of such
discrimination. There are no laws that mandate accessibility to
buildings for the disabled.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Many Afro-Cubans have benefited
from access to basic education and medical care since the revolution,
and much of the police force and army enlisted personnel is black.
Nevertheless, racial discrimination often occurs. There have been
numerous reports of disproportionate police harassment of black youths.
In 1997 there were numerous credible reports of forced evictions of
squatters and residents lacking official permission to reside in
Havana. The evictions, exacerbated by Decree 217 (see Section 2.d.),
primarily targeted individuals and families from the eastern provinces,
which are traditionally areas of black or mixed-race populations.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution gives priority to
state or collective needs over individual choices regarding free
association or provision of employment. The ``demands of the economy
and society'' take precedence over individual workers' preferences. The
law prohibits strikes; none are known to have occurred. Established
official labor organizations have a mobilization function and do not
act as trade unions, promote worker rights, or protect the right to
strike. Such organizations are under the control of the State and the
Communist Party, which also manage the enterprises for which the
laborers work.
The Communist Party selects the leaders of the sole legal labor
confederation, the Confederation of Cuban Workers, whose principal
responsibility is to ensure that government production goals are met.
Despite disclaimers in international forums, the Government explicitly
prohibits independent unions and none are recognized. There has been no
change since the 1992 International Labor Organization (ILO) finding
that Cuba violated ILO norms on freedom of association and the right to
organize. Those who attempt to engage in union activities face
government persecution. Workers can and have lost their jobs for their
political beliefs, including their refusal to join the official union.
Several small independent labor organizations have been created, but
function without legal recognition and are unable to represent workers
effectively and work on their behalf. The Government actively harasses
these organizations. Police detained independent labor activist Jose
Orlando Gonzalez Bridon of the Confederation of Democratic Workers of
Cuba for brief periods in November and December 1998 and in January.
The CTC is a member of the Communist, formerly Soviet-dominated,
World Federation of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining does not exist. The State Committee for Work and Social
Security (CETSS) sets wages and salaries for the state sector, which is
almost the only employer in the country. Since all legal unions are
government entities, antiunion discrimination by definition does not
exist.
The 1995 Foreign Investment Law (Law 77) continued to deny workers
the right to contract directly with foreign companies investing in Cuba
without special government permission. Although a few firms have
managed to negotiate exceptions, the Government requires foreign
investors to contract workers through state employment agencies, which
are paid in foreign currency and, in turn, pay workers very low wages
in pesos. Workers subcontracted by state employment agencies must meet
certain political qualifications. According to Minister of Basic
Industry Marcos Portal, the state employment agencies consultwith the
Party, the CTC, and the Union of Communist Youth to ensure that the
workers chosen deserve to work in a joint enterprise.
There are no functioning export processing zones, although Law 77
authorizes the establishment of free trade zones and industrial parks.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Neither the
Constitution nor the Labor Code prohibits forced labor. The Government
maintains correctional centers where it sends persons for crimes such
as dangerousness. They are forced to work on farms or building sites,
usually with no pay and inadequate food. The authorities often imprison
internees who do not cooperate.
The Government employs special groups of workers, known as
``microbrigades,'' on loan from other jobs, on special building
projects. These microbrigades have increased importance in the
Government's efforts to complete tourist and other priority projects.
Workers who refuse to volunteer for these jobs often risk
discrimination or job loss. However, microbrigade workers reportedly
receive priority consideration for apartments. The military channels
some conscripts to the Youth Labor Army, where they serve their 2-year
military service requirement working on farms that supply both the
armed forces and the civilian population.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children;
however, the Government requires children to work without compensation.
All students over age 11 are expected to devote 30 to 45 days of their
summer vacation to farm work, laboring up to 8 hours per day. The
Ministry of Agriculture uses ``voluntary labor'' by student work
brigades extensively in the farming sector.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum working age is 17 years. However, the
Labor Code permits the employment of 15- and 16-year-old children to
obtain training or fill labor shortages. The law requires school
attendance until the ninth grade, and this law generally is respected.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor; however, it
requires children to work without compensation (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage varies by
occupation and is set by the CETSS. The minimum monthly wage for a
maid, for example, is $8.25 (165 pesos); for a bilingual office clerk,
$9.50 (190 pesos); and for a gardener $10.75 (216 pesos). The
Government supplements the minimum wage with free education and
subsidized medical care (but reduces daily pay by 40 percent after the
third day of being admitted to a hospital), housing, and some food--
subsidized food is enough for about 1 week per month. However, even
with these subsidies, the minimum wage does not provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. Corruption and black market
activities are pervasive. The Government rations most basic necessities
such as food, medicine, clothing, and cooking gas, which are in very
short supply.
The Government requires foreign companies in joint ventures with
state entities to hire and pay workers through the State. Human Rights
Watch noted that the required reliance on state-controlled employment
agencies effectively leaves workers without any capacity directly to
negotiate wages, benefits, the basis of promotions, and the length of
the workers' trial period at the job with the employer. Reportedly
these exploitative labor practices force foreign companies to pay the
Government as much as $500 to $600 per month for workers, while the
workers in turn receive only a small peso wage from the Government.
The standard workweek is 44 hours, with shorter workdays in
hazardous occupations, such as mining. The Government also reduced the
workday in some government offices and state enterprises to save
energy.
Workplace environmental and safety controls are usually inadequate,
and the Government lacks effective enforcement mechanisms. Industrial
accidents apparently are frequent, but the Government suppresses such
reports. The Labor Code establishes that a worker who considers his
life in danger because of hazardous conditions has the right not to
work in his position or not to engage in specific activities until such
risks are eliminated. According to the Labor Code, the worker remains
obligated to work temporarily in whatever other position may be
assigned him at a salary prescribed by law.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--In February the National Assembly
revised the Penal Code to prohibit trafficking in persons through or
from the country and to prescribe the following penalties for
violations: A term of 7 to 15 years' imprisonment for organizing or
cooperating in alien smuggling through the country; 10 to 20 years'
imprisonment for entering the country to smuggle persons out of the
country; and 20 years to life in prison for using violence, causing
harm or death, or putting lives in danger, in engaging in such
smuggling. These provisions are directed primarily at persons engaging
in organized smuggling of would-be emigrants from Cuba to the United
States. In addition, the revised Code made it illegal to promote or
organize entrance of persons into or exit of persons from the country
for the purpose of prostitution; violators are subject to 20 to 30
years' imprisonment.
There were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to, or from
the country for the purpose of providing forced labor or services.
______
DOMINICA
Dominica is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy and a member of
the Commonwealth of Nations. A Prime Minister, a Cabinet, and a
unicameral Legislative Assembly compose the Government. A President,
nominated by the Prime Minister in consultation with the leader of the
opposition party, and elected for a 5-year term by the Parliament, is
head of state. The United Workers Party (UWP), led by Prime Minister
Edison James, won 11 of 21 seats in Parliament in free and fair
elections in 1995 and gained an additional seat in 1996. The
Constitution calls for elections at least every 5 years, and the UWP
lost control of the Government in the January 2000 general elections.
The judiciary is independent.
The Dominica Police is the only security force. It is controlled by
and responsive to the democratically elected Government. There were
occasional allegations of abuse by the police.
The country's primarily agrarian economy depends on earnings from
banana exports. The Government is also developing the tourist industry,
diversifying agricultural production, and promoting the export of fresh
fruits, vegetables, and coconut products, both within and outside the
region. Per capita gross domestic product was about $3,340 in 1997.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
however, there were problems in several areas. The principal human
rights problems are occasional instances of use of excessive force by
police, poor prison conditions, societal violence against women and
children, instances of discrimination against indigenous Carib Indians,
and societal discrimination against female Caribs in mixed marriages.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, there
were some allegations of occasional use of excessive force by the
police.
In November 1997, the authorities forced the Commissioner and
Deputy Commissioner of police to retire, as a result of recommendations
by a Commission of Inquiry that investigated allegations of
mismanagement, corruption, and police brutality. Under new leadership,
the police created an Internal Affairs Department in December 1997 to
investigate public complaints against the police and to provide
counseling to police. In July 1998, a consultant from the United
Kingdom conducted a 3-month study to update antiquated police
regulations and to establish new operational guidelines for the police.
This report was submitted to the Government in 1998 but was still under
review at year's end. From January to September, the authorities
received 19 complaints regarding excessive use of force by the police.
Prison conditions are poor. Overcrowding and unsanitary conditions
continue to be problems in the sole prison facility. There are about
226 prisoners. The prison provides work therapy, sports programs,
educational opportunities, and counseling for inmates. Twelve prisoners
in the maximum security section of the prison conducted a 2-day hunger
strike in July to protest what they claimed to be the poor quality of
prison food. The strike ended after the prison superintendent promised
to investigate and make any needed improvements in the quality of the
food.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
requires that the authorities charge persons with a crime within 24
hours after arrest. If charges arebrought, the police must bring the
detainee to court within 72 hours. This requirement generally is
honored in practice, although often those arrested on Fridays must
remain in jail over the weekend and are not charged until the following
Monday.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
The judicial system is composed of a high court judge, 5
magistrates, and 10 magistrate courts located with police stations
around the country. Appeals can be made to the Eastern Caribbean
Supreme Court and to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom.
The law provides for public trial before an independent, impartial
court. Criminal defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty,
are allowed legal counsel, and have the right to appeal. Courts provide
free legal counsel to the indigent only in capital cases.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices. Government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the
right of free expression, and the Government respects this in practice.
The political opposition openly criticizes the Government.
The principal radio station is state-owned and has a government-
appointed board. There is also an independent radio station owned by
the Catholic Church. The print media consist of two private newspapers
and political party journals; all publish without censorship or
government interference. Citizens also enjoy access to independent news
sources through cable television and radio reception from neighboring
islands.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the authorities respect them in practice. The Government may revoke
passports if subversion is suspected but has not done so in recent
times.
The Government has not formulated a policy regarding refugees,
asylees, or first asylum. The issue of the provision of first asylum
did not arise. There were no reports of forced expulsion of anyone
having a valid claim to refugee status; however, government practice
remains undefined.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
In the last national elections in June 1995, the United Workers
Party defeated the incumbent Dominica Freedom Party, taking 11 of 21
seats in Parliament. In a by-election in August 1996, the UWP gained an
additional seat when it won a seat vacated by a member of the Dominica
Freedom Party, giving the UWP a total of 12 seats. The Dominica Freedom
Party currently holds fourseats, and the Dominica Labour Party holds
five seats. According to the Constitution, the next general election
must take place by June 2000; at year's end, the Prime Minister called
them for January 31, 2000.
There are no impediments in law or in fact to the participation of
women in leadership roles in government or political parties; however,
they are underrepresented in practice. Voters elected two women to
Parliament in the 1995 elections. Indigenous Carib Indians participate
in national political life.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no government restrictions on the formation of local
human rights organizations, although no such groups exist. Several
advocacy groups, such as the Association of Disabled People and a
women's and children's self-help organization, operate freely and
without government interference. There were no requests for
investigations of human rights abuses from international or regional
human rights groups.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution includes provisions against racial, sexual, and
religious discrimination, which the authorities respect in practice.
Women.--Sexual harassment and domestic violence cases are common,
and there is no family court to deal specifically with domestic
violence issues. Women can bring charges against husbands for battery,
and both the police and the courts prosecute cases of rape and sexual
assault, but there are no specific spousal abuse laws. However, in
April 1998, a new Sexual Offences Act went into effect to replace the
previous act, which required medical evidence or witness corroboration
for indictment. As a matter of policy, all rape cases are handled
solely by female police officers. The Department of Labor recruited a
permanent counselor and established a crisis response mechanism to
assist women who are victims of domestic violence. The Welfare
Department assists victims of abuse by finding temporary shelter,
providing counseling to both parties, or recommending police action.
The Welfare Department reports all cases of abuse to the police. The
courts may issue protective orders, but the police do not enforce them
consistently.
Beyond the general protection of the Constitution, women do not
benefit from any specific civil rights legislation. While there is
little open discrimination against women, property ownership continues
to be deeded to ``heads of households,'' who are usually males. When
the male head of household dies without a will, the wife cannot inherit
the property or sell it, although she can live in it and pass it to her
children. In the civil service, the law establishes fixed pay rates for
specific jobs, whatever the gender of the incumbent.
The Dominica National Council of Women, a nongovernmental
organization (NGO), has developed local adult education and small
business training programs for women. According to the Labor
Department, many women in rural areas find it difficult to meet basic
needs, at least in part owing to the decline in the banana export
industry.
Children.--The law stipulates that the Government should protect
the rights of children to education and health care. Education is
compulsory through age 16, and primary health care is available
throughout the island.
Various laws enumerate children's rights, but their enforcement is
hampered by lack of staffing in government agencies. According to the
Welfare Department, reported cases of child abuse, including sexual
abuse, have increased over the past few years. In 1997 there were 267
reported cases of child abuse, 175 of which were sexual abuse cases. In
1998 there were 303 reported cases of child abuse, 124 of which were
sexual abuse cases. At year's end, there were nine staff members in the
social welfare office that handles all welfare problems, including
complaints of child abuse.
Although the maximum sentence for sexual molestation (rape, incest)
is life imprisonment, the normal sentence given is 15years except in
the case of murder. The age of consent for sexual relations is 16
years.
People with Disabilities.--Beyond the general protection of the
Constitution, there is no specific legislation dealing with the
disabled. However, the labor laws permit authorization of employment of
a disabled person for less than the minimum wage, in order to increase
opportunities for employment of the disabled (see Section 6.e.). There
is no requirement mandating access for those with disabilities.
Indigenous People.--There is a significant Carib Indian population,
estimated at 3,400, of a total population of 72,000. Most live on a
3,783-acre reservation created in 1903 and expanded in 1997. School,
water, and health facilities available on the Carib reservation are
rudimentary but similar to those available to other rural Dominicans.
Most Carib Indians engage in farming, fishing, and handicraft.
Unemployment is believed to be higher than in rest of the country,
while the average income is below the national average. About 65
percent of the Carib population is between the ages of 18 and 35.
The reservation is governed by the 1978 Carib Constitution. Carib
Indians over the age of 18 who reside there are eligible to vote for
the Chief and eight members of the Council of Advisors. Elections are
held every 5 years, and the latest election was held in July. According
to the Carib Constitution, the Council must meet once a month,
determine the chief's itinerary, and publish council meeting agendas in
the government Gazette.
There are credible reports of discrimination against Carib women
who are married to, or who live with, non-Carib men, making it
difficult for such couples to obtain permits to build homes within the
reservation. Building permits are obtained from the Carib Council.
Until 1979 the Carib Constitution allowed Carib men married to non-
Carib women to continue living on the Carib reserve but dictated that
Carib women married to non-Carib men had to move off the reservation.
Although the law has changed, practice is not yet in keeping with the
law. In one case, a Carib woman in a common-law relationship with a
non-Carib man who tried to build a house on land reserved for her
family received threats that her house would be burned down. An
estimated 25 percent of the Carib Indian population is believed to be
in mixed marriages or relationships.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers have the legal right to
organize, to choose their representatives, and to strike, but unions
represent less than 10 percent of the work force. All unions are
independent of the Government. While there are no direct ties, members
of certain political parties dominate some unions. There is no
restriction on forming labor federations, and unions are affiliated
with various international labor bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have
legally defined rights to organize workers and to bargain with
employers. Collective bargaining is widespread in the nonagricultural
sectors of the economy, including the government service, and there is
also recourse to mediation and arbitration by the Government. The law
prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers, and judicial and
police authorities enforce union rights. In addition employers must
reinstate workers fired for union activities. The law requires that
employers recognize unions as bargaining agents once both parties have
followed appropriate procedures. Department of Labor inspectors under
the supervision of the Labor Commissioner enforce labor legislation,
but the small Labor Inspection Office lacks qualified personnel to
carry out its duties.
Labor regulations and practices governing the country's industrial
areas and export firms do not differ from those prevailing in the rest
of the economy.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, including that by children, and such labor
is not known to exist.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum legal age for employment is 15 years.
Employers generally observe this law without government enforcement.
The law prohibits forced or bonded child labor, and the Government
enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets minimum wages for
various categories of workers, but these were last revised in 1989. The
minimum wage rate for some categories of workers (e.g., household
employees) is as low as $0.37 (EC$1.00) per hour if meals are included.
However, minimum wages for most workers fall in a range between $0.74
(EC$2.00) per hour for tourist industry workers to $1.11 (EC$3.00) per
hour for occupations such as shopclerks. Minimum wages are not
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. However, most workers (including domestic employees) earn more
than the legislated minimum wage for their category. The Minimum Wage
Advisory Board met in 1998 and recommended increases in these wage
levels. The Prime Minister, who is also Labor Minister, had not yet
acted upon these recommendations at year's end.
The labor standards laws state that no employer shall establish or
maintain differences in wages between men and women performing the same
or similar work with parallel responsibilities under similar
conditions. The law further states that no employer may reduce the
wages of an employee to comply with equal wage standards. The labor
laws also provide that the Labor Commissioner may authorize the
employment of a disabled person at a wage lower than the minimum rate
in order to enable that person to be employed gainfully.
The standard legal workweek is 40 hours in 5 days. The law provides
for a minimum of 2 weeks' paid vacation per year. The Employment Safety
Act provides occupational health and safety regulation. Local NGO's and
one major union consider it to be consistent with international
standards. The Advisory Committee on Safety and Health is an
established body but has never met. The rarely used enforcement
mechanism consists of inspections by the Department of Labor, which can
and does prescribe specific compliance measures, impose fines, and
prosecute offenders. Workers have the right to remove themselves from
unsafe work environments without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons.
Recent press reports indicate that the country's economic
citizenship program, which allows individuals to purchase passports
through investments ranging from $15,000 (EC$40,000) to $50,000
(EC$135,000), has facilitated the illegal immigration of persons from
China and other countries to North America. Criminal organizations
reportedly provide funds to such individuals to pay these fees, and the
persons later are trafficked to Canada and the United States, where
they work under conditions similar to bonded labor until their debt is
repaid.
______
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The Constitution provides for a popularly elected president and a
bicameral Congress. President Leonel Fernandez of the Dominican
Liberation Party (PLD) took office in 1996 after a free and fair
election. The opposition Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), after
free and fair congressional elections in May, 1998, dominates the
Senate and has the largest presence in the lower house. The efforts of
the Supreme Court have led to a more effective judiciary independent of
other branches of government; nevertheless, there have been attempts by
both public and private entities, including the executive branch, to
undermine judicial independence.
The National Police (PN), the National Department of Investigations
(DNI), the National Drug Control Directorate (DNCD), and the military
(army, air force, and navy) form the security forces. The PN is under
the Secretary of the Interior and Police; the military is under the
Secretary of the Armed Forces; and the DNI and the DNCD, which have
personnel from both the police and the military, report directly to the
President. Although the security forces generally are responsive to
civilian authority, there were many instances in which members of the
security forces acted independently of government authority or control.
Some members of the security forces continue to commit human rights
abuses, sometimes with the tacit acquiescence of the civil authorities.
The economy, once heavily dependent on sugar and other agricultural
exports, continues to diversify; tourism, telecommunications, and free
trade zones (FTZ's) are major sources of income and employment.
Remittances from abroad, estimated to exceed $1.5 billion, are
equivalent to approximately 10 percent of the $1,800 per capita gross
domestic product. The country's agricultural and tourism sectors and
electrical power network largely have recovered from the effects of
Hurricane Georges, which hit the island in 1998, while transportation
infrastructure lags somewhat behind. During the year, the Government
transferred the sugar mills and lands belonging to the State Sugar
Council (CEA) by long-term lease to private control and privatized the
distribution function and part of the power generating capacity of the
Dominican Electricity Corporation. Income distribution in the country
is highly skewed, and more than half of the population live in poverty.
The Government's human rights record continued to be characterized
by serious problems. Police committed over twice as many extrajudicial
killings as in 1998. The police beat suspects and regularly used
excessive force to disperse demonstrators. Some security force
personnel tortured prisoners. Prison conditions in general are
extremely harsh. Police arbitrarily arrested, detained, and abused
suspects and suspects' relatives. Lengthy pretrial detention and long
delays in trials remained problems. Security forces committed break-ins
of private quarters without cause to search for suspects, and regularly
refused to obey judicial orders. The police were responsible for most
of the human rights abuses committed by the security forces and in many
cases commit such abuses with impunity. The administration and
effectiveness of the justice system improved somewhat, although
interference with the judiciary remained a problem, as did
administrative corruption. The Government at times pressured editors
not to publish unfavorable items, journalists practiced some self-
censorship, and police on several occasions limited freedom of
assembly. The Government restricts the movement of Haitian sugar cane
workers. Violence and discrimination against women; trafficking in
women and girls; prostitution, including child prostitution; abuse of
children; discrimination against the disabled, discrimination against
and abuse of Haitian migrants and their descendants; and forced labor
and child labor are serious problems. Workers in the sugar plantations
and mills of the CEA continued to work under unfair and unsafe
conditions through the harvest season.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by government officials; however, police
reportedly committed well over 200 extrajudicial killings during the
year, nearly three times the number in 1998. The Dominican Human Rights
Committee and others state that the police may employ unwarranted
deadly force against criminal suspects in a kind of uniformed
vigilantism. In addition, some victims are involved in private disputes
with police agents who use their public authority and weapons tomurder
them, while other victims later were found to be honest citizens
erroneously caught up in the wave of antigang violence carried out by
the police. The circumstances of the vast majority of these killings
are questionable, but witnesses other than the police usually are
lacking.
Extrajudicial killings stem from the lack of basic education, poor
training, and weak discipline of the members of the police force. These
problems are aggravated by low pay and the fact that the Government's
budgetary allocation for the police is too low to support the higher
recruiting standards needed and to provide adequate training. For
example, new recruits fire only one round during training, and there is
no coherent policy on the use of deadly force or rules of engagement by
the police. Finally, there is a lack of specific training in human
rights as applied to police work.
In the majority of the more than 200 extrajudicial killings, the
police characterized the victims as delinquents. The rest were wives,
girlfriends, or associates of the officers, other civilians, or fellow
officers. In most cases, the police said that the deaths resulted from
the exchange of gunfire incident to arrest. In many cases, the police
commit such killings with impunity. In October the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) issued a report that criticized the
police for committing extrajudicial killings and neglecting to
investigate and punish officers responsible for such abuses.
In Santo Domingo, police said that they shot a man known only as
``Penita'' when he confronted their patrol with a shotgun in the
streets of Manoguaybo. The police said that Penita was wanted on a
series of charges and that when he was spotted by a patrol he
immediately began shooting. The police, according to their spokesman,
returned the fire, mortally injuring Penita, who died en route to the
hospital. There were no outside witnesses to confirm or dispute the
police account, which was typical of police encounters with
delinquents, as described by the police.
The police shot and killed Fausto Torres Estevez, whom they sought
in connection with the murder of a fellow officer earlier the same day.
According to the PN, Torres Estevez was a known delinquent in Santiago,
and in possession of a 12-gauge shotgun with which he tried to fight
off the police patrol. However, according to neighbors and other
witnesses, Torres Estevez was walking when a vehicle suddenly swerved
to a stop in front of him and several men carrying firearms leaped out
and began shooting. When he was dead, they put his body in the trunk of
their vehicle and drove him to the morgue. No investigation has been
reported.
Police have claimed that the deaths of so-called delinquents result
from shoot-outs requiring the police to act in self-defense. However, a
number of cases highlight instances in which the public has been
misinformed. In at least one confirmed case, the deaths occurred after
the alleged delinquents were taken into custody. In Moca the police
handcuffed three young men and placed them, alive, in the back of a
police pickup truck. A young journalism student who happened to be
present recorded their arrest and departure from the scene. When the
truck arrived at the police headquarters, the three men were dead. The
authorities arrested a general, a colonel, a legal consultant, and
various police officers in connection with the three deaths and
transferred them from the jail in Santiago to the National District in
furtherance of the investigation.
Witnesses reported that the police shot and killed 26-year-old
Felix Manuel, a Herrera man with a criminal record, moments after the
police officers placed him under arrest. No investigation of this
incident has been reported.
The police in La Romana detained a young man who had reportedly
videotaped the arrest of a young man who was dead when he arrived at
the police station. The police confiscated the videotape, but not long
thereafter reported that two private citizens had erased it because
they wanted to ``avoid confusion among the public.'' However, the
erasure occurred while the tape was in police custody.
Police courts may try police officers or may remand them to
civilian court jurisdiction. Military courts try military personnel
charged with extrajudicial killings. Chief of Police Pedro de Jesus
Candelier announced that every time an officer is involved in a
questionable incident, the case goes to a commission of superior
officers for investigation. He said that if it is determined that the
police officer has exceeded his authority, the case is sent to the
police courts or to the civilian courts, depending on the severity of
the offense. Outof a force of about 23,000 members, including officers
and cadets, Candelier fired at least 2,300 during the year and
investigated or detained hundreds of police officers because of their
alleged use of excessive violence. Also, despite efforts to vet police
recruits, many persons with prior criminal records reportedly have been
incorporated into police ranks, either using false names or
identification or with recommendations from other state institutions,
such as the army. Candelier has undertaken an ongoing process to
eliminate unqualified or abusive police officers.
The police used force--at times deadly force--to disperse
demonstrators. The PN reported that nine persons were killed in the
course of protest demonstrations during the year, mostly in the
northeast and south of the country. For example, the military and
police were called into service to clear former employees of the sugar
mills, squatters, and would-be alien smugglers off government-owned
lands. In the process of removal of families with 15 to 25 years'
residence in Los Valientes de la Caleta, near Boca Chica, government
agents killed one man and shot several others. A young man of Punta de
Moca died from a gunshot wound received when police attempted to stop a
demonstration organized by community members to focus attention on
unfinished public works projects in their area.
The IACHR report also criticized the Government for extrajudicial
killings carried out by state agents in prisons.
There was no progress reported in trials of police officers
detained for killing law student Franklin Bortolo Fabian Mejia in July
1998; for killing a suspected robber of a Santiago pharmacy, also in
July 1998; for killing a priest after allegedly mistaking him for a
murder suspect in August 1998 in Santo Domingo; or for the triple
homicide on November 25, 1998, of three young male victims who might
have been killed because of their refusal to share the proceeds of a
recent robbery with the police.
There was some progress in the case of the 1975 murder of
journalist Orlando Martinez Howley, a critic of the Balaguer
administration, in the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Appeals in
Santo Domingo. Although the authorities released one suspect from
custody following a highly controversial judicial ruling, another of
the accused, Mariano Cabrera Duran, is to stand trial. Former President
Balaguer himself continues to be vulnerable to future charges of
complicity and obstruction of justice, as well as to being called as a
witness, should the case ever reach trial.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
In the case of Narciso Gonzalez, a university professor and critic
of the Balaguer government who disappeared in May 1994, an examining
magistrate questioned more than 20 people, 16 of whom were present or
former members of the armed forces. The authorities detained three
persons--retired General Constantino Matos Villanueva, retired General
Leonardo Antonio Reyes Bencosme, and Colonel Manuel C. Perez Volquez--
for different periods of time during the year. A court later released
them from custody on writs of habeas corpus. The investigations
continued at year's end.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and other forms of
physical abuse; however, security forces' personnel continue to
torture, beat, and otherwise physically abuse detainees and prisoners.
Lack of supervision, training, and accountability throughout the law
enforcement and corrections systems exacerbate the problem of physical
abuse. The IACHR's October report, human rights groups, and the press
reported regular and repeated occurrences of physical abuse of
detainees while in custody.
Shortly after her release from 2 years' confinement on drug-related
charges, ``Miss Najayo 98'' Angela de la Cruz spoke of practices she
witnessed at the Mexico section of the San Pedro de Macoris prison,
including torture. The most graphic was the use of a punishment called
``the toaster'', where guards laid prisoners, shackled hand and foot,
on a bed of hot asphalt for the entire day and, if they screamed, beat
them with a club. The army administers San Pedro de Macoris prison.
Homosexual and transvestite detainees report to gay rights
advocates that during detention the police have held them in a darkened
room and have given them the alternative of performingfellatio on
whichever guards so desired or being placed in a locked cell with the
most dangerous prisoners, where the detainees presumed that they would
be raped, beaten, or both. Other informants confirmed that the police
use the prospect of being locked in with the most dangerous prisoners
as a threat. For example, a police sergeant struck a newspaper artist
arrested for a traffic infraction when the latter asked to make a
telephone call and told him to shut up or be locked in with the most
dangerous prisoners.
The National Coordinator for Human Rights cited the Department of
Homicide and Robbery Investigations and DNCD for the persistent use of
torture to extract confessions from detainees. The method most often
used is beating. After several former detainees went to the press with
credible reports that the police interrogators had beaten them
repeatedly, the Chief of Police and Attorney General designated a
commission to investigate. The beatings allegedly took place during
periods of detention of up to 15 days without arraignment before a
judge (the Constitution permits only 48 hours). The informants reported
that the police repeatedly awoke them during the night for questioning.
The National District prosecutor's office continued to place
lawyers in high-volume police stations and in several DNCD offices to
monitor the investigative process and to assure that detainees' rights
are respected (see Section 1.d.). Most of the affected PN and DNCD
investigators responded positively to this oversight, although some
DNCD personnel reportedly complain that their hands were being tied.
Still, the initiative remains largely limited to the Santo Domingo
metropolitan area, with a lesser presence in Santiago. There is some
evidence that these assistant prosecutors at times acquiesce in
traditional police practices, rather than attempt to raise these
practices to constitutional standards. Less qualified prosecutors
assigned to the rest of the country have not yet assumed stronger roles
in managing criminal investigations and ensuring the rights of
suspects. Human rights courses are an integral part of military and
DNCD training, both for enlisted personnel and officers.
Civilian prosecutors sometimes file charges against police and
military officials alleging torture, physical abuse, and related
crimes. A 1997 law provides penalties for torture and physical abuse,
including sentences from 10 to 15 years in prison. However, until
recently these provisions were not known fully or applied by
prosecutors and judges. In August the Government inaugurated a judicial
training school, which eventually may remedy this type of lag between
legislative action and judicial follow-through.
In December the PN chief ordered the arrest of Colonel Benito Diaz
Perez after an investigation by the PN's Internal Affairs Department of
allegations that he was torturing detainees in the police detachments
that he commanded in Sabana Perdida, Villa Mella, Guaricanos, and other
communities north of the National District. The charges included use of
battery acid on suspects during questioning. Dozens of complaints of
torture and mistreatment had been lodged against Colonel Diaz Perez
during his career. He reportedly threatened the life of the president
of the Dominican Committee on Human Rights, Virgilio Almanzar, when the
latter visited La Victoria Prison during the Colonel's tenure there in
1994. Nevertheless, the PN had placed him in command of the police in a
cluster of densely populated communities.
The police at times forcibly dispersed demonstrators, using tear
gas and weapons (see Sections 2.b. and 3).
Election campaigning was relatively peaceful, although there were
isolated instances of violence.
Prison conditions range from poor to extremely harsh, but most
facilities fall in the latter category. The prisons are seriously
overcrowded, health and sanitary conditions are poor, and some prisons
are out of the control of the authorities. Prison conditions for the
vast majority of prisoners are so harsh as to be in violation of the
constitutional ban on punishments that involve the loss or diminution
of the health or physical integrity of the individual. Reports of
torture and mistreatment in prisons are common. A warden is responsible
for running each prison and reporting to the Attorney General through
the Directorate of Prisons. A police or military colonel (or lieutenant
colonel) who is appointed for 3 to 6 months only, reports to the warden
and is responsible for providing security. However, in practice the
colonel is in charge of the prison, and neither the Directorate of
Prisons nor the individual wardens have much power. According to
credible reports, some prisons are totally out of the control of
theauthorities. They are, in effect, operated by armed inmates, who
decide whether an individual gets food, or space to sleep, or a needed
visit to a doctor or dentist. Individual inmates only can secure a
tolerable level of existence by paying for it. Only those with
considerable personal or family resources can do so.
Conditions at La Victoria prison, run by the PN, pose a serious
threat to life and health. This prison held 3,099 prisoners in a
facility built for 1,000. Prisoners had 4 square yards of space apiece.
In four prisons--Azua, Nagua, La Romana, and Higuey--inmates had one-
half square yard each. In San Cristobal they had 1.5 square yards; in
12 other prisons the space available was 2 to 3 square yards. Nine
others allowed 4 square yards per inmate. At Elias Pina, a prison built
in 1922, there were 24 beds and--depending on the reports relied on--82
or 160 prisoners. There was no kitchen, no laundry, no workshops, no
area for religious services, no recreation area, no dining room, no
commissary, no dispensary, no warden's office, and no school. There was
a sewer system, a cistern for water, and a septic tank. In May the
press reported that inmates at Elias Pina had not seen the sun for 4
months and that the lack of light was the cause of many prisoners
losing their sight--at least temporarily--when released or transferred
from Elias Pina.
In 32 prisons around the country with a total capacity of 6,971
persons, the police and the military held more than 15,000 persons.
During the first 6 months of 1999, the number of new admissions
exceeded the number of releases by 1,461. Medical care suffers from a
lack of supplies and available physicians. Prisoners immobilized by and
dying of AIDS are not transferred to a hospital, but some terminal-
stage inmates were released early to spend their last days at home.
The General Directorate of Prisons falls under the authority of the
Public Ministry and is seriously underfunded. An effort by the Director
of Prisons to create a new corps of specially trained prison officers
collapsed when it was omitted from the Government's budget. Initial
budget allocations for necessities such as food, medicines, and
transportation were reduced still further during the year.
In June the wardens of 31 prisons reported that their money to buy
food for the prisoners was exhausted in May, and that for 17 days they
were unable to provide breakfast or supper to the inmates. A government
food program for the general public was providing lunches at some
prisons; at others, food came from the agricultural products raised,
while at other prisons the inmates had for lunch whatever could be
begged from persons who lived in the vicinity of the prison or brought
by family members.
In September the Director of Prisons reported that funds to buy
gasoline had run out. Consequently there was no way to transport
prisoners to court for hearings or trials.
Prisons controlled by the military generally are administered
better than those controlled by the National Police.
Female prisoners are separated from male inmates. In general,
conditions in the female prison wings are superior to those found in
male prison wings. There have been some reports of guards abusing
female inmates.
The law requires that juveniles be detained separately from adults.
However, a recent press report found a high incidence of violations,
with 200 minors jailed with adults at Najayo prison.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors and by the press.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention are problems. The Constitution provides for the security of
the individual against imprisonment without legal process, detention
beyond 48 hours without being presented before judicial authorities, or
failure by custodial authorities to present detainees when requested.
It also provides for recourse to habeas corpus proceedings to request
the release of those unlawfully withheld. However, the security forces
continue to violate constitutional provisions by detaining suspects for
investigation or interrogation beyond the prescribed 48-hour limit. The
security forces traditionally detain all suspects and witnesses in a
crime and use the investigative process to determine which ones are
innocent and merit release, and which ones they should continue to
hold. After the prosecutor's office placed its lawyers in several
police stations in 1997, the police began to curtail thepractice of
arbitrary detention in those precincts. However, progress has been slow
(see Section 1.c.), and this program has been limited for the most part
to the Santo Domingo metropolitan area.
The prosecutor for the Court of Appeals in Santiago reported that
the Department of Investigation of Homicide and Robbery of the National
Police, Northern Command, routinely detained persons beyond the 48-hour
limit. Detainees at police headquarters in Santo Domingo, known as
``the palace'', complained of being held for 15 to 21 days.
The police continued the practice of making frequent sweeps or
roundups in low-income, high-crime communities in which they arrest and
detain individuals arbitrarily. The alleged object of the roundups is
to fight delinquency. Following the indiscriminate arrests, the police
regularly detain individuals for up to 20 days or more, while they look
for a reason to charge them with a crime.
The police say that they rely upon unlawful detention without
presentation to a court because some cases involve more complicated
investigations. However, there is a clear pattern of the police
arresting individuals before investigating a crime thoroughly, relying
on confessions to make their case. Without the education, training, or
equipment to conduct modern forensic investigations, police instead
hold suspects incommunicado (see Section 1.e.), repeatedly question
them, and sometimes beat them, until they confess. The prosecutors who
are assigned to monitor the criminal investigation phase at police
stations appear to be unable to control the practice (see Section
1.c.).
A related problem is the police practice of arresting and detaining
individuals solely because of their familial or marital relationship to
a suspect. A suspect's parents, siblings, or spouse are all vulnerable
to this practice, the goal of which is to compel an at-large 65 suspect
to give himself up or to coerce a confession from one already arrested.
A former police sergeant, Roberto Medina Guerrero, the brother of
another former policeman wanted in connection with a gang known as Los
Murdos, gave himself up to the police through the good offices of the
president of the Committee on Human Rights. He complained that the
police had unleashed a wave of repression upon his entire family, that
they even arrested his 65-year-old mother, Esperanza Maria Guerrero,
and held her for several days to pressure his brother Cristian to give
himself up. Medina Guerrero reported that he was detained for 5 days,
released on a Friday, and on the following Monday the police were
looking for him to arrest him again.
In December the PN chief ordered that this practice be ended
immediately.
In September DNCD Director Vice Admiral Luis Alberto Humeau Hidalgo
promised a full investigation of a case in which agents of the DNCD, as
well as someone claiming to be with INTERPOL, arrested a young man and
held him pending payment by his family of about $20,000 (300,000
pesos). Sotero Velez was detained for several days. His family
collected $10,000 (150,000 pesos), bought their son's freedom, and
promptly reported the case to the prosecutor.
During the days leading up to the general strike called in October
to protest an increase in fuel prices, the PN arrested numerous labor
union officials as well as others whom it suspected of supporting the
strike or opposing the Government. The police held those taken into
detention for several days, without warrant or arraignment.
Many suspects suffer long pretrial detention. In December over 74
percent of the national prison population were awaiting trial, almost
the same proportion as in 1998. However, while suspects nationwide
still suffer long pretrial detention, judicial statistics show reduced
delays for the last 3 years in the Santo Domingo National District (an
area that accounts for approximately 45 percent of all criminal cases
in the country). In this area the average pretrial detention dropped
from 13.8 months in 1996 to 6.1 months in 1999. However, the rest of
the country apparently has experienced only modest decreases in
judicial delays. In December prison statistics showed that 10,833 of
the 14,604 inmates were in pretrial or preventive detention; only 3,771
actually had been convicted.
Because of the historical inefficiency of the courts (see Section
1.e.), the granting of bail serves as the de facto criminal justice
system. As a rule, defendants awarded bail rarely face an actual trial.
(Time already served counts towarda sentence.) This situation improved
somewhat as a result of the steps taken by the Santo Domingo District
Attorney and the judiciary, in cooperation with the Director of
Prisons, to introduce a prisoner registry system whose goal is to
ensure that prisoners receive a timely trial. The prison system (see
Section 1.c.) remains underfunded and sometimes is unable to account
for prisoners who are scheduled for trial or for release. The failure
of the prison authorities to produce the accused caused 21 percent of
all trial postponements. The authorities held some prisoners even
though there was no formal charge against them, and kept some prisoners
jailed even after a court ordered their release.
Jose Luis Amezquita spent 15 years behind bars without an official
charge and without ever being presented to a judicial officer, before
he was finally released on a writ of habeas corpus. During his
incarceration, he spent at least some time in the majority of the
country's prisons and his case finally came to the attention of the
Public Defender program, which ultimately obtained his release. At the
time of his release, then-Attorney General Mariano German Mejia
launched an investigation to determine the identities of other persons
incarcerated without official charges or convictions, saying that these
cases represent the lack of order and structure within the judicial
system. Other officials noted that there may be hundreds of such cases
in the prison system.
The law prohibits forced exile, and there were no reports of its
use. However, persons who credibly asserted that they were citizens
were sometimes expelled to Haiti (see Section 1.f.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution calls for an
independent judiciary; however, there have been attempts by other
public and private entities, including the executive branch, to
undermine judicial independence. In August 1997, the National Judiciary
Council chose members of the Supreme Court for the first time,
beginning a new independence from the executive and legislative
branches, and the efforts of the Supreme Court have led to a more
effective judiciary independent of the other branches; nevertheless,
interference from other branches continues.
The judiciary, based primarily on the French judicial system,
includes the 16-member Supreme Court, appeals courts, courts of first
instance, and justices of the peace. There are also specialized courts
that handle administrative, labor, land, and juvenile matters.
Military or police courts have jurisdiction over members of the
security forces. There is increasing controversy over the use of
military or police panels to judge the propriety of armed forces or
police conduct. Public pressure has resulted in military or police
boards remanding some cases involving serious crimes to civilian courts
for review, after the boards ordered the perpetrators to be discharged
dishonorably. In other cases, civil authorities have requested the PN
to turn over their files so that cases of suspected extrajudicial
killings might be evaluated independently for possible prosecution.
Judges, rather than juries, render all verdicts. Under the 1994
constitutional amendments, the Supreme Court is responsible for naming
all lower-court judges in accordance with a judicial career law, which
entered into force in August 1998. The National Judiciary Council
selects new justices of the Supreme Court. The Council consists of the
President, the President of the Senate, the President of the Chamber of
Deputies, two at-large members designated by them, the President of the
Supreme Court, and one other justice designated by the Supreme Court.
Following the commission of a crime, the criminal process begins
with the arrest of possible suspects. During the investigative phase,
suspects are questioned repeatedly and urged to confess. The
Constitution provides for the right not to be arrested without judicial
warrant except in cases where the suspect is caught in the act; the
right not to be deprived of liberty without trial or legal formalities,
or for reasons other than those provided by law; the right to be
presented to a competent judicial authority within 48 hours of one's
detention; the right not to be a witness against oneself; and the right
to a defense in an impartial and public trial.
The most serious and common violation of these rights occurs when
police detain suspects, sometimes for many days, without giving them
access to a telephone call to family while subjecting them to frequent
questioning. Although accused persons are entitled to have an attorney
present, they often arenot permitted to call one or, if one arrives,
the attorney is not permitted to be present during the questioning.
(The police complain that the presence of attorneys interferes with
their investigations.) Under these circumstances, suspects may confess
to acts that they did not commit merely to get relief from the intense
questioning and the detention. The results of these interrogations
frequently form the only evidence presented at the trial.
The Supreme Court broadened the remedy of ``Amparo''--an action any
citizen may bring for violation of a constitutional right--to include
violations by judicial officials, in accordance with the terms of the
American Convention on Human Rights.
The Supreme Court continued to combat judicial corruption and
incompetence. In a series of operations, the trial court judges in the
National District eliminated all but criminal cases from their dockets,
then set themselves a target of hearing some 12 or 13 cases per day.
Using this approach in cooperation with other segments of the criminal
justice system, the trial judges succeeded in increasing the number of
cases resolved so that they finally exceed, slightly, the number of
cases taken into the system. The process of dispute resolution was
assisted by recourse to the use of private reconciliation and mediation
as alternatives to trial and incarceration.
There remains a backlog of 100,000 criminal cases in the National
District alone, and a total of 200,000 throughout the country. The
Supreme Court's plan to unclog the court dockets has been frustrated by
the Government's failure to allocate sufficient funds. Dockets are
crowded with traffic infractions that should be heard in the traffic
courts provided for by statute; due to a lack of funds, the traffic
courts have not been set up. Other complications in clearing the
backlog arise from the exhaustion of funds for transporting prisoners
to court; many cases must be sent back when the accused does not
appear. The Government has not yet established 25 additional courts
provided for by law and planned for the National District and elsewhere
in the country.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution contains provisions against invasion
of the home; however, police sometimes break in to private quarters
without cause to search for suspects, and the authorities infringe on
citizens' privacy rights in other ways as well. Although the Government
denies arbitrary use of wiretapping or other surreptitious methods to
interfere with the private lives of persons or families, it tolerates
an active private wiretapping industry.
The law permits the arrest of a suspect caught in the act of
committing a crime, and police may enter a residence or business in
pursuit of such suspects. Otherwise judges must authorize arrests and
issue search warrants. However, the PN and occasionally the DNCD
continue to violate these requirements. Some prosecutors confess that
out of ``tactical necessity to combat criminality'' and ``with great
reluctance'', they tolerate the illegal search practices. They justify
their actions by arguing that the Government has not provided
sufficient resources or attention to criminal investigation and that,
given the cumbersome and antiquated criminal procedures, adhering to
the letter of the law would make law enforcement nearly impossible.
On a Saturday in early August, the police executed a series of dawn
raids on motels in and near the National District in an attempt to
locate and arrest suspected criminals. They woke up persons of whom
there was no reason to suspect any criminal activity, before 6 a.m. and
made them stand outside while their rooms were searched. Human rights
advocates complained vigorously that these raids interfered with the
security of domicile provided for by the Constitution.
In September police agents in Barahona carried out a number of
early morning break-ins at various homes in the community in search of
the organizers of a strike held the previous day during which one
person was killed and several others were wounded. The police detained
several persons as a result of the searches.
The security forces continued to detain relatives and friends of
suspects to try to compel suspects to surrender or to confess (see
Section 1.d.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for these
freedoms, and the Government generally respects them in practice;
however, there are some exceptions. There are instances of government
pressure on editors not to publish certain unfavorable items, such as
negative poll results.
Citizens of all political persuasions exercise freedom of speech.
Newspapers and magazines freely present a diversity of opinion and
criticism. However, self-censorship is practiced, particularly when
coverage could adversely affect the economic or political interests of
media owners.
In an apparent attempt to suppress information, the police arrested
a journalist who had listed the numerous extrajudicial killings during
the year and held him for questioning.
Major supporters of the ruling PLD made significant financial
investments in a major newspaper, which at the time faced bankruptcy.
Those investments were followed by a perceptible change in the
newspaper's content, as its coverage of government activities and PLD
candidates became more favorable. This sequence of events created the
appearance of improper government influence.
The numerous privately owned radio and television stations
broadcast all political points of view. The Government controls one
television station.
Public and private universities enjoy broad academic freedom. The
main public university, the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo,
with approximately 100,000 mostly part-time students, has few
restrictions on enrollment and maintains a policy of nonintervention
(other than on curriculum development) in classroom affairs. The
Government exerts no control over private universities, except for the
preservation of standards, and teachers are free to espouse their own
theories without government oversight.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
this right in practice; however, there were some exceptions. Outdoor
public marches and meetings require permits, which the Government
usually grants; however, there were incidents in which the police used
force to break up demonstrations. In January the security forces used
tear gas and fired shots in clashes with PRD supporters during the
campaign for control of the Dominican Municipal League (LMD), which has
an important political role in influencing the flow of government funds
to the relatively autonomous municipal governments. On several
occasions throughout the year, the Government responded with force to
disperse demonstrators calling for completion of public works projects,
opposing evictions, or supporting a strike.
Judicial branch statistics concerning the use of the criminal
charge of ``association with criminal elements'' suggest improvement in
conditions for political dissent under the Fernandez administration.
Under former President Balaguer, the authorities traditionally used
this charge against dissidents and those involved in street
demonstrations against the Government. From 1990 to 1996, this charge
represented 13 to 16 percent of all criminal charges filed in the
National District. In 1997 and 1998, this figure dropped to less than 2
percent. However, it rose slightly, to 3 percent, in 1999.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice. Political parties
frequently affiliate with their foreign counterpart organizations.
Professional organizations of lawyers, doctors, teachers, and others
function freely and can maintain relationships with counterpart
organizations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution prohibits discrimination
on religious grounds, and the Government does not interfere with the
practice of religion. Many religions and denominations are active.
The Catholic Church, which signed a concordat with the Government
in 1954, enjoys special privileges not extended to other religions.
These include the use of public funds to underwrite some church
expenses, such as rehabilitation of church facilities, and a complete
waiver of customs duties when importing goods into the country.
Attendance at Catholic Mass for members of the National Police is
compulsory.
In August education authorities investigated a report that the
directors of Pilar Constanzo Polytechnic School, in Villa Duarte,
National District, were discriminating against students and teachers
who were not Catholics. The publicly controlled school laid off at
least 10 teachers, and there were also complaints that Protestant
students were refused admission, despite excellent test scores and
grades. Students whose parents are Jehovah's Witnesses, Seventh-Day
Adventists, Mormons, and faiths other than Catholicism allegedly were
refused entry to the school. The case was still under investigation at
year's end.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
travel, except for limitations imposed under judicial sentence, or
police regulations for immigration and health reasons. Citizens face no
unusual legal restrictions on travel within or outside the country. The
October IACHR report cited discrimination against Haitian workers, whom
it said were subject to arbitrary and unilateral action by the
authorities.
Haitians continue to migrate in great numbers to the Dominican
Republic, some legally but most without legal documents, in search of
economic opportunity. Throughout the year, the security forces,
particularly the army, repatriated undocumented Haitian nationals
believed to be in the country illegally. International observers
estimated that the Government deported approximately 10,000 Haitians
from the southwestern province of Barahona alone. In many cases, the
Government denied those deported the opportunity to demonstrate that
they resided legally in the Dominican Republic or to make arrangements
for their families or property. Haitian Government officials complained
that Haitians often were detained with little or no food and then
deported without timely notice to Haitian authorities. At year's end,
there was no accurate count of the number of persons affected by this
practice.
The ongoing process of repatriating Haitian nationals accelerated
during the second half of the year. According to the Director of
Migration, hundreds of Dominican cedulas (identification cards) were
confiscated from individuals during the month of November, before those
persons were escorted to the Haitian side of the common frontier. Those
expelled were told that their claim of nationality would be
investigated, but no process for followup or investigation was in
place.
NGO representatives working in rural areas reported that decisions
to deport often were made by lower ranking members of the security
forces, sometimes based upon the racial characteristics of the
deportees. The Director of Migration described the process of rounding
up illegal Haitians as one essentially performed by the rank and file
of the armed forces and immigration officers. They approach persons who
look to them like Haitians, usually persons who have very dark
complexions and fairly poor clothing. They engage them in conversation
about their work and residence, mainly to check their use of Spanish
and any accent they may have. If such persons speak Spanish poorly or
with a noticeable accent, they are detained and deported, regardless of
any documentation they may have showing their legal right to live in
the country.
The Haitian Government protested the failure to give detainees an
opportunity for a hearing on their claim of citizenship or right to
residence, although it acknowledges the Government's right to deport
those individuals who are illegal aliens. NGO's and Catholic priests
familiar with the process also have protested that children born of one
or two Haitian parents in the Dominican Republic, heretofore denied
registration as Dominican nationals, are frequently among those
deported as illegal Haitians.
According to a 1984 presidential decree, an applicant for refugee
status must be referred to the Technical Subcommission of the National
Commission for Refugees by the National Office of Refugee Affairs. The
Subcommission, which makes a recommendation to the Commission, is made
up of members from the Foreign Ministry, the DNI, and the Immigration
Directorate. The Commission, which makes a final decision on the
application,consists of the three members of the Subcommission; the
legal advisor to the President; and members of the PN, the Secretariat
of Labor, and the Attorney General's office.
In practice, the National Office of Refugee Affairs is not yet
functioning, although the subcommission makes recommendations, and the
Immigration Directorate issues documentation to refugees certified as
such by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). While these
documents are accepted routinely by the police and immigration
officials, the process by which they are issued does not comply with
the decree.
The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. The Government provides first
asylum and resettlement.
Citing fears of a massive influx of Haitians across the shared
border, the Government backed away from its refugee policy with respect
to Haitians, opting instead for a policy of strictly enforced
documentary requirements and repatriation for those found lacking. This
policy has, in practice, been rendered somewhat arbitrary by the
reality of dependence on Haitian labor for certain agricultural labor
and most construction work. Thus, after being stopped as a suspected
illegal Haitian, an individual may be allowed to remain in the country
despite his lack of documents if his story about his work satisfies the
official who stopped him.
In December the Government signed agreements with Haiti stipulating
that it would not repatriate persons at night, on weekends, or on
holidays; that it would only use four border crossing points where the
Haitian authorities would have officials to receive deportees; and that
it would avoid the separation of nuclear families in the process of
repatriation. The agreements provide that the Government of Haiti would
increase efforts to furnish Haitian migrants with identity documents
and that it would put migration control posts along the Haitian side of
the frontier.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully through periodic elections. The Dominican
Republic is a constitutional democracy, and its citizens last exercised
this right in free and fair congressional elections in May 1998. The
President and all 179 members of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies are
elected freely every 4 years by secret ballot. There is universal adult
suffrage; however, active duty police and military personnel may not
vote. In practice, voting is limited to those persons who can show a
national identity document, which requires that their births have been
registered properly by their parents.
The nation has a functioning multiparty system. Opposition groups
of the left, right, and center operate openly. In practice the
President can dominate public policy formulation and implementation. He
can exercise his authority through the use of the veto, discretion to
act by decree, and influence as the leader of his party. Traditionally,
the President has predominant power in the Government, effectively
making many important decisions by decree. President Fernandez reduced
the reliance on rule by decree during the first 3 years of his
administration. The President appoints the governors of the 29
provinces.
Congress provides an open forum for the free exchange of views and
debate. The main opposition party--the PRD--holds 18 of 30 seats in the
upper house and 57 of 149 seats in the lower house. A third major
party, the Social Christian Reform Party (PRSC) of former President
Balaguer, contests all elections; various smaller parties are certified
to contest provincial and national elections.
The Central Electoral Board (JCE) conducts all elections. In August
1998, the PLD and the PRSC began vigorously protesting the manner in
which the PRD-dominated Senate had appointed the five-member JCE,
calling the board unrepresentative and biased in favor of the PRD. In
late 1998, the Fernandez administration showed its displeasure with the
JCE by delaying disbursement of government funds. In April the leading
political parties agreed that the Congress should approve legislation
expanding the JCE to seven members until after the 2000 presidential
elections.The PLD and the PRSC each nominated one new member to join
the board.
Opposition groups and human rights organizations criticized the
violent confrontation and the closing of the Dominican Municipal League
in January. The LMD is the organization of the country's mayors, and is
responsible for dispersing approximately 4 percent of the national
budget to municipal governments. The PRD holds a majority of the
municipal governments and expected to elect one of its members to the
presidency of the league at the January meeting. The police sealed off
the building where the group was to convene, as well as the Congress,
after protesters assembled to demonstrate about the impending
elections. Police reportedly fired rubber bullets into the crowds of
protesters, forcefully restrained Congressmen and mayors from entering
the buildings, and used tear gas against the crowds. The PRSC and PLD
parties, and the PRD, then held separate elections to select the new
president of the LMD. Opposition critics claimed that the incident was
indicative of the growing rift between the PLD (and its PRSC allies)
and the PRD, as well as the rift between the executive branch, the
legislature, and local governments. The PRSC candidate, supported by
the PRD, was eventually recognized as the head of the LMD, but the
institution did not function effectively during the year.
Women and minorities confront no serious legal impediments to
political participation; however, they are underrepresented in
government and politics. By law parties must reserve 25 percent of
positions on voting lists for women; a proposal to increase this
proportion to 40 percent had not been approved by the legislature at
year's end. However, the parties often place women so low on the lists
as to make their election difficult or impossible. Women hold 2 seats
in the 30-member Senate and 25 seats in the 149-member Chamber of
Deputies. Women continue to be represented in appointed positions,
albeit to a limited degree. The president of the Chamber of Deputies is
a woman, as is the Secretary of State for the presidency. Three of the
15 cabinet secretaries are women, but none of the 29 provincial
governors are women. Women fill 5 of the 15 seats on the Supreme Court;
there is 1 vacancy on the Court. The Government's Directorate for
Women's Issues was elevated to cabinet level in August.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Nongovernmental human rights organizations operate freely without
government interference. In addition to the Dominican Human Rights
Committee, the National Human Rights Commission, and the
nongovernmental Truth Commission (dealing with the Narciso Gonzalez
case), several Haitian, church, women's, and labor groups exist.
At the beginning of the Dominican-Haitian migration crisis in
November, the Legal Advisor to the presidency--in what some construed
as a government attempt to chill the exercise of free enquiry,
criticism of the Government, and support of victims of abuse by human
rights organizations--suggested in the press that international and
human rights organizations, supported by donations from other
countries, were actually foreign agents and should be registered as
such.
There is no ombudsman's office.
The Government accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights for the first time in March.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination based on race and sex. Such
discrimination exists in society; however, the Government seldom has
acknowledged its existence or made efforts to combat it.
Women.--Domestic violence and sexual harassment are widespread.
Under the 1997 Law Against Domestic Violence, the State can prosecute a
suspect for rape, even if the victim does not file charges. This law
also allows a rape victim to press charges against her husband without
having her marriage annulled. However, because the law was passed
relatively recently, its effectiveness cannot yet be determined. The
Secretariat for Women assists women with outreach programs on domestic
violence and legal rights. In 1998 the Government opened a center for
the forensic examination of abused women, which handled 60 to 80 cases
a day, most ofthem involving minors. However, at year's end, there were
still no shelters for battered women.
Although rape is a serious problem, it is widely believed to be
underreported. The Santo Domingo district attorney's office received
only 238 reports of rape during the year in the National District. (By
contrast, that office reported over 400 cases per month in Santo
Domingo of sexual abuse of minors and incest.) Victims often do not
report cases of rape because of fear of social stigma, as well as the
perception that the police and the judiciary would not provide any
redress. The police are reluctant to handle rape cases and often
encourage victims to seek assistance from NGO's.
The Government does not vigorously enforce prostitution laws,
except in cases involving child prostitution and international
trafficking in women and girls (see Section 6.f.). Sex tourism is a
growing industry throughout the country as the number of international
visitors increases. NGO's have ongoing HIV/AIDS and sexually
transmitted disease prevention programs for male and female
prostitutes, as well as for hotel and industrial zone workers. The 1997
Law against Domestic Violence prohibits acting as an intermediary in a
transaction of prostitution, and the Government has used the law to
prosecute third parties who derive profit from prostitution.
Divorce is easily obtainable by either spouse, and women can hold
property in their own names apart from their husbands. Traditionally,
women have not shared equal social and economic status or opportunity
with men, and men hold the majority of leadership positions in all
sectors. In many instances women are paid less than men in jobs of
equal content and equal skill level. Some employers in industry
reportedly give pregnancy tests to women before hiring them, as part of
a required medical examination. Union leaders and human rights
advocates report that pregnant women often are not hired.
Children.--Despite the existence of government institutions
dedicated to child welfare, private social and religious organizations
carry the principal burden. The private institutions receive no
government financing.
The 1994 Minor's Code requires only 6 years of formal education. In
the National District, the Department of Family and Children, in the
Office of the Prosecutor, administers the Minor's Code. The Department
works with NGO's, law enforcement personnel, and the general public to
publicize children's rights, to arrange conciliation of family
conflicts, to execute court decisions with respect to child protection,
and to interview children whose rights have been violated. The
Department estimates that 50 percent of the children in the country are
victims of some sort of abuse.
Sexual abuse is perhaps the most serious human rights violation
affecting children. The PN's Department of Sexual Abuse received 200 to
300 reports per month of rapes of children between 4 and 11 years of
age. Only 30 percent ever reached the courts, while the facts of other
cases remained hidden behind doors within families. In 50 percent of
the cases, the accused is a person close to the child: a father,
grandfather, uncle, brother, cousin or close family friend. The
criminal law provision on sexual abuse and intrafamily violence was
modified to provide a penalty of 10 to 20 years incarceration and a
fine of $6,600 to $13,200 (100 to 200 thousand pesos) for persons found
guilty of sexual abuse of a minor, and up to 30 years if the victim is
a family member of the abuser.
Typical cases of child sexual abuse include that of a 14-year-old
girl who was raped in the home where she worked as a domestic in San
Cristobal; and the case of two daughters, ages 13 and 14, who were
abused sexually by their truck driver father. The latter case was
prosecuted vigorously and the father sentenced to prison. Sexual abuse
is commonly accompanied by other kinds of abuse, as in the case of a
preadolescent girl who, on the pretext of foster care, was required to
cook, clean, and wash clothes for her aunt's entire family, in addition
to being sexually available to all the males. She also was beaten if
any part of her performance displeased the family.
The Minor's Code contains provisions against child abuse, including
physical and emotional mistreatment, sexual exploitation, and child
labor. It also provides for removal of a mistreated or delinquent child
to a protective environment. According to local monitors, instances of
child abuse were underreported because of traditional beliefs that
familyproblems should be dealt with inside the family. However, child
abuse is receiving increasing public attention.
Midyear reports from the Ministry of Health showed that 26 to 30
percent of female adolescents were pregnant or already had children.
Many of these pregnancies were reported to be the result of rape or
incest and often are accompanied by sexually transmitted diseases.
Some in the tourist industry have facilitated the sexual
exploitation of children. Tours are marketed overseas with the
understanding that boys and girls can be found as sex partners.
Trafficking in girls for prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
Journalists reported that the majority of prostitutes in brothels
visited around the National District appeared to be between 16 and 18
years of age. There are no shelters that provide refuge to children who
break free from the prostitution trade. For underage girls,
prostitution is one of the few jobs available in the informal economy.
In August the Prosecutor for the National District rescued a 16-
year-old Villa Mella girl from a brothel where she had been held
against her will for 5 months and offered as a sexual attraction to
tourists. The authorities who rescued the girl found evidence of drug
use, as well as a large number of bedbugs and rats, at the site. They
arrested six persons in connection with the kidnaping.
The judicial system commonly fails to protect the status of minors
in criminal cases. The authorities sometimes treated minors as adults--
most often when physical forensic examinations indicated the minors
were probably adults--and incarcerated them in prison rather than
juvenile detention centers. In 1997 the Government began to implement
the 1994 Minor's Code, laying the groundwork for the juvenile court
system that the code mandated. The Supreme Court inaugurated the first
of 11 juvenile courts in August and chose judges for the other 10
courts. These juvenile courts are to be organized with a focus on
rehabilitating offenders. There are legal advocates especially for
juveniles in Santo Domingo and La Vega to provide them with
representation in delinquency cases.
It is not uncommon for minors to be put on the street to fend for
themselves as younger siblings claim the parent's meager resources.
Homeless children are frequently at the mercy of adults called
``Palomas'', who collect these children into a gang and put them to
work begging and selling fruit, flowers, and other goods on the street.
In return for their work they are allowed to have some sort of a roof
over their heads. The ages at which the children work, the hours they
put in, and their failure to comply with compulsory school attendance
for 6 years all violate the law, but the Government has not been able
to combat this practice.
Needy adolescent girls and boys are sometimes enticed into
performing sexual acts by the promise of food or clothing; sometimes
they are pushed into unsafe relationships with strangers by the need
for money. Once involved, they may be held against their will by
individuals who sell their sexual favors to others. Some of these
minors are lured from their parental homes; others are already on the
street, having been pushed out of the house by the demands of younger,
even more dependent, children.
People with Disabilities.--Disabled persons encounter
discrimination in employment and in the provision of other services.
Although the law contains provisions for physical access for the
disabled to all new public and private buildings, the authorities have
not enforced this law uniformly. There is a Subsecretariat for
Rehabilitation under the Secretariat of Public Health, a recreation
center for the disabled in Las Caobas, and a department in the Sports
Secretariat to facilitate athletic competition for the disabled.
However, there is little consciousness of the need to make the daily
lives of the disabled safer and more convenient. For example, new
street construction made few provisions for the disabled to cross the
streets safely.
A private entity founded in 1962, the Dominican Rehabilitation
Association (ADR) has grown from a 1-room operation to a large complex
with 17 affiliates throughout the country. It provides services for
2,500 persons daily. The Government provides about 25 percent of the
ADR's budget.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--A strong prejudice against
Haitians runs through society, disadvantaging many Haitians and
Dominicans of Haitian ancestry, as well as other foreigners of African
ancestry. The Government has not acknowledged the existence of this
discrimination nor made any efforts to combat it. Darker-skinned
Dominicans also face informal barriers to social and economic
advancement.
Efforts to stem the influx of Haitian immigrants have made it more
difficult for those already in the country to live peaceably. Police
regulations threaten those offering transportation to illegal
immigrants with confiscation of their vehicles and have discouraged
taxi and bus drivers from picking up dark-skinned persons. In the
roundup of illegal immigrants, the authorities picked up and expelled
darker Dominicans and legal Haitian residents, including some properly
documented university students.
Perhaps 500,000 Haitian immigrants--or 7 percent of the country's
population--live in ``bateyes'' or cane worker camps, in harsh
conditions with limited or no electricity, running water, or schooling.
Human rights groups regularly charge the Government with unlawful
deportations of, and police brutality toward, these legal and illegal
immigrants.
Credible sources also charge that the Government refuses to
recognize and document as Dominican citizens many individuals of
Haitian ancestry born in the country. Since many Haitian parents have
never possessed documentation for their own birth, they are unable to
demonstrate their own citizenship. As a result, they cannot declare
their children's births at the civil registry and thereby establish
Dominican citizenship for their offspring. Some civil registry offices
do not accept late declarations of birth for children of Haitian
immigrants, although they routinely accept late declarations for
children of Dominican parents.
Haitian parents encounter difficulties registering their children
for school. Lack of documentation usually deprives children of Haitian
descent of the opportunity to attend school where there is one
available. Some parents fail to seek documentation due to fear of being
deported. It falls to the discretion of public school principals
whether children may attend, when immigrant parents have no identity
cards or birth certificates to register children formally. Even when
permitted to attend primary school, it is rare that the offspring of
Haitian parents progress beyond sixth grade.
Although the Government has largely eliminated the use of children
for cutting sugar cane, poor Haitian and Dominican parents sometimes
arrange for Dominican families to ``adopt'' and employ their children.
The adopting parents can simply register a child of any age as their
own. In exchange, the parents receive monetary payment or a supply of
clothes and food. They believe that this ensures their children a more
promising future. In many cases, adoptive parents do not treat the
adoptees as full family members and expect them to work in the
households or family businesses rather than attend school. The effect
is a kind of bondage, at least until the young person reaches his
majority. There were reports that Haitian girls between the ages of 10
and 14 were the most sought after, especially in border areas.
The Government is doing little to improve the conditions of Haitian
immigrants and generally relies upon relief organizations. A number of
NGO's and other agencies provide assistance in the shantytowns.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
freedom to organize labor unions and for the right of workers to strike
(and for private sector employers to lock out workers), and workers in
all sectors exercise this right. All workers, except the military and
the police, are free to organize. Organized labor represents only an
estimated 10 percent of the work force and is divided among four major
confederations and a number of independent unions.
Requirements for calling a strike include the support of an
absolute majority of all company workers whether unionized or not, a
prior attempt to resolve the conflict through mediation, written
notification to the Labor Secretariat, and a 10-day waiting period
following notification before proceeding with the strike. The
Government respects association rights and placesno obstacles to union
registration, affiliation, or the ability to engage in legal strikes.
Nurses went on strike in July, and medical doctors working for
health maintenance organizations and insurance companies struck in
August. Professors of the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo struck
in August, delaying the opening of classes for more than a week. Public
school teachers struck at the beginning of the school year as well.
The 1992 Labor Code provides extensive protection for worker rights
and specifies the steps legally required to establish a union,
federation, or confederation. The code calls for automatic recognition
of a union if the Government has not acted on its application within a
specific time. In practice, the Government has facilitated recognition
of labor organizations readily. Unions are independent of the
Government and generally independent of political parties. However,
there were reports of widespread albeit discreet intimidation by
employers in an effort to prevent union activity. For example, unions
in the free trade zones in Bonao report that their members hesitate to
discuss union activity at work, even during break time, due to fear of
losing their jobs.
Labor unions can and do affiliate freely regionally and
internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining is lawful and may take place in firms in which a union has
gained the support of an absolute majority of the workers. Only a
minority of companies have collective bargaining pacts. The Labor Code
stipulates that workers cannot be dismissed because of their trade
union membership or activities.
The Labor Code establishes a system of labor courts for dealing
with disputes. After a recent overhaul by the Supreme Court, these
courts have proven more effective at enforcing the law.
The Labor Code applies in the 40 established FTZ's, which employ
approximately 200,000 workers, mostly women. Workplace regulations and
their enforcement in the FTZ's do not differ from those in the country
at large, although working conditions are sometimes better. Some FTZ
companies have a history of discharging workers who attempt to organize
unions. There also have been reports of union organizers extorting
money from business owners. Although there are approximately 70 unions
in the FTZ's, many exist only on paper. The majority of the unions in
the FTZ's are affiliated with the National Federation of Free Trade
Zone Workers or the United Federation of Free Trade Zone Workers.
Many of the major manufacturers in the FTZ's voluntarily have
signed the codes of conduct promoted by the ``Labor, Yes, but with
Dignity'' campaign carried out by a combination of NGO's and trade
union organizations between 1996 and 1999. These voluntary codes
provide for protection against forced labor, freedom of association,
freedom from discrimination, and prohibit the use of child labor. They
also call for a workplace that is safe and healthy.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children;
however, such practices are common. Poor Haitian and Dominican parents
sometimes arrange for Dominican families to ``adopt'' their children,
in exchange for money or goods. Such children often are not treated as
full family members and are expected to work in households or
businesses, in effect in a kind of bondage (see Section 5). In
addition, trafficking in women and girls for purposes of prostitution
is also a problem (see Section 6.f.). There were numerous credible
reports of coerced overtime in factories and of workers being fired for
refusing to work overtime. Union officials state that newly hired
workers are not informed that overtime is optional.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits employment of children under 14
years of age and places restrictions on the employment of children
under the age of 16. These restrictions include a limit of no more than
6 hours of daily work, no employment in dangerous occupations or in
establishments serving alcohol, and limits on nighttime work. Children
between the ages of 14 and 16 may work in apprenticeship and artistic
programs. The law requires 6 years of formal education.
Children who do not continue in school often seek illegal
employment before reaching the minimum working age. The law prohibits
forced or bonded labor by children; however, poor Haitian and Dominican
parents sometimes arrange the adoption of their children by Dominican
families in exchange for money or goods, and such children generally
are expected to work in households or businesses (see Sections 5 and
6.c.).
The high level of unemployment and lack of a social safety net
create pressures on families to allow or encourage children to earn
supplemental income. Tens of thousands of children begin working before
the age of 14. The Government does not sanction the parents of these
children. Child labor takes place primarily in the informal economy,
agriculture, small businesses, clandestine factories, and prostitution.
Conditions in clandestine factories are generally poor, unsanitary, and
often dangerous.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution provides the
Government with legal authority to set minimum wage levels, and the
Labor Code assigns this task to a national salary committee. Congress
also may enact minimum wage legislation. The minimum monthly salary is
$125 (1,932 pesos) in the FTZ's and ranges from $101 (1,555 pesos) to
$157 (2,412 pesos) outside the FTZ's depending upon the size of the
company and the nature of the business. The minimum wage does not
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. It covers
only a fraction of the living costs of a family in Santo Domingo--about
$400 (6,000 pesos) per month for a family of five--but many workers
receive only the minimum wage.
The Labor Code establishes a standard work period of 8 hours per
day and 44 hours per week. The code also stipulates that all workers
are entitled to 36 hours of uninterrupted rest each week. In practice,
a typical workweek is Monday through Friday plus a half day on
Saturday, but longer hours are commonplace. The code grants workers a
35 percent differential for work totaling between 44 hours to 68 hours
per week and double time for any hours above 68 hours per week.
Conditions for agricultural workers are poor, especially in the
sugar industry. Many sugar cane worker villages have high rates of
disease and lack schools, medical facilities, running water, and sewage
systems. On sugar plantations, cane cutters usually are paid by the
weight of cane cut rather than the hours worked. Employers often do not
provide trucks to transport the newly cut cane at the conclusion of the
workday, causing workers to receive lower compensation because the cane
has dried out and become lighter.
When the cane finally is weighed, workers are given tickets
indicating the weight of cane cut (often rounded in favor of the
employer) and the amount of money due. These tickets, issued to a
specific person but payable to the bearer, may be turned in to the
employer and redeemed for cash every 2 weeks. Many cane cutters earn
less than $4.00 (60 pesos) per day. Because workers earn so little and
sometimes cannot wait until payday to redeem their tickets, an informal
barter system has evolved in which the tickets also are used to
purchase items at private stores located on the plantations. These
private stores make change by giving back a combination of tickets and
cash. However, it is not unusual for these stores to retain 10 percent
of the cash due a customer. The conditions are somewhat better at some
of the privately owned sugar plantations. At year's end, it was not yet
possible to determine how many, if any, of these practices persisted
following privatization of the CEA.
The Dominican Social Security Institute (IDSS) sets workplace
safety and health conditions. The existing social security system is
seriously underfunded and applies to only about 9 percent of the
population. Approximately 13,000 employees work in the IDSS bureaucracy
to support fewer than 20,000 retirees.
Both the IDSS and the labor Secretariat have small corps of
inspectors charged with enforcing standards. Inspector positions
customarily are filled through political patronage, and bribes from
businesses are common. In practice, workers cannot remove themselves
from hazardous working situations without jeopardy to continued
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, and in August 1998 an alien smuggling law increased the
penalties for those found guilty of various phases of the traffic in
persons. Laws dealing with domestic violence, as well as the Minor's
Code,create protection under both civil and criminal law against
particular situations that may be conducive to--or acts that may be a
part of--the traffic in persons, whether female or male, minors or
adults. The law also prohibits acting as an intermediary in a
transaction of prostitution, and the Government has used this law to
prosecute third parties who derive profit from prostitution. However,
trafficking of women and children is a serious problem.
The Directorate of Migration estimates that there are approximately
400 rings of alien-smugglers and purveyors of false document operating
within the country. These individuals profit by facilitating the
trafficking of women to Spain, the Netherlands, and Argentina under
false pretenses, for purposes of prostitution. The Government also is
concerned that some individuals coming to the country ostensibly to
adopt children, may actually intend to use the children in the
production of pornography or in the sex trade.
In March the Government created the Interinstitutional Committee
for the Protection of Migrant Women (CIPROM), which is composed of
representatives from government entities and NGO's. CIPROM is intended
to provide a framework for integrated action by both groups, and to
prevent and reduce social and economic problems in those regions from
which most of the trafficked women originate and in the various
countries to which they are sent. CIPROM is establishing unified
criteria for management of cases of migrant women or trafficking
victims. One NGO counsels women planning to accept job offers in Europe
and the eastern Caribbean about immigration, health, and other issues.
The program also provides services to returning women.
In May the PN dismantled an expatriate ring that specialized in the
prostituting of minors in Israel and used false documents to arrange
their transportation. The ring was broken after the father of one of
the girls taken to Israel made a report that his daughter had been
kidnaped along with 10 other girls.
The Director General of Migration reported that the authorities
have dismissed a number of immigration inspectors and supervisors for
their links with the bands trafficking in women. In addition, since the
passage in 1998 of an antismuggling law, the authorities have charged
at least 80 individuals under the law. The courts convicted two of
them, and the remainder of cases were still pending at year's end.
The executive branch also established an Oversight Organization for
the Protection of Children to coordinate the approaches of various
agencies involved in combating trafficking in children, whether for
adoption, for sexual exploitation, or for other purposes. This
organization works with the Attorney General's office, the Public
Health Ministry, Migration, and other agencies. In the National
District, the Department of Family and Children in the Office of Public
Prosecutor focuses on identifying children who are victims of abuse of
any kind and prosecutes offenders under the heightened penalties
contained in the domestic violence law.
A primary concern of the Oversight Organization is to prevent the
use of the child adoption process by those who intend to sell the
children or to exploit them through prostitution or child pornography.
The Department of Family and Children is very concerned with
kidnapings, especially of infants, for sale to foreigners who, under
the rubric of adoption, deliberately sidestep the legal formalities--
including those of their own country--in place to protect children from
victimization. Many children do leave the country as adoptees, but
government officials have made obtaining them much more difficult and,
they hope, have prevented some would-be traffickers from using this
route.
Poor Haitian and Dominican parents sometimes arrange for more
prosperous Dominican families to ``adopt'' their children, in exchange
for money or goods. Such children often are not treated as full family
members and are expected to work long hours in domestic service,
agriculture, or industry under threat of corporal punishment and
without compensation. Especially in the case of girls, these children
often are abused sexually.
____
ECUADOR
Ecuador is a constitutional republic with a president and a 123-
member unicameral legislature that was chosen in free elections in May
1998. In July 1998, voters elected President Jamil Mahuad to a 5-year
term, and he took office in August of that year. A National Constituent
Assembly approved extensive constitutional reforms, which also took
effect in August 1998. The reforms included the termination of the
Congress' power to dismiss cabinet ministers and the reduction of
fringe parties' influence in the Congress. Members of the Supreme Court
preside over a judiciary that is constitutionally independent, but in
practice is inefficient and susceptible to outside pressure.
The military enjoys substantial autonomy, reinforced by guaranteed
revenues from the nation's oil exports, as well as from civil aviation,
shipping, and other commercial sectors. The National Police,
responsible for domestic law enforcement and maintenance of internal
order, falls under the civilian Ministry of Government and Police.
There continued to be credible allegations of human rights abuses by
the police and, in some isolated cases, members of the military.
Ecuador suffered an extremely severe economic crisis as the economy
contracted by 7.5 percent. The economy is based on private enterprise,
although there continued to be heavy government involvement in key
sectors such as petroleum, utilities, and aviation. The inflation rate
for the year reached 78 percent, the currency depreciated by 260
percent, and the country defaulted on its international debt; in
addition, to prevent a possible collapse of the financial sector, the
Government temporarily closed the country's banks and froze all banking
deposits. The principal exports are oil, bananas, and shrimp, which are
the country's leading sources of foreign exchange. Manufacturing for
regional export markets is of growing importance. Most citizens are
employed in the urban informal sector or as rural agricultural workers;
rural poverty is extensive, and underemployment is high. The per capita
gross domestic product of $1,101 provides most of the population with a
low standard of living. According to a 1999 study, 62.5 percent of
citizens live in poverty and 15 percent are indigent, with an almost
total lack of resources.
There continued to be serious problems in the Government's human
rights record. There were isolated instances of extrajudicial killings.
Police tortured and otherwise mistreated prisoners and detainees, and
prison conditions remained poor. Persons are subject to arbitrary
arrest and prolonged detention is a problem. Once incarcerated, persons
may wait years before being convicted or acquitted unless they pay
bribes. More than one-half the prisoners in jail have not been
sentenced formally. The Government failed to prosecute and punish human
rights abusers. The most fundamental human rights abuse stems from
shortcomings in the politicized, inefficient, and corrupt legal and
judicial system. The Government infringed somewhat on press freedom,
and some self-censorship continues. On several occasions throughout the
year, the Government declared or extended states of emergency that
limit freedom of assembly and movement, and it ordered participants in
nationwide strikes back to work. Violence and pervasive discrimination
against women, indigenous people, and Afro-Ecuadorians also remain
problems. Child labor is a problem. Mob violence and killings persist.
In 1998 the Government decreed an ambitious National Human Rights
Plan with the goal of ``preventing, eradicating, and sanctioning''
human rights violations in the country. The three branches of
government, as well as the independent Ombudsman's office and a number
of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) contributed to this plan.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed reports of politically motivated killings; however, there
continued to be credible reports that police committed extrajudicial
killings. Through late September, the Ecumenical Committee for Human
Rights (CEDHU) reported a total of 17 extrajudicial killings by the
police, security forces, or semiofficial entities such as neighborhood
brigades. (Neighborhood brigades are civic defense groups organized by
the National Police to provide an anticrime presence in neighborhoods.
They are not authorized to carry firearms.)
On January 10, police in a Guayaquil suburb hit Sergio Michael
Zambrano in the face and then shot and killed him as he and his brother
tried to intervene in an incident involving a third brother. The police
asserted that they had acted in self-defense.
In March Irving O. Pazmino, Luis Echeverria, and Franklin Espinel
were killed during a car chase and an exchange of gunfire with police
in Guayaquil. Pazmino's family claims that police murdered Pazmino, but
government officials' review of the incident cast doubt on these
claims. At year's end, the matter was still under review.
In March in Guayaquil, 14-year-old Mickey Mendoza was killed during
what appears to have been a tussle with a police officer over a gun.
The police said that the killing was accidental. The case was under
investigation at year's end.
On July 16, a drunken policeman identified as Carlos Alulema shot
and killed cigarette vendor Victor Concha in Guayaquil. The authorities
subsequently arrested Alulema, and he awaited trial at year's end.
On November 13, national police officers Alcivar Palma and Jose
Palma shot and killed Richard Morales Cabrera in the Cisne-Reten
neighborhood of Guayaquil. The police also injured three other persons
in the incident. The victims' families said that the police confused
innocent victims with robbers and lodged complaints with the
authorities. At year's end, the incident was still under investigation.
In 1998 17 inmates died in prison due to traumatic injuries (see
Section 1.c.).
In May in the Las Malvinas suburb of Guayaquil, vigilantes killed
at least seven suspected criminals. The vigilantes were believed to be
under the direction of Jaime Toral, a rightwing political boss, who
himself is suspected of being an organized crime leader.
On February 17, unknown assailants killed Jaime Hurtado Gonzalez,
an Afro-Ecuadorian member of Congress from the far-left Popular
Democratic Movement (MPD) party, Pedro Tapia (Hurtado's alternate in
the Congress), and Wellington Borja near the Supreme Court in Quito.
The killings bore the hallmarks of a professional ``hit,'' and the
authorities brought charges against three police officers and a former
police informant in the killing. Several theories were advanced as to
the possible motive, but the case remained under investigation at
year's end.
There has been no disposition of the November 1998 kidnaping case
in Quito of Saul Filormo Canar Pauta, a leader of the Ecuadorian
Confederation of United Working Class Organizations. In December 1998,
a municipal worker found Canar's body in a trash dump. His hands and
feet were tied and his body showed signs of torture. The authorities
suspect that he may have been killed by private landowners in
retaliation for his activities organizing land invasions by squatters.
In July massive Indian protests erupted in Latacunga against
government austerity measures. Security forces opened fire, killing 25-
year-old Segundo Aymacana and injuring scores of other persons (see
Section 2.b.).
There were also instances in which citizens took the law into their
own hands, inciting mob violence that resulted in lynchings and
burnings of suspected criminals (see Section 1.e.). Mobs killed 16
crime suspects in the first 9 months of the year; individual lynchings
continued to occur in all parts of the country, especially in
indigenous communities in remote areas of the highlands. For example,
in September in La Chimba, northern Pinchincha, a crowd of 300 women
reportedly burned to death 15-year-old William Iguamba for stealing
property from private residences.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
On December 18, all eight foreign hostages held since September 11
in the northern province of Sucumbios along the border with Colombia
were released unharmed. The media had variously speculated that the
kidnapers were guerrillas, members of paramilitary groups, Colombians,
or common criminals. At year's end, the authorities were still
investigating the identities of the kidnapers.
There was no progress in resolving the 1997 disappearance of Angel
Heriberto Hinojoza.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Although the law prohibits torture and similar forms of
intimidation and punishment, the police continued to abuse suspects and
prisoners, usually with impunity. For example, in May in Guayaquil, the
police arrested Billy Navarrete Benavidez, coordinator for the
Permanent Committee on Human Rights, severely beat him, and later
robbed him in his cell. The incident was under investigation at year's
end. Also in May, in the Bastion Popular section of Guayaquil, the
police detained three youths (Alfredo Cabullales, Ivan Rivera, and
Wilmer Padilla) for no apparent reason. The police took the youths to
the police station where they whipped their buttocks with pieces of
wood and iron. The youths' parents protested the abuses.
The CEDHU has published one detailed report on suspects who
identified specific policemen as having tortured them. In most cases,
the police appeared to have abused such persons during investigations
of ordinary street crime. The victims reported that the police beat
them, burned them with cigarettes, applied electric shocks, or
threatened them psychologically. There were also at least 14 reports of
incidents involving physical mistreatment.
In May in Guayaquil, the police fired upon and wounded Joaquin
Hernandez, an editorial writer for the newspaper Hoy, in an apparent
case of mistaken identity. The incident was under investigation at
year's end.
In July the security forces injured scores of persons at massive
Indian protests in Latacunga against government austerity measures.
Police in Quito used tear gas in March and July to repel demonstrators
protesting higher prices and government plans to cut spending.
Conditions in detention centers generally continued to be poor.
Prisons in the tropical coastal areas tend to be worse than those in
the temperate highlands. Overcrowding is a chronic problem, although
conditions are notably better in the women's prison in Quito than in
other facilities. Prison overcrowding was reduced slightly by the
release of several hundred drug addicts charged only with possession
and of prisoners charged with minor offenses who had been held in
preventive custody for more than a year. The Constitution that took
effect in August 1998 requires that prisoners charged with lesser
offenses (carrying a maximum sentence of 5 years) and who have been
detained for more than 1 year without a sentence shall obtain their
freedom immediately. There are no separate facilities for hard-core or
dangerous criminals, nor are there effective rehabilitation programs.
New prisons have not been constructed due to lack of financial
resources.
In September the National Directorate for Social Rehabilitation
published a report that indicated that there was a total of 8,520
inmates incarcerated in facilities originally designed to hold a
population of 5,964. Women represented 9.5 percent of the total. In
1998, 26 inmates died in prison. The report stated that traumatic
injuries, reportedly inflicted by fellow inmates, were the cause of
death in 65 percent of the cases. It attributed the other deaths to
illness and drug use. The prison authorities routinely investigate
deaths in custody.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the
Penal Code provide that no one may be deprived of liberty without a
written order from a governmental authority, but the authorities often
violated these legal protections in practice. By law, the authorities
must issue specific written arrest orders within 24 hours of
detention--even in cases in which a suspect is caught committing a
crime--and must charge the suspect with a specific criminal offense
within 48 hours of arrest. All detained persons may challenge the
legality of their detention within 48 hours of their arrest, but in
practice few such petitions are brought. The senior elected official
(usually the mayor) of the locality in which the suspect is held
conducts this review. Regardless of the legality of a detention, a
prisoner may be released only by court order. In some cases, detainees
who are unaware of this, or who do not have the funds to hire a lawyer,
may remain in prison for an extended period before being released. Bail
is not generally available, and the law prohibits it in narcoticscases.
Families of detainees sometimes intervene in an attempt to secure the
prisoners' freedom through illegal means.
Human rights organizations reported occasional cases of
incommunicado detention, although the law prohibits this practice. Even
when the police obtain a written arrest order, those charged with
determining the validity of detention often allowed frivolous charges
to be brought, either because they were overworked or because the
accuser bribed them. In many instances, the system was used as a means
of harassment in civil cases in which one party sought to have the
other arrested on criminal charges. Preventive detention up to and
including trial is legal if a judge determines that it is necessary and
if evidence that a crime has been committed is presented.
Following the 1997 ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights that the Government had violated due process provisions in
connection with the arrest, investigation, and pretrial detention of
Ivan Suarez Rosero, the authorities released him. In the aftermath of
the Suarez ruling, the Government moved quickly to settle several other
cases that were under consideration by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights and one--the Consuelo Benavides case--that had been
accepted by the Inter-American Court. Led by the then-Attorney General
(and current Ombudsman), the Government took the unprecedented step of
admitting fault officially and of negotiating and paying settlements to
the families of Benavides and the Restrepo brothers, for wrongful
death, and to the Putumayo 11, a group of rural workers, for illegal
arrest, detention, and torture.
The authorities arrested hundreds of persons in Guayas province
during a state of emergency that lasted from January 8 until early
July. The measure was imposed to stem a soaring crime rate (315 persons
had died in violent crimes in Guayaquil by early May). The police often
arrested persons on mere suspicion or for lack of proper
identification; they released most of them a few days later. The
authorities reimposed the state of emergency in Guayas province in
December.
The Government does not use exile as a method of political control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary. In practice, however, the judiciary is
susceptible to outside pressure. Despite efforts begun in 1992 to
depoliticize and modernize the court system, the judiciary continues to
operate slowly and inconsistently. Judges reportedly rendered decisions
more quickly or more slowly depending on political pressure or the
payment of bribes. However, the norm is for lengthy delays before cases
come to the courts.
The judiciary is composed of the Supreme Court, superior circuit
courts, and other courts and tribunals that hear cases in accordance
with the Constitution and other laws, and the new Judicial Council.
Military and police tribunals are at the same level as circuit courts,
while criminal, provincial, and cantonal courts serve as lower courts,
with first-instance jurisdiction.
The regular court system tries most nonmilitary defendants,
although some indigenous groups try members independently for
violations of tribal rules. The law permits police or military courts
to try police officers and military defendants in closed sessions, in
accordance with the respective military and police court martial
manuals. Only the Supreme Court may try cases involving flag-rank
officers. The police court does not announce verdicts or punishments,
reinforcing the strong impression that the police are immune from
prosecution. The constitutional reforms by the National Constituent
Assembly placed both police and military justice under the control of
the Supreme Court. However, the three systems had not yet been
integrated by year's end.
The Supreme Court that took office in 1997 publicly recognized the
shortcomings of the judicial system and pledged to improve the quality
and training of judges. In May 1998, the Supreme Court supervised the
selection by open competition of all appellate judges. A new Judicial
Council, charged with administering the court system and disciplining
judges, took office in the fall of 1998. In November the council's
disciplinary committee fired two judges and two court employees for
their role in the release of suspected drug traffickers in May. All
four are to face criminal charges. The council also sanctioned a judge
in Guayas province, Isabel Segarra, for improper conduct in a banking
scandal.
The inadequacies of the justice system led to a growing number of
cases in which communities took the law into their own hands. There
continued to be reports of lynchings and burnings of suspected
criminals by outraged citizens (see Section 1.a.). These occurred
particularly in indigenous communities and poor neighborhoods of the
major cities where there is little police presence.
The law provides for internationally accepted due process rights
for criminal defendants, but the authorities often did not observe
these rights in practice. By law, the accused is presumed innocent
until proven guilty, and defendants have the right to a public trial,
defense attorneys, and appeal. They may present evidence, refuse to
testify against themselves, and confront and cross-examine witnesses.
Although a public defender system exists, in practice there are
relatively few attorneys available to defend the large number of
indigent suspects.
Trial is supposed to begin within 15 to 60 days of the initial
arrest, but in practice, initiation of the trial phase can take years.
Less than 40 percent of all prisoners have been convicted and
sentenced. Accused narcotics traffickers cannot obtain bail or be
released on recognizance. The number of narcotics cases is likely to
decline, however, following passage of a law decriminalizing possession
of small amounts of narcotics by addicts for their own use.
In November Congress passed a new Criminal Procedures Code that was
to take effect in 2000. On December 5, President Mahuad partially
vetoed the law and proposed changes to the vetoed portions; Congress
acquiesced in the changes. The new code is intended to change the
criminal justice system from an inquisitorial to an accusatorial-style
system. The Chief Prosecutor's office is to investigate and prosecute
crimes, while the role of judges is to change to that of neutral
arbiters presiding over oral trials. The new code is a step toward
implementation of provisions in the 1998 Constitution intended to
strengthen the justice system by improving due process and enhancing
the rights of the accused, through measures such as habeas corpus and
limits on preventive detention.
A foreign assistance program begun in 1994 has enabled the courts
to computerize the National Register of Prisoners. Use of this system
made it possible for the courts to track prisoners' status more easily
and more accurately. In 1998, the courts used this system to help
identify and release hundreds of accused minor offenders who had spent
more than a year in preventive detention.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanctions.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech, and the authorities generally respected this
provision in practice, but with some notable exceptions. There are
frequent charges of slander and libel brought by and against public
figures, but few result in final decisions or judicial relief. Some
self-censorship continues.
All of the major media organs--television, newspapers, and radio--
are in local, private hands except for two government-owned radio
stations. The law limits foreign investment in broadcast media. Using a
law promulgated by the last military regime that requires the media to
give the Government free space or air time, the Government can and does
require television and radio to broadcast government-produced programs
featuring the President and other top administration officials.
There is a free and vigorous press. Ownership of the media is
broadly based, and editorials represent a wide range of political views
and often criticize the Government. However, some degree of self-
censorship in the print media occurs, particularly with respect to
politically sensitive issues or stories about the military and its
related industries. In addition, most elements of the media cannot be
independent ofeconomic considerations and tend to reflect the narrow,
regional interests of their owners.
The Government does not interfere in issues involving academic
freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of free assembly for peaceful purposes, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice. Public rallies
require prior government permits, which generally are granted, although
exceptions occur. Numerous labor and student demonstrations took place
without incident in the capital and the outlying regions. In general
the security forces intervened in demonstrations only when there was
violence against bystanders or property. In March and July, protests in
various parts of the country were marred by violence; the police
injured scores of protesters (see Section 1.c.), several policemen were
injured, and property was damaged. In both March and July, President
Mahuad decreed 60-day nationwide states of emergency, which limited
freedom of assembly. He decreed a state of emergency for Guayas
province (primarily to help combat an increase in crime) from January
to July and again in December.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
Government does not require religious groups to be licensed or
registered unless they form NGO's that engage in commercial activity.
Approximately 90 percent of the population considers itself to be Roman
Catholic, although most citizens either do not practice the religion or
follow a syncretistic version that combines indigenous beliefs with
orthodox Catholic doctrine. The Government allows missionary activity
and religious demonstrations by all religions. The Government does not
permit religious instruction in public schools; however, private
schools have complete liberty in this regard. In early 1998, police in
Pinchincha suspended the meetings of a group known as ``Gnostico
Cristiano Universal,'' following the suicide of 29 members of the
``Heaven's Gate'' cult in California, while they investigated possible
links between the 2 groups.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice. The Government
requires all citizens to obtain exit visas when traveling abroad, which
are granted routinely. Military and minor applicants must comply with
special requirements.
The law includes provisions for granting refugee and asylee status
in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The issue of provision of first asylum did not
arise. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a
country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. Since the return to civilian rule in 1979, citizens
actively have exercised their right to change their national and local
governments. In May 1998, voters elected members to a new Congress; in
July of that year President Jamil Mahuad defeated Alvaro Noboa in the
second round of the presidential election in a close contest. Noboa
disputed Mahuad's election, but an OAS-led observer mission noted that
the election had been conducted transparently and that the official
results accorded with the observers' private sample of election day
ballots.
Voting is mandatory for literate citizens over 18 years of age and
voluntary for illiterate citizens. The law does not permit active duty
members of the military to vote. The Constitution bars members of the
clergy and active duty military personnel from election to the
Congress, the presidency, or the vice presidency.The National
Constituent Assembly to reform the Constitution concluded its work in
June 1998. The new Constitution took effect in August 1998, with
changes intended to strengthen the presidency, improve management of
the Congress, and ensure increased protection for the rights of women,
children, indigenous groups, and minorities.
Few women, Afro-Ecuadorians, or indigenous people occupy senior
positions in government, although no specific laws prevent women or
minorities from attaining leadership positions. Women are
underrepresented in politics and government, holding 16 of 123 seats in
the Congress, the largest proportion of seats held by women in the
country's history. There were two female cabinet ministers. No Afro-
Ecuadorians serve as members of Congress or in senior-level government
jobs.
The indigenous movement, which previously shunned traditional
politics, formed an electoral movement called Pachakutik (which means
``cataclysmic change'' in Quichua) and ran candidates for national,
provincial, and local office in the 1996 and 1998 elections. A
Pachakutik Congresswoman, Nina Pacari, was elected Second Vice
President of the Congress. The first indigenous member to hold a top
leadership rank, Pacari heads an eight-member congressional bloc whose
cooperation with the majority in the Congress on some issues has
ensured it significant influence. Indigenous members of the National
Constituent Assembly, and their supporters, won important
constitutional protections for indigenous rights, which took effect
with the new Constitution in August 1998.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups, both domestic and international,
operate without restriction, investigating and publishing their
findings on human rights cases. Domestic human rights groups, such as
the CEDHU and the regional Latin American Human Rights Association
(ALDHU), were outspoken in their criticism of the Government's record
on specific cases. Nevertheless, the Government contracted with the
ALDHU to provide human rights training to the military and the police.
The Truth and Justice Commission, established in 1996 to
investigate reports of past rights abuse, is no longer active. The
office of Ombudsman was created to ensure ongoing attention to human
rights issues. In September 1998, Congress elected a new Ombudsman who,
as Attorney General under interim President Alarcon, had earned a
reputation as a human rights advocate.
In 1998 the Government decreed an ambitious National Human Rights
Plan with the goal of ``preventing, eradicating, and sanctioning''
human rights violations in the country. The three branches of
government, as well as the independent Ombudsmen's office and a number
of NGO's contributed to development of this plan. At the end of the
year, the United Nations contributed $1.2 million to support the plan.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, religion,
sex, or social status. In addition, the constitutional reforms
explicitly increased the rights of women, children, and minorities, and
required the new Congress to pass legislation implementing these rights
promptly. However, women, Afro-Ecuadorians, and indigenous people face
significant discrimination.
Women.--Although the law prohibits violence against women,
including within marriage, it is a widespread practice. Many rapes go
unreported because of the victims' reluctance to confront the
perpetrators. Women may file complaints against a rapist or an abusive
spouse or companion only if they produce a witness. In cases of
statutory rape involving ``amorous'' sex with a minor, if the rapist
marries the victim, the charges against him or anyone else who took
part in the rape cannot be pursued unless the marriage is subsequently
annulled. While some communities have established their own centers for
counseling and legal support of abused women, the Government only began
to address this question seriously with the formation of the
``Comisaria de la Mujer,'' or Women's Bureau, in 1994. Although this
office can accept complaints about abuse of women, it has no authority
to act on them itself. However, the Women's Bureau doubled thenumber of
its outreach offices and actively referred abuse cases to prosecutors.
The 1995 Law Against Violence Affecting Women and Children, drafted
by a coalition of women's organizations, criminalized spousal abuse for
the first time, including physical, sexual, and psychological abuse. It
also created family courts and reformed the Penal Code to give courts
the power to remove an abusive spouse from the home.
Discrimination against women is pervasive in society, particularly
with respect to educational and economic opportunities for those in the
lower economic strata. The increasingly active women's movement blames
culture and tradition for inhibiting achievement of full equality for
women. There are fewer women than men in the professions and skilled
trades, and pay discrimination against women is common.
The Ecuadorian Women's Permanent National Forum, founded in 1994,
comprises more than 320 women's organizations and promotes social,
economic, and cultural change through various methods, including
increasing political participation by women. In addition, the National
Women's Council provides support for approximately 500 women's
organizations, many of which promote social consciousness and greater
participation by women in the political process.
Children.--The Government has not taken effective steps to promote
the welfare of children. The Government rarely enforces the
constitutional requirement of education through the age of 14.
There is no societal pattern of abuse against children. Government
resources to assist children have traditionally been limited, although
the Government instituted a program to care for the children of the
working poor called ``Operation Child Rescue.'' The IACHR concluded
that this program reached only a small percentage of those affected.
Approximately 45 percent of children under the age of 5 are
malnourished. Government spending on education continued to decline,
both in real terms and as a proportion of gross domestic product.
Several private organizations are very active in programs to assist
street children, and the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) also runs a
program in conjunction with the Central Bank. Especially in urban
areas, the children of the poor often experience severe hardships. It
is common to see children as young as 5 or 6 years of age selling
newspapers or candy on the street to support themselves or to augment
the family income. Also, there are instances of prostitution by girls
under 18 years of age in urban areas. In rural areas, young children
often must leave school at an early age to help out on the family's
plot of land.
People with Disabilities.--There is no official discrimination
against disabled persons in employment, education, or the provision of
other state services. However, there are no laws to ensure disabled
persons access to public buildings or services, nor are they provided
any other special government assistance.
Indigenous People.--While at least 85 percent of all citizens claim
some indigenous heritage, culturally indigenous people make up about 15
to 20 percent of the total population. The vast majority live in rural
areas, and most live in varying degrees of poverty. Land is scarce in
the more heavily populated highland areas where high infant mortality,
malnutrition, and epidemic disease are also common. In addition,
electricity and potable water are often unavailable. Although the rural
education system is seriously deficient, many indigenous groups
participated actively with the Ministry of Education in the development
of the bilingual education program used in rural public schools.
The new Constitution recognizes the rights of indigenous
communities to hold property communally, to administer traditional
community justice in certain cases, and to be consulted before natural
resources are exploited in community territories. Indigenous people
continue to enjoy, in addition, the same civil and political rights as
other citizens. In the Amazon area, indigenous groups have lobbied the
Government, enlisted the help of foreign and domestic NGO's, and
mounted protests (including kidnaping oil workers and tourists) in
attempts to win a share of oil revenues and a voice inexploitation and
development decisions. The new Constitution expressly recognizes the
indigenous communities' rights to be consulted, but not to approve, oil
exploration and development. Oil companies have increased their efforts
to minimize the environmental and social impact of their oil projects
in the Amazon but continue to face criticism from indigenous groups
that environmental damage ensues.
Despite their growing political influence (see Section 3) and the
efforts of grassroots community groups, which were increasingly
successful in pressuring the central Government to assist them, Indians
continue to suffer discrimination at many levels of society. With few
exceptions, indigenous people are at the lowest end of the
socioeconomic scale.
The Confederation of Ecuador's Indian Nationalities (CONAIE) became
increasingly militant during the year and mounted major demonstrations
in March and July to protest economic austerity measures. Security
forces killed one Indian and injured scores of other persons during the
massive protests in July (see Sections 1.a and 2.b.). CONAIE is
discussing the issue of compensation with the Government, which has
agreed to pay some compensation to those injured in the protests.
Religious Minorities.--Although relations between religious
communities generally have been amicable, there were a few incidents of
interreligious or intrareligious tension or violence. In March 1998, in
the pilgrimage town of Quinche, near Quito, Catholic residents burned
an evangelical temple that was under construction. Catholic Church
leaders criticized the act. Subsequently, in April 1999, a mob
surrounded an evangelical indigenous church and briefly held 100 church
members hostage.
During 1998 there was a series of nonviolent confrontations between
groups of Protestants and Catholics in the town of Peguche, in the
province of Imbabura. Some citizens claimed that commercial rivalry was
at the root of the problem.
In April Southern Baptist workers reported increasing opposition
from local residents to the development of a church and a medical
clinic in the town of Chachas. The Baptist workers were accused of
``starting a new religion.'' Based on official permission from
community leaders to operate the clinic, local police promised to give
protection to the Baptist workers.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population of the rural,
northern coastal area includes large numbers of Afro-Ecuadorian
citizens. They suffer widespread poverty and pervasive discrimination,
particularly with regard to educational and economic opportunity. There
were no special government efforts to address these problems.
There are five major Afro-Ecuadorian organizations active in the
country; they estimate that Afro-Ecuadorians account for 700,000
people, or about 6 percent of the total population. While the presence
of Afro-Ecuadorians has grown in the fields of sports and culture,
educational opportunities continue to be limited.
The press has focused on lingering racism among all strata of
society. Afro-Ecuadorian organizations note that despite the absence of
official discrimination, societal discrimination continues to affect
them. For example, they assert that the police stop Afro-Ecuadorians
for document checks with greater frequency than other citizens.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and Labor Code
provide most workers with the right to form trade unions. Members of
the police and the military, and public sector employees in nonrevenue
producing entities are not free to form trade unions. The 1991 Labor
Code reforms raised the number of workers required for an establishment
to be unionized from 15 to 30, which the International Labor
Organization's Committee on Freedom of Association considered too
stringent a limitation at the plant workers' council level.
While employees of state-owned organizations enjoy rights similar
to those in the private sector, the law technically prevents the
majority of public sector employees from joining unions or exercising
collective bargaining rights. Nevertheless, most public employees
maintain membership in some labor organization, and there are frequent
``illegal'' strikes.Despite official threats, the Government rarely
takes action against striking public workers. The National Constituent
Assembly defeated an attempt to overturn November 1997 legislation that
outlawed public sector strikes that paralyze key services, including
schools. Although the labor confederations are politically independent,
the two largest single labor unions, the Teachers' Union and the Union
of Social Security Workers, are allied with the Democratic Political
Movement, a far-left socialist party.
Approximately 12 percent of the work force is organized. There are
four large labor centrals or confederations. None of the main labor
centrals is firmly connected to any one political party, and there are
no ties between the Government and any labor union.
There are few restrictions on the right of workers to strike,
although a 10-day cooling-off period is required before a strike is
declared. The Labor Code revisions limit solidarity strikes or boycotts
to 3 days, provided that the Labor Ministry approves them. In a legal
strike, workers may take possession of the factory or workplace, thus
ending production at the site, and receive police protection during the
takeover. The employer must pay all salaries and benefits during a
legal strike; the Labor Code protects strikers and their leaders from
retaliation.
There were three significant strikes during the year, mainly in
response to government austerity measures. They involved public sector
employees such as teachers, social security and medical workers, as
well as transportation workers; indigenous groups also protested during
the strikes. In at least one case (involving health workers), the
Government ordered strikers to return to work. Police in Quito used
tear gas in March and July to repel demonstrators who sought access to
the city center.
Unions may freely form and join federations or confederations, and
three of the large labor centrals maintain international affiliations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The labor
market is highly segmented, with a minority of workers in skilled,
usually unionized, positions in state-run enterprises or in medium to
large industries. Most of the economically active population is
employed in the agricultural sector or the urban informal sector; the
vast majority of these workers are not organized. The Labor Code
requires that all private employers with 30 or more workers belonging
to a union must negotiate collectively when the union so requests.
Although approximately 12 percent of the work force is organized,
collective bargaining agreements cover only one-quarter of these
workers.
The Labor Code streamlined the bargaining process in state
enterprises by requiring workers to be represented by one labor union
only. It prohibits discrimination against unions and requires that
employers provide space for union activities upon the union's request.
The law does not permit employers to dismiss a worker without the
express permission of the Ministry of Labor, whose rulings are not
subject to judicial review. If the Ministry of Labor rules that a
dismissal is unjustified, it can require the employer to pay large
indemnities or separation payments to the worker, although the reforms
set a cap on such payments. The Labor Code provides for resolution of
labor conflicts through an arbitration and conciliation board
comprising one representative of the Ministry of Labor, two from the
union, and two representatives of management.
The Maquila (in bond processing for export) Law passed in 1990
permits the hiring of temporary workers for the maquila industries
only. While there is no express prohibition on association rights in
the Maquila Law, in practice it is difficult to organize temporary
employees on short-term contracts. Since temporary workers are not
recognized by the Labor Code, they do not enjoy the same level of
protection offered to other workers. The maquila system allows a
company and its property to become an export processing zone wherever
it is located. Many such ``zones'' have thus been established; most are
dedicated to textiles and fish processing.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
the Labor Code prohibit compulsory labor, and there were no reports of
it in general, or of forced or bonded labor by children.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution establishes that children must attend
school until 14 years of age. However, because of the lack of schools
in many rural communities and the need for children to work, this
provision is rarely enforced. The law prohibits persons younger than 14
years old from working, except in special circumstances such as
apprenticeships. It requires those between the ages of 14 and 18 years
to have the permission of their parent or guardian to work. The law
prohibits children between the ages of 15 and 18 years from working
more than 7 hours per day or 35 hours per week, and it restricts
children below the age of 15 years to a maximum of 6 hours per day and
30 hours per week. In practice, the Ministry of Labor fails to enforce
child labor laws. A 1997 UNICEF report estimated that of the 2.1
million children between the ages of 10 and 17, 37 percent worked. In
rural areas, many children attend school only sporadically after about
10 years of age in order to contribute to household income as farm
laborers. In the city, many children under 14 years of age work in
family-owned ``businesses'' in the informal sector, shining shoes,
collecting and recycling garbage, or as street peddlers. The law
prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and there were no reports
of such practices (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor sets the
minimum wage every 6 months in consultation with the Commission on
Salaries, but Congress also may adjust it. The statutory minimum wage
is not adequate to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. As of December, the minimum wage plus mandated bonuses provided
a gross monthly compensation of approximately $55 (1,109,166 sucres).
Most organized workers in state industries and formal sector private
enterprises earned substantially more than the minimum wage and also
received significant other benefits through collective bargaining
agreements. The majority of workers, however, work in the large
informal and rural sectors without recourse to the minimum wage or
legally mandated benefits.
The Ministry of Labor has the principal role in enforcing labor
laws and carries out this responsibility through a corps of labor
inspectors who are active in all 22 provinces. The Labor Code provides
for a 40-hour workweek, a 15-day annual vacation, a minimum wage, and
other employer-provided benefits, such as uniforms and training
opportunities.
The Labor Code also provides general protection for workers' health
and safety on the job. A worker may not leave the workplace of his own
volition, even if there is a hazardous situation. The worker is allowed
to request that an inspector from the Ministry of Labor come to the
workplace and confirm the hazard; that inspector may then close down
the workplace.
The Government enforces health and safety standards and regulations
through the Social Security Institute. In the formal sector,
occupational health and safety is not a major problem. However, there
are no specific regulations governing health and safety standards in
the agricultural sector and, in practice, there is no enforcement of
safety rules in the small mines that make up the vast majority of the
mining sector.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no law that specifically
addresses trafficking in persons. The migration law provisions in the
Penal Code impose sanctions on suppliers of false documents for
purposes of travel or work, and provide for prison sentences for the
crime of facilitating illegal immigration for the purpose of
prostitution. Other laws dealing with kidnaping, labor, occupational
safety, and slavery apply to and provide sanctions for trafficking in
persons. There were no reports of persons being trafficked in, to, or
from the country. However, police in Spain reported that they had
arrested 50 Ecuadorian women working as prostitutes who were likely
victims of trafficking.
______
EL SALVADOR
El Salvador is a constitutional, multiparty democracy with an
executive branch headed by a president and a unicameral legislature. In
a free and fair process, Francisco Flores of the Nationalist Republican
Alliance (ARENA) was elected President in March and began his 5-year
term in June. In free and fair legislative elections in March 1997, the
former guerrilla organization Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
(FMLN) won one-third of the seats in the Legislative Assembly, leaving
the ARENA party with a one-vote plurality. Seven other parties,
representing a broad political spectrum, hold seats, including the
conservative National Conciliation Party and the centrist Christian
Democratic Party. The judiciary is constitutionally independent but
suffers from inefficiency and corruption.
Under the terms of the Peace Accords that ended the 12-year civil
war in 1992, the Government has reduced the armed forces; removed the
internal security function from the armed forces and placed it under
civilian control; and replaced the discredited National Police with a
new Civilian National Police (PNC). The former guerrillas have been
integrated fully into the political system. The armed forces are less
than one-fourth the size they were in 1991, and instruction in human
rights is a routine part of the training for all military personnel.
Although its internal policing mission has been eliminated, the
military continues to provide support, on an emergency basis, for some
PNC patrols in rural areas, a measure begun in 1995 to contain violence
by well-armed, organized criminal bands. The PNC's level of
professionalism continued to improve, but the force remains
understaffed, undertrained, underfunded, and short on practical
experience. Civilian authorities maintained effective control of the
military and security forces. Some members of the police committed
human rights abuses.
The country has a market-based, mixed economy largely based on
agriculture and manufacturing. Some 40 percent of the work force are in
the agricultural sector; coffee and sugar are the principal export
crops and major sources of foreign exchange. The manufacturing sector
employs 6.4 percent of the work force, is dominated by apparel
manufacturing (mostly in export processing zones), and represents the
main source of new jobs. The Government is committed to privatization
and free market reforms. The economy is open, and private property is
respected. The rate of real economic growth was about 2 percent, and
per capita gross domestic product was estimated to be $2,024. The
official unemployment rate averaged 7.5 to 8 percent during the year;
however, the rate of underemployment (less than full-time work or total
income below the minimum wage) was estimated at about 30 percent. About
45 percent of the population live below the poverty level.
There continued to be some problems in the Government's human
rights record; however, the Government's performance continued to
improve somewhat. There were several cases of reported extrajudicial
killings by police. The police sometimes used excessive force,
mistreated detainees, and arbitrarily arrested and detained persons;
however, the PNC improved its procedures. The PNC, the Attorney
General's office and the independent PNC Inspector General's office
(IG) sought to identify and to punish police who committed criminal
acts or violated established procedures, although with mixed results.
There was a reduction in the number of human rights complaints against
the police compared with the previous year. Prison conditions remained
poor, but the Government continued to improve conditions and
significantly reduced overcrowding. The judiciary remains inefficient;
however, it made considerable progress in clearing up its backlog of
cases, and the court system began to reduce lengthy pretrial detention
and delays in trials. Implementation of new criminal and sentencing
codes in 1998 continued to have a positive impact on the problems of
violation of due process, prison overcrowding, overburdened court
dockets, and trial delays. The Supreme Court made further progress in
increasing the professionalism of the judiciary, but disciplining or
dismissing corrupt or incompetent judges remained a slow process.
Impunity for the rich and powerful remained a problem. The office of
the Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights (PDDH), established by
the Constitution and the Peace Accords, was an independent advocate for
citizens' rights. However, its investigative capacity remained limited
due to resource constraints. In addition, there were continuing
complaints from nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) and some
legislators about the performance of Ombudsman Eduardo Penate Polanco.
Violence and discrimination against women are problems. Discrimination
against the disabled and the indigenous remained problems. Abuse of
children and forced child prostitution were also problems. The Freedom
of Association Committee of the International Labor Organization (ILO)
charged that the 1998 dismissal of two groups of employees of the
privatized statetelephone company violated freedom of association and
the right to organize. The Government began several internationally
sponsored programs to combat the continuing problem of child labor.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings; however, there were several cases of
reported extrajudicial killings by police.
In July Wiliam Ernesto Rosales Bonilla, who worked for the major
newspaper El Diario de Hoy in a nonjournalistic capacity, was shot five
times in the head. Neighbors claimed that just prior to his death, men
in civilian dress picked up Rosales at his home and took him away in
what was described as a police vehicle. One of the men also took
Rosales's personal vehicle. Two PNC agents being investigated in
connection with Rosales's murder were part of a group of six PNC agents
under investigation in August for burglary of a private residence.
However, at year's end, there was no concrete evidence to link
Rosales's murder to any police, and the case remained under
investigation.
In August three men dressed in what neighbors said appeared to be
police uniforms took Fernando Hernandez and Manuel Aguilar away from
their home in Hernandez's truck near the western city of San Juan de
Opico. The three men rode in the bed of the truck and later appeared to
have opened fire on Hernandez (who was driving) and Aguilar (in the
passenger seat), killing both and wrecking the truck. Hernandez's
family reported that he had been shot at the previous week and blamed a
local transportation cooperative that had been trying to stop Hernandez
from forming a competing transportation business. In December the
authorities arrested three police officers and charged them with the
murders. At year's end, one of the accused officers was under detention
and the other two were suspended from the police force but free on
bail, pending trial.
In August police shot and killed two protesters near Sonsonate
during a confrontation between police and several hundred members of
the Association of Salvadoran Agricultural Producers (APROAS), the most
vocal and militant of several organizations of former militia members.
(These loosely organized militias assisted the armed forces in rural
areas, but their members were not part of the armed forces and were not
included in the settlement offered to most former combatants under the
1992 Peace Accords.) The Sonsonate demonstration was one of a dozen
held throughout the country to demand government compensation for some
40,000 to 45,000 persons claiming to be former militia members for
their services before and during the civil war. On the day of the
killings, several of these organizations blocked major highways with
burning tires. While most of the demonstrations were nonviolent, in
Sonsonate police were unable to persuade demonstrators to disband
peacefully. A clash ensued, and police shot and killed two former
militia members. In addition, 7 other former militia members and 7 PNC
agents were wounded; 47 demonstrators were jailed but subsequently were
released. APROAS has been involved in several violent clashes with
authorities over the years and had made thinly veiled threats of
violence prior to the demonstrations. There was evidence that some
members of APROAS were armed with machetes, slingshots, and other
weapons during the demonstration and were belligerent prior to the
killings. There also were charges that the PNC used excessive force. In
September the local prosecutor ordered one police officer detained in
the deaths of the two former militia members. The police officer, who
had been injured by machete in the incident, claimed self-defense. At
year's end, the killings still were under investigation.
In November Manuel de Jesus Parada died as a result of a beating
after a police patrol flagged down a car to take him to a hospital. The
five policemen in the patrol claimed that others beat Parada and that
they simply were helping the victim of an assault. However, the
Attorney General's office opened an investigation and charged that the
five police agents picked up Parada for being drunk, that Parada
resisted being taken into custody, and that they then severely beat
Parada, causing his death. One of the accused police officers fled and
was still at large at year's end; the remaining four officers were in
custody awaiting trial.
Also in November, police shot and killed Carlos Lopez Regalo on the
outskirts of San Salvador. Prior to the shooting, a police patrol
stopped to question Lopez, who was standing on the side of a highway
attempting to sell wild game. Lopez fled, and in the ensuing foot
chase, the police reportedly fired four shots, one of which hit and
killed Lopez. Family members claimed that Lopez fled because the police
had beaten him on a previous occasion for selling game by the road. At
year's end, two police officers were in custody and faced a charge of
aggravated homicide in the case.
A number of inmates died in prison due to violence and illness.
(See Section 1.c.).
There was mixed progress in cases of extrajudicial killings from
previous years.
In 1998 the handcuffed body of Carlos Lobo was discovered in a
river near San Salvador. The apparent cause of death was drowning. Two
PNC agents had arrested Lobo on suspicion of carrying stolen goods. The
PNC agents claimed that Lobo escaped from custody, still handcuffed,
and ran toward the area where his body later was found. The PNC told
Lobo's father that his son escaped. Both PNC agents involved were
placed in custody for ``negligence'' in allowing Lobo to escape. In
February the PNC internal Control Unit found both police officers not
culpable for the escape or subsequent death of Lobo, but faulted the
senior officer for failure to follow correct procedure to locate Lobo
after he fled. The second police officer was a driver, and, according
to police regulations, was not allowed to pursue Lobo. In March the PNC
Disciplinary Tribunal suspended the senior agent for 362 days. The
officer appealed, and his appeal was still under consideration at
year's end.
In 1998 PNC agent Mariano Rodriguez shot and killed Jose Antonio
Villalta in Santa Tecla. Villalta's family charged that the PNC agent
shot him in the back when Villalta attempted to intervene to stop a
group of police who reportedly were beating two of his friends. At the
end of 1998, the PNC's independent IG office submitted the case to the
PNC Control Unit with the recommendation that Rodriguez be investigated
for improper use of a firearm. While not citing specific officers, the
IG also recommended that other PNC agents be investigated to determine
any shared culpability. At year's end, the Control Unit was
investigating the case.
In 1996 a PNC agent shot and killed Francisco Manzanares during
what the police said was surveillance of ongoing criminal activity
during an investigation in an extortion case. Although not active in
politics at the time of his death, Manzanares's past as an FMLN
combatant and party member raised the issue of political killing. In
January a court found four police officers guilty of killing Manzanares
(three as accomplices). The court determined that Jose Antonio Guzman
Ramirez had fired the gun that killed Manzanares, and sentenced him to
15 years in prison; the other three defendants received 10-year
sentences. All four were serving their sentences at year's end.
There were no further developments in the cases of two FMLN
activists murdered in Nejapa during the 1997 election campaign. No
concrete evidence has been discovered indicating that the killings were
politically motivated.
There were no new developments in the 1995 beating death of medical
student Adriano Vilanova. In 1998 a jury unanimously found five PNC
agents guilty of Vilanova's murder. Another two PNC agents charged with
participation in the killing remained at large at year's end. The
victim's parents had expressed satisfaction with the guilty verdicts,
but they continued to allege that the police were covering up
involvement of higher level government officials and called on the
police and the Attorney General's office to identify and prosecute the
``intellectual authors'' of the crime. The case remained open at year's
end.
There were no new developments related to the 1994 murder of Ramon
Garcia Prieto. In 1996 a court found Jose Argueta Rivas, a former
member of the National Police, guilty of the murder, and sentenced him
to 30 years in prison. In 1997 the Garcia Prieto family charged before
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) that the
Government had failed to investigate the crime properly to determine
who ordered the killings. In 1998 the authorities arrested Jose Ismael
Ortiz Diaz, a member of a criminal gang, for participating in the
murder. At year's end, the case remained open and Ortiz Diaz remained
in custody, but no trial date had been set.
In 1998 the authorities charged Ortiz Diaz, who was already under
detention for participation in the Garcia Prieto murder, as an
accomplice in the 1993 murder of FMLN leader Darol Francisco Velis
Castellanos. Carlos Romero Alfaro, a former member of the National
Police, also remained in custody. In 1998 the Supreme Court admonished
a lower court for the delay in the case; at year's end, the case
remained open but there still was no indication when it would go to
trial.
In December the IACHR published a report on the 1989 murders of six
Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter. The report
concluded that the State was responsible for violating the right to
life of the eight murdered persons and had failed to investigate those
violations effectively. The report also criticized the 1993 general
amnesty law, which resulted in the release from custody of two military
officers found guilty of the murders in 1992, and called on the
Government to reopen the case. The Government had not responded to the
report as of year's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed politically motivated
disappearances.
Most cases of disappearances have been kidnaping for profit, a
common occurrence affecting all levels of society throughout the
country. During the year, the PDDH accepted three cases for
investigation charging forced or involuntary disappearance.
In March unknown persons abducted Margarita Posada, the director of
the Center for the Defense of the Consumer (a domestic NGO), held her
for nearly a day and then released her. Police linked her case to a
criminal band captured in May while attempting to negotiate a ransom in
another kidnaping. However, Posada said that her abductors released her
without making any ransom demands and she asserted that her abduction
was an effort to intimidate her for work the Center had done in
opposition to powerful business interests. At year's end, the
authorities had not charged anyone in the case.
In April unknown assailants kidnaped Miguel Montenegro, president
of the Human Rights Commission of El Salvador (CDHES), in San Salvador,
drove him around the city for 2 hours and then released him unharmed.
During the 2-hour ride, the captors threatened Montenegro and his
family, making direct reference to his work in human rights. Montenegro
reported this incident to the Government, the police, the PDDH, NGO's,
and the diplomatic community. At year's end, the police continued their
investigation into the abduction but had made little progress in
identifying the perpetrators.
There were no further developments in the 1995 kidnaping of Andres
Suster, the 15-year-old son of the former president of the state
telephone company. Rumors of political motivation had surrounded the
kidnaping. In 1997 police arrested a number of persons in connection
with the kidnaping. A principal suspect in the Suster and other
kidnapings, who was associated with the disbanded Communist Party, fled
the country in 1997. In 1998 a judge ordered five suspects released
from detention due to lack of evidence, dropped charges against four
additional suspects, and lifted arrest orders against six others. As of
year's end, two suspects remained in custody, one suspect had died of
natural causes, and one suspect remained at large.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, some
members of the PNC continued to use excessive force or otherwise
mistreated detainees.
During the year, the PDDH accepted 929 complaints (an average of 77
per month) of violation of the right of personal integrity (a category
covering torture; inhuman or degrading treatment; mistreatment;
disproportionate use of force; and improper treatment of detainees).
The PDDH reported that the vast majority of these complaints involved
the PNC and were the direct result of minor to serious violations of
arrest procedures. Since 1996 complaints have fallen. From June 1998 to
May, the PDDH accepted a monthly average of 82 complaints in this
category compared with 87 per month for the period from June 1997 to
May 1998 and 108 per month for June 1996 to May 1997. From June 1998 to
May, the PDDH investigated 28.4 percent of the total complaints it
received, and, of those accepted for investigation, found human rights
violations in an average of 4.2 percent (covering all categories of
human rights).
The PNC Inspector General's office, an entity separate from the
PNC, answers directly to the Minister of Public Security and is charged
with overseeing police activities and investigating allegations of
human rights abuse. The IG investigated 181 cases of violation of the
right of personal integrity during the year (a monthly average of 15),
compared with an average of 15 per month in 1998 and 14 per month in
1997.
The PDDH continued to receive a large number of human rights
complaints directed against the PNC (1,437 cases during the year, a
monthly average of 120), indicating continuing problems. However, the
PDDH's statistics showed a reduction in complaints over the course of
the last few years; during that time, the police force more than
doubled. The PNC grew from about 7,100 active members in June 1995 to
18,800 in the summer of 1999. From June 1998 to May, the PDDH accepted
a monthly average of 126 cases against the PNC, compared with an
average of 190 cases per month from June 1997 to May 1998, and 208
cases per month from June 1996 to May 1997.
Through July the IG's investigations of complaints that it received
(71 percent initiated by private citizens and 29 percent by individuals
or offices within the PNC) found sufficient merit in an average of 9
cases a month to remit them to the PNC internal affairs offices for
further investigation. The large number of complaints involving the PNC
reflected several factors: the PNC's authority to use force in carrying
out arrests; its inexperience; the difficulty of its work in the face
of critical levels of often violent crime; and a continuing need for
training in human rights, the use of force, and correct arrest
procedures.
The PNC internal affairs offices--the Disciplinary Investigative
Unit (UID) and the Control Unit--continued their efforts to identify
and punish improper or illegal police actions. During the year, the UID
investigated 992 charges against the police. Based on the complaints
investigated, during the year the Disciplinary Tribunal of the PNC
dismissed 363 PNC agents (a monthly average of about 30) and sanctioned
an additional 1,124 agents (a monthly average of about 94). At year's
end, a total of 131 police agents were held in jail on criminal charges
or were serving prison sentences.
Working together to improve PNC human rights awareness, the PDDH
and the National Public Security Academy continued to expand and refine
the human rights content of the standard curriculum for the academy's
police officer basic training program.
There were allegations from children's rights groups that street
children suffer from police brutality; the PNC denied these charges
(see Section 5).
In August seven demonstrators and seven PNC agents were wounded in
a violent clash between police and former militia members demanding
government compensation for service rendered during the civil war (see
Section 1.a.).
There were no further developments in 1998 shooting of FMLN
communications adviser Leonardo Mena Marroquin. However, no evidence
has been discovered indicating a political motive for the crime.
Prison conditions remained poor, but are improving measurably. The
Government improved medical care and provided better food. As a result
of the implementation in 1997 and 1998 of the new sentencing and penal
codes, which limit preventive detention to more serious crimes, the
prison population fell about 23 percent from December 1997 to December
1999. During the year, the Government increased the prison system's
capacity by about 10 percent, and it now has the capacity for holding
6,480 prisoners in 18 penal facilities. While there was still some
overcrowding in individual facilities, it was less severe than in past
years, except in the women's facility. At year's end, there were 6,618
men held in 17 prison facilities with a combined capacity of 6,360; 296
women in the single women's prison with a capacity of 120; and 44 men
in 3 secure hospital wards with a combined capacity of 75.
Gang violence, especially in the country's three largest and oldest
penitentiaries and its juvenile holding facilities, continued to plague
the prison system, despite government efforts to separate different
gangs. According to press reports, 1 inmate was killed and over 40 were
injured when fighting broke out in July between rival gangs at a youth
rehabilitation center in San Francisco Gotera. In September a pitched
battle between two rival gangs at a juvenile detention center left 1
detainee dead (killed by rival gang members) and15 detainees wounded.
PNC officials investigated allegations that guards had used excessive
force in the riot. Prison authorities reported that during the year,
there were nine deaths in the prison system due to violence. The
authorities also reported that a total of 27 prisoners died during the
year: 18 died as a result of illness, of whom 7 died from AIDS or other
HIV-related illnesses; 6 died from wounds; 1 died in a prison riot; 1
died in an escape attempt; and 1 committed suicide. In September the
Ministry of Interior assumed from the Ministry of Security and Justice
responsibility for administering the prison system.
The 1995 Juvenile Offenders Law requires that all juveniles be
housed separately from adults both prior to trial and while serving a
prison sentence. Most criminal cases involving juveniles are brought to
trial or conciliation within 3 months.
There are separate facilities for female detainees and prisoners.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors, NGO's, and the media.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest; however, at times the PNC arbitrarily
arrested and detained persons.
During the year, the PDDH accepted a total of 225 complaints (an
average of 19 per month) for violations of personal liberty. The PDDH
accepted a monthly average of 21 cases in this category from June 1998
to May, 47 cases per month from June 1997 to May 1998, and 62 per month
from June 1996 to May 1997. PDDH statistics continued to show moderate
improvement in PNC respect for personal liberty. The courts generally
enforced a ruling that interrogation without the presence of counsel
amounts to coercion, and that any evidence obtained in such a manner is
inadmissible. As a result, police authorities generally delayed
questioning until a public defender arrived. Substantially increased
salaries and improved supervision contributed to a growing pool of
public defenders, greatly increased their ability to represent indigent
detainees properly, and improved the protection of human rights.
By law the police may hold a person for 72 hours before delivering
the suspect to court, after which the judge may order detention for an
additional 72 hours to determine if an investigation is warranted.
Because of a lack of holding cells, such detainees often are sent to
the regular prisons, where they may be placed together with violent
criminals. The law allows 120 days to investigate serious crimes and 45
days for lesser offenses, before a judge must bring the accused to
trial or dismiss the case. However, many cases were not completed
within the legally prescribed time frame.
The 1997 Penitentiary Code permits release on bail for detainees
who are unlikely to flee or whose release would not impede the
investigation of the case. Because it may take several years for a case
to come to trial, some prisoners have been incarcerated longer than the
maximum legal sentence for their crimes. In such circumstances, a
detainee may request a review by the Supreme Court of his or her
continued detention. At the beginning of September, 4,867 inmates in
the prison system were awaiting trial, a steady improvement over the
situation as of September 1998, when 5,506 inmates were awaiting trial,
and at the end of 1997, when 6,167 inmates were awaiting trial. Also,
beginning in 1998, new court cases were handled under new criminal and
sentencing codes, which are designed to reduce the court caseload by
sending cases to the prosecutor's office first and only allowing cases
with merit to enter the court system. During the year, the justice of
the peace courts, where most court cases originate, accepted a daily
average of 157 cases. Of these, a daily average of 16 cases were
resolved through conciliation and an additional 86 cases were resolved
through other abbreviated procedures.
The new system also is designed to improve court efficiency by
removing the time-consuming investigative responsibilities from the
judge and placing them with the police and the prosecutor's office. The
number of backlogged cases was reduced steadily. The Supreme Court
reported that 28,539 backlogged cases were resolved during the year.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and it is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. However, the judiciary suffers from inefficiency and
corruption.
The court structure has four levels: Justices of the peace, trial
courts, appellate courts, and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
selects justices of the peace, trial judges, and appellate judges from
a list of nominees proposed by the National Judicial Council. The
Council is an independent body provided for in the Constitution to
nominate, train, and evaluate judges. All lower court judges serve
until they voluntarily resign or are dismissed for cause. The
Legislative Assembly elects, by a two-thirds majority, 5 of the 15
Supreme Court justices and 5 of the 15 alternate justices every 3 years
from a list provided by the National Judicial Council and the National
Association of Lawyers. A justice serves for 9 years and may be
reelected. Separate court systems for family matters and juvenile
offenders were established in 1996; they stress conciliation as an
alternative to adjudication. The Criminal Sentencing Court has
responsibility for executing and monitoring the sentences imposed by
the trial courts.
Judges, not juries, decide most cases. A jury verdict cannot be
appealed. However, the defendant may appeal the sentence to the Supreme
Court for reduction. A jury verdict may be overturned by a mistrial
determination resulting from serious problems with jury panel selection
or errors in trial procedures.
The Government continued to implement the wide-ranging reforms of
the criminal justice system that went into effect in 1998, specifically
the Criminal Procedures Code (enacted in 1996) and the Penal and
Penitentiary (Sentencing) Codes (enacted in 1997 and designed to speed
up the trial process and reduce the number of detainees). The 1995
Juvenile Legal Code required minors under the age of 18 to be tried
only in juvenile courts, included greater provisions for due process,
raised the age of majority from 16 to 18 years, limited sentences for
minors to a maximum of 7 years, and introduced alternatives to
incarceration.
In June and September, the Legislative Assembly approved a number
of additional changes to the Criminal Procedures and Penal and
Penitentiary (Sentencing) Codes. These changes included the
establishment of more severe penalties for some crimes (including
increasing the maximum possible prison sentence from 30 to 35 years);
the elimination of parole for some crimes; and the addition of new
crimes to the code. One of the June reforms strengthened the legal
protection afforded to children and the disabled by prescribing a 6-to-
8-year prison sentence for individuals convicted of sexual aggression
against adults incapacitated by a mental or physical condition or
against minors.
Under the Constitution, defendants have the right to a presumption
of innocence, protection from self-incrimination, legal counsel,
freedom from coercion, and compensation for damages due to judicial
error. They also have the right to be present in court. While these
rights are not always respected fully in practice, compliance with
these provisions improved, in part due to increased judicial training
programs and to evaluations and monitoring of judges conducted by the
National Judicial Council and the Supreme Court. The Constitution and
law require the Government to provide legal counsel to the indigent.
While this requirement has not always been implemented in practice, the
Government continued to make progress during the year toward ensuring
provision of legal assistance to indigents. In 1998 the Public
Defender's office began adding new attorneys and increased salaries for
public defenders. At year's end, the Public Defender's office had 339
attorneys compared with 279 in 1998 and 113 in 1997.
The new sentencing code implemented in April 1998 stresses criminal
rehabilitation and prevention of future crimes and stipulates the
provision of humane conditions in prisons as well as the separation of
violent offenders and pretrial detainees. It also established the
Criminal Sentencing Court. Previously, the same judge that
investigated, judged, and sentenced the accused was also responsible
for the imposition, monitoring, and suspension of the sentence. The new
code also provides for alternatives to imprisonment for nonviolent
offenders, designed to reduce prison overcrowding.
There are still problems of corruption and incompetence in the
judicial system, but the Supreme Court stepped up its efforts to
discipline judges. While the court system steadily improved, the
process remains deliberative and slow. Pay and benefits forjudges,
prosecutors, and public defenders increased, and are sufficient to
attract well-qualified individuals. However, despite significant
investment in physical infrastructure, working conditions remain barely
adequate, contributing to inefficiency. Training programs improved, but
focused on overcoming inadequate university education rather than
judicial procedure and advanced professional development. While
representing a marked improvement in procedures, the new criminal and
sentencing codes entail a massive reeducation effort for the judicial
sector.
Impunity for those who are politically, economically, or
institutionally well-connected continued, although there was some
progress in addressing this historic problem. The continued systemic
weaknesses in the criminal justice system contribute to this impunity.
Such impunity might take the form of a reluctance on the part of
authorities to pursue aggressively and to conclusion allegations
involving acts of violence or other major crimes. There is a clear
perception among the public that those who are well-connected,
especially the rich and powerful, often have impunity with respect to
the country's civil and criminal laws. Public suspicion that special
groups receive special treatment under the law clearly diminishes
confidence in the justice system, although during the year, the
Government investigated prominent citizens involved in suspected
criminal activity, including current and former government officials,
political leaders (across the political spectrum), diplomats, and
persons in the business community. However, there were no convictions,
nor did the authorities make serious progress in prosecuting these
individuals. The authorities also had little success in addressing
general criminal impunity.
The implementation of judicial reforms continued to create
confusion and uncertainty among police, prosecutors, public defenders,
and the courts. Inadequate police coverage (due to limited resources
and lack of sufficient personnel) and intimidation (especially by
gangs) of victims and witnesses made it difficult to identify, arrest,
and prosecute criminals, diminishing public confidence in the justice
system.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution requires the police to have the
resident's consent, a warrant, or a reasonable belief that a crime is
under way or is about to be committed, before entering a private
dwelling, and government authorities generally respected these rights
in practice.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of the press, and the Government respects this right in
practice. Print and broadcast journalists from all major media outlets
regularly and freely criticize the Government and report opposition
views. Opposition figures are interviewed routinely on television and
radio, and in the written press. According to major media associations,
the Government did not use direct or indirect means to control the
media. However, some television stations complained that advertising
agencies responsible for placement of government-funded public service
announcements were biased in favor of media companies that generally
supported government policy.
There are 5 daily newspapers, with a combined circulation of more
than 250,000 copies per day, and 12 television stations. Four
independent VHF television stations reach most areas of the country,
while the government-owned and operated VHF station has poor signal
quality even in San Salvador. Seven independent UHF stations serve San
Salvador, and several can be received as far as 30 miles from the
capital. Two cable television systems cover much of the capital, and
other cable companies operate in San Miguel, Santa Ana, and Sonsonate.
All carry the major local stations and a wide range of international
programming. There are as many as 20 small cable television stations
across the country, serving limited local areas. While most of them
appear to be authorized broadcasters, several are believed to be
pirating signals. Approximately 150 licensed radio stations broadcast
on the FM and AM bands.
A provision in the new Criminal Code allows judges to close court
proceedings if public exposure could prejudice the case.The media and
the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) asserted that the provision
abridged press freedom. Several legislative deputies have argued that
misuse of the provision could lead to impunity and corruption by
limiting the ``watchdog'' role of the press.
The August 1997 murder of Lorena Saravia, a news reader employed by
a commercial radio station, remained under investigation at year's end.
In 1997 the IAPA listed this case among examples of violence directed
against the media; however, there still is no concrete evidence linking
the murder directly to Saravia's profession and the motives for the
murder remained unclear.
There were no instances of censorship of books, other publications,
films, or plays.
The Constitution provides for academic freedom, and the Government
respects this right in practice, although it was criticized for efforts
in 1998 and 1997 to implement minimum academic and administrative
standards for the operation of universities.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for peaceful assembly for any lawful purpose, and the
Government respects this right in practice. There is no requirement for
permits to hold public meetings, and public demonstrations are common
and generally peaceful. However, in August police killed two
demonstrators during a violent clash (see Section 1.a.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice. In 1997 the Government
implemented a 1996 law that charges the Ministry of Interior with
registering, regulating, and overseeing the finances of NGO's and non-
Catholic religious groups in the country. The law specifically exempts
unions, cooperatives, and the Catholic Church, and the Interior
Minister stated that it would not affect other churches, which already
were being registered, under other laws, with the Ministry of Interior.
Leaders within the NGO community expressed continuing concerns that
the law would be used by the Ministry to control certain organizations.
Several small, domestic human rights NGO's have reported that they have
not been able to register. The law requires the Ministry to respond to
applications within 15 days; if the Ministry fails to do so, the law
dictates that the NGO receives automatic registration. At year's end,
the Supreme Court was considering a constitutional challenge to the NGO
registration law brought by a group of NGO's in 1998.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
The Constitution specifically recognizes the Roman Catholic Church,
and grants it legal status. In addition, the Constitution provides that
other churches may register for such status in accordance with the law.
The Civil Code specifies that a church must apply for formal
recognition through the General Office of Nonprofit Associations and
Foundations within the Ministry of Interior. The 1996 law and the 1997
implementing regulations on registration of NGO's and non-Catholic
churches (see Section 2.b.) did not change the existing mechanism for
church registration, and there were no allegations that churches
encountered problems in obtaining registration.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
The law does not include specific provisions for granting refugee
or asylee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol;
however, the Government has procedures for handling such requests, in
accordance with these principles.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not
arise in 1999 and has not arisen in recent years. There were no reports
of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. The President and Vice President are elected every
5 years. The Constitution bars the President from election to
consecutive terms. Voting is by secret ballot.
Ten political parties, representing the full political spectrum,
fielded seven candidates in the March presidential elections. The
Government did not restrict opposition participation, and there were no
violent incidents during the campaign. Observers found that the vote
was without major flaws and proceeded peacefully with fair access to
the polls for all. Francisco Flores, the candidate of the ARENA party,
won a clear majority in the first round of voting.
The March presidential election followed the free and fair 1997
legislative and municipal elections. In 1997 the FMLN--the principal
opposition party--and its allies won nearly one-third of the assembly
seats and many of the largest municipalities (including San Salvador,
in which an FMLN coalition candidate was elected mayor). The governing
ARENA party lost its legislative working majority and important mayoral
races. The next two largest opposition legislative parties won
significant blocs of seats.
There are no laws or overt practices that prevent women from voting
or participating in the political and governmental systems; however,
women are not accorded equal respect or stature in these areas and are
underrepresented in government and politics. Women represented 49
percent of the registered voters in the March election, and party
campaigns and slates reflected strong attention to this vote. The FMLN
chose Maria Marta Valladares (known during the civil war as Nidia Diaz)
as its vice presidential candidate. President Flores named women to
head three ministries (Foreign Affairs, Education, and Environment),
the Social Security Institute, and a substantial number of vice- and
sub-ministerial jobs. In 1997 voters elected 14 women to the 84-seat
legislature, an increase from the previous Assembly's 9. However, women
held fewer positions (2 of 11) on the Assembly's governing board than
in the previous legislature.
Minorities are not barred from voting or participating in
government and politics; however, they are underrepresented.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government demonstrated a willingness to discuss human rights
issues and problems with domestic, international, and nongovernmental
organizations. Numerous domestic NGO's operated freely as did various
international human rights groups, including migration and other
humanitarian and technical assistance groups. Domestic and
international NGO's were required to register with the Government under
the terms of the 1996 NGO registration law, and some reported
difficulties (see Section 2.b.). In March unknown persons kidnaped and
held for a number of hours the president of the Center for the Defense
of the Consumer (see Section 1.b.). In April unknown assailants briefly
kidnaped the head of the CDHES (see Section 1.b.).
The principal human rights investigative and monitoring body is the
Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights, elected by the Assembly for
a 3-year term. The Peace Accords specifically created the PDDH, which
was established formally by a constitutional amendment that defined its
role. Although the 1998 budget gave the PDDH a modest increase in
funds, its investigative capacity remained limited due to resource
constraints. The PDDH has been spread increasingly thin as the
organization sought to expand its scope of attention, extend its
presence throughout the country, and meet increased public demand.
In 1998 in a drawn-out and politically charged process, the
Legislative Assembly elected Judge Eduardo Antonio Penate Polanco as
Ombudsman to replace Victoria de Aviles, whose term expired early that
year. However, after the vote and during the 30-day confirmation stage,
the FMLN, the Social Christian Unity Party, and many in the NGO
community questioned Penate's selection, citing a lack of experience in
the human rights field, reports of poor performance as a judge, and
charges that defendants in his court were not afforded the right to a
speedytrial. The Supreme Court found no substance to these allegations,
and the Assembly found no grounds to annul the election. The Assembly
confirmed Penate in July 1998. However, his appointment and subsequent
performance as Ombudsman continued to generate controversy during the
year, with continuing charges from NGO's, the FMLN, and some other
parties that he was unqualified. In January a coalition of NGO's
petitioned the Assembly to remove Penate on grounds of incompetence.
Penate claimed that the campaign against him was motivated by political
considerations. The Assembly postponed action until after the June
inauguration of the new President. On December 1, the Assembly's
Political Committee created a subcommittee to evaluate Penate's tenure
as Ombudsman and determine whether to present charges against him for
inadequate performance. The subcommittee still was considering the
matter at year's end.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that all persons are equal before the law
and prohibits discrimination based on nationality, race, sex, or
religion. In practice, discrimination against women, the disabled, and
indigenous people occurs in salaries, in hiring, and in access to
credit and education.
There were some instances of violence against homosexuals. On June
29, an unknown assailant shot and wounded a man who was accompanying
William Hernandez, director of the domestic homosexual rights
organization Entre Amigos, as the two left the organization's office.
At year's end, neither the motive nor the perpetrator were determined.
In October Jose Armando Rivera, a transvestite prostitute known as
``Doris,'' was murdered in San Salvador. In December Nestor Adonai
Marenco (known as ``Gloria''), another transvestite prostitute and a
witness in the Rivera murder investigation, was killed in the same
area. At year's end, the motive for the Rivera murder remained unclear;
the killing occurred in an area known for illegal drug dealing and
police had detained Rivera twice earlier in the year, once for
threatening another transvestite prostitute and once for assaulting a
police officer. The investigation of the Marenco killing also was
inconclusive at year's end, although it suggested that the murder might
be linked to his testimony in the Rivera case. Beginning in November,
Hernandez reported receiving telephonic death threats that he believed
were in response to public statements that Entre Amigos made about the
Rivera murder. Although they took place in the same general area, as of
year's end, there was no evident connection established between the two
1999 murders and a series of six murders of transvestite prostitutes in
1998. There was little progress in the investigations carried on by the
PNC and the Attorney General's office into the 1998 murders. Both the
1998 and 1999 murders, and the threats against Hernandez, remained
under investigation at year's end. In August Entre Amigos charged that
PNC agents in Chalatenango department hit, insulted, and threatened a
group of six homosexuals. The incident was under investigation at
year's end.
Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence, is a
widespread and serious problem. Once a taboo social subject,
increasingly it is being recognized publicly and has become a topic for
national debate. Government institutions such as the PDDH, the Attorney
General's office, the Supreme Court, and the PNC coordinated efforts
with NGO's and other organizations to combat violence against women
through education, government efforts to increase enforcement of the
law, and NGO support programs for victims. The National Secretariat for
the Family maintains a hot line for victims to report domestic abuse.
Statistics from the Salvadoran Institute for the Development of Women
(ISDEMU) show a growing trend of reported domestic violence cases
(principally against women) over the past few years. The upward trend
of reports of violations may reflect broader public debate of family
violence issues, rather than a worsening problem. ISDEMU received 6,451
cases of domestic violence through November (a monthly average of 586),
compared with 3,543 cases in 1998 (a monthly average of 295) and 3,845
cases in 1997 (a monthly average of 320).
Incidents of domestic violence and rape continued to be
underreported for several reasons: Societal and cultural pressures
against the victim; a fear of reprisal; poor handling of victims by the
authorities; fear of publicity; and the belief that cases are unlikely
to be resolved. The PDDH noted that hundreds of domestic abuse victims
who underwent psychotherapy refused to report their cases formally.
ISDEMU received 359 cases of ``sexual aggression'' through November (a
monthly averageof 33) compared with 298 cases (a monthly average of 25)
in 1998 and 479 cases (a monthly average of 40) in 1997. For the year,
the Institute of Legal Medicine, using different criteria, reported
1,082 cases of sexual crime against women of all ages, an average of 89
cases per month. Under the new Criminal Procedures Code (implemented in
1998), victim testimony is admissible evidence. The former law did not
allow victims to testify, and since the rape victim is often the only
witness, this resulted in little chance for conviction in rape cases.
In 1996 the Assembly repealed an old law that exonerated a rapist if he
offered to marry the victim and she accepted.
Prostitution is common. There were credible reports that some women
and girls were forced into prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
The Constitution grants women and men the same legal rights, but
women suffer discrimination. The 1994 Family Legal Code amended laws
that discriminated against women, especially affecting the large number
of women in common-law marriages. The law also established special
courts to resolve family disputes. Several NGO's are engaged in
promoting women's rights and have conducted several rights awareness
campaigns.
Women suffered from cultural and societal discrimination, resulting
in significantly reduced economic opportunities. Priority generally is
given to male children for schooling, to men for available jobs and
promotions, and to sons for inheritances. Of the economically active
female population, 65 percent worked in the informal economy. Women are
not accorded equal respect or stature in traditional male-dominated
areas such as agriculture and business. While there is no definitive
evidence available, it is widely believed that women often are paid
less than men for equal work. The one sector in which there is an
exception to this practice is in the export processing zones and in-
bond assembly plants, the largest source of new jobs, where women made
up 85 to 90 percent of the work force (see Section 6.b.). However, even
in this sector, men hold the great majority of management jobs.
Training for women generally was confined to low-wage occupational
areas where women already hold most positions, such as teaching,
nursing, home industries, and small businesses.
Children.--The Government's focus on children's rights and welfare
was concentrated more toward reducing poverty and promoting family
stability through economic growth than in direct expenditure on
children's programs. Considerable publicity and the personal campaign
of the former First Lady focused attention on this problem. The law
requires education through the ninth grade (up to the age of 14).
Although there was progress in increasing the availability and quality
of schooling throughout the country, rural areas still fell short of
providing a ninth grade education to all potential students. A 1997
study by the Business Foundation for Educational Development indicated
that 17 percent of urban children and 34 percent of rural youth were
not attending classes.
The Government worked closely through state institutions and with
the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) to promote protection and
general awareness of children's rights. However, children continued to
fall victim to physical and sexual abuse, abandonment, exploitation,
and neglect. The Salvadoran Institute for the Protection of Children
(ISPM), an autonomous entity, is responsible for protecting and
promoting children's rights. The ISPM estimated that it averaged 2,600
to 2,700 children (its maximum capacity) in its shelters, some
abandoned and others victims of mistreatment. For the year, it reported
a monthly average of 126 cases of physical mistreatment (compared with
109 per month in 1998), a monthly average of 55 cases of negligence
(compared with 21 per month in 1998), and a monthly average of 59 cases
of abandonment (compared with 10 per month in 1998). Approximately 55
percent of all its cases involved girls. Using different criteria,
ISDEMU reported a significant increase in child abuse. ISDEMU recorded
9,751 cases of ``abuse of a minor'' through November (a monthly average
of 886), compared with 6,312 cases (a monthly average of 526) for 1998,
and 4,334 cases (a monthly average of 361) for 1997.
A 1997 study by the NGO network Procipotes estimated that 1,000
children (up to age 16) were living on their own in the streets, 42
percent of whom were under the age of 5. Substance abuse (glue and
paint sniffing) was an endemic problem among urban street children. In
1998 the Assembly passed a law regulating the sale of glue and other
substances used as street drugs, prohibiting their sale to minors.
There are allegations fromchildren's rights advocates that street
children suffer from police brutality. The PNC denies these charges and
has incorporated PDDH human rights training into programs for police
units that deal with juveniles. The PDDH also has called for the
creation of drug treatment centers for minors.
For the year, the Institute of Legal Medicine recorded 1,073 cases
of sexual abuse of children under 15 years of age (a monthly average of
90). A majority of the victims were female. The ISPM reported that it
received a monthly average of 9 cases of sexual abuse during the year,
compared with an average of 8 per month in 1998. According to the PDDH,
over 85 percent of all abuse occurs in schools and at home, and only a
small percentage of these cases were reported to the authorities.
In June the Legislative Assembly approved the addition of a new
provision to the Criminal Code that mandates a 6-to-8-year prison
sentence for individuals convicted of sexual aggression against minors
(see Section 1.e.).
The PDDH estimated that 270,000 minors work, mostly as street
vendors (see Section 6.d.). Besides losing their opportunity for an
education, these children often fell victim to sexual abuse and were
exploited and forced into prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
Since 1997 the PDDH, NGO's, and the media have conducted a publicity
and investigative campaign to highlight the plight of children. A 1998
study on child prostitution by the Commission on the Family, the Woman,
and the Child of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights concluded
that child prostitution in the country was promoted by poverty, lack of
a strong nuclear family, discrimination against women, and organized
crime. A separate NGO study in 1998 on the same problem indicated that
at least 44 percent of the estimated 1,300 prostitutes in 3 major red
light districts of San Salvador were between the ages of 13 and 18. The
NGO report pointed to poverty and familial problems as the two major
factors pushing children and adolescents into prostitution.
The Government, the International Program for the Elimination of
Child Labor (IPEC), and local NGO's and business groups consulted
throughout the year and joined forces in August and September to begin
several projects to combat child labor in specific industries (see
Section 6.d.).
The level of infant malnutrition decreased, but continued to be a
problem. A National Family Health Poll, conducted in 1998 and released
in December 1999, found that 1.1 percent of children under 5 years of
age suffered from grave malnutrition, with an additional 21 percent
experiencing less severe malnutrition. The Ministry of Health listed
malnutrition as one of the 10 principal causes of infant mortality in
the country. The Government has a national plan for infants designed to
increase access to potable water, iodized salt, and vitamins, and to
encourage breast feeding, but all of these remain problem areas,
especially among the rural poor.
People with Disabilities.--Except for the war wounded, who have
secured both government and international funding for rehabilitation
and retraining programs, the Government has no program to combat
discrimination against the disabled. There are no laws mandating
provision of access to public or private buildings for the disabled.
The Government has not enforced the 1984 law requiring employers with
over 50 workers (private companies, state-owned enterprises, and
government offices) to have ``persons with physical limitations''
represent a minimum of 2 percent of their work force. Access by the
disabled to basic education was limited due to lack of facilities and
appropriate transportation. There was no provision of state services
for the physically disabled. Only a few of the Government's community-
based health promoters have been trained to treat the disabled, and
they rarely provided such service, tending rather to focus on life-
threatening conditions and preventive care for mothers and children.
The Ministry of Health estimated that some form of disability afflicts
10 percent of the population. In 1997 the National Council of Disabled
People estimated that there were 500,000 persons with disabilities, of
whom 12,500 had disabilities directly attributable to the civil war.
Other factors contributing to the large number of disabled persons were
lack of prenatal care, misuse of pesticides in food production,
malnutrition, auto accidents, and criminal violence.
There were few organizations dedicated to protecting and promoting
the rights of the disabled. Foreign funds for badly needed
rehabilitation services channeled through the Telethon Foundation Pro-
Rehabilitation, a local private voluntary organization, helped address
numerous rehabilitation issues andprovided alternatives for the
education and rehabilitation of the disabled population. A
semiautonomous institute, the Salvadoran Rehabilitation Institute for
the Disabled (ISRI), also provided assistance to the disabled. The ISRI
offered medical treatment, counseling, special education programs, and
professional training courses. Founded in 1957, the ISRI has 10 centers
throughout the country and received assistance from the Government and
national and international private and nongovernmental organizations.
In June the Legislative Assembly approved a new provision to the
Criminal Code that mandates a 6-to-8-year prison sentence for
individuals convicted of sexual aggression against persons
incapacitated by a mental or physical condition (see Section 1.e.).
Indigenous People.--The country is ethnically homogeneous, although
a very small segment of the population still claims indigenous status.
The Constitution makes no specific provisions for the rights of
indigenous people.
Early in the century, facing active repression, most indigenous
people adopted local customs and successfully assimilated into the
general population, from which they are generally indistinguishable.
There are a few very small communities whose members still wear
traditional dress and maintain traditional customs to a recognizable
degree without repression or interference. These small indigenous
groups exist in the poorest parts of the rural countryside where
employment opportunities are few and domestic violence is a problem.
Indigenous people reportedly earned less than other agricultural
laborers, and indigenous women in particular had little access to
educational and work opportunities. As with the poor rural sector in
general, access to land was a growing problem confronting indigenous
people. Few possessed titles to land, and bank loans and other forms of
credit were extremely limited.
There are some small, active indigenous associations. The largest
and best known is the National Association of Indigenous Salvadorans
(ANIS). In 1998 a long-running internal political fight and land
dispute caused a major split in ANIS. One faction held a direct
election that replaced long-time leader Adrian Esquino Lisco, who was
accused of corruption and lying. Esquino refused to step down, claiming
that his leadership position was perpetual. Police arrested him on
civil charges of occupying ANIS property illegally after his removal as
leader and criminal charges of fraud in his administration of ANIS.
Esquino was exonerated of the criminal charge of fraud. In August the
Supreme Court ruled against Esquino's 1998 petition to stop eviction
procedures against him and his extended family, on charges of illegal
possession of land and several houses. In the last 2 years of his
leadership of ANIS, Esquino had charged that the Government was
targeting the indigenous community, and especially its leaders, with
legal harassment and threats. There has been little evidence to support
these allegations, and the new ANIS leadership does not endorse them.
Religious Minorities.--During February and March, eight break-ins
and burglaries occurred at offices of the Lutheran Church, including
four at the Church's Office of Human Rights. The PNC opened an
investigation into the incidents. Initially there was concern that
these incidents might have been attacks directed against the Lutheran
Church or its work in human rights. However, they occurred in high-
crime areas, and the available evidence indicated that they were common
crimes. The incidents remained under investigation at year's end.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution prohibits the
Government from using nationality, race, sex, creed, or political
philosophy as a means to prevent workers or employers from organizing
themselves into unions or associations. In practice, the Government
generally has respected this right. However, in March the International
Labor Organization Committee on the Freedom of Association cited the
Government for its failure to provide protection or remedy for a number
of labor leaders fired in 1998 in the process of privatizing the state-
owned telephone company. The decision concluded that the Labor Code
imposed a series of excessive formalities for the recognition of a
trade union, and found that the application of the law was used to
refuse legal status to a number of efforts to establish a trade union
in the telephone company. The Committee also emphasized that
changingownership of a business should not threaten unionized workers
and questioned the propriety of the January 1998 dismissal of 72 labor
leaders, but noted that 70 of this group had accepted legal
compensation. The Committee called on the Government to complete the
process for recognition of the telephone union, amend the Labor Code to
remove the excessive formalities that the Committee concluded infringe
on the right to form a union, seek to have the two union leaders who
had not yet accepted severance pay reinstated, and ensure that future
changes of company ownership do not threaten labor leaders or labor
organizations. A legal action brought by the union to oblige the
Ministry of Labor to grant the union's 1998 petition for recognition
still was pending before the Supreme Court at year's end.
Military personnel, police, and government workers may not form
unions (but are allowed professional and employee organizations) and
may not strike. The 1994 Labor Code streamlined the process required to
form a union in the private sector, extending union rights to
agricultural, independent, and small-business workers, and extending
the right to strike to union federations. The Labor Code prohibits
partisan political activity by unions. The unions routinely ignored
this prohibition, but the Government took no punitive action against
them.
There is a small organized labor sector with approximately 150
active unions, public employee associations, and peasant organizations,
representing over 300,000 citizens, approximately 20 percent of the
total work force. By law only private sector workers have the right to
form unions and strike; some employees of autonomous public agencies
may form unions if they do not deal with essential services. In fact,
some of the most powerful labor groups are public employee
associations. These public sector labor groups take on the same
responsibilities as unions, including calling technically illegal
strikes and collective bargaining. The Government has negotiated with
public employee associations and generally treated strikes as
legitimate, although the Labor Code provides for mandatory arbitration
of public sector disputes. However, during the year, the Government
refused to accede to strikers' demands in the cases of several public
sector strikes, which continued at year's end.
Two judicial employee associations went on strike on November 30 to
protest a presidential veto of a bill authorizing pay raises for
judicial workers. The Supreme Court ended the strike by raising the
workers' pay using funds from within its existing budget. The public
water works union went on a partial strike in December, unsuccessfully
demanding pay increases and opposing water works privatization. The
union for nonmedical employees of the Social Security Institute (ISSS)
staged a series of partial strikes and blockages of public and employee
access to public medical facilities during the year to protest the
ISSS's failure to pay raises negotiated by the previous administration
in 1998, a presidential decree freezing public sector wages, and
alleged government plans to privatize two hospitals and eventually the
entire health system. The workers defied a court decision that found
the strike illegal and ordered the strikers back to work. The ISSS
fired over 200 strikers who refused to honor the court order to return
to work, and withheld pay and legal bonuses of other strikers. The
President vetoed legislation passed in November that would have granted
pay increases for ISSS employees and restored pay to teachers whose pay
was docked for striking illegally earlier in the year. The legislation
was passed by a bloc of opposition parties outside the framework of the
year's national budget. Following these developments, the ISSS's
medical professionals' union announced its support for the strikers;
both groups threatened to abandon the public hospitals unless the
President created a high-level committee to negotiate with the
strikers, and the ISSS rehired fired workers and paid wages and bonuses
that had been withheld from other strikers. In December mediation
efforts failed and the dispute went to binding arbitration, as called
for by the Labor Code. The Government and the ISSS did not accede to
any of the strikers' demands, and the two unions broadened the strike.
The standoff continued at year's end.
The law prohibits antiunion actions before a union is legally
registered and provides specific job protection to workers whose names
appear on a union application. The Labor Code forbids foreigners from
holding positions in unions.
Unions and other labor organizations freely affiliated with
international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution and the Labor Code provide for collective bargaining
rights, but only to employees in the private sector and to certain
categories of workers in autonomous government agencies, such as
utilities and the port authority. However, both private sector unions
(by law) and public sector employee associations (in practice) used
collective bargaining.
The Ministry of Labor oversees implementation of collective
bargaining agreements and acts as a conciliator in labor disputes in
the private sector and in autonomous government institutions. In
practice, ministers and the heads of autonomous government institutions
often negotiate with labor organizations directly, relying on the
Ministry of Labor only for such functions as officially certifying
unions. The Ministry often seeks to conciliate labor disputes through
informal channels rather than attempt to enforce regulations strictly,
which has led to charges that the Ministry is biased against labor.
Corruption continued to affect labor inspectors and courts, but
improvements in training and an increase in pay in 1997 for Ministry of
Labor employees have begun to address this problem.
The Constitution prohibits discrimination against unions. It
provides that union officials at the time of their election, throughout
their term, and for 1 year following their term may not be fired,
suspended for disciplinary reasons, removed, or demoted except for
legal cause. Employers generally observed this provision in practice,
but credible reports continued of employers using illegal pressure,
including dismissal of labor activists, to discourage organizing. The
law requires employers to rehire employees fired for any type of union
activity, and the Ministry of Labor has increased efforts to enforce
this requirement. However, in many cases, employees chose to take a
cash payment in lieu of returning to work.
There are six export processing zones (EPZ's) and several
``maquila'' (in-bond assembly or processing) plants operating outside
of these zones. The Labor Code applies in the EPZ's; there are no
special EPZ labor regulations. During the last few years, most EPZ
companies and a large portion of the maquila plants have accepted the
provisions of voluntary codes of conduct from their parent corporations
or foreign purchasers. In addition, two EPZ's have instituted their own
codes of conducts for all their tenants. These codes include worker
rights protection clauses. In 1997 the apparel industry association
announced implementation of an industrywide code of conduct with worker
rights protection. The great majority of companies in the EPZ's
provided much better salaries and working conditions than those offered
elsewhere in the private sector (see Section 6.e.). However, there were
credible reports that some factories dismissed union organizers, and
only one EPZ company was unionized, with two active plant unions.
On August 7, a group of workers at Industrias Caribbean Apparel
(ICA), a Korean-owned EPZ maquila company, formed a small sectional
union of the textile sector union within the Federation of Associations
and Independent Unions of El Salvador (FEASIES) and applied to the
Ministry of Labor for formal recognition. On August 9, ICA fired two
employees who were members of the sectional union's executive board; in
early September, the company fired four more union board members.
FEASIES and the first four employees fired filed a complaint against
ICA with the Ministry of Labor for violation of worker rights and the
Labor Code, which specifically grants job protection to leaders of
unions in formation. In August local labor leader Jiovanni Fuentes
charged that he had received anonymous telephone warnings and thinly
veiled threats from ICA's lawyer as a result of his work to assist in
the organization of the union. None of the fired ICA union board
members reported receiving similar threats. The Ministry of Labor
investigated the charges against ICA, and in October recognized the
union and completed its registration; instructed ICA to pay back wages
to the fired union board members; and advised ICA to meet with the
fired workers to work out a mutually acceptable solution to their
disagreements or face legal penalties. After a series of Ministry-
hosted mediation sessions, representatives of the union board, Fuentes,
and representatives of ICA appeared in person at the Ministry to report
that they had reached a mutually acceptable economic settlement.
On November 24, the Salvadoran Workers' Central (CTS), an umbrella
labor organization, charged that the Korean-owned factory DOALL in the
San Marcos EPZ had fired illegally 22 of 38 workers who had formed a
union and applied to the Government for recognition on November 20. A
week later, the CTS asserted thatthe number of union employees
dismissed rose to 35. DOALL claimed that several of the union's
organizers had resigned voluntarily 2 hours before the union was
constituted and that the union therefore was not legal. On November 24,
the Ministry of Labor began investigating the case. In December,
following pressure from its major foreign customer, DOALL claimed that
it had offered to rehire the fired workers. However, the union claimed
that these workers had not been asked to return to work. At year's end,
the Ministry's investigation was still underway and the dispute was
unresolved.
In 1998 the PDDH released a detailed analysis of the maquila sector
(covering both EPZ and non-EPZ in-bond plants) that indicated that 20.8
percent of the sector's workers ``trusted'' unions while 55.3 percent
``did not trust'' unions. Credible accusations persisted that some
factories abused their workers, and that some women were not hired
because they were pregnant. According to the PDDH report on maquilas,
37.7 percent of the workers surveyed stated that they had been
mistreated, 37.7 percent had been threatened, 3.2 percent had been hit
in some fashion, 3.5 percent had been harassed sexually by bosses, and
3 percent had been harassed sexually by other workers. Although the
Ministry of Labor improved its efforts to increase inspection and
follow up on such complaints, it still had insufficient resources to
cover all the EPZ's, much less the much larger national private sector.
Although under 1996 legislation, the Government authorized the
Ministry of Economy to withdraw free zone privileges from companies
that violated labor regulations, there have been no instances in which
this has been threatened publicly. There is also a tripartite
(government, business, and labor) commission, established in 1996, to
help resolve conflicts in EPZ and other bonded companies.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, except in the case of calamity
and other instances specified by law, and the Government generally
enforces this provision; however, there were credible complaints of
forced overtime in the maquila sector and of forced prostitution by
children.
While not dealing directly with the issue of forced overtime, the
PDDH report on the maquila sector indicated that 7.8 percent of workers
in its survey sample were not paid legally required extra pay for
working beyond the normal 44-hour work week, a strong indication of
forced overtime. The survey also found that 50.2 percent of maquila
workers did not work any overtime and 28.7 percent averaged 5 hours or
less overtime a week (roughly 10 percent of regular time). Although not
specifically prohibited by law, forced and bonded labor by children are
covered by the general prohibition, and there were no reports of their
use in the formal sector; however, there was strong evidence that
minors have been forced into prostitution (see Section 5.). There also
were credible reports that women were forced into prostitution.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution prohibits the employment of children
under the age of 14. Minors, age 14 or older, may receive special Labor
Ministry permission to work, but only where such employment is
absolutely indispensable to the sustenance of the minor and his or her
family. This is most often the case with children of peasant families
who traditionally work during planting and harvesting seasons. Those
legal workers under the age of 18 have special additional rules
governing conditions of work (see Section 6.e.). The law limits the
workday to 6 hours for youths between 14 and 18 years of age and sets a
maximum normal workweek for youths at 36 hours.
Orphans and children from poor families frequently work for their
own or family survival as street vendors and general laborers in small
businesses, mostly in the informal sector (see Section 5.). Children in
these circumstances often do not complete compulsory schooling through
the ninth grade (up to the age of 14) as the law requires. A 1998 joint
report of the ISPM and UNICEF, based on nationwide data collected in
1996, indicated that of the 1.8 million children between 5 and 17 years
of age, roughly 6.6 percent, or 118,800, worked without attending
school, and 36,200 of these were under the age of 14. An additional 5.8
percent, or 104,400, worked but also attended school. Of these, 55,300
were under the age of 14. The primary reason for working for over 45
percent of each group was familial economic survival. However, the
average income forchild workers was less than half of the minimum wage
and represented 18.7 percent of average family income. The second most
important reason for working for 10 percent of the nonstudent child
workers and nearly 34 percent of the child workers attending school was
to learn a trade. Child labor is not found in the industrial sector and
has disappeared in the EPZ's. The PDDH report on the maquila industry
found no workers under the age of 17 and only 0.5 percent who were 17
(a legal working age, with some restrictions).
The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing child labor laws
and made an effort to do so; however, scarce resources and the
difficulty of monitoring the large informal sector limited its
effectiveness outside the urban formal sector. In 1997 the Government
helped establish the National Committee for the Eradication of Child
Labor (CNETI). The CNETI was designed to be a coordinating body of the
Government, NGO's, and the private sector (labor and business) to
combat child labor. However, there has been little CNETI activity. The
Labor Code does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor of
children, but they are covered by its general prohibition; however,
there were reports that minors were forced into prostitution (see
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
The Government collaborated with the International Program to End
Child Labor under the auspices of the ILO on two country projects and
two Central American regional projects aimed at directly combating
child labor. These projects are designed to discourage children from
working, promote schooling and recreation, help develop new economic
options for both children and their families, and eventually be self-
sustaining and permanent. In August the Government, IPEC, and the ISPM
inaugurated a project in the southeastern shore area to remove children
from the unhealthful harvesting of mangrove clams. In September the
Government, the ISPM, local NGO's, the Coffee Growers Association, and
IPEC joined forces and resources to begin a project in the coffee
sector to help remove children from the fields and enroll them in
school. A similar project was planned to help children in the sugar
sector, with participation from the Sugar Foundation (representing the
sugar industry). Also in September, the Government, IPEC, and an NGO
began implementing a project that focused on removing children from the
cottage production of fireworks.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is set by a
tripartite (government, labor, business) committee. Effective May 1,
1998, the committee set the minimum daily wage at $4.81 (42.00 colones)
for commercial, industrial, and service employees; $3.57 (31.20
colones) plus food allowance for coffee plantation workers; $2.61
(22.80 colones) plus food allowance for sugar and cotton plantation
workers; and $2.47 (21.60 colones) plus food allowance for all other
agroindustrial workers. By law a full-time minimum wage employee is
paid a full 7 days (56 hours) for the 44-hour normal workweek and
receives an average of 1 month's wage a year in required bonuses plus 2
weeks of paid vacation. There were continuing allegations that the
maquila sector underpaid workers. The PDDH 1998 report on maquilas
found that 42.3 percent of the maquila workers surveyed received the
minimum wage, 25.1 percent earned an amount moderately above the
minimum wage, and 10 percent earned significantly more than the minimum
wage. Of the 23.3 percent of the workers earning less than the minimum
wage, many were apprentices or workers in training, and under the law
were not ensured the minimum wage. The minimum wage with benefits does
not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. The
Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing minimum wage laws and
does so effectively in the formal sector.
The law limits the workday to 8 hours, and it mandates premium pay
for longer hours. The Labor Code sets a maximum normal workweek of 44
hours. It requires bonus pay for overtime and limits the workweek to no
more than 6 days for all workers.
The Constitution and the Labor Code require employers, including
the Government, to take steps to ensure that employees are not placed
at risk in their workplaces. These laws prohibit the employment of
persons under 18 years of age, and of all women, in occupations
considered hazardous. Nevertheless, health and safety regulations are
outdated, and enforcement, while improved, is inadequate. The Ministry
of Labor attempts to enforce the applicable regulations and has devoted
resources to improving the professional training of its staff and
inspectors. Increasingly, its investigations lead to fines or other
findings favoring workers. The Ministry has restricted powers and only
limited, but growing, resources to enforce compliance. The maquila
sector continues to be subject to charges that itmaintains
``sweatshop'' conditions in its factories. The PDDH study found that 70
to 80 percent of the workers surveyed were satisfied with bathrooms,
drinking water, and eating facilities but that only 53 percent were
satisfied with the ventilation, i.e., there were problems with dust and
heat. The serious problems with working conditions that existed were
concentrated in smaller, non-EPZ plants. In general, the larger plants
(which employ the majority of maquila workers) have adequate to
excellent working conditions. Some of the largest companies have dust
control, air conditioning, on-site medical facilities, and enforced
safety regimes.
Workers can remove themselves from dangerous work situations
without jeopardizing their employment only in situations where they can
present a medical certificate issued by a doctor or the Social Security
Institute indicating that their health is at risk while using certain
equipment or substances.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons. However, it stipulates that any crime involving
``commerce in women or children'' automatically carries a 30 percent
increase in the prison sentence or fine that otherwise would be imposed
for that crime. The Government enforces this provision.
There were credible reports of some regional trafficking in women
both to and from the country for purposes of forced prostitution.
According to press reports, during the year agents of the international
police organization Interpol operating in the country discovered a
prostitution network trafficking young girls from several Central
American countries to work in bars along the border with Guatemala.
Interpol reportedly had rescued approximately 20 Salvadoran girls from
such prostitution rings over the past 3 years. There also were
unconfirmed charges that children were brought into the country from
neighboring countries and forced to beg in the streets.
______
GRENADA
Grenada is a parliamentary democracy, with a Governor General as
titular Head of State. In January parliamentary elections, Prime
Minister Dr. Keith Mitchell's New National Party (NNP) won all 15 seats
and formed a new government. The elections were contested openly and
fairly and were free of violence. The judiciary is independent.
The 755-member Royal Grenada Police Force is responsible for
maintaining law and order. It is controlled by and responsive to
civilian authorities. There were occasional allegations of abuse by the
police.
Grenada has a free market economy based on agriculture and tourism.
The estimated real economic growth rate was 5.8 percent in 1998, and
the projected annual growth rate for 1999 was 6.1 percent. Per capita
gross domestic product was approximately $3,000 in 1999.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in a few areas. Human rights
problems include an allegation of police brutality during arrest, which
has not been confirmed judicially. The Commissioner of Police has
spoken out strongly against police use of unlawful force. Violence
against women is common but appears to be on the decline. Child abuse
is a problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
no reported incidents of torture. Flogging, a legal form of punishment,
is rare but has been used as punishment for sex crimes and theft cases.
There were no reports by the press of police brutality during the
year. The 1998 case of an allegation of police brutality, which
involved excessive use of force in making an arrest, was not resolved
because the officer fled and has never been apprehended. Allegations of
police brutality are investigated internally by the police. There were
no reports that disciplinary action was taken against a police officer
during the year. The Police Commissioner can discipline officers in
valid cases of brutality with penalties that may include dismissal from
the force. The Police Commissioner has spoken out strongly against
police use of unlawful force.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides the
police with the right to detain persons on suspicion without a warrant,
but they must bring formal charges within 48 hours. The police adhered
to this time limit in practice. If the police do not charge a detainee
within 48 hours, they must release the person.
The law provides for a judicial determination of the legality of
detention within 15 days after arrest on a criminal charge. The police
must formally arraign or release a detained person within 60 days, and
the authorities generally followed these procedures. There is a
functioning system of bail, although persons charged with capital
offenses are not eligible. Persons charged with treason may be accorded
bail only upon the recommendation of the Governor General.
In 1997 the authorities arrested a Belgian national and detained
him for a period of 2 years. Because he had not been charged formally,
the judge ruled that he should be released because he had been held so
long without trial. Upon release, he was returned to Belgium to face
charges there.
Exile is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary, a part of the
Eastern Caribbean legal system, is highly regarded and independent.
Final appeal may be made to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom.
There are no military or political courts. Those arrested on criminal
charges are brought before a judge to determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges; if there is, the judge
remands the defendant for trial.
The law provides for the right to a fair public trial, and the
authorities observe it in practice. There is a presumption of
innocence, and the law protects persons against self-incrimination and
requires the police to explain a person's rights upon arrest. The
accused has the right to remain silent and to seek the advice of legal
counsel. A defense lawyer has the right to be present during
interrogation and may advise the accused how to respond or not to
respond to questions. The accused has the right to confront his
accuser.
The court appoints attorneys for indigents only in cases of murder
or other capital crimes. In other criminal cases that reach the
appellate stage, the court similarly will appoint a lawyer to represent
the accused if the defendant was not previously represented or
reappoint earlier counsel if the appellant no longer can afford that
lawyer's services. Due to the backlog of cases caused by a shortage of
judges and facilities, up to 6 months can pass before those charged
with serious offenses face trial in the high court. With the exception
of persons charged with murder and foreign-born drug suspects, the
courts grant most defendants bail while awaiting trial.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for protection from these
abuses, and there were no reports of such actions. The law generally
requires judicially issued warrants for searching homes, except in
cases of hot pursuit. The Firearms Act of 1968 and the Drug Abuse
Prevention Act Number 7 of 1992 contain other exceptions that give the
police and security units legal authority to search persons and
property without warrants in certain circumstances. In practice police
obtain warrants in the majority of cases before conducting any search.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government does not
restrict these rights. There are three weekly newspapers and several
other newspapers that publish irregularly. One of the weeklies is
affiliated with an opposition political party, but the three most
widely circulated newspapers are independent and often critical of the
Government. The newspapers routinely carry press releases by the
opposition parties, including regular weekly columns expressing the
opposition parties' views.
There are six radio stations. The main station is part of the
Grenadian Broadcasting Network (GBN), a privately owned organization in
which the Government holds a minority share. The principal television
station is also part of the GBN. A privately owned television station
began broadcasting in 1992. A cable company began operating in the
capital area and since has expanded to most areas of the country. All
newspapers, radio, and television stations enjoy independence from the
State and regularly report opposition views. The television news often
carried reports on opposition activities, including coverage of
political rallies held by various political parties and candidates,
public forums featuring political leaders of each of the major parties,
and other public service broadcasts.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right to assemble for any peaceful purpose, and the
Government respects this right in practice. Supporters of political
parties meet frequently and hold public rallies; the authorities
require permits for the use of a public address system but not for
public meetings themselves.
The Constitution provides for the right to association, and the
Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement within the country, and all citizens have the right to enter
and leave the country, except in special circumstances as outlined in
and limited by the 1986 Act to Restrict the Freedom of Movement of
Certain Persons. This law allows the Minister for National Security to
restrict travel out of the country by any person whose aims,
tendencies, or objectives include the overthrow of the democratic and
parliamentary system of government; it has not been invoked in the past
few years. Anyone so restricted may appeal after 3 months to an
independent and impartial tribunal. The Chief Justice appoints an
accredited lawyer to preside over such a tribunal.
No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests
exists. The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise. There
were no reports of forced expulsion of anyone having a valid claim to
refugee status; however, government practice remains undefined.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right inpractice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. General elections must be held every 5 years; on
January 18, Prime Minister Dr. Keith C. Mitchell's NNP was returned to
office, securing all 15 seats in Parliament.
There are no restrictions in law or practice on participation by
women in government and politics. Four of the 15 elected members of
Parliament are women; there are no women among the 13 appointed
Senators. Women account for 7 of the 13 permanent secretaries, the
highest civil service position in each ministry; in addition, a woman
is the Cabinet Secretary, the highest civil service position in the
Government.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Local human rights groups operate without government restriction,
and the Government cooperates with visits from international human
rights organizations.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, place of
origin, political opinions, color, creed, or sex, and the Government
generally adheres to these provisions.
Women.--Women's rights monitors believe that violence against women
remains a serious problem; however, they reported a decrease in such
incidents during 1998. The police state that most cases of abuse are
not reported, and others are settled out of court. The law stipulates a
sentence of 15 years' imprisonment for a conviction of rape. Sentences
for assault against a spouse vary according to the severity of the
incident. On September 1, a shelter for battered and abused women and
their children opened in the northern part of the island, with medical
and psychological counseling personnel on its staff. The home houses 20
persons.
There is no evidence of official discrimination in health care,
employment, or education. Women frequently earn less than men
performing the same work; such wage differences are less marked for the
more highly paid jobs.
Children.--The Social Welfare Division within the Ministry of Labor
provides probationary and rehabilitative services to youths, day care
services and social work programs to families, assistance to families
wishing to adopt or foster children, and financial assistance to the
six children's homes run by private organizations.
Government social service agencies reported a further increase in
the number of child abuse cases, including sexual abuse. Abused
children are placed either in a government-run home or in private
foster homes. The law provides for harsh penalties against those
convicted of child abuse and disallows the victim's alleged ``consent''
as a defense in cases of incest. Women's organizations and other
nongovernmental organizations increased their public awareness efforts
to recognize and combat sexual abuse of women and children.
People with Disabilities.--The law does not protect job seekers
with disabilities from discrimination in employment, nor does it
mandate provision of accessibility for public buildings or services.
The National Council for the Disabled and the National Children's Home
assist the Government in placing disabled students into community
schools. The Council also seeks assistance from architects and builders
in the construction of ramps at hotels and public buildings, and ramps
have been installed at some hotels.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers are free to organize
independent labor unions. Labor Ministry officials estimate that 35
percent of the work force is unionized. Union leaders play a
significant role in the political process, and one labor leader serves
in the Senate on behalf of the Grenada Trades Union Council (GTUC).
Workers in the private and public sectors are free to strike, once
legal and procedural requirements are met. There were several incidents
of industrial action, including brief strikes by road workers,
teachers, farmers, and private sector workers. However, all were short-
lived and settled with the intervention of the Labor Commission, the
Minister of Labor, or the Industrial Court. All unions are technically
free of government control, and none receive government financial
support. However, all the major unions belong to one umbrella labor
federation, the GTUC, which is subsidized by the Government. The GTUC
holds annual conventions and determines some policies for member
unions.
The GTUC and its unions freely affiliate with regional and
international trade union groups.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers are
free to organize and to participate in collective bargaining.
Legislation requires employers to recognize a union that represents the
majority of workers in a particular business. The law prohibits
discrimination by employers against union members and organizers. If a
complaint of discrimination arises, mechanisms exist to resolve it.
After all avenues for resolving a complaint have been exhausted between
union representatives and employers, both sides may agree to ask for
the assistance of the Labor Commissioner. If the Labor Commissioner is
unable to find a resolution to the impasse, the Minister of Labor
intervenes and, if unable to reach an agreement, may appoint an
arbitration tribunal if both parties agree to abide by its ruling. The
law requires employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination to
rehire dismissed employees, but in most cases the employee accepts the
option of compensation. There were no cases of antiunion discrimination
reported to the Ministry during the year.
Unions may organize and bargain anywhere in the country, including,
in theory, export processing zones (EPZ's), which are not exempted from
labor legislation.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
specifically prohibits forced or bonded labor, including that of
children, and there were no reports of it.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Child labor, including forced or bonded labor, is illegal
(see Section 6.c.); however, children sometimes work in the
agricultural sector. The statutory minimum age for employment of
children is 18 years. Inspectors from the Ministry of Labor enforce
this provision in the formal sector by periodic checks. Enforcement
efforts in the informal sector are lax.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There are no minimum wage laws
in force. Most workers, including nonunionized workers, receive
packages of benefits from employers set by collective bargaining
agreements between employers and labor unions. In many cases, overall
wages and benefits are insufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. Many agricultural workers earn only
about $5.37 to $5.55 (EC$14.50 to EC$15.00) per day.
The law does not prescribe a set number of hours as the standard
workweek, except for the public sector, which is expected to work a 40-
hour week Monday through Friday. The normal workweek in all sectors
seldom exceeds 40 hours, although in the commercial sector this
includes Saturday morning work.
The Government sets health and safety standards, but the
authorities enforce them unevenly. Workers can remove themselves from
dangerous workplace situations without jeopardy to continued
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons. There were no reports that persons were
trafficked in, to, or from the country.
______
GUATEMALA
Guatemala is a democratic republic with separation of powers and a
centralized national administration. The 1985 Constitution provides for
election by universal suffrage of a one-term president and a unicameral
congress. In the December runoff elections, Guatemalan Republican Front
(FRG) candidate Alfonso Portillo won 68 percent of the vote in a free
and fair election. He replaced President Alvaro Arzu Irigoyen of the
National Advancement Party (PAN) on January 14, 2000. In the November
general elections, the FRG won a majority (63 seats) in the 113-member
Congress. The Arzu administration took limited steps to implement the
Peace Accords that it signed with the Guatemalan National Revolutionary
Unity (URNG) guerrillas in 1996. The judiciary is independent, but
suffers from inefficiency, intimidation, and corruption.
The Minister of Government oversees the National Civilian Police
(PNC), created in January 1997 under the terms of the Peace Accords.
The PNC has sole responsibility for internal security; however, during
the year some members of the predecessor National Police (PN) remained
on duty, awaiting mandated training to become PNC officers. There are
no active members of the military in the police command structure, but
in 1998 and 1999, President Arzu ordered the army to support the police
temporarily in response to a nationwide wave of violent crime. During
the year, military forces were subordinated to civilian police in joint
operations. The Constitution requires the Minister of Defense to be
either a colonel or a general in the military. Some members of the
security forces committed human rights abuses.
The mostly agricultural-based, private sector-dominated economy
grew by approximately 4.7 percent in 1998. Coffee, sugar, and bananas
are the leading exports, but tourism, textiles, and apparel assembly
are key nontraditional export industries. More than half the work force
is engaged in some form of agriculture, and subsistence agriculture is
common in rural areas. Officially, inflation was about 7.5 percent in
1998, although most observers acknowledge that the official price index
does not measure accurately actual price movements. In October 1998,
Hurricane Mitch caused approximately 250 deaths and infrastructure,
crop, and other losses totaling an estimated $550 million. However,
with the help of foreign assistance, virtually all physical damage was
repaired and the residual economic effects of Hurricane Mitch were
minimal. There is a marked disparity in income distribution, and
poverty is pervasive, particularly in the large indigenous community.
Approximately 83 percent of citizens live in poverty; this figure rises
to 90 percent among the indigenous population. Combined unemployment
and underemployment was estimated at 64 percent. Per capita gross
domestic product (GDP) was approximately $1,700 in 1998. Remittances
from citizens living abroad constituted a significant contribution to
the national economy.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens
in many areas; however, despite some continued improvement in certain
areas, serious problems remain in others. Some police officers were
accused of extrajudicial killings and there was one credible report of
forced disappearance attributed to the police. There were credible
reports that police tortured, abused, and mistreated suspects and
detainees. According to the United Nations Human Rights Verification
Mission (MINUGUA), established in November 1994 to monitor compliance
with the Government-URNG human rights accord, the number of human
rights violations committed by police increased during the first 9
months of the year. Allegations of abuse and misdeeds by police
officers increased, likely in part because PNC deployment greatly
expanded the number of police on duty throughout the country. In May a
nongovernmental organization (NGO) publicized the existence of what
appeared to be a genuine military intelligence dossier documenting the
abduction, torture, and in many cases, killing of 183 persons at the
hands of state forces between 1983 and 1985. In June construction
workers claimed to have discovered a clandestine cemetery on the
grounds of a former military facility, but no human remains were found
during an excavation of the site in October. Prison conditions remained
harsh. Arbitrary arrest and detention and lengthy pretrial detention
continued to be problems. With judges and other law enforcement
officials subject to intimidation and corruption, the inefficient
judicial system frequently is unable to ensure fair trials and due
process. In October Congress elected magistrates to fill all seats on
the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ) and Court of Appeals (CA). Efforts
to reform the judiciary continued, but the climate of impunity
persisted. The Government achieved convictions in a few important cases
involving past human rights violations; however, courts more often
annulled or overturned convictions and commuted sentences in a number
of significant human rights cases. Intimidation of witnesses, victims,
prosecutors, and judges continued to be a problem. Allegations
persisted that the security forces infringed on citizens' privacy
rights.
On February 25, the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH)
published its report on the internal conflict, in which it found
government forces responsible for 93 percent of human rights abuses
during the conflict. The Government failed to take an active role in
carrying out the CEH's recommendations, and on May16, voters defeated a
package of key constitutional reforms in a national referendum, which
represented another setback to the peace process. The MINUGUA continued
monitoring peace implementation and human rights issues. Violence and
discrimination against women persisted, as did societal abuse of
children and discrimination against the disabled and indigenous people.
Workers' efforts to form unions and participate in union activities are
hindered by an ineffective legal system. Child labor and trafficking in
children also are problems. Lynchings and mob violence continued, often
resulting in deaths, and the Government frequently was unable to
prosecute the perpetrators. The investigation continued into the 1998
murder of an internationally renowned Catholic bishop and human rights
activist. In October leaders of the principal banana workers' union
were held at gunpoint by a group of armed civilians and forced to
resign from both their jobs and union positions.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
allegations of politically motivated killings by government agents;
however, members of the police committed some extrajudicial killings.
The Government demonstrated a willingness to arrest and prosecute those
responsible; however, in many cases the scarcity of law enforcement
resources and a weak prosecutorial and judicial system prevented the
Government from adequately investigating killings and other crimes or
arresting and successfully prosecuting perpetrators.
The number of reported extrajudicial killings continued to decline
significantly. The office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (PDH), which
generally compiles data based on personal interviews with victims and
their families, reported 16 complaints of extrajudicial killings during
the year (3 were confirmed), compared with 32 in 1998, 134 in 1997, and
173 in 1996. From January 1 to September 30, based on 27 complaints
alleging 39 extrajudicial killings, MINUGUA investigated 18 cases and
confirmed 13 by year's end. It reported 35 such complaints in 1998. The
Archbishop's Office of Human Rights (ODHAG) reported one extrajudicial
killing by police officers and the killing and apparent torture of four
prisoners.
On January 2, PNC officers detained three drunk individuals in
Chiquimulilla, Santa Rosa, and beat them severely for allegedly having
resisted arrest. Two were put in a cell while a third, Eliseo Rivera
Padilla, was beaten further, until he lost consciousness. Rivera died
en route to a hospital. An autopsy declared that the cause of death was
``asphyxia by strangulation.'' According to MINUGUA, PNC officials in
Chiquimulilla attempted to blame Rivera's two companions, but an
internal investigation by the PNC's Office of Professional
Responsibility (ORP) determined that the death had been caused by the
beating administered by the PNC officers. On January 21, the
authorities arrested 11 PNC officers and by May 11, the prosecutor had
opened a case for extrajudicial killing and a subsequent coverup.
Later, the charges were downgraded: Officer Armando Cante Tobar and
inspectors Dario Gomez de Leon and Carlos Amilcar Grijalva were accused
of unintentional homicide while several others were charged with
covering up the crime. The authorities dropped charges against nine
other officers. On April 8, the PNC suspended all officers against whom
charges were filed, pending the outcome of the case, which remained
before the courts at year's end.
On February 14, PNC officers Luis Antonio Monzon Flores and Rony
Perfecto Carpio Diaz arrested Jose Martin Reynoso for public
drunkenness in Poptun, Peten. Less than 30 minutes later, police
officers brought Reynoso's dead body to a hospital. An autopsy
determined that the cause of death was a heart attack, but noted
several injuries to the body that suggested Reynoso had been tortured.
MINUGUA reported that several witnesses changed their story after
allegedly receiving considerable sums of money from relatives of the
PNC officers involved. MINUGUA also noted that both the investigation
of the case and the medical examination of the body suffered from a
serious lack of thoroughness and numerous procedural errors. On August
19, at the request of the prosecutor, a judge dismissed the case
against the PNC officers.
On February 20, PNC officers chased and apprehended robbery suspect
Noe Vincente Gomez in a butcher shop in Guatemala City. They also
apprehended a shop customer, Santiago Rafael Ruiz, taking both
individuals outside to a police vehicle, where witnesses reported
hearing shots fired within the vehicle. The officers then drove the two
to a nearby location, where other witnesses reported hearing additional
shots fired inside the vehicle. By the time Ruiz and Gomez were taken
to a hospital, Gomez was injured seriously and Ruiz was dead from
gunshot wounds. Results of an investigation by the ORP were turned over
to the judicial system for prosecution and two PNC officers,Gerson
Andres de Rosa Rodriguez and Neftali Elixalon Lopez Salguero, were
suspended from duty pending the outcome of the court case.
On March 9, in Ocos, San Marcos, during a PNC roundup of
undocumented aliens, officers heard several shots and then found a
recently killed Salvadoran citizen, Manuel de Jesus Ortega. Officers
conducted an on-the-spot weapons check, which revealed that the weapon
of a recent PNC Academy graduate, Nahum Perez Morales, had been fired.
Perez denied killing Ortega. According to MINUGUA, witnesses reported
seeing several officers fire their weapons and that a significant
amount of money was missing from the victim's bag. MINUGUA reported
that the initial investigation was mishandled significantly--for
example, the authorities did not collect shell casings, take witness
statements, or protect the crime scene. Prosecutors declined to
reconstruct the events leading up to the crime and failed to
investigate conflicting witness testimonies. An ORP investigation
failed to shed light on the incident. Later, PNC officials informed
MINUGUA that they had decided to transfer four high-ranking officers in
San Marcos and replace all officials in nearby Tecun Uman and
Malacatan.
On March 19, a group of civilians in remote Chiantla,
Huehuetenango, detained Juan Jose Arguello for fighting and took him to
the local National Police station. Arguello complained to a friend who
visited him in jail that he had been beaten severely, first by
businessmen and later by the police. His arrest was never documented
formally. In exchange for Arguello's release, a PN inspector solicited
a bribe from his mother. After paying for his release, Arguello's
mother took him to a hospital, where he died on March 24 of internal
injuries. Based on the mother's complaint and the autopsy report,
prosecutors obtained arrest warrants for the three officers, of which
two were captured and one, Inspector Merany Garcia Castellanos,
escaped; he remained at large at year's end. An ORP investigation
established the responsibility of the three officers and the
prosecutor's investigation continued at year's end.
On April 10, PNC motorcycle officers chased and trapped criminal
suspect Abelisario Hernandez Barillas in front of a business in
Guatemala City. According to witnesses, the officers then shot and
killed Hernandez and left him in the street. Ballistic tests and
investigations by the ORP and the Public Ministry implicated officers
Nicolas Hernandez Enriquez and Gerardo Juarez Gabriel. Hernandez was
suspended and made available to the courts for prosecution while Juarez
remained on duty. By year's end, the prosecution had made little
progress in bringing the case to trial.
On August 18, in San Juan Chamelco, Alta Verapaz, PNC officers
arrested Rodrigo Larios Poou, and Manuel Xol for drunkenness and then
allegedly beat them severely before taking them to a prison in Coban,
Alta Verapaz. Twenty-one hours after arriving at the prison, Larios was
taken to a local hospital where he eventually died of internal
injuries. The PNC claimed that Larios' and Xol's injuries were caused
when they allegedly attacked each other prior to their arrest. However,
a medical examiner determined that their injuries could not have been
caused in such a way and that they were instead victims of torture and
abuse. The prison director received death threats for implicating
police officers in Larios' death and cooperating with MINUGUA
representatives investigating the incident. The authorities arrested
two police officers shortly after the crime, and prosecutors were
investigating and preparing a case at year's end.
On June 9, in the high security prison in Esquintla, prisoners
Fredy Ayala Ramirez, Genio Alberto Ramirez Mejia, Guillermo Castellanos
Rios, and Sergio Aroldo Monzon Sotoj were found hanged in their prison
cells by makeshift ropes made from mattress strips. The bodies showed
signs of torture, including bruises from an apparent beating with a
metal object, puncture wounds, and broken legs. The authorities began
an investigation of prison guards as well as other prisoners, but there
was no progress by year's end.
On May 3, oil refinery businessman Edgar Ordonez Porta was kidnaped
in El Paraiso, Puerto de San Jose. Three days later, his body was found
in an abandoned well in a neighboring town. The victim's brother, Hugo
Ordonez Porta, claimed that the military was involved in the murder and
had interfered with the subsequent investigation by prosecutors. Hugo
Ordonez is a partner in the small oil refinery and a member of the
editorial staff of one of the major daily newspapers, El Periodico,
which was sharply critical of the military during President Arzu's
regime. Although the motive for the crime remained unclear, witness
testimony linked government and military personnel and vehicles to the
crime scene. Anomalies in the investigation, including the amputation
of the victim's fingers after the body was found, changes in witness
testimony, and several instances of involvement by military
intelligence, seem to suggest at a minimum a coordinated coverup by
prosecutors and the military. In May the authorities arrested a local
municipal official,Lazaro Obispo Solorzano Lopez, and a disgruntled
former employee of Ordonez, Henry Orlando Hernandez Montepeque; on
September 24, Solorzano was charged with homicide. A trial was pending
at year's end.
Although most cases from past years remained unresolved, there were
some convictions during the year for past extrajudicial killings by
members of the security forces. However, in several high profile cases,
courts overturned, annulled, or reversed prior convictions against
alleged human rights abusers. Observers and human rights groups
criticized these decisions as confirmation of the ongoing impunity that
pervades the weak and corrupt legal system. At year's end, trials
continued in several high profile cases.
In the January 1997 killing of congressional Deputy Joel Salomon
Mendoza Pineda and his nephew, a trial court found two individuals
guilty and sentenced them for the crime. The court case against two
former congressional deputies and the former mayor of Escuintla
remained open, although a trial date had not been set at year's end.
The Constitutional Court in the summer rejected an appeal by
coplaintiff ODHAG to reverse the Supreme Court's April 1998 decision
that commuted the prison term of Obdulio Villanueva Arevalo, the member
of the Presidential Military Staff (EMP) who was convicted of killing
milkman Pedro Sas Rompich in 1996. Villanueva was on duty as a
presidential bodyguard when he shot and killed Sas Rompich for
allegedly driving his truck toward President Arzu in a threatening
manner. Sas Rompich's family rejected the Court's decision requiring
that Villanueva pay restitution in the amount of about $161,000 (1
million quetzals), arguing that the incident should be characterized as
an extrajudicial killing by the Government, not a common crime by
Villanueva as an individual. There was no apparent progress on the
investigation of the EMP interception of laboratory test results
relating to the victim's body in this case.
On August 13, after nearly 4 years of pretrial detention and the
longest oral trial in the country's history, a 3-judge panel in Coban
found Second Lieutenant Camilo Antonio Lacan Chaclan and each of the 24
members of his former patrol guilty of either negligent homicide or
complicity in negligent homicide in the Xaman massacre. In October
1995, an army patrol entered a refugee-returnee community at Xaman,
Alta Verapaz, and became involved in a confrontation with an angry but
unarmed populace. In the conflict that ensued, the patrol members fired
over 250 rounds, killing 11 returned refugees, including women and
children, and injuring 30. The court sentenced 11 defendants, including
Lacan Chaclan, to 5 years in prison, commutable for about $0.65 (5
quetzals) per day. It found the remaining 14 defendants guilty of
negligent homicide and sentenced each of them to 4 years in prison,
which are also commutable. Although some welcomed the verdict as a
modest blow against impunity, human rights groups strongly criticized
the sentences, which amount to little more than time served, as too
lenient. In the months before and during the trial, observers noted
apparent judicial bias, anomalies, and the harassment and intimidation
of prosecutors, judges, and witnesses. The prosecutor appealed the
court's decision because he believed that the sentences were too
lenient. Claiming that the verdict was negotiated with the military,
the former private plaintiff in the case, the Rigoberta Menchu
Foundation, threatened to bring the case before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), but had not done so by year's end.
On December 6, an appellate court in Coban annulled the trial court's
verdict, citing ``fundamental errors'', including ``failure to observe,
correctly interpret, or correctly apply the law.'' The court found 15
of the 25 members innocent, including Lacan Chaclan, and released them.
The court resentenced the remaining 10 soldiers to 12-year sentences
for homicide and causing other nonlethal injuries. Those sentenced
could be eligible for release as early as April 2000, since the law
provides for a 50 percent reduction in sentences for good behavior, and
the defendants already have served 4 years in prison. Shortly after
Lacan Chaclan was released from prison, the Army announced that he soon
would receive a scheduled promotion. This statement resulted in
widespread public criticism, and the Army later stated that it would
conduct a full review of the situation before making its final
decision.
On July 17, one of the former police officers sentenced to death in
1996 in the so-called Patrol No. 603 case, Anibal Archila, died in
prison of a diabetic episode, reportedly due to lack of medical
attention. The case stems from a 1995 murder and attempted murder in
what appeared to be a ``social cleansing'' operation, defined as a
killing in which persons deemed socially undesirable (e.g., gang
members, local delinquents, or convicts released from prison) are found
murdered in circumstances suggesting that the murder was planned and
carried out by an organized group. Defense attorneys for the remaining
two inmates filed a series of motions in an attempt to delay their
executions. The Constitutional Court had denied all three men an appeal
of their death sentences in July 1998.
On February 3, a trial court sentenced former military commissioner
Armando Tucubal to 30 years in prison for the 1994 murder of
evangelical minister Pascual Serech in Chimaltenango. (Military
commissioners were generally local civilian leaders who represented the
army, serving as intermediaries with members of civilian defense
patrols [PAC's]; the commissioners were formally decommissioned in
1985.) Tucubal had been convicted in September 1997 for the killing and
sentenced to 20 years in prison. Charges remained pending against
former military commissioner Victor Roman, an alleged collaborator in
the crime and also the accused perpetrator of the 1995 murder of
evangelical pastor Manuel Saquic. Roman remained at large despite an
order for his capture and the offer of a reward.
On April 5, the Supreme Court denied an appeal by the private
plaintiffs to reinstate homicide convictions against several former
senior government officials and a former officer in the now-defunct
National Police in the 1994 shooting death of University of San Carlos
student demonstrator Mario Alioto Lopez Sanchez. The plaintiffs
appealed the Supreme Court's ruling in the Constitutional Court. An
officer of the PN remains in prison after having been convicted of
unintentional homicide in the case.
An appellate court ruling remained pending in the case of the April
1994 murder of Constitutional Court president Epaminondas Gonzalez
Dubon. Both the prosecution and defense appealed aspects of the May
1998 murder conviction of Marlon Salazar and Roberto Antonio Trabanino,
who were serving 27-year prison sentences for the crime at year's end.
A third suspect, Mario Rene Salazar, remained at large at year's end.
The August 1994 killing by police of four workers at La Exacta farm
remained under investigation, and the criminal case remained suspended,
but it could be reopened with additional evidence. The parties
continued to seek a resolution through the IACHR's amicable settlement
procedures. The parties also failed to negotiate a settlement in the
pending labor court charges. The Center for Legal Assistance in Human
Rights (CALDH) continued to represent the families of the deceased, the
injured, and those who lost their jobs and homes during the illegal
eviction in these discussions with the Government, represented by the
President's Human Rights Commission (COPREDEH).
On April 29, a criminal court confirmed the convictions and 25-year
sentences imposed on 12 former PAC members for their role in the 1993
killing of Juan Chanay Pablo. On April 30, a crowd of approximately 500
persons, armed with sticks, machetes, homemade explosives, and smoke
bombs, broke into a police station in Huehuetenango and freed the 12.
Although arrest warrants were issued to recapture the escapees, they
remained at large at year's end, despite credible media reports that
they returned to their home region of Colotenango and were being
protected by former PAC comrades. Prosecutors in Huehuetenango claimed
to be waiting for information from the PNC's Criminal Investigations
Service (SIC) regarding the whereabouts of the escapees. MINUGUA and
other observers believe that military or former PAC members planned and
executed the jailbreak, which was timed to take advantage of reduced
police staffing during the transfer of authority from the PN to the new
PNC. There was no progress in the investigation of Brigadier General
Luis Felipe Miranda Trejo, the alleged intellectual author of the
crime, who was elected to Congress in the November elections and
therefore enjoys legislative immunity from prosecution.
On April 28, an appeals court overturned the 1997 conviction and
30-year prison sentence of former PAC member Juan Acabal Patzan for the
1993 murder of newspaper publisher and former presidential candidate
Jorge Carpio and three associates, citing the unexplained loss of key
evidence, including the alleged murder weapon. The court also ordered
the release of brothers Marcelino and Nazario Tuy Taniel, who were
serving 5-year sentences for manufacturing and possessing explosives
thought to be connected to the murders. The case remained open,
including charges against former PAC member Francisco Ixcoy Lopez, who
remained at large; a warrant for his arrest has been outstanding since
1995. A court decision remained pending on the private plaintiffs'
motion to reopen charges against a number of persons--including former
senior government officials--believed to have participated in the crime
as material or intellectual authors, or to have assisted in its
coverup. There was also a case pending before the IACHR.
In a hearing on the evidence in January, Judge Henry Monroy ordered
a trial of the three high-ranking military officers accused of ordering
the 1990 murder of anthropologist Myrna Mack, ruling that sufficient
evidence existed that the three ordered or covered up the killing.
However, based on the May rejection of the constitutional reforms,
which would have ratified the abolition by Congress of military
tribunals, the defendants filed yet another motion seeking to have the
case removed to the military tribunals. (The military tribunals no
longer are used to bring criminal charges; they still exist, but
address only violations of military codes and rules.) On September 3,
thecourt denied the defendants' motion, allowing a trial to be
scheduled for spring 2000. A case also was pending before the IACHR at
year's end. Enlisted man Noel de Jesus Beteta, who confessed to the
killing, is serving a 30-year sentence.
On December 3, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that
there was sufficient evidence that police officers Samuel Rocael Valdes
and Nestor Fonseca were responsible for the 1990 deaths of three
minors--Julio Roberto Caal Sandoval, Jovito Josue Juarez Cifuentes, and
Anstraun Villagran. The bodies of the three youths, who had been living
on the street, were found mutilated on the outskirts of Guatemala City.
The Court also ruled that the Government failed to protect the rights
of the victims and to provide them with justice.
The 1989 disappearances of 10 university students, 5 of whom later
were found dead, and the 1996 murder of Miguel Us Mejia, a member of
CERJ (an indigenous human rights organization), and his wife, Lucia Tiu
Tum, remained unresolved.
Proceedings to set the amount of compensation owed to the families
of the victims in the ``white van'' case remained open, pending a
petition for reparations from these families. In March 1998, the IACHR
had found the Government liable in the case, in which members of the
now-disbanded Treasury Police kidnaped and then either released or
killed 11 persons in 1987-88.
On May 20, the National Security Archive, an NGO, announced its
possession of what appeared to be a genuine military intelligence
dossier that documented the abduction, torture, or killing of 183
persons by government forces during the 1983-85 period. Commonly
referred to as the ``military diary,'' the document's release provoked
a prolonged and intense public debate about its veracity and
admissibility as evidence in potential criminal suits against the
Government. Shortly after the document's public release, human rights
groups began locating relatives of the victims and preparing to file
dozens of criminal cases. The Government responded by appointing 35
prosecutors to handle the cases, with an additional prosecutor
designated to manage the cases and their investigation.
On February 25, an appeals court in Alta Verapaz annulled the
November 1998 convictions and death sentences of 3 former PAC members
for their roles in the 1982 massacres in the villages of Rio Negro and
Agua Fria, in which some 250 persons are believed to have been killed.
In its decision, the appellate court cited errors, inconsistencies, and
insufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision, remanding
the case back to the lower court for a September 7 retrial. On
September 14, the retrial was suspended temporarily when a crowd of
several hundred persons armed with stones and clubs surrounded the jail
in Salama, Baja Verapaz, threatened to kill the judge, and attempted to
free the accused. On September 20, the trial resumed under heightened
security, and on October 7, the trial court in Salama again convicted
and sentenced to death the three defendants found guilty of murdering
two of the Rio Negro victims. Because the Rio Negro case represented
the first conviction of the perpetrators of a wartime massacre, human
rights groups considered the trial court's decision an important legal
precedent in the fight against impunity.
For much of the year there was no significant progress in the case
of the 1982 military massacre at Las Dos Erres, as prosecutors worked
to secure relocation abroad for two potential key witnesses and their
families in exchange for testimony against their former army comrades.
On March 18, the court cited a technical deficiency and declared a
mistrial in the case against Vicente Cifuentes, the former PAC member
arrested in March 1997 for the 1985 killings of American journalists
Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis. The indictment had given the date of
the killing incorrectly. The case was remanded to the trial court to
correct this error, and was expected to come to trial in January 2000.
Three other suspects in the case remained at large, despite at least
one attempt to capture them. On January 22, the IACHR ordered the
Government to pay Blake's survivors about $161,000 (1 million quetzals)
in compensation for impeding the investigation of the death, to
investigate those responsible for the murders, and to sanction them.
The COPREDEH, which represents the Government in the case, stated that
it accepted the IACHR's decision and fully intended to pay the damages
award. However, due to budgetary constraints, the Government petitioned
the IACHR to allow installment payments, rather than one lump sum. The
IACHR denied that petition, and imposed a March 30, 2000 deadline for
payment; after that date, the Government would be required to pay
interest as well as the amount of the award. At year's end, the
COPREDEH was seeking the budgetary restructuring that would be
necessary to make the payment before the deadline.
In the April retrial of former military commissioner Candido
Noriega on 155 criminal charges for crimes committed mostly in the
early 1980's, the court once again found Noriega innocent, citing
insufficient evidence. Alleging a series ofirregularities and judicial
bias in favor of the accused, the Conference of Religionists of
Guatemala (CONFREGUA), a Catholic organization and a coplaintiff in the
case, appealed the decision. On July 23, an appellate court annulled
the lower court's decision and remanded the case for a third trial,
ordering that a panel of judges from the neighboring department of
Totonicapan consider the case, to ensure impartiality. On September 20,
the new trial began, but because numerous witnesses refused to testify
due to fear of reprisals, Noriega was retried for a reduced list of
crimes, including 11 killings, 7 abductions, rape, breaking and
entering, arson, and various threats. On November 12, the trial court
found Noriega guilty of 6 murders and 2 cases of manslaughter, and
sentenced him to a total of 220 years in prison. Due to lack of
evidence, the court absolved Noriega of other charges, including rape,
torture, kidnaping, and burning persons alive. The court also ordered
the Public Ministry to investigate further Noriega's alleged
accomplice, Juan Alesio Samoya, as well as the military officers who
served at the so-called Base 20 in Quiche in 1982. In late November,
Noriega's attorney appealed the court's decision, and the appeal was
pending at year's end.
In the past several years, approximately 70 clandestine cemeteries
have been exhumed by forensic anthropologists. Most of the bodies
recovered have been those of victims of military or paramilitary
killings in the 1980's from areas such as Rabinal, Las Dos Erres, and
Panzos. Forensics groups use the information obtained from the
exhumations to verify eyewitness reports of massacres and to determine,
at least in general, who might have been responsible. The forensic
evidence has been used in some criminal cases. During the year, the
ODHAG's Forensic Anthropology Unit exhumed bodies from burial sites at
the following locations: Tablero (San Marcos), San Luis Tinajas,
Chijotom and Santa Maria Sibhia (Alta Verapaz), and Petanac
(Huehuetenango). As of September, workers at these sites had found 87
skeletons and identified 26. During the year, the Foundation of
Forensic Anthropology (FAFG) conducted excavations of 13 massacre sites
from the early 1980's, where they exhumed a total of 180 human remains.
Threats and intimidation against persons working on exhumations
continued, but at lower levels than in previous years.
On July 9, a newspaper reported the discovery of a clandestine
cemetery on the grounds of a facility formerly used by the now-defunct
Mobile Military Police (PMA). In late 1998, workers claimed to have
found what they believed to be human skeletons with pieces of olive
green clothing and military-style boots while building a dormitory for
female police officers on the grounds of the new PNC academy. The
workers reportedly were told to continue construction, and the
discovery was not revealed to the Public Ministry until June. The
discovery generated considerable public interest because it was
believed to be the first clandestine cemetery found on the grounds of a
former military facility. In October a court-ordered excavation of the
site was conducted but no human remains were found. FAFG
anthropologists found only animal remains and fragments of license
plates suspected to have been used in clandestine operations during the
internal armed conflict. In July PNC Academy Director Brigido Fuentes
reported receiving death threats for having revealed the cemetery's
existence publicly.
On December 2, indigenous leader Rigoberta Menchu filed a criminal
suit in a Spanish court against eight former military and civilian
leaders for human rights abuses committed during the internal conflict.
The suit alleges that the defendants, including retired General and
former de facto President Efrain Rios Montt, former President and
retired General Fernando Lucas Garcia, former de facto President Oscar
Humberto Mejia Victores, and others were responsible for ``crimes
against humanity,'' including genocide, torture, and terrorism. The
suit cites 3 cases--the 1980 assault on the Spanish Embassy in which
over 30 persons died, the killing of Menchu's mother and her 2
siblings, and the killing of 4 Spanish priests over the course of the
conflict. On December 18, Spanish Judge Guillermo Ruiz Polanco accepted
Menchu's suit. Attorneys for Mejia Victores later filed criminal
charges in Guatemala against Menchu, accusing her of treason, violating
the Constitution, and failing to report a crime (for filing charges in
Spanish court.)
Intimidation of witnesses continued to be a problem, although there
were no reports of the killing of witnesses. For example, in the second
trial of former military commissioner Candido Noriega, witnesses
received death threats and harassment so intense that many chose not to
testify in the third trial in September. As a consequence, the list of
charges against Noriega had to be reduced significantly. In May
unidentified individuals abducted, assaulted, and interrogated lay
worker Jeremias Tecu, who was accompanying witnesses in the Candido
Noriega trial. Witnesses and relatives of murder victim Juan Chanay
Pablo received death threats following the May jailbreak of former PAC
members convicted of his 1993 murder. Many observers reported threats
and intimidation against witnesses, lawyers, and family members of the
plaintiffs in the Xaman massacre trial. In August a family member and
witness in the murder of presidentialcandidate Jorge Carpio Nicolle
received death threats after an appeals court annulled the convictions
of four former PAC members. ODHAG personnel and prosecutors
investigating the killing of Bishop Juan Gerardi reported increased
threats and other acts of intimidation as the investigation gained
momentum; during the year both the judge and the prosecutor resigned
and fled the country, due in part to threats.
There were several allegations of politically motivated killings
during the year, and the authorities demonstrated a willingness to
investigate these murders.
On January 4, Olman Alexis Viera Rodriguez, an alleged member of
the organized criminal gang Valle del Sol, was shot to death in his
home by unidentified assailants. Prior to the killing, based on his own
``private investigation'' of the Bishop Gerardi murder case, former
Judge Juan Carlos Solis Oliva, who is related to two of the military
suspects being investigated in the case, had alleged that the Gerardi
murder was linked to a smuggling ring involving the Valle del Sol gang,
the military, and several clerics. At the time of his death, Viera
Rodriguez was rumored to be the inside source of information (and
therefore a potential witness) for Solis Oliva's now-discredited
theory. Investigation of the murder continued as police concluded that
gang-on-gang violence was the motive. By year's end, Solis Oliva's
independent investigation apparently had ended and was regarded widely
as an effort to absolve his relatives.
On January 12, Zacapa Municipal Workers Union leader Robinson
Morales Canales was killed, followed by the March 8 murder of Angel
Pineda. Both men had protested labor rights violations and corruption
in the Zacapa mayor's office, including charges of corruption in
several municipal construction projects. Police were investigating
Zacapa Mayor Carlos Vargas y Vargas, his driver, and bodyguard as the
intellectual and material authors of the murders, and the investigation
was pending at year's end. On February 3, police arrested Carlos Anibal
Paz Gordon, a former employee of a company owned by persons close to
Mayor Vargas, as the material author of the crime. Police continued to
search for Paz Gordon's alleged accomplice, whom they know only by a
nickname. Charges were filed against Paz Gordon and his trial is
scheduled to begin on February 15, 2000. MINUGUA reported that the
legal system in Zacapa seriously mishandled several aspects of the
investigation against the material authors, including poor evidence
collection at the crime scene, faulty and untimely delivery of arrest
warrants, illegal detention, and exposure of a witness to death threats
by improperly revealing his name. In addition, prosecutors made little
effort to investigate possible connections between the material authors
and the suspected intellectual author, Mayor Vargas.
On May 13, four masked men killed New Guatemalan Democratic Front
(FDNG) executive committee member Roberto Gonzalez Arias in his car. He
previously had received a series of death threats. Although FDNG party
officials concluded that the murder was politically motivated, police
focused their investigation on an unpaid debt owed by Gonzalez Arias.
On May 25, the PNC arrested Alejandro Garcia Monterroso, a suspect in
the murder, which they believe may have resulted from a vendetta
stemming from the death of one of Gonzalez's neighbors. No progress was
reported in the case at year's end.
On May 18, unknown assailants abducted and killed Tomas Tol
Salvador, another FDNG leader, in Quiche. Tol Salvador was also a human
rights activist for the Council of Ethnic Communities, an indigenous
organization (see Section 4).
On May 25, former Judge Herberto Zapata Gudiel was killed in a
restaurant parking lot in Puerto Barrios. Zapata allegedly received
numerous death threats prior to the attack. In 1998 Zapata had
sentenced to death brothers Helse and Obdulio Hernandez Salazar,
members of the Agosto Negro gang, for two murders. On June 3, police
arrested the sister of the Salazar brothers and one other person and
continued to search for additional suspects. However, by year's end,
the prosecutor was focused on a new theory of motive, based on evidence
tying Judge Zapata to a narcotics trafficking ring involving another
prosecutor and a member of the military. The prosecutor has requested
the release of the Hernandez siblings because he established that they
were not involved in the crime.
On July 27, unidentified assailants shot and killed Mayan priest
Raul Coc Choc at his home in the department of Chimaltenango. Coc Choc
was a leader of the National Association of Mayan Priests; members of
the board reported that he had received numerous death threats over the
telephone. Religious and indigenous leaders called for a thorough
investigation. After detaining and later releasing a suspect, the judge
ordered the case provisionally closed for lack of evidence, thereby
enabling the prosecutors to continue their investigation.
On August 30, unknown assailants shot and killed sociologist Maria
Ramirez Sanchez, in what appeared to be a professional killing. Because
Ramirez was an employee for the sameorganization where anthropologist
Myrna Mack worked when she was killed for political reasons in 1990,
the media and human rights groups speculated that the motive for
Ramirez's murder also was political. However, her coworkers discounted
the possibility of a work-related political motive, and there was no
evidence to suggest that the killing was politically motivated. The
prosecutor was unable to find a suspect using a police composite photo,
and there was little progress in the investigation at year's end.
Several past cases of politically motivated killings remained
unresolved, including the murders of Bishop Gerardi, acting mayor of
Santa Cruz del Quiche Luis Yat Zapeta, and Retalhuleu prosecutor
Shilvia Jerez Romero de Herrera.
The investigation continued in the April 1998 murder of Bishop Juan
Gerardi Conedera, the Coordinator of the Archbishop's Office on Human
Rights (ODHAG), but was hampered by the resignations of both judges and
prosecutors. Bishop Gerardi was killed just 2 days after his public
delivery of the final report of the ``Recovery of Historical Memory''
project, which held the military, military commissioners, and civil
patrols responsible for approximately 80 percent of the human rights
violations committed during the 36-year-long internal conflict. In
January a new prosecutor, Celvin Galindo, took over the case and
revitalized the investigation, with increased focus on the military's
potential political motive for the killing. Lawyers for Father Mario
Orantes, who was held in jail as a suspect, had asked the Court of
Appeals to recuse Judge Isaias Figueroa; on January 12, the court
rejected their motion. However, Judge Figueroa withdrew from the case,
citing defense counsel's lack of confidence in his impartiality, and
was replaced by Judge Henry Monroy. On February 17, Judge Monroy
ordered that Father Orantes be released from jail for lack of
sufficient evidence, although he remains a suspect. (Orantes had been
arrested and charged with the killing in October 1998.) The press
reported in March that Guatemala City Bishop Mario Rios Montt said that
in November 1998, he had been offered the release of Father Orantes in
exchange for formally stating that the army and Government were not
involved in the killing. Rios Montt declined to name the person who
offered him this deal. On March 23, Judge Monroy suddenly resigned and
fled the country, primarily because of persistent threats and
intimidation, and eventually was replaced by Judge Flor de Maria Garcia
Villatoro. In October former Judge Monroy said that he had been
approached during his tenure as judge in the Gerardi case by Howard
Yang, then-Secretary of Strategic Planning for the Arzu administration,
who allegedly suggested that Father Orantes was the most likely suspect
and that the investigation should focus on him.
In May prosecutors obtained DNA samples from 17 suspects, including
Father Orantes and 12 active or former members of the military, and
sent them for comparison with DNA samples found at the scene of the
crime. Preliminary and final DNA test results failed to shed light on
the identity of the crime's material author. New witnesses, including a
taxi driver and a former member of the EMP, gave testimony implicating
the EMP and several of its officers. During the year, the prosecutor
took the testimony of current and former senior military officers,
including the former Defense Minister General Hector Barrios Celada,
and impounded various EMP records and log books. Threats and other acts
of intimidation against prosecutors and ODHAG personnel increased
sharply as the investigation gained momentum. On October 6, Celvin
Galindo suddenly resigned as prosecutor and fled the country with his
family, citing increased death threats and intimidation, including an
unconfirmed plot to kidnap one of his children. In an earlier incident
in August, Galindo's neighbors had reported a suspicious vehicle
circling the streets near his home. When police stopped the vehicle,
they identified the five occupants as army Lieutenant Victor Canagui
and four army specialists. Galindo and his staff in the Bishop Gerardi
investigation reported wiretapping and surveillance. ODHAG personnel
also complained of death threats, wiretapping, and surveillance. On
April 16, just days before the first anniversary of Bishop Gerardi's
death, armed men broke into the home of ODHAG Director Ronalth Ochaeta,
threatened his maid, but stole nothing of value. The break-in was
interpreted widely as an act of intimidation related to the Gerardi
case (see Section 4).
The high-level government commission established in 1998 to support
the investigation took no action during the year and was defunct by
year's end. The Government's own investigation of the murder had not
yet established the motive for the killing by year's end. In April the
ODHAG publicly accused Otto Ardon Medina, the former public prosecutor
for the Gerardi case, of misconduct in his investigation of the case;
in July the ODHAG filed criminal charges against Ardon. The
investigation continued at year's end.
Police continued to investigate the May 1998 murder of acting mayor
of Santa Cruz del Quiche Luis Yat Zapeta. The authorities arrested
Bernardino Zapeta Vicente, Tomas Zapeta Ixcoy, and Manuel Pacajoj Mejia
as material authors. In July 1998, theauthorities had arrested former
mayor Silverio Perez de Leon and treasurer Cayetano Alvarez Velasquez,
who remained the primary suspects in the murder that police believe was
committed in revenge for Yat's successful effort to remove Perez de
Leon from office on charges of corruption. A trial remained pending
against all five suspects at the end of the year, although a specific
trial date had not been set.
In the case of murdered Retalhuleu Prosecutor Shilvia Jerez Romero
de Herrera, a trial court found Tirso Valenzuela Leiva, a suspected
member of the Agosto Negro criminal gang, guilty of the murder, and
sentenced him to death. Suspects Jorge Lopez Monroy, Juan Vidal de
Leon, Jaime Quezada, and Waldemar Hidalgo Marroquin, also alleged
Agosto Negro members, were set free. On February 23, a court sentenced
other members of the gang to prison for the killing of Danita Gonzalez
Plank, one of several sensitive cases formerly handled by Jerez, and
the possible motive for her killing.
Unlike the previous year, there were no reports of alleged social
cleansing operations, nor were there developments in cases reported in
prior years, other than in the Patrol 603 case.
In June and August, the ODHAG and CALDH brought criminal charges
against former leaders of the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) for the
alleged killings of five former EGP guerrillas in the early 1980's. The
charges were initiated after relatives of the EGP members who
disappeared broke off negotiations with former EGP leaders to determine
the whereabouts of the remains. The CALDH later halted the legal
process after negotiations resumed. The ODHAG reported little progress
in the investigation based on its charges. A prosecutor proposed
travelling to Nicaragua to establish contact with potential witnesses,
but this trip had not occurred by year's end.
Popular frustration with the inability of the Government to control
crime, and of the courts to assure speedy justice, as well as a
tradition of extrajudicial repression of crime during years of military
rule, led to continued lynchings and mob violence. Lynchings, which
often involved burning victims alive, increased significantly. MINUGUA
reported 90 lynchings or attempted lynchings by September 30, in which
41 victims died and 93 were injured (an average of 10 lynchings a
month). These figures are significantly higher than the previous 3-year
period in which 182 lynchings were reported (an average of 5.4
lynchings a month). However, there was a decrease in the number of
deaths and injuries, due mostly to the increased presence and
intervention of the PNC and other authorities. There continued to be
instances in which local municipal officials led or participated in
lynching attempts. Generally, victims were killed by mobs for either
property-related crimes or suspected membership in criminal gangs. Most
of the attacks took place in rural areas in the mostly Mayan
communities of the western highlands. Generally, these were the same
communities where, during the internal conflict, local militias (PAC's)
were accustomed to conducting populist summary hearings in the town
square and then publicly executing alleged criminals or guerrillas. The
police, sometimes with the assistance of the military or volunteer
firemen, or in some cases, MINUGUA personnel, were often successful in
rescuing victims of mob attacks.
In the first 3 months of the year, the ODHAG reported nine
lynchings and numerous attempted lynchings, many of which occurred in
Guatemala City during the week before Easter. During that time,
University of San Carlos students customarily roam the streets wearing
masks, soliciting money, and committing acts of vigilantism against
alleged wrongdoers. The vast majority of lynchings never were
investigated, and convictions were rare in the few cases that were
brought to trial. However, as ongoing PNC deployment reached more
remote communities, the authorities demonstrated increased willingness
and ability to identify and arrest the perpetrators of lynchings. On
September 4, a trial court sentenced five individuals to 50 years in
prison for their role in 2 lynchings in Totonicapan in 1998. On
September 21, the authorities arrested four individuals suspected of
organizing a June lynching in El Limon, Chisec, Alta Verapaz.
On August 24, a crowd of several hundred residents of Zacualpa,
Quiche, captured and killed five alleged members of a local criminal
gang known as ``The Specialist.'' The crowd prevented the PNC and
volunteer firemen from rescuing the victims by using roadblocks and
holding PNC officers captive until the lynchings were completed,
although police were successful in saving other individuals from the
angry crowd. Investigators identified several leaders of the mob and
reportedly sought arrest warrants. In September residents of Zacualpa
created local security committees to protect themselves from the
criminal gang, claiming that the justice system is incapable of
punishing crime.
With MINUGUA's assistance, in July the Government inaugurated an
educational campaign to combat lynchings in the hardest-hit areas of
Alta Verapaz and Quiche, which included a training program for
educators, printed materials, and radio and televisionadvertisements in
three languages. In February in an effort to deter lynchings, Catholic
Archbishop Victor Hugo Martinez of Los Altos announced that Catholic
churches would suspend religious services for 6 months following any
lynching within his jurisdiction--the departments of Quetzaltenango and
Totonicapan.
b. Disappearance.--There was at least one credible report of
disappearance attributed to police forces. A prosecutor attributed the
February disappearance of Francisco Gonzalez Vasquez to two Zacapa
police officers. The prosecutor sought and obtained an arrest warrant
for PN inspector Marvin Gomez, but Gomez had not been apprehended at
year's end.
In addition, the PDH's office reported 12 complaints of forced
disappearance during the year (4 of which were attributed to government
forces), compared with 18 in 1998, 30 in 1997 and 47 in 1996. MINUGUA
reported one unconfirmed complaint of forced disappearance during the
year, compared with one in 1998 and three in 1997.
There was also at least one credible report of a politically
motivated disappearance. On April 30, prominent indigenous leader and
FDNG party member Carlos Coc Rax disappeared while crossing Lake Izabal
on a boat from the town of El Estor. At the time of his disappearance,
Coc Rax had received numerous death threats related to his defense of
several indigenous communities involved in land and lumber disputes
with large landowners and logging and mining companies near Lake
Izabal.
Disappearances in high-profile cases from recent years remained
unresolved at year's end. Arnoldo Xi, an indigenous- and peasant-rights
activist who reportedly was shot and abducted in March 1995, remained
missing. The whereabouts of Lorenzo Quiej Pu, a human rights activist
who disappeared in January 1994, also remained unknown. Also unsolved
was the case of Juan Jose Cabrera (known as ``Mincho''), the guerrilla
commander captured in 1996 while taking part in a kidnaping, who has
never reappeared. MINUGUA concluded that the EMP was responsible for
his capture, but the media and critics of the Government accused the
EMP and MINUGUA of covering up this finding in the interest of not
disrupting the peace process. There also was no clarification of
several late-1997 cases reported by MINUGUA in which persons believed
to have been involved in kidnapings were captured by heavily armed and
well-coordinated units that bore many of the characteristics of a
clandestine security force. The disappearances of San Marcos PAC
members Margarito Lopez and Obdulio Zapeta, army enlisted man Diego
Chel Matom, and farmers Ramona Munoz and Maritza Gil, who allegedly
were kidnaped in 1993 by guerrillas, also remained unresolved at year's
end.
The fate of guerrilla leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, who
disappeared following a March 1992 clash between army and URNG forces,
remains unknown. The IACHR continued its deliberations regarding the
Government's liability and damages in the case, based upon the
Government's 1998 acceptance of partial liability due to the judicial
system's inability to determine Bamaca's whereabouts.
In August 1998, Adriana Portillo Bartow filed criminal charges in
the 1981 abduction and disappearance of her two children and four other
members of her family. The lawsuit named former Interior Minister
Donald Alvarez Ruiz, former National Police Director German Chupina
Barahona, and Pedro Garcia Arredondo, the former chief of Commando Seis
(a plainclothes police urban counterinsurgency force) as defendants.
Garcia Arredondo was reelected as mayor of Nueva Santa Rosa in the
November elections, and therefore has immunity from prosecution. There
was no significant progress in the case and it remained pending at
year's end.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution provides for the integrity and security
of the person and prohibits physical or psychological torture of
prisoners; however, there were credible reports of torture, abuse, and
other mistreatment by members of the PNC. These reports typically
involved the use of excessive force during arrests or other police
operations. The Government and the PNC showed willingness to
investigate, prosecute, or otherwise punish officers who committed
abuses, and to transfer cases to the Public Ministry.
The PDH's office reported four complaints of torture during the
year, compared with two in 1998 and one unconfirmed case in 1997. The
ODHAG reported one case of torture during the year, compared with no
cases in 1998, no cases in 1997, and four cases in 1996. The sole case
reported by ODHAG involved apparent torture in the June 9 deaths of
four prisoners (See Section 1.a.). MINUGUA's 4th report on the peace
process, covering the period between August 1998 and November 1999,
noted a sharp rise in complaints of abuses committed by the PNC.
However, most of this increaseinvolved violations of due process, and
in part may be related to a greater public willingness to report such
offenses. MINUGUA investigated 24 complaints of torture, of which 22
were confirmed at year's end. The majority of these torture cases
involved abuse or mistreatment of suspects and detainees by PNC
officers or SIC investigators. While there were some credible reports
of coverups in these cases, the PNC generally punished the use of
excessive or illegal force by officers.
Amnesty International reported several incidents of police abuse,
including the case of a man who allegedly was shot and kicked to death
in February by police officers in the capital (see Section 1.a.). In
May plainclothes officers of the Criminal Investigation Section from
Quetzaltenango reportedly arrested six men for fighting at a community
festival in San Vincente Pacaya, Coatepeque. On the way to the police
station, the men allegedly were taken out of the vehicles, beaten,
robbed, and then beaten again at the station. The case remained under
investigation by the prosecutor's office in Coatepeque. A judge in
Chiquimula reported receiving threats and blackmail attempts from a PNC
officer accused of running over two persons with his patrol car.
Casa Alianza reported that, although the number of incidents of
abuse of street children was roughly equal to 1998 levels, far fewer
incidents allegedly were committed by members of the security forces.
Most acts of violence against street children were committed by
individuals, by private security guards, or in gang- and drug-related
violence among street children. Casa Alianza alleges only two cases of
abuse of street children by PNC officers: one case of mistreatment and
one of rape, which was still being investigated at year's end.
There were no reports that police used excessive force in evictions
of landless peasants occupying farms in attempts to gain land during
the year. Because of violent confrontations in the past, the Government
continued its policy of securing an eviction order from a court,
informing the occupiers of the coming eviction, and sending in a
lightly armed police contingent to end the occupation by using dialog
and verbal persuasion. The public continued to experience difficulty in
demonstrating or securing legal title to land, and virtually no
progress was made toward genuine land reform. The Ministry of
Government carried out numerous evictions without incident during the
year using this policy.
Corruption continued to be a problem, and there were credible
allegations of involvement by individual police officers in criminal
activity, including kidnaping (see Section 1.b.). The authorities
arrested some police officers. The authorities continued to take
stronger actions against officers found to have engaged in illegal
activities, referring some violations to the criminal justice system
rather than simply imposing administrative punishments. However, some
observers claimed that, rather than discipline its officers, the PNC
often just transferred them to a different part of the country. Ongoing
impunity for police who commit abuses remains a problem.
All PNC members are required to meet minimum education requirements
and pass an entrance examination. Former PN staff who wish to integrate
into the PNC must complete successfully a 3-month retraining course.
There also are screening procedures to detect suspected human rights
violators and agents involved in criminal activities. New recruits must
complete a 6-month training course before entering on duty. The
training course, developed with the assistance of MINUGUA, foreign
countries, and international organizations, includes extensive human
rights components. However, some observers claimed that the retraining
course was insufficiently rigorous and that relatively few members of
the PN were screened out during retraining, allowing the incorporation
of some poorly qualified PN members into the ranks of the new PNC.
Pursuant to the Peace Accords, former members of the military were
eligible to apply for positions in the PNC but were required to apply
like other civilians and complete the 6-month training course required
of all civilian applicants. However, the Government incorporated some
former members of the military and the former Mobile Military Police
into the ranks of the PNC upon the completion of only the shorter
course intended for current members of the PN. The former PMA members
were not subjected to a competitive selection process but were screened
carefully before they were allowed to enter the program. As of
September, there were 13,452 PNC personnel on duty, including 8,429
former PN members and 5,023 new recruits. An additional 2,486 former PN
members awaited training classes to join the PNC. Although government
plans called for 20,000 PNC members to be on duty around the country by
year's end, resource constraints limited that number to about 16,000.
The PNC's Office of Professional Responsibility (ORP) handles
internal investigations of misconduct by police officers. The ORP
received 1,517 complaints during the year, of which nearly half were
for minor infractions. Of the more serious complaints, 224 were for
abuse of authority, 258 were for bad conduct, 93 forthreats or
extortion, 83 for illegal detention, and 40 for homicide. In cases
where sufficient evidence suggested that criminal acts were committed,
ORP investigators forwarded them to the Public Ministry for further
investigation and prosecution. For example, of the 40 alleged homicide
cases, 23 were sent to the Ministry. While this number represented an
increase over 1998 levels, a significant portion of this increase
likely was attributable to the fact that thousands of additional
officers were deployed during the year. In addition, strong anecdotal
evidence suggested that that the public was less afraid and more
willing to bring complaints against the PNC than against its
predecessor. Most observers still considered the PNC to be a
significant improvement over the PN, although there were signs of
increasing friction as communities began to face the practical
challenges of integrating the new police force into the community and
supporting its work.
In 1998 the PNC accepted some 60 police candidates from indigenous
communities in the Ixil region--approximately 30 of whom graduated on
their first attempt--to ensure that PNC personnel in those communities
are proficient in the local language and are able to operate
effectively in those communities.
No active members of the military serve in the police command
structure, but in 1998 President Arzu ordered the army to support the
police temporarily in response to a nationwide wave of violent crime.
Arzu extended this order and it remained in effect at the end of the
year. While the measure was popular politically, given the public's
preoccupation with crime and security, it appeared to open the door to
renewed military involvement in internal security and police functions,
a role that is prohibited by the Peace Accords. Despite this ambiguity,
military personnel were subordinated to police control during joint
patrols or operations.
The case of Sister Dianna Ortiz, who was kidnaped near Antigua,
tortured, and sexually abused by a group of armed men in November 1989,
remained in the investigative phase. However, the prosecutor agreed to
send interrogatories to her, so as to accommodate her reluctance to
return to Guatemala. There was no real progress in her case at year's
end.
Prison conditions remained harsh but not life threatening. The
prison system continued to suffer from a serious lack of resources,
particularly in the areas of prison security and medical facilities.
The Government reported that prison capacity nationwide was 8,373
persons, and there were approximately 8,460 inmates in September. Some
institutions were overcrowded; for example, in September the Preventive
Detention Center for Men in Guatemala City was approximately 70 percent
over its designed capacity. A project to expand prison capacity at the
maximum security prison in Esquintla was completed during the year.
Prisoners also complained of inadequate food. Corruption--especially
drug-related--is widespread. Prison officials reported frequent escape
attempts and other manifestations of prisoner unrest, and the frequency
of jailbreaks continued to be a matter of serious public concern. The
573 female prisoners in the penal system are held in facilities
separate from men, and minor children are held in other detention
facilities. The Government permitted access to prisons by family
members.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention; however, there were frequent credible
reports of arrests without judicial warrants, illegal detention, and
failure to adhere to prescribed time limits in legal proceedings. The
Constitution requires that a court-issued arrest warrant be presented
to a suspect prior to arrest unless he is caught in the act of
committing a crime. Police may not detain a suspect for over 6 hours
without bringing the case before a judge. Once a suspect has been
arraigned, the prosecutor generally has 3 months to complete his
investigation and file his case. The law also provides for bail and
access to lawyers.
There are no comprehensive, reliable data on the number of
arbitrary detentions, although most accounts agree that the security
forces routinely ignored writs of habeas corpus in cases of illegal
detention. The PDH reported 20 complaints of illegal detention during
the year, compared with 18 in 1998. From January through September,
MINUGUA investigated some 89 complaints of illegal or arbitrary
detention during the year, and confirmed 85 by year's end.
Reliable estimates suggest that approximately 62 percent of those
incarcerated are awaiting trial. The law sets a limit of 3 months for
pretrial detention; however, longer detentions still occurred
routinely. Prisoners often are detained past their legal trial or
release dates. Prisoners sometimes were notreleased in a timely fashion
after completing their sentences due to the failure of judges to issue
the necessary court order.
In the wake of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, President Arzu decreed a
state of public emergency, ratified by the Congress, which resulted in
the suspension of certain constitutional rights, enabling law
enforcement officials to detain persons without a judicial warrant or
without discovering them in the act of committing a crime. The state of
emergency expired on January 31. There were no reports of abuse of
authority due to the suspension.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and it is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judicial system often fails to
provide fair trials due to inefficiency, corruption, insufficient
personnel or funds, and intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and
witnesses. The courts' response to human rights violations, as well as
to general criminal activity, has been inadequate, although during the
year the Government achieved convictions in some important human rights
cases from previous years. However, more often, prior convictions for
human rights violations were reversed or annulled for technical
deficiencies or procedural shortcomings. Observers believe that at
least some of these rulings were actually the result of corruption or
intimidation of judges. There were numerous credible allegations of
corruption in the judiciary.
Members of the judiciary and prosecutors continued to receive
threats aimed at influencing current decisions or as reprisals for past
decisions. Death threats and intimidation of the judiciary were
commonplace in most cases involving human rights violations,
particularly where the defendants were current or former members of the
military, military commissioners, or PAC's. For example, in May a
former judge in Puerto Barrios was killed in apparent retaliation for
death sentences he handed down while on the bench (see Section 1.a.).
Judges and prosecutors in the Xaman massacre case allegedly received
numerous threats before and during the trial (see Section 1.a.). The
prosecutor and his staff in the Bishop Gerardi murder investigation
reported wiretapping, surveillance, and frequent death threats (see
Section 1.a.). In March and October, respectively, a judge and a
prosecutor in the Gerardi case resigned and left the country due, at
least in part, to threats and intimidation (see Section 1.a.). In
September the mob that attempted to free former military commissioner
Candido Noriega also threatened to kill the judge (see Section 1.a.). A
small number of prosecutors handling high-profile cases have been
assigned bodyguards; however, in general the Government has not
allocated sufficient resources to the judiciary's physical security.
The judiciary is composed of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme
Court, appellate courts, lower courts, and courts of special
jurisdiction (e.g., labor courts). The Constitution provides that
Congress elect all Supreme Court (CSJ) and Appellate Court (CA)
magistrates every 5 years from lists prepared by panels composed of
active magistrates, representatives of the bar association, and law
school deans. In October new CSJ and CA magistrates were chosen, amid
some accusations that political parties were attempting to fill the
courts with their sympathizers prior to the November general elections.
Despite such allegations, the selection process was more participatory
and transparent than ever before. There are several community courts in
indigenous rural areas (see Section 5).
The Criminal Procedures Code, which came into effect in mid-1994,
provides for the presumption of innocence, the right to be present at
trial, the right to counsel, plea bargaining, and the possibility of
release on bail. Trials are public--allowing victims, family members,
and human rights groups to observe the process--and verdicts are
rendered by three-judge panels. The code also provides for language
interpretation for those who require it; however, in practice this
provision is not always honored due to budgetary and other constraints
(see Section 5). The Public Ministry, which is independent of the
executive branch, may initiate criminal proceedings on its own or in
response to a complaint. Private parties may participate in the
prosecution of criminal cases as coplaintiffs. Lengthy investigations
and frequent procedural motions by both defense and prosecution often
lead to excessively long pretrial detention (see Section 1.d.). Courts
showed little willingness to exercise discretion in dismissing
frivolous or patently invalid motions. As a consequence, parties
continued to use such motions as delaying tactics, frequently holding
up trials for several months or even years.
Inefficiency and corruption in the courts, Public Ministry, and
police continued to impede the proper functioning of the judicial
system and undermine the right to due process. The Supreme Court
continued to seek the suspension of judges and to conduct criminal
investigations for improprieties or irregularities incases under its
jurisdiction. According to government statistics, through August the
Supreme Court imposed 1,215 sanctions against members of the judiciary
for offenses ranging from simple impropriety to illegal conduct. Of
those sanctions against judges, 1,159 were findings of impropriety, 66
were warnings, 9 judges were fired, and 1 was suspended. Magistrates
received 13 findings of impropriety. The Public Ministry has been
hampered in its efforts to investigate crimes and prosecute offenders
by inadequate training and equipment and insufficient numbers of
investigators. In addition, prosecutors remained susceptible to
intimidation and corruption. It was difficult to attract qualified
personnel to the courts because of the low salaries offered.
Notwithstanding this difficulty, the judiciary fired over 500 employees
in August, alleging that they had participated in an illegal work
stoppage in 1996 (see Section 6.a.). In October the CSJ reinstated 125
of these employees. Some observers speculated that the firings were
politically motivated. In October Congress passed a law on legal
careers, which established a system to regulate the income, terms of
office, promotion, training, and disciplinary measures, as well as
other activities of judges and magistrates, to support their
professionalism and independence. The new law took effect on December
2, and is intended to speed trials and reduce corruption by recognizing
and protecting competent judges while creating mechanisms to remove
incompetent or corrupt ones.
In cooperation with foreign donors, the Government continued its
efforts to reform the judicial system. In September 1997, the
Government formed an interagency mechanism to coordinate reform efforts
among the judicial branch, the Public Ministry, the Ministry of
Government, and the Public Defenders Service, which are the four
principal governmental institutions involved in the administration of
justice. Since 1994 the Government has created 215 judgeships
throughout the country. One of the most successful reform efforts has
been the creation of ``justice centers,'' which bring together judges,
public defenders, prosecutors, private law practitioners, police,
municipal representatives, military officers, and civil society in a
team approach to dispute resolution and problem solving. The centers
have installed modernized docket and case filing systems in the courts,
thereby increasing efficiency and public service. Centers are located
in Zacapa, Quetzaltenango, Escuintla, Nebaj, the Peten, and most
recently, Huehuetenango. The Supreme Court extended the administrative
model of the justice centers to include the criminal courts in the
capital by creating a new Clerk of Court office, which has streamlined
the processing of cases, increased transparency, and improved customer
service.
Other judicial reforms included the attendance of over 400
prospective judges and assistant judges at special courses at the
School of Judicial Studies, from which applicants were selected to fill
vacancies in the judiciary.
Despite some progress, much remains to be done to reform the
judiciary and establish effective rule of law, as mandated by the Peace
Accords. Many of the structural and procedural weaknesses of the
judiciary would have been addressed by the proposed constitutional
reforms that were defeated in a national referendum in May (see Section
3). An August visit by U.N. Special Rapporteur on Justice Param
Cumaraswamy highlighted many of the justice sector's acute problems and
the continued need for sweeping reforms. Although his final report was
not expected until January 2000, Cumaraswamy offered several
conclusions at the end of his visit. Cumaraswamy observed that the
judicial system has not recovered from the damage it sustained during
the internal conflict, noting its lack of independence and complicity
as a former tool of repression. In addition, he concluded that the
judicial system is hampered by inefficiency, incompetence, corruption,
influence peddling, and lack of resources. The Rapporteur also
criticized the threats and intimidation experienced by judicial
employees, the prevalence of lynchings and other forms of vigilante
justice, and low prosecution rates as manifestations of ongoing
impunity.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of
home, correspondence, and private documents; however, allegations
persist that the authorities sometimes disregard these provisions.
Elements of the security forces reportedly continued to monitor private
communications. Press reports continued to accuse the Presidential
Military Staff of wiretapping telephones. The prosecutor and his staff
in the Bishop Gerardi murder investigation reported wiretapping and
surveillance (see Section 1.a.).
The military continued to honor the 1994 presidential order to
suspend all conscription, including forced recruitment.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of expression, and the Government generally respected this
right in practice. Unlike the previous year, there were no reports of
self-censorship. There were some unconfirmed reports that members of
the press were targets of intimidation.
In addition to regular and open criticism of government policies,
the media publicizes communiques from human rights organizations,
unions, and groups opposed to the Government or its policies. The press
criticized the military and other powerful sectors. For example, the
press reported a number of allegations by human rights groups that the
EMP continues to monitor private telephone conversations (see Section
1.f.). The press also frequently published stories on reputed drug
traffickers and on official corruption.
The Government prepared public information programs, which the
radio and television stations were required to broadcast. The
Government controlled two national channels, one by the Presidency and
one by the Ministry of Education. Critics alleged that the channel
controlled by the Presidency was a propaganda organ rather than a
source for public information, particularly during the election
campaign. Opposition parties had no such access to the media but could
purchase broadcast time. During the election campaign, opposing parties
frequently accused the Government of using its nightly information
program to publicize the Government's accomplishments, in violation of
a prior Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) ruling that prohibits such
activity.
There were no reports of threats or violence against journalists.
The trial of the two alleged killers in the June 1997 murder of
journalist Jorge Luis Marroquin Sagastume was expected to begin in
September. The victim's relatives continued to pursue charges filed
against the crime's alleged intellectual author, former Jocotan Mayor
Manuel Ohajaca, who apparently acted out of revenge or personal
animosity.
The Constitution provides for academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
respects this right in practice. Peaceful demonstrations were common,
and demonstrators sometimes occupied government institutions. In all
these cases, the police acted with restraint, and the authorities
negotiated a peaceful departure of the demonstrators.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice. The Government did not
interfere with political associations. However, organizations must
obtain legal status, a formerly cumbersome and expensive procedure. The
URNG and several NGO's have alleged that this law particularly
disadvantaged organizations representing marginalized social sectors,
including indigenous groups. In December 1997, the Congress enacted a
statute that sought to provide a less cumbersome mechanism for
registering civil associations. Regulations implementing this statute
were adopted in 1998, and media reports suggest that the new law and
regulations have streamlined the registration process considerably.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
freedom, and the Government respects this right in practice. There is
no state religion; however, the Constitution recognizes explicitly the
separate legal personality of the Catholic Church. Members of a
religion need not register simply in order to worship together.
However, the Government requires religious congregations (other than
the Catholic Church), as well as other nonreligious associations and
NGO's, to register as legal entities in order to be able to transact
business.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice. In
October 1998, President Arzu temporarily suspended constitutional
provisions protecting freedom of movement until January, in response to
hurricane Mitch (see Section 1.d.).
The Government grants refugee status and asylum in accordance with
the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Governmentcooperates with the
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees from other countries.
The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. There were no
reports of the forced return of persons to countries where they feared
persecution.
Voluntary repatriation of refugees from Mexico concluded. The UNHCR
estimated that approximately 2,000 refugees returned, bringing the
total to over 40,000 since initiation of the program in 1993.
Guatemalans who still remain in Mexico do so by choice.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government by peaceful and
democratic means, through secret ballot and universal suffrage for
those 18 years of age and older. Members of the armed forces and police
may not vote. Since the return to democracy and civilian rule in 1985,
there have been nine free elections. International observers concluded
that both the November general elections and the December runoff
presidential election were free and fair. During and after the November
round of elections, political parties lodged numerous complaints of
fraud and misconduct against each other. The vast majority of these
complaints were unaccompanied by evidence and appeared to be partisan
attempts to disqualify opponents or annul election results. However,
the most serious allegation was a complaint brought to the Supreme
Electoral Tribunal (TSE) by the FRG that the PAN-led Guatemala City
Administration interfered with city bus transportation on election day
to prevent FRG supporters from reaching the polls. Based on this and
other FRG allegations of PAN fraud, the FRG leadership requested a
recount of the Guatemala City results. The TSE ruled against a recount,
finding insufficient evidence of fraud or misconduct. Due largely to
unexpectedly high voter turnout, the TSE was slow to report the
November vote count. Public uncertainty over the delayed count
contributed to violence and disturbances in a number of municipalities
with highly contested local races.
Voters elect the 113-member, unicameral Congress every 4 years
using a system of proportional representation based on population, with
deputies elected both from districts and from a nationwide list. The
Congress had 91 deputies from districts and 22 from the national list.
The November elections involved 13 political parties, including 2 2-
party coalitions. Four parties and both coalitions won seats in the
legislature, led by the FRG with a 63 seat majority, followed by the
PAN with 37 seats, and the New Nation Alliance coalition, which
included the URNG party, with 9 seats. Voter participation in the
November round was at a 13-year high. Congress can and does act
independently of the executive, but fragmentation along party lines and
a weak support and staff structure result in a legislature that is
relatively weak.
The former URNG guerrillas met all legal requirements for
qualification as a political party and competed in the November general
elections.
On December 26, FRG presidential candidate Alfonso Portillo won a
runoff election against PAN candidate Oscar Berger, with 68 percent of
the popular vote, in an election that international observers
characterized as free and fair.
Government efforts to implement the Peace Accords were selective.
On May 16, in a national referendum, voters rejected the entire package
of 50 constitutional reforms approved by Congress in 1998, dealing a
significant blow to the peace process. Only 20 percent of the
electorate voted. The defeated amendments included provisions to
recognize, respect, and protect indigenous languages and traditional
customs, professionalize the judicial service, give civilian courts
jurisdiction over military personnel, and define the army as an
apolitical organization. While ordinary laws could be enacted to
accomplish many of the reforms, the constitutional reforms nonetheless
held great symbolic value for the peace process.
Prior to the vote, on January 9, the Constitutional Court granted a
temporary injunction to prevent the Supreme Electoral Tribunal from
calling a national plebiscite on the amendments, following a request by
the Center for the Defense of the Constitution (CEDECON), a private,
nonpartisan association of lawyers. Following the Constitutional
Court's decision, COPMAGUA--an indigenous NGO--and the URNG political
party blocked roads in Guatemala City and several other locations to
protest the decision. On February 9, the Constitutional Court overruled
a decision by Congress to send the 50 amendments as a single package
for the referendum, but ruled that Congress would be acting within the
Constitution if it grouped the amendments into 6 thematic categories
before sending them to voters. Congress then grouped the amendments
into four categories before sending them to voters. Every major
political party had expressed support for the amendments, although none
actively campaigned on their behalf.
There are no legal impediments to women's participation in politics
and government, but women are underrepresented in the political arena.
Nevertheless, women hold some prominent political positions. Voters
elected nine women to Congress in November; women hold two seats on the
Supreme Court; and one on the Constitutional Court. There were two
female ministers in the Arzu government.
The Constitution provides for equal rights for indigenous people.
Some have attained high positions as judges and government officials,
including 15 members of the new Congress; there were 6 indigenous
members in the 80-member Congress before the elections. Indigenous
leader Rigoberto Queme was reelected as mayor of Guatemala's second-
largest city, Quetzaltenango, in a narrow victory in which there were
credible allegations of vote-buying by Queme's political organization,
the Xel-ju Civic Committee. Indigenous people still are
underrepresented significantly in politics due to limited educational
opportunity and pervasive discrimination (See Section 5). There were no
indigenous members in the Cabinet of the Arzu Government. On August 17,
the Congress opened outreach offices in Quetzaltenango (in a heavily
indigenous area), Jutiapa, and Coban, in order to facilitate
communication between the legislative branch and citizens in outlying
areas.
There was an unconfirmed report from a human rights organization
that groups of indigenous women from Quiche effectively were prevented
from registering to vote in time for the May constitutional referendum.
Reportedly, officials told them at various times that the registration
campaign was not yet underway, that the proper forms were not
available, or that notarized copies of additional documents were
required. By all accounts voter registration was generally difficult,
complicated, time consuming, and expensive, particularly for poor,
mostly indigenous rural voters, who had to incur considerable expense
just to travel to the towns or cities where registration took place.
However, women and indigenous voter participation in the November
general elections increased.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government permits local human rights groups to operate without
restriction. Numerous domestic and international groups investigate and
report freely on human rights issues. Senior government officials also
met with numerous foreign government officials and international human
rights monitors. While many international human rights organizations
and their workers do not enjoy formal legal status, they continue to
operate openly.
During the year, many NGO's credibly reported receiving threats or
being intimidated by unidentified persons. Human rights activists and
jurists working on cases involving human rights abuses, drug
trafficking, and other sensitive matters frequently reported receiving
anonymous threats. At least one observer claimed that forensic and
human rights workers exhuming a clandestine cemetery at San Francisco
Nenton, Huehuetenango, were victims of intimidation and harassment. In
addition, at least two murders, one disappearance, and one abduction of
human rights activists allegedly were committed for political reasons,
possibly related to the victims' human rights work. These cases
included the killing of FDNG party member and indigenous human rights
activist Tomas Tol Salvador (see Section 1.a.), the death of
sociologist Maria Ramirez Gonzalez (see Section 1.a.), the
disappearance of Lake Izabal indigenous leader Carlos Coc Rax (see
Section 1.b.), and the abduction of a security escort in the Candido
Noriega case (see Section 1.a.).
The ODHAG personnel working on the Bishop Gerardi murder case
reported frequent and persistent death threats, surveillance, and other
acts of intimidation. On April 16, three armed men broke into the home
of ODHAG director Ronalth Ochaeta, hit and threatened his domestic
employee, but stole nothing of real value. The break-in was widely
considered to be an act of intimidation because it occurred just days
before the ODHAG was to commemorate the first anniversary of Bishop
Gerardi's death. Furthermore, the assailants reportedly left behind a
piece of cement cinder block--the same type of object used to kill
Bishop Gerardi. Several months later, Ochaeta resigned and left the
country.
Every 5 years, Congress elects the Human Rights Ombudsman from
three candidates chosen by the Congressional Committee on Human Rights.
The Ombudsman reports to Congress, and monitors the rights provided for
by the Constitution. The PDH's rulings do not have the force of law.
The Ombudsman, Julio Arango Escobar, operates with a large degree of
independence from other branches of the Government, often ruling on
controversial issues not normally considered human rights topics, such
as bus fares and electricity rates. During the year, Arango continued
to complain that the Congress neither funded his office adequately nor
implemented his recommendations on human rights. The office'slack of
funding limited the possibility of developing adequate investigative
capabilities. Relations between the Ombudsman's office and MINUGUA were
strained, in part by Arango's issuance of a statement accusing MINUGUA
officials of complicity in the jailbreak of the former PAC members
convicted for killing Juan Chanay Pablo (see Section 1.a.). MINUGUA
responded by explaining that its involvement in the case was limited to
assisting Arango's own representative in filing a petition requesting
that the convicted PAC members be jailed closer to home, so as to
facilitate family visits. Arango also publicly criticized the
harmonious working relationship between MINUGUA and COPREDEH, claiming
that MINUGUA's intent was to marginalize the PDH. Upon the expiration
of MINUGUA's mandate at the end of 2000, the PDH is scheduled to take
over MINUGUA's human rights verification function.
COPREDEH actively sought to forge a responsive and cooperative
relationship with both domestic and international human rights
monitors, often acting as a liaison between such groups and other
government offices. COPREDEH sought to negotiate amicable settlements
in many cases of past human rights violations pending before organs of
the inter-American human rights system, rather than litigating such
cases.
On February 25, the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH)
fulfilled its Peace Accord mandate by issuing ``Guatemala: Memory of
Silence,'' its 12-volume report on the internal conflict based on
witness and survivor testimony and historical records provided by the
Government (including the military), international organizations, and
human rights NGO's. Volume One outlined the CEH's mandate and
procedures and explained the causes and origins of the internal
conflict, in which an estimated 200,000 persons disappeared or were
killed. Volumes Two and Three listed the acts of violence and human
rights abuses. Volume Four detailed the consequences and effects of the
violence, and Volume Five offered conclusions and recommendations.
Volumes Six through Twelve contained the case data collected and used
by the Commission in its findings.
Given the CEH's relatively weak mandate, most observers were
surprised at the strength and breadth of the report's findings,
conclusions, and recommendations. The report found that government
forces (the army, military commissioners, paramilitary groups, and
PAC's) were responsible for approximately 93 percent of all human
rights abuses and acts of violence. The report also found the
Government responsible for acts of genocide against the Mayan
community, citing the coincidence of significant army deployments to
those predominantly indigenous regions in which the vast majority of
massacres were committed during the bloodiest period of the conflict,
from June 1981 to December 1982. The report found that the guerrillas
were responsible for about 3 percent of all abuses and acts of
violence. Following publication of the report, human rights defenders
reported being threatened, having their telephones tapped, and being
followed; some left the country temporarily.
Many observers were disappointed by the Arzu administration's
ambivalent and legalistic response to the findings and recommendations
of the CEH. Human rights groups continued to criticize the Government's
refusal to create a foundation to follow up on the CEH's
recommendations or to carry out far-reaching reforms of the military.
MINUGUA maintained a staff of approximately 400 persons, with
regional offices to monitor implementation of the human rights
provisions of the Peace Accords and to strengthen democratic
institutions. MINUGUA stated that the Government generally cooperated
with its investigations but cited occasional isolated incidents in
which government officials or institutions had obstructed its efforts.
In July the Government hosted a visit by U.N. Special Rapporteur
for Children's Issues Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, whose visit focused on
child abuse, adoption, and other children's issues (see Section 5).
In August the Government hosted a visit by U.N. Special Rapporteur
on Justice Param Cumaraswamy, who met with government officials,
diplomats, NGO's, and other civil society groups in a thorough review
of the justice sector (see Section 1.e.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language or Social Status
The Constitution states that all persons are free and equal in
dignity and rights, and that the State must protect the life, liberty,
justice, security, peace, and development of all citizens. However, in
practice, the Government is frequently unable to enforce these
provisions, due to inadequate resources, corruption, and a
dysfunctional judicial system.
Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence,
remains common among all social classes. The 1996 Law on Intrafamily
Violence provided that the Public Ministry, the national police, family
courts, legal clinics, and the PDH can receive complaints of domestic
violence. Domestic violence is defined as ``whatever action or omission
by direct or indirect manner causes damage, or physical, sexual,
psychological, or patrimonial suffering'' to a person within the family
group. The law provides for the issuance of restraining orders against
alleged aggressors and obligates the national police to intervene in
situations of domestic violence. The law allows a rapist to be
exonerated when the victim agrees to marry the man, but the Public
Ministry must also approve the marriage when the victim is below the
age of 18.
Victims rarely report criminal sexual violence, although the number
of complaints of such offenses continues to increase significantly. PNC
statistics showed 323 rapes during the year, compared to 220 in 1998
and 167 in 1997. Many observers believe that this increase does not
reflect an increase in the number of rapes committed, but reflects an
increased willingness on the part of victims to come forward, greater
public confidence in the PNC, and improved record keeping of crime
statistics. Despite these advances, relatively few rape cases go to
court, in large part because police have little training or
investigative capacity for such crimes, and because many rape victims
are still reluctant to report and prosecute such crimes. Unofficial
statistics suggest that there were 80 convictions during the year for
rape or related crimes, compared with 67 convictions in 1998.
Complaints of spousal abuse continued to rise due, at least in
part, to increased nationwide educational programs, which have
encouraged women to seek assistance. In 1998 the PDH reported
approximately 2,600 complaints of domestic violence nationwide. Judges
may issue an injunction against an abusive spouse or companion, and the
police are charged with enforcing such injunctions. The Women's Rights
Department of the PDH and various NGO's provide medical and legal
assistance and information on family planning. The Women's Rights
Department drafted proposed regulations to implement the provision of
the Law on Intrafamily Violence establishing a National Commission for
the Prevention of Domestic Violence, but the regulations had not yet
been adopted at year's end. In September the Arzu Government created
the office of Ombudsman for Indigenous Women and appointed Juana
Catinac Xom de Coyoy as its first Director. The office was created to
provide social services for victims of intrafamily or social violence,
as well as mediation, conflict resolution, and legal services, with the
first branch offices to be opened in those areas where indigenous women
suffered the most during the internal conflict.
Sexual harassment in the workplace is common.
The Constitution asserts the principle of equality between the
sexes. Nonetheless, in practice, women face job discrimination, are
less likely to win management positions, and on average receive
significantly lower pay than men. Some women are subjected to
preemployment pregnancy tests. Women are employed primarily in low-wage
jobs in the textile industry, agriculture, retail businesses, and the
public sector. More working women than men are employed in the informal
sector of the economy, where pay and benefits are generally lower.
Women may own, manage, and inherit property on an equal basis with men.
During the year, Congress repealed the rarely enforced Civil Code
article that enabled a husband to deny his wife the right to work
outside the home, when, in his judgment, that would compromise her
duties as housekeeper and mother. Congress also repealed the article
that placed the husband in charge of administering the family's
property, replacing it with one that puts both spouses on equal footing
with regard to joint or individually owned property.
The National Women's Forum, inaugurated in November 1997, continued
to promote women's issues by participating in local and regional forums
organized by political parties during the general election campaign. In
addition, the Forum prepared a plan for development and women's issues,
which is scheduled to be presented to the Government in January 2000.
The Forum's suggestions for promoting the development of women were
included in a cabinet-level document on that topic for the Arzu
administration.
Children.--The Constitution charges the Government with protecting
the physical and mental health, as well as the moral well-being, of
minors. However, despite these provisions, the Government in the past
has not devoted sufficient resources to ensure adequate educational and
health services for children. The Government budgeted approximately
$296 million (2.25 billion quetzals) for education and approximately
$163 million (1.24 billion quetzals) for health care, an increase over
1998 levels.
The Constitution provides for compulsory education for all children
up to the sixth grade. However, less than half the population actually
receives a primary education, and only 3 of 10 students that begin
primary school complete it. Only one of eight girls who begin school
graduate from sixth grade. According to the CALDH, between 50 and 57
percent of children between the ages of 7 and 17 can be considered
completely ``outside of the educational system.'' Public expenditure
for education was equivalent to only 1.7 percent of GDP. Children in
rural and indigenous areas are less likely to complete primary school.
Approximately 2.3 million children between the ages of 5 and 12
were enrolled in schools as of January; a 15 percent increase in
enrollment from 1998, according to the Ministry of Education. The
Ministry also reported that 2,841 communities now have access to
educational services for the first time. There have been special
initiatives to promote the education of girls, and about 46,000 girls
received incentive scholarships from the Ministry of Education during
the year.
A recent United Nations Children's Fund report, titled ``Progress
of the Nations,'' concluded that the country's children are at
significant risk for infant mortality, abnormally low body weight, low
school attendance, and AIDS. According to the study, 56 percent of
rural children and 35 percent of urban children under age 5 show signs
of underdeveloped growth. The PDH reported that 73 percent of children
under 5 years of age suffer from malnutrition, and that 38 percent of
elementary school-age children and 79 percent of secondary school-age
children do not attend school.
Most estimates indicate that reports of child abuse continue to
increase. The Procuracy General reported 1,478 cases of child abuse
during the year, compared to 1,172 cases in all of 1998.
The abuse of street children (see Section 1.c.) remained a serious
problem in major cities. Most credible estimates, including a May
report by the Presidential Secretariat on Social Work and NGO's, put
the number of street children at approximately 6,000, with the majority
of these youths concentrated in Guatemala City. Criminals--reported to
include private security guards and corrupt police or military
personnel--often recruit these children into thievery or prostitution
rings. According to Casa Alianza, drugs, prostitution, and gangs posed
the greatest danger to this vulnerable group during the year. In
contrast to previous years, most violence against street children was
committed by individuals, private security guards, and other street
children, not by police or other government forces, although there were
two reports of abuse of street children by PNC officers (see Section
1.c). The Government and a number of NGO's operate youth centers, but
the funds devoted to them are not sufficient to alleviate the problem.
The Government created a Permanent Commission for Children and Youth in
1996 to investigate cases of mistreatment. Implementation of the new
Minors' Code, which would offer greater legal protection to children,
was deferred until March 1, 2000, due to strong political opposition
from certain sectors. Opponents, including religious leaders, argued
that the code derogated parental rights and threatened the integrity of
the family.
COPREDEH continued weekly meetings of the Permanent Commission for
Children, composed of representatives from Casa Alianza and from the
judicial and executive branches, with the aim of addressing the
problems of street children. The Government continued its program to
train instructors to educate civil society groups and the public about
children's rights. The PDH reported that it investigated cases of
sexual exploitation of children in Escuintla, Alta Verapaz,
Huehuetenango, and San Marcos.
The Ministry of Labor has noted an increase in child prostitution
in the towns along the borders with Mexico and El Salvador. Along the
border with El Salvador, many child prostitutes are brought into the
country from El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras by organized rings,
who force the children into prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
In July the Government hosted a visit by U.N. Special Rapporteur
for Children's Issues Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, whose mandate included
investigating matters such as child pornography and prostitution.
Although her final report is not scheduled to be published until April
2000, Calcetas called for a new adoption law to combat trafficking in
children, increased efforts to reduce child abuse, and greater
attention and resources to the physical, educational, and emotional
needs of children.
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that the State
should protect disabled persons. Nonetheless, physically disabled
persons are discriminated against in education and employment
practices, and few resources are devoted to combat this problem or to
assist thedisabled. However, in 1996 Congress passed a law mandating
equal access to public facilities, prohibiting discrimination based on
disability, and providing other legal protections. The PDH is drafting
proposed regulations to implement the provisions of the Law on
Protection of the Elderly and the Law on Attention to Disabled Persons.
The law defines a disabled person as one whose physical, mental, or
emotional deficiencies limit performance of normal activities. It
stipulates equal opportunity for disabled persons in health, education,
work, recreation, sports, and cultural activities. It also provides
that all disabled persons receive the benefits of labor laws, social
security, and have the right to work. In addition, the law establishes
equal education opportunities, the requirement that buildings meet
access codes, and the right to equal pay. While implementation of the
new law has been slow, a National Council for the Disabled, composed of
representatives of concerned government ministries and agencies, met
regularly to formulate regulations needed to implement the legislation.
Indigenous People.--The Constitution states that the country is
composed of diverse ethnic groups and obliges the Government to
recognize, respect, and promote the lifestyles, customs, traditions,
forms of social organization, and manner of dress of indigenous people.
The Government is obliged to consult with its indigenous population
before enacting any legislation that could affect it. In September the
Arzu Government created the office of Ombudsman for Indigenous Women
and appointed Juana Catinac Xom de Coyoy as its first Director.
Indigenous people constitute over one-half the population but
remain largely outside of the country's political, economic, social,
and cultural mainstream. The 1994 census, the most recent, states that
42.8 percent of the population are indigenous; however, most observers
believe that this figure is low. There is no single indicator of
indigenous status, and there are at least 22 separate indigenous ethnic
groups. In addition to the indigenous Mayan groups, there is an
indigenous Xinca community of some 6,000 persons. A separate minority
group is the Garifuna, who are descendents of Africans brought to the
Caribbean coast as laborers.
Indigenous people were the most common victims of extrajudicial
killings and other serious human rights abuses during the internal
conflict. The commissions established to discuss the implementation of
constitutional provisions relating to indigenous rights met during the
year to formulate recommendations to the Government regarding
protection of indigenous culture, languages, traditions, lands, and
sacred sites. Indigenous people are organizing into interest groups to
promote bilingual education, women's rights, and community development.
The Government also is devoting increased resources to bilingual
education. In April the Minister of Education stated that students at
the Western National School of Commercial Sciences could wear
traditional dress; the school had attempted to expel two students who
refused to wear the school uniform.
Rural indigenous people have limited educational opportunities and
thus have fewer employment opportunities. Many indigenous people are
illiterate or do not speak Spanish. Linguistic barriers hinder
interaction with the Government and limit access to public services,
including the judiciary, since few current officials speak any of the
24 indigenous languages. In 1998 the Indigenous Languages
Officialization Commission issued a report, in which it recommended
that a variety of public services be provided in the four most widely
spoken indigenous languages (Kiche, Qeqchi, Mam, and Kaqchikel), with a
lesser degree of services provided in less widely spoken indigenous
languages.
Indigenous people arrested for crimes are often at a disadvantage
due to their limited comprehension of Spanish. The Criminal Procedures
Code states that the courts must provide interpretation for anyone
requiring such services during criminal proceedings. There are 67
interpreters at all levels of the legal system, from the police to the
formal courts, to assure non-Spanish speakers the means to bring
complaints, resolve conflicts, and provide testimony. Interpreters are
concentrated in former conflict areas of the country; more interpreters
were in training. In January 1998, several community courts were
created in primarily indigenous, rural areas to decentralize justice
and incorporate customary Mayan law for minor offenses. The University
of San Carlos offers a postgraduate degree in indigenous customary law.
Judges, prosecutors, public defenders, judicial translators, and others
already have received the degree, which emphasizes criminal law and
human rights.
In May the movement for greater indigenous rights suffered a major
setback when the constitutional reform packages were defeated. These
reforms would have expanded and solidified a number of rights for the
indigenous community, in accordance with both the Constitution and the
Peace Accords. Observers attributed much of the success of the informal
antireformcampaign to misplaced or exaggerated fears that the reforms
would grant too much power to indigenous groups and create a separate
and privileged justice system for them.
Several indigenous leaders disappeared or were killed during the
year. On May 18, unknown assailants abducted and killed Tomas Tol
Salvador, an activist for the Council of Ethnic Communities and an FDNG
leader, in Quiche (see Section 1.a.). On April 30, prominent indigenous
leader and FDNG party member Carlos Coc Rax disappeared while crossing
Lake Izabal on a boat from the town of El Estor (see Section 1.b.). On
July 27, unidentified assailants shot and killed Mayan priest Raul Coc
Choc at his home in the department of Chimaltenango (see Section 1.a.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
provide workers with freedom of association and the right to form and
join trade unions. The Government does not control unions. Major
reforms to the Labor Code in 1992 mandated steps to improve worker
rights by facilitating freedom of association, strengthening the rights
of working women, increasing penalties for violations of labor laws,
and enhancing the role of the Labor Ministry and labor courts in
enforcing the statutes. All workers have the right to form or join
unions, including public sector employees, with the exception of
members of the security forces.
The Labor Code envisions a well-articulated institutional structure
for enforcement. However, in practice the poverty of the populace, the
legacy of violent repression of labor activists during the internal
conflict, the deep-seated hostility of the business and military
establishment towards independent and self-governing labor
organizations, and the weakness of the labor inspectors and labor court
system constrain the exercise of worker rights and limit enforcement of
labor standards. In its Fourth Report on the Peace Process, MINUGUA
noted that ``genuine trade union freedom does not exist'' due to
antiunion violence.
Only 2 percent of the 3.5 million person work force belong to labor
organizations, according to the Labor Ministry. The approximately 1,300
registered unions and 400 company-sponsored ``solidarity
organizations'' are independent of government and political party
domination. Labor code amendments have simplified the process for
unions to obtain legal status. The Minister of Labor further revised
the administrative process in 1996, reducing the number of steps within
the Ministry for consideration of union applications and establishing
strict timetables; the time for the procedure was reduced to 20 days
from 60. The Labor Ministry also has initiated a program to assist
unions with their applications, and the Minister has warned officials
that noncompliance with the timetable could lead to dismissal of those
responsible for the delay. These new regulations have accelerated the
approval procedure and largely eliminated the backlog of union
applications. The Labor Ministry granted legal status to 25 unions
during the year.
On October 13, a group of men, many of them armed, took control of
the union hall of the SITRABI banana workers union in the town of
Morales, Izabal. There are credible reports that leaders of the
vigilante group repeatedly threatened to kill some of the union
leaders. During the incident, which lasted over 8 hours into the
morning of October 14, at least a dozen rank-and-file unionists
reportedly were held for much of that time on the bus in which they had
come to the union hall. There are several credible reports that armed
men forcibly entered the home of one of the union leaders and made him
go with them to the union hall. Various union leaders and rank-and-file
members were shoved and struck. Union leaders were forced to sign
letters of resignation from their positions in the union and from their
jobs. The Ministry of Labor immediately declared these coerced
resignations to be invalid. MINUGUA's report on the incident called it
``one of the most serious violations of human rights since the signing
of the Peace Accords.'' Following their investigation of the incident,
Public Ministry prosecutors sought indictments against 12 individuals
on charges of abduction, illegal detention, intimidation, and coercion.
Workers have the right to strike, but labor code procedures for
having a strike recognized as legal are cumbersome. Labor organizers
criticize the requirement that two-thirds of the work force must
approve a vote to strike, the prohibition of strikes by agricultural
workers at harvest time, and the right of the Government to prohibit
strikes that it considers seriously harmful to the national economy. In
1996 Congress approved a law that further restricted the right to
strike for workers employed in essential public services, including
urban and interurban transport, mail, and telegraph. Unions strongly
opposed the law, and some members of Congress called the measure
unconstitutional and contrary to commitments to the International Labor
Organization. However, the Constitutional Court declared it
constitutional in 1997. This essential services strike legislation
gives the State the authority to intervene forcefullyshould strikes
threaten the orderly functioning of society. Employers may suspend
workers or fire them for absence without leave if the authorities have
not approved their strike legally. The strike regulation law calls for
binding arbitration if an impasse has been reached after 30 days of
negotiation.
Although the public sector historically has been the scene of
frequent strikes, almost always called without legal authorization,
there were no public sector strikes during the year. However, prison
guards reportedly threatened to strike during the year, but chose not
to do so after the authorities pledged to improve working conditions.
In 1998 the Government declared illegal a 1996 strike by judicial
workers. In September the judiciary fired about 500 of these workers,
ostensibly for having participated in this illegal 1996 strike. Unions
and human rights organizations questioned the methodology used by the
magistrates in charge of the court system to select employees for
dismissal, alleging that the dismissals were politically motivated. The
Congress established a commission to review the cases of those who were
dismissed. In October the CSJ reinstated about 125 persons (see Section
1.e.).
The law protects workers from retribution for forming and
participating in trade union activities, but enforcement of these
provisions is inconsistent. While an increasing number of employers
accept unionization, many routinely seek to circumvent labor code
provisions in order to resist union activities, which they view as
disruptive and as a challenge to their full control of the workplace.
An ineffective legal system and inadequate penalties for violations
have hindered enforcement of the right to form unions and participate
in trade union activities. Although the Labor Code provides that
workers illegally fired for union activity should be reinstated within
24 hours, in practice employers often file a series of appeals, or
simply defy judicial orders of reinstatement. Penalties for defying
such orders were increased somewhat in the 1992 labor code reform and
again in Decree 35-98, which went into effect in June 1998.
Trade union leaders and members generally did not suffer labor-
related violence; however, there were a few notable exceptions during
the year. There has been little progress in the investigation of the
January 12 killing of Robinson Morales Canales, who had been the
executive secretary of the Zacapa municipal workers union during a
long-running labor conflict with the mayor of the town (see Section
1.a.). There have been no arrests in the case of Hugo Duarte Cardon,
another member of the Zacapa municipal workers union, who was killed in
July 1998. Most of the investigations into previous years' cases of
violence against, including the murder of, various labor leaders appear
to have been suspended.
An active ``solidarity'' movement claims approximately 170,000
members in about 400 companies. Unions may operate legally in
workplaces that have solidarity associations, and workers have the
right to choose between the two or to belong to both. The Government
views these associations as civic organizations that need not interfere
with the functioning of trade unions. The amended Labor Code stipulates
very clearly that trade unions have an exclusive right to bargain
collectively on work conditions on behalf of workers. However, unions
charge that management promotes solidarity associations to avoid the
formation of trade unions or to compete with existing labor unions.
There were credible reports that some of these associations did not
always adhere to democratic principles in their formation and
management, and that workers are unable to participate fully and freely
in decisionmaking. Similar credible charges were made against some
trade unions.
At the request of trade union leaders, the Human Rights Ombudsman's
office for economic and social issues receives complaints related to
trade union activities. Union leaders and workers filed over 100
complaints with the PDH during the year, and the Ombudsman has made
public statements about labor conditions in various sectors of the
economy. The PDH can investigate union complaints and issue a
statement, but the office has no enforcement powers beyond attempting
to ameliorate the situation through publicity and moral persuasion.
Unions may and do form federations and confederations and affiliate
with international organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have
the right to organize and bargain collectively; however, the practice
of collective bargaining is limited by the weakness of the union
movement, the requirement that 25 percent of the workers in a factory
or business must be union members in order for collective bargaining to
take place, the lack of experience with collective bargaining, and
management's aversion to negotiating formally with worker
organizations. While both management and the unions honored some well-
written collective contracts, in other instances both parties openly
ignored and violated contracts. Most workers, even those organized by
trade unions, do not have collective contracts to cover their wages
andworking conditions but do have individual contracts as required by
law. Most workers receive the minimum wages established by tripartite
commissions, which operate under the guidance of the Ministry of Labor.
Employers legally cannot dismiss workers for helping to form a
trade union; workers file complaints in this regard with the labor
inspectors for resolution. The Labor Code provides for the right of
employers to fire union workers for cause, permits workers to appeal
their dismissal to the labor courts, and requires the reinstatement
within 24 hours of any union worker fired without cause. The revised
code prohibits employers from firing workers for union organizing and
protects them for 60 days following the official publication of
approval of the union. It also prohibits employers from firing any
member of the executive committee of a union and protects them for an
additional 12 months after they are no longer on the executive
committee. An employer may fire a member of the union's executive
committee for cause only after a trial and issuance of a court
resolution.
Despite governmental, bilateral, and multilateral efforts to
improve them, the labor courts remain ineffective. However, efforts to
restructure and modernize the labor court system continue. There are 20
labor courts, including 7 in the capital and 13 elsewhere around the
country. An additional nine courts deal with labor issues as part of
their jurisdiction. The weakness of the judicial system as a whole, the
severe shortage of competent judges and staff, and a heavy backlog of
undecided cases all contribute to the labor courts' lack of credibility
and enforcement ability. The small number of competent and motivated
labor inspectors and the lack of training and resources devoted to
detecting and investigating labor code violations compound the weakness
of the labor courts. However, government efforts to improve the labor
inspection system also continue. The Ministry of Labor increased its
rate of inspections and fired some incompetent or corrupt inspectors.
Ministry figures show that over 2,000 inspections or investigations of
complaints were conducted by August. The Ministry continued a review of
inspections at farms and plantations in rural areas and cited those
employers who were paying less than the minimum wage.
The Ministry of Labor has reorganized its labor inspection system
to permit some complaints to be heard at the Ministry of Labor rather
than requiring that inspectors travel to each work site. The Ministry
increased the number of court cases filed for failure to comply with
the Labor Code and continued an educational campaign on worker rights
(especially the rights of minors and women), including providing some
documents in indigenous languages. In an effort to improve enforcement
of the Labor Code outside the capital, the Ministry of Labor continued
to decentralize its operations. Eight of the Ministry's 24 branch
offices outside the capital were accorded regional authority, and their
resources increased accordingly.
Labor laws and regulations apply throughout the country, including
in the few export processing zones (EPZ's). The laws governing the
EPZ's are not discriminatory on the subject of organizing trade unions
or collective bargaining. Union leaders often blame employer pressures
and their unofficially restricted access to the EPZ's for their
inability to organize workers in these zones. While labor standards in
the EPZ's are no different from those found outside the zones, actual
working conditions are often better.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
bars forced or compulsory labor, and the practice does not exist. The
law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by children,
but they are covered by the general statute. Forced or bonded labor by
children generally did not occur; however, there were reports that
children were trafficked for the purpose of prostitution (see Sections
5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution bars employment of minors under the age
of 14 without written permission from the Ministry of Labor. However,
children below this age regularly are employed in the informal and
agricultural sectors, usually in small family enterprises. The law
prohibits minors from night work and extra hours (the legal workday for
minors under the age of 14 is 6 hours; for minors 14 to 17 years of
age, it is 7 hours), from working in establishments where alcoholic
beverages are served, or from working in unhealthy or dangerous
conditions. However, between 3,000 and 5,000 children commonly are
employed in the illegal cottage-based fireworks industry. The Labor
Ministry believes that approximately 10 percent of the children in this
industry work illegally in factories, while younger children, under the
age of 14, typically work at home on piecework taken in by their
families. Laws governing the employment of minors are not enforced
effectively, due to the shortage of qualified labor inspectors and the
weakness of the labor court system. TheAssociation for Girls and Boys
in Central America (PRONICE) estimates that approximately 2 million
children work. The majority of child laborers work in agriculture
(family farms, coffee, and sugar cane harvesting), while others work in
domestic service, construction, various family businesses, stone
quarrying, fireworks manufacturing, or other jobs. Children below the
age of 14 years are not allowed to work without written permission from
the Ministry of Labor. There are fewer than 5,000 such permits in
effect, the majority of them for work in the in-bond processing for
export, or maquila, sector. The Ministry of Labor is engaged actively
in reducing the number of these permits and issued less than 1,500 for
the year. However, many children under the age of 14 work without legal
permission and are open to exploitation. They generally receive no
social benefits, social insurance, vacations, or severance pay, and
earn below-minimum salaries.
The Labor Ministry has a program to educate minors, their parents,
and employers on the rights of minors in the labor market. In 1992 the
Government formed the Child Worker Protection Unit within the Ministry
of Labor. Implementation of the 1997 Children's and Minor's Code has
been delayed because of political controversy over its provisions.
Economic necessity forces most families to have their children seek
some type of employment to supplement family income, especially in
rural and indigenous communities. Children who work generally do so in
family enterprises. Education is compulsory for all children up to the
sixth grade. The law does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded
labor by children, but it generally did not occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Although the law sets minimum
wages, the legally mandated minimum wage for most unskilled and
semiskilled workers is not always paid. A tripartite committee
representing labor and management in specific economic sectors and
overseen by the Ministry of Labor, is named each year to make
recommendations for increases in the minimum wage. In the event that
agreement is not possible, the Government may decree such increases.
President Arzu implemented the most recent minimum wage increase by
decree, after the commission was unable to reach a consensus, and it
took effect on February 1. The basic rate is $2.53 (19.71 quetzals) for
industrial workers for an 8-hour workday, including a required hourly
bonus, and is $2.29 (17.86 quetzals) per day plus mandatory
productivity bonuses for agricultural workers. The minimum wage is not
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. According to the United Nations Development Program, at least
80 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, including
approximately 60 percent of those employed.
The legal workday is 8 hours, and the workweek is 44 hours, but a
tradition of longer hours remains in place due to economic conditions.
The amended Labor Code requires a weekly paid rest period of at least
24 hours. Trade union leaders and human rights groups charge that
workers sometimes are forced to work overtime, often without premium
pay, in order to meet work requirements. Labor inspectors report
uncovering numerous instances of such abuses, but the lack of stiff
fines or strong regulatory sanctions, as well as inefficiencies in the
labor court system, inhibit adequate enforcement of the law.
Occupational health and safety standards are inadequate. As with
other aspects of the labor law, enforcement of standards that do exist
also is inadequate. When serious or fatal industrial accidents occur,
the authorities generally take no legal steps against those
responsible. The Labor Ministry provides training courses for labor
inspectors in health and safety standards but does not accord them a
high priority due to scarce resources. The Government does not enforce
effectively legislation requiring companies with more than 50 employees
to provide on-site medical facilities for their workers, although most
large employers provide such facilities. Workers have the legal right
to remove themselves from dangerous workplace situations, and the law
provides them with protection for their continued employment. However,
few workers are willing to jeopardize their jobs by complaining about
unsafe working conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
trafficking in persons; however, various laws could be used to
prosecute traffickers. On January 23, a new immigration law came into
effect, which makes alien smuggling a crime punishable by imprisonment.
Prostitution is not illegal; there are certain health code requirements
for persons engaging in prostitution. Pimping and inducing a person
into prostitution are crimes that can result in either fines or
imprisonment, with heavier penalties if minors are involved.
Trafficking in women and children, primarily for the purpose of
prostitution, is a growing problem.
The country is a significant transit country for alien smuggling,
both from neighboring Latin American countries and from China, Taiwan,
and south Asia, aliens often are smuggled to the United States.
Traffickers use force, coercion, fraud, and deception. In one instance,
Chinese male victims apparently agreed to debt bondage to pay off their
transportation costs, while female victims, some of whom were under age
18, apparently were being taken to the United States to work as
prostitutes. The victims were told that their families in China would
suffer if they broke the debt bondage agreement.
Two government agencies regularly investigate cases of
trafficking--the Defense of Children's Rights unit in the PDH, and the
Minors' Section of the Public Ministry. There are no programs
specifically designed to provide shelter or rehabilitation to victims
of trafficking.
The Ministry of Labor has noted an increase in child prostitution
in the towns along the borders with Mexico and El Salvador. Along the
border with El Salvador, many child prostitutes are brought into the
country from El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras by organized rings,
who force the children into prostitution (see Section 5).
______
GUYANA
The Co-operative Republic of Guyana is a small nation making a slow
transition to democracy. It has a multiparty political system based on
proportional representation. Citizens directly elect an executive
president and indirectly elect a 65-member unicameral parliament. The
President appoints a prime minister and a cabinet. In December 1997,
citizens voted in free, fair, and nonviolent national elections to
return the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and its Civic (C) partner
to office and elected Janet Jagan, widow of the late President Cheddi
Jagan, as president. Social unrest and occasional violence marred the
postelection period, with the People's National Congress (PNC), the
main opposition party, alleging that the elections were fraudulent.
International observers considered that these charges were unfounded.
Nonetheless, as part of a Caribbean Community brokered truce between
the two parties, the PPP/C alliance agreed to shorten its
constitutionally mandated 5-year term to 3 years. In August President
Jagan resigned due to health reasons. She was succeeded by Finance
Minister Bharrat Jagdeo. The judiciary, although constitutionally
independent, is inefficient and often appears subject to government
influence.
The Guyana Defence Force (GDF) and the Guyana Police Force (GPF)
are under civilian control. The GPF has the authority to make arrests
and maintains law and order throughout the country. The GDF is a
professional military responsible for national defense, internal
security, and emergency response. Although the President deployed the
GDF to assist the GPF during periods of civil unrest in 1998, this did
not take place in 1999. Members of the police continued to commit human
rights abuses.
Guyana is a very poor country. The economy, which for years was
centrally planned and controlled, is based on a mix of private and
state enterprises. Rice, sugar, bauxite, and gold are the major
exports. Annual economic growth had averaged more than 6 percent from
1993 through 1997. However, in 1998 the growth rate declined 1.8
percent, hurt by poor weather and by an unstable business climate
brought about by political unrest. Growth in 1999 was 2.3 percent. The
agricultural sector brings in a large portion of the nation's annual
foreign exchange earnings, and the slowdown has hurt the Government's
ability to service its high external debt. Per capita gross domestic
product is estimated at $808, and over half the population lives in
poverty. There are severe shortages of skilled labor and the economy is
constrained by an inadequate and poorly maintained infrastructure for
transportation, power distribution, flood control, and communications.
There continued to be serious problems in the Government's human
rights record, although it improved slightly in a few areas. The police
continued to commit extrajudicial killings; however, they committed
fewer such killings than in the previous year, and police abuse of
suspects also declined. The authorities took some steps to investigate
these abuses more effectively and brought charges against some
individual policemen accused of killings. However, in general the
police continued to commit abuses with impunity. Prison conditions are
poor, and lengthy pretrial detention is a problem. The inefficient
judicial system results in long delays in trials. Police infringed on
citizens' privacy rights. Members of both major political parties
engaged in propaganda attacks that exacerbated racial tensions and
social insecurity. Other human rights problems included violence
against women and children, societal discrimination against women and
indigenous Amerindians, and incidents of discrimination stemming from
the racial tensions between Indo-Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The police committed
extrajudicial killings, although fewer than in previous years. The
Guyana Human Rights Association (GHRA) reported that police killed 9
civilians during the year, compared with 11 in 1998 and 27 in 1997. In
seven cases, the police shot the victims while attempting to arrest
them or while a crime was being committed.
On October 22, a police officer shot Fazal Narine in the chest in
front of his wife and children; he later died. The police had detained
Narine at the Enmore police outpost after his wife had complained about
his abusive behavior. Although the police claimed that Narine had died
in a scuffle his relatives stated that he was drunk and unarmed. At
year's end, the Director of Public Prosecutions was investigating
Narine's death. TheWorking People's Alliance called for an
investigation of the Narine case due to concern that abused women might
be reluctant to report their problems to police in light of Narine's
death in custody.
On November 14, 8 to 10 police reportedly opened fire in the home
of Colin McGregor, killing him. The opposition PNC cited this killing
as an example of police brutality and called for the Government to
establish a commission to investigate what the PNC termed
``widespread'' extrajudicial killings since 1993 by members of the
police force.
A judicial inquiry into the controversial fatal shooting by police
in 1998 of Victor ``Junior'' Bourne began in late 1998, with several
witnesses giving testimony. Pathologist Dr. Leslie Mootoo testified,
consistent with official reports, that the deceased fired a gun before
his death. However, 17-year-old Shemrick Raulston Nedd, who lived in
the same house at the time of the incident, contended that while
peering through a hole in the wall he saw senior superintendent Stephan
Merai and superintendent Leon Fraser shoot Bourne while he lay asleep.
On January 6, all documents required to prosecute Merai and Fraser
disappeared from the responsible magistrate's office.
No further progress was made toward resolving the 1997 case of Adam
Hescott, an escaped prisoner whom police shot and killed. The GPF's
standing orders officially permit the use of firearms only when other
means have been exhausted. However, many justice authorities and human
rights activists say that because of rising crime and pressure from
urban businesses, which are often the targets of criminals, the
Government has taken a lax attitude toward investigation of alleged
police abuses. In general, police abuses are committed with impunity.
The Police Complaints Authority (PCA) is required to transmit all
complaints to the Police Commissioner. The PCA was established in 1989
and is composed of five members who investigate complaints against
police officers. Most members are themselves members of the criminal
justice system; thus, the PCA is not truly independent, contrary to the
statute that created the PCA. The PCA received 45 complaints during the
year, completed investigation of 31 of them, and sent them to the
Police Commissioner for action. However, the PCA has not submitted an
annual report since 1995. Even when police officers do face charges,
most of the cases are heard by lower magistrate courts, where other
specially trained police officers serve as the prosecutors. As a
result, human rights activists question officers' commitment to
prosecuting their own colleagues.
In response to the growing number of complaints against the police,
the police established the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)
in 1997. The OPR received 99 complaints that resulted in criminal and
departmental charges brought against 40 police officers related to 78
of the complaints At year's end, the OPR continued to investigate 35
reports of alleged misconduct.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
In March police arrested and detained Franz Britton. Although the
police claimed to have released Britton, his relatives said that they
had not seen him since his detention.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, police
continued to abuse suspects, although to a lesser degree than in the
previous year. For example, a Trades Union Congress executive called
for an investigation of the beating of Esther Grant on March 22. Police
were videotaped beating her in front of her children. From 1995 to
1997, the GHRA received an average of 20 complaints per year from
victims who had been beaten by police while in custody. In 1998 the
GHRA reported a significant drop in direct complaints against police.
This trend continued in 1999. However, inmates, attorneys, and judicial
authorities provided credible evidence that police and correctional
officers frequently ignored the actions of other inmates who beat,
robbed, or otherwise mistreated ``problematic'' prisoners.
There were 23 persons injured as a result of nonlethal police
shootings through September.
Violence accompanied several large public protests and strikes
during the year. In March there was a report that police beat a member
of the press and a group of strikers. Also in March, supporters of PNC
leader Desmond Hoyte set fire to a movietheater to protest an alleged
attempt to assassinate Hoyte. In April public service strikers, to
protest the fact that some health care workers had not joined their
strike, invaded the hospital in Georgetown, beat medical personnel, and
prevented seriously ill patients from entering the hospital. According
to the GHRA, one person reportedly died during this attack when unable
to receive medical treatment. On May 18, the police injured 17 persons
when they fired pellets into a crowd of 200 striking workers (see
Section 2.a.). Police fired shots, tear gas, and pellets at strikers
and demonstrators on several occasions during the 7-week-long strike.
The press reported that strikers and demonstrators threw grenades into
a business and local newspaper headquarters during demonstrations, as
well as vandalizing several other businesses. Police also reported
several bomb threats to public buildings (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.).
In July the President established a commission of inquiry to examine
police misconduct during the strike. The commission had not completed
its work by year's end.
No progress was made on the torture case of Mark Brown, who accused
police of torturing him by applying acid to his body in 1998.
Prison conditions are poor, especially in police holding cells.
Georgetown's Camp Street Prison, the country's largest, is extremely
overcrowded. For most of the year, Camp Street held between 900 and
1,100 prisoners in space initially designed to hold 350. Conditions in
the country's four smaller prisons generally are adequate. The only
women's prison is at New Amsterdam, in a facility that holds men and
women in separate dormitory-type buildings. In 1997 when the Director
of Prisons reported that a prisoner had died in part due to
overcrowding at the Camp Street Prison, the Government responded by
assigning more full-time nurse practitioners and pharmacists to the
prison system and by requiring that doctors visit prisons more
regularly. Prison directors and inmates reported that over the course
of the year, medical coverage improved. The authorities reported no
deaths related to prison conditions during the year. However, the GHRA
still questioned the Government's commitment and continued to push it
to improve health care in the prison system.
In addition to overcrowding and a lack of medical personnel, poor
staff morale is a serious problem within the prison system. Prison
staffers are poorly paid and their salaries and benefits are
insufficient to compensate for the on-the-job risks. Prison officials
lobbied the Government for increased funding to improve prison
conditions. Prison officials also encouraged efforts by local and
international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) to improve physical
and sanitary conditions.
Although sanitary and medical conditions in police station
temporary holding facilities vary, in almost all cases these conditions
are worse than those in the prisons. Some such jails are bare,
overcrowded, and damp. Few have beds, washbasins, furniture, or
utensils. Meals are normally unavailable; friends and relatives must
bring detainees food and water. Cells rarely have sanitary facilities,
and inmates sometimes are escorted by staff members outside the cells
to use holes in the floor for toilets. Inmates generally sleep on a
thin pallet on the concrete floor. Conditions in the East La Penitence
police jail, where female prisoners are held until sentencing, are
below the standard of the other jails and prisons in the country. The
Brickdam lock-up in Georgetown has poor sanitation and dangerous
conditions. One cell without plumbing or other facilities typically
holds up to 30 detainees and is often the site of violence between
inmates. Although precinct jails are intended to serve only as pretrial
holding areas, some suspects have been detained there as long as 4
years, waiting for the overburdened judicial system to take action on
their cases.
In one case reported by the GHRA and the United Nations Children's
Fund (UNICEF) two boys, ages 8 and 11, were detained in one of these
dangerous jails for several months. A GHRA investigation determined
that older inmates had burned the 8-year-old with lighted cigarettes
and otherwise mistreated him. In December the media discovered that a
9-year-old boy was being held in Brickdam prison and alleged that other
prisoners had abused him sexually. However, the police stated that the
boy denied to his mother that he had been molested and that there was
no evidence to support the media's claims. In December following these
reports, the Home Affairs Minister announced that all juvenile
offenders would be housed in a separate facility and that Brickdam
prison would eventually be closed. The Minister also announced that the
Government would build a new house of detention for the women held at
East La Penitence prison.
Prison officials were receptive to local and international NGO
requests to enter and inspect prison facilities. The GHRA participates
as a member of the prisons' visiting committee, which investigates
prisoner complaints, inspects diets, reviews primary medical care
services, and provides recommendations to prison authorities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides that no person may be deprived of personal liberty except as
authorized by law and requires judicial determination of the legality
of detention, a mandate that the authorities generally respected in
practice.
Arrest does not require a warrant issued by a court official.
Police may arrest without a warrant when an officer witnesses a crime
or at the officer's discretion in instances where there is good cause
to suspect that a crime or a breach of the peace has been or will be
committed. The law requires that a person arrested and held for more
than 24 hours be brought before a court to be charged. Bail is
generally available, except in capital offense cases. In narcotics
cases, magistrates have limited discretion in granting bail before
trial but must remand persons convicted on narcotics crimes into
custody, even if an appeal is pending.
Lengthy pretrial detention remains a problem. The GHRA has asserted
that prisoners often are detained for 3 or 4 years while awaiting
trial; however, the authorities denied that delays were this long.
The Constitution prohibit forced exile, and it is not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, law enforcement officials and prominent
lawyers questioned the independence of the judiciary and accused the
Government of intervening in certain criminal and civil cases. There
are no institutional checks on the President or the ruling party when
they seek to influence judges. However, the Government generally
respects the independence of the judiciary in human rights cases.
The court system is composed of a High Court (the Supreme Court of
Judicature), an appeals court, and a system of magistrate courts.
Magistrates are members of the civil service and are trained
lawyers. The magistrate courts deal with both criminal and civil
matters. The Ministry of Legal Affairs headed by the Attorney General
is the principal legal advisor to the State. The Director of Public
Prosecution is statutorily independent and can file legal charges
against offenders. The Constitution provides that anyone charged with a
criminal offense has the right to a hearing by a court of law. This
right is respected in practice.
Delays in judicial proceedings are caused by shortages of trained
court personnel and magistrates, inadequate resources, postponements at
the request of the defense or prosecution, occasional alleged acts of
bribery, and the slowness of police in preparing cases for trial. The
inefficiency of the judicial system is so great as to undermine due
process. Lengthy pretrial detention remains a problem (see Section
1.d.). Defendants are granted public trials, and appeal may be made to
higher courts. Appeals of some murder cases may go on for several
years. Trial postponements are granted routinely to both the defense
and the prosecution. However, programs designed to improve legal
structures, reform judicial procedures, upgrade technical capabilities,
and improve efficiency of the courts are having an effect.
Although the law recognizes the right to legal counsel, in
practice, with the exception of capital crimes, it has been limited to
those who can afford to pay. There is no public defender system. The
Georgetown Legal Aid Clinic, with public and private support, provides
advice to persons who cannot afford a lawyer, with a special interest
in cases of violence against women and criminal cases related to civil
cases in such matters (e.g., assault as part of a divorce case).
Defendants in murder cases who need a lawyer are assigned an attorney
by the court. The Guyana Association of Women Lawyers provides free
legal services for civil cases only.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for these rights; however,
the authorities often infringed on citizens' privacy. Law enforcement
officials must obtain warrants before searching private homes or
properties. Although the authorities generally respected these
requirements, there were numerous reports of police officers searching
homes without warrants, particularly in neighborhoods where narcotics
trafficking is a problem.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice. Citizens openly criticize the
Government and its policies.
The independent Stabroek News continued to publish daily, and a
wide range of religious groups, political parties, and journalists
publish a lively variety of privately owned weekly newspapers. The
Government's daily newspaper, the Guyana Chronicle, covers a broad
spectrum of political and nongovernmental groups. However, throughout
the year the Chronicle typically displayed a clear antiopposition bias.
While printed media flourished, a growing number of journalists
charged the Government with failure to respect freedom of the
electronic media. The Government owns and operates the country's three
radio stations. There are no private radio stations, and private
interests continued to allege that the Government either denied or
failed to respond to more than 20 requests for radio frequency
authorizations. The Government maintained that it is unable to grant
frequencies to private stations because there is no legislation
governing their allocation. However, despite a similar lack of
legislation to govern television frequencies, there were 17 independent
television stations in addition to the government station.
The Ministry of Information, which previously censored the Internet
and restricted public access to a variety of sites, lifted these
restrictions in January.
In May during civil unrest associated with the civil service
strike, a television cameraman alleged that the police beat him and
members of a group of strikers who were blocking a wharf.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
this right. The Public Order Act requires police permits for mass
political meetings. The Police Commissioner has the authority to refuse
permission for a public meeting if he believes that it may provoke a
breach of the peace. In cases of refusal, applicants can appeal to the
Minister of Home Affairs, whose decision on the matter is final. After
obtaining authorization, which is generally granted, political parties
and other groups held public meetings and rallies throughout the
country without hindrance.
For several days in March, street protests and isolated incidents
of violence erupted in Georgetown, following a rally at which PNC
leader Hoyte announced that his party would resume a campaign of
antigovernment civil unrest. PNC supporters smashed shop windows,
looted, and beat persons who were primarily Indo-Guyanese (see Section
5). The Government did not respond forcefully to these incidents.
During a 7-week civil service strike that began in April, the
police generally exercised restraint, except on several occasions when
they fired tear gas and pellets at strikers and demonstrators. For
example, on May 17 police injured 17 strikers when they fired pellets
into a crowd see Sections 1.c. and 6.a.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement within the country, and the Government generally respects this
right in practice. Travel to Amerindian areas requires government
permission, the result of a law dating from colonial times designed to
protect indigenous people from exploitation. In practice, however, most
people travel throughout these areas without regard to the formality of
a permit. Citizens are free to travel abroad, to emigrate, and to
return.
The Government cooperates with the office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. The Government does not have a
fixed policy on refugees or asylum but is studying draft model
legislation prepared by the UNHCR. The issue of provision of first
asylum did not arise.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
Citizens enjoy this right and exercised it in free, fair, and
nonviolent elections held in December 1997, which were nonetheless
protested by the opposition. There is a multiparty political system
based on proportional representation. Voters directly elect the
President to a 5-year term of office, but indirectly elect the
unicameral Parliament. Any citizen 18 years or older can register to
vote. As a result of opposition complaints of fraud (that international
observers considered unfounded) following the December 1997
presidential elections, the ruling party entered an agreement brokered
by officials from other Caribbean Community nations to hold new
elections after 3 years instead of 5 years as required by the
Constitution. Accordingly, the next presidential and legislative
elections are expected to be held in January 2001.
The presidential candidate who wins a plurality of the popular vote
also obtains a percentage of seats in Parliament equal to the
percentage of the popular vote received. The political parties then
decide who is to hold the seats. The President appoints a cabinet and a
prime minister who, with the President, exercise executive power.
Citizens are free to join or support political parties of their choice.
Since Parliament always is controlled by the party in power, the
legislature typically provides only a limited check on the executive's
power. Party leaders are free to hire and fire parliamentary
representatives at will. If a Member of Parliament acts in accordance
with constituents' wishes, but against the wishes of the party's
leadership, the member risks being dismissed.
Guyana is a racially divided society in which the political party
structure polarizes the main ethnic groups. Winner-take-all elections
exacerbate these tensions. The two major parties (the PPP and the PNC)
are formed largely by Indo-Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese, respectively. In
October 1998, a court began hearing testimony in a civil suit filed by
the PNC in support of its allegation that the December 1997 election
was rigged; however, by year's end, no verdict was reached.
There are no legal impediments to the participation of women or
minorities in the political process, but women are underrepresented in
government and politics. The 20-person Cabinet includes 2 women, and
the country's second-highest judge is a woman. The 72-member Parliament
includes 12 women and 10 Amerindians, representing both major parties.
In the December 1997 elections, voters elected a female president.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Guyana Human Rights Association, the most active local human
rights group, functioned without government interference. The GHRA is
an NGO formed in 1979 with the participation of trade unions,
professional organizations, various ethnic groups, and churches. It
issues periodic press releases and publishes an annual report on human
rights in Guyana. Members of the Government openly discussed human
rights issues and made public statements in response to foreign and
local human rights reports. The authorities did not interfere with the
activities of human rights groups.
In April the Government withdrew from the United Nations Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which had permitted death row prisoners to appeal their cases to the
U.N. Human Rights Committee. The withdrawal was in response to the
Committee's ruling in May 1998 in favor of two convicted murderers who
were to be hanged in 1997.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides fundamental rights for all persons
regardless of race, sex, religion, or national origin. However, the
Government does not always enforce these provisions effectively.
Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence, is
widespread. Rape, particularly of girls and young women, is common but
still infrequently reported or prosecuted. Health professionals and
NGO's report a high incidence of incest. Lawyers say that while more
victims are reporting these crimes to the authorities, there is still a
social stigma applied to the victim for doing so. Despite efforts by
NGO's and the Department of Public Prosecutions to sensitize police
officers to domestic violence, the police are often hesitant to
interfere in cases of domestic disputes.
In 1996 Parliament passed the Domestic Violence Act. In addition to
defining domestic violence and establishing it as a crime, the
legislation gives women the right to seek prompt protection.
Magistrates can issue interim protection orders when a victim of abuse,
a police officer, or a social worker fills out an application for
protection. A magistrate then evaluates the case and decides whether or
not to replace interim orders with permanent orders. The Domestic
Violence Act allows victims to seek protection, occupation, or tenancy
orders. Protection orders prohibit abusers from being anywhere that the
applicant lives, works, visits, or attends school. Occupation orders
allow the victim and any children to remain at a home previously shared
with an abuser, while the abuser must leave. Similarly, tenancy orders
require an abuser to leave a rented dwelling and continue to pay some
or all of the rent.
Although local NGO's that address the issue of domestic violence
are relatively new, they work effectively together under tight budget
constraints. While NGO's consider the Domestic Violence Act a positive
step, they claim that it has had little effect on the overall situation
of domestic violence in society. NGO's report that domestic violence
crosses racial and socioeconomic lines. According to Help and Shelter
(H&S), the first local NGO dedicated to fighting domestic violence,
societal reeducation is required in order to sensitize persons to
domestic violence. As of July, H&S had counseled 1,768 people since it
began offering counseling services in November 1995. H&S reported that
68 percent of its cases involved spousal abuse and 7 percent involved
child abuse. Another 10 percent of cases reported to H&S were rape
cases, and the vast majority of these--78 percent--were reported by
victims age 16 and under.
In 1997 Parliament approved the Antidiscrimination Act, which
builds upon the provisions of the 1990 Equal Rights Act. The two laws
provide a strengthened framework under which women and minorities may
seek redress for discriminatory acts or practices. However, no case has
ever been tried under the Equal Rights Act, and critics of the
Antidiscrimination Act claim that the new laws are unlikely to be
effective since the act places enforcement responsibilities on the
overburdened Chief Labor Officer. There is no legal protection against
sexual harassment in the workplace. Legislation prohibits dismissal on
the grounds of pregnancy, and dismissal on such grounds does not occur
in practice. The Women's Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Labor, Human
Services, and Social Security monitors the legal rights of women. The
Women's Leadership Institute was established by law in December 1997
and opened in February 1999. The center seeks, through education and
training, to facilitate greater women's participation in government and
the private sector. The center plans to train an average of 350 women
annually on issues such as women's rights, status of women, violence
against women, and leadership development.
Legislation passed by Parliament in 1990 protects women's property
rights in common-law marriages and entitles a woman who separates or
divorces to one-half the couple's property if she had been working and
one-third of the property if she had been a housewife. Divorce by
consent remains illegal. Legislation also gives authority to the courts
to overturn a man's will inthe event that it does not provide for his
wife, as long as she was dependent on him for financial support.
Children.--At least half of the population lives in poverty, and
children are affected more severely than any other group. One-third of
the population is under 18 years of age and, although the Government
provides free education through secondary school, the severe
deterioration of the public education and health care systems has
limited children's future prospects. The public health system is
inadequate, and private health care is unaffordable for many children.
Children are often not given the opportunity to attend school because
their families need them to contribute to the household by working or
providing child care.
Concern continues to rise over the effects of domestic violence on
children. Although the GHRA reported no deaths from child abuse in
1999, law enforcement officials stated that the vast majority of
criminal child abuse cases went unreported. Media reports of rape and
incest further indicated that violence against children is a
significant problem. According to the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF)
office, a disturbing aspect is the concept of the ``girl child,'' in
which teenage girls trade sexual favors for money, a practice condoned
by their parents yet obscured by cultural norms. In a related practice,
parents demand monetary compensation following the rape of a teenage
daughter.
The Domestic Violence Act allows police officers or social workers
to file an application on behalf of an abused child. However, the
administration of justice for children is characterized by a lack of
social services or trained experts to deal with children fleeing
sexual, physical, or emotional abuse. Many children suffer from neglect
or abandonment in a society where 3 percent of the population emigrates
each year, often leaving children behind.
People with Disabilities.--The lack of appropriate infrastructure
to provide access to both public and private facilities makes it very
difficult to employ the disabled outside their homes. There is no law
mandating provision of access for people with disabilities. In December
1997, Parliament passed a law establishing the Council for Persons with
Disabilities, although the Council has yet to begin its activities.
There are several special schools and training centers for the
disabled, but they lack trained staff and are in disrepair.
Indigenous People.--The Amerindian population, which consists of
nine tribal groups, constitutes an estimated 8 percent of the
population. Most live in reservations and villages in remote parts of
the interior. Their standard of living is much lower than that of most
citizens and their ability to participate in decisions affecting their
lands, cultures, traditions, and the allocation of natural resources is
limited.
Amerindian life is regulated by the Amerindian Act, legislation
dating from colonial times designed to protect indigenous people from
exploitation. The act gives the Government the power to determine who
is an Amerindian and what is an Amerindian community, to appoint
Amerindian leaders, and to annul decisions made by Amerindian councils.
It also prohibits the sale of alcohol to Amerindians and requires
government permission before any Amerindian can accept formal
employment. These provisions are not enforced. Both Amerindian
individuals and groups remain free to criticize the Government. In 1998
the Ministry of Amerindian Affairs admitted that the Amerindian Act is
antiquated and expressed a commitment to update it, although it has
taken no action to do so.
The Government has long maintained that it is committed to
demarcating lands that traditionally have been the home of Amerindians.
However, the Government holds title to almost all the nation's land and
is free to act as it wishes without consultation. The Government
identified a total of 75 villages and reported that it successfully
demarcated the lands of 11 Amerindian communities in 1998. The Ministry
of Amerindian Affairs claimed that, in close consultation with
Amerindian leaders, it would demarcate a total of 40 additional
villages by the end of 1999; however, while a handful of village
leaders has accepted these new titles, most leaders rejected the
demarcations. Local Amerindian NGO's regarded government consultations
as mere public relations exercises and demarcationas a means of
confining Amerindian communities so that the rest of what Amerindians
considered to be their land could be offered as concessions to miners
and loggers. (Most of the titles to demarcated land were granted
decades ago under the Amerindian Act and did not allow for the growth
of Amerindian communities.) The Amerindian NGO's claimed that
Amerindian leaders were not consulted properly and were pressured into
uninformed decisions. The Government maintained that it would consider
granting additional land rights to those communities that agreed to
have their lands demarcated in 1999. However, as of year's end, the
Government had taken no action to do so.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Longstanding ethnic tensions,
primarily between citizens of African descent and those of South Asian
origin, continued to influence society and political life. Historical
patterns of social organization have resulted in social and political
organizations coalescing around ethnic groups. This pattern of racial
and ethnic grouping has become politicized over the years, polarizing
society along ethnic lines. Discrimination and exclusion continue to
occur. Members of both the largely Indo-Guyanese PPP and the largely
Afro-Guyanese PNC engaged in rhetorical and propaganda attacks that
fueled racial tensions.
The civil service and defense and police forces are overwhelmingly
staffed by Afro-Guyanese. Recruitment efforts targeted at Indo-Guyanese
candidates for the uniformed services generally have met with an
unenthusiastic response, with most qualified Indo-Guyanese candidates
opting for a business or professional career over military, police, or
public service. However, in the aftermath of the 1997 election, the
Government stepped up its efforts to recruit Indo-Guyanese for the
security forces. The Chief of Staff of the Guyana Defence Force is
Indo-Guyanese, and there are other Indo-Guyanese officers in both the
GDF and the police force. The Government sponsored various forums for
discussion of racial problems and to promote inclusion. It supported
the work of NGO's that deal with these concerns.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of association and specifically enumerates workers' rights to
form or belong to trade unions. The Trade Unions Recognition Law, which
requires employers to recognize the union chosen by a majority of the
workers, was passed in late 1997 and came into effect in 1999.
Approximately 34 percent of the work force is unionized. Most union
members work in the public sector and in state-owned enterprises.
Organized labor freely associates in one major national federation, the
Guyana Trades Union Congress (TUC), which is composed of 22 unions.
There is a tradition of close ties between the trade union movement and
political parties.
Historically, the two major political parties have wielded
significant influence over the leadership of several unions, and trade
union officials often served in dual roles as party officials. This
occasionally led to overt politicization of labor issues. For example,
the Guyana Public Service Union organized a strike of customs employees
in November 1998, with explicit political support from the opposition
PNC.
Workers have a generally recognized right to strike. Strikes can be
declared illegal if the union leadership did not approve them, or they
did not meet the requirements specified in collective bargaining
agreements. Public employees providing essential services may strike if
they provide the proper notice to the Ministry of Labor and leave a
skeletal staff in place.
A particularly divisive civil service strike over low wages began
in April and lasted 7 weeks. There was a report that police beat
strikers in May (see Section 2.a.), and police fired tear gas and
pellets at protesters (see Section 2.b.). The strike ended on June 20
with an agreement to send the salary increase issue to binding
arbitration. On August 31, a civil service arbitration panel awarded
civil servants an across-the-board 31 percent increase for 1999 and an
additional 26 percent increase in 2000. The Government said it would
abide by the arbitration panel's decision. However, by the end of the
year, the Government had yet to pay the salary increase due to lack of
funds.
There is no legislation prohibiting retaliation against strikers or
antiunion discrimination by employers. However, this principle always
is included in the terms of resumption after a strike. The new Trade
Unions Recognition Law defines and places limits on the retaliatory
actions employers may take against strikers. Arbitration rulings, when
agreed to by the contending parties, are legally enforceable.
Unions and their federations freely maintain relations with
recognized Caribbean and international trade union and professional
groups. All three of the major international trade union federations
have affiliates in Guyana.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Public and
private sector employees possess and utilize the right to organize and
to bargain collectively. The Ministry of Labor certifies all collective
bargaining agreements and has never refused to do so. Until enactment
of the new recognition law, however, this right was not codified, and
employers legally were not required to recognize unions or to bargain
with them.
Individual unions directly negotiate collective bargaining status,
pursuant to the 1993 repeal of a regulation that required that all
collective bargaining be negotiated through the TUC. Unions are
dissatisfied with a provision granting the Ministry of Finance veto
power over wage contracts negotiated by other ministries.
The Chief Labor Officer and the staff of the Ministry of Labor
provide consultation, enforcement, and conciliation services.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there is no indication that
it occurs. The Government prohibits forced or bonded labor by children
and enforces this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Factories Act and the Employment of Young Persons and
Children Act set out minimum age requirements for employment of
children. Legally, no person under age 14 may be employed in any
industrial undertaking and no person under age 16 may be employed at
night, except under regulated circumstances. The Government prohibits
forced or bonded labor by children, and enforces this prohibition
effectively. The law permits children under age 14 to be employed only
in enterprises in which members of the same family are employed.
However, it is common to see very young children engaged in street
trading in the capital. While cognizant of the situation, the Ministry
of Labor does not employ sufficient inspectors to enforce existing laws
effectively. According to UNICEF, child labor in the informal sector is
a problem, as is the practice of teenage girls trading sexual favors
for money (see Section 5).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Act and the Wages
Councils Act allow the Labor Minister to set minimum wages for various
categories of private employers. However, there is no legislated
private sector minimum wage. The minimum public sector wage is $63
(g$9,700) per month. As a result of a civil service arbitration panel
ruling in August, the Government agreed to increase civil service
salaries by 31 percent, but as of December 31, it had yet to do so due
to lack of funds. Although enforcement mechanisms exist, it is
difficult to put them into practice, and unorganized workers,
particularly women and children in the informal private sector, are
often paid less than what is legally required. The legal minimum wage
for the public sector is insufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family.
The Shops Act and the Factories Act set hours of employment, which
vary by industry and sector. In general, work in excess of an 8-hour
day or a 44-hour week requires payment of an overtime rate. However, if
the initial contract stipulates a 48-hour workweek, then the overtime
rate applies only for hours worked in excess of 48 hours. The law does
not provide for at least a 24-hour rest period.
The Factories Act also sets forth workplace safety and health
standards. The Occupational Health and Safety Division of the Ministry
of Labor is charged with conducting factory inspections and
investigating complaints of substandard workplace conditions. As with
its other responsibilities, inadequate resources prevented the Ministry
from effectively carrying out this function. Workers cannot remove
themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardizing
continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons, but persons providing fraudulent
documents for the purpose of facilitating illegal immigration can be
charged with obtaining money under false pretenses, which carries a
small fine and a 6-month prison sentence. There were occasional reports
of trafficking in persons of Chinese and South Asian origin, who would
illegally immigrate to the United States, under conditions amounting to
debt bondage.
______
HAITI
Haiti was in a constitutionally irregular situation throughout the
year. Prime Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis, appointed in December
1998, completed only the first stage of the required two-part
ratification process. The terms of office of the entire 85-seat House
of Deputies and all but 9 of the 27 members of the Senate expired on
January 11. Before Alexis could submit his Cabinet and plan of
government to Parliament for approval as required by the 1987
Constitution, President Rene Preval announced that he would not
recognize Parliament's decision to extend its incumbents' mandates
until new elections could be held. This effectively dissolved the
Parliament on January 11, leaving the country without a functioning
legislative branch of government or any duly elected officials apart
from President Preval and eight remaining senators. In March, after
negotiations with a five-party opposition coalition, Prime Minister
Alexis formed a cabinet. However, due to the absence of a parliament,
the new ministers took office without being confirmed. At year's end,
there were plans to hold a first round of parliamentary elections in
March 2000, a second round in April, and presidential elections in
December. The judiciary is theoretically independent; however, in
practice it remained largely weak and corrupt.
In September 1994, a U.N.-sanctioned multinational force restored
the country's democratically elected president. The Armed Forces of
Haiti (FAd'H) were subsequently disbanded. At that time, the Government
established the Haitian National Police (HNP), which continues to gain
experience and to benefit from international training and advisors,
although it has severe attrition problems. Moreover, it remains an
immature force that is still grappling with problems of corruption and
human rights abusers within its ranks. Allegations of corruption,
incompetence, and narcotics trafficking target members at all levels of
the force. The HNP has a variety of specialized units, including a
crisis response unit, a crowd control unit (CIMO) serving Port-au-
Prince and the Western department, crowd control units (UDMO's) serving
each of the remaining eight departments, a presidential and palace
security unit, an 81-officer Coast Guard unit, and a Special
Investigative Unit (SIU). The SIU was formed to investigate high-
profile political killings but is ill-equipped, inexperienced, and has
made limited progress on its cases. Some members of local government
councils (CASEC's) exercise arrest authority without legal sanction.
Members of the HNP and other security forces committed some serious
human rights abuses.
The mandate of the U.N. Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH), which
advised and trained the HNP, is currently set to expire on March 15,
2000. The United Nations plans to replace that mission with a civilian
follow-on technical assistance program.
Haiti is an extremely poor country, with a per capita annual income
of around $400. This figure probably does not fully include significant
transfers from the over 1 million Haitians living abroad, as well as
income from informal sector activities that constitute an estimated 70
percent of actual economic activity. The country has a market-based
economy with state enterprises controlling telecommunications and
utilities. The Government had proposed a broad plan for privatization
of state-owned enterprises. However, aside from the sale of two
previously closed enterprises, the process has come to a halt. A small
elite controls much of the country's wealth. Accurate employment
statistics are unavailable. About two-thirds of the population work in
subsistence agriculture, earn less than the average income, and live in
extreme poverty. A small part of the urban labor force works in the
industrial and assembly sectors, with an equal number in government or
service sector employment. Assembled goods, textiles, leather goods,
handicrafts, and electronics are a source of limited export revenue and
employment. Other important exports are mangoes and coffee. The
Government relies heavily on international assistance.
The Government's human rights record was generally poor, and its
overall effort to respect the human rights of its citizens was marred
by serious abuses and shortcomings in oversight. The HNP's tendency to
resort to excessive force resulted in a sharp increase in extrajudicial
killings. Police were linked to several disappearances. Police
continued to beat, at times torture, and otherwise mistreat detainees.
While some HNP members were fired and some were incarcerated for human
rights abuses, methodical investigations and prosecutions are rare, and
impunity remains a problem. Poor prison conditions, arbitrary arrest
and detention, and prolonged pretrial detention also remained problems.
However, instances of brutality in prisons decreased during the year.
The judiciary remained plagued by understaffing, inadequate resources,
and corrupt and untrained judges. Judicial dockets remain clogged, and
fair and expeditious trials are the exception rather than the rule. The
judiciary is not independent in practice, and in at least 22 cases the
executive branch detained persons in defiance of release orders issued
by judges. Security forces carried out illegal warrantless searches.
Most media practice some self-censorship; however, the press frequently
is critical of theGovernment. Due to the nation's political crisis,
citizens were unable to vote for representatives to Parliament.
Violence against women, societal discrimination against women, and
government neglect and abuse of children remain problems. The
widespread practice of rural families sending young children to the
larger cities to work as unpaid domestics (restaveks) also is still a
problem. Child labor persists. Vigilante activity, including killings,
remained a common alternative to formal judicial processes.
The Government's effort to redress the legacy of human rights abuse
from the 1991-94 period was slightly more successful than in previous
years. The 4-year investigation into the Raboteau massacre was
completed in September, an indictment was issued, and by the end of the
year, the case was moving towards trial. In July the Ministry of
Justice disbursed about $1,700 (27,000 gourdes) in reparation money to
914 victims of the 1993 Cite de Soleil fire, which reportedly was set
by the paramilitary Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti
(FRAPH). Otherwise, no significant progress was made in addressing
other human rights violations or political killings dating from the
Duvalier, de facto, or post-intervention periods.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Members of the HNP
committed extrajudicial killings. Most of the HNP killings were due to
the use of excessive force, police confrontation with armed suspects,
or armed confrontations involving off-duty officers. Credible reports
of such killings by HNP members compiled by the UN/OAS International
Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) increased sharply in 1999. At
year's end, 66 such reports had been received compared with 31 in 1998.
MICIVIH also received credible reports that HNP officers participated
with civilians in vigilante-style killings.
The most egregious single instance of extrajudicial killing was the
summary execution by HNP officers in the presence of the Port-au-Prince
police chief of 11 men on May 28 in the Port-au-Prince neighborhood of
Carrefour-Feuilles. The killings occurred when residents called the
police to respond to bandit activity. After the killings, the
authorities arrested six police officers. Former Port-au-Prince police
chief Coles Rameau fled to the Dominican Republic following the
executions; however, he was apprehended at the Santo Domingo airport
and returned to Port-au-Prince where he remained in custody at year's
end. A special three-magistrate committee was formed to investigate the
case; the investigation was still underway at year's end.
On January 8, an off-duty HNP member shot and killed a man
following a traffic dispute in Cap Haitien. The officer was arrested
but released by an examining magistrate on February 10 on the grounds
that there were ``many other considerations.'' On March 7, an off-duty
policeman in Thomonde shot and killed a youth he suspected of taking
his wallet. He was arrested but charged only with ``theft of a
weapon.'' In June a Port-de-Paix policeman crushed with a rock the head
of a suspect he had just arrested. A prosecutor determined that the
policeman acted in self-defense, despite independent inquiries that
found that he had used excessive force. On April 19, HNP officers shot
and killed Hypolite Elysee who was alleged to have been the leader of a
gang that killed a CIMO agent and four other youths in the Fontamara
area of Port-au-Prince 10 days earlier. HNP officials stated that
Elysee opened fire first and that an HNP officer fired back, killing
him; the authorities did not investigate this case. On April 20, two
HNP officers killed Michelson Jean Philippe Guillame in Port-au-Prince.
Guillame was a Fanmi Lavalas (former President Jean Bertrand Aristide's
political party) coordinator, and his murder sparked a large pro-
Lavalas demonstration and rumors that the killing was politically
motivated. The HNP opened an investigation into the killing; however,
the case remained unsolved at year's end. In June the authorities
detained two Port-au-Prince police officers in connection with the
fatal shooting of a man in Les Cayes on May 30. Also in May, police
shot and killed a suspected gang member. During a June shootout between
the HNP and an armed suspect in Ferrier, stray bullets killed a passer-
by. Although the HNP concluded that the latter case was an accident, it
paid for the victim's funeral expenses.
In early June, recent skeletal human remains were found at Titanyen
(near Croix des Missions), an area that often had served as a dumping
ground for bodies of victims of political killings during the Duvalier
and military eras. The HNP's forensic unit removed the remains with the
assistance of foreign experts. Preliminary findings link some of the
remains with an April incident in which HNP officers allegedly arrested
eight teenage associates of the gang leader, Hypolite Elysee, who HNP
agents killed in April. Despite the efforts of their families to find
them at police stations, prisons, and the morgue the youths werenot
located (see Section 1.b.). The HNP opened an investigation into the
case in June; at year's end the investigation remained open.
At least one extrajudicial killing occurred when a suspect was in
police custody. On April 13, HNP officials detained Felix Lamy in the
Camp Perrin police station and severely beat him before transferring
him to Les Cayes prison where he died. The authorities subsequently
placed the HNP agent responsible for the beating in disciplinary
custody.
The prison system experienced food shortages, and there were at
least four deaths due to malnutrition (see Section 1.c.).
The 4-year investigation into the 1994 Raboteau massacre was
completed in August, resulting in the dismissal of charges against 8
suspects and the indictment of 22 others, including former military
leader Raul Cedras, who was indicted in absentia. Most of those
indicted appealed; at year's end a ruling of the appeal was pending.
There were two killings that were widely regarded as politically
motivated, although the HNP never solved them. On March 1, an unknown
person shot OPL Senator Yvon Toussaint at close range. Toussaint's
murder occurred at a high point of tension between the executive branch
and members of the OPL over dissolution of the Parliament. Toussaint
reportedly was followed and threatened in the days before the attack.
Following the Toussaint killing, several other OPL parliamentarians
were attacked and reported receiving death threats (see Section 1.c.).
The HNP identified a suspect in the killing who was believed to have
left the country. At year's end, the case remained unsolved.
The second killing occurred on the evening of October 8, when Jean
Lamy, an advisor to the HNP and longtime political ally of former
President Aristide, was shot and killed. This murder occurred the day
after State Secretary for Public Security Robert Manuel resigned
reportedly after a long campaign by groups associated with Fanmi
Lavalas to secure his removal. Lamy's funeral was the venue for a
demonstration by self-professed Aristide supporters. The killing
remained unsolved at year's end.
Extrajudicial killings often take the form of vigilante actions.
Most such incidents occurred without official complicity; however,
MICIVIH reported credible evidence that certain so-called vigilance
brigades were engaging in vigilante activities with the approval and
even cooperation of the HNP and CASEC's. For example, vigilance
brigades that consisted of police officers and civilians were
responsible for 16 killings and 4 disappearances (see Section 1.b.) in
May and June in the Bois Neuf area of Cite Soleil. MICIVIH also
received reports that the HNP condoned the activities of the ``Brigade
Fort St. Claire,'' one of Port-au-Prince's most infamous vigilante
groups. On April 11, this group seized a man in the emergency waiting
room of a Port-au-Prince hospital and lynched him.
Especially in rural areas where there is little or no police
presence, the populace routinely resorts to lynching in the absence of
reliable means of legal redress. Angry mobs often killed suspected
thieves, bandits, murderers, rapists, and sorcerers, usually by assault
with machetes, stoning, beating, or burning. MICIVIH recorded 76
fatalities in 48 separate lynchings during the year. However, the
actual number of lynchings probably is far higher given the
pervasiveness of the practice in remote rural areas. In several cases,
HNP intervention prevented lynchings. In incidents in Mole St. Nicolas
and Trou du Nord, HNP members attempted but failed to prevent
lynchings. In one incident in Camp Coq, a mob seized an accused
criminal during a hearing before the justice of the peace.
b. Disappearance.--In April HNP officers allegedly arrested eight
teenagers who disappeared following their arrests. The HNP's forensic
unit linked some of the skeletal human remains found at Titanyen to the
teenagers (see Section 1.a.).
MICIVIH reported that four persons from the Bois Neuf area of Cite
Soleil disappeared on May 17. Several persons reported seeing members
of a vigilante brigade chasing these individuals before their
disappearance. Family members of the four attempted to find their
bodies; however, they did not succeed in finding them by year's end.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the use of unnecessary force or
restraint, psychological pressure, or brutality by the security forces;
however, members of the security forces continue to violate these
provisions. Police officers used excessive--and sometimes deadly--force
in making arrests or controlling demonstrations and rarely were
punished for such acts. Policefrequently beat suspects. There were
sporadic instances of torture and other forms of abuse.
In interviews with prisoners, MICIVIH registered fewer allegations
of police brutality in 1999 than in 1998. MICIVIH recorded 342 such
allegations, compared with 423 in 1998. Nevertheless, police
mistreatment of suspects, at both the time of arrest and during
detention, occurs in all parts of the country. Beating with fists,
sticks, and belts is by far the most common form of abuse. However,
MICIVIH documented other forms of mistreatment, including burning with
cigarettes, choking, hooding, and kalot marassa (severe boxing of the
ears, which can result in eardrum damage). Those who reported such
abuse often had visible injuries consistent with the alleged
mistreatment. There also were isolated allegations of torture by
electric shock, although MICIVIH was unable to verify these.
Mistreatment also sometimes takes the form of withholding medical
treatment from injured jail inmates. During the year, MICIVIH
registered particular concern about police brutality in Cap Haitien,
Petit-Goave, Petionville, Cite Soleil, and the Cafeteria precinct of
Port-au-Prince. Police rarely are prosecuted for the abuse of
detainees.
There were credible allegations of the use of excessive force on
the part of the CIMO and UDMO crowd control forces. On February 2, CIMO
members reportedly used excessive force in breaking up a demonstration
of Cite Soleil residents at the National Palace. In May HNP officers
were filmed beating four journalists who were covering a rally against
crime and violence attended by several thousand persons (see Sections
2.a. and 2.b.). A CIMO agent reportedly assaulted a reporter and
confiscated his camera during a June 24 disturbance at the ``Lafamni
Selavie'' orphanage (see Section 2.a.). In Cap Haitien on February 8,
UDMO personnel reportedly used excessive force in breaking up a student
demonstration.
The Government's record of disciplining police officers implicated
in these offenses is mixed. As of the end of September, at least 58 HNP
officers were in prison on a variety of charges. The authorities
charged 11 of these officers with human rights violations. However,
more frequently the HNP simply discharged officers caught committing
flagrant abuses. During the year, MICIVIH registered concern over
several cases in which the authorities treated police officers accused
of human rights violations with undue leniency. In Cape Haitien, the
Ministry of Justice first ordered the transfer of an investigating
magistrate and then fired him, for attempting to bring a police officer
to trial on apparently well-founded charges of assault. A government
prosecutor found that the Port-de-Paix policeman who smashed a
suspect's head with a rock (see Section 1.a.) acted in self-defense,
despite the conclusion of MICIVIH and an internal police inquiry that
it was obviously a case of excessive force. The policeman returned to
active duty.
There continued to be sporadic instances of brutality on the part
of local officials exercising unauthorized law enforcement functions.
Especially in rural areas, MICIVIH has documented brutality by members
and agents of local government councils, who tend to assume an illegal
law enforcement role in the absence of a regular police presence. In
the past, unofficial security forces controlled by mayors also
committed human rights abuses; however, there were no reports that this
occurred during the year.
In September four Haitians living in France filed lawsuits against
former President Jean-Claude Duvalier, charging him with crimes against
humanity while they were imprisoned and tortured during his 1976-86
rule.
Following the murder of OPL Senator Toussaint, several OPL senators
and deputies were attacked and some reported receiving death threats.
On March 15, OPL Senator Yrvelt Chery reported that shots were fired
outside his gate. In April OPL deputy Vionette Wilner Raphael reported
that his house was sprayed with bullets and that his official car was
set on fire. Both Chery and Raphael alleged that they were targeted for
being part of the opposition OPL. On April 22, three OPL
parliamentarians, including Wilner, asked for and received temporary
refuge at the Chilean Embassy claiming that their lives were in danger;
they subsequently left the country. On September 5, unknown individuals
fired at OPL spokesman Saveur Pierre-Etienne while he was driving
towards Port-au-Prince (see Section 3).
On April 26, unidentified persons fired shots at or near the house
of former OPL deputy Lorraine Casimir; she allegedly had been receiving
telephone threats since before January 11. On May 5, unknown
individuals vandalized Casimir's home. HNP officers reported that these
attacks occurred because of a personal dispute; however, OPL leaders
claimed that they were actually part of a systematic campaign to
intimidate OPL parliamentarians.
On March 8, Pierre Esperance, Director of the National Coalition
for Haitian Rights (NCHR) and treasurer of Platform of Haitian Human
Rights Organizations (POHDH) was shot and wounded in Port-au-Prince.For
weeks before this attack, both the NCHR and the POHDH received a number
of threatening phone calls and leaflets, and the POHDH issued a press
release on March 1 alleging that the threats were condoned officially.
The HNP's investigation of this shooting remained unresolved at year's
end (see Section 4).
On September 4, an explosive device detonated at the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry. The blast did not injure anybody and only
damaged the building slightly. Some members of the media characterized
the bombing as part of an attempt to intimidate members of the private
sector to stop rallying against lawlessness and poor governance.
Members of the Chamber alleged that the attack was connected directly
to pro-Lavalas threats against its president, Oliver Nadal.
Several sites related to the forthcoming elections were vandalized,
and unidentified persons set fire to electoral offices in various
locations. In the Grand'Anse, police failed to respond to acts of
intimidation against election offices and against candidates from
parties other than the locally-strong KOREGA party (see Section 3).
Prison conditions remained very poor. The new Penitentiary
Administration Management (DAP), with the support of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UNDP, and MICIVIH, struggled to
improve conditions in the country's prisons. Prisoners and detainees,
held in overcrowded and inadequate facilities, continued to suffer from
inadequate basic hygiene, poor quality health care, and 24-hour
confinement to cells in some facilities. Several prisons experienced
water shortages. At year's end, the country's 17 prisons held 3,797
prisoners, an increase of about 300 over 1998. In March the Government
improved facilities at the main penitentiary in Port-au-Prince by
adding space for an additional 600 inmates; however, overcrowding
remained a problem.
The prison system experienced food shortages, and there were at
least four deaths due to malnutrition. Many prisons were only able to
supply one (as opposed to the required two) meals a day to inmates.
Most severely affected were inmates whose diet was not supplemented by
food brought by family members. A team of physicians who examined 217
inmates of Port-au-Prince's National Penitentiary found that 153 were
suffering some degree of malnutrition and that 40 detainees were
severely malnourished and not receiving proper medical care. The ICRC
also found malnutrition in Gonaives prison, where there were three
malnutrition-related deaths in early June. In Fort Liberte and Les
Cayes, inmates organized demonstrations to protest the food shortage.
The ICRC began a nutrition program in Gonaives, and a food center was
set up at the National Penitentiary to address this problem. As an
additional measure, DAP hired supervisors in four prisons with the sole
responsibility of managing the food stocks. Despite these efforts, the
ICRC found at year's end that 18 percent of inmates at the National
Penitentiary suffered from malnutrition.
Fort National prison in Port-au-Prince is the only prison facility
expressly for women and juveniles. In other prison facilities, women
are housed in cells separate from the men. However, overcrowding often
prevents strict separation of juveniles from adults, convicts from
those in pretrial detention, or violent from nonviolent prisoners.
MICIVIH statistics indicated a decline in reports of mistreatment
of inmates by DAP guards. However, abuse in the form of beating,
slapping, and other degrading treatment continued. DAP took
disciplinary action against a handful of guards implicated in these
abuses. In January the director of the National Penitentiary, as a
measure to prevent abuse, ordered that the guards no longer routinely
be issued batons.
In June the Government approved regulations for acceptable prison
conditions and disciplinary guidelines for inmates after a 2-year
delay. Following government approval of these regulations, conditions
improved slightly.
In the past, persons detained in politically sensitive cases often
were kept in police station holding cells, rather than in regular
prison facilities. These and other holding-cell detainees depended
largely on their families for food and medicine. In some cases, police
officers used their personal funds to buy food for such persons. There
were no reports that this occurred during the year.
The authorities freely permitted the ICRC, the Haitian Red Cross,
MICIVIH, and other human rights groups to enter prisons and police
stations, monitor conditions, and assist prisoners with medical care,
food, and legal aid. The Director General of the HNP and the State
Secretary for Public Security cooperated with MICIVIH.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The HNP continued to use
arbitrary arrest and detention. The Constitution stipulates that a
person may be arrested only if apprehended during the commission of a
crime, or if a judicial warrant has been issued. Judicial warrants
cannot be executed between 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. The authorities must
bring the detainee before a judge within 48-hours of arrest. In
practice, the authorities frequently ignored these provisions. There
were instances of arrests by security forces and local officials
lacking the authority to do so. In particular, arrests by mayors and
members of CASEC's occurred in underpoliced rural areas. Furthermore,
MICIVIH has documented cases in which both children and adults have
been imprisoned without a hearing simply because their parents
requested this of a judge.
The requirement that a detainee be brought before a judge within 48
hours of his arrest was disregarded routinely in certain police
jurisdictions, according to MICIVIH. Although the 48-hour rule is
violated in all parts of the country, it is ignored most flagrantly in
Jeremie, Cap Haitien, Petionville, and the Delmas commissariat of Port-
au-Prince. In Petionville, MICIVIH documented 50 cases in the month of
September alone in which this rule had been violated. Moreover, arrests
sometimes are made on charges (for example, sorcery or debt) that have
no basis in law. The authorities also detained some persons on
unspecified charges or ``pending investigation.''
The authorities continued to detain persons in defiance of valid
orders for their release issued by judges. MICIVIH expressed ``extreme
concern'' at these cases and described the handling of them as
``completely arbitrary and illegal.'' This practice disproportionately
affected prisoners with histories of opposition to the Government or
affiliation with the Duvalier or de facto regimes. However, suspected
narcotics traffickers and other criminals also were included. At year's
end, there were 22 prisoners held in defiance of valid release orders,
including Thomas Asabath, Leoncefils Ceance, Steve Conserve, Bertrand
Constant, Akis Deronette, Calero Bibas Fabien, Meradieu Faustin, Jean-
Louis Henry, Robert LeCorps, Jean-Robert Lherisson, Rilande Louis,
Leonard Lucas, Pierre Luckner, Georges Metayer, Alexandre Paul, Claude
Raymond, Jean-Michel Richardson, and Jean Enel Samedi. During the
months of October and November, 20 prisoners, including 2 who were
being held in defiance of valid release orders, staged a hunger strike
at the National Penitentiary to protest their plight. All of the
strikers had been detained for at least 440 days and no trial date had
been set in at least half of the cases. Minister of Justice Leblanc
acknowledged that this practice was a problem and formed a commission
to report to him on the matter. The commission does not have the
authority to release the detainees; however, Minister Leblanc stated
that he would abide by any recommendations to release them. The October
reassignment of a state prosecutor who had acknowledged following
political directives led to the release of some of the hunger strikers
on humanitarian grounds.
As in previous years, the dysfunctional judicial system resulted in
pervasive prolonged pretrial detention, with an estimated 80 percent of
the country's prisoners awaiting trial. The problem is most extreme in
Port-au-Prince. A February compilation of statistics on these cases by
MICIVIH showed that of 3,090 prisoners, 1,172 have been held for more
than 1 year. Of these, 775 had been held between 1 and 2 years, 287 had
been held between 2 and 3 years, and 110 had been held for more than 3
years. Sometimes the charges in these lengthy detentions are minor.
MICIVIH found one case in which a man had been imprisoned in the
National Penitentiary since 1996 awaiting trial for theft of a portable
tape recorder. Another inmate has been in prison since 1996 for
suspected theft of a pair of pants.
Justice Minister Leblanc has announced that he accords resolution
of the problem of pre-trial detentions high priority, has reorganized
the Port-au-Prince prosecutor's office, and has attempted to implement
a more rigorous schedule for hearings for correctional and criminal
affairs. However, resolution of the problem awaits thorough judicial
reform at all levels of the penal chain: Police, justices of the peace,
prosecutors, investigating magistrates, trial judges, and prisons (see
Section 1.e.).
Police in some instances attacked and detained journalists (see
Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
The Constitution prohibits involuntary exile of citizens, and there
were no reports of its use.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, it is not independent in practice.
Years of rampant corruption and governmental neglect have left the
judicial system poorly organized and nearly moribund. The Constitution
sets varying periods of tenure for judges above the level of justice of
the peace. However, in practice the Ministry of Justice
exercisesappointment and administrative oversight of the judiciary,
prosecutors, and court staff. The Ministry of Justice can remove
justices of the peace and occasionally dismisses judges above this
level as well.
At the lowest level of the justice system, the justices of the
peace issue warrants, mediate cases, adjudicate minor infractions, take
depositions, and refer cases to prosecutors or higher judicial
officials. Investigating magistrates and public prosecutors cooperate
in the development of more serious cases, which are tried by the judges
of the first-instance courts. Appeals court judges hear cases referred
from the first-instance courts, and the Supreme Court deals with
questions of procedure and constitutionality.
The judicial apparatus follows a civil law system based on the
Napoleonic Code dating from 1832, with few subsequent amendments. The
Constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial; however,
this right was widely abridged in practice. The Constitution also
expressly denies police and judicial authorities the right to
interrogate persons charged with a crime unless the suspect has legal
counsel or a representative of his of her choice present or waives this
right. While trials are public, most accused persons cannot afford
legal counsel for interrogation or trial, and the law does not require
that the Government provide legal representation. Despite the efforts
of local human rights groups and the international community to provide
legal aid, many interrogations without counsel occur. All defendants
are entitled to representation by counsel during trials; however, in
practice many defendants are unrepresented at trial. Defendants enjoy a
presumption of innocence and the right to be present at trial, to
confront witnesses against them, and to present witnesses and evidence
on their own behalf, and the Government respects these rights in
practice.
A shortage of adequately trained judges and prosecutors, among
other systemic problems, created a huge backlog of criminal cases, with
many detainees waiting months or even years in pretrial detention for a
court date. The problem of case backlogs is related to the general
shortage of qualified judges, prosecutors, and justices of the peace.
Judges and other judicial officials lack the basic resources (such as
office space, legal reference texts, and supplies) necessary to perform
their duties. Professional competence sometimes is lacking as well;
illiterate judges are not unheard of. If an accused person ultimately
is tried and found innocent, there is no redress against the Government
for time served in detention.
The Code of Criminal Procedure does not clearly assign
responsibility to investigate crimes and divides the authority to
pursue cases among police, justices of the peace, prosecutors, and
investigative magistrates. Examining magistrates often receive dossiers
that are empty or are missing police reports. Autopsies only rarely are
conducted, and reports are even more rare. The code provides for two
criminal court sessions (assizes) per year in each of the 15 first-
instance jurisdictions, each session generally lasting 2 weeks, to try
all major crimes requiring a jury trial. During the year, the Port-au-
Prince jurisdiction--by far the largest in terms of caseload--failed to
adhere to this stipulation due to difficulties in assembling a jury.
The first criminal assizes since July 1998 occurred in Port-au-Prince
in December.
The Prime Minister and Justice Minister have acknowledged openly
the justice system's many failings and have developed a plan for
judicial reform. Justice Minister Leblanc has demonstrated a relatively
energetic and imaginative approach to his portfolio, although due to
the vastness of the problems at hand and a lack of resources, the year
was devoted largely to setting priorities and laying the groundwork for
reform. Some of Leblanc's priorities included improving communication
between the jurisdictions to the ministry, enforcing judicial
decisions, and making justice more accessible by providing judges with
cars to enable them to travel into their districts. Leblanc also
created seven working groups to study a range of problems relating to
the administration of justice. Their findings are to be used to develop
implementing legislation for the judicial reform bill passed by
Parliament in 1998.
In September the new Magistrates' School (whose first class
graduated in 1998) held admission examinations for its next class. A
total of 140 candidates took the examination, from which a class of 40
was selected; they started a 1-year training program in November. The
Magistrates' School also held training seminars for 120 justices of the
peace with the goal of improving their professional skills.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits interference with privacy,
family, home, or correspondence; however, police and other security
force elements conducted illegal warrantless searches. The
policereportedly arrested family members of wanted persons when the
suspects themselves could not be found.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights. Print and electronic media from opposite ends of
the political spectrum often criticize the Government. However, most
media practice a modest degree of self-censorship, wary of offending
sponsors or the politically influential.
There are two daily French-language newspapers in the country, Le
Nouvelliste and Le Matin, with a combined circulation of less than
15,000. Print media in Creole is limited due to regional variations and
the lack of a consistent orthography; however, many newspapers include
a page of news in Creole. Both daily newspapers frequently are critical
of government policies.
With a literacy rate of only about 20 percent, broadcast media,
especially Creole-language radio, have an unusual importance. Over 200
independent radio stations exist, including about 40 in the capital
alone. Most stations carry a mix of music, news, and talk show
programs, which many citizens regard as one of their only opportunities
to speak out on a variety of political, social, and economic issues.
Uncensored foreign satellite television is available; however, its
impact is limited as most persons do not have access to television due
to financial constraints. Broadcast media tend to criticize the
Government less than the written press but freely express a wide range
of political viewpoints.
On May 28, during a rally against crime and insecurity organized by
the Chamber of Commerce, police and CIMO crowd control forces were
filmed beating four journalists and seizing their cameras and film (see
Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). In protest about 150 journalists demonstrated
in front of the HNP commissariat on the Champs de Mars on June 7. The
police authorities formally apologized; however, no charges were
brought against them.
On June 24, a CIMO agent reportedly assaulted a journalist from the
newspaper Haiti en Marche and confiscated his camera and press card(see
Section 1.c.). The journalist was covering an incident in which 40
youths invaded their former Aristide Foundation-run orphanage; the
youths threw stones at the orphanage management and police personnel
claiming that they were promised jobs and places of residence that
never materialized.
On April 27, the HNP arrested Leslie Fareau Bonny, director of
Radio Timoun for possessing anti-HNP leaflets. HNP officials charged
him with inciting to riot and defamation. On April 28, Bonny was
released from prison.
Radio Vision 2000, which is known for its opposition to the
Government, has engaged in a long-running dispute with Conatel, the
Government's communications regulatory authority. In October unknown
persons fired shots through the front windows of the station. One week
later, the director of Conatel ordered Radio Vision 2000 to disconnect
its satellite, which he declared illegal; however, station officials
asserted that this was harassment by Conatel. The station was able to
continue operations when a magistrate refused to approve the agency's
actions.
Foreign journalists generally circulated without hindrance from the
authorities.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the authorities generally respect
this right in practice. A variety of organizations were able to
exercise this right without hindrance. Large and generally peaceful
demonstrations occurred frequently throughout the year to protest the
dissolution of Parliament, to decry increasing political violence, and
to express dissatisfaction with a variety of economic issues.
At the May 28 rally organized by the Chamber of Commerce, HNP
officers were filmed beating four journalists and confiscating their
photography equipment (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.). At the same
demonstration, HNP officials failed to intervene as
counterdemonstrators, many of who reportedly were linked to populist
groups associated with the Fanmi Lavalas party, violently disrupted the
event.
On October 24, demonstrators shouted pro-Aristide slogans and threw
chairs and bottles of urine to disrupt a rally organized by the
Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) to launch its preelection civic
education campaign. The agitators succeeded in breaking up the rally.
The HNP was not present at the event and, although apolice station was
nearby, they did not arrive to restore order after the violence began.
The HNP subsequently asserted that the police leadership had not been
given proper notice of the rally. President Preval, spokesmen of
political parties, including Fanmi Lavalas, as well as MICIVIH,
criticized the demonstrators' actions. Police handling of two
subsequent rallies showed improvement.
In several cases, HNP officers used tear gas in order to control
demonstrations. At a student demonstration in March, police officers
used tear gas to disperse the crowd. In June protesters at the funeral
of the 11 men executed by the HNP threw stones at HNP officers; police
personnel shot into the air and used tear gas to quell the
demonstration.
In February private security guards wounded several persons at a
demonstration protesting recent cutbacks in electricity service.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for the right to
practice all religions and faiths, provided that practice does not
disturb law and order, and the Government respects this right.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government respects the right of
freedom of movement within the country, to travel, to emigrate, and to
return.
An unknown number of undocumented migrants put to sea seeking
better economic opportunities in other countries. The Government
operated, with international support, a national migration office to
assist citizens involuntarily repatriated from other countries, notably
the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas. In November mass repatriations
of about 15,000 Haitian nationals by the Dominican Republic military
created a crisis in Haitian-Dominican relations. About 25 percent of
those repatriated returned to their hometowns, while the remainder
either returned to the Dominican Republic or were waiting to do so at
year's end. There were reliable reports of separation of families and
mistreatment of Haitians by Dominican soldiers during this episode.
The Government has no policy regarding foreign nationals seeking
refuge or asylum from third countries. The question of provision of
first asylum did not arise. There were no reports of the forced return
of persons to countries where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government:
The Constitution provides for regular elections for local and
parliamentary offices and for the presidency, and President Rene
Preval, who was elected in late 1995 in an election regarded by the
international community as free and fair, continued in office. However,
due to the nation's political crisis, citizens were unable to vote for
representatives to Parliament.
Constitutional order has been eroded by the prolonged political
crisis that was touched off by the flawed local and parliamentary
elections of April 1997 and Prime Minister Rosny Smarth's subsequent
resignation. A stalemate between the President and Parliament, which
was dominated by members of the opposition OPL, over the approval of a
successor continued through 1997 and most of 1998, preventing the
organization of parliamentary and local elections due in November 1998.
Preval's third nominee to the post of Prime Minister, Jacques Edouard
Alexis, passed the first part of a two-stage ratification process in
December 1998. Before he could complete the second part, which would
have sought parliamentary approval of his Cabinet and plan of
government, the terms of office of the entire 85-seat House of Deputies
and all but 9 of the 27 members of the Senate expired on January 11.
All of the deputies in the last legislature were elected between
June and December 1995. The mandates of nine senators who were elected
in early 1991 expired in January 1997, and they should have been
replaced in elections in 1996. However, those elections were delayed
until April 1997, when only two senators received a clear majority and
seven seats were supposed to be determined in a second round. The
results of the 1997 elections were so widely contested that the second
round was not held, and none of the nine senators took office. The
other 18 senators were elected under the Electoral Law of 1995, in
which a political deal was struck, determining that the terms of 9
senators would expire in January 1999 and 9 would expire in January
2001. After January 11, the parliamentarians unilaterally voted to
extend their mandates until new elections could be organized; however,
President Preval announced publicly that he would not recognize this
decision, which left the countrywithout a functioning legislature.
Members of Parliament requested that the Supreme Court hear their case
for extending their terms of office; however, in February the Supreme
Court ruled that it would not hear the dispute because it was not first
considered by a lower court. Since January 11, President Preval and the
remaining senators were the only serving government officials on the
national level who were elected freely and held office in conformity
with the provisions of the Constitution.
The mandates of the country's mayors also expired on January 11;
however, President Preval decided to appoint all but two of them to
continue serving until elections could be held. Opposition leaders and
foreign observers criticized this decision, alleging that it placed the
mayors in debt to President Preval, and effectively put the country's
rural areas under his control. On January 22, about one-third of the
mayors rejected Preval's offer to serve as presidential appointees,
stating that their mandate should come from the electorate, and not the
President.
Officials elected in 1997 as members of the territorial assemblies
continued to serve following the disbanding of Parliament. Opposition
leaders criticized the alleged preferential treatment given to those in
territorial assemblies whose membership they claimed was largely allied
with President Preval and Fanmi Lavalas.
In the weeks following the disbanding of Parliament, the political
climate was increasingly tense. There were several occasionally violent
strikes and demonstrations, and a series of reported threats and
violent attacks against some opposition politicians. Authorities
attributed at least some of the attacks to common crime unrelated to
the political crisis. Members of opposition political parties--
particularly the OPL--reported receiving telephoned threats, hearing
shots fired outside their residences, suffering vandalism of their
property and other acts of intimidation (see Section 1.c.). On March 1,
OPL Senator Yvon Toussaint was killed (see Section 1.a.), and in April
three OPL parliamentarians and members of their families took refuge in
the Chilean Ambassador's residence, citing death threats. They
subsequently left the country. In September unknown assailants shot at
OPL spokesman Saveur Pierre-Etienne. Unknown assailants shot and
wounded Marie-Claude Calvin, President Preval's sister, and others shot
at Prime Minister Alexis's car; however, authorities reported that
these incidents were not politically motivated (see Section 1.c.).
Dissatisfaction by some groups with the CEP's electoral plans also led
to violence; several sites related to the forthcoming elections were
torched or vandalized in the southern department of Grand'Anse in
December. Unidentified persons set fire to the house of the president
of the Departmental Electoral Board in Jeremie, while others also set
fire to the communal electoral offices (BEC's) in nearby towns of Anse-
d'Hainault and Troubonbon and vandalized the BEC in Corail (see Section
3).
The leadership of the HNP also came under the pressure of threats
and intimidation, raising concerns of a possible campaign to politicize
the 4-year-old force at a time when police personnel were charged with
ensuring a climate of security prior to elections. Populist groups
reportedly associated with Fanmi Lavalas mounted a public campaign
calling for the resignation of Robert Manuel as Secretary of State for
Public Security. On October 7, Manuel resigned from his position. On
October 8, unidentified assailants killed Jean Lamy, an advisor to the
HNP (see Section 1.a.). One week later, unidentified assailants shot at
the Director of the HNP's Judicial Police outside his home. On October
16, self-proclaimed supporters of former President Aristide disrupted
Lamy's funeral service and forced the HNP's Director General, Pierre
Denize to flee the building.
On March 6, President Preval negotiated an agreement with the
Democratic Consultation Group, a coalition of five small opposition
parties, aimed at ending the crisis by naming a Provisional Election
Council to organize the overdue parliamentary and local elections.
Members of the OPL, the country's largest opposition party, withdrew
from the Democratic Consultation Group during negotiations with Preval,
citing an unconstitutional cabinet and delays in the investigation of
Senator Toussaint's murder. The OPL leaders also announced that they
would not propose candidates for the CEP or for the new Government;
however, they did not reject the possibility of participating in the
forthcoming elections. The CEP consists of nine members chosen by
President Preval on the basis of proposals made by the Democratic
Consultation Group and members of civil society.
The CEP was charged with addressing the contested 1997 elections.
In June CEP members declared publicly that the two controversial seats
from the April 1997 elections would be on the ballot. In July the
Lissade Commission report on the 1997 elections, which had never been
released despite demands by opposition leaders, became public. The
report listed numerous irregularities with the elections, including
ballot box stuffing, falsification of affidavits, lack of affidavits,
multiple voting by one party, use of false voter cards, voter and
candidate intimidation, presenceof armed persons at voting sites,
moving polling sites, incomplete candidate lists, and impeding voter
registration. The report also revealed that out of the 95 cases of
documented transgressions the culprit was readily identifiable in 21
cases. Of these, Fanmi Lavalas was the culprit in 16 cases, OPL in 3,
and Korega in 2. Following the release of this report, the CEP
incorporated several provisions in the draft Electoral Law that were
aimed at eliminating election fraud, such as distributing photo
identification cards, adding poll watchers and providing them with
better training, and instituting a policy of reporting results on
election night.
President Preval implemented the new Electoral Law by decree in
July, and the CEP began laying the groundwork for parliamentary and
local elections. The elections initially were set for November;
however, they were delayed several times. The first round of
parliamentary and local elections was subsequently scheduled for March
19, 2000, with a runoff to be held in late April. At year's end, about
29,000 candidates from a range of political parties were registered as
candidates in the local, regional, and national elections. Separate
presidential elections were scheduled for December 2000.
In March President Preval also appointed a new Cabinet, in
consultation with the Democratic Consultation Group. In the absence of
a parliament, new ministers took office without being confirmed.
There are no legal impediments to women's participation in politics
or government; however, they are underrepresented, and the low status
of women limits their participation. The Election Law provides that the
deposit required of female candidates for political office is half that
required of male candidates, if a recognized party sponsors them. In
the recent past, Haiti has had a female president, prime minister,
foreign minister, and finance minister. Of the 80 sitting members of
the Chamber of Deputies (3 seats were vacant) when it was disbanded, 3
were women. The Senate had no female members. At year's end, there were
a total of 34 women registered for the Senate and Chamber of Deputies
elections scheduled for 2000.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights:
Domestic and international human rights groups generally operate
without government restrictions; however, incidents of threats and
intimidation from unknown sources increased during the year. Justice
Minister Leblanc has sought dialog with some of these groups and
solicited their recommendations on human rights issues such as
restitution for victims of abuses committed under the 1991-94 de facto
military regime. About a dozen groups monitor human rights abuses, with
some working on civic education and legal aid as well.
On March 8, Pierre Esperance, country director of the National
Coalition for Haitian Rights was shot and seriously wounded as he was
driving his car near his Port-au-Prince office. The incident occurred
after an escalation of telephone and verbal threats, and the appearance
of threatening leaflets. The identities of the attackers or the motive
for the shooting were not established. The HNP's investigation remained
open but reportedly was inactive (see Section 1.c.).
The security climate worsened for several other domestic human
rights groups including the Platform of Haitian Human Rights
Organizations, the Karl Leveque Cultural Institute, Human Rights Fund
II, and the National Coalition of Haitian Rights. These groups reported
receiving repeated threats, most of them anonymous.
In May the Human Rights Fund II suspended a victims' assistance
program after threats from members of the popular organization,
Movement of the Victims of September 30 (MOVI-30).
In June the International Republican Institute (IRI) closed the
offices of its democracy building program in Port-au-Prince. Since May
1998, the IRI had been the target of threats and violence, allegedly by
self-professed supporters of former President Aristide. For example,
two of the IRI's employees reportedly were threatened at gunpoint, its
workshops were destroyed, and associates of Fanmi Lavalas had called
for the Institute's expulsion from the country.
The Office of the Protector of Citizens, an autonomous, ombudsman-
like office provided for by the 1987 Constitution, made slow progress
towards establishing itself as an effective entity. It remained
constrained by budgetary and personnel deficiencies and reported
difficulty in establishing cooperation with other ministries. In March
in cooperation with the Human Rights Fund, it organized a seminar on
police-community relations with the participation of HNP Director
General Pierre Denize.
The lack of a functioning Parliament (see Section 3) had an impact
on human rights monitoring, since parliamentary committees no longer
investigated allegations of police abuses, as they had in 1998 during
disturbances in Mirebelais and Milot.
The UN/OAS International Civilian Mission continued to play a vital
and successful role in monitoring the human rights situation and in
promoting adherence to human rights norms by the authorities. MICIVIH
investigated all reports of human rights violations, issued periodic
reports and press releases, conducted civic education, and trained
local human rights groups. MICIVIH also worked with the Government to
develop its institutional capacity to prevent and provide redress for
human rights abuses. In June MICIVIH was forced to close five regional
offices and dismiss half its monitors due to severe financial
difficulties. The U.N. component of MICIVIH was scheduled to expire on
December 31; however, it was extended until March 15, 2000. In November
the U.N. General Assembly approved creation of a follow-on mission to
MIPONUH and MICIVIH. The mandate of the new entity, the International
Civilian Mission for Support in Haiti (MICAH), is to begin in March
2000 and continue to operate until February 6, 2001.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status:
The 1987 Constitution does not specifically prohibit discrimination
on the grounds of race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social
status. It does provide for equal working conditions regardless of sex,
beliefs, or marital status; however, there is no effective governmental
mechanism to administer or enforce these provisions.
Women.--According to women's rights groups, rape and other abuse of
women is common, both within and outside marriage. A 1998 study by the
Haitian Center for Research and Action for the Promotion of Women
documented widespread rape and violence against women. The report also
found that many women do not report these forms of abuse due to fear,
shame, or lack of confidence in judicial remedies. A survey by the
United Nations Children's Fund of violence against women found that 37
percent of women reported being victims of sexual violence or reported
knowing a woman who had been; another 33 percent reported being victims
of other types of physical abuse. The law provides penalties for these
crimes; however, the authorities do not enforce these adequately. The
law excuses a husband if he murders his wife or her lover upon catching
them in the act of adultery in the home; however, a wife who kills her
husband upon discovering him in the act of adultery is not excused. The
National Commission of Truth and Justice, formed after the 1991-94
period of military rule, recommended several improvements to existing
laws concerning rape and abuse of women; however, Parliament has not
enacted any of these proposed changes. There are no government-
sponsored programs for victims of violence.
In May 1998, 20 women's organizations met with parliamentarians and
proposed changes to laws that they considered discriminatory. The
changes proposed include the decriminalization of adultery, the
classification of rape as a crime against the person rather than as a
crime against honor, and the extension of the Labor Code to cover
domestic work. They also proposed a law on violence against women and
changes to the Family Code. None of the proposed changes were
implemented by year's end. Sexual harassment of female workers in the
assembly sector is a problem (see Section 6.b.).
The Ministry of Women's Affairs is charged with promoting and
defending the rights of women and ensuring that they attain an equal
status in society, but it has few resources at its disposal and was
able to accomplish little in this regard.
The Constitution states that all citizens are equal before the law;
however, women do not enjoy the same social and economic status as men.
In some social strata, tradition limits women's roles. Peasant women,
often the breadwinners for their families, remain largely in the
traditional occupations of farming, marketing, and domestic labor. Very
poor urban women, who head their families and provide their economic
support, also often find their employment opportunities limited to
traditional roles in domestic labor and marketing. Female employees in
private industry or service jobs, including government jobs, seldom are
promoted to supervisory positions. Laws governing child support
recognize the widespread practice of multiple-father families but
rarely are enforced. However, well-educated women have occupied
prominent positions in both the private and public sector in recent
years. Women's rights groups are small, localized, and receive little
publicity.
Children.--The Government's programs do not promote or defend
children's rights. Government health care and education programs
forchildren are inadequate or nonexistent. Primary education is
supposed to be free and compulsory, but there are far too few public
schools to accommodate the country's children, especially in rural
areas. Public schools are not obligated to admit illegitimate children.
According to a Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs spokesperson,
schools' refusals to admit illegitimate children currently is less of a
problem than it was in the past. Poorer families sometimes ration
education money to pay school fees for male children only.
Rural families continued to send young children to more affluent
city dwellers to serve as unpaid domestic labor; families of these
children frequently received financial compensation (see Section 6.f.).
A 1991 U.N. study cited this practice as an example of slavery in the
20th century. One international organization estimated that 250,000 to
300,000 children, 85 percent of them girls, may be victims of this
practice, called ``restavek'' (which means ``lives with'' in Creole).
The Ministry of Social Affairs believes that many employers compel the
children to work long hours, provide them with little nourishment, and
frequently beat and abuse them. The law requires that restaveks 15
years of age and older be paid ``not less than one half the amount
payable to a hired servant'' to perform similar work, in addition to
room and board. To avoid this obligation, employers send many if not
most restaveks away from the home before the children reach the age of
15.
Most local human rights groups do not report on the plight of
restavek children as an abuse or seek to improve their situation. The
Ministry of Social Affairs believes that it can do little to stop this
practice, regarding it as economically motivated; the Ministry assigned
five monitors to oversee the welfare of restavek children. Society
holds such children in little regard, and the poor state of the economy
worsened their situation. Port-au-Prince's large population of street
children includes many restaveks who have been sent out of employers'
homes or are runaways.
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that disabled
persons shall have the means to ensure their autonomy, education, and
independence. However, there is no legislation to implement these
constitutional provisions or to mandate provision of access to
buildings for the disabled. Although they do not face overt
mistreatment, given the severe poverty in which most Haitians live,
those with disabilities face a particularly harsh existence. Disabled
beggars are commonly seen on the streets of Port-au-Prince and other
towns.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Some 99 percent of Haitians are
descendants, in whole or in part, of African slaves who won their war
of independence from France in 1804. The remaining population is of
European, Middle Eastern, North American, or Latin American origin. The
law makes no distinction based on race. Longstanding social and
political animosities often are tied to cultural identification, skin
color, and overlapping issues of class in this starkly inegalitarian
society. Some of these animosities date back to before Haiti's
revolutionary period.
The Government recognizes two official languages: Creole, which is
spoken by virtually all Haitians; and French, which is spoken by about
20 percent of the population, including the economic elite. The
inability to communicate in French has long limited the political and
economic opportunities available to the majority of the population. The
Government prepares most documents only in French, and most judges
conduct most legal proceedings exclusively in French. Complicating this
is the lack of an agreed-upon standard for written Creole. However, in
1995 the lower house of Parliament designated Creole as the language
for parliamentary debate.
Section 6. Worker Rights:
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
provide for the right of association and provide workers, including
those in the public sector, with the right to form and join unions
without prior government authorization. The law protects union
activities and prohibits a closed shop. The law also requires a union,
which must have a minimum of 10 members, to register with the Social
Affairs Ministry within 60 days of its formation.
Unions are independent of the Government and political parties. Six
principal labor federations represent about 5 percent of the total
labor force, including about 2 to 3 percent of labor in the industrial
sector.
Teachers went on strike for several months early in the year
because they had been promised a 32 percent pay increase that never
materialized. This strike led public high school studentsto throw rocks
at private schools, demanding that they close in solidarity. Students
also clashed with HNP officers during demonstrations (see Section
2.b.). The public school teachers eventually returned to work; however,
they called a 3-day strike in June to protest the Government's
continuing failure to increase salaries and disburse back pay. The
teachers struck again from September to November. They eventually filed
suit against the Government due to the fact that they had not received
back pay or the promised salary increase by year's end.
On January 22, the OPL, allied political parties, civil society
groups, and some labor unions held a nationwide general strike to
protest the dissolution of Parliament.
In August workers forced the closure of the port in Gonaives for
over 2 weeks by striking over a new method of tax collection.
Each of the principal labor federations maintained some fraternal
relations with various international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
protects trade union organizing activities and stipulates fines for
those who interfere with this right. Unions generally were free to
pursue their goals, although the Government made little effort to
enforce the law. Union leaders assert that some employers in the
private industrial sector dismiss individuals who participate in union
organizing activities. Organized labor activity was concentrated in the
Port-au-Prince area, in state enterprises, the civil service, and the
assembly sector. The high unemployment rate and antiunion sentiment
among some factory workers limited the success of union organizing
efforts.
Collective bargaining continued to be nonexistent, and employers
set wages unilaterally. The Labor Code does not distinguish between
industries producing for the local market and those producing for
export. Employees in the export-oriented assembly sector enjoyed
better-than-average wages and benefits. Female workers in the assembly
sector report that some employers sexually harass female workers with
impunity. Women also assert that, while the vast majority of assembly
sector workers are female, virtually all the supervisors are men.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
prohibits forced or compulsory labor and applies equally to minors;
however, while such labor is not known to occur among adults, the
Government failed to enforce this law for children, who continued to be
subjected to forced domestic labor as restaveks in urban households
under conditions that amount to slavery (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age of Employment.--
The minimum employment age in all sectors is 15 years, with the
exception of domestic service, where the minimum age is 12. The Labor
Code prohibits minors from working under dangerous conditions, and it
prohibits minors under the age of 18 from working at night in
industrial enterprises. There is also legal provision for employment of
children between the ages of 12 and 16 as ``apprentices.'' Fierce adult
competition for jobs ensures that child labor is not a factor in the
industrial sector. Children under the age of 15 commonly worked at
informal sector jobs to supplement family income, despite the legal
prohibition and the fact that primary education is supposed to be free
and compulsory (see Section 5). Children also commonly work on small
family farms alongside their parents, even though the high unemployment
rate among adults keeps children from being employed on commercial
farms in significant numbers. The Labor Code prohibits forced or
compulsory labor, which applies equally to minors; however, some
children are forced to work as domestic servants (see Sections 5 and
6.c.). In these as in many other areas, government agencies lack the
resources to enforce the relevant laws and regulations effectively.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum daily wage,
established in June 1995, is about $2.18 (36 gourdes). Annually, a
minimum wage worker would earn about $680, an income considerably above
the national average but not sufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. The majority of citizens work in
subsistence agriculture, a sector where minimum wage legislation does
not apply.
The Labor Code governs individual employment contracts. It sets the
standard workday at 8 hours, and the workweek at 48 hours, with 24
hours of rest on Sunday. However, the officers of the HNP work 12-hour
shifts 6 days per week, in apparent violation of the Labor Code. The
code also establishes minimum health and safety regulations. The
industrial and assembly sectors largely observed these guidelines. The
assembly sector published a voluntary code of conduct in April,
committing signatories to a number of measures designed to raise
industry standards, including payment of the minimum wage and the
prohibition of child labor. However, the Ministry of Social Affairs did
not enforce work hours or health and safety regulations. With more than
50 percent of the population unemployed, workers were not able to
exercise the right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations
without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons, and internal trafficking of children is a problem. Rural
families send young children to affluent city dwellers to serve as
unpaid domestic labor; the families of such ``restaveks'' frequently
receive monetary compensation (see Section 5). An estimated 250,000 to
300,000 children, 85 percent of them girls, may be victims of this
practice.
There were no other reports of trafficking in, to, or from the
country.
______
HONDURAS
Honduras is a constitutional democracy, with a president and a
unicameral congress elected for 4-year terms. President Carlos Flores
Facusse took office in January 1998. The two major political parties,
the Liberals and the Nationalists, have alternated in power peacefully
after free elections. The judiciary is independent, but often
ineffective and subject to outside influence.
The Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF) comprise the army, the air force,
and the navy. The National Police (formerly a paramilitary force known
as the FUSEP) were transferred to civilian control in 1997. The police,
including a new ``preventive'' unit, handle public security,
counternarcotics, and border patrol duties. The Government created a
new Ministry of Security in 1998 to oversee police operations and
counter a national crime wave. On January 25, the National Congress
ratified a constitutional amendment establishing direct civilian
control over the armed forces--through a civilian Minister of Defense--
for the first time since 1957. The amendment also replaced the position
of the armed forces commander in chief with that of Chief of the Joint
Staff. In July the President removed the new Chief of the Joint Staff
and Vice Chief of Staff after they sought to amend a draft organic law
governing the armed forces; his action further cemented civilian
control over the military. Members of the police continued to commit
human rights abuses.
The market-based economy is based primarily on agriculture and
increasingly upon the important maquiladora (in-bond processing for
export) industry that accounts for about 110,000 jobs, mostly filled by
young women. The armed forces indirectly play a declining role in the
national economy through their pension fund, which controls some
enterprises usually associated with the private sector, including a
bank and several insurance companies. About 37 percent of workers labor
in agriculture, with most of the rest in industry and manufacturing,
commerce, and services. The principal export crops are coffee and
bananas; these, along with ``value added'' income from the maquiladora
industry, are the leading sources of foreign exchange. Nontraditional
products, such as melons, pineapples, and shrimp, play a growing role
in the economy. In October 1998, Hurricane Mitch caused widespread
flooding and landslides, which killed several thousand persons, left
hundreds of thousands homeless, caused over $3 billion in damage, and
deprived tens of thousands of their livelihoods. International
humanitarian assistance saved many lives and met basic needs, but
substantial additional foreign aid is needed to help rebuild
infrastructure and productive economic capacity. The economic growth
rate declined in 1999, and the budget deficit and unemployment both
rose significantly. Annual per capita income is approximately $800;
about two-thirds of the country's households live in poverty.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
in many areas; however, serious problems remained. Members of the
security forces allegedly committed extrajudicial killings,
particularly of presumed criminals, leading human rights groups to
charge that the security forces and business community colluded to form
organized death squads. Security force personnel committed acts of
torture and beat and otherwise abused detainees and others, including
street children. Police reportedly fired their weapons without
authorization during an October riot near the presidential offices;
both police and rioters were injured in the melee. Prison conditions
remain harsh, lengthy pretrial detention is common, and detainees do
not always receive due process. Considerable impunity for members of
the economic and official elite, exacerbated by a weak, underfunded,
and sometimes corrupt judicial system, contributes to human rights
problems. Although civilian courts increasingly considered allegations
of human rights violations or common crimes against armed forces
personnel and some cases went to trial, there were relatively few
convictions. While no senior government official, politician, or
bureaucrat, or member of the business elite was convicted of crimes,
the Government removed numerous military officials; police officers,
investigators and agents; and judges from office on corruption and
other charges. The judicial system continued to deny swift and
impartial justice to prisoners awaiting trial. On occasion, the
authorities conducted illegal searches. Other human rights problems
included violence and societal discrimination against women, child
prostitution, abuse of street children, and discrimination against
indigenous people. The Government does not enforce effectively all
labor laws. Some workers are forced to work overtime. Child labor is a
problem, particularly in rural areas and in the informal economy, but
not in the export processing sector.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by government agents.
Human rights organizations alleged that individual members and
former members of the security forces, acting as ``security squadrons''
in collusion with business leaders, committed extrajudicial killings of
street criminals. One organization claimed in October that the Office
of the President itself was implicated in such activities, but
subsequently withdrew that assertion after its leader met with
President Flores. The Government publicly denied accusations relating
to the security forces as institutions, but investigated allegations
against members of neighborhood vigilante groups. Human rights groups
also asserted that members of the security forces on such death squads
were involved in killings of street children (see Section 5).
In at least two instances, persons found dead reportedly were last
seen in police custody. There was no progress in the investigation of
those deaths at year's end.
In October the police arrested a prison guard who shot and killed a
minor who refused to surrender after escaping from the central
penitentiary in Tegucigalpa in May. At year's end, the case had not yet
gone to trial.
On March 23, four men armed with AK-47 assault rifles killed Juan
Ramon Alvarado, the mayor of Cabanas, Copan Department, in an apparent
political killing. Alvarado, the target of two previous failed murder
attempts, reportedly had alienated fellow local politicians. The
authorities first detained a member of the town council but then
released him due to lack of evidence; they subsequently detained two
other persons. However, at year's end, no further progress in solving
the killing was reported.
In July police detained a suspect in the October 1998 killing of
Pedro Garcia Villanueva, a regional director of attorneys for the
Public (Justice) Ministry, in Santa Barbara. Garcia had been
investigating several notorious human rights cases, including the 1992
murder of former national electric company director Marco Tulio
Castellon Baide. At year's end, several suspects detained in 1998 still
awaited trial.
In May 1998, four persons reportedly killed Carlos Antonio Luna
Lopez, a town councilman in Catacamas. The police arrested one person,
who had been identified by a witness as one of the assailants.
Human rights groups asserted that many deaths of gang members,
including persons under 18 years old, were extrajudicial executions.
Such groups alleged that between 100 and 150 youths associated with
criminal gangs were killed, execution-style, during the year. In such
cases, renegade elements of the security forces, or civilian (including
vigilante) groups working with such elements, allegedly used
unwarranted lethal force against supposed habitual criminals. Several
groups pushed for investigations into specific incidents, while others
claimed to have provided evidence of collusion between police and
business leaders to public prosecutors. The Government did not take
effective action to investigate, try, convict, or punish anyone for
such offenses.
Violent crime continued to fuel the growth of private--often
unlicensed--guard services, and of volunteer groups that patrolled
their neighborhoods or municipalities to deter crime. The continued
proliferation of private security forces made it more difficult to
differentiate among homicides that may have been perpetrated by
government security personnel, private vigilantes, or common criminals.
Homicides, armed robberies, and other violent assaults were common.
Concerns that the security forces would not investigate credible
allegations of extrajudicial killings by members of the former FUSEP
led to the creation in 1994 of a civilian-controlled Directorate of
Criminal Investigations (DIC) under the Public Ministry (which also
includes a prosecutorial branch). The Police Organic Law, which took
effect in November 1998, placed the DIC under the new Ministry of
Security and renamed it the General Directorate of Criminal
Investigations (DGIC). TheAttorney General and human rights groups have
noted a decrease in reported human rights abuses over the past 2 years.
In January 1998, a judge ruled that although Lieutenant Colonel
Juan Blas Salazar Mesa was guilty of participating in the kidnaping,
torture, and murders of students in 1982, he qualified for amnesty
under laws passed several years earlier. In December 1998, the Supreme
Court upheld the lower court's ruling on amnesty for Salazar. In
January the Public Ministry filed an appeal with the Supreme Court
relating to the application of amnesties to former military officials,
including Salazar. The court reportedly agreed in October to review the
appeal, which was still pending at year's end.
In July the Attorney General urged the Supreme Court to decide
quickly whether amnesty laws created to protect leftist dissidents can
be used to shield 12 fugitive policemen and soldiers accused of human
rights violations. In one case, 10 police and soldiers allegedly
arrested and tortured 6 university students; in another, 16 soldiers
are accused of killing 2 men. The Supreme Court continued to consider
this issue at year's end.
There were some developments in several cases involving the
investigation or prosecution of other alleged extrajudicial killings
committed in previous years. In June 1998, the armed forces named a
commission of senior military officers to investigate accusations of
human rights violations or other criminal activities by armed forces
personnel. At the end of the year, this commission had made no public
findings.
On June 8, the Supreme Court sentenced former army Colonel Angel
Castillo Maradiaga to 10 years' imprisonment for the 1991 rape and
killing of student Riccy Mabel Martinez, a case that helped begin to
bring an end to the longstanding impunity of members of the armed
forces from arrest for common crimes. The authorities arrested Castillo
and an accomplice, Sergeant Santos Eusebio Ilovares Funez, immediately
following the crime; a court convicted them in July 1993. In April
1994, the first appeals court decreed that the convictions were null
for procedural faults and a lack of evidence against Castillo. The
original court reviewed the case and ratified its original decision,
which was then upheld by the appeals court. However, in October 1996,
the first appeals court dismissed the sentences and ordered the second
criminal court to issue new sentences. In February 1997, the second
criminal court found Castillo innocent, but sentenced Funez to prison.
In June 1998, the Supreme Court confirmed these decisions, but the
victim's lawyers filed a final appeal, upon which the June 1999
decision was based. Funez remains in prison.
A judge absolved former armed forces commander Brigadier General
Mario Hung Pacheco of complicity in the 1988 death of student leader
Roger Gonzalez, although he reserved judgment on the involvement of two
other military officials.
In October a court found former Battalion 3-16 member Marco Tulio
Regalado Hernandez guilty of the 1983 death of labor leader Herminio
Deras and imprisoned him. However, two other battalion members
implicated in the death remained at large at year's end.
Although in October a judge found army Chief of Staff Oscar
Hernandez Chavez not guilty of the 1982 death of student Hans Madisson,
prosecutors filed an appeal. Former army Captain Billy Joya Amendola,
who returned to the country in December 1998 after evading arrest for 3
years, also was found not guilty in October in the Madisson case. Other
charges against Joya for torture and disappearance were pending at
year's end.
In July retired armed forces General Daniel Bali Castillo returned,
after 3 years as a fugitive in Guatemala, to appear before a court for
his alleged role in the cases of Adan Aviles Funez and Nicaraguan
citizen Amado Espinoza Paz. The bodies of the two, who disappeared in
Choluteca in 1982, were exhumed near there in 1995. The court
immediately freed him, pending presentation of further evidence by
prosecutors. Two other officials, army Colonel Suarez and retired
police colonel Marco Antonio Matute, had been freed earlier in
connection with the case (but still face charges), and several others
remain at large. Police Colonel Alexander Raymundo Hernandez, another
suspect in this case, has been missing since 1995; the police
discontinued his salary in 1997 and discharged him from the force in
March 1998.
Government agencies and human rights groups investigated claims of
possible deaths, disappearances, and torture at the El Aguacate
military base in Olancho department when it was used byNicaraguan
insurgents (``contras'') during the 1980's. Investigators found
evidence of blood on the interior walls of some ruins on the base but
were unable to link that evidence to specific incidents or persons. The
Defense Minister and the HOAF Chief of Staff have opened the base to
independent investigators, including international visitors.
In July human rights prosecutors began investigating reported
graves at La Montanita, near Tegucigalpa, and at El Aguacate, in
Olancho department. Those investigations continued at year's end.
Vigilante justice led to killings of street children (see Section
5) and criminals. In October one vigilante group in Cortes department
reportedly beat and killed a young man with no known criminal
connections.
Killings of peasant leaders were reported in various locations, but
appeared linked to personal or criminal, rather than political,
motives.
There has been no progress in the investigations into the deaths of
two indigenous leaders (see Section 5).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
The Attorney General continued investigations into the
disappearances of 184 persons in the 1980's. Various witnesses,
survivors, and a few former members of the military have charged that
members of the now-disbanded Battalion 3-16 kidnaped, tortured, and
murdered many of those who disappeared. The National Commissioner for
Human Rights, Leo Valladares, also continued his investigation into the
human rights abuses allegedly committed by members of Battalion 3-16
and the former police intelligence unit.
Foreign forensic anthropologists arrived early in the year to
collaborate with magistrates searching for remains of persons who
disappeared on the property belonging to a retired armed forces general
in Amarateca, Francisco Morazan department, but no findings were
reported by year's end. There were reports of possible clandestine
burials of persons who disappeared at the former contra military base
at El Aguacate, Olancho department, but no evidence to confirm such
reports was discovered (see Section 1.a.).
Courts reached decisions in several murder cases involving
disappearances (see Section 1.a.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, there were
isolated instances in which officials employed such practices. In
addition, police beatings and other alleged abuses of detainees
remained a problem.
In August a judge in La Ceiba ordered the arrest of a police
official and two agents for torturing two persons. In June an appeals
court overturned a lower court decision from January that had freed two
DGIC officials accused of torturing two men. In June the Attorney
General acknowledged that security force personnel continue to commit
acts of torture, due in part to poor training and lack of knowledge
regarding human rights obligations. In November a judge in the Bay
Islands department ordered two police officials jailed for torturing a
citizen. The Public Ministry Human Rights Prosecutor stated in July
that she received at least 10 complaints that month alone of human
rights abuses against detained suspects and prisoners.
The police reportedly fired their weapons without authorization
during an October riot near the presidential offices; both police and
rioters were injured in the melee (see Section 2.b.).
The police also engaged in violence, including beatings, against
street children (see Section 5).
The Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) within the National
Police investigates allegations of torture and abuse and can recommend
sanctions against police agents found guilty of such mistreatment.
However, neither the police commander nor the OPR is empowered to
punish wrongdoers; only the immediate superior of the accused agent has
the authority to do so. The Public Ministry and human rights groups
criticized the OPR for being unresponsive to their requests for
impartial investigations of police officers accused of abuses. In
1996the Public Ministry created the office of Human Rights Inspector
within the DGIC to monitor the behavior of its agents; the inspector
reports to the head of the human rights section of the Public Ministry
and to the Attorney General. Both the DGIC and the preventive police
dismissed or suspended dozens of agents and officials for abuse of
authority.
Widespread frustration at the inability of the security forces to
prevent and control crime, and the well-founded perception that corrupt
security personnel were complicit in the high crime rate, led to
continued considerable public support for vigilante justice. There were
reported efforts by local landowners to form large-scale vigilante
groups in Olancho and Choluteca departments. In March President Flores
ordered the HOAF to reinforce the National Police and conduct joint
patrols throughout the country, in an effort to reduce crime during the
Easter holiday season.
A Special Prosecutor for the Environment investigating reports of
illegal logging was wounded seriously during an attempt on his life in
June.
Elements of the armed forces withheld their cooperation from
official efforts to track down military officers wanted in connection
with alleged human rights abuses dating back to the 1980's. In August
1998, a HOAF spokesman quoted the armed forces commander as having
admitted that the military was protecting officers accused of human
rights violations; the HOAF subsequently claimed that the news media
had reported the commander's remarks erroneously. The Supreme Court
considered whether government amnesties for crimes committed in the
1980's covered the military, as political deliberations in the Congress
had suggested. The Court determined in December 1998 that, while the
amnesty laws were constitutional, amnesty appeals would have to be
decided on their individual merits.
A constitutional amendment that replaced the armed forces commander
in chief position with a civilian Minister of Defense took effect in
January, ending several decades of military autonomy. In August the new
Chief of Staff of the armed forces pledged cooperation should the
judiciary order the arrest of army Chief of Staff Oscar Hernandez
Chavez for crimes allegedly committed during the 1980's.
Prison conditions remained harsh. Prisoners suffered from severe
overcrowding, malnutrition, and a lack of adequate sanitation, and
allegedly were subject to various other abuses, including rape. The 24
penal centers held over 10,000 prisoners; more than 90 percent of these
were awaiting trial for an average of 22 months, with some waiting over
5 years (see Section 1.d.). Prison disturbances, caused primarily by
harsh conditions, occurred throughout the year, resulting in a number
of deaths and injuries, the destruction of prison facilities, and mass
escapes. The Government sent the army into various prisons to assist
guards in maintaining order during the year. In February the
authorities fired 17 employees of the National Penitentiary, including
the head of security and 4 police officers, for alleged complicity in
introducing narcotics into the facility.
Prison escapes, through bribery or otherwise, remained a frequent
occurrence, with guards occasionally firing on, and killing, escapees.
In February two Colombian narcotics traffickers escaped from the
Trujillo jail; reports indicate that they walked out in the company of
the prison supervisor and were driven away from the prison by a retired
army officer. The colonial-era central penitentiary in downtown
Tegucigalpa was repaired and returned to service following Hurricane
Mitch in 1998, but conditions remained poor. In June the prison in San
Pedro Sula suffered a devastating fire; prisoners voluntarily helped
repair the facility. An imprisoned drug figure in San Pedro Sula was
found to have bribed guards into providing special accommodations and
privileges. The authorities transferred a number of prisoners deemed
particularly dangerous or likely to try to escape through bribery to a
maximum security holding area within the new National Penitentiary at
Tamara, near Tegucigalpa. The Ministry of Security assumed
responsibility for the prison system from the Ministry of Government
and Justice in January, but the shift in coverage had virtually no
impact on the resources available to improve conditions.
More often than not, and for lack of alternative facilities,
wardens housed the mentally ill and those with tuberculosis and other
infectious diseases among the general prison population. Prisoners with
money routinely bought private cells, decent food, and permission for
conjugal visits, while prisoners without money often lacked basic
necessities, as well as legalassistance. The prison system budgets
about $0.40 (6 lempiras) per day for food and medicine for each
prisoner. Prisoners were allowed visits, and in many cases relied on
outside help to survive, as the prison system could not provide
adequate or sufficient food. Street children in detention often were
housed in adult prisons, where they were abused routinely. Women were
incarcerated in separate facilities under conditions similar to those
of male prisoners, except that female prisoners do not have conjugal
visit privileges.
In June the Public Ministry signed an agreement with the Center for
Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture and
their Relatives to establish programs to protect the human rights of
prisoners; to train police and prison personnel to avoid committing
acts of torture; and to arrange for periodic inspections of prisons.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides for
protection against arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the
authorities occasionally do not observe these legal requirements. The
law states that the police may arrest a person only with a court order,
unless the arrest is made during the commission of a crime, and that
they must clearly inform the person of the grounds for the arrest. By
law the preventive police cannot investigate crimes; that force only
detains suspects. Police must bring a detainee before a judge within 24
hours; the judge then must issue an initial temporary holding order
within 24 hours, make an initial decision within 6 days, and conduct a
preliminary investigation to decide whether there is sufficient
evidence to warrant further investigation.
While bail is legally available, it is granted primarily for
ostensibly medical reasons; however, procedures in such cases are
confused and unclear. Poor defendants, even when represented by a
public defender, seldom are able to take advantage of bail (see Section
1.e.). Lengthy pretrial detention is a serious problem; more than 90
percent of prisoners are awaiting trial, some for over 5 years. The
average length of detention was about 22 months (see Section 1.c.).
In 1996 the Government enacted a law regarding unsentenced
prisoners that mandates the release from prison of any detainee whose
case has not come to trial, and whose time under detention exceeds the
maximum prison sentence for the crime of which he is accused.
Nonetheless, many prisoners remain in jail after being acquitted or
completing their sentences, due to the failure of responsible officials
to process their releases. A significant number of defendants served
the maximum possible sentence for the crime of which they were accused
before their trials were concluded, or even begun. One prisoner
reportedly was detained for 2 years before receiving a sentence of 1
month's imprisonment. At the end of 1998, more than 90 percent of all
prisoners had been neither tried nor sentenced.
Under the 1984 Code of Criminal Procedures, judges, the police,
public officials, or any citizen may initiate criminal proceedings.
Perhaps as many as 80 percent of the cases reported to the police are
never referred to the criminal justice system, but instead are settled
administratively by the police or by municipal courts.
Neither the Constitution nor the legal code explicitly prohibit
exile, but it is not used as a means of political control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is poorly staffed and
equipped, often ineffective, and subject to outside influence. While
the Government respects constitutional provisions in principle,
implementation has been weak and uneven in practice. A number of
factors limit the effectiveness of the system. Both the judiciary and
the Public Ministry suffer from inadequate funding; low wages and lack
of internal controls make law enforcement officials susceptible to
bribery; the civil law inquisitorial system is both inefficient and
nontransparent; and powerful special interests still exercise influence
and often prevail in many courts. Also, many leading politicians enjoy
constitutional immunity from prosecution because of their membership in
either the National Congress or the Central American Parliament. That
immunity extends to acts committed before taking office.
The court system is composed of a 9-member Supreme Court, 10
appeals courts, 67 courts of first instance of general jurisdiction,
and 325 justice of the peace courts of limited jurisdiction. Congress
elects the nine Supreme Court justices and names the president of the
Court; the Supreme Court, in turn, names all lower court judges. The 4-
year term for justices of the Supreme Court coincides with those of the
Congress and the President.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial. However,
the written, inquisitorial trial system is labor-intensive, slow, and
opaque; it does not protect the rights of defendants adequately. In
December Congress passed a law to modernize the Criminal Procedures
Code; the new law (scheduled to take effect in February 2002)
substitutes an adversarial system for the inquisitorial system and
obligates speedier disposition of cases. The law is designed to change
the code into one based upon the presumption of innocence, the right to
a public trial, and respect for the dignity and liberty of the accused.
It also expressly prohibits incarceration without first receiving a
clear sentence from a judge or tribunal. Judges legally are in charge
of investigations, as well as of trials and sentencing. Both
prosecutors working for the Public Ministry and private individuals may
bring criminal charges against citizens. A judge may jail an accused
person for 6 days before a determination is made of probable cause to
accept charges. If a judge sustains the criminal accusation, the
accused remains in jail, or may be released on bail while awaiting
trial (see Section 1.d.).
An accused person has the right to an initial hearing by a judge,
to bail, to an attorney provided by the State, if necessary, and to
appeal. Although the Constitution recognizes the presumption of
innocence, the Criminal Code in practice often is administered by
poorly trained judges operating on a presumption that the accused is
guilty; consequently, the rights of defendants often are not observed.
All stages of the trial process are conducted in writing and, at the
judge's discretion, may be declared secret and, thus, even less
``public'' than normal.
Defendants and their attorneys are not always genuine participants
in the process, despite rights accorded under law. Defendants may
confront witnesses against them and present evidence on their own
behalf, but only through the judge. By law defendants and their
attorneys are entitled to review government-held evidence relevant to
their cases, but this right is not always respected in practice.
A public defender program provides assistance to those unable to
afford an adequate defense. There are 137 public defenders providing
free legal services nationally to 37 percent of the prison population;
however, public defenders are hard pressed to meet the heavy demands of
a nonautomated, inadequately funded, and labor-intensive criminal
justice system. The Supreme Court issued an instruction in 1998 that
holds judges personally accountable for reducing the number of
backlogged cases and separates judges into pretrial investigative
judges and trial and sentencing judges. The Court also created a
program to monitor and enforce compliance with these measures. The
Court's instruction was intended to ensure more effective protection
for the rights of the accused to a timely and effective defense, but it
has had little effect to date.
Modest progress was made in previous years towards implementing a
judicial career system to enhance the qualifications of sitting judges;
depoliticize the appointment process; and break the subcultures of
corruption, clientism, patronage, and influence-peddling within the
judiciary. Nonetheless, many courts remained staffed by politically
selected judges and by unqualified clerks and were inefficient and
subject to influence from special interests. For example, one judge
issued criminal warrants for the arrest of two employees of a major
multinational company over a civil dispute, allegedly at the behest of
the complainant. The judicial employees' association publicly
criticized the Supreme Court's failure to follow civil service
regulations in disciplining employees. No action was taken against the
individuals on the list of 31 judges under investigation for alleged
corruption in September 1998.
Over the past 5 years, the Public Ministry has taken steps to
investigate and charge not only military officers for human rights
violations, but also ranking officials of the two previous governments,
for abuses of power, fraud, and diversion of public funds and
resources. However, at year's end, very few of those accused had been
tried or convicted. Two Callejas administration officials remained in
jail on corruption charges and were awaiting trial at year's end. In
June a courtconvicted former President Carlos Roberto Reina of
involvement in a corruption scandal and fined him a relatively small
sum, which he declined to pay because he holds immunity as a member of
the Central American Parliament. In July a judge issued a warrant for
the arrest of a retired HOAF colonel accused of embezzling from a
business owned by the military benefits institute.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution specifies that a person's home is
inviolable, that persons in the employ of the State may enter only with
the owner's consent or with the prior authorization of a competent
legal authority, and that entry may take place only between 6 a.m. and
6 p.m., or at any time in the event of an emergency or to prevent the
commission of a crime; however, as in previous years, there were
credible charges that police and armed forces personnel failed at times
to obtain the needed authorization before entering a private home.
Coordination among the police, the courts, and the Public Ministry
remained weak. The Government respects the privacy of correspondence.
In July Security Minister Chiuz Sierra stated during a radio
interview that the DGIC had tapped her telephones and undertaken an
investigation of her activities. The DGIC director denied the charges.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the authorities largely
respected these rights in practice. Journalists admitted to self-
censorship when their reporting threatened the political or economic
interests of media owners. Although there was little serious
investigative journalism, the news media were, at times, critical of
certain government entities, including the HOAF and municipal
officials. The news media themselves suffered from corruption and
politicization. Credible reports existed of regular and substantial
payments to journalists by powerful business interests, as well as
public and political figures, either to carry or suppress certain
stories. There were also reports of executive branch pressure on
publishers and media outlets to avoid direct criticism of the
administration or its programs. In January one newspaper complained of
the withdrawal of government advertising, reportedly due to its
criticism of a presidential helicopter purchase.
The executive branch made frequent use of the ``Cadena Nacional,''
a nationwide network through which it broadcasts on all television and
radio stations, preempting regular programs. Initially used by the
administration to report on Hurricane Mitch-related measures, the
Cadena Nacional increasingly appears to be an exercise in public
relations. President Flores owns La Tribuna, one of the major daily
newspapers.
A journalist employed by Channel 63 reported a possible attempt
against his life in July by two men who sought to lure him out of his
house under false pretenses. A freelance journalist reported death
threats in October that he attributed to his efforts to end the
exploitation of forests. A former judge filed a defamation lawsuit
against a journalist who reported that she had unjustly freed several
narcotics trafficking suspects; the lawsuit was pending at year's end.
The Government respects academic freedom and has not attempted to
curtail political expression on university campuses.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
generally respects it in practice.
In April police used tear gas during a demonstration at the
National Congress to deal with unruly indigenous protesters. Militant
union leaders took over a May Day parade by labor confederations,
called for the deaths of 13 named labor leaders, assaulted 1 rival
figure, pelted others with eggs, tomatoes, and pieces of ice, and
denied them the right to address the crowd. In June police armed with
batons clashed with rock-throwing protesters in southern Tegucigalpa
who sought to prevent the relocation of hurricane victim shelters into
their neighborhood. The confrontation resulted in minor injuries to
both police and demonstrators.
A significant clash occurred on October 12, when indigenous
demonstrators, who were blocked by police from marching past the
presidential offices, rioted nearby. The demonstrators had been
escorted peacefully along their route by the police until that point.
Their leaders reportedly had just secured the Government's agreement to
allow the march to proceed in the desired direction when the clash
broke out. Demonstrators threw rocks and used slingshots against the
police while some police opened fire without authorization, allegedly
aiming either in the air or at the street. Approximately two dozen
persons were injured, including nine police agents. Both police and
demonstrators suffered injuries caused by fragmenting police rounds,
and one demonstrator lost an eye. The President ordered investigations
by government agencies, and a judge opened his own investigation, which
continued at year's end. The police requested that the judge
investigate the role of several dozen alleged instigators of the riot
and, on October 14, filed charges of assault, attempted assault, and
other crimes against leaders and members of various NGO's. The
administration agreed to pay damages to injured demonstrators.
In October the National Congress passed a resolution calling on the
executive branch to force the cancellation of a convention of psychics,
whom it characterized as ``witches and sorcerers.'' The Congress
expunged the reference to cancellation in an amendment to the
resolution passed the following day.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects it in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for all forms of
religious expression, and the Government generally respects this right
in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens enter and exit the country
without arbitrary impediment, and the Government does not restrict
travel within the country's borders.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees.
The Government provides first asylum and grants asylum or refugee
status in accordance with the terms of the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens last exercised the right to change their government
through democratic and peaceful elections in November 1997.
International observers found the elections to be free and fair.
Citizens choose a president, three vice presidents, and members of
the National Congress by free, secret, direct, and obligatory balloting
every 4 years. In 1997 voters for the first time were able to cast
separate ballots for the President, deputies in the National Congress,
and municipal leaders, making individual elected officials more
representative and accountable. Voting was made easier for citizens by
a change that allowed them to vote closer to their homes.
Suffrage is universal, but neither the clergy nor members of the
military or civilian security forces are permitted to vote. Any citizen
born in Honduras or abroad of Honduran parentage may hold office,
except for members of the clergy, the armed forces, and the police. A
new political party may gain legal status by obtaining 20,000
signatures and establishing party organizations in at least half of the
country's 18 departments.
There are no legal impediments to the participation of women or
minorities in government and politics; however, they are
underrepresented. Women in the Government include one of the three vice
presidents, four cabinet ministers, and a Supreme Court justice, as
well as a number of cabinet vice ministers and agency heads, including
the president of the Central Bank and Controller General. Of the 128
deputies in the Congress, 8 are women. In the 1997 elections, for the
first time a woman ran as the presidential candidate of a major
political party.
There are few indigenous people in leadership positions in
government or politics; there are no members of Congress who state that
they are indigenous, but there is one indigenous alternate deputy.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operates without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials generally cooperate with these
groups and are responsive to their views.
Anonymous telephone callers continued to threaten human rights
workers. Human Rights Commissioner Valladares and his family received
numerous telephone threats. Ramon Custodio, president of the Human
Rights Defense Committee, and Bertha Olivia de Nativi, general
coordinator of the Committee of Relatives of the Detained and
Disappeared, also received many telephone threats. In June Olivia's
sister reported that unknown persons kidnaped her for several hours as
a warning.
In 1996 the Congress ratified a presidential decree expanding the
functions of the National Commissioner for Human Rights and unanimously
reelected Leo Valladares to a 6-year term. Under this decree, and in
fulfillment of his expanded functions, the National Commissioner has
free access to all civilian and military institutions and centers of
detention and is supposed to perform his functions with complete
immunity and autonomy. However, in April the National Congress suddenly
passed, with no public hearings or debate, a law that would have
limited the Commissioner's powers and reduced his term of office to 4
years. The action followed a report released by the Commissioner that
alleged 17 instances of malfeasance by public officials and
institutions in the handling of international aid following Hurricane
Mitch. Domestic and international protests persuaded the Congress to
revoke the legislation 1 week later.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution bans discrimination based on race or sex. Although
it also bans discrimination on the basis of class, in practice, the
political, military, and social elites generally enjoyed impunity
before the legal system. Members of these groups rarely were arrested
or jailed; legislators enjoy legal immunity.
Women.--Violence against women remained widespread. The Penal Code
was amended in 1997 to classify domestic violence and sexual harassment
as crimes, with penalties of 2 to 4 years' and 1 to 3 years'
imprisonment, respectively. Most such violence took place within the
family. The penalties for rape are relatively light, ranging from 3 to
9 years' imprisonment. All rapes are considered public crimes, so a
rapist can be prosecuted even if he marries his victim. Under pressure
from women's advocacy and reform groups, the Congress in 1997 enacted
the Law Against Domestic Violence to strengthen the rights of women and
increase the penalties for crimes of domestic violence. This law allows
the Government to protect battered women through emergency measures,
such as detaining an aggressor or separating him temporarily from the
victim's home. In 1998 some 3,000 women took action under the Law
Against Domestic Violence, but their cases remained pending because the
Government has not yet created the special courts authorized by that
law. The Government attempted to remedy this situation by working with
women's groups to provide specialized training to police officials on
enforcing the Law Against Domestic Violence.
There are few shelters specifically maintained for battered women.
The Government operates 1 shelter that can accommodate 10 women and
their families. Six private centers for battered women opened in 1996,
offering legal, medical, and psychological assistance, but not physical
shelter.
Sexual harassment in the workplace also continued to be a problem.
Women, who make up 51 percent of the work force, were represented
in at least small numbers in most professions, but cultural attitudes
limited their career opportunities. In theory, women have equal access
to educational opportunities. Nevertheless, family pressures often
impede the ambitions of women intent on obtaining a higher education.
The law requires employers to pay women equal wages for equivalent
work, butemployers often classify women's jobs as less demanding than
those of men to justify paying them lower salaries.
Some organizations have begun to offer assistance to women,
principally targeting those who live in rural areas and in marginal
neighborhoods of cities. For example, the Honduran Federation of
Women's Associations provided home construction and improvement loans,
offered free legal assistance, and lobbied the Government on women's
causes. The Center for the Investigation and Promotion of Human Rights
continued to operate a program to make women aware of their rights
under the law. Programs that provide small loans to microentrepreneurs
target women clients.
Women have advanced significantly in some professions during the
past several years. The HOAF and National Police academies accepted
female recruits for the first time in 1998; women at the Air Force
academy continued to receive aeronautical training and the first class
graduated at the end of the year. In September 1998, Reyna Dinora
Aceituno was elected secretary general of the Confederation of Honduran
Workers (CTH), the country's second largest labor confederation.
Aceituno is the first woman to head a national labor confederation. In
March 1998, the Government granted cabinet-level status to its Office
of Women's Affairs, although the executive president of that office is
not a member of the cabinet.
Children.--Although the Government allocated 32 percent of its 2000
budget to public education and health care, this was insufficient to
address the needs of the nation's youth. The Government provides free,
universal, and compulsory education through the age of 10; however, the
Government estimated that up to 175,000 children each year fail to
receive schooling of any kind, either due to insufficient financial
resources, or because parents rely on their children to assist in
supporting the family by working. Girls attend primary school in the
same proportion as boys. Media reports indicated that up to 40 percent
of children under 5 years old suffer from chronic malnutrition.
The Government was unable to prevent the abuse of street children
(see Section 1.c.) and child laborers (see Section 6.d.). In 1998 the
Government raised its estimate of street children to 8,000, only half
of whom have shelter on any given day. The number of street children
increased substantially due to Hurricane Mitch. Many street children
have been molested sexually, and about 40 percent regularly engaged in
prostitution. Approximately 30 percent of the street children in
Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, the two largest population centers,
were reported to be HIV-positive in 1998. Over 75 percent of the street
children found their way to the streets because of severe family
problems; 30 percent simply were abandoned. Both the police and members
of the general population engaged in violence against street children.
When the authorities arrested minors charged with the commission of
capital and other serious crimes, they were housed with adult detainees
who often abused them.
In 1996 the Government opened juvenile centers in Tamara, El
Carmen, and El Hatillo (located in or near Tegucigalpa and San Pedro
Sula). Nonetheless, a general lack of juvenile detention facilities
contributed to the detention of minors in adult prisons, and to
vigilante violence against, and police abuse of, street children. Human
rights groups implicated out-of-uniform security force personnel,
vigilantes, and business leaders in some juvenile deaths.
In 1997 Covenant House of Honduras, an organization dedicated to
children's rights, brought charges before the Public Ministry against
unnamed members of the armed forces and the police for the alleged
torture of 63 juveniles or minors, 35 of whom reportedly were murdered,
since 1990. The Government took no action in this instance. There was
no progress in the case of police agents who were detained and placed
under investigation for detaining and beating youths in October 1997.
New legislation covering children and adolescents took effect in
1996, covering the rights, liberties, and protection of children,
including in the area of child labor (see Section 6.d.). It established
prison sentences of up to 3 years for persons convicted of child abuse.
In September 1998, the Government launched the National Commission for
the Gradual and Progressive Eradication of Child Labor, comprising
government ministries, official family welfare agencies, and local
NGO's.
People with Disabilities.--There are no formal barriers to
participation by an estimated 300,000 disabled persons in employment,
education, or health care, but neither is there specific statutory or
constitutional protection for them. There is no legislation that
requires access by disabled persons to government buildings or
commercial establishments.
Indigenous People.--The small communities of indigenous people have
little or no ability to participate in decisions affecting their lands,
cultures, traditions, and the allocation of natural resources.
Indigenous land rights are communal. While the law permits persons to
claim individual freeholding titles, this is difficult to accomplish in
practice. Tribal lands often are defined poorly in documents dating
back to the mid-19th century and, in most cases, lack any legal title
based on modern cadastral measurements. The Honduran Forestry
Development Corporation (COHDEFOR) makes all decisions regarding
exploitation of timber resources on indigenous lands, often over
strenuous tribal objections.
The lack of clear title by indigenous groups to public lands that
they occupy often leads to conflicts between such groups and COHDEFOR
and other government entities. However, such disputes are equally
common between COHDEFOR and nonindigenous groups, and COHDEFOR is
working with numerous indigenous groups on management plans for public
and tribal lands that they occupy. In view of the absence of clear land
titles and their unequal access to legal recourse, indigenous groups
also are vulnerable to frequent usurpation of their property rights by
nonindigenous farmers and cattle ranchers. Expanded coverage of the
national cadastral registry, property titling, and government land
registries is reducing this vulnerability.
The courts commonly denied legal recourse to indigenous groups and
often showed bias in favor of nonindigenous parties of means and
influence. Failure to obtain legal redress frequently caused indigenous
groups to attempt to regain land through invasions of private property,
which usually provoked the authorities into retaliating forcefully.
The Government generally is responsive to indigenous land claims,
but numerous cases remained unresolved because of conflicting claims by
nonindigenous persons. During 1998 the Government issued over 100 land
titles, encompassing over 250,000 acres, to various indigenous groups.
An additional 170 land claims by indigenous people were under
adjudication at the end of 1998. The Government issued over 20,000
individual land titles in 1997, benefiting many indigenous families.
Indigenous groups nonetheless charged that the Government had failed to
fulfill its commitments in this area.
In 1997 Candido Amador Recinos, a leader of the Chorti indigenous
group active in efforts to acquire claimed tribal lands, was murdered
in Corralitos, Copan department; there has been no progress in the
investigation, although the Public Ministry and police reportedly
formed a special unit to investigate his death and that in 1991 of a
Tolupan indigenous leader, Vicente Matute. Indigenous groups petitioned
actively during the year for the Government to carry out more effective
investigations in both cases.
Also in 1997, after a month of nationwide protests by indigenous
organizations that included a hunger strike, the Government signed a
22-point agreement with representatives of various groups that made
available 9 initial land grants of about 22,000 acres each to different
tribes, granted some contested land titles outright to indigenous
petitioners, and set aside $15,385 (200,000 lempiras) in government
funds for indigenous housing. The Congress also created a commission to
study indigenous land claims, which often conflict with the claims of
small farmers, but the commission was largely inactive.
Indigenous groups, backed by international supporters, objected
strongly to a proposed constitutional amendment that would permit
foreigners to own and develop land for tourism within 25 miles of the
country's coasts and land frontiers. The amendment was approved on its
first reading in late 1998 but had not been ratified (approved at the
required second reading during the next session) by year's end. The
Government sought to spur domestic economic growth and provide job
opportunities for indigenous people by attracting new foreign
investment and tourism to such areas, but the indigenous groups
asserted that the proposed amendment would vitiate indigenous claims to
ancestral lands, accelerate alienation of indigenous property,and
deprive indigenous people living in the affected areas of access to
coastal areas. The congressional leadership pledged not to ratify the
constitutional amendment following a demonstration on October 12 that
led to a violent clash near the presidential offices (see Section
2.b.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the legal right to form
and join labor unions; unions are independent of the Government and
political parties. Most peasant organizations are affiliated directly
with the labor movement. Unions frequently hold public demonstrations
against government policies and make extensive use of the news media to
advance their views. However, only about 14 percent of the work force
are unionized, and the economic and political influence of organized
labor has diminished in recent years.
The labor movement is composed of the three national labor
federations: The General Council of Workers, the Confederation of
Honduran Workers, and the Unitary Confederation of Honduran Workers.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, along with a
wide range of other basic labor rights, which the authorities honor in
practice. However, the Civil Service Code denies the right to strike to
all government workers, other than employees of state-owned
enterprises. Public sector employees in the fields of health and
education conducted illegal work stoppages during the year. In June
members of the National Police staged a ``strike of inertia'' due to
the failure of the Ministry of Security to pay their salaries.
A number of private firms have instituted ``solidarity''
associations, essentially aimed at providing credit and other services
to workers and managers who are members of the associations.
Representatives of organized labor groups criticize these associations,
asserting that they do not permit strikes, have inadequate grievance
procedures, and neutralize genuine, representative trade unions.
The three national labor confederations maintain close ties with
various international trade union organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
protects the rights to organize and to bargain collectively; collective
bargaining agreements are the norm for companies in which workers are
organized. However, although the Labor Code prohibits retribution by
employers for trade union activity, it is a common occurrence. Some
employers have threatened to close down unionized companies and have
harassed workers seeking to unionize, in some cases dismissing them
outright. The labor courts are considering hundreds of appeals from
workers seeking reinstatement and back wages from companies that fired
them for engaging in union organizing activities. However, once a union
is recognized, employers actually dismiss relatively few workers for
union activity. Nonetheless, such cases serve to discourage workers
elsewhere from attempting to organize.
Workers in both unionized and nonunionized companies are protected
by the Labor Code, which gives them the right to seek redress from the
Ministry of Labor. The Ministry took action in several cases,
pressuring employers to observe the code. Labor or civil courts can
require employers to rehire employees fired for union activity, but
such rulings are uncommon. Agreements between management and unions
generally contain a clause prohibiting retaliation against any worker
who participates in a strike or other union activity.
The Labor Code explicitly prohibits blacklisting. Nevertheless,
there was credible evidence that informal blacklisting occurred in the
privately owned industrial parks, known as maquiladoras. When unions
are formed, organizers must submit a list of initial members to the
Ministry of Labor as part of the process of obtaining official
recognition. However, before official recognition is granted, the
Ministry must inform the company of the impending union organization.
The Ministry has not always been able to provide effective protection
to labor organizers. There were credible reports, particularly in the
export processing zone (EPZ) sector, that some inspectors had gone so
far as to sell the names of employees involved in forming a union to
companies that then dismissed union organizers before the Ministry
could recognize the unions.
The same labor regulations apply in EPZ's as in the rest of private
industry. Unions are active in the government-owned Puerto Cortes free
trade zone (7 of 11 maquiladoras there are unionized), but factory
owners have resisted efforts to organize the privately owned industrial
parks. The Honduran Association of Maquiladores (AHM) over the past 4
years has sponsored seminars and other meetings between its members and
major labor groups. As a result, tensions have declined, and 46 of the
203 maquila plants have unionized, with 32 of those plants having
collective bargaining agreements.
In 1997 the AHM adopted a voluntary code of conduct governing
salaries and working conditions in the industry and recognizing
workers' right to organize. Although local unions were not consulted
during the drafting process and have no formal role in its
implementation, the code nonetheless represented a public commitment by
apparel manufacturers to abide by local laws and regulations governing
their industries. It provided a starting point for a dialog among the
AHM, organized labor, and the Government, which have formed a
tripartite commission that meets on a monthly basis to discuss and
facilitate solutions for labor problems. The attitude of the Government
towards organized labor in the EPZ's is the same as in other
industries.
In a number of maquiladora plants, workers have shown little
enthusiasm for unionizing, since they consider their treatment, salary,
and working conditions to be as good as, or better than, those in
unionized plants. In the absence of unions and collective bargaining,
several EPZ plants have instituted solidarity associations that, to
some extent, function as ``company unions'' for the purposes of setting
wages and negotiating working conditions. Other EPZ plants use the
minimum wage to set starting salaries, and adjust wage scales by
negotiating with common groups of plant workers and other employees,
based on seniority, skills, categories of work, and other criteria.
In 1997 a South Korean-owned maquiladora plant agreed to permit an
independent monitoring group composed of religious, human rights, and
women's organizations to inspect its facility and observe the working
conditions of its employees. The national labor confederations objected
to the agreement because it excluded them, while other maquiladoras
observed that the monitors lacked relevant expertise in the industry.
Plant officials gave the independent monitors office space on the
premises in 1997, but withdrew it in June 1998. However, they continued
to allow periodic visits by the monitors, who have provided assistance
to the local union during contract negotiations.
Labor leaders blame the Government for allowing private companies
to act contrary to the Labor Code and expect the problem to continue
until the Ministry of Labor is reorganized to make it more efficient.
They criticize the Ministry for not enforcing the Labor Code, for
taking too long to make decisions, and for being timid and indifferent
to workers' needs. Industry leaders contend that the obsolete and
cumbersome Labor Code discourages foreign investment and requires
significant redrafting. A 1995 Memorandum of Understanding between the
Ministry of Labor and the office of the United States Trade
Representative calling for greater enforcement of the Labor Code
resulted in some progress. However, labor unions charged that the
Ministry has made insufficient progress towards enforcing the code,
especially in training its labor inspectors and in conducting
inspections of the maquiladora industry. The Government has
acknowledged that it does not yet adhere completely to international
labor standards and in 1997 agreed, along with other Central American
nations, to fund a regional program to modernize the inspection and
labor management functions of the Ministry of Labor.
A South Korean-owned maquiladora, Kimi de Honduras, reached a
collective bargaining agreement with its workers in March, but in
August workers took over the plant and held managers captive for
several hours in a wage dispute. The Ministry of Labor mediated
effectively, persuading the company to drop legal charges and to reopen
the factory. The AHM is now assisting the company to improve its
productivity, which could facilitate future wage increases. In
September the Yu Yang maquiladora in the same industrial park
reportedly fired labor organizers, thereby stimulating worker unrest.
Other labor disputes occasionally occurred at maquiladoras in the San
Pedro Sula area, principally over delayed payment of wages or failure
to honor promises regarding pay scales, seniority, or working
conditions.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
the law prohibit forced or compulsory labor, and this applies equally
to children; however, while there were no official reports of such
practices in the area of child labor, there were credible allegations
of compulsory overtime at EPZ plants, particularly for women, who make
up an estimated 80 percent of the work force in the maquiladora sector.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution and the Labor Code prohibit the
employment of minors under the age of 16, except that a child who is 15
years of age is permitted to work with parental and Ministry of Labor
permission. The Children's Code prohibits a child of 14 years of age or
less from working, even with parental permission, and establishes
prison sentences of 3 to 5 years for individuals who allow children to
work illegally. An employer who legally hires a 15-year-old must
certify that the child has finished or is finishing the required
compulsory schooling. The Ministry of Labor grants a limited number of
work permits to 15-year-old children each year.
The Ministry of Labor cannot enforce effectively child labor laws
outside the maquiladora sector, and violations of the Labor Code occur
frequently in rural areas and in small companies. According to the
Ministry, human rights groups, and children's rights organizations, an
estimated 350,000 children work illegally. The most significant child
labor problem is in the construction industry. Many children also work
on small family farms, as street vendors, or in small workshops to
supplement the family income. Hurricane Mitch exacerbated existing
child labor problems in every sector of the economy.
The employment of children under the legal working age in the
maquiladora sector may occur, but not on a large scale. (Younger
children sometimes obtain legitimate work permits by fraud or purchase
forged permits.) The maquiladoras in recent years have raised their
minimum employment age, and some hire only at age 18 or above, reducing
the number of legal job opportunities available to persons under 18
years of age.
In September 1998, the Government created a National Commission for
the Gradual and Progressive Eradication of Child Labor (see Section 5).
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited, including that performed
by children, and there were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In the aftermath of Hurricane
Mitch, labor leaders agreed to forgo the usual January pay increase in
return for a pledge by business leaders to control price increases for
basic goods and services. When labor and business reached an impasse on
wage negotiations in June, the Catholic Church arbitrated a 25 percent
increase in the minimum wage, which the Government implemented in July.
Both sides also agreed that, as of January 1, 2000, an 8 percent
increase would take effect for all workers and that the base for both
increases would be the minimum wage effective before the salary
increase in July. There is to be no further raise in the minimum wage
through 2000, as long as inflation (according to Central Bank
statistics) does not exceed 12 percent during the first 6 months of the
year.
Daily pay rates vary by geographic zone and the sector of the
economy affected; urban workers earn slightly more than workers in the
countryside. The lowest minimum wage occurs in the nonexport
agricultural sector, where it ranges from $2.27 to $2.89 (33 to 42
lempiras) per day, depending on whether the employer has more than 15
employees. The highest minimum wage is $3.79 (55 lempiras) per day, in
the export sector. All workers are entitled to an additional month's
salary in June and December of each year. The Constitution and the
Labor Code stipulate that all labor must be paid fairly, but the
Ministry of Labor lacks the personnel and other resources for effective
enforcement. The minimum wage is insufficient to provide a decent
standard of living (above the poverty line) for a worker and family.
The law prescribes a maximum 8-hour workday and a 44-hour workweek.
There is a requirement of at least one 24-hour rest period every 8
days. The Labor Code provides for a paid vacation of 10 workdays after
1 year, and of 20 workdays after 4 years. However, employers frequently
ignored these regulations due to the high level of unemployment and
underemployment and the lack of effective enforcement by the Labor
Ministry.
The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing national health
and safety laws, but does not do so consistently or effectively. Some
complaints alleged that foreign factory managers failed to comply with
the occupational health and safety aspects of Labor Code regulations in
factories located in the EPZ's and private industrial parks. There is
no provision allowing a worker to leave a dangerous work situation
without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The legal code includes provisions
prohibiting trafficking in persons; however, it is a problem. Weak
police and court systems hinder law enforcement efforts.
There were at least six different cases of aliens smuggled to the
United States that involved force, sequestration (holding persons
incommunicado against their will), and debt bondage. The most common
instance involved sequestration of persons until a smuggling fee was
paid. If the fee is not paid, the smugglers normally seek retribution
by turning such persons in for deportation proceedings. Many times fees
are paid by relatives who fear that smugglers may employ violence
against the smuggled persons. There were two reports of women who were
coerced into submitting sexually to smugglers in return for their
freedom. The most common practice involving debt bondage is the
smuggling of indentured persons, through Honduras from China or South
America, whose smuggling fee is paid by an employer in the United
States in return for free or low-paid labor. The Government does not
provide economic aid or other assistance to victims or potential
victims of such crimes.
______
JAMAICA
Jamaica is a constitutional parliamentary democracy and a member of
the Commonwealth of Nations. Two political parties have alternated in
power since the first elections under universal adult suffrage in 1944;
a third major party was established in late 1995. Prime Minister P.J.
Patterson's People's National Party (PNP) won 50 of the 60 seats in
Parliament in national elections in December 1997. The general election
campaign was significantly less violent than previous electoral
campaigns. However, there continued to be intimidation of voters and
party agents and restrictions on the free movement of voters. The
judiciary is independent but lacks adequate resources.
The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) has primary responsibility for
internal security, assisted by the Island Special Constabulary Force.
The Jamaica Defense Force (JDF--army, air wing, and coast guard) is
charged with supporting the JCF in maintaining law and order, although
it has no powers of arrest. While civilian authorities generally
maintain effective control of the security forces, some members of the
security forces committed human rights abuses.
The economy is based on primary products (bauxite and alumina,
sugar, bananas), services (tourism, finance), and light manufacturing
(garment assembly). The Government promoted private investment to
stimulate economic growth and modernization, pursuing in the process a
sometimes painful program of structural adjustment. In 1998 annual per
capita income was $2,440, but this figure is misleading as there is a
large and widening gap between the wealthy and the impoverished.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
however, serious problems remained in several areas. Members of the
security forces committed extrajudicial killings and beatings and
carried out arbitrary arrests and detentions. Although the Government
moved effectively to punish some of those involved, continued impunity
for police who commit abuses remains a problem. Prison and jail
conditions remained poor; overcrowding, brutality against detainees,
poor sanitary conditions, and inadequate diet are problems. The
judicial system was overburdened, and lengthy delays in trials were
common. Violence and economic discrimination against women remained
problems. Child labor is a problem. Mob violence against those
suspected of breaking the law also remained a problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
The security forces frequently employed lethal force in
apprehending criminal suspects, usually in the guise of shoot-outs.
This resulted in the killing by police of 151 persons during the year.
While allegations of ``police murder'' were frequent, the validity of
some of the allegations was suspect. This problem is the result of
unresolved, longstanding antipathy between the security forces and
certain communities, especially among the urban poor. The JCF conducted
both administrative and criminal investigations into incidents
involving fatal shootings by the police. The JCF policy statement on
the use of force incorporates U.N.-approved language on basic
principles on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement
officials.
From April 19 to 21, there were 3 days of island-wide protests
following a substantial increase in the tax on various petroleum
products. The protests were mainly peaceful; some involved blocking
roads, and some persons took advantage of the situation to loot
businesses and to stone passing vehicles. In general the security
forces acted with restraint and professionalism in the course of
arresting 152 persons, mainly for looting; however, during the
disturbances the police killed 7 persons and wounded 5 others. Although
the majority of those killed and wounded were alleged looters, one of
those shot and killed was an off-duty JDF soldier, who reportedly was
trying to protect a child from gunfire and was shot by police despite
allegedly identifying himself as a soldier. At year's end, this case
was awaiting action by the public prosecutor's office, which had not
yet brought charges against anyone for killing the soldier.
At year's end, the police still had not yet made public the results
of their investigation into the August death of a 26-year-old Kingston
man, allegedly suffering from clinical depression, whom nine soldiers
and four policemen beat severely when he tried to walk through a police
barricade during a curfew. Police arrested the man, who they allege
pushed apoliceman and tried to take his rifle. He later died from
peritonitis caused by the beating. The case led local human rights
groups to demand that the law be changed to allow relatives and their
representatives to observe the post mortems of persons killed by the
security forces. Initially, the Government tried to bar an independent
pathologist from observing the deceased man's autopsy. As a result of
an independent autopsy paid for by a local human rights nongovernmental
organization (NGO), a coroner's inquest was convened. On December 22,
an 11-person coroner's jury returned a 10-to-1 verdict that the death
was manslaughter. The record was forwarded to the Public Prosecutor's
office for possible prosecution of the security force members who
conducted the beating.
Another case that received national publicity involved the police
firing on a taxi carrying passengers in Kitson Town in June. The police
killed the driver--a district constable--and injured one of the
passengers. It is not clear why police fired on the car, but local
human rights activists say that the police acted under the mistaken
belief that the taxi contained someone they wanted. The incident
triggered a violent protest by the Kitson Town community and resulted
in the arrest of 26 persons and the burning of 2 police cars. The
results of the police investigation were sent to the Public
Prosecutor's office for action.
Vigilantism, involving spontaneous mob executions in response to
crime, continued to be a problem. There were 9 vigilante killings
during the year, compared with 16 in 1998, and 16 in 1997. Official
investigations into such killings generally do not uncover any
information, since the persons and the community involved usually band
together to intimidate potential witnesses.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other abuse of prisoners and
detainees; however, reports of physical abuse of prisoners by guards
continued, despite efforts by the Government to remove abusive guards
and improve procedures.
In December 1998, the court of appeal announced that flogging could
not be imposed as a punishment because the legislative authority for it
had expired. This sentence was rarely used; prior to 1994, no sentence
of flogging had been imposed for 25 years.
In April 1997, the Police Commissioner criticized the excessive use
of force by police in Hopewell, Hanover, who shot six persons who were
demonstrating against the substandard roads and water supply. Although
the authorities initially charged three policemen with unlawful
wounding, in December 1998, the court dismissed the case for lack of
prosecution. The Director of Public Prosecutions could have appealed
the dismissal, but in May he decided not to do so.
A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report published in July detailed
frequent and credible allegations of police abuse in lock-ups,
including severe beatings, mock executions, and rape. The Government
did not deny the report's allegations (and one government Minister
admitted that the situation did not differ much from that described in
a 1994 HRW report). Human Rights Watch noted that the Government
responded quickly to remove some children from lockups; however, HRW
also noted that the Government must undertake a systematic effort to
curb police abuse effectively and bring sanctions against officers who
commit abuses. The Government has not demonstrated this type of
institutional commitment to reform.
There were reports that police sexually harassed women (see Section
5).
Prison conditions remained poor; overcrowding, inadequate diet,
poor sanitary conditions, and insufficient medical care are typical.
The July HRW report also criticized the conditions in which juveniles
are held. The report detailed many cases in which juveniles were
detained improperly, not given access to legal representation, and held
in adult lock-ups where they were victimized by adult prisoners. The
conditions in these lock-ups are harsh, with severe overcrowding,
intermittent meals, poor lighting, ventilation, and sanitation.
In general the Government allowed private groups, voluntary
organizations, international human rights organizations, and the media
to visit prisons and monitor prison conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The police continued to
arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. In 1994 Parliament repealed the
Suppression of Crimes Act of 1974, which permitted warrantless searches
and the arrest of persons ``reasonably suspected'' of having committed
a crime. However, the Jamaica Constabulary Force Act now contains
several of these provisions, and there were continued reports that the
police abused these provisions. In March 1997, the Jamaican Bar
Association (JBA) protested that the police were unlawfully detaining
and fingerprinting groups of citizens in poor, inner city areas. At the
time, the Police Commissioner disavowed the practice and ordered it
discontinued; however, both the JBA and the Independent Jamaica Council
for Human Rights state that the practice continues. This was confirmed
in July, when police rounded up 52 men from the Grant's Pen area of
Kingston. The men reportedly were fingerprinted, photographed, and then
released without being charged.
A July case involving the detention and forced transport of 32
persons (many of whom were reportedly mentally ill), who were living on
the streets in a Montego Bay business district, triggered a national
debate about police action and the dignity of citizens. These persons
were rounded up during the night; some allegedly were bound and sprayed
with pepper spray. They then were transported in an open truck
belonging to the St. James Parish Council (the local government in
Montego Bay) and released in a rural area of a neighboring parish. In
July the authorities suspended five policemen from duty pending an
investigation, which failed to uncover sufficient evidence for the
Public Prosecutor to charge anyone with a crime. Upon further
investigation, in October the authorities charged three persons
(including a police inspector and two public sector employees) with
false imprisonment and assault. However, few believe that only three
persons were involved; it is believed widely that the police were
involved and acted at the behest of Montego Bay merchants and with the
acquiescence of the local government, and that large sums of ``hush
money'' were paid as part of a coverup; both groups denied any
knowledge or involvement. The local media severely criticized the
apparent coverup, with one talk show going so far as to offer a $6,250
(J$250,000) reward for information leading to the identification of the
parties responsible.
The law requires police to present a detainee in court within 48
hours of detention, but the authorities continued to detain suspects,
especially those from poor neighborhoods, without bringing them before
a judge within the prescribed period. Magistrates inquire at least once
a week into the welfare of each person listed by the JCF as detained.
There is a functioning bail system.
Foreign prisoners must pay for their own deportation once they have
completed their sentences. If they cannot afford to pay, they are
jailed until relatives or consulates can arrange for transportation. In
effect this constitutes an additional prison term for indigent
foreigners.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and no instances of exile
occurred.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, which exists in practice. However, the judicial
system is overburdened and operates with inadequate resources.
Three courts handle criminal matters at the trial level. Resident
magistrates try lesser offenses (misdemeanors). A Supreme Court judge
tries felonies, except for felonies involving firearms, which are tried
before a judge of the Gun Court. Defendants have the right to appeal a
conviction in any of the three trial courts to the Court of Appeal,
which is the highest court. The Constitution allows the Court of Appeal
and the Parliament to refer cases to the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in the United Kingdom as a final court of appeal.
The lack of sufficient staff and resources hinders due process.
Trials in many cases are delayed for years, and other cases are
dismissed because files cannot be located. The Government initiated a
night court in 1995, which has had some success in reducing the backlog
of cases.
While the defendant's right to counsel is well established, the
courts appoint counsel for the indigent only for serious offenses
(e.g., murder, rape, robbery, and gun offenses). However, the law does
not consider many offenses, including wounding with intent to cause
great bodily harm, as ``serious,'' and the courts try many defendants
without benefit of counsel.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary intrusion by the
State into the private life of an individual. The revised Jamaica
Constabulary Force Act continues to give security personnel broad
powers of search and seizure similar to those granted by the former
Suppression of Crimes Act (see Section 1.d.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice.
The Government privatized the Jamaica Broadcasting Company in 1997,
and the television station and two radio stations it operated became
privately owned. The Government's broadcasting commission has the right
to regulate programming during emergencies. Foreign television
transmissions are unregulated and available through satellite antennas.
The four largest newspapers, all privately owned, regularly report on
human rights abuses, particularly those involving the JCF. Foreign
publications are widely available.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this
right in practice.
Widespread public protests over gasoline price increases in April
led to the closure of businesses, as demonstrators resorted to
violence. The police killed and wounded a number of persons (see
Section 1.a.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the authorities respect them in practice.
The Government provides asylum or refugee status in accordance with
the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The Government provides first asylum, and provided
it to approximately 40 persons in 1994. Similar but smaller numbers of
first asylum cases, mainly Cubans and Haitians, were accepted in 1995
and 1996, but none have been accepted since. The Government established
a committee and formal procedures to review claims to refugee status.
This committee has denied all claims to refugee status by Cubans and
Haitians who have arrived in Jamaica since 1994.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in periodic
elections held on the basis of universal suffrage. All citizens age 18
and over have the right to vote by secret ballot. However, voters
living in so-called garrison communities, which are located in inner-
city areas dominated byone of the two major political parties, face
substantial impediments to the free exercise of their right to vote.
During the 1997 general election campaign, both international and local
observer groups concluded that, although the process was significantly
less violent than recent election campaigns, problems persisted in the
garrison communities. These problems included intimidation of party
agents and voters of nondominant parties and restrictions on the
movement of voters and election workers. Some areas are so dominated by
one party that the polls simply closed early and vote counts were taken
that resulted in 100 percent (or nearly 100 percent) of the votes being
awarded to the dominant party. These problems persisted in the December
1997 election, despite the best efforts of the security forces, which
were credited with controlling violence, such as the beating of voters,
and reducing election malpractice, such as the theft of ballot boxes
from polling places.
There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women in
politics; however, they are underrepresented. Women hold about 13
percent of all political offices and 30 percent of the senior civil
service positions. Two of the 16 cabinet members are women, as is the
PNP General Secretary.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. The Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights (IJCHR)
remains the country's only formal organization concerned with all
aspects of human rights. However, a new human rights group, Jamaicans
for Justice, was created in August in response to widespread concern
about police impunity. The new NGO focuses on the issues of
extrajudicial killing and excessive use of force by the police.
Government officials are generally cooperative and responsive to the
views of human rights organizations.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, place
of origin, political opinions, color, creed, or sex. The Government
largely enforces these prohibitions in practice, except for widespread
discrimination on the basis of political opinion in the distribution of
scarce governmental benefits, including employment, especially in the
garrison communities (see Section 3).
Women.--Social and cultural traditions perpetuate violence against
women, including spousal abuse. Violence against women is widespread,
but many women are reluctant to acknowledge or report abusive behavior,
leading to wide variations in estimates of its extent. The Domestic
Violence Act of 1995 came into effect in 1996. It provides remedies for
domestic violence, including restraining orders and other noncustodial
sentencing.
There were anecdotal reports that the police sexually harassed
women. One case of this type involved a young woman who was protesting
peacefully the April gas tax increase and allegedly was arrested for no
apparent reason. The incident, which was videotaped and widely
broadcast, angered women throughout the country and contributed to the
large turnout for the Women's March for Justice, an event that received
international media coverage.
Women suffer from economic discrimination and sexual harassment in
the workplace. The Constitution and the 1975 Employment Act accord
women full equality. The Bureau of Women's Affairs in the Ministry of
Labor oversees programs to ensure the legal rights of women. These
programs have had limited effect but have raised the awareness of
problems affecting women. In 1996 the Government established a steering
committee, charged with creating a Commission on Gender and Social
Equity. The committee forwarded its recommendations to Parliament,
which accepted them; Parliament continued to discuss methods of
implementation at year's end.
A number of active women's rights groups exist. They are concerned
with a wide range of issues, including employment,violence against
women, political representation, and the image of women presented in
the media. Their effectiveness is mixed, but the groups were successful
in advocating enactment of the Domestic Violence Act.
Children.--The Government is committed to improving children's
welfare. The Ministry of Education, Youth, and Culture is responsible
for implementation of the Government's programs for children.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. The Juvenile Act
of 1951 deals with several areas related to the protection of children,
including the prevention of cruelty, a prohibition on causing or
allowing juvenile begging, the power to bring juveniles in need of care
or protection before a juvenile court, the treatment of juvenile
offenders, the regulation and supervision of children's homes, and
restrictions on employment of juveniles. However, resource constraints
have resulted in juveniles ``in need of care or protection'' being
incarcerated in police lock-ups with adults. The Government has not
made resources available to construct additional facilities for
juveniles (see Section l.c.).
People with Disabilities.--No laws mandate accessibility for people
with disabilities. Several government agencies and NGO's provide
services and employment to various groups of disabled citizens. In
January 1998, the Prime Minister appointed the first blind member of
the Senate, an action that is expected to raise the parliamentary
profile of problems affecting disabled persons. In July an incident in
which police rounded up 32 persons (many of whom reportedly were
mentally ill) triggered a national debate over police action (see
Section 1.c.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides for the right to
form or join a trade union, and unions function freely and
independently of the Government. The Labor Relations and Industrial
Disputes Act (LRIDA) defines worker rights. There is a spectrum of
national unions, some of which are affiliated with political parties.
Approximately 15 percent of the work force is organized.
The LRIDA neither authorizes nor prohibits the right to strike, but
strikes do occur. Striking workers can interrupt work without criminal
liability but cannot be assured of keeping their jobs. Workers in 10
broad categories of ``essential services'' are prohibited from
striking, a provision the International Labor Organization (ILO)
repeatedly condemned as overly inclusive. The Government did not
declare any strikes illegal during the year.
Unions maintain a wide variety of regional and international
affiliations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Government
rarely interferes with union organizing efforts. Judicial and police
authorities effectively enforce the LRIDA and other labor regulations.
All parties are committed firmly to collective bargaining in contract
negotiations, even in some nonunion settings. An independent Industrial
Disputes Tribunal (IDT) hears cases where management and labor fail to
reach agreement. Any cases not resolved by the IDT pass to the civil
courts. The IDT generally handles 35 to 40 cases each year. Most are
decided within 90 days, but some take longer to resolve due to the
complexity of the dispute or delays requested by the parties. The LRIDA
prohibits antiunion discrimination, and employees may not be fired
solely for union membership. The authorities enforced this law
effectively.
Domestic labor laws apply equally to the ``free zones'' (export
processing zones). However, there are no unionized companies in any of
the 3 zones--established in 1972, 1985, and 1988--that employ 10,039
workers. Organizers attribute this circumstance to resistance by
foreign owners in the zones to organizing efforts, but attempts to
organize plants within the zones continue. Company-controlled
``workers' councils'' handle grievance resolution at most free zone
companies, but do not negotiate wages and conditions with management.
Management determines wages and benefits within the free zones; these
are generally as good as or better than those in similar industries
outside the zones. The Ministry of Labor is required to perform
comprehensive factory inspections in the free zones once eachyear, and
actually performs them at 6- to 9-month intervals. There were no
reports of substandard or unsafe conditions in the free zone factories.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
does not specifically address the matter of forced or compulsory labor
for either adults or children, but there were no reports that this
practice exists.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Juvenile Act provides that children under the age of
12 shall not be employed except by parents or guardians, and that such
employment may only be in domestic, agricultural, or horticultural
work. However, enforcement is erratic. Children under the age of 12
peddle goods and services on city streets, but there is no evidence of
widespread illegal employment of children in other sectors of the
economy. The Educational Act stipulates that all children between 6 and
11 years of age must attend elementary school. Industrial safety,
police, and truant officers are charged with enforcement. However, due
to difficult economic circumstances, thousands of children are kept
home to help with housework and avoid school fees. A 1994 report by the
U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) stated that 4.6 percent of children below
the age of 16 worked to help support their households. In December the
Minister of Labor, Welfare, and Sport made a widely reported speech in
which she stated that 23,000 children were engaged in child labor.
While the Constitution does not prohibit forced or bonded labor by
children, such practices were not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage, raised from
$20 (J$800) to $30 (J$1,200) per week in August, is widely considered
inadequate to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. Most salaried workers are paid more than the legal minimum.
Work over 40 hours per week or 8 hours per day must be compensated at
overtime rates, a provision that is observed widely.
The Labor Ministry's Industrial Safety Division sets and enforces
industrial health and safety standards, which are considered adequate.
Industrial accident rates, particularly in the bauxite and alumina
industry, remained low. Public service staff reductions in the
Ministries of Labor, Finance, National Security, and the Public Service
have contributed to the difficulties in enforcing workplace
regulations.
The law provides workers with the right to remove themselves from
dangerous work situations without jeopardy to their continued
employment if they are trade union members or covered by the Factories
Act. The law does not specifically protect other categories of workers
in those circumstances.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons; however, there are laws against assault and
fraud, and other laws establish various immigration and customs
regulations. There were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to,
or from the country.
______
MEXICO
Mexico is a federal republic of 31 states and the Federal District,
with an elected president and a bicameral legislature. President
Ernesto Zedillo of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was
elected in 1994 to a single 6-year term. The PRI, the oldest and
largest political party, enjoys significant advantages in patronage,
incumbency, and fund-raising, and has won every presidential election
since the party's founding in 1929, some of which involved credible
allegations of fraudulent practices. However, in largely free and fair
elections in 1997, the PRI lost its absolute majority in the lower
house for the first time, and the two main opposition parties--the
Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) and the National Action Party
(PAN)--have become firmly established and continue to be competitive in
elections. Politically motivated violence continued to plague the
southern states of Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca. The peace process in
Chiapas between the Government and the Zapatista National Liberation
Army (EZLN) remained stalled, although in September the Government
proposed a new peace initiative to restart talks. The judiciary is
generally independent; however, it occasionally has been influenced by
the executive branch.
The military shares responsibility for internal security with the
police forces, which include federal and state judicial police, the new
federal preventive police, the municipal police, and various police
auxiliary forces. Elected civilian officials have control over the
military and police; however, corruption is widespread within police
ranks and also is a problem for the military. The military maintains a
strong presence in the states of Chiapas and Guerrero. Military
personnel and police officers continued to commit serious human rights
abuses.
The Government continued to deregulate and open the market-based,
mixed economy. The real rate of growth in gross domestic product (GDP)
in 1998 was 4.8 percent and the inflation rate was 18.6 percent. One-
fourth of the population reside in rural areas where subsistence
agriculture is common. Per capita GDP in 1999 was about $4,600. The
economy is still recovering from the 1994 economic crisis, and real
wages are less than before the crisis. Leading exports include
petroleum, automobiles, and manufactured and assembled products,
including electronics and consumer goods. Income distribution remained
skewed; the top 20 percent of the population received about 60 percent
of total income, while the bottom 20 percent earned less than 5
percent.
The Government generally respected many of the human rights of its
citizens; however, serious problems remain in several areas, and in
some states where a poor climate of respect for human rights presents
special concern. Continued serious abuses include extrajudicial
killings; disappearances; torture and other abuse; police corruption
and alleged involvement in narcotics-related abuses; poor prison
conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; lengthy pretrial detention;
lack of due process; judicial inefficiency and corruption; illegal
searches; attacks and threats against journalists; some self-
censorship; assaults, harassment, and threats against human rights
monitors; violence and discrimination against women; child prostitution
and abuse; discrimination against indigenous people; violence and
discrimination against religious minorities; violence against
homosexuals; limits on worker rights; extensive child labor in
agriculture and in the informal economy; and trafficking in persons.
The Government's efforts to improve the human rights situation have
met with limited success. Although the Government has sanctioned some
public officials, police officers, and members of the military, a
culture of impunity continues to pervade the security forces. The
Government continued to support the National Human Rights Commission
(CNDH), and Congress amended the Constitution to grant it greater
autonomy from the executive branch. However, the CNDH primarily
investigates complaints against federal authorities and has no
enforcement powers.
Armed civilian groups operating in the state of Chiapas were
responsible for human rights abuses. The incidence of narcotics-related
violence and human rights abuses also increased, allegedly with the
assistance of members of the security forces. Guerrilla attacks against
government property and personnel continued.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Members of the
security forces, both the military and police, committed political and
other extrajudicial killings.
On March 4 in the state of Guerrero, men dressed in Federal
Judicial Police uniforms and armed with automatic weapons killed
Aurelio Garcia, a former state attorney general and advisor to the
PRD's unsuccessful gubernatorial candidate in the February 7 election.
On April 16, the authorities charged Bernardino Alvear Villa and Juan
Valdovinos Rodriguez in connection with this murder. The Federal
Attorney General's (PGR) investigation continued at year's end.
On May 8, the military admitted that soldiers killed two farmers
during the month of April (see Section 1.g.).
On May 15, Federal Fiscal Police killed 1 immigrant when they
opened fire on a van containing 23 persons. The PGR opened an
investigation into the incident and detained three Federal Fiscal
Police officers. Press reports indicate that at least one of the
officers detained also was involved in a similar incident on March 17
when the Federal Fiscal Police opened fire on a van. The police wounded
4 of the 45 passengers but did not kill anyone in that incident.
On August 12, a judge ordered the arrest of current and former
Tamaulipas PGR officials Carmen Oralio Castro Aparicio, Aurelio Soto
Huerta, Jose Isabel Lopez Rivas, Gabriel Angel Gutierrez Portillo, and
Ramiro Garcia Eugenio. They are charged with the murder of fellow PGR
official Jaime Rajid Gutierrez Arreola.
On October 3, Cosem Demian Sanchez Sastre, a member of the
Zapatista National Liberation Front (FZLN, the political branch of the
EZLN), was found dead in his cell in a Tijuana detention facility.
Police arrested him along with two others on charges of possession of
marijuana and public intoxication the previous evening. The authorities
announced that the official cause of death was suicide by hanging.
However, Sanchez's family and fellow FZLN members claim that at least
two witnesses saw prison guards beat him to death. The Binational
Center for Human Rights office in Tijuana also protested the official
cause of death. Sanchez was the fourth person to die in this Tijuana
detention center during the year.
There have been numerous reports of executions carried out by rival
drug gangs, whose members have been proven to include both active and
former federal and state security personnel.
Throughout the country, but particularly in the northern border
states, violence related to narcotics trafficking increased. The police
and military were accused of being responsible for disappearances,
arbitrary detentions, torture, use of excessive force, and other
serious human rights violations as they carried out the Government's
efforts to combat drug cartels.
Narcotics-trafficking organizations included corrupted public
officials. The former governor of Quintana Roo, Mario Villanueva
Madrid, is suspected of having aided narcotics-trafficking
organizations. He fled shortly before his term of office expired and at
year's end was still being sought by federal authorities. Villanueva
Madrid claims that he is innocent and alleges that he is the victim of
a political frameup.
On March 24, a court convicted the former Morelos state attorney
general, Carlos Peredo Merlo, of tolerating the coverup of the
kidnaping, torture, and murder of Jorge Nava Aviles in 1998 and
sentenced him to 3 years and 7 months in prison. However, a higher
court later reduced his sentence to less than 2 years. The killing of
Nava Aviles was discovered when the then-chief of the antikidnaping
unit and other members of the Morelos state judicial police were found
dumping his body alongside a highway. The court also convicted
Cuernavaca's former deputy prosecutor and the former director of the
judicial police on related charges in the same case and sentenced each
of them to 3 years and 3 months. The remaining persons accused in this
case still were awaiting trial at year's end.
In another incident, and following a public campaign by the
victim's family, the authorities brought charges against two police
officers in February for the 1998 robbery and murder of a foreign
visitor in a death that first had been ruled accidental. Video cameras
from automatic teller machines showed police officers Lucio Tapia
Galindo and Francisco Leon Gonzalez withdrawing money from the victim's
account. The two officers also were implicated in similar incidents
involving foreign tourists. They fled the country, but were brought
back to stand trial. In February the court found them guilty of robbery
and murder.
In January the PGR arrested two former Chiapas officials, public
security official Absalon Gordillo Diaz and prosecutor Roberto Arcos
Jimenez, and charged them with crimes relating to the December 1997
massacre of 45 persons in Acteal, Chiapas. In the first convictions for
actual involvement in the Acteal massacre, on July 19 a court sentenced
20 persons to 35-year prison terms on charges including homicide,
assault, and illegal possession of firearms. In September the court
sentenced a second group of 24 persons to 35-year prison terms on
similar charges. Former mayor of Chenalho Jacinto Arias Cruz, believed
to have played a significant role in the Acteal massacre, was among
those sentenced. At year's end, the court had not ruled on charges
against more than 80 other individuals.
The September 1997 killing by police of six youths during a police
operation in the Mexico City neighborhood of Buenos Aires remains
unresolved. The authorities brought charges against only 6 of the 26
police officers originally accused of the crime, and charged only 1 of
the 6, Eleazar Perez Zavala, with homicide.
The courts have convicted 9 former public officials and 13 former
police officers of crimes in the 1995 Aguas Blancas massacre of 17
indigenous farmers. In April a circuit court released 15 former
Guerrero state police officers without bringing them to trial. Former
Guerrero governor Ruben Figueroa is alleged to have masterminded the
massacre. However, the authorities never thoroughly investigated this
allegation and never charged him with any crime.
In February 1998, Gerardo Villarreal Rodriguez died in Nuevo Leon,
after being tortured by four state police officers. His body was
discovered the next day in a shallow grave. A local television station
broadcast a taped conversation in which state police chief Americo
Melendez Reyna asked the state attorney general for help in covering up
the crime. Melendez Reyna immediately left office; the authorities
prosecuted him but did not bring charges against any of the alleged
torturers.
In June 1998, in El Charco, Guerrero, army troops killed 12 alleged
members of the rebel Revolutionary Army of the People's Insurgency
(ERPI), a breakaway faction of the People's Revolutionary Army (EPR),
in a firefight. Five individuals were wounded and 22 were arrested.
After investigating the incident, human rights NGO's found it
suspicious that the military had sustained no casualties if, as the
army asserted, there had been an intense firefight between troops and
well-armed guerrillas. The authorities later released 20 of the persons
arrested during the incident; they kept 2 persons in jail and
subsequently arrested 2 more individuals. The Government charged the
four persons with rebellion, possession of illegal weapons, and
organized delinquency. The authorities insisted that those detained
confessed to being guerrilla leaders, while the accused claimed that
the confessions were false and extracted under torture. A judge in
Acapulco upheld a ruling in January that the four are presumed members
of the ERPI; they remained in prison, and a CNDH investigation into
their allegations of torture continued during the year.
There was no information available on the investigation of the June
1998 killing of an alleged migrant smuggler, in which seven members of
the Grupo Beta police unit were detained. Officials were investigating
whether the victim was killed after he had been detained and whether
evidence was planted on him.
There were no new developments in the investigation into the March
1997 incident at San Pedro Nixtalucum, El Bosque municipality, Chiapas,
in which police killed 4 persons and detained 24 others during a
confrontation between PRI supporters and opponents.
On May 20, a court sentenced former judicial police officer Mario
Alberto Gonzalez Trevino to a total of 49 years in prison for the
torture and murder in 1990 of Norma Corona Sapien, a cofounder of the
Sinaloa Human Rights Defense Commission. Corona Sapien had been
investigating narcotics-related violence.
Some killings apparently were politically motivated. Jorge Aguirre
Meza, cofounder of the Sinaloa Human Rights Defense Commission and a
mayoral candidate in the municipality of Navolato, was killed on
January 27. The other two cofounders of the defense commission, Jesus
Michel Jacobo and Norma Corona Sapien, were killed in 1987 and 1990,
respectively. The authorities have not charged anyone with Aguirre
Meza's murder.
In June a police officer in Naucalpan, in the state of Mexico,
killed Mauricio Martinez Hernandez, a municipal worker. Union activists
and members of the opposition PAN party claimed thatthe killing was
politically motivated. The authorities arrested one officer, who was
tried and convicted for murder. A second suspect remained a fugitive at
year's end.
Violence in the predominately indigenous state of Oaxaca increased.
On May 9, PRD Senator Hector Sanchez Lopez and two companions were
shot. All three survived the attack, which occurred near the town of
Chalcatongo. There is some dispute whether the attack was politically
motivated, and the PGR was investigating.
On May 11, the leader of an indigenous rights movement, Heriberto
Pazos Ortiz, was shot and seriously wounded in the Oaxaca capital. Two
other politically active indigenous leaders were killed in the same
attack. On August 10, the secretary general of an organization
supporting the Triqui indigenous group was killed as he left his home.
On October 3, a group of men armed with AK-47 assault weapons
attacked an Acapulco city councilor-elect and his family en route to a
PRD election victory celebration. The councilor's son was killed, and
the councilor seriously wounded. State authorities charged a PRD
activist with the crime and alleged that he was affiliated with the
ERPI insurgent group. The suspect later repudiated a confession that he
alleges was coerced by torture. PRD officials rejected the results of
the state investigation as falsified and called for federal
intervention. Human rights observers charged that state and federal
authorities used the investigation into electoral violence to repress
opposition parties and peasant organizations by linking the political
opposition to insurgent groups.
On January 5, a group of persons killed villagers in Tzacabel,
Chiapas, including a 4-year-old child. One survivor notified the state
authorities, who arrested three men on January 8 in connection with the
killings. One report of the incident asserted that a landowner hired
the suspects to avenge the theft of two weapons. Another report
described the attackers as men dressed in black who pretended to be
police officers looking for thieves. Chiapas police said that they had
detained a total of six persons in the attack, including two women. On
the same day, state authorities found the remains of three indigenous
persons and were investigating their killing.
In January Raul Salinas de Gortari, brother of former president
Carlos Salinas, was convicted of ordering the 1994 murder of PRI leader
Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu. Salinas, who maintains his innocence, was
sentenced to 50 years in prison. On appeal, the court reduced his
sentence to 35 years' imprisonment.
There has been some progress in solving the disappearances and
murders, beginning in 1993, of about 200 women near Ciudad Juarez. Most
of the victims were young women working in the in-bond export
processing (maquila) sector. According to the state's special
prosecutor for crimes against women, the authorities had completed
investigations and filed charges or obtained convictions in 80 percent
of the 198 cases under their purview from 1993 through 1999. Of the 46
cases discovered in 1998 and 1999, the authorities have investigated
and made arrests in the majority of the killings. In February a court
sentenced Abdel Latif Sharif to 30 years in prison for committing one
of these murders. He is also alleged to have hired two persons to prove
his innocence; they have been accused of 16 murders between them. There
is no evidence that Sharif or his accomplices had political motives for
their alleged crimes.
Several human rights organizations and the U.N. Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial Executions, Asma Jahangir, who visited the country in
June, believe that the limited progress in solving these murders was
due to the fact that most of the victims were poor, young women, few of
whom had anyone to press the authorities for intensive investigation.
However, police incompetence, prosecutorial ineptitude, and lack of
investigative resources also hampered the investigation. No one else
has been charged in any of the other 184 disappearances or murders,
which apparently stopped after Sharif's arrest (see Section 1.b.).
Narcotics-trafficking organizations committed many killings. Human
rights groups allege that military and police forces are responsible
for some killings generally attributed to narcotics traffickers or
other criminals, including some of those whose bodies were discovered
in Chihuahua in December (see Section 1.b.).
There were many reports of vigilante killings and violence during
the year. For example, in Mexico City there were at least two incidents
in which bus passengers overpowered would-berobbers and beat them
before police could intervene. Only the alleged robbers were reportedly
prosecuted in these incidents.
b. Disappearance.--There continued to be credible reports of
disappearances. In 1998 the CNDH registered 42 complaints of
disappearance, compared with 30 in 1997. It was able to resolve 25 of
these cases. The CNDH also is working to establish a nationwide
database to assist in the identification of unknown remains. By the end
of 1998, 20 states had agreed to take part in this network.
Kidnaping is a seriously underreported crime throughout the
country. After the authorities arrested state police officers in
Morelos in January 1998 for participation in the operations of a
kidnaping ring, the state police force was subsequently purged and no
further such incidents were reported. In Baja California human rights
groups claimed that 79 kidnapings took place in 1998 and 13 in the
first 2 months of the year. The groups blamed the increase on local
kidnaping rings and the lack of police response to escalating crime.
As of December 22, a total of nine bodies had been recovered from
graves in the state of Chihuahua. The authorities believe that the
graves were used by narcotics-trafficking organizations, and that some
of the remains found are of the 224 persons reported missing in the
state since 1994. The Chihuahua-based Committee for the Defense of
Human Rights alleges that military and police forces are responsible
for some of the disappearances. It also claims that at least 20 of the
disappearances were politically motivated, but there was no evidence
offered to support these claims. The Association of Families of the
Disappeared Persons also has alleged that the security forces were
behind many of the disappearances and has argued that the cases were
not investigated properly for that reason.
According to the January Human Rights Watch report, many
disappearance cases were in fact cases of prolonged detention by
security forces. The report detailed incidents that occurred in
previous years, and numerous human rights groups credibly asserted that
disappearances continued to occur.
On June 10, Jose Hidalgo Perez, a member of a politically active
family in San Cristobal de las Casas, disappeared in the state of
Chiapas. No motive was found for his disappearance. On June 24, human
remains were found alongside the Nachiv-Yalentay highway and were to be
DNA-tested to determine if they belong to Hidalgo Perez. However, the
Miguel Agustin pro-Juarez Human Rights Center (PRODH) said that the PGR
claimed that the skull was too deteriorated to provide a DNA sample; no
one had been arrested in the case by year's end.
There was no progress in the investigations of the 1995
disappearances of peasant leader Gilberto Romero Vasquez or journalist
and human rights activist Cuauhtemoc Ornelas Campos.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, it continues
to be a serious problem. The Constitution excludes as evidence
confessions obtained in the absence of the accused's defense attorney,
and the law excludes coerced confessions, including those extracted
under torture; however, the police regularly obtain information through
torture, prosecutors use this evidence in courts, and the courts
continue to admit as evidence confessions extracted under torture. The
authorities prosecute and punish few officials for torture, and this
impunity abets the practice.
In her annual address in June, the president of the CNDH
acknowledged that torture continues to be a serious human rights
problem. She cited the PGR and the Defense Secretariat as the principal
organizations responsible for the use of torture. Although the CNDH
reported receiving only 21 complaints of torture in 1998, this figure
likely understates the extent of the use of torture. In a report
published in July, the U.N. Human Rights Committee expressed concern
that laws aimed to prevent torture were inadequate because of the
absence of an independent body to investigate allegations of
mistreatment. There are persistent reports by nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) of the widespread use of torture by the police
and the security forces. Nigel Rodley, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Torture, reported in January 1998 that torture continued to occur
despite the fact that the country had in place an array of legal
safeguards.
The authorities punish few officials for torture, which continues
to occur in large part because confessions are the primary evidence in
many criminal convictions. Poorly trained and inadequately equipped to
investigate crimes, police officers often attempt to solve crimes by
rounding up likely suspects and then extracting confessions from them
by force. Many victims do not report, or do not follow through on,
their complaints against the police due to fear of reprisals, thereby
hampering prosecution of the perpetrators.
State human rights commissions also received reports of torture
allegedly committed by police. The Jalisco state Human Rights
Commission charged in September that the state attorney general, Felix
Ledezma Martinez, and the mayor of Guadalajara, Francisco Ramirez
Acuna, impeded an investigation into an alleged case of torture. The
state commission claimed that information was withheld to protect high-
ranking members of the Guadalajara municipal police force.
On September 15, the president of the Mexico City Human Rights
Commission (CDHDF), Luis de la Barreda, announced that during the
CDHDF's 6 years of existence, the Mexico City attorney general's office
(PDJDF) was the subject of the majority of its recommendations
regarding torture. The commission made 14 recommendations involving 18
alleged perpetrators; 7 against the PDJDF, 6 against the Director
General of Prisons, 3 against the Secretary of Public Security, and 2
against the Director General of Public Health. As of September 13, the
CDHDF had investigated 44 security personnel for the use of torture. It
had 17 of these cases still under investigation, dismissed 5, and had
found culpable 22 public officials. However, the authorities had yet to
arrest 11 of those found culpable.
Government officials conceded the country's serious human rights
shortcomings. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) Mary
Robinson, who visited the country in November, characterized President
Zedillo's admission that serious human rights violations occur as a
positive sign. In an effort to fight corruption and provide better
public security, the Government created a new federal preventive police
force. The 12,000-person force is to include approximately 5,000
transferred military personnel, when it reaches full strength. The
inclusion of former military personnel led to criticism from some human
rights NGO's.
Official corruption and complicity in crime continues to be a
source of human rights violations. Some forms of corruption are less
serious but illustrate the widespread nature of the problem. For
example, in August Mexico City police chief Alejandro Gertz removed
ticketing authority from all male traffic police officers in an effort
to respond to the public's lack of confidence in police integrity. At
the time, Gertz proclaimed that he was doing so because female officers
were less liable to become corrupt. However, a few months later Gertz
admitted that he was wrong; female traffic officers turned out to be as
susceptible to corruption as their male counterparts.
Public security officials also committed more serious crimes. For
example, Human Rights Watch reported that in June, federal police
officers beat a state police bodyguard who was assigned to protect the
editor of the magazine Pulso, who had received death threats after
reporting on the drug trade.
A 1998 report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) described a definite pattern of rape and sexual assault
committed by state agents. The Commission stated that it had received
information indicating that some women, particularly those in
detention, were the victims of sexual assault either by or with the
consent of state agents.
In a case that received widespread publicity, in July a court
convicted 15 Mexico City mounted police officers for the abduction,
sexual abuse, and rape of 3 teenage girls in 1998. In May soldiers
allegedly raped two women in Chiapas (see Section 1.g.).
Police extorted money from street children, at times abused
homosexuals (see Section 5), violated the rights of illegal immigrants
(see Section 2.d.), and used force against strikers (see Section 2.b.).
Prison conditions are poor. Many prisons are staffed by
undertrained and corrupt guards, and some lack adequate facilities. The
penal system comprises 441 facilities: 4 federal penitentiaries, 8
Federal District prisons, 280 stateprisons, and 149 municipal jails.
Prison overcrowding is a common complaint, despite an early release
program endorsed by the CNDH and legal reforms reducing the number of
crimes that carry mandatory prison sentences. For example, La Mesa
state penitentiary in Tijuana, built to hold 1,800 inmates, has a
prison population of at least 4,300. The situation is no better in
other parts of the country. It is estimated that the majority of
prisons have populations 50 percent in excess of intended capacity. At
a prison undergoing renovation in the state of Chiapas, the authorities
assigned up to eight prisoners to cells designed to hold two inmates.
Prisoners complain that they must purchase food, medicine, and
other necessities from guards or bribe guards to allow the goods to be
brought in from outside. In 1998 Federal District prison director
Carlos Tornero Diaz admitted that guards supply 40 percent of the
illegal drugs smuggled into the prisons and that inmates lacked
sufficient drinking water. While the authorities investigate some
prison officials for abusing prisoners, they more commonly dismiss
those who commit abuses or charge them with only minor offenses.
Drug and alcohol abuse is rampant in prisons. A Baja California
state official estimated that 80 percent of the state's prison
population is addicted to drugs. Conflicts between rival prison groups
involved in drug trafficking continue to occur.
In many prisons inmates exercise authority, displacing prison
officials. Influence peddling, drug and arms trafficking, coercion,
violence, sexual abuse, and protection payoffs are the chief methods of
control used by prisoners against their fellow inmates. Corruption and
poor conditions led to riots and escapes. A March 18 riot at La Loma
prison in Nuevo Laredo reportedly arose from the planned transfer of an
inmate considered to be the leader of the prison population. There were
several other prison riots, notably in Ciudad Juarez and in the state
of Chiapas. According to the Tabasco state government, nine inmates
were killed in prison riots following severe flooding in that state.
Although the Constitution calls for separation of juveniles from
adult prisoners, men from women, and convicted criminals from detainees
held in custody, in practice these requirements were violated routinely
as a result of overcrowding and corruption. Moreover, according to
information from 1998, prison officials encouraged sexual liaisons
between female inmates and male prisoners and guards.
There is no specific law or regulation allowing human rights
organizations or other NGO's to visit prisons; however, in practice
such visits are allowed in certain situations. The Government granted
special advance permission for the ICRC to visit prisoners charged in
politically sensitive cases in Guerrero, Chiapas, and Oaxaca.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the police continued
to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. Arbitrary arrest and
detention were among the most common human rights abuses. Legally, a
prosecutor may hold a detainee no more than 48 hours before he must
present the accused to a judge, except when the accused is caught in
the act or within 72 hours of committing a crime. A great number of
disappearances eventually are found to be cases of arbitrary detention
(see Section 1.b.).
Reports of arbitrary detention occur with greatest frequency in
Tabasco, Guerrero, Chiapas, the Federal District, and Oaxaca. States'
attorney general personnel, state police, and the army are the most
frequent abusers of detention laws.
The Constitution provides that the authorities must sentence an
accused person within 4 months of detention if the alleged crime
carries a sentence of less than 2 years, or within 1 year if the crime
carries a longer sentence. These periods can be extended if the parties
agree. In practice, judicial and police authorities frequently ignored
these time limits. Criminal defendants often were held with convicted
prisoners. Furthermore, many detainees reported that judicial officials
often solicited bribes in exchange for not pressing charges. Those able
to pay were released from custody. Corruption is rampant throughout the
system.
Judges often failed to sentence indigenous detainees within legally
mandated periods. In 1996 the CNDH reviewed 8,661 files of indigenous
persons who were detained and recommended the immediate release of
1,727 persons. Of those states withthe largest numbers of indigenous
prisoners, the CNDH reviewed 2,222 cases in Oaxaca, and recommended 407
releases, of which 296 had been accomplished by the end of 1998; 1,219
cases in Veracruz, with 331 recommendations for release and 245
releases; and 639 cases in Puebla, with 157 releases recommended, and
61 releases.
Federal prosecutors continued to adhere to the recommendation by
the National Indigenous Institute (INI) that they drop charges against
first-time offenders accused of drug cultivation, as drug traffickers
often forced indigenous defendants, who were not made aware of the
legal significance of their actions, to grow the crops. The INI also
supports programs to provide translators for indigenous defendants and
to assist them in obtaining bail bonds.
Some human rights groups claim that activists arrested in
connection with civil disobedience activities are in fact political
detainees. The Government asserts that the system fairly prosecutes
those charged in sometimes violent land invasions for common crimes,
such as homicide and damage to property.
The law does not permit forced exile, and it is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.-- The judiciary is generally
independent; however, on occasion it has been influenced by the
executive branch, particularly at the state level. Corruption,
inefficiency, and disregard of the law are major problems. The wealthy
and the powerful generally benefit from impunity. Judicial reforms have
begun to address some of these problems, but full resolution of these
problems awaits more extensive and systemic judicial reform. In
February and March, the Congress and the states passed constitutional
reforms designed to streamline the administration of justice and repeal
archaic laws. Human rights groups criticized these reforms, claiming
that they effectively allow prosecutors to disregard defendants'
allegations of violation of due process during criminal proceedings.
The federal court system consists of the Supreme Court, 91 circuit
courts of appeal, 49 courts of appeal, and 185 district courts.
Efforts to implement the 1995 judicial reforms continued. The
Federal Judicial Council strengthened administrative control over the
judiciary, investigated cases of corruption, and removed some corrupt
judges during the year. On January 4, the 11 Supreme Court ministers
elected reform-minded Genaro David Gongora Pimentel to lead the Supreme
Court.
In a report released in January, Human Rights Watch asserted that
judicial reforms have done little to improve the problems that plague
the justice system. The report states that the continued use of forced
confessions, illegal detentions, and fabrication of evidence is ignored
by judges and government officials, and that this undermines the
democratic process.
Based on the Napoleonic Code, the trial system consists of a series
of fact-gathering hearings at which the court receives documentary
evidence or testimony. Court officials may add notarized documents
(that are not authenticated) into the case file. A judge in chambers
reviews the case file and then issues a final, written ruling. The
record of the proceeding is not available to the general public; only
the parties have access to the official file, although by special
motion the victim may have access to it.
The Constitution provides for the right of the accused to attend
the hearings and challenge the evidence or testimony presented, and the
Government respects these rights in practice. In general, court
hearings are open to the public and it is common to find not only the
accused, but also relatives of the accused and journalists in the
courtroom.
While there is a constitutional right to an attorney at all stages
of criminal proceedings, in practice the authorities often do not
assure adequate representation for many poor defendants. Moreover, the
public defender system is not adequate to meet the demand, although
improvements in salaries and benefits began to ameliorate this
situation. Attorneys are not always available during the questioning of
defendants; in some instances a defense attorney may attempt to
represent several clients simultaneously by entering different rooms to
certify formally that he was present, although he did not actually
attend the full proceedings.
In the case of indigenous defendants, many of whom do not speak
Spanish, the situation is often worse. The courts do not routinely
furnish translators for them at all stages of criminal proceedings,
although this is their right by law, and thus defendants may be unaware
of the status of their case. The CNDH, through the Fourth General
Visitor's Office, has a program to assist incarcerated indigenous
defendants. In 1998 it reviewed 5,799 cases and obtained the release of
802 persons. The National Indigenous Institute has judicial assistance
programs for indigenous defendants and advocates on their behalf. The
INI also distributes educational and informational material in
indigenous languages.
A particularly egregious abuse of due process is the prosecution's
ability to use evidence gathered by means of torture. While torture
itself is a criminal act, judges routinely allow statements coerced
during torture to be used as evidence to convict the accused (see
Section 1.c.).
The law does not require civil trial of soldiers involved in civil
crimes, and the military continues to handle such cases. The
Constitution provides for military jurisdiction for crimes or offenses
involving any violation of military discipline. In cases in which a
member of the military commits a crime and is arrested by civil
authorities, the military has the right to request transfer immediately
of the case to military jurisdiction. Although the military retains
jurisdiction over its personnel, it has begun cooperating with the PGR
on investigations of counternarcotics cases involving soldiers and
sailors.
Calls for reform of the military justice system and criticism of it
increased. In January the Military Judicial Police arrested five
members of a military dissident group, the Patriotic Command for
Raising People's Awareness (CPCP), a group composed of military
personnel protesting what they called an unjust military justice
system. The authorities charged the five CPCP members with the crime of
sedition and later arrested the leader of the group, Hildegardo Bacilio
Gomez, who led a December 1998 public demonstration against the
military justice system. At year's end, the authorities held Bacilio
Gomez in jail but had not yet brought him to trial.
Amnesty International reported that Manuel Manriquez San Agustin,
allegedly a political prisoner, was released from a maximum security
prison in Guadalajara and absolved of a murder conviction on March 29
after the IACHR recommended his release. Manriquez, an Otomi Indian,
was accused of being a member of the EPR and was detained on murder
charges in 1990. His conviction was based on little evidence except his
confession, which was obtained under torture.
The only political prisoner is General Jose Francisco Gallardo, who
maintains that he was sentenced to 28 years' imprisonment for speaking
his mind on the advisability of having a military ombudsman (see
Section 4).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the rights to privacy,
family, home, and correspondence, and the law requires search warrants;
however, there were credible reports that unlawful searches without
warrants were common.
In November 1996, Congress passed the Federal Law Against Organized
Crime, which--among other innovations--allows for electronic
surveillance with a judicial order. The law prohibits electronic
surveillance in cases of electoral, civil, commercial, labor, or
administrative matters.
In March 1998, PRD Senator Layda Sansores asserted that the
Government was responsible for a wiretapping operation in Campeche
state. The Government denied involvement, and the PGR charged three
persons found at the scene with illegal wiretapping. The investigation
was still pending at the end of the year.
The Constitution states that all persons have the right to make
free, responsible, and informed decisions on the number of children
they choose to have. The 1984 General Health Law provides for criminal
action against those who pressure a woman to undergo sterilization
procedures or perform such procedures without the woman's consent.
Independent agencies believed that forced sterilization exceeded by
several times the number of known cases, but the overall scope of the
problem was difficult to quantify. Women may not realize that
procedures have beenperformed until after the fact, and many victims
are reluctant to file complaints, although there are mechanisms for
filing formal complaints with the National Medical Arbitration
Commission and with the national and state human rights commissions.
Nevertheless, there have been reports of possible violations of
informed consent standards in the state of Guerrero; these charges have
not been substantiated.
In 1997 state health services workers encouraged men to have
vasectomies in exchange for government social benefits. In May some of
those affected lodged complaints with the state human rights
commission. In December the commission issued a recommendation
confirming that the men who had undergone vasectomies were in fact
threatened with the withholding of benefits. The commission also found
that once the procedures had been performed, the men were not paid the
promised benefits. In previous years, NGO's have received similar
complaints that women had undergone tubal ligation procedures without
informed consent, sometimes under similar circumstances.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--There were numerous allegations of the use of
excessive force and the violation of international humanitarian law.
Incidents of conflict in Chiapas between the security forces and EZLN
sympathizers and in Guerrero between the army, the EPR, and the ERPI
led to many of these accusations. UNHCHR Robinson suggested in November
that the Government consider creating a military human rights ombudsman
to combat impunity in the armed forces. The military continued to
maintain a large presence throughout the state in response to the EZLN-
backed uprising that began in 1994.
The peace process in Chiapas between the Government and the EZLN
remained stalled, although in September the Government proposed a new
peace initiative to restart talks. At that time, the Government
proposed that the Senate take up its legislative initiative on
indigenous rights; invited the EZLN to return to dialog, possibly
through a mediator; suggested the creation of a new law enforcement
office to investigate human rights abuses committed by individuals or
armed civilian groups; and offered to release prisoners accused of
being EZLN sympathizers but not charged with violent crimes. The
initiative also proposed activation of the verification commission
under the 1996 San Andres Accords, called on the EZLN to permit to
social development of indigenous communities in Chiapas, and offered a
government negotiator with decisionmaking authority. The EZLN did not
accept the Government's offer.
In August a military force occupied the area surrounding the
village of Amador Hernandez to protect road construction crews,
increasing tension in the region. On August 25, the army and the EZLN
clashed near San Jose la Esperanza. A total of seven persons on both
sides were injured. This was the first clash between the army and the
EZLN since June 10, 1998.
There have been credible reports of violent incidents and murders
committed by armed civilian groups and local political factions in
Chiapas. The National Democratic Federation alleges that the group
Peace and Justice, which it described as a paramilitary group, was
responsible for the murders of 53 Zapatista sympathizers since 1995.
Another group alleged to have committed human rights abuses in Chiapas
is the Revolutionary Indigenous Movement against the Zapatistas. From
January 1998 through August 1999, the army confiscated 431 weapons from
civilians in the Chiapas zone of conflict. The Chiapas state Attorney
General's office claimed to have disbanded 39 gangs and confiscated 132
firearms within the same time period.
In the southern states of Oaxaca and Guerrero, there have been
attacks by the EPR, the EPRI, and other rebel groups on government
property. There have been numerous accusations in Guerrero that police
and army personnel have used excessive force during operations against
these groups.
On April 20, military forces, in response to an attack that injured
one soldier, occupied the municipality of Tlacoachistlahuaca, Guerrero.
Also on April 20, two local Mixtec men were reported missing, and two
female relatives (who were searching for them) alleged that they were
raped by soldiers stationed in the area. On May 8, the military
conceded that soldiers had killed the two farmers during an armed
confrontation but did not respond to the women's allegations of rape.
The state Attorney General's office, citing lack of evidence, declined
to pursue the allegations of rape.
On September 22, the EPRI was blamed for an attack on a military
convoy on a highway in the state of Guerrero, near the town of Ayutla
de los Libres, which injured two soldiers.
The human rights network All Rights for All contended that the
Government's response to the guerrilla presence in Guerrero has
resulted in an increase in reports of human rights violations.
Armed civilian groups, controlled by local political bosses loosely
affiliated with the PRI, were alleged to have committed many human
rights violations in Chiapas, including the Acteal massacre. NGO's,
such as the PRODH, the Fray Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center
in Chiapas, and the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of
Human Rights (CMDPDH), identified at least nine such groups. The NGO's,
and some press accounts, contended that these groups were not only the
private armies of local bosses, but also army surrogates armed by the
military and used to attack the EZLN. The Government denied these
allegations and likewise rejected the existence of paramilitary groups.
In December 1998, the Fray Bartolome de Las Casas center and the
PGR published conflicting reports on the Acteal massacre. The Fray
Bartolome report blamed the Government for sponsoring armed civilian
groups in Chiapas and for failing to protect the victims. The NGO
accused the Government of waging ``low-intensity warfare'' in Chiapas
and stated that the Government was responsible for the massacre. The
PGR attributed the massacre to a history of local confrontation, the
presence of the EZLN, an absence of the rule of law, and the neglect of
local enforcement officials.
The military continues to deny any responsibility for abuses
committed during the early stages of the Chiapas rebellion in 1994. The
military authorities who have jurisdiction failed to punish any
military personnel or government officials for committing abuses,
although the CNDH issued an interim report in May 1994 finding that
there was reason to believe that the military had injured or killed
civilians in aerial attacks and that there were summary executions,
illegal detentions, and instances of torture.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice. The mass media are not subject to
formal censorship by any element of the Government; however, there were
reports of some self-censorship. In addition, threats and attacks on
journalists--some reportedly by federal, state, or local authorities--
hindered press freedom. Nonetheless, the media were more free and more
independent than at any time in the country's history. Many observers
believe that drug trafficking organizations or corrupt security
personnel in the pay of such groups carry out most attacks on the
media.
The traditional cozy relationship between the Government and the
media that tilted coverage and editorial opinion in the Government's
favor has diminished but not disappeared entirely. The Government no
longer controls the import of newsprint but does retain control over
broadcast licensing, which critics claim led some broadcast media to
practice self-censorship. Accordingly, old habits of accommodation
lingered, and the editorial line of key news organizations maintained a
bias in favor of the Government. The persistence of official
influence--and its greatest concentration--was most apparent in
television. Instead of paying a 12.5 percent tax on advertising
revenues, television broadcasters provided free broadcast time to the
Government, which gave it convenient access to this powerful medium.
Official advertising in the media continues but disguising it as news
coverage is more common at the state than at the national level. Cash
and noncash payments to journalists persisted but were not as common as
they once were, and legislation to end this practice was enacted.
The many credible reports of attacks on journalists constituted the
most serious problem for press freedom. A report issued by 4 NGO's
recorded 240 attacks of various types against journalists during 1998,
compared with 187 during 1997. These numbers include all aggressive
acts against the media as reported in the media. According to the
report, government institutions (including federal, state, or local
police) or officials were responsible for 40 percent of the incidents.
The Manuel Buendia Foundation, one of the NGO's, concluded that thevast
majority of attacks were intended to intimidate. During the first 7
months of the year, the CNDH program on aggression against journalists
investigated 22 complaints of attacks on journalists; most were for
assault or intimidation. One, from July in the state of Morelos, was
for murder. The CNDH began an investigation of that case.
A report by the Committee for the Protection of Journalists of the
Mexican Academy of Human Rights selected five cases that, in its
judgment, are indicative of attacks on freedom of the press. Three of
the cases, all from the northern states, were closely related and
linked to narcotics trafficking. Two other cases took place in southern
states and were tied to political actors. In the first case, Benjamin
Flores Gonzalez, the editor of the local daily newspaper La Prensa in
San Luis Rio Colorado, Sonora was murdered in 1997 after publishing
stories about a local narcotics trafficker. This case highlighted the
continued impunity for the alleged murderer, who recently was released
from jail on unrelated charges. In the second case, Sergio Haro
Cordero, director of the Baja California weekly Sietedias began
receiving death threats in April after writing about the foregoing
case. In the third case, journalist Jesus Barraza Zavala of the weekly
Pulso in Sonora, again writing about the same case, received death
threats, and federal police officers reportedly attacked his state
police bodyguard in April and May (see Section 1.c.). In the other two
cases, public authorities and common criminals harassed Carlos R.
Menendez Navarrete, editor of the Diario de Yucutan newspaper in
Merida, Yucutan, and Luisa Veronica Danell Monter, correspondent for
the Para Empezar television program in Villahermosa, Tabasco, after
they reported negatively on local PRI politicians.
There was no information available about the PGJDF investigation of
the February 1998 killing of Luis Mario Garcia Rodriguez, a reporter
for the Mexico City daily newspaper La Tarde. Garcia was shot and
killed very close to a Mexico City police station, and witnesses stated
that the perpetrators were from the PGR. Garcia had reported on PGR
corruption and charged that PGR officials were collaborating with
notorious drug traffickers.
Television news independence has been enhanced by greater political
pluralism, generational change in media leadership, and growing
competition for advertisers and viewers, which continued to separate
government and media interests. Moreover, as much of the national media
developed higher journalistic standards and independence over the past
10 years, government influence declined. The media showed a high degree
of editorial independence, particularly in the capital and other major
urban centers. Direct criticism of the Government, especially in radio
and the print media, was severe and commonplace.
There was one complaint from a French journalist that the
authorities denied an entry visa without explanation.
The Constitution recognizes academic freedom in higher education,
and the Government respected this provision in practice. Beginning on
April 20, some students at the National Autonomous University of Mexico
(UNAM) occupied campus buildings and shut down the institution. The
strike began when the authorities announced an increase in tuition but
quickly evolved from a protest by some students into a more generalized
attack on the national political system. The university administration
made the tuition hike voluntary but had not met other striking
students' demands at year's end.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of assembly, and the Government respects this
right in practice. The only requirement for holding demonstrations is
that groups that wish to meet in public areas must inform local police
authorities in advance. Organized, peaceful demonstrations occur
frequently throughout the country.
The police showed restraint and generally avoided confrontation
with the UNAM student strikers, who conducted periodic marches through
the streets of Mexico City (see Section 2.a.).
On October 14, municipal police forcibly removed strikers who were
blocking a major thoroughfare in Mexico City. The authorities later
investigated two policemen for use of excessive force against prone
strikers after the media broadcast videotape showing the officers
beating and kicking several unresisting strikers. An internal police
investigation absolved the policemen, but city officials vowed to
impose administrative sanctions on the officers.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice. Political parties,
opposition, and independent associations functioned freely without
government interference or restriction. The Federal Electoral Code
recognizes national political parties as well as political
associations. Political associations can participate in elections
through an agreement with a political party but are not allowed to use
their names or symbols during the election campaigns. Political parties
do not have legal status until they receive their official designation
from the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). The IFE currently
recognizes 11 political parties and 31 political groups.
Citizens are free to associate and may form private or charitable
associations. However, in 1998 the Mexico City legislature passed a law
that gave the city government more influence over private charities.
The more than 8,000 NGO's active in the country are an important and
vocal part of civil society. The Government was accused of harassing
NGO's, especially in the state of Chiapas (see Section 4).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for the right to
practice the religion of one's choice, and the authorities generally
respect this right in practice; however, local officials sometimes
infringed on this right. In November 1998, the Government and
representatives of many religious denominations signed a Religious Code
of Conduct that reaffirms freedom of religion. The law bars clergy from
holding public office and from advocating partisan political views.
The authorities at times used immigration law to restrict the
activities of religious workers, particularly in the state of Chiapas
(see Section 2.d.). Some groups claim that it is government policy to
keep foreign religious practitioners out of Chiapas and Oaxaca. There
also have been incidents of violence between religious groups in
Chiapas (see Section 5).
The Government lifted almost all restrictions on the Catholic
Church in 1992. The Catholic Church and other religions maintain their
own schools. Nonetheless, the Church's ability to own and operate mass
media is limited, and it asserts that there are restrictions on the
running of schools and the raising and spending of funds.
To obtain legal status, religious organizations must register with
the Office of Religious Affairs in the Secretariat of Government. Since
1992 over 5,000 religious associations have been registered.
Relations were difficult between the Catholic diocese of San
Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas, and the Government. The Government
blamed Samuel Ruiz, the former Bishop of the diocese, for exacerbating
its problems with the EZLN and the international human rights community
(see Section 1.g.). The diocese complained that its lay catechists
constantly were threatened and harassed, and that foreign clergy
working for the diocese could not have their visa status clarified. In
May the IACHR declared that the June 1995 deportation of Catholic
priests Loren Riebe, Rodolfo Izal, and Jorge Baron was a violation of
their right to religious freedom and recommended that the Government
investigate and sanction officials involved in the case. The Government
criticized the IACHR's ruling as interference in internal affairs and
declared it invalid.
The non-Catholic Christian population was growing in Campeche,
Chiapas, Yucatan, and along the northern border. The Evangelical
Commission in Defense of Human Rights claimed that the authorities had
expelled 35,000 evangelicals from San Juan Chamula, Chiapas, in the
last 30 years. Traditional religion includes indigenous practices that
cause friction with Christian religions. Tribal chieftains or leaders
of the traditional, syncretist religions are the usual organizers of
the expulsions of evangelicals.
Municipal authorities expelled 70 evangelical Christians living in
San Juan Chamula in 1998, but state officials assisted their return
later that year. However, the children of evangelicals have been denied
access to the local public schools in six nearby communities since
1994. Societal harassment of, and pressures against, evangelical
Christians continued to be a problem (see Section 5).
On June 15, local police in Mitziton, Chiapas, arrested 13
evangelicals who were building a Protestant church. After intervention
by state authorities, the police released themafter 3 days; however,
the local authorities prevented them from completing construction of
the church.
In certain indigenous communities practicing traditional religion,
a long history of religious intolerance and expulsions exists. In these
communities, religious diversity is viewed as a threat to indigenous
culture. The Government failed to intervene to prevent local officials
from threatening, harassing, attacking, and expelling evangelical
representatives (see Section 5).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
of free movement, and the Government generally does not restrict
movement of its citizens into, out of, or within the country, except in
Chiapas where the Government attempts to keep persons away from EZLN
areas.
The army and federal immigration authorities maintain strict
checkpoints in parts of Chiapas. The focus of the checkpoints is the
verification of tourist activities by persons with tourist visas.
Church and human rights activists claim that the Government is
fostering an antiforeigner climate. In addition, church groups complain
about legal requirements that foreign religious workers must secure
government permission to visit the country for religious purposes and
that the Government limits the number of visas granted to each
religious group.
Corrupt police sometimes violated the rights of illegal immigrants.
Illegal immigrants rarely file charges in cases of crimes committed
against them, because the authorities generally deport immediately such
persons who come to their attention; any pending case brought by an
illegal immigrant is subject to dismissal because the person is no
longer present. There were several incidents on both the southern and
northern borders in which intending immigrants either were injured or
killed. One such incident occurred on March 17 near Mexicali, Baja
California, in which the Federal Fiscal Police allegedly beat four
persons. In May the authorities arrested two agents of the Fiscal
Police in connection with this incident; they remained in custody at
year's end. There were also credible reports that police, immigration,
and customs officials were involved in the trafficking of illegal
migrants (see Section 6.f.).
The law provides for protection of foreigners who face political
persecution. The Government accepts the principle of first asylum and
reviews each claim on a case-by-case basis with the assistance of the
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In June
UNHCR Sadako Ogata visited Mexico, signing agreements with the
government that strengthened protections for refugees. During her
visit, Ogata attended ceremonies regularizing the status of those
former Guatemalan refugees who chose to remain in Mexico.
The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. In conjunction with the UNHCR, the
Government completed a repatriation program for Guatemalan refugees
desiring to return home after having fled their country during the
civil war, which ended in 1996. During the course of this program, a
total of 42,641 persons returned to Guatemala and a further 22,144 were
granted immigrant residence status or Mexican nationality.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully through periodic elections. Since the party's
founding in 1929, the PRI has dominated politics, controlled the
Federal Government, and won every presidential election. The PRI has
maintained power, in part, through public patronage, use of government
and party resources, and electoral fraud. However, political change
continued to alter the nation's politics, and opposition parties
continued to gain strength nationally and locally. As a result of
electoral reforms approved and implemented in recent years, the
political and especially the electoral process have become more
transparent. While elections are open and generally fair, some abuses
continue to occur.
The legislature amended the Constitution to allow the eligible 9
million citizens resident overseas to vote in nationalelections;
however, owing to differences over the costs and requirements for
voting, the Senate failed to act on necessary implementing legislation
that would have made overseas voting possible for the 2000 election.
Presidents are elected every 6 years and cannot be reelected.
President Ernesto Zedillo chose to forgo the traditional process of
hand-picking his party's candidate for the presidential election in
2000. This decision was part of the democratic transition taking place
within the PRI. The three political parties that dominate national
politics--the PRI, PAN, and PRD--all announced that they would hold
some form of primary election to choose their presidential candidate
for the 2000 election; however, the PRD and the PAN had only one
entrant into their internal nomination process. On November 7, about 10
million persons voted in the contested primary held by the PRI. Of the
4 candidates, Francisco Labastida won by taking 272 of the 300
electoral districts.
As of September, in the Chamber of Deputies, the PRI holds 238
seats; the PAN 117; the PRD 124; the Labor Party (PT) 11; the Green
Ecologist Party (PVEM) 5, and there are 5 independents. The PRI holds
73 seats in the Senate; the PAN 31; the PRD 16; the PT one; and there
are 6 independents. Legislators can and do change their party
affiliation frequently.
On the state level, the PRI governs 21 states; the PAN 6; the PRD
1; and opposition coalitions govern in 3 states. On the municipal
level, opposition strength is well established. The PRD governs the
Federal District and the PAN governs 13 of the 20 largest metropolitan
areas.
In the February 7 elections in the state of Guerrero, the PRI
candidate was elected governor by a margin of 2 percent. The opposition
charged that the vote was tainted by fraud. As a result of legal
challenges filed by the PRD, the state electoral commission eventually
invalidated the votes cast in 18 of the more than 3,000 voting booths;
this action did not change the results. In the election in the state of
Mexico on July 4, also won by the PRI candidate for governor, a survey
reported in the Reforma newspaper indicated that one-third of voters
received a gift from the state PRI for their vote. These acts and other
irregularities caused the PAN and the PRD to file protests with the
state electoral board.
The Federal Electoral Institute, operating with full autonomy,
organized the federal elections for the Congress and in 1997 for the
mayor of Mexico City. (In subsequent elections, Mexico City is to have
its own electoral commission.) The IFE has implemented extensive
constitutional and legislative reforms passed in 1996 to help prevent
electoral fraud and to create more uniform conditions for political
party participation by regulating campaign finance, advertising, and
other areas. The IFE also has provided support to state electoral
institutes in running state and local elections and was instrumental in
overhauling electoral district boundaries to reflect demographic
shifts.
Although there are no legal impediments to their full
participation, women are underrepresented in government and politics.
However, the three largest political parties are attempting to increase
the number of women who run for elected office through formal and
informal means. They have utilized quotas requiring that a certain
percentage of candidates on a party list be female and in practice have
supported female candidates over equally qualified male candidates. The
PRD has set a 30 percent quota for female candidates; 22 percent of its
leadership is female, and it elected a female party president in July.
The PAN has used more informal methods, and 23 percent of its
leadership is female. PRI party rules mandate that a certain number of
spaces on the candidate lists be reserved for women, and 12 percent of
the party leadership, including its president, is female.
Women hold approximately 16 percent of the seats in the Congress.
There are two female cabinet members. The mayor of Mexico City is a
woman. No women serve as governors or justices on the Supreme Court.
Constitutional changes in 1996 expanded the rights of indigenous
people to elect representatives to national office according to
traditional ``usages and customs,'' rather than standard electoral law.
These traditional customs vary from village to village. In some
villages, women have neither the right to vote nor to hold office. In
others, they can vote but not hold office. Women were excluded
systematically from the political process by traditional ``usages and
customs'' in most of Oaxaca state andexpected to face the same
phenomenon in the state of Quintana Roo.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operate largely without
government restriction, investigating allegations of human rights
abuses and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government
officials generally have become more cooperative and responsive to NGO
views; however, the Government used vigorous enforcement of its
constitutional prohibition on foreigners engaging in political
activities to hinder the work of foreign human rights monitors, and it
restricted the activities of many human rights observers and religious
workers in the state of Chiapas.
After the December 1997 Acteal massacre, foreign concern over
Chiapas increased significantly, and many foreigners traveled to that
area, often on tourist visas, to learn first-hand about conditions
there. Members of human rights groups also made the journey, several
with tourist visas, to observe the human rights situation and donate
supplies. However, when individual foreign activists in Chiapas acted
in ways that the Government considered political and inconsistent with
their tourist status, the Government expelled them.
According to a report issued by the NGO Global Exchange, in
collaboration with the PRODH and the CMDPDH, the authorities expelled
144 human rights observers from the country in 1998. Most of these
expulsions were made under Article 33 of the Constitution, which allows
the President to expel foreigners whose presence is judged to be
``inconvenient.'' Human rights groups contended that the use of this
provision was unconstitutional, and the Government did not use that
article in 1999. Instead, the authorities issued a letter of departure
to those individuals deemed to be engaging in unauthorized political
activities in pursuit of human rights objectives, which required them
to leave the country upon the expiration of their visas.
On September 13, Thomas Hansen, former director of Pastors for
Peace, won a court order overturning his deportation from the state of
Chiapas in February 1998. The Government has refused his subsequent
requests for visas.
In May 1998, the National Migration Institute began requiring
persons who wished to enter the country to monitor the human rights
situation to go through a new application process. This application
process required, among other things, a 30-day advance application, a
10-day limit on visits, a limit of 10 visitors per NGO, a detailed
travel itinerary, and submission of an agenda. Domestic and foreign
NGO's objected to these new visa requirements. Human Rights Watch
argued that, taken together, the rules appeared designed to restrict
human rights monitoring and give the Government the right to decide
which human rights organizations were legitimate. While government
officials promised that the process would improve access for human
rights observers, the effect has been the opposite. Human rights
observers reported that the process is difficult, complex, rarely
results in visa issuance, and interferes significantly with their
ability to monitor human rights violations. Immigration officials have
used this new visa requirement to remove from the country religious
workers whom they judge to be engaging in human rights activities. They
also have used this procedure to restrict the activities of human
rights monitors.
The PRODH and human rights lawyer Digna Ochoa were victimized by
threats, harassment, and attacks. The most serious incident occurred on
October 28, when unknown assailants held Ochoa captive for 9 hours in
her home. According to Ochoa, her captors tied her to a chair, covered
her face, and interrogated her regarding guerrilla groups operating in
the country. Then, they left her bound next to an open canister of
propane gas, but she was able to free herself and escape. The PGJDF
investigated this incident and four other threats against the PRODH. In
August the PGR and the Secretariat of Government offered their
assistance in the investigation. In November the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights ordered the Government to provide protection to Ochoa
and members of the PRODH. The investigation continued at year's end,
and human rights NGO's began a dialog with federal officials regarding
the safety of human rights workers.
Credible NGO's reported that human rights workers in several states
received death threats while working on cases thatimplicated government
officials. For example, in Guerrero Abel Berrera of the Tlachinollan
Mountain Human Rights Center implicated members of the army in human
rights abuses and subsequently received death threats.
The National Human Rights Commission, established by the Government
in 1990, has steadily improved its credibility. In an important vote
that was expected to provide greater political autonomy to the CNDH,
the Senate approved legislation that allows it, rather than the
President, to appoint the commission's president. Some NGO's were
critical of the Senate's decision, fearing that it makes the CNDH more
susceptible to political pressure. Utilizing these powers for the first
time, in November the Senate replaced the sitting president of the CNDH
prior to the expiration of her term in office. The Senate named legal
scholar Jose Luis Soberanes to a 5-year term as CNDH president. This is
the first time since the creation of the CNDH that the executive branch
did not play a role in the selection process. Although most NGO's have
a favorable opinion of the CNDH, many are critical of its method of
presenting information, especially the reporting of compliance with
recommendations. NGO's also criticized the CNDH's reliance on former
government security or judicial personnel as investigators of human
rights abuse allegations.
In July the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions, Asma Jahangir, visited the country at the
Government's invitation. Jahangir suggested that the Government invite
international observers for the 2000 presidential elections. The IFE
invited international observers for the 1997 Congressional elections
and has invited them for the 2000 presidential elections. Jahangir had
not made any formal recommendations regarding her mandate at year's
end. The Foreign Relations Secretariat criticized Jahangir's public
comments that impunity would persist unless the Government undertook
legal and political reform, saying that she was ``completely
misinformed.''
In November Mary Robinson, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights, made a 6-day visit and met with President Zedillo, other
officials, and NGO representatives. Robinson signed a memorandum of
intent with the Government that provides for technical assistance and
further cooperation with the United Nations. She characterized the
human rights situation in the country as ``serious'' and highlighted
official impunity and poor administration of justice as areas of
particular concern. She told a press conference that the Zedillo
administration had demonstrated a commitment to improving the human
rights situation. During her trip she also visited Chiapas, where she
voiced concern about the size of the military presence, which she said
contributed to an environment of impunity and conflict. Government
officials expressed moderate criticism of Robinson's comments on
Chiapas, emphasizing that deployment of a military force to the region
was exclusively a sovereign decision.
The military jailed General Jose Francisco Gallardo Rodriguez in
1993 on a range of charges, including embezzlement and dishonoring the
military, but he maintained that military authorities were persecuting
him because he wrote an academic dissertation calling for the
establishment of a human rights ombudsman's office in the military.
Since 1996 the IACHR and Amnesty International had called for his
immediate release. In March and April 1998, two different military
tribunals convicted General Gallardo on charges of illegal enrichment
and diversion of funds and sentenced him to 28 years in prison. At
year's end, he remained in jail in the state of Mexico, where he gives
telephone interviews and receives regular visits from family members.
General Gallardo has not complained of any mistreatment while in
custody.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that men and women are equal before the
law. It also provides that education should avoid ``privileges of race,
religion, groups, sexes, or individuals.'' These provisions are not
enforced effectively, although the Government continues to make
progress in efforts to do so.
Amnesty International has reported that homosexual men and women
were likely to be victims of abuse and violence. The Citizen's
Commission against Homophobic Crimes reports that there are an average
of four murders committed due to sexual orientation per month, and the
consensus among gay rights groups is that the police fail to
investigate these crimes seriously.
Women.--The most pervasive violations of women's rights involve
domestic and sexual violence, which is both widespread and vastly
underreported. A rape is committed in Mexico City on average every 6
minutes. Victims report only 23 percent of rapes, and the courts
penalize only 23 percent of the men eventually charged with rape. The
Center for Attention to Intrafamily Violence expected to receive a
total of over 13,500 complaints of domestic violence during the year.
Women are reluctant to report abuse or file charges, and even when
notified, the police are reluctant to intervene in what society
considers to be a domestic matter. Police also are inexperienced in
these areas and unfamiliar with appropriate investigative technologies.
According to press accounts, reports of domestic violence in Jalisco
increased 86 percent in 1997.
The authorities began to implement and enforce the legislative
reform initiative on intrafamily violence Congress passed in December
1997. This law had three main objectives: to discourage and punish
intrafamily violence, establish protective measures for victims, and
educate the public. The legislation expanded the crime of rape to
include spousal rape, involving married or common-law couples.
Over 1 million women each year, according to the CMDPDH, seek
emergency medical treatment for injuries sustained because of domestic
violence, the fourth highest cause of death for women. Groups such as
the nongovernmental Center for Research and Care of Women are working
to educate both men and women in an effort to counter the widespread
view of domestic violence as a private act that is common (and
therefore tolerated) and to deter future violence.
Under certain circumstances limited to statutory rape of a minor
between the ages of 12 and 18, the Criminal Code provides that a judge
may dismiss the charges if the persons involved voluntarily marry. In
practice, this provision is invoked rarely.
In the case of the approximately 200 women murdered in the Ciudad
Juarez area since 1993 (see Section 1.b.), in 1998 the CNDH determined
that the Chihuahua state attorney general's office's inadequate
response to the murders had violated the human rights of the victims
and their families and recommended that the state attorney general and
the mayor of Ciudad Juarez be investigated for negligence. In the same
year, the authorities appointed a special prosecutor and hired foreign
experts in serial killings to advise investigators.
The Federal Criminal Code includes penalties for sexual harassment,
but victims must press charges. Many female victims were reluctant to
come forward, and cases were difficult to prove. Sexual harassment in
the workplace was considered widespread by NGO's and women's agencies.
Although the Constitution provides for equality between the sexes,
neither the authorities nor society in general respect this in
practice. The legal treatment of women's rights is uneven. Women have
the right to own property in their own names and to file for separation
and divorce. However, in some states a woman may not bring suit to
establish paternity and thereby obtain child support, unless the child
was a product of rape or cohabitation, the child resides with the
father, or there is written proof of paternity.
Within the CNDH, the Office of the First Inspector General is
devoted solely to protecting the rights of women. This office is
staffed by a variety of professionals, including lawyers, sociologists,
and doctors.
The Constitution and labor laws provide that women shall have the
same rights and obligations as men, and ``equal pay shall be given for
equal work performed in equal jobs, hours of work and conditions of
efficiency.'' However, women in the work force generally are paid less
and are concentrated in lower-paying occupations. According to an
academic study, even though girls and boys attend school at similar
rates, a woman on average needs 4 more years of education to earn the
same salary as a man in a comparable position.
Labor law includes extensive maternity protection, including 6
weeks' leave before and after childbirth and time off for breast
feeding in adequate and hygienic surroundings provided by the employer.
During pregnancy, employers are required to provide a woman full pay,
not to dismiss her, and to remove her from heavy or dangerous work or
exposure to toxic substances. In order to avoid these expensive
requirements, some employers, includingsome in the maquila industry,
reportedly deliberately violate these provisions by requiring pregnancy
tests in preemployment physicals, by regular examinations and inquiries
into women's reproductive status (including additional pregnancy
tests), by exposing pregnant women to difficult or hazardous conditions
to make them quit, or by dismissing them. A report released in 1999 by
Human Rights Watch indicated that the Government not only was aware of
such practices and failed to take action to punish or prevent them, but
also publicly made excuses for companies that violated the law. The
U.S. National Administrative Office (NAO), under terms of the North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), the labor side
agreements to the North American Free Trade Agreement, accepted a
challenge to these practices in the maquila industry and in January
1998 recommended ministerial consultations. As a result, the U.S. and
Mexican Secretaries of Labor participated in a conference in Merida,
Yucatan, in March on gender discrimination in employment. In addition,
the U.S. and Mexican NAO's organized cross-border outreach sessions in
August on the rights of women in the workplace in McAllen, Texas and
Reynosa, Tamaulipas. The conference and the outreach sessions concluded
that discrimination does exist, that it is not sanctioned by law, and
that the authorities have taken steps to inform women workers of their
rights to bring complaints against such practices by publishing and
distributing brochures and developing networks of government offices,
which together with NGO's work to raise awareness of the problem and
available remedies.
In order to protect women's labor rights, the Ministry of Labor
made 23,138 safety and hygiene inspections in private factories and
public institutions during 1996. However, while the Government
increased the number of federal inspectors during 1997 and negotiated
agreements with an increasing number of state governments to expand and
coordinate labor inspections better, the number of maquila plants far
outstrips what state and federal inspectors can monitor.
In 1995 the CNDH found that the largest number of complaints
against health care institutions involved negligence or abuse during
childbirth by medical personnel and charges of forced sterilization. It
said that the number of such complaints had grown, in large part due to
women's increased awareness of their rights.
There continued to be credible allegations of forced sterilization
(see Section 1.f.).
The National Women's Program (PRONAM) monitored the situation of
women, made recommendations to the Government regarding women's issues,
and worked with government agencies, international organizations, and
NGO's to support women's causes. PRONAM and the National Statistics
Institute compiled gender-specific statistics to ascertain more
accurately the status of women. The International Labor Organization
(ILO), the Secretariats of Labor and Foreign Relations, and PRONAM also
promoted the status of women in the workplace. In addition, PRONAM and
the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) initiated an advertising campaign
attacking social stereotypes and discrimination against women.
Children.--Children under the age of 15 make up 35 percent of the
population, and the median age of the population is 21. The Government
maintains several programs to promote child welfare that support
maternal and infant health, provide stipends for educating poor
children, subsidize food, and provide social workers; however, problems
in children's health and education remain. The CNDH receives numerous
complaints about the services provided by the Secretary of Health, the
Secretary of Education, and the Institute of Social Security. Although
9 years of education are compulsory, the director of the National
Education Council reported in August 1998 that 1.7 million school-age
children were not in school because their poverty obligated them to
work. In the same year, children from Jalisco visited the state
congress to protest the use of child labor in the streets after 9:00
p.m. The legal minimum age for employment is 14.
UNICEF classified the country as ``lacking adequate strategies'' to
combat malnutrition among children and reported that 30,000 children
die each year as a result. The problem of child labor is particularly
pronounced among migrant farming families, although programs recently
have been instituted to allow for portability of educational
credentials. There is a large population, estimated at 40,000, of
vulnerable street children in Mexico City. UNICEF and the National
Institute for Integral Development of the Family, in a study of working
children in the100 largest cities, estimated that 150,000 children work
in those cities. (NGO's maintain that the total is higher.) Street
children often become involved with alcohol, drugs, prostitution, petty
thievery, and increasingly, violent crimes. Corrupt police officials
sometimes exploit these children by pressuring them to commit petty
crimes and extorting money from them. The CNDH attempted to protect
children's rights by educating children on their rights and reviewing
legislation to ensure compliance with relevant international
conventions.
A report by the Center for Research and Advanced Study in Social
Anthropology counted 5,000 minors, 90 percent of them female, working
as prostitutes or subjects of pornography. In 1998 police in
Guadalajara broke up a child prostitution ring; they arrested 17 adults
and 12 girls on charges including corrupting minors and pandering. The
arrests spurred press investigations into juvenile crime, as well as
meetings with city officials and local NGO's.
The Government and various NGO's have programs directed at children
that address human rights issues. Generally, the purpose of these
programs is not only to protect the rights of children but also to
instill a generational respect for human rights through educational
programs. An example of this educational approach is the Tree House (La
Casa del Arbol), an interactive learning project sponsored by the Human
Rights Commission of Mexico City.
People with Disabilities.--Estimates of the number of disabled
persons ranged from 2 to 10 million. Disabled persons and their
specific disabilities are to be counted separately in the 2000 census
so that the Government can learn what services are most needed. In
Mexico City alone, 124 NGO's dealt with issues affecting the physically
disabled.
Twenty-seven of the 31 states have laws protecting the disabled.
The law requires access for the disabled to public facilities in Mexico
City but not elsewhere in the country. However, in practice most public
buildings and facilities do not comply with the law. The Federal
District also mandated access for physically disabled children to all
public and private schools. The Mexico City secretary of education,
health, and social development maintained that 78 percent of these
children received some schooling.
Mental Disability Rights International (MDRI), an NGO, discovered
mistreatment and violations of the rights of mentally disabled persons
within government mental health facilities. Visits to institutions
during 1996-99 revealed abuses including inhuman and degrading
treatment, misuse of physical restraints, and neglect that in some
cases led to deaths of patients. MDRI alleged that the process through
which persons are legally admitted to state institutions is conducted
without oversight by a judicial or independent body, which can lead to
a total loss of independent decisionmaking or consent to treatment by
patients.
Indigenous People.--The indigenous population, long subject to
discrimination, repression, and marginalization, is estimated at 11
million persons, of which 9 million live in extreme poverty. According
to the National Indigenous Plural Assembly for Autonomy (ANIPA), there
are 56 distinct indigenous groups, each with its own unique culture and
language. Indigenous people are located principally in central and
southern regions and represent a majority in the states of Oaxaca (53
percent) and Yucatan (52 percent). However, these groups remain largely
outside the political and economic mainstream, a result of longstanding
patterns of economic and social development. In many cases their
ability to participate in decisions affecting their lands, cultural
traditions, and allocation of natural resources is negligible.
The 1994 Chiapas uprising focused unprecedented attention on the
demands of that state's indigenous population for increased economic
and social rights. Among its basic demands, the EZLN called on the
Government to enact measures to protect indigenous cultures, provide
more opportunity for employment, and invest in schools, clinics, and
infrastructure projects. In the 1996 San Andres Accords, the Government
agreed with the EZLN on the need to expand indigenous rights. However,
these accords have not yet been codified. In the continuing dispute,
NGO's characterize the Government's heavy military presence in Chiapas
as threatening and intimidating the indigenous population (see Section
1.g.).
The Government, through the National Indigenous Institute, the
CNDH, and various NGO's, operates programs to educate indigenous groups
about their political and human rights. The Government generally
professes respect for their desire to retain elements of their
traditional culture. In 1998 the CNDH created the Office of the Fourth
Inspector General to review and investigate violations of indigenous
rights. More than 130 NGO's are dedicated to the promotion and
protection of indigenous rights.
Indigenous people do not live on autonomous reservations, although
some indigenous communities exercise considerable local control over
economic and social issues. In the state of Oaxaca, for example, 70
percent of the 570 municipalities are governed according to the
indigenous regimen of ``usages and customs,'' which may not follow
democratic norms in allowing for secret ballot, universal suffrage, and
political affiliation. These communities apply traditional practices to
resolve a variety of disputes, including allegations of crimes, and to
elect local officials. Quintana Roo's state legislature passed a
similar provision in 1998. While the laws allow communities in these
states to elect officials according to their traditions, these usages
and customs tend to exclude women from the political process (see
Section 3).
The law provides some protection for indigenous people, and the
Government provides indigenous communities support through social and
economic assistance programs, legal provisions and social welfare
programs. However, these were not sufficient to meet the needs of all
indigenous people. Although the overall population growth rate slowed
to less than 3 percent annually, the birthrate among marginalized
indigenous groups has not decreased. The General Education Act states
that ``teaching shall be promoted in the national language [i.e.,
Spanish] without prejudice to the protection and promotion of
indigenous languages.'' However, many indigenous persons speak only
their native languages. ANIPA statistics suggest that indigenous people
suffer from a high rate of illiteracy and a low rate of school
attendance. Non-Spanish speakers frequently are taken advantage of in
commercial transactions involving bilingual middlemen and have great
difficulty finding employment in Spanish-speaking areas.
Religious Minorities.--In the highlands of Chiapas and other
indigenous areas, traditional leaders sometimes acquiesced in, or
actually ordered, the expulsion, beatings, or killing of Protestants
belonging primarily to evangelical groups. Although religious
differences were often a prominent feature of such incidents in
Chiapas, other factors such as ethnic differences, land disputes, and
struggles over political power were very often at the root of the
problem.
On July 18, there was a violent confrontation between Catholic and
evangelical Protestant groups in the community of Icaluntic, Chiapas.
Two persons were injured by gunfire. Following this incident, local
authorities drove 91 members of the Organization of Evangelical Peoples
of the Chiapas Highlands from the community.
On December 3, 97 evangelical residents of the Chiapas community of
San Juan Chamula, who were expelled from their homes in July in a
religious conflict, returned to their homes. They were escorted by 250
state public security officers, 200 of whom remained in the community
to ensure their safety.
Progovernment supporters have accused the Catholic Church in the
three Chiapas dioceses of supporting the EZLN.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Federal
Labor Law (LFT) provide workers with the right to form and join trade
unions of their choice. About 25 percent of the total work force is
unionized, mostly in the formal sector, where about one-half the labor
force is employed.
No prior approval is needed to form unions, but they must register
with the Federal Labor Secretariat (STPS) or state labor boards (JLCA)
in order to function legally. Registration requirements are not
onerous. However, the STPS or the JLCA occasionally withheld or delayed
registration of unions hostile to government policies, influential
employers, or established unions. The STPS and the JLCA also registered
unions thatturned out to be run by extortionists or labor racketeers
falsely claiming to represent workers. To remedy this, STPS officials
required evidence that unions were genuine and representative before
registering them.
Human Rights Watch criticized the Government's system of labor
tribunals in a report released in December, claiming that the right to
freedom of association often was violated even when courts ruled in
favor of organizing workers. The report states that in the case of the
Democratic Union of Workers of the Ministry of the Environment, Natural
Resources, and Fishing the courts allowed workers to organize formally,
but government officials continued to interfere in such a way that the
union could not function effectively.
Like the Federal Labor Board (JFCA), the JLCA are tripartite.
Although trade union presence on the boards is usually a positive
feature, it sometimes led to unfair partiality in representation
disputes. For example, the board member from an established union may
work to dissuade a JLCA from recognizing a rival organization. Trade
union registration was the subject of followup activities pursuant to a
1995 agreement reached in ministerial consultations under the NAALC.
Unions form federations and confederations freely without
government approval. Most unions belong to such bodies. They, too, must
register to have legal status. The largest trade union central was the
Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), traditionally a part of the
labor sector of the ruling PRI, but affiliation is by individual
unions.
The Federal Employee Union Federation (FSTSE), the Revolutionary
Worker and Peasant Confederation, and most of the separate national
unions, smaller confederations, and federations in the Labor Congress
(CT) also were allied with the PRI. However, several unions do not ally
themselves with the PRI, including the large teachers' union, which
severed its PRI ties several years ago, freeing its minority factions
to cooperate openly with other parties, particularly the PRD. Rivalries
within and between PRI-allied centrals are strong. There also are a few
small labor federations and independent unions outside the CT not
allied with the PRI. One is the small, left-of-center Authentic Labor
Front (FAT). Most FAT members sympathize with the PRD, but the FAT is
independent and not formally tied to the PRD. In November 1997, 160
labor organizations representing workers in the private and public
sectors, led by the telephone workers and social security workers
unions, formed the National Union of Workers (UNT)--a labor central in
competition with the officially recognized CT. In April the Mexican
Electricians Union (SME) announced that it would withdraw from the CT
over its failure to give full support to the SME's opposition to the
Government's plan to privatize partially the electric power sector.
PRI-affiliated union officers traditionally helped select, ran as,
and campaigned for, PRI candidates in federal and state elections and
supported PRI government policies at crucial moments. This gave unions
considerable influence on government policies but limited their freedom
of action to defend member interests in other ways, particularly when
this might harm the Government or the PRI. The CT, especially the CTM,
is well represented in the PRI senatorial and congressional
delegations, although their numbers diminished somewhat after the 1997
elections.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts
(COE) has found that certain restrictions in federal employee labor
law, adopted at FSTSE request, violated ILO Convention 87 on freedom of
association, which the Government has ratified. These restrictions
allow only one union per jurisdiction, forbid union members from
quitting the union, and prohibit reelection of union officials. In 1998
the COE and the ILO Committee on Application of Standards reiterated
their criticism and asked the Government to amend the law. A 1996
Supreme Court decision invalidated similar restrictions in the laws of
two states, but the decision applied only in the specific instances
challenged. In May the Supreme Court extended this interpretation to
unions in federal government entities.
The Constitution and the LFT provide for the right to strike. The
law requires 6 to 10 days' advance strike notice, followed by brief
government mediation. If federal or state authorities rule a strike
``nonexistent'' or ``illicit,'' employees must remain at work, return
to work within 24 hours, or face dismissal. If they rule a strike
legal, the company or unit must shut down completely, management
officials may not enter the premises until the strike is over, and the
company may not hire replacements for striking workers. Provisions for
maintainingessential services are not onerous. The law also makes
filing a strike notice an effective, commonly used threat that protects
a failing company's assets from creditors and courts until an agreement
is reached on severance pay. Although few strikes actually occur,
informal stoppages are fairly common, but uncounted in statistics, and
seldom last long enough to be recognized or ruled out of order. The law
permits public sector strikes, but formal public sector strikes are
rare. Informal ones are more frequent.
During the first 11 months of the year, the JFCA reported that
6,080 strike notices were filed and 30 legal strikes occurred in
federal jurisdiction, 11 percent more notices and 9 percent fewer
strikes than in the same period in 1998. Federal labor authorities did
not stretch legal requirements to rule strikes nonexistent or illicit,
nor did they use delays to prevent damaging strikes and force
settlements. However, in 1998 strikers at the Han Young maquiladora
plant in Tijuana filed an ``amparo'' (a type of injunction) action in a
Federal District court challenging the ruling of the JLCA in Tijuana
that declared the strike, which began on May 22 of that year, to be
illegal. On May 3, the court recognized the striking union's right to
the collective bargaining contract and declared the 1998 strike to have
been legal. Acting quickly on that decision, the union put strike flags
at the plant, but the JLCA declared the new strike illegal because the
board had not yet been officially informed of the court's ruling nor
given time to act on that ruling.
On November 11, 1998, dissidents from the National Teachers Union
used violence to force their way into the Senate. The dissidents held a
number of senators hostage all night. That incident, although more
violent than other incidents, was part of an ongoing struggle for
control of the teachers' union. The Government released five leaders of
that forcible takeover from jail on bond on February 3, after 34 days'
detention, and reduced the charges against them.
The Constitution and the LFT protect labor organizations from
government interference in their internal affairs, including strike
decisions. However, this also can protect undemocratic or corrupt union
leaders. The law permits closed shop and exclusion clauses, allowing
union leaders to vet and veto new hires and to force dismissal of
anyone the union expels. Such clauses are common in collective
bargaining agreements.
Employer organizations slowed efforts to push for labor law reform
early in the year and entered into discussions with the Government, and
labor unions about reforming the LFT's rules of procedure. Government,
employers, and unions had negotiated reforms through tripartite
national agreements and collective bargaining at the enterprise level.
Reforms were effected also via cooperation in programs to increase, and
compensate for, productivity. Government, national labor unions, and
employer organizations met periodically throughout the year to discuss
ways and means of cooperation to boost productivity, wages, and
competitiveness.
Unions are free to affiliate with, and increasingly are interested
in actively participating in, trade union internationals.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution and the LFT provide for the right to organize and bargain
collectively. Interest by a few employees, or a union strike notice,
compels an employer either to recognize a union and negotiate with it
or to ask the federal or state labor board to hold a union recognition
election. LFT prounion provisions led some employers to seek out or
create independent ``white'' or company unions as an alternative to
mainstream national or local unions. Representation elections are
traditionally open, not secret. Traditionally, management and union
officials are present with the presiding labor board official when
workers openly declare their votes, one by one. Such open recounts are
prevailing practice but are not required by law or regulation. Secret
ballots are held when all parties agree.
Wage restraints no longer exist, except for those caused by
recession or an employer's difficult situation. Wages in most union
contracts appeared to keep pace with or ahead of inflation, but most
workers had not yet regained buying power lost over the past decade.
The country's record in internal union democracy and transparency
was mixed. Some unions were democratic, but corruption and strong-arm
tactics were common in others.
A disputed 1997 election for the right to the collective bargaining
contract for workers at a Korean-owned maquiladora in Tijuana, Baja
California continued to provoke controversy. Although the parties
reached a settlement in January 1998, allegations that plant management
violated health and safety regulations were considered in a public
hearing by the U.S. NAO that year. The dispute over union
representation at the plant continued, and in June the U.S. and Mexican
federal labor authorities reached agreement on steps to resolve this
dispute; as of late fall, the two sides still were discussing details
of how those steps were to be taken.
In another case involving freedom of association linked to the
right to organize unions, in December 1997, 9 unions and 24 human
rights NGO's jointly filed a submission with the U.S. NAO alleging that
a CTM-affiliated union used strong-arm tactics to intimidate workers so
that they would not vote in favor of a rival union to represent workers
at a plant in Mexico state. This submission also alleged violations of
health and safety regulations. The Canadian NAO also received a
submission on this case in the spring of 1998. The U.S. NAO issued a
report in July 1998 that recommended ministerial consultations. At
year's end, U.S., Mexican, and Canadian labor authorities continued to
discuss the issues raised in both submissions.
On November 10, the U.S. Association of Flight Attendants filed a
submission with the U.S. NAO alleging violations of worker rights to
freedom of association and to bargain collectively, protection of the
right to organize; minimum employment standards; and prevention of
occupational injuries and illnesses at Executive Air Transport, Inc.
(TAESA). The complaint focused on the voting process employed when the
Mexican Flight Attendants Union sought the right to represent flight
attendants employed by TAESA.
The public sector is almost totally organized. Industrial areas are
heavily organized. Even states with little industry have transport and
public employee unions, and rural peasant organizations are
omnipresent. The law protects workers from antiunion discrimination,
but enforcement is uneven in the few states with low unionization.
Unionization and wage levels in the in-bond export sector vary by
area and sophistication of the manufacturing process. Wages have been
lower and job creation has been greater in this sector than in more
traditional manufacturing, but the gap continues to narrow. Wages in
the maquiladora sector are still lower than in the traditional
manufacturing sector, although they are approaching manufacturing
sector level. Some observers allege poor working conditions, inadequate
wages, and employer and government efforts to discourage unionization
in this sector. There is no evidence that the Federal Government
opposes unionization of the plants (the maquiladora sector tends to be
under state jurisdiction), but some state and local governments in the
west are said to help employers discourage unions, especially
independent ones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor, which includes forced and bonded labor by
children. There have been no credible reports of forced labor for many
years, with the exception of abuses of refugees and illegal immigrants
in Chiapas (see Section 2.d.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution prohibits children under 12 years of age
from working. The law sets the minimum legal work age at 14 years.
Those between the ages of 14 and 15 may work only limited hours, with
no night or hazardous work, which generally makes hiring them
uneconomical. Enforcement was reasonably good at large and medium-sized
companies, especially in export industries and those under federal
jurisdiction. Enforcement was inadequate at many small companies and in
agriculture and construction. It was nearly absent in the informal
sector, despite government efforts.
The ILO reported that 18 percent of children 12 to 14 years of age
work, often for parents or relatives. Most child labor is in the
informal sector (including myriad underage street vendors), family-
owned workshops, or agriculture and ruralareas. Mexico City's central
market employs approximately 11,000 minors between the ages of 7 and
18, who work as cart-pushers, kitchen help, and vendors. The children
do not receive a fixed wage, and most work long shifts, starting in the
early morning hours. The CTM agricultural union's success years earlier
in obtaining free transport for migrant seasonal workers from southern
states to fields in the north inadvertently led to a significant
increase in child labor. The union and employers were unable to
convince indigenous farm workers to leave their families at home, and
many have settled near work sites in the north. The union has had some
limited success in negotiating with employers to finance education in
Spanish and indigenous languages near work sites and in obtaining
social security child care centers, but it has had difficulty in
persuading member families not to bring their children into the fields.
Many urban child workers are migrants from rural areas, are illiterate,
and have parents who are unemployed. The law bans child labor,
including forced or bonded labor (see Section 6.c.).
The Federal Government increased the number of obligatory school
years from 6 to 9 in 1992 and made parents legally liable for their
children's attendance, as part of a reform to upgrade labor force
skills and long-term efforts to continue increasing educational
opportunities for and participation by youth. Scholarships offered to
families of the abject poor under the Government's ``Progresa''
antipoverty program kept an additional 100,000 children in school in
1999.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution and the LFT
provide for a daily minimum wage. The tripartite National Minimum Wage
Commission (government, labor, and employers) usually sets minimum wage
rates each December, effective January 1, but any of the three parties
can ask that the commission reconvene during the year to consider a
changed situation. In December the wage commission adopted a 10 percent
increase effective January 1, 2000, based in part on the Government's
projection of a 10 percent annual inflation rate for 2000. For the
first time, all labor representatives on the commission abstained from
the vote in protest, and also for the first time, the Government stood
firm on its original offer. During the course of the year, wage and
benefit adjustments to collective bargaining contracts averaged about
15 to 16 percent, which was several points above the final inflation
rate of 12.32 percent for the year.
In Acapulco, Mexico City and nearby industrial areas, southeast
Veracruz state's refining and petrochemical zone, and most border
areas, the minimum daily wage was set at $3.99 (37.90 pesos). However,
employers actually paid $4.55 because of a supplemental 14 percent
subsidy. These income supplements to the minimum wage, agreed to in
annual tripartite pacts, are for all incomes less than four times the
minimum wage, decreasing as wages and benefits rise. In Guadalajara,
Monterrey, and other advanced industrialized areas, the minimum daily
wage (before the subsidy) was $3.70 (35.10 pesos). In other areas, it
was $3.44 (32.70 pesos). There are higher minimums for some
occupations, such as building trades.
The minimum wage does not provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family. Few workers (about 16 percent) earn only the minimum
wage. Industrial workers average three to four times the minimum wage,
earning more at bigger, more advanced, and prosperous enterprises.
The law and contract arrangements provide workers with extensive
additional benefits. Legally required benefits include free social
security medical treatment and pensions, individual worker housing and
retirement accounts, substantial Christmas bonuses, paid vacations, and
profit-sharing. Employer costs for these benefits add from about 27
percent of payroll at marginal enterprises to over 100 percent at major
firms with good union contracts. In addition, employers frequently
subsidize the cost of meals, transportation, and day care for children,
and pay bonuses for punctuality and productivity.
The LFT sets six 8-hour days as the legal workweek, but with pay
for 56 hours. For most industrial workers, especially under union
contract, the true workweek is 42 hours, although they are paid for 7
full 8-hour days. This is one reason why unions jealously defend the
legal ban on hourly wages. Workers asked to exceed 3 hours of overtime
per day or required to work overtime on 3 consecutive days must be paid
triple the normal wage.
The Federal Government established 11 special labor arbitration and
conciliation boards (in Queretaro, Pachuca, Ciudad delCarmen,
Zacatecas, Orizaba, Ciudad Juarez, Cancun, Colima, La Paz, Reynosa, and
Tijuana) in 1997 and four more state offices of the STPS in 1998 to
make it more convenient for workers to file complaints and bring other
actions before the labor court system. In addition, the Labor Secretary
transferred more personnel to the JFCA to reduce backlogs. He also
highlighted as special issues child labor, women in the workplace, and
the physically disabled by assigning responsibility for them directly
to one of the under secretaries. In February the Labor Secretariat
established a separate office for equality and gender issues.
The law requires employers to observe occupational safety and
health regulations, issued jointly by the STPS and the Social Security
Institute (IMSS), and to pay contributions that vary according to their
workplace safety and health experience ratings. LFT-mandated joint
management and labor committees set standards and are responsible for
workplace enforcement in plants and offices. These committees meet at
least monthly to consider workplace needs and file copies of their
minutes with federal labor inspectors. In 1998 the STPS completed
signing agreements with all of the state labor authorities and
implemented new regulations on inspections, which provided for
information exchanges and federal training of state inspectors.
STPS and IMSS officials report that compliance is reasonably good
at most large companies. Federal inspectors are stretched too thin for
effective enforcement if companies do not comply voluntarily and
fulfill their legal obligation to train workers in occupational health
and safety matters. There are special problems in construction, where
unskilled, untrained, poorly educated, transient labor is common,
especially at many small sites and companies. Many unions, particularly
in construction, are not organized effectively to provide training, to
encourage members to work safely and healthily, to participate in the
joint committees, or to insist on their rights.
Individual employees or unions also may complain directly to
inspectors or safety and health officials. Workers may remove
themselves from hazardous situations without jeopardizing their
employment. Plaintiffs may bring complaints before the federal labor
board at no cost to themselves.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Available information does not suggest
that trafficking of persons in or to the country is a significant
problem. However, there have been isolated cases of organized
trafficking of persons for the purpose of forced prostitution or sexual
services, domestic servitude, forced or bonded sweatshop labor, or
other debt bondage. Mexico is used as a transit country for the
trafficking of persons, especially from China, to the United States and
Canada. The Government has significantly strengthened its cooperation
with China, the United States, and other countries to address this
problem. However, there were credible reports that police, immigration,
and customs officials were involved in the trafficking of such persons
(see Section 2.d.). There have been no reports of foreigners being
trafficked to the country for the purpose of performing forced labor
within its borders.
There are no specific laws that prohibit the trafficking of
persons; however, immigration laws, the federal organized crime law,
and federal and state penal codes contain laws that are used to
prosecute traffickers of undocumented migrants, women, and children.
______
NICARAGUA
Nicaragua is a constitutional democracy, with a directly elected
president, vice president, and unicameral legislature. President
Arnoldo Aleman was elected in a free and fair election in 1996,
defeating his closest competitor, Daniel Ortega of the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN). The Supreme Electoral Council is an
independent fourth branch of government. The Constitution provides for
an independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is at times
susceptible to political influence.
The President is the supreme chief of the national defense and
security forces. President Aleman established the first-ever civilian
Defense Ministry upon his inauguration. The Ministry of Government
oversees the National Police, which is charged formally with internal
security. However, the police share this responsibility with the army
in rural areas. The civilian authorities generally maintained effective
control of the security forces. Some members of the security forces
committed human rights abuses.
Nicaragua is an extremely poor country, with an estimated per
capita gross domestic product of $454. The economy is predominantly
agricultural, dependent on sugar, beef, coffee, and seafood exports,
with some light manufacturing. In late 1998, Hurricane Mitch had a
devastating effect on the economic infrastructure, reducing the annual
growth rate for 1998 from a pre-hurricane estimate of 6 percent to 4
percent. Despite this setback, the economy grew 6.3 percent in 1999.
The inflation rate dropped to 11.5 percent from 18.5 percent in 1998.
The unemployment rate was estimated officially at 11 percent; however,
some nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) estimated the rate of
unemployment and underemployment combined at 40 to 50 percent. Private
foreign investment continued to increase; however, economic growth
continued to be hindered by unresolved property disputes and unclear
land titles stemming from massive confiscations by the Sandinista
government of the 1980's. The country continued to have a precarious
balance of payments position and remained heavily dependent on foreign
assistance, which also increased significantly in the wake of Hurricane
Mitch.
The Government generally respected many of its citizens' human
rights; however, serious problems remained in some areas. Members of
the security forces committed several extrajudicial killings, and
police continued to beat and otherwise abuse detainees. There were
allegations of torture by the authorities. Prison and police holding
cell conditions remain harsh, although prison conditions improved
slightly. Security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens,
although apparently less frequently than in the previous year. The
Government effectively punished some of those who committed abuses;
however, a degree of impunity persisted. Most of the human rights
abusers cited by the Tripartite Commission in well-documented reports
remain unpunished. The Government followed few of the Commission's
recommendations, and the political will to reopen these cases is
virtually nonexistent. In March the Government forced Colonel Lenin
Cerna, an egregious human rights abuser and former head of state
security under the Sandinistas, to retire from the army, along with
some of his top deputies; however, despite Cerna's admissions in
newspaper interviews that he committed abuses, the Government has not
prosecuted him. Lengthy pretrial detention and long delays in trials
remain problems, and the judiciary suffers from a large case backlog.
The judiciary also is subject at times to political influence and
corruption. The Supreme Court continued its structural reform program
for the judicial system. A new Judicial Organic Law, intended to
address many of these problems, came into effect in January; however,
the weak judiciary continued to hamper prosecution of human rights
abusers in some cases. In June the National Assembly elected Benjamin
Perez, President of the Assembly's Human Rights Commission, as the
country's first Human Rights Ombudsman. Discrimination against women is
a problem. Violence against women and children, including domestic
abuse and rape, remained a problem. Child prostitution increased.
Discrimination against indigenous people is a problem. Child labor also
remained a problem. There were some cases of trafficking for forced
labor and trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced
prostitution.
FSLN leaders continued to threaten, in speeches and public
statements, the use of violence for political ends.
The civil war formally concluded in June 1990 with the
demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN, or ``Contras'').
However, the rule of law and basic infrastructure do not extend to all
rural areas. Despite the Government's disarmament campaigns, many
citizens, especially in rural areas, are heavily armed. Marauding
criminal gangs, some of which claimedpolitical agendas, continued to be
a problem in the mountainous regions of the north, as well as on the
Atlantic Coast.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by government officials; however, there
were several reports of extrajudicial killings by police attempting to
arrest suspects, of suspects while in detention, and by army members in
rural areas.
During the year, the Inspector General's office (IG) of the
National Police reported 18 instances in which police officers killed
alleged criminals and 2 instances in which police seriously wounded
criminal suspects, while attempting to arrest them. The IG
automatically remands to the court system for review cases in which
police use deadly force; however, the cases often take considerable
time to process. Of the 20 cases that the IG remanded to the courts
during the year, 3 were adjudicated. In those cases, one officer was
found innocent of wrongdoing and released; one officer was discharged
dishonorably; and one voluntary police officer was found guilty of
homicide and received a prison sentence. Police Inspector General Eva
Sacasa has stated that the police themselves are often in great danger
when apprehending heavily armed members of criminal gangs.
On January 12, Hilario Briones Arostegui and Santos Arostegui
Torres, reportedly wanted by the police for multiple crimes, were
collecting discarded cans from a trash dump in Esteli when four police
officers in civilian clothes and two civilians identified as Pablo
Andino and ``Cesar'' approached them. The civilian known as Cesar shot
Briones repeatedly in the head, killing him. Arostegui attempted to
flee, but the four police officers prevented him from doing so. Cesar
then reportedly killed Arostegui in a manner similar to the killing of
Briones. According to the Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights
(ANPDH), the police could have arrested the unarmed suspects without
difficulty. Late in the year, the ANPDH filed a formal complaint in the
case with the police Internal Affairs Unit; action by the Internal
Affairs Unit was pending at year's end.
On February 14, in Puerto de Hierro, Matagalpa department,
voluntary police officer Juan Thomas Lopez Guerrero killed Juan Adolfo
Mejia Leon following an argument between Mejia and Lopez's brother
while they both were attending a baseball game. According to an
investigation by the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights (CENIDH), after
the argument, the Lopez brothers left the stadium and waited outside
for Mejia to leave; Juan Lopez then killed him. The CENIDH assisted the
victim's sister in filing a complaint with the District Court in
Matagalpa. On February 23, a District Court judge found Lopez guilty of
first degree homicide and sentenced him to 7 years' imprisonment.
However, according to the CENIDH, despite the judge's guilty verdict
and issuance of an arrest warrant, the authorities reportedly did not
take Lopez into custody to serve his sentence by year's end, and he
continued to serve as a voluntary police officer.
On February 23, in Belen, Boaco department, Martin Canales Suarez
was playing baseball with friends when army member Marcos Antonio
Chavarria arrived in a drunken state and shot Canales approximately 40
times with an assault rifle. The crime appeared to have roots in
personal animosity between the two men. Chavarria fled; however, the
case was remanded to the civilian courts, and in March a court tried
Chavarria in absentia, found him guilty of the murder, and sentenced
him to 30 years' imprisonment. In April the authorities took Chavarria
into custody; he was serving his sentence at year's end.
On April 20, Lieutenant Enrique Flores of the National Police
antiriot unit shot and killed Roberto Jose Gonzalez, a student
demonstrating in support of the ``6 Percent Rule'' (see Section 2.b.),
with a rubber bullet. On April 27, a police investigative panel
released a report indicating that Gonzalez was shot at a range of
approximately 3 meters. Correct police procedure calls for such bullets
to be fired from at least 20 to 30 meters. Police witnesses to the
incident said Flores acted in self-defense after Gonzalez pointed a
homemade mortar--a potentially lethal type of device, which had caused
Flores to lose an ear in a previous riot--at him. Student witnesses
disputed this account. The authorities remanded Flores's case to the
courts following the police investigation; in June a juryfound him
innocent of wrongdoing in Gonzalez's death and he was reinstated in the
police force.
On May 10, police killed Pedro Gonzalez Talavera near Villa Sandino
in Chontales department after Talavera had arrived in the area on
horseback to attend a local festival. A group of police officers
recognized Talavera, who was wanted for aggravated assault, and chased
him; six officers then shot at him with assault rifles. A subsequent
investigation indicated that a shot fired from a distance of about
1,000 feet knocked Talavera off his horse; police officer Donald de
Jesus Lanzas then allegedly approached Talavara as he lay on the
ground, kicked him, and shot him twice, killing him. The authorities
charged Lanzas and several other police officers with premeditated
homicide; however, despite evidence presented by the CENIDH in the
case, in June the presiding judge released the officers without
charges. At year's end, the case was pending in the Appellate Court of
Juigalpa.
On August 20, in the town of Jicaro, police shot brothers William
and Roger Chavarria Garcia, killing William and wounding Roger.
According to the CENIDH, the victims were wanted for cattle rustling;
however, according to the police IG's office and the ANPDH, the
incident began when the victims, who were inebriated and on horseback,
deliberately knocked over officer Juan Arguijo's motorcycle. There also
reportedly was personal animosity between William and voluntary police
officer Dimas Pasos Centeno, one of the officers involved in the
incident. In September a court convicted Pasos of William Chavarria's
murder and sentenced him to a prison term; the court found three other
officers innocent in the case.
On November 17 in La Libertad, Chontales department, police shot
and killed Armando Roberto Perez Ocana, who was wanted in Juigalpa on
robbery charges, after they arrived to expel a group of squatters at
the house where Perez was living. According to family members, after
four officers entered the house and found Perez lying down complaining
of stomach pain, Lieutenant Victor Galeano hit Perez with the butt of
his rifle. Moments later, Galeano shot Perez; Perez died of his wounds
on the way to a local medical facility. The police claimed that Galeano
shot Perez in self-defense; however, the CENIDH concluded after looking
into the case that the police account lacked credibility. In December
the Criminal Circuit Court of Juigalpa accepted the argument of self-
defense and opted not to pursue charges against Galeano or the other
officers involved in the incident.
In August Wilmer Antonio Gonzalez Rojas, age 16, committed suicide
in Modelo prison near Managua; a subsequent investigation indicated
that Gonzalez was subjected to abusive treatment by prison personnel
prior to his death (see Section 1.c.).
On December 24, 1998, police officer Nicasio Martin Jiron killed
14-year-old Everet Alexander Gonzalez Gaitan in the German Pomares
neighborhood of Managua. Jiron and other police officers reportedly
were attempting to apprehend an armed robbery suspect when a group of
neighborhood residents attempted to prevent the suspect's arrest; in
the ensuing clash between residents and police, Jiron shot Gonzalez. A
lower court released Jiron without charges, but in January an appellate
court found him guilty of involuntary homicide.
On December 25, 1998, Douglas Enrique Toruno was leaving the
Enamores discotheque in Condega when two soldiers in a state of severe
inebriation arrived and began firing automatic weapons indiscriminately
in the direction of Toruno and his friends. One of the bullets hit
Toruno in the back, and he died shortly thereafter. In February the
District Criminal Court found one of the soldiers, Sergeant Mario
Garcia Perez, guilty of murder and sentenced him to 7 years in prison.
The court absolved the second soldier, Francisco Bello Oporta, of
wrongdoing.
There were no further developments in the 1997 Wamblan case in
which 16-year-old Irma Lopez was killed, after allegedly being raped,
by an army patrol.
There were no further developments in the 1997 La Patriota case, in
which members of the army killed five members of a criminal band as
they slept.
There were no further developments in the case of former army
officer Frank Ibarra, who in 1993 was sentenced in absentia to 20
years' imprisonment for the November 1992 murder of Dr. Arges Sequeira
Mangas, president of the Association of Nicaraguan Confiscated Property
Owners. (The killing occurred when Ibarra was still a member of the
army.)
There were no further developments in cases cited by the Tripartite
Commission. The Commission, established by then-President Violeta
Chamorro in 1992 to address the issue of unresolved deaths of former
Contras and others, was composed of representatives from the
Government, the Catholic Church, and the OAS International Support and
Verification Commission (CIAV). It concluded its review in October 1996
and turned over 83 human rights cases involving 164 allegedly murdered
former combatants, as well as 181 specific recommendations, to the
Government for followup. However, only one soldier and five policemen
cited by the Commission ever served a partial or whole sentence.
In March the Government forced Colonel Lenin Cerna, an egregious
human rights abuser and former head of state security under the
Sandinistas, to retire from the army, along with some of his top
deputies; however, despite Cerna's admissions in newspaper interviews
that he committed abuses, the Government did not prosecute him.
In 1997 the Government negotiated the disbandment and disarmament
of over 1,200 members, a majority of them former Contras, of the
``Northern Front 3-80'' and promised them food, clothing, seeds, and
small plots of land. It also disarmed 423 members of the pro-Sandinista
``Andres Castro United Front'' (FUAC). Despite these successful
disarmaments, armed bands, including former members of the 3-80 front
and FUAC engaged in murder, kidnaping for ransom, and armed robbery in
the north and north-central regions. FUAC members have alleged that
they were acting in opposition to the Aleman administration, and FSLN
leaders have made positive reference to the FUAC activities in public
statements. Law enforcement groups and political analysts described the
political motivations as tenuous and stated that most of these actions
were purely criminal in nature.
In 1998 members of a Sandinista-affiliated agricultural cooperative
attacked a group of squatters at the Las Plazuelas Ranch in Chontales
department, leaving three persons dead and seven wounded. The ANPDH
alleged the involvement of voluntary police officers in the killings.
Although in December 1998, a jury found five voluntary police officers
innocent of murder charges in the case, IG Sacasa's office expelled
them from the police force. The ANPDH asserted that the authorities
failed to take any action against the persons who had planned the
attack. At year's end, the ranch remained in the hands of the
cooperative members allegedly responsible for the killings.
There were no new developments related to the February 1991 killing
of former Contra commander Enrique Bermudez.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law makes the use of torture a punishable crime;
however, there were credible reports that police beat or otherwise
physically mistreated detainees, often to obtain confessions. During
the year, the ANPDH received 70 complaints of torture or degrading
treatment by the authorities. The ANDPH and other human rights groups
forwarded complaints of human rights abuses directly to police
Inspector General Sacasa, who proved willing to prosecute abusers.
During the year, her office recorded 94 complaints of physical abuse by
police, including those submitted by the ANPDH, and found 26 to have
merit. The Inspector General sanctioned 51 officers in these cases.
While the Inspector General's office investigated allegations of
abuse and sanctioned the offenders in many cases, a degree of impunity
persisted. Inadequate budget support for the National Police also
hampered efforts to improve police performance and resulted in a
continuing shortage of officers. However, the police were provided with
some training during the year, much of it through international
assistance programs.
The Office of Civil Inspection for Professional Responsibility is
responsible for monitoring allegations of illegal detention and police
abuse and forwarding complaints received to the police Inspector
General for followup action. A small budget and a small staff limited
its effectiveness. Police Inspector General Sacasa received a total of
529 complaints of human rights abuses by police officers during the
year, including complaints forwarded by the Office of Civil Inspection
for Professional Responsibility, and found 155 of these cases tohave
merit. She sanctioned a total of 232 officers for violations of human
rights. Of those sanctioned, 11 officers were discharged dishonorably,
and 54 were remanded to the courts; the rest received lesser
punishments, including demotion, suspension and loss of pay.
In April a number of persons were injured in a series of violent
clashes between police and students demonstrating in support of
additional government funding for universities (see Sections 2.a. and
2.b.). During one of the demonstrations on April 9, police injured some
demonstrators when they shot rubber bullets at a group of protesters
after some protesters threw homemade grenades at police officers. There
were media reports that police beat a student whom they detained. After
conducting an investigation, the Chief of Police announced that six
police officers would be remanded to the courts on charges of
destruction of property (a sound system being used by students) and
using unnecessary force in dealing with students during the
demonstration. In May a court found the six officers innocent of the
charges. On April 20, when further student demonstrations took place,
the police killed one student (see Section 1.a.), and four police
officers and several students were wounded, in violent confrontations
between demonstrators and police. In addition, Luis Chavez, age 12, was
severely wounded by the explosion of a homemade grenade apparently left
behind by a demonstrator.
Prison conditions remained harsh, although they improved slightly.
The prison system is overcrowded and underfunded, with medical
attention virtually nonexistent. There was some improvement in prison
food, but malnutrition remained a widespread problem in local jails and
police holding cells. A series of uprisings at the Modelo Prison in
Tipitapa, just outside Managua, coincided with a change in the
leadership of the prison system. In February William Frech, the first
civilian prison director in more than 20 years, replaced the quasi-
military prison administration that had been in place since the 1980's.
Frech, a lawyer and a sociologist, attempted to provide more humane
treatment for prisoners, but soon faced the threat of a walkout by
prison guards after he fired the Modelo Prison director and three
deputies in May. The conflict was resolved on May 11 after high-level
mediation and concessions by both sides. After Frech's appointment,
prison conditions improved slightly due to the arrival of 1,200 donated
beds and to small improvements in medical care. In October Frech
resigned, and the Government appointed another civilian, Carlos
Quintana, to replace him. According to government statistics, prisons
had a total inmate population of 5,298 in September, down from 5,570 in
September 1998.
In August 16-year-old Wilmer Antonio Gonzalez Rojas committed
suicide in Modelo Prison. In letters he wrote before taking his life,
Gonzalez described severe beatings by a prison official called
``Rocky'' and solitary confinement in a small ``punishment cell'' for
months. At the time of his death, Gonzalez, who had served 15 months in
prison, believed that he had to serve another 21 months; he had not
been informed yet that his sentence had been reduced, requiring him to
serve only 3 more months before being released. Then-Director of
Prisons William Frech initiated an investigation into Gonzalez's death;
as a result of the investigation, the prison psychologist, the prison
official responsible for Gonzalez's transfer to a punishment cell, and
the prison guard known as Rocky all were fired. An additional six
prison officials were reprimanded and demoted. However, the authorities
did not file criminal charges against any of those involved.
Prison officials calculated that the daily expenditure per prisoner
for food was about $0.58 (7 cordobas) and reported that the annual
budget for food remained constant. However, food distribution improved
after Frech's appointment as Director of Prisons. Many prisoners also
received additional food from visiting family and friends. Medical care
available to prisoners fell far short of basic needs. Some prisons and
many police holding cells were dark, poorly ventilated, and unhygienic.
At the Bluefields jail, there were only 4 showers and 4 toilets for
more than 150 prisoners.
As of September, 4 percent of the prison population were between
the ages of 15 and 18, compared with 8.5 percent in 1998 and 10.4
percent in 1997. Youths generally are housed in separate prison wings
from those housing adults; however, at year's end, some prisons outside
the Managua area had not completed the process of establishing separate
facilities for juveniles or converting part of their existing prison
space into separate youth wings. In the Managua area, juveniles are
housed in the youth wing of the Modelo Prison. Only Managua has a
separate prison for women; outside the Managua area, women were housed
inseparate wings in prison facilities and were guarded by female
custodians. As of September, females made up 4.5 percent of the prison
population. The Public Defender's office assigned two full-time
employees to work with the women's prison system to help ensure its
proper functioning in such areas as timely release of inmates granted
parole.
Conditions in jails and holding cells also remained harsh. Police
station holding cells were severely overcrowded. Suspects often were
left in these cells during their trials, since budgetary shortfalls
often restricted the use of fuel for frequent transfers to distant
courtrooms. At the Corn Island jail, six cells holding six detainees
each frequently were filled to capacity. At the Bluefields jail, over
150 prisoners were crowded into 4 cells originally designed to hold 8
prisoners apiece. The authorities occasionally released detainees when
they no longer could feed them.
Several churches and national and international NGO's donate
foodstuffs, beds, and medicine to the prison system to help alleviate
shortfalls, which remain severe. The ANPDH worked with the Director of
Prisons in an effort to ensure that prisoners were released in a timely
fashion when their sentence had been served or they were granted parole
(see Section 1.e.). Prison guards received human rights training from
NGO's and the Catholic Church and generally treated prisoners well,
although there were some reports of abuses.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention by the police remains a problem, but apparently occurred less
frequently than in the previous year. The Police Functions Law requires
police to obtain a warrant prior to detaining a suspect and to notify
family members within 24 hours of the detainee's whereabouts.
Compliance with this law increased significantly in 1999, largely
because of pressure applied by the police internal affairs office and
support for compliance from Chief of Police Franco Montealegre.
Detainees do not have the right to an attorney until they have been
charged formally with a crime. Local human rights groups are critical
of the law for providing inadequate judicial oversight of police
arrests.
The 1995 constitutional reforms reduced from 72 to 48 hours the
time police may hold a suspect legally before they must bring the
person before a judge to decide if charges should be brought. The judge
must then either order the accused released or transferred to prison.
Although cumbersome, this law was more closely observed than in past
years, and few prisoners were held illegally beyond the 48-hour
deadline.
Lengthy pretrial detention remained a problem. It is estimated
that, contrary to law, as many as one-third of prisoners had been
jailed for 6 months or more without a trial. Some prisoners spend more
than a year in jail without a trial.
During the year, the ANPDH forwarded 113 complaints of illegal
detention to the police IG's office. That office deemed 13 complaints
to merit investigation. Of these, nine were determined to be without
merit and four remained under investigation at year's end. Some
complaints came to the IG's office directly, while others were made via
human rights organizations such as the ANPDH and the Permanent
Commission for Human Rights (CPDH). As in past years, incidents of
arbitrary detention were most common in Managua and in the rural
northern and north-central regions, where much of the civil war was
fought.
Exile is not practiced. There were no reports of political violence
against any citizens returning from civil war era self-imposed exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is susceptible at times
to political influence. The judiciary is hampered by arcane legal
codes, prosecutors who play a passive role, a hitherto nonexistent
public defender's office, judges and lawyers who often lack sufficient
training or education, and corruption. In the past, many judges were
not lawyers. Judges' political sympathies or acceptance of bribes
reportedly often influenced judicial actions and findings.
The judicial system comprises both civil and military courts. The
12-member Supreme Court is the system's highest court, and in addition
to administering the judicial system, is also responsible for
nominating all appellate and lower court judges. The Court is divided
into specialized chambers on administrative, criminal, constitutional,
and civil matters. Under the Law of the Child and Family, which took
effect in 1998, the Attorney General's office rather than the police
investigates crimes committed by and against juveniles. The 1994
Military Code requires the civilian court system to try members of the
military charged with common crimes.
A 5-year administration of justice reform program, begun in 1997,
continued during the year. A new Judicial Organic Law, passed by the
National Assembly in 1997 to overhaul the archaic structure of the
court system, finally was signed by President Aleman in 1998 and took
effect in January. The new law contains a provision establishing
minimum professional standards for judicial appointees. The Supreme
Court commission supervising the revision of the country's outdated
criminal codes and procedures continued its work, in coordination with
the National Assembly's Judicial Commission. Reform of these codes is
intended to reduce judicial delays and resulting excessive pretrial
detention. By year's end, the Assembly's Judicial Commission approved a
new draft Criminal Code, which was scheduled for consideration by the
full Assembly in 2000. At year's end, a special subcommission of the
Judicial Commission was reviewing a new draft Criminal Procedures Code.
A draft of an important reform of the Attorney General's office and
functions was made public in May and was under review by a special
commission of the Assembly at year's end.
All legal actions on property-related lawsuits in district courts
were suspended in December 1997 in anticipation of the establishment of
new mediation and arbitration services referred to as ``new property
courts'' (see Section 1.f.). By year's end, the delay in establishing
the new courts had deprived property claimants of due process in the
judicial system for 24 months.
Human rights and lawyers' groups complained about the delay of
justice, sometimes for years, caused by judicial inaction. Among the
steps the judiciary took to address such delays were an increase in the
number of courts, the creation of a Public Defender's office in
Managua, the designation of trained lawyers as judges, the creation of
an appeals court on the Atlantic Coast, and a separation of juvenile
courts from adult courts in Managua.
Judges appear susceptible to corruption. For example, in June the
president of Banco del Sur was accused of corruption and fled the
country. The National Police tracked him for several weeks; he
eventually turned himself over to the authorities, after which he came
to Managua to stand trial. Under suspicious circumstances, the judge
handling his case absolved him of all wrongdoing.
In an ongoing campaign to reduce incompetence and corruption in the
judiciary, the Supreme Court removed an additional 10 judges during the
first half of the year, bringing the total removed since the campaign
began in 1997 to 104--more than one-third of the 300 judges in the
system. The Judicial Inspector's office received 238 official
complaints against lawyers, judges and judicial functionaries in the
first half of the year.
Judges at times appeared to be susceptible to political influence.
On November 8, a criminal court judge handed down a ``provisional
sentence'' (similar to an indictment) against Controller General
Agustin Jarquin and two codefendants, journalist Danilo Lacayo and
Nestor Abaunza, a former employee of the Comptroller General's office,
for fraud against the State in connection with payments of official
funds Jarquin made to Lacayo with Abaunza's involvement (see Section
2.a.). The same day, Jarquin relinquished his position as Comptroller
General. However, contrary to normal practice, the judge did not issue
a warrant for the arrest or detention of Jarquin or his codefendants
prior to making her ruling. Following criticism by jurists and the
press of this departure from normal procedure, the judge issued a
warrant and police arrested Jarquin and his codefendants on November
10. Jarquin and his codefendants appealed the court's ruling, as
provided for in the law; in December an appeals court overturned the
provisional sentencing on the fraud charge; all three defendants were
released from custody and Jarquin resumed his position as Controller
General.
In criminal cases, the accused has the right to legal counsel, and
defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. The new Judicial
Organic Law provided for the establishment of a Public Defender's
office to represent indigent defendants. Atyear's end, the office was
operational in Managua and had 13 appointed public defenders; however,
more are needed. Elsewhere in the country where public defenders were
not available, the system in effect before the passage of the new law
continued in use. Under that system, the presiding judge appoints
attorneys from a standard list to represent indigent defendants, but,
because they are not paid by the State, many attorneys have paid a fine
of about $8.30 (100 cordobas) rather than represent such clients.
According to the ANPDH, despite difficulties in implementing fully
the provisions of the new law, the number of indigent defendants who
went to trial without an attorney to represent them decreased
significantly. Under the Napoleonic legal system, a trial does not
consist of a public hearing. Rather, there is a desk review by a
magistrate of the accused's file. An initial hearing usually is held
within the constitutionally mandated 10 days. Although very simple
cases or those with high profile or outside interest may be resolved
quickly, many languish for months. Due to a lack of administrative
coordination between judges and the penal system, many prisoners have
remained in prison after their scheduled release date. The ANPDH worked
with the Director of Prisons during the year in an effort to ensure
that prisoners were released in a timely manner after serving their
sentence or being granted parole.
Despite improvements to the criminal law system, the country still
lacks an effective civil law system. As a result, cases more properly
handled in a civil proceeding often are transmuted into criminal
proceedings. One party then effectively is blackmailed, being jailed
due to action by the party wielding greater influence with the judge.
In addition, this heavy civil-based criminal caseload claims attention
from an overburdened public prosecutor's office and diverts resources
that otherwise could be directed toward genuine criminal matters.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for protection against these
abuses, and the Government generally respected these provisions in
practice. The Constitution stipulates that all persons have the right
to privacy of their family and to the inviolability of their home,
correspondence, and communications; requires warrants for searches of
private homes; and excludes from legal proceedings illegally seized
letters, documents, and private papers.
In November 1997, the National Assembly passed a law intended to
resolve longstanding property disputes that stemmed from massive
confiscations by the Sandinista government in the 1980's. The law's
purpose is to implement President Aleman's 1996 campaign promise that
the poor would receive titles to properties received during Sandinista-
era land redistributions, and that wealthier beneficiaries either would
have to pay for such properties or return them. The law suspended
judicial actions on property claims until new property courts offering
mediation and arbitration procedures are established to expedite
settlement of property disputes. By year's end, the Supreme Court had
established the physical locations for the new courts and had begun
identifying personnel to train mediators and arbitrators; however, the
courts were not operational yet at year's end, and property claims,
some of which had been pending for over 2 years, remained suspended.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. However, freedom of the press is potentially
qualified by several constitutional provisions. The 1987 Constitution
stipulates that citizens have the right to ``accurate information,''
thereby providing an exception by which the freedom to publish
information that the Government deems inaccurate could be abridged.
Although the right to information cannot be subject to censorship,
there is retroactive liability established by law, defined as a
``social responsibility,''implying the potential for sanctions against
irresponsibility by the press. Although the legislature did not modify
these provisions in the 1995 constitutional reforms, the Government has
not invoked these provisions to suppress the media.
The Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) reported that during
the year, members of the pro-Sandinista Nicaraguan Journalists Union
and leaders and members of the Nicaraguan Journalists' Association
attempted to revive legislation to establish a professional
journalist's guild. Although in 1996 the National Assembly passed a
bill that would have established such a guild, the bill never was
signed into law. The journalistic community was divided sharply over
whether such a law would improve the quality of journalism or merely
restrict freedom of speech and of the press. The IAPA expressed concern
about any attempts to revive this proposal and also about the possible
effect on press freedom of a provision in the new draft Criminal Code
approved by the Judicial Commission of the National Assembly (see
Section 1.e.) that would increase the possible penalties for libel and
slander.
The privately owned print media, the broadcast media, and academic
circles freely and openly discussed diverse viewpoints in public
discourse without government interference. However, the IAPA reported
that the Government directed a disproportionate amount of total
government advertising in the print media to publications favorable to
the Government and denied to a newspaper critical of the government
certain tax benefits provided to other media businesses.
The news medium with the largest national audience is radio, but
polls show that television is the primary source of news in the cities.
There are 117 chartered radio stations in the country; listeners
receive a wide variety of political viewpoints, especially on the 67
stations based in Managua. There are seven Managua-based television
stations, six of which carry news programming, often with noticeable
partisan political content. In addition, there are 60 cable television
franchises that offer services in most large and medium-sized cities.
In March a presidential adviser publicly asserted that Controller
General Agustin Jarquin, a political rival of President Aleman who
previously had raised questions about the President's financial
holdings, had made payments from official funds to numerous political
allies and journalists through contracts for ``public relations
consulting.'' The next day, a major daily newspaper identified one of
the beneficiaries, who used a false identity to receive payments, as a
well-known journalist and host of a popular television interview
program. There were allegations that the payments were made in return
for media coverage favorable to Jarquin in his ongoing dispute with the
Aleman administration about alleged government corruption. Jarquin and
the journalist, Danilo Lacayo, both acknowledged the payments, but
claimed that Lacayo had provided unspecified investigative support in
return and denied that the purpose was to influence media coverage of
Jarquin. Following public disclosure of the payments, Lacayo resigned
from his television show. In November a judge in Managua charged
Jarquin, Lacayo, and a third individual with fraud against the State in
connection with the payments. The defendants appealed the judge's
finding; in December the appeals tribunal overturned the lower court's
ruling and dismissed the fraud charge (see Section 1.e.). However, the
tribunal did not rule out the possibility of further judicial action
against the defendants on lesser charges, including falsification of
documents, mismanagement of funds and use of a false name.
The IAPA reported that in June Mario Mariena Martinez, a reporter
for a major daily newspaper, was prevented from covering a presidential
news conference. The presidential communications secretariat issued a
statement that it suspended Mariena's credentials due to his improper
attitude. A presidential advisor stated that he asked the newspaper's
managing editor to assign another reporter to cover the President; the
newspaper subsequently published an editorial protesting the government
action regarding Mariena.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom. In April student
demonstrations organized by the FSLN to demand increased government
funding for universities under the so-called ``6 Percent Rule,'' a
Sandinista-supported constitutional provision that allocates funding
for universities at 6 percent of the national budget, led to violent
confrontations between police and university students, which resulted
in one death and several injuries (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 2.b.).
On May 5, the situation finally was defused when the National Assembly
reached a compromise agreement on university funding following
government talks with university and student representatives.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
recognizes the right to peaceful assembly without prior permission, and
the Government generally respects this right in practice. However, the
Constitution also recognizes the right to public assembly,
demonstration, and mobilization ``in conformity with the law,'' and the
law requires demonstrators to obtain permission for a rally or march by
registering its planned size and location with the police. The
authorities routinely granted such permission, but many groups chose
not to register because, they claimed, the process was too cumbersome.
In April there were violent confrontations between police and
university students during a series of student demonstrations (see
Section 2.a.). On April 9, several hundred students confronted police
outside the National Assembly building in Managua while the Assembly
was debating the budget. Some students threw homemade grenades at
police, who responded by shooting rubber bullets, wounding some
students (see Section 1.c.). In another demonstration on April 20, a
student was killed by a rubber bullet fired by a police officer as
antiriot police were attempting to dislodge a group of 80 to 100 masked
students who had taken over the Central Bank building (see Section
1.a.). Following this incident, a 12-year-old boy was maimed by the
explosion of a homemade grenade apparently left behind by a
demonstrator (see Section 1.c.). Later the same day, students and
others, apparently including youth gang members and older agitators,
attacked police headquarters in Managua with rocks and homemade
grenades and vandalized and looted the headquarters of the governing
Liberal Constitutionalist Party. Four police officers and several
students reportedly were injured in the incidents (see Section 1.c.).
On April 22, a large group of pro-Sandinista students tried to assault
Managua police headquarters with rocks and homemade explosive devices;
they withdrew after antiriot police responded with rubber bullets and
tear gas.
The Constitution provides for the right to organize or affiliate
with political parties, and the Government respects this right in
practice. Opposition and independent associations functioned freely
without government interference or restriction. Private associations do
not have legal status to conduct private fund raising or receive public
financial support until they receive this authorization from the
National Assembly, which it routinely confers.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
to travel and reside anywhere in the country and to enter and exit the
country freely, and the Government respects these rights in practice.
In December 1998, the Government abolished a requirement that citizens
and residents obtain an exit visa to leave the country. The right of
citizens to return to the country is not established in the
Constitution, but in practice the Government has not restricted
anyone's return.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The Constitution provides for asylum, and refugees
cannot be expelled to the country that persecuted them. The issue of
the provision of first asylum did not arise. There were no reports of
the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens exercised their right peacefully to change their
government in free and fair national elections in 1996 held under the
auspices of the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), an independent branch
of government. Over 90 percent of eligible voters registered, and 76
percent of eligible voters voted in 1996. Over 3,000 national and
international observers declared the elections free and fair, despite
some logistical and organizational problems.
The 1995 reforms to the 1987 Constitution established a more equal
distribution of power and authority among the four coequal branches of
government. The executive branch is headed by thePresident and a
cabinet appointed by the President, who is both head of state and head
of government, as well as supreme chief of the defense and security
forces. The Vice President has no constitutionally mandated duties or
powers. Both the President and Vice President are elected to 5-year
terms by direct popular vote, with the possibility of a runoff election
between the top two candidates if one does not obtain at least 45
percent of the vote on the first ballot. The Constitution does not
permit reelection of the President.
A single-chamber National Assembly exercises legislative power. In
October 1996, voters chose 93 members, including 20 deputies from
nationwide lists, 70 from lists presented in each of the 15 departments
and the 2 autonomous regions, and 3 defeated presidential candidates
who obtained a minimum percentage of the national vote. Members elected
concurrently with the President and Vice President in 1996 are to serve
5-year terms.
On December 10, the National Assembly voted to approve a package of
proposed constitutional amendments supported by the leadership of both
the governing Liberal Constitutionalist Party and the opposition FSLN.
The proposed amendments require a second favorable vote in the
subsequent National Assembly session, scheduled to begin in January
2000, in order to take effect. Key elements of the legislation include
a change in the requirements that a presidential candidate must meet to
avoid a second-round runoff election; expansion of the Supreme Court
from 12 to 16 judges; expansion of the CSE from 5 to 7 magistrates; an
automatic assembly seat for the outgoing President and Vice President;
a requirement for a two-thirds majority vote in the Assembly, rather
than the current ``qualified majority'' vote, to remove presidential
immunity from prosecution; and the replacement of the current single
Controller with a 5-person collegial body. The proposed amendments
provide for election of the President and the Vice President in the
first round of voting if one political party wins at least 40 percent
of the vote, or if one party wins at least 35 percent of the vote and
the party in second place is more than 5 percentage points behind the
front-runner. In addition, a party would lose its legal status if it
obtained less than 4 percent of the vote in a general election. The
latter provision, if enacted, is expected greatly to reduce the number
of parties eligible to field candidates in general elections; over 20
parties ran candidates in the 1996 elections.
There are no restrictions in law or practice against women,
indigenous groups, or other minorities voting or participating in
politics; however, they are underrepresented. Women served as President
and Vice President until January 1997, and a woman serves as president
of the CSE. Additionally, 3 of 12 Supreme Court justices are women;
women hold ministerial, vice ministerial, and other senior positions in
government; and voters elected 10 women to the National Assembly in
October 1996. Two members of the National Assembly claim indigenous
heritage.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
With the exception of some peace commissions, human rights groups
operated without government interference. Major organizations included
the Permanent Commission for Human Rights (CPDH), the Nicaraguan
Association for Human Rights (ANPDH), and the Nicaraguan Center for
Human Rights (CENIDH). During the year, the CENIDH demonstrated
increased independence from the FSLN by supporting Zoilamerica Narvaez
in a complaint that she filed with the IACHR against her stepfather--
FSLN leader, former President, and National Assembly Deputy Daniel
Ortega--for sexually abusing her (see Section 5). However, the CENIDH
maintained sufficient allegiance to the FSLN to limit the objectivity
and impact of much of its reporting. The ANPDH, the CENIDH, the CPDH,
and the Catholic Relief Services continued to conduct human rights
workshops at the police training academy, at various police
headquarters, and with army units throughout the country. Some military
officers received internationally sponsored human rights training.
In July 1997, a small successor organization to the OAS/CIAV, the
OAS Technical Cooperation Mission (TCM), opened at the request of the
Government and continues to operate. The TCM's presence was focused on
the 13 municipalities that were affected most adversely by the decade-
long civil war, where the TCM worked on conflict resolution,
reconciliation, improving local government, and extending legal
infrastructure.
The OAS/CIAV and Catholic Relief Services helped maintain more than
200 peace commissions in the northern and central parts ofthe country,
intended to give inhabitants of the area a means of dispute resolution,
a means of monitoring human rights abuses, and a vehicle for expressing
their concerns to government authorities. Many of the commissions
operate in areas that are without any governmental presence, and serve
as surrogates for absent police and courts. The Government granted
legal standing to additional such grassroots organizations during the
year. Some peace commission members initially reported that soldiers,
rural police, and local residents sometimes misunderstood their efforts
at advocacy on behalf of jailed criminals, interpreting them as
challenges to law enforcement officials' authority. However, during the
year, the commissions continued to report increased support from all
elements of the societies they serve, including law enforcement.
In 1995 the National Assembly passed a law creating a Human Rights
Ombudsman's office, with the Ombudsman to be elected by the Assembly.
In June, after a delay of nearly 5 years, the National Assembly elected
Benjamin Perez, formerly the head of the Assembly's Human Rights
Commission, as the country's first Ombudsman. The Assembly also elected
Julian Corrales as Deputy Ombudsman.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of birth,
nationality, political belief, race, gender, language, religion,
opinion, national origin, economic condition, or social condition. In
practice the Government made little or no effort to combat
discrimination. However, few, if any, discrimination suits or formal
complaints were filed with government officials.
Women.--The most prevalent violations of women's rights involved
domestic and sexual violence, which were widespread and under-reported.
The Nicaraguan Demography and Census office reported that in a 1998
poll of 13,600 women, more than 3,900 women stated that they had been
physically or sexually abused by their husbands or boyfriends; 1,400
stated that they were abused while pregnant, and 2,800 reported that
they had suffered severe physical abuse during the previous year.
The National Police confirmed local human rights groups' charges
that while police sometimes intervene to prevent injury in cases of
domestic violence, they rarely prosecute perpetrators because victims
often refuse to press charges. Those cases that actually reached the
courts usually resulted in a not guilty verdict due to judicial
inexperience with, and lack of legal training related to, proper
judicial handling of such violence.
The National Police reported 1,253 instances of rape during 1998,
up very slightly from 1,249 cases in 1997. Many women are reluctant to
report abuse or file charges due to social stigmas attached to victims
of rape. However, police stated that the apparent rise in rapes from
previous years is at least partially due to the increased willingness
of rape victims to report the crime.
On October 24, with the help of the CENIDH, Zoilamerica Narvaez
filed a complaint with the IACHR against her stepfather, FSLN leader,
National Assembly Deputy, and former President Daniel Ortega. Narvaez
asserted that Ortega sexually molested and harassed her from the time
she was 11 years old until she filed charges against him in 1997. The
case publicized the problems of incest, rape, and women's rights and
also highlighted the issue of immunity from prosecution for
parliamentary deputies. In 1998 Narvaez championed an effort to
persuade the National Assembly to withdraw Ortega's immunity so that
she could bring a lawsuit against him; however, the Assembly did not
take up the issue of Ortega's immunity by year's end. On November 8,
the IACHR officially opened a case in response to Narvaez's complaint
and advised the Government that it would be required to respond to the
charges. The Government did not do so by year's end.
The police manage 14 ``women's commissariats'' in 11 cities. Each
commissariat is located adjacent to a police station and is staffed by
six police officers, two social workers, one psychologist, and one
lawyer. The commissariats provide both social and legal help to women
and mediate spousal conflicts. The 1996 Law against Aggression against
Women reformed the Criminal Code to make domestic violence a crime and
to provide for up to 6 years' imprisonment for those found guilty of
such violence. The law also provided for the issuance of restraining
orders in cases in which women fear for their safety.
Prostitution is common, and there were credible reports that some
women were trafficked and forced into prostitution (see Sections 6.c.
and 6.f.). Modes of prostitution vary. In Managua most prostitutes work
on the streets or clandestinely in nightclubs. In towns along the Pan
American Highway, women and girls sell sexual services to truck drivers
and other travelers, often foreigners driving north from Costa Rica. In
port cities such as Corinto, the primary clientele are sailors. Corinto
is unusual in that prostitutes receive medical examinations and the
town provides those who are free of disease with cards certifying this.
In addition, prostitutes in Corinto reportedly often worked together to
maintain a rudimentary price-setting structure that enabled them to
earn much more than prostitutes generally earn in other areas. However,
in most areas, prostitutes do not have access to medical screening or
treatment.
Although the Constitution provides for equality between the sexes,
reports of discrimination against women are persistent and widely
believed. A 1998 poll on women and discrimination showed that 70
percent of women believe that they suffer from discrimination and
showed the most prevalent form of discrimination to be lower pay for
similar work. Women are well represented in the public sector, more so
than in the private sector, but women's groups claim that they are
losing ground in both. Women are underrepresented in management
positions in the private sector. Women constitute the majority of
workers in the traditionally low-paid education, textile, and health
service sectors. Women have equal or somewhat better access to
education than men, especially in urban areas. Primary school
enrollment rates for boys and girls are estimated at 73 and 75 percent,
respectively; secondary school enrollment rates are 39 and 47 percent.
Children.--Children 18 years of age and younger make up
approximately 53 percent of the population. Education is compulsory
through the sixth grade, but this provision is not enforced. The
Government expresses its commitment to children's human rights and
welfare publicly, but does not commit adequate funding levels for
children's programs or primary education. A constitutional provision
known as the ``6 Percent Rule'' automatically allots 6 percent of the
annual budget to a higher education consortium, often at the expense of
funding for primary and secondary education programs.
Children were increasingly involved in crime, both as victims and
as perpetrators. From January to July, 39 minors (younger than age 17)
died as a result of violent crime. During the same period, victims of
rape included 239 children under the age of 13, and 482 between the
ages of 13 and l7. Children, especially boys in street gangs,
contributed to an ongoing rise in the crime rate, which resulted in a
police crackdown on youth gangs in August that involved over 500
juvenile arrests.
As a result of the Child and Family Law, which took effect in late
1998, juvenile prisoners could no longer be held in adult facilities,
nor could they be held for more than 24 hours without being charged.
However, implementation of the new law proved problematic. In August
17-year-old Modesto Perez ambushed and killed his former employer,
National Assembly deputy Jose Cuadra, after Cuadra fired Perez. Public
outrage at the inability of the system to punish Perez effectively was
directed primarily at the new law, in particular the provision that
minors charged with crimes be prosecuted in new juvenile courts, where
the possible penalties for serious crimes are more limited than the
penalties that could be imposed on an adult convicted of the same
crime. In addition, by year's end the juvenile courts were operational
only in the Managua area; consequently, minors charged with crimes
elsewhere in the country often avoided prosecution entirely. The
National Assembly, the Catholic Church, and other organizations spoke
out in favor of reforming the law to allow prosecution as adults of
minors who commit serious crimes. At year's end, Perez was still in
custody and the investigation in his case was continuing.
In 1998 the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) reported that 65 percent
of children are literate, and that 20 percent of children between the
ages of 6 and 9 work. A study published in 1998 by the National
Commission Against Child Labor concluded that over 160,000 children
under 17 years of age work, including approximately 140,000 employed in
rural activities such as the annual harvests. Others are forced by
their parents to work in the streets of Managua as vendors or beggars
(see Section 6.d.). According to local media and the Ministry of the
Family, the incidence of child prostitution increased, especially in
Managuaand near borders with Honduras and Costa Rica. According to
press reports, UNICEF noted significant growth in prostitution among
children between the ages of 12 and 16 in towns where taxi drivers were
said to serve as middlemen. OAS personnel in the country also noted
growth in prostitution among girls as young as 10 years of age; in
rural areas, clientele are often truck drivers and other travelers,
including foreigners, who patronize prostitutes in towns along the Pan
American Highway. From December 1998 to May 1999, the Ministry of the
Family sponsored an investigation into child prostitution in five
municipalities. Of the more than 300 children surveyed, 82 percent
reported that they had started engaging in prostitution within the past
year, leading investigators to believe that the practice of child
prostitution is growing rapidly, particularly in border towns, port
cities, and the Managua area. Many of those surveyed said that they
engaged in prostitution to buy basic necessities such as food and
clothing, or to support a drug habit. There were cases of trafficking
in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution. In July the local
media reported the arrest in Guatemala of three Guatemalan citizens for
trafficking in girls and young women, including Nicaraguan citizens,
for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--The Government has not legislated or
otherwise mandated accessibility to buildings for the disabled. In 1998
the Ministry of Health created a National Council for Rehabilitation to
address the needs of the 559,000 citizens with some type of disability,
only 3 percent of whom receive medical treatment. Through its clinics
and hospitals, the Government provides care to war veterans and other
disabled persons, but the quality of care is generally poor. However,
with assistance from international NGO's, foreign governments, and the
public health care system, the Government has procured thousands of
prostheses and other medical equipment for veterans and former
resistance members.
Indigenous People.--Indigenous people constitute about 5 percent of
the country's population and live primarily in the Northern Autonomous
Atlantic Region (RAAN) and Southern Autonomous Atlantic Region (RAAS).
The RAAN and the RAAS, which were created in 1987 out of the former
department of Zelaya and which border the Caribbean Sea, constitute 47
percent of the national territory. Based on 1998 information from the
Center for Investigation and Documentation of the Atlantic Coast and
other sources, the four major identifiable tribes are the Miskito (with
approximately 100,000 members), the Sumo (10,000), the Garifuna
(3,000), and the Rama (1,000). In an effort to encourage indigenous
participation in Atlantic coast regional elections held in 1998, the
CSE distributed electoral and civic education materials in four
languages, including Miskito and Sumo.
The indigenous people of the RAAN, primarily the Miskito and the
Sumo, have a political organization known as Yatama, which has
representation in regional and municipal councils, and there is also an
armed faction of the same name. The extent to which the two groups are
linked is not clear. Like many armed groups operating since the end of
the civil war, the Yatama groups mix banditry with a genuine desire to
force the Government to devote more resources to their underdeveloped
region. However, two factors differentiate the armed groups in the RAAN
from those that have operated elsewhere in the country. First, most
participants in these groups are Amerindians who long have seen
themselves as having a separate culture. Second, drug trafficking and
drug money on the Atlantic coast have become far more pervasive than
elsewhere in the country. Total strength of Yatama armed groups was
estimated at 210 men.
In 1998 President Aleman signed a disarmament agreement with
representatives of the Yatama armed groups. In return, the Government
made a number of promises to the Miskitos including land to fighters
who turned in their arms, support for housing for Yatama-affiliated
families, agricultural credits, protection of traditional Amerindian
fishing rights, and resolution of long-standing disputes about the
boundaries of communal Miskito land. These provisions had not been
implemented fully by year's end.
The 1987 Autonomy Law requires the Government to consult indigenous
people regarding the exploitation of their areas' resources. Indigenous
people claim that the central Government often made decisions without
adequate community consultation. As in previous years, some indigenous
groups complained that central government authorities excluded the
indigenous people of the Atlantic coast from meaningful participation
in decisionsaffecting their lands, cultures, traditions, and the
allocation of natural resources. Government health care exists in the
Atlantic towns of Puerto Cabezas, Siuna, and Bluefields, but a majority
of indigenous people in rural areas has no access to modern health
care. Critics of government policy cited extremely high unemployment
rates, but calculation of reliable employment statistics was
complicated by the fact that most of the working indigenous population
on the Atlantic coast is engaged in subsistence fishing, farming, and
mining.
The Awas Tingni, an Amerindian tribe in the RAAN, sued the
Government in 1996, claiming that the Government's decision to award a
long-term lumber concession to a Korean firm on a portion of the land
it claims as its own was a violation of the American Convention on
Human Rights. In 1997 the Supreme Court declared the Government's
concession to the Korean firm unconstitutional. The case eventually
went before the IACHR, where it remains. In 1998 a court decree shut
down the Korean firm's operations on the land, but a domestic company
purchased the enterprise and reopened it not long afterward.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Most citizens are of mixed
background, and ethnicity is not a barrier to political or economic
success. However, various indigenous groups from both the RAAN and the
RAAS sometimes linked the Government's failure to expend resources in
support of the Atlantic coast population to the existence of ethnic,
racial, and religious (principally members of the Moravian church)
minorities that predominate in that region.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of workers to organize voluntarily in unions, and this right was
reaffirmed in the new Labor Code that entered into effect in 1996 and
replaced the antiquated 1944 code. All public and private sector
workers, except those in the military and the police, may form and join
unions of their own choosing, and they exercise this right extensively.
New unions must register with the Ministry of Labor and be granted
legal status before they may engage in collective bargaining. The new
code legally recognizes cooperatives, into which many transportation
and agricultural workers are organized. Less than half of the formal
sector work force, including agricultural workers, is unionized,
according to labor leaders. Union membership continued to fall during
the year. The unions are independent of the Government, although many
are affiliated with political parties.
The Constitution recognizes the right to strike. The Labor Code
requires a majority vote of all the workers in an enterprise to call a
strike. Workers may strike legally only after they have demonstrated
that they have just cause to strike and have exhausted other methods of
dispute resolution, including mediation by the Ministry of Labor and
compulsory arbitration.
The Labor Code prohibits retribution against strikers and union
leaders for legal strikes. However, this protection may be withdrawn in
the case of an illegal strike. Only two strikes have ever been declared
legal, one in the 1970's and another in 1990. At the beginning of May,
the national construction workers' union was about to begin a legal
strike after having spent 2 years following all the necessary measures.
However, a strike was avoided when the construction branch of the
Private Enterprise Council finally agreed to negotiate with the union.
On April 29, bus and taxi owners and employees went on strike to
protest the Government's tax on diesel fuel. There were a number of
violent incidents as strikers blocked streets, burned tires, shot off
homemade mortars, and damaged buses and taxis that continued to
operate. The police initially avoided confrontations with the strikers,
but on April 30 moved to remove strikers who were blocking traffic. The
strikers were joined in some areas by members of neighborhood street
gangs, who took advantage of the situation to engage in criminal
activity; in other areas, street gang members attacked strikers who
were blocking access to their neighborhood. In the course of the
protests, 2 persons were killed and at least 12 were injured. One of
those killed apparently was shot by a street gang member; the other was
a street gang member shot by an individual whose car the gang member
apparently was vandalizing. On May 4, the strike ended when the
Government and the strikers reached a settlement in which the
Government agreed to reduce diesel fuel prices, drop a proposal to
deregulate bus transit, and release detained strikers who faced charges
of ``minor crimes.''
The Labor Code provides protected status to union leaders,
requiring that companies receive permission from the Ministry of Labor
after having shown just cause in order to fire union executive board
members. Such protection is limited to nine individuals per union.
However, the Labor Code allows businesses to fire any employee,
including union organizers, provided the business pays the employee
double the normal severance pay. This practice is used routinely by
business leaders to stymie unionization attempts.
Unions freely form or join federations or confederations and
affiliate with and participate in international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution provides for the right to bargain collectively, and this
right was reaffirmed in the 1996 Labor Code. The Government generally
sought to foster resolution of pressing labor conflicts (usually in the
public sector) through informal negotiations rather than through formal
administrative or judicial processes. According to the reformed code,
companies engaged in disputes with employees must negotiate with the
employees' union if the employees have thus organized themselves.
There are 29 enterprises operating in the government-run export
processing zone (EPZ), employing approximately 18,000 workers. In
addition, there are five authorized private export processing zones,
four of which were operational at year's end; the 14 enterprises in
these zones employ some 2,400 workers. Approximately half the workers
in the government-run EPZ are represented by a union organization;
however, only about 10 percent of them are actual union members. While
some of these unions have real collective bargaining power, others are
primarily symbolic. In response to longstanding complaints by union
representatives that the Ministry of Labor did a poor job of enforcing
the Labor Code in the EPZ's, the Ministry opened an office in the
Managua free trade zone in 1997 to ensure that the code was being
enforced. EPZ officials claim that, due to memories of the corrupt and
ineffective unions of the 1980's, many workers in the EPZ enterprises
simply have no interest in unionizing. They also claim that wages and
working conditions in EPZ enterprises are better than the national
average.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor; however, it does not specifically
address forced or bonded labor by children, and such practices occur.
The Ministry of Labor reported that some child mendicants were forced
to beg by their parents, and that some were ``rented'' by their parents
to organizers of child beggars (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). There were
cases of trafficking in persons for forced labor, and trafficking in
women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section
6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution prohibits child labor that can affect
normal childhood development or interfere with the obligatory school
year. The 1996 Labor Code raised the age at which children may begin
working with parental permission from 12 to 14 years. Parental
permission to work also is required for 15- and 16-year-olds. The law
limits the workday for such children to 6 hours and prohibits night
work. However, because of the economic needs of many families, a
cultural legacy of child work among peasants, and lack of effective
government enforcement mechanisms, child labor rules rarely are
enforced except in the small formal sector of the economy.
A study published in 1998 by the National Commission against Child
Labor concluded that over 160,000 children under 17 years of age work,
140,000 of them in rural activities, including the annual harvest of
crops such as coffee, cotton, bananas, tobacco, and rice. Most of the
children working in rural areas are age 14 or younger. In Managua 4,000
to 5,000 children work on city streets, selling merchandise, cleaning
automobile windows, or begging. The Labor Ministry reported that many
child mendicants are forced to beg by their parents, and that many are
``rented'' by their parents to organizers of child beggars. Children
age 10 or older often worked for less than $1.00 per day on the same
banana and coffee plantations as their parents. The Constitution
prohibits forced and bonded labor, but does not specifically prohibit
forced or bonded labor by children (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is set through
tripartite (business, government, and labor) negotiations, and must be
approved by the Legislative Assembly. A new minimum wage scale took
effect in August. Minimum wages vary by sector. For example, monthly
rates that went into effect on August 1 included: Agriculture, $37.50
(450 cordobas plus food); fisheries, $58 (700 cordobas); mining, $71
(850 cordobas); industrial manufacture, $50 (600 cordobas); electric,
gas and water utilities, $75 (900 cordobas); construction, $100 (1,200
cordobas); restaurants and hotels, $75 (900 cordobas); transportation,
$75 (900 cordobas); banking, $83 (1,000 cordobas); community and social
services, $58 (700 cordobas), central and municipal government
(includes health and education employees), $46 (550 cordobas). The
minimum wage does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker
and family. It falls below the government estimate of what an urban
family must spend each month for a basic basket of goods ($133, or
1,600 cordobas). The majority of urban workers earn well above the
minimum rates.
The Labor Code incorporates the constitutionally mandated 8-hour
workday; the standard legal workweek is a maximum of 48 hours, with 1
day of rest weekly. The 1996 code established severance pay at from 1
to 5 months' duration, depending on the duration of employment and the
circumstances of firing. However, persons fired for cause may be denied
severance pay through a process that requires employers to demonstrate
proof of worker misconduct. The code also established an obligation of
an employer to provide housing to employees who are assigned
temporarily to areas beyond commuting distance.
The Labor Code seeks to bring the country into compliance with
international standards and norms of workplace hygiene and safety, but
the Ministry of Labor's Office of Hygiene and Occupational Security
lacks adequate staff and resources to enforce these provisions. The
code gives workers the right to remove themselves from dangerous
workplace situations without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons; however, the Government does not enforce the law adequately,
and there were some cases of trafficking in women and girls for the
purpose of forced prostitution. Effective enforcement of the law is
hampered by corruption, low salaries, and lack of technical skills
among Migration Office officials. The country is a major transit point
for alien trafficking (generally to the United States) from other
countries in the region and elsewhere, including China and the Middle
East; however, not all such trafficking is for the purpose of providing
forced labor or services. On occasions when Migration Office officials
detain alien traffickers, the judicial system often releases them. The
Government does not have special programs to provide assistance to
victims of trafficking.
The Labor Ministry reported that the parents of many child
mendicants ``rented'' their children to organizers of child beggars
(see Section 6.c.). In July the local media reported that Guatemalan
authorities arrested three Guatemalan citizens in Guatemala on charges
of white slavery. The Guatemalans allegedly actively recruited
Nicaraguan girls and young women, aged 15 to 21, ostensibly to work as
dancers and waitresses in clubs in Guatemala; however, upon arrival in
Guatemala, the victims were forced into prostitution. The extensive
high-profile media coverage of this scheme served as an educational
campaign, with newspapers and radio stations urging young women not to
fall victim to ``recruiters'' for foreign brothels.
____
PANAMA
Panama is a representative democracy with an elected executive
composed of a president and two vice presidents, an elected 71-member
legislature, and an appointed judiciary. In May voters elected
President Mireya Moscoso, who replaced former President Ernesto Perez
Balladares on September 1. Although the Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, the judicial system is subject to corruption and
political manipulation.
Panama has had no military forces since 1989. In 1990 the
Government created the Panamanian Public Forces, which consist of the
Panamanian National Police (PNP), the National Maritime Service (SMN),
the National Air Service (SAN), and the Institutional Protection
Service (SPI). In 1994 a constitutional amendment formally prohibited
the establishment of a permanent military, although it contains a
provision for the temporary formation of a ``special police force'' to
protect the borders in case of a ``threat of external aggression.'' The
Ministry of Government and Justice oversees the PNP, SMN, and SAN,
while the Ministry of the Presidency supervises the SPI. The PNP are
responsible for law enforcement. The Judicial Technical Police (PTJ)
perform criminal investigations in support of public prosecutors. The
PTJ is a semiautonomous body with leadership appointed by the Supreme
Court. Police forces respond to civilian authority, have civilian
directors, and have internal review procedures to deal with police
misconduct. There were reports of instances of abuse by some members of
the security forces.
The service-oriented economy uses the U.S. dollar as currency,
calling it the Balboa. Gross domestic product grew by 4.6 percent in
1998, but growth for 1999 was projected to be below 4 percent. The
Ministry of Economy and Finance expects modestly higher growth in 2000
as the effects of economic liberalization and the Panama Canal transfer
become evident. Poverty persists and income distribution remains
extremely skewed, with large disparities between rich and poor.
Unemployment is estimated at 13 percent.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there continued to be serious problems in several
areas. Police and prison guards on occasion used excessive force
against detainees and prisoners, and on occasion police used force
against protesters. Credible reports of corruption within both the PNP
and PTJ contributed to some police dismissals. Despite some modest
improvements, overall prison conditions remained harsh, with occasional
outbreaks of internal prison violence. Prisoners were subject to
arbitrary and prolonged pretrial detention. The judiciary was subject
to political manipulation, and the criminal justice system was
inefficient and often corrupt. The Government began implementation of a
$27 million program to reduce case backlogs, inefficiency, and
corruption in the judiciary. There were instances of illegal searches
and political pressure on the media. Violence against women remained a
serious problem, and discrimination against women persisted.
Discrimination against indigenous people and blacks is a problem. Child
labor also is a problem. Worker rights were limited in export
processing zones. Trafficking in persons, particularly Asian
immigrants, also was a problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
A Public Ministry investigation concluded in August 1998 that three
PNP guards accused of the March 1997 beating death of detainee Jose
Luis Alvarado at the Tinajitas prison should stand trial. The guards
remain separated from the PNP pending the outcome of the trial, but as
of year's end there had been no further action in this case.
There was no further action in the PNP investigation into the June
1997 shooting death of Ngobe-Bugle tribe member Juan Santos Chobra.
In September President Moscoso rescinded pardons granted by former
President Perez Balladares for 33 former civilian and military
collaborators of former ruler General Manuel Noriega, in order to allow
the Government to continue prosecutions of officials for abuses
committed during the dictatorship--from 1968 to 1989. One such official
reportedly was involved in theexecution of nine persons following a
failed coup attempt against Noriega in 1989.
In September the authorities discovered an unmarked grave
containing two bodies on the grounds of a former military base near
Panama City. One of the bodies was believed to be that of Hector
Gallego, a Colombian priest who disappeared in 1971 during the Torrijos
dictatorship. In 1992 after the return of civilian rule, three former
military officers were tried for his murder and given lengthy prison
sentences. There was also speculation that the other body was that of
Eber Quintanar, an accused guerrilla reportedly killed by the National
Guard in 1969. After several DNA tests, investigators determined that
the remains belonged to neither Gallego nor Quintanar. As of year's
end, the identity of the corpses was still unknown. During the
investigation, longstanding rumors of other gravesites scattered around
the country reemerged in the press. Investigators initiated excavations
at several sites but did not achieve any results by year's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
Guerrillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
reportedly kidnaped persons in the Darien region along the border with
Colombia. At year's end, they had abducted three persons and held them
for ransom; there were reports that the FARC harassed citizens and even
killed some persons, but there were no confirmed killings.
The Hector Gallego Committee for Disappeared Relatives maintains a
list of 120 people who disappeared during the military dictatorships of
1968-89.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the use of measures that could
harm the physical, mental, or moral integrity of prisoners or
detainees; however, while the public security forces generally
performed in a professional and restrained manner, there were some
reports of excessive use of force or inhuman punishment, particularly
against prison inmates. There also were reports that police used
physical violence and psychological threats to control detainees during
the initial arrest, interrogation, and holding phases.
The legislation providing the legal basis for the PNP, promulgated
in June 1997, includes specific guidelines for use of force, including
deadly force; requires that police officers respect human rights; and
prohibits instigation or tolerance of torture, cruelty, or other
inhuman or degrading behavior. However, there is no follow-on training
in the use of force provided to the PNP.
The PTJ and the PNP have offices of professional responsibility
that act as internal affairs organs to hold officers accountable for
their actions. Both have staffs of independent investigators as well as
administrative authority to open internal investigations. In both
organizations, a defined legal process is followed where, upon
completion of the process, the respective director has the final
authority to determine the disposition of each case. Penalties include
reduction in rank, dismissal, and in severe cases, criminal
prosecution. The PNP deputy director and secretary general address
human rights issues that arise in the police force.
Corruption among police officers remained a problem, but in some
cases, PNP and PTJ directors enforced disciplinary measures against
officers shown to be involved in illicit activities. However, both
organizations only react to egregious abuses, due to a lack of staff,
independence, and institutional priority. Credible reports of
corruption within both the PNP and PTJ contributed to some police
dismissals.
According to residents of the Pueblo Nuevo neighborhood, in March
police shot a minor who was lying on the ground in handcuffs. The
authorities placed a sergeant and three officers on administrative duty
while the PNP's Office of Professional Responsibility investigated, and
sent the case to the PNP's disciplinary committee. At year's end, the
investigation continued, and the officers remained on administrative
duty.
In April the Office of Professional Responsibility stated that it
was investigating 50 police officers for poor conduct, including the
use of excessive force and violations of citizens' human rights. In
addition to the Pueblo Nuevo shooting, theoffice sent the case of an
alleged police attack on two sisters in San Miguelito to the
Disciplinary Committee of the PNP.
There were several instances in which police responded with force
to demonstrations. For example, in February and in August the police
used tear gas and bird shot to disperse protesters (see Section 2.b.).
Police arrested and detained children for minor infractions during
neighborhood sweeps (see Section 5).
The FARC guerrillas and the paramilitary forces of the United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) share a long history of spillover of
violence from Colombia into the border area on the Darien peninsula,
including killings, kidnaping, robbery, and other forms of harassment
of innocent bystanders. In November the AUC reportedly forced the
evacuation of the San Blas town of La Bonga and burned it to the
ground.
Prison conditions throughout the country remained harsh and a
threat to prisoners' health and safety. Most prisons are dilapidated
and overcrowded. Medical screening and care is inadequate, with
tuberculosis and other communicable diseases common among the prison
population. Frequent gang battles injured or killed numerous inmates.
Many of the problems within the prisons stem not only from overcrowding
but also from the lack of separation of inmates by classification
according to the type or severity of the crime committed. Gang
violence, insufficient budgets, and abuse by prison guards also are
problems of the prison system.
The General Penitentiary Directorate (DGSP) largely depends on PNP
officers, who are trained inadequately for prison duty, to supply its
guard force. Civilian corrections officers or ``custodians'' handle
inmates within La Joya, El Renacer, and the central women's prison
(which uses only female guards). The DGSP has authority to discipline
prison guards with criminal or civil sanctions.
President Perez Balladares' Minister of Government and Justice
attempted to introduce some reforms of the penal system. He changed the
prison management structure in June and replaced the Department of
Corrections with the DGSP, but substantive reform was lacking. In
September President Moscoso's Minister of Government and Justice,
Winston Spadafora, promised to make prison reform a top priority. PNP
Director Carlos Bares also promised reform, stating in September that
prison guard responsibilities should fall to civilian corrections
officers and not the PNP. However, at year's end, PNP members continued
to provide perimeter security at the prisons. Prison directors
supervise ``custodians'' who provide internal security.
Prison conditions on Coiba Island Penal Colony remained harsh and
dangerous. In January 1998, a prison gang reportedly beheaded four of
five prison escapees who belonged to a rival gang. The authorities
accused 14 prisoners of participating in the killings, but these
prisoners continued to maintain their innocence. The lone survivor and
witness is in a maximum security cell. Both guards and prisoners have
been implicated in the investigation into the other eight murders
discovered in 1998, but the authorities had brought no one to trial by
year's end. Although national prison authorities had planned to close
Coiba, they continued to use the island prison colony to relieve
overcrowding at the two largest prisons, La Joya and La Joyita. Prison
officials also had attempted to establish order in the other prisons by
moving dangerous prisoners to Coiba. However, after completion of two
new compounds, La Joya became the primary maximum security facility and
houses most prisoners accused of serious crimes. This enabled the
authorities to use Coiba to hold prisoners accused of lesser crimes and
to relieve overcrowding in the prisons of the central provinces (i.e.,
outside Panama City and Colon). The Government acknowledges that it
must keep Coiba open, but it has not made adequate provisions for
health, security, and other basic needs of prisoners there.
The authorities have not yet brought to trial many of the 361
prisoners on Coiba Island. Geographic isolation and lack of
communications separated detainees from their attorneys and caused many
to miss trials. Prisoners suffer from malnutrition and shortages of
potable water, and medical care is practically nonexistent. Coiba has a
civilian administrator, but its guard force still consists of police
guards instead of civilian corrections officers. Escapes from Coiba
reportedly are common.
According to unverified press reports, eight inmates at Coiba have
AIDS. The prisoners told reporters that they are isolated in small
cells and that medical attention is provided once ayear. At La Joya
prison, 22 inmates with AIDS went on a hunger strike in June to protest
their lack of access to medical treatment and their need for special
permits to receive medicine. La Joya has a planned capacity of 1,250,
yet houses over 2,000 inmates.
Prison conditions in Colon province also are harsh. According to
the Human Rights Commission of the Legislative Assembly, prisoners at
the Women's Prison of Colon must contend with overcrowding,
semidarkness day and night, constantly wet floors, and virtually no
health care. The Commission also described the Public Prison of Colon
as a ``time bomb,'' which fails to provide the most basic health needs.
The prison frequently has no running water or functioning sewage
system. In June approximately 150 inmates at the Colon women's prison
refused to return to their cells in order to force a dialog with the
Corrections Director and Minister of Government and Justice. The
inmates complained about the food, the failure to release inmates who
had served two-thirds of their sentences with good behavior, the lack
of rehabilitation or skills programs, and the sudden absence of Prison
Director Cristina Torres. Then-Corrections Director Maritza Grifo
acknowledged the overcrowding problem; 576 inmates were housed in a
facility for 325 persons, and 61 persons eligible for conditional
release still were incarcerated. The inmates' protest ended without
violence after officials promised to investigate the complaints. As of
year's end, there had been no substantive reform of the prison.
Conditions at women's prisons in Panama City and Chiriqui province
and at the Juvenile Detention Center were noticeably better than at
adult male prisons. However, female prisoners, especially those in the
primary detention area, reportedly suffered from overcrowding, poor
medical care, and lack of basic supplies for personal hygiene. Juvenile
Detention Centers throughout the country suffer from inadequate
resources to provide for education or adequate supervision of children,
many of whom spend a majority of their time in an empty cell.
The current prison system has over 8,600 prisoners with only 6,843
allotted positions. Prison administrators plan to close both the Colon
Women's Prison and the Public Prison of Colon and shift those inmates
to Nueva Esperanza prison. The new inmates are to be housed in separate
sections of Nueva Esperanza, where construction was quite advanced at
year's end, with some of the new cells already outfitted with bunks and
toilets. However, inmates from the rapidly deteriorating Public Prison
reportedly were apprehensive about being moved to Nueva Esperanza,
where their access to the outdoors will be limited.
In July 1998, the authorities introduced organizational reforms of
the prison system, including a conditional release program for inmates
charged with minor offenses who have served a substantial part of their
sentence. The new government continued to implement the conditional
release program, and released some 60 inmates by year's end, with new
rounds expected for early 2000. The release program has already helped
relieve pressure on the country's overcrowded prisons.
In June former National Penitentiary Director Enriqueta Davis filed
an 80-page criminal complaint against then-Minister of Government and
Justice Mariela Sagel. The complaint alleged that Sagel knew about
prisoners buying furloughs, funds being mismanaged, and other abuses,
yet refused to take action. Davis attributed other problems to the lack
of modern administrative procedures. For example, because records are
kept manually at each location, there is no central archive or census
of inmates. The National Council for Private Enterprise (CONEP)
publicly asked then-President Perez Balladares to look into Davis's
allegations. CONEP expressed concern over the disappearance of
materials and food that were destined for the penitentiary system.
Several other reports of corruption and misallocation of prison
resources appeared in the media throughout the year.
The Government generally allows prison visits by independent human
rights monitors. However, the authorities arrange appointments ahead of
time, and monitors generally speak to prisoners in the presence of
guards or administrators. Prisoners may not feel comfortable speaking
freely under such conditions, and they have expressed fear of
retaliation if they complain. Officials from the Ombudsman's Office
occasionally had trouble gaining immediate access to some prisons, but
various procedural details were worked out and it appeared that the
situation had improved by year's end.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
stipulates that arrests must be carried out with a warrant issued by
the appropriate authorities, and theGovernment generally respected this
provision; however, the authorities often violated the provision that
suspects are to be brought promptly before a judge. Exceptions are
permitted when an officer apprehends a person during the commission of
a crime, or when disrespect by an individual towards an officer
prevents the officer from carrying out his duty. The law requires the
arresting officer to inform the detainee immediately of the reasons for
arrest or detention and of the right to immediate legal counsel, to be
provided to the indigent by the State.
The Constitution also provides for judicial review of the legality
of detention and mandates the immediate release of any person detained
or arrested illegally. The Constitution prohibits police from detaining
suspects for more than 24 hours without bringing them before a
competent judicial authority. In practice, the authorities often
violated the 24-hour time limit by several days. Under law the
preliminary investigation phase may last 8 days to 2 months, and the
follow-on investigation phase another 2 to 4 months, depending on the
number of suspects. The courts frequently grant extensions of these
limits, leaving the accused in detention for a long period without
having been charged formally.
Extended pretrial detention continued to be one of the most serious
human rights problems, in part a consequence of the elaborate
notification phase in criminal cases. Many legal authorities (including
court officials) criticized judges for excessive use of this measure.
According to government statistics, there were 4,687 pretrial
detainees, who constituted about 59 percent of the prison population,
down from 65 percent in 1998. The average period of pretrial custody
was 16 months, and pretrial detention in excess of the maximum sentence
for the alleged crime was common. A legal mechanism exists to hold the
Government financially accountable in cases where a detainee spends
more than 1 year in jail but subsequently has all charges dismissed at
a preliminary hearing. The dismissal must be either because the act of
which the detainee was accused is not ruled a crime or because there is
no evidence to link the suspect to the crime. Although this redress
procedure is not complicated, few former detainees have employed it.
Legal alternatives to prison exist but are not widely implemented.
Options such as house arrest have been used in some cases involving the
elderly or minors, but require that the defendants have access to and
understanding of their legal options.
The Constitution prohibits exile; there were no reports of forced
exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is susceptible to
corruption and outside influence, including from other branches of
government.
The President appoints nine Supreme Court magistrates to 10-year
terms, subject to Legislative Assembly confirmation. New allegations of
executive tampering with the judiciary arose with the creation of the
Fifth Chamber of the Supreme Court. In July the Assembly passed a law
that created a fifth chamber, which allowed then-President Perez
Balladares to appoint three additional Supreme Court Justices before
leaving office. In October the Assembly approved a Moscoso
administration proposal to repeal the law, eliminate the three
additional magistrate positions, and abolish the Fifth Chamber.
The Supreme Court magistrates appoint appellate (Superior Tribunal)
judges, who, in turn, appoint circuit and municipal court judges in
their respective jurisdictions. Judicial appointments are supposed to
be made under a merit-based system, but the top-down appointment system
lends itself to political tinkering and undue interference by higher-
level judges in lower-level cases in which they have no jurisdiction.
The Attorney General, who heads the Public Ministry, appoints the
superior and circuit-level prosecutors.
In December 1998, the Legislative Assembly passed a law that gave
the Supreme Court the power to appoint the Director and Sub-Director of
the PTJ for 7-year terms and requires Supreme Court approval for their
removal. Previously, the Attorney General appointed these two
officials. The law also gave these two officials the power to name
other PTJ officials without consulting the Attorney General. Opposition
and media critics charged that this law increased the influence of the
Supreme Court over the criminal investigators, removed the generally
positive oversight of the Attorney General, and made cooperation
between prosecutors and the police much more difficult.
Tensions between the Attorney General and the PTJ arose in July
when PTJ officers and the Attorney General, accompanied by his PNP
bodyguards, exchanged shouts with guns drawn before both sides finally
backed down. The incident was followed by charges by both sides of
abuse of authority.
At the local level, mayors appoint administrative judges who
exercise jurisdiction over minor civil and criminal cases in which they
may impose fines or sentences of up to 1 year. This system has serious
shortcomings: Defendants lack adequate procedural safeguards; judges
need not be (and normally are not) attorneys; and some engage in
corrupt practices. In reality, appeal procedures are nonexistent. More
affluent defendants tend to pay fines while poorer defendants go to
jail, one of the chief factors leading to prison overcrowding.
In May 1998, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) loaned the
Government $18.9 million to reform the judicial system. The loan is to
be used at national and local levels to provide better conditions for
the court system, including better information management, training for
personnel, revision of judicial procedures, and construction of
administrative offices for judges and prosecutors in two locations, San
Miguelito and David. Program implementation began during the year, with
funding allocated to temporary courts to clear backlogs, for training
additional judges, and for working with the judicial college to create
a curriculum that encourages the merit-based hiring and promotion of
judges. In September the IDB began work on a database linking prison
population data with prosecutors and the courts, which is intended to
facilitate the systematic release of prisoners who have served time
beyond their potential maximum sentence but still are awaiting trial.
The two commissions established during the Endara administration
and resurrected by the Perez Balladares administration to evaluate the
justice system never presented publicly any results of their work.
The Constitution provides that persons charged with crimes have the
right to counsel, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, to
refrain from incriminating themselves or close relatives, and to be
tried only once for a given offense. If not under pretrial detention,
the accused may be present with counsel during the investigative phase
of the proceeding.
Judges can order the presence of pretrial detainees for the
rendering or amplification of statements, or for confronting witnesses.
Trials are conducted on the basis of evidence presented by the public
prosecutor, and the accused person is not necessarily present. The
Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Code provide for trial by jury
at the defendant's election, but only in criminal cases where at least
one of the charges is murder.
The Constitution obliges the Government to provide public defenders
for the indigent. However, many public defenders are not appointed
until after the investigative phase of the case, a serious disadvantage
for the defendant since it is during this stage that the prosecutor
produces and evaluates the bulk of the evidence and decides whether to
recommend trial or the dismissal of charges. Public defenders'
caseloads remained staggering, averaging 540 cases per attorney in
1998. Only 3 new public defenders have been hired since 1992, making a
total of 38 nationwide, with a similar number of assistants. This heavy
workload undermined the quality of representation, with many prisoners
meeting their public defender for the first time on the day of trial.
The Legislative Assembly passed legislation in 1998, popularly
known as the ``Faundes Law,'' which requires judges and other public
officials to retire at age 75. The law was designed to remove former
Supreme Court magistrate Jose Manuel Faundes after attempts to impeach
him failed to muster the necessary two-thirds majority vote in the
Assembly. The law required the 82-year-old Faundes to retire, making
the impeachment proceedings moot. The National Bar Association
challenged the constitutionality of the law's retroactive nature.
However, in July the Supreme Court ruled that the law did not violate
the Constitution.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
home, private papers, and telephonic communications, and the Government
generally respected these rights; however, there were complaints that
in some cases police failed to follow legalrequirements and conducted
unauthorized searches of private residences. The authorities may not
enter private residences except with the owner's permission, or by
written order from the appropriate authority for specific purposes.
These may include entry to assist the victims of crime or disaster, or
to conduct lawful health and safety inspections. The authorities may
not examine private papers and correspondence, except as properly
authorized by competent legal authority and in the presence of the
owner, a family member, or two neighbors.
Although the Constitution prohibits all wiretapping, the Government
maintains that wiretapping with judicial approval is legal, and that
the Attorney General may authorize a wiretap when confronted with
probable cause in a serious crime. Under the guidelines established by
antinarcotics legislation passed in July 1994, the Public Ministry may
engage in undercover operations, including ``videotaping and recording
of conversations and telephonic communications.'' In March a dispute
arose when critics charged Attorney General Sossa with illegally
wiretapping a judge. The Attorney General countered that he was
operating within his authority to pursue a criminal investigation.
Although then-Chief Justice Arturo Hoyos publicly criticized Sossa, the
Supreme Court has not issued a definitive ruling on whether wiretapping
is constitutional and, if so, under what circumstances.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice.
There is an active and often adversarial press and a broad range of
print and electronic media outlets, including foreign newspapers, radio
and television broadcasts, and cable stations. Six national daily
newspapers, 3 commercial television stations, 2 educational television
stations, and approximately 100 radio stations provide a broad choice
of informational sources; all are privately or institutionally owned.
While many media outlets took identifiable editorial positions, the
media carried a wide variety of political commentaries and other
perspectives, both local and foreign. There is a noticeable
concentration of control of television outlets in the hands of close
relatives and associates of former President Perez Balladares.
In June the National Assembly passed a bill that made newspaper
companies ineligible for radio and television concessions and vice
versa. The bill was proposed after the La Prensa Corporation, the
publisher of a newspaper of the same name, sought to acquire the
Channel 8 frequency.
Panamanian and foreign journalists worked and traveled freely
throughout the country. The Perez Balladares Government never fulfilled
its informal promise to seek revocation of the 1978 law that requires
directors and deputy directors of media outlets to be citizens. In June
then-Minister of Government and Justice Mariela Sagel recommended the
revival of the Noriega-era system of issuing journalist licenses to
Panamanian citizens graduating from journalism schools. Working
journalists and human rights groups criticized this suggestion, and it
was dropped.
Under ``gag laws'' dating from the military dictatorship, the
Government had legal authority to prosecute media owners and reporters
for criminal libel and calumny. A special executive branch authority
had discretionary powers to administer the libel laws, which provide
for fines and up to 2 years in prison. Under the statute, opinions,
comments, or criticism of government officials acting in their official
capacity are exempted specifically from libel prosecution, but a
section of the law allows for the immediate discipline of journalists
who show ``disrespect'' for the office of certain government officials.
In December President Moscoso ratified the National Assembly's decision
to eliminate these gag laws. Although this action improved the legal
status of the media, legal actions against many journalists remained
pending at year's end.
Human Rights Ombudsman Italo Antinori criticized the Perez
Balladares administration's use of libel laws to intimidate journalists
who reported on government corruption. Approximately 85 journalists who
had been charged with libel met with Antinori to describe the case they
have submitted to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Other
international free press and human rights bodies had criticized the
continued use of the laws against journalists.
In 1998 then-PNP Director Jose Luis Sosa used the libel laws to
bring charges against National University law professor (and now an
adviser to the Moscoso administration) Miguel Bernal for statements
about the decapitations of the prisoners on Coiba Island (see Section
1.c.). Bernal had said on television that ``the only ones who have
decapitated others in this country are the National Police and the
National Guard of the now defunct Defense Forces.'' Bernal clarified
that he had not said that the PNP had carried out the decapitations at
Coiba, rather that the PNP, through acts of omission, allowed the
decapitations. Bernal, an advocate of prison reform, repeated his
charges in follow-up interviews and opinion pieces. He claimed that the
PNP Director's charges amounted to a limit on freedom of expression.
There was a preliminary hearing on Sosa's charges against Bernal in
November, but no trial date had been set by year's end.
In another 1998 case, a prosecutor acting on behalf of Attorney
General Jose Antonio Sossa charged La Prensa journalists Gustavo
Gorriti and Rolando Rodriguez with a ``crime against the honor of the
authorities'' for defaming a government official and allegedly
falsifying evidence. Gorriti and Rodriguez refused to reveal sources
for a story they wrote in 1996, which alleged that the Attorney General
accepted checks of dubious origin in his unsuccessful 1994 campaign for
a seat in the Legislative Assembly. Subsequent press reports suggested
that the story was erroneous. The charges remained pending at year's
end, and the Attorney General sued the two journalists for $1 million.
In December 1998, police officers attempted to escort journalist
Herasto Reyes from his office at the La Prensa newspaper to a court
appearance. Newsroom staffers prevented the police from taking Reyes
into custody. Then-President Perez Balladares had filed libel charges
against Reyes, after he published a story in August 1998 accusing the
Perez Balladares administration of trying to cover up a government
embezzlement scandal. The case was still pending at year's end.
The Electoral Tribunal must approve election polling results before
publication. In April the Tribunal fined the newspaper Panama America
$10,000 for failing to follow the approval procedure before printing
Gallup poll results.
The press laws provide for the establishment of a censorship board.
The board monitors radio transmissions and has the authority to fine
stations that violate norms regarding vulgar and profane language.
The law provides for academic freedom, which generally was
respected in both public and private universities. However, the Faundes
Law forced the retirement of dozens of professors at the public
universities.
After protesters turned to violence in December 1998 (see Section
2.b.), then-Governor of Panama Province Eduardo Herrera ordered the
police to enter and temporarily close the University of Panama. In
August then-President Perez Balladares issued a pardon for Herrera, who
was accused of abuse of authority for violating the university's
autonomy. President Moscoso rescinded that pardon in September.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
generally respects this right in practice. No authorization is needed
for outdoor assembly, although prior notification for administrative
purposes is required. In 1998 the Legislative Assembly considered, but
did not enact, legislation that would have tightened restrictions on
public demonstrations.
Police response to public protests was mixed. Throughout much of
the year, police showed restraint and professionalism while monitoring
large protests by students, political activists, prisoners, and
workers.
In February residents of the San Joaquin area protested the power
company's cutting off electricity to 400 families that had fallen
behind on payments. The move touched off 2 days of protests, during
which demonstrators barred a section of the highway leading to the
airport. In response, the police used tear gas and bird shot and
arrested about 30 persons. Paramedics attended residents affected by
the gas and injured by the bird shot. Eventually the residents and the
electric company reached an agreement. On August 31, the police used
similar methods to disperse bus drivers who blocked traffic in Panama
City, as well as at smaller protests throughout the year.
In December 1998, a mix of student and worker groups protesting the
privatization of the state-owned water utility, the changing of the
date to celebrate a national holiday, and fee changes at the university
engaged in a week of protests and confrontations. The demonstrators
used Molotov cocktails and hurled stones at police. The police response
to the at-times violent protests included the use of bird shot, tear
gas, and rubber bullets. There were reportedly dozens of beatings and
instances of abusive treatment, particularly against those taken into
custody (also see Section 2.a.).
The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice. Citizens have the
right to form associations and professional or civic groups. They may
form and organize political parties freely, although new parties must
meet strict membership and organizational standards in order to gain
official recognition and participate in national campaigns.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution, although recognizing
Catholicism as ``the religion of the majority of Panamanians,''
provides for free exercise of all religious beliefs, provided that
``Christian morality and public order'' are respected. The Government
imposes no limitations in practice, and there is a broad diversity of
religions. The Constitution prohibits clerics from holding public
office, except as related to social assistance, education, or
scientific research.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice. The Government
enforced exit permit requirements for foreigners who overstayed their
initial visas. A 9:00 p.m. curfew for minors under 18 years of age in
the Panama City and San Miguelito districts of Panama province, imposed
in 1992, remained in effect. Police enforcement of the curfew was
uneven, with strictest compliance focused on high-crime areas.
During the year, between 300 and 500 Colombians fled the violence
in Colombia and entered the country by crossing the border. At year's
end the refugees were still living in the Darien town of Jaque and
refused to return to Colombia until the Colombian Government could
guarantee their safety in Jurado municipality. The Government, along
with local NGO's and the United Nations, provided the refugees with
protection and humanitarian assistance. At year's end, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs had not taken an official stance on policy towards the
Colombians.
The law has provisions for granting refugee status in accordance
with the 1951 U. N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
its 1967 Protocol. The Government generally cooperates with the office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The issue of first
asylum did not arise during the year.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution. However, throughout the year, there were
unconfirmed reports that the police along the border, on an ad hoc
basis, required Colombians to return to Colombia.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have this right and exercised it in the May general
elections. The Constitution provides for a representative democracy
with direct popular election by secret ballot of the President, two
vice presidents, legislators, and local representatives every 5 years.
While the Constitution provides for independent legislative and
judicial branches, in practice the executive dominates. The independent
Electoral Tribunal arranges and supervises elections. The Government
respected the rights of its citizens to join any political party,
propagate their views, and vote for candidates of their choice.
In the May 2 general elections, Arnulfista candidate Mireya Moscoso
defeated Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) candidate Martin Torrijos
and Christian Democratic Party candidate Alberto Vallarino, winning
44.8 percent of the popular vote. The PRD won 35 seats in the National
Assembly; the Arnulfistas, 18;Solidarity, 4; the National Liberal
Party, 2; MOLIRENA, 3; Democratic Change, 2; MORENA, 1; the Christian
Democratic Party, 4; and the Civic Renewal Party, 2.
Domestic and international observers characterized the elections as
generally free and fair; however, several local contests were marred by
reports of vote buying and in extreme cases, voter intimidation.
Legislative District 9-3, in Veraguas province, was criticized widely
for such electoral interference.
There are no legal barriers to participation by women, members of
minorities, or persons of indigenous descent, but they generally are
underrepresented in government and politics. At year's end, women held
7 of 71 Legislative Assembly seats, and a woman served as its vice
president. Women also held 3 of 13 cabinet positions. In May voters
elected the first female President, and an indigenous person was
elected President of the National Assembly. There are two female
members of the Supreme Court, one of whom was elected Chief Justice in
October.
The Government provides semiautonomous status to several indigenous
groups in their homelands, including the Kuna, Ngobe-Bugle, Madugandi,
and Embera-Wounaan reserves. The Kuna of San Blas have two
representatives in the Legislative Assembly, proportionate to their
share of the population. Locally, tribal chiefs govern each reserve;
they meet in a general congress at regular intervals. Neither the
Madugandi nor the Embera-Wounaan reserve has its own dedicated
legislators, but each has a separate governor. The Government continued
the process of demarcating electoral districts within a new reserve
created for the Ngobe-Bugle. May elections allowed many Ngobe-Bugle to
choose their own local representatives in these newly created electoral
districts.
The law prohibits discrimination against any social, religious, or
cultural group; however, naturalized citizens may not hold certain
categories of elective office.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights organizations, including both religious and secular
groups, operated without government restrictions. These organizations
carried out a full range of activities, including investigations and
dissemination of their findings. Organizations generally had access to
government officials while conducting investigations. Some
organizations were particularly active in encouraging voter turnout for
the May general elections and in assisting election observers.
The legislature created the office of Human Rights Ombudsman in
December 1996, but initially did not provide funding, and the office
did not open until January 1998, when it began to handle cases. In
February 1998, the Supreme Court stripped the Ombudsman of his
authority to investigate human rights violations involving the
administration of justice.
Human Rights Ombudsman Italo Antinori, the first to fill the
position, sparred with the Perez Balladares Government until it left
office. The Ombudsman received 15 to 20 complaints daily. With the
authority only to investigate and publicize, Antinori handled several
high-profile cases, although he failed to develop close links with
other domestic human rights organizations. This highly personalized
approach may have limited the overall institutional development of the
ombudsman's office. Nonetheless, the office handled some 4,000
complaints since its founding in 1998, and Antinori's activities were
well-publicized in the press. The Ombudsman also conducted a high
profile ``get out the vote'' campaign prior to the general elections,
consisting of public information messages on radio and television.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits either special privileges or
discrimination on the basis of race, birth status, social class, sex,
religion, or political views. Nevertheless, societal prejudices
persist, based primarily on social status. Cases of discrimination are
difficult to prove, and legal remedies for victims are complicated,
time-consuming, and costly.
Women.--Domestic violence against women continued to be a serious
problem. The Center for the Development of the Woman estimated that
victims report as few as 20 percent of sexual assaults tojudicial or
law enforcement authorities. However, statistics indicate a greater
willingness by women to report incidents of abuse. The PTJ registered
959 cases of domestic violence through August, compared with 582
through August 1998 and only 35 for all of 1997. The PTJ also
registered 514 cases of rape and 135 cases of attempted rape. The
Foundation for the Promotion of the Woman, among other women's advocacy
groups and government agencies, operated programs to assist victims of
abuse, and to educate women on their legal rights. The 1995 Family Code
criminalized family violence, including psychological, physical, or
sexual abuse, although convictions are rare unless a death occurs. A
widely acknowledged characteristic of rape is that it frequently occurs
in the home.
In addition to domestic violence, sexual harassment is a threat to
the equal status of women in society. According to a report by the
Latin American Committee for the Defense of Women, in 1995, the latest
year statistics were available, about 70 percent of female government
employees reported having endured sexual harassment in the workplace,
42 percent by their immediate supervisors and 18 percent by more senior
supervisors. Since a bill to criminalize sexual harassment failed to
pass the legislature in 1995, no further legislation has been
introduced.
The 1995 Family Code recognizes joint or common property in
marriages. However, insufficient resources hampered government efforts
to enforce the code's provisions effectively.
The Constitution mandates equal pay for men and women in equivalent
jobs, but wages paid to women are on average 20 percent lower and
increase at a slower rate. Although statistics are lacking, there are
credible reports of irregular hiring practices based upon age and
``attractiveness.'' In December 1998, the Legislative Assembly passed a
law that reiterated protections laid out in the Constitution and
prohibited all discrimination on the basis of sex.
A number of private women's rights groups, including groups for
indigenous women, concentrate on disseminating information about
women's rights, countering domestic abuse, enhancing employment and
other skills, and pressing for legal reforms. The Foundation for the
Promotion of the Woman stated that it provided legal assistance,
counseling, and skills training to over 750 women during the year.
In January 1998, the Government created the Ministry of Women,
Youth, Family, and Childhood, appointing Leonor Calderon as the
Minister. Although the new Ministry is largely a consolidation of
departments previously operating in other government ministries, its
creation raised the profile of social issues.
Children.--Minors (under 18 years of age) represent 48 percent of
the population. The PTJ registered 171 cases of child abuse during the
year. Education of children is compulsory through the equivalent of
ninth grade. However, in remote areas children do not always attend
school due to a lack of transportation, traditional attitudes, and
insufficient government resources to enforce the requirement. The
Government furnishes basic health care for children through local
clinics run by the Ministry of Health. A central children's hospital in
Panama City operates on government funds as well as private donations.
The Superior Tribunal for Minors and Superior Tribunal for Families
are judicial authorities charged with overseeing the protection and
care of minors. The Minister of Women, Youth, Family, and Childhood
acts much like an ombudsman, and the office proposes and reviews laws
and monitors government performance. Many children continue to suffer
from malnutrition, neglect, and inadequate medical care. Malnourishment
is lowest in urban areas and highest among rural indigenous groups.
Child labor is a problem (see Section 6.d.).
Juvenile courts report a high incidence of juvenile delinquency in
major urban areas. The authorities report an increase in crimes
attributed to juvenile gangs, including drug trafficking, armed
robberies, kidnapings, car thefts, and murders. In March the Minister
of Women, Youth, Family, and Childhood charged the police with
violating the human rights of minors by arresting and detaining them
for minor infractions following periodic neighborhood sweeps.
People with Disabilities.--The Workers with Disabilities Office of
the Department of Labor and Social Welfare is responsible for
government policy and support for citizens with disabilities and for
placing qualifieddisabled workers with employers. The office was in
charge of implementing a June 1993 executive order that provided
employers with tax incentives for hiring the disabled but has had only
minimal success. Although some public buildings and retail stores have
access ramps for the disabled, no national law compels the installation
of facilitated access features in public or private buildings. In July
the Panama City government began enforcing municipal building codes
passed in 1998 that require such access to be included in new
construction.
Indigenous People.--Indigenous people number approximately 194,000
(8 percent of the population) and have the same political and legal
rights as other citizens. The Constitution protects the ethnic identity
and native languages of indigenous people, requiring the Government to
provide bilingual literacy programs in indigenous communities.
Indigenous people have legal rights and take part in decisions
affecting their lands, cultures, traditions, and the allocation of
natural resources. The Family Code recognizes traditional indigenous
cultural marriage rites as the equivalent of a civil ceremony. The
Ministry of Government and Justice maintains a Directorate of
Indigenous Policy. The Legislative Assembly also has an Indigenous
Affairs Commission to address charges that the Government has neglected
indigenous needs. Despite legal protection and formal equality,
indigenous people generally endure relatively higher levels of poverty,
disease, malnutrition, and illiteracy than the rest of the population.
Discrimination against indigenous people, although generally not overt,
is widespread.
Since rural indigenous populations infrequently master Spanish well
enough to use appropriate legal terminology, they often have difficulty
understanding their rights under the law and defending themselves in
court. The indigenous population has grown increasingly vocal in
requesting that the Government grant it more autonomy by creating more
indigenous reserves or expanding existing ones. The Government
continued the process of demarcating electoral districts within a new
reserve created for the Ngobe-Bugle. May elections allowed many Ngobe-
Bugle to choose their own local representatives in these newly created
electoral districts.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There is some evidence that a
constitutional provision reserving retail trade to Panamanian citizens
originally was directed at Chinese immigrants, but government officials
have stated that it serves as a barrier to prevent foreign retail
chains from operating in the country. The measure is not enforced in
practice. Chinese, Middle Eastern, and Indian legal residents, as well
as citizens of Chinese and Indian descent, operate much of the retail
trade, particularly in urban areas. Leaders of the over 100,000-member
East Asian and South Asian communities credibly claimed that Panamanian
elites treat Panamanian-resident Chinese and Indians as well as
citizens of Asian origin as second-class citizens.
Although such practices are illegal, clubs and restaurants often
discriminate against blacks by denying them admission. After student
protests at several nightclubs, Ombudsman Italo Antinori investigated
and found racial discrimination at four nightclubs. Racial
discrimination also is found in the workplace, particularly in jobs
involving dealing with the public, where light-skinned persons are
disproportionately represented.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Private sector workers have the right
to form and join unions of their choice, subject to registration by the
Government. A labor code reform package signed in 1995 significantly
increased workers' ability to establish unions. The reforms streamline
the accreditation and registration process for unions, reduce the
minimum size from 50 to 40 workers, and cut the Government's required
response time on applications from 2 months to 15 days. In the event
the Government does not respond within this time frame, the union
automatically gains recognition and is accorded all rights and
privileges under the law.
According to Ministry of Labor statistics, approximately 10 percent
of the total employed labor force are organized. There are over 250
active unions, grouped under 7 confederations and 48 federations
representing approximately 80,000 members in the private sector.
Neither the Government nor the political parties control or financially
support unions.
The 1994 Civil Service Law permits most government workers to form
public employee associations and federations and establishes their
right to represent members in collective bargaining with their
respective agencies. It also provides civil servants (but not other
government workers) with the right to strike, except for those in areas
vital to public welfare and security, such as the police and health
workers and those employed by the U.S. military forces and the Panama
Canal Commission.
The Labor Code reforms addressed some longstanding concerns of the
International Labor Organization (ILO). The code no longer makes labor
leaders automatically ineligible to keep their union positions if they
are fired from their jobs.
As is general practice in the country's public offices after
elections, newly elected politicians and appointees began dismissing
public workers immediately upon taking office to free up positions for
loyal followers. The authorities discharged up to several thousand
government employees by year's end. Public workers do not benefit from
union protection, Labor Code standards, or minimum wage provisions.
The Civil Service Law has proven insufficient to protect public
workers. Under the law, public workers may be promoted into the civil
service and thus enjoy some right to bargain collectively, strike, and
evade summary dismissal. The Perez Balladares administration promoted
some 10,000 public workers into the civil service during its final
weeks in office, but the incoming Moscoso administration responded to
this last minute influx by suspending the promotions of the new civil
servants ``for review.'' Only a small percentage of the 150,000 public
workers truly enjoy job security by virtue of their status as civil
service employees.
The ILO's Committee of Experts has observed for some years that the
prohibition of public servants' associations is inconsistent with
obligations under ILO Convention 87 (The Right to Organize and Freedom
of Association). The ILO made a second request that the Government
amend labor laws with regard to public workers, but no changes had been
made at year's end.
Union organizations at every level may and do affiliate with
international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
provides most workers with the right to organize and bargain
collectively, and unions exercise it widely. The law protects union
workers from antiunion discrimination and requires employers to
reinstate workers fired for union activities. The Ministry of Labor has
mechanisms to resolve complaints against antiunion employers. The Civil
Service Law allows most public employees to organize and bargain
collectively and grants some of them a limited right to strike. While
the right to strike applies to some 10,000 civil servants, it does not
apply to the approximately 140,000 other government workers. The Labor
Code establishes a conciliation board in the Ministry of Labor to
resolve labor complaints and provides a procedure for arbitration. A
March ruling by the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional Article 452
of the Labor Code, which obligated private sector strikers to submit to
binding arbitration after a given period.
Employers commonly hire temporary workers to circumvent onerous
labor code requirements for permanent workers; such temporary workers
receive neither pensions nor other benefits. The practice of blank
contracts is, according to union sources, becoming more widespread.
Labor law addresses this problem by requiring all companies to submit
copies of all labor contracts for permanent workers to the Labor
Ministry and by requiring the Labor Ministry to conduct periodic
inspections of companies' work forces and review all contracts to
ensure that they are in order. The code also authorizes the Labor
Ministry to levy fines against companies not in compliance with the
law.
In January and February 1996, the Government issued cabinet decrees
governing labor relations in export processing zones (EPZ's) as a means
of attracting investment into areas vacated under the terms of the
Panama Canal Treaty. The original decree limited a broad range of labor
rights, including the right to strike and to bargain collectively. The
second decree modified the first and restored most worker rights in
EPZ's. However, it provides for collective bargaining with
``representatives of employees'' but makes no specific mention of trade
unions; it requires mandatory arbitration of disputes; and it allows
forthe participation of an unrepresentative worker delegate in the
tripartite (government, labor, and industry) arbitration commission.
A 1997 decree further modified the EPZ labor regulations,
stipulating that a strike may be considered legal only after 36
workdays of conciliation are exhausted. If this requirement is not met,
striking workers can be fined or fired. A 1998 ILO ruling noted that
the 1997 regulations do not mention arbitration or specify procedures
to resolve disputes in the courts. The ILO ruling stated that the
Government should amend the EPZ labor regulations to conform with
international norms, but the Government did not respond. Minimum wage
provisions do not apply in the EPZ's.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
children, and neither practice was reported.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits the employment of children under
14 years of age as well as of those under age 15 if the child has not
completed primary school; children under age 16 cannot work overtime;
those under age 18 cannot perform night work. Children between the ages
of 12 and 15 may perform farm or domestic labor as long as the work is
light and does not interfere with their schooling. The Ministry of
Labor enforces these provisions in response to complaints and may order
the termination of unauthorized employment. However, the Government
acknowledges that it is unable to enforce other child labor provisions
in rural areas, due to insufficient staff. The law prohibits forced or
bonded labor by children, and the Government enforces this provision
(see Section 6.c.).
The Permanent Committee Against Child Labor asserts that 11 percent
of all children between the ages of 10 and 17 are working or actively
are seeking employment. Most of these children, both rural and urban,
are believed to be working at their parent's insistence. Some of these
children may be providing a substantial part of their family income.
Child labor violations occur most frequently in rural areas during
the harvest of sugar cane, coffee, and tomatoes. Farm owners usually
pay according to the amount harvested, leading many persons to bring
their young children to the fields to help with the harvest. In many
small rural communities, the entire able-bodied population participates
in a harvest, and parents are not willing to leave their children
behind unattended. Many children also are involved extensively in
subsistence agriculture.
Urban supermarkets employ an estimated 1,500 children, who work for
tips bagging groceries. Some supermarket managers claim that these
children are not employed by their firm, but these ``baggers'' often
have schedules, uniforms, and must comply with company codes of
conduct. In addition, many children work as domestic workers or sell
items and wash cars in the streets.
The Government has not developed an effective strategy to address
the problem of children working as street vendors and car washers, and
has been unwilling to challenge the larger supermarket chains where
large numbers of children work.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code establishes
minimum wage rates for specific regions and for most categories of
labor. The minimum wage ranges from $0.77 per hour to $1.33 per hour,
depending on the sector. This wage is not sufficient to provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most workers
formally employed in urban areas earn the minimum wage or above. An
estimated 39 percent of the population who work in the large informal
sector earn far below the minimum wage. The Government does not enforce
labor laws in most rural areas, where laborers earn $5 or $6 per day,
with no benefits. In December a tripartite commission comprising
representatives from government, the private sector, and labor convened
to negotiate an increase in the minimum wage, which would go into
effect in July 2000. If the commission fails to reach consensus, the
President has the power to raise the minimum wage by decree.
Unions repeatedly have alleged that contractors operating in the
Panama Canal area pay less than the required minimum wage. The Ministry
of Labor does not enforce the minimum wage lawadequately, due to
insufficient personnel and financial resources.
The Labor Code establishes a standard workweek of 48 hours and
provides for at least one 24-hour rest period weekly.
The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing health and
safety standards and generally does so. The standards are fairly broad
and generally emphasize safety over long-term health hazards, according
to organized labor sources. An occupational health section in the
social security system is responsible for conducting periodic
inspections of especially hazardous employment sites, such as those in
the construction industry, as well as inspecting health and safety
standards in response to union or worker requests. Worker complaints of
health problems continued in the banana industry as well as in the
cement and milling industries.
The law protects from dismissal workers who file requests for
health and safety inspections. Workers also have the right to remove
themselves from situations that present an immediate health or safety
hazard without jeopardizing their employment. They generally are not
allowed to do so if the threat is not immediate, but may request a
health and safety inspection to determine the extent and nature of the
hazard.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits alien smuggling, but
does not prohibit specifically trafficking in persons. However, the
authorities held several persons in custody for trafficking; they
awaited trial at year's end.
The country is a transit point for aliens, primarily from other
countries in South America (particularly Colombia and Ecuador) seeking
to reach the United States, some of whom are trafficked into indentured
servitude. An estimated 30,000 aliens transit the country annually,
generally posing as tourists. Their travel is facilitated by a network
of alien smugglers, travel agents, hotels, and safe-houses. The
majority of aliens transiting through Panama originate in South America
but a significant and increasing number come from India and China.
Panamanians themselves represent only a small percentage of illegal
aliens transiting through Central America.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that illegal aliens transiting through
Panama overland are subject to frequent hardship. They commonly are
deprived of adequate food and shelter. Chinese aliens are particularly
vulnerable to poor treatment.
South Americans pay approximately $5,000 in their country of origin
for the entire trip. For the Chinese, $5,000 constitutes only the down
payment on a total fee that could reach $30,000. Once in the United
States, many Chinese are coerced into working off their debt as
indentured servants in the Chinese community.
Corruption, legal technicalities, and lack of resources and staff
contribute to the Government's inability to combat the problem fully.
______
PARAGUAY
Paraguay is a constitutional republic with a strong executive
branch and an increasingly important bicameral legislature. The
President is the head of government and cannot succeed himself. The
1998-99 Government of President Raul Cubas Grau was marked by growing
attempts by the executive to undercut the constitutional authority of
the legislative and judicial branches. In turn, Congress and the
Supreme Court challenged the President for months, and on March 23,
Cubas foe and Vice President Luis Maria Argana was assassinated,
allegedly by supporters of retired General Lino Oviedo. On March 28,
President Cubas, General Oviedo's protege, resigned, and Senate
president Luis Gonzalez Macchi assumed the presidency. The succession,
while tense, was orderly and took place as mandated in the
Constitution. The Congress, Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and the Supreme
Court agreed that the new President should serve the remainder of the
former President's term, until 2003. President Gonzalez Macchi formed a
``national unity'' government that included, for the first time in 50
years, the two major opposition parties. Although the Constitution
provides for an independent judiciary and the Supreme Court continued a
reform process, the courts continued to be subject to pressure from
politicians and others.
The military no longer plays an overt role in politics; however,
many citizens remained concerned about possible erosion of its
apolitical status. The military's decision to support the democratic
transition in late March was viewed as a sign of its increasing
professionalism and acceptance of its role in a democracy. The national
police force has responsibility for maintaining internal security and
public order; while it is nominally under the authority of the
presidency, in practice it reports to the Ministry of the Interior. The
civilian authorities maintain effective control of the security forces.
Members of the security forces committed serious human rights abuses.
Paraguay has a market economy with a large informal sector. The
formal economy is oriented toward services, with less than half of the
$7.9 billion gross domestic product resulting from agriculture and
industry. Over 40 percent of the population are engaged in agricultural
activity, and approximately 20 percent of families depend on cotton
farming. Wealth continues to be concentrated, with both urban and rural
areas supporting a large subsistence sector. Agricultural commodities
(soybeans, cotton, lumber, and cattle) were the most important export
items. The economy shrank by approximately 1.5 percent in 1999. Annual
per capita income was approximately $1,500. About 30 percent of the
population live in extreme poverty.
The Government's human rights record generally remained poor, and
there continued to be serious problems; however, there were
improvements in some areas under the Gonzalez Macchi administration.
The principal human rights abuses included extrajudicial killings,
torture and mistreatment of criminal suspects, prisoners, and military
recruits, extremely poor prison conditions, arbitrary arrest and
detention, lengthy pretrial detention, general weaknesses within the
judiciary, infringements on citizens' privacy rights, violence and
discrimination against women, abuse of children, discrimination against
the disabled and indigenous people, incomplete protection at times for
worker rights, instances of forced labor, and allegations of forced
child labor.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The March 23
assassination of Vice President Argana has been widely attributed to
retired general and coup-plotter Lino Oviedo, and his protege, then-
President Cubas. The assassination, during which Argana's bodyguard
Francisco Barrios Gonzalez also was killed, led to protests during
which the police and civilian supporters of President Cubas fired on
unarmed student demonstrators, killing 8 and injuring over 100. As the
most prominent anti-Oviedo and anti-Cubas leader of the ruling Colorado
Party, Argana had sought unsuccessfully in February to get Congress to
approve Cubas' impeachment. The assassination and subsequent deaths of
the demonstrators, widely viewed as political killings, intensified
opposition within Congress, while at the same time the lower house
impeached Cubas on charges that he had failed to abide by a Supreme
Court order to take retired General Oviedo into custody; Cubas resigned
on March 28 before the Senate could vote to convict him and fled the
country.
The allegations that Oviedo and his key advisers planned Argana's
murder are plausible. There are also credible allegations that Oviedo
and the police command ordered supporters to fire on protesters later
that week. Although the authorities freed some of those arrested from
prison and placed them under house arrest, they kept others jailed on
weak or no evidence, with no provision for due process. There also have
been plausible accusations that the police tortured two of those
persons they arrested.
The police and the military were responsible for some extrajudicial
killings. On July 2, members of the president's military guard, with
assistance from a unit of the Antinarcotics Secretariat Police (SENAD),
shot and killed Jose ``Coco'' Villar during a raid on his home. Villar
was a suspect in the assassination of Vice President Argana, which a
congressional commission was investigating. The SENAD claimed that
Villar was armed and shot at its agents when they raided his home. The
Prosecutor General criticized the SENAD's role in the raid, since its
mandate is limited to investigation and action in narcotics and
firearms cases.
On July 13, agents from the Antinarcotics Police (DINAR) shot and
killed Guillermo Jara Ramirez in Nueva Germania, San Pedro. Jara
allegedly was harvesting marijuana leaves along with two other persons,
who were not harmed, when the DINAR agents approached them. The DINAR
reported that the suspects opened fire on agents, who fired back in
self-defense, killing Jara.
Some military recruits died as a result of beatings by superior
officers (also see Section 1.c.). According to the National Obligatory
Service Law, conscripts may be assigned to service either in the armed
forces or in the National Police. In April two military recruits were
killed while serving at two different police stations; one, Fernando
Aristides Gutierrez, was shot to death in a petty dispute with another
recruit. The other, Marcial Torres, a 17-year-old conscript working in
a police station in Puerto Antequera, in San Pedro province, died as
the result of severe injuries inflicted in a beating by the station
commander, Ramon Duarte. Although Torres' mother filed an official
complaint against Duarte, no investigation or other judicial action had
been taken against Duarte by year's end. Human rights monitors,
including a support group for families of military recruits, report
that 94 recruits, some underage, have been killed or died in accidents
since 1989 while serving their mandatory military service.
Three female inmates died as the result of a prison fire of
undetermined origin that broke out in their isolation cell (see Section
1.c.).
There has been no further action in the criminal investigation into
the killing of Gustavo Daniel Gonzalez Delgado in 1997. Human rights
monitors claim that police officers shot Gonzalez three times following
a traffic incident between Gonzalez's car and a police vehicle.
There was no further action in the killing of Gumersindo Pavon
Diaz, a peasant laborer on land expropriated from a businessman. The
killing, allegedly by armed civilian security guards, provoked violence
by peasants against the company operating on the land.
There was no further action in the investigations into the 1995
killing of peasant protester Pedro Jimenez and the 1994 killings of
peasant leaders Sebastian Larrosa and Esteban Balbuena.
Authoritarian regimes ruled the country until 1989, when dictator
Alfredo Stroessner was overthrown by General Andres Rodriguez, who was
elected President later that year. In 1996 an appellate court affirmed
the convictions for human rights abuses of five Stroessner-era
officials: Former police Investigations Director Pastor Coronel and
police officers Lucilo Benitez Santacruz, Agustin Belotto Youga, Camilo
Almada Morel, and Juan Aniceto Martinez. In September a judge added
additional lengthy sentences to each of the prisoners' terms for their
roles in the 1976 murder of two brothers, Rodolfo and Benjamin Ramirez
Villalba.
In December a court sentenced Stroessner-era police chief, retired
General Ramon Duarte Vega, to over 13 years in prison for the attempted
murder and systematic torture of former political prisoner Sebastian
Castillo. The authorities had arrested Duarte in 1997 and kept him in
military prison for acts of torture committed in 1963.
The 1998 arrest of former Chilean dictator General Augusto Pinochet
in the United Kingdom drew renewed attention toextrajudicial killings
and other abuses that occurred under the Stroessner regime. There were
renewed allegations that Stroessner cooperated in Operation Condor, a
regional plan to eliminate leftists. One human rights activist, who was
a political prisoner during that time, has filed cases with Spanish
judge Baltasar Garzon, who was preparing the case against Pinochet, and
provided him with documents from Paraguayan archives that he claims
implicate General Pinochet in Operation Condor.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, as well as cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment; however, torture
(primarily beatings) and brutal and degrading treatment of convicted
prisoners and other detainees continued. A human rights nongovernmental
organization (NGO), the Committee of Churches, reported several cases
of torture and other abusive treatment of persons designed to extract
confessions, punish escape attempts, or intimidate detainees. The
Attorney General's office and the Committee of Churches compiled
numerous examples of police abuse and extrajudicial killings.
Some of the more than 40 Oviedo supporters arrested following Vice
President Argana's assassination alleged that the police tortured or
otherwise abused them (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
In addition, there were several allegations of mistreatment of
military recruits by noncommissioned and commissioned officers. One NGO
claims to have documented five cases of torture of recruits during the
year, leading to the death of one of them (see Section 1.a.).
Credible reports continued that landowners living near the border
in the Alto Parana, Canindeyu, and Amambay departments forcibly removed
squatters from their property with the help of the police, without the
required judicial order. Some of the evictions reportedly were violent,
with paid armed civilians operating in conjunction with police
personnel. The authorities undertook no effective action in response to
these reports.
In March police armed with a detention order for 6 persons arrested
24 squatters on the property of an absentee landlord outside of Ciudad
del Este and imprisoned them for 3 weeks. According to one of those
detained, the police beat several of the women and children in the
group when their friends protested their arrest. One of them, a woman
who was 7 months pregnant, had her baby prematurely as a result of the
beating. During their imprisonment, the prisoners reportedly were
required to walk up to 15 miles each day to pick beans for their own
meals and to collect wood to be carried back to the prison to be used
as cooking fuel. After 3 weeks, during which their fellow squatters
demonstrated on their behalf in front of the Justice Ministry in
Asuncion, the Government released the prisoners and granted them a
small plot of land.
Violence accompanied protests and demonstrations from January
through April and included the use of excessive force by police and
military forces. On two occasions in January, unknown attackers--
allegedly Oviedo supporters--threw Molotov cocktails and fired shots
into the residences of Supreme Court justices. Similarly, shots were
fired into the home of former president Juan Carlos Wasmosy in the same
month.
Violence peaked in March as the impeachment proceedings against
then-President Cubas continued and following the assassination of Vice
President Argana. A bomb threat to the Supreme Court closed the
building. On March 23 and 24, police attacked protesters from peasant
organizations and unions, as well as Oviedo supporters and
proimpeachment activists with tear gas and a water cannon. On March 25,
37 protesters and 6 police officers were injured in confrontations. The
police allowed factions involved in the protest to assault one another
using rocks, sticks, and firecrackers. On March 26, increasingly
violent confrontations resulted in the deaths of 8 persons and injuries
to almost 100 others (see Section 1.a.). According to press reports,
Oviedo supporters shot at least 20 persons, allegedly without any
action by the police.
Prison conditions are extremely poor. Overcrowding and unsanitary
living conditions were the most serious problems affecting all
prisoners. Prisons generally serve one meal a dayand prisoners seldom
get vegetables, fruit, or a meat protein source, unless they have
individual means to purchase them. Mistreatment of prisoners is also a
serious problem. Tacumbu prison, the largest in Asuncion, was built to
hold 800 inmates but housed over 1,700 for most of the year. Other
regional prisons generally hold about three times more inmates than
originally planned. Jailing large numbers of landless peasants for
trespassing exacerbates prison overcrowding.
In January at Buen Pastor, the Asuncion women's prison, a fire in
the isolation cell killed two prisoners, and a third died of her
injuries a month later. There were no guards near the cell, and women
in a neighboring cell had to alert prison authorities to the fire,
which slowed assistance to the victims and led a judge to claim that he
had been unaware of the degree of isolation of the women's confinement.
Although laws governing the prisons forbid male guards in the women's
prisons, the laws are not always observed in practice, and there have
been several reported rapes of prisoners by their guards.
Security is another problem. At one point during the year, there
were 114 guards for over 1,800 prisoners at Tacumbu prison, before a
court ordered some 200 released because of overcrowding; on December
28, another 255 prisoners were released for the same reason. The
Congressional Human Rights Commission has criticized the prisons for
their poor nutritional standards. Prisons have separate accommodations
for well-to-do prisoners, ensuring that those with sufficient means
receive far better treatment than other prisoners.
The Government permits independent monitoring of prison conditions
by human rights organizations.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention are persistent problems. The Constitution prohibits detention
without an arrest warrant signed by a judge and stipulates that any
person arrested must appear before a judge within 24 hours to make a
statement. The police can arrest persons without a warrant if they
catch them in the act of committing a crime but must bring them before
a judge within 24 hours. However, according to human rights activists,
the authorities often violated these provisions.
Following the assassination of Vice President Argana and the
killing of student protesters in March, the authorities arrested over
45 persons in connection with these cases. Many of those arrested were
well-known political figures, including legislators allied with the
former government. There was little evidence presented to support the
charges against them, and most of the accused were held without bail,
leading some to question whether due process had been observed. For
example, those arrested included Senator Jose Francisco Appleyard,
accused because he had accompanied Oviedo to a political rally in 1998,
and former Vice President Angel Seifart, accused of having made remarks
that somehow contributed to the deaths in March. By year's end, few
suspects had been cleared of the charges against them (see Section
1.e.).
In November the authorities arrested 14 members of the army who
were suspected of disloyalty when rumors circulated that a coup was
being planned. At year's end, they remained incarcerated.
Pretrial detention remains a serious problem. About 93 percent of
the over 5,000 prisoners were held pending trial, many for months or
years after their arrest. While the law encourages speedy trials, the
Constitution permits imprisonment without trial until the accused
completes the minimum sentence for the alleged crime, which often
occurs in practice. However, there were several cases in which
detainees were held without conviction for terms longer than the
maximum sentence associated with the crimes with which they were
charged. A bail system based on judicial discretion exists for most
crimes. Judges frequently set relatively high bail, and many accused
persons are unable to post bond. The Supreme Court, the Public
Ministry, and a judicial working group have taken steps to reduce the
large number of pretrial detainees but have achieved only modest
results. The Supreme Court and many criminal court judges also make
quarterly visits to the prisons to identify and release improperly held
individuals.
The Constitution expressly prohibits forced exile, and it is not
practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the courts often are pressured by
politicians and other personswhose interests are at stake. There were
credible allegations that members of the judiciary who issued arrest
warrants for the Oviedo supporters following the events of March did so
in response to political pressure. The judges defended their actions by
noting the risk that the defendants might flee, and the need to
investigate fully the 10 murders. The courts dismissed charges against
some persons originally accused of the March killings. Although the
detained Oviedo supporters assert that they are held for political
reasons, they face criminal charges in a system plagued by slow
movement, as well as political pressures. The judiciary is not allied
with any one political group.
In early November, the Senate voted not to confirm three of the
nine justices on the Supreme Court, basing its authority to do so on a
disputed article of the Constitution. Many persons assume that the vote
was based on partisan political considerations. Two of the justices
appealed the vote to the Court's Constitutional Chamber, which
temporarily suspended the Senate's decision until it could be reviewed
further.
The nine-member Supreme Court appoints lower court judges and
magistrates, based upon recommendations by the Magistrate's Council.
There are five types of appellate tribunals: Civil and commercial,
criminal, labor, administrative disputes, and juvenile. Several minor
courts and justices of the peace fall within these five functional
areas. The military has its own judicial system.
The judicial system remains relatively inefficient, but the
enactment of new criminal procedure and penal codes is expected to
improve the judicial system's efficiency. However, the judiciary
continues to suffer from insufficient resources. There was also a large
backlog of cases, but the judiciary undertook to eliminate up to 40
percent of the cases that are inactive or invalid due to the statute of
limitations.
The Constitution stipulates that all defendants have the right to
an attorney, at public expense if necessary, but this right often is
not respected in practice. Many destitute suspects receive little legal
assistance, and few have access to an attorney sufficiently in advance
of the trial to prepare a defense. In Asuncion, for example, there are
only 20 public defenders available to assist the indigent, and just 77
nationwide. Some judicial districts have not even been assigned public
defenders. Moreover, the public defenders lack the resources to perform
their jobs adequately.
New penal and criminal procedures codes entered into force in 1998
and 1999 to replace antiquated codes. They provide for protection of
fundamental human rights, and include procedures for an oral and
accusatorial system, as well as a faster and more transparent criminal
trial process.
Although trials still were conducted almost exclusively by
presentation of written documents to a judge, who then renders a
decision, the new penal and criminal procedure codes are expected to
introduce oral proceedings gradually. A Public Ministry official is
responsible in most cases for bringing charges against accused persons.
Defendants and the Public Ministry can present written testimony of
witnesses and other evidence. In practice, testimony is oral and
generally taken by members of the judicial staff, without a judge
present. All interested parties have access to all documents reviewed
by the judge, and defendants can rebut witnesses' statements.
Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence. The judge alone determines
guilt or innocence and decides punishment. During the pretrial phase,
the judge receives and may request investigative reports. In this
phase, the judge is also likely to make a personal inspection of the
scene of the crime and of the available physical evidence. The accused
often appears before the court only twice: to plead and to be
sentenced. If the sentence is appealed, an appellate judge reviews the
verdict, and the law provides for appeals to the Supreme Court in
certain cases.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Government and its security forces generally did
not interfere in the private lives of citizens; however, human rights
activists claimed that local officials and police officers abuse their
authority by entering homes or businesses without warrants and
harassing private citizens. The Constitution provides that police may
not enter private homes except to prevent a crime in progress or when
the police possessa judicial warrant. There was evidence that the
Government occasionally spied on individuals and monitored
communications for political and security reasons. There were
allegations of the forced conscription of underage youths (see Sections
5 and 6.c.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of expression and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice; however, there were numerous
instances of societal violence and threats against journalists during
the year.
The print and electronic media are independently owned. The media
commonly criticized the Government and freely discussed opposition
viewpoints.
Reflecting political tensions in society, journalists reported some
incidents of intimidation and violence, although the victims could not
link any of them conclusively to the Government. In August an unknown
person threw a hand grenade into the garden outside the home of ABC
Color newspaper publisher Aldo Zucolillo. Also in August, shots were
fired at the house of Radio Nanduti owner Humberto Rubin, and the
residence of the editor of the daily newspaper Popular was broken into
and ransacked. In August an armed person stopped three employees of the
La Nacion newspaper outside the city of Aregua, and ordered them at
gunpoint to turn over their film, cameras, cellular phones, and other
material. The gunman was identified as an off-duty narcotics policeman
providing guard service to the subject of the journalists'
investigation. In September shots were fired at the house of Noticias
reporter Esteban Areco.
On January 26, members of the opposition-controlled National
Congress filed a suit against four journalists--Julio Osvaldo Dominguez
Dibb, publisher of La Nacion; Alberto Vargas Pena, columnist and
editorial writer of that newspaper; Raul Melamed, announcer of the
radio station Montecarlo; and Juan Carlos Bernabe, director of the
radio station Nanawa--accusing them of ``committing punishable offenses
against constitutional institutions, offenses against the State, and
offenses against the maintenance of the social order.'' Melamed and
Bernabe in particular urged that Oviedo supporters physically
intimidate Supreme Court justices who had ruled against the Cubas
Government in December 1998. Melamed, who was the master of ceremonies
at the December 1998 Oviedo demonstration in which Oviedo promised
``rivers of blood'' for his opponents, was particularly active in using
the radio as a form of intimidation. In June the Inter-American Press
Association (IAPA) sent a delegation to look into press freedom issues
raised by these cases. It filed a preliminary report that concluded
that the media were highly polarized and requested that the authorities
ensure that press freedom be protected. In July the OAS Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, along with members of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), visited to demonstrate the
international community's support for press freedom. The OAS Special
Rapporteur expressed concern over acts of violence and threats against
journalists, rulings by judges that affected freedom of expression, and
lack of progress in the investigation of the 1991 murder of journalist
Santiago Leguizamon.
In June a lower court judge in the city of Villarrica ordered the
arrest of two radio journalists for transmitting comments critical of
the judge's rulings. The Journalists' Union immediately filed a protest
and a motion that won the release of the journalists. A month later, an
official of the Attorney General's office determined that the judge had
acted outside her authority, a decision later upheld by the Attorney
General.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of all citizens to peaceful assembly, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice. In 1997 the
Government amended a law regulating demonstrations in Asuncion, which
further restricted the areas where demonstrations may take place;
however, it expanded slightly the hours in which they may be held.
Union groups were the most vocal opponents of the modifications. The
law requires that organizers notify the Asuncion police 24 hours before
any planned rally in the downtown area. The police may ban a protest
but must provide written notification of such a ban within 12 hours of
receipt of the organizers' request. Thelaw permits a police ban only if
another party already has given notice of plans for a similar rally at
the same place and time. In addition, the law prohibits public meetings
or demonstrations in front of the presidential palace and outside
military or police barracks. This law does not apply to religious
processions.
On December 17, the authorities arrested 32 Oviedo supporters as
they inaugurated a new branch office of the Colorado Party. They were
held without charges for 24 hours and then released. When pressed by
journalists for a reason for the arrests, the prosecutor claimed that
the persons were ``co-conspirators'' of Oviedo.
With the notable exception of the violent protests in March,
political demonstrations and rallies occurred without major incidents.
Labor unions continued to demonstrate for better working conditions and
peasant organizations closed roads on a number of occasions to bring
attention to the needs of the rural population. While police kept
order, demonstrations were not hindered.
The Constitution provides for the right of freedom of association,
and the Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
conscience for all persons, and the Government respects this right in
practice. Roman Catholicism is the predominant religion, but there is
no official religion and all persons are free to worship as they
choose. Foreign and local missionaries proselytize freely. All
religious groups must be registered with the Ministry of Education and
Culture, but the Government imposes no controls on these groups.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--All citizens may travel within the
country with virtually no restrictions, and there are no restrictions
on foreign travel or emigration. However, in March the Government
temporarily closed its borders and the international airport in
Asuncion during the search for suspects following the assassination of
Vice President Argana.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. There are no established provisions to grant asylum
or refugee status; the Immigration Department determines each request
on a case-by-case basis in consultation with the Ministries of Foreign
Relations and the Interior and the nongovernmental Committee of
Churches (which investigates claims to refugee status). The issue of
the provision of first asylum has never arisen.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens To
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right and ability to change their government
through democratic means. Multiple parties and candidates contest the
nation's leadership positions. Three parties are represented in the
Congress. The Constitution and the Electoral Code mandate general
elections every 5 years, voting by secret ballot, and universal
suffrage. Debate in Congress is free and frank. The Congress often
rejects the executive branch's proposals.
There are three major political parties and a number of smaller
ones. The opposition's power had increased as a result of the changes
brought about by the 1992 Constitution and the subsequent election of a
civilian president and an opposition-controlled Congress. However, the
Colorado Party swept the 1998 general elections, and the opposition
lost control of both chambers of Congress.
The succession of Luis Gonzalez Macchi to the presidency, following
the resignation of President Raul Cubas in March, was in large part
attributable to the actions of civil society, which, for the first time
in recent history, took to the streets to seek a peaceful change of
government following the assassination of the Vice President. The
Government that emerged received the support of all major political
parties, and President Gonzalez Macchi formed a government of national
unityby giving selected ministries to the former opposition. However,
by the end of the year, the coalition faced a crisis and the Liberal
Party threatened to withdraw from the Government. Political opposition
factions that supported former General Oviedo protested the decision to
allow Gonzalez Macchi to finish Cubas' term.
There are no legal impediments to women seeking to participate in
government and politics; however, in practice they are
underrepresented. There are 9 women in Congress (7 of 45 senators and 2
of 80 national deputies), and there is 1 woman in the Cabinet. The new
Electoral Code requires that, in their internal primaries, 20 percent
of each party's candidates for elective office be women.
Members of indigenous groups are entitled to vote, and the
percentage of indigenous people who exercised this right has grown
significantly in recent years. Nevertheless, the inhabitants of some
indigenous communities report being threatened and inhibited from fully
exercising their political rights. Members of indigenous groups are
underrepresented in government and politics.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Several human rights groups operate, including the Committee of
Churches (an interdenominational group that monitors human rights,
investigates refugee claims, and provides legal assistance), Tekojoja
(a group dedicated to the protection of children's rights), and SERPAJ
(a group that defends conscientious objectors and provides legal
assistance to those with grievances arising from military service). On
July 22, 32 NGO's, civil organizations, and trade unions officially
formed the Paraguayan Human Rights Coordinator (CODEHUPY). The
Government did not restrict the activities of any human rights group;
however, it has a mixed record in cooperating with or responding to
recommendations.
The 1992 Constitution calls for the Congress to name a human rights
ombudsman through whom citizens can press claims against the State;
however, the Congress has yet to do so, nor has it set up any
alternative interim mechanism to serve this purpose until an ombudsman
eventually is appointed. The IACHR criticized the failure to name an
ombudsman during its July visit.
The Director General of Human Rights, located in the Ministry of
Justice and Labor, chairs the National Commission on Human Rights. The
commission sponsors seminars to promote human rights awareness. The
Director General's office has access to congressional, executive, and
judicial authorities. It does not have subpoena or prosecutorial powers
but may forward information concerning human rights abuses to the
Attorney General for action. It also serves as a clearinghouse for
information on human rights and has trained thousands of educators in
human rights law.
The office of the Attorney General's Special Adviser on Human
Rights has been extremely active in pursuing justice against human
rights abusers from the Stroessner regime. Although the position has
little real authority, the adviser is a key spokesman for the human
rights community and the rights of the disenfranchised and uses his
position to identify and publicize human rights abuses by the
Government.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Although the Constitution and other laws prohibit discrimination,
certain groups faced significant discrimination in practice.
Women.--The most pervasive violations of women's rights involved
sexual and domestic violence, which is both widespread and vastly
underreported. Spousal abuse is common. While the new Penal Code
criminalizes spousal abuse, it stipulates that the abuse must be
habitual before being recognized as criminal, and then it is punishable
only by a fine. Thousands of women are treated annually for injuries
sustained in violent domestic situations. According to women's rights
activists, official complaints rarely are filed, or when filed soon are
withdrawn due to spousal reconciliation or family pressure. The
Secretariat of Women's Affairs chairs a national committee, made up of
other government agencies and NGO's, which has developed a nationalplan
to prevent and punish violence against women. Pursuant to the plan, an
office of care and orientation receives reports on violence against
women and coordinates responses with the National Police, primary
health care units, the Attorney General's office, and NGO's. The
Secretariat also conducts training courses for the police, health care
workers, prosecutors, and others.
Violence against women has been targeted as a key area of concern
by several NGO's and the Secretariat of Women's Affairs. According to a
1995-96 national poll on reproductive health, 14 percent of women
reported that they were physically abused at some point in their lives.
Most observers believe that this number understates the reality. In
Asuncion alone, observers believe close to 5,000 cases of violence
against women go unreported each year. Almost 30 percent of the women
who responded that they had been abused physically but did not report
the abuse said that they had believed that they could resolve the
situation themselves. Approximately 20 percent had feared reprisals
from their attacker. About 25 percent of all violent crimes take place
in the home, with the vast majority directed against women. Almost 20
percent of women with less than 2 years of education reported being
abused; roughly 10 percent of women report being hit by their spouses.
Women's rights and advocacy groups succeeded in widening the debate
about violence against women. The Women's November 25th Collective
operates a reception center where female victims of violence can
receive legal, psychological, and educational assistance. No shelters
for battered and abused women are available outside the capital of
Asuncion.
In July an IACHR report stated that in 1998 one case of rape was
reported to the press every 3 days. During the first 4 months of the
year, there was one case of rape reported each day. There are no
specialized police units to handle complaints involving rape.
The law prohibits sexual exploitation of women; however, the
authorities do not enforce it effectively. Prostitution by adults is
not illegal, and exploitation of women, especially teenage prostitutes,
remains a serious problem. Law enforcement officials regularly stage
raids on houses of prostitution, and there were cases of arrests and
closures of brothels where minors were involved in prostitution.
The Secretariat of Women's Affairs continued to sponsor programs
intended to enable women to have free and equal access to employment,
social security, housing, land ownership, and business opportunities.
Sex-related job discrimination continues to be common and widely
tolerated. Recognizing that a majority of women in the workplace face
sexual harassment, several unions have sponsored an ongoing campaign
against it.
Women have much higher illiteracy rates than men. In addition,
maternal mortality rates are high, at 192 per 100,000 live births, and
as many as 65 percent of such deaths are related to poor medical care.
Several groups work to improve conditions for women. One is Women for
Democracy, which is active in civic and electoral education. Other
groups include Sumando, an NGO that promotes educational reform policy
and voter participation in elections; and SEFEM, which highlights such
issues as women and public policy, women and social policy,
participation of women in local development, and women in the Americas.
Children.--The Constitution protects children's rights and
stipulates that parents and the State should care for, feed, educate,
and support children. The population is very young, with 41 percent
under the age of 15, and 60 percent under age 20. Boys and girls are
entitled to equal treatment in education and health care. The
educational system does not provide adequately for the educational
needs of the population. The Government recently made elementary school
education compulsory through the seventh grade and plans to extend it
through grade nine; however, it lacks the resources to implement these
changes in practice. Statistics from the Ministry of Education and
Culture indicate that some 35,000 children leave school each year, with
only 60 percent of children finishing the sixth grade. In rural areas
that figure can be as low as 3 percent, and female access to education
is markedly lower than in urban areas.
Abuse of children is a problem. According to the United Nations
Children's Fund (UNICEF), 1 in 3 children (some 462,000) between the
ages of 7 and 17 work, many in unsafe labor conditions. Recent studies
indicate that 42 percent of these children began working by the age of
8. According to a study by a local NGO, between 3,700 and 6,000
children and adolescents work in thestreets of Asuncion. Many of these
children suffer from malnutrition, lack of access to education, and
disease. The typical workday extends from before 7:00 a.m.,
uninterrupted, until 5:00 p.m. The employers of some of the estimated
11,500 young girls working as domestic servants or nannies deny them
access to education and mistreat them. Employers sometimes file false
charges of robbery against those who seek to leave domestic jobs and
turn them over to the police. Children age 14 and older are treated as
adults for purposes of arrest and sentencing. The Labor Code requires
that domestic workers be paid at least 40 percent of the minimum wage,
and allows them to work up to a 12-hour day. It is common practice for
families who cannot afford to raise a given child to send him or her to
relatives or colleagues, where the child may be expected to work in
exchange for room, board, and access to education. Sometimes these
children are abused by those charged with providing for them.
Sexual exploitation is a problem, and of all the females who report
being exploited sexually, 58.5 percent are 16 years old or younger (see
Section 6.f.). According to the Attorney General's office, there are
approximately 200 complaints per month regarding mistreatment and
sexual abuse of minors. The Government has taken effective steps to
combat the problem of baby trafficking (see Section 6.f.).
The Government has ordered military officers responsible for
recruiting to ensure that all conscripts meet the legally mandated age
of 18 for military service. However, only 16 percent of those serving
in 1999 met that requirement, and over 35 percent were age 15 or
younger. There were frequent allegations that military recruiters
forced underage youths to join units. The military took no significant
disciplinary action against those responsible for underage recruits.
Human rights groups and some military personnel confirm that poor
families knowingly send underage children to the armed forces for the
economic benefits.
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides for equal
opportunity for the disabled and mandates that the State provide them
with health care, education, recreation, and professional training. It
further requires that the state formulate a policy for the treatment,
rehabilitation, and integration into society of the disabled. However,
the Congress has never enacted legislation to establish such programs.
Many persons with disabilities face significant discrimination in
employment; others are unable to seek employment because of a lack of
accessible public transportation. The law does not mandate
accessibility for the disabled, and the vast majority of the nation's
buildings, both public and private, are inaccessible to the disabled.
Indigenous People.--The Constitution provides indigenous people
with the right to participate in the economic, social, political, and
cultural life of the nation. Nevertheless, the indigenous population,
estimated at 75,000 to 100,000, is unassimilated and neglected. Low
wage levels, long work hours, infrequent payment (or nonpayment) of
wages, job insecurity, lack of access to social security benefits, and
racial discrimination are common. Weak organization and lack of
financial resources limit access by indigenous people to the political
and economic system. Indigenous groups relied primarily upon
parliamentary commissions to promote their particular interests. The
Constitution also protects the property interests of indigenous people,
but these rights still are not codified fully. The Constitution
provides that Public Ministry officials may represent indigenous people
in matters involving the protection of life and property.
A lack of access to sufficient land hinders the ability of
indigenous groups to progress economically and maintain their cultural
identity. This is made worse by insufficient police and judicial
protection from persons encroaching on their land. The Government's
National Indigenous Institute (INDI) has the authority to purchase land
on behalf of indigenous communities and to expropriate private property
under certain conditions to establish tribal homelands. However, there
have been significant allegations of wrongdoing within INDI, and in
1997 a congressional human rights committee requested an accounting of
INDI's land purchases and transfers. During the year, allegations of
poor performance because of corruption continued, a previous INDI
director was arrested for embezzlement, and three different persons
served as director. Many indigenous people find it difficult to travel
to the capital to solicitland titles or process the required
documentation associated with land ownership.
Significant problems facing the indigenous population are lack of
education, malnutrition, lack of medical care, and economic
displacement resulting from other groups' development and
modernization. Scarce resources and limited government attention
resulted in little progress in dealing with these problems.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution allows both private
and public sector workers (with the exception of the armed forces and
the police) to form and join unions without government interference.
The Constitution contains several provisions that protect fundamental
worker rights, including an antidiscrimination clause, provisions for
employment tenure, severance pay for unjustified firings, collective
bargaining, and the right to strike. Approximately 121,000, or 15
percent, of workers are organized in approximately 1,600 unions.
In general, unions are independent of the Government and political
parties. One of the nation's three labor centrals, the Confederation of
Paraguayan Workers (CPT), traditionally was aligned closely with the
ruling Colorado Party, but these ties appear to be loosening. In March
the largest labor union, the Central Worker's Party (CUT) was involved
in the political demonstrations in front of Congress after the
assassination of Vice President Argana. The CUT called for an
indefinite work stoppage, accusing then-President Cubas and former
General Oviedo of ordering the assassination. Union members were among
those protesters shot and injured during the violent demonstrations.
All unions must be registered with the Ministry of Justice and
Labor. The registration process is cumbersome and can take several
months. Employers who wish to oppose the formation of a union can delay
union recognition further by filing a writ opposing it. However,
virtually all unions that request recognition eventually receive it.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, bans binding
arbitration, and prohibits retribution against strikers and leaders
carrying out routine union business, a prohibition often violated by
employers. Voluntary arbitration decisions are enforceable by the
courts, but this mechanism still is employed rarely. Senior Labor
Ministry officials are available to mediate disputes.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts has
noted deficiencies in the application of certain conventions ratified
by the Government. These include conventions dealing with minimum wage
fixing machinery, abolition of forced labor, minimum age of employment,
freedom of association, equal remuneration, and employment policy.
There were numerous strikes by members of all three worker centrals
and smaller unions. Many of these were related to the firing of union
officials, management violations of a collective contract, management
efforts to prevent the free association of workers, or demands for
benefits such as payment of the minimum wage or contributions to the
social security system.
Unions are free to form and join federations or confederations and
affiliate with and participate in international labor bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for collective bargaining. The number of negotiated collective
contracts continued to grow; at year's end, there were close to 100.
However, they were still the exception rather than the norm in labor-
management relations and typically reaffirmed minimum standards
established by law. When wages are not set in free negotiations between
unions and employers, they are made a condition of individual offers of
employment.
The Constitution prohibits antiunion discrimination; however, the
firing and harassment of some union organizers and leaders in the
private sector continued. Union organizers sometimes are incarcerated
for their role in leading demonstrations. For example, in 1998 the
authorities jailed six union members accused of leading bus drivers in
a demonstration. Fired union leaders can seek redress in the courts,
but the labor tribunals have been slow to respond to complaints and
typically favored business in disputes. The courts are not required to
order thereinstatement of workers fired for union activities. As in
previous years, in some cases where judges ordered the reinstatement of
discharged workers, the employers disregarded the court order with
impunity. There are a number of cases in which trade union leaders,
fired as much as 5 years earlier, have not yet received a decision from
the courts.
The failure to meet salary payments also frequently precipitated
labor disputes. Principal problems included bottlenecks in the judicial
system and the inability or unwillingness of the Government to enforce
labor laws. There were also complaints that management created parallel
or ``factory'' unions to compete with independently formed unions.
There were several cases of workers who chose not to protest because of
fear of reprisal or anticipation of government inaction.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced labor, including that performed by children; however, cases of
abuse of national service obligations occurred. There were reports of
conscripts forced to work as servants or construction workers for
military officers in their residences or privately owned businesses.
There also were allegations of forced conscription of underage youths
(see Section 5). Apart from the abuse of national service obligations,
the authorities appear to enforce the law effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Director General for the Protection of Minors in the
Ministry of Justice and Labor is responsible for enforcing child labor
laws. The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and
generally is enforced effectively; however, there were allegations of
forced conscription of underage youths (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
Minors between 15 and 18 years of age may be employed only with
parental authorization and cannot be employed in dangerous or unhealthy
conditions. Children between 12 and 15 years of age may be employed
only in family enterprises, apprenticeships, or in agriculture. The
Labor Code prohibits work by children under 12 years of age, and all
children are required to attend elementary school through the seventh
grade. However, in practice many thousands of children, many of them
younger than 12 years of age, may be found in urban areas engaged in
informal employment such as selling newspapers and sundries, shining
shoes, and cleaning car windows. According to UNICEF, one in three
children between the ages of 7 and 17 work, many in unsafe conditions
(see Section 5). In rural areas, it is not unusual for children as
young as 10 years of age to work beside their parents in the field.
Local human rights groups do not regard families harvesting the crop
together as an abuse of child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The executive, through the
Ministry of Justice and Labor, has established a private sector minimum
wage sufficient to maintain a minimally decent standard of living for a
worker and family. Theoretically, the minimum salary is adjusted
whenever annual inflation exceeds 10 percent and was approximately $179
(591,444 guaranies) per month at year's end. However, the Ministry is
unable to enforce the minimum wage, and most analysts agree that 50 to
70 percent of workers earn less than the decreed minimum.
The Labor Code allows for a standard legal workweek of 48 hours (42
hours for night work), with 1 day of rest. The law also provides for an
annual bonus of 1 month's salary and a minimum of 6 vacation days a
year. The law requires overtime payment for hours in excess of the
standard, but many employers violate these provisions. There are no
prohibitions on excessive compulsory overtime. Workers in the transport
sector routinely stage strikes to demand that their employers comply
with the Labor Code's provisions on working hours, overtime, and
minimum wage payments.
The Labor Code also stipulates conditions of safety, hygiene, and
comfort. The Ministry of Justice and Labor and the Ministry of Health
did not enforce these provisions effectively, due in part to a lack of
inspectors and other resources. In 1997 the Ministry sponsored the
reconvening of a tripartite group of government, labor, and employers
in an effort to update the labor inspection manual, which was severely
outdated. In addition to updating the labor manual, the program
expanded transparency in the labor inspection process.
Workers have the right to remove themselves from situations that
endanger health or safety without jeopardy to their continued
employment, but they may not do so until such conditions are recognized
formally by the Ministries of Justice and Labor and Health. Although
there are laws intended to protect workers who file complaints about
such conditions, many employers reportedly took disciplinary action
against them.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws specifically
addressing trafficking in persons, but the Constitution proscribes
slavery, personal servitude, and trafficking in persons. The Penal Code
contains provisions prohibiting compelling persons to travel to or from
the country for purposes of prostitution, compelling a minor under 18
years of age to serve as a prostitute, and pandering for a prostitute.
There were unconfirmed reports in Brazil of trafficking in women and
girls from Paraguay for purposes of prostitution. Other than that,
there were no reports of trafficking of persons in, to, or from the
country.
The Government has taken effective steps to combat the problem of
baby trafficking. The Penal Code criminalizes the act of compelling a
child's parent or legal guardian to give up a child for adoption or
relocation to another family. In 1995 the Government enacted a
moratorium on international adoptions, but in September 1997 began to
allow them again on a case-by-case basis depending on the nationality
of the prospective parents.
______
PERU
Peru is a multiparty republic with a dominant executive branch that
often uses its control of the legislature and the judiciary to the
detriment of the democratic process. President Alberto Fujimori won a
second 5-year term in 1995, at which time his party also won a
controlling majority in the unicameral Congress. The Constitutional
Tribunal has not functioned effectively since 1997, when Congress
removed three of its members for opposing an interpretation of a law
that permitted President Fujimori to run for a third consecutive term.
On December 27, Fujimori announced his candidacy to seek another term;
on December 31, the National Elections Board (JNE) rejected 18
challenges to his candidacy, ruling that he was eligible to run. The
Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, in
practice the judicial system is inefficient, often subject to
corruption, and easily controlled by the executive branch.
The police and military share responsibility for internal security;
the National Intelligence Service (SIN) also plays a role in anticrime
efforts. The capture or death of several remaining terrorist leaders
marked continuing progress in eliminating the once great threat posed
by the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement (MRTA) terrorist groups. The Government further reduced the
extent of its emergency zones, which cover about 6 percent of the
country and 5 percent of the population. Within these zones, certain
constitutional protections are suspended. In the rest of the country,
civilian authorities generally maintain effective control of the
security forces. Nevertheless, the security forces remained responsible
for serious human rights abuses, although fewer than in the previous
year.
The Government has implemented major economic reforms, transforming
a heavily regulated economy into a dynamic, market-oriented one. The
Government has eliminated controls on capital flows, prices, and trade.
It has privatized most state enterprises but did not meet its target of
selling those remaining by the end of 1999. Inflation remained in the
single digits, and growth was expected to reach 3 percent, up from 0.3
percent in 1998. Per capita gross domestic product is estimated at
$2,500. Major exports include copper and other minerals, fishmeal, and
textiles. The unemployment rate is estimated at 9.5 percent;
underemployment remains around 45 percent. More than one-half of the
economically active population work in the informal sector. The poor
constituted 50 percent of the population in 1997, and some 15 percent
of the population live in extreme poverty.
The Government's human rights record was poor in several areas;
abuses decreased in several areas, including abuses of the person, but
serious problems remained, including protection of civil and political
rights. The security forces were responsible for several extrajudicial
killings and one disappearance. Security forces tortured, beat, and
otherwise abused persons, and impunity remained a problem. Lack of
accountability within the armed forces, particularly regarding
counterterrorist operations, continued to be a problem. Overall prison
conditions remained poor and were extremely harsh in maximum security
facilities. Arbitrary arrest and detention, prolonged pretrial
detention, lack of due process, and lengthy trial delays continued to
be problems. The general inefficiency of the judicial system persisted,
and it remained subject to executive influence. On July 8, the
Government announced its withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights after the Court determined that the
Government had failed to provide due process in the case of four
Chileans convicted by a military tribunal of treason. The Court ruled
on September 28 that the Government could not withdraw without
renouncing the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Government
stated that it would not comply with future Inter-American Court
decisions, although it did comply in several pending cases. The
Government inhibits freedom of speech and of the press. Efforts to
ensure a compliant, uncritical press continued; journalists faced
increased harassment and intimidation and practiced a great degree of
self-censorship. There are some limits on freedom of assembly and some
limits on freedom of movement in the emergency zones. Questions remain
about the openness and fairness of the electoral process. In November-
December a team of pre-election observers from the National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs and the Carter Center concluded
that there were serious problems in the election environment, including
the harassment of the press and intending candidates, inadequate
opposition access to the media, and use of government resources to
promote the current Government. The authorities at times hindered the
operations of human rights monitors. Violence and discrimination
against women were widespread. Violence against children and
discrimination against the disabled, indigenous people, andracial and
ethnic minorities remained problems. Labor advocates argue that labor
laws and practices restrict collective bargaining rights. Child labor
remained a serious problem.
The office of the Defender of the People, or Human Rights
Ombudsman, opened several new offices throughout the country. The ad
hoc Pardons Commission continued to take applications from individuals
claiming to have been jailed unjustly for terrorism or treason. The
newly created Terrorism Division of the Supreme Court traveled to
Ayacucho and dismissed 158 longstanding arrest warrants on terrorism
charges.
Police suspect that vigilante actions resulted in numerous beatings
and other abuse, including the killing of at least one person.
Sendero Luminoso terrorists were responsible for killings, torture,
and numerous other abuses. MRTA terrorists were responsible for several
killings.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There we no reports
of politically motivated extrajudicial killings; however, there were
five confirmed cases of extrajudicial killings.
In January guards in the Yanamilla prison in Ayacucho beat inmate
Pablo Pascual Espinoza to death after they reportedly found him
drinking an alcoholic beverage. The authorities brought charges against
two guards, Marco Espinoza Rivera and Marcial Pirez Yopla, and tried
them under the 1998 antitorture law. The court sentenced Espinoza to 12
years in prison and acquitted Pirez. The Supreme Court reviewed the
cases and increased Espinoza's sentence to 15 years and ordered the
lower court to undertake a judicial review of Pirez's case and
sentence.
In February two army officers were involved in the shooting of
Demetrio Esteban Valencia in the city of Aucayacu. Esteban and Rosas
Diego Espiritu were reportedly drinking beer in a local establishment
when two unidentified men dressed in black entered, one of whom had
drawn a pistol. Esteban reportedly attempted to disarm the man carrying
the pistol and was shot and killed by an army lieutenant from a Tingo
Maria unit. An investigation of the army personnel involved found both
army officers innocent of wrongdoing because they were defending
themselves.
In September army lieutenant Edi Paredes Alegre allegedly shot and
killed Juan Espinoza Rodriguez, who was returning late at night to his
home in Pachitea, Huanuco. Espinoza's family filed a complaint of
homicide to the Pachitea prosecutor, who brought formal charges against
Paredes. By year's end, proceedings had begun against Paredes in a
Pachita court.
In November Tambo de Mora penitentiary inmate Esteban Minan Castro
died after guards reportedly used tear gas to subdue him and put into
solitary confinement after he had allegedly violated prison rules.
Prison inmates told members of the Ombudsman's office that Minan had
not committed any offenses and was healthy prior to being put into
solitary quarters. The prison doctor testified that prison warden
Alberto Gonzales Teves ordered him to send the body to a city hospital
and to report that the inmate had been alive before leaving the prison.
An NGO filed a formal complaint of torture and homicide against several
prison officials, including Teves. By year's end, the case remained in
the initial stage of investigation.
In April Teobaldo Jaime Palacios Sanchez, an 18-year-old military
recruit, died after military personnel allegedly beat him. He was
admitted to the hospital and diagnosed with an acute respiratory
infection and died on April 21. According to family members, Palacios
died from mistreatment after he tried to escape the military
installation. In addition, the family claims that Palacios' corpse had
hematomas on different parts of his body. With legal support from an
NGO, the family requested that the Public Ministry conduct an
investigation of the cause of his death. The Human Rights Ombudsman
also heard the family's complaint, and military officials undertook an
investigation and awarded financial compensation to the victim's
family. At year's end, the investigation continued.
Human Rights Watch reported that nine soldiers and recruits died
between January and April at military bases under unexplained
orquestionable circumstances (see Section 1.c.). Local human rights
NGO's were unable to verify this information.
There continued to be reports that the security forces conscripted
persons, using beatings and mistreatment that led in some cases to
murder or suicide (see Section 1.f.).
For example, in March 19-year-old Juan Salazar Cayetano died as a
result of possible medical neglect during his mandatory military
service. After Salazar left the military in December 1998 and was
diagnosed with abdominal cancer, he claimed that his military superiors
ignored his complaints of severe pain and responded by frequently
beating him in the stomach. According to the Ministry of Health,
Salazar died of a lung tumor.
There continued to be a public perception that the armed forces
operate with impunity in the war against terrorism.
There were also reports of unexplained deaths of persons who were
in police custody. In April police detained Adan Tito Mariluz Dolores
for drinking in public and fighting with Willian Inga Mendoza (also
known as ``Puma'') in Tingo Maria. According to a police report, police
held both men for approximately 4 hours, after which Tito fled the
police station still handcuffed. He was found in a nearby riverbed 10
days later. An internal investigation against policemen Alferez Jose
Chaves Core, Carlos Dias Calizaya, and Mario Coa Delgado recommended
administrative disciplinary measures. Police have been unable to locate
Willian Inga Mendoza to solicit his testimony. By year's end, the
prosecutor had not completed his initial investigation of the incident.
In June National Police officials detained Mario Clemente Guillen
Mendez in the city of Chincha and held him in a local police station.
When his wife arrived to inquire about the reason for her husband's
arrest, police instructed her to return the next morning. When she did
return, police informed her that her husband had confessed and hanged
himself. Medical authorities from a nearby town performed an autopsy,
concluding that the cause of death was asphyxiation. The autopsy also
noted pancreatic hemorrhages. By year's end, the Chincha criminal court
had brought charges of torture against policemen Edwin Alfredo Saravia
Torres, Marco Antonio Carrasco, and Julian de la Cruz Huyarote.
In July police detained Rony Machaca Flores in Juliaca, Puno, for
reportedly insulting another citizen. National Police lieutenant Rolnad
Bastidas ordered Machaca's detention for intent to commit murder. Later
that evening police found Machaca dead in his cell after allegedly
hanging himself. At year's end, the Human Rights Ombudsman's office and
the National Prosecutor were reviewing the case.
In December police detained Jose Antonio Palacios Garcia in Ica for
not carrying proper identification. Two hours later police found
Palacios dead in his cell. Family members claim that the police
informed them that Palacios killed himself. Police later stated that he
died while trying to escape. After an initial police investigation, the
provincial prosecutor filed formal charges against Jorge Luis Gallegos
Cornejo for the crime of aggravated homicide. Several other officers
were charged with abuse of authority related to the death. By year's
end, Gallegos Cornejo had been detained and judicial proceedings
against him had begun.
In August 1998 a court placed Felix Rojas Daza and Zozimo Campos
Gamboa, the two police officers arrested for the 1998 extrajudicial
killing of Willy Llerena Macedo, on 1-year's probation for failure to
do their duty but acquitted them of Llerena's murder.
In January the police officer charged with the December 1998 death
of Carlos Orrellano Mallqui asked to have his case transferred to the
military justice system. The police in Coris, Aija province, Ancash,
had detained Arrellano Mallqui on suspicion of theft. On December 11,
1998, the police took him to a local hospital; he had been shot in the
head and suffered injuries consistent with having been beaten in the
face, hands, knees, and testicles. Orrellano Mallqui died in the
hospital 2 days later. On April 8, the provincial prosecutor asked for
an extension to complete his investigation; by the end of the year, the
Supreme Court had yet to decide whether the case should be held in
civil or military courts.
No progress has been made in the investigation of the four soldiers
suspected of robbing and killing Genaro Julca Bula and Alberto Aponte
in 1998. In November the departmental court in Ayacucho acquitted
policeman Raymundo Gutierrez Rivero, the defendant in the 1998 case of
torture that led to the death of Lucas Huaman Cruz. Despite convincing
evidence to the contrary,the court apparently accepted the defense's
assertion that Huaman's family, rather than Gutierrez, had tortured and
beaten him to death. Attorneys representing the Huaman family and the
Attorney General's office petitioned to have the acquittal annulled and
the case retried before the Supreme Court. By year's end, their request
was still pending.
There were no developments in the case of Mariela Barreto, a
military intelligence (SIE) agent whose dismembered and decapitated
body was found in March 1997. The Human Rights Ombudsman's office
interviewed former SIE agent Luisa Margarita Zanatta Muedas in 1998,
but did not uncover additional evidence or take further action on the
case since then. President Fujimori promised an exhaustive
investigation into the matter in 1998, but neither the Public Ministry
nor the police uncovered a motive or identified likely suspects.
In May published photographs appeared to show former Second
Lieutenant Ricardo Telmo Hurtado Hurtado presiding at a public function
in uniform with the rank of major. Hurtado commanded the army unit
responsible for the 1985 Accomarca massacre, in which more than 60
persons were killed, many of them women and children. Although Hurtado
admitted executing 25 to 30 peasants whom he believed were terrorists,
the court ultimately convicted him only of ``abuse of authority'' and
disobedience and acquitted all the other defendants. In 1993 the
Supreme Military Council sentenced him to prison for 7 years for abuse
of authority. Available evidence suggests that the army never
officially dismissed Hurtado, despite the fact that the Military Code
states that any conviction that entails a sentence of 2 or more years'
imprisonment must result in the officer's immediate discharge. During
the 8 years from the massacre to his final appeal in 1993, the army
promoted Hurtado from second lieutenant to captain. Nonetheless, at
year's end, the armed forces had not provided coherent answers
regarding Hurtado's promotions or his standing in the army beyond
maintaining that he was released from prison under the 1995 general
amnesty.
Police suspect that vigilante action resulted in at least one
killing. For example, in September the tortured and strangled body of
Guillermo Coa Mansanilla was found in one of Lima's poorer
neighborhoods with a note that read, ``This is what happens to
rapists'' (see Section 1.c.).
Sendero Luminoso terrorists killed 51 persons, including 34
civilians. According to information gathered by the Legal Defense
Institute, the MRTA was responsible for nine deaths.
b. Disappearance.--There was one report of a disappearance
attributed to the security forces. On March 20, the police detained 19-
year-old Walter Munarriz Escobar on questionable theft charges, took
him into custody, and beat him at the Licay police station in Angaraes,
Huancavelica. Munarriz was never seen again. In April the provisional
prosecutor brought formal charges against and ordered the detention of
National Police captain Roberto Gastiaburu Nakada, Ensin Claudio
Gutierrez Valasquez, and Adolfo Angeles Ramos. The prosecutor
subsequently charged policemen Gunter Cuaresma Ramos and Percey
Salvatierra Laura. By year's end, Gastiaburu and Angeles reportedly
remained in reclusion in the San Fermin penal facilities in
Huancavelica. Gutierrez Velasquez was under orders to appear in court.
A penal court was still considering a counter motion filed by the
policemen who accused the magistrate of being partial against them.
In May the Government paid full compensation, as ordered by the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, to the family of Neira Alegria,
who disappeared in 1986. At year's end, the Government still had not
paid $245,000 in compensation to the family of Ernesto Rafael Castillo
Paez, who disappeared after the police forcibly detained him in 1990,
despite the Court's 1997 ruling that the Government had violated
Castillo Paez's right to life, liberty, and personal integrity. The
Court also had ordered the Government to punish those responsible and
to return the victim's remains to his family; however, the Government
had not done either by year's end.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and the law prohibit torture and inhuman
or humiliating treatment; however, in practice torture and brutal
treatment of detainees by the security forces continued to occur. The
Human Rights Ombudsman and NGO's believe that torture and the brutal
mistreatment of detainees by the security forces continue to be
widespread. Torture most often takes place during the period
immediately following arrest and in the emergency zones. The incidence
of torture is high during policedetention in part because families are
prohibited from visiting suspects while they are held incommunicado,
and attorneys have only limited access to them (see Section 1.d.).
Such abuse is particularly common in police cells operated by the
National Counterterrorism Directorate (DINCOTE) and in detention
facilities on military bases where terrorism and treason suspects
normally are held. Psychological torture and abuse, which result from
the harsh conditions in which detainees are held, are more
characteristic of the prisons. In emergency zones, which cover about 6
percent of the country's territory and 5 percent of its population,
certain constitutional protections are suspended.
The Human Rights Ombudsman and NGO's reported more than a dozen
cases of aggravated torture by security forces.
In February Fabian Astete Fuente filed a complaint against police
in the department of Tacna for allegedly detaining and beating him
after intervening in an argument Astete was having with his wife. Local
authorities dismissed his charges of abuse of authority against the
police officers.
On March 5, police in Huamanga, Ayacucho, detained 16-year-old
Huber Mendez Barzola while carrying out an antigang operation. Although
detained on suspicion of terrorism, the police later charged him with
illegal possession of a gun, a metal chain weapon, and belonging to a
criminal gang. Mendez alleged that, once in the police station, he was
stripped naked, beaten, and sodomized with the metal chain weapon. On
March 18, a judge opened an investigation into the alleged torture and
ordered the detention of policemen Oscar Italo Flores Montanez and
Carlos Palacios Soto. The two officers were charged with committing
torture. William Saenz, another police officer, was charged with
violating the public trust. In November the court found Palacios Soto
and Flores Montanez guilty of torture, sentenced them each to 6 years
in prison and fined them about $650 (2,000 soles). William Saenz was
sentenced to 4 years in jail and fined about $150 (500 soles). At
year's end, the cases were before the Supreme Court for final review.
In March the National Police in Lima arrested and detained Pedro
Tinta Vera on charges of aggravated terrorism. In his statement to the
Human Rights Ombudsman's office, Tinta said that authorities had held
him incommunicado for a month and tried to make him confess. Tinta
accused policemen Domingo Arnaldo Gil, Guillermo Osorio, and Ricardo
Loli of repeatedly beating him all over his body, hoisting him by his
arms bound behind his back, and leaving his broken arm untreated for 10
days. In October the provincial prosecutor formally charged the three
policemen with the crime of torture and a judge ordered their arrest.
By year's end, the case had not concluded.
In April the parents of 18-year-old Antero Espinoza Alzamora filed
a complaint that the police in the department of Piura had detained
their son without judicial order and held him on arbitrary charges. The
family alleged that police repeatedly beat and otherwise mistreated
Espinoza. By year's end, the local prosecutor was still investigating
these charges.
In June police in Huamachuco allegedly detained brothers Catalino
Daga Ruiz and Bernardo Daga Ruiz on suspicion of robbery. The two men
claim that police beat them and then took them to a cemetery and buried
both of them up to their necks. The police then allegedly took the men
back to the police station where they beat them again. By year's end
both men filed a formal complaint of torture and illegal entry, and the
case remained in pretrial proceedings.
Investigations and judicial proceedings on charges of torture or
abuse of authority against members of the National Police continued in
several of the following cases: Jesus Natividad Roman Portocarrero,
arrested in Piura in March; Mario Jimenez Roque, arrested in Pasco in
April; Julio Armando Uribe, arrested in Moquergua in July; Moises Pacco
Mayhua, arrested in Puno in August; and Victor Valle Cabello, detained
in Pasco in September.
In December 1998, personnel from the Aguaytia Naval Base, located
in the Amazon basin, detained and assaulted Miguel Andahua. After
several days, they turned him over to police with a signed confession
that he was a terrorist and a medical report attributing his numerous
injuries to an automobile accident. In addition to severe beatings and
electric shocks, naval personnel allegedly sodomized Andahua repeatedly
with a wooden baton. Police released Andahua and absolved him of any
terrorist links. A special prosecutor charged several naval officials
under the antitorture law. However, the court issued an arrest warrant
against Julio Spencer Guido Davalos, on a much lesser charge of
committing bodily harm. Notwithstanding thewarrant, the Aguaytia Naval
Base and naval authorities refused to cooperate with civil authorities
and Guido remained at large. In October the Supreme Court ruled that
the civil courts had jurisdiction. The authorities arrested Guido,
charged him with violating the 1998 antitorture statute, and released
him for the duration of the civil proceedings, which were still
underway at year's end.
In addition to beatings, common methods of torture and other
inhuman or degrading treatment included electric shock, water torture,
asphyxiation, and the hanging of victims by a rope attached to hands
tied behind the back, and, in the case of female detainees, rape.
Common forms of psychological torture included sleep deprivation and
death threats against both detainees and their families. Interrogators
frequently blindfolded their victims during torture to prevent them
from identifying their abusers. The Government did take action during
the year to investigate and prosecute security force personnel charged
with torture; however, impunity persisted to some degree. During the
year several officers were charged under the 1998 antitorture law.
However, of the several sentences handed down under the 1998 torture
law, most have been overturned on appeal.
There were continued reports of beatings and mistreatment on army
bases of youths who volunteered or were conscripted for military
service (see Section 1.f.). For example, 18-year-old recruits Jaime
Palacios Sanchez and Elvis Lopez Tuya were caught while trying to
escape from Fort Coloma in Tumbes. A group of soldiers allegedly held
them naked for 2 days and later beat them; Palacios Sanchez died as a
result of the beating (see Section 1.a.).
In April Carlos Yauri began his military service in Tumbes and
received a full medical clearance. However, in August an army medical
examination indicated that Yauri was suffering from mental illness,
even though he had originally been admitted to the base hospital for
tuberculosis. Army medical personnel also reportedly failed to note
that the recruit had suffered massive blows to the head. With the
support of a local NGO, the Huaraz province prosecutor investigated and
requested that the military prosecutor expedite an investigation into
the case. At year's end, army officials had not acted on this request.
In November 1998, Julio Asencios Vargas, a military recruit serving
in an army unit in Huaraz was allegedly beaten with a rifle butt and
lost an eardrum. The army conducted an administrative investigation and
found Sergeant Robert Figueroa Sarmiento guilty of aggravated assault.
The army also provided a financial settlement to the victim.
The police used a water cannon and tear gas to disperse protesters
in June (see Section 2.b.).
No progress was made in the case of the 1998 beating and torture of
Pablo Waldir Cerron Gonzalez by policeman Elmer Perez Arnao. In October
a penal court acquitted a policeman in the 1998 case of torture that
led to the death of Lucas Huaman Cruz (see Section 1.a.). In the same
month, the Supreme Court began a review of the case. In November the
Supreme Court prosecutor filed a motion to nullify the Ayacucho court's
decision; at year's end, the Supreme Court had decided to hear
arguments on the case.
In the 1997 case of Leonor La Rosa, a military intelligence officer
who was beaten and tortured by four of her colleagues (and who now
resides in Sweden), the Supreme Council of Military Justice awarded La
Rosa approximately $1,500 (5,250 soles) as an indemnity. La Rosa's
attorney considered the amount seriously inadequate, since she is a
paraplegic as a result of the torture. The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights was reviewing La Rosa's case when the Government announced
its withdrawal from the Court's jurisdiction (see Section 4). By year's
end, it remained unclear whether the Government would comply with the
Court's decision.
In response to terrorism in the 1980's and early 1990's, many
communities organized self-defense committees. Terrorism is no longer a
serious threat in most areas and self-defense committees seek to deter
crime. Committees patrol their communities nightly and regularly
apprehend criminals in the act. Committee members sometimes administer
vigilante justice before turning the suspect over to police.
There continued to be credible reports that Sendero Luminoso was
also responsible for acts of torture, including cases that resulted in
death (see Section 1.a.).
Prison conditions continued to be poor and were extremely harsh in
maximum security facilities, especially those operating at high
altitudes. Low budgets, severe overcrowding, lack of sanitation, and
poor nutrition and health care continued to be serious problems within
the prison system. Prisoners were victimized routinely by both prison
guards and fellow inmates. Corruption continued to be a serious problem
among poorly paid prison guards, many of whom were implicated in sexual
abuse, blackmail, extortion, narcotics and weapons sales, and the
acceptance of bribes in exchange for favors that ranged from providing
a mattress to arranging an escape. Since prison authorities do not
supply adequate bedding and budget only about $0.75 (2.5 soles) per
prisoner per day for food, the families of prisoners typically must
provide for these basic needs. In high-security prisons, female inmates
are allowed to see their children only once a week. However, in prisons
that house only common criminals, such as Lima's Chorrillos women's
prison, children 3 years of age and younger live with their jailed
mothers.
Overcrowding and inadequate infrastructure continued to hamper
efforts to improve the living conditions of prison inmates. At Lima's
Lurigancho men's prison, the country's largest, more than 6,000
prisoners live in a facility built for 1,500. Inmates have only
intermittent access to running water; bathing facilities are
inadequate; kitchen facilities are unhygienic; and prisoners sleep in
hallways and common areas due to lack of cell space. Illegal drugs are
abundant in many prisons, and tuberculosis and AIDS are reportedly at
near-epidemic levels. Detainees held temporarily while awaiting
arraignment at Lima's Palace of Justice are not allowed outside for
fresh air and have restricted access to bathrooms.
In November the Human Rights Ombudsman published a report on prison
conditions and administration, which highlighted many serious
shortcomings, including a shortage of trained medical personnel, spotty
legal representation for prisoners, and insufficient numbers of social
workers. The Ombudsman's staff visited 44 of the country's 86 prisons,
which account for 80 percent of the country's total prison population
of approximately 28,000 inmates. The Government employs 50 lawyers to
service the prison system; since 65 percent of the prisoners have been
charged but not convicted, the penal system's legal resources fell far
short of demand. The system employs 81 social workers and 84
psychologists, which the Ombudsman judged to be woefully inadequate.
Medical staff for the entire penal system consisted of 44 doctors and
80 nurses. In 47 of the 86 prison facilities, there were no health care
services; of the remaining facilities, 20 were staffed by doctors and
nurses, 18 with only nurses, and 4 with only doctors. The Ombudsman
noted that the operating philosophy in the prison system is one of
punishment rather than rehabilitation. Roughly half of all prisoners
performed some form of work, and only 28 percent participate in some
kind of educational activity.
According to human rights monitors, the Challapalca prison in
Tarata, Tacna, seriously violates international norms and standards,
particularly with respect to its isolation and high altitude. Located
at an altitude of about 14,000 feet, Challapalca's freezing
temperatures and oxygen-thin air have unavoidably negative effects on
prisoner health. Moreover, since the prison can be reached only after
an all-night bus ride from the nearest population center, most families
can visit their jailed relatives only rarely. Hospital care is 8 hours
away by overland transportation. Face-to-face consultations by inmates
with their attorneys are rare. To relieve some of the isolation, the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and to a lesser extent
the Government, fund a monthly visit to Challapalca by families of its
inmates. In 1998 the International Federation of Human Rights, as well
as visiting members of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) and the Ombudsman, called on the Government to shut down
Challapalca.
There were a number of protests and hunger strikes in various
prisons, including the high security prisons at the Callao Naval
Station and Yanamayo. In September MRTA prisoners at Callao staged a
hunger strike to protest their isolation; the strike lasted 30 days.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors, including the ICRC. However, representatives of the Human
Rights Ombudsman were not granted access to the military prisons (see
Section 4). During the year, the ICRC performed 748 jail visits,
interviewed 1,253 inmates, and visited seven prisoners in custody at
the maximum security naval base facility in Callao every 2 months.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention remain problems. The Constitution, Criminal Code, and
antiterrorist statutes delineate the arrest and detention process. The
Constitution requires a written judicial warrant for an arrest unless
the perpetrator of a crime is caught in the act. However, the Organic
Law of the National Police permits the police to detain a person for
any investigative purpose. Although the authorities must arraign
arrested persons within 24 hours, they often violate this requirement.
In cases of terrorism, drug trafficking, or espionage, arraignment must
take place within 30 days. Military authorities must turn over persons
they detain to the civilian police within 24 hours; in remote areas of
the country this must be accomplished as soon as practicable. However,
the military often disregards this requirement.
The Government suspends certain constitutional protections in the
emergency zones where, for example, security forces do not need an
arrest warrant in order to detain a suspect. Police may detain
terrorism and treason suspects for a maximum of 15 days, and hold them
incommunicado for the first 10 days. Treason suspects, who are handed
over automatically to military jurisdiction, may be held incommunicado
for an additional 30 days. The authorities prohibit families from
visiting suspects being held incommunicado, and attorneys have access
to them only during the preparation and giving of sworn statements to
the prosecutor.
By year's end, the Government took action on the recommendations
the Human Rights Ombudsman made in 1998 to resolve the cases of an
estimated 5,228 individuals still subject to detention orders, many of
whom were forced against their will to participate in terrorist
activities during the internal conflict or were accused falsely of
links with terrorist groups. A group from the special terrorism
division of the Superior Court went to Ayacucho and dismissed 179 of
the standing arrest warrants. In 1998 the Ombudsman had called on the
Government to rescind all outstanding detention orders that were more
than 5 years old and to cancel all orders that did not comply with
legal specifications.
The Ombudsman also had asked that the ad hoc Pardons Commission be
authorized to evaluate any remaining cases and to recommend that the
President revoke those detention orders where insufficient evidence
existed that the individuals in question either committed terrorist
acts or were associated with terrorist groups. By year's end, 3,225 of
the 3,878 persons accused of these crimes have applied for clemency,
and 535 have received the Commission's recommendation for pardon. Since
1998 there have been 48 recommendations for new pardons pending before
the President. During the year, he pardoned 23 persons convicted of
terrorism, bringing the total of terrorism or treason convicts pardoned
and released to 481 (see Section 1.e.) Detainees have the right to a
prompt judicial determination of the legality of their detention and
adjudication of habeas corpus petitions. However, according to human
rights attorneys, judges continued to deny most requests for such
hearings. In Lima and Callao, detainee petitions for habeas corpus are
restricted severely, because under a 1998 executive branch decree
issued as part of the war on crime, only 2 judges are able to hear such
petitioners, instead of the 40 to 50 in previous years, thereby
significantly delaying justice. Judges rarely allow the unconditional
release of suspected terrorists, even if there is insufficient evidence
to bring a case against them, despite 1993 amendments to antiterrorism
laws that gave lower court and superior court judges the power to do
so. As a result, accused terrorists sometimes must wait until their
cases have been reviewed and dismissed by the Supreme Court before they
are freed. This process can last more than a year.
As of November, figures from the National Penitentiary Institute
(INPE) showed that 65 percent of a total prison population of 28,081
had been sentenced. Over 50 percent of the prison population remained
in Lima; of these prisoners, 74 percent remained unsentenced. In 1998
the Catholic Bishops' Social Action Commission (CEAS) called for
implementation of a system that would allow detainees to post bail, so
that first-time offenders would not have to wait in jail for their
trials. According to the INPE, the elapsed time between arrest and
trial in civil, criminal, and terrorism cases averages between 26 and
36 months. Those tried by military courts on treason charges generally
do not have to wait more than 40 days for their trial; however, since
trial procedures in military courts are largely devoid of due process
protections, the speed with which trials are concluded offers little
benefit to the defendants involved. Once trials have concluded,
prisoners continue to have to wait long periods before receiving copies
of their sentences.
According to two human rights organizations, police routinely
detain persons of African descent on suspicion of having committed
crimes, for no other reason than the color of their skin, and rarely
act on complaints of crimes against blacks (see Section 5).
In November 1997, the authorities charged eight human rights
lawyers with terrorism and treason for having defended Sendero Luminoso
terrorists in military courts. This group included Sendero Luminoso
founder Abimael Guzman's defense attorney Luis Ramon Landaure. The
military courts absolved all eight defendants of treason and sent them
to be tried for terrorism in the civilian courts. The authorities
arrested them in May, but a court acquitted them in September of the
terrorism charges.
The Constitution does not permit exile, and the Government respects
this prohibition.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is
inefficient, subject to corruption, and easily controlled by the
executive branch and the private sector. As a result, public confidence
in the judiciary remains low. In 1993 the Government created an
executive commission of the judicial branch and an executive commission
of the Public Ministry for a 5-year period, ostensibly to carry out
judicial reform. The commissions consist of individuals the President
appointed, and who regularly rule in favor of the Government,
compromising the independence of the judicial system. In December 1998,
both commissions were extended until December 2000. The judicial reform
process has produced some successes, including administrative,
technical, and organizational improvements such as computerization of
files and improved work areas for judges and magistrates. Reforms also
established quicker and less expensive procedures and better salaries
for judges. The new Extrajudicial Conciliation Law, which originally
was to have made conciliation a mandatory first step in most civil
cases by January 2000, is scheduled to make conciliation obligatory
beginning January 14, 2001. Before that date, the executive could start
the implementation of the law in Lima, Arequipa, and Trujillo.
However, little has been done to restore the judiciary's
independence from the executive, and these administrative and
procedural improvements have been overshadowed by the lack of a fully
functioning Constitutional Tribunal; the curtailment of the authority
of the National Judiciary Council to investigate, discipline, and
remove judges; the continuing large number of provisional judges in the
court system; and the transfer of jurisdiction of sensitive cases to
courts more inclined to rule in the Government's favor.
Of the country's 1,686 civilian judges, only 20 to 30 percent have
permanent appointments and have been selected independently. The
remainder, including 21 of the 36 superior judges of the Supreme Court,
have provisional or temporary status. Critics charge that, since these
judges lack tenure, they are more susceptible to outside pressures. The
Government's reliance on untenured, provisional, and temporary judges
was demonstrated when the executive commission of the judicial branch
created two specialized chambers of the Supreme Court. These chambers,
staffed by provisional and temporary judges, assumed control over tax,
customs, and narcotics crimes previously under the jurisdiction of the
tenured judges of the Lima superior court. This enabled the Government
to supervise closely such cases as that of Baruch Ivcher (see Section
2.d.), his family and associates, and of Jaime Mur (a fraud case
dismissed in 1998) to ensure decisions favorable to the Government.
Critics also point to occasions when judges or prosecutors who ruled
against the Government's interests have been transferred and replaced
by new judges who immediately overruled the previous decisions (see
Section 2.a.).
There is a three-tier court structure that consists of lower and
superior courts and a Supreme Court of 33 judges. The Constitutional
Tribunal rules on the constitutionality of congressional legislation
and government actions; the National Judiciary Council tests,
nominates, confirms, evaluates, and disciplines judges and prosecutors;
and the Judicial Academy trains judges and prosecutors. The Government
has in recent years taken action to limit the independence of the
Constitutional Tribunal. By year's end, Congress still had not taken
any steps to replace the three judges ousted from the Constitutional
Tribunal after they voted against application of a law allowing
President Fujimori a third term. This effectively paralyzed the court's
ability to rule on any constitutional issues for lack of a quorum (see
Section 3).
The justice system generally is based on the Napoleonic Code. In
civilian courts criminal cases move through three distinct phases.
First, in a lower court a Public Ministry prosecutor investigates cases
and submits an opinion to the examining judge, who determines whether
there is sufficient evidence to issue an indictment. If there is, the
judge conducts all necessary investigations and prepares and delivers a
case report to the superior court prosecutor. Second, the superior
court prosecutor reviews the lower court decision to determine if
formal charges should be brought and renders an advisory opinion to
another superior court, where a three-judge panel holds an oral trial.
All criminal case convictions in civilian courts must proceed to a
third phase, where the Supreme Court hears appeals and confirms or
rejects the previous sentences. All defendants have the right to be
present at their trial. Defendants also have the right to counsel.
However, a public defender system exists in name only; the judicial
system often fails to provide indigent defendants with qualified
attorneys.
Under the military justice system, judges in the lower courts have
the power to sentence and are required to pass judgment within 10 days
of a trial's opening. Defendants may then appeal their sentences to the
Superior Military Council, which has 10 days to make its decision. A
final appeal may be made to the Supreme Council of Military Justice,
which must issue its ruling within 5 days. At the superior military
council and supreme council levels, a significant number of judges are
active-duty line officers with little or no professional legal
training.
Human rights groups and legal experts strongly criticize the power
of the military courts to try civilians in cases of treason or
aggravated terrorism and the powerlessness of the civilian judicial
system to review military court decisions. In 1997 Gustavo Adolfo Cesti
Hurtado, an insurance broker who had retired from military service 13
years earlier, was arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to
prison by the military justice system in a complicated case involving,
in part, alleged insurance fraud in a military purchase of helicopters.
When a civilian court approved a habeas corpus petition and ordered the
military court to release Cesti, the military jurisdiction not only
refused to do so but also charged the civilian judges with usurpation
of power and sought to have them reassigned. The case was brought
before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which rejected a
government motion to dismiss it, and ruled in September that the
Government had violated the American Convention on Human Rights and
ordered that the habeas corpus petition be honored and that the
reparations stage be initiated in order to compensate the victim. In
November the authorities released Cesti from military prison; however,
at year's end, Cesti's legal status remained unresolved, pending a
request from the Government to the Inter-American Court for further
clarification of its ruling.
In 1998 President Fujimori issued a series of decrees that
classified acts of extreme violence such as criminal gang activity,
homicide, kidnaping, and the use of explosives as aggravated terrorism,
to be tried automatically by the military courts in accelerated
proceedings with possible maximum penalties of life imprisonment. The
Government also created the National Intelligence Directorate for
Social Peace and Safety, which increased further the anticrime role of
the National Intelligence Service.
While simple terrorism cases are tried in civilian courts, cases of
aggravated terrorism and treason are tried only before military courts.
Human rights groups and legal experts also charge that the vaguely
worded definitions of certain crimes in the antiterrorism statutes
often lead military judges to issue sentences disproportionate to the
crimes committed. Moreover, defendants in treason cases who are found
not guilty by a military court may be remanded to a civilian court for
a second trial on terrorism charges based on the same facts. In
December the Congress passed legislation which classified cases of
aggravated terrorism as ``special terrorism'' and assigned jurisdiction
over such crimes to the civilian courts. Additionally, in the case of
American citizen Lori Berenson, who was tried by a military tribunal
without due process rights that would have been afforded her in a
civilian court, the Prime Minister indicated in a December 14
television interview that the Government had not foreclosed the
possibility of a civilian trial if it were warranted by previously
unconsidered evidence.
Proceedings in these military courts--and those for terrorism in
civilian courts--do not meet internationally accepted standards of
openness, fairness, and due process. Military courts hold treason
trials in secret, although such secrecy is not legally required.
Defense attorneys in treason trials are not permitted adequate access
to the files containing the State's evidence against their clients, nor
are they allowed to question police or military witnesses either before
or during the trial. Somemilitary judges have sentenced defendants
without even having notified their lawyers that the trials had begun.
Since 1992 military courts tried 1,897 persons charged with treason or
aggravated terrorism. Of these cases, the courts handed down 409 life
sentences, imposed 1,032 sentences between 10 and 35 years in prison,
remitted 408 cases to civilian courts for trial on terrorism charges,
and absolved 48 persons. Since May 1998, the military courts tried 283
civilians for violent crime classified under a 1998 law as aggravated
terrorism. Of these, the courts imposed 66 life sentences, remitted 62
cases to civilian courts, and absolved 20 persons; the remainder
received sentences from 6 to 25 years in prison.
In July the military captured Sendero Luminoso leader Oscar Ramirez
Durand (also known as ``Feliciano'') and tried him in secrecy in August
at the Callao Naval Prison on charges of aggravated terrorism. On
November 18, the court sentenced him to life in prison.
The Constitutional Tribunal remains unable to rule on the
constitutionality of legislation and government actions for lack of a
quorum, since the 1997 impeachment and conviction of three justices who
voted against the application of a law that allowed President Fujimori
to run for a third term in office. The Government ignored an IACHR
recommendation that the three justices be reinstated. The case is
pending before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, although the
Government's unilateral withdrawal from the Court's ``contentious
jurisdiction'' (i.e., when a member government accepts its rulings as
mandatory) raises questions as to whether it would comply with an
adverse ruling.
The National Judiciary Council (NJC), established by the 1993
Constitution has lost many of its original functions. A March 1998 law
transferred the power to investigate and dismiss Supreme Court judges
and prosecutors from the formerly independent NJC to the executive
commissions of the judicial branch and the Public Ministry,
respectively, both of which are controlled by strong allies of
President Fujimori. Critics point to this action as a further example
of executive branch control of the judiciary. A September 1998 law
partially restored the NJC's powers, while leaving the Public Ministry
in charge of determining whom the NJC could investigate. In June the
President of the NJC resigned over differences with his colleagues
after he argued for a more active NJC role. His resignation also
protested the Government's unilateral withdrawal from the Inter-
American Court's contentious jurisdiction.
The NJC also has the power to nominate new judges and magistrates.
However, it is unable to fulfill this mandate until the first class
graduates from the new National Judicial Academy in July 2000. The
Academy continued its in-service training program for judges and
magistrates, which consists of a few hours of classes each week during
the first year, and practical training during the second. The Academy's
training program, originally scheduled to last 6 months but later
extended to 2 years, was strongly criticized as further prolonging
reliance on provisional and temporary officials.
On June 1, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled against
the Government in the case of four Chileans who were convicted of
treason by a military tribunal and sentenced to life in prison. The
Court found that the military had denied the defendants' due process
provided for under the American Convention on Human Rights. The Court
ruled that a civilian court should have had jurisdiction; that military
authorities held the suspects too long in pretrial detention; and that
defense attorneys lacked access to witnesses and evidence and did not
have sufficient time to review the case. The Court directed the
Government to provide the four with new, civilian trials.
Immediately following the Court's decision, the executive branch
announced that it would not comply with the ruling and made clear its
intention not to hold new trials for the Chilean defendants.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court delegated to the Supreme Military
Council the final decision regarding enforcement of the Court's
decision. The Council ruled that it could not grant the Chileans new
civilian trials because laws passed after signing the Convention
required military trials in cases of treason and aggravated terrorism.
President Fujimori and his Cabinet promptly endorsed the Council's
decision not to comply with the Court decision. Despite protests from
the opposition and the legal and human rights communities in July, the
Congress passed a law that called for the Government's immediate
withdrawal from the Court's contentious jurisdiction.
On September 28, the Court ruled that the Government could not
withdraw immediately from the Court's contentious jurisdiction,and
stated that it would continue to process pending cases. The Government
responded that it considered itself outside the Court's contentious
jurisdiction. Public and official statements by government officials
raised questions regarding the extent to which the Government would
comply with pending and future Inter-American Court decisions. This
decision effectively restricted citizens' constitutional rights to seek
redress in the hemisphere's preeminent international tribunal.
In the civilian jurisdiction, a specialized terrorism division of
the Superior Court began trying cases in 1998. The division is based in
Lima, but its judges travel to the provinces as needed. During the
year, judges from this court traveled to Ayacucho to hear the cases of
158 individuals with old warrants outstanding for terrorism charges. Of
these, judges found 24 persons innocent and ordered the suspension of
all 158 warrants. In December 21 additional individuals with old
warrants were also found innocent by this specialized Superior Court,
bringing the total to 179 warrants dismissed. Human rights NGO's and
the Human Rights Ombudsman noted that this action addressed the
concerns of those who considered themselves innocent but feared coming
forward for an abbreviated and unfair trial. However, over 5,000
warrants still remain in effect.
In 1996 Congress established the ad hoc Pardons Commission, which
consisted of the Human Rights Ombudsman as chairman, the Minister of
Justice, and President Fujimori's representative, Father Hubert
Lanssiers. The Commission's mandate was to consider applications of
those who believed themselves to be unjustly accused of terrorism or
treason. At year's end, 3,056 of a total of 3,878 persons accused of
these crimes had applied for clemency, and 535 had received the
Commission's recommendation for pardon. The Commission terminated its
activities on December 31; on December 15 the President signed a law
assigning the Commission's functions to the Justice Ministry's National
Human Rights Council.
Of the 48 recommendations for new pardons that have been pending
before President Fujimori since 1998, 11 received pardons in December.
During the year, he pardoned 7 detainees, bringing the total of
terrorism or treason convicts pardoned and released to 481. Of this
total, military courts had convicted 23 persons of terrorism; civilian
courts convicted the remaining 458. Human rights organizations
independently brought the cases of prisoners they believed to have been
charged wrongly with terrorism or treason to the courts. The courts
declared innocent and freed some 414 prisoners, bringing the total of
all prisoners incarcerated and either pardoned or exonerated to 2,295.
In May the Human Rights Ombudsman recommended legislation for
monetary compensation of innocent persons released through the Pardon
Commission's program. At year's end, the Congressional Committee on
Justice was evaluating this proposal but had not issued its
recommendations.
There were no reports of political prisoners. Sendero Luminoso and
MRTA members charged with terrorism are not considered to be political
prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
Correspondence.--The Constitution requires security forces to have a
written judicial warrant to enter a private dwelling; however, this
requirement is suspended in the emergency zones, where security forces
routinely conduct searches without warrants.
The Human Rights Ombudsman and human rights NGO's continued to
receive complaints about incidents of forced conscription of young men,
including minors, by security forces as part of the constitutionally
mandated system of compulsory 2-year military service, although the
number declined from last year. There continued to be reports of
beatings, mistreatment, and severe injury leading in some cases to
murder or suicide (see Section 1.a. and 1.b.). In a country where well-
placed contacts and even bribes were used by middle-class families in
order to avoid military service, forced conscription tended to target
uneducated youth in remote areas. Although the Ombudsman repeatedly has
raised the issue with the military authorities, they continue to deny
that forced conscription is an official policy. The Human Rights
Ombudsman established a nationwide, toll-free telephone line for use by
any citizen who may have been recruited forcibly or wished to report
such an incident. Despite November 1998 legislation reiterating the
prohibition against forced recruitment, there were 106 cases of forced
conscription reported during 1999. Of these 106 cases, 75 percent
resulted from the military's improper application of conscription laws
to young men who presented themselves voluntarily for military service
and should not have beenassigned to military units because they had
either not completed high school or were not yet 18-year-olds. Roughly
25 percent of the complaints received involved allegations of forced
conscription, which occurred principally in Ayacucho and Huancayo. The
Ombudsman intervened in 95 percent of such cases.
In September President Fujimori signed a law that makes military
service voluntary and prohibits the practice of forced conscription,
although registration remains obligatory. Among other provisions, the
law limits the training period to 30 days and forgives penalties
against those who have not complied with the mandatory service. Under
certain circumstances the President may decree the reestablishment of
mandatory service. These provisions of the law go into effect in
January 2000. The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman plans to monitor
implementation to ensure that the military adheres to the law, since
past efforts to prohibit forced conscription did not prevent it.
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to private
communication, but the media, politicians, some government officials,
and private individuals continued to report that the Government
violated this right. In April 1998, representatives of the Ombudsman's
Office traveled abroad to interview former military intelligence agent
Luisa Margarita Zanatta Muedas, who had fled the country in 1998, after
allegedly providing information regarding SIE wiretapping operations.
They recommended that President Fujimori pardon Zanatta; that the
Public Ministry investigate the wiretapping; and that Congress broaden
the investigation conducted by its committee on defense. By year's end,
the Government had not acted on these recommendations.
In November the IACHR heard the wiretapping case filed by
opposition Congresswoman Anel Townsend and 13 journalists. They charged
that the Government had violated their constitutional right to privacy
and sought civil damages. The Constitutional Tribunal dismissed the
charges in 1998. Having exhausted their domestic resources, the
journalists took their case to the IACHR. By year's end, the IACHR had
not yet reported on the matter. The Congressional Committee on Defense,
Intelligence, and Internal Order, chaired by one of President
Fujimori's loyalists, conducted a summary investigation of the charges.
The investigation not only exonerated the intelligence services and
security forces, but concluded that the aggrievedjournalists had
wiretapped themselves and recommended that they be charged with having
fabricated and disseminated false information that tainted the honor of
the military.
Opposition politicians reported credible incidents of wiretapping
and surveillance. Although high-level government officials denied
government involvement in any of these incidents, there was little
effort to investigate the allegations. On December 5, opposition
presidential candidate Luis Castaneda Lossio called a press conference
to describe his capture and detention of David Pinedo Torres, whom he
alleged had admitting being a SIN agent under orders to conduct
surveillance of Castaneda. However, Pinedo denied Castaneda's account
and charged that Castaneda had kidnaped him and interfered with
Pinedo's performance of his official duties as a policeman.
Reports of forced conscription by the MRTA (most of whose surviving
members are jailed) and the greatly weakened Sendero Luminoso terrorist
groups diminished significantly. However, Sendero Luminoso continued to
coerce indigenous people to join its ranks (see Section 5).
In August the Human Rights Ombudsman updated its 1998 report on
forced or coerced sterilization of women in public hospitals and family
planning clinics. Allegations first arose in October 1997 that a number
of health workers in public hospitals and family planning clinics had
induced female patients to opt for sterilization by promising them food
or another type of good or service or by not providing them with
complete information about available alternatives. The Ombudsman
recommended that all clients of family planning programs be provided
with complete information about all the alternatives available to them,
that no client be pressured into using any particular contraceptive
method, and that if sterilization were chosen, the patient be afforded
a 72-hour waiting period during which to consider that option, prior to
a final decision. The Ministry of Health accepted the Ombudsman's
report and already has implemented many of his recommendations. Since
only 10,000 men have been sterilized under the Ministry of Health's
family planning program, compared with 130,000 women, the Ombudsman
recommended that the Ministry integrate men fully into its family
planning program, thereby disseminating reproductive and contraceptive
information more equitably across gender boundaries. During the year,
the Ombudsman's office received 23 additional complaints of abuses
committed by family planning personal, raising the overall total to 177
between June 1997 and December 1999. The Ombudsman's office continues
to investigate these cases.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, in practice, the
Government inhibits the full exercise of these freedoms. The broadcast
media and portions of the print media continued to practice a great
degree of self-censorship in order to avoid provoking government
retribution. Many in the press regard the Fujimori administration's
harassment of the media as a key tactic for winning the President's
reelection in April 2000.
While the press represents a wide spectrum of opinion, ranging from
left-leaning opposition views to those favoring the Government, the
1997 loss by television owner Baruch Ivcher of his station, the 1998
dismissal of antigovernment journalist Cesar Hildebrandt, and the 1999
closing of the financially stricken opposition daily tabloid Referendum
demonstrate the limits of press freedom.
In the greater Lima area alone, there are 22 daily newspapers, 9
television stations, 65 radio stations, and 3 news channels on 2
commercial cable systems. The Government owns one daily newspaper, one
television network, and two radio stations, none of which has a
particularly large audience.
International press groups and the Organization of American States
(OAS) reported press harassment and accused the Government's
intelligence services of being responsible for some of it. In a
statement issued on October 12, OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression Santiago Canton discussed these accusations, criticized the
use of judicial proceedings to harass journalists, and cited cases of
death threats aimed at journalists. In January Freedom House classified
Peru as ``not free'' in terms of press freedom, and ranked Peru as the
worst country in Latin America for press freedom apart from Cuba. The
Committee to Protect Journalists named President Fujimori one of the
world's ``Top Ten Enemies of the Press.''
Tensions continued during the year between the Government and the
segment of the media that was very critical of certain government
policies and actions, and whose investigative reporting has generated
wide public criticism of alleged government wrongdoing. Government
intelligence agents allegedly continued to orchestrate a campaign of
spurious attacks by the tabloid press against the political opposition
and independent journalists and newspapers. The six tabloids that
carried such attacks had almost identical headlines and text, and the
text also appeared on the Internet, making it appear as though a single
entity were orchestrating the entire campaign of intimidation and
defamation. In October a group of journalists and other workers from
the yellow press tabloid ``El Chato'' resigned from the jobs alleging
they had not received their salaries. In addition, they claimed that
the paper's owner, Rafael Documet, had received payments of $6,000 per
day over the last 10 months from Augusto Bresani, a public relations
advisor who allegedly works for the government, to print headlines
critical of opposition candidates and government critics. Among others,
targets of the tabloid press include journalists Gustavo Mohme, Angel
Paez, and Fernando Rospigliosi. Many investigative reporters admit that
they or their editors held back stories critical of the Government to
avoid the risk of retaliation. In addition, investigative reporters and
their families were targets of telephoned death threats and other
harassment.
According to the NGO Transparencia, the Government spent $62.6
million on advertising, making it the country's largest advertiser by a
large margin. The Ministry of the Presidency spent $24.5 million on
advertising, or 31 percent of the total. Of the total amount, 75
percent of the funds were spent on television ads. Most television
stations are heavily in debt, and low economic growth greatly reduced
revenue from advertising purchased by commercial clients. The resulting
economic dependence leaves them susceptible to government pressure.
Most media observers agree that the broadcast media (with the prominent
exception of one cable news channel), on which most citizens rely for
news, refrained from any critical reporting on the Government during
the year.
According to several credible NGO's, television stations slanted
their views and coverage in favor of President Fujimori at the expense
of other presidential pre-candidates. One opposition candidate claimed
that three private television stations refused to broadcast one of his
paid political advertisements.
Television station representatives subsequently replied that their
station do not have a policy against selling television airtime to
opposition candidates, but they cannot be expected to displace prime
time programming to run 5- to 10-minute political advertisements.
Opposition party representatives then claimed that private television
stations refused to run even 30-second advertisements. The Government's
electoral law does not explicitly regulate political advertising on
privately owned television stations (see Section 3).
In December 1998, the privately owned Channel 13 canceled the
public affairs program of antigovernment journalist Cesar Hildebrandt,
and in August dropped its nightly newscast, which also had been
frequently critical of the Government. In May journalist Nicholas Lucar
resigned from Channel 4's popular Sunday public affairs program
(Revista Dominical) after the station broadcast an interview with
National Intelligence Service adviser Vladimiro Montesinos in which,
according to Lucar, Montesinos dictated the questions and retaped his
own answers. Channel 4 then canceled the program entirely. In related
cases, Channel 13 reporter Rosana Cueva broadcast a tape of purported
conversations in which Montesinos told Channel 4 executive Jose
Francisco Crousillat how to report favorably on the Government. In both
cases, journalists claimed that the Government had pressured the
stations to slant their coverage, although the station owners denied
it.
The opposition press alleged that the Government used financial
pressure to force the opposition tabloid Referendum out of business on
October 2 (Referendum's principal editors worked for Baruch Ivcher at
Channel 2). According to the newspaper's editors, SUNAT, the tax
authority, demanded that Referendum stop publishing in exchange for
rescheduling the tax debt of its parent company. Referendum closed the
day before it was to publish an article alleging the existence of a SIN
plan to murder human rights lawyer Heriberto Benitez, and while it was
investigating other stories critical of the Government. In November
journalist Cesar Hildebrant began publishing the staunch antigovernment
daily newspaper Liberacion.
The campaign against Baruch Ivcher and his former Channel 2
employees also continued, although the Government reissued Ivcher a
passport and the Prime Minister identified Ivcher as a Peruvian citizen
in October. In June a judge sentenced former Channel 2 station manager
Julio Sotelo to 4 years in prison forhaving signed a document
transferring shares of the station from Ivcher to his daughters. In an
April press conference, Ivcher presented supposedly secret documents
from 1997 showing that the SIN and the SIE had planned harassment
against the press. The daily newspaper La Republica later printed the
text of the documents.
In April an organization calling itself the Association in Defense
of Truth (APRODEV) launched an Internet web site that posts the
tabloids' articles and additional dubious information about independent
journalists and opposition figures. APRODEV's representative in Peru is
Hector Ricardo Faisal, an Argentine citizen, and former military
officer. In May 1998, the Argentine Government asked the Government to
extradite Faisal, but the Supreme Court rejected the extradition
request in June 1998. Journalists brought a case against APRODEV,
claiming that its web site was libelous and asking the court to force
APRODEV to close it. The judges initially assigned to the case issued
preliminary rulings in favor of this request, but then were removed
from the case. When a new judge was appointed to handle the case, he
reversed the initial decisions and ruled that the APRODEV site was not
libelous because it simply reprinted information authored and published
by other sources. The journalists filed and lost an appeal of this
ruling.
Independent press associations also alleged that journalists were
subjected to harassment, including death threats. On August 25, several
journalists, along with opposition Congresswoman Anel Townsend, formed
an association called Prense Libre (Free Press) to promote freedom of
expression. Within 2 weeks of the association's founding, the Supreme
Military Tribunal brought a case against it for allegedly using false
documents to support a story on SIE actions to gather information on
potential opposition presidential candidates. In November the Public
Ministry opened an investigation of Prensa Libre journalist Guillermo
Gonzales for his role in Prensa Libre's activities. Public Ministry
officials questioned him but did not formally charge Gonzales or his
colleagues. Also in November, the IACHR issued a statement cautioning
the Government from further actions against journalists. By year's end,
this case remained open, and the possibility of arrest and formal
charges served as an implied threat against journalistic integrity.
According to the National Journalists Association (ANP) and the
Institute of Journalism and Society's journalist protection system (La
Red), there were many cases of media harassment in the provinces by
government institutions (the National Police and the military), and by
local political and commercial organizations. The ANP reported 127
cases of harassment in during the year--of these, 64 percent were in
the provinces, 76 percent were violent, and 54 percent were directed at
radio stations. In the same period, La Red received 101 reports of
harassment, 98 of them from the provinces, where journalists have less
support and visibility than in Lima. A total of 64 percent of the
threats were against radio reporters, reflecting the influence of
provincial radio stations.
Most of these incidents took the form of threats of violence,
judicial proceedings, and charges of defamation, and came from local
police, military officials, politicians, and businessmen. The incidents
resulted in fines against journalists or media outlets, or in rulings
to stop publishing or broadcasting. In one case, a judge sentenced the
news director of Huancayo radio station Radio Senorial to 2 years'
probation and forbade him from working as a journalist for 2 years for
defamation after reporting the results of an audit that revealed
management irregularities by two Huancayo city officials. In another
case, a reporter for La Republica in the city of Jaen received death
threats in September for having investigated and revealed the identity
of a previously unknown member of the Colina group who participated in
the 1997 La Cantuta murders of eight college students.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the authorities
generally respect this right in practice, except in the designated
emergency zones where it is suspended. The law does not require a
permit to organize a public demonstration, but the organizers have to
inform the political authority (Prefecto) about the kind of
demonstration and where the demonstration will take place. Permission
may be denied only for reasons of public safety or health. Municipal
authorities usually granted permission for demonstrations in all
nonemergency zones.
There were five major protests over the year, but only three were
conducted nationally. On April 28, over 3,000 protesters representing
labor unions, student organizations, and opposition political parties
demonstrated against Congress's removal of three Constitutional
Tribunal judges (see Section 3). Over 100 police were deployed; they
used a powerful water cannon and tear gas to disperse the marchers. The
police briefly detained an undetermined number of protesters who were
throwing rocks and attempting to destroy private property.
In July labor groups and social groups held demonstrations in
downtown Lima and in other major cities to protest various Government
policies as well as President Fujimori's eligibility to seek reelection
to a third term. Police were deployed but no violent confrontations or
arrests were reported.
In December a group of about 2,000 students, labor representatives,
and opposition party members marched in protest of President Fujimori's
official announcement that he would seek a third term in office. Labor
union organizers reported that progovernment groups shouted insults and
threw objects at protesters who were facing off with riot police.
Photographs of antigovernment protesters displayed them wielding large
sticks, which protest organizers claimed they had taken up in self-
defense in a standoff with riot police. Some pushing and shoving
occurred, but the police commander's order to retreat prevented a
larger confrontation. Protesters reportedly attempted, but failed, to
gain access to a Government building.
In 1998 the Human Rights Ombudsman, acting in response to violent
confrontations between protesters and the National Police, began a
dialog between protest groups and police on basic rules of conduct.
Monitors from the Ombudsman's office served as official observers to
ensure adherence to these rules by police and protesters alike. The
Ombudsman's office reported that these measures have reduced
significantly tensions and the level of arbitrary arrests, while
diminishing the risk of damage to public and private property.
According to the Ombudsman, with some exceptions, groups were able to
express their opinions publicly, while the National Police maintained
order in a lawful manner.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
authorities generally respect this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
Although the Constitution establishes the separation of church and
state, it also acknowledges the Catholic Church as ``an important
element in the historical, cultural, and moral development'' of the
nation. The preferential status accorded to Roman Catholicism in public
life can be seen in the special treatment and tangible benefits the
Church receives from the State, including remuneration to certain
clergy and church personnel, and tax exemptions on clergy salaries and
real estate holdings. Teaching about Roman Catholicism in primary and
secondary schools is mandatory. Conversion to other religions is
permitted, and missionaries are allowed to enter the country and
proselytize.
This preferential treatment continued throughout the year. In
September Congress passed legislation that required the military to
hire only Catholic clergy and made Catholicism the only recognized
religion of military personnel. Prior to 1977, religious courses in
public and private primary and secondary schools were inter-
denominational. Since 1977 public primary and secondary schools have
offered only teaching about Catholicism, although some non-Catholic
private schools provided non-Catholic religion courses.
In April 1998, the Government issued an executive order that
established basic Catholic religion courses for all public and private
primary school students. Traditionally, school authorities appointed
religious education teachers upon individual recommendations by the
presiding bishop of the local diocese. In November the Education
Ministry issued a directive to implement a September 1998 decree which
made it mandatory for religion teachers to have the approval of the
presiding bishop.
Although teaching about Roman Catholicism has not been required in
the public school system since the education reforms of the 1970's,
most schools devoted 1 hour a week to such study. School authorities
appoint religious education teachers, upon individual recommendations
by the presiding bishop of the local diocese. Parents who do not wish
their children to participate in the prescribed religion classes must
submit a written request for an exemption to the school principal. Non-
Catholics who wish their children to receive a religious education in
theirown particular faith are usually free to organize such classes,
during the weekly hour allotted by the school for religious education,
but must supply their own teacher. The Freedom of Conscience Institute
(PROLIBCO), a recently established NGO that favors the strict
separation of church and state and opposes the preferential treatment
accorded to the Catholic religion, opposes the requirement for Catholic
teaching in the school curriculum and claims that the alternatives made
available to non-Catholic parents violate the constitutional protection
of the privacy and confidentiality of one's convictions and beliefs.
PROLIBCO and other religious groups have challenged mandatory
teaching of Roman Catholicism, and their case is pending before the
Constitutional Tribunal. The case alleges that the mandatory catechism
requirement violates the rights of non-Catholic students to practice
their personal religious convictions. They also have challenged the
practice in which parents must ask school directors for permission to
excuse their children from mandatory religion courses and then pay for
their own teacher during the 1 hour per week of religious study. Apart
from its pending court case, PROLIBCO has alleged discrimination
against non-Catholic groups who must pay import duties and a sales tax
on Bibles brought into the country.
Sendero Luminoso rejects religion and in the past has threatened
and intimidated religious workers.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
of free movement; however, this right is suspended in the emergency
zones, which cover about 6 percent of the country's territory and where
the security forces may detain travelers at any time. The military
generally does not hinder travel in these zones; however, military
commanders often limited the freedom of human rights monitors to
investigate abuses in the emergency zones (see Section 4). Passengers
on public transportation and drivers in private vehicles may be checked
at control points throughout the country.
Although there are no political or legal constraints on foreign
travel or emigration, the authorities legally can restrict persons with
pending criminal and, in some cases, civil charges against them from
leaving the country. Repatriates, both voluntary and involuntary, are
not treated differently from other citizens.
The Constitution prohibits the revocation of citizenship. However,
according to the Nationality Law of January 1996 naturalized Peruvians
can lose their citizenship for, among other reasons, committing crimes
against the State, national defense, and public security, as well as
for reasons that ``affect the public interest and the national
interest.'' Critics believe that it was the Nationality Law that
provided the Government with the legal basis for its 1997 invalidation
of the citizenship through naturalization of Israeli-born Baruch
Ivcher, who consequently lost control of his property, including the
Channel 2 television station which had aired stories of government
abuse (see Section 2.a.). However, the Government claimed that its
decision was based upon irregularities in Ivcher's original
naturalization petition 13 years earlier. Although the Government
issued Ivcher a new Peruvian passport in October, private legal
proceedings continued against him, his family, and former associates.
Sendero Luminoso occasionally interrupts the free movement of
persons by setting up roadblocks in sections of the Upper Huallaga
Valley.
Political violence in the 1980's and early 1990's resulted in the
internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons from their
original homes, and massive rural-to-urban migration. Most families
migrated to Lima or to one of several other department capitals. This
movement created problems which, for the most part, remain unsolved,
despite the Government's and NGO's continued efforts to address them.
The government-sponsored Program for the Repopulation and Development
of Emergency Zones (PAR) estimates the total number of displaced
persons at approximately 600,000; an NGO coalition estimates the total
at approximately 450,000. Apart from the rural-to-urban migration,
there was substantial rural-to-rural migration. At the same time,
persons whose homes were destroyed and whose lives were disrupted
resisted the encroachment of terrorist groups by forming civilian self-
defense committees and thereby managed to remain in their home
communities.
There is also a large population of indigenous Ashaninkas in the
central jungle region who face a terrorist threat. In addition,oil
exploration companies have in the past encroached upon their lands
without consulting them (see Section 5).
With the decrease in terrorist violence since 1995, many displaced
persons began to return to their rural homes. The PAR, which provides a
number of basic services to accelerate returnee self-sufficiency, has
assisted 18,000 persons to return and estimates that another 300,000
have returned on their own. NGO's differ on the total number of
returnees and estimate generally that less than 100,000 have returned
to their communities of origin. However, NGO's and the PAR agree that
only 15 to 20 percent of returnees leave after resettling in their
original communities, due to dissatisfaction with the arrangements that
awaited them in their home communities. An even higher percentage of
returnees have yet to reestablish themselves permanently and instead
travel back and forth between their original and their displacement
homes.
The PAR tends to concentrate on infrastructure development in the
communities to which displaced persons are destined to return, building
roads, bridges, utility lines, schools, health centers, and the like.
The PAR also provides returnees with an initial supply of agricultural
tools, seeds, food, medicines, blankets, and kitchen utensils. The
NGO's, on the other hand, focus on the training of the returnees in
self-advocacy and on the development of vocational skills. The PAR
provides no direct financial assistance to those displaced persons who
chose not to return to their original communities.
According to the Ministry for the Promotion of Women and Human
Development (PROMUDEH), since 1995 the PAR has supported the return of
over 19,000 persons to repopulate 210 localities in the departments of
Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Junin. Since 1995 the Government has
invested almost $5.5 million to build 1,913 classrooms; $1.3 million on
health facilities; $3.8 million on sanitation; $6.6 million to build
12,000 residences; and $2.6 million on local community facilities. The
Government also spent $900,000 on programs to educate and train women
participating in the repopulation programs and provided 947 job
training courses. Additionally, to provide documentation to displaced
persons, the Government registered 764,907 persons since 1997, spending
roughly $7.3 million on its Registry of Provisional Identity Program.
A special problem related to the displaced persons is the lack of
basic documentation, such as birth certificates and voter registration
cards. The many displaced persons who lack birth certificates or other
basic documentation to establish their identity and place of origin can
register with a special office within the PAR. This office in turn
provides applicants with documentation that can be used both to request
PAR assistance to return to their communities of origin and to apply
for a national identity card. The Government conducted a national
registration drive throughout the country to provide displaced
individuals with identity documents and to register them to vote in the
April 2000 national elections.
Another unresolved problem is the question of the legal status of
the approximately 5,000 displaced persons who also fall into the
category of ``requisitoriados''--persons who were forced to join
terrorist groups or were falsely accused of associating with such
groups and continue to have outstanding detention orders issued against
them (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). Although there are insufficient
judicial resources to deal with the caseload and many persons continue
to have outstanding detention orders issued against them, the
Government began to address this problem. During the year, a
specialized terrorism division of the Superior Court heard the cases of
158 individuals in Cusco, found 24 innocent, and ordered the suspension
of all 158 warrants. In December the court found innocent an additional
21 persons, bringing the total of dismissed warrants to 179. Most of
these individuals speak only Quechua, a fact that increases their
vulnerability and reduces even further their capacity for economic and
social integration into urban areas.
Sendero Luminoso continued to coerce indigenous people to join its
ranks during the year, which resulted in further internal displacement
(see Section 5).
The law includes provision for granting refugee and asylee status
in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government
cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in granting
asylum and refugee status and recognizes the Catholic Migration
Commission as the official provider of technical assistance to refugees
and applicants for asylum. The Commission also advises citizens who
fear persecution at home and seek asylum abroad. The
Governmentrecognized 7 persons as new refugees: 5 Colombians, 1 Cuban,
and 1 Bulgarian; there were a total of 758 refugees in the country.
Refugees are allowed to live and work without restrictions and can
apply for naturalization. The status of refugees is reviewed annually.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to countries
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their
government, although the law bars groups that advocate the violent
overthrow of the Government from participating in the political
process. Voting is by secret ballot and mandatory for all citizens
between the ages of 18 and 70. However, members of the armed forces and
the police, as well as felons, are ineligible to vote.
The controversy over President Fujimori's eligibility to seek
reelection continued throughout the year. The undermining of the
Constitutional Tribunal by congressional action was particularly
significant in setting the stage for Fujimori's run for a third term.
As many as 1.4 million signatures were gathered in a petition drive for
a referendum on whether or not the law permitting Fujimori to run for a
third consecutive term should be repealed. However, the National
Elections Board (JNE) ruled that according to a 1996 law, the
referendum could be held only if 48 members of Congress favored it,
thereby reversing its earlier decision permitting the signature drive
to proceed without congressional approval. In August 1998, the
referendum effectively was killed when only 45 members voted for it.
Thus the right to a referendum, which is established in the
Constitution, was abrogated by JNE and legislative action with no
opportunity for judicial review.
The Constitution stipulates that the President can be elected to a
term of 5 years, and that he or she may be reelected for one additional
successive term. On December 27, President Fujimori announced his
candidacy for a third term in 2000; on December 31, the JNE dismissed
on technical grounds 18 objections by opposition figures, political
parties, and other civic groups who argued that a third term would be
unconstitutional. In December the Human Rights Ombudsman stated
publicly that the JNE's decision did not correspond to constitutional
law, but because the Constitution vested the JNE with the final
decision on electoral matters, citizens had to respect the JNE's
decision as representing the final legal recourse.
In accordance with the 1993 Constitution, President Fujimori ran
for a second 5-year term in 1995 and was reelected over 12 other
candidates, receiving 65 percent of the vote. Voters also elected the
120 members of the unicameral Congress under a proportional
representation system; at year's end 72 seats were held by members of
Fujimori's Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoria with allied political movements, and
the remaining 48 members representing 11 parties. Under the 1997
Elections Law, each of the participating political parties must prepare
a list of ranked candidates from which the 120 members of the
unicameral legislature are elected by direct ballot.
Challenges to the constitutionality of a third successive term
rested largely on a series of controversial actions taken by the
executive controlled Congress. In 1996 the congressional majority,
addressing the constitutional provision limiting presidents to no more
than two consecutive terms in office, passed a law (The Law of
Authentic Interpretation) interpreting President Fujimori's 1995
victory as his first under the new Constitution, thereby opening the
way for him to run for a third consecutive term in 2000. The
Administration and Congress' attempt to permit Fujimori to seek a third
term created a constitutional crisis. In 1997 Congress voted to remove
three members of the Constitutional Tribunal who voted against the
application of the Law of Authentic Interpretation to Fujimori, and the
Tribunal effectively ceased to function, unable to rule on any
constitutional issues for lack of a quorum (see Section 1.e.). The
three members of the Constitutional Tribunal filed a complaint with the
IACHR, which the Commission found admissible. In 1998 the Commission
called on the Government to reinstate the three judges on the Tribunal
and formally gave the Government 60 days in which to comply with its
recommendations.
Several legal actions undertaken by certain courts and by Congress
affected the candidacies and campaigns of potential presidential
contenders. On August 6, Congress passed a law prohibiting candidacies
for certain offices such as president or congress of anyone who had
served in high office and had been charged with a crime against the
State. In effect this lawpresumes the guilt of anyone charged but not
convicted of a crime and removes the right to compete for office.
In 1997 Congress appointed a subcommittee to investigate
infiltration by the intelligence service of the voter registration
agency, incompetence in contract administration, and massive
embezzlement of funds. When the subcommittee produced a critical report
in 1998, the Director of the National Voter Registration Bureau and a
number of his senior staff fled the country. There were no reports of
SIN infiltration of electoral institutions during the year.
There were numerous allegations of government-linked harassment of
potential opposition presidential candidates in August and September.
On August 25, members of the Prensa Libre presented documents
purporting to show involvement by the SIN in a press campaign defaming
presidential candidates Alberto Andrade and Luis Castaneda (see Section
2.a.). The Director of Military Intelligence (DINTE) requested that the
Military Supreme Council initiate an investigation, and the Council
concluded that the journalists' documents had misrepresented material
facts. The prosecutor also concluded that the journalists were
responsible for crimes against the public and ordered the JNE and the
Public Ministry to investigate the journalists on these charges. At
year's end, the Public Ministry's investigation remained open.
Lima Mayor and Somos Peru (``We are Peru'') party leader Alberto
Andrade filed a complaint in August against six local daily tabloid
newspapers on the grounds that they had conducted for several months a
systematic defamation campaign against him. Andrade requested a
judicial investigation. The courts remanded the case to the Public
Ministry and ordered the district prosecutor's office to proceed with
an investigation. However, the owners of the six dailies petitioned the
Superior Public Law Court and won an injunction blocking the
investigation. The court further prohibited Andrade's attorney from
continuing any legal action.
In December SUNAT, the national tax collection agency, reportedly
conducted an audit of pre-presidential candidate Andrade's Lima-based
business; government spokesmen asserted that the audit was routine.
On December 5, Solidarity National Party leader Luis Castaneda
Lossio announced a ``citizens arrest'' of a National Police member who
was allegedly surveilling him and his family on behalf of the SIN.
Castaneda turned the man over to police and filed a harassment charge.
Denying the policeman was an intelligence agent surveilling the
presidential candidate, the National Police filed a formal complaint
against Castaneda for kidnapping and interference with the policeman's
official duties. Both sides subsequently dropped their formal
complaints.
On December 13, Prensa Libre published documents purporting to show
that an alleged SIN agent, Corina Manyari, had infiltrated Castaneda
Lossio's National Solidarity Party to spy on his campaign. Manyari told
reporters she had joined Castaneda Lossio's campaign in 1999 as the
head of youth activities and had left in September after being sexually
harassed by a party director. On December 14, President Fujimori told
the press that the government would oppose any infiltration of
opposition parties, and he pledged to investigate allegations of these
types of activities. By year's end, the Government had not indicated
whether it would undertake an investigation.
Opposition members claimed difficulties in buying airtime from
privately owned television stations. According to Transparencia,
television stations slanted their views and coverage in favor of
President Fujimori at the expense of other pre-presidential candidates.
One opposition candidate claimed that three private television stations
refused to broadcast one of his paid political advertisements. The
electoral law does not regulate political advertising on privately
owned television stations (see Section 2.a.).
In December a seven-member delegation from the National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs and the Carter Center reported
``serious flaws'' in the country's preelectoral environment. The
delegation observed that political parties and candidates continued to
actively organize, although the opposition parties continued to
emphasize their participation was not an acceptance of the process as
fair or legitimate, especially regarding the constitutionality of
President Fujimori's reelection bid. The mission found that credible
nonpartisan domestic election observations were underway. It identified
as problems the constitutional interpretation regarding standing for
reelection; violations of press freedoms; use of state resources for
electoral advantage; and declining public confidence in the electoral
process. The delegation alsocalled on the Government to return to the
Inter-American Court and to fill the vacancies on the Constitutional
Tribunal.
The Constitution establishes three bodies to administer elections:
the National Board of Elections; the Office of Electoral Processes
(ONPE); and the National Registry of Identification and Civil Affairs
(RENIEC). The JNE sets the legal parameters and rules on election-
related disputes and challenges. The ONPE administers the elections,
and the RENIEC issues election identity documents.
Women and some minorities participate actively in government and
politics, although they are underrepresented. There are 13 women in the
120-seat Congress. One of 15 cabinet ministers and several vice
ministers are women, as are 3 of the 33 judges of the Supreme Court.
The 1998 municipal elections were held under a new law that mandated
that all party candidate lists for congressional and municipal
elections include at least 25 percent of each sex. Under these
guidelines, women were elected to 24 percent of municipal offices, up
from 8 percent in 1998. In conjunction with the 2000 election campaign,
four women's organizations undertook nationwide programs to identify
female candidates and promote women's interests, increase the number of
female voters, prepare a woman's political agenda, and train women who
were elected to office.
Citizens of Asian descent hold numerous leadership positions in
government; President Fujimori is of Japanese descent and a recent
president of the Council of Ministers was of Chinese descent. Several
members of Congress have mixed ancestry, and a recent Vice President
was a Quechua speaker, as was a recent Minister of Transportation and
Communications. However, it is rare for indigenous people, who make up
more than one-third of the population, to reach the highest leadership
ranks in the public sector. The Afro-Peruvian minority, unofficially
estimated at 3 to 5 percent of the total population, is not represented
at all in the leadership of any branch of the Government.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
In general, the Government permitted numerous NGO's dedicated to
monitoring and advancing human rights to operate freely. The ICRC is
usually able to visit prisoners, including those held for terrorism-
related offenses at the maximum security Naval Prison at Callao.
Military commanders often did not grant access to local and
international human rights monitors to investigate abuses in the
emergency zones and on military bases. Early in the year, officials
from the Ombudsman's office were not granted access to the Sixth Region
military compound.
Government, military, judicial, and police officials, as well as
some members of Congress, publicly accused NGO's and the IACHR of being
overprotective of criminals and terrorists to the detriment of their
victims. There was one report of Government surveillance of an NGO's
office. Dialog between the NGO human rights community and civilian
authorities improved slightly, although communication between the human
rights community (both official and nongovernmental) and the military
ranged from strained to nonexistent.
Most human rights NGO's are independent, thorough, and generally
objective. The National Coordinator for Human Rights (Coordinadora),
established in 1985, provides an umbrella organization for 60 human
rights NGO's. The Coordinadora does not politicize its positions on
human rights issues, although its constituent members may do so in
their own names. A number of other human rights groups associated with
the Catholic Church or with government institutions operate on the
fringes of the Coordinadora.
The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, created in 1993 and
headed by Jorge Santistevan de Noriega, continues to grow steadily in
stature and reputation and opened two additional decentralized offices
in Iquitos and Huancayo. It receives funds from the Government and
foreign governments and is considered one of the most independent and
effective forces in the country for bringing citizens justice. The
Ombudsman enjoys investigative independence and the ability to inform
the public of his conclusions and recommendations. However, he has no
enforcement mechanism other than moral suasion. The Ombudsman's
achievements include: Reports and recommendations for strengthening
democracy and the rule of law; the work of the Pardons Commission,
which he chaired (see Section 1.e.); recommendations regarding alleged
abuses in the Government's family planning program (see Section 1.f.);
the influence onCongress to enact legislative protection for women
against discrimination (see Section 5); a legal analysis of the
country's obligations under, and the benefits of the Inter-American
Court system; a study of the military recruitment system and
recommendations for a voluntary military; and a study on
decentralization of administrative and political power.
The Human Rights Ombudsman has a legal mandate to supervise prison
facilities defined as ``penitentiary centers.'' However, Ombudsman
representatives continued to have problems in gaining access to the
military prison in Callao. In September Ombudsman officials requested
access to this prison to investigate a hunger strike. Although the
military authorities did not reject the request explicitly, they
referred the issue to military officials in Lima. By the time the
strike had ended, authorities had not acted on the request. However,
officials did permit several unscheduled ICRC visits to the Callao
facility during the hunger strike. In July Ombudsman officials visited
Socabaya prison in Arequipa in response to a prisoner strike. The
Minister of Justice subsequently criticized the Ombudsman's office for
taking what he believed was an antigovernment stance.
Following its 1998 visit, the IACHR fact-finding mission delivered
its conclusions and recommendations to the Government. Although the
Government welcomed the Commission's recognition of action taken, such
as the creation of the Human Rights Ombudsman's office and the
abolition of faceless judges, it rejected the Commission's criticism
and recommendations for change. In particular, the Commission had
called on the Government to restore the power of the Constitutional
Tribunal to rule on constitutional issues by reinstating the three
dismissed justices. Following several months of commission-government
discussions, the Government announced that it would not comply with
this recommendation. The Commission forwarded the case to the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights.
On July 8, the Government announced its decision to withdraw from
the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights after that Court determined that the Government had failed to
provide due process in the case of four Chileans convicted of treason
by a military tribunal (see Section 1.e.).
There were no reports of Sendero Luminoso hampering the work of
human rights monitors.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens, and
specifically prohibits discrimination based on ethnic origin, race,
sex, language, religion, opinion, or economic condition. Nevertheless,
discrimination against women, the disabled, indigenous people, and
racial and ethnic minorities continued, although progress is being made
in a number of areas.
Women.--Violence against women, including rape, spousal abuse, and
sexual, physical, and mental abuse of women and girls, continued to be
a chronic problem. Such abuses are aggravated by insensitivity on the
part of law enforcement and judicial authorities toward the female
victims of abuse. The National Institute of Statistics estimated in
October that 37 percent of adult women living in Lima and Callao are
abused annually. One NGO estimates that there are 25,000 annual cases
of physical and mental abuse against women. In 1998 Lima's Police
Station for Women received 3,089 complaints of domestic violence; in
1999 it expected to receive as many as 5,000 complaints. Nationwide in
1998 there were 27,935 complaints of domestic abuse (77 percent for
violence and 23 percent for psychological abuse). Human rights
organizations continue to believe that a large number of domestic
violence cases remain unreported. Moreover, although official figures
for the number of arrests and convictions in abuse cases are
unavailable, NGO sources contend that even the vast majority of
reported cases do not result in formal charges due to fear of
retaliation from the accused spouse, or because of the cost involved in
pursuing a complaint.
Legislation addressed the problem of domestic violence in 1993, and
1997 changes in a law simplified the procedures for reporting cases of
domestic violence, made the process less expensive, and broadened the
judicial remedies available. The 1997 law gave judges and prosecutors
the authority to prevent the convicted spouse or parent from returning
to the family's home. The law also expanded the number of persons
authorized to file complaints of domestic violence to include the
victims' relatives and unrelated persons living in the home. Whereas
previously victims of domestic violence had to have a specialist in
legal medicine certify their injuries, and had to pay for thereport,
the new law eliminated the required fee and stipulated that the report
may be prepared by any health professional.
In March PROMUDEH created the Women's Emergency Program to call
attention to the legal, psychological, and medical problems facing
women and children who were victims of violence. The program received
approximately 8,600 cases between March and November.
According to the Human Rights Ombudsman's office, many women
continued to complain that police officers react indifferently to
charges of domestic violence, even though the new law clearly requires
all police stations to receive such complaints. In 1998 the Ministry of
Women's Advancement and Human Development, with NGO assistance,
initiated a national program to educate police about domestic violence
and to train officers in all police stations in processing domestic
violence cases. The Ministry also opened facilities, staffed entirely
by women, that bring together in one place representatives of all
government institutions--police, prosecutors, counselors, and public
welfare agents--to which abused women might have recourse.
According to the Human Rights Ombudsman, many rape victims continue
to complain that court-appointed medical examiners inappropriately
delved into their past sexual histories. They also accused judges of
looking more favorably on rape victims who were virgins prior to the
rape and of believing that a woman who was raped must have enticed her
attacker. In 1997 Congress repealed a statute whereby convicted rapists
could be absolved of their crime if they married their victim.
In May Congress responded to an appeal from the Human Rights
Ombudsman and amended the Criminal Code to provide greater protection
to victims of sexual violence. The Ombudsman sought elimination of the
provision in the code that affords rapists and other sexual predators
the opportunity to avoid prosecution if they reach a private settlement
with their victims. In addition, the Ombudsman favored rescinding the
provision that specifies that, in cases of sexual abuse of victims over
14 years of age, only victims themselves may file a complaint. Many
victims are afraid of personally filing a complaint of sexual abuse,
particularly in cases where the perpetrators are police officers.
In August the Human Rights Ombudsman published an updated report on
forced or coerced sterilization of women in public hospitals and family
planning clinics, and the Government took action on some of its
recommendations during the year (see Section 1.f.).
The Constitution provides for equality between men and women, and
the 1995 amendments to the Employment Promotion Law, as well as other
laws relative to marriage, divorce, and property rights, prohibit
discrimination against women. In 1997 Congress prohibited racial and
sexual discrimination in employment advertisements or announcements of
educational training opportunities. Legislation in 1997 also repealed
the old disqualification of unmarried or childless individuals for
judgeships in the family courts. This legislation was intended to
broaden employment opportunities for single women. In 1998 Congress
stripped health-care professionals in police hospitals of their police
rank and accorded them civilian status only. Since over 80 percent of
such professionals are women, the Human Rights Ombudsman challenged the
constitutionality of the new law and its implementing regulations, on
grounds of discrimination. The Superior Court of Lima ruled against the
Ombudsman, who then appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which had
not reached a decision at year's end. In October the Congress passed
legislation protecting pregnant women against arbitrary firing.
Traditional assumptions and misconceptions often impede access by
women to leadership roles in both the public and private sectors.
Because of societal prejudice and discrimination, women historically
have suffered disproportionately from the country's pervasive poverty
and unemployment. ``Mibanco,'' a program supported by the Government
and a consortium of NGO's, represents an effort to improve women's
ability to generate income through providing credit to small businesses
started by enterprising women. More than 60 percent of its clients are
women. As of September, Mibanco's loan portfolio represented $13.3
million (approximately 46.5 million soles), with a total of 37,600
clients being served through 17 branches.
Children.--The Government provides free, compulsory education
through secondary school. However, roughly 6 percent of children
between the ages of 6 and 12, and 17 percent of adolescents between the
ages of 12 and 17, either never have attended school or have abandoned
their education. Among children andadolescents who live in poverty or
extreme poverty, the corresponding figures are 16 percent and 43
percent, respectively. School nonattendance is highest in rural and
jungle areas and affects girls more than boys. In 1998 Congress amended
the Child and Adolescent Code to provide pregnant school-age girls with
the right to begin or continue attending school, which reversed the
previous policy at some schools.
The Children's Bureau of the Ministry of Women's Advancement and
Human Development coordinates child- and adolescent-related policies
and programs throughout the Government. In the nongovernmental sector,
the National Initiative on the Rights of the Child is the largest NGO
of its kind and coordinates the work of 27 groups concerned with the
problems of children across the nation.
At the grassroots level, 1,010 Children's Rights and Welfare
Protection Offices receive and resolve complaints ranging from physical
and sexual abuse to child support, abandonment, and undetermined
guardianship. Provincial or district governments operate some 55
percent of these offices, while schools, churches, and NGO's run the
remaining 45 percent. Law students staff most of the units; only the
offices in the wealthiest districts of the country have professionally
trained lawyers, psychologists, and social workers. When these offices
cannot resolve cases, officials typically refer them to the local
prosecutors' offices of the Public Ministry. During 1997 these offices
received a total of 41,077 complaints. Of this total, 15,962 concerned
lack of child support and 8,288 involved violence against children. In
December 1998, Congress enacted new legislation stipulating that
settlements adjudicated by these offices are binding legally and have
the same force as judgments entered by a court of law.
Violence against children and the sexual abuse of children
continued to be serious problems. It is estimated that only 10 to 20
percent of mistreatment and abuse are reported, since many persons
believe that such problems belong within the family and should be
resolved privately. Nonetheless, in Lima alone, at least 400 rapes of
minors are reported annually. In 1996 there were 219,000 orphans in the
country, of whom 25,000 were orphaned for reasons related to political
violence. There were continuing reports of beatings and other
mistreatment of adolescents on army bases, in connection with the
conscription of youths for military service (see Section 1.f.).
According to the 1993 Census, 69.6 percent of children 6 to 17
years old lived in poverty. Of these, roughly half live in rural areas.
Of all children and adolescents under 17 years of age, 20 percent live
in extreme poverty. In 1996 the infant mortality rate was 43 per 1,000.
However, this figure masks wide regional disparities: 30 per 1,000 in
urban areas, compared with 62 per 1,000 in rural areas. Twenty-six
percent of children under age 5, and 48 percent of children ages 6 to
9, suffered from chronic malnutrition. In those homes where the mother
has a low level of education, as many as 50 percent of the children
suffer from chronic malnutrition and 114 per 1,000 die from preventable
causes before they reach age 5.
Street crime committed by children and adolescents is extremely
high, including robbery, physical assault, and vandalism, often carried
out by gangs. According to a 1998 congressional commission study that
investigated the causes of crime, such gangs carry out 75 percent of
all acts of vandalism, 29 percent of assaults, and 23 percent of
robberies. The majority of these crimes are committed under the
influence of drugs and alcohol, and their underlying causes are
unemployment, nonattendance at school, and difficult family
relationships.
In 1998 the Government enacted a series of measures to reduce
street crime, including prosecuting 16- to 18-year-old criminal gang
members in military courts and sentencing those convicted to no less
than 25 years in adult prisons. Human rights groups concerned with the
protection and welfare of children and adolescents called on the
Government to repeal such measures.
As many as 1.2 million children work to help support their
families. Of this total, some 500,000 are under the age of 14, while
700,000 are between the ages of 15 and 17 (see Section 6.d.).
Although laws exist that prohibit sexual abuse of minors and police
enforced such laws, there continued to be reports that minors and young
adults work in the sex trade.
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that severely
disabled persons have ``the right to have their dignity respected and
to be provided by law with protection, care, rehabilitation, and
security.'' In1998 new comprehensive legislation established the
National Council for the Integration of People with Disabilities and
specified the rights, allowances, programs, and services that should be
provided for the disabled. The statute prohibits discrimination,
mandates that public spaces be barrier-free and that buildings be
architecturally accessible, and provides for the appointment of a
specialist in disability rights in the office of the Human Rights
Ombudsman. Nevertheless, in practice, the Government devotes little
attention and resources to the disabled, and they remain economically
and socially marginalized.
The Government does not allocate sufficient funds to make genuine
integration of the disabled into the economy actually possible.
According to the National Coordinator of the Association of Disabled
People, the Government allocated approximately $250,000 (1 million
soles) to integrate the disabled into the economy. Although the new
legislation prohibits discrimination in the workplace, it is vague
regarding the source of funds to pay for the human assistance,
technological support, and environmental adaptations that often are
necessary to enable disabled workers to be productive. As a result,
disabled individuals and the private agencies serving them generally
must rely on public charity and on funding from international
organizations.
The 1993 census counted 288,526 disabled persons, or 1.3 percent of
the population; however, the Ministry of Health and the Pan American
Health Organization believe that the vast majority of disabled persons
either do not wish to acknowledge their disability to census takers or
do not know what constitutes a disability, and that the actual number
of disabled persons could be as high as 3 million, or 13.8 percent of
the population. The Government, in conjunction with the country's
hospitals, plans to implement a national register of disabled persons;
however, it had not yet done so by year's end.
Since the privatization of the social security and national health
insurance systems, it has been difficult for many disabled persons to
obtain coverage because insurance carriers typically believe that a
severe disability necessarily increases a person's vulnerability to
accidents and illnesses.
Although construction regulations have long mandated barrier-free
access by persons with physical disabilities to public service
buildings, no effort has been made to implement this provision. Nor do
accommodations exist, such as accessible polling stations, interpreters
for the deaf in government service offices, and Braille or recorded
versions of the Constitution, which would permit the disabled to
participate in the basic processes of democracy and citizenship.
According to officials of the Institute for Social Security, less
than 1 percent of severely disabled citizens actually work. Among those
who do, many have been channeled into a restricted number of
occupations traditionally assumed to be ``suitable'' for the disabled,
such as telephone switchboard operation and massage, in the case of the
blind. Some private companies have initiated programs to hire and train
the disabled, and a private foundation provides small loans to the
disabled for the purpose of starting their own businesses.
Nevertheless, in general, disabled persons continued to face
discrimination by potential employers. For example, the basic statute
governing the policies and procedures of the judicial branch
specifically prohibits the blind from serving as judges or prosecutors,
a discriminatory provision that the National Judiciary Council has
interpreted to apply to all persons with disabilities. In 1998,
SEDAPAL, Lima's water utility, dismissed all its blind switchboard
operators, ostensibly as part of a nondiscriminatory, across-the-board
cost-cutting measure. However, the chief advocate for the disabled in
Congress reported that all the blind operators immediately were
replaced by younger, sighted recruits. The disabled only recently have
begun to organize and demand equal rights and opportunities as a
minority.
Indigenous People.--The Constitution prohibits discrimination based
on race and provides for the right of all citizens to speak their
native language. Nevertheless, the large indigenous population still
faces pervasive discrimination and social prejudice. Many factors
impede the ability of indigenous people to participate in, and
facilitate their deliberate exclusion from, decision-making directly
affecting their lands, culture, traditions, and the allocation of
natural resources. According to indigenous rights groups, the
provisions in the 1993 Constitution and in subsequent implementing
legislation regarding the treatment of native lands are less explicit
about their inalienability and unmarketability than were earlier
constitutional and statutoryprotections. Pervasive discrimination and
social prejudice intensify feelings of inferiority and second-class
citizenship. Many indigenous people lack such basic documents as a
birth certificate or a voter's registration card that normally would
identify them as full citizens and enable them to play an active part
in society.
Peruvians of Indian descent who live in the Andean highlands speak
Aymara and Quechua, which are recognized as official languages. They
are also ethnically distinct from the diverse indigenous groups that
live on the eastern side of the Andes and in the tropical lowlands
adjacent to the Amazon basin. A 1998 regulation stipulating that all
school teachers must have a professional teaching certification
initially caused fears that uncertified indigenous teachers would lose
their jobs, and that the continued use of Aymara and Quechua as
languages of instruction, as well as the very survival of indigenous
cultures, had been put in jeopardy; however, due to the unwillingness
of many certified teachers to work in rural areas, uncertified Aymara-
and Quechua-speaking teachers continue on the job.
The native population of the Peruvian Amazon, which the Government
estimates at a little under 200,000 and organizations representing the
native communities estimate at between 200,000 and 300,000, faces
pervasive discrimination and social prejudice. In accordance with local
culture and traditions, most of the native communities have a spiritual
relationship with their land, and the concept of land as a marketable
commodity is alien to them. Nevertheless, according to the Director of
the Human Rights Ombudsman's Native Communities Program, the only right
still statutorily set aside for this native population with respect to
its land is that of ``unassignability,'' which prevents the title to
such lands from being reassigned to some nonindigenous tenant, simply
because that tenant happens to have lived on those lands for a
substantial amount of time. On the other hand, the marketing and
outright sale of the lands are no longer prohibited.
Many other factors also contribute to the marginalization of
indigenous people in society. Poor transportation and communications
infrastructure in the highlands and in the Amazon jungle region makes
political mobilization and organization difficult. The geographic
isolation of much of the indigenous population and the centralization
of government action in Lima further limit the access and participation
of indigenous people in society.
In many jungle areas, encroachment on native lands comes from a
variety of sources--colonists and coca growers in search of livelihood
and profit, terrorists in search of new bases of operation, and
business interests in search of exploitable natural resources. For
example, there are approximately 25 oil exploration fields and numerous
gold mining operations on indigenous lands in the Amazon region. The
45,000 Aguaruna and the 5,000 Huambisa people, who inhabit the frontier
area where the 1995 Peru-Ecuador border conflict took place, are just 2
of many indigenous groups that complain about intolerable living
conditions and inaccessible public services. In the same region, along
the Pastaza River, the 4,700 Achuar people live in 36 communities, only
12 of which have title to their land. In addition, the Achuar are
fighting what they fear may be a losing battle against an incursion by
oil exploration and drilling interests, as well as against a
government-sponsored influx of colonists. Title to land does not
include mineral or other subsoil rights; this condition leads to
conflicts between mining interests and indigenous communities. Such
encroachment often can damage the environment and negatively affect the
health of the native people. About 20 indigenous groups in the Amazon
Basin have requested communal reserves to hunt wild game, which is
allowed under the law, but the Government has not approved this
request.
The two principal NGO's that represent the interests of the native
population of the Peruvian Amazon are the Inter-Ethnic Association for
the Development of the Peruvian Jungle (AIDESEP) and the Confederation
of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru (CONAP). Both organizations joined
the Permanent Conference of Indigenous Peoples, an umbrella body
designed to coordinate the activities and unify the voice of the
country's indigenous population. Both AIDESEP and CONAP are critical of
the 1995 land law, which permits Amazonian land to be bought and sold
if no one is living on it or otherwise making use of it. However, CONAP
believes that mining and other development operations are inevitable
and, therefore, wants native communities to share appropriately the
benefits of that development. AIDESEP remains opposed to territorial
encroachments by government, commercial, and other interests.
Although indigenous rights advocates protest the low priority
assigned by the Government to the socioeconomic condition of indigenous
people and the lack of consultation regarding matters affecting their
welfare, the Human Rights Ombudsman believes that the Government's
attitude has changed. The Government's Indigenous Affairs Commission,
formed in November 1998, is working to fulfill its mandate to
coordinate all available state services to meet the needs of indigenous
people better. The Commission, which is chaired by the Ministry of
Women's Advancement and Human Development, has among its members
officials from a variety of relevant ministries as well as four
representatives of the Indian peasant population in the highland and
coastal areas and the native population of the Amazon jungle. While
Congress created its own Indigenous Affairs Committee in May, it had
not yet begun to function as of year's end.
Sendero Luminoso continued to be a leading violator of the rights
of indigenous people. Isolated primarily along the Ene River in Junin
department, Sendero Luminoso continued to coerce indigenous Ashaninkas
to join its ranks. This practice resulted in further internal
displacement in this region.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population includes several
racial minorities, the largest of which are persons of Asian and
African descent. Afro-Peruvians, who tend to be concentrated along the
coast, often face discrimination and social prejudice, and they are
among the poorest groups in the country.
Afro-Peruvians generally do not hold leadership positions in
government, business, or the military. Both the navy and the air force
are widely believed to follow unstated policies that exclude blacks
from the officer corps. The law prohibits employment advertisements in
the newspapers from specifying the color of the candidates sought, but
employers often find discreet ways to relegate blacks to low-paying
service jobs.
In 1998 Congress passed legislation that prohibits various forms of
discrimination by retail establishments against prospective customers.
The law passed due to strong support from the Commission on Consumer
Protection of the National Institute for the Defense of Free Market
Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property (INDECOPI),
whose order to nightclubs not to exclude black patrons had been
overturned by a district court. However, the new legislation has not
deterred significantly discriminatory practices.
According to two organizations specializing in the rights of
persons of African descent, police continue to detain persons of
African descent on suspicion of having committed crimes, on the basis
of their skin color. Similarly, police rarely act on complaints of
crimes against Afro-Peruvians. Afro-Peruvians are portrayed
unflatteringly by the entertainment industry as individuals of
questionable character.
Although Peruvians of Asian descent historically have suffered
discrimination, their social standing has improved markedly during the
past decade, as the country has sought to emulate Asia's earlier
economic growth and as the Asian community achieved financial success.
Besides President Fujimori, who is of Japanese descent, many other
Peruvians of Asian descent hold leadership positions in business and
government.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the law provide
for the right of association, but worker rights advocates claim that
provisions are overly restrictive. About 5 percent of the total work
force of 8.5 million belong to organized labor unions. More than half
of all workers participate in the informal sector of the economy.
Workers are not required to seek authorization prior to forming a trade
union, nor can employers legally condition employment on union
membership or nonmembership. However, groups including the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) continue to
assert that laws promulgated by the Fujimori administration in 1992, as
well as provisions included in the 1993 Constitution, fail to protect
the rights of workers to form unions. Labor rights advocates claim that
many workers are reluctant to organize due to fear of dismissal.
Unions represent a cross section of political opinion. Although
some unions traditionally have been associated with political groups,
the law prohibits unions from engaging in explicitly political,
religious, or profit-making activities. The several union leaders who
ran unsuccessfully for Congress in 1995 all did so in their own names,
without official union sponsorship.Nevertheless, it is believed that
some union activists who run for public office receive unofficial
backing from their unions.
In 1995 and 1996, Congress passed legislation amending the 1992
Employment Promotion Law, which all the main union confederations
publicly criticized for restricting the rights of workers, including
the freedom to bargain collectively. Unions also complained that the
new legislation eliminated the right of dismissed workers to compulsory
reinstatement, if it was proven that they had been dismissed unjustly.
In practice, the legislation continued to have a negative impact on the
right of association by making it easier for companies to fire workers
involved in union activities.
On April 28, the Peruvian General Workers' Union (CGTP) and other
labor groups called a general strike throughout the country. According
to press accounts, the strike drew support from some 400,000 public
transport drivers and workers from other sectors. This included some
civil service workers, health providers, and construction workers, as
well as support from a broad range of religious and social
organizations and opposition politicians. The strike reportedly
paralyzed commercial and other activities in the country's largest
cities. It culminated in protest marches around the country, including
a large gathering of up to 20,000 persons in downtown Lima. The
Government responded by posting a heavy police presence throughout the
country to maintain order.
Confrontations in Lima between protesters and police occurred in
several different instances, in some cases reportedly provoked by
protesters who burned tires, threw rocks, and tried to destroy public
and private property. The office of the Human Rights Ombudsman reported
that 75 individuals were arrested following sporadic incidents of
violence, and only 7 were held for over 2 days. The Ombudsman's office
also reported one episode in which police used tear gas to break up a
group of protesters in route to downtown Lima who had done nothing
provocative.
In June medical workers undertook a 2-day strike to protest low
wages and working conditions after negotiations between their union and
the Ministry of Health broke down.
There are no restrictions on the affiliation of labor unions with
international bodies. Several major unions and labor confederations
belong to international labor organizations such as the ICFTU, the
international trade secretariats, and regional bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution recognizes the right of public and private sector workers
to organize and bargain collectively. However, it specifies that this
right must be exercised in harmony with broader social objectives.
Labor regulations promulgated prior to adoption of the 1993
Constitution provide that workers may form unions on the basis of their
occupation, employer affiliation, or geographic territory. The
regulations prohibit temporary, probationary, apprentice, and
management employees from union membership.
According to the regulations, union officials must be active
members of their union, but the number of individuals each union may
designate as ``official'' is limited, as is the amount of time
officials may devote to union business on company time. No legal
provisions exist requiring employers to reinstate workers who are found
to have been fired unjustly for union activities.
To become an official collective bargaining representative, a union
must represent at least 20 workers. Representatives may participate in
collective bargaining negotiations and establish negotiating
timetables. Management negotiating teams cannot exceed the size of
union teams, and both sides are permitted to have attorneys and
technical experts present as advisers.
Proposals for a strike require secret ballot approval of a majority
of all workers in a company, whether union members or not. A second
vote must be taken, if petitioned by at least 20 percent of the
workers. However, labor rights advocates complain that many temporary
workers are reluctant to participate even in secret ballots, due to
fear of employer retaliation. The labor movement continued to criticize
provisions in the new amendments to the Employment Promotion Law, which
make it easier for employers to dismiss employees and thereby to impede
the right of workers to bargain collectively. However, there are no
legal restrictions preventing unions from negotiating for higher levels
of worker protection than the baseline standards provided for by law.
Labor regulations permit companies unilaterally to propose
temporary changes in work schedules, conditions, and wages, and to
suspend collective bargaining agreements for up to 90 days, if obliged
to do so by worsening economic circumstances or other unexpected
negative developments, provided they give their employees at least 15
days' notice of such changes. However, worker rights advocates allege
that, in practice, few employers respected this provision. If workers
reject an employer's proposed changes, the Ministry of Labor is
required to resolve the dispute based on criteria of ``reasonableness''
and ``economic necessity.'' Whether the changes proposed by employers
in such instances are upheld in full or in part, employers are required
to adopt all possible measures, such as the authorization of extra
vacation time, in order to minimize the negative economic impact on
their employees.
Although a conciliation and arbitration system exists to resolve
management and labor disputes, union officials complain that their
proportionate share of the costs of arbitration often exceeds their
resources. In addition, union officials claim that, as the law
prohibits temporary workers from participating in union organizing
elections, more and more companies have resorted to hiring workers on
temporary, personal services contracts as a means of preventing
increases in union strength. Although the new legislation restricts the
number of temporary workers hired to 20 percent of a company's work
force, worker rights advocates alleged that this quota rarely was
respected. Employers denied that they are biased against unions,
arguing that the labor stability provisions of the legislation have
made long-term commitments to workers too expensive.
Special regulations aimed at giving employers in export processing
and duty free zones a freer hand in the application of the new
legislation provide for the use of temporary labor as needed, for
greater flexibility in labor contracts, and for setting wage rates
based on supply and demand. As a result, workers in such zones have
difficulty in unionizing, although worker rights advocates admit these
zones are few in number and do not contribute substantively to labor's
unionizing difficulties.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor. There were no reports during the
year of this practice in remote Andean mountain and Amazonian jungle
regions. The Constitution does not prohibit specifically forced or
bonded labor by children. There were occasional allegations of such
labor in the informal gold mines of Madre de Dios department in recent
years. However, information obtained during the year indicates that the
practice is no longer a problem.
In response to a 1994 complaint filed with the International Labor
Organization (ILO), the Government acknowledged that forced labor
existed and adopted measures to address the problem. The Government had
not policed this practice adequately, partly because of inadequate
funding for what was regarded as a low priority, and partly because of
the geographical remoteness of the informal gold mining region. NGO's
and other labor observers in Lima and Madre de Dios believe that the
recruitment system known as ``enganche'' ceased. This system was
practiced over the last several years in the early 1990's in Puno,
Juliaca, Sicuani, and Cuzco, and provided free transportation to the
mines. Workers were allegedly required to work for at least 90 days
before being paid.
In general, gold mining workers lack proper medical care, are
forced to work long hours for as little as $2.50 (12 soles) plus meals
for a 12-hour day. Some employers hold their workers' pay for long
periods of time, although there were no reports during the year of
workers being deprived of their pay altogether. There were reports of
beatings and rapes in some mining camps. The mine owners have failed in
the past to comply with the legal provisions that apply to juvenile
workers.
In 1999 the Ministry of Energy and Mines reported for a second
consecutive year that the number of registered dredging companies fell,
while informal operations continued. NGO sources and the ILO report
that mechanization largely has replaced manual labor, and in 1999 the
Ministry of Labor inspection programs helped deter illegal child labor
in this region. The ILO and NGO's agree that child labor remained a
problem nationwide and especially in the informal sector, but there
were no reports of forced child labor during the year. Available
information suggests that other forms of forced labor were not a
problem during the year.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--TheChild and Adolescent Code of 1992 governs child and
adolescent labor practices. The legal minimum age for employment is 14.
However, children between the ages of 12 and 14 may work in certain
jobs to help support their families if they obtain special permission
from the Ministry of Labor and certify that they are also attending
school. In certain sectors of the economy, higher minimums are in
force: 14 in agricultural work; 15 in industrial, commercial, or mining
work; and 16 in the fishing industry. Certain types of employment are
prohibited, such as work underground; work that involves the lifting
and carrying of heavy weights; work where the child or adolescent is
responsible for the safety of others; night work; or any work that
jeopardizes the health of children and adolescents, puts at risk their
physical, mental, and emotional development, or prevents their regular
attendance at school.
The Constitution provides for compulsory, free education through
secondary school. Nevertheless, largely because of widespread poverty,
approximately one-third of all school age children and adolescents work
during daytime hours rather than attend classes, and only a few of them
attend classes at night.
Many children are pressed to help support their families from a
very early age by working in the informal economy, which escapes
government supervision of wages and working conditions. Other children
and adolescents work either in formally established enterprises, or as
unpaid workers at home, or in the sex trade (see Section 5).
Adolescent workers must be authorized to work and must be
registered unless they are employed as domestic workers or as unpaid
family workers. Adolescents only may work a certain number of hours
each day: 4 hours for ages 12 through 14, and 6 hours for ages 15
through 17. Adolescent employment must be remunerated in accordance
with the principle of equal pay for equal work. In practice, the
stipulations and prohibitions stated in the Child and Adolescent Code
are violated routinely, especially in the informal sector where
government standards very rarely are enforced. Child and adolescent
laborers work long hours in the agricultural sector. Many other
children are reportedly employed in dangerous occupations or in high-
risk environments, such as gold mining, garbage collection, loading and
unloading produce in markets, and brick making, or work in stone
quarries and fireworks factories, among others.
In recent years, government surveys variously have estimated the
number of child and adolescent workers at anywhere from 500,000 to 1.9
million. A 1996 government study found that 8 percent of the work force
is between the ages of 6 and 14 (see Section 5). Child and adolescent
labor tends to be seasonal, with the highest survey statistics being
reported during school vacation periods. The Constitution does not
prohibit specifically forced or bonded labor by children, although
there are laws which prohibit this practice.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution provides that
the State promote social and economic progress and occupational
education. It states that workers should receive a ``just and
sufficient'' wage to be determined by the Government in consultation
with labor and business representatives, as well as ``adequate
protection against arbitrary dismissal.''
In 1997 the Government raised the statutory minimum wage to $104
(345 soles) a month, which is not considered sufficient to provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family. That year the
Government estimated the poverty line to be about $45 (157 soles) a
month per person. According to some estimates, as much as half the work
force earns the minimum wage or below.
The Constitution also provides for a 48-hour workweek, a weekly day
of rest, and an annual vacation. In addition, it prohibits
discrimination in the workplace.
While occupational health and safety standards exist, the
Government lacks the resources to monitor firms or enforce compliance.
Labor advocates continued to argue that the Government dedicated
insufficient resources to enforce existing legislation. However, the
Ministry of Labor employs a force of 100 inspectors to carry out
ongoing unannounced visits throughout the country. When firms are found
to be in violation of the law, the Government sanctions them with fines
or, in some case, closure. In cases of industrial accidents, the level
of compensation awarded to the injured employee usually is determined
by agreement between the employer and the individual involved. In 1992
the Government introduced reforms that eliminated the need to prove an
employer's culpability in order to obtain compensation for work-related
injuries. No provisions exist in law for workers to remove themselves
from potentially dangerous work situations without jeopardizing their
continued employment. The Ministry of Labor continued to receive worker
complaints and intervened in hundreds of cases.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons. In November the Government adopted
legislation that criminalized alien smuggling, which is defined as
promoting, executing, or assisting in the illegal entry or exit of
persons from the country. Prostitution is legal, but the law prohibits
and sanctions activities of those who would obtain benefits from
prostitution, such as pimping. Laws prohibiting kidnaping, sexual abuse
of minors, and illegal employment are enforced and could be used to
sanction traffickers in persons. Available information suggests that
illegal trafficking in persons in, to, or from the country is not a
significant problem.
______
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS
Saint Kitts and Nevis is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy and
a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. The Constitution provides the
smaller island of Nevis considerable self-government, as well as the
right to secede from the Federation in accordance with certain
enumerated procedures. The Government comprises a prime minister, a
cabinet, and a bicameral legislative assembly. The Governor General,
appointed by the British monarch, is the titular head of state, with
largely ceremonial powers. After national elections in June 1995, Dr.
Denzil Douglas of the St. Kitts and Nevis Labour Party became Prime
Minister and formed a government with 7 of 11 seats in the legislature.
The judiciary is independent.
Security forces consist of a small police force, which includes a
50-person Special Services Unit that receives some light infantry
training, a coast guard, and a small, newly formed defense force. The
forces are controlled by and responsive to the Government. There were
occasional allegations of abuse by the police.
The mixed economy is based on sugar cane, tourism, and light
industry. Most commercial enterprises are privately owned, but the
sugar industry and 85 percent of arable land are owned by a state
corporation. In November Hurricane Lenny caused $7.2 million in
additional damage to the economy, which had been devastated by
Hurricane Georges in 1998, which caused an estimated $445 million in
damage. The 1998-99 tourist season suffered significant losses, since
85 percent of the houses and buildings were damaged. The hurricanes
also damaged an estimated 50 percent of the sugar industry. Per capita
gross domestic product was about $7,080 in 1998.
The Government generally respected citizens' human rights; however,
there were problems in a few areas. Poor prison conditions, apparent
intimidation of witnesses and jurors, government restrictions on
opposition access to government-controlled media, and violence against
women were the principal problems.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Law enforcement authorities abide by the constitutional
prohibitions against the use of torture or other forms of inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. However, there are occasional
instances of excessive use of force by the police. The police force
conducts its own internal investigation when complaints are made
against members. There was one reported incident of excessive physical
force against civilians by a police officer, involving abuse of a
suspect. The police conducted an internal investigation of this case,
but the case finally was dropped due to lack of sufficient evidence.
Prison conditions are poor. Prisoners suffer from severe
overcrowding and poor food, and security is lax. These conditions have
contributed to riots in the past, although none has occurred since
1994. The prison, built in 1840, was designed to accommodate 60 inmates
but houses approximately 127 prisoners.
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government respects
this provision in practice. The law requires that persons detained be
charged within 48 hours or be released. If charged, the police must
bring a detainee before acourt within 72 hours. Family members,
attorneys, and clergy are permitted to visit detainees regularly.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the judiciary is highly regarded. However,
intimidation of witnesses and potential intimidation of jurors in high-
profile, drug-related cases threatened this traditional independence.
The Government is exploring the possibility of a program to protect
witnesses, judges, and jurors through the Caribbean Community
(Caricom).
The court system comprises one high court and four magistrate's
courts at the local level, with the right of appeal to the Eastern
Caribbean Court of Appeal. Final appeal may be made to the Privy
Council in the United Kingdom. There are no military or political
courts. Free legal assistance is available for indigent defendants in
capital cases only.
The Constitution provides that every person accused of a crime must
receive a fair, speedy, and public trial, and these requirements
generally are observed. In the latter part of the year, approximately
26 persons were being held on ``remand'' (detention pending trial or
further court action).
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--There were no reports of arbitrary government or
police interference in the private lives of individuals. The law
requires judicially issued warrants to search private homes.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and, for the most part, the
authorities respected these provisions in practice. The Government owns
the only radio and television station on St. Kitts. A Trinidadian
company manages it; however, the Government appoints three of its five
board members. There is a religious television station and a privately
owned radio station on Nevis.
St. Kitts and Nevis does not have a daily newspaper; each of the
major political parties publishes a weekly or biweekly newspaper. A
third weekly newspaper is nonpartisan. The papers are free to criticize
the Government and do so regularly and vigorously. International news
publications are readily available.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly. Political parties
organized demonstrations, rallies, and public meetings during the 1995
election campaign without significant government interference. Many
meetings sponsored by the Nevis Island administration and opposition
parties were held in Nevis to discuss the secession question.
The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for the free
exercise of religion, and religious practices are not restricted. All
groups are free to maintain links with coreligionists in other
countries.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict travel
within or departure from the country. However, following Hurricane
Georges in September 1998, the Government declared a state of emergency
and instituted a curfew to avoid looting during the period of
electrical power loss.
No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests
exists. The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise. There
were no reports of forced expulsion of anyone having avalid claim to
refugee status; however, government practice remains undefined.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens are free to change their government by peaceful means. A
vigorous multiparty political system exists in which political parties
are free to conduct their activities. Periodic elections are held in
which all citizens 18 years of age and older may register and vote by
secret ballot. According to the Constitution, the next general
elections must take place by June 2000.
The Legislative Assembly has 11 elected seats; 8 for St. Kitts and
3 for Nevis. The Government holds 7 of the 11 seats; opposition parties
hold the other 4. In the June 1995 elections, Dr. Douglas' St. Kitts
and Nevis Labour Party won seven of eight seats at stake in St. Kitts
with 60 percent of the popular vote, and Douglas became Prime Minister.
The People's Action Movement (PAM), the former ruling party, took only
one seat, but received 40 percent of the vote. The Concerned Citizens
Movement won two of the three Nevis seats; the Nevis Reformation Party
won the remaining one. The island of Nevis has considerable self-
government and its own legislature.
In accordance with its rights under the Constitution, the Nevis
Island Assembly in 1996 initiated steps towards secession from the
Federation, the most recent being a referendum in August 1998. However,
the referendum failed to secure the two-thirds majority required for
secession. Prior to the referendum, a Caricom-initiated Constitutional
Review Commission submitted a report that recommended an alternative
political structure--a presidential system with separate elected
legislatures for Saint Kitts and for Nevis. These recommendations are
under review by both islands. All parties involved adhered to
constitutional procedures, and no acts of violence were reported in
connection with the secession question.
Although the Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of
political opinion or affiliation, the opposition PAM alleges widespread
employment discrimination by the St. Kitts and Nevis Labour Party
against public sector employment of persons perceived to be opposition
supporters. PAM alleges that the ruling party dismissed or demoted many
PAM supporters from their jobs in order to replace them with its own
supporters. The Government acknowledged that it had withheld pension
benefits from opposition members of Parliament voted out of office and
entitled to such benefits. However, all pension benefits have since
been paid with the exception of those of the former Minister of Women's
Affairs.
There are no impediments in law or in practice to the participation
of women in leadership roles in government or political parties. There
are no women in the Cabinet. However, 2 of 3 senators are women, 1 of 2
magistrates is a woman, the court registrar is a woman, and 5 of 9
permanent secretaries are women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
While there are no governmental restrictions, no local human rights
groups have been formed. There were no requests for investigations or
visits by international human rights groups.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, place
of origin, birth out of wedlock, political opinion or affiliation,
color, sex, or creed, and the Government generally respects these
provisions in practice.
Women.--According to a government official, violence against women
is a problem, but many women are reluctant to file complaints or pursue
them in the courts. Despite this reluctance, there were publicly
reported cases of both domestic violence and rape, and a few
convictions. There is no domestic violence legislation.
The role of women in society is not restricted by law but is
circumscribed by culture and tradition. There is no overt societal
discrimination against women in employment, although sectoral analyses
suggest that women do not yet occupy as manysenior positions as men.
The Bureau of Women's Affairs, under the Ministry of Health and Women's
Affairs, is active in promoting change in the areas of domestic
violence, poverty, institutional mechanisms to advance the status of
women, health, and leadership positions for women. Since 1997 the
Bureau has also been active in training the police and school guidance
counselors on issues of domestic violence, sexual crimes, and child
abuse.
Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and
welfare and has incorporated most of the provisions of the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child into domestic legislation.
People with Disabilities.--Although there is no legislation to
protect the disabled or to mandate accessibility for them, the
Government and the Constitution prohibit discrimination in employment,
education, and other state services.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of all workers to form and belong to trade unions. The law
permits the police, civil service, and other organizations to have
associations which serve as unions. The major labor union, the St.
Kitts Trades and Labour Union, is affiliated with the St. Kitts and
Nevis Labour Party and is active in all sectors of the economy. There
is also an independent teachers' union, a union representing
dockworkers in the capital city, and two taxi drivers' associations.
The right to strike, while not specified by law, is well
established and respected in practice. There were no major strikes
during the year.
Unions are free to form federations or confederations and to
affiliate with international organizations. The islands' unions
maintain a variety of international ties.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor unions
are free to organize and to negotiate for better wages and benefits for
union members. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination but does not
require employers found guilty to rehire employees fired due to
antiunion discrimination. However, the employer must pay lost wages and
arrange for severance pay. There is no legislation governing the
organization and representation of workers, and employers are not
legally bound to recognize a union, but in practice employers do so if
a majority of workers polled wish to organize. Collective bargaining
takes place on a workplace by workplace basis, not industrywide. A
Labor Commission mediates all types of disputes between labor and
management on an ad hoc basis. However, in practice few disputes
actually go to the Commission for resolution. If neither the Commission
nor the Ministry of Labor can resolve the dispute, legislation allows
for a case to be brought before a civil court.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
forbids slavery and forced labor, and they do not occur in practice.
While neither the Constitution nor law specifically addresses bonded
labor, it has not been a problem in practice.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The 1966 Employment of Children Ordinance outlaws slavery,
servitude, and forced labor, and prescribes the minimum legal working
age, which is 14 years. The Labor Ministry relies heavily on school
truant officers and the community affairs division to monitor
compliance, which they do effectively. The law mandates compulsory
education up to the age of 16. Although the law does not specifically
address bonded labor (see Section 6.c.), it has not been a problem in
practice.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--A 1984 law, updated in 1994,
establishes minimum wage rates for various categories of workers, such
as domestic servants, retailemployees, casino workers, and skilled
workers. The minimum wage varies from $56.18 (EC$ 150) per week for
full-time domestic workers to $74.91 (EC$ 200) per week for skilled
workers. These provide an adequate, though Spartan, living for a wage
earner and family; many workers supplement wages by keeping small
animals such as goats and chickens. The Labor Commission undertakes
regular wage inspections and special investigations when it receives
complaints; it requires employers found in violation to pay back wages.
The law provides for a 40- to 44-hour workweek, but the common
practice is 40 hours in 5 days. Although not required by law, workers
receive at least one 24-hour rest period per week. The law provides
that workers receive a minimum annual vacation of 14 working days.
While there are no specific health and safety regulations, the
Factories Law provides general health and safety guidance to Labor
Ministry inspectors. The Labor Commission settles disputes over safety
conditions. Workers have the right to report unsafe work environments
without jeopardy to continued employment; inspectors then investigate
such claims.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons.
Recent press reports indicate that the country's economic
citizenship program, which allows individuals to purchase passports
through investments ranging from $200,000 (EC$540,000) to $285,000
(EC$770,000), has facilitated the illegal immigration of persons from
China and other countries to North America. Criminal organizations
reportedly provide funds to such individuals to pay these fees, and the
persons later are trafficked to Canada and the United States, where
they work under conditions similar to bonded labor until their debt is
repaid.
______
SAINT LUCIA
Saint Lucia is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy and a member
of the Commonwealth of Nations. The Government comprises a prime
minister, a cabinet, and a bicameral legislative assembly. A Governor
General, appointed by the British monarch, is the titular head of
state, with largely ceremonial powers. In general elections in 1997,
the Saint Lucia Labour Party (SLP) defeated the incumbent United
Workers Party (UWP), gaining 16 of 17 seats in the House of Assembly.
Dr. Kenny Anthony of the SLP assumed the prime ministership from the
UWP's Dr. Vaughan Lewis, who had taken over from long-serving UWP Prime
Minister John Compton in March 1996. The judiciary is independent.
The Royal Saint Lucia Police is the only security force and
includes a small unit called the Special Services Unit (which has some
paramilitary training) and a coast guard unit. They are controlled by
and responsive to the Government. There were occasional allegations of
abuse by the police.
The economy is based on tourism and on the export of bananas, which
represent the principal sources of foreign exchange earnings. Saint
Lucia is diversifying its economy into other types of agriculture,
light manufacturing, and construction. Unemployment, estimated at 22
percent in late 1998, remains a source of potential instability. Per
capita gross domestic product was about $3,000 in 1997.
The Government generally respected citizens' human rights; however,
there were a few problems. Occasional credible allegations of physical
abuse of suspects or prisoners by the police, very poor prison
conditions, long delays in trials, domestic violence against women, and
child abuse were the major problems.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
On June 18, in the village of Micoud, police shot and killed a
suspected marijuana dealer in an exchange of gunfire. Police officers
also were injured in the exchange. In commenting on the incident, one
local newspaper questioned whether the police had used excessive force
in seeking to apprehend the marijuana dealer.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution specifically prohibits torture, and there
were no reports of such abuse. However, one newspaper reported that on
July 15 police officers severely beat a detainee being held on charges
of breaking and entering, and burglary. The individual allegedly broke
into and stole items from a police officer's home. According to the
medical report, injuries included a black eye due to fist blows, pains
in a finger due to twisting, pains in the thorax and scrotum due to
blows, and head pains due to kicks.
Prison conditions are very poor. The island's only prison, built in
the 1800's to house a maximum of 101 prisoners, was subject to severe
overcrowding with over 340 inmates. The prison's conditions,
overcrowding, and lengthy trial delays led to a prison riot in June
1997; prisoners set fires that destroyed over half of the antiquated
prison. The inmates asserted that the fires were part of a protest for
improved prison conditions. Following the fires, the authorities
transferred about 250 inmates to a factory shell outside the capital
and stationed the paramilitary Special Services Unit at the prison. The
prison has since been repaired, the majority of prisoners have been
returned to the prison, and the Special Services Unit has ceased
guarding the prison.
Following the riots, the Government invited Penal Reform
International (PRI), a London-based nongovernmental organization (NGO),
to conduct a study of the prison and make recommendations. Its
recommendations included the release of prisoners awaiting trial for
minor offenses and the introduction of noncustodial alternatives as a
sentencing option. As a result of the PRI report, the authorities
selected a new superintendent of prisons who took over in February
1998,established a permanent Complaints Board comprised of prominent
citizens to meet every month to hear prisoners' complaints, hired 24
new prison officials, and made some limited improvements to the
facility. Despite these measures, inmates made another attempt to burn
down the main prison facility in September 1998, but caused only
limited damage. According to the superintendent, both the 1997 and the
1998 incidents of unrest occurred prior to the start of a new session
of the High Court when prisoners on ``remand'' (detention pending trial
or further court action) discovered that their cases were not on the
published list of cases to be heard. There are 101 prisoners on remand
who have been denied bail and are awaiting trial.
The Government also started the groundwork for a new $17 million
(EC$50 million) prison facility near Dennery in the eastern part of the
island. The projected completion date for the new prison is September
2000.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government adheres
to the constitutional provisions that prohibit arbitrary arrest or
imprisonment and require a court hearing within 72 hours after
detention. However, the authorities frequently have held prisoners for
years on remand after charging them (there is no constitutional
requirement for a speedy trial). At the time of the 1997 prison riot,
about 160 of the prisoners were on remand. One extreme case involved a
prisoner put on remand in 1993, who finally was tried and convicted in
June 1998. In addition, two foreign nationals, a Ghanaian and a
Nigerian, have been held on remand since 1996. These individuals are
being detained for immigration violations, pending resolution of who
will pay the expense of their deportations.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
There are two levels of courts: Courts of summary jurisdiction
(magistrate's courts) and the High Court. Both levels have civil and
criminal authority. The lower courts accept civil claims up to about
$1,850 (EC$5,000) in value and criminal cases generally classified as
``petty.'' The High Court has unlimited authority in both civil and
criminal cases. All cases can be appealed to the Eastern Caribbean
Court of Appeal. Cases may be appealed to the Privy Council in London
as the final court of appeal.
The Constitution requires public trials before an independent and
impartial court and, in cases involving capital punishment, provision
of legal counsel for those who cannot afford a defense attorney. In
criminal cases not involving capital punishment, defendants must obtain
their own legal counsel. Defendants are entitled to select their own
legal counsel, are presumed innocent until proven guilty in court, and
have the right of appeal. The authorities observe both constitutional
and statutory requirements for fair public trials.
However, the court system continued to face a serious backlog of
cases. In the latter part of 1998, the magistrate's courts had a
backlog of over 6,000 cases. Previously, the Government had invited a
team of justices from Australia to conduct a study and to make
recommendations for reducing the backlog. The team issued a report (the
Bauer report) in 1998. At year's end, the Government still was
reviewing the report's recommendations.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanctions.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects this right in practice.
There are five privately owned newspapers, two privately owned
radio stations, and one partially government-funded radio station. They
carry a wide spectrum of political opinion and are often critical of
the Government. The radio stations have discussion and call-in programs
that allow persons to express their views. The two local television
stations are also privately owned and cover a wide range of views. In
addition there is subscription cable television service, which provides
programming from a variety of sources.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
this right in practice. The law requires permits for public meetings
and demonstrations if they are to be held in public places, such as on
streets or sidewalks or in parks. The police routinely grant such
permits; the rare refusal generally stems from the failure of
organizers to request the permit in a timely manner, normally 48 hours
before the event.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests
exists. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. There
were no reports of the forced expulsion of anyone having a valid claim
to refugee status; however, government practice remains undefined.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government and exercised
that right in 1997 when the SLP defeated the UWP, which had governed
with only one interruption since 1964. The SLP won 16 of 17 seats,
campaigning on a platform of job creation and economic diversification
and appealing explicitly to women and younger voters. In response to
concerns about the size of the SLP's parliamentary majority, Prime
Minister Anthony publicly emphasized that the Government would make
efforts to reach out to the opposition to ensure that the country's
democratic traditions were not undermined by the small size of the
parliamentary opposition. The 1996 merger of smaller parties--the
Concerned Citizens' Movement, the Saint Lucia Freedom Party, and the
Citizens' Democratic Party--into the SLP left the country with only two
major political parties. The Governor General, who had been affiliated
with the UWP, stepped down following the elections. He was replaced by
Pearlette Louisy.
Under the Constitution, general elections must be held at least
every 5 years by secret ballot, but may be held earlier at the
discretion of the government in power. Two members of the Senate are
independent, appointed by the Governor General.
There are no legal impediments to participation by women and
minorities in government and politics; however, women and minorities
are underrepresented. Two of the 13 members of the Cabinet are women,
as is the Governor General.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government generally does not restrict international or
nongovernmental investigations of alleged violations of human rights.
In some cases it has requested international organizations to
investigate possible abuses.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Government policy is nondiscriminatory in the areas of housing,
jobs, education, and opportunity for advancement. There are no legal
restrictions on the role of women or minorities.
Women.--There is increased awareness of the seriousness of violence
against women. The Government does not prosecute crimes of violence
against women unless the victim presses charges. If the victim chooses
for any reason not to press charges, the Government cannot bring a
case. Charges must be brought under the ordinary Civil Code. In 1997
the Government established a family court to hear cases of domestic
violence and crimes against women and children.
The police force conducts some training for police officers
responsible for investigating rape and other crimes against women, but
there is no special unit that handles crimes against women. Police and
courts enforce laws to protect women against abuse, although police are
hesitant to intervene in domestic disputes, and many victims are
reluctant to report cases of domestic violence and rape or to press
charges.
The 1994 Domestic Violence Act allows a judge to issue a protection
order prohibiting an abuser from entering or remaining in the place
where the victim is. It also allows the judge to order that an abuser's
name be removed from housing leases or rental agreements, with the
effect that the abuser would no longer have the right to live in the
same residence as the victim.
The Saint Lucia Crisis Center for women was established in 1988 in
Castries, the capital; a second opened in the southern town of Vieux
Fort in January. These centers monitor cases of physical and emotional
abuse and help clients deal with such problems as incest, nonpayment of
child support, alcohol and drug abuse, homelessness, custody, and
visitation rights. The Crisis Center has publicized the plight of
battered women and has protested the rare deaths of women who were
victims of domestic violence. The organizers also are working to
establish a shelter for battered women and homeless girls, but no
progress had been made at year's end. The Crisis Center reports that
the number of new cases declined since the establishment of the family
court because women can seek help in two places. Some secondary schools
address the problems of sexual harassment and battering in their
curriculum topics.
Women's affairs come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Health, Human Services, Family Affairs, and Women. The Minister is
responsible for protecting women's rights in domestic violence cases
and preventing discrimination against women, including ensuring equal
treatment in employment.
Children.--Since independence, successive governments have given
high priority to improving educational opportunities and health care
for the nation's children. Education is free and compulsory from age 5
through 15. However, only about one-third of primary school children
continue on to secondary schools, and the drop-out rate from primary to
secondary school is higher for boys than for girls. Government clinics
provide prenatal care, immunization, child health care, and health
education services throughout the island.
A broad legal framework exists for the protection of children
through the Criminal Code, the Children and Young Persons Act, the
Family Court Act, the Domestic Violence Act, and the Attachment of
Earnings Act. Although the Government adopted a national plan of action
in November 1991 for the survival, protection, and development of
children, it has not fulfilled this program by implementing effective
programs. The Saint Lucia Crisis Center reports that the incidence of
child abuse remains high.
People with Disabilities.--No specific legislation protects the
rights of the disabled, nor mandates provision of access to buildings
or government services for them. There is no rehabilitation facility
for the physically disabled, although the Health Ministry operates a
community-based rehabilitation program in residents' homes. There are
schools for the deaf and for the blind up to the secondary level. There
is also a school for the mentally retarded.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution specifies the right
of workers to form or belong to trade unions under the broader rubric
of the right of association. Most public sector employees are
unionized; about 20 percent of the total work force is unionized.
Unions are independent of government and are free to choose their own
representatives in often vigorously contested elections. There are no
restrictions on the formation of national labor federations. In 1994
several of the major unions formed an umbrella grouping called the
Industrial Solidarity Pact.
Strikes in both the public and private sectors are legal, but there
are many avenues through collective bargaining agreements and
government procedures that may preclude a strike. The law prohibits
members of the police and fire departments from striking. Other
``essential services'' workers--water and sewer authority workers,
electric utility workers, nurses, and doctors--must give 30 days'
notice before striking.
Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations, and
some have done so.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have the
legal right to engage in collective bargaining, and they fully exercise
this right. Union representatives have reported attempts by the
Government and other employers to undermine this process.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers, and there
are effective mechanisms for resolving complaints. It also requires
that employers reinstate workers fired for union activities.
Labor law is applicable in the export processing zones (EPZ's), and
there are no administrative or legal impediments to union organizing or
collective bargaining in those zones. However, in practice many firms
resist union efforts to organize in the EPZ's, even to the point of
closing operations.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur.
While there is no specific prohibition of forced or bonded labor by
children, there were no reports of such practices.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--While the Children and Young Persons Act permits a minimum
legal working age of 14 years, education legally is required through
age 15. Ministry of Labor officials are responsible for enforcing the
law. There were no reports of violations of child labor laws. The
Government does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by
children, but such practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Wages Regulations (Clerks)
Orders, in effect since 1985, set out minimum wage rates only for
clerks. These office workers receive a legislated minimum wage of about
$300 (EC$800) per month. The minimum wage is not sufficient to provide
a decent standard of living for a worker and family, but some
categories of workers receive more than the legal minimum for clerks,
which is used only as a guide for setting pay for other professions.
There is no legislated workweek, although the common practice is to
work 40 hours in 5 days. Special legislation covers hours which shop
assistants, agricultural workers, domestics, and young people in
industrial establishments may work.
Occupational health and safety regulations are relatively well
developed. The Labor Ministry periodically inspects health and safety
conditions at places of employment under the Employees' Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1985. The Ministry enforces the act through
threat of closure of the business if it discovers violations and the
violator does not correct them. Workers are free to leave a dangerous
workplace situation without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
address trafficking in persons. There were no reports that persons were
trafficked in, to, or from the country.
______
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
St. Vincent and the Grenadines is a multiparty, parliamentary
democracy and a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. A prime
minister, a cabinet, and a unicameral legislative assembly compose the
Government. The Governor General, appointed by the British monarch, is
the titular head of state, with largely ceremonial powers. Prime
Minister Sir James F. Mitchell and his New Democratic Party (NDP) were
returned to power for an unprecedented fourth term by a slim margin in
free and fair elections held in June 1998. The judiciary is
independent.
The Royal St. Vincent Police, the only security force in the
country, includes a coast guard and a small Special Services Unit with
some paramilitary training. The force is controlled by and responsive
to the Government, but police continued to commit some human rights
abuses.
St. Vincent has a market-based economy. Much of the labor force is
engaged in agriculture. Bananas are the leading export and a major
source of foreign exchange earnings. However, the banana industry is
declining, and the growing tourism sector is becoming the leading
earner of foreign exchange. Unemployment is estimated to be 20 percent,
and the 1998 per capita gross domestic product was approximately
$2,400.
The Government generally respected citizens' human rights; however,
there were problems in a few areas. The principal human rights problems
continued to include occasional instances of excessive use of force by
police, the Government's failure to punish adequately those responsible
for such abuses, poor prison conditions, and an overburdened court
system. Violence against women and abuse of children also were
problems.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
On December 14, a police antidrug patrol shot and killed Junior
Harry, who they said was fleeing while the patrol conducted a search
for narcotics in buildings near the town of Barrouallie. A police
spokesman said that Harry was armed with a shotgun. At year's end, the
authorities had not yet scheduled the inquest to establish whether
police used excessive force, which is the normal procedure in such a
case.
There was one death in custody under circumstances involving
criminal negligence (see Section 1.c.).
In June 1998, the police shot and killed a man who had been
arrested, when he attempted to flee the police station in handcuffs.
The authorities initially arrested and charged the officer responsible
for the shooting death with murder, but they later reduced the charge
to manslaughter. The officer was released on bail, and a magistrate
acquitted him at the preliminary inquiry early in the year.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and other forms of
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. However, regional
human rights groups have noted that a high percentage of convictions
are based on confessions. One human rights group believes that some of
these confessions resulted from unwarranted police practices, including
the use of physical force during detention, illegal search and seizure,
and failure properly to inform those arrested of their rights.
There is no independent review board to monitor police activity and
to hear public complaints about police misconduct. Human rights
advocates recommend such a board to protect the rights of citizens who
complain about police misconduct.
On June 25, one individual died of injuries sustained while in
police custody. The police detained the person in the police station at
about 5:00 p.m. that day. Later the same evening, they took the
detainee to the local hospital where he was pronounced dead as a result
of severe head injuries. On August 12, a coroner's inquest
investigating the death found the deathto have been due to criminal
negligence. The authorities suspended the six police officers
implicated in the abuse, and the acting director of public prosecutions
filed charges against the officers for manslaughter due to gross
criminal negligence. In December the magistrate conducting the
preliminary inquiry dismissed the cases against the police officers.
The magistrate recognized that the death was due to negligence, but
stated that he was unable to apportion the blame among the six
officers.
Prison conditions are poor. Antiquated and overcrowded prisons,
with over 350 inmates in a prison designed for 75, result in serious
health and safety problems. An inmate who wishes to speak with his
lawyer must do so by written correspondence, and the authorities
sometimes monitor and censor such correspondence. In July prisoners
rioted and seized control of the prison to protest poor conditions and
treatment. The riot ended peacefully within 24 hours. To resolve the
prison disturbances, the Government acceded to some demands set by the
prisoners, such as improved food, shorter lock-down periods, and more
attentive medical care. However, conditions did not change
significantly in the prison and less violent incidents of prisoner
protest continued.
Conditions are also inadequate for juvenile offenders. There is a
small facility for delinquent boys, but it is seriously inadequate and
generally is used for those already convicted through the criminal
system. Although separate legal statutes exist for youthful offenders,
there are no separate magistrates or prosecutors to handle such cases.
In 1998 the High Court ruled against the Superintendent of Prisons
for having ordered corporal punishment with a ``cat-o-nine tails''
against an inmate, characterizing the flogging as torture. In July
1998, the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal dismissed the Government's
appeal of this decision and ordered the High Court to determine an
amount of compensation for the prisoner. In October the High Court
judge awarded compensation to the prisoner of about $85,000
(EC$225,000).
The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides for persons detained for criminal offenses to receive a fair
hearing within a reasonable time by an impartial court. Although there
are only two official magistrates, the registrar of the High Court and
the presiding judge of the family court effectively serve as
magistrates when called upon to do so. While this practice reduced the
backlog, complaints remain regarding police practices in bringing cases
to court. Some defense attorneys claim that this has caused 6- to 12-
month delays in preliminary inquiries for serious crimes.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent and impartial court, and the judiciary is independent in
practice.
The judiciary consists of lower courts and a High Court, with
appeal to the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal and final appeal to the
Privy Council in the United Kingdom. There are three magistrates, plus
one magistrate who serves only the family court.
The Constitution provides for public trials. The court appoints
attorneys for indigent defendants only when the defendant is charged
with a capital offense. Defendants are presumed innocent until proven
guilty and may appeal verdicts and penalties. There is a large backlog
of pending cases, particularly for criminal cases, because of delaying
tactics by lawyers as well as the overburdened judicial system.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary search and
seizure or other government intrusions into the private life of
individual citizens, and there were no reports of such abuses.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects this right in practice.
There are two major newspapers and numerous smaller, partisan
publications; all are privately owned, and most are openly critical of
the Government's policies. There were no reports of government
censorship or interference with the operation of the press. However,
individual journalists believe that government advertising, a
significant source of revenue, sometimes is withheld from newspapers
that publish articles that are less than favorable to the Government.
The lone television station in St. Vincent is privately owned and
operates without government interference. Satellite dishes are popular
among those who can afford them. There is also a cable system with
mainly North American programming that has about 300 subscribers. The
Government controls programming for the government-owned radio station.
The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests
exists. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. There
were no reports of forced expulsion of anyone having a valid claim to
refugee status; however, government practice remains undefined.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government through
regularly scheduled free and fair elections. St. Vincent has a long
history of multiparty parliamentary democracy. During the June 1998
election, the ruling New Democratic Party won a slim 1-seat majority (8
of 15) in Parliament, despite losing the popular vote by a 55 to 45
percent margin to the opposition Unity Labour Party (ULP). Calling this
outcome an ``overt manifestation of rejection by the public'' of Prime
Minister Mitchell's Government, the ULP made claims of election fraud
and demanded new elections. The Prime Minister refused the ULP demand,
and instead proposed a constitutional review to consider possible
amendments such as a provision for proportional representation.
There are no legal impediments to women's full participation in
politics or government; however, they are underrepresented. There is
only one woman in Parliament, as a member of the opposition.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Opposition political groups and the Vincentian press often comment
on human rights matters of local concern. The St. Vincent and the
Grenadines Human Rights Association (SVGHRA) monitors government and
police activities, especially with respect to treatment of prisoners,
publicizing any cases of abuse. The Government is generally responsive
to public and private inquiries about its human rights practices.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal treatment under the law
regardless of race, sex, or religion, and the Government adheres to
this provision.
Women.--Violence against women, particularly domestic violence,
remains a major problem. The Government took legislative steps to
address this problem through the Domestic Violence/Matrimonial
Proceedings Act (1994) and the more accessible Domestic Violence
Summary Proceedings Act (1995). Both laws provide for protective
orders, as well as occupation and tenancy orders, although the former
is only accessible through the High Court, whereas the latter can be
obtained without the services of a lawyer in family court. Since
passage of the laws, the SVGHRA has conducted numerous seminars and
workshops throughout the country to familiarize citizens with their
rights under these acts. Increasing numbers of women are coming forward
with domestic violence complaints.
Depending on the magnitude of the offense and the age of the
victim, the penalty for rape is generally 10 or more years in prison.
In 1995 the legislature amended the Child Support Law to allow for
payments ordered by the courts even when notice of an appeal has been
filed. Previously, fathers who had been ordered to pay child support
could appeal decisions and not pay while the appeal was being heard.
This resulted in a huge backlog of appeal cases and effectively reduced
the number of mothers and children receiving support payments. The
family court was established in 1995 in the capital city of Kingstown
with one magistrate. According to the SVGHRA, because there is only one
bailiff to service all the country, summonses often are not served on
time for cases to be heard as scheduled in court.
The Ministry of Education, Women's Affairs, and Culture has a
women's desk that assists the National Council of Women with seminars,
training programs, and public relations. The minimum wage law specifies
that women should receive equal pay for equal work.
Marion House, a social services agency established by the Catholic
Church in 1989 and staffed by four trained counselors and three foreign
volunteers, provides counseling and therapy services.
Children.--Education is not compulsory, but the Government states
that it investigates cases where children are withdrawn from school
before the age of 16. Although the Government has played a more
prominent role in legislating health and welfare standards since
independence, the infant mortality rate is still very high. One
underlying cause is the large number of children born to teenage
mothers.
The Domestic Violence Summary Proceedings Act provides a limited
legal framework for the protection of children. Nevertheless, reports
of child abuse remain high and are on the increase. The Social Welfare
Office is the government agency responsible for monitoring and
protecting the welfare of children. The police are the enforcement arm;
the Social Welfare Office refers all reports of child abuse to the
police for action.
People with Disabilities.--There is no specific legislation
covering persons with disabilities, and the circumstances for disabled
individuals are generally difficult. Most severely disabled people
rarely leave their homes because of the poor road system and lack of
affordable wheelchairs. The Government partially supports a school for
the disabled which has two branches. A separate, small rehabilitation
center treats about five persons daily.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides citizens
the right to form unions and to organize employees, while the Trade
Unions and Trade Disputes Act allows the right to strike. Employers
often ignore the constitutional provisions that provide for union
rights, and claim that they have a constitutional right not to
recognize a trade union. However, some employers seek a good industrial
relations environment and cooperate with trade unions. There were no
major strikes during the year.
St. Vincent and the Grenadines joined the International Labor
Organization in 1997 and assumed all its obligations for enforcement of
labor standards.
Unions have the right to affiliate with international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There are no
legal obstacles to organizing unions; however, no law requires
employers to recognize a particular union as an exclusive bargaining
agent. Some companies offer packages of benefits with terms of
employment better than, or comparable to, what a union normally can
obtain through negotiations. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination
by employers. Generally effective mechanisms exist for resolving
complaints. The authorities can order employers found guilty of
antiunion discrimination for firing workers without cause (including
for participation in union activities) to reinstate the workers or give
them severance pay.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. The
Government does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by
children, but there were no reports that it occurred.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law sets the minimum working age at 16 years of age,
although a worker must be 18 years of age to receive a national
insurance card. The labor inspection office of the Ministry of Labor
monitors and enforces this provision, and employers generally respect
it in practice. The age of leaving school at the primary level is 15
years; when these pupils leave school, they are usually absorbed into
the labor market disguised as apprentices. There is no known child
labor except for children working on family-owned banana plantations,
particularly during harvest time, or in family-owned cottage
industries. The Government does not prohibit specifically forced or
bonded labor by children, but there were no reports that it occurred
(see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets minimum wages,
which were last promulgated in 1989. They vary by sector and type of
work and are specified for several skilled categories, including
attendants, packers, cleaners, porters, watchmen, and clerks. In
agriculture the wage for workers provided shelter is $0.82 (EC$2.25)
per hour; skilled industrial workers earn $7.36 (EC$20) per day, and
unskilled workers earn $3.68 (EC$10) per day. In many sectors the
minimum wage is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living
for a worker and family, but most workers earn more than the minimum.
The Wages Council, according to law, should meet every 2 years to
review the minimum wage, but it has not met since 1989. However, in
mid-year the Cabinet agreed to convene a new Wages Council to discuss
changes to the minimum wage. At year's end, the council's meeting was
postponed until March 2000.
There is no legislation concerning the length of the workweek;
however, the general practice is to work 40 hours in 5 days. The law
provides workers a minimum annual vacation of 2 weeks.
According to the Ministry of Labor, legislation concerning
occupational safety and health is outdated. The most recent
legislation, the Factories Act of 1955, has some regulations concerning
only factories, but enforcement of these regulations is ineffective.
Workers enjoy a reasonably safe working environment; however, the trade
unions have dealt with some violations relating to safety gear, long
overtime hours, and the safety of machinery. There were some reports of
significant visual deficiency by visual display unit workers, and some
reports of hearing impairment by power station and stone crushing
employees. It was not clear under present legislation whether workers
have the right to remove themselves from work situations that endanger
health or safety without jeopardy to their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws specifically
addressing trafficking in persons. There were no reports that persons
were trafficked in, to, or from the country.
______
SURINAME
After over a decade of predominantly military rule, Suriname
installed a freely elected Parliament and inaugurated a democratically
chosen president in 1991. Another free and fair election was held in
May 1996, but no candidate was able to secure the two-thirds majority
of the 51-member National Assembly necessary to elect a president. In
accordance with the Constitution, an 836-member United People's
Assembly, a broadly representative, democratically chosen body, then
voted in Jules Wijdenbosch of the National Democratic Party (NDP) as
President in September 1996. Wijdenbosch formed a cabinet from members
of the NDP, the ethnic-Hindustani Grassroots Party for Renewal and
Democracy, the ethnic-Javanese KTPI party, and several smaller
political parties. Although the Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, an ongoing dispute between the previously
sitting judges and a new slate Wijdenbosch appointed has damaged
severely the concept of an independent judiciary. As a result, the
effectiveness of the courts is even more limited in practice.
The armed forces are responsible for national security and border
and immigration control and are under the control of the civilian
Minister of Defense. Civilian police bear primary responsibility for
the maintenance of law and order and report to the Ministry of Justice
and Police. The Venetiaan government had taken steps to reform the
military in 1995-96 by purging military officers and supporters of
former dictator Desi Bouterse, who ruled the country in the 1980's.
Although Bouterse loyalists continue to hold civilian positions of
authority, their influence within the military has declined steadily.
The military hierarchy has placed a growing emphasis on civilian
control over the military. During large antigovernment street
demonstrations in May, the military remained apolitical and rejected
suggestions for military intervention. Members of the security forces
continue to be responsible for some human rights abuses.
The economy depends heavily on the export of bauxite derivatives.
Unregulated gold mining is an increasingly important economic activity
that highlights a lack of land rights for indigenous and tribal people
and has a serious environmental impact. The Government and state-owned
companies employ over half the working population. Overall economic
conditions deteriorated during the year. Following an inflation rate of
5 percent for most of 1997 and 22 percent in 1998, in 1999 inflation
had reached an estimated annual rate of 121 percent. In addition,
estimated gross domestic product declined by 1 percent in 1999. Per
capita annual income was about $2,500.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, endemic problems still remain in some areas. There
was one incident of extrajudicial killing. Police mistreat detainees,
particularly during arrests; guards abuse prisoners; and local
detention facilities remain overcrowded. The judiciary suffers from
ineffectiveness and a huge case backlog. There was some harassment and
media self-censorship, and societal discrimination against women and
indigenous and tribal people persists. Violence against women is a
problem. In view of the human rights record of the Bouterse regime,
many of whose members participate in the current Government, human
rights organizations remain concerned about the potential for a
deterioration of civil liberties. The Wijdenbosch administration has
not addressed calls to investigate human rights abuses by previous
regimes, other than by appointing a committee in December 1997 to
establish a framework for an investigative commission. However, the
Government did participate in an independently sponsored ``Truth and
Reconciliation'' conference in August 1998. The preliminary meeting
sought to solicit suggestions for the framework of a human rights
commission and included frank discussion of human rights violations
committed during the 1980's, but no concrete action followed.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
In June police officers shot and killed two innocent men whom they
mistook for escaped armed felons. The Government immediately admitted
it was at fault and compensated the families. The families also sued
the Government in civil court.
While there have been no recent reports of political killings, the
Government has not addressed past abuses, and they continue to be a
focus of concern. The authorities have not taken action against prison
guards who allegedly beat a prisoner to death in 1993. The Government
undertook no investigation into the 1982 executions by the Bouterse
regime of 15 opposition leaders and the 1986 massacre of civilians at
the village of Moiwana.
However, in December 1997 the Wijdenbosch administration appointed
a ``committee to establish the framework for a commission to
investigate past human rights abuses.'' Human rights groups, which had
been pressing since 1995 for an independent human rights commission to
investigate violations committed during the 1980's, were neither
informed nor consulted prior to the establishment of the committee.
Moreover, the chairman of the committee was reportedly a member of
Bouterse's team of legal advisers; his appointment raised questions
regarding the objectivity of the group's work. Although the committee's
report was presented to the President in September, the Government has
not yet released its contents or recommendations.
The Organization for Justice and Peace, a nongovernmental
organization (NGO), sponsored a ``Truth and Reconciliation'' conference
in August 1998 aimed at creating an independent truth commission for
the country. Representatives from both local and international human
rights organizations, as well as high-level government officials
including the Vice President, attended the conference. Although it was
only a preliminary meeting, there was at times frank discussion of the
human rights violations committed during the 1980's. However, there
were no significant developments regarding these problems.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
However, the Government took no action to investigate allegations
of disappearances that occurred under previous regimes.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits inhuman treatment or
punishment, but human rights groups continue to express concern about
official mistreatment and have documented cases of police mistreatment
of detainees, particularly during arrests, and guard abuse of
prisoners. Local detention facilities remain overcrowded.
The police used tear gas to disperse at times violent
demonstrations in May, and fired at least one shot that struck a
demonstrator (see Section 2.b.).
Prison conditions are poor. With the completion of a new prison in
1996, there are three state prisons and several detention facilities at
police stations, where arrestees are detained until they appear before
a judge for trial. Human rights activists are concerned about
conditions in the prisons and especially about conditions in local
detention facilities. They report that the jails are overcrowded, that
guards mistreat prisoners, and that medical care and living conditions
are inadequate. Police officers, who are not trained in prison work,
serve as the jailers at local detention facilities, a situation that
human rights groups assert contributes to the abuses.
In February the human rights group Moiwana '86 issued a report that
accused prison officials at two of the federal prisons of using
electrical shocks to discipline prisoners. The report further asserted
that different ethnic groups receive different forms and degrees of
punishments. Prison officials denied the accusations, and the
Government took no investigative action. Moiwana '86 did not pursue the
issue further.
The completion of a new prison and renovation of existing jails
have reduced somewhat the problems and improved overall health and
safety conditions. However, the older jails remain seriously
overcrowded, with as many as four times the number of detainees for
which they were designed. In addition, these older prisons are
unsanitary. At police stations, guards allow detainees no exercise and
only rarely permit them to leave the cells. Detainees and human rights
groups also complain about inadequate prison meals, although families
are permitted and encouraged to provide food to incarcerated relatives.
In January 1996, Moiwana '86 implemented a program to monitor the
condition of prisoners. Representatives of the group report that in
general they have access to prisoners and receive cooperation from
prison officials on routine matters. Moiwana '86 and the police
cooperated to develop a detention officer training program for police
guards working at the local detention facilities. The program consists
of lectures given at the state prison to both guards and to prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the authorities generally respect
these provisions in practice. However, delays resulting from the split
in the judiciary have caused prisoners who appeal their sentences to
remain in prison until a ruling is reached on their appeal, even if
they have served the full term of their original sentence. Lawyers have
filed complaints, but the problem has not been resolved.
The law provides that the police may detain for investigation up to
14 days a person suspected of committing a crime for which the sentence
is longer than 4 years. During the 14-day period, the law also permits
incommunicado detention, which must be authorized by an assistant
district attorney or a police inspector. Within the 14-day period, the
police must bring the accused before a prosecutor to be formally
charged. If additional time is needed to investigate the charge, a
prosecutor may authorize the police to detain the suspect for an
additional 30 days. Upon the expiration of the initial 44 days, a
``judge of instruction'' may authorize the police to hold the suspect
for up to 120 additional days, in 30-day increments (for a total of 164
days), before the case is tried. The judge of instruction has the power
to authorize release on bail, but that power is rarely, if ever, used.
Pretrial detainees, who constitute a large percentage of inmates,
are routinely held without being brought before a judge. They are often
held in overcrowded detention cells at local police stations. Of those
held in police custody or detention cells, a steadily growing number
had already been convicted but not placed in prisons.
In October 1997, the authorities arrested 25 men for allegedly
attempting to overthrow the Government. One of the ringleaders was
hospitalized for injuries sustained during his arrest. The detainees
were accorded due process under the law and were given access to
attorneys and family members. In August the coup plotters were
sentenced formally. The presiding judge issued mostly moderate
sentences of approximately 2 years' imprisonment for each person, with
the exception of the leaders, who received approximately 4 years'
imprisonment.
The military police continued to observe the requirement to hand
over civilians arrested for committing a crime in their presence to the
civil police. The military police continued to control the country's
borders and airports but no longer investigated civilian crimes.
While not specifically forbidden by law or the Constitution, exile
is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Although the Constitution provides
for an independent judiciary, an ongoing dispute between the previously
sitting judges and a new slate that Wijdenbosch appointed has damaged
severely the concept of an independent judiciary. As a result, the
effectiveness of the civilian and military courts is even more limited
in practice.
The judicial system consists of three lower courts and an appeals
court; there is no Supreme Court. In July 1998, President Wijdenbosch
named a new President of the Court of Justice and Prosecutor General
without consulting with, and over the objections of, the sitting
justices. Most legal authorities interpret the Constitution to require
that consultation, and the members of the court refused to recognize
the named President of the court or Prosecutor General. In spite of the
continued objections, President Wijdenbosch named additional justices
without consultation in December 1998. In May the appointed President
of the Court of Justice first swore in himself and then the new
justices. Both groups of justices have set their own agendas for the
next series of court sessions. The 1987 Constitution calls for the
establishment of an independent constitutional court. However, the
Government has not taken anysteps to set up such a court, and the
timing of its establishment remains unclear.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial in
which defendants have the right to counsel if needed. The courts assign
lawyers in private practice to defend prisoners and pay them from
public funds. However, the court-assigned lawyers usually only show up
at the trial, if they show up at all. The courts must, and in practice
do, free a detainee who is not tried within the 164-day period. In one
instance, a court levied a fine against the Government for failing to
release detainees as directed by the court. Trials are before a single
judge, with the right of appeal. Due to the conflict over the
legitimacy of the President of the Court and the justices, there is a
huge backlog in the judicial system.
Military personnel generally are not subject to civilian criminal
law. A soldier accused of a crime immediately comes under military
jurisdiction, and military police are responsible for all such
investigations. Military prosecutions are directed by an officer on the
public prosecutor's staff and take place in separate courts before two
military judges and one civilian judge. The military courts follow the
same rules of procedure as the civil courts. There is no appeal from
the military to the civil system.
Foreign military instructors conducted human rights and military
justice seminars in 1998 and 1999. These seminars provided continued
opportunities for civilian government officials, private sector
representatives, and military personnel to discuss human rights and the
role of the military in a democracy.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy.
The law requires warrants for searches, which are issued by quasi-
judicial officers who supervise criminal investigations. The police
obtain them in the great majority of investigations. There have been
complaints of surveillance of human rights workers by members of the
military police and the division of central intelligence.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights; however, there were reports of intimidation and
harassment.
The parliamentary and extraparliamentary opposition criticize the
Government freely. Some media members continue to practice some self-
censorship because of the history of intimidation and reprisals by
certain elements of the former military leadership.
The Government publicly reprimanded radio stations and newspapers
for their negative coverage of protest demonstrations that took place
in May. Although the Government threatened to censor the press, it
ultimately took no action, and there continued to be reports
unfavorable to the Government.
On December 8, 1997, three men kidnaped, beat and threatened a
journalist. The incident occurred on the anniversary of the 1982
murders of 15 political opponents of the Bouterse regime and appeared
aimed at stifling criticism in the local press. In June 1998, a Dutch
journalist, who was principally covering political and economic issues,
was kidnaped, beaten, and threatened. Both incidents remain under
investigation.
The two daily newspapers, three television stations, and most of
the radio stations are privately owned. Two television stations and two
radio stations are publicly owned. Three companies provide cable
television, which includes international channels.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
respected this right in practice. However, in response to a series of
public demonstrations in May, the Government announced that it intended
to begin enforcing a 1930's law requiring a permit to hold a public
demonstration orgathering. After the announcement, in late July the
authorities detained two opposition leaders for demonstrating without a
permit but quickly released them. Subsequent public marches were
allowed to proceed without permits.
There was a series of generally peaceful demonstrations in May in
protest of economic conditions. The demonstrations resulted in several
violent confrontations, one of which involved a police officer whom
demonstrators pushed through a ground floor window. Police used tear
gas to disperse the crowds on two occasions. During one demonstration,
a police office discharged his revolver when confronted by an advancing
crowd, injuring a demonstrator with a ricocheting bullet.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respected this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens may change their residence and
workplaces freely and travel abroad as they wish. Political dissidents
who emigrated to the Netherlands and elsewhere during the years of
military rule are welcome to return. Few of them have chosen to do so,
generally for economic reasons. Citizenship is not revoked for
political reasons.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not
arise in 1999. There were no reports of forced return of persons to a
country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for this right, but in the past the
military prevented its effective exercise. Although the military has
twice handed over power to elected civilian governments following
coups, 1996 marked the first time since independence from the
Netherlands in 1975 that one elected government succeeded another in
accordance with constitutional provisions. The Government is still in
the process of institutionalizing democratic, constitutional rule.
The Constitution stipulates that power and authority rest with the
people and provides for the right to change the government through the
direct election by secret ballot of a National Assembly of 51 members
every 5 years. The National Assembly then elects the President by a
two-thirds vote. If the legislature is unable to do so, as was the case
both in the 1991 and 1996 national elections, the Constitution provides
that a national people's assembly, comprising members of parliament and
regional and local officials, shall elect the President.
While the Constitution is clear on how the executive and
legislative branches of government are chosen to begin their terms, it
is vague about how they may be removed or replaced in midterm.
Questions arose following street protests in May as to whether the
President had the authority to dissolve the National Assembly and call
early elections or whether the National Assembly could vote the
President out of office with a simple majority no-confidence vote. With
no constitutional court yet established, there exists no definitive
interpretive authority to settle such disputes, creating the potential
for future constitutional conflict.
The Constitution provides for the organization and functioning of
political parties. Many parties and political coalitions are
represented in the National Assembly.
There are historical and cultural impediments to equal
participation by women in leadership positions in government and
political parties. In the past, most women were expected to fulfill the
roles of housewife and mother, thereby limiting opportunities to gain
political experience or position. Participation by women in politics
(and other fields) was generally considered inappropriate. While women
have made limited gains in attaining political power in recent years,
political circles remain under the influence of traditional male-
dominated groups, and women are disadvantaged in seeking high public
office. In 1996 voters elected six women to the National Assembly,
compared with three who held seats in theprevious assembly, and the
Assembly appointed a woman as chairperson. The Cabinet includes one
woman as Minister of Regional Development and another as Deputy
Minister of Social Affairs.
Although the Constitution proscribes racial or religious
discrimination, several factors limit the participation of Maroons
(descendants of escaped slaves who fled to the interior to avoid
recapture) and Amerindians in the political process. Most of the
country's political activity takes place in the capital and a narrow
belt running east and west of it along the coast. The Maroons and
Amerindians are concentrated in remote areas in the interior and
therefore have limited access to, and influence in, the political
process. Voters elected the first Amerindians to the National Assembly
in 1996. There are six Maroons and two Amerindians in the National
Assembly. There are no Maroons or Amerindians in the Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights groups operate without government restriction,
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases;
however, government officials generally are not cooperative or
responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution and laws, with the exception of ethnic marriage
laws, do not differentiate among citizens on the basis of their ethnic
origins, religious affiliations, or other cultural differences. In
practice, however, several groups within society suffer various forms
of discrimination.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. The law does not
differentiate between domestic violence and other forms of assault. The
Government has not addressed specifically the problem of violence
against women. According to a national women's group, victims continue
to report cases of violence against women and complain of an inadequate
response from the Government and society to what appears to be a trend
of increasing family violence. Although the police have been reluctant
to intervene in instances of domestic violence, a national women's
group noted that police attitudes have improved significantly as a
result of training conducted during the year.
There are no specific laws to protect women against trafficking and
sexual exploitation. There were credible reports of trafficking in
women for prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
Women have the right to equal access to education, employment, and
property. Nevertheless, social pressures and customs, especially in
rural areas, inhibit their full exercise of these rights, particularly
in the areas of marriage and inheritance. Women experience economic
discrimination in access to employment and in rates of pay for the same
or substantially similar work. The Government has not made specific
efforts to combat economic discrimination.
The National Women's Center is a government agency devoted to
women's issues; there is also a women's policy coordinator. Their
effectiveness is limited severely by financial and staffing
constraints. The principal concerns of women's groups are political
representation, economic vulnerability, violence, and discrimination.
Children.--School attendance is free and compulsory until 12 years
of age, but some school-age children do not have access to education
because of a lack of transportation, facilities, or teachers. There is
no difference in the treatment of girls and boys in education or health
care services. Both students and parents complained about the
Government's decision to double enrollment fees for public school.
Children face increasing economic pressure to discontinue their
education in order to work.
The Government allocates only limited resources to ensure
safeguards for the human rights and welfare of children. There are
continuing reports of malnutrition among poor children, but it is
difficult to quantify the extent of the problem. In the capital, where
most of the country's population is concentrated, there are several
orphanages, and a privately funded shelter for sexually abused children
opened in 1993. Elsewhere, distressedchildren must usually rely on the
resources of their extended families.
There is no societal pattern of abuse directed against children;
however, some children are sexually exploited and there were credible
reports of trafficking in girls for prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
The legal age of consent is 21; however, it is not strictly enforced,
and the Asian Marriage law lowers the marriage age for children of
Asian descent to 13 years for girls and 14 years for boys.
People with Disabilities.--There are no laws concerning disabled
people and no provisions for making private or public buildings
accessible to them. There are also no laws mandating that they be given
equal consideration when seeking jobs or housing. However, there are
some training programs for the blind and others with disabilities.
Indigenous People.--The Constitution affords no special protection
for, or recognition of, indigenous people. Most Amerindians and Maroons
suffer a number of disadvantages and have only limited ability to
participate in decisions affecting their lands, cultures, traditions,
and natural resources. The nation's political life, educational
opportunities, and jobs are concentrated in the capital and its
environs, while the majority of Amerindians and Maroons live in the
interior. Government services in the interior became largely
unavailable and much of the infrastructure was destroyed during the
1986-91 domestic insurgencies; progress in reestablishing services and
rebuilding the infrastructure has been very slow.
The Government appointed the Consultative Council for the
Development of the Interior in September 1995. This Council, provided
for in the 1992 peace accords that formally ended the insurgencies,
includes representatives of the Maroon and Amerindian communities. The
Government did not, however, consult with representatives of these
communities about the granting of gold and timber concessions on
indigenous and tribal lands.
Organizations representing Maroon and Amerindian communities
complain that small-scale mining operations, mainly illegal Brazilian
gold miners, dig trenches that cut residents off from their
agricultural land and threaten to drive them away from their
traditional settlements. Mercury runoff from these operations also
contaminates and threatens traditional food source areas.
Maroon and Amerindian groups continue to cooperate with each other
in order to exercise their rights more effectively. Two summits, or
``gran krutus,'' bringing together Maroon and Amerindian tribal
leaders, have been held, the most recent in September 1996. During
these summits, indigenous leaders reiterated their demands for the
right to participate in decisions concerning the use of natural
resources on land they claim as their own and for greater autonomy from
the Government.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution protects the right
of workers to associate and to choose their representatives
democratically. Nearly 60 percent of the work force is organized into
unions, and most unions belong to one of the country's six major labor
federations. Unions are independent of the Government but play an
active role in politics. The small Labor Party has historically been a
very influential force in government.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike. Civil servants
have the right to strike, and strikes in both the public and private
sectors are common as workers try to secure wage gains to protect their
earning power from inflation.
There are no restrictions on unions' international activities.
Several labor federations were accepted once again as affiliates of
international trade union organizations, after having been suspended
for collaboration with the military regime in the late 1980's.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution explicitly recognizes these rights, and the authorities
respect them in practice. Collective bargainingagreements cover
approximately 50 percent of the labor force. The law prohibits
antiunion discrimination by employers, and there are effective
mechanisms for resolving complaints of such discrimination. Employers
must have prior permission from the Ministry of Labor to fire workers,
except when discharging an employee for cause. The Labor Ministry
individually reviews dismissals for cause; if it finds a discharge
unjustified, the employee must be reinstated.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports that it
occurred. However, there were credible reports of trafficking in women
and girls for prostitution (see Section 6.f.). The law prohibits forced
and bonded labor by children, and such practices are not known to
occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law sets the minimum age for employment at 14 years.
However, the Ministry of Labor and the police enforce this law only
sporadically. Children under 14 years of age work as street vendors,
newspaper sellers, or shop assistants. Working hours for youths are not
limited in comparison with the regular work force. School attendance is
compulsory until 12 years of age. The law prohibits forced and bonded
labor by children, and there were no reports of such practices,
although trafficking of girls for prostitution does occur (see Section
6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage
legislation. In January civil servants were granted a 20 percent pay
increase, with a cost of living allowance of about $21 (Sfl 30,000).
Including that allowance, the lowest wage for civil servants is about
$56 (Sfl 78,000) per month at the official exchange rate, or about $52
at the legal parallel market rate. This salary level makes it very
difficult to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. Government employees, who constitute close to 50 percent of the
work force of 100,000, frequently supplement their salaries with second
or third jobs, often in the informal sector. The President and Council
of Ministers set and approve civil service wage increases. Civil
service and other wages are not keeping pace with inflation.
Work in excess of 9 hours per day or 45 hours per week on a regular
basis requires special government permission, which is routinely
granted. Such overtime work earns premium pay. The law requires one 24-
hour rest period per week.
A 10- to 12-member inspectorate of the Occupational Health and
Safety Division of the Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing
legislated occupational safety and health regulations. Resource
constraints and lack of trained personnel preclude the division from
making regular inspections of industry. Accident rates in local
industry do not appear to be high, and the key bauxite industry has an
outstanding safety record. There is, however, no law authorizing
workers to refuse to work in circumstances they deem unsafe. They must
appeal to the inspectorate to declare the workplace situation unsafe.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The only legislation specifically
prohibiting trafficking in persons are old ``white slavery laws'' that
are rarely enforced.
There were credible reports of trafficking in women and girls for
prostitution. Women and girls from the interior are brought to the
capital city and also to various gold mining locations in the interior.
Several clubs in the capital are also known for recruiting women from
Brazil and the Caribbean.
In addition, alien smuggling organizations use the country as an
intermediate destination to smuggle Chinese nationals, including women
and girls, to the United States, where frequently they are forced into
bonded-labor situations.
______
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Trinidad and Tobago, a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, is a
parliamentary democracy in which there have been free and fair general
elections since independence from the United Kingdom in 1962. A
bicameral parliament and a prime minister govern the country.
Parliament elects a president, whose office is largely ceremonial. A
12-member elected House of Assembly handles local matters on the island
of Tobago. The judiciary is independent.
The Ministry of National Security controls the police service and
the defense force, which are responsive to civilian authority. An
independent body, the Police Service Commission, makes all personnel
decisions in the police service, and the Ministry has little direct
influence over changes in senior positions.
Oil and natural gas production and related downstream petrochemical
industries form the basis of the market-based economy. The service
sector is the largest employer, although continued industrialization
has created many jobs in the construction industry. Agriculture, while
contributing only 2 percent to gross domestic product, remains an
important employer, both at the subsistence and commercial level.
Although per capita income is over $4,700 annually, 13.1 percent
unemployment contributes to a skewed income distribution, which has not
improved despite economic growth of 5.6 percent. Government efforts to
address this problem by further diversification into manufacturing and
tourism have been only partially successful.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. Nonetheless, poor prison
conditions, long delays in trials, and violence against women remain
problems.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
no reports that officials employed them.
Prison conditions at the women's prison and two of the three men's
prisons meet minimum international standards. However, conditions are
worse in the Port of Spain prison, which was designed for 250 inmates,
but houses about 1,000. Diseases such as chicken pox, tuberculosis,
AIDS, and other viruses spread easily, and prisoners generally must
purchase their own medication. Overcrowding plagued the entire prison
system, which housed 4,900 inmates in prisons built to accommodate
1,800. A new maximum security prison was opened in 1998 with 200
inmates. With an eventual capacity of 2,100, this prison is expected to
help alleviate the problem. However, plans to have the prison fully
functional by June 1 were not met.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention, and the Government generally
observes this prohibition.
A police officer may arrest a person either based on a warrant
issued or authorized by a magistrate or without a warrant when the
officer witnesses commission of the alleged offense. For less serious
offenses, the authorities typically bring the accused before a
magistrate within 24 hours; for indictable offenses, the accused must
appear within 48 hours. At that time the magistrate reads the charge
and determines whether bail is appropriate. Magistrates may deny bail
to violent or repeat offenders. If for some reason the accused does not
come before the magistrate, the case comes up on the magistrate's
docket every 8 to 10 days until a hearing date is set. The courts
notify persons of their right to an attorney and allow them access to
an attorney once they are in custody and prior to anyinterrogation.
However, the authorities do not always comply with these standards.
Allegations of corruption among justices of the peace also raised
concerns about compliance; the Government pledged to dismiss and
prosecute any justice found to have violated these standards (see
Section 1.e.).
The Minister of National Security may authorize preventive
detention in order to prevent actions prejudicial to public safety,
public order, or national defense, and the Minister must state the
grounds for the detention. A person detained under this provision has
access to counsel and may have the detention reviewed by a three-member
tribunal established by the Chief Justice and chaired by an attorney.
The Minister must provide the tribunal with the grounds for the
detention within 7 days of the detainee's request for review, which
shall be held ``as soon as reasonably practicable'' following receipt
of the grounds. There have been no reports that the authorities abused
this procedure.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and it is not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair judicial process.
However, in September the Chief Justice warned that judicial
independence was under attack by the executive branch, particularly the
Attorney General, under the guise of increased accountability and
improved efficiency. The Government refuted the allegations, and two
independent commissions were appointed to review the issue.
The court system consists of a court of appeal, a high court, and a
magistrate's court. A criminal offense is first sent to a magistrate's
court for a preliminary inquiry to determine if it can be heard before
a magistrate without a jury. If the magistrate determines that the
offense is a serious one, it is referred to the High Court, where it is
heard before a judge and jury. All civil matters are heard by the High
Court. Appeals can be filed with the local court of appeal and
ultimately to the Privy Council in London. There is considerable
support for abolishing appeals to the Privy Council and establishing a
Caribbean Court of Justice, located in Trinidad and Tobago, to serve as
the final court of appeal.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and an
independent judiciary vigorously enforces this right. All criminal
defendants have the right to an attorney. In practice the courts
sometimes appoint attorneys for those persons charged with indictable
offenses (serious crimes) if they cannot retain one on their own
behalf. The law requires a person accused of murder to have an
attorney. An indigent person may refuse to accept an assigned attorney
for cause and obtain a replacement.
Despite serious efforts to improve the judiciary, severe
inefficiency remains in many areas. Several criminal cases were
dismissed due to judicial or police inefficiency. Despite significant
progress, lengthy trial delays remain a serious problem. Spurred by a
desire to implement the death penalty, and in order to comply with a
ruling by the Privy Council, the Cabinet established time limits for
the courts to dispose of capital appeals. To accomplish this goal, the
Attorney General created a case management unit to track capital
appeals. The Government also allocated additional resources to help the
courts deal with the extra workload. The courts remained open during
the summer to clear many of the cases that had been on the books for
more than 15 years.
The Government continued to take steps against corruption in the
criminal justice system. Over a 2-year period, the authorities charged
at least 62 persons with various offenses after a presidential
commission's investigation found collusion among justices of the peace,
bailiffs, and police officers in the granting and fixing of bail. The
Government revoked the licenses of 25 justices of the peace. It also
brought charges against 11 justices of the peace, 31 bailiffs, 3
attorneys, and 4 police officers. However, by year's end, only one of
those indicted as a result of the commission's inquiry had come to
trial. In that case, a court convicted one of the justices of the peace
and sentenced him to 4 years' imprisonment.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects this
right in practice. An independent press and a functioning democratic
political system combine to ensure freedom of speech and of the press.
The three major daily newspapers freely and often criticized the
Government in editorials. Widely read weekly tabloids tend to be
extremely critical of the Government. All newspapers are privately
owned. The two local television newscasts, one of which appears on a
state-owned station, are sometimes critical of the Government but
generally do not editorialize.
A Board of Film Censors is authorized to ban films that it
considers to be against public order and decency or contrary to the
public interest. This includes films that it believes may be
controversial in matters of religion or race, or that contain seditious
propaganda. In practice films rarely are banned.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this
right in practice. The police routinely grant the required advance
permits for street marches, demonstrations, or other outdoor public
meetings. In August 1998, the Government amended the Summary Offences
Act to put greater controls on the staging of public rallies. The
amendments require that permits for public meetings and rallies be
applied for 48 hours in advance instead of 24 hours. The fine for
violation of the act was raised from about $275 (TT$2,000) to $1,375
(TT$10,000). The amendment makes it an offense to hold a public meeting
without a permit under the guise of conducting an exempted religious,
educational, recreational, or sports function. This new offense is
punishable by imprisonment for 2 years or a fine of about $1,375
(TT$10,000). In practice, the law has not restricted unduly public
meetings, demonstrations, or exempted events.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice. Registration or other
governmental permission to form private associations is not required.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
There is no provision for persons to claim or be classified as
refugees or asylum seekers; the Ministry of National Security's
Immigration Division handles any such requests on a case-by-case basis.
The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. There were no
reports of forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. Parliamentary elections are held at intervals not
to exceed 5 years. Elections for the 12-member Tobago House of Assembly
are held every 4 years. The Constitution extends the right to vote to
citizens as well as to legal residents at least 18 years of age who are
citizens of other Commonwealth countries.
In the November 1995 general elections, the former opposition
United National Congress (UNC) and the ruling People's NationalMovement
(PNM) each won 17 seats in Parliament. The National Alliance for
Reconstruction (NAR) won two seats and joined with the UNC to form a
new government. Basdeo Panday became the country's first Prime Minister
of East Indian descent. The PNM is primarily but not exclusively Afro-
Trinidadian; the UNC is primarily but not exclusively Indo-Trinidadian.
There are no specific laws that restrict the participation of women
or minorities in government or the political parties. Women hold many
positions in the Government and political party leadership. Four of 36
elected members of the House of Representatives and 10 of 31 appointed
Senators are women, with 2 women serving as ministers. Prime Minister
Panday appointed the first woman to serve as Attorney General; she has
since moved to the position of Minister of Education.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive
to their views. An independent ombudsman receives complaints relating
to governmental administrative issues and investigates complaints of
human rights abuse. The Ombudsman can make recommendations but does not
have authority to force government offices to take action.
The Government sought to curtail appeals by death row inmates to
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the U.N.
Human Rights Committee. In May it withdrew from the IACHR following its
required 1-year notice. The Government also withdrew from the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
but reacceded with the reservation that the U.N. Committee would not
have jurisdiction over death penalty cases.
The Government's moves were prompted by a Privy Council ruling that
failure to execute a condemned prisoner within 5 years of sentence
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Constitution. To meet this 5-year deadline, the Government established
time limits for appeals to courts and human rights bodies. Local
appeals are now disposed of within an average of 16 months compared
with the previous average of 7 years.
The Government asked the IACHR and the U.N. Committee each to agree
to dispose of petitions within 8 months. According to the Government,
both bodies responded that they could not provide such assurances. The
Government stated that the conflict between a binding Privy Council
ruling and its obligations to the human rights organs had to be
resolved in favor of the Constitution and the Privy Council. The
Government indicated that it would execute condemned prisoners who have
exhausted all their appeals and have unresolved petitions pending more
than 8 months before one of the human rights bodies.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Government respects in practice the constitutional provisions
for fundamental human rights and freedoms for all without
discrimination based on race, origin, color, religion, or sex.
Women.--Physical abuse of women continued to be an extensive
problem. There has been increased media coverage of domestic abuse
cases and signs of a shift in public opinion, which held that such
cases were a private matter. The Government has taken action to improve
aid to victims. Murder, rape, and other crimes against women are
reported frequently; 30 percent of all female homicide victims were
believed to have been killed by their husbands or lovers. Rape, spousal
abuse, and spousal rape are criminal offenses. The 1991 Domestic
Violence Act was intended to facilitate court-issued restraining orders
to protect victims and extended protection to common-law relationships,
a frequent form of marital union. However, some observers say that the
number of restraining orders issued has not increased at the rate
expected since the enactment of the law. The establishment of a
community police division improved police responsiveness to reports of
domestic abuse, but some police officers are reported to be
unsympathetic or reluctant to pursue such cases, resulting in
underreporting of crimes of violence against women. There were more
than 4,000 complaints of spousal abuse during the year; police handled
an average of 9 cases a day that led toreports by victims, with the
actual incidence of such abuse considered to be much higher. Two
government ministries, operating independently, direct the
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) that run most of the country's
social programs addressing domestic violence, including five shelters
for battered women, and a rape crisis center offers counseling for rape
victims and perpetrators on a voluntary basis. A Government-sponsored
hot line receives about 200 calls per month.
In October a new Domestic Violence Act came into effect. The new
law strengthens provisions of the 1991 law and allows easier access for
police in instances of domestic violence. The Senate also introduced
amendments to the Sexual Offences Act that would broaden the definition
of sexual offenses and increase the punishment for such crimes. These
amendments had not yet been approved by the lower House at year's end.
The court of appeals reduced the conviction and sentence of a woman
who had been sentenced to death in 1998 for killing her husband in
1991. The appeals court based its decision on the argument that she
suffered from battered-wife syndrome. The case had drawn wide
attention; some women's groups asserted that the conviction and the
death sentence represented a double standard that punished wife-killers
less severely than women who retaliate against abusive husbands. The
appeals court found her guilty of manslaughter and reduced her sentence
to 5 years plus time served.
Many women hold positions in business, the professions, and
government, but men tend to hold the most senior positions. There is no
law or regulation requiring equal pay for equal work.
The Division of Gender Affairs in the Ministry of Culture and
Gender Affairs is charged with protecting women's rights in all aspects
of government and legislation. Several active women's rights groups
also exist.
Children.--The Government's ability to protect children's welfare
is limited by a lack of funds and expanding social needs. Some parts of
the public school system seriously fail to meet the needs of the school
age population due to overcrowding, substandard physical facilities,
and occasional classroom violence by gangs. There is no societal
pattern of abuse directed at children. The Domestic Violence Act
provides protection for children abused at home. Abused children are
usually placed with relatives if they are removed from the home. If
there is no relative who can take them, there are several government
institutions and NGO's that accept children.
People with Disabilities.--There is no legislation that
specifically enumerates or protects the rights of disabled persons or
mandates the provision of access to buildings or services, although
NGO's lobbied Parliament to pass such legislation. The lack of access
to transportation, buildings, and sidewalks is a major obstacle for the
disabled. The Government provides some public assistance and partial
funding to a variety of NGO's which, in turn, provide direct services
to disabled members or clients.
Indigenous People.--Members of a very small group in the population
identify themselves as descendants of the original Amerindian
population of the country. They maintain social ties with each other
and other aboriginal groups and are not subject to discrimination.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Various ethnic and religious
groups live together peacefully, generally respecting one another's
beliefs and practices. However, at times racial tensions appear between
Afro-Trinidadians and Indo-Trinidadians. Each group comprises about 40
percent of the population. The private sector is dominated by Indo-
Trinidadians and people of European, Middle Eastern, or Asian descent.
Indo-Trinidadians also predominate in agriculture. Afro-Trinidadians
tend to find employment in disproportionate numbers in the civil
service, police, and military. Some Indo-Trinidadians assert that they
are excluded from equal representation in the civil service due to
racial discrimination. Since Indo-Trinidadians constitute the majority
in rural areas and Afro-Trinidadians are in the majority in urban
areas, competition between town and country for public goods and
services often takes on racial overtones.
In October 1996, there were reports that several popular
recreational clubs refused entry to Afro-Trinidadians and dark-skinned
Indo-Trinidadians. The reports led to criticism of racism by the local
press, and the Government pledged to implement a law banning racial
discrimination in entry policies for private clubs. However, the
Government has not yet taken such action.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1972 Industrial Relations Act
provides that all workers, including those in state-owned enterprises,
may form or join unions of their own choosing without prior
authorization. Union membership has declined, with an estimated 20 to
28 percent of the work force organized in 14 active unions. Most unions
are independent of the Government or political party control, although
the Sugar Workers' Union is historically allied with the UNC. The Prime
Minister was formerly president of the Sugar Workers' Union.
The law prohibits antiunion activities before a union is legally
registered, and the Ministry of Labor enforces this provision when it
receives a complaint. A union may also bring a request for enforcement
to the Industrial Court. All employees except those in ``essential
services,'' such as government employees and police, have the right to
strike.
The Labor Relations Act prohibits retribution against strikers and
provides for grievance procedures if needed. A special section of the
Industrial Court handles mandatory arbitration cases. Arbitration
agreements are enforceable and can be appealed only to the Industrial
Court.
Unions freely join federations and affiliate with international
bodies. There are no restrictions on international travel or contacts.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Industrial
Relations Act establishes the right of workers to collective
bargaining. The Ministry of Labor's conciliation service maintains
statistical information regarding the number of workers covered by
collective bargaining agreements and the number of antiunion complaints
filed.
The Industrial Court may order employers who are found guilty of
antiunion activities to reinstate workers and pay compensation, or it
can impose other penalties including imprisonment. When necessary the
conciliation service also determines which unions should have senior
status.
There are several newly organized export processing zones (EPZ's).
The same labor laws apply in the EPZ's as in the country at large.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law does not
explicitly prohibit forced or compulsory labor, but there were no
reports that it was practiced. There were also no reports of forced or
bonded labor by children.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum legal age for workers is 12 years. Children
from 12 to 14 years of age may only work in family businesses. Children
under the age of 18 legally may work only during daylight hours, with
the exception of 16- to 18-year-olds, who may work at night in sugar
factories. The probation service in the Ministry of Social Development
and Family Services is responsible for enforcing child labor
provisions, but enforcement is lax. There is no organized exploitation
of child labor, but children are often seen begging or working as
street vendors. The Government does not prohibit specifically forced
and bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur
(see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The 1998 Minimum Wages Act
established a minimum wage of about $1.10 (TT$7.00) per hour. The
minimum wage is not sufficient to support a worker and family, but most
workers earn more than the minimum. The Ministry of Labor enforces the
minimum wage regulations.
The Minimum Wages Act also established a 40-hour workweek, time and
one-half pay for the first 4 hours of overtime on a workday, double pay
for the next 4 hours, and triple pay thereafter. For Sundays, holidays,
and off days the act also provides for double pay for the first 8 hours
and triple pay thereafter. Daily rest periods and paid annual leave
form part of most employment agreements.
The Factories and Ordinance Bill of 1948 sets requirements for
health and safety standards in certain industries and provides for
inspections to monitor and enforce compliance. The Industrial Relations
Act protects workers who file complaints with the Ministry of Labor
regarding illegal or hazardous working conditions. If it is determined
upon inspection that hazardous conditions exist in the workplace, the
worker is absolved for refusing to comply with an order that would have
placed him or her in danger.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--While there are no laws that
specifically address trafficking in persons, the illegality of such
acts is covered broadly in a variety of legislation dealing with
kidnaping, labor conditions, pimping and prostitution, slavery, and
indentured servitude. There were no reports of persons being trafficked
in, to, or from the country.
______
URUGUAY
Uruguay is a constitutional republic with an elected president and
a bicameral legislature. In 1994 former President Julio Maria
Sanguinetti won a narrow election victory. His 5-year term ends in
March 2000. In national elections for the presidency and the
legislature on October 31, the left-of-center Broad Front coalition won
about 40 percent of the vote in a four-party race, constituting the
largest congressional bloc. Jorge Batlle of the Colorado Party won the
runoff presidential election held on November 28. The judiciary is
independent.
The Interior Ministry administers the country's police departments
and the prison system and is responsible for domestic security and
public safety. The military is responsible for external security within
the prison system. The police at times committed human rights abuses.
The economy is a mixture of private and state enterprises and is
heavily dependent on agricultural exports and agroindustry. The leading
exports are meat, leather, and rice. The Government respects private
property rights. The unemployment rate is estimated at 11.4 percent.
The economy grew by 4.5 percent in 1998, but growth was estimated to
decline by 2 to 2.5 percent in 1999. Annual per capita income was about
$6,560 in 1998.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary generally provide effective means
of dealing with individual instances of abuse. However, there were
problems in some areas, principally instances of police abuse and
mistreatment of detainees, poor prison conditions, and delays in the
justice system. Court cases sometimes last many years, resulting in
lengthy preverdict detention. Other problems include violence against
women and societal discrimination against women and the black minority.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
In August guards at the prison in the department of San Jose shot
and killed an inmate who apparently was attempting to escape and who
ignored warnings to halt.
The investigation into the 1992 murder of Chilean chemist/
intelligence agent Eugenio Berrios remained closed. Berrios, who had
been called to testify in Chile concerning the assassination of former
Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier, reportedly entered Uruguay
under protective military custody. His body was discovered in 1995,
after he was last seen alive in military custody in 1992. In March the
judge in the case declined to provide the case files to Chilean
judicial authorities, as they had requested. He reasoned that releasing
such information would jeopardize any future prosecution of the case,
should it be reopened. The judge did provide records of telephone calls
made by Berrios in Montevideo prior to his disappearance and murder.
Also in March, a group of Argentine and Uruguayan journalists filming a
documentary about persons who disappeared during the military
dictatorship were threatened and beaten while filming outside the house
in which Eugenio Berrios had been detained by members of the military.
The attacker was a relative of the military officer who owned the house
and who had been questioned previously in the Berrios case.
The 1986 Amnesty Law applied to perpetrators of extrajudicial
killings, torture, and other abuses during the 12 years of military
rule from 1973 to 1985. However, some victims and relatives of victims
had success using the civilian courts to seek redress. In March the
widow of a criminal suspect who in 1998 died under suspicious
circumstances while in police custody filed criminal charges against
the personnel of the police unit at which her husband died. In two 1998
rulings, the trial judge ordered the Government to pay a total of $1.4
million in compensation to the families of a number of victims of
torture and, in several cases, extrajudicial execution. Action on the
Government's appeal of these rulings is pending.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
Calls for investigations into past disappearances continued. In
May, as in prior years, thousands of persons marched in memoryof the
159 Uruguayans who disappeared during the rule of the dictatorship (115
in Argentina, 36 in Uruguay, 6 in Chile, and 2 in Paraguay).
The Government continued to disregard a 1992 ruling of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, reaffirmed in October 1997, which
concluded that the 1986 Amnesty Law was incompatible with the American
Convention on Human Rights and which recommended that the Government
investigate the disappearances and compensate the families of the
victims. Although the Amnesty Law obliges the executive branch to
investigate the cases of citizens who were detained and then
disappeared under the military regime, all three administrations since
the return to democracy have consistently refused to open official
investigations into their fate. The only exception was a cursory,
nonpublic inquiry conducted by a military prosecutor that revealed
nothing.
Since the 1986 Amnesty Law precludes criminal actions against
suspected participants in human rights violations during military rule,
some persons have sought justice in non-Uruguayan courts. In March Sara
Mendez filed papers in an Argentine court formally accusing five
present and former members of the Uruguayan military with the 1976
kidnaping of her infant from her Buenos Aires home. In June the
relatives of eight Italian-Uruguayan dual nationals who had disappeared
filed charges in an Italian court against four present and former
members of the military and one police officer.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits brutal treatment of prisoners,
but the police continued at times to commit abuses. On occasion, such
abuse resulted in forced confessions (see Section 1.d.).
The judicial and parliamentary branches of government are
responsible for investigating specific allegations of abuse. An
internal police investigative unit receives complaints from any person
concerning possible noncriminal police abuse of power, but it is
understaffed and can issue only recommendations for disciplinary
action. While the courts seldom convicted and punished law enforcement
officials for such abuse in the past, such prosecutions are occurring
more frequently. In the month of August alone, over 20 police officers
were prosecuted for crimes ranging from abuse of authority to bank
robbery and murder.
Police officers charged with less serious crimes may continue on
active duty; those charged with more serious crimes are separated from
active service until a court resolves their cases. A Ministry of
Interior study reported that 179 police officers had been investigated
or convicted by a court, and that 117 of these cases were directly
linked to the exercise of their jobs. The 1995 Public Security Law
requires a proportional use of force by the police and the use of
weapons only as a last resort, in accordance with United Nations codes
regarding the use of force.
Some torture victims and relatives of victims continued to use the
courts to seek redress for their grievances. The Government is
appealing damage awards made in 1998 to the families of a number of
persons tortured or murdered in custody during military rule (see
Section 1.a.).
In January three small explosions occurred in Montevideo. The
authorities arrested two persons, including one former member of a neo-
Nazi group, in connection with the bombings. They held the latter in
custody at year's end (see Section 5).
Conditions in prisons and juvenile detention facilities for the
roughly 3,700 prisoners remain poor but not life threatening. In 1997 a
legislative human rights commission presented a report that criticized
the ``excessive use of force and abuse of authority'' by prison guards
and officials, and stated that sanitation and health standards in the
prison system were ``unacceptable.'' This report reflects the work of a
previous commission that in 1996 published a report to the Government
citing overcrowding, lack of staff training, corruption, and physical
violence as problems. According to press reports and a study conducted
by SERPAJ, a nongovernmental organization (NGO), HIV-positive inmates
sometimes received inadequate medical treatment. There were several
incidents of prisoner unrest during the year, including a riot in June
at the country's only maximum security prison, during which inmates
demanded better prison conditions. The riot resulted in severe damage
to the substandard facility, requiring a number of prisoners to
betransferred to other facilities, some of which were already
overcrowded.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors,
although prisoner unrest, as well as the requirement to route all such
requests through the Ministry of Interior, at times cause delays.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
requires the police to have a written warrant issued by a judge before
making an arrest, and the authorities generally respect this provision
in practice. The only exception is when the police apprehend the
accused during commission of a crime. The Constitution also provides
the accused with the right to a judicial determination of the legality
of detention and requires that the detaining authority explain the
legal grounds for the detention. Police may hold a detainee
incommunicado for 24 hours before presenting the case to a judge, at
which time the detainee has the right to counsel. It is during this 24-
hour period that police sometimes abuse prisoners, occasionally
resulting in forced confessions.
A 1980 law stipulates that police confessions obtained before a
prisoner appears before a judge and attorney (without the police
present) have no validity. Further, should a prisoner claim that he has
been mistreated, by law the judge must investigate the charge.
If the detainee cannot afford a lawyer, the courts appoint a public
defender. If the crime carries a penalty of at least 2 years in prison,
the accused person is confined during the judge's investigation of the
charges unless the authorities agree to release the person on bail.
This seldom happens. As a result, approximately 68 percent of all
persons incarcerated are awaiting a final decision in their case, down
from approximately 90 percent in the past years. This improvement is
due to the Government's efforts to improve the functioning of the
criminal justice system. Because of the slowness of the judicial
process, the length of time prisoners spend in jail before the judge
issues a verdict may exceed the maximum sentence for their crime. The
uncertainty as to how long one will be imprisoned is a factor creating
tension within the country's prisons.
In December 1997, the legislature approved a bill to reform and
modernize the Criminal Code. Among its provisions, the new law provides
for more oral argument by prosecution and defense attorneys, and less
investigative responsibility for judges, which is expected to
accelerate the pace of criminal trials. The law was to take effect in
1998, but was delayed until at least February 2001, due to a lack of
resources to implement the new system.
The Government does not use forced exile as a means of punishment.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice.
The Supreme Court heads the judiciary system and supervises the
work of the lower courts. A parallel military court system operates
under a Military Justice Code. Two military justices sit on the Supreme
Court but participate only in cases involving the military. Military
justice applies to civilians only during a state of war or
insurrection.
Trial proceedings usually are based on written arguments to the
judge, which are not made public routinely. Only the prosecutor and
defense attorney have access to all documents that form part of the
written record. The courts introduced oral argument in 1990, but
individual judges use it at their option. Most judges choose to retain
the written method, a major factor slowing the judicial process. There
is no legal provision against self-incrimination, and judges may compel
defendants to answer any question they pose. The defense attorney or
prosecutor may appeal convictions to a higher court, which may acquit
the person of the crime, confirm the conviction, or reduce or increase
the sentence.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, but the authorities may abridge
these rights if persons are deemed to be inciting violence or
``insulting the nation.''
All elements of the political spectrum freely express their
viewpoints in both print and broadcast media. Montevideo alone has 8
daily newspapers and 6 important weeklies; there are also approximately
100 other weekly and a few daily newspapers throughout the country.
Montevideo has one government-affiliated and three commercial
television stations. There are about 110 radio stations and 20
television stations in the country.
A 1989 law stipulates that expression and communication of thoughts
and opinions are free, within the limits contained in the Constitution,
and it outlines methods of responding to ``inexact or aggravating
information.'' The law calls for 3 months' to 2 years' imprisonment for
``knowingly divulging false news that causes a grave disturbance to the
public peace or a grave prejudice to economic interests of the State''
or for ``insulting the nation, the State, or their powers.'' The
authorities use this law intermittently to set and enforce certain
limits on freedom of the press.
Human rights activists and journalists have alleged that state
enterprises such as the telephone and electric companies on occasion
have withheld advertising from independent media that are critical of
the Government and have favored media friendly to the Government with
extensive paid advertising.
The national university is autonomous, and the authorities
generally respect academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
The Government grants refugee status in accordance with the 1951
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol. The Government grants asylum only for political crimes as set
forth in the 1928 Treaty of Havana, the 1889 Treaty of Montevideo, and
the 1954 Caracas Convention. The Government cooperates with the office
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. The Government granted first
asylum to a Cuban tourist who requested asylum in October 1998. The
Government granted asylum to other persons who requested asylum during
the year, including Cubans and Colombians.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. Uruguay is a multiparty democracy with mandatory
voting for those 18 years of age or older, and there are no
restrictions regarding race, sex, religion, or economic status. The
Colorado party, the National (Blanco) party, the Broad Front coalition,
and the New Space Party are the four major political groupings.
Women and blacks face impediments to high-level participation in
politics and employment in government. Only 1 of 12 cabinet ministers
is a woman. In the legislature, 2 of 30 senators and 8 of 99 deputies
were women. In October voters elected 3 female candidates to the Senate
and 13 women deputies. There are no female justices on the Supreme
Court. There has never been a black parliamentarian or cabinet-level
official.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate
without government restriction, investigating and publishing their
findings on human rights cases. Government officials are generally
cooperative and responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution and the law prohibit discrimination based on race,
sex, religion, or disability. Despite these provisions, discrimination
against some groups exists.
Women.--Violence against women continues to be a serious problem. A
1999 Ministry of Public Health study projected that within 5 years,
domestic violence would constitute the second most prevalent threat to
public health, after traffic accidents. In a November 1997 poll of 545
urban and suburban households, 47 percent of respondents reported
physical or psychological abuse from their partners, with 23 percent
reporting severe abuse. The law provides for sentences of 6 months to 2
years in prison for a person found guilty of committing an act of
violence or of making continuing threats to cause bodily injury to
persons related emotionally or legally to the perpetrator. The
Montevideo city hall's hot line for victims of domestic violence
received 4,785 complaints in 1998 and 4,927 in the first 10 months of
1999, reflecting both an increased public awareness of the problem as
well as a changing attitude among women. Persons calling the hot line
are provided counseling, free legal advice, and may be referred to
NGO's that can provide further socialservices. The Criminal Code covers
spousal abuse and spousal rape, although criminal charges rarely are
initiated for those crimes. Similarly, although the law prohibits
sexual harassment in the workplace, few complaints are ever filed under
this provision.
The Government has established an office of assistance for victims
of domestic violence that trains police how to resolve complaints of
violence against women. A new directorate within the Ministry of
Interior instituted a public awareness campaign about domestic violence
and founded community assistance centers where abuse victims receive
information and referrals to government and private organizations in
their area that aid abused women. Both the Ministry of Interior and
NGO's operate shelters in which abused women and their families can
seek temporary refuge.
Women enjoy equality under the law but face discrimination stemming
from traditional attitudes and practices. The work force exhibits
segregation by gender. Women, who make up almost one-half the work
force, tend to be concentrated in lower paying jobs. Women's salaries
average two-thirds those of men; 10 years earlier, this figure was 57
percent. Two-thirds of the students who entered the university system
in 1997 were women. Women often pursue professional careers but are
underrepresented in traditionally male-dominated professions. In
February 1997, the Government approved regulations to implement a 1989
law for equality in the workplace that had previously gone unenforced.
In 1997 the Air Force Academy became the first armed services academy
to admit women and has 7 female students out of a total student body of
74. The Army Military Academy began admitting women in 1998 and has 19
women enrolled in its 240-member student body.
A small institute in the Ministry of Education coordinates
government programs for women. There are a number of active women's
rights groups, and many of their activities remained centered on
followup to the platform of action of the 1995 U.N. Conference on
Women.
Children.--The Government generally is committed to protecting
children's rights and welfare. An institute in the Ministry of Interior
oversees implementation of the Government's programs for children but
receives only limited funding for programs. The Government regards the
education and health of children as a top priority and believes it
should do more to ensure free education and proper health care for all
children. An estimated 40 percent of children under the age of 5 live
in the poorest 20 percent of homes. The Government is attempting to
extend proper health care and education to them with the help of the
United Nations Children's Fund. The Government provides free,
compulsory primary and secondary education, and 95 percent of children
complete their primary education. Girls and boys are treated similarly.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. Minors under the
age of 18 are not subject to criminal trial, but receive special
treatment with special judges and, when sentenced, stay in institutions
run by the National Institute for Minors (INAME) for the period
determined by the judge. The Government currently houses all problem
minors in INAME-run institutions that emphasize the rehabilitation of
minors. The most controversial aspect of the 1995 Public Security Law
would allow the Government to put minors with a record of violent
crimes in adult prisons if INAME has no room in its own institutions.
Even though the law stipulates that minors would occupy separate
facilities within the prisons, human rights groups adamantly oppose
this provision. As a result, INAME has decided that it will not send
minors to adult prisons. INAME runs an extensive network of programs,
including shelters for at-risk children. INAME also runs a confidential
hot line for children who are victims of domestic abuse.
A Code of the Child, intended to bring the law into compliance with
the provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, was
approved by the lower house of Congress in August. The Senate
subsequently referred the bill back to committee for further study and
modification, and the Senate took no further action before the end of
the legislative session.
People with Disabilities.--The legislature passed a law covering
the rights of the disabled in 1989. A national disabilities commission
oversees implementation of the law. Although the law mandates
accessibility only to new buildings or public services forpeople with
disabilities, the Government is providing access to a number of
existing buildings. The law reserves 4 percent of public sector jobs
for the disabled. There is no governmental discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
state services. The country has a generally excellent mental health
system and an interest in the rights of people with mental
disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's black minority,
estimated at 5.9 percent of the population, continues to face societal
discrimination. A government study conducted in 1996-97 found that the
unemployment rate for blacks was 1.5 times the rate for whites. The
National Institute of Statistics found that blacks earn an average of
20 percent less than whites who perform the same job. A 1993 report put
the number of black university graduates at 65, and black professionals
at fewer than 50. According to a study conducted by Mundo Afro (an
NGO), one-half of Afro-Uruguayan women work as household domestics.
Blacks are practically unrepresented in the bureaucratic and academic
sectors.
Religious Minorities.--Isolated neo-Nazi elements have carried out
occasional, limited attacks since 1997. One such incident occurred in
June 1998, when a Molotov cocktail was thrown into the Ahdut Israel
synagogue. Two policemen sustained minor injuries after three small
explosions in January in Montevideo. Police subsequently arrested two
persons in connection with the explosion, one of whom, a former member
of a neo-Nazi group, remained in custody at year's end. In August an
intensive police investigation resulted in the arrest of eight persons
(including one minor) of a very small neo-Nazi group suspected of
creating racist and anti-Semitic Internet websites. The authorities
charged five of the suspects with subversive association; two were also
charged with inciting hate or violence toward a particular group.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution states that laws
should promote the organization of trade unions and the creation of
arbitration bodies. In spite of this provision, there is almost no
legislation concerning union activities. Unions traditionally organize
and operate free of government regulation. Civil servants, employees of
state-run enterprises, and private enterprise workers may join unions.
An estimated 13 percent of the work force is unionized. Labor unions
are independent of political party control but traditionally have
associated more closely with the Broad Front, the leftist political
coalition.
The Constitution provides workers with the right to strike, and
there were numerous strikes during the year. The Government may legally
compel workers to work during a strike if they perform an essential
service which, if interrupted, ``could cause a grave prejudice or risk,
provoking suffering to part or all of the society.'' In May the
umbrella labor confederation PIT/CNT organized a one day general
strike.
There are mechanisms for resolving workers' complaints against
employers, but unions complain that these mechanisms are sometimes
applied arbitrarily. The law generally prohibits discriminatory acts by
employers, including arbitrary dismissals for union activity. Unions
maintain that organizers are dismissed for fabricated reasons, thus
avoiding penalty under the law.
There are no restrictions on the right of unions to form
confederations or to affiliate with international trade union groups;
however, the one national confederation has chosen not to affiliate
officially with any of the world federations. Some individual unions
are affiliated with international trade secretariats.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining between companies and their unions determines a number of
private sector salaries. The executive branch, acting independently,
determines public sector salaries. There are no laws prohibiting
antiunion discrimination, but a1993 executive decree established fines
for employers engaging in antiunion activities. The law does not
require employers to reinstate workers fired for union activities.
However, in cases of legal challenges by union activists, courts tend
to impose indemnization levels that are higher than those normally paid
to dismissed workers.
Union members continued to file claims of discrimination with the
Ministry of Labor, which has a labor commission that investigates all
claims. In some of the cases, employers agreed to reinstate workers,
but other cases remained unresolved at year's end.
All labor legislation fully covers workers employed in special
export zones. There are no unions in any of these zones, but the few
workers in these zones are not in traditionally organizable
occupations. Because of the protected status given many of the
companies in the free zones and the lack of union presence,
occasionally companies will implement labor practices in violation of
the law.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. The
law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and the Government
enforces this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Child Labor Code protects children; the Ministry of
Labor and Social Security is responsible for enforcing the law. Illegal
child labor is not a major problem. The law prohibits forced or bonded
labor by children, and the Government enforces this prohibition
effectively (see Section 6.c.). A total of 95 percent of children
complete primary school education, which is compulsory and free of
charge. By law children under 15 years of age are not allowed to work
unless granted a special permit; this is enforced in practice. Children
under the age of 18 may not perform dangerous, fatiguing, or night
work. Controls over salaries and hours for children are more strict
than those for adults. Children over the age of 16 may sue in court for
payment of wages, and children have the legal right to dispose of their
own income. However, some children work as street vendors in the
expanding informal sector or in the agrarian sector, which generally
are regulated less strictly and where pay is lower.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor
effectively enforces a legislated minimum monthly wage which is in
effect in both the public and private sectors. The Ministry adjusts the
minimum wage whenever it adjusts public sector wages. The minimum wage,
which was set in July at about $90 (1,040 pesos) per month, functions
more as an index for calculating wage rates than as a true measure of
minimum subsistence levels, and it would not provide a decent standard
of living for a worker and family. The vast majority of workers earn
more than the minimum wage.
The standard workweek is 48 hours in industry and 44 hours in
commerce, with a 36-hour break each week. The law stipulates that
industrial workers receive overtime compensation for work in excess of
48 hours and that workers are entitled to 20 days of paid vacation
after a year of employment.
The law protects foreign workers and does not discriminate against
them. However, in order to receive official protection, the companies
that employ foreign workers must report them as employees. Many
workers--both native and foreign--work off the books and thus forfeit
certain legal protection.
The Ministry of Labor and Social Security enforces legislation
regulating health and safety conditions in a generally effective
manner. However, some of the regulations cover urban industrial workers
more adequately than rural and agricultural workers. Workers have the
right to remove themselves from what they consider hazardous or
dangerous conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws specifically
addressing trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that
persons were trafficked in, to, or from the country.
______
VENEZUELA
Venezuela is a republic with an elected president and a bicameral
congress. President Hugo Chavez Frias, the leader of an attempted coup
in 1992, took office in February after being elected in December 1998
with 57 percent of the vote. Chavez's election was the result of deep
popular dissatisfaction with the traditional parties and frustration
with the country's continued economic crisis. Chavez campaigned on a
promise of radical reform, including constitutional change through the
election of a National Constitutional Assembly (ANC). In an April 25
national referendum, voters overwhelmingly approved his proposal for
the popular election of a 131-member assembly with a 6-month mandate to
rewrite the Constitution. Chavez's political party, the Fifth Republic
Movement (MVR), won 119 of the 131 ANC seats in a July 25 election. The
ANC drafted a new constitution, which voters approved in a December 15
referendum. Despite controversy over the ANC electoral campaign rules,
international observers characterized the elections and both
referendums as largely free and fair. The new Constitution, which took
effect on December 30, creates two new branches of government--the
civil authority and the electoral authority--and allows immediate
presidential reelection for a 6-year term. In August the ANC issued a
Legislative Emergency Decree that led to an institutional clash between
the ANC and the Congress until a cohabitation agreement was reached
over respective responsibilities. Also in August, the ANC issued a
Judicial Emergency Decree to reform the largely discredited judiciary,
which although legally independent is highly inefficient, corrupt, and
subject to influence.
The security apparatus comprises civilian and military elements,
both accountable to elected authorities. The newly combined Interior
and Justice Ministry controls the Judicial Technical Police (PTJ),
which conducts most criminal investigations, and the State Security
Police (DISIP), which is primarily responsible for investigating cases
of subversion and arms trafficking. The General Directorate for
Military Intelligence, under the Defense Ministry, is responsible for
collecting intelligence related to national security and sovereignty.
The national guard, an active branch of the military, has arrest powers
and is largely responsible for guarding the exterior of prisons and key
government installations, maintaining public order, monitoring
frontiers, conducting counterdrug operations, and providing law
enforcement in remote areas. It also supplies the top leadership for
the Metropolitan Police, the main civilian police force in and around
Caracas, and for various state and municipal police forces, which fall
under the authority of the respective state governors or municipal
mayors. There was controversy during the year over the increasing role
that the military played in government and society. In February
President Chavez ordered 70,000 members of the military to participate
in a public works program which continued throughout the year,
including conducting a census of the unemployed; providing medical care
to the needy; renovating schools, playgrounds, and medical care
centers; and removing garbage. In May the President appointed an army
general as his chief of staff. In December paratroopers and other
security force members assisted with relief efforts following
devastating flooding. Both police and military personnel were
responsible for human rights abuses during the year.
The country has abundant natural resources, and its per capita
gross domestic product (GDP) is $4,087. However, income is distributed
unevenly, and approximately 80 percent of the population live at or
below the poverty line. Oil accounted for 27 percent of GDP, 43 percent
of government revenues, and 70 percent of the country's exports in
1998. State-owned enterprises' production of iron, aluminum, and
petrochemical products constitute one-fifth of the country's nonoil
exports. The economy underwent its worst recession in the last 10 years
due to low oil prices, the recessionary effect of oil production cuts,
monetary tightening to bring inflation under control, and investor
uncertainty caused by nearly a year of constant political change.
According to preliminary figures from the Central Bank, GDP contracted
by 7.2 percent in 1999, compared with a contraction of 0.1 percent in
1998. However, a strong rebound in oil prices reduced the estimated
fiscal deficit for the year. In December the country suffered its worst
natural disaster when heavy rains triggered severe flooding and
landslides that caused an estimated 20,000 deaths as well as extensive
property and infrastructure damage. Following the disaster, the ANC
declared a ``state of alarm,'' and granted the President broad powers
to respond to the flood.
The Government's human rights record continued to be poor in some
areas; although there were improvements in some areas, serious problems
remain. Human rights violations include extrajudicial killings of
criminal suspects by the police and military, an increase in torture
and abuse of detainees, failureto punish police and security officers
guilty of abuse, arbitrary arrest and excessively lengthy detention,
long delays in trials, illegal searches, and corruption and severe
inefficiency in the judicial and law enforcement systems. Prison
conditions remained harsh, and overcrowding and violence in the prisons
were so severe as to constitute inhuman and degrading treatment. In
October the ANC declared a prison emergency and set up an
interinstitutional commission to address conditions in the prisons. On
July 1, the Organic Criminal Procedures Code (COPP) entered into force,
replacing the secretive inquisitorial system with an open adversarial
system. The authorities fired a number of judges for corruption. In
February the Chavez administration reinstated the constitutional
provisions of freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention and search
without warrant, as well as freedom of movement, which had been
suspended in some border areas since June 1994. Violence and
discrimination against women, abuse of children, discrimination against
the disabled, and inadequate protection of the rights of indigenous
people continue to be problems. Child labor persisted, and there were
reports of trafficking in children for forced labor. Killings due to
vigilante justice increased.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of targeted political killings; however, the security forces
continued to commit extrajudicial killings, primarily of criminal
suspects. The Venezuelan Program of Action and Education in Human
Rights (PROVEA), a highly respected nongovernmental human rights
organization, documented 101 extrajudicial killings from October 1998
through September 1999, compared with 104 from October 1997 to
September 1998. The killings involved summary executions of criminal
suspects, indiscriminate or excessive use of force, and death resulting
from mistreatment while in custody. According to PROVEA, the state
police forces were responsible for 44 of the killings; the Metropolitan
Police, 11; the PTJ, 5; the national guard, 5; the municipal police
forces, 13; the armed forces, 15; the DISIP, 2; and other security
forces, 6. These figures reflect a range of killings in very different
situations committed by organizations with varying levels of control
and responsibilities. The majority of the killings were attributed to
various state and municipal police forces that report to local
officials and usually have little training or supervision.
The perpetrators of extrajudicial killings act with near impunity,
as the Government rarely prosecutes such cases. The police often fail
to investigate crimes allegedly committed by their colleagues and
characterize incidents of extrajudicial killings as ``confrontations,''
even when eyewitness testimony and evidence strongly indicate
otherwise. In addition, the civilian judicial system still is
struggling to implement the new Organic Criminal Procedures Code (COPP)
and, in the meantime, remains highly inefficient and sometimes corrupt.
Military courts often are biased in favor of members of the armed
forces accused of abuse. A pretrial summary phase called ``nulo
hecho,'' which is used in cases involving public officials and is
conducted in secret, was abolished in July under the COPP. It often
shielded members of the security forces from prosecution, since cases
could languish in this phase for several years. In the small number of
prosecutions in which the courts convict perpetrators of extrajudicial
killings and other abuses, the sentences issued are frequently light or
the convictions are overturned on appeal. Unlike common criminals,
members of the security forces charged with or convicted of crimes
rarely spend much time in prison.
On February 24, Sucre state police in Cumana used tear gas
canisters and pellet guns against students at the University Institute
of Technology who were protesting peacefully noncompletion of the
cafeteria. One student, Angel Castillo Munoz, died as a result of being
hit in the head by rubber bullets and falling unconscious into an area
flooded by tear gas. Police reportedly continued to fire, despite
students' attempts to surrender, resulting in a delay of medical care
to the injured. (Following Castillo's death on February 25, the
students again protested and attacked, looted, and burned the Sucre
state government palace. The National Guard was called in to restore
order.) The Sucre state governor fired police commander Jose Jesus
Navarro Dona and Sucre state secretary general Amalio Ermilo Rojas,
suspended the police officers who took part in the original
confrontation with students, and requested federal help in the
investigation. Militaryintelligence (DIM) officers subsequently
arrested Navarro and Rojas. Various groups objected to the fact that
the military took over the case. The authorities released Navarro and
Rojas for lack of evidence; there was no further progress on the case
at year's end.
Also in February, Red de Apoyo, a nongovernmental organization
(NGO), reported that Oswaldo Blanco died as the result of abuse by the
National Guard, in whose custody he had been detained.
In June the Metropolitan Police detained Jhon Linares after
shooting him in the stomach. The police also threatened his brother and
sister who tried to help him. Later, Linares was found dead at the
hospital with three bullet wounds. An investigation continued at year's
end.
In December heavy rains triggered flooding and landslides that
killed an estimated 20,000 persons. The authorities are investigating
allegations of human rights violations by the military and security
forces in the days immediately following the disaster. Witnesses claim
that military and security forces beat, detained, and killed alleged
looters and criminal suspects, between December 19 and December 25.
Security forces committed a small number of killings in prisons.
However, the majority of the 390 inmate deaths resulted from gang
confrontations, riots, fires, and generally unsanitary and unsafe
conditions in prison facilities (see Section 1.c.).
There has been no further investigation into the January 1998
killings of Harold Michael Zambrano Gonzalez and Arturo Jose Hernandez
Ramirez by Metropolitan Police. The PTJ also made no progress in the
investigation of the May 1998 killings of Carlos Alberto Colmenares
Garcia, Richard David Palacios Garcia, and Avelino Rafael Vega, who
died after the Sucre municipal police opened fire on their car. Nor was
any progress made in the investigation of the January 1997 incident in
which members of the Metropolitan Police arrested and led away two
young men in Guatire, Miranda state. Witnesses heard gunshots and later
found one of the men, Freddy Rafael Toro Ramirez, dead from bullet
wounds.
There were no prosecutions or new information surrounding the 1996
death of 25 inmates in a fire started by prison guards at La Planta
prison. On February 19, a judge sentenced two of the three PTJ members
implicated in the 1995 execution-style killing of 21-year-old Hector
Rojas to 7 years in prison for first-degree murder, far less than the
15 to 25 years established by law. The court absolved the third
officer, despite evidence of his guilt. The prosecution appealed the
decision, but there was no further progress in the case at year's end.
There were no developments in the 1994 discovery of a common grave in
the Sierra de Perija region of Zulia state, the 1992 killing of at
least 63 prisoners at Catia prison, or the 1992 killing of reporters
Maria Veronica Tessari and Virgilio Fernandez by members of the
security forces.
In November before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the
Government accepted its responsibility in 44 cases of extrajudicial
killings by security forces during and after the civil unrest of
February-March 1989, in which some 300 alleged extrajudicial killings
were committed. The Government also agreed to compensate the families
of the victims and to identify and punish those responsible. A total of
45 cases had been referred to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR) by the Committee of Family Members of Victims of the
Unrest (COFAVIC) in 1995. In 1991 a police officer was found guilty of
one killing, but the courts released the officer from prison 1 year
later. In October 1997, the IACHR called on the Government to
investigate this case, provide compensation to the victim's family, and
bring to justice those responsible for the death. By the end of 1998,
the Government had complied partially; it had investigated and made a
payment, but it had not punished any of those responsible. The IACHR
made a series of recommendations to the Government, but when the
Government did not comply with these recommendations nor reach a
settlement with the petitioners, on June 7, the IACHR referred the case
to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. On September 23, the
Supreme Court made an unprecedented decision to assume the preliminary
investigation of all the related cases that until then had been
scattered among 13 courts.
In September 1996, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights awarded
$722,332 in damages to 2 survivors and the surviving families of 14
fishermen killed in 1988 by military and police officers near the
border town of El Amparo, Apure state. The Government acknowledged its
responsibility and began to make payments in September 1997; it had
completed payments by year'send, and the parties were discussing the
payment of interest on the compensation. The Court also had ruled that
the Government had to investigate the case and prosecute those
responsible. The military originally claimed that the deaths were the
result of a confrontation with Colombian guerrillas, and in August 1994
a military tribunal overturned the conviction of 16 defendants in the
case despite strong evidence that they had participated in a planned
ambush. In October 1998, the Supreme Court upheld that decision.
Mob lynching of supposed criminals increased substantially due to
the public's perception of increased impunity resulting from the
difficult implementation of the COPP. The victims were almost always
known criminals who preyed on residents of poor neighborhoods. Between
October 1997 and September 1998 (the latest available figures), PROVEA
recorded 2 lynchings and 24 attempted lynchings, but both police and
NGO's believe that the figures increased. The activities of vigilante
groups known as ``brigadas'' reportedly decreased.
On February 25, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
guerrilla organization kidnaped American citizen indigenous activists
Terence Freitas, Lahe'ena'e Gay, and Ingrid Washinawatok in Colombia.
Their bodies were later found in Venezuela.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reliable reports of persons who
disappeared after being detained by the police or the armed forces.
There were no developments in connection with the 1995
disappearances of Julio Rafael Tovar, Fidel Ernesto Croes Aleman, Luis
Martin Sanchez Vargas, Juan Daniel Monsalve, or Jose Ramos; or the 1994
disappearances of Elsida Ines Alvarez, Benjamin Vasquez, and Fidel A.
Sanabria. Members of the security forces reportedly had detained each
of them prior to their disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture; however, the security forces
continue to torture and abuse detainees physically and psychologically
at a substantially increased rate. Credible human rights groups report
that this abuse most commonly consists of beatings during arrest or
interrogation, but there have been incidents when the security forces
used near suffocation and other forms of torture that leave no telltale
signs. Most victims come from the poorest and least influential parts
of society.
PROVEA documented 424 cases of torture from October 1998 through
September 1999, compared with 21 from October 1997 through September
1998. (This increase may reflect improved data collection and more
accurate reporting by PROVEA.) According to PROVEA, the DISIP was
responsible for 11 of the reported torture incidents; the PTJ, 10; the
armed forces, 7; the state police forces, 203; the municipal police
forces, 72; the Metropolitan Police, 67; and the national guard, 40. In
April human rights NGO's presented a report to the U.N. Committee
Against Torture in which they listed and documented 120 torture cases
since 1987 that they have investigated and reported to the Prosecutor
General and the National Human Rights Commission, but that still have
not been investigated fully by the Government.
Torture, like extrajudicial killings, continues because the
Government does not ensure the independent investigation of complaints
needed to bring those responsible to justice. In addition to lack of
vigor by the judiciary, the fact that the Institute of Forensic
Medicine is part of the PTJ also contributes to a climate of impunity,
since its doctors are unlikely to be impartial in their examinations of
cases that involve torture by members of the PTJ. Very few instances of
torture have resulted in convictions.
In March the Metropolitan Police harassed and beat 22-year-old
Andres Flores for no apparent reason when they encountered him sitting
on the steps of a building. Despite the protests of those present, the
police arbitrarily detained him. He was released only when a priest
lobbied on his behalf at the police station.
In August the PTJ in Guasdualito detained Juan de la Cruz Bravo and
accused him of murder. Bravo alleges that the police drugged him, beat
him, and subjected him to electrical shock. The Justice Foundation, an
NGO, is bringing his case to trial.
There were reports that security force members killed and beat
looters following the December floods and landslides (see Section
1.a.).
No action ever was reported against some 50 Baruta municipal police
officers who attacked residents of the poor working class Caracas
suburb of Petare in the predawn hours of December 25, 1997, injuring 43
persons. There was no reported progress from the criminal court
investigation or the internal investigation by the chief of the Baruta
municipal police.
The police used tear gas and pellet guns against peaceful
demonstrators, resulting in deaths and injuries (see Sections 1.a. and
2.b.).
In the Colombian border area where some constitutional protections
had been suspended since 1994, the National Guard and army acted with
near impunity until the suspension of the protections was lifted on
February 23. Subsequently, complaints against the security forces in
this area decreased. The Support Network for Justice and Peace had
documented many human rights abuses in this region by amassing detailed
witness testimony. There has been no resolution of the border-area
cases from 1995, in which members of the military, in separate
incidents in reaction to guerrilla attacks, tortured 23 rural workers
near Cararabo and 19 peasant farmers in La Victoria, both in Apure
state.
Prison conditions continued to be extremely harsh due to
underfunding, poorly trained and corrupt prison staff and national
guard members, and overcrowding so severe as to constitute inhuman and
degrading treatment.
Inmates often have to pay guards as well as each other to obtain
necessities such as space in a cell, a bed, and food. Because of the
prison food's low quality and insufficient quantity, only about 30
percent of inmates consume it. Most prisoners get their food from their
families, by paying prison guards, or in barter with other prisoners.
Many inmates also profit from exploiting and abusing others, and
violence among prisoners is common. This problem is exacerbated by the
absence of a rational system of prisoner classification: convicted
murders and rapists are housed with unsentenced first-time petty
offenders. Gang-related violence and extortion is fueled by the
substantial trafficking in arms and drugs that exist in the prisons. In
early June, 26 inmates escaped from Barcelona prison east of Caracas;
prisoners in the El Dorado prison threatened to commit mass suicide
unless they were transferred to other jails. In October some 35
prisoners escaped from a prison in downtown Caracas.
Female prisoners are detained in separate prisons, where conditions
generally are better than those in the men's facilities. Security
forces and law enforcement authorities often detain children together
with adults.
At the beginning of the year, roughly 70 percent of the
approximately 24,500 prisoners had not been convicted of a crime
because, under the old procedural code, most criminal defendants were
incarcerated rather than granted provisional liberty while their
prosecutions were pending. In addition, the slow and secretive
inquisitorial justice system of the old code had led to an inefficient,
overwhelmed, and corrupt justice system, which resulted in cases
languishing an average of 4 to 5 years in the courts during which time
the accused usually remained in jail. With the implementation of the
new COPP on July 1, prisoners accused of petty crimes who had not been
convicted but already had served 2 years or the minimum sentence
possible for that crime were to be released following a psychiatric
examination. Between July 1 and October 1, approximately 2,000
prisoners were released under the new provisions and benefits provided
by the law. There were approximately 19,000 prisoners at year's end.
At the end of September, prisoners carried out a number of hunger
strikes to demand that the Government expedite the review of the cases
of inmates who might benefit from the COPP's provisions. It was
estimated that there were still more than 6,000 prisoners who had not
been convicted but already had served 2 or more years in prison.
However, prisoners also had false expectations with respect to the
benefits of the COPP, which resulted in rising levels of tension and
violence. By the end of September, violent gang clashes in various
penitentiaries resulted in 16 deaths and 57 injuries.
In response to these events, the National Constitutional Assembly
declared a Prison Emergency on September 30 and created an
Interinstitutional Prison Emergency Commission comprised
ofrepresentatives from the ANC, the Interior and Justice Ministry, the
judicial branch, and NGO's. Despite resistance from the Catholic Church
and human rights NGO's, the Government decided to use the national
guard, normally charged with guarding the outside of the prisons, to
maintain internal control of the prisons while the Commission carried
out its work and until new prison guards could be trained.
PROVEA documented 390 deaths and 1,695 injuries from violence in
the prisons from October 1998 through September 1999; a decline from a
total of 460 deaths from violence between October 1997 and September
1998. The majority of the deaths resulted from prisoner-on-prisoner
violence, especially during clashes between rival gangs. Many others
died as a consequence of poor sanitary conditions, poor diet, and
inadequate medical care. Security forces committed a small number of
the killings in prisons. Funding for prisons remained extremely low,
preventing significant improvement in most penitentiaries.
There were no prosecutions of public officials for the corruption
and neglect that contributed to the January 1994 riot at Sabaneta
prison, in which inmates killed 105 fellow prisoners and wounded scores
of others.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the
COPP provide for freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention; however,
the security forces routinely continued to arrest and detain citizens
arbitrarily.
On February 23, the Government reinstated the constitutionally
protected freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention in the border
areas, where certain constitutional provisions had been suspended since
1994 and had not been lifted in 1995 when those protections were
restored in the rest of the country.
There continued to be arbitrary detentions by the Metropolitan
Police, the DISIP, the national guard, and the PTJ--especially during
anticrime sweeps in impoverished sections of major cities. The
authorities detained persons during the sweeps for up to 2 days while
they checked criminal records; most were released without charges.
PROVEA documented 6,236 persons detained in sweeps from October 1998
through September 1999, compared with 12,308 persons detained in sweeps
from October 1997 through September 1998. Human rights groups attribute
the decline to the shift in government policy away from using sweeps as
a method of controlling crime. After taking office, the Chavez
Government declared that DISIP and other intelligence agencies no
longer would be used for domestic political purposes. However, on April
5, DISIP arrested Daniel Perez, the son of the then-secretary general
of the Democratic Action (AD) party, based only on an anonymous
telephone call accusing Perez of alleged arms trafficking. Following
intervention by the Foreign and Interior Ministers, Perez was released
the following day.
The COPP states that a person accused of a crime cannot be
incarcerated during the criminal proceedings unless that person is
caught in the act of committing a crime, or a judge determines that
there is a danger the accused may flee or impede the investigation. The
law also provides for the right to a judicial determination of the
legality of the detention within 48 hours. In no case can the detention
of a person accused of a crime exceed the possible minimum sentence for
the crime committed, nor exceed 2 years. Under the previous system, the
police could hold persons without an arrest warrant for up to 8 days,
and in many cases, the police abused detainees physically and
psychologically during that period and illegally held them
incommunicado. There still exists confusion over the new code, and
arbitrary arrests continued to be common. Prison officials often
illegally demand payment from prisoners for transportation to judicial
proceedings. Those who are unable to pay often are forced to forgo
their judicial hearings.
Forced exile is illegal and is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The civilian judiciary is legally
independent; however, it is highly inefficient, and judges are subject
to influence from a number of sources.
The judicial sector consists of the Supreme Court, which is the
court of final appeal; the Prosecutor General, who provides opinions to
the courts on prosecution of criminal cases and acts as public
ombudsman to bring public employee misconduct orviolations of the
constitutional rights of prisoners or accused persons to the attention
of the proper authorities; the Ministry of Justice, which manages the
national police force, oversees the prisons, and files complaints in
criminal courts; and the Judicial Council, which oversees the lower
courts as well as the selection and training of judges. The lower court
system includes district and municipal courts as well as trial and
appeal courts that deal with civil and criminal matters.
Both the old code and its replacement, the new Organic Code of
Criminal Procedures, provide for the right to a fair trial and consider
the accused innocent until proven guilty in a court. However, under the
old secretive inquisitorial code, the presumption of innocence was
ineffective in the justice system, which became overburdened,
inefficient, and corrupt under a paper-intensive, costly, and time-
consuming judicial process. Judges are underpaid, poorly disciplined,
and susceptible to political influence. The COPP introduced for the
first time open, public trials with oral proceedings and verdicts by
juries or panels of judges. This new adversarial system of justice
gives practical effect to the presumption of innocence, eliminates the
secret stage of trial that had existed in the previous system, and
establishes the right to plead guilty and make reparation agreements.
Lengthy delays in trials were still common; there has been some
improvement, but the average length of delay is approximately 2\1/2\
years.
The Government struggled to implement the COPP, which required a
major shift in the fundamental concept of how justice is carried out,
the legal procedures involved, and the respective roles of the police,
the judge, and the lawyers. The police no longer may detain persons
arbitrarily for up to 8 days and now must work under the supervision of
a prosecutor; judges have ceased to be investigators and are now
arbiters of law; and prosecutors and defense attorneys confront one
another in open court. Open, oral trials took place around the country
despite a shortage of trained personnel and resources. The COPP's
successful implementation over the long term is expected to require
further progress, including increased training for police and lawyers
and an increased number of prosecutors and defenders to handle the
workload.
In August the ANC issued a Judicial Emergency Decree that created
the Judicial Emergency Commission, in order to bring about reform of
the judicial system. On September 7, the Judicial Council, which
oversees the selection, training, and discipline of judges, removed
eight judges from office based on charges of corruption or judicial
impropriety. The decisions were made with the support of the Supreme
Court and the Judicial Emergency Commission. The head of the Judicial
Emergency Commission announced at the same time that 50 other judges
would face similar charges, and that many others were under active
review. On September 9, the president of the Judicial Council resigned,
stating that the Judicial Emergency Commission's method of dismissing
judges violated the constitutional right to a proper defense. On
September 17, the Judicial Council dismissed 10 more judges for
administrative failures or sentencing errors. The Judicial Council also
announced that it would dismiss formally judges more than once for
different charges against them; in order to be reinstated, a judge
would have to win an appeal to the Supreme Court on each charge. Judges
with pending cases against them would not be eligible to take the
October 15 competitive examinations required for all judges to become
part of the new oral system under the COPP. Judges who had been
reprimanded would lose points on the exam.
On October 7, the ANC amended the Judicial Emergency Decree to
allow for the suspension of judges facing more than 7 charges while
investigations are conducted, which facilitated the suspension of 124
judges. These judges continued to receive salaries, and their
prosecution was subject to due process of law. By year's end, the
Judicial Council had suspended or dismissed more than 200 judges,
largely for corruption.
The military courts implemented a similar reform of the military
justice system and successfully have made the transition to the new
system. The military justice system carried out the first oral trial in
the country. The secret pretrial summary phase called ``nulo hecho''
was abolished in July with the implementation of the COPP. This phase
often shielded members of the security forces from prosecution, since
cases could languish for several years. Despite this success, human
rights NGO's expressed concern that the Supreme Court's selection of
military judges from a list of candidates provided by the Minister of
Defense links the careers of military judges to the high command,
making them more responsive to the views of their military leaders and
influencing them to act slowly in cases in which the military is
implicated. As a result, militaryoffenders might evade punishment for
extrajudicial killings and other human rights abuses.
The law provides for public defenders for those unable to afford an
attorney; however, there are not enough public defenders to handle the
caseload. The Judicial Council reported that there are 159 public
defense attorneys for the entire country.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Constitutional provisions prohibit arbitrary
interference with privacy, family, home, and correspondence; however,
the security forces infringed on citizens' privacy rights. From June
1994 to July 1995, the Government suspended the constitutional
protection of freedom from search without a warrant, along with other
freedoms. This suspension remained in effect in border areas until
February 23, when President Chavez restored the suspended
constitutional provisions. Even after reinstatement of the provision in
urban areas, security forces often conducted searches of homes without
warrants, especially during anticrime sweeps in impoverished
neighborhoods. There were no complaints during the year by human rights
NGO's of illegal wiretapping by the security forces.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice. Individuals and the media freely and
publicly criticize the Government. A provision in the new Constitution
states that all persons have the right to timely, truthful, and
impartial information, without censorship. This ``truthful
information'' clause raised concerns among many in the domestic and
international media that it could be used by the Government to
intimidate or censor the press. In addition, there were some
allegations of government pressure on the media. On December 21, the
editor of the El Mundo daily newspaper announced that he was resigning
because of ``tremendous government pressures'' against the newspaper's
owners. The paper had denounced the concentration of power in the
President's hands.
There is no statutory censorship. The Government has tools to
influence the press (e.g., potential controls on newsprint importation,
lucrative public sector advertising, licensing requirements for
journalists); however, in practice the media environment is free and
open. Some observers believe that there is self-censorship; for
example, there are very few editorials that reflect the opinion of an
individual newspaper. However, signed articles on opinion pages carry
abundant and varied perspectives, often highly critical of the
Government. Radio and television stations do not broadcast overt
political opinions.
Human rights groups criticized the Government for interfering with
free debate over the proposed new Constitution. In November Catholic
Bishop Roberto Luckert of Coro reportedly spoke against the new
Constitution on his diocese's radio station. The next day, two military
intelligence agents allegedly visited the station, accused its manager
of opposing the political process, and warned that they would be
monitoring and recording future broadcasts.
A 1994 law requires practicing journalists to have journalism
degrees and be members of the National College of Journalists. These
requirements are waived for foreigners and for opinion columnists, on
the grounds of tolerance of free speech. Media owners challenged the
law in November 1995, but the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on this
matter by year's end.
Print and electronic media are independent. There are state
television and radio stations whose directors are named by the
President, but whose broadcast policies are autonomous. The President's
speeches are broadcast live on all radio and television stations, which
traditionally provide broadcast time. The President has a weekly
television show, which began in June, and a weekly call-in radio show.
There is also a government-funded newspaper entitled The President's
Mail.
There is no state censorship of books, films, or other media
products.
Internet access is completely free and uncontrolled.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government generally
respects this right in practice. Public meetings, including those of
all political parties, generally are held unimpeded. The Government
requires permits for public marches but does not deny them for
political reasons.
However, as in earlier years, some demonstrations turned violent
and were quelled by security forces, who on occasion used deadly force
(see Section 1.a.). According to PROVEA, 2 persons were killed during
demonstrations, and 77 were injured from October 1998 through September
1999. The student and teaching sectors carry out the largest number of
protests, and the largest number of their demonstrations end up being
quelled by security forces. In February one student died as a result of
police tear gas and pellet guns used against peaceful student
demonstrators (see Section 1.a.). In August police minimally used tear
gas and water cannon to keep pro-Congress demonstrators and pro-ANC
demonstrators separate following an attempt by the ANC to prevent
Congress from meeting (see Section 3).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice. Professional and academic
associations operate without interference.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, provided that the practice of a religion does not threaten
public order or violate good custom, and the authorities respect this
right in practice.
Each local church must register with the Office of Religion in
order to hold legal status as a religious organization and to own
property. The requirements for registration are largely administrative.
However, some groups have complained that the process of registration
is slow and inefficient. Foreign missionaries require a special visa to
enter the country, which is obtained through the Office of Religion.
Missionaries generally are not refused entry; however, many complain
that the Office of Religion often takes months or years to process a
request.
In 1964 the Government and the Holy See signed a concordat that
underscores the country's historical ties to the Roman Catholic Church
and provides government subsidies to the Catholic Church's schools and
social programs. Other religious groups are free to establish and run
their own schools, but do not receive subsidies from the Government.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
of citizens and legal residents to travel within the country and to go
abroad and return, and the Government generally respects these rights.
However, the Government can suspend the freedom to travel, as it did
from June 1994 to July 1995. Freedom of movement remained suspended in
some border areas until February 23 when President Chavez restored the
suspended constitutional provisions. The Government also restricts
foreign travel for persons being investigated for criminal activities.
In December the security forces sometimes restricted movement in and
out of some of the areas hardest hit by the floods.
There is no domestic legislation regarding determination of refugee
status, the procedure or criteria to be applied, and no independent
organization to handle asylum requests. In the absence of any such
legislation, the Government allows the Venezuelan Bishops' Conference
to coordinate with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in
assisting refugees, determining the status of individual asylum
applicants under UNHCR's mandate. In 1999 there were a total of 188
persons in the country who had been granted refugee status. Under UNHCR
procedures, 39 of these were granted refugee status during the year.
The Government in theory provides first asylum; however, in June
some 3,500 Colombians entered the country in 3 waves following a
paramilitary offensive in the Catatumbo area of Colombia. The
Government provided rapid and effective humanitarian aid but, in
coordination with the Colombian Government, quickly repatriated all of
the Colombians. The first group of 2,084 Colombians, arrived June 3-4
and was repatriated voluntarily with thesupport of both governments by
June 6. The Government determined that they were not refugees, but
``displaced persons in transit.'' A second group arrived on June 8, and
according to human rights workers, expressed fear of returning to their
homes in Rio Negro, Colombia. The accelerated procedures adopted by
both governments for the return of the second and third groups limited
the opportunity for the Colombians to seek asylum, despite the
intention previously stated by some members of these groups to
different NGO's and the UNHCR. In August human rights NGO's filed a
petition before the IACHR asserting that this was a violation of
international refugee law. The Government established an
Interministerial Technical Commission to address future cross-border
movements, and the UNHCR reiterated the importance of enacting domestic
regulations to establish a humanitarian procedure within a framework of
respect for international refugee principles. There were no other
reports of the possible forced return of persons to a country where
they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right through
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
suffrage.
In December 1997, Congress passed a new election law that automated
the vote counting process, removed political party representatives from
all electoral organs, prohibited campaign financing by anonymous
sources, and created the National Electoral Council (CNE). The
smoothness of the electoral process and the rapid reporting of the
results during the November and December 1998 regional and presidential
elections, and the referendums and elections related to the ANC, were
evidence of the electoral reform. Most legislators from all levels of
government were elected from party lists (which, under the new law,
were supposed to have at least 30 percent women). The top election
officials, although not party members, were selected by negotiation
among the political parties in Congress. However, representatives to
the ANC were not chosen from party lists, and top election officials
did not function as formal representatives of political parties.
President Chavez had promised during his 1998 presidential campaign
to reform the Government and to use a constitutional assembly as the
primary mechanism to accomplish this objective. On January 19, the
Supreme Court ruled that a national referendum on the proposed
constitutional assembly did not violate the existing Constitution. The
Young Jurists civic association and the Foundation for Human Rights
both had challenged the referendum in October and December 1998,
respectively, and the January ruling addressed both of these challenges
simultaneously. On February 2, President Chavez signed a decree calling
for a consultative referendum on his proposed constitutional assembly,
asking the public to authorize the calling of a constitutional assembly
and to grant the President the authority to determine how its members
would be selected. On February 8, leaders of the Democratic Action
party asked the Supreme Court to rule the second question
unconstitutional; the Court ruled on March 23, and Chavez modified the
second question. On April 25, voters approved a constitutional assembly
in elections that international observers judged to be free and fair.
On April 26, following an extended debate with Congress over the
scope and extent of the powers, President Chavez signed an enabling law
that granted him emergency powers and allowed him to legislate by
decree for 6 months on economic, financial, and social issues.
Since electoral law did not regulate specifically elections for a
constitutional assembly, campaign regulations became the subject of
controversy between President Chavez and the CNE. In May the CNE ruled,
based on electoral regulations applied to other elections, that high
public officials, including the President, could not campaign for or
against candidates to the Constitutional Assembly. Later that month,
five government ministers resigned to run for the ANC. President Chavez
personally praised each candidate and disputed the CNE's ruling against
such endorsements. The confrontation reached its conclusion in July
when the CNE fined the President for violating the campaign regulations
and suspended his radio and television shows. Chavez paid the fine and
then stayed within the campaign regulations, as defined by the CNE.
On June 17, the Supreme Court rejected an appeal of the CNE's
ruling that party symbols or colors could not appear on the
ANCelectoral ballot; however, it ordered the CNE to publish symbols and
colors along with each participating organization and candidate in its
official gazette.
On July 25, voters elected 131 candidates to the ANC; 24 were
elected nationally, 104 regionally, and indigenous groups chose 3
persons. President Chavez's MVR party won 119 seats in elections that
international observers judged to be free and fair.
At its opening, President Chavez called upon the ANC to decree a
state of emergency relating to all branches of the government. The ANC
maintained that, in addition to its mandate to draft a new
constitution, it had the authority to establish, dissolve, and
otherwise alter government institutions. It quickly issued a Judicial
Emergency Decree, which was supported by a majority on the Supreme
Court but led to the resignation of the its president (see Section
1.e.). President Chavez called several times on the ANC to dissolve
Congress, including on one occasion in July when the Senate rejected 34
military promotions that he sought. On August 25, the ANC issued a
Legislative Emergency Decree limiting the legislative powers of
Congress and subjecting those prerogatives that it retained to ANC
approval. The decree forbade the Congress to meet in plenary session,
which applied to state governments as well; remaining legislative
functions were to be carried out by small standing committees. The
decree also established two committees within the ANC to propose
legislation to the ANC for consideration and to investigate past
congressional actions.
Congressional leaders subsequently said that the body would meet in
plenary session despite the ANC measure. The secretary general of the
Catholic Church's Episcopal Conference offered to mediate the dispute,
and congressional leaders agreed not to try to meet in plenary session
in exchange for a continued dialog with the ANC. However, some rank and
file members of Congress, from parties that did not support the
President, disagreed with the leadership and declared themselves in
general committee. When they tried to read their declaration in front
of Congress, they were attacked by ANC supporters, whom the police
dispersed with tear gas. Congressional Vice President Capriles appealed
the ANC's decree to the Supreme Court. In April the Supreme Court
indicated that Congress could not be shut down until a new constitution
was approved in a national referendum.
The Catholic Church continued to mediate talks between
congressional members and the ANC, allowing for continued dialog
between the two groups. On September 6, the two groups reached an
agreement that allowed Congress to begin holding sessions in October,
on an agenda prenegotiated with the ANC, and on September 9, an
agreement was signed that effectively nullified the Legislative
Emergency Decree, allowing Congress to resume its regular duties and
the ANC to focus on drafting a new constitution. In early October, the
Supreme Court rejected Capriles's challenge to the legislative decree,
ruling that the ANC was not bound by the Constitution, as a result of
the mandate it received from the public in the referendum.
On September 14, the ANC's president submitted a draft
constitutional text to the ANC, which then was debated. In November the
ANC presented its draft constitution to the public, and on December 15,
71 percent of voters approved the new Constitution. The abstention rate
was 54 percent, due in part to the heavy rains in parts of the country.
CNE rules for the election allowed public officials and bureaucrats to
campaign actively to maximize public participation in the referendum,
but they were not allowed to campaign in favor of an affirmative or
negative vote. On December 30, the Official Gazette published the text
of the new Constitution, and it formally entered into force, abrogating
the previous constitution.
On December 23, the ANC appointed a new provisional executive board
for the CNE; the move was criticized by civil society organizations and
by the existing CNE leadership.
Women and nonwhites participate fully in government and politics;
however, they remain underrepresented in senior leadership positions
and national elective office. The bicameral Congressional Committee for
Women's Rights focused on promoting political office-holding
opportunities for women. In the November 1998 regional elections, women
won 25 seats as deputies in the 207-member lower house of Congress, and
5 seats in the 53-member Senate; in the July elections, 16 women won
seats in the 131-member National Constitutional Assembly. President
Chavez appointed three women to ministerial positions in February.
However, following the reorganization after passage of the Organic Law
of Central Administration on August30, which reduced the number of
ministries to 14, there were no women in ministerial positions.
Indigenous people traditionally have not been integrated fully into
the political system due to their limited knowledge of politics, low
voter turnout, geographic isolation, and fewer economic and educational
opportunities. Few indigenous people are in government, and only one
was in Congress as an alternate deputy; there were 3 indigenous members
of the ANC, who were chosen by traditional indigenous procedures. In
February the President appointed Atala Uriana Pocaterra--an indigenous
rights activist and member of the Wayuu indigenous group--as Minister
of Environment and Natural Renewable Resources, making her the first
indigenous person to occupy a ministry-level position. Along with four
other ministers, she resigned in May at the President's request to run
for a seat in the ANC. In addition to the three seats reserved for
indigenous representatives elected by the indigenous communities,
Uriana won a regional seat from Zulia state.
In March the National Indigenous Council of Venezuela (CONIVE),
which claims to represent all indigenous groups, held an indigenous
congress in which it selected three representatives to the ANC.
Opposing indigenous groups contested the selections, and the CNE
refused to ratify the choices, since they were made before the national
referendum that approved the proposed constitutional assembly. After
consulting with the indigenous communities, the CNE decided to
reconvene an indigenous assembly in which approximately 600
representatives of the various groups would select their
representatives; the assembly ratified the original choices. The active
participation of indigenous people resulted in an expansion of their
rights in the new Constitution.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups generally operate without
government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on
human rights cases.
President Chavez met with human rights NGO's to listen to their
suggestions and to discuss human rights issues during his consultations
with a broad spectrum of society to formulate a plan for the
convocation of the ANC. However, the human rights groups remained
concerned about the lack of a new human rights agenda or of support for
the national human rights agenda formulated by the previous government
in a July 1997 symposium with NGO's. The Chavez administration also did
not support the National Human Rights Commission that former President
Caldera created in 1996 as a mechanism to coordinate the Government's
human rights programs and to serve as a forum for dialog with NGO's.
Despite the Commission's paralysis, NGO's have developed good
relationships with specific ministries, such as the Ministry of
Education to develop educational materials on human rights, and the
Foreign Ministry to discuss the resolution of existing human rights
cases against the Government in international courts.
The Defense Ministry's Human Rights Office made significant
advances to incorporate human rights training into the military's
curriculum. However, although the Defense Ministry continued to reject
the validity of NGO reports of alleged human rights violations by the
armed forces, it remained unwilling to provide evidence to refute the
charges, citing confidentiality regulations. The National Guard opened
a Public Attention Office to process charges of human rights violations
by national guard members. A national Police Committee created in
September 1997 to monitor police conduct, receive complaints, and
ensure implementation of disciplinary measures no longer exists.
During their meeting with President Chavez, the human rights NGO's
petitioned for the release of two neighborhood leaders and one human
rights activist who were detained arbitrarily in the border town of
Guasdualito, after the previously suspended constitutional protections
had been restored in February. All three were released shortly after
the meeting. At the request of the Venezuelan Episcopal Conference,
Chavez also issued a presidential pardon to Jose Rosario Paishi, an
indigenous person accused of collaborating with Colombian guerrillas;
he had been detained since May 1998.
In September President Chavez invited the IACHR to make an on- site
visit to the country.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination based on ethnic origin, sex, or
disability. However, the Government does not safeguard adequately the
rights of indigenous people, protect women against societal and
domestic violence, or ensure the disabled access to jobs and public
services. Very few resources are devoted to children's welfare; young
delinquents are locked in institutions that are unsafe.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem, and women face
substantial institutional and societal prejudice with respect to rape
and domestic violence. The law makes rape extremely difficult to prove,
requiring at a minimum medical examination within 48 hours of the
violation. A provision in the Penal Code provides that anyone guilty of
rape can avoid punishment if, before sentencing, he marries the victim.
Few police officers are trained to deal responsibly with rape victims.
In 1997, the most recent year for which statistics were available, the
police received 7,426 reports of sexual crimes, of which over 3,600
were cases of rape. However, women's organizations assert that such low
figures do not accurately portray the problem of rape and sexual
assault. They claim that many victims do not report the incident or
press charges due to societal pressure and their own feelings of guilt.
Domestic violence against women is very common and has been
aggravated by the country's economic difficulties. A total of 14,683
cases of domestic violence were reported to the authorities in 1997.
According to local monitors, the police generally are unwilling to
intervene to prevent domestic violence, and the courts rarely prosecute
those accused of such abuse. In addition, poor women generally are
unaware of legal remedies and have little access to them. On January 1,
the Law Against Violence toward Women and Children came into force, and
the PTJ opened the Division Against Violence to accommodate its
provisions. This law requires the police to receive reports of domestic
violence and obligates hospital personnel to advise authorities of
abuse.
The National Women's Council, an agency of the presidency with
representation from the Ministries of Justice, Education, Family,
Health, and Labor, in 1996 prepared a manual on violence against women
and children, which includes information on where the victims might
obtain assistance. There are a number of NGO's concerned with domestic
violence, sex education, and economic discrimination. However, the
recommendations of these groups have not been implemented widely by the
police or other concerned governmental agencies.
Sexual harassment in the workplace is a common problem.
Women and men are legally equal in marriage. Women account for
roughly half the student body of most universities, have advanced in
many professions, including medicine and law, and gradually have
surmounted many of the barriers to their full participation in
political and economic life. Nonetheless, women still are
underrepresented in the higher ranks of labor unions and private
industry.
The Labor Code specifies that employers must not discriminate
against women with regard to pay or working conditions, must not fire
them during pregnancy or for a year after giving birth, must grant them
unpaid leave and benefits for 6 weeks before the birth of a child and
12 weeks after, and must provide them with 10 weeks of unpaid leave if
they legally adopt children under 3 years of age. According to the
Ministry of Labor and the major labor federation, these regulations are
enforced in the formal sector, although social security payments often
are delayed.
Children.--The Government continued to scale back its expenditure
on education, health, and social services. While the law provides for
universal free education, about one-third of the Ministry of Education
budget was dedicated to post-secondary education, leaving both primary
and secondary education chronically underfunded. According to the
United Nations Children's Fund, only 76.5 percent of eligible children
enter the first grade. This means that over 750,000 children remain
outside the educational system. In addition, the 1998 annual report of
the Community Centers for Learning (CECODAP) stated that over 400,000
children are not eligible to receive government assistance, including
public education, because their births arenot documented properly. In
1998 the Government attempted to remedy this problem by adopting a new
regulation that requires hospitals to register the births of all
children.
According to CECODAP's study, 500,000 children, most under the age
of 5, have an average of 2 episodes of gastroenteritis a year, a
sickness that is the ninth leading cause of death in the country. A
total of 40 percent of the population under the age of 17 suffer from
malnutrition, and 76 percent live in poverty. These conditions
contribute to the increase in preventable diseases that are leading
causes of infant mortality.
An increase in poverty has raised the level of stress within
families and led to a rise in the number of abandoned children and to
more child abuse. A survey by the National Institute for Minors in 1994
determined that 206,000 children were involved in illicit activities,
principally begging but also petty theft, prostitution, and drug
trafficking. Some 40,000 children were exploited sexually, according to
a 1994 study. There were also reports of trafficking in children from
other South American countries to work in Caracas as street vendors and
housemaids (see Section 6.f.).
The authorities in Caracas and several other jurisdictions tried to
cope with the phenomenon of street children by imposing curfews for
unsupervised minors. Children's rights advocates claim that curfews
permit the police to act arbitrarily in detaining persons who have
committed no crime. Because reform institutions are filled to capacity,
hundreds of children accused of infractions are confined in jails where
they are crowded into small, filthy cells, fed only once a day, and
forced to sleep on bare concrete floors.
In October 1997, Amnesty International reported past incidents in
which minors were subjects of extrajudicial killings and abuse, as well
as deficiencies in law and practice with regard to the detention of
children. In particular, the 1980 Minors' Protection Act requires them
to be brought before a judge within 8 days of detention, but this may
be extended to 3 months. In addition, security forces and law
enforcement authorities often detain children together with adults.
Reports of child abuse are rare due to a fear of entanglement with
the authorities and ingrained attitudes regarding family privacy. The
overburdened judicial system, although very slow, generally ensures
that in most situations children are removed from abusive households
once a case has been reported. However, public facilities for such
children are inadequate and have poorly trained staff.
People with Disabilities.--The physically disabled have minimal
access to public transportation, and ramps are practically nonexistent,
even in government buildings. According to local advocates, the
disabled are discriminated against in many sectors, including
education, health care, and employment.
In 1993 the Government passed the first comprehensive law to
protect the rights of the disabled. The law requires that all newly
constructed or renovated public parks and buildings provide access for
the disabled. Among other important provisions, the law forbids
discrimination in employment practices and in the provision of public
services. However, the Government did not make a significant effort to
implement the new law, to inform the public of it, or to try to change
societal prejudice against the disabled.
Indigenous People.--Although the law prohibits discrimination based
on ethnic origin, members of the country's indigenous population
frequently suffer from inattention to and violation of their human
rights. Many indigenous people are isolated from modern civilization
and lack access to basic health and educational facilities. High rates
of cholera, hepatitis-B, malaria, and other diseases plague their
communities. There are approximately 316,000 indigenous people in 27
ethnic groups.
The Constitution provides for special laws governing ``the
protection of indigenous communities and their progressive
incorporation into the life of the nation.'' Nonetheless, local
political authorities seldom take account of the interests of
indigenous people when making decisions affecting their lands,
cultures, traditions, and allocation of natural resources. As farmers
and miners intrude on their habitats, indigenous communities are
threatened by deforestation and water pollution. Few indigenous people
hold title to their land, but many do notwant to since most indigenous
groups reject the concept of individual property and want the
Government to recognize lands traditionally inhabited by them as
territories belonging to each respective indigenous group.
At year's end, the Supreme Court of Justice had not yet ruled on a
lawsuit filed by environmental and indigenous organizations challenging
a 1997 decree that permitted the expansion of legal mining activities
in the Imataca Forest Reserve. The groups charged that only Congress
can change the nature of the reserve, that there was an inadequate
public review process prior to the change, and that expanded mining
activities would affect adversely the health of the Warao, Arawako,
Karina, Akawaio, and Pemon indigenous communities that inhabit the
Imataca watershed area. In November 1997, the Supreme Court ordered the
Government not to issue any new mining concessions in the Imataca
reserve until the Court ruled on the constitutionality of the
presidential decree. In June President Chavez said that he planned to
enact a new law to regulate the use of the Reserve and that it would
annul the 1997 decree.
The controversy over infrastructure development and the maintenance
of traditional Indian lifestyles is most evident in Bolivar state,
where the Pemon Indians continued to protest the building of power
lines through Canaima National Park. In September the Pemons knocked
down an electrical tower, blocked a key highway linking the country to
Brazil, and detained three trucks being used to build the lines.
The Yanomami, among the most isolated of the indigenous people,
have been subject to persistent incursions into their territory by
illegal gold miners. The miners have not only introduced new diseases
but social ills as well. In December 1996, a number of human rights
organizations, acting on behalf of the Yanomami community of Haximu,
petitioned the IACHR in connection with the 1993 massacre of 16 members
of the community by Brazilian miners. The petition alleges that the
Government failed in its obligation to protect the Yanomami and to seek
appropriate punishment of the killers, who were released by the
Brazilian authorities after 3 months' detention. In May 1998, the
Government agreed to work with the NGO's under IACHR mediation to
resolve the case. In November the Government signed an agreement to
compensate the Yanomami; plans to implement this agreement were being
discussed at year's end.
Since 1998 hundreds of members of the Warao indigenous group have
migrated from their traditional homelands in the swampy Orinoco delta
region to the capital of Caracas where they live in the streets,
selling their traditional crafts and begging. The Warao say that
flooding and petroleum exploration have eroded their traditional means
of survival, fishing, and horticulture. In addition, many Warao no
longer want to or no longer possess the knowledge required to survive
in their traditional manner. However, the Caracas city government and
the Metropolitan Police have maintained a policy of forcing the Warao
to return to the delta by rounding them up and loading them onto buses.
In 1998 they returned, on average, groups of 100 Warao, at least 15
times. Many of the Warao return to Caracas, citing lack of jobs and
money in the delta and their ability to receive approximately $225
(130,000 bolivars) per week in handouts in Caracas.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Both the Constitution and labor law
recognize and encourage the right of workers to organize. The
comprehensive 1990 Labor Code extends the right to form and join unions
of their choosing to all private sector and public sector employees
(except members of the armed forces). The code mandates registration of
unions with the Ministry of Labor, but it reduces the Ministry's
discretion by specifying that registration may not be denied if the
proper documents (a record of the founding meeting, the statutes, and
the membership list) are submitted. Only a judge may dissolve a union,
and then only for reasons listed in the law, such as the dissolution of
a firm or by agreement of two-thirds of the membership.
One major union confederation, the Venezuelan Confederation of
Workers (CTV), three small union confederations, and a number of
independent unions operate freely. About 28 percent of the national
labor force is unionized. The CTV's top leadership includes members of
several political parties but the majority are affiliated with one of
the traditional parties, Democratic Action. The CTV and the AD
influence each other.
In September the ANC debated a proposed labor decree, which called
for the closing of unions and federations, and the establishment of a
single federation; however, the decree had not been enacted at year's
end. On September 13, the ANC and the CTV formalized an agreement to
create a single, unified workers confederation with free and open
leadership elections. On October 23, the CTV voted to coordinate action
plans with the country's three other labor confederations, with the
collaboration of the ANC.
The law recognizes the right of public and private sector employees
to strike. However, public servants may exercise it only if it does not
cause ``irremediable damage to the population or to institutions.'' The
Labor Code allows the President to order public or private sector
strikers back to work and to submit their dispute to arbitration if the
strike ``puts in immediate danger the lives or security of all or part
of the population.'' During the year, most strikes were brief and
occurred among government employees such as petroleum workers, health
workers in public hospitals and clinics, and firefighters. In May
striking truckers blocked the border crossing between Tachira state and
Colombia for 2 weeks, to protest competition from Colombian truckers.
There are no restrictions on affiliation with international labor
organizations, and many union organizations are active internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
protects and encourages collective bargaining, which is practiced
freely. According to the code, employers must negotiate a collective
contract with the union that represents the majority of their workers.
The code also contains a provision stating that wages may be raised by
administrative decree, provided that the Congress approves the decree.
The law prohibits employers from interfering with the formation of
unions or with their activities and from stipulating as a condition of
employment that new workers must abstain from union activity or must
join a specified union.
Ministry of Labor inspectors hear complaints regarding violations
of these regulations, and can impose a maximum fine of twice the
minimum monthly wage for a first infraction. Under the code, union
officials enjoy special protection from dismissal. If a judge
determines that any worker was fired for union activity, the worker is
entitled to back pay plus either reinstatement or payment of a
substantial sum of money, which varies according to his years of
seniority.
Labor law and practice are the same in the sole export processing
zone, located in Punto Fijo, as in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
states that no one may ``obligate others to work against their will,''
and such practices generally are not known to occur. Apart from the
general prohibition of compulsory labor, the law does not prohibit
specifically forced and bonded labor by children, but such practices
generally are not known to occur; however, there were reports that
children were trafficked into the country to work as housemaids and
beggars (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code and the Tutelary Law for Minors contain
provisions to protect children from exploitation in the workplace. The
Ministry of Labor and the National Institute for Minors enforce child
labor policies effectively in the formal sector of the economy but much
less so in the informal sector, which accounts for the vast majority of
child laborers. A plan formulated by the National Institute for Minors
in 1996 to reach and better protect children who work in the informal
sector has not been implemented because of a lack of funding.
Primary school education is compulsory, free, and universal.
However, 64 percent of children leave school before the ninth grade. In
a 1996 survey of working children conducted by the National Institute
for Minors, 45 percent of those polled stated that they were not in
school. The actual figure is probably much higher considering that
those who stated that they attended school also reported that they
worked on average 7\1/2\ hours a day 4 to 7 days a week.
The Labor Code allows children between the ages of 12 and 14 to
work only if the National Institute for Minors or the Labor Ministry
grants special permission. It states that children between the ages of
14 and 16 may not work without permission from their legal guardians.
Minors may not work in mines or smelters, in occupations that risk life
or health, that could damage intellectual or moral development, or in
public spectacles.
Those under 16 years of age must by law work no more than 6 hours a
day or 30 hours a week. Minors under the age of 18 may work only
between the hours of 6 a.m. and 7 p.m. The estimated 1.2 million
children who work in the informal sector, mostly as street vendors,
generally work more hours than the total permitted under the law. In
the National Institute for Minors 1996 survey of working children, half
the children worked both morning and afternoon, and 64.5 percent worked
6 or 7 days a week. The Government's Central Office of Statistics and
Information reports that 12 percent of the country's children between
the ages of 10 and 17 are working, have worked at some time, or are
seeking work. Of that number, approximately 70 percent work in the
informal sector of the economy. Less than 300,000 of those working in
the informal sector have work permits.
Apart from the general prohibition of compulsory labor, the law
does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but
such practices generally are not known to occur; however, there were
reports of trafficking in children (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The monthly minimum wage was
$201 (120,000 bolivars) in the private sector for urban workers and
$165 (98,000 bolivars) for rural workers, effective May 1. Total take-
home pay in the public sector, the product of collective bargaining,
was at least equal to that received by private sector minimum wage
workers. Fringe benefits are added to these minimum figures; they vary
with the workers' individual circumstances, but in general increase
wages by about one-third. However, even with these benefits, the
minimum wage is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living
for a worker and family. Unions point out that a worker's income is
often less than the cost of a family's basic monthly food basket,
estimated by the Center for Documentation and Analysis for Workers in
September at $363 (228,591 bolivars). Under the Labor Code, minimum
wage rates are set by administrative decree, which Congress may either
suspend or ratify but may not change. The law excludes only domestic
workers and concierges from coverage under the minimum wage decrees.
The Ministry of Labor enforces minimum wage rates effectively in the
formal sector of the economy, but about one- half of the population
works in the informal sector, where labor laws and protections
generally are not enforced.
The 1990 Labor Code reduced the standard workweek to a maximum of
44 hours and requires 2 ``complete days of rest each week.'' Some
unions, such as the petroleum workers, have negotiated a 40-hour week.
Overtime may not exceed 2 hours daily, 10 hours weekly, or 100 hours
annually, and may not be paid at a rate less than time and a half. The
Ministry of Labor effectively enforces these standards in the formal
sector.
The authorities have yet to promulgate regulations to implement the
1986 Health and Safety Law, which is not enforced. The delay is due
largely to concern that the law provides penal sanctions against
management when violations of health and safety occur and that there is
ambiguity in the law over what constitutes a violation. The Labor Code
states that employers are obligated to pay specified amounts (up to a
maximum of 25 times the minimum monthly salary) to workers for
accidents or occupational illnesses, regardless of who is responsible
for the injury.
The code also requires that workplaces maintain ``sufficient
protection for health and life against sicknesses and accidents,'' and
it imposes fines ranging from one-quarter to twice the minimum monthly
salary for first infractions.
However, in practice Ministry of Labor inspectors seldom close down
unsafe job sites. Under the law, workers can remove themselves from
dangerous workplace situations without jeopardy to continued
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There were reports that women were
trafficked to Spain for purposes of prostitution.
There also were reports of trafficking in children from other South
American countries to work in Caracas as street vendors and housemaids.
EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
----------
AUSTRALIA
Australia has a federal system of government and a long history as
a multiparty parliamentary democracy. The judiciary is independent.
Federal, state, and local police are under the firm control of the
civilian authorities and carry out their functions in accordance with
the law. There were occasional reports that police committed abuses.
A highly developed economy, which includes manufacturing, mining,
agriculture, and services, provides most citizens with a high per
capita income. A wide range of government programs offers assistance
for disadvantaged citizens.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens,
and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with
individual instances of abuse. There were occasional reports that
police beat or otherwise abused persons. The Government administers
many programs to improve the socioeconomic conditions of Aborigines and
Torres Straits Islanders, who together form about 2 percent of the
population, and to address longstanding discrimination against them.
Societal violence and discrimination against women are problems that
are being addressed actively. Trafficking in women, a growing problem,
also is being addressed.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by government officials. However, 93
persons died in prisons, police custody, or during police attempts to
detain them (see Section 1.c.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits all such practices; however, police on
occasion mistreat suspects in custody. Indigenous groups charge that
police harassment of indigenous people is pervasive and that racial
discrimination among police and prison custodians persists. Amnesty
International reported several incidents that involved such abuses.
State and territorial police forces have internal affairs units that
investigate allegations of abuse and report to a civilian ombudsman.
In 1998 the total number of deaths in custody fell by 10 to 93. Of
these, 24 deaths occurred in police custody or during attempts by
police to detain suspects. The remainder occurred in prison custody,
including one youth who died in a juvenile detention center. Of the
total deaths in custody, 38 persons died from hanging. Twenty persons
died of natural causes. Five died as a result of injuries sustained
while fleeing police during high-speed pursuit. The police shot and
killed six persons; in all cases the use of deadly force was found to
be justified. One person died from a self-inflicted gunshot wound. A
record eight prison inmates died during 1998 at the hands of another
inmate. Eleven persons died as a result of drug overdoses. Three died
of unknown causes. One cause of death is still to be determined by a
coroner.
Aboriginal adults represent 1.6 percent of the adult population but
constituted approximately 19 percent of the total prison population
during 1998. Aborigines accounted for 16 (17 percent) of the 93 deaths
in custody. Six died in police custody or during attempts by police to
detain them. Of the six, one died from hanging; two died of natural
causes; one died from injuries; one died from a self-inflicted gunshot
wound during a police siege; and one died from an undetermined cause,
possibly smoke inhalation, after setting a fire in his cell. Nine died
in prison. Of the nine, five died from hanging; three died of natural
causes; and one died from injuries inflicted by another inmate. For the
first time since 1988, an indigenous youth died, from hanging, in a
correctional setting.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes this
prohibition.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the executive and legislative branches
respect its provisions.
There is a well-developed system of federal and state courts, with
the High Court at its apex. Almost all criminal trials are conducted by
courts established under state and territorial legislation. The Federal
Court and the High Court have very limited roles to play.
The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and an independent
judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
When trials are conducted in local courts, the magistrates sit
alone. In higher courts, namely the state district or county courts and
the state or territorial supreme courts, trials are usually conducted
before a judge and jury. The jury decides on the facts and a verdict
after a trial conducted by a judge.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices; government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although there is no bill of
rights, in two decisions the High Court has indicated that freedom of
political discourse is implied in the Constitution. The Government
respects these rights in practice. An independent press, an effective
judiciary, and a functioning democratic political system combine to
ensure freedom of speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Although these
rights are not codified in law, citizens exercise them without
government restriction.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
Constitution prohibits the adoption of a state religion. Minority
religions are given equal rights to land, status, and building of
places of worship.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
The Government encourages immigration by skilled migrants, family
members, and refugees.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees,
and relevant laws and regulations are in accordance with the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Reugees and its 1967 Protocol.
There is no provision for first asylum. In April the Government offered
temporary safe haven to 4,000 Kosovar refugees. On September 1, 550
East Timorese were given similar temporary protection. In November the
Government changed its policy on undocumented migrants and asylum
seekers. Previously those who claimed a fear of persecution if returned
to their country of origin were either issued or denied protection
visas, providing for full residence and employment rights, with no
intermediate measures. With the change in policy, undocumented arrivals
are issued a temporary protection visa valid for 3 years only. This
visa does not provide for application for family reunification and
limits access to public benefits to medical assistance only. After 3
years, a case is to be reviewed, at which point a full protection visa
would be issued if the person were still unable to return home.
Under the Migration Reform Act of 1994, asylum-seekers, who arrive
at the border without prior authorization to enter the country, are
automatically detained, but may be released from detention if they meet
certain criteria--including age, ill-health, and experiences of torture
or other trauma. The majority of asylum seekers are detained for the
duration of the often-prolonged asylum process. The detention policy
has led to extensive litigation initiated by human rights and refugee
advocacy groups, which charge that the sometimes-lengthy detentions
violate the human rights of the asylum seekers. The U.N. Human Rights
Commission (UNHRC) stated in April 1997 that Australia had violated the
rights of a boat person by detaining him for more than 4 years while
his applications to remain in the country were being considered. The
UNHRC stated that his detention was arbitrary and in violation of the
InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights. In an April 1997
report to Parliament, the federally funded but independent Australian
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission also condemned the
Government's treatment of asylum seekers as breaching international
treaty obligations.
In 1998-99 the Government planned to accept 68,000 migrants, with
an additional 12,000 admitted under the humanitarian program. This
figure includes 2,000 places for those persons already in the country
who are granted refugee status. As in 1997-98, the humanitarian program
continues to give priority to the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East,
and Africa. Persons admitted under the humanitarian program have
immediate access to a wide range of government welfare and health
benefits, including income support, English education, and translating
and interpreting services. In 1997-98 the Government spent
approximately $7 million for resettlement services for refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage and mandatory voting. In October 1998, voters
elected the Liberal-National Party coalition to a second 3-year term of
office. On November 6, voters rejected a referendum to amend the
Constitution to become a republic.
No legal impediments exist to prevent women and indigenous people
from holding public office. However, historical patterns of bias
against women have contributed to their underrepresentation in
government and politics. Approximately 25 percent of federal
parliamentarians are women, an increase from the 22 percent in the last
Parliament. Both the Government and the opposition have declared their
intent to increase the numbers of women elected to public office.
The deleterious effects of poor educational achievement and a
generally inferior socioeconomic status have contributed significantly
to the underrepresentation of Aboriginals among political leaders. One
Aboriginal was elected to the Federal Senate in the October 1998
elections; there were no Aboriginals in the previous Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government
restriction (and in some instances with government funding),
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.
Government officials cooperate and respond to their views. Overall
complaints of discrimination dropped from 2,249 in 1996-97 to 1,522 in
1997-98, a 32 percent reduction.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination based on these factors, and the
Government and an independent judiciary vigorously enforce the
prohibition.
From July 1998 to June 1999, 37 cases of assault against gays and
lesbians were reported in the state of New South Wales.
Women.--Social analysts and commentators estimate that domestic
violence may affect as many as one family in three or four. Wife
beating is particularly prevalent in certain Aboriginal communities.
The Government recognizes that domestic violence and economic
discrimination are serious problems and the statutorily independent Sex
Discrimination Commissioner actively addresses these and other areas of
discrimination. A 1996 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) study
found that 111,000 women who were married or in a common-law
relationship experienced an incident of violence by their partner in
the previous 12-month period. Almost one in four women who have been
married or in a common-law relationship have experienced violence by a
partner at some time during the relationship, according to the ABS
study.
Trafficking in East Asian women for the sex trade is a growing
problem (see Section 6.f.).
Women have equal status under the law, and the law provides for pay
equity. There are highly organized and effective private and public
women's rights organizations at the federal, state, and local levels.
There is a federal-level Office of the Status of Women that monitors
women's rights. The federal Sex Discrimination Commissioner receives
complaints and attempts to resolve those that are deemed valid.
According to governmentstatistics, sex discrimination complaints fell
by 37 percent from the previous year. In August the Office of the
Status of Women estimated the ratio of female to male full-time average
hourly earnings was 85 percent. This was termed ``the highest on
record.''
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its publicly funded systems of
education and medical care. The Government provides rebates of
approximately 10 percent of the cost of childcare to all parents and
provides additional childcare subsidies to lower income families.
The federal Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission receives
complaints and attempts to resolve those it finds valid. Similarly, the
six states and two territories investigate complaints of neglect or
child abuse and institute practical measures aimed at protecting the
child when such complaints prove founded. The Government has enacted
strict legislation aimed at restricting the trade in, and possession
of, child pornography, and which further allows suspected pedophiles to
be tried in Australia regardless of where the crime was committed.
There is no societal pattern of abuse.
The Government and domestic NGO's have responded promptly to the
problem of a small number of children who have been smuggled into the
country generally for the sex trade. The NGO End Child Pornography and
Trafficking in Children (ECPAT) has conducted an aggressive public
education campaign to raise awareness of the issue and offer strategies
to combat trafficking in children. ECPAT successfully lobbied the
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) to conduct
police checks of unaccompanied children entering the country to verify
that they are not part of a trafficking operation (see Section 6.f.).
People With Disabilities.--Legislation prohibits discrimination
against disabled persons in employment, education, or other state
services. The Disability Discrimination Commissioner promotes
compliance with federal laws that prohibit discrimination against
disabled persons. The Commissioner also promotes energetic
implementation and enforcement of state laws that require equal access
and otherwise protect the rights of disabled persons. On July 21, the
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission found that a private
primary school had violated the federal Disability Discrimination Act
when it refused to enroll a 7-year-old girl with spina bifada in its
kindergarten program. The school is appealing the ruling through the
federal courts.
No federal legislation mandates the uniform provision of
accessibility for the disabled. It is lawful to deny employment or
services to those with disabilities if there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the disabled person would be unable to carry out the
work or would require the employer or service provider to furnish
services or facilities that could not reasonably be provided.
Indigenous People.--The Racial Discrimination Act of 1975 prohibits
discrimination on grounds of race, color, descent, or national or
ethnic origin. The Ministry for Aboriginal Affairs, in conjunction with
the Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islander Commission (ATSIC), has the
main responsibility for initiating, coordinating, and monitoring all
governmental efforts to improve the quality of life of indigenous
people. A wide variety of government initiatives and programs seek to
improve all aspects of Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islander life. In
1998 the Federal Government spent approximately $1.13 billion on
health, welfare, education, and regional development programs targeted
at assisting Aboriginal people. Spending on indigenous-specific
programs is now the highest on record in real terms and in 1998
amounted to almost $14,000 annually per Aboriginal household.
However, in practice indigenous Australians continue to experience
significantly higher rates of imprisonment, inferior access to medical
and educational institutions, greatly reduced life expectancy rates,
elevated levels of unemployment, and general discrimination, which
contribute to a feeling of powerlessness.
Nationally, indigenous people are imprisoned at 21 times the rate
of nonindigenous people. Over 45 percent of Aboriginal men between the
ages of 20 and 30 years have been arrested at some time in their lives.
The prison incarceration rate for indigenous juvenile offenders is 21
times that of nonindigenous juveniles. Indigenous groups claim that the
Government's lack of response to a series of recommendations by the
1991 Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody contributes to
these disturbing statistics. Human rights observers claim
thatsocioeconomic conditions give rise to the common precursors of
indigenous crime, e.g., unemployment, homelessness, and boredom.
Indigenous groups charge that police harassment of indigenous
people including juveniles is pervasive and that racial discrimination
among police and prison custodians persists. A human rights delegation
that visited in 1996 alleged a pattern of mistreatment and arbitrary
arrests occurring against a backdrop of systematic discrimination. Most
of the juveniles interviewed complained about violence occurring after
apprehension and during questioning about alleged offenses. In November
1998, the Queensland Government launched an inquiry after it was
discovered that an 11-year-old Aboriginal boy had been held for 3 days
in an adult detention center because no youth facility was available in
that remote part of the state. Government statistics confirm the common
perception among indigenous people that police systematically mistreat
them. Government reports have suggested that the pursuit of economic
self-determination for indigenous people would greatly assist in
solving the crime problems in indigenous communities and the
differences in rates of imprisonment.
The average life expectancy of an indigenous person is 20 years
less than that of a nonindigenous person. The infant mortality rate for
indigenous children is 3 times that of nonindigenous children. The
maternal mortality rate for indigenous women is 5 times that of
nonindigenous women. The incidence of illnesses such as tuberculosis,
leprosy, hepatitis, and of sexually transmitted diseases is 10 times
greater among indigenous people than nonindigenous people. Data
indicate that 22.5 percent of indigenous children complete secondary
education compared with 76.2 percent of nonindigenous children.
Government statistics for 1995 show that the participation rate in
university education for Aboriginals is 2.4 percent (up from 1.8
percent in 1991) compared with 2.7 percent for non-Aboriginals.
Government programs, including a $750 million indigenous land fund
and a ``Federal Social Justice Package,'' aim at ameliorating the
challenges faced by indigenous Australians. In July 1998, after a
compromise with its opponents, the Government was able to pass
amendments to the 1993 Native Title Act. The ATSIC stated that the
amended act contains gains for Aboriginal people but still contains
``substantial pain'' for native title claimants. Aboriginal leaders
were pleased by the removal of the time limit for lodging native title
claims but expressed deep concern about the weakening of Aboriginal
rights to negotiate with non-Aboriginal leaseholders over the
development of rural property. Aboriginal groups continue to express
concern that the amended act limits the future ability of Aboriginal
people to fully protect their property rights. At present 15 percent of
Australian land is owned or controlled by Aboriginal people. In March
the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
expressed serious concern about the Government's Native Title
amendments and asked the Government to explain why the amendments were
not racially discriminatory. In August then-ASTIC Chairman Gatjil
Djerrkura asked the CERD to maintain scrutiny on the Howard Government.
He claimed that the Howard Government had continued to ignore concerns
raised by the CERD.
On August 26, the Government, in identical motions passed by both
Houses of the Federal Parliament, expressed public regret for past
mistreatment of the Aboriginal minority; however, the government-
sponsored motion of reconciliation was criticized by many aboriginal
leaders as not going far enough. Prime Minister Howard acknowledged the
``most blemished chapter in our national history'' and submitted a
seven-point motion to Parliament. Howard proposed that Parliament
express ``its deep and sincere regret'' that Aborigines had ``suffered
injustices under the practices of past generations, and for the hurt
and trauma that many indigenous people continue to feel.'' However,
both Aboriginal and opposition leaders stated that only a full apology
would be sufficient. The Government also continues to oppose an
official apology in the specific case of the ``Stolen Generation'' of
Aboriginal children, who were taken from their parents by the
Government from 1910 to the early 1970's and raised by foster parents
and orphanages. The Government's position remains that the present
generation has no responsibility to apologize for the wrongs of a
previous generation.
As of October, the Federal Government had allocated an additional
$7 million over 4 years to the Link Up Program, which was created to
reunite members of the Stolen Generation with their families. The ASTIC
spent over $630,000 during the financial year ending June 30 on
location, reunion, and counseling support for members of the Stolen
Generation. Across the nation, Link Up counselors are assisting over
2,500 Aboriginal clients. The ASTIC reports that during the financial
year ending June 30, it assisted the reunion of slightly more than 100
clients with their families.
Following the October 1998 reelection of the Government, Prime
Minister Howard gave Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Minister
Philip Ruddock additional duties with regard to Aboriginal Australians.
In his victory speech followingreelection, Howard said that he would
make reconciliation with Aboriginals one of his second term priorities.
In June the Council on Aboriginal Reconciliation released its draft
document of reconciliation for public comment and discussion. Created
by Parliament in 1991, the Council is to hold its culminating national
event in May 2000, at which time it is to release a document of
reconciliation, which is intended to serve as a national blueprint for
healing between indigenous citizens and the wider community.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although Asians make up less
than 5 percent of the population, they account for 40 percent of recent
immigrants. Public opinion surveys indicate growing criticism of
immigration. In a survey published in 1996 by the Chinese-language
newspaper Sing Tao, more than half the respondents said that they had
been abused verbally or physically in the previous 2 months. Leaders in
the ethnic and immigrant communities expressed concern throughout the
year that the nativist One Nation Party had contributed to the
increasing sense of isolation and atmosphere of vilification of
immigrants and minorities. However, according to the Human Rights and
Equal Opportunity Commission, during the financial year ending June 30,
the number of racial discrimination complaints fell 37 percent from the
previous year.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law and practice provide workers,
including public servants, freedom of association domestically and
internationally. Approximately 32 percent of the work force is
unionized.
Unions carry out their functions free from government or political
control, but most local affiliates belong to state branches of the
Australian Labor Party (ALP). Union members must make up at least 50
percent of the delegates to ALP congresses, but unions do not
participate or vote as a bloc.
The 1996 Workplace Relations Act significantly restricted the right
of workers to take industrial action by confining it to the period of
bargaining, where it remains a protected action. In April this
provision was sucessfully challenged by a union in federal court. In
its decision, the court refused to grant an injunction against the
union for taking industrial action outside of a bargaining period
because it was in support of maintaining existing wages and conditions.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) is examining whether several
provisions of the Workplace Relations Act violate ILO conventions.
Legislation that went into force in 1994 for the first time legalized
what had always been a de facto right to strike.
Laws and regulations prohibit retribution against strikers and
labor leaders, and they are effectively enforced. In practice employers
tend to avoid legal remedies, e.g., secondary boycott injunctions,
available to them in order to preserve a long-term relationship with
their unions.
During the year, the most notable industrial action was taken by
the coal miners of the Construction, Forestry and Mining Union, who
struck twice, once to protest the threat to job security cased by
reductions in coal prices, and a second time to protest nonpayment of
entitlements following the closure of a mine. In the first action the
Industrial Relations Commission ordered the strikers back to work. In
the second, the Government was pressured into passing legislation to
compensate workers.
Unions freely may form and join federations or confederations, and
they actively participate in international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law and
practice provide workers with the right to organize and bargain
collectively, and the law protects them from antiunion discrimination.
The Workplace Relations Act contains curbs on union power,
restrictions on strikes, and a new unfair-dismissal system. Several
unions are considering challenging the law on the grounds that it
violates the right to assembly provided for in several International
Labor Organization conventions that Australia has signed. The primary
curb on union power is the abolition of closed shops and union
demarcations. Although unions are weakened, this provision could create
many small and competing unions at individual worksites. The
restrictions on strikes include heavy fines for labor unrest during the
life of an agreement and tougher secondary-boycott provisions. The new
unfair-dismissal system further limits redress and compensation claims.
The negotiation of contracts covering wages and working conditions
is gradually shifting from the centralized system of the past.
Previously legislation provided for the negotiation ofsimpler
``enterprise agreements,'' which were negotiated by individual
companies with their workers or with the relevant union(s). The federal
and state governments administered centralized minimum-wage awards and
provided quasi-judicial arbitration, supplemented by industrywide or
company-by-company collective bargaining. The Workplace Relations Act
also provides for the negotiation of Australian Workplace Agreements
(AWA's) between employers and individual workers. These agreements are
subject to far fewer government regulations than the awards. At present
the AWA's are required to be roughly equivalent to basic working
conditions in the award that would apply to the sector to which the
firm belongs.
There are no export processing zones. The Darwin Trade Development
Zone, Northern Territory, attempts to increase exports via a
geographically defined free trade zone. In practice the Darwin
initiative is focused almost exclusively on its Asian neighbors to the
north and west.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Although there are
no laws prohibiting it, forced labor, including forced and bonded labor
by children, generally is not practiced. However, as a result of the
discovery in April of children in several clothing sweatshops in Sydney
and Melbourne, the Attorney General's Department is studying the
existing laws and considering whether new legislation would strengthen
the Government's ability to combat the problem. Most cases of abuses in
the past few years have involved members of ethnic communities from
nations where child labor is not uncommon.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--There is no federally mandated minimum age of employment,
but state-imposed compulsory educational requirements, monitored and
enforced by state educational authorities, effectively prevent most
children from joining the work force until they are 15 or 16 years of
age. Federal and state governments monitor and enforce a network of
laws, which vary from state to state, governing the minimum school-
leaving age, the minimum age to claim unemployment benefits, and the
minimum age to engage in specified occupations.
The law does not explicitly prohibit forced and bonded labor by
children, but such practices generally are not known to occur, although
there were isolated instances of such abuses (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Although a formal minimum wage
exists, it has not been relevant in wage agreements since the 1960's.
Instead, 80 percent of workers are covered by differing minimum wage
rates for individual trades and professions, all of which are
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family.
Most workers are employees of incorporated organizations. For them,
a complex body of government regulations, as well as decisions of
applicable federal or state industrial relations commissions, prescribe
a 40-hour or shorter workweek, paid vacations, sick leave, and other
benefits. The minimum standards for wages, working hours, and
conditions are set by a series of ``awards'' (basic contracts for
individual industries). Some awards specify that workers must have a 24
or 48 hour rest break each week while others specify only the number of
days off per number of days worked.
Federal or state safety laws apply to every workplace.
The Occupational Health and Safety (Commonwealth Employment) Act of
1991 provides federal employees with the legal right to cease work if
they believe that particular work activities pose an immediate threat
to individual health or safety. Most states and territories have laws
that grant similar rights to their employees. At a minimum, private
sector employees have recourse to state health and safety commissions,
which will investigate complaints and demand remedial action.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in persons is a growing
problem. Each of the country's states and territories has a
comprehensive set of laws designed to combat exploitative acts such as
slavery, bonded labor, and prostitution (immigration and hence
trafficking is a federal responsibility). In August the Federal
Parliament passed the Criminal Code Amendment (Slavery and Sexual
Servitude) Act 1999 to improve investigative effectiveness and ensure
more uniform legal action. It contains new definitions of offenses
involved in slavery, sexual servitude, and deceptive recruiting and is
part of a comprehensive effort directed at eliminating these practices.
The act also provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction over citizens
and persons of other nationalities incertain circumstances. It includes
penalties of up to 25 years' imprisonment.
Another government initiative was the Child Sex Tourism Act of
1994, which provides for the investigation and prosecution of citizens
who travel overseas and engage in illegal sexual conduct with children.
Trafficking in East Asian women for the sex trade is a growing
problem. Immigration and federal police have developed profiles and
identified trends in the industry, but lax laws--including legalized
prostitution in parts of the country--make enforcement difficult at the
working level.
Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Department of Immigration
and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) have determined that women and
children from Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, China, Indonesia,
and South Korea are trafficked into the country for purposes of
prostitution. Some of the brothels that employ these prostitutes are
owned and operated by prominent organized crime figures, and
connections have been made to triad societies (ethnic Chinese gangs
historically headquartered in Hong Kong) such as the 14k. (These groups
also are suspected of involvement in international heroin trafficking
and money laundering.) The high profit potential, combined with the
difficulty of detection and previously low penalties when prosecuted,
has resulted in the spread of groups engaged in these activities.
While the numbers of women being brought into the country are
relatively small (in the hundreds per year), they are subjected to what
is essentially indentured sexual servitude. Recent investigations by
DIMA found women locked in safe houses with barred windows, with no
access to medical care or the outside world. These women have been
lured either by the idea that they would be waitresses in restaurants
or, in some cases, coerced to come by criminal elements operating in
their home countries. Their movements often are controlled strictly.
Some women are escorted to the various brothels and later collected and
taken back to their residences until their next shift. To reduce the
likelihood of all their workers being apprehended in one raid (as
occurred in Sydney in 1992, with the mass arrest of 16 Asian women
living at one address) organizers sometimes house the prostitutes in
separate residential premises. Women have been charged up to
approximately $25,000 (A$40,000) to come to the country and pay off the
cost of their smuggling by performing sexual ``services.'' Some women
also are obliged to pay off additional hidden assessments for clothing
and lodging fees, and thereby are forced into continued indentured sex
work. There are unconfirmed reports of punishments for women who try to
escape, including executions, beatings, and transfers to more secure
brothels.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that an increasing number of children,
mainly from Asia, are entering the country as sex workers. The numbers
of children involved and whether their entry into the sex industry is
coerced is unknown. Under the laws of the various states it is illegal
for an adult to have sex with a minor.
There also is evidence of a growing problem of trafficking in women
to work in sweatshops in textile, clothing, and footwear industries as
well as in service industries, sometimes as bonded labor.
______
BRUNEI
Brunei Darussalam, a small, wealthy monarchy located on the north
coast of Borneo, is a sultanate ruled by the same family for 600 years.
The 1959 Constitution provided for the first delegation of
political power by the late Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin to an appointed
council of state, but in 1962 the then Sultan invoked an article of the
Constitution that allowed him to assume emergency powers for 2 years.
These powers have been regularly renewed, most recently in July 1998.
In August the Foreign Minister confirmed that a review of the
Constitution had been submitted to the Sultan for approval, and that
``an element of an election'' was in this report. Although not all the
articles of the Constitution are suspended, the state of emergency
places few limits on the Sultan's power. The Sultan also serves as
Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Minister of Finance, chancellor of
the national university, superintendent general of the Royal Brunei
Police Force, and leader of the Islamic faith.
The police force, which has responsibility for internal security,
reports to the Prime Minister's office, which includes an Internal
Security Department, and is firmly under the control of civil
authorities.
Brunei's large oil and natural gas reserves, coupled with its small
population, give it a very high per capita gross national product. A
midyear recovery in oil prices helped the country's cash flow; however,
the economy still was feeling the effects of the Amedeo Corporation's
collapse. The corporation, which was owned by the Sultan's brother
Jefri, is being liquidated to pay debts amounting to more than $6
billion.
Human rights remain broadly circumscribed. In practice citizens do
not have the right to change their government, and they generally avoid
political activity of any kind. Nor, constitutional provisions
notwithstanding, do they genuinely exercise the freedoms of speech,
press, assembly, and association. Other human rights problems
continued, including discrimination against women and restriction of
religious freedom.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
In June 1998, an assistant superintendent of police was arrested
and charged with the manslaughter of a Bangladeshi national. The police
official allegedly used police premises to interrogate the Bangladeshi
national over a personal business matter. During the interrogation, the
police official allegedly beat and kicked the victim, who subsequently
died of internal injuries. The police superintendent was convicted of a
reduced charge of causing hurt, since pathologists could not conclude
that the beating directly caused the victim's death. He was sentenced
to 12 months in jail and ordered to pay $12,050 (B$20,000) to the
deceased's family in compensation. The superintendent was dismissed
from the police service.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--There were no reports of police mistreatment of prisoners.
Any report of police mistreatment of prisoners would be investigated as
a violation of the law. In 1988 caning became mandatory punishment for
42 drug-related and other criminal offenses and for vandalism. Since
then, sentences of caning have been handed down and carried out in the
presence of a doctor who monitors implementation and has the authority
to interrupt and postpone the punishment for medical reasons. Caning
generally is included as part of the sentencing in 80 percent of
criminal convictions. Many convicted persons reportedly prefer caning
to lengthy incarceration.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. There is no
overcrowding; however, there is a growing prison population, and a new
facility to supplement the 60-year-old prison was completed in 1998.
Prisoners receive regular medical checkups. Remand cells at police
stations are Spartan.
Human rights monitors are not known to have requested prison
visits; foreign diplomats have visited prisoners. Family members also
can visit prisoners and bring food.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides for a
prompt judicial determination of the validity of an arrest. However,
those provisions, like the Constitution itself, may be superseded,
either partially or wholly, through invocation of the emergency powers.
The Internal Security Act (ISA) permits the Government to detain
suspects without trial for renewable 2-year periods. The Government
occasionally has used the ISA to detain persons suspected of
antigovernment activity; however, information on the detainees is
published only after they are released. In 1997 two former rebel
leaders were pardoned and released, after undergoing ``religious
indoctrination'' and swearing loyalty to the Sultan (see Section 1.e.).
Muhamad Yasin Abdul Rahman, age 76, who played a pivotal role in the
abortive 1962 rebellion, was detained without trial for 12 years from
1962 to 1973, when he escaped from prison to live in exile in Malaysia.
He returned to the country in 1997 and immediately was arrested and
detained once more without trial. In July 1999, he was released from
detention after swearing an oath of loyalty to the Sultan and admitting
his political ``crimes.''
In August 1998, authorities arrested several citizens under the ISA
for distributing defamatory letters containing allegations about the
royal family and senior government officials connected with the
collapse of the Amedeo Group, a large holding company headed by the
former Finance Minister and Sultan's brother, Prince Jefri. The
Government warned citizens that it would take action against anyone
involved in such activities. There were no known arrests for publishing
or distributing antigovernment literature during the year.
Under normal circumstances, a magistrate must endorse a warrant for
arrest. Warrants are issued without this endorsement on rare occasions,
such as when police are unable to obtain the endorsement in time to
prevent the flight of a suspect. Police officers have broad powers to
make arrests, without warrants, of persons caught in the physical act
of committing a crime.
Under the colonial-era Banishment Act of 1918, any person deemed to
be a threat to the safety, peace, or welfare of Brunei, may be forcibly
exiled either permanently or temporarily by the Sultan. Since
independence, there have been no cases of banishment of citizens.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution does not
specifically provide for an independent judiciary. However, in 1996 in
a landmark legal decision, the appellate-level High Court ruled that
the court has powers independent of the prosecution and ordered a
discharge in a car theft case under review, which amounted to an
acquittal under the Criminal Procedure Code. So far the Government has
not challenged the court's finding that magistrates have the legal
power to discharge and acquit a defendant, even when the prosecution
does not request the discharge.
The judicial system consists of five levels of courts, with final
recourse in civil cases available through the Privy Council in London.
In 1995 Brunei terminated appeal to the Privy Council in criminal
cases. Procedural safeguards include the right to defense counsel, the
right to an interpreter, the right to a speedy trial, and the right to
confront accusers. There were no known instances of government
interference with the judiciary and no trials of political opponents.
The civil law, based on English common law, provides citizens with
a fair and efficient judicial process. Shari'a (Islamic law) supersedes
civil law in some areas, including divorce, inheritance, and some
sexual crimes. Shari'a law is not applied to non-Muslims.
At present there are no known political prisoners (see Section
1.d.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Although the law permits government intrusion into the
privacy of individual persons, families, or homes, this rarely happens.
There were no reports of mail having been tampered with during the
year. The Government at times prevents the importation of foreign
newspapers and magazines (see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--While there are no laws
restricting freedom of speech and freedom of the press, the Government
used its authority to protect public safety, morals, health, and
domestic security to restrict these freedoms. Editions of foreign
newspapers or magazines with articles that are found objectionable,
embarrassing, or critical of the Sultan, royal family, or government
are not allowed into the country. Magazine articles with a Christian
theme reportedly invariably are censored. However, the growing use of
fax machines, the Internet, and access to satellite transmissions make
it increasingly difficult to keep such material from entering. The
independently owned local newspaper, the Borneo Bulletin, appears to
practice self-censorship in its choice of topics to avoid angering the
Government, but it has instituted a new feature of letters to the
editor, by which citizens--some by name and some anonymously--criticize
the Government's handling of certain social, economic, and
environmental issues. In 1997 the newspaper expanded its letters column
to reflect the increase in letters. In July a second English-language
newspaper, the News Express, began publication. The daily, which is
owned by a former government minister, features a letters page where
citizens and residents express their views and complaints, often about
government services and, increasingly, about government policy. The
newspapers' willingness to publish these expressions of opinion
represents a modest extension of press freedom.
The Government's reactions to the letters have been mixed. On the
one hand, it clearly has been responsive to public opinion on some
issues concerning social or environmental problems. On the other hand,
the Internal Security Department allegedly has tried--abeit without
success--to obtain the names of people who have complained to the
newspaper about government services.
Although the only television station is government-owned, three
Malaysian television channels are also received locally. A 14-channel
cable network of television stations is widely available. This network
includes the Cable News Network, the British Broadcasting Corporation
World News, and several entertainment channels.
The Government's tolerance of political criticism has not been
tested recently because there is no organized opposition. Moreover,
citizens generally make almost no criticism of the Government. In the
past, the Government has not hesitated to arrest those who attempted to
propagate unwelcome political views.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom to
assemble for political purposes has not been tested seriously in recent
years.
Following a 1967 ban on political parties, the Government allowed
two parties to form in 1985 and 1986. It disbanded one of the parties
in 1988. Political parties are allowed but they are not to engage in
``activities that endanger people.'' Membership is open to all
citizens, except civil servants and security force personnel, who
together make up 60 percent of all employed citizens.
The remaining party, the Brunei Solidarity National Party (BNSP),
which was inactive for several years, held an assembly in February
1995, reportedly with the consent of the Government. About 50 people
attended. In April 1998, fewer than 50 persons attended a BNSP General
Assembly. Following the General Assembly, party leaders expressed
support for the Government's determination to investigate the Amedeo
crisis, but the party appeared to be largely inactive. In October 1998,
the Prime Minister's Office rebuked BNSP President Haji Mohamed Hatta
over an interview he gave to a regional newsmagazine. The Prime
Minister's Office described Hatta's portrayal of Brunei as
``irresponsible, untrue, inaccurate, misleading, and embarrassing.''
The activities of international service organizations such as
Rotary, Kiwanis, and the Lions continued to be constrained by the
Government, which in 1995 reminded local leaders of these organizations
that Muslims may not be members.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution states that, ``The
religion of Brunei Darussalam shall be the Muslim religion according to
the Shafeite sect of that religion: Provided that all other religions
may be practiced in peace and harmony by the person professing them in
any part of Brunei Darussalam.'' However, the Government only partially
respects these rights, as it routinely restricts the practice of non-
Islamic religions. The Government sporadically voiced alarm about
``outsiders'' preaching radical Islamicfundamentalist or unorthodox
beliefs. Citizens deemed to have been influenced by such preaching
(usually students returning from overseas study) have been ``shown the
error of their ways'' in study seminars organized by mainstream Islamic
religious leaders. The Government seems more concerned about these so-
called Islamic ``opportunists'' than unwelcome political views.
Moreover, the Government does not hesitate to investigate and to use
its internal security apparatus against persons whom it considers
purveyors of radical Islam.
In 1991 the Government began to reinforce the legitimacy of the
hereditary monarchy and the observance of traditional and Muslim values
by reasserting a national ideology known as the Malayhu Islam Beraja
(MIB) or ``Malay Muslim monarchy,'' the genesis of which reportedly
dates to the 15th century. The Government in 1993 participated in
issuing the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, which affirms the right of all
persons to a wide range of human rights, including freedom of religion.
Despite this and constitutional provisions providing for the full and
unconstrained exercise of religious freedom, the Government routinely
restricts the practice of non-Muslim religions by: Prohibiting
proselytizing; occasionally denying entry to foreign clergy or
particular priests, bishops, or ministers; banning the importation of
religious teaching materials or scriptures such as the Bible; and
ignoring requests to expand, repair, or build new churches, temples,
and shrines. However, in February 1998, the Government allowed the
Catholic Church to establish the first apostolic prefecture in the
country and to install a Bruneian of Chinese origin as the country's
first apostolic prefect. This development constituted a modest step in
the direction of improved religious freedom, but as yet there is no
broad trend toward increased religious freedom.
In September 1998, officials of the Islamic Propagation Center
confiscated gold and other precious Buddhist and Christian icons from a
number of goldsmiths in the capital, stating that the open display of
these items ``offended local sensitivities.'' The confiscations were
made under the Undesirable Publications Act, which gives the Government
wide-ranging powers. Several days later, the goldsmiths were informed
that they could recover their property from the Ministry of Home
Affairs. The Government also routinely censors magazine articles on
other faiths, blacking out or removing photographs of crucifixes and
other Christian religious symbols.
In July 1998, the authorities began to raid clubs frequented by
foreign residents and foreign workers in order to confiscate alcohol
and foodstuffs that were not prepared in accordance with ``halal''
requirements (the Islamic requirements for the slaughter of animals and
the prohibition on inclusion of pork products in any food). These
actions continue and are regarded by the majority of citizens as
upholding Islam.
The Ministry of Education also restricted the teaching of the
history of religion or other courses on religion in non-Islamic schools
while requiring courses on Islam or the MIB in all schools. Only the
Bandar Seri Begawan international schools are exempt from these
restrictions.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government restricts the movement of
former political prisoners during the first year of their release.
Otherwise the Government generally does not restrict the freedom of
movement of its citizens, visitors, and permanent residents. Government
employees, both citizens and foreigners working on a contractual basis,
must apply for approval to go abroad; it is routinely granted.
No legal provision exists for granting temporary refuge, first
asylum, or refugee status to those seeking such refuge or asylum. Under
the law, persons arriving without valid entry documents and means of
support are considered illegal immigrants and are refused entry. There
were no reported cases of individuals seeking temporary refuge during
the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens are unable to change their government; Brunei is a
monarchy and there are no established democratic processes. Under the
continuing state of emergency, there is no parliament, and political
authority and control rests with the ruling monarch. Individuals may
seek to express their views or to influence government decisions and
policies by writing letters to a local newspaper or by petitioning the
Sultan or handing him letters when he appears in public.
A form of popular representation lies in a traditional system of
village chiefs who, since 1992, are elected by secret ballot by all
adults. These leaders communicate constituents' wishes through a
variety of channels, including periodic meetings chaired by the Home
Affairs Minister, with several officialsappointed by the Sultan. In
1996 the Sultan officiated at the first General Assembly of the
``mukim'' (a group of villages) and village consultative council. Over
1,000 village chiefs from 150 villages and 35 mukim participated as
delegates. The delegates were elected from among individual villagers,
and the Government described the Assembly as ``a grass roots level
political system.'' However, the Sultan appoints all the council's
advisers. The Government insists that ordinary citizens actually use
these councils to present their grievances and to obtain redress.
The Sultan has an appointed Cabinet, the members of which serve as
his principal advisors.
The lack of representative democratic government seriously limits
the role of both men and women in government and politics; however,
women are making progress. In 1997 the Sultan's sister, Princess Masna,
became the second ranking official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
and for the first time two women were appointed as permanent
secretaries, one in the Ministry of Education and the other in the
Ministry Culture, Youth, and Sports. Other firsts included the
appointments of the first female High Court judge and the first female
ambassador.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
No government or private organizations deal specifically with the
protection of human rights. However, in 1997, for the first time, the
Government entered into a human rights dialog with a foreign embassy
and that dialog continues. There were no known allegations of abuses or
requests to visit by international human rights groups.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Except for religion (see Section 2.c.), the Constitution does not
contain specific provisions prohibiting discrimination based on the
factors listed above.
Women.--The extent to which spousal abuse may occur and go
unreported is not known. In response to a perception that domestic
violence was rising, in 1994 a special unit was established within the
police department to investigate domestic violence complaints. Female
officers staff the unit. Since 1995 a hot line has been in service for
abused spouses and the public to report domestic violence. During the
year approximately 10 women and their children stayed at a women's
shelter run by the Social Affairs Services unit of the Ministry of
Culture. The Social Affairs Services unit provides counseling for women
and their spouses. In August a photograph of a man accused of stabbing
his wife and assaulting one of his children was published in a daily
newspaper, a new development in the country, where privacy generally is
guarded closely. While Islamic courts usually discourage divorce in
domestic violence cases, there appears to be a movement away from
encouraging wives to reconcile with flagrantly abusive spouses. Islamic
religious authorities recognize wife beating as grounds for divorce.
The criminal penalty for a minor domestic assault is 1 to 2 weeks
in jail and a fine. An assault resulting in serious injury would be
punished by caning and a longer jail sentence. In October a man
convicted of assaulting his ex-wife with a knife and a piece of wood on
three separate occasions, received three concurrent sentences of 2
years and 6 months in prison and three strokes of the cane. He also
received a 6-month prison sentence for assaulting his 7-year-old
daughter. A man impersonating a religious inspector who raped and
extorted money from a woman he found in a compromising situation with
her boyfriend was sentenced to 12 years in prison and 6 strokes of the
cane.
One area of apparent abuse involves female domestic servants. While
the level of violence in society is low, beating of servants--or
refusing them the right to leave the house on days off, sometimes on
grounds that they ``might encounter the wrong company''--is less
socially unacceptable behavior. Since most female domestics are foreign
workers who are highly dependent on their employers, those subject to
abuse may be unwilling or unable to bring complaints, either to the
authorities or to their governments' embassies. However, when such
complaints are brought, the Government generally is quick to
investigate allegations of abuse and impose fines and punishment as
warranted.
In accordance with Koranic precepts, women are denied equal status
with men in a number of important areas such as divorce, inheritance,
and custody of children. Under the Brunei Nationality Act, citizenship
is transmitted through males only. Female citizens who are married to
foreigners or bear children by foreign fathers cannot transmit
citizenship to their children,even when such children are born in the
country. This has resulted in the creation of a sizable population of
stateless children, estimated at more than 5,000 residents, who are
entitled to live in the country and to be documented for travel by the
Government, but who cannot enjoy the full privileges of citizenship,
including the right to own land.
Although men are eligible for permanent positions in government
service whether or not they hold university degrees, women who do not
have university degrees are eligible to hold government positions only
on a month-to-month basis. While recent changes eliminated some
previous inequities, women in month-to-month positions continue to
receive slightly less annual leave and fewer allowances than their male
and female counterparts in permanent positions.
There are no separate pay scales for men and women, and in recent
years there has been a major influx of women into the work force. Women
serve in a wide variety of capacities in the armed forces, although
they are not permitted to serve in combat. The number of female
university graduates is increasing, and nearly two-thirds of Brunei
University's entering class is female.
Religious authorities strongly encourage Muslim women to wear the
tudong, a traditional head covering, and many women do so. However,
some Muslim women do not, and there is no official pressure on non-
Muslim women to do so. All female students in government-operated
schools are required to wear the tudong; students in nongovernment
schools are encouraged to wear it.
In July a new Married Women's Law came into effect, improving
significantly the rights of non-Muslim married women with respect to
maintenance, property, and domestic violence. In November changes to
the Islamic Family Law (in the section on Women's Position in Marriage
and Divorce) came into effect and are expected to improve the marital
rights of Muslim women.
Children.--No statistics are published regarding the welfare of
children. The strong commitment to family values within society, the
high standard of living, and government funding for children's welfare
provides most children a healthy and nurturing environment. Education
is free, compulsory, and universal for 9 years. With a few exceptions
involving small villages in extremely remote areas, nutritional
standards are high, and poverty is almost unknown. There were 18
reported cases of child abuse in the first half of 1995. In 1996 the
High Court convicted a father of child abuse. The Chief Justice
sentenced him to 20 years in prison and ordered him caned with 20
strokes of the rattan for causing the death of his 3-year-old daughter
and grievous hurt to another 2 of his children.
People with Disabilities.--No legislation mandating accessibility
or other assistance for disabled persons has been passed. The
Government is attempting to provide educational services for children
with disabilities, although these efforts are not yet adequate to
address the situation. Teachers are still being trained to deal with
disabled children, and some children have no educational opportunities.
A special facility with trained educators is needed to accommodate the
disabled children who cannot be assimilated into normal classrooms, and
the Ministry of Education is studying the problem.
Indigenous People.--The 6 percent of the population that is
composed of indigenous people long has been integrated into society,
and enjoys the same rights as other citizens.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Some members of non-Malay
minorities, such as ethnic Chinese, including those born and raised in
the country, are not automatically accorded citizenship and must travel
abroad as stateless persons. Brunei's colonial-era naturalization laws
are widely viewed as out of date and in need of reform.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Trade unions are legal but must be
registered with the Government. The three registered trade unions--one
passive and two generally inactive--are all in the oil sector and have
a total membership amounting to less than 5 percent of that industry's
work force. All workers, including civil servants other than those
serving in the military and police, may form or join trade unions.
Unions are independent of the Government.
The 1962 Trade Unions Act permits the formation of trade union
federations but forbids affiliation with international
labororganizations. An individual contract is required between an
employer and each employee, but legal trade union activities cannot be
deemed to violate employee contracts. Local legal experts interpret
this provision as conferring the right to strike, but there have been
no strikes. Brunei is not a member of the International Labor
Organization.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Government
has not prevented the legal registration of trade unions, nor has it
dissolved any. The Government did not interfere with lawful union
activity. It is illegal to refuse employment or discriminate against an
employee on the basis of membership or nonmembership in a trade union.
While unions are legal and easy to register, conditions are not
conducive to the development of trade unions. There is little interest
on the part of workers in forming trade unions, and existing unions are
not very active. The law is silent on collective bargaining, and it
occurs in only a few industries. There are few industries of the kind
in which unions have traditionally developed. Also cultural tradition
favors consensus over confrontation. Wage and benefit packages are
based on market conditions and tend to be generous.
There is a free trade zone in Muara Port, known as the Muara Export
Zone (MEZ), established in May 1994.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced labor including forced and bonded labor by children, and it is
not practiced.
In 1997 a foreign beauty contest winner brought suit in a foreign
court against members of the Brunei royal family alleging that she and
six other women were brought to Brunei in 1996 and subsequently held
against their will for purposes of sexual exploitation. A statement by
the royal family called the case ``frivolous and groundless.'' The
Sultan's sovereign immunity was recognized, and the court accepted
Prince Jefri's claim of immunity. An appeal of Prince Jefri's immunity
was pending at year's end.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The 1954 Labor Enactment Laws prohibits the employment of
children below the age of 16. Education is free, compulsory, and
universal through grade nine. Parental consent and approval by the
Labor Commission is required for those below the age of 18. Female
minors under age 18 may not work at night or on offshore oil platforms.
The Department of Labor (DOL), which is a part of the Ministry of Home
Affairs, effectively enforces laws on the employment of children. There
were no reports of violations of the child labor laws. Forced and
bonded labor by children is prohibited and it is not practiced (see
Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Skilled labor is in short
supply, and market forces enable most citizens to command good
salaries. There is no minimum wage. The standard workweek is Monday
through Thursday and Saturday, with Friday and Sunday off, allowing for
two 24-hour rest periods each week. Overtime is paid for work in excess
of 48 hours a week, and double time is paid for work performed on legal
holidays. Occupational health and safety standards are established by
government regulations. The DOL inspects working conditions on a
routine basis and in response to complaints. The DOL generally enforces
labor regulations effectively. However, in the unskilled labor sector
enforcement is lax, especially for foreign laborers (see Section 5).
The DOL is empowered to close any workplace where health, safety, or
working conditions are unsatisfactory, and it has done so in the past.
The law permits a worker to leave a hazardous job site without
jeopardizing his employment, but in practice this is unlikely to
happen.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no specific references to
trafficking in persons in the Constitution and laws. There are
occasional reports of women entering the country for purposes of
prostitution (which is illegal), but they usually are deported swiftly.
____
BURMA
Burma continued to be ruled by a highly authoritarian military
regime. Repressive military governments dominated by members of the
majority Burman ethnic group have ruled the ethnically Burman central
regions and some ethnic-minority areas continuously since 1962, when a
coup led by General Ne Win overthrew an elected civilian government.
Since September 1988, when the armed forces brutally suppressed massive
prodemocracy demonstrations, a junta composed of senior military
officers has ruled by decree, without a constitution or legislature. In
1997 the junta reorganized itself and changed its name from the State
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) to the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC). The Government continued to be headed by
armed forces commander General Than Shwe, although Ne Win, who retired
from public office during the 1998 prodemocracy demonstration, may
continue to wield informal but declining influence. In 1990 the junta
permitted a relatively free election for a parliament to which the
junta announced before the election that it would transfer power.
Voters overwhelmingly supported antigovernment parties with the
National League for Democracy (NLD) winning more than 60 percent of the
popular vote and 80 percent of the parliamentary seats. Throughout the
1990's, the junta systematically violated human rights in Burma to
suppress the prodemocracy movement, including the NLD, and to thwart
repeated efforts by the representatives elected in 1990 to convene.
Instead, the junta convened a government-controlled ``National
Convention'' intended to approve a constitution that would ensure a
dominant role for the armed forces in the country's future political
structure. Since 1995 the NLD has declined to participate in this
National Convention, perceiving its agenda to be tightly controlled by
the junta. More than a dozen armed ethnic groups continued to rule or
to exercise some governmental functions in peripheral ethnic minority
areas under various cease-fire agreements negotiated with the junta
between 1989 and 1995. The judiciary is not independent of the junta.
Since 1988 the junta has more than doubled the size of the armed
forces, from about 175,000 to more than 400,000 men, and has increased
the Government's military presence throughout the country, especially
in ethnic minority areas from which government forces were not excluded
by cease-fire agreements. The Government reinforces its firm military
rule with a pervasive security apparatus led by the military
intelligence organization, the Directorate of Defense Services
Intelligence (DDSI). Control is buttressed by arbitrary restrictions on
citizens' contacts with foreigners, surveillance of government
employees and private citizens, harassment of political activists,
intimidation, arrest, detention, and physical abuse. The Government
justifies its security measures as necessary to maintain order and
national unity. Members of the security forces committed numerous,
serious human rights abuses.
Burma is a poor country with a population said by its Government to
number about 48 million. Average per capita income was estimated to be
about $300, but about $800 on a purchasing power parity basis. More
than 3 decades of military rule and mismanagement have resulted in
widespread poverty. Primarily an agricultural country, Burma also has
substantial mineral, fishing, and timber resources. From 1988 to 1995,
the Government partly liberalized and opened the economy and thereby
reversed the economic contraction of the 1980's. However, economic
growth has slowed since the mid-1990's as the junta has retreated from
economic liberalization in response to a worsening foreign exchange
shortage. Obstacles to growth include extensive overt and covert state
involvement in economic activity, state monopolization of leading
exports, a bloated bureaucracy, arbitrary and opaque governance,
institutionalized corruption, poor human and physical infrastructure,
and disproportionately large military spending at the expense of social
development spending and stable prices.
The Government's extremely poor human rights record and
longstanding severe repression of its citizens continued during the
year. Citizens continued to live subject at any time and without appeal
to the arbitrary and sometimes brutal dictates of the military regime.
Citizens did not have the right to change their government. There
continued to be credible reports, particularly in ethnic minority-
dominated areas, that soldiers committed serious human rights abuses,
including extrajudicial killings and rape. Disappearances continued,
and members of the security forces tortured, beat, and otherwise abused
detainees. Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening, but
improved slightly in some prisons after the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) gained access to prisons in May. Arbitrary arrest
and detention for expression of dissenting political views continued
with increasing frequency; the Government continued to detain more than
55 members-elect of Parliament and hundreds of other NLD supporters to
prevent theparty from convening the parliament elected in 1990. Since
1962 thousands of persons have been arrested, detained, or imprisoned
for political reasons; more than 1,300 political prisoners remained at
year's end. The judiciary is not independent. The Government continued
to infringe on citizens' privacy rights, and security forces continued
systematically to monitor citizens' movements and communications, to
search homes without warrants, and to relocate persons forcibly without
just compensation by due process. During the year, those suspected of
or charged with prodemocratic political activity were subjected to
increased surveillance and harassment. Security forces continued to use
excessive force and to violate international humanitarian law in
internal conflicts against ethnic insurgencies. The regime forcibly
relocated large ethnic minority populations in order to deprive armed
ethnic groups of civilian bases of support.
The SPDC continued severely to restrict freedom of speech and of
the press. The junta restricted academic freedom; most universities
have been closed since 1996 due to fear of political dissent. The junta
severely restricted freedom of assembly, and systematically intensified
its restriction of freedom of association, pressuring many thousands of
members to resign from the NLD political party and closing party
offices nationwide. Since 1990, the junta frequently has prevented the
NLD and other prodemocracy parties from conducting normal political
activities. Although the junta continued to recognize the NLD as a
legal entity, it also continued to refuse to recognize the legal
political status of key NLD party leaders, particularly its general
secretary and 1991 Nobel laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi, and the two party
cochairmen, and to constrain their activities severely through security
measures and threats. During the year, the SPDC intensified its
systematic use of coercion and intimidation to deny citizens the right
to change their government. In August 1998, the NLD leadership
organized a 10-member Committee Representing the People's Parliament
(CRPP) to act on behalf of the Parliament. The junta has responded by
intensifying its campaign to destroy the NLD without formally banning
it, by intimidating several elected representatives into resigning from
the parliament, by detaining 55 other elected representatives, and by
pressuring constituents to sign statements of no confidence in others.
The junta restricted freedom of religion; it continued its
institutionalized control over Buddhist clergy in order to restrict
efforts by some Buddhist clergy to promote human rights and political
freedom, and government authorities coercively promoted Buddhism over
other religions in some ethnic minority areas. The Government imposed
restrictions on certain religious minorities. The Government continued
to restrict freedom of movement and in particular foreign travel by
female citizens; the junta also continued to restrict Aung San Suu
Kyi's freedom to leave her residence or to receive visitors. The
Government did not allow domestic human rights organizations to exist,
and remained generally hostile to outside scrutiny of its human rights
record. Violence and societal discrimination against women remained
problems. The junta continued severely to neglect the education of
children by underfunding public schools. There was governmental and
societal discrimination against ethnic minorities, and animosities
between the Burman majority and ethnic minorities continued. The
Government continued to restrict worker rights, ban unions, and use
forced labor for public works and to produce food and other daily
necessities for military garrisons. Forced labor including forced child
labor was a serious problem. The forced use of citizens as porters by
the army--with attendant mistreatment, illness, and sometimes death--
remained a common practice. The Government did not honor its repeated
pledge to prevent its officials from using their authority under the
country's Towns Act and Villages Act to mobilize forced labor. In June
the Government responded to sanctions that the International Labor
Organization (ILO) imposed on it for its use of forced labor by
unilaterally withdrawing from the convention on forced labor
administered by the ILO. Child labor is also a problem, and varies in
severity depending on the region. Trafficking in persons, particularly
in women and girls to Thailand and China, mostly for the purposes of
prostitution, remained widespread.
Insurgent forces committed numerous abuses, including killings,
rapes, forced labor, and the forced use of civilians as porters.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There continued to
be many credible reports of extrajudicial killings by soldiers of
noncombatant civilians, particularly in areas of ethnic insurgencies
(see Section 1.g.).
There were numerous detailed but unconfirmed reports that army
soldiers indiscriminately shot and killed ethnic Karen, including women
and children, in villages in the Thaton District of Mon State during
the first half of the year.
Brutal treatment by soldiers also caused deaths among those
impressed as military porters for use in counterinsurgency operations
in areas of ethnic insurgencies. According to reports, porters who no
longer can work often are either abandoned without medical care or
assistance, or executed (see Section 6.c.). There also continued to be
detailed reports that physical abuse and neglect by army soldiers
resulted in the death of persons forced to labor on physical
infrastructure projects (see Section 6.c.). An exile Chin nationalist
organization reported that on May 5, soldiers beat and killed Pa Za
Kung, a man from Vomkua village in Chin State's Thantlang Township, for
resting without permission while being forced to help build a road from
Thantlang to Vuangtu village. While these reports are unconfirmed, the
Government's general disregard for human rights has created a climate
that is clearly conducive to such abuses.
Some inmates died in prisons and labor camps, or shortly after
being released from them, due to torture or to denial of adequate
medical care and harsh conditions (see Section 1.c.). On May 23, in
Depeyin Town in Sagaing Division, 25-year-old Kyi Khaing died after 10
hours in police custody; he was arrested for verbally abusing his aunt.
Although police initially informed his family that he hanged himself,
his body had a broken pelvis and many bruises, and in the course of a
subsequent investigation police sergeant Sein Win reportedly confessed
to beating Kyi Khaing to death; however, no action was taken against
Sein Win, who subsequently disappeared. On July 1, NLD member-elect of
Parliament Kyaw Min died of hepatitis contracted during his
incarceration in Rangoon's Insein Prison from May 1996 to May 1998; he
had been detained along with hundreds of other members-elect of
Parliament in 1996 for attempting to convene the Parliament elected in
1990. On May 21, NLD member Hla Khin died in Insein prison, allegedly a
suicide. He had been detained in 1998 for traveling on a public road to
witness the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, who was prevented by
security forces from traveling to a town in the western part of the
country (see Section 1.d.).
Some insurgent groups also committed extrajudicial killings. In
March near three pagoda's pass in the eastern part of the country
soldiers of the Karen National Union (KNU) reportedly captured and
killed 10 Burmese immigration officials. The KNU claimed that its
captives were killed in a firefight with the army. On June 23, near the
town of Myawadi on the Thai border, a KNU landmine destroyed a bus,
killing seven noncombatants, reportedly in retaliation for the bus
company's refusal to pay protection ``taxes'' to the KNU. The
Government reported that on July 31 in Kayah State, elements of the
Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), an insurgent group, killed 2
persons who in July helped to arrange the surrender of 100 KNPP members
to the Government, and who were attempting to mediate further similar
negotiations (see Sections 1.g. and 2.d.).
b. Disappearance.--Throughout the country, as in previous years,
private citizens and political activists continued to ``disappear'' for
periods ranging from several hours to several weeks or more; some have
never reappeared. DDSI officials usually apprehended individuals for
questioning without the knowledge of their family members. In many,
although not all cases, the DDSI released them soon afterward. Such
action usually was intended to prevent free political expression or
assembly. The army continued to seize by force large numbers of persons
for porterage or related duties, often without the knowledge of their
family members. The whereabouts of those persons seized by army units
to serve as porters, as well as of prisoners transferred for labor or
porterage duties, often remained unknown.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Government routinely subjected detainees to harsh
interrogation techniques designed to intimidate and disorient. The most
common forms of mistreatment were sleep and food deprivation coupled
with around-the-clock questioning under bright lights; some detainees
also were kicked and beaten. Credible reports continued that prisoners
were forced to squat or assume stressful, uncomfortable, or painful
positions for lengthy periods.
There continued to be credible reports that security forces
subjected ordinary citizens to harassment and physical abuse. The
military forces routinely confiscated property, cash, and food, and
used coercive and abusive recruitment methods to procure porters. Those
forced into porterage or other labor faced extremely difficult
conditions and beatings and mistreatment that sometimes resulted in
death (see Sections 1.a. and 6.c.). In contrast to previous years,
there were no instances of security forces beating NLD members who were
attempting to assemble for meetings.
There were frequent reports that army soldiers and other army
personnel raped women who were members of ethnic minorities, especially
in Shan, Karenni, and Karen states, where the majority of armed
encounters between the army and insurgents took place (see Sections
1.g. and 5.).
Members of insurgent forces also reportedly raped civilians.
Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening; however,
they improved slightly in some prisons after the ICRC gained access to
prisons in May. All prisoners usually were permitted to receive
medicine as well as essential supplemental food brought by their
families (if the families could afford to do so) during 15-minute
visits permitted every 2 weeks, although there are occasional reports
that guards demand bribes for that privilege.
The Government's Department of Prisons operates many facilities of
several categories including several labor camps. Conditions for
political prisoners reportedly remained much harsher at facilities far
from major cities, including prison labor camps than at prisons in
Rangoon and Mandalay. Throughout the year, the Government transferred
many prisoners--including NLD members--from Insein prison to prisons
and labor camps far from Rangoon. Most such prisoners suffered
additional hardship in the form of reduced access to family support,
food, medicine, and clothing. There were credible reports that at least
a few political prisoners or detainees have long been denied adequate
medical care. Some of these prisoners died as a result (see Section
1.a.). On July 1, NLD member-elect of Parliament Kyaw Min died of
hepatitis contracted in prison. He had been detained from 1996 to 1998
without trial and released to his family prior to his death.
International monitoring of prisons began in May after the
Government agreed to allow the ICRC unrestricted access to all
prisoners in all prisons, detention centers, and labor camps. In
response to ICRC recommendations, the Government provided some
prisoners with an opportunity for exercise, better food, reading
material, and improved medical care. Although the Government
transferred many political prisoners from Rangoon's Insein Prison to
other facilities before the ICRC's first visit to Insein in May, the
Government apparently subsequently ceased such practices. During the
year the ICRC was able to visit more than 30,000 prisoners in at least
18 prisons including more than 1300 political prisoners. The Government
allowed the ICRC to perform its traditional services such as delivering
letters to and from prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There is no provision in
the law for judicial determination of the legality of detention, and
the SPDC routinely practiced arbitrary arrest and incommunicado
detention. Prior to being charged, detainees rarely had access to legal
counsel or their families and political detainees have no opportunity
to obtain release on bail. Some political detainees are held
incommunicado for long periods. Even after being charged, detainees
rarely have benefit of counsel. Some political prisoners were not
released after completing their sentence.
Authorities continued to detain some private citizens and political
activists continued to ``disappear'' temporarily at the hands of
security forces (see Section 1.b.).
The Government repeatedly detained and deported foreign journalists
(see Section 2.a.).
Throughout the year, the Government continued its campaign of
detention and intimidation to prevent the NLD from convening the
parliament elected in 1990. Between July and September authorities
arrested or detained hundreds of local NLD leaders and former student
leaders throughout the country; authorities reportedly detained as many
as 100 persons in Pegu and Mandalay between July and September (see
Section 1.c.). Many of these detentions apparently were intended to
prevent public demonstrations in connection with the anniversary of the
August 1988 prodemocracy demonstrations (see Section 2.b.) or on the
numerologically significant date of September 9 (9/9/99) on which some
prodemocracy groups based in foreign countries had called for a
nationwide general strike to commemorate the 1988 prodemocracy
demonstrations.
At year's end, the Government continued to detain without charge 55
persons elected to parliament in 1990; most were NLD members and most
had been detained since September 1998, just before the NLD organized
the formation of the CRPP. During the year, the junta released about
150 members-elect of Parliament who were being detained without charge
as of the end of 1998. However, there were credible reports that in
many cases the junta released members-elect of Parliament only after
they agreed to resign from the elected Parliament, to withdraw their
proxies to CRPP members, or otherwise to restrict their political
activities (see Section 3).
In August in the town of Mergui in Tenasserim Division, authorities
arrested and detained at least 17 high school students who were
protesting rising formal and informal school fees, the continued
closure of the universities, and the Government's continued prohibition
of independent student associations (see Sections 1.e., 2.b. and 5). In
December authorities arrested and detained high school students in
Mergui for planning a protest, and students of closed postsecondary
institutions living in Mandalay and in the town of Pakokku in Magwe
Division for planning unauthorized public meetings or distributing
prodemocracy literature (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.).
The Government did not use forced exile. However, during the year,
Aung San Suu Kyi was threatened with deportation in the state-
controlled media.
Since 1988, when the SPDC refused to recognize the results of the
elections and pressured successful candidates to resign, some
candidates, as well as thousands of political activists, went into
foreign exile rather than face threats.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is not independent
of the military junta. The junta appoints justices to the supreme court
who, in turn, appoint lower court judges with the approval of the
junta; it has done so since 1988. These courts adjudicate cases under
decrees promulgated by the junta that effectively have the force of
law. Pervasive corruption further serves to undermine the impartiality
of the justice system.
The court system, as inherited from the United Kingdom and
subsequently restructured, comprises courts at the township, district,
state, and national levels.
Throughout the year, the Government continued to rule by decree and
was not bound by any constitutional provisions providing for fair
public trials or any other rights. Although remnants of the British-era
legal system were formally in place, the court system and its operation
remained seriously flawed, particularly in the handling of political
cases. Unprofessional behavior by some court officials, the misuse of
overly broad laws--including the Emergency Provisions Act of 1950, the
Unlawful Associations Act, the Habitual Offenders Act, and the Law on
Safeguarding the State from the Danger of Destructionists--and the
manipulation of the courts for political ends continued to deprive
citizens of the right to a fair trial and the rule of law.
Some basic due process rights, including the right to a public
trial and to be represented by a defense attorney, generally were
respected, except in political cases that the Government deemed
especially sensitive. Defense attorneys are permitted to call and
cross-examine witnesses, but their primary purpose is to bargain with
the judge to obtain the shortest possible sentence for their clients.
Most court proceedings are open to the public. However, in political
cases, trials are not open tothe public. Political detainees often are
given harsher sentences if they mount a defense in court. In political
cases, defense counsel appears to serve no purpose other than to
provide moral support, since reliable reports indicate that senior
military authorities dictate verdicts. Defense attorneys often are
reluctant to take political cases.
Two foreign prodemocracy activists were sentenced to long prison
terms for actions that elsewhere would be deemed innocuous. After two
arrests in 1997 and 1998 that included serving 90 days of a 5-year
prison sentence for illegal entry, James Mawdsley was again arrested in
August. He was convicted and sentenced to a total of 17 years in
prison. In September Rachel Goldwyn was arrested after chaining herself
to a lamppost in downtown Rangoon and singing a prodemocracy song. She
was convicted of sedition and sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment, but
was released on appeal and left the country in November.
In October the Supreme Court dismissed suits brought by members of
the NLD's central executive committee against SPDC Secretary One Lt.
Gen. Khin Nyunt, the chief of military intelligence. The suits alleged
that the military intelligence apparatus intentionally damaged private
individuals in connection with the detention of NLD members elected to
parliament in 1990. They also filed suit against other senior
government officials for libel, fraud, and intimidation in connection
with the organization of petitions of ``no confidence'' in NLD members-
elect of Parliament (see Sections 1.d. and 3). Although the hearing was
closed to the public, the Supreme Court reportedly ruled that General
Khin Nyunt could not be sued for official actions without the
permission of his superior, Senior General Than Shwe, and that the ``no
confidence'' petitions were valid.
There were unconfirmed estimates that the Government holds over
1,300 political prisoners. Although the law provides for the
commutation of sentences for good behavior, political prisoners often
are not granted this benefit. Moreover, some political prisoners
remained in custody despite having completed their sentences. However,
in January and February the Government released two prominent political
prisoners, Ohn Myint and Dr. Ma Thida, on humanitarian grounds prior to
the completion of their sentences.
Some of the persons arrested and detained in July through September
for prodemocracy activities were tried and sentenced to prison terms.
For example, NLD youth member Tey Za from Myinma in Sagaing Division,
who was arrested for posting a sign that his shop would close on
September 9, was tried and sentenced later in the same month to 2 years
in prison on a charge of instigating public panic. In Mandalay, a
family of four was arrested and its members were sentenced to harsh
prison terms for wearing yellow, a color associated with the NLD, on
September 9 (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The military Government continued to interfere
extensively and arbitrarily in the lives of citizens. Through its
extensive intelligence network and administrative procedures, the
Government systematically monitored the travel of all citizens and
closely monitored the activities of many citizens, particularly those
known to be active politically. The law requires that any person who
spends the night at a place other than his registered domicile inform
the police in advance, and that any household that hosts a person not
domiciled there maintain and submit to the police a guest list. Police
routinely entered and searched homes during night hours without
warrants, ostensibly to enforce compliance with this requirement.
Security personnel also commonly searched private premises and other
property without warrants in other contexts.
Government employees generally are required to obtain advance
permission before meeting with foreigners. Military intelligence
continued frequently to monitor the movements of foreigners and to
question citizens about conversations with foreigners.
Government employees are prohibited from joining or supporting
political parties. The Government continued to use coercion and
intimidation to induce many persons including nearly all public sector
employees not only to join the Union Solidarity and Development
Association (USDA), the Government's mass mobilization organization,
but also repeatedly to attend mass meetings called to criticize the NLD
and NLD members-elect of Parliament (see Sections 1.d., 2.b., and 3).
Government officials including senior officials continued
repeatedly to make statements in the state-monopolized domestic media
warning parents of students that authorities could hold them
responsible for any political offenses that their children might
commit.
In July 1998, the Attorney General banned women from marrying
foreigners (see Sections 2.d., 5, and 6.f.). However, this ban is not
enforced.
During late 1998 and early 1999, the Government refused to allow
Aung San Suu Kyi's late husband Michael Aris, then terminally ill, to
travel from Britain to visit his wife in Rangoon. The Government stated
that if Aung San Suu Kyi wanted to see her British husband, she could
leave the country to visit him in the United Kingdom. The Government
announced that it would allow the prodemocracy leader to reenter the
country only if they judged her visit to be non-political. At about the
same time, state-owned media and billboards and government-organized
mass rallies called for Aung San Suu Kyi to be deported (see Section
1.d.).
Army units routinely forced citizens, including women and children,
to provide a wide range of support services without compensation and to
work as military porters under harsh conditions (see Sections 1.a.,
1.b., 1.g., and 6.c.). The army reportedly includes child soldiers as
young as 14-years old. Child soldiers are assigned support duties.
Weak private property rights regarding land ownership continued to
facilitate involuntary relocations of persons by the State. The law
does not permit private ownership of land; it recognizes only different
categories of land use rights, many of which are not freely
transferable. Postcolonial land laws have revived the precolonial
tradition that the State owns all land and that private rights to it
are contingent upon use that the State deems productive.
To make way for commercial or public construction and in some cases
for reasons of internal security and political control, the SPDC
continued to relocate citizens out of cities to new towns; however,
this occurred on a much smaller scale than during the early 1990's.
Persons relocated to ``new towns'' continued to suffer from greatly
reduced infrastructure support and living standards, and residents
targeted for displacement continued to be given no option but to move,
usually on short notice.
In rural areas the military Government also continued its
widespread and frequent practice of forcibly relocating ethnic minority
villages. This practice was particularly widespread and egregious in
the Shan, Kayah, and Karen States and in areas of Mon State and Pegu
Division as part of the armed forces campaign against insurgents. In
these areas, thousands of villagers were displaced and herded into
smaller settlements in strategic areas (see Section 1.g.). These forced
relocations often have been accompanied by intensified demands for
forced labor to build infrastructure for both villagers and army units
to guard them in the areas to which they were relocated, and often have
generated large outflows of refugees to neighboring countries or to
parts of the country not controlled by the Government. In areas that it
has forced ethnic minorities to leave, the junta repeatedly has
organized the settlement of Burmans. In some areas army units forced or
attempted to force ethnic Karen to relocate to areas controlled by the
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), an armed ethnic group allied
with the Government (see Section 5).
During the year, the Government reportedly also forcibly relocated
several largely Islamic villages in Arakan State and resettled the area
with Buddhist Burmans whom it compelled to move out of Dagon Township
in Rangoon Division (see Sections 1.g. and 5).
In a number of urban areas, residents were compelled to cede use of
land for road widening and a host of other projects approved without
any public consultation or endorsement. Other long-term city residents
were required to cede use of land for commercial redevelopment and were
compensated at only a fraction of the value of their lost homes.
In rural areas, military units and personnel routinely confiscated
livestock, fuel, food supplies, alcoholic drinks, or money. This abuse
has become widespread and systematic since 1997, when the junta, intent
upon continuing its military buildup despite mounting financial
problems, ordered its regional commanders insofar as possible to supply
theirlogistical needs locally rather than rely on the central
authorities, and reorganized the junta to give greater authority to
regional commanders relative to the central Government. As a result,
regional commanders have increased their use of forced contributions of
food, labor and building materials throughout the country.
Security personnel continued to screen private correspondence and
telephone calls.
Government authorities continued generally to prevent citizens from
subscribing directly to foreign publications or satellite television
(see Section 2.a.). The Government continued to license or ration
electronic communication devices. A decree promulgated by the junta in
1996 has made possession of an unregistered telephone, facsimile
machine, or computer modem punishable by imprisonment. (see Section
2.a.).
Both army and insurgent units used forced conscription.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--Continuously since independence in 1948, the army
has battled diverse ethnic insurgencies. These ethnic minority
insurgent groups have sought to gain greater autonomy, or in some
cases, independence from the ethnic Burman-dominated State. Since 1989
about 15 such groups have concluded and maintained cease-fire
agreements with the Government; under these agreements, such groups
generally have retained their own armed forces and either rule or
perform some governmental functions within specified territories
inhabited chiefly by members of their ethnic groups. However, the Karen
National Union (KNU) has continued to conduct insurgent operations in
areas with significant Karen populations in the eastern and southern
regions of the country, including not only Karen State but also Mon
State, Tenasserim Division, and Pegu Division. In Kayah State, the
Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) has resumed fighting against
the Government since the breakdown of a cease-fire negotiated in 1995.
In central and southern Shan State, military forces continued to engage
the Shan State Army (SSA), a remnant of Khung Sa's narcotics-linked
Mong Tai army. The government continued a campaign of forced relocation
of villagers. There are credible reports that the army committed
retaliatory killings, rapes and other atrocities against civilians.
Numerous other minor ethnically based insurgent groups including the
Chin National Front (CNF), the Naga National council, the Rohingya
solidarity organization (RSO), and the Arakan National Organization
(ANO) continue to oppose the central government with varying levels of
insurgent activity.
In combat zones or in areas controlled by ethnic minorities as part
of the government's cease fire arrangements, some insurgents subjected
civilians to forced labor.
Some antigovernment insurgent groups also committed serious abuses.
Some KNU units committed extrajudicial killings of civilians, in one
case by blowing up a passenger bus with a landmine (see Section 1.a.).
KNPP elements reportedly killed two persons who had arranged the
surrender of KNPP fighters to the Government and were attempting to do
so again (see Section 1.a.). SSA insurgents reportedly committed
retaliatory killings, rapes, and other atrocities against civilians.
There were credible reports that some insurgents used women and
children as porters. At least one Karen insurgent group calling itself
God's Army, which has split from the KNU and operated from a base
inside the country near the border with Thailand, was led by child
soldiers (see Section 5). In September five young armed Karen seized
the Burmese Embassy in Thailand and held persons of several
nationalities hostage. The hostage takers later were granted refuge at
God's Army camp in Burma.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law authorizes the Government
to restrict freedom of speech and of the press and in practice the
junta continued to restrict these freedoms severely and systematically.
The Government continued to arrest, detain, convict or imprison many
persons for nonviolently expressing or attempting to express political
opinions critical of the junta or of military rule, or for distributing
or possessing publications in which such opinions were expressed (see
Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.). In addition, security services
continued to monitor, harass, and intimidate persons believed to hold
such political opinions. Many more persons refrained from speaking out
due to fear of arrest, interrogation, and other forms of intimidation.
Legal restrictions on freedom of speech, already severe since the
early 1960s, have intensified since 1996, when the junta promulgated a
decree prohibiting speeches or statements that ``undermine national
stability'' as well as the drafting of alternative constitutions. In
all regions of the country that it controlled, the military Government
continued to use force to prohibit virtually all public speech critical
of it by all persons, including persons elected to parliament in 1990
and by leaders of political parties (see Sections 1.d., 1.e., 2.b., and
3). The Government has pursued this policy consistently since 1990,
with the one exception of permitting weekly speeches by NLD leaders in
front of Aung San Suu Kyi's residence in Rangoon from late 1995 until
December 1996.
During the year, novelist Maung Tha Ya fled the country and
publicly stated that he believed that 20 prominent writers remained in
prison in the country, including novelist and journalist San San Nweh,
who has been imprisoned for a 10-year-term since 1994 for passing
information about human rights violations to international reporters
and United Nations observers. Some of these writers, including San San
Nweh, were reportedly in poor health, and government censorship boards
continued not to approve publication or distribution of many works
written by them. An international nongovernmental organization (NGO)
that promotes media freedom reported in December that 13 journalists
were in prison. The government did allow former political prisoner Dr.
Ma Thida to publish a novel following her release from prison.
On August 19, the junta announced that security forces recently
seized thousands of ``instigative leaflets'' and many cassettes and
videotapes that called for participation in September 9 activities to
commemorate the prodemocracy demonstrations of August 1988 (see Section
1.d.). On August 27, in Rangoon Division's Thaketa Township, security
forces reportedly arrested six high school students for distributing
such leaflets on the street.
All forms of domestic public media were officially controlled or
censored. This strict control in turn encouraged self-censorship on the
part of writers and publishers.
The State continued to own and the Government continued to control
all daily newspapers, domestic radio and television broadcasting
facilities. These official media remained propaganda organs of the
junta and normally did not report opposing views except to criticize
them. While some state-owned newspapers continued to include many
edited international wire service reports on foreign news, domestic
news hewed strictly to and reinforced government policy.
All privately owned publications remained subject in principle to
prepublication censorship by state censorship boards. Due in part to
the time required to obtain the approval of the censors, private news
periodicals generally were published monthly or less often. However,
since 1996 the Government, in order to help state employees supplement
their increasingly inadequate salaries, has given transferable waivers
of prepublication censorship for weekly periodicals to state employee
associations; although private weekly tabloids have proliferated, they
remain subject in principle to censorship and generally have not
reported domestic political news.
Imported publications remained subject in principle to
predistribution censorship by state censorship boards, and possession
of publications not approved by the state censorship boards remained a
serious offense that continued in cases involving prodemocracy
literature to be punished by imprisonment (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
The Government also restricted the legal importation of foreign news
periodicals, as of all other goods, by licensing. Citizens were
generally unable to subscribe directly to foreign publications, but a
limited selection of foreign newspapers could be purchased in a few
hotels and stores in Rangoon (see Section 1.f.). Censors frequently
banned issues or deleted articles deemed unwelcome by the Government.
However, some street vendors sold illegally imported copies of
international newsmagazines and daily newspapers.
Since 1997 the Government has issued few visas to foreign
journalists and has held fewer than a handful of press conferences on
political subjects. Several journalists who entered the country as
tourists were detained and deported by the Government.
Due to widespread poverty, limited literacy, and poor
infrastructure, radio remained the most important medium of mass
communication. News periodicals rarely circulated outside urban areas,
and most villages lacked access to electrical power, except from
generators or batteries. The junta continued to monopolize and to
control tightly the content of all domestic radio broadcasting. Foreign
radio broadcasts, such as those of the British Broadcasting
Corporation, Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and the Norway-based
Democratic Voice of Burma, remained the principal sources of uncensored
information.
The Government continued to monopolize and to control tightly all
domestic television broadcasting, offering both a government channel
and an armed forces channel. The Government continued to restrict the
reception of foreign satellite television broadcasts, although
restrictions are not enforced strictly in many cases (see Section
1.f.). Operation of an unlicensed satellite television receiver is a
crime punishable by imprisonment for up to 3 years. Persons active in
prodemocracy activities remained generally unable to obtain licenses.
However, many citizens not engaged in prodemocracy activities ignored
the licensing regulation without penalty. The Television and Video Law
makes it a criminal offense to publish, distribute or possess a
videotape not approved by a state censorship board, and in 1996 the
junta promulgated an amendment to that law that stiffened the penalties
for distributing uncensored videos.
The junta continued severely and systematically to restrict access
to electronic media. Under a decree promulgated by the junta in 1996,
all computers, software, and associated telecommunications devices are
subject to government registration, and possession of unregistered
equipment is punishable by imprisonment (see Section 1.f.).
The Ministry of Defense continued to operate the country's only
known Internet server, and during much of the year began to offer
Internet services selectively to a small number of customers. However,
in December military intelligence officials closed the private domestic
e-mail services, seized some of their equipment, closed two private
computer training schools, and detained and interrogated five
instructors at those schools. Also in December, military intelligence
reportedly closed the Defense Ministry's domestic Internet subscription
service, arrested Col. Khin Maung Lwin, who managed the Defense
Ministry's Internet operations, and charged him with violating the
Official Secrets Act. The country's first cybercafe opened in Rangoon
during the year, but did not offer patrons direct access to the
Internet.
The Government continued to restrict academic freedom severely.
University teachers and professors remained subject to the same
restrictions on freedom of speech, political activities, and
publications as other government employees. The Ministry of Higher
Education continued routinely to warn them against criticism of the
Government; to instruct them not to discuss politics while at work; to
prohibit them from joining or supporting political parties or engaging
in political activity; and to require them to obtain advance
ministerial approval for meetings with foreigners. Like all government
employees, professors and teachers continued to be coerced into joining
and taking part in the activities of the USDA (see Sections 1.d., 1.f.,
2.b., and 3.). Teachers at all levels continued to be held responsible
for preventing students from engaging in any unauthorized
demonstrations or political activity.
Most institutions of higher education have remained largely closed
again since 1996, when the junta closed the universities and even
primary and secondary schools following widespread student
demonstrations. Primary and secondary schools reopened in August 1997.
Graduate students also were allowed to continue their studies. In 1998
several universities were opened for abbreviated refresher courses and
examinations. Dissatisfaction with the limited time for education
prompted several student demonstrations. Authorities arrested student
protest leaders and sentenced them to lengthy prison terms. After
holding exams, the junta again closed the universities. The junta
reopened the medical college in 1998 and the agricultural college in
1999. In December it reopened some engineering and technical
institutes, but these did not remain open.
Although the Government increasingly has promoted higher education
through correspondence courses, in practice domestic access to general
higher education involving substantial classroom instruction remained
conditional upon enrollment in the armed forces. The armed forces
academy and medical and technical schools remained open.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
continued to restrict freedom of assembly severely. Its prohibition of
unauthorized outdoor assemblies of more than five persons remained in
effect, although it was enforced unevenly. The 10 existing legal
political parties remained required to request formal permission from
the Government to hold internal meetings of their members, although
some members still met without official permission.
The military junta intensified its systematic decade-long use of
coercion and intimidation to prevent the parliament elected in 1990
from convening (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e. and 3.).
From July through September, government authorities in various
parts of the country used force to prevent prodemocracy demonstrations
or punish participants in them. Authorities detained or arrested and in
many cases convicted and imprisoned persons suspected of planning such
demonstrations (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). On August 8 and September
9, security forces, including army soldiers and riot police deployed at
key intersections in Rangoon to prevent any antigovernment
demonstrations. On August 12, in Mergui, security forces reportedly
arrested about 30 high school students who participated in a
demonstration for a reduction of school fees, the right to form a
student union, and other educational and political reforms (see
Sections 1.d. and 5).
The Government continued to allow the NLD to celebrate certain key
party events with public gatherings at Aung San Suu Kyi's residence or
the national NLD party headquarters in Rangoon. However, on some of
these occasions, the Government restricted the size of the gatherings
or the types of individuals who were allowed to attend. In August the
security forces prevented diplomats and journalists from attending an
NLD commemoration of the first anniversary of the formation of the
CRPP. Outside the capital, authorities in most areas routinely
restricted NLD members' freedom of assembly more severely, and required
members of parliament-elect to register at police stations twice per
day. In contrast to previous years, there were no incidents during
which security forces publicly beat NLD members as they attempted to
peaceably assemble or attend meetings.
In 1998 the Government organized large anti-NLD rallies in every
state and division (see Section 3). Many participants were required to
attend. These rallies ceased in 1999 and were replaced by trumped-up
recall petitions for elected members of parliament who refused to
resign in the face of government pressure.
The Government sometimes interfered with religious groups'
assemblies or other outdoor gatherings during the year (see Section
2.c.).
The Government intensified its already severe restrictions on
freedom of association, particularly against members of the main
opposition political party, the NLD.
Aside from officially sanctioned organizations like the USDA, the
right of association existed only for organizations, including trade
associations and professional bodies, permitted by law and duly
registered with the Government, such as the Forest Reserve Environment
Development and Conservation Association. Few secular nonprofit
organizations continued to exist, and even those were subject to direct
government intervention and took special care to act in accordance with
government policy. This group included nominally apolitical
organizations such as the Myanmar Red Cross and the Myanmar Medical
Association. Only 10 political parties remained legally in existence,
and most were moribund. Military authorities generally required
civilian employees both of the Government to belong to the USDA.
Government authorities continued to harass NLD members for petty
offenses or for no offenses at all. The authorities reportedly cut off
the supply of electrical power to the home of an NLD township chairman.
On August 29, security forces reportedly detained the wife of an NLD
member of the CRPP for having provided food at an NLD commemoration of
a national holiday on July 19. Authorities also continued to arrest,
convict, and imprison NLD activists for political crimes (see Sections
1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.).
In addition, during the year the junta continued its systematic
nationwide campaign to destroy the NLD without formally banning it.
This campaign was intensified after September 1998, when the NLD's
national leadership organized the CRPP. Throughoutthe year, government
media published hundreds of reports from localities across the country
that NLD members had ``voluntarily resigned'' from the party in groups
ranging in size from fewer than 10 to more than 1,000 persons. By
year's end, the reported number of NLD members who ``voluntarily
resigned'' numbered in the tens of thousands. Government authorities
announced in state media that those who had resigned from the NLD
included 27 persons elected to parliament in 1990 (see Section 3.).
Many of these resignations from the NLD generally were coerced
according to the people concerned. In some townships, authorities
subjected local NLD officers to particularly intense pressure to resign
from the party and rendered local party organizations officially
defunct due to a lack of recognized officers. In some localities, NLD
members and in particular local NLD officials who refused to resign
from the party were arrested or imprisoned or recall motions were
mounted against them. In many townships, this campaign deprived people
of any registered organization though which they could associate for
political purposes without criminal liability. The NLD credibly alleged
that the government also used its control of some members of the
Buddhist clergy to induce NLD members to resign and to dissolve local
party organizations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Most adherents of all religions duly
registered with the authorities generally enjoyed freedom to worship as
they chose; however, the Government imposed some restrictions on
certain religious minorities. In addition, the government
systematically restricted efforts by Buddhist clergy to promote human
rights and political freedom, and coercively promoted Buddhism over
other religions in some ethnic minority areas.
The most recent Constitution, promulgated in 1974, permitted both
legislative and administrative restrictions on religious freedom,
stating that ``the national races shall enjoy the freedom to profess
their religion . . . provided that the enjoyment of any such freedom
does not offend the laws or the public interest.'' The Government
required religious organizations, like all organizations, to register
with it. Although there is a government directive exempting ``genuine''
religious organizations from registration, in practice only registered
organizations can buy or sell property or open bank accounts, which
induces most religious organizations to register. Religious
organizations register with the Ministry of Home Affairs with the
endorsement of the Ministry for Religious Affairs. The State also
provides some utilities, such as electricity, at preferential rates to
recognized organizations.
The Government routinely monitored religious meetings, like all
assemblies; and it subjected religious publications, like all
publications, to censorship and control.
There is no official state religion; however, the Government
continued both to show preference for Theravada Buddhism, the majority
religion. State-controlled news media continued frequently to depict or
describe junta members paying homage to Buddhist monks, making
donations at pagodas throughout the country, officiating at ceremonies
to open, improve, restore or maintain pagodas, and organizing
ostensibly voluntary ``people's donations'' of money, food, and
uncompensated labor to build or refurbish Buddhist religious shrines
throughout the country. State-owned newspapers routinely featured, as
front-page banner slogans, quotations from the Buddhist scriptures.
Buddhist doctrine remained part of the state-mandated curriculum in all
elementary schools; however, individual children could opt out of
instruction in Buddhism. The Government continued to fund two State
Sangha Universities in Rangoon and Mandalay to train Buddhist clergy.
Religious groups of all faiths were able to establish and maintain
links with coreligionists in other countries and travel abroad for
religious purposes; however, the Government reportedly monitored these
activities. Foreign religious representatives usually were allowed
visas only for short stays but in some cases were permitted to preach
to congregations.
In general, the Government has not permitted permanent foreign
missionary establishments since the mid-1960's, when it expelled nearly
all foreign missionaries and nationalized all private schools and
hospitals, which were extensive and were affiliated mostly with
Christian religious organizations. However, some elderly nuns and
priests working in the country since before independence in 1948 have
been allowed to continue their work. By contrast, the junta partly
funded the construction of the International Theravada Buddhist
Missionary University in Rangoon, which opened in December 1998; its
stated purpose is``to share Myanmar's knowledge of Buddhism with the
people of the world,'' and the main language of instruction is English.
There continued to be credible reports from various regions of the
country that government officials and security forces compelled
persons, especially in rural areas, to contribute money, food, or
uncompensated labor to state-sponsored projects to build, renovate, or
maintain Buddhist religious shrines or monuments. The Government calls
these contributions ``voluntary donations'' and imposes them on both
Buddhists and non-Buddhists (see Section 6.c.).
The Government prohibits any organizations of Buddhist clergy other
than nine state-recognized monastic orders, which submit to the
authority of a state-sponsored State Clergy Coordination Committee
(``sangha maha nayaka committee''--SMNC) elected indirectly by monks.
The junta continued to subject the Buddhist clergy (``sangha'') to
special restrictions on freedom of expression and association. Since
1995 the junta has prohibited the ordination as clergy of any member of
a political party.
In July the senior abbots of five monasteries around Mandalay
reportedly protested a new order by the regional military command that
forbade Buddhist clergy to leave their township of residence without
first surrendering their identity cards and obtaining written
permission from local authorities; persons other than Buddhist clergy
generally were not subject to such severe restrictions on movement (see
Section 2.d.).
There is no reliable estimate of the number of Buddhist clergy in
prisons or labor camps at year's end. Buddhist monks reportedly have
died in prisons or labor camps run by the Government's Department of
Prisons.
Christian and Islamic groups continued to have difficulties in
obtaining permission to build new churches and mosques, particularly on
prominent sites.
It was credibly reported that in Karen State's Pa'an Township, army
units repeatedly conscripted as porters young men leaving worship
services at some Christian churches, causing young men to avoid church
attendance.
Religious publications, like secular ones, remained subject to
censorship. Translations of the Bible and the Koran into indigenous
languages could not be imported or printed legally, although this ban
is not enforced in many areas. In February and May in Tamu Township in
Sagaing Division, military authorities reportedly confiscated 1,600
copies of the Bible printed outside the country in the Chin, Kachin,
and Karen languages; these Bibles reportedly remained confiscated at
year's end.
Since 1990 government authorities and security forces have promoted
Buddhism over Christianity among the Chin ethnic minority of the
western part of the country. Since 1990 government authorities and
security forces, with assistance from monks of the Hill Regions
Buddhist Missions, coercively have sought to induce Chins to convert to
Theravada Buddhism and to prevent Christian Chins from proselytizing
Chins who practice traditional indigenous religions. This campaign,
reportedly accompanied by other efforts to ``Burmanize'' the Chin, has
involved a large increase in military units stationed in Chin State and
other predominately Chin areas, state-sponsored immigration of Buddhist
Burman monks from other regions, and construction of Buddhist
monasteries and shrines in Chin communities with few or no Buddhists,
often by means of forced ``donations'' of money or labor. Government
authorities repeatedly prohibited Christian clergy from proselytizing.
Soldiers beat Christian clergy who refused to sign statements promising
to stop preaching. There reportedly have been instances of forced
conversion. Since the early 1990's, security forces have torn down or
forced villagers to tear down crosses that had been erected outside
Chin Christian villages; these crosses often have been replaced with
pagodas, sometimes built with forced labor. In parts of Chin State,
authorities reportedly have not authorized the construction of any new
churches since 1997. After parts of the Aungdawmu Buddhist pagoda in
Chin State's Falam Township collapsed in July, Buddhist monks and army
authorities reportedly forced Chin villagers, most of whom were not
Buddhists, to labor for months without pay to repair it.
During the year, there were several credible reports of harassment
of Christian churches and pastors in Chin State and in the Chin
community elsewhere in connection with the celebration of the l00th
year of Christianity among the Chin.
On January 5, after a centennial celebration held in the town of
Than Tlang on January 1-3, citizens of the town erected a cross atop
Vuichip Hill outside the town. The township military commander
reportedly ordered the town's residents to remove the cross, but they
refused to do so, whereupon soldiers reportedly removed the cross and
arrested and interrogated six Chin Baptist pastors. In response the
inhabitants of Than Tlang observed a general strike and day of prayer
on January 6. The township military command then reportedly summoned 20
Christian clergy and church leaders for interrogation. On January 9,
Christian churches around Hakka, the capital of Chin State, joined Than
Tlang's protest by holding special prayer services. The regional
military command then reportedly ordered the postponement until April
of a centennial celebration to be held in Hakka, and informed Chin
Christian leaders that erection of the crosses on hilltops must be
approved by authorities in Rangoon. Authorities allowed the centennial
celebration in Hakka to take place in April, but reportedly limited
participation to 4,500 persons and reportedly refused to allow former
Baptist missionaries and Baptists from other countries to participate.
Early in the year, military authorities in Hakka reportedly ordered
that the construction of new churches be halted, thereby preventing the
completion before the April centennial celebration of a hall named in
honor of the first Baptist missionary among the Chin.
For several years, there have been reports that the Government
sought to induce members of the Naga ethnic group in Sagaing Division
to convert from Christianity to Buddhism by means similar to those it
used to convert members of the Chin to Buddhism. During the year, the
first mass exodus of Naga religious refugees from the country occurred.
In August more than 1,000 Christians of the Naga ethnic group, from 8
different villages, reportedly fled the country to India. These Naga
reportedly claimed that the army and Buddhist monks tried to force them
to convert to Buddhism and had forced them to close churches in their
villages, then desecrated the churches.
Religious affiliation sometimes is indicated on government-issued
identification cards that citizens and permanent residents of the
country are required to carry at all times. There appear to be no
consistent criteria governing whether a person's religion is indicated
on his or her identification card. Nationals are also required to
indicate their religions on some official application forms, e.g., for
passports.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government restricts freedom of
movement. Although citizens have the legal right to live anywhere in
the country, both urban and rural residents were subject to arbitrary
relocation (see Sections 1.f. and 1.g.). Except for limitations in
areas of insurgent activity, most citizens could travel freely within
the country but were required to notify local government of their
whereabouts (see Sections 1.f.).
Since ostensibly freeing NLD general secretary Aung San Suu Kyi in
1995 from a 6-year-long house arrest, the junta has continued to
restrict severely her freedom of movement within the country, seldom
allowing her to travel outside the capital and sometimes preventing her
from leaving her home in Rangoon. The Government prevented her from
leaving her residence on September 9 and September 16 (see Section
2.a.). Since 1996 security forces also have restricted public movement
along the street in front of her residence.
Those residents unable to meet the restrictive provisions of the
citizenship law, such as ethnic Chinese, Arakanese, Muslims, and others
must obtain prior permission to travel. Some Arakanese Muslims must
obtain permission from the security forces to travel to the next town.
The Government also prohibits foreign diplomats and foreign employees
of U.N. agencies based in Rangoon from travelling outside the capital
without advance permission, which sometimes was not granted or
rescinded after travel had begun.
The Government carefully scrutinized prospective travel abroad.
This facilitated rampant corruption as many applicants were forced to
pay large bribes to obtain passports to which they otherwise were
entitled. The official board that reviews passport applications denied
passports in some cases apparently on political grounds. All college
graduates who obtained a passport (except for certain government
employees) were required to pay a special education clearance fee to
reimburse the Government for the cost of their education. Citizens who
had emigrated legally generally were allowed to return to
visitrelatives, and some who had lived abroad illegally and acquired
foreign citizenship were able to return to visit.
Since the mid-1990's, the Government increasingly has restricted
the issuance of passports to female citizens (see Sections 1.f., 5 and
6.f.). However, these restrictions sometimes were evaded by payments of
large bribes.
In March while denying a visa to her terminally ill British
husband, the Government indicated that they would issue Aung San Suu
Kyi a passport to enable her to visit him in the United Kingdom, but
stated that it would allow her to reenter the country only if her
foreign travel were not of a political nature. In the first quarter of
the year, state media throughout the country featured slogans urging
that Aung San Suu Kyi be deported (see Sections 1.f. and 5).
Restrictions on foreign travelers have been eased as part of an
effort to promote tourism. Burmese embassies issued tourist visas,
valid for 1 month, within 24 hours of application. However, select
categories of applicants, such as foreign human rights advocates,
journalists, and political figures continued to be denied entry visas
unless traveling under the aegis of a sponsor acceptable to the
Government and for purposes approved by the Government. In September
the Government temporarily stopped issuing visas to independent
travelers in order to prevent foreign activists from entering the
country. Many travelers were questioned at length and asked to sign
oaths indicating that they were not journalists or activists before
their visas were issued. The Government detained and deported several
journalists (see Section 2.a.). One foreign citizen who entered the
country after previously being expelled for antigovernment activity was
sentenced to 5 years in prison in 1998. He was released after 90 days
and deported. After violating the terms of his deportation by returning
to Burma in September, he was convicted of immigration and publishing
violations and sentenced to seventeen years in prison. Although some
areas of the country remained closed to foreigners for security
reasons, the Government permitted travel to most other destinations.
Rangoon-based diplomats must apply 10 days in advance for travel
outside the capital.
From early October until late November the Government closed the
border with Thailand; it announced that the seizure of its embassy in
Bangkok, Thailand, by Karen insurgents in early October impelled it to
take this action (see Section 1.g.).
Hundreds of thousands of citizens continued to reside outside the
country, mostly in Thailand, India, and Bangladesh. About 150,000 lived
in refugee camps. During the first months of the year, at least 112,000
Karen, Mon, and Karenni residing in refugee camps in Thailand, and the
tens of thousands of Shan refugees whom the Thai Government did not
confine to such camps, were joined during the year by thousands of new
arrivals who fled army attacks against insurgencies in the Karen,
Karenni, and Shan ethnic areas, which were accompanied by numerous,
serious, widespread abuses of the human rights of noncombatants (see
Sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.f., 1.g., and 6.c).
At year's end, there were still 21,000 Rohingya Muslims remaining
in refugee camps in Bangladesh. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) repatriation program, which since 1992 had succeeded in
returning approximately 238,000 refugees to Burma and originally had
been scheduled to end on August 15, 1997, halted prematurely when the
Rohingyas as a group rejected repatriation and demanded resettlement in
Bangladesh. While the Government agreed to resume repatriation of those
remaining, this repatriation is proceeding extremely slowly.
The Rohingyas refused to return because they feared human rights
abuses, including religious persecution and other government
restrictions. The UNHCR reported that the Government cooperated in
investigating isolated incidents of renewed abuse of repatriated
citizens. However, returnees face severe and increasing restrictions
imposed by the Government on their ability to travel and to engage in
economic activity (see Sections 2.c. and 5).
The Government does not allow refugees or displaced persons from
abroad to resettle or seek safe haven, and has no policy to grant
asylum. There were no reports that persons formally sought asylum in
the country during the year. There also were no reports of the forced
return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
On October 1, a handful of armed antigovernment terrorists who took
control of the Burmese embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, heldhostage and
threatened to kill foreign tourist visa applicants as well as embassy
staff; the incident was resolved without loss of life (see Section
1.g.).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Despite the overwhelming desire that citizens demonstrated in the
1990 elections for a return to democracy, the regime continued to deny
them the right to change their government.
Since 1962 active duty military officers have occupied most
important positions throughout the Government, particularly at the
policy making level, but also extending to local administration. Since
the armed forces brutally crushed widespread and largely peaceful
prodemocracy demonstrations in 1988, all state power has been held by a
military junta. All members of the junta have been military officers on
active duty, and the junta has placed military or recently retired
military officers in most key senior level positions in all ministries.
At year's end, only 11 of the 41 government ministers were civilians.
Following the NLD's victory in the 1990 elections, the SPDC
thwarted voters by refusing to implement the election results. The
Government disqualified, detained, or imprisoned many successful
candidates, and many others fled the country (see Sections 1.d. and
1.e.).
Rather than accept the will of the citizenry as expressed in the
1990 election, the junta convened a national convention in 1993 to draw
up principles for a new constitution. The junta hand-picked most
delegates, and carefully stage-managed the proceedings; even limited
opposition views were ignored. The junta tasked the convention with
drafting a new constitution designed to provide a dominant role for the
military services in the country's future political structure. In 1995
the NLD delegates withdrew from the convention pending agreement by the
Government to discuss revising the convention's working procedures to
permit debate and meaningful participation in formulation of a new
constitution. Two days after its withdrawal, the NLD was expelled
formally. The national convention continued its deliberations until it
adjourned in March 1996. It has not reconvened. The provisions that it
adopted were designed to ensure the large-scale involvement of the
military services in all levels of government--including reserving 25
percent of seats in the Parliament for appointed members of the
military services, and reserving key government posts for military
personnel as well. In addition it adopted provisions that prohibited,
among other things, anyone ``under acknowledgment of allegiance'' to a
foreigner or who has received any type of assistance from a foreign
source, from participating in the Government. These provisions
apparently were designed to exclude Aung San Suu Kyi, who was married
to a British citizen.
During the year, the SPDC intensified its systematic use of
coercion and intimidation to deny citizens the right to change their
government. In August 1998, the NLD leadership organized a small
Committee of Representatives of the People's Parliament that had
written delegations of authority from a majority of the surviving
representatives elected in 1990 to act on behalf of the Parliament, in
view of the junta's continued use of force to prevent the whole
Parliament from convening. The junta has responded by directing a
sustained, systematic campaign to destroy the NLD without formally
banning it; authorities pressured many thousands of NLD members and
local officials to resign and closed party offices throughout the
country. Military intelligence officials also have detained without
charge 55 other elected representatives, mostly NLD members, since
September 1998 (see Section 1.d.).
In addition, the junta continued its systematic nationwide campaign
in which local authorities pressured constituents to sign statements of
no confidence in NLD representatives elected from their districts in
1990. During the year, state-owned media reported that a majority of
eligible voters in at least 10 townships had signed petitions
expressing no confidence in at least 27 NLD members-elect of
Parliament. These petitions were presented to local Multiparty
Democracy General Election Commissions in formal ceremonies staged at
mass rallies widely publicized by state-owned media. Both the CRPP in
public statements and the NLD in lawsuits it filed to protest these
activities (see Section 1.e.) alleged credibly and in detail that
signature of these petitions and participation in these mass rallies
generally was obtained by systematic coercion and intimidation by
government and USDA officials (see Section 1.e.).
In late October the national Multiparty Democracy General Election
Commission reportedly announced that of 392 NLD members elected to
parliament in 1990, only 92 remained both NLD members and members-elect
of parliament; 105 had resigned their parliamentary status, the
Commission had disqualified or revoked the candidacy of 139, 27 had
resigned from the NLD, and 31 had died.
At year's end, the government claimed there were only 166 of the
485 elected members of Parliament. Given credible reports of forced
resignations and opposition assertions that disqualifications are
invalid, a more indicative statistic is that 432 persons elected to be
members of parliament in 1990 remained alive and in the country at
year's end.
Women and minorities were underrepresented in the Government and
the top ranks of government services and excluded from military
leadership. There were no female members of the SPDC, ministers, or
supreme court judges.
Members of certain minority groups continued to be denied full
citizenship and a role in government and politics (see Section 5).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government does not allow domestic human rights organizations
to exist, and it remained generally hostile to outside scrutiny of its
human rights record. Approximately 15 nonpolitical, humanitarian,
international NGO's continued project work. A few others established a
provisional presence while undertaking the protracted negotiations
necessary to set up permanent operations in the country.
The Government continued to refuse to meet with representatives of
the U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), which repeatedly has
criticized the Government's junta rights record in annual resolutions,
and continued to deny the UNHRC Special Rapporteur for Burma, Rajsoomer
Lallah, entry into the country. In his report to the UNHRC, Lallah
criticized the human rights violations committed against ethnic
minorities as a result of the SPDC's policy of forcible relocations and
continued recourse to forced labor. The Government allowed two visits
of U.N. Special Envoy to Burma Alvaro de Soto in 1998 and 1999.
However, the SPDC refused to engage on the substance of Mr. De Soto's
mandate.
In recent years the Government has denied entry to foreigners,
including staff of an International Labor Organization (ILO) Special
Commission of Inquiry, who sought to investigate allegations of forced
labor (see Section 6.c.).
The Government continued routinely, although less routinely than
during 1998, to deny visas to foreign journalists and NGO staff whom it
regarded as likely to criticize its human rights record publicly.
The Government's restriction of travel to and within the country by
foreign journalists, NGO staff, U.N. agency staff, and diplomats, its
monitoring of the movements of such foreigners, and its frequent
interrogation of citizens about contacts with foreigners, its
restrictions on the freedom of expression and association of citizens,
and its practice of arresting citizens who passed information about
government human rights abuses to foreigners, all impeded efforts to
collect or investigate information about human rights abuses (see
Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., 2.a., 2.b., 2.c., and 6.a.). Reports of
abuses, especially those committed in prisons or ethnic minority areas,
often emerged months or years after the abuses allegedly were
committed, and seldom could be verified with certainty.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
The military junta continued to rule by decree and was not bound by
any constitutional provisions concerning discrimination.
Women.--Domestic violence against women, including spousal abuse,
appears to be relatively infrequent. Married couples often live in
households with extended families, where social pressuretends to
protect the wife from abuse. The Government sponsors social welfare
training for women.
Prostitution became an increasingly overt problem during the
period, particularly in some of Rangoon's ``new towns,'' populated
chiefly by poor families forcibly relocated from older areas of the
capital (see Section 1.f.). The Government and at least one
international nongovernmental organization operate schools and other
rehabilitation programs for former prostitutes.
Trafficking in women for the purposes of prostitution is a serious
problem (see Section 6.f.).
In general women traditionally have enjoyed a high social and
economic status exercising most of the same basic rights as men.
Consistent with traditional culture, women keep their names after
marriage and often control family finances. While nationwide, there was
little difference between the males and females in school attendance
rates or educational attainment, in Muslim dominated areas, girls
tended to stop schooling much earlier than boys. However, women
remained underrepresented in most traditional male occupations, and
women continued to be barred effectively from a few professions
including the military officer corps. The burden of poverty, which is
particularly widespread in rural areas, fell disproportionately on
women. In recent years, the Government officially hampered women from
marrying foreigners and restricted foreign travel by women but has not
enforced these restrictions consistently (see Sections 1.f., 2.d., and
6.f.).
Women did not consistently receive equal pay for equal work. Women
legally were entitled to receive up to 26 weeks of maternity benefits;
however, in practice these accommodations often were not realized.
There were no independent women's rights organizations; the
National Committee for Women's Affairs in the Ministry of Social
Welfare is charged with safeguarding women's interests. The Myanmar
Maternal and Child Welfare Association, a government-controlled agency,
provided assistance to mothers. A professional society for
businesswomen, the Myanmar Women Entrepreneurs' Association, formed in
1995, provided loans to new businesses, and made charitable donations.
During the year, the State acceded to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
Children.--The Government continued to neglect and restrict the
education of children. The junta continued to allocate few and
declining resources to fund public education. In response to inadequate
public education, private institutions began emerging during the year
despite an official monopoly on education. Government expenditures for
all civilian education for 1997-98 were equivalent to only 0.9 percent
of recorded GDP during the year and have declined by more than 70
percent in real terms since 1990. According to government studies
conducted with U.N. assistance, although education is compulsory, only
37 percent of children finished fourth grade in urban areas and only 22
percent did so in rural areas. Rates of school attendance and
educational attainment decreased during the 1990s, due largely to
increasing formal and informal school fees as the junta diverted
expenditures from health and education to the armed forces. Teachers'
salaries were far below subsistence wages. Increasingly, only
relatively prosperous families could afford to send their children to
school, even at the primary level. In some areas in the center of the
country, where few families could afford unofficial payments to
teachers, teachers generally no longer came to work and schools no
longer functioned. Junta policies have accelerated a general
educational decline (see Section 1.f.).
Children also suffered greatly from the junta's severe and
worsening neglect of health care. Private health care facilities became
increasingly the provider of choice for the relatively prosperous. The
junta has cut government expenditures on public health care even more
sharply than it cut spending for education. Government expenditures for
civilian health care in 1997-98 were equivalent to only 0.3 percent of
GDP. Government studies sponsored by U.N. agencies in 1997 found that
on average 131 of 1,000 children died before reaching the age of 5
years, and that on average only 1 out of 20 births in rural areas was
attended by a doctor, due chiefly to pervasive and extremely shortages
of medical personnel, facilities, and equipment. In parts the country,
health care was virtually nonexistent.
Government studies sponsored by U.N. agencies in 1997 found that of
children under 3 years old, 37 percent were malnourished and 13 percent
were severely malnourished. Many families subsisted on one meal of rice
per day.
Child prostitution and trafficking in girls for the purpose of
forced prostitution--especially Shan girls who were sent or lured to
Thailand, continued to be a major problem (see Section 6.f.). Reports
from Thailand indicated that the rising incidence of HIV infection
there has increased the demand for supposedly ``safer'' younger
prostitutes.
The army conscripts children as young as the age of 14, especially
orphans and street children; they are deployed to training camps where
they support the military forces. In combat areas the military forces
continued to force children to labor as porters, and often subjected
them to beatings (see Sections 1.f., 1.g., 6.c. and 6.d.).
Religious Minorities.--The great majority of the country's
population at least nominally follow Theravada Buddhism. There are
minorities of Christians (mostly Baptists as well as some Catholics and
Anglicans), Muslims (mostly Sunni), Hindus, and practitioners of
traditional Chinese and indigenous religions. There is some correlation
between ethnicity and religion. In much of the country there is also
some correlation between religion and social class, in that non-
Buddhists tend to be better educated in secular matters, more
urbanized, and more commercially oriented than the Buddhist majority.
There are social tensions between the Buddhist majority and the
Christian and Muslim minorities, due in large part to government
preference in practice (although not in law) both for non-Buddhists
during British colonial rule and for Buddhists since independence.
Non-Buddhists continued to experience discrimination at upper
levels of the public sector. Only one non-Buddhist served in the
Government at ministerial level, and the same person, a brigadier
general, is the only non-Buddhist known to have held flag rank in the
armed forces during the 1990's. The Government discourages Muslims from
entering military service, and Christian or Muslim military officers
who aspire to promotion beyond the middle ranks are encouraged by their
superiors to convert to Buddhism.
There were credible reports that during the spring anti-Islamic
booklets were distributed throughout the country through the USDA. This
report followed other reports in recent years of government instigation
or toleration of violence against Muslims. Even though the Government
reportedly contributed to or instigated anti-Muslim violence in Arakan
State in 1991, in Shan State and Rangoon in 1996, and in cities
throughout the country in 1997, its reported ability to do so
repeatedly reflects widespread prejudice against Muslims, many of whom
are ethnic Indians or Bengalis.
Members of the Muslim Rohingya minority in Arakan State, on the
country's western coast, continued to experience severe legal,
economic, and social discrimination. The Government denies citizenship
status to most Rohingyas on the grounds that their ancestors allegedly
did not reside in the country at the start of British colonial rule, as
required by the country's highly restrictive citizenship law. In 1991
tens of thousands of Rohingya, according to some reports as many as
300,000, fled from Arakan State into Bangladesh following anti-Muslim
violence alleged although not proven to have involved government
troops. Rohingyas who have returned to Arakan complained of government
restrictions on their ability to travel and to engage in economic
activity.
There are credible reports that government authorities in Arakan
State have compelled Muslims to build Buddhist pagodas as part of the
country's forced conscription labor program (see Section 6.c.). In
March the Government forcibly relocated about 200 Buddhists from Dagon
Township in Rangoon to Arakan State; this had the effect of increasing
the population of Buddhists in a region with a large Muslim population
(see Section 1.f.). On November 19, in Arakan State's Maungdaw
Township, Myint Tun, director of the state's Buddhist Religious
Association, accompanied by officials of a local Buddhist religious
center, reportedly visited the village of lower Purma and ordered the
village headman to demolish the village's largest and oldest mosque,
without citing any reason.
Since 1994 when the progovernment Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
(DKBA) was organized, there has been armed conflict between the DKBA
and the Christian-led Karen National Union. This armed conflict between
two nongovernmental Karen organizations has had strong religious
overtones. During the mid-1990's, it was reportedly common DKBA
practice to torture Christian villagers and kill them if they refused
to convert to Buddhism, and during 1998 DKBA troops in Ler Doh Township
in Karen State reportedly posted signs in front of churches warning
that they would kill anyone attending those churches on Sundays. In
recent years, a Karen Christian fundamentalist insurgent group that
called itself God's Army has split from the KNU (see Section 1.g.).
People with Disabilities.--In principle official assistance to the
disabled includes two-thirds of pay for up to 1 year of a temporary
disability and a tax-free stipend for permanent disability; however, in
practice assistance is extremely limited. There is no law mandating
accessibility to buildings, public transportation, or government
facilities. While there are several small-scale organizations to assist
the disabled, most disabled persons must rely on their families to
provide for their welfare. Disabled veterans receive available benefits
on a priority basis. Because of landmine detonations, there is a high
rate of amputee injuries.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Wide-ranging governmental and
societal discrimination against minorities persists.
Animosities between the country's many ethnic minorities and the
Burman majority, which has dominated the Government and the armed
forces since independence, continued to fuel at least four active
ethnic insurgencies that resulted in many killings and other serious
abuses (see Section 1.g.). Some frequently reported abuses included
killings, beatings, and rapes of Chin, Karen, Karenni, and Shan by
mostly Burman army soldiers. During the past decade, the junta has
sought to pacify these ethnic groups by means of negotiated cease-
fires, grants of limited autonomy, and promises of development
assistance.
The Government continued to discriminate systematically against
non-Burmans. National identity cards and passports generally denoted
the ethnicity of non-Burmans either explicitly or through the use of a
personal title in the ethnic minority language rather than Burmese.
Ethnic minority areas that were remote from active insurgent
operations, such as the large Karen areas of Irrawaddy Division,
experienced tighter controls on personal movement including more
frequent military checkpoints, closer monitoring by military
intelligence, and larger military garrisons and hence more informal
taxes, than comparable Burman areas.
Ethnic minority groups generally had their own primary languages.
However, throughout all parts of the country controlled by the
Government, including ethnic minority areas, Burmese remained the sole
language of instruction in all state schools. Even in ethnic minority
areas, primary and secondary state schools did not offer any
instruction in the local ethnic minority language even as a second
language. There were very few domestic publications in indigenous
minority languages. In some ethnic minority areas such as Chin State,
there continued to be many reports that the army offered financial and
career incentives for Burman soldiers to marry Chin women, teach them
Burmese, and convert them to Buddhism. Throughout the 1990s, there were
credible reports that the junta resettled groups of Burmans in various
ethnic minority areas.
The ethnic minority populations continued to complain that their
concerns have not been addressed adequately by the Government. Economic
development among minorities has continued to lag, leaving many persons
living at or below subsistence levels.
There are ethnic tensions between the Burmans and nonindigenous
ethnic populations including Indians, many of whom are Muslims, and a
rapidly growing population of Chinese, mostly recent immigrants from
Yunnan province that increasingly dominates the economy of the northern
part of the country. Both groups have tended to be more commercially
oriented and hence more prosperous and economically powerful than
Burmans, and their members commonly have discriminated based on
ethnicity in hiring, buying, and selling.
Since only persons who can prove long familial links to the country
are accorded full citizenship, nonindigenous ethnicpopulations
continued to be denied full citizenship and to be excluded from
government positions. Persons without full citizenship continued to
face restrictions in domestic travel and to be barred from certain
advanced university programs in medicine and technological fields (see
Section 2.d.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1926 Trade Unions Act, which
remained in effect, permits the formation of trade unions only with the
prior consent of the Government; however, free trade unions do not
exist in the country, and the junta has dissolved even the government-
controlled that existed before 1988.
There were no strikes during the year. The last reported strike was
in December 1997, when workers in a foreign-owned textile factory in
Pegu staged a successful 4-day strike.
Because of its longstanding violation of ILO Convention 87 on
freedom of association, the 1998 ILO Conference cited the Government
for continued failure to implement that convention. The Conference
criticized both lack of progress and absence of cooperation on the part
of the Government. On June 17, the Foreign Ministry issued a press
release stating that it would ``cease participation in activities
connected with Convention 87,'' thereby in effect withdrawing from that
Convention.
The Government also continued to require that citizens who found
work on foreign vessels through its Seafarers' Employment Control
Division (SECD) neither contact nor participate in any activities of
the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF).
No unions are affiliated internationally.
In 1989 the United States suspended Burma's eligibility for trade
concessions under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program,
pending steps to afford its labor force internationally recognized
worker rights.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers do not
have the right to organize and bargain collectively to set wages and
benefits. The Government's Central Arbitration Board, which once
provided a means for settling major labor disputes, continued to exist
but in practice has been dormant since 1988. Township-level labor
supervisory committees existed to address minor labor concerns.
The Government unilaterally set wages in the public sector. In the
private sector, market forces generally set wages. However, the
Government pressured joint ventures not to pay salaries greater than
those of ministers or other senior employees. Some joint ventures
circumvented this with supplemental pay, as well as through incentive
and overtime pay and other fringe benefits. Foreign firms generally set
wages near those of the domestic private sector but followed the
example of joint ventures in awarding supplemental wages and benefits.
There were no export processing zones. However, there were special
military-owned industrial parks, such as Pyin-ma-bin near Rangoon,
which attracted foreign investors and often manufactured for export by
offering cheaper labor than was available elsewhere. These were
tantamount to export processing zones in many respects.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor remained a widespread and serious problem. Although the Penal
Code provides for the punishment of persons who impose forced labor on
others, there were no known cases of the application of this provision.
Throughout the country, international observers have confirmed that the
Government routinely continued to force citizens to work on
infrastructure construction and maintenance projects. The law does not
prohibit forced and bonded labor by children specifically, and forced
labor by children occurs.
On June 17, the ILO Conference suspended Burma from receiving ILO
technical assistance or attending ILO meetings due to the Government's
``flagrant and persistent failure to comply'' with Convention 29 on
forced labor. The ILO Conference's action followed an exhaustive 1998
report by an ILO Special Commission of Inquiry into Forced Labor in
Burma, which concluded, based on 6,000 pages of documentation, that
there was abundant evidence of pervasive use of forced labor in the
country. The SpecialCommission of Inquiry found that women, children,
and the elderly were unduly required to perform forced labor; that
porters often were sent into dangerous military situations, rarely
received medical treatment, and were almost never compensated; that
forced laborers frequently were beaten; and that some women performing
forced labor were raped or otherwise abused sexually by soldiers. On
June 17, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release stating
that the Government would ``cease participation in activities connected
with Convention 29.''
Since precolonial times, the country's rulers have imposed large
forced labor obligations on its inhabitants for military, economic, or
religious purposes. However, from 1992 to 1996, the junta significantly
increased the State's use of forced labor to meet its infrastructure
development goals. After 1996, when the Government announced that
military personnel would provide labor for infrastructure projects, the
use of unpaid civilian labor on physical infrastructure projects,
especially for irrigation projects and railroad building, diminished.
Nonetheless, the use of forced labor on such projects has remained
widespread.
Many detailed credible reports indicate that in recent years,
especially in areas inhabited chiefly by members of the Chin, Karen,
Karenni, and Shan ethnic groups, army units have increased greatly
their use of forced labor for logistical support purposes, including to
build, repair, or maintain army camps and roads to them, as well as to
plant crops, cut or gather wood or bamboo, cook, clean, launder, weave
baskets, fetch water for army units--and, in the case of young women,
to provide sexual services to soldiers. The number of reports of this
practice has increased since 1997, when the junta required regional
military commanders to become more self-sufficient logistically (see
Sections 1.f. and 1.g.).
Authorities continued to impose forced labor chiefly, although not
exclusively, on rural populations, and imposed forced labor quotas on
villages, households, or persons directly or through village headmen.
Government authorities often allowed households or persons to
substitute contributions of money or food for contributions of labor
for infrastructure projects, but widespread rural poverty obliged most
households to contribute labor. The State allocated funds to regional
and local authorities to pay wages to at least some of the civilians on
whom it imposed labor obligations; however, these wages were set at
levels that were below rural market wages, and reports indicated that
local authorities commonly did not disburse allocated funds to workers.
Especially in ethnic minority areas, the army often deployed soldiers
to guard persons engaged in forced labor; there continued to be reports
that such soldiers often beat and occasionally killed workers (see
Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
During the year, in Sagaing Division over 1,000 persons were herded
into a ``volunteer labor camp'' and forced to work to build a railroad;
at least 17 reportedly died from malaria. Authorities in Irrawaddy
Division's Nga-Thaing-Chaung Township forced villagers to build an
embankment or pay about $1.60 (500 kyat) per person, and detained for
17 days a woman who protested, citing government statements that there
was no forced labor in the country. In April authorities in Rangoon
Division's Htan-Da-Bin Township ordered villagers to work on a road
between Hle-Seik and Kyun Ngu villages; after some villages failed to
appear, the authorities sent a letter to village ward leaders
threatening to fine them if they failed to contribute labor the next
day. In May authorities in Rangoon Division ordered villagers to work
on a road from Insein to Nyaung Don or pay a fine of about $1 (300
kyat) per household; police threatened residents with beatings or
detention if they refused and arrested those who did not comply. In May
authorities in Sagaing Division's Hsar-Lin-Gyi Township forces persons
from 42 village tracts to work on the Taung-Yama dam near Mwe-Tone
Village, or pay a fine of slightly more than $2 (700 kyat) per
household. In June, authorities forced all villagers including children
to build a 20-mile road between the towns of Myo Tha and Tada Oo; about
1,000 persons worked on the road every day. In June authorities in
Sagaing Division forced villagers to build a canal in the industrial
zone in Monywa Township; every 10 households were required either to
dig a hole 66 feet long, 15 feet wide, and 5 feet high, or to pay a
fine of about $3 (800 to 1,000 kyat) per household; in March
authorities forced villagers from the same area to build a drainage
canal for the Chindwin Rivier. In a May report, the ILO's Director
General described more than a dozen other reports of forced labor on
infrastructure projects between August 1998 and May. In Irrawaddy
Division, two villagers who failed to provide forcedlabor or pay fines
were convicted and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment under the
provisions of the Villages Act.
There continued to be reports that the Government used forced labor
to construct infrastructure to support tourism. During the year,
government officials used forced labor to build the approach road to
the international airport being built near Mandalay; officials
reportedly went door-to-door in villages outside Mandalay, ordering
each household to contribute either about $1 (300 kyat) or one person's
labor to the project, and most households contributed labor. Government
officials also used forced labor to prepare the historic city of Mrauk-
Oo in Arakan State for expected tourist and VIP arrivals.
Starting in late 1998 and continuing throughout the year, the
Government began to use large amounts of forced labor on a project to
double the amount of cultivated land in the country by developing 22
million acres of wetlands and virgin lands. This involved the
establishment of ``labor villages'' to help private entrepreneurs,
including foreign investors, to develop wetlands. In December 1998,
government authorities instructed each village tract from 8 townships
in Sagaing Division to provide 2 villagers to work on 500 acres of land
per township for a project to reclaim about 4,000 acres of virgin land;
in addition, each household was required to give about $0.70 (200 kyat)
each to the authorities to buy food for workers on the project. During
the first half of the year, officials of the military's Northwest
Command forced villagers in Sangaing Division's Yinmarbin Township to
provide uncompensated labor or else pay more than $3 (1,000 kyat) per
person to reclaim 2,000 acres of fallow land. Authorities in another
township in Sagaing Division reportedly forced villagers to clear 1,000
acres of land or pay a fine of more than $10 (3,500) kyat per
household. Authorities in Irrawaddy Division ordered residents of a
village both to clear over 100 acres of land as part of a wetlands
reclamation project, and to pay for equipment needed to clear the land.
Government authorities also forced both Buddhists and non-Buddhists
to work to build, repair, or maintain Buddhist religious facilities. In
Twantay Township in Rangoon Division, authorities forced villagers to
guard the ancient Danoke Pagoda, which has been under renovation, and
to gather wood, fetch water, and perform other tasks for soldiers
involved in the project. Villagers were allowed to pay money to be
exempted from pagoda guard duty. In Bogalay Township in Irrawaddy
Division, authorities forced villagers to construct 32 miles of road
between Pe-Chaung village and Kadone village, or else to hire
substitutes, which cost about $15 to $30 (5,000 to 10,000 kyat) at
market wages. The road was being built for the use of Buddhist pilgrims
at the request of the Pe-Chaung monastery. In predominantly Islamic
Maungdaw District in Arakan State, authorities required villagers to
build a Buddhist pagoda in Dail Fara; residents of one village said
they had to provide 10 laborers per week. Buddhist monks and army
authorities reportedly forced Chin villagers, most of whom were not
Buddhists, to labor for months without pay to repair a Buddhist pagoda
that collapsed in Chin State's Falam Township in July (see Section
2.c.).
The army continued to force citizens--including women and
children--to work as porters in military actions against ethnic
insurgents. This practice continued to lead to mistreatment, illness
and death (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.g.). Both the May report of
the ILO'S Director General and reports during the year by NGO's
including Amnesty International described dozens of reports of forced
porterage.
Parents routinely called upon their children to help fulfill their
households' forced labor obligations, without opposition by the
Government (see Section 6.d.).
There were numerous, detailed and jointly credible reports that
forced labor, including forced child labor, was used directly in
growing and harvesting some crops, chiefly for army units. Widespread
forced labor including forced child labor continued to contribute
materially to the construction and maintenance not only of irrigation
facilities important to the cultivation of some export crops including
rice, but also of roads and some railroads important for the
transportation of exports to ports. Forced labor, including forced
child labor, has contributed materially to the construction of
industrial parks subsequently used largely to produce manufactured
exports including garments. There have been many credible reports that
forced labor, including forced child labor, has been used widely since
1998 to clear and drain virgin lands and wetlands for the cultivation
of crops many of which, according to public descriptions of the
Government's economic plans, are intended largely for export.
There have been unconfirmed reports about the use of forced labor
on past individual projects by both government and nongovernment
actors.
Trafficking in women and girls to neighboring countries for the
purpose of forced prostitution remained a serious problem (see Sections
5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Although the law sets a minimum age of 13 for the
employment of children, in practice the law is not enforced. Working
children are highly visible in cities, mostly working for small or
family enterprises, and in family agricultural activities in the
countryside. Children working in the urban informal sector in Rangoon
and Mandalay often start work at young ages. Children are hired at
lower pay rates than adults for the same kind of work. In the urban
informal sector, child workers are found mostly in food processing,
selling, refuse collecting, light manufacturing, and as tea shop
attendants. Despite a compulsory education law, almost 50 percent of
children never enroll in school, and only 40 percent of them complete
the 5-year primary school course (see Section 5).
The law does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by
children; while bonded labor is not practiced, forced labor by children
occurs. The military Government not only tolerates child labor, but
also uses children as porters in infrastructure development and in
providing other services to military forces (see Section 6.c.).
Households tend to satisfy forced labor quotas by sending their least
productive workers, and government authorities accepted such workers in
satisfaction of those quotas. Many children often have been seen
working on gangs building or repairing roads and irrigation facilities.
In recent years, there have been growing numbers of reports that
military units in various ethnic minority areas either forced children
to perform logistical support services, such as fetching water,
cleaning, cutting bamboo, or cultivating food crops, or allowed
households or villages to use children to satisfy army orders to
perform such services (see Sections 1.f. and 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Only government employees and
employees of a few traditional industries were covered by minimum wage
provisions. The minimum monthly wage for salaried public employees is
$2.00 (600 kyats) for what was in effect a 6-hour workday. Various
subsidies and allowances supplement this sum. Neither the minimum wage
nor the higher wages earned even by senior government officials
provides a worker and family with a decent standard of living. Low and
falling real wages in the public sector have fostered widespread
corruption. In the private sector, urban laborers earned about $0.70
per day (200 kyat), while rural agricultural workers earn about half
that rate. Some private sector workers earn substantially more; a
skilled factory worker earns about $15 per day (4,500 kyat).
Surplus labor conditions, a dismal economy, and lack of protection
by the Government continues to dictate substandard conditions for
workers. The 1964 Law on Fundamental Workers Rights and the 1951
Factories Act regulate working conditions. There is a legally
prescribed 5-day, 35-hour workweek for employees in the public sector
and a 6-day and a 44-hour workweek for private and state enterprise
employees, with overtime paid for additional work. The law also allows
for a 24-hour rest period per week, and workers have 21 paid holidays
per year. However, in practice such provisions benefitted only a small
portion of the country's labor force, since most of the labor force was
engaged in rural agriculture.
Numerous health and safety regulations exist, but in practice the
Government has not made the necessary resources available to enforce
the regulations. Although workers may in principle remove themselves
from hazardous conditions, in practice many workers cannot expect to
retain their jobs if they do so.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law was known specifically to
prohibit trafficking in persons; however, there were laws, including
laws against abduction, that prohibited some aspects of trafficking.
Trafficking in women and children is a severe problem. Burma is a
source country for thousands of women and young girls who are
trafficked into the commercial sex industries of neighboring countries.
There are reliable reports that many women and children in border
areas, where the Government's control is limited, were forced or lured
into working as prostitutes in Thailand and China. It is unknown how
many young women have been induced or coerced into working as
prostitutes, but a common practice is to lure young women to Thailand
with promises of employment as a waitress or domestic servant.
Government efforts to stop trafficking in young women are limited
and relatively ineffective. In recent years the Government has made it
difficult for women to obtain passports or marry foreigners in order to
reduce the outflow of women both as victims of trafficking and for
other reasons (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.). However, most citizens who
were forced or lured into prostitution crossed the border into Thailand
without passports. It is illegal to leave Burma without government
authorization.
Child prostitution of girls, especially from the Shan ethnic
minority sent or lured to Thailand, continued to be a major problem.
______
CAMBODIA
Cambodia is a constitutional monarchy. Political stability,
achieved through the coalition Government formed following the 1998
national elections, continued through year's end. Hun Sen of the
Cambodian People's Party (CPP) is Prime Minister, Prince Norodom
Ranariddh of the National United Front for a Neutral, Peaceful,
Cooperative, and Independent Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) is President of the
National Assembly, and Chea Sim of the CPP was president of the Senate,
which was created in March. The 1998 electoral campaign and its
aftermath were marred by protests, voter intimidation, and partisan
violence, some of it government-directed. Despite these events, the
formation of the new Government reflected the will of the electorate.
King Norodom Sihanouk remains the constitutional monarch and Head of
State. Most power lies within the executive branch and, although its
influence grew within the new coalition structure, the National
Assembly does not provide a significant check to executive power. For
the first time in 30 years, the Khmer Rouge was not a political or
military threat. The judiciary is not independent; it frequently is
subject to legislative and executive influence, and suffers from
corruption.
The National Police, an agency of the Ministry of Interior, have
primary responsibility for internal security, but the Royal Cambodian
Armed Forces (RCAF), including the military police, also have domestic
security responsibilities. Government efforts to improve police and
RCAF performance no longer were hampered significantly by political
factionalism within the forces but remained hampered by budgetary
limitations. Members of the security forces committed numerous
documented human rights abuses.
Cambodia is an impoverished country. It has a market economy in
which approximately 80 percent of the population of 11.4 million engage
in subsistence farming, with rice as the principal crop. Economic
deprivation and poor health characterize life for most citizens. Annual
per capita gross domestic product is approximately $300. Average life
expectancy is only 50 years. Foreign aid is an important component of
national income. The stagnant economy of previous years began to
improve following the formation of the coalition Government in late
1998, and business activity and tourism increased significantly during
the year.
There continued to be serious problems in the Government's human
rights record; however, there were marked improvements in several
areas. The military forces and police were responsible for dozens of
extrajudicial killings, and impunity remains a problem since the
Government rarely prosecuted the perpetrators of such killings.
However, unlike the previous year, there were no reports of politically
motivated killings. There were credible reports that members of the
security forces tortured, beat, and otherwise abused persons in
custody, often to extract confessions. Prison conditions remained
harsh, and the Government continued to use arbitrary arrest and
prolonged pretrial detention.
In August the Government repealed civil service legislation that
previously made it difficult to arrest and prosecute members of the
police and security forces for criminal activity. Courts began to
prosecute some members of the security forces for human rights abuses;
however, immunity for those who committed human rights abuses remains a
problem. The Government, and local government officials, generally
continued to lack the political will and financial resources to act
effectively against security force officials suspected of being
responsible for human rights abuses. Democratic institutions,
especially the judiciary, remain weak. The judiciary is subject to
influence by the executive branch and is marred by inefficiency, a lack
of training, a shortage of resources, and widespread corruption related
to low wages. Politically related crimes rarely were prosecuted, and
citizens without defense counsel often effectively were denied the
right to a fair trial. The Government's respect for freedom of the
press, assembly, and association improved, and the Government generally
respected these rights.
Societal discrimination against women is a problem. Domestic
violence against women and abuse of children are common. Discrimination
against the disabled is a problem. The ethnic Vietnamese minority
continued to face widespread discrimination by the Khmer majority, and
this enmity was exploited by the political opposition. Labor conditions
generally improved. The Government took steps to ease the creation and
registration of trade unions; however, the Government does not enforce
effectively legal provisions on wages, overtime labor, rest time, and
protection of workers' rights to organize. Trafficking in women and
girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a serious problem.
Mob violence, not ethnically directed, resulted in some killings.
Land mines killed or wounded over 800 persons.
The mass Khmer Rouge defections that began in 1996 and ended in
late 1998 with the surrender of senior Khmer Rouge leaders Nuon Chea
and Khieu Samphan resulted in complete cessation of the guerrilla
insurgency against the Government. In March Ta Mok, the sole remaining
Khmer Rouge leader at large following the mass defections, was arrested
at the Thai border. Efforts to bring Ta Mok and senior Khmer Rouge
leaders to justice for crimes committed from 1975 through 1979 remained
underway.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Unlike previous
years, there were no reports of politically motivated killings by the
government forces; however, the military forces and police committed
dozens of extrajudicial killings. The United Nations Center for Human
Rights (UNCHR) documented many such nonpolitical killings.
On February 2, Cheng Srey, a 19-year-old woman working in a Phnom
Penh karaoke bar was killed following a dispute with a customer.
According to witnesses, Cheng Srey had refused a proposition made by
the customer, who then shot the victim in the forehead. Witnesses
identified a police officer as the assailant, but he escaped without
being apprehended. A warrant for his arrest was issued in July.
On October 13, Bith Poeun was arrested in Phnom Penh following a
series of robberies. After interrogation and a search of the residence
in which he and his accomplices lived, the local police retrieved
stolen merchandise and brought it outside the house. They thereafter
released Bith Poeun in front of the house, where an angry crowd had
gathered. The crowd kicked and beat Bith Poeun severely as the police
watched; he was shot and killed by police when he attempted to flee.
The Government took no action against the police.
On March 26, opposition party member Chhum Doeun was killed in
Kandal province during a nighttime burglary at his home by several
persons, including a local village chief who had long been involved in
a dispute with the victim. Chhum Doeun was shot at least 11 times; the
gunmen then took jewelry and money belonging to the victim's wife and
relatives. The UNCHR determined that Chhum Doeun's death was attributed
to personal, not political, factors.
Two prisoners from the Sihanoukville prison, Chen Vibol and Nguyen
Yang Yong, were killed by prison officials on June 17 after an
unsuccessful escape attempt by over 30 prisoners. Chen Vibol and Nguyen
Yang Yong were among the first prisoners recaptured after the escape
attempt and were returned to the prison. Chen Vibol was taken to the
prison director's office and Nguyen Yang Yong was brought to the prison
yard. Shortly thereafter, they were executed by prison guards. The
Government took no action against the prison guards.
Early in the year, there were a number of apparently racially
motivated grenade attacks in which 1 person was killed and
approximately 30 were injured (see Section 5). There also were killings
that may have been ethnically motivated (see Section 5).
In some cases, police or military forces acquiesced in or
encouraged mob violence against suspected criminals, which resulted in
killings. The Government did not arrest the vigilantes for committing
such killings. The Government also has not prosecuted most of those
responsible for the numerous political or extrajudicial killings
committed during the term of the previous government and reported by
the UNCHR in 1997 and 1998. Through year's end, 1,005 civilians and
military personnel were killed or wounded by land mines deployed by the
Khmer Rouge or various government forces during previous conflicts. The
number of such casualties declined by approximately 40 percent from
1998.
In March Ta Mok, the sole remaining Khmer Rouge leader at large,
was arrested at the Thai border. Efforts continued to bring Ta Mok and
other senior Khmer Rouge officials to justice for mass killings and
other crimes committed from 1975 through 1979 (see Section 1.e.). The
Government thereafter charged Ta Mok with illegal membership in the
Khmer Rouge and genocide.
In April the Government arrested Kiang Kek Iev (``Duch''), the
former director of the Khmer Rouge prison Tuol Sleng. In May he was
charged with murder.
In June Nuon Paet, a former Khmer Rouge commander, was sentenced to
life imprisonment for his role in the 1994 train ambush in Kampot
province that resulted in the deaths of 3 foreigners and at least 13
citizens. Later, charges were brought against Sam Bith and Chouk Rin,
former Khmer Rouge commanders who are officers in the RCAF and who
allegedly were involved in the ambush as well. By year's end, however,
neither Bith nor Chouk had been arrested.
b. Disappearance.--Unlike previous years, there were no reports of
politically motivated disappearances. One local human rights
nongovernmental organization (NGO) reported that the whereabouts of
four persons were unknown following their arrests during the year by
local police or security officials for various crimes, including
robbery and theft. By year's end, all remained missing, and NGO efforts
to establish their whereabouts continued.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and physical abuse of
prisoners; however, torture, beatings, and other forms of physical
mistreatment of persons held in police or military custody continued to
be a serious problem. The problem is compounded further by government
impunity, whereby perpetrators of torture and abuse frequently are
protected from prosecution or disciplinary action by local government
authorities, despite some central government efforts to curtail or
eliminate violations of prisoners' rights and to address problems of
accountability.
There were credible reports that military and police officials used
physical and psychological torture and severely beat criminal
detainees, particularly during interrogation. According to the UNCHR,
the Serious Crimes Department of the municipal police in Phnom Penh
beat or tortured persons routinely, but less frequently than during the
previous year. Dozens of detainees interviewed in Siem Reap,
Sihanoukville, and Banteay Meanchey provinces reported beatings in
police custody. One domestic human rights NGO received 8 formal
complaints of torture and recorded 94 other cases of new physical
assaults through October. At the youth rehabilitation center in Phnom
Penh, 13 of 48 detainees interviewed claimed torture or mistreatment by
police.
Following intervention by the UNCHR in May, the Government
instructed police throughout the country to cease any activity that
might violate the law or the rights of citizens and informed them that
any violations would be punished. The National Police thereafter
investigated and provided detailed accounts of 32 instances of torture
in Battambang province that had been reported by the UNCHR in 1997. It
is not known whether anyone was prosecuted, nor whether there were
further investigations of 1998 abuses. After intervention by human
rights organizations, the situation involving torture by local police
in Koh Kong province improved during the year.
There were credible reports that police harassed members of
opposition parties (see Section 1.f.). There were also reports that
police took the proof of citizenship of persons of Vietnamese
ethnicity.
In April the Government arrested the former head of a Khmer Rouge
prison and torture center (see Section 1.a.).
Prison conditions remained harsh, and government efforts to improve
prison conditions and implement new regulations were hampered by lack
of funds and weak enforcement. However, conditions improved due to
construction and renovation of some prison buildings, the timely
disbursement of monthly government allocations for food and operating
costs, and the adoption of new prison regulations that require the
application of international standards of detention. Human rights
organizations cited a number of serious problems, including
overcrowding, health problems, food and water shortages, malnutrition,
and poor security. Use of shackles and the practice of holding
prisoners in small, dark cells continued in some prisons after escape
attempts. Government ration allowances for purchasing prisoners' food
remain inadequate, exacerbating their malnutrition.
The Government continued to allow domestic human rights groups to
visit prisons and prisoners and to provide human rights training to
prison guards. However, NGO's reported occasional limited cooperation
from provincial authorities (see Section 4).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the Government
continued to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. A penal code
drafted by the U.N. Transitional Authority for Cambodia in 1992 remains
in effect, as does a 1993 criminal procedure law. The criminal
procedure law in principle provides for adequate protection for
criminal suspects; however, in practice the Government sometimes
ignored these provisions during the year. One human rights NGO recorded
17 complaints of unlawful detention and arrest by police, military, or
local government authorities through October.
Although lengthy detention without charge is illegal, suspects
often are held by authorities for long periods before being charged or
brought to trial or released. According to the UNCHR, such prolonged
detention largely is a result of a growing prison population and the
limited capacity of the court system. Accused persons legally are
entitled to a lawyer, although in practice they often have limited
access to legal representation. Prisoners are held routinely for
several days before gaining access to a lawyer or family members.
Although there is a bail system, many prisoners, particularly those
without legal representation, often have no opportunity to seek release
on bail. The introduction in 1998 into the legal system of newly
trained lawyers, who frequently received supplemental training by
NGO's, resulted in significant improvements during the year for those
defendants who were provided with counsel, including a reduction in
pretrial detention period and improved access to bail.
In August the Parliament amended the law to extend the maximum
period of pretrial detention to 3 years for alleged Khmer Rouge war
crimes in order to permit the continued detention of Ta Mok and
``Duch'' until a Khmer Rouge tribunal is formed.
The Government does not use forced exile, and no persons were in
self-imposed exile during the year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the Government does not respect this
provision in practice. The courts are subject to influence by the
executive, and there is widespread corruption among judges, virtually
none of whom receives a living wage.
The court system consists of lower courts, an appeals court, and a
Supreme Court. The Constitution also mandates a Constitutional Council,
which is empowered to review the constitutionality of laws, and a
Supreme Council of Magistracy, which appoints and disciplines judges.
The composition of both of these bodies is viewed widely as favorable
to the Cambodian People's Party, resulting in complaints by other
political parties of its institutional dominance. There is a separate
military court system.
Trials are public. Defendants have the right to be present and to
consult with an attorney, to confront and question witnesses against
them, and to present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf.
However, trials are typically perfunctory, and extensive cross-
examination usually does not take place. The serious shortage of
attorneys--especially outside of Phnom Penh--remains a significant
impediment to broader implementation of the right to counsel in
practice. Persons without the means to secure defense counsel often
effectively are denied the right to a fair trial.
Defendants also are entitled by law to the presumption of innocence
and the right of appeal. However, because of excessive corruption,
defendants often are expected to bribe the judge for a favorable
verdict, therefore effectively being denied the presumption of
innocence. Citizens' rights to appeal sometimes are limited by the
logistic difficulties in transferring prisoners from provincial prisons
to the appeals court. Many appeals thus are heard in the absence of the
defendant.
A serious lack of resources and poor training contribute to
corruption and inefficiency in the judicial branch and in practice the
Government does not ensure due process. For example, judges often have
no legal training and lack copies ofthe laws on which they are expected
to rule. As a result of these weaknesses, citizens often effectively
were denied a fair trial.
The courts often pressure victims of crimes to accept small cash
settlements from the accused instead of seeking prosecution of the
guilty. When a case does make its way to court, the verdict sometimes
is determined by a judge before the case is heard, often on the basis
of a bribe paid by the accuser or the defendant. Sworn, written
statements from witnesses and the accused usually are the extent of
evidence presented in trials. Such statements by the accused sometimes
result from beatings or threats by investigation officials, and
illiterate defendants often are not informed of the content of written
confessions that they are forced to sign. In cases involving military
personnel, military officers often exert pressure on judges to have the
defendant released without a trial or other due process.
In August the National Assembly and Senate amended Article 51 of
the Common Statute on Civil Servants that previously had made it
difficult to arrest and prosecute members of the police and security
forces for criminal activity. Subsequently, the courts began to
prosecute some members of the security forces for human rights abuses,
but immunity for those who commit human rights abuses remains a
problem. The Government and local government officials generally
continued to lack the political will and financial resources to act
effectively against security force officials suspected of being
responsible for human rights abuses.
In November the Government formed a legal committee headed by the
Minister of Justice to investigate court corruption. In December the
Ministry of Justice suspended two senior municipal court officials for
corruption and detained and rearrested several criminals or suspects
who had been released previously by them. Although several of those
rearrested admitted that they had bribed the court to secure their
release, some criticized the Government's actions as procedurally
invalid.
There is ongoing cooperation between the Government, many foreign
donors, and NGO's to improve the legal system. Assistance programs had
been suspended after violence in July 1997.
In an avowed action to remove official impunity for crimes
committed by government authorities, the Government in August amended
the 1994 law on civil servants to remove the requirement that the
courts seek advance government permission to prosecute a member of the
civil service, which includes the police. Cited as a positive step by
the UNCHR, this reform removed the legal bar to prosecutions of civil
servants, and some successful prosecutions of police and security
officials began in August. Nonetheless, court delays or corrupt
practices often allow those accused of crimes to flee or otherwise
escape prosecution, effectively leading to effective impunity for some
government officials who commit crimes.
In March Ta Mok, the one remaining senior Khmer Rouge leader still
at large was arrested and remains in prison pending trial. In April the
Government arrested Duch, the director of the former Khmer Rouge prison
Tuol Sleng; he also remains in prison pending trial. During the year,
following an initiative by the U.N. Secretary General and agreement by
the Government to permit the participation of foreign judges and
prosecutors in the domestic legal system, the Government drafted new
legislation to create a legal and judicial framework to bring these and
other Khmer Rouge leaders to justice. In September it sought expert
legal advice from the international community to develop a plan to seek
credible justice and accountability for crimes committed during the
Khmer Rouge regime in a fashion consistent with the Constitution and
international standards of justice. However, despite continued
diplomatic efforts, the Government and the U.N. had not reached
agreement over a framework for a tribunal by year's end. In August the
Parliament amended the law to extend the maximum period of pretrial
detention to 3 years for alleged Khmer Rouge war crimes in order to
permit the continued detention of Ta Mok and ``Duch'' until a Khmer
Rouge tribunal is formed.
Two employees of the human rights NGO LICADHO, arrested in 1998
following violent demonstrations against a toxic waste dump in
Sihanoukville, were tried in July. At the end of a 3-day trial, all
charges against the two human rights workers and eight other defendants
were dismissed for lack of evidence. Despite some procedural
irregularities, most observers found the trial to be generally fair,
with active participation by defense counsel (see Section 4).
In September the UNCHR received reports that Prey Veng provincial
authorities had granted immunity from prosecution to 15 persons who had
confessed to crimes that included murder and robbery. In October Prey
Veng authorities granted further extraconstitutional amnesties from
prosecution to a group of brothel owners. Many suspected that bribery
played a decisive role in these cases.
The military court system suffers from deficiencies similar to
those of the civilian court system. Moreover, the legal distinction
between the military and civil courts often is ignored in practice;
several persons arrested for crimes that appear to have no connection
with military offenses have been detained for trial by the military
court.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution contains provisions protecting the
privacy of residence and correspondence and includes a provision
against illegal search; however, the police routinely conducted
warrantless searches and seizures. There were no reports that the
Government monitored private electronic communications.
Citizens generally were free to live where they wished; however,
there were continued reports of land disputes between residents, local
authorities, and business persons. Since the forced collectivization
during Khmer Rouge rule and the return of thousands of refugees, land
ownership is often unclear, and adequate land titles do not exist.
Moreover, with the end of the Khmer Rouge insurgency, the rush to gain
possession of former Khmer Rouge lands on or near potentially lucrative
cross-border trade routes has exacerbated the land ownership problem
caused by lack of documentation.
In response to the prevalence of land disputes, several provinces
created land dispute settlement committees chaired by one of the deputy
provincial governors; these committees resolved several disputes,
although sometimes they encountered difficulty in resolving disputes
that involved military officials. The Government is drafting a land law
with the help of international organizations and NGO's.
In June and July, almost 300 families were removed from land on
which they had resided in Banteay Meanchey province amid claims by
local military officials and business persons that they were squatters
illegally occupying land owned by the Government or other persons.
Although some accepted compensation packages through mediation by
provincial officials, others claim that they lost the land unjustly and
mounted protests at the National Assembly in Phnom Penh to deter use of
the land for business and commercial activity or new infrastructure
developments to be constructed in the area.
In August 500 families were removed from their homes in the former
military resistance stronghold of O'Smach in Oddar Meanchey province.
In most cases, the families had occupied the area since they returned
from refugee camps in Thailand earlier in the year and were relocated
to a newly demined residential building site 1.2 miles away (see
Section 2.d.). The Government claimed that a new market and commercial
area would be developed on the cleared land, which is at the Thai-
Cambodian border; the Government and Thai companies building the
complex paid compensation and distributed roofing materials to the
displaced families, but many complained that the compensation was
inadequate.
In November approximately 600 residents of a floating village on
the Bassac River in Phnom Penh were evicted by municipal authorities as
illegal Vietnamese immigrants and forced to float down river toward
Vietnam. Although most lacked identity documents, some residents
claimed that they were Cambodian citizens of Vietnamese ethnicity and
that proof of their citizenship was confiscated by police officials in
the days prior to their eviction. The Government claimed that police
investigated their residency status and displaced only those without
legitimate documents (see Section 5).
The Government does not coerce or forbid membership in political
organizations systematically; however, there were several credible
cases in which members of the opposition Sam Rainsy party (SRP)
complained of being harassed by police or other local officials. In
other cases, including the arrest of two persons with ties to the SRP
for their roles in the 1998 rocketattack against the Prime Minister's
motorcade and the kidnaping for ransom of a SRP parliamentarian,
opposition claims of government-sponsored political harassment could
not be verified by the UNCHR.
Unlike the previous year, there were no reports that military
officers forcibly conscripted adults and children.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of expression, press, and publication, and the Government
generally respects this right in practice, unlike the previous year
when it sometimes limited press freedom. However, the Constitution
implicitly limits free speech by requiring that speech not adversely
affect public security. The Constitution also declares that the King is
``inviolable.'' The Press Law provides journalists with a number of
rights, including a prohibition on prepublication censorship and
protection from imprisonment for expressing opinion. However, the Press
Law also includes a vaguely worded prohibition on publishing articles
that affect national security and political stability. Unlike the
previous year, there were no reports that journalists practiced self-
censorship. The number of news items critical of the Government was
high and included frequent vituperative personalized criticism of the
Prime Minister and president of the National Assembly.
Although limited in circulation, newspapers are a primary source of
news and expression of political opinion. All major political parties
have reasonable and regular access to the print media. The press
remained somewhat partisan but, unlike the past year, the only major
newspapers receiving substantial financial support from a political
party were a few opposition newspapers. As a result, the number of
Khmer-language newspapers declined. There are approximately 16 Khmer-
language newspapers published regularly. Of these, 11 are considered to
be progovernment journals, 4 are considered to support the opposition
Sam Rainsy Party, and one is considered to be antimonarchy. In addition
there is one French-language daily, one English-language daily, and two
other English newspapers published regularly. Many of the Khmer-
language newspapers frequently publish articles translated from the
English-language newspapers.
Most newspapers criticize the Government frequently, and Prime
Minister Hun Sen and National Assembly President Prince Ranariddh
frequently came under strong attack by opposition newspapers. Unlike
the previous year, there were no instances of government intimidation
or retribution against newspapers for reporting critical of the
Government.
In September the Ministry of Information suspended an antimonarchy
newspaper, Republic News, for 30 days due to publication of an article
critical of King Sihanouk. In at least three other instances, the
Ministry of Information sent warning letters to other newspapers for
publishing articles critical of the King, citing the constitutional
prohibition against such acts.
The Government, the military forces, and political parties
continued to dominate the broadcast media. The government-sponsored
television network inaugurated live coverage of National Assembly
sessions at the initiative of Prince Ranariddh, the National Assembly
President. According to a report by the U.N. Center for Human Rights
(UNCHR), the procedures for licensing and allocation of radio and
television frequencies to the media were not impartial.
In March the Government authorized the opposition Sambok Khmum
(beehive) radio station to resume broadcasting. In August the FUNCINPEC
Party was permitted to resume control of its radio station which had
been confiscated in 1997. National radio and television stations
regularly broadcast some human rights, social action, public health,
and civil society programming produced by domestic NGO's.
The Government respects academic freedom. In January students
protested the lack of available jobs. In February university students
demonstrated peacefully to protest low budget allocations for education
and to support teachers' demands for higher salaries; the Government
subsequently agreed to modest increases in teacher salaries. In
December students again mounted a public demonstration over dormitory
issues.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly and, unlike the previous
year, the Government generally respected this right in practice.
Numerous groups assembled peacefully, including workers protesting
labor conditions, political opposition activists supporting a tribunal
for Khmer Rouge leaders or other issues, students protesting lower
budget allocations and dormitory problems, teachers rallying to demand
higher wages, and other groups protesting land seizures or border
encroachments, all without incident.
The Government requires a permit to be obtained in advance of a
march or demonstration. The Government often did not issue a requested
permit, or took no action on a permit application, but these actions
did not have any practical effect since the assemblies were held
anyway. Unlike the previous year, there were no incidents in which
security forces disrupted or ended marches or demonstrations.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and unlike
the previous years, the Government generally respected this right in
practice. There were no reports of interference with political party
offices. The Government proposed a revised draft NGO law that
eliminated many provisions previously opposed by the NGO community but
retained some registration and reporting requirements for domestic
NGO's and associations; by year's end, the National Assembly had not
debated or acted on the new draft law.
Membership in the Khmer Rouge, which previously conducted an armed
insurgency against the Government, is illegal.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
Constitution also prohibits discrimination based on religion, and
minority religions experience little or no official discrimination.
Buddhism is the state religion and over 95 percent of the population is
Buddhist. Most of the remainder is made up of ethnic Cham Muslims, who
generally are well integrated into society.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict
domestic or international travel, although the presence of land mines
and bandits makes travel in some areas of the country dangerous.
Monks can move internally without restriction.
All Cambodian refugees remaining in temporary refugee camps in
Thailand returned to the country following the formation of the
coalition Government in late 1998; over 37,000 refugees returned either
spontaneously or through the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees'
(UNHCR's) voluntary repatriation program during the first 4 months of
the year. All refugee camps at the Thai border subsequently were
closed.
There were no reports of refugees being forced by Thai authorities
to return to Cambodia involuntarily, according to the UNHCR, nor were
there any reports of persecution or discrimination against those who
returned from any country. Internally displaced persons also were
allowed to resettle in other areas of the country.
The Government allows noncitizens to apply to the UNHCR for refugee
status. The Government cooperated with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
organizations to prepare for and assist in the repatriation of the
returning refugees from Thailand. The Government has not formulated a
policy regarding asylees or first asylum, and it did not provide asylum
during the year.
There were no reports that the Government forced persons to return
to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and most citizens exercised this right by
participating in the 1998 national elections. In July 1998, in the
first national elections since 1993, the CPP won a plurality of votes.
The electoral campaign and its aftermath were marred by protests, voter
intimidation, and partisan violence, some of it government-directed.
Despite suchincidents, the formation of the new Government reflected
the will of the electorate. Most international and domestic observer
groups certified the election as acceptable.
The coalition Government formed in late 1998 between the Cambodian
People's Party and FUNCINPEC, the two parties that won the largest
number of votes and National Assembly seats in the 1998 election,
achieved renewed political stability. The coalition agreement provided
for roughly equal power sharing between the parties, with Hun Sen of
the CPP as Prime Minister and Prince Ranariddh of FUNCINPEC as
President of the National Assembly. The coalition agreement also
provided for the creation of a Senate, which was formed in March with
Chea Sim of the CPP as President. The Senate's function is to review
and provide advice on the laws passed by the National Assembly; the
National Assembly retains final authority over whether to modify
legislation based upon the Senate's recommendations.
Although growing in influence, the legislature remained weak in
comparison with the executive branch. The coalition Government
appointed the provincial governors and their deputies, who generally
are divided between the CPP and FUNCINPEC parties, as well as district
officials. Commune level officials were appointed by the previous
government; most of these officials are appointees from the previous
regimes, the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the State of Cambodia.
Elections for new commune councils were not held in 1999 as planned,
and are scheduled for late 2000. The National Assembly has not yet
enacted the communal election law or commune administration law.
Although traditional cultural practices inhibit the role of women
in government, women took an active part in the 1998 national election
and participate actively in the coalition Government. There are 10
women among the 122 members of the National Assembly, 8 women among the
61 members of the Senate, and 2 ministers and 4 state secretaries in
the Cabinet, which includes a Ministry of Women's and Veterans Affairs.
There are several members of ethnic and religious minorities in the
Cabinet and the National Assembly (see Section 5).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The large domestic and international human rights community
remained active and engaged in diverse activities. Numerous human
rights organizations and the UNCHR conducted monitoring activities and
human rights training for provincial officials, military officers,
villagers, the legal community, and other groups. These organizations
operated relatively freely throughout the country. There are
approximately 40 NGO's involved in human rights activities, but only a
small portion were involved actively in organizing training programs or
investigating abuses. The Government generally cooperated with human
rights workers in performing their investigations, but some domestic
NGO's reported occasional limited cooperation from some provincial
authorities in conducting inspections of prison conditions.
In July two human rights workers from the NGO LICADHO who were
arrested in 1998 following violent demonstrations against a toxic waste
dump in Sihanoukville were acquitted in a trial that most observers
found to be credible (see Section 1.e.). Although some NGO's expressed
concern that the arrest of these workers would have a negative effect
on human rights work, no similar arrests were reported during the year.
In September the Government and the UNCHR agreed to an extension
until March 2002 of the UNHCR's activities in the country, although the
formal memorandum of understanding was not signed by year's end. The
UNCHR maintains a head office in Phnom Penh and has six provincial
offices. The U.N. Special Representative for Human Rights met with
government representatives at all levels, as well as with
representatives of political parties and NGO's.
By year's end, the government-established Cambodian Human Rights
Committee had published the results of only a few of its investigations
of the human rights abuses that had been reported by the UNCHR in
previous years. The Committee, which was established in June 1998, also
is charged with improving the administration of justice and drafting a
law to establish an independent permanent national human rights
commission. By year's end, the commission had not been established.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, color,
sex, language, religious beliefs, or political views. Although the
Government does not engage in discrimination systematically, it
sometimes fails to protect these rights in practice.
Women.--Domestic and international NGO workers report that violence
against women, including rape and domestic violence, is common.
Although there were reports of rape and domestic abuse, accurate
statistics are not available. Authorities normally decline to become
involved in domestic disputes, and the victims frequently are reluctant
to complain.
Prostitution and trafficking in women are serious problems (see
Section 6.f.). Due in part to budgetary limitations, the Government has
not enforced effectively a 1996 law against prostitution and
trafficking in women. Despite sporadic government crackdowns during the
year on brothel operators in Phnom Penh, the prostitution trade
continues to flourish. A survey by a local human rights NGO found that
three-fourths of women and girls who work as prostitutes do so
voluntarily, while one-fourth have been forced to work as prostitutes
or have been deceived into prostitution.
According to NGO reports, women comprise 52 percent of the
population, 60 percent of agricultural workers, 85 percent of the
business work force, 70 percent of the industrial work force, and 60
percent of all service sector workers. Women often are concentrated in
low-paying jobs in these sectors and largely are excluded from
management positions.
The Constitution contains explicit language providing for equal
rights for women, equal pay for equal work, and equal status in
marriage. In practice women have equal property rights with men, have
the same status in bringing divorce proceedings, and have equal access
to education and some jobs. However, cultural traditions continue to
limit the ability of women to reach senior positions in business and
other areas. There are a large number of women's NGO's that train poor
women and widows and address social problems such as spousal abuse,
prostitution, and trafficking. An active Women's Media Center NGO
produces and broadcasts programming on women's issues.
Children.--The Constitution provides for children's rights, and
ensuring the welfare of children is a specific goal in the Government's
political program. The Government relies on international aid to fund
most social welfare programs targeted at children, resulting in only a
modest flow of funds to ameliorate problems that affect children.
Children frequently suffer from the inadequacy of the health care
system. Infant mortality is reported at 89.4 per thousand, and 12
percent of children do not live to the age of 5 years. Child mortality
from preventable diseases is high.
Children also are affected adversely by an inadequate educational
system. Despite an extensive government school construction program,
schools are overcrowded and short of equipment. Less than 5 percent of
primary school teachers have completed high school. The Government does
not deny girls equal access to education but in practice families with
limited resources often give priority to educating boys.
Child abuse is believed to be common, although there are no
statistics available on the extent of the problem. Poverty and domestic
violence often drive children onto the streets; domestic NGO's estimate
there are more than 10,000 street children in Phnom Penh alone, who are
easy targets for sexual abuse and exploitation.
Although sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of 15 is
illegal, child prostitution and trafficking in children were common
(see Section 6.f.). In July the Government adopted a 5-year plan
against child sexual exploitation that emphasizes prevention through
information and protection through law enforcement.
In November in a demonstration organized by domestic and foreign
NGO's marking the anniversary of the signing of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 300 child marchers between the ages of 10 and 18
marched peacefully through Phnom Penh to demand that the Government
take further steps to protect their rights.
People with Disabilities.--The Government does not require that
buildings or government services be accessible to the disabled.
According to the Government, approximately 1 in 250 citizens is missing
at least one limb. This statistic reflects the continuing effects of
land mine detonations. Programs administered by various NGO's have
brought about substantial improvements in the treatment and
rehabilitation of amputees. However, amputees face considerable
societal discrimination, particularly in obtaining skilled employment.
Religious Minorities.--Muslims are the largest religious minority
and experience little or no discrimination in practice; however,
occasional tensions have been reported among the various branches of
Islam, which receive monetary support from groups in Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Malaysia, or Indonesia depending on the tenets of the
particular branch.
The small Christian community has not experienced serious or
systematic discrimination; however, occasional tensions have been
reported when Christian evangelists have attempted to remove Buddhist
images or religious items in private homes. Christian missionary groups
have not encountered significant difficulties in performing their work.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Citizens of Vietnamese and
Chinese ethnicity have long constituted the largest ethnic minorities.
Ethnic Chinese citizens are well accepted in society. However, fear and
animosity continue among many Khmer citizens toward ethnic Vietnamese,
who are seen as a threat to the Cambodian nation and culture. The
rights of minorities under the 1996 Nationality Law are not explicit;
constitutional protections are extended only to ``Khmer people,'' that
is, Cambodians.
In July in Ratankiri province, a group of armed bandits killed and
injured several persons from five remote hill tribe villages. A total
of 14 persons were killed, including 13 ethnic Jarai villagers and 1
ethnic Vietnamese. The motive of the killers remains unclear, but it
appears that the villages in which the victims lived were targeted
specifically.
Unlike 1998 there were no reports of ethnic violence supported by
opposition politicians during which ethnic Vietnamese citizens or
residents were killed, despite continued anti-Vietnamese statements by
the political opposition.
In at least five separate attacks during February and March, hand
grenades were thrown into cafes and residences owned by ethnic
Vietnamese in one Phnom Penh district, killing one person and injuring
approximately 30 others. Although the motive for the attacks was not
established, a number of the victims believe that they were racially
motivated.
In October approximately 600 residents of a floating village on the
Bassac River in Phnom Penh were evicted by municipal authorities as
illegal Vietnamese immigrants and forced to float down river toward
Vietnam. Although most lacked identity documents, some residents
claimed that they were Cambodian citizens of Vietnamese ethnicity and
that proof of their citizenship was confiscated by police officials in
the days prior to their eviction (see Section 1.f.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. Right of Association.--The 1997 Labor Law provides workers with
the right to form professional organizations of their own choosing,
without prior authorization, and all workers are free to join the trade
union of their choice; however, the Government's enforcement of these
rights was uneven, and some unions complained that the procedures for
registration were burdensome. Membership in trade unions or employee
associations is not compulsory, and workers are free to withdraw from
such organizations; however, the Ministry of Labor has accepted the
charter of at least one union that requires workers to obtain
permission before they can withdraw.
During the year, the Government issued decrees and subdecrees
clarifying the Labor Law in a number of areas, including the
registration of labor unions, the election of shop stewards, the
registration of collective bargaining agreements, and thecalculation of
overtime pay rates. However, despite these legal advances, the
Government's enforcement efforts were hampered by a lack of resources,
little knowledge of the law by factory managers, and a lack of
qualified labor inspectors. Unions also suffer from a lack of
resources, training, and experience.
There were 85 strikes during the first 10 months of the year, none
of which were carried out in accordance with the law. The Government
allowed all peaceful strikes and demonstrations to take place, although
police intervened in violent strikes in garment factories on at least
two occasions in October. In the first incident, police fired shots
into the air to disperse a violent confrontation between striking and
nonstriking workers at a garment factor in Kandal province. Another
violent, unannounced strike at a garment factory in Phnom Penh was
stopped following peace police intervention.
The Labor Law requires unions and employer organizations to file a
charter and lists of officers with the Ministry of Social Affairs,
Labor, Vocational Training, and Youth Rehabilitation. Since the Labor
Law went into effect, the Ministry registered 77 unions and 4 labor
federations. Thirteen new unions were registered through August.
Although all unions collect dues from members, none has been able to
operate without outside sources of support. None of the unions has the
capacity to negotiate with management as an equal.
In October 1998, the Ministry issued a new subdecree relaxing union
registration procedures. The Ministry registered one opposition-party
linked union in December 1998 after a long delay, even though that
union did not comply technically with the requirements of the Labor
Law. The vast majority of the other registered unions often failed to
meet one or more legal requirements. Unions and other observers still
complain of the difficulty and cost associated with assembling the
necessary paperwork from other government agencies in registering union
officers, particularly the ``letter of no criminal record.'' During the
year, there were no credible complaints of political bias in union
registration.
In another October 1998 subdecree, the Ministry clarified the role
of labor unions in nominating candidates for shop stewards, provided
for elections to remove nonperforming shop stewards, and required
factories to furnish the Ministry with minutes of shop steward
elections. The Ministry reported that it received such minutes for 82
enterprises through September. Shop stewards in some factories began to
represent workers effectively to management. However, in a significant
number of factories, election irregularities, or irregularities in
choosing candidates for election, resulted in the selection of pliant
or promanagement shop stewards.
Most workers are subsistence rice farmers and have little knowledge
of trade unions. Nearly all trade union activity was concentrated in
the rapidly growing garment sector. Although there is an expanding
service sector, most urban workers are engaged in small-scale commerce,
self-employed skilled labor, or unskilled day labor. The Labor Law does
not apply to workers in the public sector.
Unions may affiliate freely, but the law does not address
explicitly their right to affiliate internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Law
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively; however,
the Government's enforcement of these rights has been uneven.
Since enactment of the Labor Law in 1997, there has been confusion
over the overlapping roles of labor unions and shop stewards. The Labor
Law gives unions the right to negotiate with management over wages and
working conditions and allows unions to nominate candidates for shop
steward positions. However, the law gives shop stewards the right to
represent the union to the company director and to sign collective
bargaining agreements. Legal ambiguities also exist in the process for
unions to nominate shop stewards.
In practice very little collective bargaining takes place. A
February 1998 strike at a Phnom Penh cigarette factory still represents
the only instance in which an officially registered trade union held a
strike that generally conformed to the Labor Law and yielded one of the
few collective bargaining agreements.
The Labor Law specifically protects shop stewards from dismissal
without permission from the Ministry and provides union members
protection from discrimination on the basis of union membership.
The Government observes neither of these provisions adequately.
Illegal dismissals led to several strikes during the year, only some of
which ended with reinstatement.
Wages in the private sector are set by market conditions, although
the Ministry has the right to set minimum wages based on
recommendations from the tripartite Labor Advisory Committee that was
established in May 1998. The Government sets wages for civil servants.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition on Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Law
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including forced labor by
children; however, the Government does not enforce these prohibitions
adequately.
Mandatory overtime is widespread in the garment industry, with
workers in some factories facing fines, dismissal or loss of premium
pay if they refuse, even occasionally. There were numerous reports that
women and girls were trafficked into prostitution. A 1995 survey of
prostitution made by a local NGO indicated that 31 percent of female
prostitutes were between the ages of 12 and 17. Up to half of the girls
involved were sold by their families, then forced to work as
prostitutes. There were also reports that children were kidnaped and
forced to work in the illegal sex trade (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
Although the institution of bonded labor does not appear to be
widespread, there were reports of it in the wood-processing, rubber,
and brick making industries. Although the Labor Law prohibits the
collection of recruitment fees from new workers, some garment workers
reported that they paid fees in excess of 2 months' salary to various
middlemen, inside or outside the factory, in order to gain employment
or pass their probation periods.
There were no reports of forced conscription, unlike in 1998.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Law establishes 15 years as the minimum age for
employment. However, the law permits children between 12 and 15 years
of age to engage in ``light work,'' that is, work that is not hazardous
to their health and that does not affect school attendance. The Labor
Advisory Committee, which held its first meeting in October, is
responsible for specifying occupations that are hazardous to the
health, safety, or morality of adolescents, as well as consulting with
the Ministry to determine which types of employment and working
conditions constitute ``light work.'' Children under 15 are about 43
percent of the population. According to the Government, about 17
percent of children between the ages of 5 and 17 are active
economically, the vast majority of whom fall toward the upper end of
the age range, and 80% of whom are engaged in agriculture. Few children
are engaged in industrial work. Some children work in brick factories
and on rubber plantations. With assistance from the International Labor
Organization (ILO), the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor, Vocational
Training, and Youth Rehabilitation in 1995 established a child labor
unit to investigate and suppress child labor. However, the Ministry is
hampered by inadequate resources, staff, and training. In August the
Government ratified seven ILO conventions, including Convention 105
(abolition of forced labor) and Convention 138 (minimum age).
The Labor Law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including
forced labor by children; however, the Government does not enforce the
law effectively, and children are trafficked and forced to work as
prostitutes (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Law requires that
minimum wages be established for each sector of the economy based on
recommendations by the Labor Advisory Committee. To date a minimum wage
has been set only in the garment sector, where workers must receive at
least $40 (151,000 riel) per month (based on 26 8-hour days) at the
conclusion of their training. Most garment factories pay in excess of
this wage, but prevailing wages in the industry are not sufficient to
provide a worker and family with a decent standard of living.
The Labor Law provides for a standard legal workweek of 48 hours,
not to exceed 8 hours per day. The law stipulatestime-and-one-half for
overtime hours, and double time if overtime work occurs at night, on
Sunday, or on a holiday. The Government does not enforce these
standards adequately. Workers frequently complain of overtime in excess
of 2 hours per day and of being forced to work 7 days per week. Many
factories do not pay the legally mandated premiums for overtime (150
percent) and night or holiday work (200 percent) properly, and there is
legal ambiguity over which hours constitute night work. Another common
complaint is that management violates the law by paying the overtime
rate only for the salary component of workers' pay, leaving piece rates
unchanged regardless of the number of hours worked.
The Labor Law states that the workplace should have health and
safety standards adequate to ensure workers' well-being. The Government
enforces existing standards inconsistently, in part because it lacks
staff, equipment, and training. Work related injury and health problems
are common. Conditions in small-scale factories and cottage industries
are generally poor and often do not meet international standards. The
Government issued several instructions on workplace standards during
the year, and more detailed regulations awaited approval by the Labor
Advisory Committee at year's end. Penalties are specified in the Labor
Law, but there are no specific provisions to protect workers who
complain about unsafe or unhealthy conditions. Workers who remove
themselves from unsafe working conditions risk loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The 1996 Law on the Exploitation and
Trafficking of Humans prohibits these abuses, but the Government does
not enforce the law effectively in practice. Trafficking in women and
children for the purpose of forced prostitution remained a serious
problem, and government prosecution of traffickers is rare. The law
established a jail sentence of up to 20 years for any person convicted
of trafficking; however, its enforcement is hampered in part by budget
limitations and a lack of implementing subdecrees.
Surveys conducted by domestic NGO's in 1995 indicated that 40 to 50
percent of young women who were trafficked were victimized by a close
relative or friend of the family for money or on promises of a better
life. Poverty and ignorance at the village level is a major factor
contributing to the trafficking problem.
Child prostitution and trafficking in children were common. There
were reliable reports that children were lured from or kidnaped in some
provinces and forced into the illegal sex trade, both in Cambodia and
abroad. Other children were smuggled into Thailand to become beggars.
In July the Government adopted a 5-year plan against child sexual
exploitation that emphasizes prevention through information and
protection through law enforcement. In September the Prime Minister
instructed the Cabinet to develop additional measures to fight
trafficking of women and children, including speedy promulgation of
subdecrees and signing bilateral extradition treaties to bring
traffickers to justice. In September, in the country's first trial on
cross-border trafficking, Seng Savoeun was sentenced to 15 years in
prison in Banteay Meanchey province for trafficking a 2-year old girl,
a 4-year old boy, and a 7-year old girl into Thailand to work as
beggars.
______
CHINA
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is an authoritarian state in
which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the paramount source of
power. At the national and regional levels, Party members hold almost
all top government, police, and military positions. Ultimate authority
rests with members of the Politburo. Leaders stress the need to
maintain stability and social order and are committed to perpetuating
the rule of the CCP and its hierarchy. Citizens lack both the freedom
peacefully to express opposition to the Party-led political system and
the right to change their national leaders or form of government.
Socialism continues to provide the theoretical underpinning of Chinese
politics, but Marxist ideology has given way to economic pragmatism in
recent years, and economic decentralization has increased the authority
of regional officials. The Party's authority rests primarily on the
Government's ability to maintain social stability, appeals to
nationalism and patriotism, Party control of personnel and the security
apparatus, and the continued improvement in the living standards of
most of the country's 1.27 billion citizens. The Constitution provides
for an independent judiciary; however, in practice, the Government and
the CCP, at both the central and local levels, frequently interfere in
the judicial process, and decisions in a number of high profile
political cases are directed by the Government and the CCP.
The security apparatus is made up of the Ministries of State
Security and Public Security, the People's Armed Police, the People's
Liberation Army, and the state judicial, procuratorial, and penal
systems. Security policy and personnel were responsible for numerous
human rights abuses.
China is making a difficult transition from a centrally planned to
a market-based economy. The economy continues to expand. The country is
a leading world producer of coal, steel, textiles, and grains. Trade
and foreign investment are helping to modernize the economy. Major
exports include electronic goods, toys, apparel, and plastics.
According to official government statistics, the official gross
domestic product (GDP) growth rate during the year was just over 7
percent, but the actual rate was widely considered to be lower by
experts. The economy faces growing problems, including state enterprise
reform, unemployment, underemployment, and regional economic
disparities. Rural unemployment and underemployment combined are
estimated to be over 30 percent. Tens of millions of peasants have left
their homes in search of better jobs and living conditions.
Demographers estimate that between 80 and 130 million persons make up
this ``floating population,'' with many major cities counting 1 million
or more such persons. Urban areas also are coping with millions of
state workers idled on partial wages or unemployed as a result of
industrial reforms. In the industrial sector, downsizing in state-owned
enterprises prompted 6 million layoffs in the first half of 1999,
bringing the total number of urban unemployed to well over 15 million.
Industrial workers throughout the country sporadically protested
layoffs and demanded the payment of overdue wages and benefits.
Overall, however, economic reforms have raised living standards for
many, provided greater independence for entrepreneurs, and diminished
state control over the economy and over citizens' daily lives. Despite
serious economic difficulties in the state sector, individual economic
opportunities expanded in the nonstate sectors, resulting in increased
freedom of employment and mobility. A constitutional amendment passed
in March recognized the private sector as equal in status to the state
sector. The total number of citizens living in absolute poverty
continues to decline; estimates range from official figures of 42
million to World Bank figures of 150 million. However, the income gap
between coastal and interior regions, and between urban and rural
areas, is wide and growing. Chinese economists put the ratio of urban
to rural income at 12 to 1. Urban per capita disposable income for 1998
was $656, while rural per capita net income was $261.
The Government's poor human rights record deteriorated markedly
throughout the year, as the Government intensified efforts to supress
dissent, particularly organized dissent. A crackdown against a
fledgling opposition party, which began in the fall of 1998, broadened
and intensified during the year. By year's end, almost all of the key
leaders of the China Democracy Party (CDP) were serving long prison
terms or were in custody without formal charges, and only a handful of
dissidents nationwide dared to remain active publicly. Tens of
thousands of members of the Falun Gong spiritual movement were detained
after the movement was banned in July; several leaders of the movement
were sentenced to long prison terms in late December and hundreds of
others were sentenced administratively to reeducation through labor in
the fall. Late in the year, according to some reports, the Government
started confining some Falun Gong adherents to psychiatric hospitals.
The Government continued to commit widespread and well-documented human
rights abuses, in violation of internationally accepted norms. These
abuses stemmed from the authorities' extremely limited tolerance of
public dissent aimed at the Government, fear of unrest, and the limited
scope or inadequate implementation of laws protecting basic freedoms.
The Constitution and laws provide for fundamental human rights;
however, these protections often are ignored in practice. Abuses
included instances of extrajudicial killings, torture andmistreatment
of prisoners, forced confessions, arbitrary arrest and detention,
lengthy incommunicado detention, and denial of due process. Prison
conditions at most facilities remained harsh. In many cases,
particularly in sensitive political cases, the judicial system denies
criminal defendants basic legal safeguards and due process because
authorities attach higher priority to maintaining public order and
suppressing political opposition than to enforcing legal norms. The
Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government
tightened restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press, and
increased controls on the Internet; self-censorship by journalists also
increased. The Government severely restricted freedom of assembly, and
continued to restrict freedom of association. The Government continued
to restrict freedom of religion, and intensified controls on some
unregistered churches. The Government continued to restrict freedom of
movement. The Government does not permit independent domestic
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to monitor publicly human rights
conditions. Violence against women, including coercive family planning
practices--which sometimes include forced abortion and forced
sterilization; prostitution; discrimination against women; trafficking
in women and children; abuse of children; and discrimination against
the disabled and minorities are all problems. The Government continued
to restrict tightly worker rights, and forced labor in prison
facilities remains a serious problem. Child labor persists.
Particularly serious human rights abuses persisted in some minority
areas, especially in Tibet and Xinjiang, where restrictions on religion
and other fundamental freedoms intensified.
Beginning in the spring, Communist Party leaders moved quickly to
suppress what they believed to be organized challenges that threatened
national stability and Communist Party authority. In the weeks before
the 10th anniversary of the June 4 Tiananmen massacre, the Government
also moved systematically against political dissidents across the
country, detaining and formally arresting scores of activists in cities
and provinces nationwide and thwarting any attempts to commemorate the
sensitive anniversary. Authorities in particular targeted the CDP,
which had already had three of its leaders sentenced to lengthy prison
terms in December 1998. Beginning in May, dozens of CDP members were
arrested in a widening crackdown and more of the group's leaders were
convicted of subversion and sentenced to long prison terms in closed
trials that flagrantly violated due process. Others were kept detained
for long periods without charge. In one August week alone, CDP members
Liu Xianbin, She Wanbao, Zha Jianguo, and Gao Hongming were sentenced
to prison terms of 13, 12, 9, and 8 years, respectively. Dissidents
also were rounded up in large numbers before the October 1 National Day
celebrations. In addition, the press reported that the Government
rounded up 100,000 or more persons and sent them out of Beijing under
the custody and repatriation regulations prior to the October 1
National Day celebrations, to ensure order.
Control and manipulation of the press by the Government for
political purposes increased during the year. After authorities moved
at the end of 1998 to close a number of newspapers and fire several
editors, a more cautious atmosphere in general pervaded the press and
publishing industries during the year. As part of its crackdown against
the popular Falun Gong spiritual movement, the Government employed
every element of the state-controlled media to conduct a nationwide
anti-Falun Gong propaganda campaign reminiscent of the campaigns
against the democracy movement that followed the Tiananmen massacre of
1989. The press continued to report on cases of corruption and abuse of
power by some local officials.
Unapproved religious groups, including Protestant and Catholic
groups, continued to experience varying degrees of official
interference, repression, and persecution. The Government continued to
enforce 1994 State Council regulations requiring all places of
religious activity to register with the Government and come under the
supervision of official, ``patriotic'' religious organizations. There
were significant differences from region to region, and even locality
to locality, in the attitudes of government officials toward religion.
In some areas, authorities guided by national policy made strong
efforts to control the activities of unapproved Catholic and Protestant
churches; religious services were broken up and church leaders or
adherents were harassed, and, at times, fined, detained, beaten, and
tortured. At year's end, some remained in prison because of their
religious activities. In other regions, registered and unregistered
churches were treated similarly by the authorities. Citizens worshiping
in officially sanctioned churches, mosques, and temples reported little
or no day-to-day interference by the Government. The number of
religious adherents in many churches, both registered and unregistered,
continued to grow at a rapid pace. The Government launched a crackdown
against the Falun Gong spiritual movement in July. Tens of thousands of
Falun Gong members were reported detained in outdoor stadiums and
forced to sign statements disavowing Falun Gong before being released;
according to official sources, practitioners of Falun Gong had 35,000
confrontations with police between late July and the end of October. A
number of practitioners were detained multipletimes. An unknown number
of members who refuse to recant their beliefs remain detained; others
are serving prison or reeducation-through-labor sentences. An intensive
proatheism, ``antisuperstition'' media campaign also accompanied the
suppression of Falun Gong. In October, new legislation banning cults
was passed. Adherents of some unregistered religious groups reported
that these new laws are used against them.
Although the Government denies that it holds political or religious
prisoners, and argues that all those in prison are legitimately serving
sentences for crimes under the law, an unknown number of persons,
estimated at several thousand, are detained in violation of
international human rights instruments for peacefully expressing their
political, religious, or social views. Persons detained at times during
the year included political activists who tried to register an
opposition party; leaders of a national house church movement;
organizers of political discussion groups that exceeded what the
Government deemed to be the permissible level of dissent; and members
of the Falun Gong movement. Some minority groups, particularly Tibetan
Buddhists and Muslim Uighurs, came under increasing pressure as the
Government clamped down on dissent and ``separatist'' activities. In
Tibet the Government expanded and intensified its continuing
``patriotic education campaign'' aimed at controlling the monasteries
and expelling supporters of the Dalai Lama. In Xinjiang authorities
tightened restrictions on fundamental freedoms in an effort to control
independence groups.
The authorities released fewer political prisoners before their
terms were over than in recent years, although three were released
early. In February the journalist Gao Yu was freed 6 months early,
after having served 5\1/2\ years in prison. In September Internet
dissident Lin Hai was released 6 months early. Shi Binhai, co-editor of
the controversial book ``Political China,'' who had been detained
without charge since September 1998, was released in March. Liu Xiaobo
was freed in October after having completed his 3-year reeducation
term. However, at year's end several thousand others, including Bishop
An Shuxin, Cai Guihua, Chen Lantao, Chen Longde, Han Chunsheng, Li
Bifeng, Li Hai, Liu Jingsheng, Peng Ming, Qin Yongmin, Shen Liangqing,
Wang Youcai, Pastor Xu Yongze, Xu Guoxing, Xu Wenli, Yang Qinheng,
Zhang Lin, Zhang Shanguang, Zhao Changqing, Zhou Yonjun, Ngawang
Choephel, Abbot Chadrel Rinpoche, Jigme Sangpo, and Ngawang Sangrol
(see Tibet addendum)--remained imprisoned or under other forms of
detention for the peaceful expression of their political, social, or
religious views. Some of those who completed their sentences and were
released from prison--such as Bao Tong, senior aide to former Communist
Party leaders--were kept under surveillance and prevented from taking
employment or otherwise resuming normal lives. There were also reports
of increasing surveillance of dissidents.
During the year, the Government continued efforts to reform the
legal system and to disseminate information about new legislation.
Initiatives to improve the transparency and accountability of the
judicial and legal systems continued. The Government also expanded
efforts to educate lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and the public on the
provisions of new laws. A number of statutes passed in recent years--
e.g., the Administrative Litigation Law, the Lawyers Law, the State
Compensation Law, the Prison Law, the Criminal Law, and the Criminal
Procedure Law--if enforced effectively hold the potential to enhance
citizens' rights. The revised Criminal Procedure Law, which came into
effect in 1997, provided for the defendant's right to legal counsel, an
active legal defense, and other rights of criminal defendants
recognized in international human rights instruments. If fully
implemented, this law would bring criminal laws closer toward
compliance with international norms. However, enforcement of the new
statute is poor, and the law routinely is violated in the cases of
political dissidents.
Despite intensified suppression of organized dissent, some positive
trends continued. Nongovernmental-level village committee elections
proceeded, giving citizens choices about grassroots representatives, as
well as introducing the principle of democratic elections. Additional
experiments with higher level township elections were conducted without
fanfare (or official approval by the central Government). Social groups
with economic resources at their disposal continued to play an
increasing role in community life. As many as 8.9 million citizens had
access to the Internet, although the Government increased its efforts
to try to control the content of material available on the Internet.
Most average citizens went about their daily lives without significant
interference from the Government, enjoying looser economic controls,
increased access to outside sources of information, greater room for
individual choice, and more diversity in cultural life. However,
authorities significantly stepped up efforts to suppress those
perceived to be a threat to government power or to national stability,
and citizens who sought to express openly dissenting political and
religious views continued to live in an environment filled with
repression.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The official press
reported a number of instances of extrajudicial killings, but no
nationwide statistics are available. In October a Falun Gong website
reported that Zhao Jinhua, a Falun Gong member in Shandong, died from
being beaten while in police custody. However, the official media
reported that Zhao died of a heart attack (see Section 2.c.). Two other
Falun Gong practitioners also reportedly died while in police custody;
the authorities stated that they died of injuries received after
jumping from moving trains (see Sections 1.c. and 2.c.). In February a
domestic publication reported that a local government worker, suspected
of embezzlement, died after 29 hours of police interrogation and
torture. There were reports that persons held in custody and
repatriation centers (where persons may be detained administratively to
``protect urban social order'') were beaten while detained, and that
some have died as a result (see Sections 1.c and 1.d).
In January the Western press reported that police killed one
protester and injured more than 100 others while dispersing villagers
in Hunan province (see Section 2.b.). In late October, police killed 6
Uighurs (see Section 5).
There continued to be numerous executions carried out after summary
trials. Such trials can occur under circumstances where the lack of due
process protections borders on extrajudicial killing (see Section
1.e.). In February, for example, a government radio station in the
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region reported that eight ``violent
terrorists,'' who ``had taken part in many illegal religious terrorist
activities in recent years in a vain attempt to split the motherland,''
had been sentenced to death in public trials. According to the report,
the eight were executed immediately after sentencing (see Sections 1.e.
and 5).
In March the Western press reported a 1997 case in which police
executed four farmers in rural Guangdong over a monetary dispute.
Despite an attempted coverup by local officials, the families of the
victims persisted in their demands for justice, lodging 27 separate
complaints with the Government, while securing the assistance of a
Beijing lawyer and the interest of the country's largest circulation
newspaper on legal affairs. The resulting investigation by the Legal
Daily finally forced provincial authorities to act. A Hong Kong-based
human rights organization reported that seven policemen were arrested
in December 1998 for the farmers' murders.
Early in the year, there were a number of apparently unrelated
bombings in Liaoning, Guangdong, Changsha, Hunan, Henan, Tibet,
Sichuan, and Jiangsu, some of which resulted in death. Based on
available evidence, it was not possible to establish links to political
or separatist activity; bombs are sometimes used in personal or
economic violence.
b. Disappearance.--There were no new reports of disappearances.
However, the Government still has not provided a comprehensive,
credible accounting of those missing or detained in connection with the
suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations. There were more
reported incidents of long incommunicado detentions than in 1998 (see
Section 1.d.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture; however, police and other
elements of the security apparatus employed torture and degrading
treatment in dealing with detainees and prisoners. Former detainees and
the press reported credibly that officials used electric shocks,
prolonged periods of solitary confinement, incommunicado detention,
beatings, shackles, and other forms of abuse against detained men and
women. Prominent dissident Liu Nianchun, who was released in December
1998, reported that guards used an electric stun gun on him. Persons
detained pending trial were particularly at risk during pretrial
detention due to systemic weaknesses in the legal system or lack of
implementation of the revised Criminal Procedure Law.
In February a domestic publication reported that an engineer in
Liaoning province, suspected of theft, suffered brain damage as a
result of hours of beatings while in police custody. The police
eventually determined that the engineer was innocent and released her.
She later sued the local government. Chinese reporters whoattended her
trial said that there were efforts in court to intimidate them. Also in
February, a government-owned television station in Sichuan broadcast
film taken secretly of city police officers beating and spitting on
suspects in an effort to coerce confessions and to extort bribes. In
June a Hong Kong human rights group reported that labor activist Guo
Xinmin was beaten repeatedly and hung by his tied hands by police
interrogators trying to extract a confession. The same human rights
organization also received a letter from a former vice mayor of Harbin,
which had been smuggled out of prison, in which he claimed to have been
beaten and given electric shocks while in custody. According to Amnesty
International, some adherents of Falun Gong were tortured with electric
shocks, as well as by having their hands and feet shackled and linked
with crossed steel chains. There were reports that persons held in
custody and repatriation centers were beaten while detained, and that
some died as a result (see Sections 1.a and 1.d.).
In January police killed one protester and injured more than 100
others while dispersing villagers in Hunan province. In March police
beat demonstrators in Sichuan province (see Section 2.b.). Police at
times used force to disperse Falun Gong practitioners (see Section
2.c.).
Wang Wanxing, who protested in Tiananmen Square in 1992, continued
to be held in a psychiatric hospital on the outskirts of Beijing until
late August, when he was released for a trial period of 3 months. He
reportedly was detained again on November 23, 4 days after he told the
hospital director that he might hold a news conference to discuss the
conditions he endured in the hospital (see Section 1.d.). Late in the
year, according to some reports, the Government started confining some
Falun Gong adherents to psychiatric hospitals.
After meeting briefly with a foreign diplomat on November 30, Fu
Sheng, a member of the CDP, was detained for 6 days, questioned, and
beaten in Beijing (see Section 1.d.).
The Government has stated that ``the Chinese judiciary deals with
every complaint of torture promptly after it is filed, and those found
guilty are punished according to law.'' As part of its campaign to
address police abuse, the Government in 1998 for the first time
published national torture statistics, along with 99 case studies, in a
volume entitled ``The Law Against Extorting a Confession by Torture.''
The book, which was published by the Supreme People's Procuratorate,
stated that 126 persons had died during police interrogation in 1993
and 115 in 1994. Most cases of torture are believed to go unreported.
One overseas human rights group reported in January that there had
been some 9,000 cases of mishandling of justice discovered in 1998 and
that 1,200 police officers had been charged with criminal offenses.
Authorities continued a nationwide crackdown on police corruption and
abuses. Government statistics released in March showed that in 1998
corruption prosecutions were up 10 percent, to over 40,000
investigations and 26,000 indictments of officials. In January there
were reports that Public Security Bureau Deputy Minister Li Jizhou was
detained for corruption. Several other high-ranking Party officials
also were prosecuted on corruption charges during the year. Late in the
year, National People's Congress Standing Committee Chairman Li Peng
issued a warning on police corruption.
Conditions in penal institutions for both political prisoners and
common criminals are generally harsh and frequently degrading.
Conditions in administrative detention facilities (including re-
education-through-labor camps and custody and repatriation centers) are
reportedly similar to those in prisons. According to released political
prisoners, it is standard practice for political prisoners to be
segregated from each other and placed with common criminals. There are
credible reports that common criminals have beaten political prisoners
at the instigation of guards. Zhang Lin, a dissident living overseas
who secretly had returned to China in 1998, was arrested in November
1998 and sentenced to 3 years in a labor camp. While he was conducting
a hunger strike to protest harsh camp conditions, fellow inmates at the
order of camp guards reportedly beat him. His sentence was extended by
an additional year following the incident, according to human rights
organizations. Guards in custody and repatriation centers reportedly
rely on ``cell bosses'' to maintain order; these individuals frequently
beat other detainees and have been known to steal their possessions.
Prominent political prisoners sometimes receive better treatment.
Dissident Liu Xiaobo, recently released after 3 years in a labor camp
in Dalian, told one foreign diplomat that he had never been beaten and
that his treatment was in general better than that of non-political
prisoners. The 1994 Prison Law was designed, in part, to improve
treatment of detainees and increase respect for their legal rights. The
Government's stated goal is to convert one-half of the nation's prisons
and 150 reeducation-through-labor camps into ``modernized, civilized''
facilities by the year 2010. According to credible sources, persons
held in new ``model'' prisons receive better treatment than those held
in other prisonfacilities. (For conditions in prisons in Tibet, see the
Tibet Addendum.)
Adequate, timely medical care for prisoners continues to be a
serious problem, despite official assurances that prisoners have the
right to prompt medical treatment if they become ill. Nutritional and
health conditions can be grim. At year's end, political prisoners who
reportedly had difficulties in obtaining medical treatment, despite
repeated appeals on their behalf by their families and the
international community, included Chadrel Rinpoche, Chen Lantao, Chen
Longde, Chen Meng, Fang Jue, Hu Shigen, Kang Yuchun, Liu Jingsheng,
Ngawang Sangdrol, Peng Ming, Qin Yongmin, Wang Guoqi, and Zhang
Shanguang. Xu Wenli, despite repeated pleas by his family, was denied
treatment for hepatitis. Xu tested positive for the disease during a
prison hospital examination. Prison officials told Xu's family that the
hepatitis had been contracted before his incarceration and was no
longer active. However, his family reported that Xu was chronically
fatigued and appeared jaundiced; he also reportedly is in need of
dental care. Yu Dongyue, who defaced the portrait of Mao Zedong in
Tiananmen Square during the 1989 student protests, reportedly is
suffering severe mental illness from repeated beatings and mistreatment
in a Hunan prison. According to press reports, Hua Di, a Stanford
researcher, was sentenced to 15 years in prison in early December but
the Government only acknowledges that he was arrested for suspicion of
deliberately seeking state secrets. According to credible reports, his
health is poor. According to one credible report in 1998, there have
been instances in which women in reeducation-through-labor camps found
to be pregnant while serving sentences were forced to submit to
abortions (see Section 1.f.).
The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prisons or
reeducation-through-labor camps, and prisoners remain largely
inaccessible to international human rights organizations. Talks with
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on an agreement for
ICRC access to prisons remain stalled. The Government suspended
discussions with a prominent foreign businessman and human rights
monitor on prisoner accounting, in response to a proposed resolution
critical of China at the U.N. Human Rights Commission. Prison visits
with family members and others are monitored closely.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention remain serious problems; there were more reports of long
incommunicado detentions than in 1998. Because the Government tightly
controls information, it is impossible accurately to determine the
total number of persons subjected to new or continued arbitrary arrest
or detention. The Government reported in March that prosecutors had
censured police officers 70,992 times in 1998 for detentions that
exceeded the legal time limit. According to estimates, thousands more
remain incarcerated, charged with other criminal offenses, detained but
not charged, or sentenced to reeducation-through-labor. Amnesty
International documented 241 specific cases of persons who remain
imprisoned or on medical parole for activities related to the 1989
Tiananmen protests alone. Official government statistics report that
there are some 230,000 persons in reeducation-through-labor camps,
sentenced to up to 3 years through administrative procedures, not a
trial. It has been estimated that as many as 1.7 million persons per
year were detained in a form of administrative detention known as
custody and repatriation before 1996; the number of persons subject to
this form of detention reportedly has been growing since that time.
According to one report, Liu Xin, who was a 15-year-old junior high
school student at the time of his arrest in 1989, remains in a Hunan
jail serving a 15-year sentence for arson. Liu had apparently handed a
box of matches to his brother-in-law during a demonstration in Shaoyang
city in 1989. According to an April report in the Western press, Lu
Decheng, one of three men jailed for throwing paint on the portrait of
Mao Zedong in Tiananmen Square, was released in 1998 after serving 9
years of his original 16-year sentence. However, his two colleagues, Yu
Dongyue and Yu Zhijian, remain in jail, both reportedly in solitary
confinement. Chen Ziming remained under house arrest at year's end.
Wang Wanxing, who protested in Tiananmen Square in 1992, was released
from a psychiatric hospital near Beijing in late August but was
detained and returned to the hospital on November 23, after informing
the hospital director that he might hold a news conference on the
conditions he endured in the hospital (see Section 1.c.). Late in the
year, according to some reports, the Government started confining some
Falun Gong adherents to psychiatric hospitals.
The amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law, which came into
effect in 1997, represented a significant improvement in the statutes
governing arrest and detention. The amendments provide for earlier and
greater access for defendants to legal counsel and the abolition of a
regulation that allowed summary trials in certain cases involving the
death penalty. Under the old system, defendants were not allowed to
consult an attorney until 7 days before trial, usually precluding the
possibility of mounting an effective defense. The amended law gives
most suspects the rightto seek legal counsel shortly after their
initial detention and interrogation. However, police often use
loopholes in the law to circumvent a defendant's right to seek counsel
and political activists in particular still have significant problems
obtaining competent legal representation of their own choosing.
While the new criminal procedure law represents an improvement over
past practice, anecdotal evidence indicates that implementation of the
new Criminal Procedure Law remains uneven and far from complete,
especially in politically sensitive cases. Differing interpretations of
the law taken by different judicial and police departments have
contributed to contradictory and incomplete implementation. The Supreme
People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Ministry of
Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of
Justice, and the Legal Work Committee of the National People's Congress
in 1998 issued supplementary implementing regulations to address some
of these weaknesses. During the year, the Government continued its
efforts to educate lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and especially the
public on the provisions of this and other new laws. In June the
Ministry of Justice announced that 500,000 ministry officials would
undergo training over the next 3 years as part of ``a massive effort to
improve the quality of all judicial workers in the country.'' In March
the President of the Supreme People's Court announced that all senior
judges in the nation's courts would attend training courses within the
next 3 years, with an emphasis on new laws and regulations.
Even if fully implemented, the Criminal Procedure Law still would
fall short of international standards in many respects. For example,
while the statute precludes a presumption of guilt, it includes no
explicit recognition of the presumption of innocence; has insufficient
safeguards against use of evidence gathered through illegal means such
as torture; the appeals process it provides for fails to provide
sufficient avenue for review; and there are inadequate remedies for
violations of defendants' rights. However, the law did abolish an often
criticized form of pretrial detention known as ``shelter and
investigation'' that allowed police to detain suspects for extended
periods without charge. Nonetheless, in some cases police still can
detain unilaterally a person for up to 37 days before releasing him or
formally placing him under arrest. Once a suspect is arrested, the
revised law allows police and prosecutors to detain him for months
before trial while a case is being ``further investigated.'' Few
suspects are released on bail or put in another form of noncustodial
detention pending trial.
The Criminal Procedure Law also stipulates that authorities must
notify a detainee's family or work unit of his detention within 24
hours. However, in practice timely notification remains a serious
problem, especially in sensitive political cases. Under a sweeping
exception, officials need not provide notification if it would ``hinder
the investigation'' of a case. In January Che Hongnian, who had been
held incommunicado for nearly 3 months, was sentenced to 3 years of
labor in Shandong province, apparently for writing a letter asking how
to contact a human rights organization in Hong Kong. His appeal was
denied in March.
Police continue to hold individuals without granting access to
family or a lawyer, and trials continue to be conducted in secret. For
example, the family of China Development Union (CDU) founder Peng Ming
was not allowed to see him for weeks after his detention. Police
initially dismissed the family's requests to see Peng by claiming they
did not have to allow visitation since Peng had not been ``formally
arrested''--i.e., charged with a specific crime. In July Wang
Yingzheng, a 19-year-old activist in Jiangsu Province, was tried in
secret for writing an article criticizing official corruption. Wang's
family was not notified of the trial until several weeks afterward. In
June labor activist He Chaohui also was tried in June at a closed
courtroom in Hunan.
As the government broadened and intensified its campaign to
eliminate the China Democracy Party, the number of detentions, either
temporary or leading to formal arrest, increased significantly. CDP
members Dai Xuezhong, Li Guotao, Fu Shenping, Li Zhiying, and He Bowei
all were picked up in 1 week in January, interrogated, and later
released. In February four CDP members in Wuhan--Lu Xinhua, Chen
Zhonghe, Xiao Shichang, and Jiang Hansheng--were arrested for trying to
organize the Wuhan Human Rights Forum. Hangzhou CDP member Lai Jinbiao
was detained for 5 days in March for trying to organize an ``illegal''
rally. In the weeks before the sensitive 10th anniversary of the June
4, 1989, Tiananmen Square massacre the Government detained or otherwise
confined scores of CDP members. Six CDP activists in the northeastern
town of Acheng were picked up on May 2 while holding a meeting to plan
commemorative events for June 4. At least 15 other CDP members were
detained around the country during the same week. Wu Yilong, Li Bagen,
Mao Qingxiang, Li Xi'an, Wang Rongqing, Zhu Yufu, Lai Jinbiao, and Yu
Tielong in Hangzhou; Yang Tao in Guangzhou; Wang Wenjiang, Kong
Youping, and Wang Zechen in Anshan; He Depu, Wang Zhixin, Gao Hongming
and Zha Jianguo in Beijing; Liu Xiaoming and Li Chun in Wuhan; Liao
Shihua inChangsha; Zhang Baoqin in Fujian; and Li Jinhong, Liu Shili,
and Chen Guojin were among those detained for varying periods of time
in the weeks before June 4. Some, such as Gao Hongming and Zha Jianguo,
subsequently were sentenced to lengthy prison terms. One Hong Kong
nongovernmental organization (NGO) reported more than 160 detentions of
political activists in the month before the Tiananmen anniversary.
The campaign intensified after June 4, as detentions continued and
a number of those arrested were put on trial or sentenced
administratively to reeducation-through-labor (see Section 1.d.). Hebei
CDP member Yu Feng was taken away by police on June 8. Tong Shidong, a
CDP organizer and physics professor in Hunan, was arrested on June 11
and charged with trying to ``overthrow state power'' on June 15. On
June 19, police rounded up eight CDP activists in Hangzhou--Zhu Yufu,
Han Shen, Wang Rongqing, Mao Qingxiang, Yan Zhengxue, Jiang Tanyun, Li
Cunrong and Li Bagen--reportedly ransacking Zhu's home in the process
and confiscating his computer, address book, and documents. Zhu, Mao,
and Xu were tried on October 25 and sentenced to prison terms of 7, 8,
and 5 years, respectively. During the week of June 25, Li Xian and Xu
Guang were detained in Hangzhou, while Zhang Jian and Liu Jin were held
in Hebei. In July Guo Chengming, a lawyer in Shenyang, formally was
placed under arrest. Sichuan CDP members Chen Wei and Ouyang Yi were
arrested at their homes in August. Five CDP activists--Dai Xuezhong,
Wang Wenjiang, Chen Zhonghe, Xiao Shichang, and Quan Li--all were
detained in the first week of September. Li Guotao was briefly detained
in October. On November 30, Fu Sheng, a member of the CDP, was
detained, questioned, and beaten in Beijing 2 days after meeting
briefly with a foreign diplomat. He was released on December 5.
There were also frequent detentions of non-CDP dissidents during
the year. Shenzhen activist Miao Xike was arrested in March after he
announced the founding of a ``Chinese Rights Party.'' Chengdu poet Liao
Yiwu was detained on his wedding day in March. In April Hangzhou
activist Su Huibing was detained after he tried to sweep the graves of
Tiananmen Massacre victims during the Qingming holiday in accordance
with the holiday's tradition. Police detained dissident Wang Ke in
April in Hainan Province before the anniversary of the death of former
national leader Hu Yaobang. Also in April, journalist Ma Xiaoming was
arrested in Shaanxi province while trying to report on a tax protest by
farmers. Detentions and harassment of non-CDP dissidents reportedly
increased in the weeks leading up to the June 4 anniversary, apparently
in an attempt to forestall any commemoration activities. In mid-May,
activist and former Tiananmen Square student leader Jiang Qisheng was
detained by authorities in Beijing for authoring and attempting to
distribute essays about the 1989 massacre. He was held for several
weeks before his family was informed of his whereabouts. In early May,
two students at Zhongnan Politics and Law Academy reportedly were
arrested for putting up posters to commemorate another student protest;
six activists in the northeast and 12 in Changsha also were detained in
early May. Police in Changsha reportedly detained Tan Li, Zhou Min, and
Yao Xiaozhou in April after they refused to sign agreements stating
that they would not hold any commemorations on or around June 4; Tan
and Zhou reportedly were detained for a few hours, but Yao remained in
detention. Their relatives reportedly were harassed by the authorities
at work, and were ordered to try to persuade the dissidents to comply
with the authorities' demands. Two persons attempting to demonstrate
were detained quickly by police on or near Tiananmen Square on June 4;
seven journalists near one of the protesters also were detained briefly
and their film was confiscated. Yuan Yongbo, a college student in Hubei
province, was arrested in June for putting up posters commemorating the
10th anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre. The China Development Union
(which works for environmental and political reform) virtually was shut
down by arrests of its members during the year.
In August Xinjiang businesswoman Rebiya Kadeer, her son, and her
secretary were detained in Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Uighur
Autonomous Region. Kadeer, who was detained while on her way to meet a
visiting foreign delegation, was charged in September with passing
state secrets to foreigners. Kadeer's husband has criticized the
Government's treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang on broadcasts of the
Voice of America and Radio Free Asia.
Authorities detained a number of members of house churches (see
Section 2.c.). After the authorities banned Falun Gong in July, tens of
thousands of its adherents were detained by the authorities and held
for varying periods in stadiums around the country. Most were released
after signing statements in which they recanted their beliefs; however,
arrests of Falun Gong adherents continued through year's end (see
Section 2.c.). In July, the designer and operator of a Falun Gong
website in Jilin was arrested; his website reportedly was shut down
(see Sections 1.f. and 2.c.). In late October a new anti-cult law was
passed, shortly after Falun Gong was declared a ``cult'' (see Sections
1.e. and 2.c.). In early November, the Government announced that six
Falun Gong leaders, some of whom reportedly had been detained since
July, were charged with violating the new law. InDecember, four were
sentenced to long prison terms (see Section 2.c.). Hundreds of other
adherents were sentenced administratively for terms of up to 3 years in
reeducation-through-labor camps. On November 8, the authorities
confirmed the formal arrest of 111 Falun Gong members, who were charged
with, among other things, disturbing social order and stealing state
secrets. This new legislation also was used against members of
unregistered churches and religious groups (see Section 2.c.).
Members of the foreign and Hong Kong press also were detained
during the year, often for reporting on subjects that met with the
Government's disapproval (see Section 2.a.).
Author Wang Lixiong was detained in Xinjiang on February 4 while
collecting information for a book on the region (see Section 2.a.). He
was released on March 1 without charge. Visiting academic researcher
and librarian Song Yongyi was detained on August 7 in Beijing. After
months of detention and interrogation, he was charged on December 24
with ``the purchase and illegal provision of intelligence to persons
outside China; he was charged on December 24, and remained in custody
at year's end. Song, an expert on the Cultural Revolution, traveled to
the country to collect materials such as newspaper articles, books, and
other publicly available information on that period, as he had on
several previous occasions (see Section 2.a.). Song's wife was detained
with him in August but was released 2 months later.
In addition, the press reported that the Government rounded up
100,000 or more persons and sent them out of Beijing under the custody
and repatriation regulations prior to the October 1 National Day
celebrations, to ensure order.
Under the revised Criminal Procedure Law, detained criminal
suspects, defendants, their legal representatives, and close relatives
are entitled to apply for a guarantor to enable the suspect or
defendant to await trial out of custody. In practice, the police, who
have sole discretion in such cases, usually do not agree.
In theory, the Administrative Litigation Law of 1989 permits a
detainee to challenge the legality of administrative detention, but
lack of timely access to legal counsel inhibits the effective use of
this law. Persons serving sentences in the criminal justice system can
request release under Article 75 of the Criminal Procedure Law or
appeal to the Procuratorate, but have no recourse to the courts to
challenge the legality or length of criminal detention. In June 1998,
Xinhua News Agency reported that Beijing prosecutors had found that 143
criminal suspects in the city had been detained illegally for more than
one year. The prosecutors reportedly ordered 141 of them released.
There are documented cases in which local officials and business
leaders illegally conspired to use detention as a means of exerting
pressure in commercial disputes involving foreign businessmen. In
February officials reportedly detained Hong Kong businessman Yiu Yun-
Fai, after a dispute erupted when he went to check on goods his company
ordered. There were also cases in which foreign businessmen had their
passports confiscated during such disputes. A Beijing court was to
investigate the case of businessman Lok Yuk-shing, a resident of Hong
Kong who was detained in Inner Mongolia and held for 8 months because
of a debt his employer owed. Australian businessman James Peng, who had
been detained since 1994, was released in November.
The State Compensation Law provides a legal basis for citizens to
recover damages for illegal detentions. Although many citizens remain
unaware of this 1995 law, there is evidence that it is having a
growing, if still limited, impact. In February a Hong Kong NGO reported
that more than 12,000 villagers from 45 villages in Shaanxi province
had filed a lawsuit against the local township government to protest
excessive taxation. In September the press reported that a man in
Shanxi, who had served a 1-year reeducation term even though he was
innocent, had been awarded $966 (8,000 rmb) in damages. Throughout the
year, the official press published numerous articles to raise public
awareness of recent laws meant to enhance the protection of citizens'
rights, including the Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law, State
Compensation Law, Administrative Procedure Law, and Lawyers Law.
A major flaw of the new Criminal Procedure Law is that it does not
address the reeducation-through-labor system, which permits authorities
to sentence detainees administratively without trial to terms of 1 to 3
years in labor camps. Local Labor Reeducation Committees, which
determine the term of detention, may extend an inmate's sentence for an
additional year. According to the latest available official statistics,
there were some 230,000 persons in reeducation-through-labor camps in
1997. More political dissidents were given reeducation sentences in
1999 than during the previous year. In February Peng Ming, the founder
of the China Development Union, was sentenced to 18 months of
reeducation-through-labor, allegedly for soliciting prostitution.
Peng's family and supporters maintained that Pengwas framed in
retaliation for his political activities. Peng Cheng, who solicited
signatures in Shandong for a petition calling on the Government to
reverse its stance on the student demonstrations of 1989, was arrested
and sentenced in August to 3 years of labor. Zhou Yongjun, an overseas
activist who had returned in December 1998, was found in June to be
serving a 3-year sentence in a reeducation camp in Guangdong. Returned
dissident Zhang Lin had his reeducation sentence extended by 1 year.
China Democracy Party members Cai Guihua and Han Lifa, arrested in the
fall of 1998, remain in labor camps; their sentences were extended
during the year. Chen Longde remained in a labor camp. Defendants
legally are entitled to challenge reeducation-through-labor sentences
under the Administrative Litigation Law. Persons can gain a reduction
in, or suspension of, their sentences after appeal, but appeals are
usually not successful because of problems such as short appeal times
and inadequate legal counsel that weaken the effectiveness of the law
in preventing or reversing arbitrary decisions. Authorities ignored CDU
founder Peng Ming's wrongful detention appeal, and he continues to
serve his sentence. There have been cases of individuals successfully
appealing their reeducation sentences through the courts, though the
exact number of successful cases is unknown.
The new Criminal Procedure Law also does not address custody and
repatriation, which allows the authorities to detain persons
administratively without trial to ``protect urban social order.''
Persons who may be detained under this provision include the homeless,
the unemployed, petty criminals, and those without permission to live
or work in urban areas; such persons may be returned to the locality in
which they are registered. If the location to which they are to be
repatriated cannot be determined, or if they cannot be repatriated,
such persons may be sent to ``resettlement farms.'' Those unable to
work may be sent to ``welfare centers.'' Until they are repatriated,
those detained may be held in custody and repatriation centers, and may
be required to pay for the cost of their detention and repatriation by
working while in detention. Relatives and friends of detainees in these
centers reportedly are often able to secure a detainee's release
through the payment of a fee. Provincial regulations on custody and
repatriation in some cases have expanded the categories of persons who
may be detained. In Beijing, for example, those who may be detained
specifically include the mentally ill and mentally disabled, and
``those who should be taken into custody according to government
regulations.'' Many other persons are detained in similar forms of
administrative detention, known as custody and education (for
prostitutes and their clients) and custody and training (for minors who
have committed crimes). Persons reportedly may be detained for long
periods under these provisions, particularly if they cannot afford to
pay for their release (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.e., 2.d, 5, 6.c.,
6.d., and 6.f.).
By one estimate, more than 1.7 million persons per year might be
detained under custody and repatriation or similar regulations.
According to the NGO Human Rights in China, the reasons for such
detentions are rarely made clear to detainees. There are reports that
persons with documentation allowing them to live or work in urban areas
have been detained illegally under these provisions; but, because they
are not entitled to a trial, they have little recourse if the detaining
officials cannot be persuaded to allow their release. Some are
reportedly forced to confess that they were living and working without
permits in the urban area in which they were detained, despite having
the appropriate documentation; in some cases, such documentation
reportedly is destroyed. During the last week of October, a Communist
Party official told the foreign press that 3,000 persons from other
parts of the country were detained in police sweeps of nonresidents in
Beijing. By some estimates, police forced 100,000 or more non-residents
out of Beijing prior to October 1 through the custody and repatriation
program (see Section 2.d.).
The Government also continued to refuse reentry to citizens who
were dissidents and activists (see Section 2.d.). In April dissident
Wang Xizhe was denied entry to the country to attend his father's
funeral. The Government's denial of permission to some former
reeducation-through-labor camp inmates to return to their homes
constitutes a form of internal exile (see Section 2.d.).
There were no reports that the Government forcibly exiled citizens;
however, dissidents released from prison on medical parole in earlier
years continue to be unable to return to the country.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution states that the
courts shall, in accordance with the law, exercise judicial power
independently; however, in practice, the judiciary is subject to policy
guidance from both the Government and the Communist Party, whose
leaders use a variety of means to direct courts on verdicts and
sentences in politically sensitive cases. At both the central and local
levels, the Government and the CCP frequently interfere in thefindings
of the judicial system and dictate court decisions. Corruption and
conflicts of interest also affect judicial decisionmaking. Judges are
appointed by the people's congresses at the corresponding level of the
judicial structure, which can result in undue influence by local
politicians over the judges they appoint. During a May 1998 conference
at a Beijing university, according to informed sources, one expert
estimated that more than 70 percent of commercial cases in lower courts
were decided according to the wishes of local officials rather than the
law. State-run media published numerous articles calling for an end to
such ``local protectionism'' and for the development of a judiciary
independent of interference by officials.
The Supreme People's Court (SPC) stands at the apex of the court
system, followed in descending order by the higher, intermediate, and
basic people's courts. There are special courts for handling military,
maritime, and railway transport cases.
During the year, the Government continued a campaign to correct
systemic weaknesses in the judicial system and make it more accountable
to public scrutiny. The law requires that all trials be held in public;
however, in practice, many trials are not. In March the Supreme
People's Court issued regulations requiring all trials to be open to
the public, except for those involving state secrets, personal privacy,
or minors; divorce cases in which both parties request a closed trial;
and cases involving commercial secrets. The official media reported in
February that all Beijing municipal courts had opened their trials to
the public. The media report claimed that some 6,518 cases were tried
openly in one month, with some 10,000 citizens observing the trials and
1,000 journalists reporting on them. The Shanghai Intermediate Court
also opened its trials in February, except for those involving state
secrets, privacy, or minors. Under the new regulations, ``foreigners
with valid identification'' are to be allowed the same access to trials
as citizens. However, requests by at least one foreign mission to send
an observer to politically sensitive trials have been ignored
consistently by the Government. Moreover, none of the numerous trials
involving political dissidents were open to the general public. The
legal exception for cases involving state secrets, privacy, and minors
has been used to keep proceedings closed to the public and even family
members in some sensitive cases (see Section 1.d.).
In June 1998, the President of the Supreme People's Court, Xiao
Yang, called for courts to come under the ``supervision'' of citizens
and the media, and in July 1998 state-run television carried the first
live broadcast of a trial, a case involving intellectual property.
National newspapers gave both events extensive coverage. Programs
featuring actual court proceedings have since become a regular
television feature, meant in part to educate the public and in part to
build greater confidence in the judicial system. In March the Fuzhou
City Intermediate People's Court began broadcasting a television
program called ``Court and Society,'' featuring live and recorded
coverage of actual cases, in an effort to ``ensure impartial
administration of justice and implement the system of open trials.''
The Government continued a self-proclaimed ``unprecedented internal
shake-up'' of the judiciary, which began in 1998. In March the Supreme
People's Court reported that 2,512 judges and staff had been punished
for misconduct in 1998. The Supreme People's Procuratorate reported
that 1,401 prosecutors and staff either had been disciplined or
prosecuted in 1998. In October the Procuratorate reported that 1,179
local prosecutors had been dismissed in 1999 for lack of
qualifications. In January Procurator General Han Zhubin reported that
a former head of the Anticorruption Bureau of the Supreme People's
Procuratorate was dismissed for corruption. The Government also
reported that 4,200 unqualified judicial workers had been dismissed
nationwide, and that 12,045 verdicts had been overturned on appeal by
higher courts. The court and procuratorate continued to operate hot
lines established in 1998 for the public to report illegal activities
by judges and prosecutors. In August a vice president of the Supreme
People's Court announced that in the first half of the year the number
of court workers who had to be disciplined had dropped 36 percent from
the same period the year before.
Police and prosecutorial officials often ignore the due process
provisions of the law and of the Constitution. For example, police and
prosecutors can subject prisoners to severe psychological pressure to
confess, and coerced confessions frequently are introduced as evidence.
In May 1998 the top prosecutor, Han Zhubin, said in an interview that
use of illegal methods by prosecutors had become ``very serious'' in
some areas. He acknowledged that some prosecutors employed torture to
extract confessions and used interrogation rooms like ``prison cells''
to hold suspects beyond the legal detention period. The Criminal
Procedure Law forbids the use of torture to obtain confessions, but one
weakness of the law is that it does not expressly bar the introduction
of coerced confessions as evidence. Traditionally, defendants who
failed to show the correct attitude by confessing their crimes were
sentenced more harshly. The conviction rate in criminal cases is over
90 percent, and trials can be little morethan sentencing hearings. In
most politically sensitive trials, guilty verdicts were handed down
immediately following court proceedings that rarely lasted more than
several hours. There is an appeals process, but appeals rarely reverse
verdicts.
The revised Criminal Procedure Law was designed to address many of
these deficiencies and give defense lawyers a greater ability to argue
their clients' cases. The amendments abolish a form of pretrial
detention called ``shelter and investigation,'' expand the right to
counsel, put limits on nonjudicial determinations of guilt, and
establish a more transparent, adversarial trial process. However, the
amendments do not bring the country's criminal procedures into full
compliance with international standards. For example, in ``state
secrets'' cases, the revised Criminal Procedure Law authorizes
officials to deny suspects access to a lawyer while their cases are
being investigated. The definition of state secrets is broad and vague
and subject to independent interpretation by police, prosecutors, and
judges, at different stages in a criminal case. Uncertainty regarding
the scope and application of this statute has created concern about a
detainee's right to legal assistance.
Nevertheless, there are signs that members of the public are
beginning to use the court system and the new legal remedies available
to it to protect their rights and to seek redress for a variety of
government abuses. The Supreme People's Court reported in March 1998
that citizens had filed 90,000 lawsuits against government officials in
1997. In May Leng Wanbao sued the Jilin Province Supreme People's Court
for $136,000 (1.13 million rmb) for wrongly being jailed for
``counterrevolutionary crimes'' stemming from his involvement in the
1989 Tiananmen protests. In September a Shanxi court awarded a man $966
(8,000 rmb) in compensation for having been sentenced unjustly to 1
year of reeducation. Nonetheless, in politically sensitive cases, a
decision in favor of the dissident remains rare. Shanghai resident Lin
Hai, who was arrested in March 1998, was convicted in January and
sentenced to a 2-year prison term for ``inciting subversion of state
power.'' Lin's crime had been providing e-mail addresses to an overseas
Internet web magazine critical of the Government. A higher court
rejected his subsequent appeal. Lin was released on September 23, 6
months before the end of his term. In March, police held activist Lai
Jingbiao for 5 days; in June a court in Hangzhou dismissed his wrongful
detention suit against the police. In June political essayist Fang Jue
received a 4-year prison sentence for ``economic crimes'' and his
subsequent appeals were denied.
The first Lawyers' Law, designed to professionalize the legal
profession, took effect in 1996. Subsequently the Ministry of Justice
drafted relevant regulations to standardize professional performance,
lawyer-client relations, and the administration of lawyers and law
firms. It also granted lawyers formal permission to establish law
firms, set educational requirements for legal practitioners, encouraged
free legal services for the general public, and provided for the
disciplining of lawyers. Government officials state that there is an
insufficient number of lawyers to meet the country's growing needs. The
Justice Ministry set a target of 150,000 lawyers, 30,000 notaries, and
40,000 grassroots legal service centers by the year 2000. In March
Justice Minister Gao Changli said that the country has over 110,000
lawyers. According to official reports, there are some 9,000 law
offices. Lawyers are organizing private law firms that are self-
regulating and do not have their personnel or budgets determined
directly by the State. More than 60 legal aid organizations have been
established around the country, and the Ministry of Justice is
establishing a nationwide legal services hot line.
Defendants frequently have found it difficult to find an attorney
willing to handle sensitive political cases. Government-employed
lawyers still depend on official work units for employment, housing,
and other benefits, and therefore many may be reluctant to represent
politically sensitive defendants. In January dissident Wang Ce was
tried and defended himself, reportedly because lawyers recommended by
the court refused to take his case. Nonetheless, a Beijing lawyer who
had represented Wei Jingsheng, Xu Wenli, and Fang Jue in the past,
agreed to represent Jiang Qisheng, who remained in detention at year's
end. In December 1998, authorities blocked attempts by prominent
dissidents Wang Youcai and Qin Yongmin to hire lawyers of their own
choosing. There were no new reports of the Government revoking the
licenses of lawyers representing political defendants, as it sometimes
has done in the past. However, Liu Jian, a criminal defense attorney,
reportedly was detained in July 1998 after most of the witnesses he had
called refused to testify at the trial of a local official charged with
taking bribes; Liu was charged with ``illegally obtaining evidence''
and was detained for 5 months. Liu reportedly was held incommunicado
for 10 days, and was beaten and tortured in detention in an effort to
force a confession. He eventually pled guilty in exchange for a light
sentence, but his criminal record prevents him from practicing law.
Lawyers who try to defend their clients aggressively often have
problems with police and prosecutors. In 1998 the SecretaryGeneral of
the All China Lawyer's Association said that in the previous 3 years
the group had received 59 complaints from lawyers who had been
threatened or harassed by law enforcement officials. He predicted that
it would take 3 to 5 years for the new Criminal Procedure Law to take
root in the legal system. He called for better protection of lawyers
and their legitimate role in the adversarial process.
The lack of due process is particularly egregious in death penalty
cases. The number of capital offenses has increased from 26 to 65 as
amendments were added to the 1979 Criminal Law. They include financial
crimes such as counterfeiting currency. A higher court nominally
reviews all death sentences, but the time between arrest and execution
is often days and sometimes less, and reviews consistently have
resulted in the confirmation of sentences. In March the state-run press
reported that the Supreme People's Court had upheld the death sentences
for two Zhejiang farmers convicted of issuing fake value-added tax
invoices worth tens of millions of dollars (several hundred million
rmb). Also in March, a banker in Hunan province was sentenced to death
for embezzling $24.4 million (202 million rmb). The death sentence
reportedly was suspended for 2 years. On May 12, seven high-ranking
Communist Party officials were sentenced to death for smuggling or
corruption. Six of the officials were executed on June 7. In late June,
58 persons reportedly were executed for drug trafficking. In September
public sentencing rallies reportedly were held in Guangdong prior to
the National Day celebrations on October 1; 818 violent criminals were
sentenced in this manner, 238 of them to death. Minors and pregnant
women are expressly exempt from the death sentence, and only those
theft cases involving banks or museums warrant capital punishment.
Based on a review of Chinese press accounts, Amnesty International (AI)
reported that in 1998 2,701 persons were sentenced to death (compared
with over 3,152 in 1997 and 6,100 in 1996 in the midst of the anticrime
``Strike Hard'' campaign) and 1,769 executions were carried out
(compared with 1,876 in 1997 and 4,367 in 1996). AI believes that
actual figures were higher because not all death penalties or
executions are reported, and the authorities can manipulate such
information. Officials say that new safeguards placed on sentencing and
execution have reduced the number of death penalty cases. The number of
executions that were reported in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region
was particularly high; according to AI, scores of Uighurs, many of whom
were reportedly political prisoners, have been sentenced to death and
executed in Xinjiang since 1997 (see Section 1.e.).
In recent years, credible reports have alleged that organs from
some executed prisoners were removed, sold, and transplanted. Officials
have confirmed that executed prisoners are among the sources of organs
for transplant but maintain that consent is required from prisoners or
their relatives before organs are removed. There is no national law
governing organ donations, but a Ministry of Health directive
explicitly states that buying and selling human organs and tissues is
not allowed. In February 1998, two Chinese nationals were charged in a
foreign court with attempting to sell human organs allegedly taken from
the bodies of executed prisoners; the charges were dropped in November.
At least one Western country has asked repeatedly for information on
government investigations of alleged organ trafficking, but to date no
information has been released. There have been credible reports in the
past that patients from abroad had undergone organ transplant
operations on the mainland, using organs removed from executed
criminals.
The authorities sentence persons administratively without trial to
terms of 1 to 3 years in reeducation-through-labor camps. According to
international press reports, some 230,000 persons are serving sentences
in reeducation through labor camps. By one estimate, 1.7 million
persons per year may also be detained under custody and repatriation or
similar regulations, which allow ``undesirable'' persons in urban areas
to be detained administratively and/or returned to their registered
place of residence (see Section 1.d.). Defendants legally are entitled
to challenge reeducation-through-labor sentences under the
Administrative Litigation Law. Persons can gain a reduction in, or
suspension of, their sentences after appeal, but appeals are usually
not successful because of problems such as short appeal times and
inadequate legal counsel that weaken the effectiveness of the law in
preventing or reversing arbitrary decisions.
Government officials deny that China holds any political prisoners,
asserting that authorities detain persons not for their political or
religious views, but because they violate the law. However, the
authorities continued to confine citizens for political and religious
reasons. It is estimated that thousands of political prisoners remain
incarcerated, some in prisons and others in labor camps.
The 1997 Criminal Law replaced ``counterrevolutionary'' offenses,
which often, in the past, had been used against the Government's
political opponents, with loosely defined provisions barring ``crimes
endangering state security.'' In September 1998, officials said that
there were 1,946 individuals in prisonsserving sentences under the
Counterrevolutionary Law. Persons detained for such offenses included
Hu Shigen, Kang Yuchun, Liu Wensheng, Yu Zhijian, Zhang Jingsheng, and
Sun Xiongying. Several foreign governments urged the Government to
review the cases of those charged with counterrevolution, given that
the crime was no longer on the books, and release those who had been
jailed for nonviolent offenses under the old statute. Officials have
indicated that a case-by-case review of appeals filed by individual
prisoners is possible under the law, and there is one known case of a
successful appeal. However, the Government indicated that it would
neither initiate a broad review of cases nor grant a general amnesty,
arguing that ``crimes'' covered by the law on counterrevolution still
are considered crimes under the Law on State Security. Those charged
with counterrevolutionary crimes continue to serve their sentences.
The Government released early at least two political prisoners.
Journalist Gao Yu was released in February after serving more than 5
years in prison. Also in February, Sun Weiban was released after
serving 9\1/2\ years of a 12-year-sentence for his activities during
the 1989 prodemocracy movement. In September Internet dissident Lin Hai
was released 6 months before the end of his term. However, many others,
including Cai Guihua, Chadrel Rinpoche, Chen Lantao, Fan Zhongliang,
Han Chunsheng, Jigme Sangpo, Li Bifeng, Li Hai, Ngawang Choephel,
Ngawang Sangdrol (see Tibet Addendum), Qin Yongmin, Shen Liangqing,
Wang Youcai, Xu Guoxing, Xu Wenli, Xu Yongze, Yang Qinheng, Zhang Lin,
Zhang Shanguang, Zhao Changqing, and Zhou Yongjun remained imprisoned
or under other forms of detention during the year. In addition the
authorities summarily tried and sentenced a large number of political
dissidents to long prison terms. In March Guo Shaokun was given a 2-
year sentence, reportedly for informing overseas human rights groups
and media of a protest by farmers. In July a court in Gansu sentenced
labor activists and CDP members Yue Tianxiang, Guo Xinmin, and Wang
Fengshan for subversion to 10, 2, and 2 years, respectively. In 1 week
in August, courts in Beijing and Sichuan sentenced CDP activists Gao
Hongming to 8 years, Zha Jianguo to 9 years, She Wanbao to 12 years,
and Liu Xianbin to 13 years--all for alleged subversion. Also in
August, poet Yu Xinjiao, who had founded the ``Literary Renaissance
Party,'' was sentenced to 7 years for alleged rape. Four members of the
Falun Gong spiritual movement were sentenced to prison terms ranging
from 7 to 18 years in December (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c).
Criminal punishments can include ``deprivation of political
rights'' for a fixed period after release from prison, during which the
individual is denied rights of free speech and association. Former
prisoners also can find their status in society, ability to find
employment, freedom to travel, and access to residence permits and
social services severely restricted. Economic reforms and social
changes have ameliorated these problems for nonpolitical prisoners in
recent years. However, former political prisoners and their families
frequently are subjected to police surveillance, telephone wiretaps,
searches, and other forms of harassment, and may encounter difficulty
in obtaining or keeping employment and housing. There were reports that
the harassment of dissidents and their families increased during the
year.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home,
Correspondence.--Government interference in daily personal and family
life continues to decline for the average citizen. In urban areas, most
persons still depend on government-linked work units for housing,
permission to have a child, approval to apply for a passport, and other
aspects of ordinary life. However, the work unit and the neighborhood
committee, which originally were charged with monitoring activities and
attitudes, have become less important as means of social or political
control.
Despite legal protections, authorities often do not respect the
privacy of citizens in practice. Although the law requires warrants
before law enforcement officials can search premises, this provision
frequently has been ignored; moreover, the Public Security Bureau and
the procuratorate can issue search warrants on their own authority. The
Constitution states that ``freedom and privacy of correspondence of
citizens are protected by law.'' However, in practice, authorities
often monitor telephone conversations, facsimile transmissions,
electronic mail, and Internet communications of foreign visitors,
businessmen, diplomats, and journalists, as well as dissidents,
activists, and others. The security services routinely monitor and
enter the residences and offices of foreigners to gain access to
computers, telephones, and fax machines. All major hotels have a
sizable internal security presence. Authorities also open and censor
domestic and international mail. Han Chunsheng, a Voice of America
(VOA) listener who allegedly sent over 20 letters critical of the
Government to a VOA mailbox, remains in prison on an 8-year sentence
for counterrevolutionary incitement and propaganda. Government security
organs monitor and sometimes restrict contact between foreigners and
citizens.
Some dissidents are under heavy surveillance and routinely had
their telephone calls with foreign journalists and diplomats monitored;
there were reports that surveillance of dissidents increased during the
year. Before he was arrested and sentenced to 8 years in prison for
alleged subversion, Beijing CDP member Gao Hongming's meetings with
foreign diplomats often were monitored and sometimes even videotaped by
security personnel. Some dissidents were blocked from meeting with
foreigners during politically sensitive periods. Ding Zilin, an
organizer of relatives of victims of the Tiananmen massacre, was
prevented on at least one occasion from meeting a foreign diplomat when
police restricted her and her husband to their Beijing home. The sister
of one jailed dissident was ordered not to meet with a foreign diplomat
on the eve of October 1 celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of
the founding of the People's Republic of China. Dissidents routinely
are warned not to speak with the foreign press. Authorities also
harassed and monitored the activities of relatives of dissidents. For
example, security personnel keep close watch on relatives of prominent
dissidents such as Chen Ziming, particularly during sensitive periods.
Security personnel followed He Xintong, the wife of Xu Wenli, and Wei
Xiaotao, the brother of Wei Jingsheng, to meetings with Western
reporters and diplomats on numerous occasions. Internet dissident Lin
Hai's father and wife were reportedly under police supervision at a
local hotel in January during Lin's trial (see Section 1.e.). In August
the wife of Wu Yilong reportedly was detained; the authorities
confiscated a computer, books, and other items from her. On the day the
Nobel Peace Prize was announced in Sweden, relatives of Wei Jingsheng
and Wang Dan, both of whom were nominated for the prize, were detained.
Government harassment has prevented relatives of Chen Ziming, Qin
Yongmin and other dissidents from obtaining and keeping steady
employment. In April police visited the wife of jailed CDP leader Xu
Wenli to warn her not to ``stir up trouble'' while Chinese Premier Zhu
Rongji was visiting the United States. Xu's daughter, who is a student
in the United States, recently had published an open letter in a major
American newspaper calling for her father's release. In mid-June, the
NGO Human Rights In China (HRIC) sent a $20,000 wire transfer, made up
of funds raised from within the overseas Chinese community, to a bank
account in China. The funds were intended to help victims of the June
4, 1989 Tiananmen massacre, as well as the families of dissidents. In
late July, Li Ling, the intended recipient of the funds, was detained
by public security officers and interrogated. Public security officials
forced Li Ling to withdraw the money from the bank and confiscated it.
By year's end, the money had not been returned. The Government
continued to freeze a bank account kept by activist Ding Zilin to help
the families of Tiananmen massacre victims, an action criticized by
dissidents within China and human rights organizations abroad. Police
sometimes detained the relatives of dissidents (see Sections 1.d. and
2.a.).
The Government continued to encourage expansion of the Internet and
other communications infrastructure and put more official information
online, and the number of sites increased from 25 to 2400; however, the
Government increased monitoring of the Internet during the year, and
placed restrictions on information available on the Internet. Internet
use is expanding exponentially, creating a potentially powerful channel
of information to the computer literate. The Government reported that
2.1 million persons and 744,000 computers were connected to the
Internet as of the end of 1998. By the end of the year, actual users
were believed to number as many as 8.9 million.
The Government has special Internet police units to monitor and
increase control of Internet content and access. In January the
Ministry of State Security, Information Industry, and Culture, along
with the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, issued a
circular requiring Internet bars and cafes--locations where customers
can rent time on Internet computers--to register. The circular also
required managers of such bars to curtail access to information on the
Internet that is prohibited by law or regulation, and to monitor and
report on customers who use the terminals. In February the Government
announced the creation of a new committee charged with ``protecting
government and commercial confidential files on the Internet,
identifying net users, and defining rights and responsibilities.'' The
new entity was created to ``guard individual and government users,
protect information by monitoring and keeping it from being used
without proper authorization.'' One human rights group reported a
national police directive ordering the special units to monitor
Internet bulletin boards for ``reactionary'' notices. According to the
directive, if such a posting were discovered, police were to contact
the bulletin board service to seek assistance in tracing the message.
Bulletin boards that did not stop such ``seditious'' messages from
being posted would be shut down. A spokesman for the Government denied
the existence of any such directive. Nevertheless, a popular bulletin
board called ``Everything Under the Sun,'' which had carried messages
discussing the 10th anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre, was shut
down in January, several days after a government newspaper criticized
it for attacking government policies and leaders. Another
popularbulletin board, the ``New Wave Network,'' which featured
political discussion, also was closed in February. In May at least one
bulletin board related to the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade was shut down. In the period prior to the sensitive Tiananmen
anniversary, at least one web site based in Beijing closed its chat
rooms as a preventive, self-censorship measure. In May the press
reported that Shanghai authorities had issued a notice that restricted
pager services and Internet access providers, among others, from
transmitting ``political information'' or information that could harm
social stability. On October 7, the Government issued State Council
Order Number 273, which required firms using encryption products or
equipment with encryption technology to register with the Government by
January 31, 2000. The order provided that after the initial
registration, firms using encryption technology would be required to
provide the names, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses of all persons
using such technology. In addition, the order limited the import or
sale of foreign encryption technology within the country. At year's
end, it was unclear whether these regulations would be enforced
effectively.
Authorities have blocked at various times politically ``sensitive''
web sites, including those of dissident groups and some major foreign
news organizations, such as the Voice Of America, the Washington Post,
the New York Times, and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Web
pages run by Falun Gong followers were targeted specifically by the
Government as part of its crackdown against the group that began in
July. According to one Western press report, an attack against a
foreign-based Falun Gong web site was traced back to government
security departments. In October a Hong Kong-based human rights
organization reported that Zhang Haitao, a computer engineer in Jilin
who had designed and operated a Falun Gong website, was arrested on
July 29. Zhang's website reportedly was shut down on July 24. In August
the official press announced that police were using the Internet to
wage ``war on the web'' against criminals, reportedly employing the
Internet to apprehend criminals. Nonetheless, a number of human rights
web pages continue to be accessible, including that of the Tibet
government-in-exile. The Government's efforts to block content and
control usage have had only limited success because sophisticated users
can bypass site blocking, and, more importantly, the number of Internet
sites that provide outside information and news is growing so rapidly.
In October new rules restricted Chinese news sites from creating links
to foreign news sites. The links disappeared temporarily, but were back
in December. Further, censorship of the Internet appears to be applied
inconsistently, and some Internet service providers practice self-
censorship.
E-mail and e-mail publications are more difficult to block,
although the Government attempts to do so by at times blocking all e-
mail from overseas Internet service providers used by dissident groups.
The VOA Chinese-language e-mail news server was blocked beginning in
April, except for a brief period in July. There also have been reports
that the Government is trying to develop an e-mail filtration system to
block antigovernment messages from entering the country; a project on
such a system at Shenzhen University in Guangdong reportedly is
sponsored by the Ministry of Education. Human Rights Watch reports that
in May the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS) installed
monitoring devices at the facilities of Internet service providers that
can track individual e-mail accounts. The authorities also target some
e-mail users and read their e-mail. Dissident groups abroad use e-mail
to send publications and disseminate information to readers in China,
and a small but growing number of activists within the country
communicate this way as well. An e-mail magazine called VIP Reference
News publishes articles mainly from overseas sources on many news
stories not covered by the official media. In September Qi Yanchen of
Hebei was arrested, most likely for having contact with VIP Reference
News; his computer, fax, and notes were allegedly confiscated. At least
one dissident has set up his own web site. Some dissident groups,
including the China Democracy Party, have established web sites based
overseas. When a dissident is harassed or detained, activists using e-
mail, faxes, telephones, and pagers can spread the word quickly to
colleagues around the country and to the international community.
There is no effective enforcement of 1997 State Council regulations
requiring those involved in international networking to apply for
licenses and provide details regarding the scope and nature of their
activities. The State Council also promulgated a comprehensive list of
prohibited Internet activities, including using the Internet to
``incite the overthrow of the Government or the Socialist system'' and
``incite division of the country, harming national unification.'' The
regulations, which came into effect in December 1997, provide for fines
and other unspecified punishments to deal with violators. Shanghai
businessman Lin Hai, convicted in January of trying to undermine state
power for providing VIP Reference with some 30,000 e-mail addresses,
was released in September, 6 months before the end of his term. The
authorities continue to jam VOA broadcasts on an ad hoc basis, but the
effectiveness of this interference varies considerably byregion, with
audible signals of the VOA and other short-wave broadcasters reaching
most parts of the country (see Section 2.a.). Dissidents and average
citizens in Beijing report varying degrees of difficulty in picking up
VOA, but VOA believes that these reception problems are mainly
technical and not due to intentional Government interference.
Government jamming of Radio Free Asia (RFA) appears to be more frequent
and effective (see Section 2.a.). In the absence of an independent
press, overseas broadcasts such as VOA, BBC, RFA, and Radio France
International have a large audience, including activists, ordinary
citizens, and even government officials. Che Hongniang, a dissident in
Jinan, was sentenced to reeducation, in part for two letters he wrote
to the Hong Kong office of VOA.
The Government continued to implement comprehensive and often
intrusive family planning policies. The State Family Planning
Commission (SFPC) formulates and implements policies with assistance
from the Family Planning Association, which has 83 million members in
1.02 million branches nationwide. Officials have predicted that the
population will reach almost 1.6 billion in the year 2044 if current
birth rates continue. Most Chinese demographers estimate fertility at
2.1 births per woman (although the official figure is 1.8)--indicating
that the ``one-child policy'' is not applied uniformly to Chinese
couples. Couples in urban areas are affected most by family planning
guidelines, seldom receiving permission to have more than one child,
although urban couples who themselves were only children may have two
children. In general economic development--as well as factors such as
small houses and high education expenses--in major urban centers has
reached a level where couples often voluntarily limit their families to
one child. There were signs that, due to the success of the one-child
policy in urban areas, the Government was beginning to relax its
policies in the cities. In May the official press reported that
although couples in Beijing were still limited to one child, effective
October 1 they were no longer required to obtain a family planning
certificate before having their child. At year's end, the effect of
this change was unknown. Unmarried women cannot get permission to have
a child.
Outside the cities, exceptions to the ``one-child policy'' are
becoming the norm. The average number of children per family in rural
areas, where 70 percent of citizens still live, is slightly over two.
Although rules can vary somewhat by province, in rural areas, couples
generally are allowed to have a second child if the first is a girl, an
exception that takes into account both the demands of farm labor and
the traditional preference for boys. Families whose first child is
disabled also are allowed to have another child. Ethnic minorities,
such as Muslim Uighurs and Tibetans, are subject to less stringent
population controls. Minorities in some rural areas are permitted to
have as many as four children, but increasingly, authorities are
pressuring minorities to limit births. Amnesty International reports
that while members of the Uighur minority in Xinjiang are allowed to
have 2 children in urban areas and 3 in rural areas, there has in fact
been pressure for them to have only one. In remote areas, such as rural
Tibet, there are no effective limits, but Tibetan government employees
and Party members are encouraged to have only one child (see Section
5).
Population control policy relies on education, propaganda, and
economic incentives, as well as on more coercive measures, including
psychological pressure and economic penalties. The national family
planning policy is implemented through provincial and local
regulations. According to local regulations in at least one province,
women who do not qualify for a Family Planning Certificate that allows
them to have a child must use an intrauterine loop or implant. The
regulations further require that women who use an intrauterine device
undergo quarterly exams to ensure that it remains properly in place. If
a couple has two children, those regulations require that either the
man or woman undergo sterilization. According to a credible report,
there was a significant increase in the number of couples undergoing
sterilization procedures after giving birth to two children in at least
one inland province. Rewards for couples who adhere to family planning
policies include monthly stipends and preferential medical and
educational benefits. In June the press in Guangzhou reported that
Yangchun city had issued ``certificates of preferential treatment'' to
15,000 one-child families, and that city authorities purchased ``old-
age insurance'' for 6,230 families to reward them for having only one
child. Disciplinary measures against those who violate policies can
include fines (sometimes called a ``fee for unplanned birth'' or a
``social compensation fee''), withholding of social services, demotion,
and other administrative punishments that sometimes result in loss of
employment. Fines for giving birth without authorization vary, but they
can be a formidable disincentive. According to the State Family
Planning Commission (SFPC) 1996 Family Planning Manual, over 24 million
fines were assessed between 1985 and 1993 for children born outside
family planning rules. In Quanzhou, Fujian province, the fine for
violating birth quotas is three times a couple's annual salary, to be
paid over a 12 to 13 year period. In Shanghai the fine is also three
times the combined annual salary of the parents. In Zhejiang province,
violatorsare assessed a fine of 20 percent of the parents' salary paid
over 5 years. According to Guizhou provincial family planning
regulations published in July 1998, families who exceed birth quotas
are to be fined two to five times the per capita annual income of
residents of their local area. The regulations also stipulate that
government employees in Guizhou who have too many children face the
loss of their jobs. In many provinces, penalties for excess births in
an area also can be levied against local officials and the mother's
work unit, thus creating multiple sources of pressure. In Guizhou, for
example, regulations state that officials in an area in which birth
targets are not met cannot be promoted in that year. Unpaid fines
sometimes have resulted in confiscation or destruction of homes and
personal property by local authorities. In June Anhui province
promulgated amended family planning rules that stated that each couple
``is encouraged'' to have only one child, that second births are
``strictly controlled,'' and that ``unplanned births are forbidden.''
Childbearing-age couples are required periodically to take part in
pregnancy tests and ``practice effective contraceptive measures.''
Couples already having a child should adopt long-term birth control
measures. In the cases of families that already have two children, one
of the parents ``is encouraged to undergo sterilization.'' In addition,
the rules state that ``unplanned pregnancies must be aborted
immediately.''
Central government policy formally prohibits the use of force to
compel persons to submit to abortion or sterilization; however, intense
pressure to meet family planning targets set by the Government has
resulted in documented instances in which family planning officials
have used coercion, including forced abortion and sterilization, to
meet government goals. During an unauthorized pregnancy, a woman often
is paid multiple visits by family planning workers and pressured to
terminate the pregnancy. In 1998 a former Fujian province local family
planning official stated that local authorities in a Fujian town
systematically used coercive measures such as forced abortion and
sterilization, detention, and the destruction of property to enforce
birth quotas. After the Fujian allegations were made public, the SFPC
sent a team led by a senior official to investigate the charges. In a
meeting with foreign diplomats, the senior official did not deny that
abuses may have occurred, but insisted that coercion was not the norm,
nor government policy, nor sanctioned by central authorities in
Beijing. There were reports that, after the central government's
investigation, local officials in Fujian scaled back the intensity of
their family planning enforcement efforts. The Government provided more
information on cases of local officials who had been punished for
carrying out coercive family planning measures, including to a
delegation representing a foreign country's parliament. Senior
officials have said repeatedly that the Government ``made it a
principle to ban coercion at any level.'' They acknowledge that
problems persist and insist on the Government's determination to
address such problems. The SFPC states that it has issued circulars
nationwide prohibiting family planning officials from coercing women to
undergo abortions or sterilization against their will. Under the State
Compensation Law, citizens also can sue officials who exceed their
authority in implementing family planning policy, and there are a few
instances in which individuals have exercised this right.
Corruption related to family planning fines is a widespread
problem. In March the press reported that one city in Henan province
had punished 879 party members and government officials for corruption
in family planning. One study reported in January that a survey of nine
towns in Jiangsu province revealed that a total of $717,000 (5.907
million rmb) in ``unplanned-birth fees'' had been levied in 1997. The
study reported that the collection of unfair and unregulated unplanned-
birth fees ``aroused the resentment of the masses.''
In late 1998, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) launched a
4-year pilot project in 32 counties to address family planning and
reproductive health issues solely through the use of voluntary measures
on an experimental basis, emphasizing education, improved reproductive
health services, and economic development. The SFPC worked closely with
the UNFPA to prepare informational materials and to provide training
for officials and the general public in the project counties. In
particular, in order to meet the conditions established by the UNFPA
for the implementation of the program, the SFPC and the UNFPA jointly
prepared a pamphlet for distribution to all households in the 32
project counties to inform them about the UNFPA program, including the
requirement that birth quotas be eliminated in those counties. Although
it is still too early for an overall assessment of this program, it is
clear from visits to selected counties by foreign diplomats that
progress in implementing the program has been mixed. Some counties have
made appreciable progress in implementing the program, while others
have made relatively little. Notably, some counties have informed the
general public about the UNFPA program and have eliminated the system
of strict, government-assigned birth quotas; other counties have not
yet done so, or have only begun to do so. However, the Government has
welcomed foreign delegations toinspect the UNFPA project counties.
Although access to these areas has varied from province to province,
foreign diplomats visited several counties during the year, and a group
of foreign parliamentary staff inspected two counties, one in Guizhou
province and another in Chongqing municipality, in September.
Regulations forbid the termination of pregnancies based on the sex
of the fetus, but because of the traditional preference for male
children, particularly in rural areas, some families have used
ultrasound to identify female fetuses and terminate pregnancies. Use of
ultrasound for this purpose is prohibited specifically by the Maternal
and Child Health Care Law, which came into effect in 1995 and calls for
punishment of medical practitioners who violate the provision.
According to the SFPC, a handful of doctors have been charged under
this law. Government statistics put the national ratio of male to
female births at 114 to 100; the World Health Organization estimates
the ratio to be 117 to 100. The statistical norm is 106 male births to
100 female births. These skewed statistics reflect both the
underreporting of female births so that parents can keep trying to
conceive a boy, and the abuse of sonograms and the termination of
pregnancies based on the sex of the fetus. Female infanticide,
abandonment, or the neglect of baby girls that results in lower female
survival rates are also factors. State-run media is paying increasing
attention to unbalanced birth ratios, and the societal problems, such
as trafficking in women, which they cause (see Section 6.f.). In the
cities the traditional preference for sons is changing.
There reportedly have been instances in which pregnant prisoners in
reeducation-through-labor camps were forced to submit to abortions (see
Section 1.c.).
The Maternal and Child Health Care Law requires premarital and
prenatal examinations to determine whether couples have acute
infectious diseases or certain mental illnesses (not including mental
retardation), or are at risk for passing on debilitating genetic
diseases. The Ministry of Health implements the law, which mandates
abortion or sterilization in some cases, based on medical advice. The
law also provides for obtaining a second opinion and states that
patients or their guardians must give written consent to such
procedures (see Section 5). At least five provincial governments have
implemented local regulations seeking to prevent persons with severe
mental disabilities from having children. In August 1998 the Government
issued an ``explanation'' to provincial governments clarifying that no
sterilization of persons with genetic conditions could be performed
without their signed consent.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution states that
freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights to be enjoyed
by all citizens; however, the Government restricts these rights in
practice. The Government interprets the Communist Party's ``leading
role,'' as mandated in the preamble to the Constitution, as
circumscribing these rights. The Government does not permit citizens to
publish or broadcast criticisms of senior leaders or opinions that
directly challenge Communist Party rule. The Party and Government
continue to control many--and, on occasion, all--print and broadcast
media tightly and use them to propagate the current ideological line.
There are more than 10,000 openly distributed publications, including
2,500 newspapers. All media employees are under explicit, public orders
to follow CCP directives, and ``guide public opinion'' as directed by
political authorities. Both formal and informal guidelines continue to
require journalists to avoid coverage of many politically sensitive
topics. Journalists also must not divulge ``state secrets'' in
accordance with the State Security Law. These public orders,
guidelines, and statutes greatly restrict the freedom of broadcast
journalists and newspapers to report the news and lead to a high degree
of self-censorship. Overall, during the year press freedom deteriorated
further. During the early part of the year, newspaper closures or
suspensions increased; efforts by the authorities to block the
reception of foreign news also increased during the year, particularly
prior to sensitive anniversaries.
More than in recent years, the press was exploited by the
Government as an effective propaganda tool to disseminate an official
line. For example, in its press coverage of NATO's action against
Serbia, NATO was depicted as bent on using the conflict in Kosovo as an
excuse to expand its influence. Casualties caused by NATO attacks on
Serb forces received prominent coverage, but there was almost no
mention of the plight of ethnic Albanian Kosovars. The Government's
manipulation of the press to mold public opinion had violent results
when demonstrators targeted foreign diplomatic facilities in Beijing
after NATO's mistaken bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.
Journalists were given explicit instructions during the year to
minimize coverage of negative issues and emphasize positiveachievement
in preparation for the October 1 celebration of the 50th anniversary of
the founding of the PRC. The general worsening of the political
atmosphere greatly increased the tendency of journalists, writers, and
publishers to censor themselves.
In July and August, the Government mobilized the official media in
a nationwide crackdown against the Falun Gong spiritual movement. Some
citizens commented privately that the unrelenting diatribe against
Falun Gong was reminiscent of Cultural Revolution era propaganda
campaigns. Falun Gong was banned on July 22. For weeks anti-Falun Gong
propaganda dominated the nightly news, which consisted almost solely of
details of Falun Gong's alleged crimes and the effectiveness of the
Government's campaign to crush the illegal group. Special programs were
broadcast about Falun Gong's alleged ``evil nature'', including
testimonials by people claiming to be former Falun Gong practitioners,
who recounted how they had been duped by the ``cult.'' At year's end,
the campaign against the Falun Gong in the media continued, with
articles appearing regularly in the media, though with far less
frequency than at the campaign's height.
The Government strictly regulates the establishment and management
of publications. As in previous years, the Government continued to
close down publications and punish journalists for printing material
deemed to be too sensitive. Newspaper editors may be suspended and sent
to the Propaganda Bureau for ``rectification'', after which they can
generally can return to work in the publishing industry. In the early
part of the year, the Government began to tighten its control of the
press. Liberal publications in particular were targeted. In January
alone, the Guangzhou-Hong Kong Daily News reportedly was ordered by
authorities to dismiss its management staff, after the newspaper
challenged the official economic growth rate and mentioned the lack of
accountability among the country's leaders; two Guangdong newspapers,
the New Weekly and the Shenzhen Pictorial Journal, were suspended for
mentioning the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Square incident; and six
Guangdong newspapers, including New Stage, Chic, and Street, were
closed (at least one of these reportedly was closed for printing
controversial articles). In March, the Government ordered the closure
of a popular Beijing-based intellectual magazine, Fangfa, because it
continued to publish articles calling for political reform. The
Government stopped issuing permits for new magazines or newspapers in
March, and in September ordered the closure or merger of many smaller
periodicals, ostensibly in an effort to reduce the number of
unprofitable publications, but also to exercise more effective control
over the content of existing publications. Some publishers found ways
to circumvent the restrictions and publish new newspapers or magazines,
often as weekend or monthly supplements to already existing
publications. In April, the Hong Kong-based newspaper Ming Pao reported
that the Communist Party committee in southern Guangdong had banned all
articles about the events of June 4, 1989 and the improper use of
material from the Internet. In May the Government ordered the recall
and destruction of thousands of copies of the journal ``Beijing
Literature'' because it advocated democratic reform. In early June, the
editorial pages of international newspapers were removed before
delivery. In September an edition of Time magazine that commemorated
the country's 50th anniversary was banned and pulled from the shelves;
it contained articles by exiled dissidents Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan.
Editions of Asiaweek and Newsweek editions also were banned around that
time. With the Government's consent and even open support, the press
continued to publish stories related to official corruption, official
misconduct and gross abuses, particularly by law enforcement officials,
citizens' rights, and legal reform. In January the state-run media
reported that the former chief and deputy of the Anticorruption Bureau
of the Supreme People's Procuratorate had been dismissed for
corruption. The press published numerous articles and interviews with
senior officials, such as Supreme People's Court President Xiao Yang,
calling for further reform and improvement of the judicial system and
an end to corruption in the courts.
Hong Kong and foreign journalists were subjected to harassment and
detention during the year. According to reports, Gao Shaokun, a
policeman, was sentenced to 2 years in prison for telling the foreign
press about a peasant protest in March. In April journalist Ma Xiaoming
was arrested in Shaanxi province while trying to report on a tax
protest by farmers. In mid-June, 10 Hong Kong journalists were detained
in Beijing. They were covering the visit of three Federation of
Students representatives to petition the Standing Committee of the
People's National Congress regarding its interpretation of the Basic
Law. The journalists' film and videotape reportedly were seized by the
authorities, and they reportedly were required to write letters stating
that they understood the rules for reporting on the mainland, including
a ban on reporting near Tiananmen Square, before their release.
A combination of government repression and rising nationalism
created a tense political atmosphere that took its toll on
therelatively open debate among intellectuals--often at public seminars
and political salons-- that the government had tolerated for most of
1997 and 1998. CDU founder Peng Ming remained in a labor camp serving
an 18-month sentence. The CDU's open discussion of economic, political,
and social issues ended due to government pressure. In early March, a
weekly book discussion group at a popular independently owned bookstore
was terminated by the owners after they were told that they would need
police permission to hold gatherings in the store in the future. On May
4, the authorities prevented 30 dissidents from holding a seminar to
discuss the spirit of May 4 in Changchun. Intellectuals, along with
others, were required to attend political study sessions that
propagated the Government's views on the Falun Gong, NATO action in
Kosovo, and the ``Three Stresses'' campaign, which emphasized loyalty
to the CCP. The few intellectual groups that continued to meet kept a
far lower profile than in the previous 2 years, when the Government
tolerated a greater range of debate, or stuck to less controversial
subjects for discussion. Many writers chose to defer publication of
books on sensitive topics such as political reform, in the hope that
the political climate would relax at some future date.
During the year, there was an increase in Government censorship of
the publishing industry. The publishing industry consists of three
kinds of book businesses: Roughly 500 government-sanctioned publishing
houses, smaller independent publishers that cooperate with official
publishing houses to put out more daring publications, and an
underground press. The 500 government-approved publishing houses are
the only organizations legally permitted to print books. The Government
exerts control by issuing a limited number of publishing licenses,
which are required for each edition of a book. A party member at each
publishing house monitors the content of the house's publications,
using the allocation of promotions, cars, travel and other perquisites
to encourage editors to exercise ``proper'' judgement about
publications. Overt intervention by the State Publications
Administration and Party Propaganda Bureau is strictly post-
publication. Independent publishers take advantage of a loophole in the
law to sign contracts with government publishing houses to publish
politically sensitive works. These works generally are not subjected to
the same multi-layered review process as official publications of the
publishing houses. Underground printing houses, which are growing in
number, publish the books that are the most popular among the public.
These underground printing houses are the main target of a campaign
initiated at the end of 1998 to stop all illegal publications
(including pornography and pirated computer software and audiovisual
products), which has restricted the availability of politically
sensitive books. Many street vendors who sell sensitive works
apparently have a tacit understanding with the authorities that they
will look the other way when the vendors sell other illegal
publications if the vendors stop selling politically sensitive books.
However, in March the press reported that two street vendors were
sentenced to 2\1/2\ to 3 years in prison for selling illegal political
publications. Many illegal works are printed by police or military-
affiliated organizations, which often are not targeted for
investigation. While governmental efforts have made it somewhat more
difficult to find these books, they are still available. Pirated
software, music compact discs, and VCD's are widely and openly
available. On February 4 author Wang Lixiong was detained in Xinjiang
while collecting information for a book on the region, and reportedly
was released on March 1 without charge (see Section 1.d.). There were
reports early in the year that several politically sensitive books were
ordered off bookstore shelves, including ``Political China,''
``Selected Writings on Liberation,'' and ``Shouts.'' However, the
enforcement of the order appeared to be uneven, as these books remained
on bookstore shelves. On May 11, Liu Xianli reportedly was sentenced to
a 4-year prison term for attempting to publish a work about well-known
dissidents.
In December 1998, a new interpretation of the Publications Law by
the Supreme People's Court took effect. The majority of provisions in
the new regulations concern intellectual property rights violations and
the publication of pornographic material. However, one provision
specifically criminalizes under the State Security Law the
``publication, distribution, or broadcast'' of material containing
content intended to ``incite national division, damage national unity,
incite subversion of national authority, or incite the overthrow of the
socialist system.''
In the first several months of the year, some dissidents remained
active despite the Government's preoccupation with stability. In March
Liaoning dissident Jiang Lijun organized a petition signed by 44
dissidents from three northeastern provinces calling on the National
People's Congress (NPC) to abolish the system of reeducation-through-
labor. In the same month, seven branches of the CDP in Guizhou province
sent an open letter to the NPC calling on the parliamentary body to
reassess the Tiananmen massacre. Ding Zilin led a group of 20 relatives
of Tiananmen victims in writing open letters to the President and
Premier demanding a full accounting of the Tiananmen tragedy. Also in
March, Beijing CDP member Gao Hongming established a group to demand
government compensation for Tiananmen victims and theirfamilies. In
April 82 dissidents from 6 provinces signed a petition calling for the
release of Xuzhou-based dissidents Wang Yingzheng and Guo Shaokun. Bao
Tong, the most senior government official jailed after Tiananmen, sent
a letter in March to government and party leaders calling for a
reassessment of the 1989 events.
The Government's crackdown on dissent, particularly organized
dissent, begun in 1998, continued. By the middle of the year a series
of politically sensitive events and anniversaries--the May 8 embassy
bombing in Belgrade, the June 4 10th anniversary of the Tiananmen
massacre, and the July crackdown against Falun Gong--were the
background to the Government's adoption of a policy of near-zero
tolerance of dissent. As scores of activists around the country were
arrested and leading dissidents sentenced to lengthy prison terms (see
Sections 1.d. and 1.e.), almost all dissident activity effectively was
halted. Open calls for government action became for the most part
limited to relatives of imprisoned dissidents who called for their
release. In July the sister of jailed activist An Jun wrote an open
letter to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan seeking assistance in
persuading the Government to free her brother. The wife of Wang Zechen
wrote in June to President Jiang Zemin pleading for her husband's
release.
The Government kept tight control over the foreign press during the
year and continued efforts to prevent its ``interference'' in internal
affairs. The authorities continued to jam Chinese- and Tibetan-language
broadcasts of Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, particularly the
latter, with varying degrees of success. In May an official circular
ordered the dismantlement of all satellite receivers unless the
Government granted specific permission; hotels, tourist sites, and
compounds for foreigners were among those to be allowed to have
receivers. In Fujian on May 6, hundreds of privately owned satellite
dishes and decoder boxes were confiscated. In May the press reported
that Shanghai authorities had issued a notice that restricted pager
services and Internet access providers, among others, from transmitting
``political information'' or information that could harm social
stability. Access of the foreign community to Cable News Network (CNN)
was cut (except at diplomatic compounds) on June 1, and remained
inaccessible until June 8. In October several foreign journalists were
questioned by the authorities after attending a clandestine press
conference given by members of Falun Gong; their press credentials and
residence permits were confiscated temporarily (see Section 2.c.). Also
in October, a Japanese journalist was expelled from the country; in
November a German journalist was expelled, allegedly for possessing
documents containing state secrets. In February dissident journalist
Gao Yu was released on medical parole, after spending over 5 years in
prison, reportedly on the condition that she not speak to foreign
journalists.
Authorities have blocked at various times politically ``sensitive''
web sites, including those of dissident groups and some major foreign
news organizations (see Section 1.f.).
Despite tighter government control of the press, information about
the nation and the world continued to flow into the country at an
increasing rate. Residents in Guangdong and other southern provinces
have wide access to Hong Kong television programs and newspapers.
Throughout the country, a lively tabloid sector is flourishing. Radio
talk shows remain popular, and, while avoiding the most politically
sensitive subjects, they provide opportunities for citizens to air
grievances about public issues. Despite licensing requirements and
other restrictions, a small but rapidly growing segment of the
population has access to the Internet. Most of the population has the
means to own and use short-wave radios, and the Government does not
place restrictions on their use.
The Government continues to impose ideological controls on
political discourse at colleges, universities, and research institutes.
Scholars and researchers report varying degrees of control regarding
the issues that they may examine and the conclusions that they may
draw. Censorship of written material comes at the time of publication,
or when intellectuals and scholars, anticipating that books or papers
on political topics would be deemed too sensitive to be published,
exercise self-censorship. In areas such as economic policy or legal
reform, there was far greater official tolerance for comment and
debate.
Visiting academic researcher and librarian Song Yongyi was detained
on August 7 in Beijing. After months of detention and interrogation, he
was charged on December 24 with ``the purchase and illegal provision of
intelligence to persons outside China.'' Song, an expert on the
Cultural Revolution, traveled to the country to collect materials such
as newspaper articles, books, and other publicly available information
on that period, as he had on several previous occasions (see Section
2.a.). This detention raised concerns about a possible chilling effect
on other Chinese researchers, whether resident in the country or
abroad. There also was concern that collaborative research with
foreigners may become more difficult.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Government
severely restricts this right in practice. The Constitution stipulates
that such activities may not challenge ``party leadership'' or infringe
upon the ``interests of the State.'' Protests against the political
system or national leaders are prohibited. Authorities deny permits and
quickly move to suppress demonstrations involving expression of
dissenting political views.
At times police used force against demonstrators. In January the
Western press reported that one protester was killed and more than 100
others injured when police dispersed some 3,000 villagers in Hunan
province protesting corrupt government and high taxes. In March police
in Suining, Sichuan province reportedly beat demonstrators to disperse
a 3-day protest by machinery factory workers over unpaid benefits. In
April two groups of CDP members in Hangzhou attempted to lay wreaths
for victims of the Tiananmen massacre in two different parks. Police
reportedly dispersed one group, and arrested three participants. The
other group was able to hold its vigil. In October a violent protest
reportedly broke out in Panzhihua in Sichuan province after police
refused to help a robbery victim who subsequently was knifed by his
attackers. Many of those protesting were injured in clashes with the
police; 10 persons reportedly were arrested. In late October, police in
Ganzi township, Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Region, western Sichuan
reportedly clashed with up to 3,000 ethnic Tibetans protesting the
detention of 3 monks, including the respected Buddhist teacher Sonam
Phuntsok, from nearby Dargye monastery a few days before (see Section
2.c.). The police reportedly fired upon the crowd, injuring some
protestors. It is unknown whether any persons were killed. Up to 80
ethnic Tibetans reportedly were detained in connection with the
incident.
Despite restrictions in Beijing and elsewhere, the number of
demonstrations nationwide continued to grow, especially those related
to economic grievances and official corruption. Demonstrations related
to family planning continued. Many protests were handled with restraint
by the authorities. In March the victim of an alleged fraudulent
housing project staged a lone protest in front of the National People's
Congress, which was meeting at the time. Police reportedly removed her
from the front of the parliament building and told her to hand in her
petition to the complaints section of the NPC. Also in March some 400
laid-off workers in Xian reportedly staged a daylong demonstration,
until a provincial vice governor arrived at the scene to hear their
concerns and convince them to disperse peacefully. On April 25, a
demonstration by some 10,000 Falun Gong members in front of the
Government's leadership compound in Beijing caught authorities by
surprise; it continued for more than 12 hours before the protesters
were convinced to disperse. In July the Government banned the Falun
Gong movement; however, many of its members continued to hold or
attempt to hold peaceful demonstrations. Authorities stated that some
35,000 confrontations between police and Falun Gong practitioners took
place between July 22 and October 30; (the Government later clarified
this with the statement that the figure represented the total number of
confrontations that police had had with adherents of Falun Gong,
pointing out that many persons had multiple encounters with police).
Many practitioners were detained while attempting to protest; police
reportedly used force in some cases (see Section 2.c.). In June one
human rights group reported that about 150 peasants gathered in front
of the Fuzhou municipal government office to protest corruption,
blocking traffic in the process. Some 50 police reportedly took the
demonstrators to the complaints bureau of the provincial government,
where officials held talks with them. The demonstrators dispersed
peacefully that afternoon.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
Government restricts this right in practice. Communist Party policy and
government regulations require that all professional, social, and
economic organizations officially register with, and be approved by,
the Government. Ostensibly aimed at restricting secret societies and
criminal gangs, these regulations also prevent the formation of truly
autonomous political, human rights, religious, labor, and youth
organizations that directly challenge government authority. According
to Human Rights Watch, in November An Jun, an attorney who formed an
organization called ``Corruption Watch'' to expose local corruption,
was put on trial. No verdict had been announced by year's end. An had
attempted to register the organization legally with the Ministry of
Civil Affairs, but it was banned.
There are no laws or regulations that specifically govern the
formation of political parties. The government moved decisively, using
detentions and prison terms, to eliminate the China Democracy Party,
which activists around the country had tried since 1998 to organize
into the country's first opposition political party (see Sections 1.e.
and 3).
In 1998 there were 1,500 national-level, quasi-nongovernmental
organizations, and 200,000 social organizations and 700,000 nonprofit
organizations registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Although
these organizations all came under some degree of government control,
they were able to develop their own agendas. Many had support from
foreign secular and religious NGO's. Some sought advocacy roles in less
controversial public interest areas such as women's issues, the
environment, and consumer rights. In October 1998 the Government
promulgated a revised and more complete set of regulations on the
registration of NGO's. The new rules require that all NGO's must
reregister under the revised regulations, a process that may be used to
further restrict the numbers and types of NGO's. To register, local-
level groups must have an official office and at least $3,600 (30,000
rmb) in funds. National-level groups must have at least $12,000
(100,000 rmb). Applications must be vetted by the Government, which has
2 months in which to grant approval. Once established, groups are
required to submit to regular oversight and ``obey the constitution,
laws, and national policies;'' they must not ``violate the four
cardinal principles, damage national unity, or upset ethnic harmony.''
Violators (groups that disobey guidelines or unregistered groups that
continue to operate) may face administrative punishment or criminal
charges. It is difficult to estimate how many groups may have been
discouraged from organizing NGO's due to the new regulations. However,
preexisting groups report little or no additional interference by the
Government since the new regulations came into effect.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religious belief; however, the Government seeks to restrict religious
practice to government-sanctioned organizations and registered places
of worship and to control the growth and scope of the activity of
religious groups. During the year, some unregistered religious groups
were subjected to increased restrictions--and, in some cases,
intimidation, harassment, and detention--although the degree of
restrictions varied significantly from region to region, and the number
of religious adherents, in both registered and unregistered churches,
continued to grow rapidly. Over the past 20 years, there has been a
loosening of government controls and a resurgence of religious
activity. According to an official government white paper there are
over 200 million religious adherents with a great variety of beliefs
and practices. Most profess eastern faiths but millions adhere to
Christianity. The Criminal Law states that government officials who
deprive citizens of religious freedom may be sentenced to up to 2 years
in prison in serious cases. However, there are no known cases of
persons being punished under this statute.
The State Council's Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) is responsible
for monitoring and judging the legitimacy of religious activity. The
RAB and the Communist Party United Front Work Department (UFWD), both
of which are staffed by officials who are rarely religious adherents,
provide policy ``guidance and supervision'' over implementation of
government regulations on religious activity, as well as the role of
foreigners in religious activity.
The Government continued, and, in some areas, intensified a
national campaign to enforce 1994 State Council regulations and
subsequent provincial regulations that require all places of worship to
register with government religious affairs bureaus and to come under
the supervision of official ``patriotic'' religious organizations. The
Government officially permits only those Christian churches affiliated
with either the Catholic Patriotic Association/Catholic Bishops
Conference or the (Protestant) Three-Self Patriotic Movement/Chinese
Christian Council to operate openly. There are six requirements for the
registration and establishment of venues for religious activity:
Possession of a meeting place; citizens who are religious believers and
who regularly take part in religious activity; qualified leaders and an
organized governing board; a minimum number of followers; a set of
operating rules; and a legal source of income. There are five
officially recognized religions--Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism,
Islam, and Taoism.
At the end of 1997, the Government reported that there were more
than 85,000 approved venues for religious activities. Some groups
registered voluntarily, some registered under pressure, while
authorities refused to register others. Unofficial groups claimed that
authorities often refuse them registration without explanation. The
Government contends that these refusals were mainly the result of
inadequate facilities and meeting spaces. Many religious groups have
been reluctant to comply with the regulations out of principled
opposition to state control of religion or due to fear of adverse
consequences if they reveal, as required, the names and addresses of
church leaders and members. In some areas, efforts to register
unauthorized groups are carried out by religious leaders and civil
affairs officials. In other regions, registration is performed by
police and RAB officials, concurrently with other law enforcement
actions. Police closed many ``underground'' mosques, temples,
seminaries,Catholic churches and Protestant ``house churches,'' many
with significant memberships, properties, financial resources, and
networks. Some were destroyed. Leaders of unauthorized groups are often
the targets of harassment, interrogations, detention, and physical
abuse.
In certain regions, government supervision of religious activity is
minimal, although local implementing regulations in other places, such
Zhejiang, Guangxi, Shanghai, and Chongqing call for strict government
oversight. In some parts of the country, registered and unregistered
churches are treated similarly by authorities, existing openly side by
side, and many congregants worship in both types of churches. In other
areas, particularly where considerable unofficial and unregistered
religious activity takes place, local regulations call for strict
government oversight of religion and authorities have cracked down on
unregistered churches and their members. The relationship between
unregistered and registered churches can be tense. Some house church
members maintained that authorities had continued efforts during the
year to register house churches and to harass those who resist,
especially in Henan and Shandong provinces. Throughout the year, the
Government moved swiftly against houses of worship outside its control
that grew too large or espoused beliefs that it considers threatening
to ``state security.''
The law does not prohibit religious believers from holding public
office; however, most influential positions in government are reserved
for party members, and Communist Party officials state that party
membership and religious belief are incompatible. Party membership also
is required for almost all high level positions in government and in
state-owned businesses and organizations. The Communist Party
reportedly issued a circular in 1997 ordering party members not to
adhere to religious beliefs. This followed a 1995 document circulated
to party organizations at the provincial level ordering the expulsion
of party members who belong to religious organizations, whether open or
clandestine. There were reports that the Government issued a circular
early in the year to remind Party cadres that religion was incompatible
with Party membership, a theme reflected in authoritative media during
the summer. Muslims allegedly have been fired from government posts for
praying during working hours. The ``Routine Service Regulations'' of
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) state explicitly that servicemen
``may not take part in religious or superstitious activities.'' There
is no available evidence indicating whether party or PLA military
personnel were expelled under such regulations. According to government
officials, 20 to 25 percent of Communist Party officials engage in some
kind of religious activity in certain localities. Most officials who
practice a religion are Buddhist or practice a folk religion. Religious
figures, who are not members of the CCP, are included in national and
local government organizations, usually to represent their constituency
on cultural and educational matters. The National People's Congress
(NPC) includes several religious leaders, including Pagbalha Geleg
Namgyai, a Tibetan ``living Buddha,'' who is a vice chairman of the
Standing Committee of the NPC. Religious groups also are represented in
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, a forum for
``multiparty'' cooperation and consultation led by the Chinese
Communist Party, which advises the Government on policy.
The authorities permit officially sanctioned religious
organizations to maintain international contacts that do not entail
``foreign control.'' What constitutes ``control'' is not defined.
Regulations enacted in 1994 codified many existing rules involving
foreigners, including a ban on proselytizing by foreigners, but for the
most part allow foreign nationals to preach to foreigners, bring in
religious materials for their own use, and preach to citizens at
churches, mosques, and temples at the invitation of registered
religious organizations. Foreigners are not permitted to conduct
missionary activities, but foreign Christians currently are teaching
English and other languages on college campuses with minimum
interference from authorities as long as their proselytizing is low
key. There were reports that early in the year the Government issued a
circular to tighten control over foreign missionary activity in the
country, and that foreign missionaries were detained in Fujian province
in March for engaging in missionary activities with an unregistered
church.
According to an official government white paper, there are over 200
million religious adherents, 3,000 religious organizations, 300,000
clergy, and 74 religious colleges. Official religious organizations
administer local Bible schools, 54 Catholic and Protestant seminaries,
9 institutes to train imams and Islamic scholars, and institutes to
train Buddhist monks. Students who attend these institutes must
demonstrate ``political reliability'' and all graduates must pass an
examination on their theological and political knowledge to qualify for
the clergy. In May the Nanjing Union Theological seminary reportedly
ordered three students to leave the seminary ``voluntarily'' because
they opposed curriculum changes. The three students, who were nearing
graduation, initially refused to accept this expulsion, but later left
voluntarily in protest. The Government permitted someCatholic and
Protestant seminarians, Muslim clerics, and Buddhist clergy to go
abroad for additional religious studies. In most cases, funding for
these training programs is provided by foreign organizations. Both
official and unofficial Christian churches have problems training
adequate numbers of clergy to meet the needs of their growing
congregations. However, due to government prohibitions, unofficial
churches have particularly significant problems training clergy or
sending students to study overseas, and many clergy receive only
limited and inadequate preparation.
Approximately 8 percent of the population are Buddhist,
approximately 1.4 percent are Muslim, an estimated 0.4 percent belong
to the official patriotic Catholic Church, an estimated 0.4 to 0.8
percent belong to the unofficial Vatican-affiliated Catholic Church, an
estimated 0.08 percent to 1.2 percent are registered Protestants, and
perhaps 2.4 to 6.5 percent worship in house churches that are
independent of government control. There are no available estimates of
the number of Taoists. However, according to a 1997 government
publication, there are over 10,000 Taoist monks and nuns and over 1,000
Taoist temples.
The traditional folk religion (worship of local gods, heroes, and
ancestors) of 75 percent of the population has revived in recent years
and is tolerated to varying degrees as a loose affiliate of Taoism, or
as an ethnic minority cultural practice; however, folk religion has
been labeled as ``feudal superstition'' and local authorities have
destroyed thousands of local shrines.
Buddhists make up the largest body of organized religious
believers. The Government estimates that there are more than 100
million Buddhists, most of whom are from the dominant Han ethnic group.
However, it is difficult to estimate accurately the number of Buddhists
because they do not have congregational memberships and often do not
participate in public ceremonies. The Government reports that there are
13,000 Buddhist temples and monasteries and more than 200,000 nuns and
monks. In some areas, local governments enforced strictly regulations
on places of worship, particularly on illegally constructed Buddhist
temples and shrines. During a May 1998 conference in Hunan on
provincial religious work, a senior provincial party official said that
goals for the coming year were to ``Tighten management of places of
religious activities, properly handle issues concerning the
indiscriminate establishment of temples and the setting up of outdoor
Buddha statues, and crack down on heretical religious organizations and
illegal religious activities.''
Tibetan Buddhists outside of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) seem
to have fewer restrictions than those in the TAR, but they still face
significant restrictions and are subject to patriotic education
campaigns. In June two Tibetan Buddhist monks reportedly were arrested
at Ganzi monastery, Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Region in western Sichuan
(Tibetan Kham); they were charged with handing out leaflets supporting
Tibetan independence. On October 24, three Tibetan Buddhist monks,
Sonam Phuntsok, Agya Tsering, and Sonam, were arrested at Dargye
monastery in western Sichuan province. The three reportedly were
suspected of being in contact with exile groups, and of supporting the
Dalai Lama. These arrests reportedly were linked to the bombing of a
medical clinic on October 7. Their detention sparked a large local
protest later in the month, during which police reportedly fired into
the crowd and injured demonstrators (see Section 2.b.). (A discussion
of government restrictions on Tibetan Buddhism in the TAR can be found
in the Tibet addendum to this report.)
In the past, official tolerance for religions considered to be
traditionally Chinese, such as Buddhism and Taoism, has been greater
than that for Christianity. As these non-Western faiths have grown
rapidly in recent years, there are signs of greater Government concern
and new restrictions, especially on syncretic sects.
According to government figures, there are 20 million Muslims,
35,000 Islamic places of worship, and more than 45,000 imams. In some
areas where ethnic unrest has occurred, particularly among Central
Asian Muslims (and especially the Uighurs) in Xinjiang, officials
continue to restrict the building of mosques and the religious
education of youths under the age of 18. After a series of violent
incidents in Xinjiang in 1997, police cracked down on Muslim religious
activity and places of worship, and local authorities issued
regulations further restricting religious activities and teaching.
During the year, several Islamic fundamentalists from other countries
were expelled for proselytizing.
Restrictions on religious practices in Xinjiang were tight, and the
Government dealt harshly with religious adherents accused of separatist
activities. Some young Uighur Muslims are being trained outside of the
country in Muslim religious schools. Amnesty International reported
that a group of four men and four children, all of whom were Muslim
Uighurs from Xinjiang, were returned forcibly to China from Kazakhstan
in late 1998. Two of the men, Yasim Karim and Abla Karim, are mullahs.
Both menreportedly refused to acknowledge publicly the merits of
government policies in their mosques. The children allegedly were
released after 18 days, but the four men were believed to remain in
detention in Kashgar as of January. Amnesty International reported in
January that Ibrahim Ismael was executed in Ili prefecture, Xinjiang.
Ismael was a religious scholar known for holding private religious
classes for Muslim youth in his home in Memyuzi village, near Gulja,
Ili prefecture, Xinjiang. He had been arrested in 1997. Officials
stated that he had joined a reactionary organization in 1991,
participated in illegal religious activities, helped to organize
protests in 1995 and 1997, and helped to organize an attack in 1997 in
which five persons died (see Section 5). Three Uighur men from Xinjiang
were repatriated forcibly to China on February 11, after having been
detained since they were apprehended crossing the border into
Kazakhstan in August 1998. The three, Hemit Memet, Kasim Mahpir, and
Ilyas Zordun, fled Xinjiang after wanted posters went up listing them
as separatists. In July a court in Nonshishi reportedly sentenced 18
men to prison terms ranging from 10 to 15 years for, among other
things, allegedly destroying the Party's religious policy. In April
1998, the Urumqi Evening news reported that 56 mosques in Egarqi had
been searched by police. In May 1998, a report on Xinjiang People's
Radio quoted a senior provincial official accusing separatists of
having ``carried out subversion and sabotage in the region in the name
of religious activities.'' The official said that the Government must
``resolutely oppose illegal religious activities'' and that religious
practice must ``uphold the dignity of laws, the interest of the people,
the unification of the motherland, and the unity of the nationalities.
Any violation will not be tolerated by the people's democratic
dictatorship.''
The Government permits, and in some cases subsidizes, Muslim
citizens who make the hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca. According to
government statistics, more than 45,000 Muslims have made the
pilgrimage in recent years--5,000 in 1998. However, government
sensitivity to concerns of the Muslim community is limited. In 1998 a
Qing dynasty mosque, which was the center of Muslim life in Chengdu,
was destroyed in the city's Muslim quarter to make way for a boulevard
near an expanded city square, despite strong opposition from the city's
Muslim population. The construction of a new mosque over a complex of
retail establishments further offended the community. At year's end, no
construction upon the site of the Qing dynasty mosque had yet occurred;
the imam, or leader, of the mosque that was demolished was ordered to
leave Chengdu and has been forbidden to engage in religious work. The
new officially sanctioned mosque over the retail complex has been
attended only lightly since its opening.
The unofficial, Vatican-affiliated Catholic Church claims a
membership far larger than the 5 million persons registered with the
official Catholic Church. Precise figures are difficult to determine,
but Vatican officials have estimated that there are as many as 10
million adherents. According to official figures, the government-
approved Catholic Church has 69 bishops, 5,000 clergy and about 5,000
churches and meeting houses. There are 60,000 baptisms each year. The
Government so far has refused to establish diplomatic relations with
the Holy See, and there is no Vatican representative in the country.
Some bishops in the official Catholic Church are not recognized by
Rome, although many have been recognized unofficially. The Government's
refusal to allow the official Catholic church to recognize the
authority of the Papacy in matters of faith and morals has led many
Catholics to refuse to join the official Catholic church on the grounds
that this refusal denies one of the fundamental tenets of their faith.
The Government maintains that there are between 10 and 15 million
registered Protestants, 18,000 clergy, over 12,000 churches, and some
25,000 meeting places. According to foreign experts, perhaps 30 million
persons worship in house churches that are independent of government
control, although estimates by some house church groups range as high
as 80 million.
The growth of unofficial churches has caused concern among many
government and Communist Party officials who perceive unregulated
religious gatherings as a potential challenge to their authority, a
threat to public order, and an alternative to Socialist thought.
Authorities in some areas continued a concerted effort to crack down on
the activities of unapproved Catholic and Protestant churches. In some
areas, security authorities used threats, demolition of unregistered
property, extortion of ``fines,'' interrogation, detention (sometimes
prolonged), and at times beatings and torture to harass Christian
religious figures and followers. There also was a report in the Western
press that authorities refused without explanation to issue a birth
certificate for a child whose parents are active in the house church
movement; without a birth certificate, a child cannot be registered,
attend school or, later, work. Implementing regulations, provincial
work reports, and other government and party documents continued to
exhort officials to enforce vigorously government policy regarding
unregistered churches. In March 1998, the Guangzhou Municipal People's
Congress passedhighly restrictive religious regulations. Zhejiang
province also promulgated new religious affairs regulations that
stipulated that ``illegal'' property and income would be confiscated
from those who: (1) Preside over or organize religious activities at
places other than those for religious activities or at places not
approved by a religious affairs department; (2) do missionary work
outside the premises of a place of religious activity; and (3) sponsor
religious training activities without obtaining the approval of a
religious affairs department at or above the county level. Regulations
in Guangxi, Shanghai, and Chongqing also call for strict government
oversight. In particular, authorities targeted unofficial religious
groups in Beijing and the provinces of Henan and Shandong, where there
are rapidly growing numbers of unregistered Protestants, and in Hebei,
a center of unregistered Catholics. However, during the year there were
reports that small family churches, generally made up of family members
and friends, which conduct activities similar to those of home Bible
study groups, may be tolerated by the authorities as long as they
remain small and unobtrusive. Family churches reportedly encounter
difficulties when their memberships become too large, when they arrange
for the use of facilities for the specific purpose of conducting
religious activities, or when they forge links with other unregistered
groups.
There were many religious detainees and prisoners. In some cases,
public security officials have used prison or reform-through-education
sentences to enforce regulations. Prominent Protestant house church
leader Xu Yongze continues to serve a 3-year reform-through-labor
sentence in Pingyuan prison in Henan for allegedly disturbing public
order. The Government's 1997 White Paper on Religious Freedom stated
that Xu had violated the law by promoting a cult, preaching that the
Apocalypse was near, and asking worshipers to wail in public spaces for
several consecutive days. Group members deny these charges. Xu's
colleagues Qin Baocai and Mu Sheng continue to serve reeducation-
through-labor sentences. In September 1998 a group of leaders from
house church networks met in Henan and issued a public communique
calling on the Government to enter into a dialog with unofficial
Protestant churches, to release all religious prisoners, and to
redefine what constitutes a ``cult.'' Another communique set forth a
common theological creed and a joint position on relations with the
Government.
In Hebei, where perhaps half of the country's Catholics reside,
friction between unofficial Catholics and local authorities continued.
Hebei authorities have been known to force many underground priests and
believers to make a choice of either joining the ``patriotic'' church
or facing punishment such as fines, job loss, periodic detentions, and,
in some cases, having their children barred from school. The
whereabouts of Roman Catholic Bishop Su Zhimin, whose followers
reported that he was arrested in 1997, remained unclear. Underground
Catholic sources in Hebei claimed that he still was under detention,
while the Government denied having taken ``any coercive measures''
against him. Reliable sources reported that Bishop An Shuxin, Bishop
Zhang Weizhu, Father Cui Xing, and Father Wang Quanjun remained under
detention in Hebei. In January Father Hu Duo reportedly was detained in
Hebei; and according to a Human Rights Watch report, authorities that
month also reportedly detained, beat, and fined an unknown number of
underground Catholics in Baoding, Hebei. In May Auxiliary Bishop Yan
Weiping was found dead in Beijing, shortly after being released from
detention. The circumstances surrounding his death are unclear. On
August 24, 40 house church members reportedly were arrested in
Fengcheng, Henan. Among those detained in Henan in August was David
Zhang (Rongliang) of the Fengcheng church group; he and other house
church leaders detained in August were sentenced to 1 to 3 years in a
reeducation-through-labor camp. Underground Catholic Bishop Joseph Fan
Zhongliang of Shanghai remained under surveillance and often had his
movements restricted.
In May 500 Christians reportedly occupied Xian's largest church to
prevent its demolition after the local Three-Self Patriotic Movement
authorities allegedly sold the church to a local property developer
(although those authorities had used the proceeds to purchase a new,
larger church in a distant suburb). The Hong Kong press reported that
the Guangdong provincial government had issued a circular ordering
authorities to increase the monitoring of Christian and Muslim
activities. In April Public Security personnel reportedly raided a
house church service in Henan and detained 25 worshippers. There were
reports that as many as 48 Christians, including Catholics and
Protestants, were arrested in Henan in January. On August 18, eight
house church leaders--Zhao Dexin, Yang Xian, Miao Hailin, Chen Zide, Li
Wen, Han Shaorong, and two others--reportedly were arrested in Henan.
On the same day in October, police disrupted services at two of
Guangzhou's most prominent house churches--those of pastors Samuel Lamb
and Li Dexian. Li and his wife, along with an Australian missionary,
were detained for several hours, and Li stated that his church was
ransacked by the police. Li also has been detained on other occasions
and reports that in some instances he was beaten. Bibles also were
confiscated from his congregation and members of the congregation
reportedly werethreatened. Roman Catholic Bishop Zeng Jingmu, released
from a labor camp in 1998, reportedly remains under house arrest.
In some regions, coexistence and cooperation between official and
unofficial churches, both Catholic and Protestant, is close enough to
blur the line between the two. However, in some areas relations between
the two churches remain hostile. In September police, allegedly at the
instigation of the local official Catholic church in Wenzhou,
instructed 12 underground Catholic church leaders--including Bishop Lin
Xili, Chen Nailiang, and Wang Zhongfa--to go to a hotel, where they
were pressured to join the official Catholic church. There also are
reports of divisions within both the official Protestant church and the
house church movement over issues of doctrine; in both the official and
unofficial Protestant churches, there are groups with conservative
views and groups with more unorthodox views. In some areas there are
reports of harassment of churches by local RAB officials which is
attributed, at least in part, to financial issues. For example, since
regulations require local authorities to provide land to church groups,
some local officials may refuse to do so by denying registration, thus
avoiding the requirement to provide land. However, official churches
also may face harassment if local authorities wish to acquire the land
on which a church is located. In addition to refusing to register
churches, there also are reports that RAB officials have requested
``donations'' from churches in their jurisdictions as a means of
raising extra revenue.
The increase in the number of Christians has resulted in a
corresponding increase in the demand for Bibles. During the year the
Government approved the printing of more than 3 million Bibles, and
there currently are more than 22 million Bibles in print. One printing
company that is a joint venture with an overseas Christian organization
printed over 2.3 million Bibles during the year, including Bibles in
Braille and minority dialects, such as Korean, Jingbo, Lisu, Lahu,
Niao, and Yao. Although Bibles can be purchased at some bookstores,
they are not readily available and cannot be ordered directly from
publishing houses by individuals. However, they are available for
purchase at most officially recognized churches, and many house church
members buy their Bibles from churches without incident. Nonetheless,
some underground Christians hesitate to buy Bibles at official churches
because such transactions sometimes involve receipts that identify the
purchaser. Foreign experts confirm reports of chronic shortages of
Bibles, mostly due to logistical problems in disseminating Bibles to
rural areas. However, they note that the situation has improved in
recent years due to improved distribution channels, including to house
churches. Customs officials continue to monitor for the ``smuggling''
of Bibles and other religious materials into the country. There have
been credible reports that the authorities sometimes confiscate Bibles
in raids on house churches, such as during an April raid on a house
church in Henan province.
Weekly services of the foreign Jewish community in Beijing have
continued uninterrupted since 1995 and High Holy Day observances have
been allowed for more than 15 years. During the fall of 1998, the
foreign Jewish community in Shanghai began holding services in a local
hotel. Members experienced initial difficulty in establishing worship
services due to the fact that Judaism is not one of the five officially
recognized religions, and meetings were suspended temporarily. However,
the group since has reestablished its meetings at the hotel, with the
approval of the local religious affairs bureau. In September, with the
support of local authorities, the Shanghai Jewish community was allowed
to hold a service in an historic Shanghai synagogue, which has been
restored as a museum, for the first time since 1949. Local authorities
indicated that the community could use the synagogue in the future for
special occasions on a case-by-case basis.
Religious groups that preach beliefs outside the bounds of
officially approved doctrine--such as the imminent coming of the
Apocalypse--often are singled out for particularly severe harassment.
Police continued their efforts to close down an underground evangelical
group called the ``Shouters,'' an offshoot of a pre-1949 indigenous
Protestant group, which the authorities deem to be an antigovernment,
counterrevolutionary ``cult.'' Since the early 1980's, the authorities
repeatedly have detained, fined, or imprisoned its members. During the
year the authorities also initiated a general crackdown on groups
considered to be ``cults.'' The press reported that on April 21, police
and members of the Public Security Bureau in Chengkuo county, Chongqing
detained 71 members of Men Tu Hui (Disciples Sect); the authorities
declared the group to be illegal and accused it of carrying out various
reckless and criminal activities in recent years, including using
heresy to spread rumors and stirring up quarrels and trouble among the
masses. In May Hunan authorities initiated a crackdown against the
``heretical cult'' organization ``God's Religion.'' In September 31
members of the ``cold water religion'' reportedly were arrested by
authorities in Lianping county, Guangdong; 3 of the group's churches
reportedly were destroyed. Liu Jiaguo, the leader of the Supreme Deity
sect, was executed in October after beingconvicted of raping 11 women
and defrauding cult members. The crackdown intensified later in the
year, with press reports stating that restrictions would be tightened
on several ``cults'' and various Christian groups. Many groups,
especially those in house churches, reportedly are viewed by officials
as ``cults.'' Some observers have attributed the unorthodox beliefs of
some of these groups to undertrained clergy. According to reports, the
crackdown on the Falun Gong led to a tightening of controls on all non-
officially sanctioned beliefs; some groups have been labeled as
``cults.''
Falun Gong (or Wheel of the Law, also known as Falun Dafa) blends
aspects of Taoism, Buddhism, and the meditation techniques of Qigong (a
traditional martial art) with the teachings of Li Hongzhi, who left the
country in 1998. The Government estimates that there may be as many as
2.1 million adherents of Falun Gong; Falun Gong followers estimate that
there are over 100 million adherents. Some experts estimate that the
true number of Falun Gong adherents lies in the tens of millions. Falun
Gong does not consider itself a religion and has no clergy or formal
places of worship.
On April 25, more than 10,000 adherents of Falun Gong gathered in
front of the Zhongnanhai leadership compound, where most of the
country's top officials live and work, to protest the detention of some
Falun Gong practitioners and to seek government acknowledgment of the
legitimacy of their practice. The sudden appearance of such a large
crowd of organized demonstrators caught the Government by surprise;
however, it allowed the peaceful protest to continue for more than 12
hours and publicly stated that the organization was not illegal.
Following the April demonstration, the Government decided that Falun
Gong was a threat to stability. In June despite a government warning
against disturbing social stability or holding large gatherings, Falun
Gong practitioners continued to hold demonstrations in cities
throughout the country. On July 22 the Government officially declared
Falun Gong illegal and began a nationwide crackdown against the
movement. Around the country, tens of thousands of practitioners were
rounded up and detained for several days, often in open stadiums with
poor, overcrowded conditions with inadequate food, water, and sanitary
facilities. Practitioners who refused to renounce their beliefs were
expelled from their schools or fired from their jobs. Some of those
detained were government officials and Communist Party members. Some
high-ranking practitioners were forced to disavow their ties to Falun
Gong on national television. There also were reports that the Public
Security Bureau forbade the renting of apartments to members of the
Falun Gong, and that local government leaders and heads of institutions
in the northeast were summoned to Beijing or fired if too many persons
under their jurisdictions participated in Falun Gong demonstrations.
In addition to detaining Falun Gong practitioners, in July the
Government also launched a massive propaganda campaign against the
group and its leader (see section 2.a.).
As part of its crackdown on Falun Gong, the Government seized and
destroyed Falun Gong literature, including over 1 million books, in
well publicized sweeps of homes and bookstores. A Falun Gong website
designed and operated by computer engineer Zhang Haitao of Jilin
province was shut down by the Government on July 24 (see Section 1.f.);
Zhang himself reportedly was arrested on July 29. Police in Dandong
city, Liaoning province reported that they had arrested six workers and
a factory boss for printing outlawed Falun Gong material. On October
28, several Falun Gong practitioners held a clandestine press
conference for foreign reporters in which they described an increase in
harassment and in physical abuse by the police. Many of the
practitioners involved later reportedly were arrested; the authorities
questioned some of the foreign journalists who attended the press
conference and temporarily confiscated their press credentials and
residence permits.
In spite of the harshness of the crackdown, Falun Gong
demonstrations continued around the country throughout the summer and
into the fall. Authorities responded quickly by breaking up
demonstrations--at times forcibly--and detaining demonstrators.
In September, the state-run press reported a raid on a gathering of
19 Falun Gong followers during which 5 were arrested formally. In mid-
September, one NGO reported that at least 300 Falun Gong adherents were
arrested in 9 cities over the course of 1 week. In late October, the
pace of protests and detentions picked up as Falun Gong practitioners
from around the country converged on Beijing and began a series of
peaceful, low-key demonstrations in Tiananmen Square to protest a new
anti-cult law being considered by the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress. Most of the protests were small and short-
lived, as the police, who roamed the square in increased numbers,
questioned persons and quickly arrested anyone who admitted to being or
appeared to be a practitioner. On some days, scores of practitioners
were arrested as they entered the square in small groups to protest.
During the last week of October, a Communist Party official told the
foreign press that 3,000 persons from other parts of the country were
detained in police sweeps of Beijing fornon-residents. On November 16,
during a visit to Beijing by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, more
than a dozen Falun Gong practitioners who unfurled a Falun Gong banner
were detained forcibly in Tiananmen Square. On November 30, Vice
Premier Li Lanqing reportedly stated in a speech to Communist Party
members that over 35,000 detentions of Falun Gong practitioners were
made by the authorities between July 22 and October 30 (the Government
later clarified Li's remarks by stating that this figure represented
the total number of confrontations that police had with adherents of
Falun Gong, pointing out that many persons had multiple encounters with
police.)
Authorities also detained foreign practitioners. For example, on
November 24, four foreign practitioners of Falun Gong were detained
along with other practitioners in Guangzhou. The foreigners were
released a few days later and expelled from the country; the Chinese
citizens arrested with them remained in custody. On December 15, three
Chinese nationals with foreign residency were detained in Shenzhen for
visiting other Falun Gong practitioners; they were sentenced to 15 days
of administrative detention.
There were credible reports of beatings and deaths of practitioners
in detention who refused to recant their beliefs; according to Amnesty
International, some adherents also were tortured by electric shocks and
by having their hands and feet shackled and linked with crossed steel
chains (see Sections 1.a and 1.c.). In October a Falun Gong website
reported that a Falun Gong practitioner from Shandong province, Zhao
Jinhua, died as a result of beatings received while in police custody.
The official media reported that Zhao died of a heart attack while in
custody. On October 27, police in Heilongjiang province stated that
Chen Ying, an 18-year old practitioner of Falun Gong who died while in
police custody in August, had jumped to her death from a moving train.
Zhao Dong also allegedly jumped from a train while in police custody;
he reportedly died in late September.
Although the vast majority of ordinary Falun Gong practitioners who
were detained later were released, authorities acted more forcefully
against practitioners it identified as leaders. On October 25, the
official media reported that at least 13 Falun Gong leaders had been
charged with stealing and leaking state secrets. On October 31, a new
anti-cult law was passed, which specifies prison terms of 3 to 7 years
for cult members who ``disrupt public order'' or distribute
publications. Under the new law, cult leaders and recruiters can be
sentenced to 7 years or more in prison. On November 3, the authorities
used the new law to charge six Falun Gong leaders, some of whom, it is
believed, were arrested in July. Also, on November 8, the Government
confirmed that 111 Falun Gong practitioners had been charged with
serious crimes including, among others, disturbing social order and
stealing state secrets. The Government issued a warrant for the arrest
of Falun Gong leader Li Hongzhi, and requested Interpol's assistance in
apprehending him. Interpol declined to do so, on the ground that the
request was political in nature.
Many others not formally arrested reportedly were sentenced
administratively, without trial, to up to 3 years in reeducation-
through-labor camps. For example, on October 12, authorities reportedly
sentenced 5 Falun Gong practitioners to a 1-year sentence in a
reeducation-through-labor camp for ``disturbing the social order.'' The
exact number of persons sentenced in this manner is unknown, although
the Hong Kong-based Information Center of Human Rights and Democratic
Movement in China reported that at least 500 persons were sentenced to
terms of reeducation- through-labor. Late in the year, according to
some reports, the Government started confining some Falun Gong
adherents to psychiatric hospitals.
Some of the leaders of Falun Gong were brought to trial by year's
end. On December 26, four practitioners of Falun Gong were sentenced by
a Beijing court for using a cult ``to obstruct justice, causing human
deaths in the process of organizing a cult, and illegally obtaining
state secrets.'' Li Chang, a former official at the Public Security
Ministry, was sentenced to 18 years in prison; former Railways Ministry
official Wang Zhiwen was sentenced to 16 years in prison. Two other
high-ranking Falun Gong members, Ji Liewu and Yao Jie, were sentenced
to 12 years and 7 years in prison. According to one international human
rights organization, the Ministry of Justice required attorneys who
wished to represent Falun Gong practitioners to obtain government
permission.
There were reports that Qigong groups not associated with the Falun
Gong have experienced an increase in harassment, as well, particularly
since the ban on Falun Gong was announced in July.
Two leaders of such groups reportedly were arrested, and the
Government banned the practice of Qigong exercises on public or
government property. This has created an atmosphere of uncertainty for
many, if not most, qigong practitioners.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The effectiveness of the Government's
national household registration/identification card system, used to
control and restrict the location of individual residences, remained in
place but continued to erode, and the ability of most citizens to move
around the country to live and work continued to improve. The
Government places some other restrictions on freedom of movement, and
it increased these restrictions during the year, especially before
politically sensitive anniversaries and to forestall Falun Gong
demonstrations. The ``floating population'' of economic migrants
leaving their home areas to seek work elsewhere in the country is
estimated to be between 80 and 130 million. This group comprises not
only migrant workers, but also includes a growing number of middle-
class professionals attracted to large cities by hopes of better paying
jobs in their fields. This itinerant population lacks official
residence status, which is required for full access to social services
and education. Unless such persons obtain resident status, they must
pay a premium for these services. However, some cities, such as
Beijing, are beginning to offer social services free of charge. In
August 1998, the Public Security Ministry issued revised regulations
that allow persons from the countryside to apply for permanent
residence in a city if: (1) They have investments or property in a
city; (2) they are elderly and have children who live in a city; or (3)
their spouses live in a city.
Prior to sensitive anniversaries, authorities in urban areas
rounded up and detained ``undesirables,'' including the homeless, the
unemployed, migrant workers, those without proper residence or work
permits, petty criminals, prostitutes, and the mentally ill or
disabled. These persons often were detained or expelled under custody
and repatriation regulations or similar administrative regulations (see
Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). In March the Government enacted a set of
measures aimed at reducing the number of migrant workers in the city
without valid work permits by 10 percent before June 1. Measures taken
included evicting persons from illegally rented housing, doubling the
monthly fee for a temporary residence permit, and increasing the cost
to employers of hiring migrant workers. On March 15, Beijing's Uighur
Village was razed. There was speculation that these measures were
undertaken to maintain order and to ``tidy up'' in a year of important
anniversaries. From Chinese New Year to sometime in March there
reportedly was a crackdown on migrant workers in Shanghai as well, with
officials checking credentials and sending those with improper ones
back to the provinces. Some reportedly were required to pay $121 (1,000
rmb) for a temporary work permit, up from $10 (80 rmb) previously.
There were reports of spot checks of identification documents, housing
raids, and harassment of migrants at train and bus stations in Beijing
during the year, particularly prior to October 1. Some non-local
residents found in Beijing, whatever their reason for being in the
city, reportedly were escorted quickly to train stations and sent home
by the police in the days prior to the National Day celebrations. Human
Rights Watch reported in December that many persons without residence
permits or permanent incomes were rounded up and sent out of the city;
migrants, beggars, hawkers, food vendors, the homeless, the unemployed,
the mentally ill, prostitutes, and other undesirables also supposedly
were targeted. It also reported that on September 6, the Public
Security Bureau notified hotels, hostels, boarding houses, and private
citizens that they would be penalized for housing illegal migrants, and
that any non-resident entering Beijing needed a detailed letter of
introduction. By some estimates, police forced 100,000 or more
nonresidents out of Beijing prior to October 1 through a custody and
repatriation program; during the last week of October, a Communist
Party official admitted to the foreign press that 3,000 persons from
other parts of the country were detained in police sweeps of Beijing
for nonresidents (see Section 1.d.). The crackdown on illegal migrants
reportedly continued after October 1, with 18,000 nonregistered
residents of Beijing detained or returned to their registered places of
residence in the last week of October.
Dissidents reported that the authorities restricted their freedom
of movement during politically sensitive periods. In April, while
Premier Zhu Rongji was visiting the United States, Xian dissident Fu
Sheng was detained for 12 hours and prevented from visiting the grave
of Hu Yaobang, whose 1989 death sparked the Tiananmen student protests.
Beijing activist Ding Zilin and her husband were confined to their home
numerous times during the year, including for 50 days during the period
of the 10th anniversary of the Tiananmen Massacre.
As the crackdown on the Falun Gong began in July, the authorities
tightly restricted travel into Beijing as Falun Gong members from
around the country converged on the city to protest the ban on the
group (see Section 2.c.).
Under the ``staying at prison employment'' system applicable to
recidivists incarcerated in reeducation-through-labor camps,authorities
have denied certain inmates permission to return to their homes. Those
inmates sentenced to more than 5 years in reeducation-through-labor
camps also may lose their legal right to return home. For those
assigned to camps far from their residences, this practice constitutes
a form of internal exile. The number of prisoners subject to this
restriction is unknown. Authorities reportedly have forced others to
accept jobs in state enterprises where they can be monitored more
closely after their release from prison or detention. Other released or
paroled prisoners returned home but were not permitted freedom of
movement. Chen Ziming, who was paroled on medical grounds in November
1996, remained confined to his home except for police-escorted visits
to doctors. Former senior leader Zhao Ziyang remained under house
arrest, and security around him was tightened routinely during
sensitive periods, such as the anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre
and during the visits of important foreign leaders. The authorities
released Bao Tong, a former Zhao Ziyang aide in 1997, but continue to
monitor closely Bao Tong's activities.
There is evidence that official poverty alleviation programs, and
major state projects such as building dams and environmental/
reforestation projects, include forced evacuation of persons.
The Government permits legal emigration and foreign travel for most
citizens. The Government continued to use political attitudes as
criteria for selecting persons for government-sponsored study abroad.
The Government did not control privately sponsored students, who
constitute the majority of citizens studying abroad; however, there
were some reports that academics faced some travel restrictions around
the year's sensitive anniversaries, especially June 4. Business
travelers who wish to go abroad can obtain passports relatively easily.
Permission for couples to travel abroad sometimes was conditioned on
agreement to delay childbirth. In 1998 in Xinjiang, a businesswoman and
former member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference, Rebiya Kadeer, reportedly was deprived of her passport and
could not leave Urumqi without police authorization. She was arrested
in August (see Section 1.d.). Authorities reportedly confiscated the
travel documents of Hong Kong prodemocracy legislator Fred Li, and
barred him from entering the mainland on July 3. Two other Hong Kong
legislators were denied permission to travel to Beijing earlier in the
year to voice their views on the right of abode case in Hong Kong.
Members of the underground Catholic Church, especially clergy wishing
to further their studies abroad, frequently found it difficult to
obtain passports and other necessary travel documents. The Government
continued efforts to attract persons who had studied overseas back to
China. Official media have stated in the past that persons who have
joined foreign organizations hostile to China should quit them before
returning home and refrain while abroad from activities that violate
China's laws.
In 1998 Beijing activist Ren Wanding was denied a passport because
his ``political rights'' still had not been restored after his release
from prison. Bao Tong reportedly was refused a passport to visit his
son abroad in 1998 and 1999.
There also were instances when the authorities refused visas or
entry on apparent political grounds. International observers and human
rights organizations reported that they had documents that
substantiated claims that border control stations keep background
records of certain individuals who are to be denied entry. Authorities
have denied these reports. In April foreign-based dissident Wang Xizhe
was denied permission to return to China to attend his father's
funeral. On two occasions, once in March and again in April, Lai Lai-
Har, a prodemocracy activist from Hong Kong, was denied entry into the
mainland. In July Chinese Democracy and Justice Party member Guo Hui,
who returned to China to visit her ailing mother, was detained by
police in Shanghai, interrogated for over 8 hours, and expelled the
following day. In September the authorities detained Huang Ciping, a
foreign-based human rights activist, who had hoped to visit her sick
father, upon arrival at Shanghai airport and deported her soon
thereafter. Also in September, the authorities denied prodemocracy
activist and Hong Kong Legislative Council representative Margaret Ng a
visa for entry to the mainland. Some foreign academics with contacts
with the dissident community also have been refused entry visas
repeatedly.
The Government does not provide first asylum. However, since the
late 1980's, China has adopted a de facto policy of tolerance toward
the small number of persons--fewer than 100 annually--from other
nations who have registered with the Beijing office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as asylum seekers. The
Government has permitted these persons to stay in China while the UNHCR
makes determinations as to their status and--if the UNHCR determines
that they are bona fide refugees--while they await resettlement in
third countries. As yet, China has no law or regulations that authorize
the authorities to grant refugee status, but the Government reportedly
continues to draft working rules on granting such status.
The Government has worked with Laos and Cambodia to facilitate the
return of resettled individuals who have decided to return to their
home countries. The Government denies having tightened its policy on
accepting Vietnamese asylum seekers. Due to the stable situation in
Vietnam with regard to ethnic Chinese and the increasingly porous
border between the two countries, very few Vietnamese have sought
resettlement in China in recent years.
There were no confirmed reports of the forced return of persons to
a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens lack the means to change their government legally and
cannot freely choose or change the laws and officials that govern them.
Citizens vote directly for local nongovernmental village committees and
among party-reviewed candidates for delegate positions in town and
township and county-level peoples' congresses. However, Peoples'
Congress delegates at the provincial level are selected by county-level
people's congresses, and in turn provincial-level people's congresses
select delegates to the National People's Congress. Although the CCP
vets all candidates, many county and provincial elections are
competitive, with more candidates running than there are seats
available.
According to the Constitution, the NPC is the highest organ of
state power. Formally it elects the President and Vice President,
selects the Premier and vice premiers, and elects the Chairman of the
State Central Military Commission. In practice the NPC Standing
Committee oversees these elections and determines the agenda and
procedure for the NPC under the direct authority of the Politburo
Standing Committee. The NPC does not have the power to set policy or
remove government or party leaders; however, in some instances its
actions have affected economic policy.
In general, the election and agenda of people's congresses at all
levels remain under the firm control of the Communist Party, the
paramount source of political authority. A number of small
``democratic'' parties that date from before the Communist takeover in
1949 play a minor consultative role and must pledge their allegiance to
the Communist Party. The CCP retains a tight rein on political
decisionmaking and forbids the creation of new political parties. The
Government intensified efforts to suppress the China Democracy Party,
an organization that had attracted hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
members nationwide since its founding in 1998. Public security organs
arrested nearly all of its most important leaders. Scores of party
members were detained in cities throughout the country in the period
prior to the 10th anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre (see Section
1.d.). The CDP's three best known leaders--Wang Youcai, Xu Wenli, and
Qin Yongmin--all were sentenced in December 1998, to prison terms of
13, 12, and 11 years respectively. In July a court in Gansu sentenced
CDP members Yue Tianxiang to 10 years, and Guo Xinmin, and Wang
Fengshan to sentences of 2 years each for subversion. In 1 week in
August courts in Beijing and Sichuan sentenced CDP activists Gao
Hongming to 8 years, Zha Jianguo to 9 years, She Wanbao to 12 years,
and Liu Xianbin to 13 years--all for alleged subversion. In late
October Zhu Yufu, Mao Qingxiang, and another activist were sentenced to
7, 8, and 5 years, respectively. Prominent members such as Hangzhou's
Wu Yilong remain detained without charge.
At the same time, democratic decisionmaking continued to grow as
the local village committee elections program expanded. Under the 1987
Organic Law of the Village Committees, all of the country's
approximately 1 million villages are expected to hold competitive,
direct elections for village committees. The NPC Standing Committee in
November 1998 passed a revised version of the law, which called for
enhancements in the electoral process, including substantial
improvements in the nominating process and the required use of voting
booths. It also provided for improved transparency in village committee
administration and appears to boost the authority of the village
committees over communally owned properties. The revised law also
explicitly transferred the power to nominate candidates to the
villagers themselves, as opposed to village groups or party branches.
Both the Government and foreign observers estimate that more than
90 percent of villages have participated in elections for local
leaders. According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the majority of
provinces have carried out at least three or four rounds of village
elections. Foreign observers who have monitored local village committee
elections, including the Carter Center and the International Republican
Institute, have judged the elections they observed, on the whole, to be
fair. However, many villages have yet to hold truly competitive
elections. The Government estimates that one-third of all elections
have serious procedural flaws. Approximately another third are judged
to have satisfied central government guidance and the law, which
requires secret ballots to select candidates. Successful
villagecommittee elections have included secret ballots to select
candidates, active campaigns by multiple candidates, platforms, and the
use of secret ballots in the election itself. Some regions have
experimented with a nominating process that gives this power completely
to villagers, as opposed to village groups or party branches.
Candidates favored by local authorities have been defeated in some
elections, although in general the party dominates the electoral
process, and roughly 60 percent of the members elected to the village
committees are Communist Party members. The final ballot is the
culmination of an election process that includes government screening
of candidates and an indirect vote that eliminates some candidates.
Many observers caution that the village election system is not
necessarily a precursor for democracy at higher levels of government,
and village elections--as currently practiced--do not threaten to
undermine the implementation of unpopular central policies or endanger
the leading role of the Communist Party. The nongovernmental elected
village committees are not part of the formal government structure. The
powers of elected village committees vary from region to region. Most
committees have the authority to mediate disputes between villagers,
improve public order, and authorize small expenditures. The committees
also carry out political work by serving as a channel of communication
between villagers and the Government. The village committees have no
power to tax, set fines or punishments independently, or hire or fire
village enterprise managers. According to press reports, Zhang Mingjun
and three others led a protest in front of the office of a corrupt
local party boss in Yuzhuang village, Shandong. After the
demonstration, the four became write-in candidates for local village
deputies in Yuzhuang village and won. Zhang Mingjun was elected village
chief. Two weeks after the election, Zhang and his three deputies were
arrested by local police for having led the demonstration, and were
charged with having attacked government offices. This allegedly was
done to nullify the election.
The 1998 revised village election law authorized the establishment
of ``villager's representative assemblies'' to oversee the performance
of village committees. Such assemblies already existed for years in
some provinces; in 1997, for example, an assembly in Zhaoxin county,
Hebei province, reportedly removed 54 corrupt or incompetent village
committee members and vetoed 72 ``unreasonable'' development projects.
Township authorities in several provinces have held experimental
elections to select local executive officials. Citizens of Sichuan's
Buyun township on December 1998 held the first such vote. Despite
central government expressions of concern that this election violated
constitutional provisions requiring that the local people's congresses
elect executive officials, the central government ultimately confirmed
the vote. During another experimental township election during the
year, the ``two ballot'' vote in Guangdong province's Dapeng township--
explicitly authorized by the National People's Congress--attracted
attention both at home and abroad. Under this arrangement, groups of
100 or more citizens were free to nominate candidates. A township-wide
conference of local leaders from various institutes thereupon voted to
select one of those candidates. The local people's congress confirmed
the decision in a pro forma vote, thereby satisfying constitutional
requirements.
The Government places no restrictions on the participation of women
or minority groups in the political process; however, they are
underrepresented in government and politics. Women freely exercise
their right to vote in village committee elections, but only a small
fraction of elected members are women. The Government and party
organizations include approximately 12 million female officials out of
61 million party members. Women constitute 21.83 percent of the
National People's Congress. The 15th Party Congress elected 22 women to
serve as members or alternates on the 193-person Central Committee, an
increase over the total of the previous committee. However, women still
hold few positions of significant influence at the highest rungs of the
party or government structure. One alternate member of the 22-member
Politburo is a woman, and women hold 2 of 29 ministerial-level
positions.
Minorities constitute 14 percent of the National People's Congress.
All of the country's 56 nationalities are represented in the NPC
membership. The 15th Party Congress elected 38 members of ethnic
minorities to serve as members or alternates on the Central Committee,
an increase over the total of the previous committee. However,
minorities hold few senior party or government positions of significant
influence.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no independent domestic NGO's that publicly monitor or
comment on human rights conditions. However, an informal network of
dissidents in cities around the country has become a credible source of
information about government actions taken againstactivists. The
information is disseminated to the outside world through organizations
such as the Hong Kong-based Information Center for Human Rights and
Democratic Movement and the New York-based Human Rights in China. The
press regularly prints articles about officials who exceed their
authority and infringe on citizens' rights. However, the Government
remains reluctant to accept criticism of its human rights record by
other nations or international organizations and criticizes reports by
international human rights monitoring groups, maintaining that they are
inaccurate and interfere with the country's internal affairs. The
Government still maintains that there are legitimate, differing
approaches to human rights based on each country's particular history,
culture, social situation, and level of economic development. In 1993
the Government established the China Society for Human Rights, a
``nongovernmental'' organization whose mandate is not to monitor human
rights conditions, but to defend the Government's views and human
rights record.
The Government has active human rights dialogs with a large number
of countries, including Great Britain, France, Australia, Canada,
Norway, Sweden, Brazil, and Japan, as well as the European Union (EU).
However, these dialogs have not produced significant improvements in
the government's human rights practices. The United States and China
resumed their bilateral human rights dialog in January, but China
suspended it in April. In recent years, the Government has expanded
greatly the number and frequency of judicial and other types of legal
exchanges with foreign countries.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
There are laws designed to protect women, children, the disabled,
and minorities. However, in practice, societal discrimination based on
ethnicity, gender, and disability persists. The concept of a largely
homogeneous Chinese society pervades the thinking of the Han majority.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Violence against women
can be grounds for prosecution under the law. Sociologists note that
there has been no detailed research on the extent of physical violence
against women. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the reporting
of domestic abuse is on the rise, particularly in urban areas, because
greater attention has been focused on the problem. Informal surveys by
women's groups indicate that 20 percent of women may have been beaten
by their husbands. Actual figures may be higher because spousal abuse
still goes largely unreported. According to experts, the percentage of
households in which domestic abuse has occurred is higher in rural
areas than in urban centers.
In recognition of the seriousness of spousal abuse, some
localities, such as Hunan province, have passed legislation to address
the problem. However, some experts note that, even when appropriate
legislation exists, local law enforcement authorities frequently choose
not to interfere in what they regard as a family matter. There is no
national spousal abuse law.
According to some estimates by experts, there are 4 to 10 million
commercial sex workers in the country. The increased commercialization
of sex and related trafficking in women (see Section 6.f.) has trapped
thousands of women in a cycle of crime and exploitation, and left them
vulnerable to disease and abuse. According to the official Xinhua News
Agency, one in five massage parlors in China is involved in
prostitution, with the percentage higher in cities. Unsafe working
conditions are rampant among the saunas, massage parlors, clubs, and
hostess bars that have sprung up in large cities. According to one
estimate there are 70,000 prostitutes in Beijing alone. Research
indicates that up to 80 percent of prostitutes in some areas have
hepatitis. In light of this and, in particular, of the growing threat
of AIDS among Chinese sex workers, the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Committee in December 1998
recommended that due attention be paid to health services for women in
prostitution. Although the central Government and various provincial
and local governments have attempted to crack down on the sex trade,
there have been numerous credible reports in the media of complicity in
prostitution by local officials. Thus far, actions to crack down on
this lucrative business, which involves organized crime groups and
business persons as well as the police and the military, largely have
been ineffective.
There were credible reports of trafficking in persons, and the
kidnaping of women for sale into prostitution or marriage is a serious
problem (see Section 6.f.).
There is no statute that outlaws sexual harassment in the
workplace, although there has been some discussion by legislators about
the need for such legislation. The problem remains unaddressed in the
legal system and often in society. However,experts state that more
women are raising their concerns about sexual harassment because of
greater awareness of the problem.
A high female suicide rate is a serious problem. According to the
World Bank, Harvard University, and the World Health Organization, some
56 percent of the world's female suicides occur in China (about 500 per
day). The World Bank estimated the suicide rate in the country to be
three times the global average; among women, it was estimated to be
nearly five times the global average. Research indicates that the low
status of women, the rapid shift to a market economy, and the
availability of highly toxic pesticides in rural areas are among the
leading causes.
The authorities have enacted laws and conducted educational
campaigns in an effort to eradicate the traditional preference for
sons; however, this preference remains strong in rural China. A number
of provinces have sought to reduce the perceived higher value of boys
in providing old-age support for their parents by establishing or
improving pensions and retirement homes.
The Government has made gender equality a policy objective since
1949. The Constitution states that ``women enjoy equal rights with men
in all spheres of life.'' The 1992 Law on the Protection of Women's
Rights and Interests provides for equality in ownership of property,
inheritance rights, and access to education. Women's economic and
political influence has increased. Nonetheless, female activists are
increasingly concerned that the progress that has been made by women
over the past 50 years is being eroded and that women's status in
society has regressed in the 1990's. They assert that the Government
appears to have made the pursuit of gender equality a secondary
priority as it focuses on economic reform and political stability.
Social and familial pressure also has grown for women to resume their
traditional roles as wives and mothers. A recent study of how women are
portrayed in the media revealed that images of a woman's worth
increasingly are linked to her ability to attract a wealthy husband and
be a good mother.
The 1992 Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests was
designed to assist in curbing gender-based discrimination. However,
women continued to report that discrimination, sexual harassment,
unfair dismissal, demotion, and wage discrepancies were significant
problems. Efforts have been made by social organizations as well as the
Government to educate women about their legal rights, and there is
anecdotal evidence that women increasingly are using laws to protect
their rights. Nevertheless, women encounter serious obstacles in
getting laws enforced. The structure of the social system also prevents
women from having a full range of options. For example, women who seek
a divorce face the prospect of losing their housing since government
work units allot housing to men when couples marry.
Women have borne the brunt of China's economic reform of state-
owned enterprises. As the Government's plan to revamp state-owned
enterprises is carried out, millions of workers have been laid off. Of
those millions, a disproportionate percentage are women, many of whom
do not have the skills or opportunities to find new jobs. A December
1998 Asian Development Bank report noted that almost 70 percent of the
23 million persons who could lose their jobs as a result of state-owned
enterprise reform were women, even though they only constitute 36.4
percent of the work force. A 1998 All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU) report estimated that 80 percent of those laid off from state-
owned enterprises in Heilongjiang province were women. Women between
the ages of 35 and 50 were the most affected, and the least likely to
be retrained. In addition, female employees were more likely to be
chosen to take pay cuts when a plant or company was in financial
trouble. There have been reports that many women have been forced or
persuaded into early retirement, as well. Discriminatory hiring
practices appear to be on the rise as unemployment rises. Increasingly
companies discriminate by both sex and age, although such practices
violate labor laws.
Many employers prefer to hire men to avoid the expense of maternity
leave and childcare and some even lower the effective retirement age
for female workers to 40 years of age. (The official retirement age for
men is 60 years and for women 55 years.) Lower retirement ages have the
effect of reducing pensions, which generally are based on years worked.
The law promises equal pay for equal work. According to a 1997
World Bank report, Chinese women, on average, earn between 80 and 90
percent of the salaries of their male counterparts. Most women employed
in industry work in lower skilled and lower paid jobs.
While the gap in the education levels of men and women is
narrowing, men continue to constitute the majority of the relatively
small percentage of the population that receives a university-level
education. According to figures released by the All-China Women's
Federation, at the end of 1997, women made up 36 percent of all
university students, and 30 percent of all graduate students. However,
educators in the large cities have reported that there is a trend
toward greater gender balance inuniversities. Some academics have
reported that in some departments women are beginning to outnumber
men--even in some graduate schools. However, women with advanced
degrees report an increase in discrimination in the hiring process as
the job distribution system has opened up and become more competitive
and market driven.
According to official figures, in 1995 there were 145 million
illiterate persons above the age of 15. Women made up approximately 70
percent of this total. A 1998 Asian Development Bank report estimated
that 25 percent of all Chinese women are semi-literate or illiterate,
compared with 10 percent of men. The Government's ``Program for the
Development of Chinese Women (1995-2000)'' sets as one of its goals the
elimination of illiteracy among young and middle-aged women by the end
of the century. The main priority is to increase the literacy of rural
women, 80 percent of whom are wholly or partially illiterate. However,
some women's advocates were skeptical that the Government's goal could
be attained given the lack of resources.
Children.--The Constitution provides for 9 years of compulsory
education for children (see Tibet addendum); however, despite the
requirement that children attend school for 9 years, in economically
disadvantaged rural areas many children do not attend school for the
required period, if at all. Public schools are not allowed to charge
tuition, but faced with revenue shortfalls since the central Government
largely stopped subsidizing primary education in the early 1990's, many
schools have begun to charge required fees. Such fees make it difficult
for poorer families to send their children to school or send them to
school on a regular basis. Some charitable schools have opened in
recent years in rural areas, but not enough to meet the demand.
Children of migrant workers in urban areas also often do not attend
school, although they may be allowed to do so if they pay required
school fees (which their parents generally cannot afford, and which are
higher than for resident children). Some unlicensed schools that cater
to migrant children and have lower school fees reportedly have opened
in cities in recent years. However, the quality of these schools is
uneven. Because the schools are not licensed, their graduates may not
be able to be admitted to high school. Such schools are in constant
danger of being closed by the authorities. The Government campaign for
universal primary school enrollment by 2000 has helped to increase
enrollment in some areas; however, it also reportedly has led to school
officials inflating the number of children actually enrolled.
The extensive health care delivery system has led to improved child
health and a sharp decline in infant mortality rates. According to 1997
official figures, the infant mortality rate was 33 per 1,000 in 1996.
According to the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), in 1995 the mortality
rate for children under 5 years of age was 47 per 1,000 live births.
The 1992 Law on the Protection of Juveniles forbids infanticide, as
well as mistreatment or abandonment of children. The law also prohibits
discrimination against disabled minors, emphasizes the importance of
safety and morality, and codifies a variety of judicial protections for
juvenile offenders. The physical abuse of children can be grounds for
criminal prosecution.
There were credible reports of female infanticide. The use of
ultrasound tests to determine gender also results in decisions to
terminate pregnancies of female fetuses, but no reliable statistics are
available on the extent of the problem. One 1997 newspaper article
quoted a doctor as saying that as many as 97.5 percent of pregnancies
terminated in his hospital were of female fetuses. A 1997 World Health
Organization paper reported that the national ratio of male to female
births in 1994 was 117 to 100 (the worldwide statistical norm is 106 to
100). Part of the statistical gap may be attributable to female
infanticide, sex-selective termination of pregnancies, and abandonment
or neglect of girls. Underreporting of female births by couples trying
to evade family planning laws to try to have a son is another
significant factor (see Section 1.f.).
According to the latest available figures, compiled in 1994, the
number of children abandoned each year is approximately 1.7 million,
despite the fact that under the law child abandonment is punishable by
a fine and a 5-year prison term. The vast majority of those eventually
admitted to orphanages are female, although some are disabled or in
poor health. Children put up for foreign adoption are almost
exclusively girls. The treatment of children at these institutions
varies from adequate to deplorable. There have been reports of children
at some orphanages being restrained for long periods of time and being
denied basic care and food. Accurate determination of infant mortality
rates in orphanages is difficult, but rates appear to be very high at
many, especially among new arrivals.
According to several sources, orphanage workers in some facilities
reserve basic medical care and even nutrition for children who are
deemed to have the best chances for survival.
Some sources report that children whose prospects of survival are
determined to be poor are placed in rooms separate from other children
and subjected to extreme neglect. Claims that government policies, as
opposed to lack of resources, were to blame for the lack of care of
children placed in orphanages could not be verified. However, Human
Rights Watch reported in 1996 that many institutions, including those
with the highest death rates, have budgets that provide for adequate
wages, bonuses, and other personnel-related costs, but that budgets for
children's food, clothing, and other necessities are low throughout the
country. There was a report in 1998 that, at least in one orphanage, a
new conference room was built while the facilities and care for orphans
under the age of 2 remained abysmal. The mortality rate for children
under the age of 2 at this institution reportedly approached 100
percent, even for those infants who entered in fair health.
Bureaucratic indifference and corruption on the part of orphanage
administrators appear to be significant factors in such cases.
The Government denies that children in orphanages are mistreated or
refused medical care but acknowledges that the system often is unable
to provide adequately for some children, especially those who are
admitted with serious medical problems. In an effort to address this
problem, in November 1998 the NPC adopted a revised adoption law making
it easier for couples to adopt. The new law dropped a restriction that
parents who adopt a child must be childless. It also allows for
multiple adoptions and lowers the age at which couples are eligible to
adopt. The Civil Affairs Ministry announced in 1997 that the
Government's top social welfare priority for that year would be to
improve conditions in orphanages, and there have been credible reports
of new construction, renovation, and improved care in some areas. Over
$30 million (248.4 million rmb) reportedly was allocated for this
program. A government white paper on women and children issued in 1997
stated that the central Government had spent $25.7 million (212.8
million rmb) between 1990 and 1994 to improve ``children's welfare
institutions,'' the official term for orphanages. During the same
period, local governments apparently allocated almost $18 million (149
million rmb) to these institutions.
Children are reportedly detained administratively in custody and
repatriation centers, either for minor crimes they have committed or
because they are homeless. Such children routinely are detained with
adults, and may be required to work (see Sections 1.d, 1.e., and 6.c.).
Despite government efforts to prevent kidnaping and the buying and
selling of children these problems persist in some rural areas (see
Section 6.f.).
People With Disabilities.--In 1990 the Government adopted
legislation that protects the rights of the country's disabled persons.
According to the official press, all local governments subsequently
drafted specific measures to implement the law. The press publicizes
both the plight of the disabled and government efforts to assist them.
The Government, at times in conjunction with NGO's such as the Lions
Club International, sponsors a wide range of preventive and
rehabilitative programs, including efforts to reduce congenital birth
defects, treat cataracts, and treat hearing disorders. The goal of many
of these programs is to allow persons with disabilities to be
integrated into the rest of society.
However, reality for the disabled lags far behind legal dictates.
Misdiagnosis, inadequate medical care, pariah status, and abandonment
remain common problems. In a 1998 speech, Vice Premier Li Lanqing noted
that in the past decade, the Government has helped some 14 million
disabled citizens solve their food and clothing problems. Nonetheless,
Government statistics show that almost one-quarter of the approximately
60 million disabled persons live in extreme poverty. According to 1998
government statistics, the unemployment rate for disabled persons is
26.7 percent, a decrease from the past, but still almost 10 times the
official rate for the general population. The Government's new strategy
is to integrate the disabled into the mainstream work force, but these
efforts are running into a cultural legacy of discrimination and
neglect, as well as a slowing economy. In the mid-1990's in Beijing and
eight other cities, the Government began, on a trial basis, to require
all companies and institutions to hire at least 1 percent of its
workers from among the disabled. However, over a period of 2 years in
Beijing, only 400 disabled persons obtained jobs in this way; in
Shanghai, over a period of 3 years, only 100 persons obtained jobs.
Deng Pufang, son of the late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, heads
the China Welfare Fund for the Handicapped and the China Disabled
Persons' Federation (CDPF), government-affiliated organizations tasked
with assisting the disabled. In March 1998, this organization laid out
a series of goals that it hoped to achieve by 2000, including ensuring
that all persons with disabilities have adequate food and clothing,
providingrehabilitation services for 3 million individuals, increasing
to 80 percent the enrollment rate for disabled students, and reducing
to 20 percent the unemployment rate for disabled workers.
The Maternal and Child Health Care Law forbids the marriage of
persons with certain specified contagious diseases or certain acute
mental illnesses such as schizophrenia. If doctors find that a couple
is at risk of transmitting disabling congenital defects to their
children, the couple may marry only if they agree to use birth control
or undergo sterilization. This law mandates premarital and prenatal
examination for genetic or contagious diseases, but it specifies that
medically advised termination of pregnancy or sterilization requires
the signed consent of the patients or their guardians.
In 1998 the adoption law was revised to loosen age restrictions on
adoption. This change, which was intended to facilitate adoption, may
have unintended consequences for children with special needs. In the
past, individuals under the age of 35 could adopt only children with
special needs. The minimum age for adopting a healthy child is now set
at 30 instead of 35. Some observers worry that the law, which became
effective on April 1, may eliminate the age-based incentive for such
adoptions.
Standards adopted in 1994 for making roads and buildings accessible
to the disabled are subject to the 1990 Law on the Handicapped, which
calls for their ``gradual'' implementation. Lax compliance with the law
has resulted in only limited access to most buildings.
Persons in urban areas who are mentally ill or disabled and are
found on city streets can be detained administratively under custody
and repatriation regulations, ostensibly for their protection (see
Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). The conditions under which they are held in
such centers reportedly are poor.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to 1995 government
statistics, the total population of the country's 55 ethnic minorities
was 108.46 million, or 8.98 percent of the national population. Most
minority groups reside in areas they traditionally have inhabited, many
of which are mountainous or remote. The Government's avowed policy on
minorities calls for preferential treatment in marriage regulations,
family planning, university admission, and employment. However, there
have been reports that in some areas ethnic minorities have been
subjected to pressure to limit births to the lower number allowed Han
Chinese (see Section 1.f.). Programs have been established to provide
low-interest loans, subsidies, and special development funds for
minority areas. Nonetheless, in practice, minorities face
discrimination. Most of the minorities in border regions are less
educated than the national average, and job discrimination in favor of
Han migrants remains a serious problem. Racial discrimination is the
source of deep resentment on the part of minorities in some areas, such
as Xinjiang and Tibet; however, the Government does not recognize
openly racism against minorities or tension among different ethnic
groups as problems.
Official figures state that the Government invested $12.6 billion
(104 billion rmb) in infrastructure development for minority areas
during the period 1991 to 1995. The ninth 5-Year Plan announced in 1997
stated that the Government would raise this figure to $27.8 billion
(230 billion rmb) for the period from 1996 to 2000. According to
government statistics, between 1991 and 1996, the economies in minority
regions grew by nearly 11 percent annually, surpassing the national
average in each year. Government development policies have helped
improve minority living standards. However, real incomes in minority
areas, especially for non-Han groups remain well below those in other
parts of the country, and minorities credibly claim that Han Chinese
have benefited disproportionately from government programs and economic
growth. Many development programs have disrupted traditional living
patterns of minority groups, including Tibetans and the Muslim Uighur
majority of western Xinjiang. For example, there is evidence that
official poverty alleviation programs, and major state projects such as
building dams and environmental/reforestation projects, include forced
evacuation of persons (see Section 2.d.). Plans to develop tourism in
Xinjiang also often have focused on marketing and investment
opportunities but paid little attention to how minority cultures and
the environment might be affected adversely. However, some projects
have been dropped for environmental reasons--for example, a proposal to
build a railway around Lake Tianchi near Urumqi. Since 1949 central
government and economic policy have resulted in a significant migration
of Han Chinese to Xinjiang. According to a government white paper, in
1998 there were approximately 8 million Uighurs, 2.5 million other
ethnic minorities, and 6.4 million Han in Xinjiang, up from 300,000 Han
in 1949.
According to official government statistics, 15.34 million minority
students attended schools between 1994 and 1996. A 1997 white paper
stated that 98.2 percent of all school-age children in the Guangxi
Zhuang Autonomous Region were enrolled in schools in 1996. In many
areas with a significant population of minorities, there are two-track
school systems using either Mandarin or the local minority language.
Students can choose to attend schools in either system. One
acknowledged side effect of this policy, originally designed to protect
and maintain minority cultures, has been reinforcement of a segregated
education system. Under this divided education system, those graduating
from minority schools are at a disadvantage in competing for jobs in
government and business, which require good Chinese-language skills.
Graduates of these schools typically need a year or more of intensive
Chinese before they can cope with course work at a Chinese-language
university (see Tibet addendum).
The Communist Party has an avowed policy of boosting minority
representation in the Government and the Party. A September government
white paper reported that there were 2.7 million minority officials in
the Government. According to government statistics, there were 163,000
minority officials in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Minority
officials constitute 23.3 percent of the region's total, exceeding the
ratio of the minority population to Han Chinese in the region. Many
members of minorities occupy local leadership positions, and a few have
positions of influence at the national level. However, in most areas
ethnic minorities are shut out of positions of real political and
decisionmaking power. In Xinjiang the job of county party secretary--
the most important position in a county--typically is reserved for Han
Chinese, even in counties that are close to 100 percent Uighur. Many
minorities resent Han officials holding key positions in minority
autonomous regions.
During the year, a government plan to resettle some 58,000 ethnic
Han, Hui Muslim, and Tibetan farmers in a traditionally Tibetan area
(Dulan county in Haixi Tibetan-Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai
province) as part of a poverty alleviation program fueled controversy.
The resettlement, which is to be funded in part by the World Bank
(which is currently reviewing the project), is planned to take 6 years
to complete; when the resettlement is completed, the Tibetan population
is projected to fall to 14 percent of the total in the project area,
from its current level of 22 percent. On August 15, two foreign
researchers and their Tibetan translator were detained and interrogated
by the authorities in Qinghai province, where they had gone to research
local reaction to the project. One of the foreigners was injured
seriously when he jumped out of a window. The two foreigners were
released from custody and expelled from the country after signing
confessions of wrongdoing; one was detained for 6 days, the other was
released to Hong Kong after 11 days. Their Tibetan translator was
released after 1 month in detention.
Tensions between ethnic Han citizens and Uighurs in Xinjiang
continued. Since 1996 the authorities have cracked down harshly on
suspected Uighur nationalists and independent Muslim religious leaders.
There were numerous reports during the year that Uighurs were being
executed or sentenced to long prison terms for separatist activities.
In February a government radio station in the Xinjiang Uighur
Autonomous Region reported that eight ``violent terrorists,'' who ``had
taken part in many illegal religious terrorist activities in recent
years in a vain attempt to split the motherland,'' had been sentenced
to death in public trials. According to the report, the eight were
executed immediately after sentencing. Newspapers reported in August
that the authorities had executed a 20-year-old Uighur, who reportedly
was behind several bombings that killed a policeman and wounded a
factory worker in 1998. Also in August, Amnesty International issued a
report documenting 210 death sentences and 190 executions in Xinjiang
since 1997. According to Amnesty International, thousands of persons
have been detained arbitrarily, including some for their suspected
support of the nationalist cause. Human Rights Watch reports that in
January, a court official in Ili prefecture admitted that 29 persons,
all but 2 of whom were Uighurs, had been sentenced to death. During the
year, there were numerous police checkpoints set up in southern
Xinjiang. There was at least one in most villages, and there were
several on major roads. Tensions rose in Xinjiang prior to October 1,
due to a heightened security presence and an increase in the harassment
of Uighurs. The heightened security presence continued after the
National Day celebrations. In late October, there were reports of a
confrontation between police and Uighurs that left six Uighurs and one
policeman dead. Amnesty International reports that many Uighurs
detained for political reasons in Xinjiang between 1990 and 1998 still
are believed to be in custody.
A campaign to stress ethnic unity and to condemn ``splittism'' and
religious extremism that began in Xinjiang in 1997 continued. This
campaign pervades the Chinese-language media and reaches into the
region's school system. Authorities maintained tight control over
``separatist activities,'' announced tightened security and
antiterrorist measures, and mounted campaigns tocrack down on
opposition during the year. Security in the region was especially tight
before the October 1 National Day celebrations, during which an
exhibition in Urumqi depicting the history of the Uighurs was shut
down.
According to some estimates, the migration of ethnic Han into
Xinjiang in recent decades has caused the Han-Uighur ratio in the
capital of Urumqi to shift from 20 to 80 to 80 to 20, and is a source
of Uighur resentment. Han control of the region's political and
economic institutions also has been a factor in the growth of tension.
The testing of nuclear weapons in Xinjiang until July 1996 was another
source of serious contention because of continuing health concerns and
environmental degradation. Although government policies have brought
tangible economic improvements to Xinjiang, Uighurs maintain that they
receive only a small share of the benefits. The majority of Uighurs are
poor farmers and 25 percent are illiterate.
The education system provides Chinese-language instruction for Han
students and Uighur-language instruction for Uighur students until
fourth grade, and then gradually switches to Chinese as the principal
language of instruction. Graduation from the Uighur school system
leaves Uighurs poorly educated, with an inadequate command of the
Chinese language.
Possession of separatist publications is not permitted, and,
according to reports, possession of such materials has resulted in
lengthy prison sentences. A Uighur-language press exists in Xinjiang,
but it has a very small circulation, and much of the population depends
on market rumor for information. In general, central authorities made
it clear that they do not tolerate opposition to Communist Party rule
and responded to unrest and terrorist incidents with force and
heightened security measures.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for
``freedom of association;'' however, in practice this right is subject
to the interests of the State and the leadership of the Communist
Party. The Communist Party controls the country's sole officially
recognized worker's organization, the All China Federation of Trade
Unions. The head of the ACFTU is a member of the Standing Committee of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party.
Independent trade unions are illegal. The 1993 Trade Union Law
required that the establishment of unions at any level be submitted to
a higher level trade union organization for approval, and only approved
registered unions are legal. The ACFTU subsumes under its authority 16
industry-based and 31 provincial-level labor unions. They, in turn,
have jurisdiction over roughly 586,000 ``grassroots'' labor unions
nationwide. According to labor regulations, there can be only one
``grassroots'' union per enterprise, and only enterprises that have at
least 25 employees may establish unions. Following the signing of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural rights in
1997, a number of labor activists petitioned the Government to
establish free trade unions as allowed under the Covenant. The
Government has not approved the establishment of any independent unions
to date.
Under the country's planned economy, the ACFTU's main task was to
improve labor discipline, mobilize workers to achieve party objectives,
and dispense social welfare funds. During the past 2 years, the ACFTU
has attempted to respond to the plight of unemployed workers, who have
grown to roughly 20 million as a result of layoffs in connection with
state-owned enterprise reform. The Government has instructed the ACFTU
to play a more active role in protecting the rights of laid off workers
and in assisting the Government in the reemployment process. The ACFTU
claims that, through 1999, it had established over 3,000 job placement
centers and more than 6,000 professional training programs, benefiting
over 3 million laid-off workers. During the year it also contributed
roughly $40 million (320 million rmb) to displaced workers in difficult
circumstances. Laid-off workers are entitled to unemployment stipends
for 5 years. The central Government, local governments, and state-owned
enterprises (SOE's) are to provide the funds for these stipends. Many
SOE's and local governments have been unable to contribute funds. As a
result, many workers have not received stipends.
The country's workforce totals approximately 740 million persons.
The ACFTU claims 103 million members, over 90 percent of whom work in
state-owned enterprises. The Trade Union Law allows workers to decide
whether to join the union in their enterprises, and there have been no
reports of repercussions for the 5 percent of workers who have not
joined ACFTU unions. In 1994 the ACFTU actively began recruiting
workers in the private sector, including in township and village
enterprises (TVE's), as well as in foreign joint ventures. The ACFTU
has 5.5 million members in foreign-funded enterprises (approximately 31
percent of the total) and 1.7 million members in private (nonstate
domestic)enterprises (approximately 12 percent of the total). Military
and security personnel are the only categories of laborers who cannot
join a union.
Despite these recruiting efforts, over half of the nonagricultural
work force is still largely unorganized. There are roughly 540 million
agricultural workers. Farmers do not have a union. There are
approximately 125 million agricultural workers in township and village
enterprises (TVE's). The ACFTU has attempted in recent years to recruit
TVE workers, but only 5.2 million have joined to date. Although some
TVE's have local branches of the ACFTU, most TVE managers maintain that
an ACFTU presence is not feasible because their employees continue to
be classified as ``farmers'' rather than ``workers.'' However, some
Communist Party secretaries in TVE's take it upon themselves to
establish union representation and then affiliate with the ACFTU.
During the year, the authorities allowed the formation of
semiautonomous ``village'' labor unions in the rural outskirts of some
cities. These nascent organizations, which have not yet been brought
formally within the ACFTU, represented migrant laborers in new private
sector industries. According to some press reports, these village
unions are effective, relatively independent, and cooperative with city
governments.
The Government continued its efforts to stamp out illegal union
activity, including through detention or arrest of labor activists. For
example, activists Li Jinhua and Yan Jinhong were sentenced in January
to reeducation-through-labor for 18 months and 12 months, respectively.
The two had been arrested in 1998 after leading steelworkers in Sichuan
to protest unpaid wages by blocking a railway. Zhang Xucheng was
arrested for participating in the same protest and still is awaiting
sentencing. Also in January, Zhang Shanguang, the founder of the short-
lived Association to Protect the Rights and Interests of Laid-off
Workers, unsuccessfully appealed the 10-year prison sentence he
received in December 1998. Zhang had been convicted of ``illegally
providing intelligence to a foreign organization'' after informing a
Radio Free Asia reporter about worker protests in Hunan province. In
April workers in Tianjin announced the formation of the Chinese
Association to Protect Worker's Rights. In July labor activist and
China Democracy Party member Liao Shaohua was arrested on subversion
charges after taking part in a workers' demonstration outside the
provincial government building in Changsha, Hunan. He was sentenced to
a total of 6 years on December 22. In July Yue Tianxiang was sentenced
to 10 years, and Guo Xinmin, and Wang Fengshan each were sentenced to 2
years in prison, for subversion. The three were arrested in January
after establishing the ``China Workers Watch,'' an organization to
defend workers'' rights. Guo Xinmin's family alleged that police hung
him by his hands in order to extract information on fellow dissidents.
In August He Chaohui was given a 10-year prison sentence for providing
intelligence to foreigners. He had served 2 years in prison for illegal
union activities in the 1980's and more recently had organized worker
demonstrations in Hunan. This time he was convicted for providing human
rights organizations overseas with information on protests.
Neither the Constitution nor the labor law provide for the right to
strike. The Communist Party exerts strong control over organized labor.
Strikes are not sanctioned officially, and accurate statistics on
strike incidents are not available. However, there continued to be
numerous reports of demonstrations throughout the country by workers in
response to unpaid wages, benefits, pensions, and unemployment
stipends, including in Shenyang, Kaishantun, and Anshan. Workers also
protested continuing large-scale layoffs that have been prompted by
industrial restructuring. Demonstrations were typically short and
nonviolent, with participation ranging as high as the thousands.
Government authorities for the most part responded with minimal force
to resolve labor conflicts and refrained from detaining large numbers
of participants.
The Trade Union Law assigns unions the role of mediators or go
betweens with management in cases of work stoppages and slowdowns. In
addition, a workers' dispute settlement procedure, in effect since
1987, provides for mediation, two levels of arbitration committees, and
a final appeal to the courts. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security
has established a nationwide organizational network for handling labor
disputes, consisting of 270,000 enterprise labor dispute mediation
commissions and 3,159 labor dispute arbitration commissions. There are
1,569,000 full- and part-time enterprise mediators and more than 17,000
labor arbitrators. In May the ACFTU reported that in 1997 there had
been more than 71,000 cases of labor-management disputes. This was
double the number reported by the ACFTU in 1995. According to
statistics released in September by the ACFTU, there were 152,000
disputes in 1998, which was more than double the 1997 figure.
Enterprise mediation committees resolved 113,000 of these cases.
Arbitration committees handled 66,000 cases, some of which had
originated before 1998. The courts addressed 3,100 appeals of
arbitration decisions. According to the 1999 International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) report, these mediation
efforts areoften preferential to employers and are largely ineffective
in advocating worker rights.
The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions brought a
complaint to the ILO against the Government in 1998, alleging the
detention of trade unionists and violations of the right to organize.
The Government denied the allegations in its official response to the
ILO in March. The case is now before the ILO's governing body.
There are no legal provisions allowing for individual workers to
affiliate with international labor organizations. However, the ACFTU
has cultivated relations with international trade unions. According to
the ACFTU, by mid-year it had established exchanges and cooperative
relations with over 400 trade unions and international and regional
trade organizations in over 130 countries. Over the past year,
approximately 50 official ACFTU delegations traveled overseas to meet
and study with trade union counterparts.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1995
National Labor Law permits collective bargaining for workers in all
types of enterprises. The law also provides for workers and employers
in all types of enterprises to sign individual as well as collective
contracts. Collective contracts are to be worked out between ACFTU or
worker representatives and management and specify such matters as
working conditions, wage distribution, and hours of work. Individual
contracts are then to be drawn up in line with the terms of the
collective contract. Collective contracts must be submitted to local
government authorities for approval within 15 days. According to the
ACFTU, 72 million workers in over 310,000 enterprises held contracts
that were negotiated in this fashion as of June.
The MOLSS uses four methods to set a total wage bill for each
collective and state-owned enterprise: (1) as a percentage of profits,
(2) as a contract amount with the local labor bureau, (3) as a state-
set amount for money losing enterprises, or (4) as an enterprise-set
amount subject to Labor Ministry review. Individual enterprises
determine how to divide the total among workers, a decision usually
made by the enterprise manager in consultation with the enterprise's
party secretary and the ACFTU representative. However, in practice only
a small number of workers with high technical skills can negotiate
effectively on salary and fringe benefits.
Worker congresses, which are held once or twice a year, have been
established in over 300,000 enterprises. A number of provincial ACFTU
chairmen have called for further strengthening the power of the
congresses--particularly on the sale and merger of enterprises.
Enterprise employees or their representatives attend voluntarily to
examine enterprise policies and reform plans. Participants also are
entitled to evaluate and, if necessary, dismiss enterprise managers,
although this right has not been realized in practice. Unions, in
consultation with management, are supposed to implement resolutions
passed by the congresses.
Nonetheless, many worker congresses continue to act largely as
rubber stamps for deals predetermined by the manager, union
representative, and Communist Party secretary. In smaller enterprises,
the same person sometimes holds these three posts.
The Trade Union Law prohibits antiunion discrimination, and
specifies that union representatives may not be transferred or
terminated by enterprise management during their term of office. Given
controls on organized labor activity, instances of reprisals or
discriminatory action by management against unions are uncommon.
Laws governing working conditions in special economic zones (SEZ's)
are not significantly different from those in the rest of the country.
However, wages in the SEZ's and in southeastern China generally are
significantly higher than in other parts of the country because high
levels of investment have created a great demand for available labor.
As in other areas of the country, officials have admitted that some
foreign investors in the SEZ's are able to negotiate ``sweetheart''
deals with local partners that effectively bypass labor regulations.
Unionized foreign businesses in the SEZ's report pragmatic relations
with ACFTU representatives.
c. Prohibition on Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is a
serious problem, particularly in penal institutions. Some penal
facilities contract with regular industries for prisoners to perform
manufacturing and assembly work. Others apparently operate their own
companies. A 1999 directory of Chinese corporations published by a
foreign business-information company listed at least two correctional
institutions as having business enterprises. Human rights advocates
cited this as evidence that products made with prison labor are being
exported. Government regulations bar the exportof prison-made goods;
however, it has been nearly impossible to verify whether these
regulations are enforced effectively. In 1998 there were reports that
Adidas World Cup soccer balls were produced for export by prisons in
the Shanghai area. A request for investigation of the allegations was
made to the Government in October 1998; there has been no response to
date.
In 1992 the U.S. and Chinese Governments signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) prohibiting trade in prison labor products. A
statement of cooperation (SOC) detailing specific working procedures
for implementation of the MOU was signed in 1994. Although the signing
of the SOC initially helped foster a more productive relationship
between U.S. Customs and Chinese authorities, in recent years the
authorities have been uncooperative. The authorities last permitted
Customs officials to visit a suspect prison labor facility in 1997, at
which time no evidence of prison labor was found. During the year, U.S.
Customs unsuccessfully pursued several standing requests to visit eight
sites suspected of exporting prison labor products (one of which dated
back to 1992, and several dating back to 1994). Customs also renewed
requests--some dating back to 1994--for the Ministry of Justice to
investigate seven factories and three penal facilities for evidence of
prison labor exports. The Ministry of Justice did not respond to any of
these requests during the year.
In addition to prisons and reform-through-labor facilities, which
hold inmates sentenced through judicial procedures, the Government also
maintains a network of reeducation-through-labor camps, to which
persons are sentenced, without judicial review, through administrative
procedures (see Section 1.d.). Inmates of reeducation-through-labor
facilities generally are required to work, and there have been reports
that products made in these facilities are exported. The Government has
taken the position that the facilities are not prisons and has denied
access to them under the 1992 prison labor MOU with the United States.
Credible reports from international human rights organizations and the
foreign press indicate that some persons in pretrial detention also are
required to work. Inmates of custody and repatriation centers, who also
have been detained administratively without trial, reportedly are
required to perform labor while in detention, often to repay the cost
of their detention. Most such inmates perform agricultural labor (see
Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
Most anecdotal reports conclude that work conditions in the penal
system's light manufacturing factories are similar to those in other
factories, but conditions on the penal system's farms and in mines can
be very harsh. As in many workplaces, safety is a low priority. There
are no available figures for deaths and injuries in prison industries.
Trafficking in women, and the kidnaping and sale of women and
children for forced prostitution, are problems (see Section 6.f.).
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and
generally enforces the prohibition effectively; except for the problem
of trafficking in children for forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.)
and of child labor in custody and repatriation centers (see Sections
1.d. and 1.e.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The National Labor Law specifies that ``no employing unit
shall be allowed to recruit juveniles under the age of 16,'' 2 years
older than the ILO standard age of 14 years for developing countries.
The Labor Law stipulates administrative review, fines, and revocation
of business licenses of those businesses that hire minors. The law also
provides for children to receive 9 years of compulsory education and
for parents or guardians to provide for their subsistence. Laborers
between the ages of 16 and 18 are referred to as ``juvenile workers,''
and are prohibited from engaging in certain forms of physical work,
including labor in mines.
Neither the ILO nor UNICEF believe that there is a significant
child labor problem in the formal sector. Good public awareness, a
cheap, abundant supply of legal young adult workers, nearly universal
primary schooling, and labor law enforcement all reduce opportunities
and incentives for employers to hire child workers. In view of this
ample supply of adult laborers, most employers choose not to risk fines
and possible arrest by hiring underage workers. Furthermore, many
foreign businesses in more developed areas follow codes of conduct that
set standards for labor conditions and provide for independent
inspections. Nonetheless, in poorer, isolated areas child labor in
agriculture is widespread.
However, scholars believe that child labor problems exist. Rural
teenagers, for example, have been attracted increasingly to work in
urban factories, since wages there are higher than can be obtained in
agricultural areas. Also, some private enterprises, particularly in
coal mining, operate far from urban centers,making it difficult for law
enforcement officials to ensure that child labor is not employed.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and
generally enforces this prohibition effectively, except for trafficking
in children for forced prostitution and child labor in custody and
repatriation centers (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e., and 6.c.). In 1995
several foreign newspapers reported instances in which forced child
labor allegedly was used in the production of Chinese coal, textiles,
and fireworks. Evidence currently is lacking to substantiate that such
practices continue.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Law codifies many of
the general principles of labor reform, setting out provisions on
employment, labor contracts, working hours, wages, skill development
and training, social insurance, dispute resolution, legal
responsibility, supervision, and inspection. There is no national
minimum wage; the Labor Law allows local governments to determine their
own standards on minimum wages. In general, minimum wage level
determinations are higher than the local minimum standard income but
lower than the current wage level of the average worker. Minimum wages
are usually sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family.
The MOLSS claims to have implemented during the year in over 600
cities a system that ensures disbursement of unemployment benefits to
laid-off workers and basic living stipends for the poorest urban
residents. It has been estimated that there are approximately 20
million laid off and unemployed workers in the country (see Section
6.a.). Unemployment benefits are set as a percentage of a worker's
former salary. Basic living stipends supplement the difference between
a poor person's income and the minimum standard income for the city
where he lives. Each city government determines the minimum standard
income on the basis of local economic conditions. In addition to the
stipend, families living on less than the minimum standard income are
eligible for subsidized food, medical services, housing, and funds to
enable school-age children to complete compulsory education. In
September the Government raised both unemployment benefits and basic
living stipends by 30 percent, despite numerous reports that some
cities had had difficulty providing these benefits and stipends even
before the increase. With the increases, the cities with the highest
minimum standard incomes were Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and
Beijing at $38 (312 rmb), $34 (280 rmb), and $33 (273 rmb) per month,
respectively. Poorer, interior cities such as Hohhot (Inner Mongolia)
and Nanchang (Jiangxi province) raised minimum standard incomes to $17
(143 rmb) and $16 (130 rmb) per month, respectively. However, many
workers reportedly are not receiving the benefits they are entitled to,
because the state-owned enterprises and the provincial governments are
unable to contribute to the funds that pay them (see Section 6.a.).
According to statistics published in 1999 by the World Bank, the annual
per capita disposable income of Chinese urban residents in 1998 was
$656 (5,379 rmb), an increase of 6 percent in real terms from 1997. The
net income of rural residents was $261 (2,140 rmb), an increase of 4
percent in real terms from the previous year. However, there were
estimates that rural income declined during the year. These income
growth rates occurred against a backdrop of 0.8 percent deflation in
1998. World Bank figures for the first three-quarters of 1999 indicated
that rural incomes were continuing to increase, but more slowly than
urban incomes, widening the already large gap between the living
standards of the 800 million peasants and those of urban workers. The
ratio between average incomes in coastal provinces and interior
provinces has been estimated by Chinese economists to be 12 to 1.
The Government reduced the national standard workweek in 1995 from
44 hours to 40 hours, excluding overtime. The Labor Law mandates a 24-
hour rest period weekly and does not allow overtime work in excess of 3
hours a day or 36 hours a month. It also sets forth a required scale of
remuneration for overtime work. Enforcement of regulations governing
overtime work varies according to region and type of enterprise.
Occupational health and safety remain problems and are frequent
themes of campaigns and posters in Chinese enterprises. Poor
enforcement of occupational health and safety regulations continues to
put workers' lives at risk. Recognizing this, the Government continued
during the year to cooperate with the ILO in organizing training
programs for enterprises' health and safety officers as well as local
government officials. The current work injury insurance system covers
only 37 million of the country's 200 million industrial workers. Every
work unit must designate a health and safety officer, and the
International Labor Organization (ILO) has established a training
program for these officials. Nonetheless, there is a high rate of
industrial accidents, with most of the accidents occurring in the
mining sector. In 1998 the Government called for a concerted effort to
improve occupational safety after industrial accidents reached 18,268
in 1997. Statistics released in during the year showed that industrial
accidents in 1998 declined 16 percent to 15,372.
Deaths stemming from such accidents likewise declined 16 percent to
14,660. This trend continued in 1999. Official figures for the first
half of the year revealed that accidents and deaths were down 12 and 14
percent, respectively, compared with the first half of 1998. Less than
half of rural enterprises meet national dust and poison standards. Many
factories that use harmful products, such as asbestos, not only fail to
protect their workers against the ill effects of such products, but
also do not inform them about the potential hazards.
The drop in the rate of industrial accidents was largely
attributable to a decrease in mine accidents, which perennially have
accounted for more than half of all such accidents. Mine accidents
declined 24 percent in 1998 to 5,674, while mining deaths fell by 18
percent to 9,221. Accidents and deaths through the first half of 1999
declined 32 percent and 25 percent, respectively, compared with the
first half of 1998. The decline was primarily the result of a national
drive to close unlicensed mines. In 1998 the Government shut down 8,845
small-sized coal mines, approximately one-third of the illegally
operated mines that have been ordered closed by the end of 1999. The
purpose of the drive has been two-fold: to reduce mine accidents and to
lower the surplus supply of coal, which has driven down coal prices in
recent years.
Although the Constitution does not provide for the right to strike,
the Trade Union Law explicitly recognizes the right of unions to
``suggest that staff and workers withdraw from sites of danger'' and
participate in accident investigations. However, it is unclear to what
extent workers actually can remove themselves from such dangerous
situations without risking loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in persons and the
abduction of women for trafficking are serious problems. The purchase
of women was criminalized in 1991, with the enactment of the NPC
Standing Committee's ``Decision Relating to the Severe Punishment of
Criminal Elements Who Abduct and Kidnap Women and Children,'' which
made abduction and sale separate offenses. The 1992 Law on the
Protection of Women's Rights and Interests also addressed the issue of
trafficking in women. Individuals have been sentenced to death for
their involvement in the trade in persons. In March, a man in Sichuan
province reportedly was executed for selling women. Although the
central Government and various provincial and local governments have
attempted to crack down on the sex trade, there have been numerous
credible reports in the media of complicity in prostitution by local
officials. Thus far, actions to crack down on this lucrative business,
which involves organized crime groups and business persons as well as
the police and the military, have been largely ineffective.
According to some estimates by experts, there may be 4 to 10
million commercial sex workers in the country, an unknown number of
whom may have been trafficked (see Section 5). The increased
commercialization of sex and related trafficking in women has trapped
thousands of women in a cycle of crime and exploitation, and left them
vulnerable to disease and abuse. According to one estimate there are
70,000 prostitutes in Beijing alone. According to the official Xinhua
News Agency, one in five massage parlors in China is involved in
prostitution, with the percentage higher in cities. Prostitutes can be
found at many bars and clubs in urban areas.
Women also are trafficked within or to China for the purpose of
forced marriage. Some experts, including the CEDAW Committee, have
suggested that the serious imbalance in sex ratios in some regions (see
Section 1.f.) has created a situation in which the demand for
marriageable women cannot be met by local brides, thus fueling the
demand for abducted women. Others have suggested that the problem is
exacerbated by the tendency for many village women to leave rural areas
to seek employment, and by the tradition that requires that expensive
betrothal gifts be given to women. The cost of betrothal gifts may
exceed the price of a bride and thus make purchasing a bride more
attractive to poor rural families. Some families address the problem of
a shortage of women by recruiting women in economically less advanced
areas. Others seek help from criminal gangs, which either kidnap women
or trick them by promising them jobs and an easier way of life and then
transport them far from their home areas for delivery to buyers. Once
in their new ``family,'' these women are ``married'' and raped. Some
accept their fate and join the new community; others struggle and are
punished. According to reports, many of the kidnapings also occur in
provinces, such as Sichuan and Guangxi, where the male to female ratio
is generally balanced. The Government has made efforts to combat this
practice, but a 1997 report by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women stated that lenient punishment of traffickers and
insufficient efforts to combat the trade contributed to its continued
prevalence.
There were reports that women from Burma, Laos, North Korea,
Vietnam, and Russia were trafficked into the country either towork in
the sex trade or to be forced to marry Chinese men. Border guards
reportedly are involved in trafficking in women from the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea into China. Some of the women are sold
against their will to rural Chinese men who have difficulty finding
wives in their home villages. Others end up working as prostitutes.
Women reportedly also were trafficked from Vietnam into China for
purposes of forced marriage. On June 8, press reports stated that 28
Vietnamese women who had been kidnaped and sold as wives to farmers in
Fujian province were rescued by the police. Two Vietnamese who
allegedly sold the women for $845 (7,000 rmb) were also detained.
According to press reports, trafficking victims have been detained
by the authorities in custody and repatriation centers before being
returned home (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
Chinese women are being trafficked to other countries for work in
the sex industry, as well. Reports indicated that Chinese women were
trafficked to countries including Malaysia, Burma, Taiwan, Australia,
the United States, and Canada; most apparently were from impoverished
areas in the northeast. Most trafficked Chinese women in Malaysia are
from the coastal areas of Guangdong, Fujian, and Shanghai. One
prominent social worker estimates that there are thousands of Chinese
women working as prostitutes in Malaysia. Most of these women were
trafficked to Malaysia by ethnic Chinese gangs. Most Chinese women
trafficked to Australia are reportedly from Shanghai, Hong Kong, and
Guangzhou.
Alien smuggling rings also traffic persons from China to other
countries, including Canada, Japan, the United States, Italy, and other
countries in Europe, to engage in work in domestic service,
restaurants, sweatshops, and other businesses. Authorities in Italy
report that an estimated 30,000 illegal Chinese immigrants work in
sweatshop conditions outside of Florence, with many children working
alongside their parents in the production of scarves, purses, and
imitations of various brand name products. Alien smuggling rings often
have ties to organized crime, and are international in scope. In late
December, authorities in the U.S. and Canada began to find persons
smuggled from China in shipping containers on cargo ships arriving from
Hong Kong. Those trafficked by alien smugglers may pay high prices for
their passage to other countries, where they hope that their economic
prospects may improve. According to press reports in December, several
Chinese were smuggled into the United States in a well-provisioned
cargo container. There were reports that the persons in the container
may have paid between $30,000 to $50,000 (248,000 to 410,000 rmb) each
for their passage. Many such persons find themselves working in
situations akin to indentured servitude. Upon arrival, many reportedly
are forced to repay the traffickers for the smuggling charges by
working in specified jobs for a set period of time. They often are
forced to pay charges for living expenses out of their meager earnings,
as well. The conditions under which these trafficked persons must live
and work are generally poor, and they may be required to work long
hours. Their movements often are restricted by the smuggling rings that
trafficked them, and their travel documents, which are often
fraudulent, frequently are confiscated. Victims of trafficking face
threats of being turned in to the authorities as illegal immigrants and
threats of retaliation against their families at home if they protest
the situation in which they find themselves. Many of those trafficked
in this manner are from Fujian province.
Trafficked persons who are repatriated may face fines for illegal
immigration upon their return; after a second repatriation, persons may
be sentenced to a term in a reeducation-through-labor camp. Alien
smugglers are fined $6,000 (50,000 rmb) and may be sentenced to up to 3
years in prison.
Despite government efforts to prevent kidnaping and the buying and
selling of children these problems persist in some rural areas. Since
December 1998, Chinese authorities have reported an increase in the
number of children being trafficked to other countries by alien
smugglers for purposes of forced prostitution.
In June the Government convened a conference on migrant trafficking
interdiction and deterrence; parts of the conference were later aired
on China Central Television.
Tibet.--(This section of the report on China has been prepared
pursuant to Section 536 (b) of Public Law 103-236. The United States
recognizes the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)--hereinafter referred to
as ``Tibet''--to be part of the People's Republic of China.
Preservation and development of Tibet's unique religious, cultural, and
linguistic heritage and protection of its people's fundamental human
rights continue to be of concern.)
Respect for the Integrity of the Person.--The Chinese Government
strictly controls access to and information about Tibet. Thus, it is
difficult to determineaccurately the scope of human rights abuses.
However, according to credible reports, Chinese government authorities
continued to commit serious human rights abuses in Tibet, including
instances of torture, arbitrary arrest, detention without public trial,
and lengthy detention of Tibetan nationalists for peacefully expressing
their political or religious views. Tight controls on religion and on
other fundamental freedoms continued and intensified during the year,
especially during sensitive anniversaries and occasions. These included
the 40th anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule
in March, the June visit of Gyaltsen Norbu, the boy recognized as the
Panchen Lama by the Chinese Government, the Dalai Lama's birthday on
July 6, the August National Minority Games, and the 50th anniversary of
the founding of the Peoples' Republic of China on October 1. There were
political protests by Tibetans in a number of ethnic Tibetan areas,
including outside of the TAR. According to the Tibet Information
Network (TIN), an independent news and research service based in
London, political protest by and detention of Tibetans is both
increasing and spreading throughout ethnic Tibetan areas, especially in
ethnic Tibetan areas outside of the TAR.
Although the authorities permit many traditional religious
practices and public manifestations of belief, activities viewed as
vehicles for political dissent are not tolerated and are promptly and
forcibly suppressed. The security clampdown throughout China is being
felt in Tibet, and Tibetan Buddhism came under increasing attack.
Individuals accused of political activism faced ongoing and serious
persecution during the year. The Government continued its campaign to
discredit the Dalai Lama and to limit the power of religious persons
and secular leaders sympathetic to him. The ``patriotic education'' of
monks and nuns continued to be an important part of the campaign, which
in the last 2 years was extended throughout Tibet and to monasteries
outside of the TAR. Although some reports suggest a winding down of
patriotic education activities throughout the region as the objectives
of increasing control over the monasteries and reducing the numbers of
monks and nuns were achieved, religious activities in many monasteries
have been disrupted severely and monks and nuns have fled to India to
escape the campaigns. The ban on the public display of photographs of
the Dalai Lama continued, and such pictures were not readily available
in many parts of the TAR. There were reports of imprisonment and
torture or abuse of monks and nuns accused of political activism, the
death of prisoners, and the closure of several monasteries.
While there was limited political violence in Tibet during the
year, several political protesters were beaten severely by security
forces. According to many credible reports, one protester, Tashi
Tsering, who attempted to raise the outlawed Tibetan flag with
explosives tied around his waist during the National Minority Games in
August, is still in the hospital because of severe head injuries
received during a brutal public beating by security forces. An
unconfirmed report has claimed that he, in fact, died from his
injuries. A teenage monk who shouted proindependence slogans during
rehearsal ceremonies for the Games also was subjected to a prolonged
beating in front of hundreds of spectators. Foreigners, including
international NGO personnel and foreign residents of Tibet, all were
subject to more restrictions on travel in Tibet than in 1998, in part
due to authorities' concerns over sensitive anniversary dates. During
several periods over the summer tourists were subjected to forced
searches. The Government also placed restrictions on the movement of
Tibetans during sensitive anniversaries and events. There was a notable
increase in the number of security forces in and around Lhasa,
especially during the summer. The Government tightly controls official
visits, and delegation members usually have very few opportunities to
meet local Tibetans not previously approved by the local authorities.
There also were numerous reports of detentions and other
punishments meted out during the year. International human rights
organizations reported that on March 10, security personnel in Lhasa
detained two monks after they demonstrated in Barkhor Square on the
anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule; TIN
reported that 80 persons were detained in Tibet prior to this
anniversary. In July the two monks, Phuntsok Legmon, age 16, and
Namdrol, age 21, were sentenced to 3 and 4 years in prison,
respectively, as well as to periods of deprivation of political rights.
There also were reports that the Jokhang Temple, the most sacred
Buddhist site in Tibet, was briefly closed prior to March 10. In August
a small group of monks and nuns reportedly shouted proindependence
slogans in a stadium during a cultural performance held in conjunction
with the National Minority Games; police ran through the crowd in an
attempt to detain them. According to unconfirmed reports, the group's
members eventually were detained by the authorities. Three monks were
detained on October 1 after a peaceful protest near the Potala palace
in Lhasa. Tibetans in Lhasa reportedly were threatened with a cut in
their pay or pensions if they refused to take part in rehearsals for
the October 1 National Day celebrations; Lhasa residents also were
required to put up national flags at their homes to mark the occasion.
On July 16, a group of three foreigners was detained in Lhasa for
having burned a Chinese flag in their hotel room and having committed
other acts of disrespect towards the flag. The men were detained after
having taken film with photographs of these events to be developed in a
local film shop. They were detained by Public Security Bureau officials
without charge at Lhasa's Gutsa detention center for periods ranging
from 10 to 15 days. Upon release, the men were expelled from the
country.
Agya Rinpoche, former abbot of Kumbum monastery in Qinghai
province, senior Tibetan religious figure, and an official at the
deputy minister level, left China in November 1998 due to differences
with the Chinese authorities over religious policies. Among reported
reasons for his departure were increased government pressure on Kumbum
monastery, including the stationing of 45 government or party officials
and the imposition of patriotic reeducation, and a heightened role
demanded of him by the Government in its campaign to legitimize
Gyaltsen Norbu, the boy recognized by the Chinese leadership as the
11th Panchen Lama. In January authorities announced the launch of a 3-
year drive to promote atheism and science, primarily directed at
government workers, saying such an effort was needed to promote
economic progress, strengthen the struggle against separatism, and stem
``the Dalai clique's reactionary infiltration.''
Legal safeguards for ethnic Tibetans detained or imprisoned are the
same as those in the rest of China and are inadequate in design and
implementation. According to information gathered by TIN, the average
judicial sentence currently being served is 7.3 years in Tibet compared
with 5.7 years for the overall average since 1987. TIN reports the
average administrative sentence (for less than 15 persons) at 2.3
years. Lack of independent access to prisoners or prisons makes it
difficult to assess the extent and severity of abuses and the number of
Tibetan prisoners. A majority of judges are ethnic Tibetans, but most
have little or no legal training, a problem authorities are working to
address through increased legal education opportunities. Trials are
brief and closed. Courts handle approximately 20 cases involving crimes
against state security each year, for which maximum prison sentences
are 15 years for each count, not to exceed twenty years in total. Such
cases mainly concern actions in support of Tibetan independence and do
not have to be violent to be illegal. A TIN report put the number of
political prisoners in Tibet at 500 as of the end of the year. TIN
reports that in Tibet, 80 percent of female detainees are nuns and
approximately 66 percent male prisoners are monks. The warden of
Drapchi prison in Lhasa told a delegation of foreign religious leaders
in February 1998 that there were 100 monks and nuns there, of whom 90
percent were incarcerated for ``crimes against national security.''
There are reports that the rate at which Tibetan political prisoners
are dying in detention or soon after their release, demonstrably as a
result of treatment while in detention, is increasing. According to
TIN, female political prisoners, particularly those held at Lhasa's
Drapchi prison, are at the greatest risk; since 1987 1 in 22 died while
in prison or soon after being released. TIN reports that it confirmed
six deaths in 1998 compared with two deaths in the period from 1987 to
1997. Drapchi's male political prisoners have died at a rate of about 1
in 37 since 1987. Overall, TIN reports a death rate of 1 in 48 for
Tibetan political prisoners as of the end of the year. A 21-year-old
monk, Legshe Tsoglam, imprisoned in early April after refusing to
cooperate with a patriotic education campaign at Nalanda monastery near
Lhasa, was beaten severely while in Lhasa's Gutsa detention center and
died on April 12, just days after his release, according to TIN.
Another monk in his twenties, Ngawang Jinpa from Ganden monastery, died
in May, 2 months after his release from Drapchi prison, where he had
served a 4-year term for political activities, according to TIN. A 22-
year-old monk from Nalanda monastery, Norbu died in February. During
his year-long detention in Gutsa, in 1995 and 1996, he sustained damage
to his kidneys from severe beatings, according to TIN. TIN also
reported that Lobsang Tenzin, a 33-year-old former student who was
arrested with Sonam Wangdu, is now in very poor health and unable to
walk after repeated beatings in the high security Powo Tramo prison in
remote Pome county. Sonam Wangdu reportedly died in March as a result
of torture. Lobsang Choephel, a monk from Khangmar monastery,
reportedly died in detention in May 1998. There have been credible
reports that after the early May 1998 protests at Drapchi prison, six
nuns, at least three monks, and another person died as a result of
beatings received during the disturbances; one prisoner, Ngawang
Sungrab, reportedly was shot in the abdomen by prison guards during the
protest. His condition is unknown.
Ngawang Choephel, a Tibetan ethnomusicologist sentenced in 1996 to
18 years in prison on charges of espionage, was moved in 1998 from a
detention center in Shigatse to the high security Powo Tramo prison,
after the failure of his appeal of his sentence. In response to
numerous inquiries by foreign officials, the Government acknowledged
that Ngawang Choephel had developed symptoms of bronchitis, pulmonary
infection, and hepatitis. His mother's repeated requests to be allowed
to travel from India toChina to visit him continue to go unanswered by
the authorities, despite provisions in the law that allow for prisoner
visits.
According to credible reports, Chadrel Rinpoche, who was accused of
betraying state secrets while helping the Dalai Lama choose the 11th
reincarnation of the Panchen Lama, has been held in a secret compound
of a Sichuan prison where he is separated from other prisoners, denied
all outside contacts, and restricted to his cell, since his 1997
sentence to 6 years' imprisonment after a trial that was closed to the
public. There are many credible reports that prisoners are tortured and
mistreated. Authorities use electric shocks, suspension in painful
positions, and other forms of torture or abuse.
Several groups also reported mistreatment and beatings of nuns in
prison, including 23-year-old Ngawang Sangdrol, who was imprisoned at
age 13, released 9 months later and resentenced at age 15; her prison
sentence extended for a third time in late 1998 to a total of 21 years
for her involvement in demonstrations, most recently during May 1998.
Sangdrol reportedly has been beaten badly on several occasions because
of repeated participation in protests at Drapchi prison; her health is
reportedly poor. Six other prisoners also had their sentences extended
for periods of 3 to 4 years as a result of the May 1998 protests.
Namgyal Tashi, the elderly father of Ngawang Sangdrol, was to have been
released from prison in June; however, friends and family have not
heard from him since 1998. There are credible reports from a number of
prisons that political prisoners who resisted political reeducation
imposed by prison authorities, particularly demands to denounce the
Dalai Lama and accept Gyaltsen Norbu, the boy recognized by the
Government as the Panchen Lama, also were beaten. There were credible
reports that guards beat political prisoners at Drapchi prison after
the protests in May 1998; some were beaten severely, including monk
Thubten Kalsang and nun Phuntsog Nyidrol (who reportedly tried to
shield Ngawang Sangdrol from beatings). In at least one cell block,
prisoners reportedly were confined to their cells for 14 months after
the incidents in May 1998. According to TIN, punishments meted out to
uncooperative prisoner leaders have resulted in hunger strikes among
female prisoners on at least two occasions at Drapchi. In March TIN
reported clampdowns in prisons following the anniversary of the Dalai
Lama's flight into exile. According to TIN, officials are resorting to
lengthening periods of solitary confinement to isolate demonstrators.
TIN reports one case of two nuns who were still in solitary confinement
in mid-1998 after having demonstrated in February 1997.
In February TIN and the foreign press reported increased use of
military-style drills and exercises at Lhasa's Drapchi prison in an
effort to increase discipline among prisoners, who were forced to run
barefoot, stand motionless for extended periods, or march while
shouting patriotic slogans. Prisoners who fell behind were beaten
severely. Prisoners also were treated badly in other prisons. TIN
reported that Gyaye Phuntsog, a 68-year-old monk from Qinghai province,
may have been deprived of food and sleep for several days during his
interrogation, prior to his release on medical parole during the
summer. Several sources report that he is now unable to walk without
the use of crutches. There were also reports that two Lhasa prisons,
Drapchi and Utritru, recently have grown to include new cellblocks and
industrial and agricultural facilities. Among the facilities reportedly
added to Drapchi prison was a cement factory.
Promotion of family planning remains an important goal for the
authorities in Tibet, but family planning policies permit ethnic
Tibetans, as well as other minority groups, to have more children than
Han Chinese. Urban Tibetans are permitted to have two children, those
in rural areas often have three or more, although according to a TIN
report, in several rural counties a two child limit is being applied.
In practice, Tibetans working for the Government, especially Communist
Party members, are pressured to limit themselves to one child.
In September, the Gyatso Children's Home, an orphanage that housed
more than 60 Tibetan children in Lhasa, was closed by local
authorities, who alleged that the home's personnel were engaged in
corrupt activity and had links to Tashi Tsering, who attempted to raise
the outlawed Tibetan flag with explosives tied around his waist during
the National Minority Games in Lhasa in August. The managers of the
facility and the entire staff were arrested. The children, ranging in
age from 1 to 14, reportedly either were returned to their home
prefectures, turned out into the streets, or placed in a local
orphanage where conditions were reportedly extremely poor.
Freedom of Religion.--The Government maintains tight controls on
religious practices and places of worship. While it allows a number of
forms of religious activity in Tibet, it does not tolerate religious
manifestations that advocate Tibetan independence or any expression of
separatism, which it describes as ``splittism.'' The Government harshly
criticizes the Dalai Lama's politicalactivities and leadership of a
government-in-exile. The official press continued to criticize
vehemently the ``Dalai clique'' and, in an attempt to undermine the
credibility of his religious authority, repeatedly described the Dalai
Lama as a separatist who was determined to split China. Both central
government and local officials often insist that dialog with the Dalai
Lama is essentially impossible and claim that his actions belie his
repeated public assurances that he does not advocate independence for
Tibet. Nonetheless, the Government asserts that it is willing to hold
talks with the Dalai Lama as long as he ceases his activities to divide
the country and recognizes that Tibet and Taiwan are inseparable parts
of China's territory. During June 1998, both President Jiang Zemin and
the Dalai Lama expressed readiness for dialog; however, the Government
later rebuffed efforts by the Dalai Lama to begin such a dialog.
Most Tibetans practice Buddhism to some degree. This holds true for
many ethnic Tibetan government officials and Communist Party members.
Some 1,000 religious figures hold positions in local people's
congresses and committees of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference. However, the Government continues to insist
that party members and government employees adhere to the Party's code
of atheism. In January a drive to promote atheism and science was
announced that, according to official sources, was directed primarily
toward raising the level of science and technology among government
workers. According to credible reports, there have been instances in
which Chinese authorities threatened to terminate Tibetan government
employees whose children are studying in India (where the Dalai Lama's
government-in-exile is located) if they did not bring the children back
to Tibet, and in which authorities searched the homes of government
workers for religious objects or pictures of the Dalai Lama.
Buddhist monasteries and proindependence activism are associated
closely in Tibet. The Government continued its patriotic education
campaigns begun in 1996, with more focus on Tibetan areas outside of
the TAR. The campaigns, which largely have been unsuccessful in
changing Tibetans' attitudes, are aimed at controlling the monasteries
and expelling sympathizers of Tibetan independence and supporters of
the Dalai Lama. According to regulations posted at the entrances of
many monasteries, monks are required to be ``patriotic'' and sign a
declaration agreeing to reject independence for Tibet; reject the boy
recognized by the Dalai Lama as the 11th reincarnation of the Panchen
Lama; reject and denounce the Dalai Lama; recognize the unity of China
and Tibet; and not listen to the Voice of America. According to some
reports, monks who refused to sign were expelled from their
monasteries; others have been detained. Resistance to the campaigns has
been intense, and the Government's efforts are resented deeply.
According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 2,905 Tibetans
left Tibet during the year. TIN reports that over one-third included
``patriotic reeducation'' and its consequences among their reasons for
leaving.
In January TIN reported that two major religious sites effectively
had been closed as a result of the ``patriotic education campaigns'' of
1997 and 1998. Monks at the Jonang Kumbum monastery in Shigatse and
nuns at the Rakhor nunnery near Lhasa reportedly were dispersed in 1998
after they refused to accept conditions laid out by the Government's
patriotic education teams, including renouncing the Dalai Lama and
Gendun Choekyi Nyima, the boy recognized by the Dalai Lama as the
Panchen Lama. The Rakhor nunnery reportedly has been destroyed.
Approximately 3,000 Tibetans enter Nepal each year, according to the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. In November 1998, Chinese police
shot and killed a 15-year-old boy attempting to leave Tibet to become a
monk in India, according to TIN. Also in the fall of 1998, at least two
Tibetan girls were raped by a group of ethnic Han and Tibetan police
after they were caught trying to cross the border with the aims of
studying at Tibetan schools in India and becoming nuns, according to
TIN.
According to information gathered in an interview by a foreign
official, 15-year-old Sonam Palden and 17-year-old Sonam Tsering
attempted to leave Tibet in October 1998 to pursue religious teaching
in India. At the border, Chinese border guards killed Sonam Tsering and
shot and injured Sonam Palden. During subsequent incarceration in Namri
prison in Shigatse, Sonam Palden was held in solitary confinement,
beaten, and denied adequate medical treatment. Following his release
because of his medical condition, Sonam Palden left Tibet in November.
TIN reported that authorities imposed harsh measures to ban the
celebration of the Dalai Lama's birthday on July 6, and that security
forces beat several Tibetans who attempted to carry out traditional
celebration activities. The ban on the public display of photographs of
the Dalai Lama continued, and such pictures were not readily available
in many parts of the TAR. These restrictions are enforced less strictly
in Tibetan areas outside of the TAR, where pictures of the Dalai Lama
are displayed at many monasteries. Portraits of the boy recognized by
the Government to be the Panchen Lama, Gyaltsen Norbu, were on
prominent display in some monasteries, but the Government stillbanned
pictures of Gendun Choekyi Nyima, the boy recognized by the Dalai Lama
as the Panchen Lama.
Nonetheless, there were numerous arrests of monks charged with
distributing or possessing pictures of the Dalai Lama or with having
links to exile groups; some of these reports came from areas outside of
the TAR. In a Tibetan area of Sichuan province, at least five monks
were arrested over the summer and fall for engaging in such activities.
Two monks in Qinghai province were arrested in April for distributing
the Dalai Lama's picture, according to a human rights group. The TIN
reported in January that at least five Buddhist monks and two lay
persons were arrested in November and December 1998 at the Kirti
monastery in Amdo, an ethnically Tibetan area outside of the TAR,
following a ``patriotic education'' campaign being carried out at the
monastery. The monks were required to accept conditions that included a
ban on pictures of the Dalai Lama and the Kirti Rinpoche (head of the
monastery, now resident in India), accept that the Dalai Lama
represented a separatist movement, hand over copies of the Dalai Lama's
speeches and writings to the authorities, and renounce Gendun Choekyi
Nyima, the boy recognized by the Dalai Lama as the Panchen Lama. Those
detained reportedly were suspected of organizing displays of pictures
of the Dalai Lama and boycotts of the ``patriotic education'' campaign.
Many monks have fled Tibet in recent years to avoid persecution for
their religious and political beliefs.
Chinese officials state that the TAR has more than 46,380 Buddhist
monks and nuns and approximately 1,790 monasteries, temples, and
religious sites. There are proportionate numbers of monks and nuns in
other Tibetan areas of China. Officials stated that these figures have
remained stable over the last 3 years because monasteries are not able
to support higher numbers of monks. However, the Government has moved
to curb the proliferation of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, which it
charges are a drain on local resources and a conduit for political
infiltration by the Tibetan exile community. The Government generally
imposes strict limits on the number of monks in major monasteries, and
has the right to disapprove any individual's application to take up
religious orders, although these restrictions are not always enforced.
The number of monks at Ragya monastery reportedly decreased from 500 to
250 in 1998. There have been reports that other monasteries also have
been required to decrease the number of monks associated with them.
The Government continues to oversee the daily operations of major
monasteries. Although the Government generally contributes only a small
percentage of the monasteries' operational funds, it retains management
control of the monasteries through the government-controlled democratic
management committees and the local religious affairs bureaus. In April
1996, regulations restricted leadership of management committees of
monasteries to ``patriotic and devoted'' monks and nuns and specified
that the Government must approve all members of the committees. Despite
these government efforts to control monasteries, antigovernment
sentiment remains strong.
The Government continued to insist that Gyaltsen Norbu, the boy it
recognizes and enthroned in 1995 is the reincarnation of the Panchen
Lama. The Panchen Lama is Tibetan Buddhism's second highest figure,
after the Dalai Lama. Since then Gyaltsen Norbu visited Tibet in June
for the first time in 3 years, holding audiences for both monks and lay
persons who were ordered by their work units to attend. Security
surrounding the visit was extremely tight. The boy's return to Tibet
received extensive coverage in the media, where he was quoted as
telling believers to ``love the Communist Party of China, love our
Socialist motherland, and love the religion we believe in.'' Norbu also
appeared publicly in Beijing to mark the 50th anniversary of the
founding of the People's Republic of China. At all other times he was
held incommunicado by Chinese authorities. Meanwhile, the Government
continued to detain Gendun Choekyi Nyima, the boy recognized by the
Dalai Lama as the Panchen Lama. The boy's family also was detained.
Repeated requests by high-level foreign government and private
delegations, including the U.N. High Commisioner for Human Rights, for
access to the boy have been denied. The Government maintains that Nyima
has been placed under government protection for his own safety. The
authorities also maintain that both boys are being well cared for and
are receiving a good education. The Government denied press reports in
November that Gendun Choekyi Nyima died and was cremated secretly;
however, the Government continues to refuse international observers the
access necessary to confirm his well-being. The majority of Tibetan
Buddhists recognize Gendun Choekyi Nyima, recognized by the Dalai Lama
as the Panchen Lama; refugee monks told a foreign official that they
believe that virtually all Tibetans hold this view. Tibetan monks have
claimed that they were forced to sign statements pledging allegiance to
the boy that the Government selected as the reincarnation of the
Panchen Lama. The Party also urged its members to support the
``official'' Panchen Lama, and the Propaganda Department of the
Communist Party committees at both the regional and city levels had
pictures of the boy printed for use in public and private religious
displays.
The Government continued to contribute significant funds towards
the restoration of Buddhist sites, many of which were destroyed during
the Cultural Revolution, in part to promote the development of tourism
in Tibet. Many other restoration efforts are funded privately. The
monasteries continue to house and train young monks. Although by law
monks are prohibited from joining a monastery prior to the age of 18.
In fact, many younger boys join monasteries. In late December, the 14-
year-old Karmapa Lama left Tibet secretly, reportedly to seek religious
teaching in India. Shortly after his departure, the monastery was
raided and two persons were arrested.
While officials state that there is no Falun Gong activity in the
TAR, reports indicated that there are small numbers of practitioners of
Falun Gong present in the region, among the ethnic Han population. A
few reportedly were detained after the Falun Gong was banned in July
(see Section 2.c.).
In June 1998, the European Union issued a report based on the trip
of its ambassadorial delegation to Tibet in early May. The report was
highly critical of the Government's control of religious freedom and
stated that ``the delegation was in no doubt that the authorities in
the TAR exercise extremely tight control over the principal elements of
Tibetan religion and culture.''
Economic Development and Protection of Cultural Heritage.--
Tibetans, as one of China's 55 other minority ethnic groups, receive
preferential treatment in marriage and family planning policies, and,
to a lesser extent, in university admissions, and in government
employment. According to official government statistics, 74 percent of
all government employees in Tibet are ethnic Tibetans. Nonetheless,
many positions of real power are held by ethnic Han, and most key
decisions in Tibet are made by Chinese. Although government regulations
stipulate that government and legal documents are to be in Tibetan, in
practice written communications by officials and government documents
very frequently are in Chinese. In the area of private sector
employment, discrimination against Tibetans is widespread.
The central government and other provinces of China heavily
subsidize the Tibetan economy, which has grown by an average annual
rate of over 10 percent for the last decade. Over 90 percent of Tibet's
budget income comes from outside sources. Tibet also benefits from a
wide variety of favorable economic and tax policies. However, these
policies have attracted growing numbers of ethnic Han and Hui (Muslim)
immigrants from other parts of China, who are competing with--and in
some cases displacing--Tibetan enterprises and labor. Government
development policies have helped raise the economic living standards of
ethnic Tibetans, particularly in the areas of health care, education,
and transportation, but many benefits of development accrue primarily
to Han Chinese. For example, in many areas of Lhasa, almost all small
businesses are run by Han. Rapid economic growth, the expanding tourism
industry, and the introduction of more modern cultural influences also
have disrupted traditional living patterns and customs, causing
environmental problems and threatening traditional Tibetan culture.
Prostitution increasingly is a problem in Tibet, as it is elsewhere
in the country, according to experts working in the region. Hundreds of
brothels operate openly in Lhasa; up to 10,000 commercial sex workers
may be employed in Lhasa alone. Much of the prostitution occurs in
sites owned by the Party or the Government, under military protection.
Many brothels reportedly are located near military bases and religious
and cultural sites. Most prostitutes in Tibet are ethnic Han women,
mainly from Sichuan, but a few are reportedly Tibetan. The incidence of
HIV among prostitutes in Tibet is unknown, but is believed to be
relatively high.
Illiteracy and semi-literacy levels are high. According to official
Government statistics, the 1998 illiteracy rate for Tibetans age 15 and
over was approximately 60 percent, and in some areas was considerably
higher. Chinese officials over the past few years have downgraded the
use of Tibetan in education and in 1997 announced that they would begin
teaching Chinese to Tibetan children starting in the first grade. The
Government stated that this step was taken in order to make Tibetan
children more competitive with their Han counterparts, and provide more
educational and employment opportunities in the long run. Primary
schools at the village level follow a Tibetan curriculum, but these
schools usually have only two or three grades.
Approximately 81 percent of eligible children attend primary
school, but most pupils end their formal education after graduating
from village schools. According to local education officials, Tibetan
is the main language of instruction in 60 percent of middle schools,
especially in more remote areas, although there are special classes
offering instruction in Chinese. NGO's maintain that this figure is
high. Most, but not all, of the students in the Chinese classes are
ethnic Han. Mostof those who attend regional high schools continue to
receive some of their education in Tibetan, but knowledge of Chinese is
essential as most classes are in Chinese. Tibetan curriculum high
schools exist in a few areas, primarily in Tibetan areas outside the
TAR. Since the mid-1980's, the Government has allocated funds to enable
Tibetan secondary students to study in schools elsewhere in China.
According to government figures, there are 13,000 Tibetan students
currently studying in some 100 schools in different parts of China.
Knowledge of Chinese is usually necessary to receive a higher
education, although some minority colleges allow for study in Tibetan.
Tibet University is a small institution with 1,300 students
established to train Tibetan teachers for the local educational system.
Ethnic Tibetans resent disproportionate Han representation in the
student body and faculty. Tibetans, officially said to constitute
approximately 95 percent of the region's population, make up only 80
percent of Tibet University's student body, and 30 percent of all
university faculty in the Tibet Autonomous Region. Although Tibetans
are given admission preferences, Han Chinese students frequently gain
admission because they score higher on admission exams due to stronger
Chinese-language skills and educational backgrounds. Authorities
reportedly require professors, particularly those from Tibet
University's Tibetan Language Department, which is viewed as a
potential source of dissent, to attend political education sessions and
limit course studies and materials in an effort to prevent
``separatist'' political and religious activity on campus. Many ancient
or religious texts are banned from the curriculum for political
reasons. The Tibetan Language Department, which was closed to new
students in the fall of 1997, was reopened in 1998 after its curriculum
had been purged of religious and ``separatist'' materials.
In October, the official news agency Xinhua reported that the Tibet
Autonomous Regional Television opened a Tibetan language satellite
television channel on October 1. The channel broadcasts in Tibetan for
10 hours each day, and reaches areas in Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu, and
Yunnan provinces as well. There also are two bilingual channels, on
which Tibetan language programs make up 15 percent of the total.
The Internet has been open to the public since April. At year's
end, Lhasa had several Internet cafes and estimates put the number of
Internet users at 900.
The Dalai Lama, Tibetan experts, and others have expressed concern
that development projects and other central Government policies adopted
at a 1994 national work conference on Tibet encourage a massive influx
of Han Chinese into Tibet, which has the effect of overwhelming Tibet's
traditional culture and diluting Tibetan demographic dominance. In
recent years in Lhasa and other urban areas, freer movement of persons
throughout China, government-sponsored development, and the prospect of
economic opportunity in Tibet have led to a substantial increase in the
non-Tibetan population (including China's Muslim Hui minority as well
as Han Chinese) in Lhasa and other urban areas. An increased number of
immigrants from China's large transient population seek to take
advantage of these new economic opportunities. Most of these migrants
profess to be temporary residents, but small businesses run by ethnic
Han and Hui citizens (mostly restaurants and retail shops) are becoming
more numerous in almost all Tibetan towns and cities.
In Lhasa, the Chinese cultural presence is obvious and widespread.
Buildings are of Chinese architectural style, the Chinese language is
widely spoken, and Chinese characters are used in most commercial and
official communications. Some observers have estimated that about one-
half of the population in the city is Han Chinese; elsewhere, the Han
percentage of the population is significantly lower. In rural areas,
the Han presence is often negligible. Chinese officials assert that 95
percent of Tibet's officially registered population is Tibetan, with
Han and other ethnic groups making up the remaining 5 percent. This
figure does not include the large number of ``temporary'' Han
residents, including military and paramilitary troops and their
dependents, many of whom have lived in Tibet for years.
China's economic development policies, fueled in Tibet by central
government subsidies, are modernizing parts of Tibetan society and
changing traditional Tibetan ways of life. Although the Government has
made efforts in recent years to restore some of the physical structures
and other aspects of Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan culture damaged or
destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, repressive social and
political controls continue to limit the fundamental freedoms of ethnic
Tibetans and risk undermining Tibet's unique cultural, religious, and
linguistic heritage.
____
HONG KONG
Hong Kong reverted from British to Chinese sovereignty on July 1,
1997 (the handover). As a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the
People's Republic of China, Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of autonomy
except in defense and foreign affairs and remains a free society with
legally protected rights. The Basic Law, approved in 1990 by China's
National People's Congress, provides for fundamental rights and serves
as a ``mini-constitution.'' A chief executive, selected by a 400-person
selection committee, chosen by a China-appointed preparatory committee,
wields executive power. The legislature (known as the Legislative
Council) is composed of directly and indirectly elected members. Upon
reversion, China, which had objected to the electoral rules instituted
by the British colonial government, dissolved Hong Kong's first fully
elected Legislative Council. A 60-member Provisional Legislature,
chosen by the selection committee that named the Chief Executive, took
office on July 1, 1997. Critics contended that the selection of the
Provisional Legislature had no basis in law and was designed to exclude
groups or individuals critical of China. On July 1, 1998, a Legislative
Council elected earlier that year replaced the Provisional Legislature.
Twenty seats were elected on a geographic basis through universal
suffrage, 30 seats through functional (occupational) constituencies,
and 10 seats through indirect election. There were complaints that the
election laws favored pro-China candidates in the geographical
constituencies and severely limited the franchise in the functional
constituencies (the number of voters in the functional constituencies
was reduced from 2.5 million to 189,000; however, no parties boycotted
the elections. Human rights groups contend that the functional
constituencies are undemocratic. Nonetheless, the 58 percent voter
turnout was the highest in Hong Kong's history, and the parties and
independents in the prodemocracy parties won 14 of the 20 seats elected
on a geographic basis. The power of the legislature is curtailed
substantially by voting procedures that require separate majorities
among both geographically and functionally elected legislators for
bills introduced by individual legislators and by Basic Law
prohibitions against the legislature's initiating legislation affecting
public expenditures, political structure, or government operations. In
addition, the Basic Law stipulates that legislators only may initiate
legislation affecting government policy with the prior approval of the
Chief Executive. The Government's successful attempts in January to
block private member bills on collective bargaining and antiunion
discrimination revealed that ``government policy'' is defined very
broadly. By law and tradition, the judiciary is independent; however,
in May the Government decided to seek interpretation of the Basic Law
in the ``right of abode'' case from the Chinese National People's
Congress (NPC). The NPC's interpretation of the law in this case
effectively overturned a ruling by the Court of Final Appeal, Hong
Kong's highest court, and raised questions about the continued
independence of Hong Kong's judiciary.
A well-organized police force maintains public order under the firm
control of civilian authorities. The 4,000 Chinese troops sent to Hong
Kong to replace the British military garrison have maintained a low
profile and did not perform police functions. There were reports that
some members of the police committed human rights abuses.
Hong Kong is a major regional and international trade and finance
center. It is the principal gateway for trade and investment with
China. A thriving free market economy operates with little government
interference (a system provided for by the Basic Law for 50 years). The
global economic crisis had a significant impact on the economy; per
capita gross domestic product dropped from $26,000 in 1997 to just over
$23,000 in 1999.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, human rights problems that existed both before and
after the reversion to China included: Limitations on citizens' ability
to change their government and limitations on the power of the
legislature to affect government policies; reports of police use of
excessive force; some degree of media self-censorship; violence and
discrimination against women; discrimination against the disabled and
ethnic minorities; instances of intimidation of foreign domestic
servants; and trafficking in persons for the purposes of forced labor
and forced prostitution. Despite the ban on the Falun Gong in mainland
China, the Hong Kong Government noted publicly that Falun Gong was a
legally registered organization and would be allowed to continue its
activities without interference.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
There were four instances of death of detainees in police custody
in the first 9 months of the year. The Coroner's Court (appointed by
the Chief Executive under the Coroner's Ordinance) determined that one
of the cases was a suicide. In another case, the cause of death was
determined to be heroin intoxication, but the Coroner's Court returned
an open verdict because the source of the heroin could not be
established. The third and fourth cases are under investigation.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law forbids torture and other abuse by the police;
however, there were reports that police at times used excessive force
against persons in custody. The law stipulates punishment for those who
violate these prohibitions, and disciplinary action can range from
warnings to dismissal. Criminal proceedings may be undertaken
independently of the disciplinary process. Allegations of excessive use
of force are investigated by the Complaints Against Police Office,
whose work is monitored and reviewed by the Independent Police
Complaints Council, a body composed of public members appointed by the
Chief Executive.
Although excessive use of force by police is not widespread, there
are occasional complaints of force being used during interrogations to
coerce information or confessions. In the first 9 months of the year,
the Complaints Against Police Office received 783 complaints of assault
by the police, but of the 246 cases that were investigated, all were
withdrawn or deemed ``not pursuable,'' false, or unsubstantiated. The
remainder are pending investigation. Human rights groups have called
repeatedly for a more independent monitoring body, noting long delays
in hearing some allegations, the contrast between the relatively large
number of complaints and the few that are substantiated, and the
unwillingness of witnesses to substantiate complaints to the police for
fear of retribution. In November the U.N. Human Rights Committee
expressed concern that police responsibility for investigation of
police misconduct undermines the credibility of these investigations.
Although conditions vary among facilities, prison conditions
conform to international standards.
An August 1998 ruling by the Correctional Services Department that
the use of force in breaking up fighting between inmates earlier in the
year was justified prompted widespread criticism and calls for the
establishment of an independent board to monitor prison conditions.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
Local justices of the peace regularly inspect prisons, but these visits
rarely are unannounced, and justices of the peace speak with prisoners
in the presence of Correctional Services Department staff.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Common law, precedents
previously in force, and the Basic Law provide substantial and
effective legal protection against arbitrary arrest or detention.
Suspects must be charged within 48 hours or released. The average
length of preconviction incarceration does not exceed 80 days.
Exile is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary has remained
independent since the handover, underpinned by the Basic Law's
provision that Hong Kong's common law tradition be maintained.
According to the Basic Law, the courts may rule on matters that are the
``responsibility of the Central People's Government or concern the
relationship between the central authorities and the (Special
Administrative) Region,'' but before making their final judgments
(which are not appealable), the courts must seek an interpretation of
the relevant provisions from the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress. When the Standing Committee makes an interpretation
of the provisions concerned, the courts, in applying those provisions,
``shall follow the interpretation of the Standing Committee.'' The
National People's Congress vehicle for interpretation is its Committee
for the Basic Law, composed of six mainland and six Hong Kong members.
The Hong Kong members are nominated by the Chief Executive, the
President of the Legislative Council, and the Chief Justice. Human
rights and lawyers' organizations have expressed concern for some time
that, if broadly applied and loosely interpreted, these exceptions to
the Court of Final Appeal's power of final jurisdiction could be used
to limit the independence of the judiciary. In May the Government
decided to seek interpretation of the Basic Law in the``right of
abode'' case from the Chinese National People's Congress (NPC). The
NPC's interpretation of the law in this case effectively overturned a
ruling by the Court of Final Appeal, Hong Kong's highest court, and
raised questions about the continued independence of Hong Kong's
judiciary.
The Court of Final Appeal is Hong Kong's supreme judicial body. An
independent commission nominates judges; the Chief Executive is
required to appoint those nominated, subject to endorsement by the
legislature. Nomination procedures ensure that commission members
nominated by the private bar have a virtual veto on the nominations.
The Basic Law provides that, with the exception of the Chief Justice
and the Chief Judge of the High Court, who are prohibited from residing
outside of Hong Kong, foreigners may serve on Hong Kong's courts. More
than 35 percent of Hong Kong's judges come from Commonwealth countries.
Judges have security of tenure until retirement age (either 60 or 65,
depending on date of appointment).
Beneath the Court of Final Appeal is the High Court, composed of
the Court of Appeal and the Court of First Instance. Lower judicial
bodies include the District Court (which has limited jurisdiction in
civil and criminal matters), the Magistracy (exercising jurisdiction
over a wide range of criminal offenses), the Coroner's Court, the
Juvenile Court, the Lands Tribunal, the Labor Tribunal, the Small
Claims Tribunal, and the Obscene Articles Tribunal.
The law provides for the right to a fair public trial, and this is
respected in practice. Trials are by jury, and the judiciary provides
citizens with a fair and efficient judicial process.
Although the judiciary remains independent, human rights activists
are concerned that the legal system may favor those closely aligned
with China or powerful local institutions. These concerns were
heightened by the Government's 1998 decisions not to prosecute the New
China News Agency for alleged violations of the Privacy Ordinance (see
Section 1.f.) and to decline to prosecute a prominent newspaper editor
accused of fraud. In February the Secretary for Justice explained the
Government's March 1998 decision not to prosecute newspaper editor
Sally Aw, who, though accused of fraud, had close ties to Beijing. The
explanation was given after Aw's three co-conspirators were convicted
of fraud in January, and a videotape of Aw's confession was leaked to
the press. In addition to citing a lack of sufficient evidence to
prosecute, the Secretary noted that she had taken the ``public
interest'' into account in making the decision because the case could
have bankrupted the newspaper, thus damaging free speech and putting
residents out of work. In March anger over the explanation, as well as
the Government's handling of the right of abode ruling, prompted a
legislative motion of no confidence in the Secretary for Justice which
was defeated after heavy lobbying from the Government. In 1998 the
Provisional Legislature passed the controversial Adaptation of Laws
(Interpretive Provisions) Ordinance, which replaced the word ``Crown''
in Hong Kong legislation with the word ``State'' in hundreds of
existing laws. Since that time the Government has reviewed 17 laws and
determined that these laws should be amended to encompass the State
specifically. Critics are concerned that this change would place
Chinese government organs above the law, since laws that previously did
not apply to the Crown now do not apply to the (Chinese) state.
On January 29, the Court of Final Appeal issued rulings in three
cases, known collectively as ``the right of abode ruling.'' At the
handover, the Basic Law for the first time conferred the right of abode
in Hong Kong on mainland-born children of Hong Kong residents. To limit
the possibility of a large influx of persons under this provision, the
Provisional Legislature soon after reversion enacted regulations that
required mainland-born children of Hong Kong residents to possess a
certificate of entitlement from Hong Kong immigration authorities
attached to a valid travel document issued by the Government of China
in order to exercise the right of abode. For many persons entitled to
the right of abode, this requirement led to long delays in the ability
to exercise the right. Would-be migrants challenged the legitimacy of
the Provisional Legislature and the regulations it issued regarding the
right of abode. In the cases heard before the Court of Final Appeal,
the Government also challenged a lower court ruling that illegitimate
children of Hong Kong resident parents enjoyed the same right of abode
as those born in wedlock. The Court of Final Appeal ruled that the
Provisional Legislature was ``legally authorized,'' that administrative
restrictions limiting the right of abode of mainland-born children of
Hong Kong parents was in violation of the Basic Law, and that all
children, born in wedlock or not, were entitled to the same right of
abode as long as one parent had resided legally in Hong Kong for at
least 7 years at the time the application was made, rather than at the
birth of the child. The ruling also asserted the Court of Final
Appeal's right of judicial review over not only the Basic Law, but also
over acts of the NPC as they affected Hong Kong. In addition, the
judgment defined tests and means by which the Hong Kong court should
seek interpretation of the Basic Law by the National People's Congress.
On February 8, a Chinese State Council spokesman termed the Court's
decision a ``mistake'' that ``should be changed.'' On February 26, in
response to criticism from mainland legal scholars and officials, the
Hong Kong Government requested an unprecedented ``clarification'' of
the Court's assertion of the right of judicial review from the Court of
Final Appeal, citing ``public interest'' and constitutional concerns.
The Court responded with a brief statement stressing that it did not
question the power of China's NPC to interpret the Basic Law but
reserved its power to test acts of the NPC against the Basic Law. Human
rights activists and some legislators expressed concern that the
clarification set a ``dangerous precedent.''
The Government of Hong Kong did not implement the right of abode
ruling immediately. After the ruling was issued, immigration officials
only processed applications on the mainland for certificates of
entitlement to Hong Kong residency that were accompanied by
applications for one-way entry permits to Hong Kong (to be granted by
granted by Chinese authorities). According to a government study
released on April 29, the January ruling increased the number of
persons eligible to apply for residency in Hong Kong on the basis of
parental residency from an estimated 66,000 persons to an estimated
1.67 million persons (approximately one-quarter of Hong Kong's current
population) within 7 years, leading to general fears of serious
overcrowding. However, some critics claimed that the Government's
figures were too high.
On May 18, Chief Executive C.H. Tung announced the Government's
intention to ask the Standing Committee of the NPC to interpret two
sections of the Basic Law relevant to the Court of Final Appeal's right
of abode ruling. The Government submitted its request to the Standing
Committee after giving the legislature only 24 hours to consider a
motion endorsing the Chief Executive's decision to seek interpretation.
On May 19, the Legislative Council voted to support the decision to
seek interpretation of the Basic Law. Legislators from the democratic
parties boycotted the vote and wore black to mourn the ``death of
justice.'' Hundreds of lawyers, who viewed the request as a
postjudicial remedy that undermined the authority and independence of
the judiciary, marched in protest.
The NPC interpretation, issued on June 26, implied that the Court
of Final Appeal erred in not seeking NPC interpretation before it
issued its ruling because the Basic Law clauses on which its ruling was
based involved ``matters involving the relations between the Central
Government and the SAR.'' The NPC declared that the original
legislative intent of one of the Basic Law articles, as expressed in a
1996 Preparatory Committee Document, was that at least one parent had
to have had right of abode at the time of the child's birth (rather
than at the time of application) in order to confer that right upon the
child. The NPC also declared that these children must apply for
approval for entry into Hong Kong. The NPC interpretation effectively
overturned the ruling of the Court of Final Appeal, which led many
legislators and human rights activists to express concern about how
final the judgments of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal actually
were. Although the status of the litigants in the original case(s) was
unchanged, the effect of the interpretation was to reduce the number of
persons eligible for right of abode in Hong Kong from an estimated 1.67
million to 160,000. Following the interpretation, the Government issued
immigration regulations that gave the interpretation retroactive effect
from July 1, 1997.
Two additional right of abode cases, one dealing with the rights of
adopted children and the other with mainlanders who sought to exercise
their right of abode without mainland-issued documents permitting them
to remain in Hong Kong were heard by the Court of Final Appeal in
October. On December 3, the Court of Final Appeal issued its judgment
regarding the mainlanders who sought to invoke the right of abode in
Hong Kong without the required documentation. The Court ruled that the
NPC had the authority to interpret the Basic Law, that the NPC's June
interpretation of the Basic Law therefore was binding, and that the
interpretation upheld the Government's previous documentation and time
of birth requirement. The Court gave the interpretation effect from
July 1, 1997, and stated that the would-be immigrants who had not
completed the proper procedures could be returned to China. Nine
persons were injured in protests which followed the Court of Final
Appeal's December ruling. Police arrested three protestors. By year's
end, no ruling had been issued in the case dealing with the rights of
adopted children.
In a March case involving the desecration of the Chinese and Hong
Kong flags, the High Court ruled unanimously that the PRC and Hong Kong
flag ordinances were inconsistent with the Basic Law because they
violated the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which is subsumed in the Basic Law. However, in December the Court of
Final Appeal overturned the ruling.
According to the Basic Law, English may be used as an official
language by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.
For historical reasons and because of the courts' reliance on
common law precedents, almost all civil cases and most criminal cases
are heard in English. To help remedy this, the Government has increased
the number of officers in the Legal Aid Department proficient in
Chinese. A 1996 pilot scheme for simultaneous interpretation in some
court proceedings failed, but the Government extended the use of
bilingual prosecution documents and indictments. All laws are available
in Chinese and in 1997 the High Court heard the first jury trial ever
conducted in Cantonese.
Some human rights groups have expressed concern that the Government
has not protected the interests of Hong Kong residents arrested in
mainland China vigorously enough. The issue is complicated by the
absence of an agreement allowing Hong Kong officials access to Hong
Kong citizens arrested or detained in mainland China.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law provides for the right of privacy, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice. The Interception
of Telecommunications Ordinance, passed by the Legislative Council in
1997, requires the security forces to obtain a warrant from the High
Court for a wiretap or mail interception. However, because the law
specifies that the Government must name an effective date for the
change, it has never been implemented. As a result, wiretaps are
approved by the Chief Executive's office; a court issued warrant is not
required. Responding to Legislative Council questioning in September
1998, the Secretary for Security refused to reveal the number of
government wiretaps.
For more than 20 years, the Independent Commission Against
Corruption was vested with powers, including the right to authorize
searches and detain suspects, which normally are exercised only by a
judicial officer. Amendments to ordinances governing the Commission
took effect in 1997, depriving the Commission of the independent
authority to issue arrest or search warrants. However, the Commission
still does not apply the presumption of innocence in corruption cases,
and criminal convictions are obtained by regarding any excessive,
unexplainable assets held by civil servants as ill gotten until proven
otherwise.
In 1996 the Government established the Office of the Privacy
Commissioner for Personal Data (PCO) under the Personal Data (Privacy)
Ordinance (PDPO) to prevent misuse and disclosure of data such as
medical and credit records. The ordinance also prohibits matching sets
of personal data without the consent of the subject individual or the
commissioner, although some government departments were exempted in
order to combat social welfare abuse and tax evasion. Some violations
of the PDPO constitute criminal offenses, although there have been no
prosecutions under the PDPO. In other cases, an injured party may seek
compensation through civil proceedings. If the PCO believes that
violations may continue or be repeated, he may issue an enforcement
notice. From the end of 1996 when the PDPO took effect through the end
of September, the PCO had received 1,018 complaints, 325 of them in the
first 9 months of the year. Since 1996, of the 903 completed
investigations, 325 completed during the year, the PCO found violations
of the PDPO in 72 cases, resulting in the issuance of 16 enforcement
notices and 44 warning notices.
The Government determined that under the Adaptation of Laws
(Interpretive Provisions) Ordinance, passed by the Provisional
Legislature (a nonelected body that performed the legislative function
from July 1, 1997 to June 30, 1998) in 1998, the Personal Data Privacy
Ordinance is not applicable to the central People's Government organs
in Hong Kong. The Adaptations of Laws Ordinance replaced the word
``Crown'' in Hong Kong legislation with the word ``State'' in hundreds
of existing laws. Government officials say that the change is a
technical fix, necessary for the continued implementation of
prehandover laws, that does not offer a wholesale exemption from laws.
However, critics are concerned that the change places Chinese
government organs, particularly the New China News Agency, above the
law.
In June the High Court dismissed a legislator's civil suit over the
failure of the New China News Agency to respond within the Ordinance-
specified time frame to the legislator's request for information about
her in the Agency's files, because the NCNA Director named in the suit
was not in Hong Kong at the time the incident occurred.
In November the Office of the Telecommunications Authority (OFTA)
requested an explanation from a major local paging company, China
Motion Telecom International (CM Telecom), which allegedly failedto
relay messages referring to the Falun Gong (which was banned on the
mainland in July) (see Section 2.c.). The OFTA stressed that the
company, which provides both Hong Kong-only and China-wide service to
Hong Kong customers, would be monitored closely to ensure that its
operations complied with Hong Kong license requirements under which
paging companies may refuse to relay only messages that are obscene or
that could lead to activities that are unlawful under local laws.
However, the OFTA also agreed that it could not ask the paging company
to act in violation of Chinese laws. In a compromise, the company
agreed to relay messages concerning Falun Gong to its Hong Kong-only
subscribers, but was allowed to use its discretion in forwarding such
messages to its China-wide subscribers. CM Telecom declined to relay
messages concerning Falun Gong to customers whose service is China-
wide. Thus, the ability of CM Telecom's Hong Kong customers to receive
messages concerning Falun Gong depends upon what type of paging service
they have purchased.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Basic Law provides for freedom
of speech, of the press, and of publication, and there was no apparent
change in the tradition of respect for these freedoms after reversion;
however, some journalists continued to practice a degree of self-
censorship. Overall, the media has been outspoken in defending civil
liberties. Reporting on the November District Council elections
generally was regarded as fair and balanced. However, the Basic Law
also directs Hong Kong to pass laws prohibiting ``treason, secession,
sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft
of state secrets'' (see Section 2.b.). The Interception of
Communications Ordinance, passed by the Legislative Council in June
1997, nullified Section 33 of the Telecommunications Ordinance, which
granted the Government wide-ranging powers to ban messages. However,
this provision was never implemented, because the Government has not
named a date for the changes to take effect. The Public Order Ordinance
enables the Government to ban a demonstration on national security
grounds, including as a factor whether it advocates independence for
Tibet or Taiwan. In practice, this situation has not arisen and only
one application for a permit to demonstrate was denied (see Section
2.b.).
Newspapers publish a wide variety of opinions. After July 1, 1997,
there was neither a sharp increase nor decrease in coverage critical of
China, but there were many more reports critical of the Hong Kong
Government than there were before the handover. Persons speak freely to
the media. Political debate is vigorous, and numerous viewpoints,
including stories and opinions critical of the Hong Kong and Chinese
Governments and statements by leading Chinese dissidents, are provided
in the mass media, in public forums, and by political groups.
International media organizations operate freely. Sixteen major daily
newspapers, 2 commercial television stations, 1 cable television
station, and 2 commercial radio stations function with virtually no
government control.
Foreign reporters need no special visas or government-issued press
cards. Many local reporters continue to enter China to cover sensitive
stories related to Hong Kong, Taiwan, or the mainland. China still
requires journalists--both foreign and those from Hong Kong--to apply
for permission to make reporting trips to the mainland. Those who
bypass official channels--which many feel they must do to get the
stories they want--risk violating Chinese regulations. At least one
publication whose owner offended China's leadership several years ago
subsequently has been unable to get official permission for its
reporters to cover events on the mainland.
There is a widespread impression among both journalists and the
public that it is prudent to engage in a degree of self-censorship;
however, there were fewer reports of self-censorship than in the recent
past. The pressures on journalists are subtle--there are no direct
orders to refrain from writing, but there is a wide perception of a
need for special care toward topics of particular sensitivity to China:
Leadership dynamics, military activity, or Taiwanese or Tibetan
independence, although numerous articles on these topics continue to
appear. Chinese-language journalists report a pervasive, if tacit,
understanding that editors expect those reporting on China to be
particularly certain of their facts and careful in their wording.
Another source of pressure comes from the belief by some publishers and
editors that advertising revenues or their business interests in China
could suffer if they were seen to be too antagonistic to China or
powerful local interests.
In August mainland leaders and local deputies to the NPC criticized
the government-owned Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) for producing a
program in which a prominent but unofficial Taiwan representative
endorsed Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's controversial ``two-states''
policy. In response to the criticism, the Chief Executive and other
senior officials reiterated the importance of freedom of speech, but
expressed dissatisfactionwith the representative's remarks. In November
the representative returned to Taiwan to take a senior position, amid
reports that the Government refused to extend his visa. In response to
the criticism, RTHK reiterated its editorial guidelines stressing its
independent editorial line. Nonetheless, journalists and human rights
groups are concerned that the criticisms may have a ``chilling'' effect
on the press. In October the Government abruptly announced that the
head of RTHK, Cheung Man-yee, was to be promoted to Economic and Trade
Representative to Japan. Cheung is known as an outspoken defender of
press freedom and of RTHK's editorial independence, and under her 13-
year leadership RTHK was often critical of the Government. Many
legislators and human rights groups expressed concern that press
freedom would be affected by Cheung's transfer. Cheung denied that the
transfer was politically motivated, but acknowledged that she had
experienced political pressures in the past. Senior government
officials, including the Chief Executive and the Chief Secretary,
denied that the transfer was anything but routine and once again
reiterated their support for freedom of the press. The appointment in
November of Cheung's deputy, an individual widely perceived to be an
ardent supporter of a free press, to succeed her helped to allay public
fears; he reiterated RTHK's commitment to editorial independence. One
of the by-products of the controversy was renewed debate over the
desirability of privatizing RTHK.
In August, in response to a growing number of complaints about
tabloid-style journalism, which encouraged intrusive reporting by the
press, the Law Reform Commission (an independent commission appointed
by the Government in the 1980's) issued a consultation paper on privacy
issues and the media. The paper suggested that a Press Council with the
power to reprimand or fine a publication found to be ``in serious
breach of the Privacy Code'' should be appointed by the Government.
Public reaction was mixed, but journalists, legal experts, and human
rights groups were concerned that such a body could be used to restrict
press freedom. In October the Chief Executive expressed the hope that
the press could regulate itself.
In November in a case in which a news group sued RTHK for
defamation, the Court of Final Appeal upheld the constitutional
protection of free speech and ruled in favor of RTHK, noting that ``no
narrow approach should be taken to the scope of fair comment on a
matter of public interest.''
On March 23, the High Court overturned the convictions of two
persons convicted of desecrating Chinese and Hong Kong flags during a
peaceful 1998 demonstration. The court ruled that both the Hong Kong
and Chinese flag desecration laws were inconsistent with the Basic Law.
The Government appealed. Many legal experts, legislators, and human
rights activists were concerned that if the Court of Final Appeal
upheld the lower court's decision, the Government would seek an
interpretation of the laws from the National People's Congress, as it
had in the right of abode case (see Section 1.e.). In December the
Court of Final Appeal ruled unanimously that the flag desecration laws
did not violate the Basic Law and reinstated the convictions of the two
persons accused of desecrating the Hong Kong and Chinese flags, thereby
avoiding another confrontation over the Basic Law. In October the
police, citing the Land Ordinance's prohibition on the erection of
unlicensed structures, removed a Taiwan flag erected on public property
on the anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China.
Falun Gong publications were displayed prominently at the Hong Kong
International Book Fair. However, some Hong Kong publishing houses
owned by mainland Chinese interests declined to continue publishing
Falun Gong materials after the movement was banned on the mainland in
July (see Section 2.c.), and some bookstores run by Chinese enterprises
removed Falun Gong books from their shelves.
In July the publisher of Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's recently
published book complained that an advertisement it had paid to run for
2 weeks in a Hong Kong subway station was taken down after 1 week, with
no explanation. A spokesperson for the subway system stated that it was
an ``administrative error'' rather than a political decision.
In November the founder of the Information Center for Democracy and
Human Rights Movements in China, which issues press releases on
strikes, demonstrations, and arrests in China, complained that he was
receiving almost 1,000 harassing phone calls and faxes each day from
security agents in China. The police are investigating the complaint.
In 1996 a code on access to information governing the provision of
information by government agencies was extended to the entire
Government. The code requires government departments to release
information to the public unless there is a valid reason to withhold
it. A department may withhold ``sensitive'' information in such areas
as defense, security, external affairs, or law enforcement. Guidelines
for access to information are provided to the public on an Internet web
page.
The Government respects academic freedom. There is a wide range of
opinions and lively debate on campuses.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom of
assembly is practiced without significant hindrance. Article 23 of The
Basic Law provides that Hong Kong shall enact laws to prohibit
subversion, secession, treason, and sedition against the Chinese
Government. The process of developing this legislation continues with
no indication of when such laws may be enacted. Amendments to the Crime
Ordinance, passed by the Legislative Council in 1997, narrowed the
definition of treason and sedition to include a ``proven intention of
causing violence or creating public disorder or a public disturbance.''
However, since the amendments stipulate that the Government must name
the date when the change is to take effect, the Government has chosen
not to enact the amendments until comprehensive legislation dealing
with all ``Article 23 crimes'' is developed. In the interim,
preexisting provisions in the Crime Ordinance dealing with treason and
sedition continue to apply. In November the U.N. Human Rights Committee
expressed concern that the offenses of treason and sedition under the
Crimes Ordinance are defined in overly broad terms, thus endangering
freedom of expression.
A revised Public Order Ordinance passed by the Provisional
Legislature, which took effect on July 1, 1997, reintroduced licensing
for demonstrations. Demonstration organizers must notify the police of
their intention to demonstrate 1 week in advance (shorter notice is
accepted when the Commissioner of Police is satisfied that earlier
notice could not have been given). The police must give a clear reply
within 48 hours and may object on national security grounds. However,
in practice, the police have denied only one application to
demonstrate; in that case, environmental groups wanted to block traffic
with garbage trucks to urge the Government to open more recycling
centers. There is an average of four demonstrations per day, a rate
slightly higher than the prehandover rate. However, demonstrators,
particularly labor activists, complain that demonstrations often are
limited to ``designated areas'' where they receive little public
attention and that police sometimes outnumber demonstrators. On May 30,
up to 4,000 persons marched through central Hong Kong to commemorate
the 10th anniversary of the June 4, 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square.
On June 4, nearly 70,000 demonstrators attended a candlelight vigil to
commemorate the anniversary. However, there were reports in October
that Chief Executive C.H. Tung urged Hong Kong Alliance for the
Promotion of Democratic Movements in China leaders earlier in the year
to stop holding annual commemorations of the Tiananmen Square
crackdown; the Chief Executive denied making any such requests. A
police order issued in September 1998, while underlining that it is
police ``policy to facilitate, as far as possible, all peaceful public
order events,'' also stipulates that certain ``internationally
protected persons'' are in addition to security entitled to
``protection of their dignity.'' Human rights activists are concerned
that the policy may lead to the use of police tactics such as those
employed during the September 1997 visit of Li Peng, when the police
played classical music over loudspeakers to drown out the shouts of
demonstrators; the independent Police Complaints Council later ruled
that such tactics were inappropriate. In October the police arrested
(but immediately released) protesters conducting noisy demonstrations
near the official flag raising ceremony marking the 50th Anniversary of
the founding of the PRC.
Freedom of association is practiced without significant hindrance.
In the first 9 months after the handover, 626 societies were registered
and no applications for registration were denied. However, the ``Never
Forget June 4 Organization,'' whose constitution calls for the end of
one party rule in China, claims that the police have delayed the
group's registration. Human rights groups also have expressed concern
that the amended Societies Ordinance, which like the amended Public
Order ordinance was passed by the Provisional Legislature, could be
used to restrict political activity. The Societies Ordinance requires
that new societies must apply for registration within 1 month of
establishment. The Government may refuse registration if it believes
that the refusal is necessary in the interests of national security,
public safety, public order, or the protection of the rights and
freedom of others. The Government also may refuse to register a
political body that receives support from a foreign political
organization or a Taiwan-based political organization.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Basic Law provides that the Government
respect religious freedom and activities, the Bill of Rights Ordinance
prohibits religious discrimination, and the Government respects these
provisions in practice. Government policy and general practice ensure
freedom of religion. Religious groups are not required to register with
the Government, and are exempted specifically from the Societies
Ordinance, which requires the registration of nongovernmental
organizations.
Following the ban on the Falun Gong in China on July 22, Falun Gong
practitioners continued to be allowed to practice and to protest the
arrests of Falun Gong practitioners on the mainland. Senior government
officials issued statements in October confirming that the local Falun
Gong chapter was registered legally under the Societies Ordinance and
would be allowed to continue its activities without interference.
Security officials in Hong Kong stated that the ban on the Falun Gong
effective in China did not apply to Hong Kong. Some bookstores run by
Chinese enterprises have removed Falun Gong works from their shelves
(see Section 2.a.). From December 11-13, up to 1,000 persons attended a
Falun Gong conference held in Hong Kong that attracted practitioners
from several countries. The conference occurred without incident,
despite stern warnings from Chief Executive C.H. Tung not to violate
mainland law. In November a major paging company was required to
explain to telecommunication authorities why it was not relaying
messages concerning Falun Gong to its Hong Kong customers; in a
compromise, it was required to forward such messages to its Hong Kong-
only service customers, but was allowed to decline to relay such
messages to its China-wide service customers because doing so would
violate Chinese law (see Section 1.f.).
Some religious leaders have expressed concern that the Basic Law,
which calls for ties between Hong Kong and mainland religious
organizations to be based on ``nonsubordination, noninterference and
mutual respect,'' could be used to limit such contacts. However, there
were no reports, however, of any limits being applied or proposed.
In June China, which has responsibility for Hong Kong's defense and
foreign affairs, blocked a proposed visit by the Pope to Hong Kong. The
Government of the People's Republic of China reportedly insisted on
treating the visit as one of a head of state rather than as one of a
religious leader. Many religious, political and human rights leaders
publicly expressed disappointment that the visit was cancelled.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There is freedom of movement within Hong
Kong, and travel documents are obtained freely and easily. (However,
there are some limits on travel to the mainland imposed by the Chinese
central Government).
As was the case before the handover, the Taiwan passport is not
recognized as valid for visa endorsement purposes.
In April, Wang Dan and several other prominent dissidents were
denied visas to enter Hong Kong; they had hoped to attend a conference
on democracy in China on May 1 and a candlelight vigil to commemorate
the events at Tiananmen Square in 1989. However, exiled Chinese
dissident Xiang Xiaoji, a foreign citizen, was allowed to attend the
conference. Chinese authorities do not permit a number of Hong Kong
activists and legislators to visit the mainland. On June 10, two
legislators, James To and Cyd Ho, were denied permission to board a
flight to Beijing; when they attempted to board another flight, they
reportedly were told that the Chinese authorities would not admit them
to the mainland. The two had intended to lobby Chinese government
officials against interpretation of the Basic Law by the NPC in the
right of abode case (see Section 1.e.). In September the Chinese
Government cancelled the visa of prominent Hong Kong legislator
Margaret Ng, who had protested the Government's request for an NPC
interpretation of the Basic Law, and had moved for a motion of no
confidence against the Secretary for Justice. The cancellation provoked
widespread anger. Political and human rights activists stated that the
restriction on travel to the mainland by those who disagree with
Beijing's policies may have a chilling effect on political debate,
particularly among those with business interests on the mainland. Many
democratic party legislators are not allowed to travel to the mainland;
many other democratic party legislators, however, are allowed to go to
China.
In July 1997, the Provisional Legislature passed legislation
regarding the right of abode of mainland children of Hong Kong parents.
On January 29, the Court of Final Appeal ruled that all children of
parents with Hong Kong residency at the time application were eligible
for the right of abode, and that the administrative restrictions on
this right were inconsistent with the Basic Law. In May the Hong Kong
Government requested that the NPC interpret the Basic Law provisions
relevant to the case, and in June the NPC issued an interpretation that
overturned the decision of the Court of Final Appeal, restricting the
right of abode to children whose parents had Hong Kong residency at the
time of their birth and endorsing the administrative restrictions on
the exercise of the right (see Section 1.e.).
The 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was not
extended to Hong Kong. On a case-by-case basis, the Directorof
Immigration has discretion to grant refugee status or asylum in cases
of exceptional humanitarian or compassionate need.
Hong Kong no longer has a first asylum policy. Forty-eight
Vietnamese not considered refugees were repatriated to Vietnam in 1998.
Approximately 968 Vietnamese refugees remain, among them 320 Vietnamese
formerly in China. The latter group's appeal against the Government's
attempt to return them to the mainland still is pending. These refugees
either live in camps where they are free to come and go, or in the
community. They are allowed to seek employment and to enroll their
children in local schools. In 1998 1,536 Vietnamese refugees were
repatriated under the (involuntary) Orderly Repatriation Program; 837
were repatriated in the first 10 months of 1999. Approximately 12
families from other countries have been admitted as refugees and
receive a subsistence allowance from the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, but are allowed neither to seek employment nor enroll their
children in local schools.
In two separate cases in September and October 1997 courts ruled
that the detention of 288 Vietnamese illegal migrants who were formerly
in China was illegal. The Vietnamese migrants' suit seeking to prevent
the Government from returning them to the mainland still is pending.
Meanwhile, they remain free on bail and live in the Pillar Point Camp.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Residents' right to change their government is limited by voting
regulations that provide for the election of the Chief Executive by an
appointed selection committee of 400, the direct election of only a
limited number of Legislative Council members, and the addition of
appointed members to the elected district boards and municipal
councils. In addition, while the approval of the Chief Executive, two-
thirds of the legislature, and two-thirds of Hong Kong's National
People's Congress delegates is required to place an amendment to the
Basic Law on the agenda of China's National People's Congress, it is
the National People's Congress that has the power to actually amend the
Basic Law.
The government structure is three-tiered, and consists of the
Legislative Council, the provisional municipal councils, and the
provisional district boards. C.H. Tung is Chief Executive.
The Chief Executive was chosen by a 400-member selection committee
chosen by the 150-member preparatory committee, itself appointed by the
Chinese Government. The Basic Law provides for elections for Chief
Executive in 2002 and 2007, by a ``broadly representative election
committee'' of 800 local residents appointed by China. The Basic Law
also permits amendment of the Chief Executive selection process after
2007 by a two-thirds majority of the Legislative Council, with the
consent of the Chief Executive and the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress, with universal suffrage and direct
elections as the ultimate goal.
A provisional legislature, appointed by the same 400-member
committee that appointed the Chief Executive, served from July 1, 1997
until June 30, 1998. Although the Provisional Legislature included 33
of 34 legislators from the 1995 Legislative Council who sought
inclusion, the Democratic Party and several independents declined to
seek seats in what they deemed an illegitimate body, which they claimed
lacked a legal foundation and transparency, and excluded groups,
parties, and individuals critical of China. The Provisional Legislature
repealed several laws that had been enacted by the elected Legislative
Council to enhance civil and political rights, including: Amendments to
the Bill of Rights Ordinance; the Employee Right to Representation,
Consultation, and Collective Bargaining Ordinance; the1997 Employment
(Amendment) Ordinance, and the 1997 Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance
(see Section 6.a.). A lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the
Provisional Legislative Council was unsuccessful, and the repeal
remains controversial.
Elections for Hong Kong's first post-reversion Legislative Council
were held in May 1998. Twenty members were elected directly from
geographic districts through universal suffrage, 30 from functional
(occupational) constituencies, and 10 by votes of a committee of local
elected officials. The functional constituencies were drawn more
narrowly than the nine broad functional constituencies of the 1995
Legislative Council, and the total number of potential voters in
functional constituencies was cut from 1.15 million to 189,000 (a
figure close to that used in elections through 1991). Human rights
groups contend that the election of functional constituency
representatives by only 189,000 persons representing various sectors is
fundamentally undemocratic. There was general acceptance of the
electoral districts proposed in October 1997 by the Electoral Affairs
Commission. A bill calling for an accelerated time line for direct
elections was defeated in the Legislative Council in 1998.
The ability of the legislature to influence policy is limited
substantially by Basic Law provisions that require separatemajorities
among members elected from geographical and functional constituencies
in order to pass a bill introduced by an individual member. The Basic
Law also prohibits the Legislative Council from putting forward bills
that affect public expenditure, political structure, or government
operations. The Chief Executive's approval is required before bills
affecting government policy may be submitted. Controversy erupted in
January when the Government attempted to block two private member bills
on collective bargaining and antiunion discrimination by applying a
very broad definition of ``government policy.'' In July the President
of the Legislative Council upheld the Government's position and ruled
that the bills were outside of the scope allowed for private member
bills because they would affect government expenditure.
The November elections for Hong Kong's District Councils (the sole
remaining local government body after the abolition of the Municipal
Councils (see below) were free and fair. However, democratic
legislators and human rights activists complained that the appointment
of nearly one-quarter of District Councilors by the Chief Executive was
undemocratic. According to the District Councils Ordinance enacted in
March, the District Councils are responsible for advising the
government on matters affecting: (1) the well-being of district
residents; (2) the provision and use of public facilities; and (3) the
use of public funds allocated for local public works and community
activities.
A motion in the Legislative Council calling for a referendum on the
Government's proposal to abolish the Urban and Regional Councils, Hong
Kong's mid-tier local government organs known collectively as the
Municipal Councils, was defeated in October. The Councils had been the
subject of widespread public criticism for their poor handling of the
Avian Flu, the Red Tide, and other public health problems for which
they were responsible. In December the Legislative Council passed a
controversial bill abolishing the Municipal Councils when their terms
expired at the end of the year. Legislators from the democratic parties
and human rights activists protested the abolition of the councils,
arguing that they were important to party and democratic politics. The
U.N. Human Rights Committee also expressed concern over the abolition
of the municipal councils in its November report.
Hong Kong sends 36 delegates to China's National People's Congress
(NPC). This is an important group since placing proposed amendments to
the Basic Law on the agenda of the NPC requires the approval of two-
thirds of Hong Kong's NPC delegates. Hong Kong's NPC delegates also are
entitled to sit on the Election Committee that chooses 10 of the
Legislature's 60 members. Hong Kong's NPC delegates were selected by
the same committee that appointed the Chief Executive and the
Provisional Legislature. Politicians and human rights activists
criticized the selection process as undemocratic and lacking
transparency and noted that New China News Agency Director Jiang Enzhu,
who is not a Hong Kong permanent resident, is one of Hong Kong's 36
delegates. Local NPC delegates were increasingly vocal during the year,
particularly with regard to rule of law issues and the right of abode
case (see Section 1.e.).
Women are underrepresented in elective offices, but larger numbers
are running for public office than ever before. Women hold 10 of the 60
Legislative Council seats. The President of the Legislative Council is
a woman, as is the head of the civil service. Minorities are
represented in senior civil service positions.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Dozens of domestic and international nongovernmental organizations
(NGO's) operate freely, despite concerns about possible restrictions
under the revised Societies Ordinance. These organizations have
thriving contacts with the local community and with groups overseas.
Government officials are cooperative and responsive to their views.
The 1988 Ombudsman Ordinance established the Office of the
Ombudsman, which has wide powers to investigate and report on
grievances from members of the public as a result of administrative
actions of the executive branch and other designated public bodies.
However, the Ombudsman does not have any oversight authority over the
police, the Independent Commission against Corruption, the Equal
Opportunities Commission, or the Office of the Privacy Commissioner for
Personal Data. The Ombudsman may investigate complaints of
noncompliance with the code on access to information by the government
departments, including the police and Independent Commission against
Corruption. With regard to election-related complaints, the Ombudsman
only is empowered to investigate complaints made against the
Registration and Electoral Office, but not the Electoral Affairs
Commission. Thus, the Ombudsman's human rights role regarding liberty
of persons, freedom fromarbitrary and unlawful arrest and detention,
equality, and related matters is limited considerably.
The Ombudsman may publish investigation reports in which the
identity of the complainant has been disguised. In addition to
responding to public complaints, the Ombudsman may initiate
investigations on his own. The Ombudsman may report to the Chief
Executive if he believes that his recommendations to the organizations
under his jurisdiction have not been acted upon or if there are serious
violations; the Chief Executive is bound by law to present such reports
to the legislature.
According to the Basic Law, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights apply, with certain restrictions, to Hong Kong. In
January the Chinese Government transmitted Hong Kong's 1998 reports
under these Covenants, without editing, to the United Nations. These
reports were prepared without interference from the Chinese Government,
but local NGO's complained that they were not consulted fully enough on
the contents of the reports. In October the Government and several
domestic NGO's testified before the U.N. Human Rights Committee in
Geneva. The Committee expressed ``serious concern'' about the
Government's decision to seek an NPC interpretation of the Basic Law in
the right of abode case and the planned abolition of the two municipal
councils (see Sections 1.e. and 3). Government statements to the press
emphasized that the interpretation did not affect the litigants in the
Court of Final Appeal's original ruling (or those in similar
circumstances). The hearings received widespread and balanced press
coverage. In November the U.N. Human Rights Committee issued its first
report on Hong Kong since the handover. The report cited concerns about
the erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy, particularly with respect to the
independence of the judiciary.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
There are no laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age or
race. After the passage of laws in 1995 banning discrimination on the
basis of sex and disability, an Equal Opportunities Commission was
established. The Commission began its oversight of nonemployment- and
employment-related provisions in 1996. Women's groups and others have
criticized the Commission for passivity in combating discrimination and
for emphasizing conciliation instead of acting as a watchdog or
pursuing court cases. However, the Government has begun to bring cases
against discriminatory employment advertisements. In the first 6 months
of the year, the Equal Opportunities Commission received 115 complaints
of sex discrimination, 89 of which involved sexual harassment. In the
first 9 months of the year, three cases under the Sex Discrimination
Ordinance and five cases under the Disability Discrimination Ordinance
were brought to court. Two have been decided, both in favor of the
plaintiffs. Damages were awarded in the amounts of $11,250 (HK$87,500)
and $3,000 (HK$23,000). However, fines against newspapers for carrying
discriminatory advertisements tend to be very light. In the first 9
months of the year, 12 cases alleging discriminatory advertising were
brought to court; all were decided against the defendants, who were
fined a total of $2,350 (HK$18,260).
In 1997 the Legislative Council enacted the Family Status
Discrimination Ordinance, which protects persons whose marital status
changes, who have children, or who are responsible for caring for
another family member, such as a child or elderly person.
The government ``Code of Practice for Employers'' designed to
prevent discrimination states that race, among other factors, should
not be considered when hiring employees. However, it ``accepts'' that
special circumstances exist, such as when the employee works or lives
in the employer's home. The Government has undertaken a public
education and awareness campaign to combat race with only limited
effect.
Women.--Violence against women remains a significant problem,
particularly among new immigrants from China. The only law to protect
battered women is the 1987 Domestic Violence Ordinance, which allows a
woman to seek a 3-month injunction against her husband (extendable to 6
months). Domestic violence also may be prosecuted as common assault.
The Government enforces the laws and prosecutes violators, but
sentences generally are lenient; of the 344 charges of ``family
violence'' from April to September 1997, only 33 resulted in
convictions. Half of those convicted were fined and only four were
imprisoned. Of the 60 spousal abuse cases in the first 9 months of 1998
that resulted in legal action, 41 were awaiting trial, 1 received a 6-
month sentence and fine, 1 received a 2-month sentence, 4 were fined
between $200 and $450, 3 received a suspended sentence, 1 received a
police warning, and 1 was acquitted as of late 1998. The Government
changed its statistical reporting on domestic violence during the year;
in the first 9 months of the year there were 7homicides, 233 woundings
(serious assaults) and 35 common assaults involving current or former
partners. Women tend not to seek help when subject to violence;
cultural factors and inadequate information about available assistance
and resources result in many cases of spousal abuse going unreported.
To address this problem, in 1995 the Government set up a working group
on battered spouses. In 1996 it crafted multidisciplinary procedural
guidelines on handling battered spouse cases. The Government also funds
programs such as family life education counseling, a hot line service,
temporary housing, legal aid, and child protective services; it also
has initiated public education and media programs.
The general incidence of rape is low. There were 90 reported cases
of rape in 1998 and 72 in the first 9 months of the year.
Prostitution is illegal. Women face significant discrimination in
employment, salary, welfare, inheritance, and promotion (see Section
6.e.). Official unemployment figures are 7.2 percent for men and 4.7
percent for women. However, human rights organizations and unions
assert that the statistics inaccurately count many unemployed women as
housewives, and thus the unemployment rate for women is actually higher
than the unemployment rate for men. Women are entering professional
fields, including medicine, in greater numbers. Nonetheless, in the
medical profession there are few women in prestigious specialties such
as surgery. Women are well represented in government and in the civil
service (46 percent of senior civil servants are women, including the
head of the civil service, Anson Chan; however, female judicial
officers and judges make up only 18 percent of the judiciary. Despite
equal educational opportunities, women also are disproportionately
represented in the lower echelons of the work force. As a result of
1994 revisions to inheritance statutes, the law treats men and women
equally in inheritance matters, although women still face
discrimination based on traditional practices. The November U.N. Human
Rights Committee report noted illegal but customary discrimination
against women in the inheritance of small homes in rural areas of the
New Territories.
During the period from 1991-95, the number of female secondary
student candidates who took university advanced-level examinations
accounted for between 51 and 55 percent of the total, and the number of
female candidates who matriculated at universities accounted for
between 52 and 56 percent of all matriculating candidates. Education
officials acknowledge that the current system of secondary school place
allocation discriminates against girls because boys and girls are
ranked (and accepted) separately.
Children.--The Government is committed firmly to children's rights
and welfare through well-funded systems of public education, medical
care, and protective services. It supports programs for custody,
protection, day care, foster care, shelters, small group homes, and
assistance to families. The age of criminal responsibility for children
is 7, although it must be proved that a child under the age of 14
understood the consequences of his actions. In 1998 there were 42
incarcerated youths under the age of 16, 13 in training centers, 24 in
detention centers, and 5 in drug addiction treatment centers. In
January the Law Reform Commission began soliciting public comments on a
consultation paper on raising the age of criminal responsibility.
Child abuse and exploitation are not widespread, but are
increasing. There are no specific laws dealing with child pornography,
but in June the Government introduced the Prevention of Child
Pornography Bill and the Crimes (Amendment) Bill. The bills would
prohibit the printing, distribution, advertising, or possession of
child pornography. The bills also would prohibit arranging or
advertising of sexual offenses involving children under age 16. The
Crimes (Amendment) Bill also provides extraterritorial effect when
either the perpetrator or the victim of a sexual offense involving a
child or a person printing, distributing, advertising or possessing
child pornography ``has a nexus with Hong Kong.'' At year's end, these
bills were pending. In the first 8 months of 1999 there were 383 cases
of child abuse reported; 194 involved physical abuse, and 134 involved
sexual abuse. In 1995 the police set up a child abuse investigation
unit to improve treatment of victims. In 1996 legislation was passed
making it easier for child victims to testify in court using an
interviewing suite for recording statements. Legal penalties for
mistreatment or neglect of minors also were increased substantially. A
witness support program also was launched in 1996 to help child
witnesses in need. A child witness information kit in Chinese, with
books explaining legal and court proceedings, was published in 1996 to
help reduce children's anxiety about testifying. In 1998, a Child Care
Center Bill was passed to prevent unsuitable persons from providing
child care services and to facilitate the formation of mutual help
child care groups.
People with Disabilities.--Discrimination against the physically
and mentally disabled persists in employment, education, and the
provision of some public services. The 1995 Antidiscrimination Law
called for improved building access and sanctions against those who
discriminate. The Buildings Ordinance amended in 1997 updated design
requirements. However, despite inspections and occasional closure of
noncompliant businesses, access to public buildings and transportation
remains a serious problem. Advocates for the disabled complained that
limited access for the disabled at polling stations made voting in the
1998 elections difficult; for example, only 36 of the 96 subsector
election polling stations were accessible. The Government has an
integrated work extension program in sheltered workshops and expanded
vocational assessment and training. No comprehensive statistics are
available on the number of disabled persons in the work force. There
are about 4,600 disabled persons employed as civil servants of a total
civil service work force of 184,638--about 2.5 percent. In 1999, the
Selective Placement Division of the Labor Department found jobs for
1511 of the 3462 disabled job seekers. Approximately 9,000 students in
a school population of 919,620, or just under one percent, are
disabled. A pilot integration program launched in 1997 offered places
to 46 mildly disabled students in regular schools. In 1997 the
Government started a special university admission scheme for the
disabled.
In the first 9 months of the year, five cases under the Disability
Discrimination Ordinance were brought to court.
In February, the Government formed the Guardianship Board under the
Mental Health Ordinance to protect the interests of persons with mental
disabilities or disorders, including dementia.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There are no laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race. A government ``Code of Practice
for Employers'' designed to prevent discrimination states that race
should not be considered when hiring employees. Minorities are well
represented in the civil service. However, there are occasional reports
of racial discrimination in employment and admission to public
restaurants. Foreign domestic workers, most of them from the
Philippines, are particularly vulnerable to discrimination. According
to organizations representing migrant workers, police intimidation of
migrant workers is also a problem.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides for the right of
association and the right of workers to establish and join
organizations of their own choosing. Trade unions must be registered
under the Trade Unions Ordinance. The basic precondition for
registration is a minimum of seven persons who serve in the same
occupation. The Government does not discourage or impede the formation
of unions. In the first 9 months of the year, 26 employee unions and
two mixed organizations of employees and employers were registered. In
1998 24 new unions were registered. By the end of 1998 there were 558
employee unions. Approximately 22 percent of the 3.1 million salaried
employees and wage earners belong to a labor organization.
The Employment Ordinance includes provisions that protect against
antiunion discrimination. Violation of the antiunion discrimination
provisions is a criminal offense with a maximum fine that was increased
in 1995 to $12,800 (HK$100,000). Employees who allege such
discrimination have the right to have their cases heard by the Labor
Relations Tribunal. The Tribunal may order reinstatement of the
employee, subject to mutual consent of the employer and employee. If no
such order is made, the Tribunal may award statutory entitlements
(severance pay, etc.) and compensation. The maximum amount of
compensation is $20,000 (HK$156,000). However, labor activists complain
that complainants are discouraged by the Labor Relations Tribunal's
tendency to push conciliation rather than issue orders.
Work stoppages and strikes are permitted. However, there are some
restrictions on this right for civil servants. There were 3 strikes
during the year, which resulted in 299 lost work days; in 1998 there
were 8 strikes. Although there is no legislative prohibition of
strikes, in practice, most workers must sign employment contracts that
typically state that walking off the job is a breach of contract which
can lead to summary dismissal.
To date, Hong Kong has amended labor legislation and taken
administrative measures to apply 49 International Labor Organization
(ILO) conventions. In the Basic Law, China committed itself to adhere
to these conventions (see Section 6.b.).
In October 1997, the Provisional Legislature promulgated the
Employment and Labor Relations (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill.
This bill permits the cross-industry affiliation of labor union
federations and confederations and allows free association with
overseas trade unions (although notification of the Labor Department
within 1 month of affiliation is required).
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--In June 1997,
the Legislative Council passed three laws that greatly expanded the
collective bargaining powers of workers, protected them from summary
dismissal for union activity, and permitted union activity on company
premises and time. The new ordinances would have enabled full
implementation of ILO Conventions 87 (which was ratified with
reservations in 1963), 98, and 154. However, in October 1997, after
consultation with the Labor Advisory Board, the Provisional Legislature
repealed the 1997 Employee's Right to Representation, Consultation, and
Collective Bargaining Ordinance and the 1997 Employment (Amendment)
Ordinance, and amended the Trade Union (Amendment) Ordinance. The
repeal removed the new legislation's statutory protection against
summary dismissal for union activity; the Government argued that
existing law already offered adequate protection against unfair
dismissal arising from antiunion discrimination.
The 1997 Employment and Labor Relations (Miscellaneous Amendments)
Bill removes the legal stipulation of trade unions' right to engage
employers in collective bargaining; bans the use of union funds for
political purposes; requires the Chief Executive's approval before
unions can contribute funds to any trade union outside of Hong Kong;
and restricts the appointment of persons from outside the enterprise or
sector to union executive committees. The Hong Kong Confederation of
Trade Unions promptly filed a complaint against the Hong Kong
Government for violation of ILO Conventions 87, 98, and 154. In
November the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association concluded that the
new labor ordinance breached conventions 87 and 98 and recommended that
the Government take legislative action to remedy the situation. The
Government provided the ILO a progress report in May, asserting that it
was in compliance with all of the 45 ILO conventions that apply to Hong
Kong. In January the Government blocked a legislator's attempt to
introduce two bills on collective bargaining and antiunion
discrimination on the grounds that they would affect government
spending and operations and therefore fell outside the scope allowed
for private member bills under the Basic Law (see Section 3).
With the repeal of the short-lived collective bargaining
legislation, the prehandover framework continued. There were no laws
that stipulated collective bargaining on a mandatory basis. Wage rates
in a few trades like tailoring and carpentry were determined
collectively in accordance with established trade practices and customs
rather than as a statutory mechanism. In practice, collective
bargaining is not widely practiced. Unions generally are not powerful
enough to force management to engage in collective bargaining. The
Government does not encourage it, since the Government itself does not
engage in collective bargaining with civil servants' unions but merely
``consults'' with them.
The Labor Relations Division of the Department of Labor offers free
nonbinding conciliation services to employers and employees involved in
disputes that may involve statutory benefits and protection in
employment as well as arrears of wages, wages instead of notice, or
severance pay. The Department of Labor takes a positive attitude
towards the participation of trade unions in such dispute negotiations.
In the first 9 months of the year, the Division handled 226 disputes
and 24,321 claims, 57 percent of which were handled through
conciliation. In 1998 the Labor Relations Division handled 226 disputes
and 24,231 claims, 60 percent of which were handled through
conciliation. Approximately 15 percent of these trade disputes and
claims were settled with Labor Relations Division conciliation.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The use of forced
labor is prohibited in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. In
addition, trafficking in persons for the purpose of forced prostitution
is a problem (see Section 6.f.). The law does not prohibit specifically
forced or bonded labor by children; however, there were no reports of
such practices.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Employment of Children Regulations prohibits
employment of children under the age of 15 in any industrial
establishment. Children 13 and 14 years of age may be employed in
certain nonindustrial establishments, subject to conditions aimed at
ensuring a minimum of 9 years' education and protecting their safety,
health, and welfare. In 1998 the Labor Department conducted 156,634
workplace inspections during which 10violations of the Employment of
Children Regulations were discovered. The Department issued 11
summonses, of which 10 resulted in convictions and fines. Work hours
for young persons 15 to 17 years of age in the manufacturing sector
remain limited to 8 hours per day and 48 hours per week between 6 a.m.
and 11 p.m. Overtime is prohibited for all persons under the age of 18
in industrial establishments. Employment in dangerous trades is
prohibited for youths except 16- and 17-year-old males. The Labor
Inspectorate conducts workplace inspections to enforce compliance with
these regulations. While provisions against forced or compulsory labor
do not specifically refer to children, there were no reports of such
practices (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no statutory minimum
wage except for foreign domestic workers. As of December 1998, the
minimum wage for such workers was about $500 (HK$3,900) per month. The
law also requires employers to provide foreign domestic workers with
housing, worker's compensation insurance, travel allowances, and food
or a food allowance in addition to the minimum wage, which together
provide for a decent standard of living for a foreign domestic worker.
However, there are an increasing number of credible reports of foreign
domestic workers who are subject to deportation if they are dismissed
and who are thus less likely to raise formal complaints, illegally
being forced to accept less than the minimum wage and unacceptable
living conditions.
Aside from a small number of trades where a uniform wage structure
exists, wage levels customarily are fixed by individual agreement
between employer and employee and are determined by supply and demand.
Some employers provide workers with various kinds of allowances, free
medical treatment, and free subsidized transport. The average wage
generally provides a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
However, two-income households are the norm.
In order to comply with provisions in the Sex Discrimination
Ordinance, provisions in the Women and Young Persons (Industry)
Regulations that had prohibited women from joining dangerous industrial
trades and limited their working hours, including compulsory weekly
rest days, were dropped in 1997.
The Factory Inspectorate Division was restructured in 1996 as part
of a government effort to strengthen its safety and health promotion
and enforcement program. The new division--part of a new occupational
safety and health branch of the Labor Department--consists of four
units: An operations division covering field services such as safety
and health advice; a support services division responsible for
technical support services; a planning and training division; and a
legal services division charged with processing and conducting
prosecutions.
The Factories and Industrial Undertakings Ordinance and its 27 sets
of subsidiary regulations regulate safety and health conditions. The
Labor Department conducted 89,846 inspections of industrial and
nonindustrial workplaces in 1998 and issued 3,181 summonses (2,912 of
which resulted in convictions with a total of $7.6 million (HK$60
million) in fines). Worker safety and health has improved, due in part
to the transfer of many manufacturing jobs to factories across the
Chinese border, but serious problems remain, particularly in the
construction industry. In 1998 there was a total of 63,526 occupational
accidents (43,034 of which were classified as industrial accidents) of
which 68 were fatal. Employers are required under the Employee's
Compensation Ordinance to report any injuries sustained by their
employees in work-related accidents. There is no specific legal
provision allowing workers to remove themselves from dangerous work
situations without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There were reports that Chinese women
lured to work in legitimate employment in Hong Kong were forced to work
as prostitutes, and that Eastern European women were trafficked into
Hong Kong to work as prostitutes in high-priced clubs. Malaysian women
and girls reportedly are trafficked to work as prostitutes in Hong Kong
by criminal organizations; some of these women allegedly are sent to
Hong Kong with promises of legitimate employment, only to be forced
into prostitution upon their arrival. There also were reports of women
being trafficked to Hong Kong from Vietnam as ``mail order brides,''
usually through arrangements made by tourist agencies, international
labor services, or marriage mediating agencies. Once in Hong Kong, they
are vulnerable to exploitation.
There were reports that Chinese women were trafficked to Australia
from Hong Kong to work as prostitutes; some reportedly were lured with
promises of jobs as waitresses. Others reportedly were coerced into
working as prostitutes by criminal gangs. These women must repay the
cost of their passage, which, in some cases, has been as much as
$25,000 (A$40,000), through prostitution. They also may be required to
pay off amounts assessed for clothing and lodging, and their movements
may be controlled by their traffickers.
Hong Kong is also a transit point for persons smuggled from China
to other countries for labor purposes, generally by organized crime
organizations. Countries to which such persons are trafficked include
the U.S., Canada, Australia, and various western European countries.
Many trafficked persons agree to pay large sums for their transport,
and may be forced to work in conditions similar to indentured servitude
in order to repay the cost of their passage. Such persons generally
work in small businesses, such as restaurants and sweatshops, in the
countries to which they are trafficked; their pay is generally low.
Their movements may be restricted and their travel documents may be
confiscated. Often, trafficked persons live under poor conditions, and
are threatened with deportation or harm to family members still in
China if they complain. In late December, after being alerted by the
Hong Kong authorities, U.S. and Canadian authorities began to discover
shipping containers on cargo ships coming from Hong Kong that contained
smuggled persons from China. Conditions for those in the shipping
containers varied; conditions in some containers were reportedly
grossly inadequate for the 2 to 3 week voyage; other containers were
reportedly well provisioned for the journey across the Pacific Ocean.
Hong Kong customs and immigration officials as well as local shipping
companies have taken remedial measures to prevent this practice.
______
MACAU
Macau, a 13 square mile enclave on the south China coast, was
recognized by both China and Portugal as Chinese territory under
Portuguese administration until year's end. Under the ``Organic
Statute'' of 1976, which served as the Constitution, Macau had
considerable administrative, financial, and legislative autonomy from
Lisbon. The Governor, appointed by the Portuguese President, had
extensive powers under the Organic Statute. Both the Governor and the
Legislative Assembly exercised legislative power. Voters directly
elected only one-third of the legislators; the rest were appointed or
elected indirectly by interest groups. However, under the principle of
``one country, two systems'' specified in the 1987 Sino-Portuguese
Joint Declaration, Macau became a Special Administrative Region (SAR)
of China on December 20, 1999 (``the handover''). The Joint Declaration
and Basic Law (the SAR's miniconstitution promulgated by China's
National People's Congress (NPC) in March 1993) specify that Macau is
to continue to enjoy substantial autonomy and that its economy and way
of life are to remain unchanged for 50 years. The Macau SAR government
is headed by a Chief Executive, chosen by a 200-member Selection
Committee, which was chosen by the Preparatory Committee (60 Macau and
40 mainland representatives appointed by the NPC, and responsible for
overseeing the transition). Since December 20, only the legislature has
legislative power, but the Chief Executive has great influence over the
legislature's activities. There are limits on the types of private
member bills that may be tabled. Voters elect only 8 of Macau's 23
legislators in direct elections in geographical constituencies. Eight
are elected by interest groups in functional constituencies. Seven are
appointed (before December 20 by the Governor; after December 20 by the
Chief Executive). On May 15, Edmund Ho Hei-wah was elected Chief
Executive by the Selection Committee to take office after the handover.
In September the Chief Executive-elect announced the appointment of six
new legislators to serve from December 20 until the term of the current
legislature expires in 2001, reappointing only one of the Governor's
appointees. Portuguese metropolitan law serves as the basis for the
legal system. A Joint Liaison Group, composed of representatives from
Portugal and China, which served until December 31, was the mechanism
for negotiating transition issues and implementing the Joint
Declaration. After reversion, most of the laws in force continued to
apply (although the laws defining the structure of the judiciary are a
major exception). The judiciary is independent.
The police force is under civilian control. An increase in
organized crime-related violence has resulted in a public demand for
more law and order. There were no Portuguese troops stationed in Macau.
However, the Garrison Law (Macau SAR), passed by the NPC in June,
provided for the establishment of a Chinese People's Liberation Army
garrison in Macau after the handover. Senior Chinese and Macau SAR
officials have said that the garrison has no responsibility for
internal security.
The market-based economy is fueled by textile and garment exports,
along with tourism and gambling. A depressed real estate market,
stagnant exports, and a decline in tourism have limited economic growth
in recent years, a trend that continued in 1999. Despite the economic
downturn, most citizens still enjoy a high standard of living. Per
capita gross domestic product is $18,000.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
however, some problems remain, including the limited ability of
citizens to change their government, limits on the legislature's
ability to initiate legislation, occasional instances of police abuse,
inadequate provision for the disabled, lack of legal protection for
strikes and collective bargaining rights, and trafficking in women.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
During the year, seven prisoners died in custody (see Section
1.c.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such abuses, and the authorities
generally respect these provisions in practice. In 1998, the last year
for which figures are available, the Procurator General's
officeinvestigated five allegations of police brutality. No details
regarding the results of the investigations have been released.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, but in the
last 5 years the prison population has doubled to 750 and facilities
and personnel have failed to keep pace. During the year, seven
prisoners died in custody, one as the result of illness, one as the
result of suicide, and three as the result of injuries received during
fights with other inmates. Two of the deaths in custody still were
under investigation at year's end.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, and the authorities respect
these provisions in practice. An examining judge, who conducts a
pretrial inquiry in criminal cases, has a wide range of powers to
collect evidence, order or dismiss indictments, and determine whether
to release detained persons. Police must present persons remanded in
custody to an examining judge within 48 hours of detention. The
accused's counsel may examine the evidence. The law provides that cases
must come to trial within 6 months of indictment. The average length of
pretrial incarceration is 3 months.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent. The
Basic Law specifically provides for the continuation of an independent
judiciary after reversion; however, the prereversion laws that applied
to the structure of the judiciary were some of the few that did not
continue in effect after the handover. In addition the need to
translate laws and judgments and a severe shortage of local bilingual
lawyers (of the 100 lawyers in private practice, approximately 5 can
read and write Chinese) and magistrates may hamper the continuation of
the present system after reversion. The judiciary also is relatively
inexperienced (a law school first opened in Macau in the early 1990's),
and the lack of locally trained lawyers is a serious impediment to the
preservation of an independent judiciary and the overall development of
the legal system. After the handover, the Chief Executive is to appoint
judges, acting on the recommendation of an ``independent commission''
(which he appoints) composed of local judges, lawyers and ``eminent
persons.''
Until June the Superior Court was the highest court in Macau, with
the Portuguese Supreme Court of Justice and Constitutional Court
serving as courts of final appeal. The Superior Court consisted of six
magistrates divided into two panels, one of which heard only
administrative, fiscal, and customs duties cases; the other had
responsibility for all other cases. An additional judge served as
President of the Court. Cases before the Superior Court were heard
initially by the relevant panel of three judges. When such a panel's
ruling was appealed, all six judges heard the case, with the President
voting only in case of a tie. This structure resulted in a situation in
which three of the individuals hearing an appeal already had rendered
an opinion in the initial judgment. Critics charged that this called
into question the objectivity of the subsequent ruling. Beneath the
Superior Court were the Courts of First Instance and the Court of
Auditors.
In June Portugal unilaterally severed the Superior Court's links
with the Portuguese courts, making it the Constitutional Court and
court of final appeal for cases affecting Macau. To deal with an
increased caseload, some of which was transferred from the Portuguese
courts after the change, the number of judges on the Superior Court was
increased. Until December 20, judges were appointed by the Governor
upon the recommendation of the Supreme Council of Justice (for the
Superior Court) and the Judiciary Council of Macau (for the common
courts). Before the handover, local judges were appointed for life;
expatriate judges were appointed under temporary contracts. A local law
is yet to be passed determining the term of office for judges for the
SAR. In October the Chief Executive-elect announced the names of three
judges (two from Macau and one Portuguese) recommended by the
commission, who constitute the SAR Court of Final Appeal. After the
handover, the Court of Auditors was replaced by a Commissioner for
Auditing.
The law provides for the right to a fair trial and the judiciary
vigorously enforces this right. Trials are open to the public. The
Criminal Procedure Code provides for the accused's right to be present
during proceedings and to choose an attorney or request that one be
provided at government expense. A 1997 law on combating organized crime
provides that ``certain procedural acts may be held without publicity''
and that witness statements read in court are admissible as evidence.
There are also additional restrictions on the granting of bail and
suspended sentences in organized crime cases.
The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient judicial
process, although the average waiting period between the filing of a
civil case and its scheduled hearing is 12 months. Laws issued between
1976 and 1991 have been translated into Chinese. Since 1991 all
legislation has been issued simultaneously in Chinese and Portuguese.
However, many administrative regulations have not yet been translated
into Chinese.
In September the Chief Executive-elect announced his choice,
approved by the Chinese State Council, for the posthandover Chief
Procurator, who, on December 20, replaced the Chief Procurator
appointed by the Governor. The Chief Procurator enjoys substantial
autonomy from both the executive and the judiciary.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Laws provide for the inviolability of the home and of
communications, the right of ownership of private property and
enterprises, and the freedom to marry and raise a family, and the
Government respects these rights in practice.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for these rights,
and the Government generally respects them in practice. Local law also
protects citizens' right to petition the government and the
legislature.
The print media include seven Chinese-language dailies, three
Portuguese-language dailies, and a number of weeklies. There is one
television station and one radio station, each with a Portuguese and a
Cantonese-language channel. In addition Hong Kong and international
newspapers are freely available. Although there is no government
censorship or intimidation of the press, criminal gangs have sent
threatening letters to newspapers warning of retaliation if they cover
gang activities. A September 1998 gang bombing deliberately targeted
journalists. The dominant newspapers have a pro-China orientation.
Critics charge that they do not give equal attention to liberal and
prodemocracy voices. Local journalists continue to oppose a government
proposal to establish a press council to monitor the press and advise
the Government on press issues. However, this was not a pressing issue
during the year.
Article 23 of the Basic Law obliges the Macau SAR to enact laws
that ``forbid any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion
against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets.''
Human rights groups are concerned that these and other provisions of
Article 23 may restrict fundamental rights and freedoms. They are
particularly concerned because the Penal Code adopted in 1995 does not
specify sentences for such crimes, and a legal vacuum was created when
an earlier Portuguese law dealing with crimes against state security
became null and void on December 19.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this right in
practice. Under local law, individuals and groups intending to hold
peaceful meetings or demonstrations in public places are required to
notify the president of the relevant municipal council in writing at
least 3 days but no more than 2 weeks in advance of the event; however,
no prior authorization is necessary for the event to take place. Local
law also provides criminal penalties for authorities who unlawfully
impede or attempt to impede the right of assembly and for
counterdemonstrators who interfere in meetings or demonstrations.
In the days immediately preceding the handover, the then government
took steps to ensure that no demonstrations or security incidents would
mar the final days of the colonial regime. On December 18, six foreign
Falun Gong practitioners were denied entry on the grounds that they
were organizing an illegal demonstration (see Section 2.d.). On
December 19, 30 Falun Gong practitioners carrying signs and doing
exercises in front of a hotel were rounded up and, after being
questioned for several hours, returned to Hong Kong via ferry. A police
official explained that the law on the right to assemble and
demonstrate gives citizens that right, but not foreigners.
Article 23 of the Basic Law obliges the SAR to enact laws that
prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting
political activities in the Region.
The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government
respects this right in practice. There is no law prohibiting political
parties, but there are no genuine political parties.Both civic
associations and candidates' committees may present candidates in the
elections by direct or indirect suffrage (see Section 3). However,
Article 23 of the Basic Law obliges the Macau SAR to enact laws that
``prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies of the region from
establishing ties with domestic political organizations or bodies.''
One international human rights nongovernmental organization expressed
concern that 1997 legislation on combating organized crime could be
used to curb freedom of association. However, that has not occurred.
c. Freedom of Religion.--In July 1998, the Legislative Assembly
passed the Freedom of Religion Ordinance, which provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
Ordinance, which remained in effect after the handover, also provides
for privacy of religious belief, freedom of religious assembly, freedom
to hold religious processions, and freedom of religious education. The
Basic Law also provides for religious freedom.
The Religious Freedom Ordinance requires the registration of
religious organizations. This is handled by the Identification Services
Office. There have been no reports of discrimination in the
registration process. Religious bodies can apply to use electronic
media to preach. The ordinance also stipulates that religious groups
may maintain and develop relations with religious groups abroad and
provides for freedom of religious education.
Senior officials have said that, in spite of the banning of Falun
Gong in mainland China, the organization is legal and that followers
will be allowed to practice without interference.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice. In December six foreign Falun
Gong practitioners were denied entry on the grounds that they were
organizing an illegal demonstration (see Section 2.b.).
The law includes provisions for handling refugees and asylees in
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. There were no reports of
refugees being forced to return to a country where they feared
persecution. The law makes no provision for first asylum.
The Government has assisted in the resettlement of Vietnamese who
fled their country by boat. Only seven Vietnamese refugees remain in
Macau. No Vietnamese refugees were repatriated in 1997 or 1998, the
last period for which statistics were available. Macau returns an
average of 444 illegal Chinese migrants to China each month.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have a limited ability to change their government. The 23-
member Legislative Assembly is composed of 8 members elected in direct
elections; 8 indirectly elected by local community interests; and 7
appointed (by the Governor before the handover, by the Chief Executive
after). Elections are held every 4 years. Fourteen of the 16 elected
members chose to serve through reversion until their current terms
expire in 2001 (1 was selected Chief Executive). In a May by-election
Chui Sai-cheong was elected unopposed to the seat vacated when Edmund
Ho was elected Chief Executive. In September the 100-member Preparatory
Committee responsible for transition arrangements determined that the
same Selection Committee that chose the Chief Executive should choose a
legislator to replace one who chose not to serve out his term after the
handover. The new legislator took office on December 20. Only one of
the seven legislators appointed by the Governor was reappointed by the
Chief Executive to serve after the handover. The number of directly
elected legislators is to increase gradually in subsequent elections.
After 2009 the rules on the Assembly's composition may be altered by a
two-thirds majority of the total membership, with the approval of the
Chief Executive.
Although until December 20 the Legislative Assembly could enact
laws on all matters except those reserved for bodies in Portugal or the
Governor, in practice the Governor initiated the vast majority of
legislation, either directly through ``decree-laws'' or through bills
approved by the Legislative Assembly. Between January 1 and December
19, the Legislative Assembly passed approximately 20 percent of Macau's
new laws. While the Legislative Assembly had the legal power to refuse
to ratify laws issued by the Governor, in practice this seldom was
done. After the handover, the Chief Executive does not have the power
to issue decree legislation. However, Article 75 of the Basic Law
stipulates that legislators may not initiate legislation related to
public expenditure, Macau's political structure, or the operation of
government. Bills relating to government policiesmust receive the
written approval of the Chief Executive before they are submitted.
The Consultative Council, an advisory group to the Governor
composed of indirectly elected and appointed members, also provided
some measure of popular representation. After the handover, a 10-member
Executive Council, appointed by the Chief Executive, fulfills this
role. Municipal Assemblies are elected by direct, universal, secret
ballot. These bodies are expected to continue to function; the Basic
Law stipulates that the SAR may establish nonpolitical municipal bodies
responsible for cultural affairs and public sanitation.
Although women traditionally have played a minor role in local
political life and are still underrepresented, they hold a number of
senior positions throughout the Government. Three of the 23 Legislative
Assembly members, including the President of the Assembly, are women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights groups operate without government restriction,
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights.
International human rights agreements that were formerly applicable
to Macau were approved by the Sino-Portuguese Joint Liaison Group and
continue to apply to the SAR.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
While the Organic Statute did not prohibit explicitly
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, disability, language, or
social status, it incorporated the principle of nondiscrimination.
Separate laws provide for many of these rights. For example, under the
law that establishes the general framework for the educational system,
access to education is stipulated for all residents regardless of race,
religious belief, or political or ideological convictions. The Basic
Law stipulates that residents shall be free from discrimination,
irrespective of their nationality, descent, race, sex, language,
religion, political persuasion or ideological belief, educational
level, economic status, or social conditions.
Women.--Violence against women is not common. For cases that are
reported, the authorities enforce criminal statutes prohibiting
domestic violence and prosecute violators. However, police and court
statistics do not distinguish between spousal abuse and other assault
cases. If hospital treatment is required, a medical social worker
counsels the victim and informs her about social welfare services.
Until their complaints are resolved, battered women may be provided
public housing, but no facilities are reserved expressly for them. In
1998, the last year for which statistics are available, five cases of
rape were brought to court.
Trafficking in women is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
Women are becoming more active and visible in business. The
Government estimates that women account for 43 percent of the work
force. Equal opportunity legislation enacted in 1995, applicable to all
public and private organizations, mandates that women receive equal pay
for equal work, prohibits discrimination based on sex or physical
ability, and establishes penalties for employers who violate these
guidelines. However, there is wage discrimination in some sectors,
notably construction. Nonetheless, no cases alleging discrimination
have been brought to court.
Children.--The Government has not promulgated any statutes
specifically to protect the rights of children, relying on the general
framework of civil and political rights legislation to protect all
citizens. School attendance is not compulsory; however, the vast
majority of residents' minor children attend school. Basic education is
provided in government-run schools and subsidized private schools, and
covers the preprimary year, primary education, and general secondary
school education. The Education Department provides assistance to
families of those children who cannot pay school fees. The children of
illegal immigrants are excluded from the educational system (see
Section 6.d.).
Child abuse and exploitation are not widespread problems. In the
first 9 months of 1998, the last period for which statistics are
available, only two cases of child abuse were reported. In 1997 eight
such cases were reported.
People with Disabilities.--In 1997 the U.N. Human Rights Committee
recommended that Macau do more to ensure the economic and social rights
of the disabled. Few special programs exist aimed at helping the
physically and mentally disabled gain better access to employment,
education, and public facilities. Laws do not mandate building access
for the disabled. More than two-thirds of the funding for services for
the disabled comes from government subsidies. In 1996 the Government
subsidized 4 homes and 10 rehabilitation centers for the disabled. Nine
schools have programs for the disabled, providing special education
programs for 359 students. In December 1997, the Government formed a
working group to define the fundamental rights of the disabled and
determine the role of social service organizations in assisting them.
The extent to which physically disabled persons experience
discrimination in employment, education, and provision of state
services is not known fully.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although no specific laws
prohibit discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic background,
the rights of ethnic minorities, particularly the Macanese (Eurasians
who comprise roughly 9 percent of the population of 430,000) are
respected. Portuguese officials no longer dominate the civil service,
but the governmental and legal systems place a premium on knowledge of
the Portuguese language, which is spoken by less than 4 percent of the
population. The Chinese language received official status in 1993, and
the use of Chinese in the civil service is growing. On December 20,
Macau residents replaced the government secretaries, the Chief
Procurator, and the Chief Justice. Localization of most jobs in the
civil service was completed earlier in the year.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Portuguese Constitution
recognized the right and freedom of all workers to form and join trade
unions, and these rights were extended to Macau. The Government neither
impedes the formation of trade unions nor discriminates against union
members. The Basic Law stipulates that international labor conventions
that applied to Macau shall remain in force and shall be implemented
through the laws of the SAR. However, human rights groups are concerned
that local law does not have explicit provisions against antiunion
discrimination.
People's Republic of China interests heavily influence local trade
union activities, including the selection of union leadership and
stress the importance of stability and minimum disruption of the work
force. Nearly all of the private sector union members belong to a pro-
China labor confederation. Many local observers claim that this
organization is more interested in furthering the Chinese political
agenda than in addressing trade union issues such as wages, benefits,
and working conditions. A few private sector unions and two of the four
public sector unions are outside Chinese control.
Although the Portuguese Constitution provides workers with the
right to strike, labor leaders complain that there is no effective
protection from retribution should they exercise this right. The
Government argues that provisions in the labor law that require an
employer to have ``justified cause'' to dismiss an employee protect
striking employees from retaliation. There were no work stoppages or
strikes during the year.
Unions may freely form federations and affiliate with international
bodies. Three new unions were registered in 1998, the last year for
which statistics are available. Three civil service unions--
representing Portuguese, Macanese, and Chinese employees--are
affiliated with the major non-Communist Portuguese union confederation.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Macau unions
tend to resemble local traditional neighborhood associations, promoting
social and cultural activities rather than issues relating to the
workplace. Moreover, Local customs normally favor employment without
the benefit of written labor contracts, except in the case of migrant
labor from China and the Philippines. Chinese unions traditionally have
not attempted to engage in collective bargaining. The Government does
not impede or discourage collective bargaining, but there is no
specific statutory protection for this right, since Portuguese laws
that protected collective bargaining no longer apply.
Some civil service unions raised concerns during the year over
government practices that they believe disadvantage them. Workers who
believe that they have been dismissed unlawfully may bring a case to
court or lodge a complaint with the LaborDepartment or the high
commissioner against corruption and administrative illegality.
There are no export processing zones; Macau is a free port.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced and bonded
labor is prohibited by law, and there were no reports of such
practices, except for cases of trafficking in women (see Section 6.f.).
Children are covered under laws prohibiting forced or bonded labor,
although they are not specified in the legislation.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits minors under the age of 16 from working,
although minors between the ages of 14 and 16 can be authorized to work
on an ``exceptional basis.'' Some children reportedly work in family-
run businesses and on fishing vessels, usually during summer and winter
vacations. Local laws do not establish specific regulations governing
the number of hours these children can work, but International Labor
Organization conventions are applied. The Labor Department enforces the
law through periodic and targeted inspections and violators are
prosecuted. The incidence of child labor is very low and has declined
radically since effective enforcement began in 1985. The Labor
Department Inspectorate does not conduct inspections specifically aimed
at enforcing child labor laws but issues summonses when such violations
are discovered in the course of other workplace inspections. No
instances of child labor were reported during the year. Forced and
bonded labor is prohibited by law; although child labor is not
specified in the law, it is covered by the law's provisions, and there
were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Local labor laws establish the
general principle of fair wages and mandate compliance with wage
agreements, but there is no mandatory minimum wage. Average wages
generally provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
In the absence of any statutory minimum wage or publicly administered
social security programs, some large companies provide private welfare
and security packages.
Labor legislation provides for a 48-hour workweek, an 8-hour
workday, paid overtime, annual leave, and medical and maternity care.
Although the law provides for a 24-hour rest period for every 7 days of
work, worker representatives report that workers frequently agree to
work overtime to compensate for low wages. The Department of Labor
provides assistance and legal advice to workers on request, but
government enforcement of labor laws is lax.
Migrant workers, primarily from China, make up approximately 16
percent of the work force. These workers often work for less than half
the wages paid to a local resident performing the same job, live in
controlled dormitories, work 10 to 12 hours a day, and owe large sums
of money to the labor-importing company for the purchase of their jobs.
In 1997 the U.N. Human Rights Committee noted the lack of protective
measures for working conditions and the absence of social security
programs for nonresident workers as matters of concern. Labor interests
claim that the high percentage of imported labor erodes the bargaining
power of local residents to improve working conditions and increase
wages.
The Department of Labor enforces occupational safety and health
regulations. Failure to correct infractions can lead to prosecution. In
the first 9 months of 1999, the Labor Department Inspectorate carried
out 144 inspections and uncovered 16 violations carrying fines worth a
total of $2,100 (MP16,500). Although the law includes a requirement
that employers provide a safe working environment, no explicit
provisions protect employees' right to continued employment if they
refuse to work under dangerous conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Specific legislation prohibits
trafficking in persons; however, trafficking in women for the purpose
of forced prostitution continues to be a problem, although it is
difficult to quantify. In October two Vietnamese women were prosecuted
in Vietnam for trafficking 15 Vietnamese women to Macau for the purpose
of prostitution. There also have been credible reports that women from
Vietnam are trafficked into Macau as mail-order brides, with the
assistance of organizations purporting to be travel agencies,
international labor organizations, or marriage mediating services.
Women from Malaysia, who are usually ethnic Chinese, also reportedly
have been trafficked into Macau; law enforcement authorities in
Malaysia believe that the women are trafficked by Chinese criminal
syndicates. In some cases, trafficking victims from Malaysia are lured
by promises of well-paying jobs and then are forced to work as
prostitutes. In late March, the Korean press reported that a Korean man
was arrested on charges of forcing 40 Korean women, recruited as
waitresses, into prostitution in Macau.
______
TAIWAN
With the popular election of President Lee Teng-hui in 1996, Taiwan
completed its transition to an open, democratic system. Lee, who is
also the Chairman of the Nationalist Party (KMT), appoints the Premier,
who heads the Executive Yuan (EY), or Cabinet. Constitutional
amendments adopted in 1997 provided the Legislative Yuan (LY) with the
authority to bring down the Cabinet with a no confidence vote and
removed the previous power of the LY to confirm the appointment of the
Premier. The current LY members were elected in a free and fair
election in December 1998. The ruling KMT remains the single most
powerful political force with a working majority in the LY, where two
opposition parties play significant roles. The Judicial Yuan (JY) is
constitutionally independent of the other branches of the political
system, but corruption and political influence remain serious problems.
The National Police Administration (NPA) of the Ministry of
Interior (MOI), the NPA's Criminal Investigation Bureau, and the
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) Investigation Bureau are responsible for law
enforcement relating to internal security. The police and security
agencies are under effective civilian control. Some members of the
police occasionally committed human rights abuses.
Taiwan has a dynamic, export-oriented, free-market economy.
Liberalization of the economy undercut the dominant role that state-
owned and party-run enterprises had played in such major sectors as
finance, transportation, utilities, shipbuilding, steel,
telecommunications, and petrochemicals. As the economy evolved,
services and capital- and technology-intensive industries have become
the most important sectors. Major exports include computers, electronic
equipment, machinery, and textiles. Citizens generally enjoy a high
standard of living and an equitable income distribution.
The authorities generally respect human rights; however, problems
remain in some areas. Principal problems include police abuse of
detainees; physical abuse of military inductees, which appears to be
declining; prison overcrowding; political and personal pressures on the
judiciary; some infringements on citizens' privacy; violence and
discrimination against women; child prostitution and abuse; societal
discrimination against Aborigines; restrictions on workers' freedom of
association and on their ability to strike, and instances of
trafficking in women and children. Restrictions on freedom of
association were eliminated in April when the Council of Grand Justices
invalidated the restrictions on using the word Taiwan in the names of
organizations.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Although the Constitution does not directly address the
issues of torture and punishment, the Code of Criminal Procedure
stipulates that no violence, threat, inducement, fraud, or other
improper means shall be used against accused persons; however, there
were credible reports that police occasionally physically abused
persons in their custody.
The law allows suspects to have attorneys present during
interrogations, primarily to ensure that abuse does not take place (see
Section 1.d.). The MOJ stated that each interrogation is recorded and
that any allegation of mistreatment is investigated. Lawyers and legal
scholars note that abuses most often occur in local police stations
where interrogations are not recorded and when attorneys often are not
present. Informed observers note that police emphasize confessions by
suspects as the principal investigative tool. Law enforcement agencies
remain weak in scientific investigative skills so that, when political
leaders demand that cases be solved, there is pressure on the police to
coerce confessions. International observers also have noted that the
judicial system sometimes has accepted such confessions even when they
contradict available physical evidence or logic. The NPA denies that
police abuse suspects; and asserts that regulations forbid such abuse
and that police who abuse suspects would be punished. The NPA
implemented regulations to protect further the rights of suspects
during questioning, including forbidding the questioning of suspects at
night and requiring audio or, whenever possible, videotaping of
interrogations. Nevertheless, there are credible reports that the
physical abuse or the threat of abuse of prisoners is arecurring
investigative technique. Detainees who are abused physically have the
right to sue the police for torture, and confessions shown to have been
obtained through torture are inadmissible in court proceedings. No such
suits were reported during the year.
The authorities state that they have made efforts to investigate,
prosecute, and punish officials responsible for torture and other
mistreatment. Although the basic responsibility for investigating
mistreatment lies with prosecutors, the Control Yuan (CY), a coequal
branch of the political system that investigates official misconduct,
also investigates such cases. While the authorities state that respect
for human rights is a part of basic police training, human rights
groups assert that the measures the authorities have taken to protect
human rights are inadequate to create an ethos of respect for human
rights among police and security personnel. Women's and children's
rights groups are active in monitoring police and judicial performance
and periodically mount campaigns to correct abuses.
Corporal punishment is forbidden under military law, and strictly
prohibited in practice. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) has
taken steps to address the occasional reports of physical abuse of
military personnel by promulgating regulations specifying the
appropriate treatment of lower ranking personnel and by conducting
regular polls of servicemen and their families to discover any abuse.
The authorities also have established a telephone hot line to report
alleged abuses within the military. Reports of abuse are investigated
and handled according to the law. In addition the MND has established
practical training and curriculums for all military personnel who have
contact with new recruits. Pressure from parents of recruits and a
program to retain recruits also have contributed to an apparent
reduction in abuses. In March the MND established a committee for the
protection of the rights of military personnel. Using the expertise of
outside consultants, the committee handles personal problems of
military personnel and is part of the MND's effort to promote
``humanitarian management'' within the military.
Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards.
However, overcrowding at the 49 prisons and overly long stays at the
detention centers for illegal aliens remained a problem. Despite an
increase in facilities since 1997, the number of inmates detained at
year's end exceeded capacity by 7,142. The primary reason for
overcrowding has changed. The number of incarcerated drug users, which
previously had been the fastest growing category of inmates, has
leveled off. In addition the Ministry of Justice has set up drug
treatment facilities to reduce the number of addicts in the prison
population. However, the number of parolees dropped after a 1997
amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure reversed a 1994 amendment
that had allowed prisoners to be paroled after serving one-third,
rather than one-half, of their sentences.
The authorities permit prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the authorities generally observe
this prohibition. Police legally may arrest without a warrant anyone
they suspect of committing a crime for which the punishment would be
imprisonment of 5 years or more and may question persons without a
formal summons when circumstances are too urgent to report to a public
prosecutor. However, the authorities must, within 24 hours after
detention, apply to a prosecutor for a warrant and give written notice
to the detainee or a designated relative or friend, stating the reason
for the arrest or questioning. Indicted persons may be released on bail
at judicial discretion.
An important amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure was
enacted in 1997, that shifted the power of investigative detention from
the prosecutors to the courts. Under the new law, prosecutors must
apply to the courts within 24 hours after arrest for permission to
continue detaining an arrestee. The duration of this pretrial detention
is limited to 2 months, and the courts may approve a single extension
of 2 months. Limits also were set for detention during trial. If a
crime is punishable by less than 10 years' imprisonment, then no more
than 3 extensions of 2 months each may be granted during the trial and
appellate proceedings. During the second appeal, only one extension may
be granted. The authorities generally observe these procedures, and
trials usually take place within 3 months of indictment.
The revised Code of Criminal Procedure requires the police to
inform a suspect during an interrogation of the specific crimes in
question, the right to remain silent, the right to counsel, and the
right to ask the police to investigate evidence that would be favorable
to the suspect. If the charges are amended subsequently, the police
also must inform the suspect. The authorities generally respect a
detainee's request to have a lawyer present during the investigation
phase, but defense lawyers and human rights groups continue to complain
that the rules do not provide adequate protection since suspects often
donot have legal representation during police interrogation. A
contributing factor is that there is no legal requirement that indigent
persons be provided counsel during police interrogation, although such
counsel is provided during trials. Informed observers report that the
``public defense counsels'' do not provide effective defense
assistance. They typically do not appear until the final debate hearing
of the trial, and they seldom spend a significant amount of time
discussing the case with their clients.
The authorities do not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, corruption and political influence
remain serious problems.
The Judicial Yuan is one of the five coequal branches of the
political system. The JY is headed by a president and a vice president
and also contains the 16-member Council of Grand Justices (CGJ), which
interprets the Constitution as well as laws and ordinances. Subordinate
JY organs include the Supreme Court, high courts, district courts, the
Administrative Court, and the Committee on the Discipline of Public
Functionaries. In February the LY passed legislation adding an
additional level to the Administrative Court to provide for judicial
review.
The law provides for the right of fair public trial, and this is
generally respected in practice. Judges, rather than juries, decide
trials; all judges are appointed by, and responsible to, the JY. In a
typical court case, parties and witnesses are interrogated by a single
judge but not directly by a defense attorney or prosecutor. The judge
may decline to hear witnesses or to consider evidence that a party
wishes to submit if the judge considers it irrelevant; a refusal to
hear evidence may be a factor in an appeal. Trials are public, but
attendance at trials involving juveniles or potentially sensitive
issues that might attract crowds may require court permission.
A defendant has the right to an attorney. If the defendant is
charged with committing a crime for which the penalty is 3 or more
years' imprisonment or if the defendant is disabled, the judge may
assign an attorney. A law passed in 1997 states that a suspect may not
be compelled to testify. The Code of Criminal Procedure states that a
confession shall not be the sole evidence used to find a defendant
guilty. However, informed observers note that many convictions
frequently result from a combination of a confession and circumstantial
evidence of varying quality. Any convicted person has the right to
appeal to the next higher court level. Persons sentenced to terms of
imprisonment of 3 years or more may appeal beyond that level. The
Supreme Court automatically reviews life imprisonment and death
sentences. Under the law, prosecutors have the right to appeal verdicts
of not guilty to the next higher court level.
The 1985 ``Antihoodlum'' Law departed from international standards
of due process in that it included a secret witness system that allowed
police to conduct ``sweeps'' of suspected ``hoodlums'' and to use the
testimony of unidentified informants in detaining the suspects. Lawyers
for the alleged hoodlums were not permitted to cross-examine these
informants. While defense lawyers were given the right to examine
documentary evidence, critics charged that evidence in these cases was
often weak or fabricated. However, in 1995 the Council of Grand
Justices (CGJ) declared unconstitutional the administrative procedures
that had been used to sentence hoodlums to reformatory education. The
LY passed new legislation in 1997 requiring all witnesses to testify
openly but providing procedures for their subsequent protection, ``in
exceptional cases.''
Despite several years of effort at judicial reform, dissatisfaction
exists among judges and others about the slowness of strengthening the
rule of law. Corruption within the judiciary remains a problem. In
March the newly appointed JY President presented a 5-year blueprint for
judicial reform. These proposals called for a defendant-oriented trial
system, which would protect the rights of the accused better and
increase judicial efficiency. The proposals also would promulgate a
code of judicial conduct, revise the precepts for evaluating judicial
performance, and strengthen review of judges' financial disclosure
reports.
In February the law was revised to create the position of law
clerks. Working as assistants to judges, the law clerks are intended to
improve judicial performance and the quality of decisions.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution and sections of the Criminal and
Civil Codes contain provisions protecting privacy. A prosecutor or a
judge,must issue a warrant before a search, except when ``incidental to
arrest.'' However, critics claim that the ``incidental to arrest''
provision is not only unconstitutional but also often interpreted
broadly by police to justify searches of locations other than actual
arrest sites. According to the National Police Administration,
warrantless searches are allowed only in special circumstances, such as
to arrest an escapee or if facts indicate a person is in the process of
committing a crime. In any such case, the police must file a report
with the prosecutor or court within 24 hours. A policeman who carries
out an illegal search may be sued for illegal entry and sentenced to up
to 1-year imprisonment. Few prosecutors or judges filed charges against
policemen found to have obtained evidence illegally. Furthermore, such
evidence is not excluded automatically from consideration by the court;
instead, its admission is left to the discretion of the judge. More
often than not, such evidence is admitted and frequently provides the
basis for conviction.
In addition to criminal suspects, persons are subject to searches
and identity checks by police in public places. Roadblocks to check
vehicles randomly are conducted routinely. Pedestrians also are subject
to identity checks. Such checks are based only on a section of the
Police Administration Law, and police officers are given wide
discretion.
The wiretapping of telephones is a serious problem. The
Telecommunication Law and the Code of Criminal Procedure provide that
judicial and security authorities may file a written request to a
prosecutor's office to monitor telephone calls to collect evidence
against a suspect involved in a major crime. According to media
reports, this practice is commonplace with more than 15,000 telephones
being wiretapped during the year. In June the LY passed legislation
intended to bring unauthorized wiretapping under control by imposing
severe penalties. The law also provides for wiretapping by the
intelligence services.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the authorities generally
respect these rights in practice. A 1998 Council of Grand Justices
decision invalidated a statute prohibiting the advocacy of communism or
the division of national territory, which previously had circumscribed
these rights formally, although the statute's provisions were not
enforced in practice.
Print media represent the full spectrum of views within society.
However, some political influence still exists over the electronic
media, particularly television. The KMT continues to be one of the
largest shareholders in three of the five island-wide broadcast
television stations, and some critics claim that coverage on these
three stations has been biased in favor of the KMT. The Taiwan
Provincial Government, previously a major shareholder, was eliminated
from government structure at the end of 1998, and, although the
military continues to be a large shareholder, it does not appear to
play any role in programming. A fourth island-wide broadcast television
station based in Kaohsiung is associated with the largest opposition
party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). A fifth island-wide
broadcast station run by a nonprofit public television foundation under
the Government Information Office was inaugurated in 1998. In any
event, the existence of approximately 100 cable television stations,
some of which carry programming openly hostile to the ruling party, has
diminished greatly the importance of KMT control over broadcast
television stations. Over 70 percent of households receive cable
television, which includes local, privately financed channels, as well
as many major international networks. Cable television call-in programs
have given the public an additional means of expressing their views.
Controls over radio stations were more limited than those over
television stations and are being liberalized further. From 1993 to
September, the Government Information Office (GIO) received 626
applications for radio broadcast frequencies. A total of 189
frequencies were made available, and 118 of these were apportioned;
many of the 71 still available are in remote areas. However, many of
the newly authorized radio stations have limited broadcast ranges,
leading critics to charge that the stations do not constitute a genuine
counterweight to the authorities' monopoly on island-wide radio
broadcasting.
Observers noted that licensing requirements oblige prospective
radio station owners to have more capital than actually is required to
operate a station. This requirement inhibits individuals or groups from
applying for radio station licenses. However, the GIO claims that the
$1.5 million (nt$50 million) required capitalization is based upon
consideration of actual business costs and notes that the required
capitalization is reduced to $31,250 (nt$1 million) for radio stations
serving remote areas or designated ethnic groups and civic
organizations, or which promote local development. Reportedly over100
unlicensed ``underground'' radio stations, many associated with
opposition parties, operate illegally.
In 1992 the authorities revised sedition statutes to limit the
purview of the Sedition Law and the National Security Law (NSL) and to
remove prohibitions on ``actions against the Constitution.'' However,
the NSL still retains prohibitions against advocating communism or
espousing the division of national territory, although these were
invalidated by the 1998 Council of Grand Justices decision that such
prohibitions were unconstitutional.
While there were three cases in which senior leaders charged local
publications with libel in 1997, no new cases were reported during
1998-99.
There is a vigorous and active free press. In January the LY
abolished the Publications Law, which had empowered the police to seize
or ban printed material that is seditious, treasonous, sacrilegious,
interfered with the lawful exercise of public functions, or violated
public order or morals. There were no reports of censorship of the
print media during the year, nor were there any seizures of materials
on political grounds. The police sometimes conduct raids to seize
pornographic materials.
The GIO requires that any publications imported from mainland China
be sent to the GIO Publications Department for screening before sale or
publication, and still seeks to ban the importation of publications
that advocate communism or the establishment of united front
organizations, endanger public order or good morals, or violate
regulations or laws. However, few local publishing companies observe
this regulation, and substantial People's Republic of China-origin
material is imported every year. Moreover, cable television systems
broadcast uncensored television channels from mainland China.
Among other restrictions regulating the media are those precluding
persons previously convicted of sedition from owning, managing, or
working in television and radio stations. Major opposition leaders,
many of whom were convicted of sedition after the 1979 Kaohsiung
incident, are nevertheless not affected because their rights were
restored through presidential amnesties.
There are few restrictions on academic freedom. The expression of
dissenting political views is common.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; although in the past the authorities
restricted this right somewhat in practice, they have not done so
following the Council of Grand Justices' 1998 decision that provisions
of the Parade and Assembly Law prohibiting demonstrations promoting
communism or advocating Taiwan's separation from mainland China were
unconstitutional.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however,
although the authorities restricted this right somewhat in practice,
these restrictions were eliminated early in the year. The Civic
Organization Law requires all civic organizations to register, but in
April the central authorities removed the previous restriction on
registration of groups that use the word ``Taiwan'' in their titles
after a CGJ ruling that such a restriction was unconstitutional. Prior
to this change, the lack of registration entailed some inconvenience to
the operations of some groups. For example they could not solicit
donations from the public, contributors could not take income tax
deductions for their contributions, and their employees could not
receive employment-linked benefits such as national health insurance
coverage. Nonetheless they operated actively, freely, and effectively.
A 1992 revision of the Civic Organization Law removed from the EY
the power to dissolve political parties. This power now resides in the
Constitutional Court. Grounds for dissolution include objectives or
actions that are deemed to jeopardize the existence of the ``Republic
of China.'' The Constitutional Court heard no cases under this law
during the year.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the authorities respect this right in practice.
Religious organizations are required to register with the
authorities under the Temple Management Law, the Civic Organizations
Law, or the Corporate Bodies Law. In the past, the authorities
occasionally denied registration to new religions whose doctrines were
unclear. But such religions are now registered as civic organizations.
There were no reports that the authorities seek to suppress new
religions.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The authorities do not restrict freedom
of internal travel. Foreign travel by passport holders is common.
Nonresident Taiwan passport holders are usually issued ``overseas
Chinese'' passports and must seek entry permits for travel to Taiwan.
According to 1992 revisions to the National Security Law, entry permits
may be refused only if there are facts sufficient to create a strong
suspicion that a person is engaged in terrorism or violence. Reasons
for entry and exit refusals must be given, and appeals may be made to a
special board. No exit or entry permit refusals were reported during
the year. In 1993 new measures provided that holders of Taiwan
passports who normally reside abroad may return and regain their
household registration, a document required to vote or participate as a
candidate in an election.
Since 1988 Taiwan has substantially relaxed strictures against
travel by residents to the Chinese mainland, and such travel is common.
Relatively tight restrictions on the entry of Chinese from the mainland
remain in force for national security reasons, but they have been
relaxed in recent years to expand cross-strait exchanges.
There is no law under which noncitizens may ask for asylum, and
there were no applications for refugee status during the year. While
the authorities have been reluctant to return to the mainland those who
might suffer political persecution, they regularly deport to the
mainland, under provisions of the Mainland Relations Act, mainlanders
who illegally enter the island for economic reasons. There were no
reports of forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution.
The detention centers for illegal immigrants continue to attract
media attention. While the completion of expansion projects has
eliminated overcrowded conditions, inmates complain about overly long
stays at the centers while waiting to be repatriated. The Bureau of
Entry and Exit faults mainland Chinese authorities for insisting on
extensive background checks, which results in a delay in repatriation.
In the spring legislative session, the LY enacted an Entry, Exit,
and Immigration Law; among other things it criminalizes alien
smuggling. However, this portion of the law still requires enabling
legislation.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have this right. In 1996 Taiwan for the first time carried
out the direct, popular election of its president, thus completing its
transition to a democratic, multiparty political system. The transition
began with the lifting of martial law in 1987. Generally free and fair
popular elections for the LY took place in 1992, 1995, and 1998.
Corruption and vote buying, particularly in local elections, are
problems. In September the National Assembly (NA) passed amendments to
the Constitution that included extending the current term of Assembly
deputies and replacing their popular election with a system of
appointment based on political party apportionment. The NA is charged
mainly with amending the Constitution.
The KMT remains the largest political party, with 2 million
members. It secured a working majority in the 1998 elections for an
expanded LY, winning 124 of 225 seats. The KMT also won the December
election for Taipei mayor. The Democratic Progressive Party, which
traditionally had advocated independence for Taiwan and has an
estimated 200,000 members, controls 54 LY seats. It won 12 of 23
mayoral and county magistrate posts in 1997, including that of Taipei
County, placing a majority of Taiwan's population in DPP-led
localities. The DPP also won the Kaohsiung mayor's office in the 1998
election. Younger KMT members who opposed the Party's domination by
``mainstream'' ethnic Taiwanese supporters of President and Party
Chairman Lee Teng-hui established the New Party in 1993. The New Party
has 11 seats in the LY and claims a membership of 86,000.
The KMT benefits from its ownership of three of the major
television channels and of enterprises and business holdings estimated
to be worth in excess of $6 billion, and from the fact that its members
still hold most key positions in the political system, sometimes
concurrently with important party positions. However, in recent years,
opposition parties grew rapidly and freely contest elections, criticize
the authorities, and influence national policy through the legislative
process.
The Constitution provides for equal rights for women, but their
role in politics, while increasing, remains limited. Nevertheless there
are six female members of the Cabinet, including the Minister of
Justice, the Chairperson of the Fair Trade Commission, and the
Chairperson of the EY Council for Cultural Development. A number of
women also hold senior KMTpositions, including three members of the
Central Standing Committee. In addition 43 of 225 LY members, 54 of 316
National Assembly members, and 2 of 29 Control Yuan members are women.
Aborigine representatives participate in most levels of the
political system, partially through 6 reserved seats in the NA and LY--
half of each elected by the plains Aborigines and half by mountain
Aborigines. An Aborigine serves as Chairman of the Aboriginal Affairs
Commission. The magistrate of Taitung County is an Aborigine first
elected in 1993 and reelected in 1997.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The principal human rights organizations are the Chinese
Association of Human Rights and the Taiwan Association for Human
Rights. Both organizations operate freely, although coordination
between the two is limited. Both organizations investigate human rights
complaints, many of which come to public attention through the media
and statements by lawmakers from all political parties. The authorities
permit representatives of international human rights organizations to
visit and meet with citizens freely. Women's and children's human
rights groups monitor police and judicial performance and campaign to
correct abuses (see Section 1.c.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equality of citizens before the law
``irrespective of sex, religion, race, class, or party affiliation.''
Constitutional amendments enacted in 1997 also provide for the rights
of disabled persons. While the authorities are committed to protecting
these rights, some areas of discrimination continue to exist.
Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence and
rape, remains a serious problem. Wife beating is especially widespread.
The DPP Women's Development Committee claimed that 35 percent of
married women were victims of spousal abuse. The authorities fund
domestic violence hot lines, which have handled some 17,000 cases over
the past decade. By law a prosecutor may not investigate domestic
violence cases until a spouse files a formal lawsuit. Although some
cases are prosecuted, strong social pressure discourages abused women
from reporting incidents to the police in order to avoid disgracing
their families. Rape also remains a serious problem, and its victims
are stigmatized socially. One expert estimates that 7,000 rapes occur
annually--10 times the number reported to the police. In a step
forward, in April the LY passed legislation that permits the
prosecution of the crime of rape without requiring the victim to press
charges. According to a law passed in 1997, rape trials no longer are
public unless the victim consents. The Code of Criminal Procedure
establishes the punishment for rape as not less than 5 years'
imprisonment, and those convicted are usually sentenced to from 5 to 10
years in prison. In the first 6 months of the year, 335 persons were
indicted for the crime of rape, and 141 were convicted.
In 1998 the LY passed new legislation that required all city and
county governments to set up domestic violence prevention and control
centers. The centers provide victims with protection, shelter, legal
counseling, and other services on a 24-hour basis. Under the law, a
judicial order may be obtained to prohibit violators from approaching
victims. The Ministry of Interior also provides assistance to victims
of rape or domestic violence, such as financial assistance and shelter.
In April the Ministry established a domestic violence prevention
committee to implement a comprehensive program for the protection of
women and children.
Prostitution, including coerced prostitution and child
prostitution, is also a problem (see Section 6.f.). The authorities are
phasing out legalized prostitution. Under the law, no new houses of
prostitution may be registered.
The law prohibits sex discrimination, and the LY has in recent
years begun a systematic review and revision of those portions of the
legal code relating to divorce, property, and child custody. As a
result of legislation passed in 1998, many discriminatory sections of
the code were eliminated. For example women now are no longer required
to adopt their husband's last name after marriage. In 1994 the CGJ
declared unconstitutional a Civil Code provision dating to the 1930's
that gave fathers priority in child custody disputes. In 1996 the LY
passed legislation that clarified a woman's right to her own property.
In 1997 the LY repealed legislation requiring that a child take the
father's name; the parents may now choose to give the child either the
father's or mother's family name.
There is no equal employment rights law, and enforcement of
existing sex discrimination laws remains a problem. Labor lawsprovide
for maternity leave, but employers do not always grant it. Women also
complain of being forced to quit jobs due to marriage, age, or
pregnancy. Women often complain of less frequent promotions and lower
salaries than their male counterparts, although the Labor Standards Law
prohibits gender-based differences in wages. According to the Council
on Labor Affairs, salaries for women average 85 percent of those for
men performing roughly equal jobs.
In the past, many women married to foreigners said that their
husbands had a more difficult time obtaining residency than the foreign
wives of male citizens. They also complained that their children were
not allowed to enter public schools. In 1995 the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs announced a relaxation of the regulations governing foreign
husbands' visas that allows the foreign husbands of citizens to remain
in Taiwan (at a minimum) for 6 months at a time rather than the shorter
periods granted previously. The Ministry of Education also clarified
regulations permitting the children of foreign fathers to attend public
schools. In May the LY passed legislation permitting spouses of
citizens to apply for permanent residency after residing in Taiwan for
5 years. However, the Citizenship Law continues to stipulate that the
transmission of citizenship may occur exclusively through the father. A
citizen mother with a foreign husband thus cannot apply for a Taiwan
passport for her child. However, when such a child reaches age 14, the
child can apply.
Children.--The Constitution has provisions to protect children's
rights, and the authorities are committed to supporting them. Education
for children between 6 and 15 years of age is compulsory, and this rule
is enforced. Children also are provided health care under the national
health insurance scheme.
Child abuse is a significant problem. The 1993 revision of the
Child Welfare Act states that any persons discovering cases of child
abuse or neglect must notify the police, social welfare, or child
welfare authorities, that child welfare specialists must make such
notification within 24 hours, and that the authorities involved must
issue an investigation report within 24 hours. Both the Ministry of
Interior's Social Affairs Department and nongovernmental specialists
assert that these requirements are followed. In June the LY passed
legislation creating a Child Welfare Bureau in the Ministry of Interior
to enhance efforts to protect child welfare.
In September the first juvenile court was established in Kaohsiung
to handle criminal cases. Previously regular courts handled such cases.
The new court includes 24 juvenile counselors. There are three juvenile
detention centers on the island.
Although no reliable statistics are available, child prostitution
is a serious problem, particularly among Aborigine children (see
Section 6.f.). Most child prostitutes range from 12 through 17 years of
age. The juvenile welfare law enables juvenile welfare bodies,
prosecutors, and victims to apply to courts for termination of
guardianship of parents and the appointment of qualified guardians if
parents have forced their children into prostitution. If children are
engaged in prostitution of their own free will, and the parents are
incapable of providing safe custody, the courts may order competent
authorities to provide counseling for not less than 6 months and not
more than 2 years. However, legal loopholes and cultural barriers
remain obstacles to enforcement. On occasion parents have sold a child
into prostitution, a problem associated mostly with Aborigine families.
According to some reports, brothel owners, to prevent child
prostitutes from escaping, use violence, drug addiction, and other
forms of coercion. In 1995 the LY passed legislation providing for as
much as 2 years' incarceration for customers of prostitutes under the
age of 18. The legislation also requires the publication of the names
of violators in newspapers. Under a plan adopted by the NPA, city and
county authorities across the island have established police task
forces to strengthen their efforts against child prostitution. During
the first 4 months of the year, 249 persons were arrested, of whom 222
were indicted and 101 convicted. In June the LY amended the Prevention
of Child and Juvenile Sex Trafficking Law to prohibit the media from
running advertisements involving the sex trade and to impose penalties
on citizens arrested abroad for having sex with minors.
People With Disabilities.--The Disabled Welfare Law was revised and
strengthened in 1990. It prohibits discrimination against the disabled
and sets minimum fines at approximately $2,400 (nt$73,800) for
violators. Under these revisions, new public buildings, facilities, and
transportation equipment must be accessible to the disabled, while
existing public buildings were to be brought into conformity by 1995.
Although new buildings appear to meet many accessibility requirements,
there does not as yet appear to besubstantial effort aimed at refitting
older buildings to accommodate disabled people.
A leading expert in the field estimates that the number of disabled
is between 400,000 and 500,000--possibly as high as 700,000. One-third
of the total are severely disabled and receive shelter or nursing care
from the authorities. The Disabled Welfare Law requires large public
and private organizations to hire disabled persons equal to 2 and 1
percent of their work forces respectively. Organizations failing to do
so must pay, for each disabled person not hired, the basic monthly
salary (approximately $570) into the Disabled Welfare Fund, which
supports institutions involved in welfare for the disabled. Many
organizations complain that it is difficult to find qualified disabled
workers, and they appear to prefer to pay the fines involved. The
authorities have noted the effect of traditional belief that the
disabled lack the ability to do real work.
Indigenous People.--The island's only non-Chinese minority group
consists of the Aboriginal descendants of Malayo-Polynesians already
established when the first Chinese settlers arrived. According to MOI
statistics, there are 357,000 Aborigines. More than 70 percent are
Christian, while the dominant Han Chinese are largely Buddhist or
Taoist. The civil and political rights of Aborigines are fully
protected under law. The National Assembly amended the Constitution in
1992 and again in 1997 to upgrade the status of Aboriginal people,
protect their right of political participation, and ensure their
cultural, educational, and business development. In addition the
authorities instituted social programs to help Aborigines assimilate
into the dominant Chinese society. A new cabinet-level agency, the
Aboriginal Affairs Commission, was created, although critics noted that
its budget is quite small. As part of its efforts to preserve ethnic
identities, the Ministry of Education now includes some Aboriginal-
language classes in primary schools. Under 1998 legislation, the
Ministry of Education subsidizes university education for Aborigines
and works to preserve Aboriginal culture, history, and language through
the establishment of Aboriginal studies centers.
Although they face no official discrimination, Aborigines have had
little impact, over the years, on major decisions affecting their
lands, culture, traditions, and the allocation of their natural
resources. In addition they complain that they are prevented from
owning ancestral lands in mountain areas under the authorities'
control, some of which have been designated as national parks or
conservation areas. Land rights remain a crucial issue for Aborigines,
along with social discrimination, educational underachievement, low
economic status, and high rates of alcoholism. Some Aboriginal leaders
have come to believe that only some form of autonomy can preserve their
land rights, which constantly are threatened by Chinese developers who
use connections and corruption to gain title to Aboriginal land.
According to MOI statistics, only about 50 percent of Aborigine
children complete elementary school. In the past, Aborigines were not
allowed to use non-Chinese personal names on legal documents, but this
rule was changed by legislation in 1996.
The sale of Aboriginal girls into prostitution by their parents is
also a problem (see Section 6.f.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--In 1995 the JY ruled that the right
to organize trade unions is protected by the Constitution. But, until
new legislation implementing this decision is passed, teachers, civil
servants, and defense industry workers still are not permitted to form
labor unions. Even with this ruling, a number of laws and regulations
limit the right of association. Labor unions may draw up their own
rules and constitutions, but they must submit these to the authorities
for review. Unions may be dissolved if they do not meet certification
requirements or if their activities disturb public order. However,
there were no instances of the authorities dissolving local labor
groups or denying new unions certification.
The Labor Union Law requires that union leaders be elected
regularly by secret ballot, and, in recent years, workers have
sometimes rejected KMT- or management-endorsed union slates.
Unions may form confederations, but no administrative district,
including a city, county, or province, can have competing labor
confederations. There is only one Taiwan-wide labor federation, the
Chinese Federation of Labor (CFL) which is closely associated with the
ruling KMT. In 1997 Lee Cheng-hung, Board Chairman of the CFL, was
elected to the KMT's Central Standing Committee.
In July unions at 18 state-owned enterprises set up an alliance to
protect worker rights during privatization. However, theCouncil of
Labor Affairs (CLA) denied the legitimacy of that federation in the
absence of an amendment to the Labor Union Law. In 1998 large unions
representing some 300,000 workers announced their decision to break
with the CFL and organize the National Federation of Industrial Labor
Unions. A similar challenge to the restriction on island-wide unions
was mounted in 1994 when 12 unions from state-run enterprises announced
their withdrawal from the CFL to establish a new national federation of
labor unions of state-run enterprises. The CLA turned down their
application, as well as the appeal of that rejection. In the meantime,
the trade unions have retained their seats in the CFL. Twenty trade
unions with a combined membership of 4,000 are affiliated as the
National Federation of Independent Trade Unionists. Although the
affiliates are legal, the Federation is considered illegal. In general
the drive for independent labor unions has lost momentum in recent
years due to the extremely low unemployment rate, higher wages, the
shift from manufacturing to service industries, the small scale and
poor organization of most unions, and prosecution of labor activists by
the authorities in the past.
The law governing labor disputes recognizes the right of unions to
strike but imposes restrictions that make legal strikes difficult and
seriously weaken collective bargaining. For example the authorities
require mediation of labor/management disputes when they deem the
disputes to be sufficiently serious or to involve ``unfair practices.''
The law forbids both labor and management from disrupting the ``working
order'' when either mediation or arbitration is in progress. The law
mandates stiff penalties for violations of no-strike and no-retaliation
clauses. Employers in the past sometimes ignored the law and dismissed
or locked out workers without any legal action being taken against
them, although no such cases were reported during the year. The CLA
reported that from 1990-98, there were 34 strikes, of which 23 involved
workers at bus companies seeking increased pay and reduced hours.
Strikes threatened in January at the Chinese Petroleum Corporation and
Taiwan Railway Bureau did not materialize as workers obtained
satisfactory concessions from management. There were three strikes in
1998 and one strike in 1997.
Taiwan was expelled from the International Labor Organization in
1971 when the People's Republic of China replaced Taiwan in the United
Nations. The CFL is affiliated with the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Except for the
categories of workers noted in Section 6.a., the Labor Union Law and
the Settlement of Labor Disputes Law give workers the right to organize
and bargain collectively. As of March, some 3 million workers,
approximately 31 percent of the 9.5 million-person labor force,
belonged to 3,710 registered labor unions.
Under the Labor Union Law, employers may not refuse employment to,
dismiss, or otherwise unfairly treat workers because they are union
members. However, in practice, employers sometimes have dismissed union
leaders without reasonable cause, and observers point out that the law
sets no specific penalties for violations. Several union leaders of a
container terminal company were laid off at the end of 1998 following a
strike earlier in the year. According to the illegal National
Federation of Independent Trade Unionists, over 400 trade unionists and
supporters have been fired since the labor movement began to expand
after the 1987 lifting of martial law.
The Collective Agreements Law provides for collective bargaining
but does not make it mandatory. Since such agreements are used only in
large-scale enterprises, and less than 5 percent of enterprises fall
into this category, the proportion of workers covered remains small.
Employers set wages generally in accordance with market conditions.
Firms in export processing zones are subject to the same laws
regarding treatment of labor unions as other firms and follow normal
practices including collective bargaining agreements with their unions.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Standards
Law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports of
these practices, apart from coerced prostitution (see Sections 5 and
6.f.). The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and the
authorities generally enforce this prohibition effectively. However,
some parents of Aboriginal children sell them into prostitution, and
the requirements of the law make prosecution difficult at times (see
Section 5).
In July nine women who were forced to work as ``comfort women''
(women who, during World War II, were forced to provide sex to soldiers
of the Japanese Imperial Government) filed lawsuits inJapan seeking
$100,000 (nt$3,000,000) and a formal apology from the Japanese
Government. The case is before the courts.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The authorities prohibit forced and bonded child labor and
generally enforce this prohibition effectively, although the sale of
Aboriginal children into prostitution remains a problem (see Sections 5
and 6.c.). The Labor Standards Law (LSL) stipulates age 15, after
compulsory education required by law ends, as the minimum age for
employment. County and city labor bureaus enforce minimum age laws.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The LSL mandates labor
standards. According to the CLA, until recently the law covered 3.6
million of 6.6 million salaried workers and was not well enforced in
areas such as overtime work and pay or retirement payments. A 1996
amendment extended the LSL to all salaried employees. By mid-year the
LSL covered 5.5 million employees. The CLA is conducting a publicity
campaign to increase public awareness of the law and set up telephone
hot lines to accept complaints on LSL violations.
The CLA did not increase the minimum monthly wage, which remained
at $465 (nt$5,840). While sufficient in less expensive areas, this wage
is less than that needed to assure a decent standard of living for a
worker and family in urban areas such as Taipei. However, the average
manufacturing wage is more than double the legal minimum wage, and the
average for service industry employees is even higher. The law limits
the workweek to 48 hours (8 hours per day, 6 days per week) and
requires 1 day off in every 7 days. In 1998 the public sector adopted a
new system providing for a 5-day workweek every other week. According
to a CLA survey, about one-third of private enterprises also have
adopted that system.
Because of an acute labor shortage, there has been a legal influx
of foreign workers in the last several years. The law stipulates that
foreign workers who are employed legally receive the same protection as
local workers. However, in 1998 foreign domestic workers were exempted
from the LSL, denying them the right to safeguards provided to
citizens. Moreover authorities say that in many cases illegal foreign
workers, many from Thailand and the Philippines, receive board and
lodging from their employers, but no medical coverage, accident
insurance, or other benefits enjoyed by citizens. Illegal foreign
workers also are vulnerable to employer exploitation in the form of
confiscation of passports, imposition of involuntary deductions from
wages, and extension of working hours without overtime pay. In addition
observers say that conditions in many small- and medium-sized factories
that employ illegal foreign labor are dangerous, due to old and poorly
maintained equipment. There are also occasional reports of the
mistreatment of legal foreign workers. According to CLA statistics,
there are 279,000 legal foreign workers, including approximately
135,000 workers from Thailand and 115,000 workers from the Philippines.
In May the CLA signed a labor agreement with Vietnam permitting its
workers to obtain employment in Taiwan. The unemployment rate remained
at 2.7 percent in 1998. The CLA set the quota for foreign workers at
300,000. However, in July the CLA announced that in view of the
increase in unemployment for unskilled labor and Aborigines, it would
decrease the foreign labor quota in the construction and manufacturing
sectors by 10 percent.
The 1991 revised Occupational Safety and Health Law (OSHL) extended
coverage to include workers in agriculture, fishing, and forestry
industries and appeared to strengthen penalties for safety violations.
It nevertheless still provides only minimal standards for working
conditions and health and safety precautions. The OSHL gives workers
the right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without
jeopardy to continued employment. However, some critics see the law as
a step backward; for example, they note that, under the revised law,
general contractors are not responsible for the safety of persons
working for subcontractors.
The 1993 Labor Inspection Law was designed to strengthen the
enforcement of labor standards and health and safety regulations. It
increased the number of enterprises and types of safety factors to be
inspected; gave inspectors quasi-judicial powers; required
preexamination of dangerous working places such as naphtha-cracking
plants, pesticide factories, and firecracker factories; and raised
penalties for violations. Critics allege that the CLA does not
effectively enforce workplace laws and regulations because it employs
too few inspectors. There are 223 inspectors for the approximately
300,000 enterprises covered by the OSHL. The inspection rate increased
to 8.3 percent in 1998, up from 7.6 percent in 1997. Since many
enterprises are small, family-owned operations employing relatives
unlikely to report violations, actual adherence to the hours, wage, and
safety sections of various labor laws is hard to document but is
believed to be minimal in these smaller enterprises.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no law specifically
prohibiting trafficking; however, traffickers for sexual purposes may
be prosecuted under the Sexual Violation Offenses Act, which outlaws
sexual transactions for profit. In addition in May the LY enacted
legislation which criminalizes alien smuggling (see Section 2.d.). The
1995 Statute for Prevention of Child and Juvenile Sexual Trafficking
empowers the authorities to prosecute any person who intends to force a
girl below the age of 18 to engage in sex or to sell or pawn her by
other means. Nonetheless there are reports of organized crime rings
trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution. The
majority of cases involve women from mainland China or Thailand.
Criminal gangs in mainland China reportedly use deceptive measures to
recruit and procure young women who are then funneled to Taiwan-based
organized crime gangs who arrange sham marriages to enable them to
obtain visas to enter Taiwan. The women then are forced into
prostitution. The extent of the problem is difficult to determine,
there have been 50,000 marriages between persons from mainland China
and Taiwan since 1992, but less than 1 percent are believed to involve
the trafficking gangs. In May police arrested eight men linked to one
such crime syndicate who married in mainland China and then forced
their wives to work as prostitutes in Taiwan. Light sentences for
traffickers hamper police efforts to end this trade. Trafficking
victims, if arrested for prostitution, also face light sentences, such
as fines or deportation.
The sale of Aboriginal girls into prostitution by their parents is
also a problem. However, reports have indicated that in the period from
June 1994 to July 1995, the percentage of all arrested child
prostitutes who were of Aboriginal origin dropped from 15 percent to 5
percent. This reduction may have come about due to intensive efforts on
the part of social workers and nongovernmental organizations to combat
the practice of selling female children into prostitution. The NPA also
coordinated the formation of police task forces in local jurisdictions
to investigate and prevent the sale of Aboriginal girls into
prostitution. From the beginning of 1998 through April, 46 Aboriginal
girls were found to have been engaged in prostitution.
______
FIJI
Fiji continued to make progress toward a more representative and
democratic government following peaceful and democratic elections in
May. The amended Constitution that came into effect in July 1998
encourages a multiethnic government while protecting traditional Fijian
values. Under the amended Constitution, the Prime Minister and the
President can be of any race, and for the first time, in addition to
the communally allocated seats, there are open seats not allocated to
any racial community in the lower house of Parliament. The judiciary is
independent.
The Constitution also includes a strengthened bill of rights and a
compact designed to protect the rights of all citizens. It alters the
official name of the country to ``Republic of the Fiji Islands'' and
designates all citizens ``Fiji Islanders,'' avoiding designations
specifying ethnicity. However, it preserves the paramountcy of
indigenous Fijian interests, which cannot be subordinated to the
interests of other communities.
Peaceful and democratic elections were held in May and resulted in
a change of government and the election of a Labor Party-led coalition
administration. The new multiethnic Government consists of a number of
political parties and enjoys a better than two-thirds majority in
Parliament. For the first time, the country has an Indo-Fijian prime
minister, Mahendra Chaudhry, the head of the Labor Party.
The Constitution is designed to promote greater political
stability. Nonetheless, ethnicity remains a dominant factor in Fijian
life and affects the country's politics, economy, and society. The
population is a multiracial, multicultural mix, with indigenous Fijians
comprising 51 percent, Indo-Fijians (descendents of immigrants from the
Indian subcontinent) around 42 percent, and Asians, Caucasians, and
other Pacific Islanders making up the rest of the population of over
775,000. The ethnic division is illustrated by the contrast between the
private and public sectors; Indo-Fijian families largely control most
private businesses, while indigenous Fijians largely head the
government ministries and the military.
The Fiji Military Forces (FMF), a small professional force, comes
under the authority of the Ministry for Home Affairs, as do the police.
The Fiji Intelligence Service was dissolved by the Cabinet in August.
Its functions were absorbed by the Police Special Branch and by a new
analytical unit that was established in the Ministry of Home Affairs.
There continue to be credible reports of human rights abuses by
individual police officers.
Sugar and tourism are the mainstays of the economy, accounting for
more than half of foreign exchange earnings. Investment is depressed
due to continuing concerns over the resolution of land lease issues.
Economic growth of approximately 4 percent was achieved due to record
numbers of tourists and a bumper sugar crop following 2 years of
droughts and floods.
The principal human rights problem, while significantly addressed
in the revised Constitution, remains ethnically based discrimination.
Constitutional provisions reduce the factors that abridge the right of
citizens to change their government. However, the Constitution
maintains a partially ethnically based electoral system. Constitutional
safeguards and a number of government policies, including hiring
practices, education policies, and land tenure preferences continue to
provide protection for indigenous Fijian interests. Other human rights
problems include occasional police brutality, informal constraints on
the freedom of the press, efforts to restrict public comments by the
diplomatic corps, discrimination and cases of violence against women,
and instances of abuse of children.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Police sometimes abuse detainees; the authorities have
punished some of the offending officers, but these punishments have not
deterred all police abuses. The Police Department's internal affairs
unit investigates complaints of police brutality. The law permits
corporal punishment as a penalty for criminal acts, but this provision
is seldom invoked.
Prison authorities have struggled to meet minimum international
standards within the limits of local financial restraints. Prison
conditions are Spartan, and food and sanitation are limited.
The Government permits visits to prisons by church groups and
family members.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Law of Arrest and
Detention provides that a person may be arrested only if police believe
that the criminal law has been or is about to be broken. Arrested
persons must be brought before a court without ``undue delay.'' This
requirement is taken to mean within 24 hours, with 48 hours as the
exception (such as when an arrest is made during a weekend). Rules
governing detention are designed to ensure that suspects are questioned
fairly. Detainees have the right to a judicial review of the grounds
for arrest; in urgent cases, detainees may apply to a judge at any
time, whether he is sitting or not. Incommunicado and arbitrary
detention, both illegal, did not occur.
Exile is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent under
the Constitution and in practice.
The judicial structure is patterned on the British system. The
principal courts are the magistrate courts, the High Court, the Court
of Appeal, and the Supreme Court. There are no special courts; military
courts try only members of the armed forces. Magistrate courts continue
to try the large majority of cases.
In addition to its jurisdiction in serious civil and criminal
cases, the High Court is granted special interest jurisdiction on
behalf of the public and is empowered to review alleged violations of
individual rights provided by the Constitution.
Defendants have the right to a public trial and to counsel. Trials
in the High Court provide for the presence of assessors (citizens
randomly selected to represent the community); cases in magistrate
court do not. In litigation involving lesser complaints, a public legal
advisor assists indigent persons in domestic or family law cases. The
right of appeal exists but is hampered by continuing delays in the
appeals process. Bail is granted freely and most defendants do not
experience pretrial detention.
The law sometimes treats women differently from men. In some
instances, there is a presumption of reduced competence and thus
reduced responsibility for women. For example only women can be charged
with infanticide (if a man kills an infant the act is treated as
murder, a more serious charge). A female defendant in an infanticide
case is presumed to have diminished mental capacity, and sentences are
reduced or suspended accordingly.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--In general the Government respects the privacy of the
home; however, the Home Affairs Ministry has powers, within specific
operational guidelines, to search persons and property, access private
financial records, and monitor mail and telephones when a warrant is
issued by the National Security Council. The Home Affairs Ministry
conducts surveillance of persons whom it believes represent a security
threat.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Freedom of speech generally is
respected; however, the new Government repeatedly has criticized the
national media for a perceived antigovernment bias and for its coverage
of sensitive issues, particularly when the Government perceives the
coverage as diminishing respect for its authority. There are credible
reports of attempts by individual members of the Government to pressure
editors or otherwise interfere with the independence of the press.
Nevertheless, political figures and private citizens can and do
speak out against the Government. Although the Public Order Act and
other acts prohibit actions that are likely to incite racial
antagonism, there were no reported arrests under these acts.
Legislation pertaining to the press is contained in the Newspaper
Registration Act (NRA) and the Press Correction Act (PCA). Under the
NRA, all newspapers must be registered with the Government before they
can publish. Although the Government never has used the PCA, the act
gives the Minister of Information sole discretionary power to order a
newspaper to publish a ``correcting statement'' if, in the Minister's
opinion, a false or distorted article is published. Should the
newspaper refuse to publish the Minister's correction, it can be taken
to court and, if found guilty, fined approximately $700 (FJ$1,000)
(individual persons convicted under the act may be fined approximately
$150 [FJ$220] or imprisoned for 6 months or both). The PCA allows the
Government to arrest anyone who publishes ``malicious'' material. This
includes anything the Government considers false news that could create
or foster public alarm or result in ``detriment to the public.''
The media operate without prior censorship but with considerable
self-censorship. Newspapers occasionally print editorials critical of
the Government and occasionally do investigative reporting. They widely
report statements about the political situation by opposition figures
and foreign governments. The letters-to-the-editor columns of the two
daily newspapers also frequently carry political statements from a wide
cross section of society, including members of the deposed precoup
government, which are highly critical of the Government, its programs,
and the Constitution. Criticism, albeit muted, of the once sacrosanct
traditional chiefly system is appearing more frequently. However, the
Government still views negative comments about individual chiefs with
disfavor.
An active local organization, the Fiji Islands Media Association
(FIMA), is an affiliate of the regional Pacific Islands News
Association (PINA). Both FIMA and PINA pressed for bettertraining and
the establishment of codes of ethics for journalists. In a show of
support for strengthening the media, the Government unconditionally
provided housing for the Fiji Journalism Training Institute. The
formerly dormant Fiji News Council was reorganized and is active again.
The Council strives to promote high journalistic standards, enhance the
image of the media, safeguard its independence, and resolve complaints
from the public.
The Government bought one of the country's two daily newspapers,
the Fiji Post and announced in August that all government advertising
and official statements henceforth would be published only in the Fiji
Post. FIMA noted its concern about these developments and their effect
on media freedom. The new Government has criticized publicly the
``bias'' of the noncitizen editor and the foreign ownership of the
country's other daily newspaper, the Fiji Times.
The country's television news production is owned and operated by
Fiji One, the only noncable television station. A trust operating on
behalf of the provincial governments owns 51 percent of Fiji One; the
other 49 percent is owned by private individuals and interests. The
Government's attempt to open the television market to new entrants is
being challenged in court.
In August 1998, the Government sought to require foreign diplomatic
representatives to submit all public address requests for approval by
the Foreign Ministry and to provide advance copies of speech texts. The
Government also stated that foreign diplomatic representatives are
obliged not to comment on politically sensitive issues such as the
Constitution, land issues, and relations between communities, citing
the need to respect the sovereignty of the State and noninterference in
internal matters.
While academic freedom generally is respected, government work
permit stipulations and University of South Pacific (USP) contract
regulations effectively have deterred university employees from
participating in domestic politics. In 1998 the Government reportedly
investigated allegations that two foreign USP journalism lecturers
violated the terms of their work permits by writing paid articles
critical of democracy in Fiji for Internet web pages and publications
not associated with USP. Student groups organize freely.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right to assemble for political purposes, subject to
restrictions in the interest of public order. However, permits for
public gatherings must be obtained from the district officer, and the
Government does not always grant permits for large outdoor political
meetings or demonstrations, particularly if the police advise of
difficulties with the anticipated crowd size or their ability to assure
public safety.
Nevertheless, the Government routinely issued permits for rallies
organized by political parties, religious groups, and groups opposed to
government policies.
Opposition parties operate without government interference.
Political organizations operate and issue public statements and did so
repeatedly and openly throughout the year.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitutional provision of freedom of
religion is honored in practice. The Government does not restrict
foreign clergy and missionary activity or other typical activities of
religious organizations.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict freedom
of movement within the country or abroad. Occasional detentions at the
airport occur, but the courts order redress where this is warranted.
Citizens are free to emigrate, and about 50,000 have done so since the
1987 coups. The Government does not restrict their return if they
choose to do so and has encouraged those who left after the coups to
return.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. In the past, it has been reluctant to grant first
asylum without assurances that the asylum seeker would be moved to a
third country. There were no reports of theforced return of persons to
a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The 1998 constitutional amendments were a significant step toward a
more representative and democratic government. The amended Constitution
reduces the ethnically based factors that abridge the right of citizens
to change their government. Under its provisions, the Prime Minister
and President can be of any race. It establishes a 71-member lower
house with 25 open seats and 46 seats allocated to different ethnic
communities. The open seats, which are unprecedented, have been
established by an electoral commission and apportioned into districts
of approximately equal population. Of the 46 communal seats, 23 are
allotted to indigenous Fijians, 19 to Indo-Fijians, 3 are ``general
voter'' (for the most part Caucasians and East Asians) seats, and 1 is
allotted to the Rotumans (an ethnically distinct Polynesian people),
roughly proportional to the different communities' representation in
the population. The amended Constitution also contains an alternate
vote system for elections to the lower house to replace the winner
takes all system of the previous constitution. Although the Review
Commission recommended a mostly elected Senate, it remains an appointed
body. The President appoints its 32 members with the Great Council of
Chiefs nominating 14 members, the Prime Minister 9, the opposition
leader 8, and the Council of Rotuma 1 member.
Included in the amended Constitution is a strengthened bill of
rights and a compact among the country's citizens to protect their
respective rights and interests; however, it acknowledges that the
paramountcy of indigenous Fijian interests cannot be subordinated to
the interests of other communities. In July 1998, Parliament passed a
new emergency powers act that can be invoked if Parliament determines
that there is a threat to the life of the nation. International media
organizations criticized the law due to concern that the Government
could close or censor publications during times of crisis.
The number of political parties expanded in the period prior to the
May elections. The former government, the ethnic-Fijian SVT party (the
Fijian Political Party), in coalition with the predominantly Indo-
Fijian National Federation Party and the general electors, was defeated
easily by the ``People's Coalition.'' The People's Coalition Government
is led by the Fiji Labor Party and includes a number of ethnic Fijian-
based parties, the Fijian Association Party, and two new parties, the
Christian Democratic Party and the Party of National Unity. A number of
independent Members of Parliament also joined the government coalition.
In the Senate, whose members are not elected but appointed based on
criteria established in the Constitution, a constitutional dispute
prevented the seating of the eight nominees of the leader of the
opposition. The President has objected to the proposed list. His
refusal to approve the nominees was challenged, and at year's end the
matter was before the High Court.
The amended Constitution mandates that all parties that gain more
than 10 percent of parliamentary seats in general elections are to be
invited to participate in a government of national unity. All of the
parties that met the 10 percent requirement were so invited, although
not all accepted.
Women in both the Fijian and Indian communities have functioned
primarily in traditional roles, and are underrepresented in government
and politics. However, an increasing number of women are rising to
prominent positions in politics and public service. The May elections
resulted in an increased number of women elected to Parliament. Five
women are members of the 27-member Cabinet, with one selected as Deputy
Prime Minister. Women also play important roles in the chiefly system
and can be chiefs in their own right. The President's wife is one of
the three highest ranking chiefs.
For the first time, an Indo-Fijian is Prime Minister.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
No local groups focus solely on human rights matters, but the
women's rights movement, the labor movement, and various political
groups (including organized political parties) are engaged in promoting
human rights. There are also several small, foreign-based organizations
that concentrate on local human rights causes, including the Coalition
for Democracy inFiji (with offices in New Zealand and Australia) and
two United Kingdom-based groups, the International Fiji Movement and
the Movement for Democracy in Fiji. There is little interaction between
the Government and these groups.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The amended Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, place of origin, political opinion, color, religion, or
creed, and provides specific affirmative action provisions for those
disadvantaged as a result of such discrimination. In the compact
included in the amended Constitution, there is a specific provision for
affirmative action and ``social justice'' programs to secure effective
equality of access to opportunities, amenities, and services for the
Fijian and Rotuman people and for all disadvantaged citizens and
groups.
Women.--Reliable estimates indicate that 10 percent of women have
been abused in some way, and this abuse is a major focus of the women's
movement. Women in Fiji are addressing the problem of domestic violence
actively. Police have adopted a ``no drop'' rule, according to which
they will prosecute cases of domestic violence even when the victim
does not wish to press charges. However, in at least one case in 1998,
the police reportedly exhibited great reluctance to investigate and
prosecute a policeman who had beaten his wife into a coma.
There is a small but active women's rights movement that has
pressed for serious punishment for rape. Courts have imposed sentences
that vary widely but are generally lenient. Women sought to have all
rape cases heard in the High Court where sentencing limits are higher.
Suva, the capital, and Ba, Labasa, and Lautoka have privately
funded women's crisis centers, which offer counseling and assistance to
women in cases of rape, domestic violence, and other problems, such as
child support payments.
Constitutional changes which came into effect in 1998 are designed
to redress the imbalance in spousal and offspring rights between male
and female citizens. Under the amended Constitution, male and female
citizens enjoy equal rights in regard to the granting of residence for
spouses, and registering and racially designating children in regard to
electoral rolls and ethnic communal property.
In general, women in the Fijian community are more likely to rise
to prominence in their own right than are women in the Indo-Fijian
community. Women have full rights of property ownership and
inheritance, and a number are successful entrepreneurs. Women generally
are paid less than men, a discrepancy that is especially notable in the
garment industry. Garment workers, most of whom are female, are subject
to a special minimum wage that is considerably lower than that in other
sectors.
Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and
welfare but has limited financial resources to carry out the
commitment. In addition the legal system is at times inadequate to
protect the rights of children, since children's testimony is
inadmissible unless corroborated by an adult. Societal changes have
undermined the traditional village and extended family-based social
structures; an outgrowth of this evolution is a child abuse problem.
The Government in 1993 created a Child Welfare Committee to address
these problems.
School is mandatory through the primary grades.
Corporal punishment is administered in some schools. The Ministry
of Education has guidelines for the administration of such punishment
by principals and head teachers. A number of incidents involving
alleged beatings of children in religious schools were reported in the
media. In at least one instance in 1998, a family initiated court
action against a teacher who reportedly beat a child for lack of
discipline. There is credible information that not all abuses are
reported or punished.
People with Disabilities.--Legal discrimination against physically
disabled persons in employment, education, and the provision of other
stateservices does not exist. However, there is no legislation or
mandated provision for accessibility for the disabled. Several small
voluntary organizations promote greater attention to the needs of the
disabled.
Religious Minorities.--Police continued to investigate a small
number of cases of desecration of Hindu temples in 1997.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The stated purpose of two
military coups in 1987 was to ensure the political supremacy of the
indigenous Fijian people and to protect their traditional way of life
and communal control of land. To this end, the post-coup government
initiated a number of constitutional and other measures to ensure
ethnic Fijian control of the executive and legislative branches. The
government also successfully raised the proportion of ethnic Fijians
and Rotumans in the public service to 50 percent or higher at all
levels, but most dramatically at the senior level: Indo-Fijians now
represent only 10 percent of the highest levels of the civil service.
The amended Constitution seeks to redress this imbalance by
specifically noting that ``the composition of state services at all
levels must be based on the principle of reflecting as closely as
possible the ethnic composition of the population.''
Control of land is a highly sensitive issue. Ethnic Fijians
currently hold, communally, about 83 percent of land, the State holds
another 8 percent, and only the remaining 9 percent is freehold land.
The British colonial administration instituted the present land
ownership arrangements to protect the interests of the indigenous
Fijians whose traditional beliefs, cultural values, and self-identity
are tied to the land. Most cash crop farmers are Indo-Fijians, who
lease land from the ethnic Fijian landowners through the Native Land
Trust Board. Many Indo-Fijians, particularly farmers, believe that the
absence of secure land tenure discriminates against them. Most current
leases expire by 2000. A parliamentary select committee has been
established to review agricultural land tenure agreement issues.
Indo-Fijians are subject to occasional harassment based on race.
There have been no credible allegations of government involvement in
such incidents, which the police have investigated, sometimes resulting
in arrests.
The new Government raised concerns with what it terms
``expatriates'' in the country. On several occasions, it announced its
intention to review all immigration records relating to foreign workers
and intervened publicly in a number of visa cases, calling on private
companies to ``localize'' their hiring practices. The minority Chinese
community complained about perceived government harassment in this
regard, and the nation's employers' organization spoke against
government interference.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law protects the right of workers
to form and join unions, elect their own representatives, publicize
their views on labor matters, and determine their own policies; the
authorities respect these rights in practice. However, the law permits
restrictions to be applied in government employment and in the
interests of defense, public safety, public order, public morality, or
public health, or to protect the rights and freedoms of other persons.
An estimated 55 percent of the paid work force is unionized.
All unions must register with, but are not controlled by, the
Government. The only central labor body is the Fiji Trade Union
Congress (FTUC), which was associated closely with the opposition Fiji
Labor Party until mid-1992. It subsequently adopted a more independent
political stance. The FTUC associates internationally. While certain
unions remain ethnically based, both Indo-Fijians and ethnic Fijians
hold leadership roles in the trade union movement. The FTUC
participates, along with the employer's federation, in the Government's
Tripartite Economic Strategies Committee.
Strikes are legal, except in connection with union recognition
disputes. The Government remains involved in certifying union strike
balloting, which can be an elaborate process given the distance between
some of the island locations. A 1-day nationallabor protest occurred on
April 23, 1998. The strike was initiated by the FTUC to protest against
layoffs, a wage freeze, and the discontinuance of a checkoff system for
union dues. Sporadic labor unrest occurred throughout 1998 in a number
of workplaces. The protest included a 1-day bus strike on August 16,
1998.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
recognizes the right to organize and bargain collectively. Employers
are required to recognize a union if more than half of the employees in
a workplace have joined it. Recognition is determined by union
membership rather than by an election. The Government has the power to
order recalcitrant employers to recognize unions and has done so. Key
sectors of the economy, including sugar and tourism, are heavily
organized. Following the 1992 return to accountable government, the
Government lifted wage guidelines, and unrestricted collective
bargaining on wages is now the norm.
Wage negotiations generally are conducted on an individual company
or enterprise basis, although industrywide negotiations are on the
increase. A government proposal to introduce such negotiations was
supported by employers but opposed by unions.
The law specifically prohibits antiunion discrimination. In
practice the unions generally are successful in preventing
discrimination against workers for union activities, but the law does
not mandate that fired workers be reinstated.
Export processing zones (EPZ's) are subject to the same law as the
rest of the country. However, the FTUC has been unsuccessful in
obtaining collective bargaining agreements in EPZ's and claims that
intimidation of workers by employers is widespread. The FTUC sees union
recognition as the single issue that does not have effective legal
recourse. The FTUC argues that because of alleged illegal and
intimidating practices in EPZ's, including threats of loss of work for
those active in organizing workers, the FTUC is unfairly prevented from
representing workers in EPZ's.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
specifically prohibits forced labor, including forced and bonded labor
by children, and there were no confirmed reports that it is practiced.
However, there were media reports that a form of bonded labor may be
practiced on a remote copra plantation on an outer island. Other media
reports indicate that forced labor conditions may exist in certain
garment manufacturing plants.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Children under the age of 12 may not be employed in any
capacity. ``Children'' (under age 15) may only be employed outside of
school hours in family enterprises and not in the industrial sector.
``Young persons'' (ages 15 to 17) may be employed in certain
occupations not involving heavy machinery and with specified hours and
rest breaks. Enforcement by the Ministry for Labor and Industrial
Relations generally is effective, except for family members working on
family farms or businesses and ``self-employed'' homeless youths.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and
enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.). School is
mandatory only through the primary grades.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum
wage. Certain sectors have minimum wages set by the Ministry for Labor
and Industrial Relations, which effectively enforces them. Minimum wage
levels will generally support a barely adequate standard of living for
a worker and family in all sectors except for the garment industry, in
which the starting hourly wage, $0.50 (FJ$0.72) for learners and $0.65
(FJ$0.94) for others, is based on the assumption that workers are young
adults or married women living at home and not supporting a household.
There are no regulations specifying maximum hours of work for adult
males. Women can do night work in factories and overtime but are
prohibited from underground work in mines. Workers in certain
industries, notably transportation and shipping, have problems with
excessive hours of work. Indo-Fijians, who generally require a cash
income to survive, are more vulnerable topressure to work long hours
than are ethnic Fijians. Many ethnic Fijians return to their villages
rather than work what they consider excessive hours. Particularly in
the garment industry, migrant workers (predominantly Chinese or
Filipino) are increasing in number (presently estimated at around 1,000
to 2,000 persons) and are a largely unregulated work force.
There are workplace safety regulations, a Workmen's Compensation
Act, and an accident compensation plan. A tribunal sets awards for
workers injured on the job. Government enforcement of safety standards
under the direction of the Labor Ministry suffers from a lack of
trained enforcement personnel, but unions do a reasonable job of
monitoring safety standards in organized workplaces. The International
Labor Organization's (ILO) 1992 recommendations cited the need to
improve working conditions, particularly in the garment industry. The
Government, supported by the FTUC, passed occupational health and
safety legislation, which came in to effect in 1997. The Government
continues to work with the ILO to address working conditions. By law an
employee has the right to remove himself from a hazardous work site
without jeopardizing his employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws specifically
addressing the subject of trafficking in persons; although laws against
bonded and forced labor could be used to prosecute traffickers. There
are unconfirmed reports that some laborers recruited from Asian
countries, particularly in the garment sector, are held in conditions
of forced labor (see Section 6.c.).
______
INDONESIA
Indonesia made significant progress in its transition from a long-
entrenched authoritarian regime to a more pluralistic, representative
democracy. During the year, as governmental authority changed hands
from President B.J. Habibie to new President Abdurrahman Wahid in
October, the political system was revamped to provide for separation of
powers, with an executive branch, a president, and an appointed cabinet
that ultimately are accountable to a directly elected parliament, and
with initial steps taken toward the establishment of an independent
judiciary. Under new election and party laws drafted in the early part
of the year, in June the country held its first pluralistic and
competitive parliamentary campaigns and elections in 43 years,
elections that were judged free and fair by international monitors. The
Government encouraged international assistance to and monitoring of the
election, permitted free assembly and association during the campaign
period, and generally refrained from attempting to influence the
electoral outcome. The new Parliament (DPR) and the new People's
Consultative Assembly (MPR) were installed on October 1, replacing the
former DPR, which was elected in 1997, and the former MPR, which
elected Habibie as President in March 1998. In accordance with
constitutional procedures, the new MPR elected, in a transparent
balloting procedure, Wahid as President, and Megawati Soekarnoputri as
Vice President on October 20 and 21, respectively. The Constitution
provides for an independent judiciary; however, it remains subordinated
to the executive and suffers from pervasive corruption.
On January 27, the Habibie Government announced its willingness to
consider broad-based autonomy or independence for East Timor, paving
the way for a United Nations-sponsored agreement concluded between
Indonesia and Portugal on May 5. The agreement provided for the holding
of a popular consultation on this issue in East Timor, under the
supervision of the U.N. Following the agreement, the U.N. Mission in
East Timor (UNAMET) was established in order to oversee the preparatory
arrangements leading to, and implementation of, the popular ballot. In
the months prior to the consultation, the uncertain security situation
in East Timor compelled the U.N. Secretary General to postpone the
ballot three times. The ballot took place on August 30. While armed
forces-backed militia groups sought to intimidate the population into
voting for autonomy (and, in effect, against independence), or to
prevent them from voting at all, some 98 percent of registered voters
cast their ballots, and 78.5 percent of the voters opposed the autonomy
proposal. In early September, the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
declared that the ballot results were ``an accurate reflection of the
views of the East Timorese people,'' and in October the MPR approved
revocation of the 1978 MPR decree that annexed East Timor, clearing the
way for the U.N. Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET). On
October 25, UNTAET became responsible for maintaining a police and
military apparatus in East Timor during the later part of the year.
The 275,000-member armed forces (TNI, formerly named ABRI) were
placed under a civilian defense minister for the first time in 40 years
and took initial steps to reduce gradually the military's political and
social role and powers, heretofore exercised under the ``dual
function'' doctrine. However, numerous problems still remain in many
areas. The national police force of 175,000 members was separated
formally from the armed forces and given primary responsibility for
internal security, although the police remain under the supervision of
the Minister of Defense. The separation was intended to reorient the
military away from an internal security role and toward an external
defense role. Nonetheless, the armed forces retain broad nonmilitary
powers and an internal security role, and are not fully accountable to
civilian authority. Both the TNI and the police committed numerous
serious human rights abuses throughout the year.
The country's severe economic crisis that began in July 1997, eased
somewhat, but its negative effects continued to be felt. Annual per
capita gross domestic product among the population of 211 million is
$690. The urban poor and middle class on heavily populated Java and
Bali suffered a significant drop in living standards, caused in part by
a wholesale shift in employment from the better paid formal sector to
the less secure informal sector. Income and living standards improved
for segments of the population in less populated, natural resource-rich
Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Sumatra, and Irian Jaya. The uneven distribution
of wealth and political power, in turn, exacerbated center-periphery
tensions and intensified demands for greater regional autonomy. The
Government has responded with plans for greater political and economic
decentralization and for revenue sharing with the provinces.
The Habibie Government committed serious human rights abuses; while
there was significant progress in institutionalizing democracy during
the year, serious problems remained under the Wahid Government,
although overall abuses decreased markedly. Security forces continued
to commit extrajudicial killings. Elements of the security forces and
prointegration militias, armed and largely supported by the military,
were responsible for numerous extrajudicial killings in East Timor in
the early months of the year. In April military-backed militias
attacked displaced persons in a church in Liquica, killing at least 25
persons. Also in April, militias attacked the Dili home of
proindependence activist Manuel Carrascalao, killing his son and many
others. Prointegration militias in Suai also carried out numerous
extrajudicial killings during the preconsultation period. In September
at least many hundreds of persons were killed in a wave of violence and
destruction after the announcement of the proindependence vote. Priests
and displaced persons were massacred at a church in Suai and up to 60
civilians were killed in a single attack by militias and security
forces in Oekussi. In November the Indonesian Commission Investigating
Human Rights Violations in East Timor discovered a mass grave
containing the bodies of 26 victims of the Suai killings, and the
commission concluded that TNI personnel were directly and indirectly
involved in this and other extrajudicial killings carried out following
the consultation vote. There was evidence that many key militia members
were, in fact, TNI intelligence personnel. There were numerous reports
of disappearances in East Timor and from refugee camps in West Timor
following the flight of over 250,000 East Timorese civilians in
September. Mau Hodu, a prominent Timorese National Resistance Council
(CNRT) activist, disappeared in West Timor in September. Human rights
violations in East Timor by security forces and military-backed
militias against proindependence supporters included: Summary
executions, massacres, massive deportation, attacks on women and
children, houses and buildings besieged and destroyed, attacks and
burnings of property belonging to international organizations and to
the Catholic Church, and an attack on the only functioning medical
clinic in Dili. More than 250 bodies were found in Dili and other
areas. An International Commission of Inquiry, as well as an
investigative commission established by the Indonesian Human Rights
Commission (KPP), were set up to investigate reports of widespread
killings.
In Aceh the military forces and national police committed numerous
extrajudicial killings and used excessive force to quell separatist
movements. Military forces sometimes resorted to force in order to
disrupt peaceful demonstrations. TNI personnel often responded with
indiscriminate violence after physical attacks on soldiers. There
continued to be crediblereports of the disappearance of dozens of
civilians, many of whom are believed to have been associated with
separatist activities.
Security forces also were responsible for numerous instances of
indiscriminate shooting of civilians, torture, rape, beatings and other
abuse, and arbitrary detention in Jakarta, Irian Jaya, Maluku, and
elsewhere in the country. Rapes by security forces continued to be a
widespread problem throughout many of these areas, and security forces
systematically employed arbitrary arrest and detention without trial in
Aceh. Prison conditions are harsh. Most instances of excessive force by
the military and police during the year went unpunished; however, a
military officer and several enlisted personnel received jail sentences
for the deaths of four detainees. In response to ongoing abuses, a
joint civilian-military court is pursuing several cases involving
military officers. Despite initial steps toward reform, the judiciary
remains subordinate to the executive, suffers from corruption, and does
not always ensure due process. Security forces infringed on citizens'
privacy rights. Government respect for freedom of speech and press
continued to improve; however, the military tightly controlled news
about East Timor and journalists continued to suffer intimidation and
assaults. The Government legally provides for religious freedom for
five designated religions; unrecognized religions are subject to
restrictions. The Government continued to restrict freedom of movement
to a limited extent. Thousands of Acehnese residents fled their
villages during various security crackdowns against separatist groups.
The military and prointegration militia also forced the relocation of
thousands of persons. The Government places significant controls on
freedom of assembly and forcibly disrupted many demonstrations
throughout the year. Both the Habibie and Wahid administrations placed
significantly fewer controls on freedom of association than did the
Soeharto administration.
Domestic human rights organizations continued to play a significant
and increasing role in advocating improved human rights conditions;
however, the authorities continued to subject some nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) to monitoring and interference. Violence and
discrimination against women are endemic problems. Child abuse and
child prostitution are problems, and female genital mutilation (FGM)
persists in some areas. Discrimination against the disabled, the
indigenous, and religious and ethnic minorities also are endemic
problems. Violence between indigenous groups and transmigrants broke
out in the spring. Interreligious violence and violence against ethnic
minorities continued. Attacks against houses of worship continued, and
the lack of an effective government response to punish perpetrators and
prevent further attacks led to allegations of official complicity in
some of the incidents.
During the year the Government ratified several International Labor
Organization (ILO) conventions, revised the registration law, and
allowed new trade unions to form and operate. Nonetheless, enforcement
of labor standards remained inconsistent and weak in some areas.
Millions of children work, often under poor conditions. Forced and
bonded child labor remained a problem, although the Government took
steps during the year to remove children from fishing platforms where
bonded child labor most commonly occurs. Trafficking of persons in and
from the country is a problem. Vigilante action and mob violence
resulted in the death of over 130 suspected criminals. A large number
of suspected practitioners of black magic also were killed.
In East Timor, proindependence groups committed serious abuses,
including killings of security personnel. In Aceh dozens of low-level
civil servants, police, and military personnel were murdered and
abducted over the course of the year. It generally is believed that
separatists carried out many of these, and other, killings. In Irian
Jaya armed insurgents also committed killings and kidnapings.
Throughout the year--and in marked contrast to the previous year--
there was a general improvement in the institutionalization of human
rights protections. By year's end, national commissions of inquiry, the
new Attorney General, and the military actively were pursuing
investigations and trials of military officers for abuses. Under a law
passed in August, the judiciary formally was separated from the
executive branch. The Wahid Government appointed a forceful, respected
Attorney General and, for the first time, a State Minister for Human
Rights.
In April the Parliament repealed the 1963 Anti-Subversion Law,
although it subsequently incorporated six crimes specified in that law
into the Criminal Code. Parliament also enacted a law on human rights
designed to strengthen protection of individual rights and the role of
the National Human Rights Commission (KOMNASHAM), and a new press law
that repealed older laws viewed as being more restrictive of press
freedom.
In October the MPR amended the 1945 Constitution for the first
time, limiting presidential powers and imposing a two-term limit on the
President and Vice President. The MPR also created a working group to
study further constitutional amendments to be considered during the
August 2000 MPR session. In March the Habibie Government freed 52
political prisoners (with some restrictions), including labor leader
Dita Indah Sari in July, and in September East Timorese leader Xanana
Gusmao. In December the Wahid Government freed all known remaining
political prisoners from the Soeharto era, a total of 196 persons.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Historically,
politically related extrajudicial killings have occurred most
frequently in areas where separatist movements were active, such as
East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya, and security forces continued to
employ harsh measures against separatist movements in these areas. In
addition security forces killed unarmed student demonstrators, and
there also were numerous instances of reported extrajudicial killings
by security forces in cases involving alleged common criminal activity.
Elements of the security forces and prointegration militias, armed
and largely supported by the military, were responsible for numerous
extrajudicial killings in East Timor in the early months of the year.
Numerous credible reports indicate that over the course of many months
the security forces distributed hundreds of guns, as well as sharp
sticks and knives, to groups such as ``Mahidi'' (Live and Die for
Integration), ``Besi Merah Putih'' (Red and White Iron) and
``Halilintar'' (Thunder) in Ainaro, Liquica, Maubara and other towns
throughout East Timor. In the Dili area, TNI and local officials
supported the ``Aitarak'' militia. It is widely alleged that the
military, at senior levels, is responsible for mobilizing, paying,
arming, and at times protecting militia groups, which moved their
operations to West Timor after September. The Habibie Government
asserted that it was arming some civilians for their own protection--
that the prointegration groups were given arms only after they were
threatened or attacked by guerrillas and proreferendum forces. However,
church, NGO, and independent observers strongly maintained that in most
cases those given arms were not traditional, established prointegration
supporters threatened by guerrillas but uneducated, unemployed men who
were organized, paid, and provided arms for the purpose of sowing
terror and instability. In early June, the Government officially
designated East Timorese prointegration militias as ``Pamswarkarsa''
(civilian self-defense) units, thereby, providing the groups with
greater legitimacy and helping to preserve them.
In East Timor security forces and government-backed militia groups
killed numerous persons during ongoing sweeps aimed at ``arresting''
young males (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.d.). For example, credible
reports indicate that security forces killed 11 persons in Alas in
January. ``Mahidi'' militia members shot and killed four civilians,
including a pregnant woman, on January 24 and 25. Violence erupted in
Suai following these incidents, causing 300 to 500 residents from 3
villages outside Suai to flee. Witnesses allege that military personnel
stood aside and allowed armed pro-Government civilians to fight
referendum supporters, resulting in at least 22 deaths, and leading
approximately 1,000 women, children, and old men to take refuge in a
local church (see Section 2.d.). According to reliable NGO's, the
typical pattern in such incidents was for militias, recently armed by
the security forces, to provoke conflict to which regular military
forces then responded. Military personnel in civilian clothes shot and
killed two persons in Dili on February 24; a soldier also was killed.
Besi Merah Putih militia members, operating in tandem with local
security forces, killed at least five persons on April 5 during clashes
with local proindependence residents in Liquica, East Timor (see
Section 1.c.). The next day, the militias attacked unarmed displaced
persons in a church in Liquica. While the death toll remains uncertain,
most credible observers, including the Indonesian Investigative
Commission (KPP-HAM), which was established by the Indonesian Human
Rights Commission (see Section 4), concluded that at least 25 persons
died in this attack. It is widely believed that TNI personnel played a
role in the assault on the church; at a minimum, they took no action to
halt the attack. Local security authorities subsequently removed all
evidence of the attack on the Liquica church compound and replastered
and repainted the areas in question.
On April 13, following an incident the previous day in which
suspected Falintil elements killed two soldiers and a civilian in an
attack on a military vehicle, Halilintar militia and national troops
executed six civilians in Cailaco, new Maliana.
With the clear support of local authorities, prointegration
militias rallied in Dili on April 17, calling for the cleansing of the
civil service of proindependence personnel and the expulsion from East
Timor of lighter skinned ``mestizos.'' Afterwards, hundreds of
participating militias went on a rampage, attacking the home of
proindependence activist Manuel Carrascalao, where they killed at least
15 persons (according to KPP-HAM), including Carrascalao's son. On
April 21, attacks by militias and security forces at Bazartete and Hera
left at least eight more civilians dead. There also were reports of
violence and intimidation against proindependence East Timorese in the
Los Palos area, leading students to flee to the hills (see Section
2.d.).
Militia and security forces mounted an operation against East
Timorese independence supporters in the Viqueque area from April 30 to
May 1, primarily targeting civil servants and traditional leaders. CNRT
and other sources reported two persons killed on April 30 at Dilor,
west of Viqueque. According to a report issued by the Baucau branch of
the Catholic Church Peace and Justice Commission, KOPASSUS (Military
Special Forces) personnel and the ``59-75'' militia killed two
civilians on May 3-4 in Viqueque, and arrested and beat several other
persons (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). The UNAMET office in Dili issued
a statement on May 17 reporting the killing of at least 5 persons by
the ``Tim Pancasila'' militia in Antara village, Atsabae district. In
June an explosive device of unknown origin killed three children
playing in a field near Becora, just outside central Dili.
The September 4 announcement of the results (an overwhelming vote
for independence) of the August 30 consultation vote set off waves of
violence, destruction, and looting of property. While the overall death
toll remains unclear, most current estimates fall in the 1,000 to 2,000
range (see Sections 1.c. and 3). Tensions had grown in previous weeks,
as prointegration leaders, militia commanders, and some military
officers and government officials threatened that widespread violence
would be unleashed if the vote went against autonomy. Police repeatedly
failed to prevent truckloads of armed militia groups from entering
Dili, to react to threats against UNAMET, and to stop violence against
civilians and restore order in Dili. For example, police in riot gear
stood by as local militia destroyed the CNRT office on August 26, and
took no action when weapons were pointed at UNAMET staff. On August 30,
UNAMET local employee Joel Lopes Gomes was killed as he walked home
from a polling station in Atsabe, Ermera district.
There were numerous eyewitness accounts of troops and police
joining militias that fired weapons against departing UNAMET personnel.
Among the more prominent post-vote incidents was the September 6
massacre of priests and displaced persons at a church in Suai. The
Indonesian Investigative Commission concluded that at least 50 persons
died in this assault, which was carried out by ``Laksaur'' militia and
elements of the security forces. On September 4, militia and security
force personnel carried out numerous killings during the destruction of
Maliana. Victims included East Timorese UNAMET employees and displaced
persons taking refuge in the police station. On September 26, members
of the ``Team Alfa'' paramilitary force attacked a humanitarian convoy
near Los Palos, killing eight persons, including Catholic nuns,
religious workers, and an Indonesian journalist. Dutch journalist
Sander Thoenes was killed in Dili on September 21 by assailants
believed to be members of Indonesian Military Battalion 745.
In September, following what was in part a forced exodus of more
than 200,000 East Timorese, there were reports that militia groups were
searching ships departing Dili and the refugee camps in West Timor for
proindependence activists, resulting in killings and disappearances.
Following the entry of the U.N. Security Council-authorized
multinational force (INTERFET), numerous bodies and gravesites were
found in and around Dili, Liquica, Suai, Maliana, and in Oeukussi/
Ambeno enclave. In November a KPP-HAM team discovered, just over the
border in West Timor, a mass grave containing the bodies of 26 victims
of the Suai killings. At year's end, Indonesian and international
investigations continued.
In Aceh the military forces and national police committed numerous
extrajudicial killings and used excessive force to quell separatist
movements. On January 3, TNI forces shot and killed 5 civilians and
wounded 25 others in a raid on Kandang village, just outside of
Lhokseumawe; TNI forces also shot and killed 6 civilians in nearby
Simpang Muliong village, and wounded 6 others. According to NGO's and
press reports, on January 9, the military raided several villages
around Lhokseumawe in an apparent attempt to capture Achmad Kandang,
the suspected leader of the Aceh separatist organization, Aceh Merdeka
(Free Aceh). The military detained 37 to 40 persons from rural villages
and then brought them back to Lhokseumawe (see Section 1.d.). The
military confirmed that the four persons were killed as a result of
beatings and torture administered by TNI personnel. Twenty-five other
detainees werebeaten severely (see Section 1.c.). A military officer
and several enlisted personnel later received 6-year jail sentences for
the deaths of the four detainees; however, there were numerous other
instances of excessive force by the military and police during the year
that went unpunished.
According to numerous reports, on February 3, in Idi Cut, East Aceh
military troops opened fire on a ``religious'' gathering (some of those
assembled gave proindependence speeches) of at least 5,000 persons
after issuing an order for them to disperse, killing at least 7
demonstrators; however, the exact series of events remain unclear and
some NGO's continue to allege that several dozen persons were killed or
are missing (see Sections 1.b. and 2.b.). TNI troops reportedly later
dumped the victims' bodies in a nearby river. On May 3, troops opened
fire on unarmed demonstrators in Krueng Geukeh, north of Lhokseumawe,
Aceh, killing at least 40 persons and wounding over 100 more. Many of
the dead and wounded persons were shot in the back. No one has yet been
tried or punished for involvement in the February Idi Cut incident or
the Krung Geukeuh (May 3) incident. The Government-sanctioned
Independent Commission on Violence in Aceh included both incidents in
their list of five recent Aceh human rights cases for which TNI
personnel should be prosecuted. President Wahid was quoted as telling
journalists that the July 23 incident should be thoroughly
investigated. The Independent Commission produced a list of TNI
personnel (none above the rank of lieutenant colonel) who should be
prosecuted for their involvement in the case.
On June 12, security forces shot and killed five civilians,
including two boys, in Aceh. On July 12, security forces opened fire on
a vehicle that declined to stop at a checkpoint in Simpang Alue, East
Aceh; three riders were killed and a fourth person was injured. A
military spokesman stated that the victims were members of Aceh
Merdeka. Also on July 12, security forces killed at least four Acehnese
during a conflict along the Takengon-Bireun road in central Aceh. On
July 23 to 24, the military killed at least 50 Acehnese civilians in
the area around Beutong Ateuh, West Aceh. Military spokesmen claimed
that the deaths were the result of an exchange of fire between the
troops and armed separatist rebels, although no military personnel were
injured. Credible human rights monitors described the incident as an
unprovoked massacre of unarmed civilians. At the instigation of the new
Attorney General, the Wahid Government ordered a full investigation of
military culpability in this incident. On August 5, the military killed
nine separatists during a raid in Keumala, Aceh. Also on August 5, a
72-year-old woman was shot and killed in Triengadding, Pidie, Aceh; the
circumstances remain unknown.
On December 4, the anniversary of separatist leader Hasan Di Tiro's
1976 Declaration of Acehnese Independence, police forces injured at
least 11 civilians during clashes, 5 with gunshots in Sigli. In a
separate incident, TNI forces allegedly shot a youth in Lhokseumawe
after he raised a separatist flag (see Section 2.a.). According to
credible reports, as many as four persons were killed and dozens
injured the weekend of December 4-5. Numerous persons also were
arrested and beaten (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). Security forces
killed over 12 civilians during December; while some victims allegedly
were armed separatists, most apparently were caught in a crossfire or,
more often, were victims of arbitrary violence.
In an unprecedented procedure, in Aceh a joint civilian-military
court (a five judge panel, three civilian, two from the military police
dubbed the ``connectivity court'') is pursuing Aceh human rights cases
involving military officers. These five incidents involve widespread
human rights abuses committed by TNI from 1989-98, when Aceh was
designated a ``Military Operations Area'' (DOM), as well as for more
recent abuses. The first case heard by the court involved the trial of
8 persons for the July massacre by TNI troops of at least 51 civilians
in West Aceh; however, no one above the rank of lieutenant colonel was
to be tried.
In Irian Jaya police shot and killed at least one person involved
in a proindependence demonstration in Sorong in July and one person
involved in a melee at Manokwari port in September. In separate
incidents, soldiers shot two youths in Jayapura in June and July. One
soldier was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment for the June killing;
three were detained in connection with the July incident. On March 28,
Obed Badii, an Irianese lecturer at a Catholic theological school in
Jayapura, died in police detention. Police blamed his death on
intoxication, a claim that was disputed by the victim's family and
NGO's. In May one person died under suspicious circumstances in police
custody in Manokwari, Irian Jaya. In July the Irian Jaya Catholic
Diocese, the Evangelical Christian Church, the Indonesian Bible Camp
Church, and the Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy called
for an independent international investigation into the July 1998
killing of persons when security forces broke up a proindependence
demonstration in Biak. These organizations stated that their
investigation revealed that at least eight persons died at thehands of
security forces during the incident; the Irian Jaya military command
has acknowledged that one person was shot and killed. A National Human
Rights Commission team visited Irian Jaya in August for a followup
investigation of the Biak incident, and recommended that President
Habibie establish an independent team to investigate the incident. The
Government did not act on this recommendation by year's end. Police
injured more than 50 persons while breaking up a separatist
demonstration in Timika, Irian Jaya on December 2. One person died
later the same day as a result of injuries sustained in the melee
caused by the police action (see Sections 1.c., 2.b., and 5).
Security forces in the Maluku island chain, especially the
centrally located island of Ambon, reportedly are responsible for at
least some of the shooting deaths that occurred during riots and
communal clashes since January (see Sections 2.c. and 5). The nature of
military and police engagement in these clashes is twofold. In some
cases, troops facing a riot or armed clash between religion-based gangs
used live ammunition in an attempt to quell violent unrest. However, in
other cases, numerous and diverse witnesses have observed elements of
the security forces siding with one side or the other. The motivation
for this intervention appears to be religious; i.e., troops who are
Muslim or Christian assist gangs of the same religion. In some cases,
this intervention has resulted in soldiers fighting soldiers.
The police and military on several occasions used deadly force to
disperse demonstrators. On September 23-24, in the vicinity of Atma
Jaya University, security forces reportedly shot and killed nine
persons during large-scale, student-led demonstrations in Jakarta
protesting the passage of a new security law (see Sections 1.c. and
2.b.). Although demonstrators threw rocks, large chunks of wood, and
Molotov cocktails at them, security forces showed restraint in the
early stages of these demonstrations; however, they resorted to
firearms, including live ammunition, later on. After most demonstrators
had dispersed, security forces in a passing convoy of trucks fired
indiscriminately at persons along the roadside, killing a student and a
bystander. Several others were injured seriously by the security
forces' indiscriminate fire. One police officer was killed during the
demonstrations when hit (apparently deliberately) by a car. On
September 27, security forces shot and killed two students in Lampung
who were involved in a demonstration protesting the killing of
demonstrators in Jakarta 3 days earlier.
The police often employed deadly force in apprehending suspects or
coping with alleged criminals, many of whom were unarmed. In response
to protests that the methods used were unjustifiably harsh and amounted
to execution without trial, police generally claimed that the suspects
were fleeing, resisting arrest, or threatening the police. Complete
statistics about the number of these cases have not been released, but
the press reported that police killed 13 suspected criminals during the
first 3 months of the year.
In the past, the military or police rarely were held accountable
for using excessive force. In October a court in Yogyakarta, Central
Java, ordered the police to pay civil damages to the family of a
student, Mozes Gatotkaca, whom police beat to death during student
demonstrations in May 1998. However, no police officers have been
investigated in connection with this case.
The domestic press reported in June that forensic ballistic experts
in Canada had determined that two bullets taken from the bodies of two
students killed at Trisakti University in May 1998 were fired from SS-1
and Steyr rifles. The SS-1 is issued to both police and military units;
the Steyr is issued only to elite forces within the Police Mobile
Brigade. Aside from two police officers who were court-martialed in
August 1998 for shooting into the crowd of demonstrators at Trisakti,
no other security force personnel have been tried in connection with
this case.
There were no new developments during the year in the following
cases in which security forces committed extrajudicial killings: The
shooting deaths of at least nine demonstrators at Atma Jaya University
in November 1998; the five cases of alleged human rights violations in
Irian Jaya involving the death of Irianese civilians, which were cited
in a 1995 report by the National Human Rights Commission; and the 1993
murder of labor activist Marsinah. In July 1998, East Java police
resumed the investigation, questioning old and new witnesses, after
NGO's and labor groups called for a fresh effort to solve the Marsinah
case. In June the International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee on
Freedom of Association called on the Government to ``institute without
delay an independent judicial inquiry into the homicide . . . so as to
identify and punish the guilty parties.''
In Jakarta hospital sources reported that during the year 132
persons accused of committing crimes (usually theft or responsibility
for vehicular accidents) were killed by mobs ofpersons who took the law
into their own hands on the scene of the alleged crimes. Hospital
personnel asserted that this was a significant increase over previous
years.
In West Java unidentified persons killed suspected practitioners of
black magic during the first 5 months of the year (see Section 5). West
Java police announced in May that 37 persons were killed, but the
independent Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence
(KONTRAS) stated that at least 57 persons were killed. KONTRAS also
charged that relatives of victims were threatened and placed under
surveillance by unknown persons.
In Maluku intercommunal warfare along religious lines (Christian
and Muslim) throughout the year claimed well over 1,000 lives.
Approximately equal numbers of Christians and Muslims are believed to
have died or suffered injuries during the fighting. One of the major
factors contributing to the continuation of violence in these once-
peaceful islands is that the perpetrators of violence have not been
brought to justice (see Sections 2.c. and 5).
In Sambas, West Kalimantan, more than 200 persons died in fighting
between ethnic Dayak and Melayu groups on one side and ethnic Madurese
(originally from the island of Madura near Java) on the other between
February and April. Most of the dead persons were reported to be
Madurese. An estimated 30,000 Madurese fled their homes to safe havens
elsewhere, including approximately 7,000 who returned to Madura (see
Section 2.d.).
In East Timor, abuses by proindependence groups also were reported.
On April 30, authorities brought journalists to Ermera to view the
bodies of what they claimed were 11 members of the Red and White
militia group who were killed in late February, allegedly by
independence supporters. In April, following violence in Liquica and
Dili, then-imprisoned CNRT activist Xanana Gusmao gave the green light
to his supporters to ``defend themselves'' from attacks by the
prointegration forces. He subsequently retracted this statement and
renewed his previous instructions for his followers to refrain from
violence. On April 12, following the execution of six proindependence
civilians at Cailaco militia and security personnel, a military vehicle
was attacked in the same area, reportedly by Falintil forces. Two
soldiers and one civilian were killed. According to prointegration and
government sources, proindependence forces ambushed and killed three
East Timorese members of the Indonesian military at Lototoe on May 17.
With the above-mentioned exceptions, independent observers, including
Indonesian and international investigative commissions, were unable to
verify claims by the Government that proindependence forces had carried
out 30 violent acts following a cease-fire agreement of April 21.
In Aceh dozens of low-level civil servants, police, and military
personnel were murdered over the course of the year. Two persons, a
sergeant and a local official, were shot and killed on March 11 in Cut
Nibong village, in the Kota Makmur district. On May 25, 4 persons were
killed and 12 persons were wounded when a security forces' truck was
ambushed in Pidie district, North Aceh. On May 29, nine military
personnel were killed on an army patrol near Meulaboh, West Aceh. The
security forces were responding to an attack the previous day that
killed two persons. The Aceh Merdeka movement later claimed
responsibility. During the national election period, a soldier was shot
and killed as he guarded a polling station in West Aceh on June 7 (see
Section 3). Two soldiers and one civilian were kidnaped and killed in
Idi Cut on June 9. On June 11, separatists attacked a TNI truck in West
Aceh, killing two persons and wounding six others. Separatists killed
at least five TNI members on July 19. On August 5, in Kandang, a police
officer disappeared and later was found dead. On August 27, in Pidie, a
TNI soldier was shot and killed. On October 12, at least three TNI
personnel were killed. On December 7, an unidentified person stabbed
two soldiers, one fatally, in Pereulak, East Aceh. On December 9, a
member of a police mobile brigade was shot and killed while eating a
predawn (Ramadan) meal with his family in North Aceh (see Section
1.c.). In December at least 10 security force personnel were killed.
Throughout many of these incidents, a great number of the victims were
killed not in the course of an armed exchange with separatists, but as
they shopped for food or commuted to or from work. It generally is
believed that separatists carried out many of these, and other,
killings. Armed separatist groups also allegedly carried out a number
of attacks and ambushes against security forces, killing at least 30
persons and wounding dozens more. Some separatists allege that the TNI
generates some violence in order to stoke unrest and create a pretext
for increased use of force; however, such allegations remain
unconfirmed.
In Irian Jaya armed insurgents of the Free Papua Movement (OPM)
killed 4 persons and kidnaped 11 others from a plantation near Arso in
May.
b. Disappearance.--There were many reports of disappearances in
East Timor prior to the consultation vote, when kidnapings of
proindependence activists were common. During the April 17 attack on
Manuel Carrascalao's house in Dili, over 100 displaced persons at the
scene were taken away by militias and it was unclear how many of these
persons eventually were accounted for (see Sections 1.a. and 2.d.).
Proindependence groups claim that on May 5, the Aitarak militia group
abducted Mateus Da Silva, a local CNRT leader in Dili. According to
Amnesty International, police detained two CNRT personnel, Kama Motan
and Herikera, in Alieu and brought them to the provincial police
headquarters in Dili on or about May 21. The police claim neither to
have received the two persons nor to know their whereabouts.
There were numerous reports of abductions and disappearances in
East Timor, and from refugee camps in West Timor following the flight
and forced relocation of over 250,000 East Timorese civilians in
September (see Section 2.d.). On November 1, the KPP-HAM issued a
preliminary report describing systematic abuses in West Timor,
including kidnapings by militias. For example, the report described
sweeping operations by militias that entered churches to search for
students and proindependence activists. It cited a case in which
militias kidnaped a priest and two students in mid-October in the
Kefamenanu area. At year's end, the persons' whereabouts remained
unknown (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.a., 2.c., 4, 5, and 6.f.). Dozens
of East Timorese prisoners, including political prisoners, previously
held in Becora prison in Dili reportedly were taken to West Timor in
September and remain unaccounted for. Mau Hodu, a prominent CNRT
activist, was abducted and disappeared in West Timor in September. It
is believed that he later was killed.
In Aceh there continued to be credible reports of the disappearance
of dozens of civilians. NGO's believe that TNI troops killed numerous
persons who disappeared during the February confrontation in Idi Cut
(see Section 1.a.). Many persons who disappeared are thought to have
been associated with separatist activities. NGO's allege that TNI
forces or police personnel killed many of these persons. Some victims
are believed to have been killed by militia groups due to armed
separatist group suspicions that they were collaborators or informants
of the security forces. There are no reported accounts as to why other
persons may have disappeared.
The 12 persons who disappeared during 1997-98 and were feared to
have been killed by their abductors, were still unaccounted for. In
April a military court handed down sentences of 12 to 22 months'
imprisonment to 11 officers (none higher than major) and
noncommissioned officers from the special forces for their alleged
involvement in the abductions of 9 student and NGO activists kidnaped
in early 1998 and later released. The trial did not address the
possible killing of 1 abductee and the fact that at least 12 others
still are missing.
The July report by three church groups and an NGO on the
investigation into the July 1998 killing of persons when security
forces broke up a proindependence demonstration in Biak (see Section
1.a.) noted that there had been no progress in identifying the remains
or cause of death of 32 ``mysterious'' bodies found floating around
Biak after the incident.
The National Human Rights Commission continued to list 16 persons
missing from the government-backed, violent takeover of Indonesian
Democratic Party (PDI) headquarters in 1996.
There were no significant efforts by the Government to account for
the missing and dead persons from the 1991 military shooting of
civilians in Dili. No additional cases were resolved during the year.
Knowledgeable observers continued to believe that most of the persons
missing are dead and that members of the armed forces know where their
bodies are located.
In East Timor, there were numerous reports of abductions and
murders of police and TNI personnel, allegedly at the hands of
separatists.
In Aceh there were reports of police abductions, allegedly at the
hands of separatist groups.
In Irian Jaya armed insurgents of the Free Papua Organization (OPM)
kidnapped 11 persons from a plantation near Arso on May 5. They were
freed on May 31. On July 6, a group of armed men abducted six employees
of the district forestry office on a survey in Arso subdistrict. Press
reports stated that the abductors were suspected of being OPM members.
At year's end, the fate of the hostages remained unknown.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--TheCriminal Code makes it a crime punishable by up to 4
years in prison for any official to use violence or force to elicit a
confession; however, in practice, legal protections are both inadequate
and widely ignored, and security forces continued to employ torture and
other forms of mistreatment, particularly in regions where there were
active security concerns, such as Aceh, Irian Jaya, and East Timor.
Police often resort to physical abuse, even in minor incidents.
In East Timor the Government organized and directed prointegration
militias engaged in extensive torture, and intimidation directed
against proindependence activists and ordinary citizens. Regular
security forces and East Timorese paramilitary forces integrated into
the TNI structure also perpetrated many such abuses. For example,
militia groups and security forces routinely fired into neighborhoods
in Dili at night for purposes of intimidation, and carried out
killings. The militia group Besi Merah Putih, joined by the police
auxiliary Kamra and Hansip (local guards), searched for proindependence
figures in Dili, usually at night. Such militia-led searches were
common throughout East Timor (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.d., and 2.d.).
On May 5, prointegrationist militia forces surrounded the home of East
Timorese human rights activist Aniceto Guterres and threatened to kill
him. This attack followed a presentation by Guterres earlier that day
at a KOMNASHAM (National Human Rights Commission)-sponsored peace
commission talk at which he reportedly severely criticized the
militias. Proindependence supporters maintain that Eurico Guterres'
``Aitarak'' militia continually pressured residents of Dili to sign
pledges of support for integration, threatening that any who refused to
sign would be taken away during the night. Reliable witnesses observed
Aitarak militia destroying and rampaging through houses in the Metiaut
district of Dili late May 16, and it also is alleged that, in a
separate incident that same day, the Aitarak militia attacked and
burned the house of a Joao Almeida, a CNRT activist, in the Bidau
section of Dili. According to reliable sources, 20 to 30 percent of the
houses along the road from Dili to Maubara were burned or destroyed as
of late May. Such destruction occurred in many other areas of the
province. Homes in Northwestern Bobonaro and Southwestern Kovalima were
burned or abondoned.
Despite a reported shortage of medical care in East Timor, in March
the Health Ministry rejected an Australian proposal to send a medical
team, insisting that the country had plenty of available staff and that
it would send its own medical team.
The ICRC initially also was not permitted to send surgeons and
other medical staff, and ICRC physicians later brought into East Timor
on May 15 were not allowed to begin work. Despite the Government's
promises to provide medical care, it withdrew most of the government
doctors and closed most medical facilities during the preconsultation
periods. While the Dili hospital remained open throughout the
preconsultation period, toward the end there were no doctors, few
nurses, and no patients. However, in many cases, despite a formal
prohibition on their practicing, a number of foreign doctors continued
to operate quietly in East Timor throughout the preconsultation period.
In September following the overwhelming proindependence victory in the
August ``consultation'' vote, armed forces and militia groups attacked
hundreds of persons in a wave of violence; as a result, numerous
persons were killed, disappeared, tortured, harassed, and displaced
(see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 2.d., and 3). The large-scale looting and
burning of churches, houses (including Bishop Belo's home, on September
6), and ICRC, and other office compounds, also continued (see Sections
3 and 4). Numerous UNAMET vehicles and other UNAMET assets throughout
East Timor were damaged, destroyed, or stolen.
In Aceh the Government sometimes violently has suppressed active
separatist movements. On January 9, the military detained 37 to 40
persons from rural villages and brought them to nearby Lhokseumawe.
While in detention, TNI forces beat and tortured numerous persons so
severely that four persons died, three were put in a coma, and almost
all others were hospitalized (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.). A military
officer and several enlisted personnel received jail sentences for
their involvement. During the raid, a house in Kandang village was
burned down. NGO's alleged that the military burned down the house,
which was owned by Achmad Kandang's parents; however, the military
alleged that local persons burned it down due to anger at Achmad
Kandang. A human rights NGO alleged that security forces tortured a
person dispatched to Idi Cut to investigate the February 3 killings
(see Section 1.a.).
On March 26, in Banda, Aceh, security forces used tear gas, batons,
and possibly rubber bullets to disperse thousands of students who were
demonstrating in support of separation, threatening to ``disrupt'' a
visit from President Habibie; as a result, 40 demonstrators were
hospitalized.
According to news reports, on November 2 in Tuwi Kareung, West
Aceh, security forces indiscriminately attacked numerous civilians in
an attempt to find the assailants who killed onesoldier and injured two
others the previous day. TNI forces reportedly also burned 36 houses
and arrested numerous persons (see Section 1.d.).
On December 4, the anniversary of separatist leader Hasan Di Tiro's
Declaration of Acehnese Independence, TNI forces arrested at least 40
persons and some persons were beaten (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.).
In Aceh TNI personnel often responded with indiscriminate violence
after physical attacks on soldiers. For example, after two soldiers
were stabbed on December 7, in Pereulak, East Aceh, the soldiers'
colleagues quickly took revenge by rounding up dozens of young men in
an adjacent neighborhood and beating them, sending at least six persons
to the hospital. After a member of a police mobile brigade was shot and
killed on December 9 in North Aceh (see Section 1.a.), soldiers entered
the nearby village of Pante Pisang and fired their rifles into the air
for several hours, terrifying residents. Also in December, after a
police mobile brigade came under fire near Lameu village, Pidie
district, and one policeman was killed, TNI forces and police personnel
entered the village, burned many or most of the homes, and beat a
number of residents. There are unconfirmed allegations that the TNI was
responsible for the original shooting of the policeman.
In early March, in Merauke, South Irian Jaya, a policeman shot an
Irianese youth in the head after he reportedly sought to evade a
citation for riding on a motorcycle without a helmet. He survived after
emergency surgery, but the shooting provoked strong public criticism.
Police acknowledged the shooting and promised an investigation, but no
followup is known to have been taken by year's end.
There were numerous reports of rape and sexual abuse perpetrated
against East Timorese women who were displaced forcibly by militia
groups from their villages in the western districts during the earlier
part of the year. It also was widely reported that the TNI-supported
militias (the Aitarak) kept women as sex slaves in their Dili
headquarters (see Sections 2.d., 5, 6.c., and 6.f.). The KPP stated
that it received reports that the TNI and the militias raped 60 women
in East Timor during the September wave of violence; the KPP also
received numerous reports that the TNI-backed militias sexually abused
women, some of whom were quite young, in the refugee camps in West
Timor. Cases of East Timorese women allegedly raped by soldiers and
government civilian personnel in previous years remained unresolved.
There were unconfirmed allegations that TNI soldiers raped nine
Acehnese women on August 19 in Kecamatan Tangse Selatan, Pidie
district.
In May the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights
published a report on rape and other human rights abuses by the
military in Irian Jaya. The report described 12 cases of sexual and
other violence against women and girls by military personnel between
1994 and 1998. The report calls for, among other things, an
investigation by the Department of Justice and prosecution of the
personnel responsible for rapes and other violence against women.
The Government failed to follow up on the recommendations of the
fact-finding team (which had both government and NGO representation)
that it commissioned to investigate the civil unrest that struck
Jakarta and other cities in May 1998. The team's report, issued in
November 1998, found evidence that some elements of the military may
have been involved in provoking the violence, which included attacks
against Sino-Indonesian women, and urged further investigation of the
matter. At least 85 instances of violence against women, including 66
rapes during the 1998 riots were verified. However, at year's end, no
further investigations had taken place.
In March U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women Radhika
Coomaraswamy released her findings from a late 1998 visit to the
country. She found that rape and sexual violence had been ``used quite
extensively'' by sections of the military as ``a means of intimidation
and torture'' during the Soeharto era. This was especially prevalent in
East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya. Coomaraswamy generally was positive
about government cooperation during her visit, although her request to
visit Aceh and Irian Jaya was denied.
Human rights monitors, both international and locally based,
reported that the military continued routinely to torture detainees in
Aceh. Methods of torture documented in the past included beating,
whipping, electric shock, and rape.
There were instances in which security forces responded with
brutality to peaceful demonstrations, although they usually allowed
entirely peaceful demonstrations to proceed without resorting to force.
Participants in several student- or NGO-leddemonstrations in Jakarta
and other cities suffered injuries when security forces seeking to
disperse crowds beat and kicked demonstrators. On February 9, police
allegedly beat 4 students for demonstrating over the Government's use
of borrowed money at Atma Jaya Catholic University in Jakarta. At a
March 31 antigovernment demonstration at the Defense Ministry in
Jakarta, security forces beat students with truncheons, causing 11
students to become hospitalized. In April police mobile brigade troops
opened fire on farmers who occupied a plantation warehouse in Jember,
East Java, killing 1 person and wounding 11 others. Police fired on and
wounded or killed demonstrators on several occasions in Irian Jaya when
they forcibly broke up demonstrations (see Sections 1.a. and 5). For
example, on the morning of December 2, police fired rubber bullets to
break up a proindependence demonstration in Timika, Irian Jaya,
injuring at least 55 persons, 5 seriously (see Section 2.b.).
Security forces often responded forcibly when demonstrators wielded
canes, threw stones or Molotov cocktails, or tried to break through
police lines. During a People's Democratic Party (PRD) demonstration
outside of the National Election Headquarters in Jakarta on July 1,
police beat demonstrators and shot rubber bullets after demonstrators
threw stones and tried to push through police lines in front of the
Elections Commission office. At least 37 demonstrators were
hospitalized as a result. In September police injured numerous
protestors who were demonstrating against the new security bill in
Jakarta (see Sections 1.a. and 1.e.). In Jakarta from September 23 to
24 (see Section 1.a.), security forces shot at and beat demonstrators;
at least 16 persons suffered gunshot wounds and scores of others were
injured. During a demonstration in downtown Jakarta on October 20,
security forces chased demonstrators who threw Molotov cocktails at
them into the Jakarta Hospital. They discharged tear gas into the
hospital, injured more than 60 demonstrators and bystanders with blows
and rubber bullets, and destroyed an estimated $350,000 (2.5 billion
Rp) worth of hospital equipment. The Jakarta city police conducted an
investigation into the incident, the results of which were conveyed to
the military police detachment of the Jakarta regional command. No
action was taken against any security forces involved in these
incidents by the end of the year.
Prison conditions are harsh, with mistreatment and extortion of
inmates by guards and violence among prisoners common. The incidence of
mistreatment drops sharply once a prisoner is transferred from police
or military intelligence (BAIS) custody into the civilian prison system
or into the custody of the Attorney General. Credible sources report
that criminal prisoners in some facilities are beaten routinely and
systematically as punishment for infractions of prison discipline and
to extract information about developments within the prison.
Punishments include use of electric shock batons and stapling of the
ears, nose, and lips. Political prisoners sometimes were incarcerated
with the general prison population. Political prisoners in the
Cipinang, Salemba, and other prisons tend to be segregated from the
criminal population and generally receive more humane treatment.
The Government generally does not permit routine prison visits by
human rights monitors. However, human rights monitors occasionally have
been able to visit prisoners.
Special arrangements for foreign dignitaries to visit some
prominent political prisoners sometimes were made. Imprisoned East
Timorese resistance leader Xanana Gusmao received a large number of
high-level foreign visitors, was allowed to participate in meetings
outside his detention quarters, and held frequent meetings with the
press prior to his release on amnesty in September. Human rights
monitors also have visited some nonpolitical prisoners, although this
appears only to be permitted on a case-by-case basis.
The ability of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
to visit prisoners varied over the course of the year (see Section 4).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Criminal Procedures
Code contains provisions against arbitrary arrest and detention, but it
lacks adequate enforcement mechanisms and authorities routinely violate
it. The code specifies that prisoners have the right to promptly notify
their families and that warrants must be produced during an arrest
except under specified conditions, such as when a suspect is caught in
the act of committing a crime. The law authorizes investigators to
issue warrants to assist in their investigations or if sufficient
evidence exists that a crime has been committed. However, authorities
sometimes made arrests without warrants.
The law presumes that defendants are innocent and permits bail.
They or their families also may challenge the legality of their arrest
and detention in a pretrial hearing and may sue forcompensation if
wrongfully detained. However, it virtually is impossible for detainees
to invoke this procedure, or to receive compensation after being
released without charge. In both military and civilian courts, appeals
based on claims of improper arrest and detention rarely, if ever, are
accepted. The Criminal Procedures Code also contains specific limits on
periods of pretrial detention and specifies when the courts must
approve extensions, usually after 60 days. In April the Parliament
repealed the 1963 Antisubversion Law, which had given the Attorney
General the authority to hold a suspect for successive 1-year periods
without limit.
The authorities routinely approve extensions of periods of
detention. In areas where active guerrilla movements exist, such as
Aceh and East Timor, there are many instances of persons being detained
without warrants, charges, or court proceedings. Bail rarely is
granted, especially in political cases. The authorities frequently
prevent access to defense counsel while suspects are being investigated
and make it difficult or impossible for detainees to get legal
assistance from voluntary legal defense organizations. Special laws on
corruption, economic crimes, and narcotics do not come under the
Criminal Code's protections.
The Agency for Coordination of Assistance for the Consolidation of
National Security (BAKORSTANAS) operates outside the legal code and has
wide discretion to detain and interrogate persons whom are perceived as
threats to national security.
Security forces frequently detained participants suspected of
inciting demonstrations, although most were released after questioning
(see Section 2.b.).
There are no reliable data on the number of arbitrary arrests or
detentions without trial, particularly in East Timor, Irian Jaya, and
Aceh, but there is ample evidence that arbitrary arrests and detention
without trial are employed systematically in Aceh. In East Timor
arbitrary detention was a continuing problem in the months prior to the
consultation vote. TNI-backed prointegration militias often arbitrarily
detained persons suspected of proindependence sympathies. For example,
in Baucau armed pro-Jakarta elements wearing unmarked black uniforms
``arrested'' numerous local opponents. In Aileu the local militia, led
by the district chief, detained young men suspected of proindependence
sympathies and interrogated and beat them in the militia headquarters.
During sweep operations by the security forces, young males,
anticipating that they would be detained and beaten simply as suspects
if found in their villages, typically fled to the mountains or Dili,
leaving behind women, children, and the elderly (see Sections 1.c.,
2.d., and 5). On April 22, 30 students were detained in the Bekora
section of Dili. Militia groups reportedly arrested four persons on May
1 and took them to the military post in Viqueque. A KPP-HAM report
issued on November 1 cited eyewitness accounts of arbitrary detention
by prointegration militia groups during the post-consultation period
(see Section 4).
On January 9, the military detained 37 to 40 persons from rural
villages and brought them to nearby Lhokseumawe, Aceh. Most of these
persons were beaten and tortured severely and four died in custody (see
Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). An NGO claimed on July 12 that the TNI rounded
up 20 Acehnese young men in a village near Teunom, West Aceh, allegedly
for separatist activities. According to news reports, on November 2 in
Tuwi Kareung, West Aceh, security forces arbitrarily arrested 136
persons (see Section 1.c.). On December 4, the anniversary of
separatist leader Hasan Di Tiro's Declaration of Acehnese Independence,
TNI forces injured a number of persons. At least 40 persons were
arrested, 20 of whom allegedly were mistreated (see Sections 1.a. and
1.c.).
On May 6, police arrested 74 Irianese in the western Irian Jaya
town of Fak Fak. The Government claimed that it found independence
materials, the Independent West Papua flag (see Sections 1.c. and
2.a.), and ``sharp weapons'' at the location. Those arrested were
released the next day, charged with violating the ban on gatherings to
publicize the results of the Irianese leaders' meeting with President
Habibie (see Section 5), and fined $0.33 (RP. 2,500).
The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention visited the
country during the first 2 weeks of February. The team was able to
spend 3 days in East Timor, but was denied permission to visit Aceh and
Irian Jaya (see Section 4).
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution stipulates the
independence of the judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is
subordinated to the executive and the military. In August the
Parliament passed and President Habibie signed a law providing for the
gradual transfer of administrative and financial control over
thejudiciary from the Department of Justice to the Supreme Court over a
period of 5 years. However, judges currently are civil servants
employed by the executive branch, which controls their assignments,
pay, and promotion. Low salaries encourage widespread corruption, and
judges are subject to considerable pressure from governmental
authorities, who often exert influence over the outcome of numerous
cases.
A quadripartite judiciary of general, religious, military, and
administrative courts exists below the Supreme Court. The right of
appeal from a district court to a high court to the Supreme Court
exists in all four systems. The Supreme Court does not consider factual
aspects of a case, only the lower courts' application of law. The
Supreme Court theoretically stands coequal with the executive and
legislative branches, but it does not have the right of judicial review
over laws passed by Parliament.
In September the former Parliament enacted, and President Habibie
signed, a new law on human rights that mandated creation of a human
rights court within 4 years. On October 8, President Habibie signed a
``government regulation in lieu of statute'' creating a human rights
court within the general judicial system. The court has the authority
to hear and adjudicate cases that occur subsequent to October 8, that
involve extinction of a national or ethnic group, extrajudicial
killings, forced disappearance, slavery, systematic discrimination, and
torture. The regulation allows the National Human Rights Commission to
request an explanation at any time from the Attorney General on the
status of a human rights case. The regulation also nullifies a
provision of the 1997 law on military tribunals that allows a
commanding officer discretion over whether to refer a subordinate to a
military court. Some legal experts criticized the regulation on the
ground that it usurped the Parliament's authority to enact laws, and
some human rights organizations expressed suspicion that the regulation
was designed to avoid trial of Indonesian human rights violators by an
international tribunal.
A panel of judges conducts trials at the district court level,
poses questions, hears evidence, decides guilt or innocence, and
assesses punishment. Initial judgments rarely are reversed in the
appeals process, although sentences can be increased or reduced. Both
the defense and the prosecution may appeal.
Defendants have the right to confront witnesses and to produce
witnesses in their defense. An exception is allowed in cases in which
distance or expense is deemed excessive for transporting witnesses to
court. In such cases, sworn affidavits may be introduced. However, the
Criminal Procedures Code does not provide for witnesses' immunity or
for defense power of subpoena. As a result, witnesses generally are
unwilling to testify against the authorities. The courts commonly allow
forced confessions and limit the presentation of defense evidence.
Defendants do not have the right to remain silent and can be compelled
to testify against themselves.
The Criminal Procedures Code gives defendants the right to an
attorney from the moment of their arrest, but not during the prearrest
investigation period, which may involve prolonged detention. Persons
summoned to appear as witnesses in investigations do not have the right
to be assisted by lawyers even though information developed in the
course of rendering testimony subsequently can become the basis of an
investigation of the witness. The law requires that a lawyer be
appointed in capital cases and those involving a prison sentence of 15
years or more. In cases involving potential sentences of 5 years or
more, a lawyer must be appointed if the defendant desires an attorney
and is indigent. In theory destitute defendants may obtain private
legal assistance, such as that provided by the Indonesian Legal Aid
Foundation. However, in practice defendants often are persuaded not to
hire an attorney, or access to an attorney of their choice is impeded.
In many cases procedural protections, including those against
coerced confessions, particularly those coerced by the police and the
BAIS, are inadequate to ensure a fair trial. Corruption is a common
feature of the legal system and the payment of bribes can influence
prosecution, conviction, and sentencing in civil and criminal cases.
Despite the beginning of the transfer of administrative and
financial control over the judiciary from the Department of Justice to
the Supreme Court, there were few signs of judicial independence. The
court continued to be used to take action against, or deny legal remedy
to, political activists and government critics. In January a court in
Biak sentenced 19 persons to sentences ranging from several months to
6\1/2\ years for engaging in proindependence demonstrations. This group
was freed as part of President Wahid's amnesty decree on December 23.
Ten persons in Wamena who were arrested and charged for raising a
Papuan Independence Flag were found guilty, sentenced to time already
served, and freed in April. At year's end, four persons in Jayapura
were on trial forraising Papuan independence flags. Several groups of
students who conducted peaceful demonstrations in Jakarta during the
first half of the year were convicted of violating a 1998 law
prohibiting demonstrations without a permit, and were required to pay
small fines.
The Parliament repealed the 1963 Anti-Subversion Law in April (see
Section 1.d.); however, at the same time Parliament passed a law (Law
No. 27 of 1999) transferring six crimes against the State specified in
the Anti-Subversion Law (e.g., propagating communism, damaging
government facilities, and interfering with distribution of essential
goods) to the Criminal Code. All persons convicted under the law
received amnesty by the end of the year.
In January the Government announced that imprisoned East Timorese
resistance leader Xanana Gusmao would be removed from prison and
detained in a house outside of Cipinang prison. The Government formally
released him on September 7.
During its 16 months in office, President Habibie's Government
released, by its own count, 213 political prisoners, including 52
persons released in March and labor leader Dita Indah Sari in July. In
March the Government released 40 Acehnese political prisoners jailed
under the Anti-Subversion Act; however, their release was only on
condition that they swear allegiance to the national Constitution and
to ``Pancasila,'' the official state ideology. A number of East
Timorese political prisoners who had been held in Dili and reportedly
moved to West Timor during the violent aftermath of the consultation
vote remained unaccounted for. On November 30, President Wahid promised
to free 18 East Timorese political prisoners from Cipinang prison. On
December 10, President Wahid signed decrees giving amnesty and
abolition of sentence to 91 political prisoners, including 6 leaders of
the People's Democratic Party (PRD), 70 East Timorese prisoners, and 15
prisoners associated with the Acehnese independence movement or Islamic
movements. On December 23, he signed another decree giving amnesty and
abolition of sentence to another 105 political prisoners. With the
latest releases, according to domestic monitors of political prisoners,
all political prisoners from the Soeharto era had been freed. However,
at year's end six persons were on trial on political charges stemming
from actions that they took when Habibie was president. In addition
five persons remained under restricted freedom awaiting trial and three
labor activists were in detention awaiting trial (see Section 6.b.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
Correspondence.--Judicial warrants for searches are required except for
cases involving suspected subversion, economic crimes, and corruption;
security agencies regularly made forced or surreptitious entries.
Security forces also engaged in surveillance of persons and residences
and selective monitoring of local and international telephone calls
without legal restraint. In February publication of a transcript of a
telephone conversation between President Habibie and the Attorney
General concerning the investigation of former President Soeharto
caused strong public criticism. Habibie ordered an investigation into
the matter, but no results were announced during the year.
The Parliament passed a controversial new law in September on
overcoming dangerous situations that allows the military to conduct
search and seizure operations for weapons during a declared state of
emergency without a warrant, but requires that such searches be
reported to a court within 24 hours. However, President Habibie did not
sign this law, and its status is unclear.
Government security officials monitor the movements and activities
of former members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its front
organizations, especially persons whom the Government believes were
involved in the abortive 1965 coup. These persons and their relatives
sometimes are subjected to surveillance, required check-ins, periodic
indoctrination, and restrictions on travel outside their city of
residence. They also are required to have official permission to change
their place of residence. The requirement that ``E.T.'' (``Ex-Tapol''
or political prisoner) be stamped on the identification cards of these
prisoners was ended officially in 1995, although in practice it
continued in use in many cases. At least some individuals who had E.T.
stamped on their identity cards were able to have the stamp removed.
This stamp has been one of the methods the Government has used to
monitor the activities of these persons, allowing the Government and
prospective employers to identify alleged former PKI members, thereby
subjecting them to official and unofficial discrimination. Even when
the stamp has been removed, these former political prisoners continue
to face discrimination and restrictions on employment.
Under the government-sponsored transmigration program large numbers
of persons were moved voluntarily from overpopulated areas to more
isolated and less developed areas (this programbegan during the Dutch
colonial period and has been carried out more or less continuously
since then). It also was used to resettle local populations within East
Timor and Irian Jaya. However, plans to revive the program, after
several years during which the Government reduced its support for it,
fell victim to the economic crisis. Human rights monitors state that in
general the transmigration program violates the rights of indigenous
people and dupes some transmigrants into leaving their home villages
without any means of return. Human rights activists also have claimed
that a number of those resettled are persons who have been forced off
lands that are coveted by developers who have collusive arrangements
with the Government or security forces. Conditions at some sites are
life threatening, with inadequate measures to protect the transmigrant
population against diseases endemic to the sites. Transmigrants and
migrants outside the Government transmigration program received direct
and indirect government support in the form of developmental assistance
programs and contracts with the TNI or local government officials. This
practice, particularly in East Timor, Irian Jaya, and parts of
Kalimantan, led to resentment among indigenous populations, whose
members believed that their rights were infringed upon and that they
were being discriminated against by virtue of the disbursement of
development funds to those who were in some cases their newly arrived
economic rivals (see Section 5).
The Government used its authority, and at times intimidation, to
acquire land for development projects, particularly in areas claimed by
indigenous people, and often without fair compensation (see Section 5).
The Government prohibits the import of Chinese-language
publications (see Sections 2.a. and 5).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The 1945 Constitution contains a
general provision for freedom of expression; the new law on human
rights provides for substantive protection of press freedom (see
Section 1.d.); however, the security apparatus often attempted to
control and restrict reporting on East Timor, and journalists continued
to suffer intimidation and assaults.
Also in September, the Parliament enacted a new press law that
provides for freedom of the press, prohibits censorship, and prescribes
penalties for anyone who violates these rights. However, the law
obliges the press to report events and opinions ``with respect to
religious and moral norms of the public,'' and to adhere to the
presumption of innocence. Press companies that violate this provision
can be fined up to $71,500 (500 million Rp). Advertising that degrades
the dignity of certain religions or creates disorder among diverse
religions, or is contrary to public morality, or refers to addictive
substances, is prohibited. The new law establishes a Press Board to
create and enforce a code of journalistic ethics. Membership of the
board consists of journalists nominated by journalist associations,
representatives of press companies, and public figures nominated by
journalists and press companies. The new law replaced previous press
laws that were viewed as being more restrictive of press freedom. In
October President Wahid abolished the Department of Information,
formerly used as the Government's propaganda and censorship arm.
During the year, the media often exercised press freedom with
detailed and hard-hitting reporting on corruption, political protests,
national unrest, the parliamentary election campaign, and the
presidential selection process; however, the security apparatus often
attempted to control and restrict reporting on East Timor. For example,
after the April 17 militia assaults in Dili (see Section 1.a.), a
cordon of military and police prevented journalists from approaching
the scene. On April 17, prointegration militia attacked and destroyed
the offices of the province's most important daily newspaper, Suara Tim
Tim. There were reports that the newspaper faced continual threats not
to publish any information sourced to proindependence East Timorese, or
about civilian deaths due to militia attacks. In April the militia also
threatened to attack the office and transmitter site of the Kamnek
radio broadcasting center, the Church broadcasting system for East
Timor, causing staff to board up the office's windows and doors.
During the transition in East Timor, the media largely conveyed
uncritically government- and TNI-inspired disinformation directed
against UNAMET and INTERFET. Overall, domestic press and television
coverage of East Timor highlighted the statements of government
officials and prointegration leaders, and uncritically conveyed the
government (prointegration) line on most issues, in many cases actively
seeking to discredit INTERFET. After the consultation election results
were announced, prointegration harassment, intimidation by security
forces, and assaults against journalists greatly increased. However,
later in the year the media did provide extensivestcoverage of the
findings of the Indonesian Commission Investigating Abuses in East
Timor (see Sections 1.b., 1.c., 1.d., 2.d., 4, 5, and 6.f.). Also
UNAMET's versions of events and reports of abuses by the militias
sometimes did appear.
Police questioned three television and radio station news directors
about their sources after the stations reported on a recording of a
telephone conversation between President Habibie and Attorney General
Andi Ghalib in February. Police said that they were investigating
possible violations of a 1946 law on the dissemination of false
information or news that stirs public unrest. In June police questioned
as suspects the chairman and executive director of the NGO Indonesia
Corruption Watch after the Attorney General filed a criminal complaint
charging that they slandered him by accusing him of accepting bribes
from local businessmen. Police also questioned as witnesses three
editors of newspapers that reported on the Indonesia Corruption Watch
accusations. In September police questioned a newspaper editor for
publishing editorials critical of President Habibie, and the news
director of a television station for airing an interview with an
Acehnese separatist movement commander. A magazine editor and a
magazine distributor went on trial in October for publishing material
that allegedly was offensive to public morality. There has been no
police followup to the interrogation of the newspaper editors or the
television news director who were critical of President Habibie.
However, court proceedings continue against the magazine editor accused
of offending public morality.
The Government retained the right to suspend publishing licenses
for an unspecified period of time, although no licenses were suspended
during the year. Other means of control include regulation of the
amount of advertising permitted and of the number of pages allowed in
newspapers. Subsequent to the abolition of the Department of
Information in October, many editors believed that they no longer
required a license to publish a newspaper or magazine, since there was
no controlling body to which to report.
The Government arrested 5 persons for raising the Papuan
Independence Flag during the year, and proceeded with trial for 42
other persons arrested for flag-raisings in 1998. All but four persons
were released by year's end under President Wahid's amnesty decrees.
There were numerous flag-raisings around Irian Jaya on December 1,
which is commemorated as the anniversary of Papuan independence. In
most cases, authorities did not take action against persons who raised
flags, but police broke up a flag-raising vigil in Timika, resulting in
injuries and one death (see Sections 1.e. and 5).
The Government operates a nationwide television network with 12
regional stations. Private commercial television companies, most with
ownership by, or management ties to, former President Soeharto's
family, continued to expand. All are required to broadcast government-
produced news, but they also all produce news and public affairs
programming independently. Just prior to the appointment of the current
Cabinet, the Minister of Information issued licenses for five new
private television stations and granted them 2 years to prepare before
beginning broadcast operations. Television networks increased their
news coverage during the year, including live gavel-to-gavel coverage
of the People's Consultative Assembly's General Session during which
the new President and Vice President were elected.
More than 700 private radio-broadcasting companies exist in
addition to the Government's national radio network. They all were
required to belong to the government-sponsored Association of Private
Radio Stations to receive a broadcast license. The Government radio
station, Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI), produces the program
``National News.'' Private radio stations and 53 regional government
network affiliates relay the program throughout the country.
Regulations issued by the Government in June 1998 reduced the
number of compulsory government programming broadcasts from 14 to 4 per
day. While private radio stations in the provinces generally adhered to
the Department of Information's edict governing the number of daily RRI
news relays, many private radio stations in larger urban areas elected
to relay the RRI news broadcast only once per day. The regulations
allowed stations to produce their own news programs, and many have done
so. Candid live coverage of demonstrations and other breaking stories
increased markedly during the year. Moreover, ``talk radio'' call-in
programs regularly address timely political and socioeconomic issues.
Foreign television and radio broadcasts are readily accessible.
Satellite dishes have proliferated throughout the country, and there is
access to the Internet. The Government made no effort to restrict
access to satellite programming and has proclaimed an ``open skies''
policy. Foreign periodicals are widely available. The authorities have
delayed distribution of publications by a day or more, although this is
rare. TheGovernment restricts the import of Chinese-language
publications (see Sections 1.f. and 5).
The Government regulates access to the country, particularly to
areas of unrest, by visiting and resident foreign correspondents. It
occasionally reminds the latter of its prerogative to deny requests for
visa extensions. Special permission is necessary for foreign
journalists to travel to East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya. In August
the Government denied entry to a foreign journalist, Amy Goodman, who
was on an immigration blacklist because of reporting critical of the
Government's handling of East Timor (see Section 2.d.). She was
intending to cover the August 30 popular consultation in East Timor.
Several foreign and domestic journalists, including Washington Post
correspondent Keith Richburg and the British Broadcasting Company's
Jonathan Head, covering the events prior to East Timor's consultation
vote were attacked and injured by prointegration militias. In September
the Government detained foreign journalist Allan Nairn, who was
visiting East Timor, for several days before deporting him.
East Timorese members of a TNI battalion killed Dutch journalist
Sander Thoenes in September, and an Indonesian journalist, Agus
Mulyawan, was among those killed when paramilitary forces attacked a
convoy in Los Palos in September (see Section 1.a.).
The Government requires a permit for the importation of foreign
publications and videotapes, which must be reviewed by government
censors. Significant amounts of material bypass customs and censorship
procedures.
Most books by the prominent novelist and former political prisoner
Pramoedya Ananta Toer are banned, although some are in circulation.
According to a study published in the newspaper Kompas, from 1969 to
1998 the Government banned 199 books, approximately 50 percent for
religious reasons, 30 percent for political reasons, and 20 percent for
ideological reasons. However, bookshops--especially ``alternative
bookstores'' at university campuses and cultural centers--openly sell
many new and newly reprinted titles. The Government banned no
additional books during the year.
The new law on crimes against the State (see Section 1.d.)
prohibits persons from disseminating or developing the teachings of
communism or from seeking to eliminate or replace the state ideology of
Pancasila in a way that causes harm to persons or property.
While the law provides for academic freedom, there are constraints
on the activities of scholars. A Japanese scholar, Yoshihara Kunio, was
denied entry to the country in March because he was on an immigration
blacklist. Nevertheless, political activity and open discussions at
universities increased significantly during the year.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government places
significant controls on the exercise of this right. The Government
promulgated regulations in 1995 that eliminated the permit requirements
for some types of public meetings. A requirement to notify the police
remained for most others, and in practice numerous public meetings
continued to be prevented or broken up, sometimes with lethal force
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
The 1998 law on freedom of expression requires that demonstrators
notify the police 3 days in advance and appoint someone accountable for
every 100 demonstrators. The law restricts demonstrations near specific
sites. Nevertheless, frequent demonstrations are held in Jakarta and
around the country. However, in some cases authorities invoked the law
to detain and try demonstrators. Several groups of students who
conducted peaceful demonstrations in Jakarta were convicted of
violating the law and were required to pay small fines. Participants in
several demonstrations in Jakarta and other cities were killed and
suffered injuries when security forces seeking to disperse crowds beat
and kicked demonstrators (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). During the
campaign period in East Timor preceding the August 30 consultation
vote, intimidation by the security forces and prointegration militias
largely prevented independence supporters from holding public
assemblies or openly campaigning. Military forces sometimes resorted to
force in order to disrupt peaceful demonstrations. In February in Aceh
military troops opened fire on a crowd of several thousand persons
after issuing an order for them to disperse (see Section 1.a.). On
March 26, in Banda, Aceh, security forces used tear gas, batons, and
possibly rubber bullets to disperse thousands of student demonstrators
(see Section 1.c.). On April 20, a standoff with police led to an
exchange of gunfire in which at least one police officer was killed and
a student and a soldier were wounded. Police also broke up several
peaceful demonstrations in Irian Jaya. For example, on December 2,
police violently disrupted a proindependencedemonstration in Timika,
injuring numerous persons. One person died later the same day as a
result of injuries sustained in the melee caused by the police action.
The police action ended a 3-week long vigil over a Papuan independence
flag on a Catholic church compound (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
Government places significant controls on the exercise of this right.
The 1985 Social Organizations Law (ORMAS) requires the adherence of all
organizations, including recognized religions and associations, to the
official ideology of Pancasila. This provision, which limits political
activity, is widely understood to be designed to inhibit the activities
of groups seeking to engage in democratic political competition, make
Indonesia an Islamic state, revive communism, or return the country to
a situation of partisan ideological division. It empowers the
Government to disband any organization that it believes to be acting
against Pancasila and requires prior government approval for any
organization's acceptance of funds from foreign donors.
The Government announced late in 1995 its intention to relax a
regulation requiring police approval for all meetings of five or more
persons of all organizations outside offices or normal work sites.
However, in practice this regulation continues to apply to union
meetings (see Section 6.a.).
The April law on crimes against the state (see Sections 1.d. and
2.a.) prohibits the formation of organizations that ``are known to or
properly suspected'' of embracing the teachings of communism/Marxism/
Leninism ``in all its forms and manifestations.''
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
freedom for members of five out of six officially recognized religions
and belief in one supreme god, and the Government generally respects
these provisions; however, there are some restrictions on certain types
of religious activity, including unrecognized religions.
Although the population is over 85 percent Muslim, the practice and
teachings of five out of six officially recognized religions generally
are respected, and the Government actively promotes mutual tolerance
and harmony among them. The law states that the Government ``embraces''
Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and
Confucianism. However, subsequently issued regulations have restricted
severely the practice of Confucianism. While the law only formally
``embraces'' these religions, it explicitly states that other
religions, including Judaism, Zoroastarianism, Shinto, and Taoism are
not forbidden. The Government permits the practice of the mystical,
traditional beliefs of ``Aliran Kepercayaan.''
A 1976 decision by the Attorney General reinforced by a separate
decision by the same office in 1978, banned Jehovah's Witnesses from
practicing their faith. Although government hostility toward Jehovah's
Witnesses has subsided, open practice of the faith remains banned, and
members report that they continue to experience difficulty registering
marriages, enrolling children in school, and in other civil matters.
Members of the Bahai faith have not reported problems recently. The
Government in some provinces has banned the messianic Islamic sect
Darul Arqam. The Government closely monitors Islamic groups considered
to be deviating from orthodox tenets, and in the past has dissolved
some groups. Historically, the Government has tried to control
``heterodox'' Muslim groups, due to pressure by nongovernmental leaders
of ``mainstream'' or ``orthodox'' Muslim groups as well as the
Government's concern for national unity. In addition ``mainstream''
Christian leaders have influenced government policy to be biased
against ``fundamentalist'' Christians. Non-Trinitarians (Jehovah's
Witnesses) have faced government bans that they claim were instigated
by Trinitarian Christians.
The legal requirement to adhere to Pancasila extends to all
religious and secular organizations. Because the first tenet of
Pancasila is belief in one Supreme God, atheism is forbidden. Although
individuals are not compelled to practice any particular faith, all
citizens must be classified as members of one of the officially
recognized religions. As this choice must be noted on official
documents, such as the identification card, failure to identify a
religion can make it impossible to obtain such documents. The
Government strongly opposes Muslim groups that advocate establishing an
Islamic state or acknowledging only Islamic law.
The October selection of Abdurrahman Wahid as President was greeted
with optimism by leaders of various religious communities. Harmony,
tolerance, and mutual respect between different religious communities
have been among Wahid's core principles throughout his public career.
Other high-level officials continued to make public statements and
emphasize by example the importance of respect for religious
diversity.However, some lower level officials continued to show
reluctance to facilitate and protect the rights of religious
minorities.
Houses of worship, including both mosques and Christian churches,
frequently were damaged or destroyed by opposing groups during clashes
in Ambon (see Sections 1.a. and 5). In addition a Muslim crowd burned
two Christian churches in Bandung in March. The perpetrators reportedly
were angry at the local government's decision to allow a new church to
be built in a predominantly Muslim neighborhood. In April Muslim crowds
set fire to a church in Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi after a bomb
exploded at Jakarta's largest mosque, Istiqlal. In December Muslim
crowds burned and ransacked a Christian seminary and a social service
complex in southeast Jakarta, killing one person in the process.
Attacks against minority houses of worship and the lack of an effective
government response to punish perpetrators and prevent further attacks
led to allegations of official complicity in incidents from current as
well as prior years.
During the period following the August consultation vote in East
Timor, security forces and government-backed militia groups killed
numerous Catholic priests and nuns who were engaged in humanitarian
activities; they also destroyed many Catholic places of worship, many
of which were being used to shelter thousands of internally displaced
persons (IDP's) (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 2.d., 3, and 4).
A 1969 regulation dictates that before a house of worship can be
built, agreement must be obtained from local residents living near the
site, and a license must be obtained from the regional office of the
Department of Religion. Some Christians claim that this regulation is
being used to discriminate against them and to prevent them from
building churches. Despite the problems, the building of churches
continues.
The law allows conversion between faiths, and such conversions
occur. Independent observers note that interfaith marriages between
Muslims and non-Muslims have become increasingly difficult. Persons
from religions outside the five accepted religions have difficulty
having their marriages recognized officially.
The Government views proselytizing by recognized religions in areas
heavily dominated by another recognized religion as potentially
disruptive and discourages it. Foreign missionary activities are
relatively unimpeded, although in East Timor, Irian Jaya, and
occasionally elsewhere missionaries have experienced difficulties and
delays in renewing residence permits, and visas allowing the entrance
of new foreign clergy are difficult to obtain. Laws and decrees from
the 1970's limit the number of years that foreign missionaries can
spend in the country, with some extensions granted in remote areas like
Irian Jaya. Foreign missionary work is subject to the funding
stipulations of the ``Mass Organizations'' (ORMAS) law.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law permits the Government to bar
persons from either entering or departing the country, and the
Government continued to restrict freedom of movement to a limited
extent. As of March, according to Department of Justice information
quoted in the press, the Government maintained a list of 3,665
foreigners who are barred from entering the country, while 417 citizens
are prohibited from leaving the country. In August it was reported in
the press that, at the request of the armed forces commander, five
prominent persons from Irian Jaya had been barred from leaving the
country (see Section 5). The Government never officially confirmed the
ban or notified the individuals concerned.
The Government also restricts movement by citizens and foreigners
to and within parts of the country. The new law on overcoming dangerous
situations (see Section 1.f.) also would allow the military to limit
land, air, or sea traffic, to prohibit migration into and out of an
area, to order relocation of persons outside an area, and to order
house arrest in a declared state of emergency. However, this law did
not take effect because President Habibie did not sign it.
The Government requires that individuals obtain permits to seek
work in a new location in certain areas, primarily to control further
population movement to crowded cities. Special permits are required to
visit certain parts of Irian Jaya. In September the police expelled two
foreign human rights monitors from Irian Jaya to Jakarta after the two
traveled to Irian Jaya as part of a preliminary planning visit for an
independent international human rights assessment undertaken in
cooperation with the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission (see
Sections 4 and 5). Although former political prisoners associated with
the abortive 1965 coup are no longer officially required to carry the
stamp ``E.T.'' on their identity cards, in many cases the stamps have
not been eliminated in practice (see Section 1.f.).
Among other restrictions, some former prisoners still are required
to obtain permission if they want to move.
During the period prior to the consultation vote in East Timor,
armed militia groups routinely set up road blocks in some areas, and
closed off parts of Dili and elsewhere. The main road from Dili and
West Timor was not usable during much of this time due to roadblocks by
militia forces. Security forces did little or nothing to prevent the
militias from controlling movement in these areas. In the days
following the consultation vote, armed militia groups were permitted to
control access to the Dili airport and they also checked incoming
passengers. Prointegration militia members reportedly confiscated cars
of proindependence civil servants. At times the Government temporarily
banned travel to East Timor by foreign diplomats.
According to churches and NGO's, over 45,000 persons were displaced
in East Timor during the months prior to the consultation vote--a July
UNAMET estimate placed the number of displaced persons at over 60,000.
The displaced generally were not accommodated in ``camps,'' as such,
but were herded into defined areas, especially in the vicinity of
Liquica and Maubara, which were under the control of prointegration
militias. Reportedly, anyone seeking to leave these camps faced
assaults by military-backed militias, which were permitted to operate
road blocks and checkpoints. In addition, militia groups committed
numerous other abuses against displaced persons (see Section 1.c.).
ICRC representatives and other humanitarian groups, had great
difficulty gaining access to the camps, which faced tremendous food and
medical shortages.
Following the consultation vote in East Timor, there was credible
evidence that, in a planned and orchestrated operation, the security
forces forcibly removed or compelled to flee a substantial percentage
of the 250,000 East Timorese who departed the territory. According to
numerous credible reports the military and prointegration militia
systematically forced the relocation of East Timorese refugees into
West Timor, in part, for revenge; however, it also is alleged that
forced relocations were meant to undermine the legitimacy of the U.N.
referendum (see Section 3). More than 130,000 of the approximately
250,000 refugees returned to East Timor by year's end, but intimidation
by TNI-backed militia forces in the camps in West Timor continued to
prevent many others from returning.
During the summer, tens of thousands of Acehnese temporarily fled
their villages claiming to be terrified of security force patrols/
activity in their area (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). At one point, as
many as 150,000 rural Acehnese were displaced. There were credible
allegations that armed separatists hoping to draw international
attention and sympathy were manipulating IDP movements.
While the law lacks provisions for dealing with refugees/asylees in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the Government cooperates with the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees, which maintains a regional office in
Jakarta. In past years, the Government offered first asylum to over
125,000 Indochinese boat persons. The Galang Island camp was closed in
1996 and by the end of the year the last remaining asylum seekers had
been repatriated or permitted to settle permanently in the country. The
Government has not formulated a policy regarding asylum seekers, but in
practice it has respected the principle of not returning asylum seekers
to the country from which they have fled.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens for the first time successfully changed their government
through an open, transparent democratic process. In January the
Parliament passed new legislation governing the election, political
parties, and the organization of the MPR and DPR. The MPR is
constitutionally the highest authority of the State and is charged with
meeting every 5 years to elect the President and Vice President and to
set the broad guidelines of state policy. It is composed of the elected
Members of Parliament plus appointed representatives of functional and
regional groups. The June 7 election, contested by 48 political parties
(who fielded candidates in every district) and monitored by
international observers, was widely accepted as open, fair, and free.
Members of the new Parliament and People's Consultative Assembly (MPR)
were sworn in on October 1. On October 20-21, the MPR in a secret
ballot procedure that was carried live on television elected
Abdurrahman Wahid as President and Megawati Soekarnoputri as Vice
President.
Under a doctrine known as dual function, the military assumes a
significant sociopolitical as well as a security role. Members of the
military are allotted 38 unelected seats in the DPR, and 10 percent of
the seats in provincial and district parliaments, in partial
compensation for not being permitted to vote. Active duty and retired
military officers (many of whom retain strongties to the military after
retirement) occupy important positions at all levels of government. The
military thus far has resisted strong pressure from student and reform
groups for an immediate end to dual function, instead reaching an
informal understanding with key political figures that it would be
phased out over a period of several years.
The other 92 percent of national and 90 percent of regional
parliamentary seats are filled through elections held every 5 years.
All adult citizens, except active duty members of the armed forces,
persons in prison convicted of crimes punishable by more than 5 years'
incarceration, persons suffering from a mental disorder, and persons
deprived of voting rights by an irrevocable verdict of a Court of
Justice, are eligible to vote.
More than 93 percent of the electorate nationwide voted in the June
parliamentary election, ranging from a low of 70 percent in Aceh to 109
percent in Maluku (the reasons for this figure are still under
investigation). The poor security situation, voter apathy and a desire
among some citizens to boycott the election contributed to the
relatively low voter turnout in Aceh, which was about 50 percent across
Aceh, far below the national average. Turnout was less than 5 percent
in several troubled districts. A halfhearted effort to organize a
boycott appears to have had little impact in East Timor, where more
than 94 percent of the electorate voted. Members of the banned PKI may
not run for office.
International and domestic monitoring groups and the major
political parties accepted the June 7 parliamentary election as
generally free and fair, notwithstanding many technical problems and
irregularities. Parties organized and campaigned without government
interference and candidates were able to express their views freely.
The new political laws were general in nature, granting sweeping
authority in implementing the election to a newly formed General
Election Commission (KPU), whose members included 5 government
representatives and 1 representative from each of the 48 parties that
were qualified to compete in the election. Under considerable public
and political pressure, the KPU went forward with plans to hold the
election on June 7, despite inadequate technical preparations and
remaining ambiguities in the regulations. Numerous technical problems
resulted, particularly in remote districts throughout the country,
including inadequate supplies of ballots and reporting forms, poor
training of poll workers, confusion over procedures, and a lack of
funds to pay poll workers. These problems contributed to a substantial
delay in vote counting.
There were numerous, and in some cases credible, allegations of
vote buying in Sulawesi, mostly directed at the ruling Golkar party,
which opposition parties saw as gaining advantage from longstanding
patronage and civil service networks. There also were scattered
allegations of voter intimidation, particularly in rural areas.
Opposition parties in Sulawesi alleged that Golkar cadres threatened
the physical safety of residents. The Government and others alleged
that supporters of Acehnese separatism actively were discouraging
residents to register. It is believed that this pressure, combined with
a sense of alienation and apathy, was responsible for lower turnouts in
Aceh. Election officials in Aceh postponed polling in most voting
stations in the North Aceh and Pidie districts due to security
concerns. The polls had not yet been held by year's end. The Elections
Supervisory Committee (PANWASLU) had legal authority to investigate
election irregularities, but acknowledged that it lacked the training,
organization, manpower, and funding necessary to address more than a
handful of the most egregious cases. In some cases, alleged violations
were referred to judicial authorities for legal action. In most cases,
political parties reached informal solutions among themselves.
In general monitoring groups and political parties concluded that
irregularities were neither systematic nor sufficiently widespread to
call into question the overall results of the election at the national
level. The atmosphere in polling sites was transparent and even
celebratory. The election campaign itself generally was free of
violence; however, there were a few isolated outbreaks, such as on June
4 in Jakarta, when Golkar cadres were attacked in various areas of the
city. In Aceh a soldier was shot and killed while guarding a polling
station (see Section 1.a.). The military, which in past elections
routinely used threats and intimidation to ensure voter support for
Golkar, honored its pledge to stay neutral. The opposition Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) came in first with 33.7 percent of
the vote (153 DPR seats), followed by Golkar with 22.4 percent (120
seats), the National Awakening Party (PKB) with 12.6 percent (51
seats), the Unity and Development Party (PPP) with 10.7 percent (58
seats), the National Mandate Party (PAN) with 7.1 percent (34 seats),
and the Crescent and Star Party (PBB) with 1.9 percent (13 seats). In
addition 5 parties won between 2 and 7 seats and 10 parties won 1 seat
each. Because of the pattern of voting district distribution, parties
that were stronger in the less populous outer islands (e.g., Golkar and
the PPP) won more seats relative to their strength in percentage terms
than parties stronger inthe populous islands of Java and Bali (e.g.,
the PDI-P and the PKB).
The actions of some KPU members following the election contributed
significantly to the delay in validating election results, providing
scope for additional doubts about the process, and led to a
considerable loss of public faith in the impartiality and integrity of
the KPU. Election laws in February required that a party must win at
least 2 percent of the seats in Parliament to qualify to compete in the
following election (in 2004). Forty-two parties failed to meet this
threshold, 27 of which failed to win even a single seat. As the outcome
of the election became evident, KPU representatives of several of the
parties that failed to win seats launched a series of rearguard actions
designed to force the KPU to give them DPR seats and to waive the 2
percent requirement. Among these actions was a refusal to certify the
election results. On August 3, President Habibie stepped in and
declared the results valid. Government representatives on the KPU
generally showed impartiality and sought to preserve the spirit of
electoral reform. Small party obstructionism and opportunism continued
in subsequent stages of the process, including during DPR seat
allocation, selection of groups eligible to send representatives to the
MPR, and assignment of candidates to seats. At several junctures,
regulations the KPU itself had written either were changed or ignored,
in some cases to suit the interests of blocs of KPU party
representatives. As a result, the election process fell far behind
schedule. In order to meet the political imperative of opening the MPR
as scheduled, authorities decided to convene the MPR on October 1 even
though several provinces had not yet finalized their choices of
regional representatives, who joined the body after it already was in
session.
Such problems added momentum to a building consensus on the need
for constitutional and further electoral reform, for the purpose of,
among other things, limiting presidential powers, eliminating unelected
representatives in the DPR and MPR, providing for direct election of
the President and Vice President, and redefining the membership and
roles of the Government's highest institutions. Amending the 1945
Constitution for the first time, the MPR took steps to limit
presidential powers, including imposing a two-term limit on the
President and Vice President. The MPR created a working group to study
further constitutional amendments to be considered during the 2000 MPR
session.
The Soeharto-era DPR elected in 1997 remained active until it went
out of session on September 24. Although under Soeharto the executive
branch dominated the DPR, it became increasingly independent under
President Habibie. It has been active in scrutinizing government policy
and in exercising oversight of government budgetary expenditures and
program implementation through hearings at which members of the
Cabinet, military commanders, and other high officials were asked to
testify. The DPR made substantive alterations to bills that it
reviewed, including changes that reflected the interests of outside
groups, and in early September, rejected government-proposed
legislation for the first time since the beginning of the Soeharto era.
On January 27, Minister of Information Yunus Yosfiah announced that
East Timor would be offered an opportunity to vote on an autonomy plan,
and that if the East Timorese rejected this offer the Habibie
Government would suggest to the MPR that East Timor formally be
released from the country. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas subsequently
clarified that the Government would not accept any formula that called
for a transition period of several years after which the East Timorese
would render their verdict on autonomy, asserting that such a delay
would lead to civil conflict. Rather, Alatas indicated that the East
Timorese would be offered the option of accepting or rejecting the
offered autonomy immediately. Alatas reiterated Yunus's statement that
were the East Timorese to reject the plan, then they could
``respectfully separate'' from the country--the Government would then
go to the new MPR, the body that approved East Timor's incorporation
into the country in 1976, to make the decision to cut ties with East
Timor. President Habibie stated that he would accept, in full, the
draft East Timor Accords that were concluded in New York in April.
Armed forces commander Wiranto also pledged to ensure security and to
abide by the results of the consultation.
There is wide evidence that the TNI was not neutral; rather, it was
determined to ensure through intimidation and violence that the
autonomy option should prevail. TNI-backed militia groups committed
numerous killings, attacks, rapes, arrests, forced displacements, and
other abuses against proindependence East Timorese throughout the year
(see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 1.d., 2.d., 4, and 5). It is widely
alleged that these attacks were intended to intimidate the population
into voting for autonomy or to prevent persons from voting at all. Many
observers also believed that they were aimed at derailing the
negotiation process in New York (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c.,1.d.,
2.d, and 4). According to UNAMET, the East Timorese were displaced for
the purpose of the ballot and, therefore, essentially were ``political
hostages'' (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.). While the July registration
period for consultation generally was conducted without numerous
serious security problems, there are reports that in some localities
militia members went door-to-door, usually at night, compelling persons
to surrender documents required for registration. Numerous credible
observers witnessed TNI personnel, local officials, and militias
jointly threatening local residents in ``socialization'' gatherings
meant to ensure support of integration. Some NGO's allege that
residents of West Timor were being provided with false East Timor
identity cards so that they could participate in the August
consultation. Intimidation during the vote registration process tended
to be most prevalent in western areas of the province. Police
authorities generally did not arrest any militia members or obstruct
their activities.
In addition to attacks against civilians, TNI-backed militia groups
sought to derail the consultation vote by intimidating and interfering
with the activities of UNAMET. Throughout the vote registration
process, TNI-backed militia groups made it impossible for U.N. staff to
carry out its duties safely in many regions of the province. For
example, on the evening of June 29, prointegration militias attacked
the UNAMET office in Maliana. During a series of attacks from July 3 to
July 4 in Liquica, aid workers sustained serious injuries; UNAMET
personnel were threatened directly with firearms; and armed militia
members threatened the U.N. helicopter deployed to evacuate personnel
(see Section 1.a.). The Liquica attacks occurred while UNAMET was
assisting internally displaced persons--a core aspect of the UNAMET
mandate. The most serious attack occurred only about 100 yards from a
police station. On August 18, several hundred armed prointegration
militia members surrounded the UNAMET command compound in Maliana and
threatened UNAMET personnel inside, with national police forces on the
scene taking no action. (This is the same office that the militia
attacked on June 29.) Police also did not react when the CNRT office in
Dili was hit by gunfire on August 17. In addition TNI-backed militias
greatly harassed and threatened, sometimes with death, NGO employees
who sought to assist with poll monitoring, and who engaged in other
activities aimed at ensuring a free and fair consultation vote (see
Sections 1.c. and 4).
The period immediately preceding the consultation vote was marred
by violence, threats, and intimidation, which led thousands of persons
to flee from their homes. However, voter turnout was high, with many
displaced descending from the hills to cast their ballots, and despite
problems in areas such as Maubisa, Suai, Ainado, and Glenno, it
appeared that the overwhelming majority of East Timorese were able to
vote their conciences.
Some 98 percent of registered voters turned out to cast their
ballots in the August 30 referendum on East Timor's future political
status. The results were as follows: 94,388 East Timorese (21 percent
of registrants) supported the autonomy proposal; and 344,580 (78.5
percent of registrants) opposed it, thus beginning the transition
towards independence. On September 3, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
declared the ballot ``an accurate reflection of the views of the East
Timorese people.'' However, in the hours after the announcement of the
results, incidents of killing, violence, and destruction increased
throughout the province. Security forces allowed armed militia groups
that opposed independence for East Timor free rein to intimidate and
kill (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 2.d., 4, and 5). The military and
prointegration militias allegedly systematically forced the relocation
of East Timorese refugees into West Timor, in part, in order to
undermine the legitimacy of the U.N. referendum. The purpose of the
forced relocation was to make it appear that many East Timorese fled
their homeland because they did not accept the ``rigged'' result (which
could, at least in theory, have caused the MPR to reject the vote).
On October 19, all 11 MPR factions formally approved revocation of
the 1978 MPR decree that annexed East Timor, clearing the way for the
U.N. Transitional Authority in East Timor, which is endowed with, in
full consultation with representatives of East Timor, overall
responsibility for creating a civil administration for the territory of
East Timor; facilitating humanitarian assistance; overseeing the
creation of structures for sustainable governance and the rule of law;
facilitating the process of development of a constitution for an
independent East Timor; conducting elections to such bodies as are
foreseen in a provisional constitution, and seeking to ensure that the
development of any indigenous structures for security conform to the
standards of civilian oversight, democratic accountability, and
international human rights norms and standards. In addition UNTAET is
responsible for maintaining a police and military apparatus.
On January 28, the All-Aceh Student Congress called for a
referendum similar to the one in East Timor. The initiative for a
referendum grew stronger during the year, and later was taken up by
others including the local parliament and, on September 14, by the
Ulema Council of Aceh.
While there are no legal restrictions on the role of women in
politics, they are underrepresented in government. Women constitute
about 8 percent of the new Parliament's membership, roughly the same
percentage as in the previous Parliament. In the Cabinet, 2 of 35
ministers are women.
A vigorous public debate over the position of women in society
emerged during the year following the success of the PDI-P, and the
strong possibility that Megawati Soekarnoputri, a woman, might emerge
as the next President. Some representatives of the Muslim community,
including the leadership of the state-sponsored Union of Ulema (Muslim
Scholars) ruled that a woman could not rule a predominantly Muslim
nation. Ironically Megawati also was criticized by women's groups, who
charged that she failed to act as an advocate for women's issues with
any vigor. Others challenged the basis of the religious argument and
dismissed the debate as politically motivated. The gender/leadership
debate faded later in the year, with Megawati's candidacy still intact.
Megawati was selected as the first female Vice President in October
(see Section 5).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Although still subjected to monitoring by and interference from the
authorities, domestic human rights organizations were extremely active
in pressing the Government to improve its human rights performance.
They pushed for government investigation of human rights abuses,
including the shooting of demonstrators by security forces, acted as
defense counsel in political trials, advocated for the release of
political prisoners, sought to offer assistance to the victims of human
rights abuses, vigorously exposed governmental corruption, and urged
improvements in government policies and legislation.
In East Timor specific threats against human rights monitoring
groups were prevalent during the preconsultation period, but a more
serious hindrance to their work was their inability to access most of
the territory, due to the activities of the military-backed militia
groups. Intimidation of NGO's greatly hindered humanitarian operations
in both East and West Timor. Intimidation, threats, and violence
towards NGO's escalated as the year progressed. Due to militia
intimidation, numerous humanitarian organizations that sought to assist
refugees in West Timor during the post-consultation period were unable
to, particularly around the IDP camps.
Both the Habibie and the Wahid Governments generally considered
outside investigations or foreign-based criticism of alleged human
rights violations to be interference in the country's internal affairs
and believed that the linkage of foreign assistance, or other
sanctions, to human rights observance constituted interference in
internal affairs and was therefore unacceptable.
The ICRC generally was allowed access to identified detainees by
civilian and military officials at the central government level. The
ICRC was able to visit prisoners convicted of involvement in the
violence of 1965-66, convicted Muslim extremists, and East Timorese, as
well as other political prisoners outside of East Timor, Aceh, and
Irian Jaya. In Aceh the ICRC maintained an office in Lhokseumawe and
was allowed to visit prisoners and others detained by security forces.
The ICRC was granted permission to visit Irian Jaya, but did not do so
during the year. In East Timor the ICRC was not able to visit all
detention facilities to which it wanted access, and in some cases its
ability to meet and communicate confidentially with prisoners was
limited. When East Timorese prointegration militia went on a rampage
after the August 30 popular consultation in East Timor, more than 2,000
persons took refugee in the ICRC compound in Dili (see Section 2.d.).
On September 6, militia personnel attacked the compound, shooting,
burning, and ultimately razing its buildings to the ground (see Section
1.a. and 1.c.). ICRC personnel were evacuated, but returned to East
Timor after INTERFET restored order in late September. The ICRC
conducted humanitarian operations in East and West Timor during the
remainder of the year but largely was unable to gain access to refugee
camps in West Timor. It offered humanitarian assistance in Ambon, but
the Government did not accept its offer.
The government-appointed National Human Rights Commission, in its
6th year of operation, continued to be active in examining reported
human rights violations and to show independence. Lacking enforcement
powers, the Commission attempts to work within the system, sending
teams where necessary to inquire into alleged human rights problems. It
employs persuasion,publicity, and moral authority to highlight abuses,
to make recommendations for legal and regulatory changes, and to
encourage corrective action. The Government appointed the Commission's
original chairman, who then appointed the other 24 original Commission
members.
In September the Parliament gave the Commission a statutory basis
and increased its membership to 35 members. Future members are to have
5-year terms and be nominated by the Commission but must be confirmed
by the Parliament and made official by the President. The new law gives
the Commission subpoena powers and provides that disputes settled by
written agreement through the Commission's mediation are enforceable in
the courts. However, the law does not give the Commission the power to
enforce its recommendations or call for action by the Government.
During the year, the Commission conducted a followup investigation
into human rights violations in Irian Jaya in August, and sent a fact-
finding team to Ambon. The Commission issued highly credible public
reports and press statements that carried significant weight in
informing public opinion. In September the Commission formed a
Commission for Investigation of Violations of Human Rights after the
Popular Consultation in East Timor (KPP). The KPP's initial mandate was
to gather facts and evaluate reports of human rights violations after
the August 30 vote in East Timor; however, on October 22, the mandate
was revised to include also abuses occurring from January onward. Its
findings are to form the basis for cases to be tried in the recently
established Human Rights Court (see Section 1.e.). The Commission's
mandate originally ran until December 31, but was extended until
January 31, 2000.
The Habibie Government ignored or moved lethargically in reaction
to some Commission findings. Neither the Habibie nor the Wahid
Government pursued recommendations in the Commission's 1998 report on
violence against ethnic Chinese women during the May 1998 riots. In
1995 the Commission identified six cases of TNI killings, rapes, and
other abuses of indigenous people in Irian Jaya; only one extrajudicial
killing was ever brought to trial, and the Commission requested
followup action in 1997. The Government made no further response to the
Commission's October 1996 report on the July 27, 1996 forcible takeover
of the headquarters of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI).
The Commission's East Timor branch remained ineffective throughout
the year, and, prior to its closure in the wake of the post-
consultation violence, had had little impact with regard to the more
serious human rights problems in East Timor. In July the Commission
opened an office in Aceh. In August the Commission announced that it
would open an office in Irian Jaya.
The KPP sent a number of investigative teams to East and West Timor
and issued an interim report directly linking the Indonesian security
forces to the post-consultation vote violence and destruction in East
Timor. The KPP pledged to cooperate closely with the U.N.'s
International Commission of Inquiry for East Timor.
The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) program
officer assigned to Jakarta continued his work throughout the year.
Representatives of the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
visited the country in February. Also in February, a World Council of
Churches delegation visited the country; some members were able to
travel to Irian Jaya. In September members of an international
assessment team under the auspices of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial
Center for Human Rights visited the country for preliminary planning
for an independent international human rights assessment undertaken in
cooperation with the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission.
However, when two of its members went to Irian Jaya to investigate the
human rights situation in and around the Freeport-MacMoran copper mine
in Timika, they were expelled after 2 days (see Sections 2.d. and 5).
The country voted against formation of an International Commission
of Inquiry on human rights violations in East Timor in the U.N. Human
Rights Commission (UNHRC), arguing that its own Commission for
Investigation of Violations of Human Rights after the popular
consultation in East Timor (KPP) was sufficient. However, it did offer
to cooperate with the International Commission. The Government
initially refused to grant visas to two UNHRC rapporteurs to visit
Jakarta and West Timor in early November, but later invited them to the
country. Following U.N. Economic and Social Council approval of the
ICOI on November 16, an ICOI team visited Jakarta and met with the KPP
and senior government officials. However, the Indonesian Department of
Foreign Affairs refused the ICOI's request to go to West Timor.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution does not forbid explicitly discrimination based on
gender, race, disability, language, or social status. However, it
stipulates equal rights and obligations for all citizens, both native
and naturalized. The 1993 Guidelines of State Policy (legal statutes
adopted by the MPR) explicitly states that women have the same rights,
obligations, and opportunities as men. However, guidelines adopted in
the past 20 years also state that women's participation in the
development process must not conflict with their role in improving
family welfare and the education of the younger generation. Marriage
law dictates that the man is the head of the family. The Constitution
grants citizens the right to practice their individual religion and
beliefs; however, the Government only recognizes six religions and
imposes some restrictions on other religious activity.
In April Indonesia ratified the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
Women.--Violence against women remains poorly documented. However,
the Government has acknowledged the problem of domestic violence in
society, which has been aggravated by social changes brought about by
rapid urbanization. Rape by a husband of a wife is not considered a
crime under the law. Although women's groups are trying to change the
law, they have not made significant progress.
Cultural norms dictate that problems between husband and wife are
private matters, and violence against women in the home rarely is
reported. While police could bring assault charges against a husband
for beating his wife, due to social attitudes they are unlikely to do
so.
Rape is a punishable offense. Men have been arrested and sentenced
for rape and attempted rape although reliable statistics are
unavailable. The maximum prison sentence for rape is 12 years, but
observers say that sentences are usually much shorter. Mob violence
against accused rapists frequently is reported. Women's rights
activists believe that rape is seriously underreported due to the
social stigma attached to the victim.
Some legal experts report that unless a woman goes immediately to
the hospital for an examination that produces physical evidence of
rape, she can not bring charges. A witness also is required in order to
bring charges, and only in rare cases is there a witness, according to
legal experts. Some women reportedly fail to report rape to police
because the police do not take their allegations seriously.
An August conference of forensic experts recommended that standard
procedures be adopted for examining and taking statements from rape
victims, in an effort to improve the successful prosecution of rapists.
Like rape, domestic violence is believed to be seriously
underreported. Women's rights NGO's estimate that only 15 percent of
domestic violence incidents are reported.
In 1998 the Government, in consultation with women's NGO's,
established a National Commission on Violence against Women. During the
year, the Commission reported a ``significant'' increase in violence
against women as a result of the economic crisis. The Government
provides some counseling for abused women, and several private
organizations exist to assist women. Many of these organizations focus
on reuniting the family rather than on providing protection to the
women involved. Many women rely on the extended family system for
assistance in cases of domestic violence. The Commission's mandate is
to improve and coordinate government and NGO efforts to combat violence
against women and to provide assistance to victims.
There are only a few women's crisis centers, including a drop-in
center founded in Jakarta by the government-sponsored National Women's
Organization (KOWANI) in 1996 and a crisis center for women in
Yogyakarta run by an NGO. Women's Partner (Mitra Perempuan), a crisis
center for women, which opened in 1997, runs a 24-hour hot line and a
temporary shelter for abused women. The hotline receives several calls
a day from battered women. The National Commission reports a general
increase in the number of female victims of violence seeking assistance
from crisis centers, attributing the increase both to a growing
awareness of services and to a real increase in the incidence of
violence against women.
In March International Women's Day was marked by rallies protesting
violence against women in front of the Department of Women's Affairs
and in front of the U.N. building in Jakarta. The latter rally ended
when 99 participants were arrested as they protested violence against
women.
The country is a significant source, transit point, and destination
for trafficked women and children for the purpose of forced
prostitution and sometimes for forced labor (see Sections 6.c. and
6.f.). It is widely alleged that TNI-backed militias raped numerous
women in East Timor and kept many as sex slaves (see Sections 1.c.,
2.d., and 6.c.).
Harassment is not a crime under the law, only indecent behavior.
However, sexual harassment charges can damage a civil service career.
The law reportedly covers physical abuse only, and requires two
witnesses. Female job applicants and workers have complained of being
victimized sexually by supervisors.
Female domestic servants also are vulnerable to exploitation and
abuse. In some cases unscrupulous recruitment agencies have promised
women placement as domestic servants overseas and then held them
against their will for extended periods as details were worked out.
Women working abroad as domestic servants often risk various forms of
abuse, exploitation, and other cruel treatment. The Government has
taken some steps to assist its citizens working abroad, but advocates
charge that much more needs to be done.
According to the Constitution, women are equal to and have the same
rights, obligations, and opportunities as men. However, in practice
women face some legal discrimination. Marriage law dictates that the
man is the head of the family. Marriage law for Muslims, based on
Islamic law, allows men to have up to four wives if the husband can
provide equally for each of them. Permission of the first wife is
required, but reportedly most women cannot refuse. Civil servants who
wish to marry a second woman also must have permission from their
supervisors. Cabinet officials and military personnel customarily have
been forbidden to take second wives. In divorce cases, women often bear
a heavier evidentiary burden than men, especially in the Islamic-based
family court system. Divorced women rarely receive alimony, and there
is no enforcement of alimony payment.
The 1958 Citizenship Law states that children's citizenship is
based only on the citizenship of the father. Children of citizen
mothers and foreign fathers are considered foreigners and need visas to
remain in the country until the age of 18, when they can apply for
citizenship. They are prohibited from attending public schools and must
attend private, international schools, which are expensive.
Foreign women married to citizens also face difficulties. Their
children are citizens and thus are not allowed to attend international
schools. These women usually are taxed as a foreign head of household,
but they do not have property, business, or inheritance rights. There
has been much discussion about problems with the citizenship law, and
NGO's and the Government appear to agree that the law needs to be
revised. However, by year's end the Government still had not taken any
action to remedy these problems.
Although some women enjoy a high degree of economic and social
freedom and occupy important positions in both the public and private
sectors, the majority does not enjoy such social and economic freedoms
and are represented disproportionately at the lower end of the
socioeconomic scale. Surveys have shown that while more than one-third
of civil servants are women, less than 6 percent are in positions of
authority.
A vigorous public debate over the position of women in society
emerged during the year due to the strong possibility that Megawati
Soekarnoputri would win the presidency. Megawati was selected as the
first female Vice President in October (see Section 3).
Female workers in manufacturing generally receive lower wages than
men. Many female factory workers are hired as day laborers instead of
as full-time permanent employees, and companies are not required to
provide benefits, such as maternity leave, to day laborers. Women's
rights activists report that there is a growing trend in manufacturing
to hire women to do work in their homes for less than the minimum wage.
Unemployment rates for women are approximately 50 percent higher than
for men. Women often are not given the extra benefits and salary that
are their due when they are the head of household, and in many cases do
not receive employment benefits for their husband and children, such as
medical insurance and income tax deductions. Income disparity between
men and women diminishes significantly with greater educational
achievement.
Despite laws that provide women with a 3-month maternity leave, the
Government has acknowledged that pregnant women often are dismissed or
are replaced while on leave. Some companies require women to sign
statements that they do not intend to become pregnant. Labor laws
mandate 2 days of menstrual leave per month for women, although this
leave is not allowed in all cases. Many groups criticized the 1997
Manpower Law for not addressing sexual harassment and violence against
women in theworkplace and for providing inadequate protection in areas
of employment where women regularly have suffered abuse, such as
overseas employment and household service. The Manpower Law is
currently undergoing extensive revisions.
Women disproportionately suffer from illiteracy, poor health, and
inadequate nutrition. The Government is making efforts to reduce the
high maternal mortality rate, which is 425 per 100,000 live births,
according to official figures, and up to 650, according to estimates
from other sources. In March an international NGO estimated that up to
5.5 million women on the island of Java (with a total population of
about 100 million persons) suffer from chronic undernourishment. The
NGO also estimated that the number of women in Jakarta suffering from
Vitamin A deficiency doubled from 1997 to 1998.
During the year, hundreds of thousands of women and children were
displaced by violent conflicts in East Timor, Maluku province, West
Kalimantan, and Aceh (see Section 2.d.). In addition to those directly
victimized by violence, a substantial number of those displaced
suffered from nutritional deficiencies and other health problems.
Women's advocacy groups remained assertive throughout the year.
Numerous NGO-organized conferences and rallies concerned with women's
issues were held throughout the year, as well as some that were
organized by academic institutions and government ministries. Women's
groups marked Independence Day on August 17 with a rally that stressed
the role of women in nation building and criticized violence against
women, particularly in strife-torn regions such as the provinces of
East Timor, Maluku, Irian Jaya, and Aceh (see Section 1.c.).
Children.--The Government has expressed a commitment to children's
rights and welfare but a lack of resources prevents it from translating
this commitment into practice. The Government allocates only 2.2
percent of GNP to education. Spending on education declined
significantly in real terms during the year, due to economic
contraction. A 1979 law on children's welfare defines the
responsibility of the State and parents to nurture and protect
children. However, implementing regulations have never been promulgated
and the law's provisions on protection of children have yet to go into
effect. The Government has made particular efforts to improve primary
education and maternity services.
Low cost medical care is available, although access and
availability are sometimes sporadic, especially in rural areas.
Moreover, government spending on health care has dropped in real terms
due to the economic crisis. In some cases, women and even children
unable to pay medical bills have been detained by hospitals maintaining
their own ``debtor's prisons.'' There have also been reports of
hospitals refusing treatment to children suffering from malnutrition,
due to a lack of resources.
Research is beginning to document the drastic toll the Asian
economic crisis has taken on children. According to a credible local
NGO, infant mortality rates have nearly doubled as a result of the
crisis, growing from 55 per 1,000 in 1995 to 100 per 1,000 deaths in
1998. (However, during the same period the mortality rate for children
under age 5 slightly decreased.) A survey released during the year
found that overall use of health care facilities by children dropped
significantly after the economic crisis struck in mid-1997.
Throughout the year, the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) continued to
warn of a ``lost generation'' of youth as a result of the economic
crisis. UNICEF estimates that 8 million preschool-age children were
undernourished, threatening the development of brain function.
According to U.N. data, as many as 37 percent of toddlers may be
suffering from some form of malnutrition, up from 9.8 percent in 1995.
Specifically, researchers have begun to document an increase in
children suffering from deficiencies of Vitamin A, iron, and protein. A
local NGO estimated that the deaths of up to 180,000 children were
related to malnutrition.
On an anecdotal level, the media frequently reported on instances
of children dying from malnutrition or those in need of treatment for
the condition. Such reports have been most frequent in Java but also
have come from Sumatra and other regions. In March newspapers quoted a
provincial health official as saying that at least 13,000 infants in
East Java were suffering from malnourishment. Also in March, local
health officials claimed that at least 3,000 children less than 5 years
old were suffering from malnutrition in Jakarta, and over 1,000 in
Purwakarta, West Java. In August the Minister of Social Affairs
reported at least 27,000 infants suffering from malnutrition in
Cirebon, West Java.
A 1994 law raised compulsory education from 6 to 9 years, but the
law has not been implemented fully due to inadequate school facilities
and the lack of family financial resources to support children to stay
in school. Official and unofficial fees forpublic education, including
payments for registration, books, meals, transport, and uniforms have
become prohibitively high for many families. According to a 1999 Rand
Corporation survey, the percentage of 7 to 12 year olds who have
dropped out of school tripled from about 1.0 percent in 1997 to 3.5
percent in 1998. According to ILO statistics, 6 million children
between the ages of 7 and 15 dropped out of school since the economy
plummeted in 1997.
Schooling for children in areas of conflict was disrupted severely
during the year. Hundreds of thousands of Timorese children, and tens
of thousands of children in Maluku and West Kalimantan, fled their
homes to escape violence (see Section 2.d.), interrupting their
education and exposing them to malnutrition, disease, and other
hazards. In Aceh at least 150 schools were targeted for arson, leaving
tens of thousands of children with no school. The military and armed
separatists each blamed the other for the burning campaign. Schooling
for Acehnese youth also was disrupted by the internal displacement of
villagers as a result of ongoing violence. The number of internally
displaced Acehnese peaked at about 150,000 in midsummer (see Section
2.d.).
According to the Department of Manpower, the number of working
children increased from approximately 2 million before the economic
downturn began in 1997 to an estimated 2.5 million at mid-year.
Children's advocates and labor analysts agree that the number of
working children has increased significantly due to the downturn, but
contend that the number of working children was higher than the
Government's current estimate even before the downturn, and has
increased significantly since 1997. According to recent government
statistics, 8 percent of all children between the ages of 10 and 14
work. Half go to school and also work, and half work exclusively.
Unofficial estimates of working children are higher. NGO's estimate
that more than 10 percent of children worked more than 4 hours per day
(see Section 6.d.).
Tens of thousands of street children live in Jakarta. According to
the Department of Social Affairs, 20,000 street children lived in the
city in 1997. NGO's report that the number may have increased by more
than 60 percent as a result of the economic crisis. The number of
street children also grew elsewhere. Medan, Bandung, Surabaya, Ujung
Pandang, and other cities also have substantial populations of street
children. Street children sell newspapers, shine shoes, help to park or
watch cars, and otherwise attempt to earn money. Many street children
work under hazardous conditions as scavengers and garbage pickers and
on fishing platforms and fishing boats. According to credible sources,
there are several thousand children working in hazardous conditions on
fishing platforms off the east coast of North Sumatra (see Section
6.c.). Many thousands work in factories and fields (see Section 6.d.).
Street children and child laborers in some cities have become
organized and interested in protecting their rights. In July
impoverished children from slums around Jakarta, with organizational
help from NGO's, staged a large rally in Jakarta to mark National
Children's Day to publicize their plight and urge the Government and
private sector to do more to invest in their future. Similar rallies
were staged marking the day in other cities.
A number of local and international NGO's work with street
children. NGO's have criticized the Government for making insufficient
and inadequate efforts to help street children and working children.
The Government is working in cooperation with the U.N. Development
Program, UNICEF, the ILO, and with NGO's to create programs for street
children and child laborers. One project incorporates many ideas
generated by the NGO community, including establishing ``open houses''
in targeted areas that provide vocational training and basic education
to street children. Efforts have been initiated to start open houses
for street children in seven provinces.
Another approach to the street children problem utilizes the
National Program for Discipline and Clean Cities Decree. Under this
program, street children are removed physically from cities by bus.
Usually, they are taken outside the city and left there. Sometimes they
are taken to ``holding houses'' where they are first interrogated and
later released. NGO's criticize this practice as ineffective and
inhumane.
Child prostitution and other sexual abuses occur, but firm data are
lacking. While there are laws designed to protect children from
indecent activities, prostitution, and incest, the Government has made
no special enforcement efforts in these areas. Although reliable
nationwide statistics remain elusive, NGO findings indicate a growth
trend in child prostitution and sexual exploitation. Instances of
families in rural areas of Java and Sumatra being forced by economic
circumstances to ``sell'' their daughters to local men continued to be
reported. In June police uncovered a syndicate involved in trafficking
young women, many below 18, to work in brothels on islands inRiau
province, near Singapore (see Section 6.f.). Many of the women were
hired under false pretenses. In July children's advocates warned of an
increase in the number of teenage girls working as prostitutes in
Surabaya, East Java. The increase, experts claimed, was primarily
related to the economic downturn, but also to an increase in demand for
young sex workers.
A separate criminal justice system for juveniles does not exist.
Ordinary courts handle juvenile crime, and juveniles often are
imprisoned with adult offenders. A Juvenile Justice Law was passed by
Parliament in 1996 and was signed by President Soeharto in 1997. It
defines juveniles as children between the ages of 8 and 18 and
establishes a special court system and criminal code for them; however,
it has not yet been implemented.
Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is practiced in some parts of the country. The
method varies depending on ethnic, cultural and religious tradition.
However, the most prevalent practice is a ceremonial one that involves
the pricking, scraping, or touching of the clitoris of a baby or young
girl, often with the purpose of drawing several drops of blood.
Sometimes, a plant root is used symbolically, and the girl is not
touched. A more serious form of FGM involves the removal of the tip of
the clitoris. Although reportedly still practiced in Madura, South
Sulawesi, and other areas, this type of FGM appears to be declining,
and there is disagreement about its prevalence. Since FGM is not
regulated, and religious leaders have taken no formal position, the
method used is often left up to the local traditional practitioner. FGM
usually takes place within the first year after birth, often on the
40th day, though it is done in some areas up to the age of 10. It is
performed either at a hospital or, especially in rural areas, by the
local traditional practitioner. There are no statistics available on
FGM's prevalence.
People with Disabilities.--During the year the U.N. estimated that
5.43 percent of the population (about 10 million persons) in the
country are disabled, while the Department of Social Affairs has
estimated that 3 percent of the population (or 6 million persons) are
disabled. Precise statistics are not available. Families often hide
disabled family members to avoid social stigma or embarrassment. The
disabled face considerable discrimination in employment, although some
factories have made special efforts to hire disabled workers. Several
provinces have established rehabilitation centers for the disabled.
Disabled persons reportedly are taken off the streets by the
authorities and brought to these centers for job training. Many
disabled citizens beg for a living.
NGO's are the primary providers of education for the disabled.
There are 1,084 schools for the disabled; 680 are private, and 404 are
government schools. Of the government schools, 165 are ``integrated,''
serving both regular and special education students. In Jakarta there
are 98 schools for the disabled, 2 of which are government-run, and 96
of which are private. The Government also runs three national schools
for the visually, hearing, and mentally disabled. These schools accept
children from throughout the country.
A disability law was passed in 1997. The law strives to provide
access to education, employment, and assistance for the disabled. It
requires companies that employ over 100 persons to give 1 percent of
their jobs to the disabled. The law mandates accessibility for the
disabled to public facilities. However, virtually no buildings or
public transportation have been designed with such accessibility in
mind.
The Constitution requires that the Government provide care for
orphans and the disabled, but it does not specify how the term ``care''
should be defined, and the provision of education to all mentally and
physically disabled children has never been inferred. Regulations
specify that the Government establish and regulate a national
curriculum for special education by stipulating that the ``community''
should provide special education services to its children.
Indigenous People.--The Government considers the term ``indigenous
people'' to be a misnomer, because it considers all Indonesians except
ethnic Chinese to be indigenous. Nonetheless, it publicly recognizes
the existence of several ``isolated communities,'' and that they have a
right to participate fully in political and social life. The Government
estimates that the number of persons in isolated communities is 1.5
million. This includes, but is not limited to, groups such as the Dayak
population in Kalimantan who live in remote forest areas, indigenous
communities throughout Irian Jaya, and economically disadvantaged
families living as sea nomads on boats near Riau in east Sumatra and
near Ujung Pandangin southern Sulawesi. Critics maintain that the
Government's approach is basically paternalistic and designed more to
integrate indigenous people into society than to protect their
traditional way of life. Human rights monitors criticize the
Government's transmigration program for violating the rights of
indigenous people (see Section 1.f.).
In March representatives of indigenous communities held the first
Indonesian Indigenous People's Congress (KMAN) to share experiences,
criticize abuses, and share strategies. The Congress, sponsored by a
consortium of domestic and international NGO's, drew more than 200
participants. In a declaration at the end of the Congress, delegates
called on the Government to respect indigenous groups' values and
customs.
Following the meeting, the National Human Rights Commission
convened a meeting of key Congress participants and senior government
officials. The new law on human rights also provides for protection of
customary and indigenous rights.
Sixty percent of the population of over 200 million persons lives
in Java, which represents only 7 percent of the country's territory.
The Government-sponsored transmigration program seeks to resettle
persons from densely populated areas to sparsely populated areas
outside Java. The majority of migrants are spontaneous migrants who are
not part of the official program.
Critics of transmigration claim that it often threatens indigenous
cultures and sparks social envy. Some critics claim that it has been
used as a political tool to inject nonindigenous persons into certain
areas to ``Indonesianize'' these areas, in part to preclude
secessionist movements. A senior government official has confirmed
this. In some areas, such as in certain parts of Kalimantan, East
Timor, and Irian Jaya, relations between transmigrants and indigenous
people are hostile. NGO's also report tensions between transmigrated
Javanese and indigenous populations in the Mentawai Islands off the
west coast of Sumatra. Indigenous groups often complain that they
receive less government support and funding than transmigrants, and
transmigrants complain that in some cases they are moved to areas with
inadequate infrastructure to support them and less than desirable land.
Transmigrants also may be settled on land of disputed ownership.
Acute tensions in West Kalimantan between the indigenous Dayak
people and settlers from Madura, an island off the eastern coast of
Java, escalated into violence that left hundreds dead in the spring.
The violence was the culmination of over 30 years of conflict between
the two communities, growing partly out of the Dayaks' perception that
they were being marginalized in their native lands. The Madurese
community in West Kalimantan grew around an earlier core of
transmigrants, although the majority of Madurese in the area are
spontaneous immigrants. Dayak-Madurese violence in the Sambas region
north of Pontianak prompted tens of thousands of Madurese to flee for
their lives. By early summer, more than 30,000 Madurese were encamped
in squalid conditions in Pontianak, with apparently little hope of
returning to their homes in Sambas. Thousands of Madurese displaced
from Sambas remained in limbo at year's end. Thousands more returned to
an uncertain future in Madura.
The Government's emphasis on relatively rapid growth and
development strategies, burgeoning urbanization, and aggressive
government-backed commercial exploitation of natural resources results
in continued tension over land tenure issues. That tension often is
expressed along racial/ethnic lines as developers are frequently ethnic
Chinese Indonesians. Land disputes represent the largest category of
complaints submitted to the National Human Rights Commission and a
significant portion of the cases brought to legal aid foundations and
other legal assistance organizations.
According to a law derived from colonial-era practices, all
subsurface mineral resources belong to the Government. The Basic
Agrarian Law states that land rights cannot be ``in conflict with
national and state interests,'' which provides the Government with a
broad legal basis for land seizures. When disputes cannot be settled
the Government has the authority to define fair compensation for land.
There are numerous instances of the use of intimidation, sometimes by
the military, and often by hired ``thugs,'' to acquire land for
development projects, particularly in areas claimed by indigenous
people.
Such intimidation has been used in Jakarta, other parts of Java,
North Sumatra, Aceh, and other areas. Compensation paid for the land is
often minimal or even nonexistent. According to credible sources in
West Sumatra, large tracts of land in the province have been
confiscated over the past several years by commercial plantation
developers who paid bribes to the local governor. In some cases, NGO's
report, farmers were evicted from the land without compensation to make
way for new palm oil plantations staffed by Javanese transmigrants.
Competition for land and resources remains acute in Sumatra.
NGO's assert that violations of the rights of indigenous people are
frequent in mining and logging areas and that violations stem from the
State's denial of ownership by indigenous people of ancestral land,
erosion of indigenous groups' traditional social structure, and forced
takeover of land. These problems are most prevalent in Irian Jaya and
Kalimantan.
In Central Kalimantan, NGO's report that local residents have
suffered as a result of projects to convert peat land into agricultural
land for rice cultivation. Vast tracts of land have been designated as
transmigration areas. Tens of thousands of indigenous people have been
forced to cease their traditional farming and forest-based livelihoods.
Many become poorly paid laborers on new agricultural projects.
Bonded labor has become a problem for some Dayaks in East
Kalimantan (see Section 6.c.). According to the ILO, on at least one
project, a logging company established a company store in a remote
area, where workers had to purchase necessities at inflated prices.
Since the workers could not afford the prices, they bought the goods
using vouchers representing future wages, thereby, according to the
ILO, ``turning once independent and relatively well-off farmers into
impoverished bonded laborers trapped in an ever-mounting cycle of
debt.''
Where indigenous people clash with private sector development
projects, the developers almost always win. Decisions regarding
development projects, resource-use concessions, and other economic
activities generally are carried out without the participation or
informed consent of the affected communities. Some NGO's that sought to
aid these communities were subjected to verbal attacks, raids, and
other forms of intimidation by government security forces.
Tensions with indigenous people in Irian Jaya continued. Indigenous
Irian Jaya residents complain of racism, religious bias, paternalism,
and condescension as constant impediments to better relations with non-
Irianese people, including members of the Government, the military, and
the non-Irianese business community. A large percentage of the
population of Irian Jaya consists of migrants, who are economically and
politically dominant. Most civil servants in local governments in Irian
Jaya and other isolated areas continue to come primarily from other
parts of Indonesia, rather than from the local indigenous population.
Interethnic tensions flared in Manokwari in late September, when
indigenous residents objected to the arrival of a boat carrying persons
from East Timor and clashed with police at the harbor. The clash caused
a crowd to go on a rampage through the town, during which police shot
and killed one person, wounded three others, and arrested four. An
argument between an indigenous resident in Timika and a shopkeeper from
South Sulawesi led to rioting on September 30 and October 1 in which
five persons died and eight persons were injured.
Government policy toward Irian Jaya varied between dialog and
unilateral measures that evoked opposition from residents of the
province. On February 26, President Habibie met with 100 Irianese
leaders as part of a ``National Dialogue on Irian Jaya'' based on terms
of reference negotiated by Irianese and government representatives. The
Irianese leaders gave the President a statement that the populace of
West Papua (Irian Jaya) wished to separate from the Republic of
Indonesia. President Habibie asked them to reflect further on their
demands. The terms of reference for the national dialog provided for
followup workshops on specific aspects of the dialog, but the workshops
were not held as scheduled. In late July, 34 of the leaders who met
with President Habibie signed a statement of ``reflections'' responding
to the President's request in which they reiterated their desire for
independence. In September the Parliament passed a package of laws that
divided Irian Jaya into three provinces. When governors were sworn in
for the two new provinces, there were very large demonstrations in
Jayapura, Biak, Nabire, and Merauke to protest the division. After
crowds occupied the governor's office and the provincial legislature,
the governor and chairman of the legislature made public statements
saying that they agreed with the public's rejection of the division.
When Abdurrahman Wahid became President in late October, he put Vice
President Megawati Sukarnoputri in charge of resolving issues related
to Irian Jaya along with several other provinces. In late November, the
Government announced that it would postpone division of Irian Jaya and
would engage in dialog with the province on options for special
autonomy. President Wahid went on a 2-day visit, beginning December 31,
to the provincial capital, Jayapura, and to Merauke; during his visit
Wahid announced that the name of the province would be changed to
Papua.
Irianese proindependence demonstrations and protests against
government policies occasionally met with harsh responses from the
security forces, who shot and killed four persons in separate incidents
during the year, and wounded several others (see Sections 1.a. and
1.c.). However, at other times security forces allowed large
demonstrations to proceed peacefully,including demonstrations in
Jayapura in February and August against past human rights violations,
large gatherings in several cities to protest the division of Irian
Jaya into three provinces, and peaceful demonstrations around Irian
Jaya on December 1 in which persons raised Papuan independence flags
(see Section 1.b.). In April the regional police commander from Irian
Jaya issued an order banning activity to publicize (through town
meetings) the results of the meeting between 100 Irianese leaders and
President Habibie. The order also banned the formation of a ``West
Papua National Youth Committee'' or any similar organization, and the
establishment of ``command posts affiliated with separatist
movements.'' In May police briefly detained and fined 74 persons in Fak
Fak for alleged proindependence activity. Police questioned persons in
Merauke (in March) and Kaimana (in September) for alleged
proindependence activity. Police charged five persons in connection
with the raising of an independent Papua flag in Jayapura on July 1. In
August there were press reports that, based on a request from the armed
forces commander, the Government banned travel outside of the country
by five prominent Irianese (Thom Beanal, Reverend Benny Giay, Reverend
Herman Awom, Octovianus Mote, and Willem Mandowen) (see Section 2.d.).
The Government never officially confirmed the ban. In December police
shot and wounded more than 50 demonstrators maintaining a vigil around
an independence flag when they refused an order to disperse. One person
died later the same day as a result of injuries sustained in the melee
caused by the police action.
The Free Papua Organization (OPM) abducted persons in May and July,
killing four persons in May (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.).
In early August, KOMNASHAM sent a team to Irian Jaya to conduct a
followup investigation of the July 1998 killings when security forces
broke up a proindependence demonstration in Biak (see Section 1.a.). On
August 25, the Commission issued a statement calling on the Government
to create an independent commission to investigate human rights abuses
in Irian Jaya, to abandon plans to proceed with the division of Irian
Jaya into three provinces, to cancel the travel ban on five Irianese
leaders, and to involve the Irianese in correcting policies they
consider detrimental.
A large foreign mining concession area near Timika continued to
draw attention and controversy. In February the Government approved the
company's request to increase production of ore to 300,000 tons per
day, and the company announced that it would double the royalties that
it pays on copper and gold produced in excess of 200,000 tons per day.
In mid-September, two members of an international human rights
assessment team came to Jakarta for a preliminary planning mission to
prepare for an assessment of conditions in the area of the mine. They
held meetings with KOMNASHAM and company representatives, then went to
Irian Jaya with the intention of meeting with Indonesian team members
in Jayapura and Timika. Once they arrived in Jayapura they were
questioned by the police and ultimately placed on a plane back to
Jayapura under police escort with a deportation order from the regional
chief of police (see Section 4). After returning to Jakarta, members of
the team met with KOMNASHAM and company management to resolve
misunderstandings and prevent recurrence of the problems that occurred
in Jayapura. It was agreed that national members of the assessment team
would continue preparations for a subsequent visit by the entire
assessment team.
Religious Minorities.--During the year, there were instances of
attacks on churches, temples, and other religious facilities, ranging
in nature from minor vandalism to arson. There also were instances of
preaching and publications against Christians, which led to concerns
that societal support for religious tolerance was under pressure.
Christian groups recorded 116 instances of attacks in which churches
and other Christian facilities were closed, damaged, or burned during
the year. The attacks ranged in severity from broken windowpanes to
total destruction. The Government did not resolve fully many cases of
attacks on religious facilities and churches that occurred during riots
and, in other cases, did not investigate such incidents at all (see
Section 2.c.).
Attacks on churches clearly reflect religious tensions, but other
contributing factors are underlying socioeconomic and political
tensions between poor Muslims and relatively more affluent ethnic
Chinese Christians.
Some of the worst interreligious violence erupted in Maluku
province in January and continued well into the year, spreading to
neighboring islands (notably the Kai island chain). The fighting had
both religious and ethnic overtones but principally involved Muslims--
both Muslims from the neighboring island of Sulawesi and Ambonese
Muslims on one side--and Christians, mostly Protestants, on the other.
More than 300 persons died and tens of thousands were displaced by the
fighting in theearly part of the year (see Section 2.d.). Clashes began
in the provincial capital of Ambon in January, then spread to other
islands in the Maluku province. According to some Ambonese, the
traditionally good relations between Christians and Muslims were
strained due to the arrival of less integrated Muslim newcomers from
other parts of the country, who threatened to upset the ethnic balance
of the province. Economic competition between the two communities also
appeared to play a role in the violence. Extensive damage resulted in
Ambon, where houses, shops, and places of worship were burned and
violent mobs fought, some armed with spears or machetes.
Throughout the year, citizens were attacked, and in hundreds of
cases killed, because of their religious identity in Ambon, Tual, and
other parts of Maluku province in the eastern part of the country.
According to Christian groups, at least 79 churches were attacked in
Maluku during the year. Dozens of mosques also were targeted. As in
other instances of interreligious violence, economic tensions between
native Christians and Muslims who migrated to Maluku in recent decades
were a significant factor. Christian and Muslim communities in Maluku
blamed each other for initiating and perpetuating the violence.
Exhaustive mediation efforts, including an initiative launched by the
military in April, failed to secure a durable peace. Moreover,
predominantly Muslim units dispatched from Sulawesi were accused of
siding with Muslim vigilantes and using excessive force against
Christians. Muslims on Ambon charged that the predominantly Christian
police force also was acting with bias.
Muslims are a religious minority in the easternmost province of
Irian Jaya. Christian-Muslim tensions in Irian Jaya remain acute. Local
sentiment against the efforts of Muslim missionaries to win converts in
the predominantly Christian province, as well as resentment of the
arrival in the province of mainly Muslim migrants from other parts of
the country, has in the past led to attacks on mosques in Irian Jaya.
However, there were no reports of attacks on mosques in Irian Jaya
during the year.
On April 19, a small bomb exploded in the Mesjid Istiqlal, the
country's largest mosque, injuring six persons. An arson attack against
a Catholic community center in Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi early on
April 20 reportedly was intended as retaliation for the mosque bombing.
Beginning in January, a series of killings occurred in Ciamis, West
Java. While some of the victims were alleged to practice traditional
magic, there does not appear to have been a clear connection to that
religious tradition as was the case in East Java, where such ``black
magic'' figures were hunted down and killed. In Banyuwangi, East Java,
killings of religious mystics by unknown elements, which began in mid-
1998, subsequently expanded to include Islamic figures and spread to
neighboring districts. Scores of murders occurred. The motives and
identities of those behind the killings remain obscure. Associates of
the victims criticized the lack of police or military response and said
that the attacks were politically motivated.
During the early part of the year in West Kalimantan, fighting
broke out between the indigenous population--Dayaks (mostly Christian
or animist) and Malayu (mostly Muslim)--who clashed with Madurese
migrants (Muslims). Again, ethnic differences and tensions between
indigenous people and newcomers appeared to be the source of the
conflict, rather than religious differences.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government officially
promotes racial and ethnic tolerance. Ethnic Chinese, at approximately
3 percent of the population--by far the largest nonindigenous minority
group--historically have played a major role in the economy. In 1998
anti-Chinese sentiment led to serious and widespread attacks on
Chinese-owned businesses. During the year, the Government failed to
followup on the recommendations of an officially sanctioned factfinding
team commissioned to investigate the civil unrest that struck Jakarta
and other cities in May 1998 (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 4). The
team's report, issued in November 1998, found evidence that some
elements of the military may have been involved in provoking the
violence, which included attacks against Sino-Indonesian women, and
urged further investigation of the matter. At least 85 instances of
violence against women, including 66 rapes during the 1998 riots were
verified. The majority of the victims were ethnic Chinese.
Racially motivated attacks against ethnic Chinese citizens dropped
sharply during the year, although Sino-Indonesians continued to report
instances of discrimination.
Since 1959 noncitizen ethnic Chinese have been denied the right to
run businesses in rural areas. Regulations prohibit the operation of
Chinese schools, formation of exclusively Chinesecultural groups or
trade associations, and public display of Chinese characters, although
Chinese characters are seen on some products. The Government permits
the publication of a government-owned, Chinese-language daily
newspaper, but otherwise legislation bans the import, sale or
distribution of Chinese-language material (see Sections 1.f. and 2.a.).
However, Chinese-language materials have begun to appear with greater
frequency in Chinese neighborhoods in Jakarta and other cities. Since
1994 the Government has allowed Chinese-language instruction for
employees in the tourism industry, and has allowed distribution of
locally printed Chinese-language tourist brochures, programs, and
similar material to Chinese speaking tourists.
Private instruction in Chinese generally is prohibited but takes
place to a limited extent. The University of Indonesia offers Chinese-
language courses. State universities have informal quotas that limit
the number of ethnic Chinese students. The law forbids the celebration
of the Chinese New Year in temples or public places, but enforcement is
limited. Chinese New Year decorations were displayed prominently and
sold in public shopping areas in at least a few cities. Senior
officials previously had shown reluctance to relax the ban on Chinese-
language publications, citing concerns that such an action could
promote interracial tensions.
Indigenous residents of Irian Jaya and various human rights groups
charge that the Irianese are underrepresented in the civil service in
that province. The Government has made some efforts to recruit more
civil servants in Irian Jaya, and there has been some increase in the
number of civil servant trainees for this province, despite a ``no
growth'' policy for the civil service as a whole.
During the pre-consultation period in East Timor, some
prointegration militia groups asserted that persons of mixed Timorese-
Portuguese blood (which include prominent proindependence leaders like
Mario Carrascalao), should be expelled from East Timor (see Sections
1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 1.d., 2.d., and 3).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Private sector workers are by law
free to form worker organizations without prior authorization, and
unions may draw up their own constitutions and rules and elect their
representatives. In June 1998, the Government issued a new regulation
on the registration of workers' organizations. The 1998 regulation
eliminated numerical and other requirements that previously were a
barrier to union registration. It provided for registration of unions
at the factory, district, provincial, and national level and allowed
unions to form federations and confederations. The regulation
prohibited unions based on political orientation, religion, gender, or
ethnic groups. The Department of Manpower issued a new registration
regulation in September that eliminates this prohibition but requires
that unions be open to all persons without reference to political
orientation, religion, ethnicity, or gender. Under these registration
regulation, at least 20 new or previously unrecognized unions have
notified the Department of Manpower of their existence since 1998, and
thousands of workplace-level units have registered with the Department
of Manpower, although some unions have complained of difficulty in
registering their workplace units.
The Federation of All-Indonesian Trade Unions (SPSI), which was
formed by the fusion (under the Government's direction) of existing
labor organizations in 1973, is the oldest trade union organization.
The head of the SPSI and many members of the executive council also are
members of the Golkar political organization and its constituent
functional groups. In August 1998, the SPSI leadership split over the
issue of reforming the Federation's structure. Following the split, the
Department of Manpower stated that it would no longer intervene in
organizational disputes within trade unions or provide guidance to any
unions.
Under the Law on Manpower Affairs enacted in October 1997, workers
may form unions on the basis of ``democratic consultation'' with other
workers in the same company and may join with other unions to form
sectoral and intersectoral federations. The law was scheduled to take
effect on October 1, but in October 1998 Parliament amended it to
postpone implementation until October 1, 2000 to allow time for
revision, consultation with concerned groups, and preparation of
implementing regulations.
Although, as with other mass organizations, the Government may
dissolve a union if it believes that the union is acting against
Pancasila, it has never done so and there are no laws or regulations
specifying procedures for union dissolution.
The Minister of Home Affairs announced during the early part of the
year that civil servants no longer would be required to belong to
KORPRI, a nonunion association. Employees of several government
departments announced that they would form their own employee
associations, and union organizations began to seek members among civil
servants. Unions also are seeking to organize state-owned enterprise
(SOE) employees, defined to include those working in enterprises in
which the State has a 5-percent holding or greater, although they have
encountered some resistance from enterprise management and the legal
basis for registering unions in SOE's remains unclear. Teachers must
belong to the Teachers' Association (PGRI). While technically
classified as a union, the PGRI continues to function more as a welfare
organization and does not appear to have engaged in trade union
activities such as collective bargaining. Mandatory PGRI contributions
are deducted automatically from teachers' salaries.
The Government announced late in 1995 its intention to relax a
regulation requiring police approval for all meetings of five or more
persons of all organizations outside offices or normal work sites.
However, in practice this regulation continues to apply to union
meetings. Permission routinely was given to the faction of the SPSI
that retains strong links to the Golkar party leadership, but other
labor organizations claim that local civilian and security officials on
a number of occasions have discouraged or denied permission to their
gatherings.
In 1994 the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions lodged
a formal complaint against the country with the ILO, accusing the
Government of denying workers the right to set up unions of their own
choosing, harassing independent workers' organizations, and of taking
other actions contrary to ILO standards on freedom of association and
the right to collective bargaining. In June the ILO Committee on
Freedom of Association noted that a series of measures taken by the
authorities over the past year had constitute ``significant progress''
with regard to freedom of association.
While Pancasila principles call for labor-management differences to
be settled by consensus, all organized workers except civil servants
have the legal right to strike. State enterprise employees and teachers
rarely exercise this right, but private sector strikes are frequent.
Before a strike legally can occur in the private sector, the law
requires intensive mediation by the Department of Manpower and prior
notice of the intent to strike. However, no approval is required. In
practice, dispute settlement procedures rarely are followed, and formal
notice of the intent to strike rarely is given because Department of
Manpower procedures are slow and have little credibility with workers.
Therefore, sudden strikes tend to result from longstanding grievances,
attempts by employers to prevent the formation of union branches, or
denial of legally mandated benefits or rights. The Government has
stated that it would address strike procedures and industrial dispute
resolution in revising the 1997 Law on Manpower Affairs and in new
legislation on dispute resolution.
On January 5, as part of a rash of strikes and demonstrations in
Surabaya against soaring inflation, approximately 4,000 utility workers
blocked a major artery for 4.5 hours before dispersing. The largest
strike involved an estimated 25,000 workers during a 2-week strike in
February at a Surabaya manufacturing company over allowances for food,
transportation, and attendance. According to press reports, security
forces used tear gas, water canon, and rubber bullets after strikers
threw stones at factory offices and nearby buildings. The strike was
settled after company management agreed to an increase in allowances.
In March security forces fired rubber bullets at striking workers at a
plywood factory in Central Java after workers threw stones at company
buildings, according to press reports. Eight workers were hospitalized
with gunshot wounds. On May 25, an estimated 2,000 striking workers
from a factory in the Tangerang industrial suburb of Jakarta blocked
the main toll road west of Jakarta for several hours. The workers
sought to dramatize their demands for an increase in pay and allowances
and an end to sexual harassment of female workers. In July up to 9,000
contract employees at a Caltex oil well complex in Sumatra went on
strike over having been kept on permanent contract status. Police broke
up their strike by shooting rubber bullets. Strikers stoned company
offices and damaged structures. The strike was settled in August. A
similar strike at an oil facility in East Kalimantan in October was
resolved peacefully.
For the first time in 3 years, the approach of the December Idul
Fitri holiday, when required annual bonuses are paid (or sometimes not
paid) caused a wave of strikes in the Jakarta area. Company and union
representatives attribute the return of this ``strike season'' to the
proliferation of unions, more confrontational and coordinated tactics
by worker representatives, and a slightly improved economic climate
that affords workers in some industries a measure of job security. A
further complicating factor is the lack of clear rules forhandling
jurisdictional disputes among unions. Some of the strikes turned
violent, resulting in property damage.
According to Human Rights Watch, on February 8 police arrested
Endang Suparmono in Palembang, South Sumatra. Endang helped organize
shrimp farmers from the village of Bumi Pratama Mandira in Ogan
Komering Ilir, South Sumatra.
Dita Indah Sari, head of the center for the struggle of Indonesian
Workers (PPBI), Labor Wing of the People's Democratic Party (PRD), was
released from the Tangerang Women's Prison in July. Dita initially was
jailed in June 1996. In 1997 Dita was charged with subversion and given
a 5-year sentence. The anti-Subversion law under which she was
convicted was repealed in April (see Section 1.e.).
The SPSI maintains international contacts but its only
international trade union affiliation as a federation is with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Trade Union Council. Some of the
SPSI's federated sectoral unions are members of international trade
secretariats. The independent Indonesian Prosperity Trade Union (SBSI)
is affiliated with the World Confederation of Labor and some
international trade union secretariats.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining is provided for by law, and the Department of Manpower
promotes it within the context of the national ideology, Pancasila.
Until 1994 only recognized trade unions--the SPSI and its components--
could engage legally in collective bargaining. By issuing new
regulations on union registration in 1998 and September, the Government
made it possible for new workers' organizations that register with the
Government to conclude legally binding agreements with employers. Under
the union registration regulation signed in September, if there is more
than one union represented in a company, a union or coalition of unions
must have the support of a majority of workers in order to bargain or
negotiate on their behalf.
In companies without unions, the Government discourages workers
from utilizing nongovernment outside assistance, e.g., during
consultations with employers over company regulations. Instead, the
Department of Manpower prefers that workers seek its assistance and
believes that its role is to protect workers. However, there are
credible reports that for many companies, consultations are perfunctory
at best and usually only occur with management-selected workers; there
also are credible reports to the contrary from foreign companies.
According to government statistics, approximately 80 percent of the
factory-level SPSI units have collective bargaining agreements. The
degree to which these agreements are negotiated freely between unions
and management without government interference varies. By regulation
negotiations must be concluded within 30 days or be submitted to the
Department of Manpower for mediation and conciliation or arbitration.
Most negotiations are concluded within the 30-day period. Agreements
are for 2 years and can be extended for 1 year.
According to NGO's involved in labor issues, in current practice
the provisions of collective bargaining agreements rarely go beyond the
legal minimum standards established by the Government, and the
agreements often merely are presented to worker representatives for
signing rather than being negotiated. Although government regulations
prohibit employers from discriminating against or harassing employees
because of union membership, there are credible reports from union
officials of employer retribution against union organizers, including
firing, which is not prevented effectively or remedied in practice.
Some employers reportedly have warned their employees against contact
with union organizers. The SBSI documented 30 cases during the year in
which companies violated their workers' right to organize by
intimidating, punishing, or firing SBSI members because of their
affiliation with the union or because they sought to organize SBSI
units within their factories--a problem other labor organizations and
activists have encountered in trying to form unions.
Regional and national labor dispute resolution committees
adjudicate charges of antiunion discrimination, and their decisions can
be appealed to the State Administrative Court. In September 1997, the
State Administrative Court reversed a National Labor Dispute Resolution
Board ruling that ordered the Hong Kong Bank to reinstate 166 union
members who went on strike, despite government regulations making it
illegal to fire workers solely for striking or other union activity.
Decisions such as this lead many union members to believe that the
dispute resolution committees generally side with employers. As a
result, workers frequently present their grievances directly to the
National Human Rights Commission, Parliament, and NGO's. Administrative
decisions in favor of dismissed workers tend to be monetary awards;
workers rarely are reinstated. The law requires that employers obtain
the approval of the Labor DisputeResolution Committee before firing
workers, but the law often is ignored in practice.
Commenting on antiunion discrimination and restrictions on the
right to organize and bargain collectively, the ILO's Committee of
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations in June
1998 expressed the hope that the Government would take the necessary
measures in the very near future to bring its legislation, including
the 1997 Manpower Law, into conformity with ILO Convention 98 on the
right to organize and bargain collectively.
In 1996 the Minister of Manpower issued a new regulation permitting
unions affiliated with the SPSI to collect union dues directly through
the checkoff system, rather than having the Department of Manpower
collect dues and transfer them to the SPSI. Implementation of this
system remains uneven, but labor observers generally believe that it
has given more power to factory-level union units where the checkoff
system is practiced. Union officials at SPSI headquarters stated that
not all local branches of the unions send a portion of dues collected
to regional and central headquarters as provided in the SPSI's bylaws.
A 1990 decree giving the BAKORSTANAS authority to intervene in
strikes in the interest of political and social stability remains in
effect. The police, as well as the military, continue to be involved in
labor matters, although since the mid-1990's there has been a shift
from open intervention and demonstrations of force by uniformed troops
to less visible measures. On several occasions security forces fired on
striking workers when strikes or workers' demonstrations became unruly
(see Section 6.a.). In March according to NGO sources, police arrested
17 workers and SBSI union representatives for planning a strike at a
tire factory in Tangerang, and beat an SBSI official during
interrogation. At year's end, two SBSI officials were on trial for
``inciting'' workers at the factory. The SBSI documented eight other
cases of police or military interference in labor matters during the
year; three SBSI activists involved in these cases were under police
detention at year's end (see Section 1.e.). In April police in Surabaya
detained three members of the SPSI-Reformasi-affiliated Textile,
Garment, and Footwear Workers Union for more than a week after a series
of strikes at a textile factory. However, the most common form of
military involvement in labor matters, according to union and NGO
representatives, is a longstanding pattern of collusion between police
and military personnel and employers, which usually takes the form of
intimidation of workers by security personnel in civilian dress. The
military also employs baiting tactics: infiltrating workers' ranks and
encouraging protest or worker actions, sometimes attempting to provoke
a violent worker action, to which the military then forcefully
responds. Employer and union representatives also have complained about
the ``invisible costs'' of corruption, which they and others estimate
constitute up to 30 percent of a company's expenses.
Labor law applies in export processing zones (EPZ's) as in the rest
of the country, although nongovernmental observers believe that in
practice enforcement of laws in EPZ's is weaker. There are seven EPZ's
in the country. Batam Island, near Singapore, is the largest.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced labor, including forced and bonded labor by children, and the
Government generally enforces it; however, forced and bonded labor by
children remains a problem, and there also were instances of debt
bondage of adults. There are credible reports that several thousand
children are forced to work on fishing platforms (``jermals'') off the
east coast of North Sumatra in conditions of bonded labor (see Sections
6.d. and 6.f.). Most are recruited from farming communities, and once
they arrive at the work site, miles offshore, they are held as virtual
prisoners and are not permitted to leave for at least 3 months or until
a replacement worker can be found. The children receive average monthly
wages of $17 to $32 (119,000 to 224,000 Rp), well below the regional
minimum wage. They live in isolation on the sea, work 12 to 20 hours
per day in often dangerous conditions, and sleep in the workspace with
no access to sanitary facilities. There are reports of physical,
verbal, and sexual abuse of such children. In November 1997, the
Department of Manpower issued a circular letter having the force of law
that prohibits the hiring of persons under the age of 14 on fishing
platforms. In April the Government ratified ILO Convention 105 on
Forced Labor. The Government stopped issuing permits to build new
jermals, and announced plans to physically remove children from the
jermals and provide them with educational and economic alternatives
(see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). Jermals operate under the paid protection
of national naval vessels; reportedly, the navy has a financial
interest in some jermals. The program yielded modest success by year's
end.
In East Kalimantan a logging company reportedly traps Dayak
laborers in a cycle of debt and turns them into bonded laborers (see
Section 5).
The TNI-supported militias (the Aitarak) in East Timor kept women
as sex slaves in their Dili headquarters (see Sections 1.c., 2.d., 5,
and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Labor law prohibits children under the age of 15 from
working more than 4 hours per day; however, government enforcement of
child labor laws is weak or nonexistent. With one exception, there were
no domestic efforts of significance to strengthen enforcement during
the year. Up to 2.5 million children meet or exceed this daily limit,
especially in the informal sector.
Indonesia signed a memorandum of understanding with the ILO in 1992
to guide collaboration under the ILO's International Program on the
Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC). The Government and the ILO signed
another memorandum of understanding on child labor in March 1997,
committing both parties to ``promote conditions to enable the
Government to protect working children and progressively prohibit,
restrict and regulate child labor with a view to its ultimate
elimination.'' In April the Government ratified ILO Convention 111 on
discrimination, and Convention 138, which established a minimum working
age of 15. Ratification of Convention 138 was a major step forward in
that it formalized the Government's commitment to the principle of
restricting child labor; however, the impact of ratification was not
felt by year's end, as most children continued to work in unregulated
environments. Although the ILO has sponsored training of labor
inspectors on child labor matters under the IPEC program, enforcement
remains lax.
The Government acknowledges that there is a class of children who
must work for socioeconomic reasons, and in 1987 the Minister of
Manpower issued a regulation on ``Protection of Children Forced To
Work.'' This regulation legalized the employment of children under the
age of 14 who must work to contribute to the income of their families.
It required parental consent, prohibits dangerous or difficult work,
limits work to 4 hours daily, and requires employers to report the
number of children working under its provisions. It did not set a
minimum age for children in this category, effectively superseding the
colonial-era government ordinance of 1925 on ``Measures Limiting Child
Labor and Nightwork of Women.'' Both regulations presumably were
superseded by the ratification of ILO Convention 138.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, but
does not enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
The 1997 Manpower Law prohibited employers from hiring children
under the age of 15; however, employers may hire children who are
forced for economic reasons to work. The Manpower Law currently is
undergoing revisions. The 1997 law stated that adolescents (ages 15 to
17) cannot work during certain hours of the night, below ground, in
mines, or in jobs that would have an adverse effect on morality, such
as in entertainment facilities. Employers, especially in the informal
sector have long flouted labor law as it pertains to children. This
practice has increased since the economic crisis struck in 1997.
According to government labor force data, most working children
work in the agricultural sector, although the number of working
children in urban areas has risen significantly with urbanization. A
prominent NGO estimated in 1998 that 1.92 million children worked more
than 4 hours per day. Of this number, 1.67 million worked in rural
areas and 249,000 worked in urban areas. According to the NGO's
estimates, boy workers outnumbered girl workers in the rural areas:
1.01 million boys worked and 662,000 girls worked. By contrast, girls
outnumbered boys in the urban areas: 119,402 boys worked and 130,000
girls worked.
More child laborers work in the informal sector than the formal
sector. Where children work in the formal sector, such work tends to
occur on the border line between the informal and formal economies,
such as alongside their parents in home enterprises and on plantations,
and in family-owned shops and small factories, particularly those that
are satellites of large industries. There are children working in large
factories, although the number is unknown, especially since documents
verifying age are falsified easily. In the informal sector, children
sell newspapers, shine shoes, help to park or watch cars, and otherwise
earn money. Many children work in hazardous conditions as scavengers
and garbage pickers, and on fishing platforms and fishing boats.
In February after years of negative publicity, the Government
launched an initiative to eliminate child labor on fishing platforms
off the coast of North Sumatra (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). In the
past, NGO's had estimated that up to 3,000 children worked on the
isolated platforms, known as ``jermals'' under inhumane and dangerous
conditions. Children working on jermals performed exhausting and
dangerous work for low pay. They are isolated from families and peers,
and may be subject to physical and sexual abuse. As part of the
initiative launched in February, the Government stopped issuing permits
to build new jermals, and announced plans to remove physically children
from the jermals and provide the children with educational and economic
alternatives. Toward year's end, the program had yielded some modest
success. NGO's reported that at least 150 children had been removed
from jermals, but the program lacked funding to provide all of the
children with sustainable alternatives on shore; thousands more still
work on the jermals, and the active kidnaping/recruiting still is
continuing, i.e., the system remains in place and is functioning.
Many domestic workers are female children under the age of 15.
Although accurate figures are unavailable, estimates put the number of
child domestic workers at up to 1.5 million. Observers agree that this
number increased in 1998 as a result of the economic crisis. A survey
done in 1995 revealed that these children work long hours, receive low
pay, generally are unaware of their rights, and often are far from
their families.
A 1994 law raised compulsory education from 6 to 9 years, but the
law has not been implemented fully due to inadequate school facilities
and lack of family financial resources to support children staying in
school. One prominent NGO reported that 8 million children had dropped
out of primary school after the economic crisis began in 1997. Some
employers hire children because they are easier than adults to manage
and tend not to organize or make demands on employers. Children working
in factories usually work the same number of hours as adults. Children
work in the rattan and wood furniture industries, the garment industry,
the footwear industry, food processing, toy making, and small mining
operations, among others.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum
wage. Rather, area wage councils working under the supervision of the
National Wage Council establish minimum wages for regions and basic
needs figures for each province--a monetary amount considered
sufficient to enable a single worker to meet the basic needs of
nutrition, clothing, and shelter. The Government increased the average
minimum wage 70 percent (when adjusted for inflation) between 1992 and
1997. However, the high inflation rate in 1998 depressed sharply the
purchasing power of the minimum wage, and it is not sufficient to meet
the government-determined ``minimum living need'' for a single person,
much less a family. After the latest minimum wage increases in April,
which averaged 16 percent nationwide, the average minimum wage was
equal to 70 percent of the government-determined ``minimum living
need'' for a single person, down from 95 percent in 1997. In Jakarta
the monthly minimum wage is about $33 (231,000 Rp). There are no
reliable statistics on the number of employers paying at least the
minimum wage. Independent observers' estimates range between 30 and 60
percent. Enforcement of minimum wage and other labor regulations
remains inadequate, and sanctions are light, although the new Manpower
Law increased penalties for not paying the minimum wage from about $14
(100,000 Rp) to $28,600 (200,000,000 Rp). According to government
figures, 38 companies applied for relief from the minimum wage
increases on the ground that they would otherwise close. The Department
of Manpower granted 2 of the applications and denied the other 36
requests.
Labor law and ministerial regulations provide workers with a
variety of other benefits, such as social security, and workers in more
modern facilities often receive health benefits, free meals, and
transportation. The law establishes 7- or 8-hour workdays and a 40-hour
workweek, with one 30-minute rest period for each 4 hours of work.
The law also requires 1 day of rest weekly. The daily overtime rate
is 1.5 times the normal hourly rate for the first hour, and 2 times the
hourly rate for additional overtime. Regulations allow employers to
deviate from the normal work hours upon request to the Minister of
Manpower and with the agreement of the employee. Workers in industries
that produce retail goods for export frequently work overtime to
fulfill contract quotas. Observance of laws regulating benefits and
labor standards varies from sector to sector and by region. Employer
violations of legal requirements are fairly common and often result in
strikes and employee protests. The Department of Manpower continues
publicly to urge employers to comply with the law. However, in general,
government enforcement and supervision of labor standards are weak.
Both law and regulations provide for minimum standards of
industrial health and safety. In January 1997, the Governmentannounced
a new occupational safety and health management system under which
companies with more than 100 employees could obtain public recognition
of their compliance with safety and health standards by submitting to a
safety audit procedure. In the largely Western-operated oil sector,
safety and health programs function reasonably well. However, in the
country's 100,000 larger registered companies outside the oil sector,
the quality of occupational health and safety programs varies greatly.
The enforcement of health and safety standards is hampered severely by
the limited number of qualified Department of Manpower inspectors, as
well as by the low level of employee appreciation for sound health and
safety practices. Allegations of corruption on the part of inspectors
are common. Workers are obligated to report hazardous working
conditions. Employers are forbidden by law from retaliating against
those who do, but the law is not enforced effectively. As a result,
workers who remove themselves from hazardous working conditions may
risk loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The country is a source, transit point,
and destination for trafficked women and children for the purpose of
prostitution and sometimes for forced labor.
There are credible reports of trafficking in women and of temporary
``contract marriages'' with foreigners in certain areas, such as
Kalimantan and Sumatra, though the extent of this practice is unclear.
These marriages are not considered legal, and the children born from
them are considered born out of wedlock. Prostitution is widespread.
Official statistics show 75,106 registered prostitutes in 1999, up from
72,000 in 1995. NGO's estimate that there may be as many as 650,000
prostitutes in the country. While an increase in prostitution since the
economic crisis has not been documented thoroughly, the sex trade is
widely believed to have increased sharply as women hurt by the economic
crisis seek means of support for their families.
Prostitution rackets are known to engage in internal trafficking of
women, some of whom may be minors, in different regions of the country.
One tactic commonly employed is to offer young women in rural areas
jobs as ``waitresses'' in distant regions, typically at island resorts.
Only when the new recruits arrive at the site do they learn that they
have been recruited as sex workers. In some instances, women are held
forcibly at the brothels or are prevented from leaving the island. In
other cases, in the absence of travel funds, and facing other economic
pressures, the women find no option other than to accept the work.
Islands in Riau province such as Tandjung Balai, just southwest of
Singapore, have been identified as centers of prostitution, attracting
an international clientele. In June police uncovered a syndicate
involved in trafficking young women, many below age 18, to work in
brothels on islands in Riau province. However, the domestic sex
industry is not limited to Riau province.
Although reliable nationwide statistics are not available, NGO
findings indicate a growth trend in child prostitution and sexual
exploitation. An ILO study on prostitution in Southeast Asia released
in August 1998 estimated that the country's sex industry makes up 0.8
to 2.4 percent of the country's GDP. Instances of families in rural
areas of Java and Sumatra being forced by economic circumstances to
``sell'' their daughters to local men continued to be reported. In July
children's advocates warned of an increase in the number of teenage
girls working as prostitutes in Surabaya, East Java. The increase,
experts claimed, was related primarily to the economic downturn, but
also to an increase in demand for young sex workers. NGO's report that
the brothels in these locations thrive on customers from Singapore and
Malaysia. There were numerous international media reports that over 40
East Timorese children were flown from refugee camps in West Timor and
possibly others for the domestic sex trade. The TNI-supported militias
(the Aitarak) in East Timor kept women as sex slaves in their Dili
headquarters (see Sections 1.c., 2.d., 5, and 6.c.).
NGO's and the media report that women and girls are trafficked to
Malaysia (particularly to Sabah and Borneo), Taiwan, and Japan as sex
workers. In addition some government officials believe that women are
trafficked as prostitutes to Saudi Arabia. However, little is known
about trafficking methods used to transport sex workers overseas, and
there is very little data available on the extent of the phenomenon.
Trafficking in children for forced labor, particularly onto
``jermals'' (fishing platforms) off the coast of North Sumatra, is an
extensive problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
Hundreds of thousands of women are exported abroad to work as
domestic servants. Importing countries include Singapore, Hong Kong,
and the Arabian Gulf states. In numerous cases, these women may be
subjected to a process fitting common definitions of trafficking. Women
recruited as domestic servants for export sometimes are abused and held
against their will by recruitingagencies even before they depart the
country. Late payment and lower than expected salaries are the most
common complaints among women working abroad, but complaints about
extreme working conditions and severe physical and sexual abuse also
are common. The Government, prompted by negative publicity and NGO
efforts, has taken steps to improve practices at home and to step up
consular protection for citizens working abroad; however, many women
remain vulnerable. In contrast to NGO assertions, a consortium of labor
recruiters insists that horror stories are the exception rather than
the rule.
Some government agencies, as well as local and international NGO's,
are involved in combating trafficking in women and children, in its
various forms; however, corrupt government officials, both at the
policy level and at the working level, historically have contributed to
the process. With regard to internal trafficking and the sex trade,
government responses have been sporadic and localized. In a well-
published incident in October 1998, more than 100 young women from West
Java were rescued by authorities after having been recruited under
false pretenses, and forced to work on an island in Riau province, just
south of Singapore. This rescue was initiated by police in West Java,
acting on complaints from the young women's families, and carried out
in cooperation with authorities in Riau. Nonetheless, the sex industry
continues to flourish on Tanjung Balai and other resort islands in Riau
province, relying at least in part on coercive recruitment practices.
There are no reports of recent national law enforcement or policy
initiatives to address the internal sex trade in a comprehensive
manner. Government efforts to combat the problem are sporadic,
relatively small-scale, and of limited effectiveness. NGO's allege that
there still is considerable reluctance to acknowledge, both within the
country at large and within the Government, that prostitution is a
major industry.
Domestic NGO's lead the fight in monitoring and prevention efforts.
At least a dozen NGO's generally are active in combating trafficking in
persons. The Indonesian Women's Association for Justice (APIK)
facilitates public awareness programs in Jakarta to sensitize young
women to the dangers of trafficking. The Indonesian Child Advocacy
Foundation (LAAI) and the City Social Worker Group (KKSP) advocate on
the specific case of child employment on jermal fishing platforms in
North Sumatra. Mitra Perempuan operates a hot line to record and help
abused women. The Indonesian Child Welfare Foundation (YKAI) issues
anecdotal reports on trafficking occurrences.
______
JAPAN
Japan is a parliamentary democracy based on the 1947 Constitution.
Sovereignty is vested in the people, and the Emperor is defined as the
symbol of state. Executive power is exercised by a cabinet, composed of
a prime minister and ministers of state, which is responsible to the
Diet, a two-house parliament. The Diet, elected by universal suffrage
and secret ballot, designates the Prime Minister, who must be a member
of that body. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Liberal Party, and
the Komeito Party formed the current Government in October. The
judiciary is independent.
A well-organized and disciplined police force generally respects
the human rights of the populace and is firmly under the control of the
civil authorities. However, there continued to be credible reports that
police committed some human rights abuses.
The industrialized free market economy is highly efficient and
competitive in world markets and provides residents with a high
standard of living.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there continued to be problems in several areas.
There continued to be some credible reports that police physically and
psychologically abused prisoners and detainees. Officials sometimes are
dismissed for such abuse but seldom are tried, convicted, and
imprisoned. Violence against women and children, child prostitution,
and trafficking in women are problems. Women, the Ainu (Japan's
indigenous people), the Burakumin (a group whose members historically
are treated as outcasts), and alien residents experience varying
degrees of societal discrimination, some of it severe and longstanding.
The Ministry of Justice handles complaints of discrimination by issuing
instructions recommending that such practices be avoided. However, the
Ministry's Human Rights Defense Bureau has a small staff and limited
investigative or enforcement powers. Since the administrative system
for combating human rights violations is weak, many cases end up in
court.
The Justice Ministry's Human Rights Commission continued to work on
a 5-year mandate to develop measures to educate citizens with regard to
human rights violations. The Commission also is tasked with advising
the Education Ministry and the Management and Coordination Agency on
how to educate citizens about the importance of respecting human
rights. In July the Commission submitted a report calling for greater
attention to human rights education, particularly at the municipal
level. The Commission cited a number of ongoing human rights problems,
including sexual harassment, violence in the home, and discrimination
against the elderly, the disabled, minorities, and foreigners. The
panel is to submit recommendations on relief measures by 2002.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
Cases still are pending in district courts against 8 senior members
of the Aum Shinrikyo cult for the killing of 12 persons on the Tokyo
subways in 1995.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution provides for freedom from torture and
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; however, reports
by several Japanese bar associations, human rights groups, and some
prisoners indicate that police sometimes use physical violence,
including kicking and beating, as well as psychological intimidation,
to obtain confessions from suspects in custody or to enforce
discipline. There are also scattered allegations of beatings of
detainees in immigration detention facilities. Despite a 1998 court
ruling that police beat a suspect in custody in Kanagawa, as of
September no disciplinary action has been taken against the policemen
involved in the incident. In July Japan ratified the U.N. Convention
Against Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Punishment.
In Japan confession is regarded as the first step in the
rehabilitative process. Although under the Constitution no criminal
suspect can be compelled to make a self-incriminating confession,
roughly 90 percent of all criminal cases going to trial include
confessions, reflecting the priority the system places on admissions of
guilt. The Government points out that the high percentage of
confessions, like the high conviction rate, is reflective of a higher
standard of evidence needed to bring about indictment in the Japanese
system. Since a system ofarraignment does not exist, a suspect, if
indicted, is brought to trial even if that person has confessed to the
crime. This process results in a higher conviction rate than would
otherwise be the case. There are persistent allegations of coerced
confessions.
Appellate courts have overturned several convictions in recent
years on the grounds that they were obtained as a result of forced
confessions. In addition civil and criminal suits alleging abuse during
interrogation and detention have been brought against some police and
prosecution officials.
Some human rights groups allege that physical restraints, such as
leather handcuffs, have been used as a form of punishment and that some
prisoners have been forced to eat and relieve themselves unassisted
while wearing these restraints. Ministry of Justice officials state
that restraints are used inside the prison only when prisoners have
been violent and pose a threat to themselves and others, or when there
is concern that a prisoner might attempt to escape. In 1998 the Tokyo
District Court ruled that the use of metal and leather handcuffs was
not a violation of the Constitution.
Prison conditions meet most minimum international standards;
however, prisons in most areas of the country are not heated, and
prisoners are given only minimal additional clothing to protect
themselves against cold weather. There have been cases of frostbite
among the prison population. The Ministry of Justice requested funding
in August to install heaters in prison cells nationwide. Many foreign
inmates complain that the quantity of food is insufficient and that
they are constantly hungry. Prisoners may not purchase or be given
supplementary food. The authorities read letters to and from prisoners,
and the letters may be censored, or, with a court order, confiscated.
All visits with convicted offenders, including visits by legal
representatives, are monitored, and prisoners are discouraged strongly
from complaining about conditions. Prison officials claim that the ``no
complaining'' rule is designed to keep family members from worrying
about their loved ones. For the same reason, the Justice Ministry
usually does not inform a condemned inmate's family prior to the
person's execution.
The Japanese Federation of Bar Associations and human rights groups
have criticized the prison system, with its emphasis on strict
discipline and obedience to numerous arbitrary rules. Prison rules
remain confidential. Wardens are provided broad leeway in enforcing
punishments selectively, including ``minorsolitary confinement,'' which
may be imposed for a minimum of 1 and not more than 60 days and in
which the prisoner is made to sit (for foreigners) or kneel (for
Japanese) motionless in the middle of an empty cell. In April a
District Court in Hokkaido dismissed a suit filed by an inmate who was
kept in solitary confinement for over 13 years.
The Government restricts access to prisons and detention facilities
by human rights groups.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Constitutional
provisions for freedom from arbitrary arrest or imprisonment generally
are respected in practice. The law provides for judicial determination
of the legality of detention. Persons may not be detained without
charge, and prosecuting authorities must be prepared to demonstrate
before trial that probable cause exists in order to detain the accused.
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, a suspect may be held in police
custody for up to 72 hours without judicial proceedings. A judge may
extend preindictment custody by up to 20 additional days based on a
prosecutor's application. These extensions are sought and granted
routinely. If an indictment follows, the suspect is transferred to a
criminal detention facility.
During the preindictment phase, under the Criminal Procedure Code,
police and prosecutors have the power to control and may limit access
by legal counsel when deemed necessary for the sake of the
investigation. Counsel may not be present during interrogations at any
time before or after indictment. As a court-appointed attorney is not
approved until after indictment, suspects must rely on their own
resources to hire an attorney before indictment, although local bar
associations may provide detainees with one free counseling session.
Critics charge that access to counsel is limited both in duration and
frequency; the Government denies that this is the case. An attorney is
provided at government expense after indictment if the arrested person
cannot afford one. In 1997 presentencing bail was available in 15.6
percent of cases.
Human rights groups have criticized the continued detention of
Yoshihiro Yasuda, chief legal counsel to Aum Shinrikyo cult leader
Shoko Asahara. The Tokyo District Court denied a March request for
bail. Amnesty International alleges that Yasuda's arrest, on charges of
financial irregularities, called into question the ability of Asahara,
who is facing charges stemming from his cult's 1995 subway gas attack,
to receive a fair trial.
Bar associations and human rights groups have criticized the use of
a ``substitute prison system'' for prisoners awaiting court hearings.
Although the law stipulates that suspects should be held in ``houses of
detention'' between arrest and sentencing, a police detention facility
may be substituted at the order of the court. This provision originally
was added to cover a shortage of normal detention facilities. According
to the most recent Ministry of Justice White Paper on Crime, published
in 1995, normal detention facilities were filled to 53 percent of
capacity in 1994. Critics charge that allowing suspects to be detained
by the same authorities who interrogate them heightens the potential
for abuse and coercion. The Government counters that adequate
safeguards to prevent abuse, including strong judicial oversight, were
built into the system. A 1997 Justice Ministry regulation permits
detention house officials to limit the amount of documentation related
to ongoing court cases retained by prisoners.
The length of time before a suspect is brought to trial depends on
the nature of the crime but rarely exceeds 3 months from the date of
arrest; the average is 1 to 2 months.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent and
free from executive branch interference. The Cabinet appoints judges
for 10-year terms, which can be renewed until judges reach the age of
65. Justices of the Supreme Court can serve until the age of 70 but
face periodic review through popular referendums.
There are several levels of courts, including high courts, district
courts, family courts, and summary courts, with the Supreme Court
serving as the highest judicial authority. Normally a trial begins at
the district court level, and a verdict may be appealed to a higher
court, and ultimately, to the Supreme Court.
The Government respects in practice the constitutional provisions
for the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial tribunal in
all criminal cases. Although most criminal trials are completed within
a reasonable length of time, cases also may take several years to work
their way through the trial and appeals process. For example, more than
4 years after the Aum Shinrikyo cult's sarin gas attack in the Tokyo
subway killed12 persons, the trials of cult leader Shoko Asahara and 7
other cult leaders are still underway. During the year, 13 others were
convicted for their parts in the subway attack. Four were sentenced to
punishments ranging from 3 years' imprisonment to death. In July
Masahiro Tominaga was sentenced to 18 years in jail for the 1994
attempted murder of a lawyer and other crimes. More than 20 years after
court proceedings were first initiated, in March 1998, the Kobe
District Court for the second time acquitted a former teacher accused
of a child's murder. The teacher initially was indicted in 1977. The
prosecution appealed the first not-guilty verdict in 1985, and the
Osaka High Court had ordered a retrial. There were no developments
regarding this case during the year, although the Kobe district public
prosecutor's office again is appealing the verdict. Critics note that
the case has dragged on longer than the 13-year prison sentence the
prosecution originally sought and longer than the 15-year statute of
limitations on murder cases.
There is no trial by jury. The defendant is informed of the charges
upon arrest and assured a public trial by an independent civilian court
with defense counsel and the right of cross-examination. The
Constitution provides defendants with the right not to be compelled to
testify against themselves as well as to free and private access to
counsel. However, the Government contends that the right to consult
with attorneys is not an absolute one and can be restricted if such
restriction is compatible with the spirit of the Constitution. Access
is sometimes abridged in practice. For example the law allows
prosecutors to control access to counsel before indictment, and there
are persistent allegations of coerced confessions (see Section 1.c.).
Defendants are protected from the retroactive application of laws and
have the right of access to incriminating evidence after a formal
indictment has been made. However, the law does not require full
disclosure by prosecutors, and material that the prosecution does not
use in court may be suppressed. Critics claim that legal
representatives of defendants do not always have access to all relevant
material in the police record needed to prepare their defense. A
defendant who is dissatisfied with the decision of a trial court of
first instance may, within the period prescribed by law, appeal to a
higher court.
No guidelines mandate the acceptable quality of communications
between judges, lawyers, and non-Japanese speaking defendants, although
the Supreme Court publishes handbooks explaining the legal procedures
and terms for court interpreters. No standard licensing or
qualification system for certifying court interpreters exists, and a
trial may proceed even if the accused does not understand what is
happening or being said. Human rights groups allege that there is a
chronic shortage of qualified court interpreters, particularly for non-
English speaking defendants in rural areas. Foreign prisoners
frequently claim that police urge them to sign statements in Japanese
that they cannot read and that the police interpreter cannot translate
adequately.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Under the Constitution, each search or seizure must be
made upon a separate warrant issued by a judge. Standards for issuing
such warrants exist to guard against arbitrary searches. An opposition
Diet member filed a complaint in July with the Tokyo Public
Prosecutor's office alleging that police wiretapped his telephone. A
wiretapping law passed by the Diet in August established strict
guidelines for the use of wiretapping and imposed penalties for the
unsanctioned use of wiretaps by police authorities.
In 1997 the Government acknowledged that nearly 16,500 disabled
women were sterilized without their consent between 1949 and 1992. In
its acknowledgment the Government stated that it did not plan to
apologize or pay compensation to these women or to further investigate
the program, despite the demands of the National Federation for the
Mentally Handicapped and several other groups representing women and
the disabled. A Ministry of Health official said that no apology was
planned because the procedure was legal at the time. The Eugenic
Protection Law, revoked only in 1996, allowed doctors to sterilize
persons with mental or physical disabilities or certain hereditary
diseases without their consent, after the approval of committees
appointed by local governments. Women's and disabled persons advocacy
groups still are pressing for a government investigation into all
sterilization cases and for a formal apology and compensation.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioningdemocratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press.
However, recent cases appear to indicate that certain types of
professionals, such as teachers and jurists, are subject to limitations
on their freedom of speech. In August the Education Ministry asserted
that the Government retains the right under the Local Public Service
law to punish teachers who refuse to teach the official meaning of the
lyrics to Japan's national anthem, ``Kimi ga Yo.'' In July an
elementary school music teacher in Tokyo received a reprimand for
refusing to play the anthem at a school graduation ceremony. In
December 1998, the Supreme Court upheld the reprimand of a judge who
took part in a meeting organized by a citizen's group opposed to a
wiretapping bill, citing the Court Law, which bans judges from engaging
in ``aggressive political activity,'' on the grounds that the judge's
presence at the meeting ``created a clear impression there is a judge
opposing the bill.'' According to a Supreme Court official, this was
the first case of a judge being reprimanded for political activity.
Academic freedom is protected, except in the case of school
textbooks. The Education Ministry has the authority to censor or order
revisions to elementary, middle, and high school textbooks. In 1997 the
Supreme Court ruled that state censorship of textbooks did not violate
the constitutional provisions for freedom of expression. In June the
Education Ministry cautioned five textbook publishers to show greater
respect for Japan's flag and anthem in their next editions.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly and association, and the Government
respects these rights in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion and the separation of
state and religion are provided for in the Constitution and are
respected in practice. While Buddhism and Shintoism are the two major
religions, there are many others, including several Christian
denominations. Some temples and shrines continue to receive public
support as national historic or cultural sites. However, this situation
may change in the wake of a 1997 Supreme Court ruling that a
prefectural government may not contribute public money to only one
religious organization, if the donations supported, encouraged, and
promoted a specific religious group. In 1998 the Kochi District Court
ruled that using village government money to repair two Shinto shrines
was tantamount to allocating public funds to a religious group and
therefore unconstitutional.
The Government does not require that religious groups be licensed.
However, to receive official recognition as a religious organization,
which brings tax benefits and other advantages, a group must register
with local or national authorities as a ``religious corporation.'' In
practice almost all religious groups register. Following the 1995 Aum
Shinrikyo terrorist attacks, a 1995 amendment to the Religious
Corporation Law gave government authorities increased oversight of
religious groups and required greater disclosure of financial assets by
religious corporations. The amendment allows authorities to more
effectively monitor the operations of registered religious
corporations. The Ministry of Education's Cultural Affairs Agency
estimates that nearly 5,000 religious groups appear dormant. In 1998 a
district court ordered the dissolution of a registered Shinto religious
group that had been dormant since 1982. This was the first time that a
court had approved a request by the Education Ministry to dissolve a
religious group since the Religious Corporation Law went into effect in
1951.
In 1998 the Nagoya High Court upheld a lower court ruling ordering
the Toyama prefectural government to pay monetary damages to 88
followers of a Buddhist sect for violating their rights by ignoring for
more than 10 years their application for certification as a religious
sect.
The only religion under active government surveillance is the Aum
Shinrikyo cult. Aum Shinrikyo lost its legal status as a religious
organization in 1996 following the indictment of several cult members.
In May 1998, a court sentenced Ikuo Hayashi, a leader of the Aum
Shinrikyo cult, to life imprisonment for the killing of 12 persons in
that incident. In October 1998, a court sentenced to death another
leader of the Aum Shinrikyo cult, Kazuaki Okazaki, for the 1989
killings of four persons, including an antisect lawyer, his wife, and
their 1-year-old son. Cases still are pending in district courts
against eight senior Aum members, including cult leader Shoko Asahara.
During the year, 13 members of the cult were convicted for taking part
in the subway gas attack and other criminal activities and given
sentences ranging from 3 years in jail to death. In response to reports
of increased cult fundraising and recruitment activities, local police
and communities have taken measures against cult members and chapters
including denying residency permits to cultleader Asahara's children.
In December the Diet passed a set of bills that allow the authorities
to crack down on the group and force it to pay compensation to victims
of its past crimes.
Members of the Unification Church and Jehovah's Witnesses have
alleged that police do not act in response to allegations of forced
deprogramming of church members. They also claim that police do not
enforce the laws against kidnaping when the victim is held by family
members, asserting that Unification Church members are subjected to
prolonged arbitrary detention by individuals, who are not charged by
police.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens have the right to travel freely
both within the country and abroad, to change their place of residence,
to emigrate, and to repatriate voluntarily. Citizenship may be
forfeited by naturalization in a foreign country or by failure of
persons born with dual nationality to elect Japanese citizenship at the
required age.
Asylum and refugee policy is in accordance with the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In
recent years, the Government has granted asylum to those claiming fear
of persecution if they return to their homeland in only a small number
of cases. It believes that most persons seeking asylum in the country
do so for economic reasons. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), Japan granted asylum to only 15 persons (4.3 percent
of applicants) in 1998.
The Government has shown flexibility in dealing with visa
extensions for Chinese student dissidents, although it continues to be
reluctant to grant permanent asylum. Burmese asylum applicants have
complained that asylum cases can go on pending for years without a
formal decision.
The Government's 60-day rule requires applicants to appear at an
immigration office within 60 days of arrival or within 60 days of
learning that they are likely to be persecuted in their home country.
Individuals who do not present their applications within the 60-day
time frame due to extenuating circumstances may apply for an exception.
An alien who is recognized as a refugee has access to educational
facilities, public relief and aid, and social welfare benefits. An
alien who is denied refugee status may appeal the decision to the
Ministry of Justice. Rejected applicants also may take their cases to
court if Ministry authorities do not recognize their objections. In an
effort to make procedures clearer to applicants, the Government
distributes an English-language pamphlet to those interested in the
asylum process.
While the Government sometimes grants first asylum, there are no
standard procedures established, and the Justice Ministry and the
Foreign Affairs Ministry jointly decide upon such grants on a case-by-
case basis. In response to a 1998 appeal by the UNHCR, the Justice
Ministry in May reversed an earlier decision to deny asylum to a group
of Burmese prodemocracy activists. In April 1998, a pregnant Chinese
woman accused of illegally entering the country filed for refugee
status on the grounds that she would be forced to undergo an abortion
if she returned to China, in accordance with China's one-child family
policy. In July 1998, the Matsue District Court rejected the
prosecution's request that she be imprisoned for 1 year for illegal
entry. After her release from detention, the women gave birth,
abandoned the child, and went into hiding.
There were no reports that persons were forced to return to a
country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government peacefully and
are able to exercise this right in practice through frequent, free, and
fair elections on the basis of universal suffrage by secret ballot. In
1998 the Diet granted citizens living overseas the right to vote for
candidates in national elections in races based on proportional
representation. In August the Diet extended this privilege to fishermen
and mariners.
A parliamentary democracy, Japan is governed by the political party
or parties able to form a majority in the lower house of its bicameral
Diet. The Liberal Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, and the Komeito
Party formed the current Government in October.
There are no legal impediments to women's participation in
government and politics, but cultural attitudes are not favorable to
their participation, and they are underrepresented in both areas. As of
August, women held 24 seats in the 500-member lower house of the Diet
(4.8 percent), and 43 seats in the upper house(17.1 percent), the
highest number since 1950. There is 1 woman in the 18-member Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of local and international human rights organizations
function freely, without governmental restrictions or impediments,
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.
Government officials generally are cooperative and responsive to their
views, although the Government restricts access to prisons and
detention facilities by human rights groups (see Section 1.c.).
The Justice Ministry's Human Rights Commission continued to work on
a 5-year mandate to develop measures to educate citizens with regard to
human rights violations. The Commission also is tasked with advising
the Education Ministry and Management and Coordination Agency on how to
educate citizens about the importance of respecting human rights. In
July the Commission submitted a report calling for greater attention to
human rights education, particularly at the municipal level. The
Commission cited a number of ongoing human rights problems, including
sexual harassment, violence in the home, and discrimination against the
elderly, the disabled, minorities, and foreigners. The panel is to
submit recommendations on relief measures by 2002.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
creed, sex, social status, or family origin, and, in general, the
Government respects these provisions.
Women.--According to a 1998 report from the Prime Minister's Office
of Gender Equality, there were 1,755 rapes and 4,398 indecent assaults
reported in 1997, down slightly from previous years. However, violence
against women, particularly domestic violence, often may go unreported
due to social and cultural concerns about shaming one's family or
endangering the reputation of one's spouse or offspring. Typically,
victimized women return to the home of their parents rather than file
reports with the authorities. Therefore, National Police Agency
statistics on violence against women undoubtedly understate the scope
of the current situation. According to a survey conducted by the Prime
Minister's Office in 1998, one in three women reported some form of
physical abuse in the home. Frequent complaints by female commuters
that they have been groped or otherwise molested on crowded trains led
the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department to set up special molestation
complaint offices at three Tokyo train stations. Many local governments
are responding positively to a need for confidential assistance by
establishing special women's consultation departments in police and
prefectural offices.
According to the Ministry of Justice, there were 126,982 foreign
women who overstayed their visas in 1998. Trafficking in women is a
problem (see Section 6.f.).
A revision to the 1997 Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Law
intended to address problems of sexual harassment and discrimination
against women went into effect in April. Sexual harassment in the
workplace is widespread, as evidenced by a 1996 report compiled by the
Japanese Trade Union Confederation (RENGO) in which 40 percent of
working women reported that they had experienced some form of sexual
harassment. According to the survey, 2 percent of respondents said that
they were forced to have a sexual relationship. A 1997 survey by the
Ministry of Labor's working group on the implementation of the revised
EEO Law reported that 62 percent of women claimed to been experienced
at least one act of sexual harassment. The revised EEO Law includes
measures to identify companies that fail to prevent sexual harassment,
although it does not include punitive measures to enforce compliance.
The new law's only penalty is that names of companies that practice
sexual discrimination can be publicized. The Ministry of Labor does not
enforce compliance through fines or other punitive penalties. Also in
1997, the Government revised the Labor Standards Law to allow an
arbitration committee to initiate procedures to help ensure the rights
of female workers at the worker's request, without first having to
obtain approval from both management and the worker's union.
Despite public awareness of discrimination against women and sexual
harassment, there is no indication that incidents of discrimination and
sexual harassment are decreasing. Women make up 40 percent of the labor
force, and women between the ages of 15 and 64 have a labor force
participation rate of 51 percent. According to a National Personnel
Authority survey conducted in the winter of 1997, roughly 36 percent of
female civil servants reported being sexually harassed by their direct
superiors, and over 50 percent reported being harassed by supervisors
of othersections. One in six women said that their bosses had pressured
them into a sexual relationship. More than 20 percent of the women
surveyed said that they were unable to work efficiently as a result of
harassment and wanted to move to another office or change jobs.
However, according to a Management and Coordination Agency survey
conducted in 1996, 93 percent of companies surveyed had not taken any
preventive measures against sexual harassment. Seventy-five percent of
the firms stated that they felt no need to take such measures. In March
1998, the National Personnel Authority distributed 60,000 pamphlets to
civil servants in all ministries and agencies in an effort to curb
sexual harassment at government offices. A growing number of government
entities are establishing hot lines and designating ombudsmen to handle
complaints of discrimination and sexual harassment.
In December the governor of Osaka, Isamu Yamada, resigned when
prosecutors filed charges against him for molesting a 21-year-old
campaign worker. The court ordered him to pay the campaign worker
$107,000 (11,235,000 yen), which was the largest award ever in the
country in a sexual harassment suit. Women's groups viewed the result
as a positive step forward in the effort to combat sexual harassment.
The Constitution prohibits sexual discrimination and provides for
individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes in the
family. The Labor Standards Law forbids wage discrimination against
women. Under the revised EEO Law, women may work overtime shifts for
the first time.
Although the law prohibits wage discrimination against women, in
1997 female workers on average earned only 63 percent of average male
earnings. Much of this disparity results from the ``two-track''
personnel administration system found in most larger companies. Under
this system, newly hired employees are put into one of two categories:
Managerial track (those engaged in planning and decisionmaking jobs and
with the potential to become top executives), or clerical track (those
engaged in general office work). According to an April survey by the
Prime Minister's Office, women held 9.3 percent of managerial
positions. A 1998 Labor Ministry survey found that 42.2 percent of
companies with two-track systems stated they considered both men and
women for managerial track positions. According to the National
Personnel Authority, as of 1995 women made up 16 percent of all
national government workers, but held only 4 percent of top (director
level and higher) government posts. According to the Home Ministry,
women constituted 31 percent of all local government workers but held
only 3 percent of top local government positions. In July the Osaka
District Court awarded $273,000 (30 million yen) to a woman for wage
discrimination over a 16-year period. Female workers have suffered
disproportionately from the continued sluggishness of the economy. A
1998 survey by the Ministry of Labor found that the job placement rate
for female college graduates was 90.5 percent, compared with 94.6
percent for men.
In addition to discrimination, the traditional male/female division
of labor at home places disproportionate burdens on working women.
According to a 1997 report from the Prime Minister's Office on Gender
Equality, women perform 90 percent of the housework and child rearing,
while men do 10 percent. The report found that there was little
difference in the time spent on housework by men whose wives had jobs
and those whose wives did not work outside the home.
In 1997 the Government acknowledged that nearly 16,500 disabled
women were sterilized without their consent between 1949 and 1992 but
refused to apologize or pay compensation to those women (see Section
1.f.).
In 1993 the government spokesperson publicly acknowledged and
apologized for the former Imperial Government's involvement in the
army's practice of forcing as many as 200,000 women (including Koreans,
Filipinos, Chinese, Indonesians, Dutch, and Japanese) to provide sex to
soldiers between 1932 and 1945. The Government consistently refused to
pay government compensation to individual victims, arguing that postwar
treaties already settled all war claims.
The ``Asian Women's Fund,'' (AWF) was established in 1995 as a
private, government-sponsored fund to compensate former ``comfort
women.'' The AWF supports three types of projects: Providing direct
compensation payments to individual victims; providing medical and
welfare assistance to individual comfort women; and funding projects to
improve the general status of women and girls. Projects in the first
category are funded by private donations, while the second and third
types of projects are financed by the Government and administered by
the AWF. As of August, the AWF had collected donations totaling
approximately $4.36 million (480 million yen) and given lump-sum
payments of almost $18,200 (2 million yen) each and a letter of apology
signed by the Prime Minister to more than 130 women. These women also
received medical and welfare assistance from the AWF. In 1998 the AWF
reached an agreement with a Dutch affiliate to start compensation
payments to former Dutch comfort women. Governmentofficials estimate
that up to 100 Dutch women were forced to provide sexual services
during World War II.
The Government's refusal to take more than ``moral responsibility''
and to pay direct compensation continues to draw international
criticism. In July nine former comfort women from Taiwan filed a suit
demanding $99,000 (10 million yen) each directly from the Japanese
Government as compensation for being forced to provide services.
Similar suits previously have been filed by women from China, Korea,
and the Philippines. In 1998 the Yamaguchi District Court ordered the
Government to pay $2,542 (300,000 yen) in state compensation to three
Korean former sex slaves for neglecting its constitutional duty to
enact compensation legislation following the Government's 1993
admission. However, the Court denied the plaintiffs' demand for an
official government apology.
This was the first court judgment rendered in favor of foreign war
victims. Five other cases concerning former comfort women are pending
in Tokyo District Court. The plaintiffs are seeking $169,492 (20
million yen) each in damages and an official apology from the
Government. In May 1998, the South Korean Government made a lump-sum
payment of $27,072 (35.6 million won) each to over 130 documented
Korean victims on condition that they not receive redress from the AWF
(although more than 10 of these victims accepted AWF money afterwards).
The South Korean program excluded the seven Korean women who had
already received compensation from the AWF. The AWF project was
suspended in South Korea in July 1998 and remains suspended.
In August 1998, the U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities issued a report that
included a recommendation that the Government provide state
compensation to these women and prosecute those responsible for setting
up and operating ``comfort stations'' during World War II. In March a
committee of the International Labor Organization called on the
Government to take swift measures to compensate former comfort women.
In August a subcommittee of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights issued
a nonbinding resolution calling for governments to pay compensation for
wartime slavery even when subsequent international agreements absolve
bilateral claims. The Foreign Ministry interprets the resolution as
referring only to acts subsequent to the subcommittee's decision.
Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and
welfare, and in general, the rights of children are protected
adequately. Boys and girls have equal access to health care and other
public services. Education is free and compulsory through the lower
secondary level. Education is free and universally available at the
upper secondary level through the age of 18.
In recent years, both the Government and society in general
appeared to take a lenient attitude toward teenage prostitution and
dating for money, which may or may not have involved sexual activities.
However, in May the Diet passed a law, which went into effect in
November, banning sex with children under age 18 as well as the
production, sale, or distribution of child pornography. The law was
passed following heightened public attention to a growing problem of
teenage prostitution and international criticism over Japan's lax laws
on child pornography. According to National Police Agency statistics,
40 percent of the over 3,000 pornographic Internet sites based in Japan
contained images of minors. In 1998 INTERPOL estimated that 80 percent
of Internet sites with child pornography originate in Japan.
In 1998 the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended
that Japanese children be protected from corporal punishment and
bullying at school and from exposure to violence and pornography in the
media and on the Internet.
In August 1998, the Government revised the law regulating ``adult''
entertainment to require operators of pornographic home pages and
suppliers of images to register with local safety commissions and to
ban offering such pages to persons under the age of 18. The revisions
took effect in April.
In July parents of a middle school student alleged that two
teachers severely beat their daughter after falsely accusing her of
committing an infraction off campus. According to a 1998 Management and
Coordination Agency study, one in three elementary and junior high
school students has been bullied, but more than one-third of the
victims did not report the bullying to anyone. Education experts
suggest that pressures at home and school to excel academically may be
contributing to the increase in student violence and long-term (30 days
or more) absenteeism. In 1994 the Ministry of Justice established the
Office of the Ombudsman for Children's Rights to cope with bullying and
other children's issues. In addition to compiling statistics on
bullying andconsulting with various groups concerned with children's
welfare, the Office of the Ombudsman provides counseling services for
children 18 years of age and younger who have been victims of bullying.
In recent years, the problem of severe bullying, or ``ijime,'' has
received greater public attention. At elementary and junior high
schools, bullying most often involves verbal abuse, with physical abuse
occurring more often at the high school level. However, because many
cases go unreported, it is difficult to determine the exact number.
Teachers also increasingly are becoming the targets of student
violence.
Public attention also is focused increasingly on reports of
frequent child abuse in the home. An August survey by a social welfare
organization reported that 40 percent of mothers committed abuse or
acts bordering on abuse against their children. A June report by the
Ministry of Health and Welfare found that from 1992 to 1996, 328
children died of abuse or neglect. A separate report by the Ministry
released in March warned that recent cuts in funding by local
governments to centers handling child abuse cases was exacerbating the
problem, particularly since caseloads at counseling centers nearly
doubled from 1988 to 1996.
Under juvenile law, juvenile suspects are tried in family court and
are not allowed a retrial. Family court proceedings are not open to the
public, a policy that has been criticized by family members of juvenile
crime victims. The number of juveniles arrested or taken into
protective custody in 1998 was up 3.1 percent, according to the
National Police Agency, despite a drop in the overall juvenile
population. Criminal offenses committed by those under age 14, who are
exempt from criminal liability, rose by 4.4 percent. Minors accounted
for nearly half of all crimes committed in 1998. In March the Cabinet
endorsed a proposal to revise the Juvenile Law to allow public
prosecutors, who previously were barred from family court proceedings,
to try serious cases in family court, and to appeal family court
decisions to a higher court.
People with Disabilities.--The law does not mandate accessibility
to buildings for the disabled; however, 1994 legislation on
construction standards for public facilities allows operators of
hospitals, theaters, hotels, and similar enterprises to receive low-
interest loans and tax breaks if they build wide entrances and
elevators to accommodate those with disabilities. There are an
estimated 2.9 million physically disabled and roughly 2 million
mentally disabled persons. Although not generally subject to overt
discrimination in employment, education, or in the provision of other
state services, the disabled face limited access to public
transportation, ``mainstream'' public education, and other facilities.
Under civil law, persons with hearing problems or speech impediments
cannot create valid wills because they cannot ``convey orally'' to a
notary the contents of a will or affirm that the text the notary reads
back to them is correct.
The Deliberation Panel on the Employment of the Handicapped, which
operates within the Ministry of Labor, has mandated since 1976 that
private companies with 300 or more employees hire a fixed minimum
proportion of disabled persons. The penalty for noncompliance is a
fine. A 1998 cabinet directive ordered private companies to raise the
proportion of physically disabled persons in their work force from 1.6
to 1.8 percent and raised the percentage of disabled persons among
civil servants from 2 to 2.1 percent. However, there is evidence that
only half the companies covered by the directive comply with the law.
The ongoing economic recession hit disabled employees particularly
hard, with the number fired from their jobs increasing by 40 percent in
1998 over the previous year.
An amendment to the Law to Promote the Employment of the
Handicapped to include the mentally disabled took effect in 1998. The
amendment also loosened the licensing requirements for community
support centers that promote employment for the disabled, and it
introduced government subsidies for the employment of mentally disabled
persons in part-time jobs. In 1997 a former factory owner in Ibaraki
prefecture who had received generous government subsidies was sentenced
to 3 years' imprisonment for physically abusing mentally disabled
workers at his plant and for withholding portions of their salaries. A
March survey by a disabled citizens support group showed that 44
percent of the staff at homes for mentally disabled persons admitted to
mistreating those under their care.
In 1995 the Headquarters for Promoting the Welfare of Disabled
Persons, set up by the Prime Minister's Office, recommended that
municipalities draw up formal plans for the care of disabled citizens
by the end of March 1997. In 1996 the Ministry of Health and Welfare
also instructed local governments to set numerical targets for the
number of home help providers and care facilities allocated to the
disabled. However, according tonewspaper reports, only one-third of the
nation's municipalities currently have formal care plans for disabled
citizens.
In 1997 the Government acknowledged that nearly 16,500 disabled
women were sterilized without their consent between 1949 and 1992 but
refused to apologize or pay compensation to those women (see Section
1.f.).
Indigenous People.--The Ainu are a people descended from the first
inhabitants of Japan. The Ainu Association of Hokkaido estimates their
total number at 50,000, less than 0.05 percent of the country's 124
million population. Almost all Ainu live on Hokkaido, the northernmost
of the country's four main islands. Their primary occupations are
fishing, small-scale farming, and jobs in the tourism industry. Under
an 1899 law, the Government pursued a policy of forced assimilation,
imposing mandatory Japanese-language education and denying the Ainu
their right to continue traditional practices. The law also left the
Ainu with control of only approximately 0.15 percent of their original
land holdings.
In 1993 two Ainu filed a suit against the Government, challenging
its right to expropriate their land, which the Ainu consider sacred, to
build a dam. In 1997 the Sapporo District Court ruled that the
Government had expropriated the land illegally, but did not order the
Government to return the land to the plaintiffs because the dam already
had been completed. However, the Court ruled that the Ainu were a
minority aboriginal race.
Ainu Diet member Shigeru Kayano was instrumental in the Diet's
passage of the Law To Promote Ainu Culture in 1997. The law officially
recognized the Ainu as an ethnic minority and required all prefectural
governments to develop basic programs for promoting Ainu culture and
traditions. It canceled a series of previous laws that discriminated
against the Ainu, including the 1899 law. With the new law, the
Government for the first time acknowledged the existence of an ethnic
minority in the country. However, the law stopped short of recognizing
the Ainu as the indigenous people of Hokkaido, and also failed to
address whether they deserved special rights as a distinct ethnic
group. The new law did not mandate civil rights protection for the
Ainu. A nonbinding accompanying resolution referred to the Ainu as a
legal Japanese minority. A 1998 report submitted by the U.N. Special
Rapporteur to the 16th U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations
stated that the Ainu had never entered into a consensual juridical
relationship with any state and stated that the lack of such an
agreement deprived them of their rights. Many Ainu criticize the Law to
Promote Ainu Culture for not advancing Ainu political rights and
criticize the Government for not providing funds for noncultural
activities that would improve Ainu living conditions or financial
status.
The Ainu continue to face societal discrimination while engaging in
an uphill struggle against complete assimilation. An Ainu-language
newspaper was established in 1997. In April 1998, a local Hokkaido
radio station began broadcasting a weekly 15-minute Ainu-language
program. In July 1998, the Japan Ainu Association, a nationwide
organization of Ainu, was established to lobby the Government for
economic assistance and greater social welfare benefits for Ainu
throughout the country.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The ethnocentric nature of
Japanese society, reinforced by a high degree of cultural and ethnic
homogeneity and a history of isolation from other cultures, impedes the
integration of minority groups. This primarily affects Burakumin,
Koreans, and alien workers.
The Burakumin (descendants of feudal era ``outcasts'' who practiced
``unclean'' professions such as butchering and undertaking), although
not subject to governmental discrimination, are frequently victims of
entrenched societal discrimination, including restricted access to
housing and employment opportunities. They are estimated to number
approximately 3 million, but most prefer to hide their identity.
Beginning in 1969, the Government introduced with some success a number
of social, economic, and legal programs designed to improve conditions
for the Burakumin and hasten their assimilation into mainstream
society. However, in recent years, some within the Burakumin community
have questioned whether assimilation is an appropriate goal. When the
basic legislation to provide funding for Burakumin programs expired in
1997, the Government enacted legislation effective for 5 years that
retains 15 of the original 45 programs for Buraku communities. One of
these programs is aimed at completing housing plans already in
progress.
In 1997 the Buraku Liberation League rewrote its manifesto for the
first time in 13 years, placing less emphasis on class struggle and
more emphasis on civil rights, social welfare, and the environment. The
new platform also replaced the term Burakumin (hamlet people) with
Buraku Jumin (hamlet residents),to try to debunk the false concept that
these people are a different race from other Japanese. The platform was
adopted at a national convention.
According to the Ministry of Justice, there were nearly 1.5 million
legal foreign residents as of December 31, 1997, accounting for 1.18
percent of the population. Of these approximately 645,400 were ethnic
Koreans, followed by 252,200 Chinese, and 233,300 Brazilians. The
number of Korean residents has been decreasing steadily as Korean
nationals naturalize or marry Japanese, which allows their children to
gain Japanese citizenship automatically. Despite improvements in legal
safeguards against discrimination, Korean permanent residents (most of
whom were born, raised, and educated in Japan) still are subject to
various forms of deeply entrenched societal discrimination.
By law aliens with 5 years of continuous residence are eligible for
naturalization and the simultaneous acquisition of citizenship rights,
including the right to vote. However, in practice most eligible aliens
choose not to apply for citizenship, in part due to fears that their
cultural identity thereby would be lost. Obstacles to naturalization
include broad discretion available to adjudicating officers and great
emphasis on Japanese language ability. Naturalization procedures also
require an extensive background check, including inquiries into the
applicant's economic status and assimilation into Japanese society.
Koreans are given the option of adopting a Japanese surname. There have
been allegations in the media that applications are turned down
routinely. The Government defends its naturalization procedures as
being necessary to ensure the smooth assimilation of foreigners into
Japanese society. Alien permanent residents may live abroad up to 5
years without losing their right to permanent residence.
In 1995 the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution does not bar
permanent foreign residents from voting in local elections. However,
the Court also ruled that existing laws denying voting rights to
foreign residents are not unconstitutional. In February the Osaka High
Court rejected an appeal by 43 Korean permanent residents demanding the
right to vote in local elections, stating that any decision on voting
rights for foreign residents should be made by the national Government.
In March the Osaka Prefectural Assembly passed a measure granting
permanent residents local suffrage, becoming the third prefecture to
pass such a bill.
Under the School Education Law, students attending Chinese, Korean,
or other non-Japanese schools are not eligible to take national
university examinations. However, in August the Education Ministry
announced that beginning in 2001, graduates of non-Japanese schools
would be eligible to take national university examinations if they pass
a state-run high school equivalency test. Although a number of local
governments provide subsidies to Korean schools, the central Government
does not.
In 1993 the Government halted the fingerprinting of permanent
foreign residents, and in August the Diet passed a revised law to end
the practice officially. Instead of fingerprinting, the Government
established a family registry system that uses the resident's picture
and signature and contains information on parents and spouses living in
the country, a system similar to that used for Japanese nationals. All
foreign residents still are required to carry alien registration
certificates at all times, but the revised law reduces the penalties
imposed on those found without documentation. In June two Korean
residents returned their residency cards to protest the law's failure
to fully eliminate the alien card requirement.
In 1953 the Government decreed that public servants with
administrative authority and the ability to influence public opinion
must be Japanese. Noncitizens were prohibited from taking examinations
for local government positions. Nevertheless, some municipal
governments began lifting restrictions on noncitizen civil servants. In
1996 the Home Affairs Ministry reversed the long-held national policy
of opposition to localities lifting the nationality clause and
instructed local governments to decide at their own discretion.
However, the Ministry instructed local governments to restrict
noncitizens' access to jobs that involved the exercise of public
authority and formation of public opinion. The directive also required
local governments to clearly state which jobs were closed to
noncitizens. Some of the jobs considered off limits include tax
collection, construction permit issuance, sanitation inspection, and
firefighting.
Several local governments already have changed their rules in
response to the Government's new position. In 1997 the cities of
Kawasaki, Yokohama, Osaka, Kobe, and Hisai, and Kanagawa and Koichi
Prefectures opened many jobs to noncitizens. The Osaka municipal
government introduced new guidelines allowing noncitizens with
permanent residency to take jobs in 276 fields, including public
relations, engineering, and social welfare services. Under the new
guidelines, noncitizens can be promotedto section chief or higher
within the specified fields. In 1998 the Hakodate municipal government
announced that in fiscal year 1999 it would allow foreign residents to
take employment tests for all city jobs except firefighters. According
to a 1997 joint survey conducted by the All Japan Prefectural and
Municipal Workers Union and the Korean Residents Association in Japan,
19.8 percent of local governments still forbid the hiring of
noncitizens.
Critics complain that opening some but not all jobs to noncitizens
perpetuates institutional discrimination and the perception that
noncitizen residents cannot be trusted to act in the community's best
interest. The system also allows each local government to develop it
own rules without uniformity being imposed by the national Government.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of workers to associate freely in unions. Approximately 12
million workers, 22 percent of all employees, belong to labor unions.
Unions are free of government control and influence. Most unions are
involved in political activity as well as labor relations, but they are
not controlled by political parties. The Japanese Trade Union
Confederation, which represents 7.6 million workers and was formed in
1989 through the merger of several confederations, is the largest labor
organization. There is no requirement for a single trade union
structure, and there are no restrictions on who may be a union
official. Members of the armed forces, police, and firefighters are not
permitted to form unions or to strike. These restrictions have led to a
long-running dispute before the International Labor Organization's
(ILO) Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations
over observance of ILO Convention 98 concerning the right to organize
and bargain collectively. The Committee has observed that these public
employees have a limited capacity to participate in the process of
determining their wages and again in November asked the Government to
consider any measures it could take to encourage negotiations with
public employees.
The right to strike, implicit in the Constitution, is exercised.
During 1998 105,000 workdays involving 42,000 employees were lost to
strikes. The law prohibits retribution against strikers and is enforced
effectively. Public employees do not have the right to strike.
Unions are free to affiliate internationally and are active in
international bodies, most notably the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions, and maintain extensive international contacts.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution provides unions with the right to organize, bargain, and
act collectively. These rights are exercised freely, and collective
bargaining is practiced widely. The annual ``Spring Wage Offensive,''
in which individual unions in each industry conduct negotiations
simultaneously with their firms, involves nationwide participation.
Management usually consults closely with its enterprise union. However,
trade unions are independent of management and aggressively pursue the
interests of their workers. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination,
and adequate mechanisms exist for resolving cases that occur, including
the reinstatement with back wages of any workers fired for union
activities. However, the collective bargaining rights of public
employees are limited. The Government determines the pay of government
employees based on a recommendation by the independent National
Personnel Authority.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
provides that no person shall be held in bondage of any kind.
Involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, is prohibited.
Although children are not specified in the provision, this legal
prohibition against forced or compulsory labor applies equally to
adults and to children. Although in general forced or bonded labor does
not occur, women are trafficked to Japan and coerced into prostitution
(see Section 6.f.).
During the year, Allied prisoners of war filed individual and class
action suits against Japanese companies seeking compensation for forced
labor during World War II. The suits were filed overseas, including in
the United States. Survivors and families of Chinese and Korean workers
also continue to press claims for damages and compensation for their
forced labor during WW II, both in Japanese civil courts and in
complaints to the ILO. In September the Tokyo High Court ordered the
Kajima Corporation to settle with surviving Chinese workers of a mine
it operated during the war. In March an ILO committee called on
theGovernment to take additional measures to satisfy individual Chinese
and Korean victims of forced labor during the war.
The Asian Women's Fund continued to compensate former comfort
women, who were forced to provide sexual services to Japanese troops
during World War II (see Section 5).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution bans the exploitation of children. Both
societal values and the rigorous enforcement of the Labor Standards Law
protect children from exploitation in the workplace. The Government
prohibits forced or bonded labor, including that performed by children
and enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
Child labor is virtually nonexistent. By law children under the age
of 16 may not be employed and those under age 18 may not be employed in
dangerous or harmful jobs. The Labor Inspection Division of the
Ministry of Labor, which vigorously enforces the Labor Standards Law,
reports no violations. Society places an extremely high value on
education, which is compulsory through the lower secondary (i.e., ninth
grade) level. Enrollment levels for both boys and girls through the
free and universally available upper secondary level (age 18) exceed 95
percent.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wages are set on a
regional (prefectural) and industry basis, with the input of tripartite
(workers, employers, public interest) advisory councils. Employers
covered by a minimum wage must post the concerned minimum wages, and
compliance with minimum wages is considered widespread. Minimum wage
rates, effective in fiscal year 1998 (starting September 1), ranged
from $50 (5,465 yen) per day in Tokyo and Osaka to $34 (4,712 yen) in
Miyazaki prefecture and are considered sufficient to provide a worker
and family with a decent standard of living. The Labor Standards Law
provides for a 40-hour workweek for most industries and mandates
premium pay for hours worked over 40 in a week, or 8 in a day. However,
labor unions frequently criticize the Government for failing to enforce
maximum working hour regulations in smaller firms.
The Immigration Bureau of the Justice Ministry estimated that, as
of January 1, 1998 there were 276,810 foreign nationals residing
illegally in the country. Illegal immigrants come primarily from: South
Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, China, Peru, Iran, Malaysia, and
Taiwan.
While many foreign illegal residents came in search of better
paying manufacturing and construction jobs, these opportunities
decreased during the economic slowdown. Thus, more of the foreign
workers are unemployed or marginally employed. Activist groups claim
that employers can exploit or discriminate against foreign workers, who
often have little or no knowledge of the Japanese language or their
legal rights. The Government has tried to reduce the inflow of illegal
foreign workers by prosecuting employers. Recent revisions of the
Immigration Law provide for penalties against employers of undocumented
foreign workers. Suspected foreign workers also may be denied entry for
passport, visa, and entry application irregularities. The August
revision to the immigration law also established penalties for illegal
stays separate from existing injunctions against illegal entry. The
Government continues to study the foreign worker issue, and several
citizens' groups are working with illegal foreign workers to improve
their access to information on worker rights.
The Ministry of Labor effectively administers various laws and
regulations governing occupational health and safety, principal among
which is the 1972 Industrial Safety and Health Law. Standards are set
by the Ministry of Labor and issued after consultation with the
Standing Committee on Safety and Health of the Tripartite Labor
Standards Commission. Labor inspectors have the authority to suspend
unsafe operations immediately, and the law provides that workers may
voice concerns over occupational safety and remove themselves from
unsafe working conditions without jeopardizing their continued
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution prohibits holding
persons in bondage, and in April the Business Entertainment Law was
amended in order to supplement the Prostitution Prevention Act as an
instrument against trafficking. The amended law sanctions employers
rather than just prostitute/victims and, inter alia, places a 5-year
waiting period for a business license on anyone convicted of the
``crime of encouragement'' to engage in prostitution. In May the Diet
enacted a law intended to prevent all forms of sexual expoitation of
children, whether trafficked or not, and imposing a 3-year sentence
upon conviction (see Section 5).
Japan is a destination country for trafficking in women for
purposes of sexual exploitation. Brokers in source countries (e.g., the
Philippines and Thailand) recruit women and ``sell'' them to Japanese
intermediaries, who in turn coerce them into the sex trade by
subjecting them to excessive debts and seizing their passports.
Reliable statistics on the number and origin of women trafficked to the
country are unavailable, but according to the Ministry of Justice 2.5
percent of the 15,823 women deported in 1997 were prostitutes.
In recent years there has been a surge in the smuggling of illegal
immigrants from China. These illegal immigrants often are held in debt
bondage to make them pay off the smugglers.
______
KIRIBATI
Kiribati is a constitutional republic with a popularly elected
president and a legislative assembly 40 members of which are elected by
universal adult suffrage, and 2 of whom are members by virtue of their
office. The country has a population of 78,400, who occupy 33 small
islands widely scattered across 1.365 million square miles of the
central Pacific. The population is primarily Micronesian, with a
significant component of Polynesian origin. The judiciary is
independent.
A police force of about 250 personnel is controlled effectively by
civilian authority.
Economic activity consists primarily of subsistence agriculture and
fishing. The islands' isolation and meager resources, including poor
soil and limited arable land, severely limit prospects for economic
development.
The Government generally respected citizens' human rights; however,
in the traditional culture, women occupy a subordinate role and have
limited job opportunities.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Although torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment are forbidden by the Constitution, corporal punishment is
permitted under traditional mores for criminal acts and other
transgressions. On some outer islands, the island councils occasionally
order strokes with palm fronds to be administered for public
drunkenness and other minor offenses such as petty thievery.
The authorities seek to meet minimum international standards for
prisons but have limited financial resources. Food and sanitation are
limited. Family members and church representatives are allowed access
to prisoners.
The question of monitoring prison conditions by local human rights
groups has not arisen, and no policy concerning such monitoring has
been formulated.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government
observes these prohibitions.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent and
free of governmental interference.
The judiciary consists of a high court, magistrate courts, a court
of appeal, and land courts. Litigants also have the right of appeal to
the Privy Council in London.
The right to a fair public trial is provided by law and observed in
practice. The Constitution provides that an accused person be informed
of the nature of the offense for which he is charged and be provided
adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. The right to
confront witnesses, present evidence, and appeal convictions is
provided for in law. Procedural safeguards are based on English common
law.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
authorities respect these provisions, and violations are subject to
effective legal sanctions.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice; however,there were some instances in which the
Government limited these rights.
The radio station and the only newspaper are government owned. An
opposition leader recently tried to open a private radio station before
the national elections in November 1998, but the Government closed it,
citing the need to comply with licensing regulations prior to
broadcasting. The station remained closed throughout the year, pending
litigation of the issue. In addition, in August the Cabinet declared a
foreign journalist a prohibited immigrant and precluded his return to
the country, after the journalist published articles that ``gave a bad
impression of the country,'' according to Cabinet officials. Churches
publish newsletters and other periodicals.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly and association, including the right
to form or belong to associations for the advancement or protection of
a group's interests, and the Government does not impose any significant
restrictions in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
There were no reports of refugees. The Government has not
formulated a policy regarding refugees, asylees, or first asylum.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens choose the Government in periodic free and open elections.
The President, who is elected for a 4-year term, exercises executive
authority. No less than three and no more than four presidential
candidates are nominated by the elected Legislative Assembly from among
its members. Under the Constitution, the President is limited to three
terms.
Voters reelected President Teburoro Tito to a second term in
November 1998, with 52.3 percent of the votes. Most of President Tito's
cabinet ministers have served in the previous cabinet.
Women are underrepresented in politics and government. Two women
hold permanent secretary positions, and one is a Member of Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no restrictions on the formation of local nongovernmental
organizations that concern themselves with human rights, but to date
none has been formed. There have been no reported allegations of human
rights violations by the Government and no known requests for
investigations.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
creed, national origin, or sex, and the Government generally observed
this prohibition in practice. Society is fundamentally egalitarian and
has no privileged chiefly class.
Women.--Violence against women does not appear to be a major
problem in this isolated, rural society. Rape is a crime under the law,
and the law is enforced when charges are brought to court. To the
extent that it exists, wife beating is dealt with informally and in a
traditional way; frequently, communal pressure is brought to bear.
The traditional culture in which men are dominant has been an
impediment to women taking a more active role in the economy. This is
slowly changing, and more women are finding work in unskilled and
semiskilled occupations. There are also signs of increased government
hiring and promotions of women. However, women may not work at night
except under specified circumstances (generally in service jobs such as
hotel clerks). Statistics on the participation of women in the work
force and on comparative wages are unavailable. Women have full rights
of ownership andinheritance of property. Women have full and equal
access to education.
Children.--Within its limited financial resources, the Government
makes adequate expenditures for child welfare. Primary education is
compulsory for children between the ages of 6 and 12 years. Following a
national examination, about 40 percent of primary school graduates
qualify to attend secondary school.
If child abuse exists, it is rare and has not become a source of
societal concern.
People with Disabilities.--There is no evidence or complaint of
discrimination in employment, education, or provision of other state
services. Accessibility for the disabled has not been mandated.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Freedom of association is provided
for in the Constitution. Workers are free to organize unions and choose
their representatives. The Government does not control or restrict
unions. Over 90 percent of the work force is occupied in fishing or
subsistence farming, but the small wage sector has a relatively strong
and effective trade union movement. In 1982 the seven registered trade
unions merged to form the Kiribati Trade Union Congress (KTUC). It has
approximately 2,500 members, mostly from the public service sector. The
law provides for the right to strike. However, strikes are rare, the
last one having taken place in 1980.
Unions are free to affiliate internationally. The KTUC is
affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining is provided for under the Industrial Relations Code. The
Government sets wages in the large public sector. However, in a few
statutory bodies and government-owned companies, employees may
negotiate wages and other conditions. In the private sector, individual
employees also may negotiate wages with employers. Negotiations are
generally nonconfrontational, in keeping with tradition. There have
been no reports of antiunion discrimination. However, mechanisms exist
for resolving any such complaints.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not practiced. The
prohibition does not specifically mention children, but forced and
bonded labor by children does not occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children under the age
of 14. Primary education is compulsory for children between the ages of
6 and 12. Children through the age of 15 are prohibited from industrial
employment and employment aboard ships. Labor officers from the
Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Employment normally enforce these
laws effectively, given the rudimentary conditions of the economy and
its industrial relations system. Children rarely are employed outside
the traditional economy. Although not prohibited specifically, forced
and bonded labor by children does not occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government has taken no
concrete action to implement longstanding legislation authorizing the
establishment of minimum wages. There is no legislatively prescribed
workweek. The Government is the major employer in the cash economy.
Employment laws provide rudimentary health and safety standards for
the workplace. Employers must, for example, provide an adequate supply
of clean water for workers and ensure the existence of sanitary toilet
facilities. Employers are liable for the expenses of workers injured on
the job. The Government's ability to enforce employment laws is
hampered by a lack of qualified personnel. Workers can remove
themselves from hazardous work sites but they risk loss of employment
if they do not first obtain approval from their employers.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
in, to, or from the country.
______
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The Republic of Korea is governed by a directly elected president
and a unicameral legislature selected by both direct and proportional
voting. Kim Dae-jung was elected president in a free and fair election
in December 1997 and was inaugurated in February 1998. The next
National Assembly elections are scheduled for April 2000. The
Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and in recent
years, the judiciary has shown increasing independence; however,
several recent scandals involving alleged illegal influence peddling
and cronyism have damaged the image of prosecutors and judges.
Responsibility for maintaining internal security lies with the
National Intelligence Service (NIS--formerly known as the National
Security Planning Agency), the Korean National Police (KNP), and the
Defense Security Command (DSC). Legislation passed in 1993 restricts
the NIS and DSC from involvement in domestic politics and grants the
NIS investigative authority only in cases involving terrorism,
espionage, and international crime organizations. The Government
revised this law in 1996 to allow the NIS to investigate members of
domestic organizations that are viewed as supporting the North Korean
Government. The statutory restrictions on the DSC remain in place.
There continued to be credible reports that some members of the
security forces were responsible for occasional human rights abuses.
The economy rebounded significantly during the year, following the
most severe economic crisis since the 1950's in late 1997 and 1998.
Underpinning the recovery is the Government's ambitious and
comprehensive financial and corporate restructuring plan. Nonetheless,
the economy remained susceptible to external shocks. Gross domestic
product grew 9.8 percent in the second quarter and growth for the year
was expected to be 7 to 8 percent. Unemployment was steady at 6.2
percent.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
however, there were problems in some areas, although there were also
some improvements. Credible sources reported instances in which police
subjected detainees to verbal and physical abuse, although human rights
groups report that the number of such cases continues to decline. The
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) continued to implement guidelines requiring
that suspects be told when arrested of their right to remain silent and
their right to a lawyer. The Government continued to require released
political prisoners to report regularly to the police under the Social
Surveillance Law, and it still has not authorized independent
investigations of the cases of some prisoners who were sentenced on
charges believed to have been fabricated by previous governments. Some
of these prisoners reportedly were subjected to torture to extract
confessions and received trials that did not meet international
standards of fairness. The use or threatened use of the National
Security Law (NSL) continued to infringe upon citizen's civil
liberties, including the right to free expression. The President
declared in his August 15 Independence Day speech that areas of the NSL
had to be revised to protect human rights and make the law consistent
with the Government's attempts to expand contacts with the North. In
March, 17 ``long-term, unconverted'' prisoners were released despite
their refusal to sign an oath to obey the law. Violence against women
and physical abuse remain serious problems, and there is still
insufficient legal redress for dealing with them. Women continued to
face legal and societal discrimination. President Kim, a long-time
democracy and human rights activist, stated repeatedly that promoting
the rights of women would be a priority goal, and in January the Equal
Employment Act was amended to stiffen the penalties for sexual
discrimination in hiring and promotion. In addition in July a new
sexual harassment law went into effect, requiring companies to
establish guidelines to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace and
punishing firms that fail to discipline those guilty of sexual
harassment. Ethnic minorities, very small in number, face legal and
societal discrimination. In July legislation legalized the activities
of teachers' unions. This and other recent labor law reforms bring the
country's labor laws close to international standards. The country is
considered to be a major transit point for traffickers of Asian women
and children destined for the sex trade and domestic servitude.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Penal Code prohibits mistreatment of suspects; the
Government has ordered investigating authorities to protect the human
rights of suspects; and allegations of abuse by authorities of those in
custody for questioning continued to decline. Nonetheless, prosecutors
continued to place much emphasis on securing convictions through
confessions. This focus is driven by cultural factors, with confession
viewed as a necessary basis for the reform and rehabilitation of
wrongdoers. While the Supreme Court has ruled that confessions obtained
after suspects have been deprived of sleep during an interrogation
cannot be used in court, there continued to be reports that police
questioned suspects throughout the night. Credible sources also
reported that in some cases police verbally or physically abused
suspects, including beatings, threats, and sexual intimidation in the
course of arrest and police interrogation. However, human rights groups
report that the number of such cases continues to decline. In February
the MOJ announced that criminal suspects, who previously had been
required to wear prison garb in court, would be allowed to wear street
clothes until proven guilty.
In October 1998, three defendants, accused of a plot to create a
North Korean military provocation in order to ensure the 1997 election
of the Grand National Party's presidential candidate, alleged during
their trial that they were tortured into confessing by NIS (then the
National Security Planning Agency) agents.
Former detainees who claimed that officials of past military
governments had tortured them continued to request compensation.
However, the Government has not provided an effective mechanism for
redress, such as an independent body to investigate complaints of past
human rights violations. Security officials accused of abuse or
harassment of suspects rarely have been prosecuted, and public concern
with police abuse appears to be growing. In February following
extensive press coverage, several police officers were disciplined
after it was discovered that they had shackled the feet and tied the
hands of a 63-year-old man who was arrested for a traffic violation.
Prison conditions are Spartan. Prison diets are adequate, but the
facilities offer little protection against cold in the winter and heat
in the summer. Some prisoners claim that these conditions damaged their
health and that medical care was inadequate. Inmates occasionally have
criticized guards for using excessive force or needlessly putting
prisoners in manacles. Inmate access to reading materials, telephones,
and television broadcasts has improved significantly in recent years.
There is little independent monitoring of prison conditions,
although representatives of human rights groups may visit certain
prisoners at the discretion of the prison warden.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law is often vague,
and prosecutors have wide latitude to interpret the law. The NSL
defines espionage in broad terms and permits the authorities to detain
and arrest persons who commit acts viewed as supporting North Korea and
therefore dangerous to the country. Authorities arrested not only
persons spying on behalf of North Korea but also those who praised
North Korea, its former leader Kim Il Sung, or its ``self-reliance''
(``juche'') political philosophy. The U.N. Human Rights Committee has
termed the NSL ``a major obstacle to the full realization of the rights
enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.'' President Kim Dae-jung, who himself was arrested and
sentenced to death under the NSL, has acknowledged that the law has
``problematic areas'' and announced during his August 15 Independence
Day address his intention to pursue major revisions. According to MOJ
data, as of November 30, 456 persons had been arrested for violating
the NSL (a 35 percent decrease from 1998). Of these, 161 were indicted
without detention. These figures represent a 23 percent and 20 percent
decrease, respectively, from the same period in 1998.
The NSL permits the imprisonment for up to 7 years of anyone who
``with the knowledge that he might endanger the existence or security
of the State or the basic order of free democracy, praised, encouraged,
propagandized for, or sided with the activities of an antistate
organization.'' The legal standard for knowing that one might endanger
the security of the State is vague. Consequently, a number of persons
have been arrested for what appeared to be the peaceful expression of
opposing views, which the authorities considered pro-North Korean or
antistate. In August the Government prosecutor questioned the 37
members of a labor union soccer team that returned to Seoul following a
match in North Korea. Team representatives had visited a statue of Kim
Il-sung and laid a wreath at its base. As of year's end, the
investigation appears closed. In August 1998, Catholic priest Moon Kyu
Hyun was arrested on charges of violating the NSL, after he returned
from North Korea. Father Moon was released on bail in October 1998; as
of year's end, his trialstill was underway. Although he had received
permission from the Government to travel to North Korea, prosecutors
alleged that Father Moon wrote in praise of Kim Il-sung in a North
Korean visitors book and participated in a North Korean-sponsored
reunification festival in Panmunjom. The eight other priests who
traveled with Father Moon were not arrested.
The Government's rationale for retaining the NSL is that North
Korea is trying actively to subvert the Government and society, and
that due to this special circumstance, some forms of expression must be
limited to block the greater danger to freedom and democracy posed by
North Korean totalitarianism. The effect sometimes is to relieve the
Government of the burden of proof in a court of law that any particular
speech or action in fact threatens the nation's security. For example
the Government has prosecuted citizens for unauthorized travel to North
Korea (see Section 2.d.). In September Yonsei University student Hwang
Hye-ro and five other persons were arrested upon returning to the
country after making an unauthorized trip to North Korea. On the
occasion of a special March amnesty, the Government announced the
reinstatement of novelist Hwang Sok-yong's civil rights. Hwang had
served 4 years of a 7-year sentence for making an unauthorized visit to
North Korea and had been released in March 1998 by an earlier special
presidential amnesty.
The Criminal Code requires warrants to be issued by judges in cases
of arrest, detention, seizure, or search, except if the person is
apprehended while committing a criminal act, or if a judge is not
available and the authorities believe that the suspect may destroy
evidence or escape capture if not quickly arrested. In such emergency
cases, judges must issue arrest warrants within 48 hours after
apprehension, or, if a court is not located in the same county, within
72 hours. Police may detain suspects who voluntarily appear for
questioning for up to 6 hours but must notify the suspects' families.
The police generally respected these legal requirements.
The standards for issuing warrants were tightened in 1997, but
following complaints from prosecutors that the new system was
administratively cumbersome, the National Assembly voted to ease
standards for issuing warrants. Authorities normally must release
suspects after 30 days unless an indictment is issued. Consequently,
detainees are a relatively small percentage of the total prison
population.
The Constitution specifically provides for the right to
representation by an attorney, and in May the National Police Agency
announced that it would enforce a suspect's right to have a lawyer
present during police interrogation. The police agency also announced
that, starting in 2000, individual police stations would employ lawyers
as legal advisors to aid in examining relevant legal clauses in
charging suspects.
In 1993 the Government began to permit suspects to consult with
``duty lawyers'' during breaks in interrogation. These duty lawyers are
hired and paid by the individual suspects, who often are billed at
reduced rates as a public service. In 1995 the MOJ also issued
guidelines requiring police to inform suspects at the time of arrest
about their right to be represented by a lawyer, and there were no
reports of access to legal counsel being denied. There is a bail
system, but human rights lawyers say that bail generally is not granted
when detainees are charged with committing serious offenses.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and in recent years, the judiciary has shown
increasing independence; however, several recent scandals involving
alleged illegal influence peddling and cronyism have damaged the image
of prosecutors and judges. The President appoints the Chief Justice and
most justices of the Constitutional Court. Although judges do not
receive life appointments, they cannot be fired or transferred for
political reasons. In recent years, the judiciary has shown increasing
independence. For example, judges in some district courts have ruled,
that, contrary to prosecutors' assertions, activists' exchange of faxes
with North Korean students or meetings with North Korean
representatives in third countries were not, in themselves, sufficient
grounds to convict them of violating the NSL.
Local courts are presided over by judges who render verdicts in all
cases. There is no trial by jury. Defendants can appeal a verdict to a
district appeals court and to the Supreme Court. Constitutional
challenges can be taken to the Constitutional Court, which was created
in 1988.
The Constitution provides defendants with a number of rights in
criminal trials including the presumption of innocence, protection
against self-incrimination, freedom from retroactive laws and double
jeopardy, the right to a speedy trial, and the right of appeal. When a
person is detained physically, theinitial trial must be completed
within 6 months of arrest. These rights generally are observed. Trials
are open to the public but the judge may restrict attendance if he
believes spectators may seek to disrupt the proceedings.
Judges generally allow considerable scope for examination of
witnesses by both the prosecution and defense. Cases involving national
security and criminal matters are tried by the same courts. Although
convictions rarely are overturned, appeals often result in reduced
sentences. Death sentences are appealed automatically.
Human rights groups believe that many dissidents tried under past
military governments during the 1970's and 1980's were sentenced to
long prison terms on false charges of spying for North Korea.
Furthermore, these persons reportedly had been held incommunicado for
up to 60 days after their arrest, subjected to extreme forms of
torture, forced to make ``confessions,'' and convicted after trials
that did not conform to international standards for a fair trial. In
July 1998, the Government repealed the system by which ``ideological
prisoners'' had to renounce their real or alleged beliefs and
instituted a system by which prisoners had to sign a written promise to
obey the law and pledge to recognize the Republic of Korea in order to
be released from prison. A total of 103 prisoners were freed in this
manner in the 1998 Independence Day amnesty. Although the new system
was a significant step for the Government, human rights groups
criticized the requirement of a promise to obey the law, including the
NSL, as tantamount to forcing citizens to renounce their beliefs.
However, on the occasion of a special presidential amnesty in March, 17
long-term, unconverted prisoners were released without having to
renounce their beliefs or sign an oath of obedience. Included among
these was U Yong-gak, who had served 41 years in prison following his
conviction on espionage charges. Some released political prisoners were
required to report their activities regularly to the police. At year's
end, most such prisoners had been released, and two persons remained
imprisoned.
Also on the occasion of the August 15 Independence Day amnesty,
seven prisoners serving sentences for NSL violations were released
after signing an oath of allegiance. In addition 49 other NSL violators
were released following the completion of more than half of their
sentences.
It is difficult to estimate the number of political prisoners,
because it is not clear whether particular persons were arrested for
merely exercising the rights of free speech or association or were
detained for committing acts of violence or espionage. Some human
rights monitors estimate the number of political prisoners at around
300. However, these monitors' definition of political prisoner often
includes all persons imprisoned for politically motivated acts, without
distinction as to whether the acts themselves included violence or
other criminal behavior. The number of political prisoners and
detainees as defined by international standards appears to number under
200.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--In general the Government honors the integrity of the
home and family. In the past, the security services conducted varying
degrees of surveillance, including wiretaps, of political dissidents.
The 1995 Antiwiretap Law and the law to reform the NIS (then known as
the National Security Planning Agency) were designed to curb government
surveillance of civilians, and largely appear to have succeeded. The
Antiwiretap Law lays out broad conditions under which the monitoring of
telephone calls, mail, and other forms of communication are legal. It
requires government officials to secure a judge's permission before
placing wiretaps, or, in the event of an emergency, soon after placing
them, and it provides for jail terms for those who violate this law.
Some human rights groups argue that a considerable amount of illegal
wiretapping still is taking place, and they assert that the lack of an
independent body to investigate whether police have employed illegal
wiretaps hinders the effectiveness of the Antiwiretap Law.
In late December 1998, several opposition lawmakers broke into the
NIS (the then National Security Planning Agency) liaison office in the
National Assembly building and removed documents that they claimed
substantiated allegations that the office was being used by the NIS to
conduct surveillance of National Assembly members. Several opposition
legislators have alleged that they are under surveillance by the
Government and that their homes, offices, and cellular telephones are
tapped.
Citizens are not allowed to listen to North Korean radio in their
homes or read books published in North Korea if the Government
determines that they are doing so to help North Korea. Student groups
make plausible claims that government informants are posted on
university campuses.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--While most political discourse is
unrestricted, under the NSL the Government limits the expression of
ideas that authorities consider Communist or pro-North Korean. Broad
interpretations of the NSL allow for restrictions on peaceful dissent.
Although the Government has abandoned direct control over the news
media, it continues to exercise indirect influence, and government
officials vigorously lobby reporters and editors. The latent threats of
tax investigations against companies and pressure on advertisers still
are believed to induce newspapers and broadcasters to soften criticism
of the Government in some cases. Moreover, while the Government's
anticorruption campaign curtailed politicians' payments of money to
reporters, it did not eliminate them. Nevertheless, press criticism of
the Government is extensive in all fields, and authorities have not
used repressive measures to stop media reporting. Many radio and
television stations are state supported, but they maintain a
considerable degree of editorial independence in their news coverage.
Journalists allege that the libel laws are used to harass
publications for articles that are unflattering but not necessarily
untrue, and in the past some journalists have been arrested and jailed
for libel.
Prosecutors continued to indict dissidents under the NSL for
producing, selling, or distributing pro-North Korean or pro-Communist
materials. Court precedents allow citizens to possess these kinds of
publications for purely academic use, profit, or curiosity, but not
with the intent of subverting the State. Prosecutors have wide
discretion in determining motives for possessing or publishing such
material.
The Government continued to allow, within its guidelines,
substantial media coverage of North Korea. Television networks
continued to broadcast edited versions of North Korean television
programs, and reported extensively on United States and South Korean
talks with North Korean officials. In September 1998, a television
station received permission for the first time to broadcast a North
Korean-produced film.
The Government Censorship Board, which screens movies for sex and
violence, has followed more liberal guidelines in recent years and
allowed release of a broader range of films.
In 1997 Suh Jun Shik, the publisher of a daily human rights
newsletter in Seoul, was arrested under provisions of the NSL along
with several other activists for attempting to screen an allegedly pro-
North Korean movie. Suh was released on bail in October 1998; in
September he was found not guilty.
The Government generally respected academic freedom, and no
instances of prosecution for scholarly writing were reported during the
year. However, student groups plausibly report the presence of
government informants on university campuses (see Section 1.f.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Law on
Assembly and Demonstrations prohibits assemblies considered likely to
undermine public order. The law requires that the police be notified in
advance of demonstrations of all types, including political rallies,
and the police must notify organizers if they consider the event
impermissible under this law. In August police prevented students from
marching to Panmunjom on the border with North Korea for a Liberation
Day rally to be held jointly with their North Korean counterparts. The
authorities labeled the attempted march and rally as illegal.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice. There are no
registration requirements. Associations operate freely, except those
deemed by the Government to be seeking to overthrow the State.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Most citizens can move freely throughout
the country; however, police may restrict the movements of some former
prisoners. Foreign travel generally is unrestricted; however, the
Government must approve travel to North Korea. To obtain approval,
potential visitors must demonstrate that their trip does not havea
political purpose--that is, to praise North Korea or criticize the
South Korean Government. During the year, the Government continued to
promote the expansion of North-South contacts, including allowing the
Hyundai Group to transport tourists to North Korea's Kumgang mountain
and granting permission to a labor union's soccer team to play a soccer
match in Pyongyang. However, travelers to North Korea who do not
receive government permission are likely to be arrested upon their
return.
In January a travel ban was placed on, but subsequently lifted
from, 11 opposition politicians for their involvement in the removal of
documents from an NIS liaison office in the National Assembly building
at the end of 1998 (see Section 1.f.).
In the past, the Government forbade some Koreans convicted of
politically related crimes from returning to Korea, and some citizens
still face sanctions if they return.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. Government guidelines provide for offering
temporary refuge in the case of a mass influx of asylum seekers.
However, the issue of provision of first asylum did not arise during
the year. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a
country where they had a fear of persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to elect their own government. The
Constitution, as amended in 1987, provides for the direct election of
the President and for a mixed system of direct and proportional
election of legislators to the unicameral National Assembly. The
President serves a single 5-year term and may not be reelected. The
National Assembly's term is 4 years. All citizens 20 years of age or
older have the right to vote, and elections are held by secret ballot.
Because of cultural traditions and discrimination, women occupy few
important positions in government. There is one woman in the Cabinet,
the Minister of Environment. Eleven female legislators were elected to
the 299-seat National Assembly, one of whom chairs a special committee
on women's affairs.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Several nongovernmental organizations are active in promoting human
rights, and they operate without government restriction. Chief among
these groups are the Lawyers for a Democratic Society, Sarangbang, the
Human Rights Committee of the National Council of Churches in Korea,
the Korean Bar Association, People's Solidarity for Participatory
Democracy, and ``Mingahyup,'' an association of the families of
political prisoners. These groups publish reports on human rights and
make their views known both inside and outside the country. Government
officials generally have been willing to meet with international human
rights groups.
In July President Kim reiterated his intention to establish a human
rights commission to investigate accusations of human rights
violations, which he first mentioned as one of his 100 presidential
policy pledges in February 1998. The Government is preparing
legislation to create this commission.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution and equal opportunity statutes forbid
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, disability, or
social status, and the Government respects these provisions. However,
traditional attitudes limit opportunities for women and the disabled.
Ethnic minorities, very small in number, face both legal and societal
discrimination.
Women.--Violence against women remains a problem, and some women's
rights groups maintain that such violence, including spousal abuse, has
worsened with the recent decline of the economy. A 1997 survey found
that 31.4 percent of households had experienced incidents of domestic
violence. In July 1998, the Government enacted the Prevention of
Domestic Violence and Victim Protection Act, which defines domestic
violence as a serious crime. Authorities can order offenders to stay
away from victims for up to 6 months and to be put on probation or to
see court-designated counselors. The law also requires police to
respond immediately to reports of domestic violence. Women's groups
praised the law as a significant step in combating domestic violence.
Rape remained a serious problem with 8,317 cases reported in 1998
(the last year for which statistics are available). Many incidents of
rape go unreported because of the stigma associated with being raped.
The activities of a number of women's groups have increased awareness
of the importance of reporting and prosecuting rapes, as well as
offenses such as sexual harassment in the workplace. According to
women's rights groups, cases involving sexual harassment or rape
generally go unprosecuted, and perpetrators, if convicted, often
receive very light sentences.
Enacted to combat sexual harassment in the workplace, a new sexual
harassment law went into effect in July. Under the new law, companies
can be fined up to $2,500 (3 million won) for failing to take steps to
prevent sexual harassment in the workplace or failing to punish an
offender. The law also requires companies to establish in-house sexual
harassment complaint centers and forbids firms from punishing employees
for taking their complaints to outside organizations. In addition the
Ministry of Education announced that the new law's guidelines would
apply at the nation's schools and that teachers who make gender-
discriminatory remarks would be disciplined. As examples of gender-
discriminatory remarks, the Ministry cited statements that emphasized
women's traditional roles in families, stressed men's leadership in
society, and encouraged female students to work for good marriages
instead of embarking on a career after graduation.
The amended Family Law, which went into effect in 1991, permits
women to head a household, recognizes a wife's right to a portion of
the couple's property, and allows a woman to maintain greater contact
with her offspring after a divorce. Although the revisions helped
abused women, the stigma of divorce remains strong, and there is little
government or private assistance for divorced women. These factors,
plus the fact that divorced women have limited employment opportunities
and have difficulty remarrying, lead some women to stay in abusive
situations. The Government has created some shelters for battered women
and increased the number of child care facilities, giving women in
abusive situations more options, but women's rights groups say that
they fall far short of effectively dealing with the problem.
A conservative tradition has left women subordinate to men socially
and economically. Despite the passage of equal employment opportunity
legislation in 1987, few women work as company executives, and sexual
discrimination in the workplace remains a problem. However, in January
the National Assembly revised the 1987 Equal Employment Act to include
tougher penalties to be imposed on companies that are found to
discriminate against women in hiring and promotions. Under the revised
law, the Presidential Commission on Women was granted the authority to
investigate sexual discrimination cases in the workplace. A company
found guilty of practicing sexual discrimination could be fined up to
$4,200 (5 million won) and have its name published in the newspaper.
The revised law also provides for a public fund to support victims in
seeking legal redress. Nevertheless, some government agencies'
preferential hiring of applicants with military service (nearly always
men) points to continued legal barriers against women. In December the
Constitutional Court ruled that government agencies' preferential
hiring practices for those who have performed military service
discriminated against women and disabled persons and were
unconstitutional. Women have full access to education, and social mores
and attitudes are changing gradually. For example, the major political
parties, are making more efforts to recruit women; the Ministry of
Women's Affairs continued its efforts to expand employment
opportunities; and the military and service academies continued to
expand opportunities for women.
The Government provides an allowance of $442 (500,000 won) per
month to 142 former ``comfort women'' (women who, during World War II,
were forced to provide sex to soldiers of the Japanese Imperial Army).
The country is considered a major transit point for traffickers of
Asian women and children destined for the sex trade and domestic
servitude (see Section 6.f.).
Children.--The Government provides high-quality elementary
education to all children free of charge, and most obtain a good
secondary education. High-quality health care facilities are widely
available to children.
Child abuse does not appear to be a significant problem; however,
it has not been studied extensively, and statistics are limited. As of
the end of July, 411 cases of child abuse had been reported. The Seoul
metropolitan government runs a children's counseling center, which
investigates reports of abuse, counsels families, and cares for runaway
children. Until 1998 there was no specific law against child abuse;
however, the new Prevention of Domestic Violence and Victim Prevention
Act, which defines domestic violence as a serious crime, allows a child
to bringcharges against a parent in cases of abuse. In July the
Government's Commission on Youth Protection, exercising its mandate to
``regulate the circulation of harmful materials and substances and to
protect youth from harmful entertainment establishments,'' revised the
youth protection law. Under the revised law, owners of entertainment
establishments who hire minors under the age of 19 face prison terms of
up to 10 years and a fine of $8,300 (10 million won) per minor hired.
(The law previously had provided for a prison term of 3 years and a
fine of $23,240 (28 million won) no matter how many minors were hired.)
The Commission also announced that it was expanding the definition of
``entertainment establishment'' to include facilities, such as
restaurants and cafes, where children sometimes were hired illegally as
prostitutes. The National Assembly is proceeding with the development
of additional legislation in this area.
The traditional preference for male children continues, although it
is less evident among people in their twenties and thirties. Although
the law bans fetal testing except for those cases when a woman's life
is in danger, a hereditary disease would be transmitted, or in cases of
rape or incest, such testing and the subsequent termination of
pregnancies with female fetuses frequently occur. The Government has
expressed concern about the widening disparity in male and female birth
rates.
The country is considered a major transit point for traffickers of
Asian women and children destined for the sex trade and domestic
servitude (see Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--Although measures aimed at creating
opportunities for the disabled have been taken, public facilities for
their everyday care and use remained inadequate. However, there is no
legal discrimination against disabled persons in employment, education,
or the provision of other state services.
In 1995 the Government expanded job training programs, medical
benefits, and welfare facilities for disabled citizens. Since 1991
firms with over 300 employees have been required by law either to hire
disabled workers or pay a fee. Surveys indicate that most companies
either paid the fee or evaded the law. After human rights groups had
publicized one such survey in 1996, the Labor Ministry increased the
subsidies provided to companies that hire the disabled. Nonetheless,
hiring of the disabled remains below target levels. The disabled make
up less than 1 percent of the work force. New public buildings are
required to include facilities for the disabled, such as ramp access to
entrances, a wheelchair lift, and special parking spaces. The Health
and Welfare Ministry has announced that existing government buildings
must be retrofitted with these facilities over the next 6 years.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country is racially
homogeneous with no ethnic minorities of significant size. Citizenship
is based on blood, not place of birth, and persons must show their
family genealogy as proof. Thus, ethnic Chinese born and resident in
Korea cannot obtain citizenship or become public servants, and may have
difficulty being hired by some major corporations. Due to legal as well
as societal discrimination, many ethnic Chinese have emigrated to other
countries since the 1970's. There are approximately 20,000 ethnic
Chinese, who represent 0.05 percent of the population. In June 1998,
the Government passed legislation to allow a female citizen to transmit
citizenship to her child regardless of the citizenship of the child's
father. Amerasians face no legal discrimination but informal
discrimination is prevalent, making it more difficult for them to
succeed in academia, business, or government.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution gives workers, with
the exception of public sector employees, the right to free
association. In 1998 the Government passed legislation that, beginning
in January, allowed government white-collar workers to form workplace
councils. Blue-collar workers in such government agencies as the postal
service, railways, telecommunications, and the National Medical Center
are allowed to organize unions. As few as two employees may form a
union. Until 1997 the Trade Union Law specified that only one union was
permitted at each workplace. However, labor law changes in 1997
authorized the formation of competing unions starting in the year 2002.
All unions are required to notify the authorities when formed or
dissolved. About 12.6 percent of workers belong to a union. There are
approximately 5,560 trade unions.
In the past, the Government did not recognize formally labor
federations that were not affiliated with the country's two legally
recognized labor groupings--the Federation of Korean Trade Unions
(FKTU) and the Independent Korean Federation ofClerical and Financial
Workers. However, in the past several years, the Labor Ministry
officially recognized some independent white-collar federations
representing hospital workers, journalists, and office workers at
construction firms and at government research institutes. The courts
ruled in 1992 that affiliation with the FKTU was not required to be
registered as a legal labor federation. The legalization of the
teachers' union paved the way for government recognition of the
dissident Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) in November. In
practice labor federations not formally recognized by the Labor
Ministry have operated without government interference.
The Government arrested and tried unionists who allegedly
instigated violent strikes or illegally disrupted normal business
operations. Following a subway strike in Seoul in April, several union
leaders were dismissed from their positions and some faced legal action
from the Government. Also in April, 6,000 workers walked off the job at
the Daewoo Shipyard in sympathy with the subway strikers and to protest
company-restructuring plans. Although there were several large general
strikes, the Government did not punish unionists for their
participation in these strikes or other mass rallies.
The ban on teachers' unions was lifted on July 1. Accordingly, the
KCTU-affiliated Korean Teachers' Union (Chonkyojo) and the FKTU-
affiliated Korean Union of Teachers and Educational Workers became
legal. Although the two teachers unions have the right to bargain
collectively with the Ministry of Education on wages or working
condition--but not school curriculums--it is illegal for the unions to
enter into collective action.
Labor laws prohibiting political activities by unions were
rescinded in 1997. Election laws that apply to other social
organizations regulate unions. These regulations prohibit donations by
unions (and other social organizations) to political parties. Some
trade unionists have temporarily resigned from their union posts to run
for office.
Strikes are prohibited in government agencies, state-run
enterprises, and defense industries. By law unions in enterprises
determined to be of ``essential public interest,'' including public
transportation, utilities, public health, banking, and
telecommunications can be ordered to submit to government-ordered
arbitration in lieu of striking. However, in practice the Government
rarely imposes arbitration. The number of labor disputes has declined
in recent years. According to Labor Ministry statistics, about 129
strikes occurred in 1998, the last year for which complete data are
available. The Labor Dispute Adjustment Act requires unions to notify
the Labor Ministry of their intention to strike; it mandates a 10-day
``cooling-off period'' before a work stoppage legally may begin and 15
days in public interest sectors. Labor laws prohibit retribution
against workers who have conducted a legal strike and allow workers to
file complaints of unfair labor practices against employers.
The FKTU and KCTU are affiliated with the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Most of the FKTU's 20 constituent
federations maintain affiliations with international trade
secretariats, as does the KCTU Metalworkers Council.
In recent years, the Government has cultivated a more neutral
stance in labor disputes. Striking workers shut down the Hyundai
Motors' auto plant in Ulsan in August 1998, and although the Government
threatened to use police to remove the workers, labor and management
settled their dispute peacefully. There were no reports that employer-
hired squads assaulted workers during the year.
In June 1998, the country was reinstated to the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation's (OPIC) insurance programs, which had been
suspended since 1991 on worker rights grounds.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution and the Trade Union Law provide for the right of workers
to collective bargaining and collective action. This law also empowers
workers to file complaints of unfair labor practices against employers
who interfere with union organizing or practice discrimination against
union members. Employers found guilty of unfair practices can be
required to reinstate workers who were fired for union activities.
Extensive collective bargaining is practiced, even with unions
whose federations are not recognized legally by the Government. The
labor laws do not extend the right to organize and bargain collectively
to defense industry workers or white-collar government employees,
although the Government passed legislation to allow government workers
to form workplace councils beginning in 1999, including workers at
state- or publicly run enterprises.
There is no independent system of labor courts. The central and
local labor commissions form a semiautonomous agency of the
LaborMinistry that adjudicates disputes in accordance with the Labor
Dispute Adjustment Law. Each labor commission is composed of equal
numbers of representatives of labor and management, plus neutral
experts who represent the ``public interest.'' Local labor commissions
are empowered to decide on remedial measures in cases involving unfair
labor practices and to mediate and, in some situations, arbitrate labor
disputes. Arbitration can be made compulsory in sectors of the economy
(for example, utilities and transportation) deemed essential to public
welfare.
In February 1998, the Government established the Tripartite
Commission, with representatives from labor, management, and the
Government to deal with labor issues related to the economic downturn.
The work of the Commission made it legal for companies to lay off
workers due to economic hardship and authorized temporary manpower
agencies. However, disputes among labor, management, and government
representatives led to the pullout of labor and management from the
Commission in April. In September management and FKTU representatives
agreed to return to the Commission. As of year's end, the KCTU had not
returned to the Commission.
In the past, regulations forbade intervention in disputes by so-
called third parties, such as labor federations not recognized by the
Government. Labor laws were revised in 1997 to lift the ban on third-
party intervention and allow nonrecognized federations to assist member
unions involved in a strike.
Enterprises in the two export processing zones (EPZ's) had been
designated by the Government as public interest enterprises. Workers in
these enterprises, whose rights to organize formerly were restricted,
gradually have been given the rights enjoyed by workers in other
sectors of the economy.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
provides that no person shall be punished, placed under preventive
restrictions, or subjected to involuntary labor, except as provided by
law and through lawful procedures. Forced or bonded labor, including
forced labor by children, is not practiced.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Standards Law prohibits the employment of
persons under the age of 15 without a special employment certificate
from the Labor Ministry. Because education is compulsory through middle
school (about age 14), few special employment certificates are issued
for full-time employment. Some children are allowed to hold part-time
jobs such as selling newspapers. To obtain employment, children under
age 18 must have written approval from their parents or guardians.
Employers can require minors to work only a limited number of overtime
hours and are prohibited from employing them at night without special
permission from the Labor Ministry. Child labor laws and regulations
are clear and usually enforced when violations are found, but the
Government employs too few inspectors to carry out regular inspections.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and enforces
this prohibition (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government implemented a
minimum wage in 1988, and the minimum wage level is reviewed annually.
As of September 1998, the minimum wage was raised to approximately
$1.17 (1,525 won) per hour. Companies with fewer than 10 employees are
exempt from this law. The FKTU and other labor organizations assert
that the current minimum wage does not meet the basic requirements of
urban workers. In fact workers earning the minimum wage would have
difficulty in providing a decent standard of living for themselves and
their families, despite fringe benefits, such as transportation
expenses, with which companies normally supplement salaries. (However,
the money an average blue-collar worker takes home in overtime and
bonuses significantly raises the total compensation package.) According
to the Ministry of Health and Welfare, 4.2 percent of the population
lived below the poverty level as of July.
Foreign workers, most of whom come from China, the Philippines,
Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan, often face difficult working
conditions. The Government sought to ameliorate the problems of illegal
workers by creating a program that allowed about 60,000 foreign workers
to enter the country legally to work at established wages with legal
safeguards. Although the number of illegal foreign workers decreased
greatly in 1998 due to the economic crisis, the country's economic
recovery reversed this decline. The Ministry of Labor reported that
there were 114,700 illegal workers as of May, down from 149,000 at the
beginning of the economic crisis in December 1997 but above the figure
of 93,000 recorded in December 1998. It is difficult for illegal
workers to seek relief for loss of pay or unsatisfactory living and
working conditions because they face deportation. However, the
Government has established counseling centers that hear complaints from
illegal foreign workers about such issues as overdue wages and
industrial accidents. Foreigners working as language teachers have
complained that the language institutes that hired them frequently
violated employment contracts, for which the legal system provided
insufficient redress.
Amendments to the Labor Standards Law passed in 1989 brought the
maximum regular workweek to 44 hours, with provision for overtime to be
compensated at a higher wage. The law also provides for a 24-hour rest
period each week. Labor laws were revised in 1997 to establish a
flexible hours system, according to which employers could require
laborers to work up to 48 hours during certain weeks without paying
overtime, as long as average weekly hours for 2-weeks did not exceed
44. If a union agreed to a further loosening of the rules, management
could ask employees to work up to 56 hours in a given week. The
legislation established a daily cap of 12 hours on the working day.
Labor groups claim that the Government does not enforce adequately the
maximum workweek provisions at small companies.
The Government sets health and safety standards, but the accident
rate is unusually high by international standards. However, this rate
continued to decline gradually due to improved occupational safety
programs and union pressure for better working conditions. The Labor
Ministry still lacks enough inspectors to enforce the laws fully. The
Industrial Safety and Health Law does not provide job security for
workers who remove themselves from dangerous work environments.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Criminal Code states that ``A
person who kidnaps another by force or coercion for purposes of
engaging in an indecent act or sexual intercourse, or for gain, shall
be punished by imprisonment for not less than 1 year . . . this shall
apply to a person who buys or sells a woman for purpose of
prostitution.''
Because of lax control of transit areas at international airports,
the country is considered a major transit point for alien smugglers,
including traffickers of Asian women and children destined for the sex
trade and domestic servitude. Relatively small numbers of Korean
economic migrants, seeking opportunities abroad, are believed to end up
as victims of traffickers as well (see Section 5).
______
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA*
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a dictatorship
under the absolute rule of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP). Kim Il Sung
led the DPRK from its inception until his death in 1994. Since then his
son Kim Jong Il appears to have had unchallenged authority. Kim Jong Il
was named General Secretary of the KWP in October 1997. In September
1998, the Supreme People's Assembly reconfirmed Kim Jong Il as Chairman
of the National Defense Commission and declared that position the
``highest office of state.'' The presidency was abolished leaving the
late Kim Il Sung as the DPRK's only president. Both Kim Il Sung and Kim
Jong Il continue to be the objects of intense personality cults. The
regime emphasizes ``juche,'' a national ideology of self-reliance. The
judiciary is not independent.
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* The United States does not have diplomatic relations with the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea. North Korea does not allow
representatives of foreign governments, journalists, or other invited
visitors the freedom of movement that would enable them to assess fully
human rights conditions there. This report is based on information
obtained over more than a decade, updated where possible by information
drawn from recent interviews, reports, and other documentation. While
limited in detail, this information is nonetheless indicative of the
human rights situation in North Korea today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Korean People's Army is the primary organization responsible
for external security. It is assisted by a large military reserve force
and several quasi-military organizations, including the Worker-Peasant
Red Guards and the People's Security Force. These organizations assist
the Ministry of Public Security and cadres of the KWP in maintaining
internal security. Members of the security forces committed serious
human rights abuses.
The State directs all significant economic activity, and only
government-controlled labor unions are permitted. The economy continued
to function at low capacity, although it showed signs of halting its
contraction of recent years. This decline is due in part to the
collapse of the Soviet bloc and the elimination of Soviet and Chinese
concessional trade and aid. It also is due to distribution bottlenecks,
an inefficient allocation of resources, a lack of access to
international credit stemming from the DPRK's default on much of its
foreign debt, and the diversion of an estimated quarter of the gross
national product to military expenditures. Since 1995 agricultural
production has fallen significantly short of minimum needs. Famine
conditions have forced thousands of persons to flee their homes. The
Government continued to seek international food aid as well as other
forms of assistance. Food, clothing, and energy are rationed throughout
the country.
The Government continues to deny its citizens human rights.
Citizens do not have the right peacefully to change their government.
There continued to be reports of extrajudicial killings and
disappearances. Citizens are detained arbitrarily, and many are held as
political prisoners; prison conditions are harsh. The constitutional
provisions for an independent judiciary and fair trials are not
implemented in practice. The regime subjects its citizens to rigid
controls. The state leadership perceives most international norms of
human rights, especially individual rights, as illegitimate, alien
social concepts subversive to the goals of the State and party. The
Penal Code is draconian, stipulating capital punishment and
confiscation of all assets for a wide variety of ``crimes against the
revolution,'' including defection, attempted defection, slander of the
policies of the party or State, listening to foreign broadcasts,
writing ``reactionary'' letters, and possessing reactionary printed
matter. The Government prohibits freedom of speech, the press,
assembly, and association, and all forms of cultural and media
activities are under the tight control of the party. Radios sold in
North Korea receive North Korean radio broadcasts only; radios obtained
from abroad must be altered to work in a similar manner. Under these
circumstances, little outside information reaches the public except
that approved and disseminated by the Government. The Government
restricts freedom of religion, citizens' movements, and worker rights.
There were reports of trafficking in women and young girls.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Defectors report
that the regime executes political prisoners, opponents of the regime,
repatriated defectors, and others (reportedly including military
officers suspected of espionage or of plotting against Kim Jong Il).
Criminal law makes the death penalty mandatory for activities ``in
collusion with imperialists'' aimed at ``suppressing the national
liberation struggle.'' Some prisoners are sentenced to death for such
ill-defined ``crimes'' as ``ideological divergence,'' ``opposing
socialism,'' and other ``counterrevolutionary crimes.'' In some cases,
executions reportedly were carried out at public meetings attended
byworkers, students, and school children. Executions also have been
carried out before assembled inmates at places of detention. Border
guards reportedly have orders to shoot-to-kill potential defectors (see
Section 2.d.).
In August 1998, an unsubstantiated Reuters report stated that
following a March coup attempt against Kim Jong Il, authorities
arrested several thousand members of the armed forces. Reports
indicated that the Government executed numerous persons.
Many prisoners reportedly have died from disease, starvation, or
exposure (see Section 1.c.).
According to unconfirmed Japanese and South Korean press reports in
1997, several senior party officials were publicly executed in
September 1997. The Kyodo News Network reported that Seo Kwan Hui,
Secretary of Agriculture for the KWP, and 17 other senior officials,
including some from the army and from the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth
League, were executed for corruption and working for South Korea. In
January 1998, Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported that among those
executed were a four-star general who ran the Political Bureau of the
Korean People's Army and Choe Hyon Tok, a member of the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly. According to the AFP, seven
persons in this group were executed by firing squad before thousands of
spectators.
A South Korean newsmagazine reported that there were at least 20
public executions during 1997 for either economic offenses, including
stealing cattle and electric wire, or for attempting to defect. Amnesty
International (AI) reported in January 1997 that at least 23 people had
been publicly executed between 1970 and 1992 for offenses that
reportedly included ``banditry'' and ``stealing rice from a train.''
Government officials reportedly told AI in 1995 that only one or two
executions had taken place since 1985.
b. Disappearance.--The Government is reportedly responsible for
cases of disappearance. According to defector reports, individuals
suspected of political crimes often are taken from their homes by state
security officials late at night and sent directly, without trial, to
camps for political prisoners. There also have been reports of DPRK
involvement in the kidnaping abroad of South Koreans, Japanese, and
other foreign nationals. In 1995 the Japanese press estimated that, in
the previous 3 decades, as many as 20 Japanese may have been kidnaped
and detained in North Korea. According to Japanese government
officials, these abductions took place between 1977 and 1983. In
addition several cases of kidnaping, hostage-taking, and other acts of
violence apparently intended to intimidate ethnic Koreans living in
China and Russia have been reported. For example there is credible
evidence that North Korea may have been involved in the July 1995
abduction of a South Korean citizen working in China as a missionary.
This missionary subsequently appeared publicly in North Korea and was
portrayed as a defector. The DPRK denies that it has been involved in
kidnapings.
In November 1997, the South Korean Government arrested several
alleged North Korean espionage agents. According to the South Korean
Government's report on its investigation, those arrested claimed that
three South Korean high school students, missing since 1978, had been
kidnaped by the North Korean Government and trained as espionage
agents. The three were identified as Kim Young Nam, who disappeared
from Son Yu beach, and Yi Myong U and Hong Kyun Pyo, both of whom
disappeared from Hong To island beach. According to those arrested,
there have been several other kidnapings.
AI reports detail a number of cases of disappearances including
that of Japanese citizen Shibata Kozo and his wife Shin Sung Suk, who
left Japan in 1960 and resettled in North Korea. The authorities
reportedly arrested Shibata in 1962 after he encouraged a demonstration
by former Japanese residents protesting the poor treatment given them.
In 1993 AI claimed that he was still in custody and in poor health, and
that there had been no word about his wife and three children since
1965. In 1995 North Korean officials informed AI that Shibata Kozo, his
wife, and children died in a train accident in early 1990, a few weeks
after he was released from nearly 30 years in prison. However, AI
reports that Shibata Kozo was still in custody at the time of the
alleged accident.
North Korean officials informed AI in 1995 that Japanese citizens
Cho Ho Pyong, his ethnic Japanese wife Koike Hideko, and their three
young children were killed in 1972 while attempting to leave the
country. The authorities told AI that Cho escaped from a detention
center where he was being held for spying, and killed a guard in the
escape.
The cases of three ethnic Korean residents of Beijing, China (16,
18, and 20 years of age), reported by AI in 1995 to have been taken to
North Korea against their will, remainedunresolved. The three were
taken in apparent retaliation for criticism of North Korean human
rights violations made by their father, a former prisoner in North
Korea, on Japanese television and in the Japanese press. The North
Korean authorities deny this allegation, claiming that the three
brothers were deported to North Korea for breaking Chinese law and that
they are now living with relatives.
Numerous reports indicate that ordinary citizens are not allowed to
mix with foreign nationals, and AI has reported that a number of North
Koreans who maintained friendships with foreigners have disappeared. In
at least one case, AI reported that a citizen who had disappeared was
executed for maintaining a friendship with a Russian national.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--While there is no information on recent practices,
credible reports indicate that prisoners are mistreated and that many
have died from disease, starvation, or exposure.
In February 1998, a Polish newspaper reported the experiences of a
woman who spent 10 years in a North Korean concentration camp before
fleeing first to China and then to South Korea. The approximately 1,800
inmates in this particular camp typically worked 16 to 17 hours a day.
The woman reported severe beatings, torture involving water forced into
a victim's stomach with a rubber hose and pumped out by guards jumping
on a board placed across the victim's abdomen, and chemical and
biological warfare experiments allegedly conducted on inmates by the
army. South Korean media reported that the DPRK State Security Agency
manages the camps through use of forced labor, beatings, torture, and
public executions.
Prison conditions are harsh. According to international
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) and defector sources, whole
families, including children, are imprisoned together. ``Reeducation
through labor'' is common punishment, consisting of forced labor, such
as logging and tending crops, under harsh conditions. A small number of
persons who claimed to have escaped from detention camps reported that
starvation and executions are common. In one prison, clothing was
reportedly issued only once in 3 years. Former inmates have produced
photographs of an inmate wearing specially designed leg irons that
permit walking but make running impossible. AI reported the existence
of ``punishment cells,'' too low to allow standing upright and too
small for lying down flat, where prisoners are kept for up to several
weeks for breaking prison rules. Visitors to North Korea report
observing prisoners being marched in leg irons, metal collars, or
shackles.
In April credible witnesses reported on the treatment of persons
held in prison camps through the early 1990's. Although their
allegations could not be substantiated, the witnesses stated that
prisoners held on the basis of their religious beliefs repeatedly were
treated worse than other inmates were. One witness, a former prison
guard, reported that those believing in God were regarded as insane, as
the authorities taught that ``all religions are opiates.'' He recounted
an instance in which a woman was kicked hard and left lying for days
because a guard overheard her praying for a child who was beaten.
The Government normally does not permit inspection of prisons by
human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There are no
restrictions on the ability of the Government to detain and imprison
people at will and to hold them incommunicado.
Little information is available on criminal justice procedures and
practices, and outside observation of the legal system has been limited
to ``show trials'' for traffic violations and other minor offenses.
Family members and other concerned persons find it virtually
impossible to obtain information on charges against detained persons.
Judicial review of detentions does not exist in law or in practice.
Defectors claim that North Korea detains between 150,000 to 200,000
persons for political reasons, sometimes along with their family
members, in maximum security camps in remote areas. An October 1992
report by two former inmates made reference to severe living conditions
in what they called ``concentration camps.'' North Korean officials
deny the existence of such prison camps but admit that there are
``education centers'' for persons who ``commit crimes by mistake.''
One credible report lists 12 such prison camps in the DPRK. It is
believed that some former high officials are imprisoned in the camps.
Visitors formerly were allowed, but currently any form ofcommunication
with detainees, including visitors, is said to be prohibited.
In mid-1999, an ethnic Korean with foreign citizenship was arrested
for unauthorized contact with North Koreans. This person was detained
for a month before being released.
In May 1998, a foreigner of Korean descent was detained and held
incommunicado for nearly 3 months before he was finally released. In
September 1998, another foreigner of Korean descent was held
incommunicado for more than a month for an unspecified ``violation of
law'' before being released and expelled from the country.
South Korean newspapers reported in 1997 that family members of
North Korean defector Hwang Chang Yop, former head of the Juche
Research Institute, and a senior advisor to Kim Il Song and Kim Jong
Il, who defected to South Korea in that year, were either under house
arrest or incarcerated in political prisons. However, visiting
foreigners, have seen some members of his family.
In 1991 a North Korean defector who had been a ranking official in
the DPRK Ministry of Public Security said that there were two types of
detention areas. One consists of closed camps where conditions are
extremely harsh and from which prisoners never emerge. In the other,
prisoners can be ``rehabilitated.''
In March North Korean officials in Thailand tried to detain a
Bangkok-based North Korean diplomat, Hong Sun Gyong, and his family.
Hong and his wife escaped from their abductors and then requested
asylum. Their son was taken to Laos by North Korean officials but
subsequently was allowed to rejoin his parents in Thailand. The North
Korean Government requested Hong's extradition, claiming that he had
conspired to embezzle state funds. As of October, Hong's asylum request
and his extradition case both were pending.
The Government is not known to use forced exile. However, the
Government routinely uses forced resettlement and has relocated many
tens of thousands of persons from Pyongyang to the countryside. There
are also reports that physically disabled persons and those judged to
be politically unreliable have been sent to internal exile as well.
Often those relocated are selected on the basis of family background.
Nonetheless, there is some evidence that class background is less
important than in the past because of the regime's emphasis on the
solidarity of the ``popular masses,'' and ``united front'' efforts with
overseas Koreans. According to unconfirmed September 1997 foreign press
reports, some 500 senior officials were sent into internal exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution states that
courts are independent and that judicial proceedings are to be carried
out in strict accordance with the law; however, an independent
judiciary and individual rights do not exist. The Public Security
Ministry dispenses with trials in political cases and refers defendants
to the Ministry of State Security for imposition of punishment.
The Constitution contains elaborate procedural protections, and it
states that cases are heard in public, and that the accused has the
right to a defense; hearings may be closed to the public as stipulated
by law. When trials are held, lawyers are apparently assigned by the
Government. Reports indicate that defense lawyers are not considered
representatives of the accused; rather, they are expected to help the
court by persuading the accused to confess guilt. Some reports note a
distinction between those accused of political crimes and common
criminals and state that the Government affords trials or lawyers only
to the latter. The Government considers critics of the regime to be
``political criminals.''
Numerous reports suggest that political offenses have in the past
included such behavior as sitting on newspapers bearing Kim Il Sung's
picture, or (in the case of a professor reportedly sentenced to work as
a laborer) noting in class that Kim Il Sung had received little formal
education. The KWP has a special regulation protecting the images of
Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. All citizens are required by this
regulation to protect from damage any likeness of the two Kim's.
Beginning in the 1970's, the ``10 Great Principles of Unique Ideology''
directed that anyone who tore or otherwise defaced a newspaper photo of
either of the two Kim's was a political criminal and punished as such.
Defectors have reported families being punished because children had
accidentally defaced photographs of one of the two Kim's. Families must
display pictures of the two Kim's in their homes, and if local party
officials found the family had neglected its photos, the punishment was
to write self-criticism throughout an entire year (see Section 1.f.).
A foreigner hired to work on foreign broadcasts for the regime was
imprisoned for 1 year without trial for criticizing the quality of the
regime's foreign propaganda. He was then imprisoned for 6 more years
(with trial) shortly after hisrelease for claiming in a private
conversation that his original imprisonment was unjust. While AI has
listed 58 political prisoners by name, the total number of political
prisoners being held is much larger. Several defectors and former
inmates reported that the total figure is approximately 150,000, while
South Korean authorities said the total figure is about 200,000.
The South Korean Ministry of National Unification reported to its
National Assembly in October 1997 that North Korea held more than
200,000 political prisoners in camps where many had frozen or starved
to death, and that famine may have worsened conditions. The report went
on to describe the camps as having no electricity or heating
facilities. The report claimed that those who attempted to escape were
executed immediately. Most camps are located in remote mountain or
mining areas. Some reports indicated an increase in the number of
political prisoners as North Koreans had begun to complain more openly
about the failure of the Government's economic policies.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of
person and residence and the privacy of correspondence; however, the
Government does not respect these provisions in practice. The regime
subjects its citizens to rigid controls. The state leadership perceives
most international norms of human rights, and especially individual
rights, as alien social concepts subversive to the goals of the State
and party. The Government relies upon an extensive, multilevel system
of informers to identify critics and potential troublemakers. Whole
communities sometimes are subjected to massive security checks.
According to Kim Jong Il, North Korean society represents ``a new way
of thinking'' that cannot be evaluated on the basis of ``old
yardsticks'' of human rights imported from abroad. In this context, the
DPRK celebrates the closed nature of its society. The possession of
``reactionary material'' and listening to foreign broadcasts are both
considered crimes that may subject the transgressor to harsh
punishments. In some cases, entire families are punished for alleged
political offenses committed by one member of the family. For example,
defectors have reported families being punished because children had
accidentally defaced photographs of one of the two Kim's. Families must
display pictures of the two Kim's in their homes, and must keep them
clean. Local party officials have conducted unannounced inspections
once a month, and if the inspectors found the family had neglected its
photos, the punishment was to write self-criticism throughout an entire
year (see Section 1.e.).
The Constitution provides for the right to petition. However, when
an anonymous petition or complaint about state administration is
submitted, the Ministries of State Security and Public Safety seek to
identify the author through handwriting analysis. The suspected
individual may be subjected to a thorough investigation and punishment.
The regime justifies its dictatorship with arguments derived from
concepts of collective consciousness and the superiority of the
collective over the individual, appeals to nationalism, and citations
of ``the juche idea.'' The authorities emphasize that the core concept
of juche is ``the ability to act independently without regard to
outside interference.'' Originally described as ``a creative
application of Marxism-Leninism'' in the national context, juche is a
malleable philosophy reinterpreted from time to time by the regime as
its ideological needs change and used by the regime as a ``spiritual''
underpinning for its rule.
As defined by Kim Il Sung, juche is a quasi-mystical concept in
which the collective will of the people is distilled into a supreme
leader whose every act exemplifies the State and society's needs.
Opposition to such a leader, or to the rules, regulations, and goals
established by his regime is thus in itself opposition to the national
interest. The regime therefore claims a social interest in identifying
and isolating all opposition.
Since the late 1950's the regime has divided society into three
main classes: ``Core,'' ``wavering,'' and ``hostile.'' These three
classes are further subdivided into subcategories based on perceived
loyalty to the Party and the leadership. Security ratings are assigned
to each individual; according to some estimates, nearly half of the
population is designated as either ``wavering'' or ``hostile.'' These
loyalty ratings determine access to employment, higher education, place
of residence, medical facilities, and certain stores. They also affect
the severity of punishment in the case of legal infractions. While
there are signs that this rigid system has been relaxed somewhat in
recent years--for example, children of religious practitioners are no
longer automatically barred from higher education--it remains a basic
characteristic of KWP political control.
Citizens with relatives who fled to South Korea at the time of the
Korean War still appear to be classified as part of the``hostile
class'' in the DPRK's elaborate loyalty system. This subcategory alone
encompasses a significant percentage of the population. One defector
estimated that the class of those considered potentially hostile may
comprise 25 to 30 percent of the population; others place the figure at
closer to 20 percent. Members of this class are still subject to
discrimination, although a defector has claimed that their treatment
has improved greatly in recent years.
The authorities subject citizens of all age groups and occupations
to intensive political and ideological indoctrination. Even after Kim
Il Sung's death, his cult of personality and the glorification of his
family and the official juche ideology remained omnipresent. The cult
approaches the level of a state religion.
The goal of indoctrination remains to ensure loyalty to the system
and leadership, as well as conformity to the State's ideology and
authority. The necessity for the intensification of such indoctrination
is repeatedly stressed in the writings of Kim Jong Il, who attributes
the collapse of the Soviet Union largely to insufficient ideological
indoctrination, compounded by the entry of foreign influences.
Indoctrination is carried out systematically, not only through the
mass media, but also in schools and through worker and neighborhood
associations. Kim Jong Il has stated that ideological education must
take precedence over academic education in the nation's schools, and he
has also called for the intensification of mandatory ideological study
and discussion sessions for adult workers.
In 1997 the Nodong Shinmun newspaper announced that the class
indoctrination program would be intensified after Kim Jong Il assumed
the office of General Secretary of the KWP. The program was being
administered by the KWP's basic-level organizations in all areas of the
country. The program stressed two points: That the Kim Jong Il
leadership blesses the people, and that the people must do their best
for the economy.
Another aspect of the State's indoctrination system is the use of
mass marches, rallies, and staged performances, sometimes involving
hundreds of thousands of people. In September 1998, celebrations of the
50th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK included hours of
carefully choreographed demonstration of mass adulation of the
leadership. In October 1997, similar celebrations of the 50th
anniversary of the KWP reportedly involved virtually the entire
population of Pyongyang and outlying communities. Foreign visitors have
been told that nonparticipation by Pyongyang residents in this event
was unthinkable.
The Government monitors correspondence and telephones. Telephones
essentially are restricted to domestic operation although some
international service is available on a very restricted basis.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Articles of the Constitution that
require citizens to follow ``Socialist norms of life'' and to obey a
``collective spirit'' take precedence over individual political or
civil liberties. Although the Constitution provides for freedom of
speech and the press, the Government prohibits the exercise of these
rights in practice. The regime permits only activities that support its
objectives.
The Government strictly curtails freedom of expression. The
authorities may punish persons for criticizing the regime or its
policies by imprisonment or ``corrective labor.'' One defector reported
in 1986 that a scientist, whose home was under surveillance through his
radio set, was arrested and executed for statements made at home
critical of Kim Il Sung. In another case, AI reports that a family
formerly resident in Japan was sent to a ``reeducation-through-labor''
center because one member of the family allegedly made remarks
disparaging the Government.
The Government attempts to control all information. It carefully
manages the visits of Western journalists. In 1996 the Cable News
Network was allowed to broadcast live, unedited coverage of the 2nd
year memorial service for the death of Kim Il Sung. The regime recently
allowed foreign journalists to report on the food situation. Foreign
journalists also were allowed to report on the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO) light-water reactor groundbreaking at
Kumho in 1997. Although more foreign journalists have been allowed into
North Korea, the Government still maintains the strictest control over
the movements of foreign visitors. Domestic media censorship is
strictly enforced, and no deviation from the official government line
is tolerated.
The regime prohibits listening to foreign media broadcasts except
by the political elite, and violators are subject to severe punishment.
Radios and television sets receive only domestic programming; radios
obtained from abroad must be submitted for alteration to operate in a
similar manner. Private telephone lines operate on an internal system
that prevents making and receiving calls from outside the country.
International phone lines are available under very restricted
circumstances. The Government set up an Internet web site, based in
Tokyo, Japan, for propaganda purposes. There may be very limited
Internet access in North Korea for government officials, according to
recent reports.
Late in 1997, the Government published threats against South Korean
media for criticizing the North Korean leadership. The first instance
was in response to a South Korean newspaper editorial; the second in
reaction to a television drama about life in North Korea.
The Government severely restricts academic freedom and controls
artistic and academic works. Visitors report that one of the primary
functions of plays, movies, operas, children's performances, and books
is to contribute to the cult of personality surrounding Kim Il Sung and
Kim Jong Il.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Although the
Constitution provides for freedom of assembly, the Government does not
respect this provision in practice. The Government prohibits any public
meetings without authorization.
Although the Constitution provides for freedom of association, the
Government does not respect this provision in practice. There are no
known organizations other than those created by the Government.
Professional associations exist primarily as a means of government
monitoring and control over the members of these organizations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for the
``freedom of religious belief,'' including ``the right to build
buildings for religious use.'' However, the same article adds that ``no
one can use religion as a means to drag in foreign powers'' or to
disrupt the social order. In practice the regime discourages all
organized religious activity except that which serves the interests of
the State.
In recent years, the regime has allowed the formation of several
government-sponsored religious organizations. These serve as
interlocutors with foreign church groups and international aid
organizations. Some foreigners who have met with representatives of
these organizations are convinced that they are sincere believers;
others claim that they appeared to know little about religious dogma,
liturgy, or teaching.
There are a few Buddhist temples where religious activity is
permitted, and three Christian churches--two Protestant and one
Catholic--have opened since 1988 in Pyongyang. Many visitors say that
church activity appears staged. Foreign Christians who have attempted
to attend services at these churches without making prior arrangements
with the authorities report finding them locked and unattended, even on
Easter Sunday. The authorities have told foreign visitors that one
Protestant seminary exists, accepting six to nine pupils every 3 years.
The DPRK claims that there are 10,000 Christians who worship in 500
house churches, and the Chondogyo Young Friends Party, a government-
sponsored group based on a native Korean religious movement, is still
in existence.
Prison inmates who are imprisoned for their religious beliefs or
who try to worship in prison reportedly are treated worse than other
inmates (see Section 1.c.).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--In the past, the regime has strictly
controlled internal travel, requiring a travel pass for any movement
outside one's home village. These passes were granted only for official
travel or attendance at a relative's wedding or funeral. Long delays in
obtaining the necessary permit often resulted in denial of the right to
travel even for these limited purposes. In recent years, it appears
that the internal controls on travel have eased or broken down
somewhat. There are reports of significant movement of people traveling
across the country in search of food. Only members of a very small
elite have vehicles for personal use. The regime tightly controls
access to civilian aircraft, trains, buses, food, and fuel.
Reports, primarily from defectors, indicate that the Government
routinely uses forced resettlement, particularly for those deemed
politically unreliable. The Government strictly controls permission to
reside in, or even enter, Pyongyang. This is a significant lever, since
food, housing, health, and general living conditions are much better in
Pyongyang than in the rest of the country.
AI has reported serious human rights abuses involving North Korean
workers working in the Far Eastern portion of Russia and North Korean
refugees living in Russia. There are about 6,000 DPRK workers in camps
in the Russian Far East engaged in farming, mining, and construction.
Conditions in these North Korean-run camps are harsh; food is scarce;
and discipline is severe. In the past, there have been allegations that
discipline includes physical torture such as placing wooden logs
between the knees of offenders, after which they were forced to sit
down, causing them excruciating pain. In recent years, offenders have
been sent back to the DPRK for punishment due to the increased scrutiny
that the labor camps have been under since Russian and foreign media
began reporting on the conditions in these camps in the early 1990's.
North Korean refugees in Russia comprise two groups: Those who were
selected to work in Russia but refused to return to the DPRK and those
who have fled into Russia from the DPRK. Until 1993 under a ``secret
protocol,'' the DPRK Public Security Service reportedly was allowed to
work inside Russia to track down workers who fled the camps. Since 1993
many North Korean refugees have been engaged in business in the Russian
Far East.
Many North Korean refugees in Russia face severe hardships due to
their lack of any identification. Workers arriving in Russia usually
have their passport and other identification confiscated by North
Korean border guards.
The DPRK Government reportedly tried to prevent defections in
Russia by using diplomatic channels to influence Russian authorities
and international organizations. In a number of cases, North Korean
authorities reportedly told Russian authorities that a particular North
Korean who had applied for asylum in Russia or elsewhere was a criminal
offender in North Korea. An extradition treaty signed by both nations
in 1957 requires that defectors with criminal records be returned to
their country.
The regime limits foreign travel to officials and trusted artists,
athletes, academics, and religious figures. It does not allow
emigration. In recent years, there are persistent reports of a steady
increase in North Korean defectors arriving in China, Hong Kong,
Vietnam, and other Asian countries. The regimereportedly retaliates
harshly against the relatives of those who manage to escape. According
to the Penal Code, defection and attempted defection (including the
attempt to gain entry to a foreign embassy for the purpose of seeking
political asylum) are capital crimes. Defectors have stated that DPRK
border guards have received shoot-to-kill orders against potential
defectors attempting to cross the border into China. Other defectors
have reported that some defectors who have been involuntarily returned
have been executed (see Section 1.a.). Following the collapse of
European communism, the regime recalled several thousand students from
overseas. It no longer allows students to study abroad except in China
and a few other places.
According to South Korean media accounts, the DPRK increased
controls over the population when Hwang Chang Yop defected in 1997 (see
Section 1.d.).
From 1959 to 1982, 93,000 Korean residents of Japan, including
6,637 Japanese wives, voluntarily repatriated to North Korea. Despite
DPRK assurances that the wives, more than a third of whom still had
Japanese citizenship, would be allowed to visit Japan every 2 or 3
years, none were permitted to do so until 1997. Many have not been
heard from, and their relatives and friends in Japan have been
unsuccessful in their efforts to gain information about their condition
and whereabouts.
The DPRK and the Japanese Government held a series of bilateral
meetings in Beijing in the second half of 1997, during which the DPRK
agreed to allow some Japanese wives resident in North Korea to visit
Japan. The first such visit occurred in November 1997 when 15 Japanese
wives arrived for a 1-week visit. An additional 12 Japanese wives
visited for a week in January and February. In June the DPRK
authorities cancelled a visit by Japanese-born women to Japan. In
announcing the cancellation, the state-controlled media cited
``artificial hurdles and inhuman acts on the Japanese side.''
Although the DPRK has permitted an increasing number of overseas
Korean residents of North America, Japan, China, and other countries to
visit their relatives in North Korea over the past decade, most
requests for such visits are still denied. Many foreign visitors to the
1995 International Pyongyang Sports Festival reported that they were
denied permission to visit or otherwise contact their relatives, even
those who lived only a few miles from Pyongyang.
Although the DPRK is a member of the United Nations, it does not
participate in international refugee forums, and it is not in contact
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. There is no known policy
or provision for first asylum.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have no right or mechanisms to change their leadership or
government. The political system is completely dominated by the KWP,
with Kim Il Sung's heir Kim Jong Il in full control. Very little
reliable information is available on intraregime politics following Kim
Il Sung's death. The legislature, the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA),
which meets only a few days a year, serves only to rubber-stamp
resolutions presented to it by the party leadership. In October 1997,
Kim Jong Il acceded to the position of General Secretary of the Korean
Worker's Party. In September the SPA reconfirmed Kim as the Chairman of
the National Defense Commission and declared that position the
``highest office of State.'' The presidency was abolished, leaving the
late Kim Il Sung as the DPRK's only President.
In an effort to give the appearance of democracy, the DPRK has
created several ``minority parties.'' Lacking grassroots organizations,
they exist only as rosters of officials with token representation in
the Supreme People's Assembly. Their primary purpose appears to be
promoting government objectives abroad as touring parliamentarians.
Free elections do not exist, and Kim Jong Il has criticized the concept
of free elections and competition among political parties as an
artifact of capitalist decay.
Elections to the Supreme People's Assembly and to provincial, city,
and county assemblies are held irregularly. In July SPA elections were
held for the first time since 1990. According to the government-
controlled media, over 99 percent of the voters participated to elect
100 percent of the candidates approved by the KWP. Results of previous
SPA elections have produced virtually identical outcomes. The vast
majority of the KWP's estimated 3 million members (in a population of
23 million) work to implement decrees formulated by the Party's small
elite.
Few women have reached high levels of the Party or the Government.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government does not permit any independent domestic
organizations to monitor human rights conditions or to comment on
violations of such rights. Although a North Korean Human Rights
Committee was established in 1992, it denies the existence of any human
rights violations in North Korea and is merely a propaganda arm of the
regime. However, by offering international human rights organizations
an identifiable official interlocutor, the Committee helped increase
their ability to enter into two-way communication with the regime.
In April 1998, during the 54th meeting of the U.N. Commision on
Human Rights, the North Korean delegation accused the international
community of slandering the DPRK's human rights record, adding that the
DPRK Government would not tolerate ``any attempt to hurt the
sovereignty and dignity of the country under the pretext of human
rights.''
In 1996 a delegation from AI visited the DPRK and discussed legal
reforms and prisoner cases with senior government officials. The
Government has ignored requests for visits by other international human
rights organizations.
In August 1997, the U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities adopted a resolution
criticizing the DPRK for its human rights practices. The DPRK
subsequently announced that it would withdraw from the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), calling the resolution
an attack on its sovereignty. For more than a decade, the DPRK had
failed to report on its implementation of the ICCPR to the U.N. Human
Rights Committee. In October 1997, the U.N. Human Rights Committee
issued a statement criticizing the attempt by North Korea to withdraw
from the ICCPR, noting that countries that had ratified the ICCPR could
not withdraw from the covenant. In August 1998, the Human Rights
Committee readopted a resolution urging the DPRK to improve its human
rights record.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution grants equal rights to all citizens. However, in
practice the Government denies its citizens most fundamental human
rights. There was pervasive discrimination on the basis of social
status.
Women.--There is no information available on violence against
women.
The Constitution states that ``women hold equal social status and
rights with men.'' However, although women are represented
proportionally in the labor force, few women have reached high levels
of the party or the Government. In many small factories, the work force
is predominantly female. Like men, working-age women must work. They
are thus required to leave their preschool children in the care of
elderly relatives or in state nurseries. However, according to the
Constitution, women with large families are to work shorter hours.
There were reports that women were trafficked to China (see Section
6.f.).
Children.--Social norms reflect traditional, family-centered values
in which children are cherished. The State provides compulsory
education for all children until the age of 15. Some children are
denied educational opportunities and subjected to other punishments and
disadvantages as a result of the loyalty classification system and the
principle of ``collective retribution'' for the transgressions of their
parents (see Section 1.f.).
Like others in society, children are the objects of intense
political indoctrination; even mathematics textbooks propound party
dogma. In addition, foreign visitors and academic sources report that
children from an early age are subjected to several hours a week of
mandatory military training and indoctrination at their schools. School
children are sometimes sent to work in factories or in the fields for
short periods to assist in completing special projects or in meeting
production goals.
In practice children do not enjoy any more civil liberties than
adults. In June the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)
released its concluding observations on a February 1996 report
submitted by the DPRK, detailing its adherence to the International
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The UNCRCfound that the DPRK
``strategy, policies, and programs for children do not fully reflect
the rights-based approach enshrined in the convention.'' The UNCRC also
expressed concern over ``de facto discrimination against children with
disabilities and at the insufficient measures taken by the state party
to ensure that these children have effective access to health,
education, and social services, and to facilitate their full
integration into society.''
According to the World Food Program, the international community is
feeding nearly every child under the age of 7 years. In some remote
provinces, many persons over the age of 6 years reportedly appear to be
suffering from long-term malnutrition. In August 1997, a senior U.N.
Children's Fund (UNICEF) official said that about 80,000 children in
North Korea were in immediate danger of dying from hunger and disease;
800,000 more were suffering from malnutrition to a serious but lesser
degree.
In the fall of 1998, the NGO's Doctors Without Borders (DWB) and
Doctors of the World closed their offices in the DPRK because the
Government denied them access to a large population of sick and
malnourished children. DWB officials said that they had evidence that
orphaned and homeless children had been gathered into so-called ``9-27
camps.'' These camps reportedly were established under a September 27,
1995 order from Kim Jong Il to ``normalize'' the country. North Korean
refugees who have escaped from the 9-27 camps into China have reported
inhuman conditions.
Information about societal or familial abuse of children is
unavailable. There were reports that young girls were trafficked to
China (see Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--Traditional social norms condone
discrimination against the physically disabled. Disabled persons almost
never are seen within the city limits of Pyongyang, and several
defectors and other former residents report that disabled persons are
assigned to the rural areas routinely. According to one report,
authorities check every 2 to 3 years in the capital for persons with
deformities and relocate them to special facilities in the countryside.
There are no legally mandated provisions for accessibility to buildings
or government services for the disabled. In a statement in April, the
U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child criticized ``de facto
discrimination'' in the DPRK against children with disabilities.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Nongovernmental labor unions do not
exist. The KWP purports to represent the interests of all labor. There
is a single labor organization, the General Federation of Trade Unions
of Korea, which is affiliated with the formerly Soviet-controlled World
Federation of Trade Unions. Operating under this umbrella, unions
function on the classic ``Stalinist model,'' with responsibility for
mobilizing workers behind production goals and for providing health,
education, cultural, and welfare facilities. Unions do not have the
right to strike.
North Korea is not a member of, but has observer status with, the
International Labor Organization.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have no
right to organize or to bargain collectively. Government ministries set
wages. The State assigns all jobs. Ideological purity is as important
as professional competence in deciding who receives a particular job,
and foreign companies that have established joint ventures report that
all their employees must be hired from lists submitted by the KWP.
Factory and farm workers are organized into councils, which do have an
impact on management decisions.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--There is no
prohibition on the use of forced or compulsory labor, and the
Government frequently mobilizes the population for construction
projects. Military conscripts routinely are used for this purpose as
well. ``Reformatory labor'' and ``reeducation through labor'' are
common punishments for political offenses. AI reports that forced
labor, such as logging and tending crops, is common among prisoners.
School children are assigned to factories or farms for short periods to
help meet production goals (see Section 5).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--According to the Constitution, the State prohibits work by
children under the age of 16 years. As education is universal and
mandatory until the age of 15, it is believed that this regulation is
enforced. There is no prohibition on forced laborby children, and
school children are assigned to factories or farms for short periods to
help meet production goals (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--No data is available on the
minimum wage in state-owned industries. Until the increasing food
shortages of recent years, wages and rations appeared to be adequate to
support workers and their families at a subsistence level. Wages are
not the primary form of compensation since the State provides all
educational and medical needs free of charge, while only token rent is
charged. The minimum wage for workers in North Korea's free economic
and trade zone (FETZ) is approximately $80 per month; in foreign-owned
and joint venture enterprises outside the FETZ the minimum wage is
reportedly close to $110 per month. It is not known what proportion of
the foreign-paid wages go to the worker and what proportion remains
with the State. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
(KEDO, the international organization charged with implementation of a
light-water reactor and other projects) has concluded a protocol and a
related memorandum of understanding concerning wages and other working
conditions for citizens who are to work on KEDO projects. Unskilled
laborers receive about $110 per month while skilled laborers are paid
slightly more depending on the nature of the work performed.
The Constitution states that all working-age citizens must work and
``strictly observe labor discipline and working hours.'' The Penal Code
states that anyone who hampers the nation's industry, commerce, or
transportation by intentionally failing to carry out a specific
assignment ``while pretending to be functioning normally'' is subject
to the death penalty; it also states that anyone who ``shoddily carries
out'' an assigned duty is subject to no less than 5 years''
imprisonment.
Even persistent tardiness may be defined as ``anti-Socialist
wrecking'' under these articles, although as a result of food shortages
absenteeism reportedly has become widespread as more time must be spent
finding food. A DPRK official described the labor force to an audience
of foreign business executives by noting that ``there are no riots, no
strikes, and no differences of opinion'' with management.
In 1994 the authorities reportedly adopted new labor regulations
for enterprises involving foreign investments. The regulations on labor
contracts set out provisions on the employment and dismissal of
workers, technical training, workhours, rest periods, remuneration,
labor protection, social security, fines for violations of regulations,
and settlement of disputes.
The Constitution stipulates an 8-hour workday; however, several
sources report that most laborers work from 12 to 16 hours daily. Some
of this additional time may include mandatory study of the writings of
Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. The Constitution provides all citizens
with a ``right to rest,'' including paid leave, holidays, and access to
sanitariums and rest homes funded at public expense. Many worksites are
hazardous, and the rate of industrial accidents is high.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no known laws specifically
addressing the problem of trafficking in persons.
There were reports early in the year that women and young girls
were sold by their families as wives to men in China. A network of
smugglers reportedly facilitates this trafficking.
______
LAOS
The Lao People's Democratic Republic is an authoritarian,
Communist, one-party state ruled by the Lao People's Revolutionary
Party (LPRP). Although the 1991 Constitution outlines a system composed
of executive, legislative, and judicial branches, in practice the LPRP
continued to influence governance and the choice of leaders through its
constitutional ``leading role'' at all levels. The 99-member National
Assembly, elected in 1997 under a system of universal suffrage,
selected the President and Prime Minister in February 1998. The
judiciary is subject to executive influence.
The Ministry of Interior (MOI) maintains internal security but
shares the function of state control with party and mass front
organizations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the
monitoring and oversight of foreigners working in Laos; these
activities are augmented by other security organizations' surveillance
systems. The MOI includes local police, security police (including
border police), communication police, and other armed police units. The
armed forces are responsible for external security but also have some
domestic security responsibilities that include counter-terrorism and
counter-insurgency activities. Civilian authorities generally maintain
effective control over the security forces. There continue to be
credible reports that some members of the security forces committed
human rights abuses.
Laos is an extremely poor country. After the LPRP came to power in
1975, 10 percent of the population (at least 360,000 persons) fled the
country to escape the Government's harsh political and economic
policies. The economy is principally agricultural; 85 percent of the
population is engaged in subsistence agriculture. Per capita gross
domestic product is estimated to be $240 per year. Since 1986 the
Government largely has abandoned its Socialist economic policies.
Economic reforms have moved the country from a moribund, centrally
planned system to a market-oriented economy open to foreign investment
with a growing legal framework, including laws to protect property
rights.
The Government's human rights record deteriorated in some aspects
throughout the year, and serious problems remain. Citizens do not have
the right to change their government. Members of the security forces at
times abused detainees and acted brutally toward suspected insurgents.
Prison conditions are extremely harsh, and police used arbitrary
arrest, detention, and intrusive surveillance. Lengthy pretrial
detention is a problem. The judiciary is subject to executive
influence, suffers from corruption, and does not ensure citizens due
process. The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The
Government restricts freedom of speech, assembly, and association. The
Government restricts freedom of religion and arrested and detained more
than 55 Christians. The Government imposes some restrictions on freedom
of movement and the press. Some societal discrimination against women
and minorities persists. The Government restricts some worker rights.
However, it permitted increased access to the foreign press and the
Internet and actively supported a policy of encouraging greater rights
for women and minorities. The Government has begun to focus on the
problem of trafficking in women and children.
An organized Hmong insurgent group was responsible for occasional
clashes with government troops. These exchanges reportedly were brutal
on both sides.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed reports of politically motivated or other extrajudicial
killings by government officials during the year. There continued to be
isolated, unsubstantiated reports of deaths at the hands of security
forces in remote areas, usually in connection with personal disputes
and the personal abuse of authority.
Attacks by armed bands on official and civilian travelers continued
on a small scale in the central and north central regions. The attacks
apparently involved a mixture of factors including insurgency, clan
rivalry, robbery, and reaction to encroaching development. There were
reports that a few civilians were killed. The Government remained
concerned about the safety of foreigners in remote areas, although
there were no confirmed attacks on foreigners during the year.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances; however, there were contradictory reports concerning
the disappearance of two U.S. citizens near the northwest border with
Thailand. The two men, Michael Vang and Houa Ly, reportedly disappeared
on April 19. The matter remained under investigation by authorities at
year's end.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and the Penal Code prohibit torture, and
the Government generally respected these provisions in practice;
however, on occasion, members of the security forces subjected
detainees to abusive treatment. For example, in March 1998, Lao
authorities, some wearing police uniforms, detained a foreign citizen
and three family members in an unofficial detention center for 4 days.
The Government did not file charges against the four persons. The
officials reportedly kept the four persons in locked, windowless rooms
and subjected them to long and arduous interrogation before releasing
them. The Government offered no explanation for this treatment. There
is no evidence that the Government is investigating the incident
seriously.
The Government chose not to address numerous reports that were made
by groups outside the country of massive human rights abuses by
government authorities. Most of these reports could not be confirmed
through independent sources. However, there continue to be credible
reports that some members of the security forces committed human rights
abuses, including arbitrary detention and intimidation. There were
unconfirmed reports that some members of the security forces were
responsible for beatings and that others acted brutally in the first
half of the year in clashes with insurgents or armed individuals
suspected to be insurgents.
Prison conditions generally are extremely harsh. Food rations are
minimal, and most prisoners rely on their families for their
subsistence. The Government discriminates in its treatment of
prisoners, restricting the family visits of some and prohibiting visits
to a few. Prison authorities use degrading treatment, solitary
confinement, and incommunicado detention against perceived problem
prisoners. There are confirmed reports that a few jails place prisoners
in leg chains, wooden stocks, or fixed hand manacles for extended
periods. Medical facilities range from poor to nonexistent. Prison
conditions for women are similar to those for men. Several
international human rights groups continued their longstanding requests
to the Government to move two political prisoners to a prison with
better conditions, including more modern medical facilities (see
Section 1.e.). At year's end, the Government continued to ignore these
humanitarian pleas.
The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison
conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides for
arrest warrants issued by the prosecutor, and the Constitution provides
for due process procedures; however, in practice the Government does
not respect these provisions fully, and arbitrary arrest and detention
remain problems. Police sometimes use temporary arrest as a means of
intimidation. Police exercise wide latitude in making arrests, relying
on exceptions to the requirement for arrest warrants for those in the
act of committing a crime or for ``urgent'' cases. Length of detention
without pretrial hearing or charges is unpredictable, and access to
family or a lawyer is not assured. There is a functioning bail system,
but its implementation is arbitrary. A statute of limitations applies
to most crimes. Alleged violations of security laws have led to lengthy
pretrial detentions without charge and minimal due process protection
of those detained. There were reports that some students, teachers, and
their associates who staged protests were detained for expressions of
hostility to the regime.
A number of Hmong returnees were detained in Thoulakhom district,
some for 2 months, on an apparently fabricated charge that was later
dropped (see Section 5).
During and after an abortive, peaceful protest in Vientiane on
October 26, police arrested at least 30 participants and detained for
questioning scores of suspected protest supporters. At least 10
suspected protesters remained in custody without charge at year's end.
The Government refused to acknowledge the incident publicly. The
Ministry of Interior did not indicate whether those arrested were in
investigative detention, in accordance with the law.
During the year, government authorities arrested and detained more
than 55 Protestant Christian believers and their spiritual leaders, at
times holding them in custody for months. In Attapeu two prisoners had
been in prison for 18 months and 16 months at year's end, respectively;
their detentions exceed the 1-year limit on investigative detention. In
Savannakhet 15 persons were held in detention for up to 10 months
before the provincial government brought charges against them related
to their religious activities. In Houaphanh 23 persons were arrested
during October and November for their religious activities; their
status was unclear at year's end. In Oudomxay four persons were
arrested in October based on their beliefs; they had not been charged
by year's end (see Section 2.c.).
Three former government officials detained in 1990 for advocating a
multiparty system and criticizing restrictions on political liberties
were not tried until 1992. One since has died in prison. That same
year, the court finally tried and handed down life sentences to three
men detained since 1975 for crimes allegedly committed during their
tenure as officials under the previous regime. One of these persons
reportedly has died in prison.
Based on known cases of detention for suspicion of violations of
national security, an estimated 100 to 200 persons are in detention.
Most of these detainees are held without trial; one person has been
detained since 1992.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
independence of the judiciary and the prosecutor's office; however,
senior government and party officials wield influence over the courts,
although likely to a lesser degree than in the past. Some corrupt
members of the judiciary appear to act with impunity. The National
Assembly Standing Committee appoints judges; the executive appoints the
Standing Committee.
The Lao People's Courts have three levels: District; municipal and
provincial; and a Supreme Court. Decisions of both the lower courts and
separate military courts are subject to review by the Supreme Court.
The Constitution provides for open trials in which defendants have
the right to defend themselves with the assistance of a lawyer or other
person. The Constitution requires authorities to inform persons of
their rights. The law states that defendants may have anyone represent
them in preparing a written case and accompanying them at their trial,
but only the defendant may present oral arguments at a criminal trial;
however, due to lack of funds, most defendants do not have lawyers.
Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence; however, in practice
lawyers face severe restrictions in criminal cases. Most trials are
little more than direct examinations of the accused, although judges
appear not to hold preconceived views of a trial's outcome. Trials for
alleged violations of some security laws and trials that involve state
secrets, children under the age of 16, or certain types of family law
are closed.
There are four known political prisoners: Two prisoners from the
pre-1975 regime, Colonel Sing Chanthakoumane and Major Pang Thong
Chokbengvoun, who are serving life sentences after trials that did not
appear to be conducted according to international standards; and two
former government officials, Latsami Khamphoui and Feng Sakchittaphong,
detained in 1990 for advocating a multiparty system and criticizing
restrictions on political liberties were not tried until 1992; they are
serving 14-year sentences based on their 1992 convictions.
Because some political prisoners may have been arrested, tried, and
convicted under security laws that prevent public court trials, there
is no reliable method to ascertain accurately their total number. There
have been no reports of other political prisoners in the last few
years.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Government imposes some limits on these rights.
Security laws allow the Government to monitor individuals' private
communications and movements. The evidence suggests that the Government
strengthened these elements of state control during the year,
especially in areas with safety and security problems. Some personal
freedoms accorded to citizens have expanded over the past few years in
tandem with liberalization of the economy.
The Constitution prohibits unlawful searches and seizures; however,
police at times disregarded constitutional provisions to safeguard
citizens' privacy, especially in rural areas. Security police may not
authorize their own searches; they must have approval from a prosecutor
or court. However, in practice they did not always obtain prior
approval. The Penal Code generally protects privacy, including mail,
telephone, and electronic correspondence.
Political groups other than mass front organizations approved by
the LPRP are forbidden. Ministry of Interior forces occasionally
monitor citizens' activities; in addition a loose militia in both urban
and rural areas has responsibility for maintaining public order and
reporting ``bad elements'' to the police. Militia usually concern
themselves more with petty crime and instances of moral turpitude than
with political activism, although some rural militia may be used for
security against insurgents. A sporadically active system of
neighborhood and workplace committees plays a similar monitoring role
on an informal and irregular basis.
The Government does not permit the public sale of some leading
foreign magazines and newspapers. However, minimal restrictions on
publications mailed from overseas are loosely enforced (see Section
2.a.). The Government allows citizens to marry foreigners but only with
its prior approval. Although the Government routinely grants
permission, the process is burdensome. Marriages to foreigners without
government approval may be annulled, with both parties subject to
fines.
The Government displaced internally hundreds of persons during the
year, mainly as a result of organized infrastructure development
programs. The Government provides compensation to displaced persons in
the form of land and household supplies. In September the Government
began a review of its policy toward ethnic minorities, including a
review of its policy of resettlement to solve the problem of highland
``slash-and-burn'' methods that destroyed forest areas and resulted in
habitat damage. Credible sources report more flexibility by the
Government toward the disposition of infrastructure-related and other
government-planned resettlements. However, some local administrators
forced highlander groups to resettle in lowland areas to control their
use of farming methods that destroy forest areas in the pursuit of
increased food security.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government severely
restricts political speech and writing in practice. The Government also
prohibits most criticism that it deems harmful to its reputation. The
Penal Code forbids slandering the State, distorting party or state
policies, inciting disorder, or propagating information or opinions
that weaken the State. The Government has shown more tolerance of
general criticisms aimed at good governance or improved public service,
and citizens who lodge legitimate complaints with government
departments generally do not suffer reprisals. In the second half of
the year, apparent government concern about public discontent over
failed economic policies led to tighter media control and fewer
critical articles and broadcasts. No Lao newspapers reported the
October 26 protest (see Section 1.d.).
All print and electronic media are state-owned and controlled.
Local news in all media reflects government policy, and only rarely
hints at differences of opinion. Television talk shows and opinion
articles refer only to differences in administrative approach.
Translations of foreign press reports generally are without bias, and
access to Thai press, radio, and television is unhindered. Other Asian
and many Western newspapers and magazines are available through private
outlets that have government permission to sell them.
Authorities also prohibited the dissemination of materials deemed
to be indecent, to undermine the national culture, or to be politically
sensitive. Films and music recordings produced in government studios
must be submitted for official censorship. However, in practice most
foreign media are easily available. Government enforcement of
restrictions on nightclub entertainment generally was lax during the
year.
Citizens have 24-hour access to Cable News Network and the British
Broadcasting Corporation, among other international stations accessible
via satellite television. The Government requires registration of
satellite dishes and a one-time licensing fee for their use, largely as
a revenue-generating scheme, but otherwise makes no effort to restrict
their use.
Foreign journalists must apply for special visas. Unfettered access
to information sources and domestic travel unescorted by officials--
hallmarks of a more liberal government attitude in previous years--
declined during the year.
The Constitution provides for academic freedom; however, the
Government restricts it, although it has relaxed its restrictions in
certain areas. Lao and Western academic professionals conducting
research in Laos may be subject to restrictions on travel and access to
information and Penal Code restrictions on publication. As the sole
employer of virtually all academic professionals, the Government
exercises some control over their ability to travel on research or
study grants. However, the Government, which once limited foreign
travel by professors, actively seeks out these opportunities worldwide
and approves virtually all such proposals.
Credible reports indicate that some academically qualified ethnic
minorities, including Hmong, are denied opportunities for foreign
fellowships and study abroad based on the actions of some state and
party officials, whose discriminatory behavior goes unchecked. On rare
occasions, the Government has denied government employees who were not
party members permission to accept certain research or study grants,
apparently because they had chosen not to join the LPRP.
While preparing to assemble and demonstrate in a peaceful protest
march on Vientiane's main boulevard, at least 30 protesters were
arrested on October 26. They reportedly intended to demand the
resignation of the Government, more freedom, and multiparty democracy.
Other suspected supporters were detained for questioning. The
Government remained silent on the arrests and subsequent detentions
(see Section 1.d.). Some government officials characterized the group's
assembly and attempts to express their opinions as illegal
antigovernment activities.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, but the Government continues to
restrict this right in practice. The Penal Code prohibits participation
in an organization for the purpose of demonstrations, protest marches,
or other acts that cause turmoil or social instability. Such acts are
punishable by a prison term of from 1 to 5 years.
In May a group of 100 citizens of China assembled in Vientiane to
protest the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) bombing that
damaged the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Serbia. Plainclothes police
quickly intercepted the group, but otherwise allowed them to conduct
their peaceful protest. This demonstration, considered the second
largest since 1975, was never reported in the local media.
In June the Government released the last 8 persons among 44
arrested in January 1998 for gathering at a Christian bible study
session in a private home. The 8 were among 13 convicted for
participating in a group assembly for the purpose of creating social
turmoil. The Vientiane municipal court record of the 1998 case
indicates that the judge considered one statement made by a member of
the group to be critical of the Government (also see Section 2.c.).
Although the Constitution provides citizens with the right to
organize and join associations, the Government restricts this right in
practice. The Government registers and controls all associations and
prohibits associations that criticize it. Although the Government
restricts many types of formal professional and social associations, in
practice informal nonpolitical groups can meet without hindrance.
Individuals who had formed the Foundation for Promoting Education, a
private voluntary organization in Vientiane Municipality in 1997, were
active during the year and awarded prizes for educational achievement
and scholarships to needy students. The group is supported by private
contributions and operates independently under its own charter, but
reports to the Ministry of Education. The Buddhist Promotion Foundation
is a semiprivate group founded in 1998 by the Lao Buddhist Fellowship
Association, which reports to the National Front.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion; however, the Government restricts this right in practice. The
Constitution prohibits ``all acts of creating division of religion or
creating division among the people.'' The Party and Government appear
to interpret this section narrowly, thus inhibiting religious practice
by all persons, including the Buddhist majority and a large population
of animists. Although official pronouncements accepted the existence of
religion, they emphasized its potential to divide, distract, or
destabilize.
The Constitution notes that the State ``mobilizes and encourages''
monks, novices, and priests of other religions to participate in
activities ``beneficial to the nation and the people.'' The Department
of Religious Affairs in the LPRP Lao National Front for Reconstruction,
an LPRP mass organization, is responsible for overseeing all religions.
The Government's tolerance of religion varied by region. In general
central government authorities appeared unable to control or mitigate
harsh measures that were taken by local or provincial authorities
against the practices of members of minority religious denominations.
Although there was almost complete freedom to worship among
unregistered groups in a few areas, particularly in the largest cities,
government authorities in many regions allowed properly registered
religious groups to practice their faith only under circumscribed
conditions. In other areas, such as Savannakhet, Houaphanh, Oudomxay,
and Attapeu, the authorities arrested and detained religious believers
and their spiritual leaders without charges. In Luang Prabang, three
evangelical Christians were sentenced on November 26 to 5 years'
imprisonment under Article 66 of the Penal Code for gathering together
to create social turmoil. Each of the three was a well-known Christian
spiritual leader. It is not known whether their single meeting was
anything other than a social get-together. In more isolated cases,
provincial authorities instructed their officials to monitor and arrest
persons who professed belief in Christianity, Islam, or the Baha'i
faith. For example, there is clear evidence that in Luang Prabang and
Savannakhet provinces the authorities continued to force some
Christians to sign renunciations of their faith.
Early in the year, citizens in Luang Prabang reported that
authorities ordered them to stop completely their Christian activities,
under threat of arrest. The order appeared to apply only to new
converts; believers of long standing were allowed to continue their
beliefs and practices.
In Savannakhet 15 persons were held in detention for up to 10
months before the provincial government brought charges against them
related to their religious activities. In Houaphanh 23 persons were
arrested during October and November for their religious activities;
their status was unclear at year's end. In Oudomxay four persons were
arrested in October for their beliefs; they had not been charged by
year's end (see Section 1.d.).
In a southern province, police refused to release a Lao Christian
who was arrested for proselytizing until the detainee had pledged not
to proselytize again. Although authorities tolerate diverse religious
practices in mid-1998, in the southern Laos panhandle, a pattern of
petty local harassment persists. Many converts must pass a gauntlet of
harsh government interviews but after overcoming that initial barrier
are permitted to practice their new faith unhindered. During the early
part of the year, members of long-established congregations had few
problems in practicing their faith; however, in the second half of the
year, some churches established a century ago were subjected to
harassment by local government officials in Savannakhet. Many groups of
coreligionists seeking to assemble in a new location are thwarted in
attempts to meet, practice, or celebrate major religious festivals.
Some minority religious groups report that they were unable during
the year to register new congregations or receive permission to
establish new places of worship, including in Vientiane. Authorities
sometimes advised new branches to join other religious groups with
similar historical antecedents, despite clear differences between the
groups' beliefs. Some groups did not submit applications for places of
worship because they did not believe that their applications would be
approved.
The Government in June released the last 8 of 13 Christians
convicted in March 1998 for exercising their rights to peaceful
assembly and free speech in a Bible study session (see Section 2.b.).
The eight remain on probation. Authorities continue to make arrests
related to religious activities. An estimated 55 to 60 members of
religious minorities remain in detention. A few of the religious
detainees are singled out for special treatment: They must wear chains
on their legs or fixed manacles on their wrists. One detainee was in
solitary confinement for a period of 3 to 4 weeks. In addition
authorities in some provinces frequently arrested and detained persons
temporarily because of their religious beliefs.
The Roman Catholic Church is unable to operate effectively in the
highlands and much of the north. However, it has an established
presence in five of the most populous central and southern provinces,
where Catholics are able to worship openly. There are three bishops: In
Vientiane, Thakhek, and Pakse. The status of the Catholic Church in
Luang Prabang center remains in doubt; there appears to be a
congregation there but, due to local obstructionism, worship services
may not always be conducted readily.
Over 250 Protestant congregations conduct services throughout the
country. The Lao National Front has recognized two Protestant groups,
the Lao Evangelical Church, the umbrella Protestant church, and the
Seventh Day Adventist Church. The Front strongly encourages all other
Protestant groups to become a part of the Lao Evangelical Church. The
Government has granted permission to these approved denominations to
have a total of four church buildings in the Vientiane area. In
addition the Lao Evangelical Church has maintained church buildings in
Savannakhet and Pakse.
The Party controls the Buddhist clergy (Sangha) in an attempt to
direct national culture. After 1975 the Government attempted to
``reform'' Buddhism and ceased to consider it the state religion,
causing thousands of monks to flee abroad, where most still remain. The
Government has only one semireligious holiday-Boun That Luang-also a
major political and cultural celebration. However, the Government
recognizes the popularity and cultural significance of Buddhist
festivals, and many senior officials openly attend them. Buddhist
clergy are featured prominently at important state and party functions.
The Lao National Front directs the Lao Buddhist Fellowship Association,
which adopted a new charter in April 1998. The Front continues to
require monks to study Marxism-Leninism, to attend certain party
meetings, and to combine with their teachings of Buddhism the party-
state policies. In recent years, some individual temples have been able
to receive support from Theraveda Buddhist temples abroad, to expand
the training of monks, and to focus more on traditional teachings.
The authorities continue to be suspicious of parts of the religious
community other than Buddhism, including some Christian groups, in part
because these faiths do not share a similar high degree of direction
and incorporation into the government structure as is the case with
Theravada Buddhism. Authoritiesespecially appear to suspect those
religious groups that gain support from foreign sources, aggressively
proselytize among the poor or uneducated, or give targeted assistance
to converts. The Government prohibits foreigners from proselytizing,
although it permits foreign nongovernmental organizations with
religious affiliations to work in the country. Although there is no
prohibition against proselytizing by citizens, there has been increased
local government investigation and harassment of citizens who do so
under the constitutional provision against creating division of
religion.
The Government permits major religious festivals of all established
congregations without hindrance. Two mosques and two Baha'i centers
operate openly in Vientiane municipality; two other Baha'i centers are
located in Vientiane province and Pakse. Five Mahayana Buddhist pagodas
are located in Vientiane, and others are found in larger cities and
towns.
The Government does not permit the printing of religious texts or
their distribution outside a congregation and restricts the import of
foreign religious texts and artifacts. The Government requires and
grants routinely its permission for formal links with coreligionists in
other countries; however, in practice the line between formal and
informal links is blurred, and relations generally are established
without much difficulty.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Migration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights; however, the Government restricted some of these rights in
practice. Citizens who travel across provincial borders are required to
report to authorities upon their departure and arrival. In designated
security zones, roadblocks and identity card checks are routine.
Citizens who seek to travel abroad are required to apply for an exit
visa; however, the Government grants these routinely. Foreigners are
restricted from traveling to certain areas such as the Saysomboun
Special Zone, an administrative area operated by the military forces,
for safety and security reasons.
Fear of insurgent attacks on civilians in vehicles traveling in the
north-central areas impedes travel, especially along parts of Route 13,
Route 7, and Route 1. Bandits operate in the same area (see Section
1.a.). The Government attempts to ensure safety on these roads.
Citizens are free to emigrate; exit visas are required, and the
Government grants these routinely.
Since 1980 more than 29,060 citizens who sought refugee status in
Thailand, China, and other countries have returned to Laos for
permanent resettlement under monitoring by the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR). There were 1,162 new returnees during the year.
The Government cooperates with the UNHCR in assisting the groups'
reintegration into society. These returnees generally have been treated
the same as other citizens.
The Constitution provides for asylum and the protection of
stateless persons under the law, which has included first asylum. There
were no known cases during the year of asylum seekers being returned to
a country where they feared persecution.
The Government has a longstanding policy of welcoming back
virtually all those among the 10 percent of the population who fled
after the change in government in 1975. Many have visited relatives,
some have stayed and gained foreign resident status, and some have
reclaimed Lao citizenship successfully. A small group tried in absentia
in 1975 for antigovernment activities does not have the right of
return. The Government announced in August that it would accept under
UNHCR monitoring the return of citizens from the Na Pho camp in
Thailand; all 1,162 returned during the year. The Government has
insisted on reviewing the backgrounds of any person being repatriated
formally.
Some refugee returnees carry identification cards with distinctive
markings, ostensibly for use by authorities. These distinctive
identification cards tend to reinforce a pattern of societal
discrimination against them.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. The
Constitution legitimizes only a single party, the Lao People's
Revolutionary Party, which must approve all candidates for local and
national elections. Candidates need not be LPRP members.
The Constitution provides for a 99-member National Assembly elected
every 5 years in open, multiple-candidate, fairly tabulated elections,
with voting by secret ballot and universal adult suffrage. The National
Assembly chooses a standing committee apparently based on the previous
standing committee's decision. Upon the committee's recommendation, the
National Assembly elects or removes the President and Vice President.
The standing committee also has powers over elections (including
approval of candidates), supervision of administrative andjudicial
organizations, and the sole power to recommend presidential decrees.
Activities of the standing committee are not fully transparent.
The National Assembly, upon the President's recommendation, elects
the Prime Minister and Ministers of the Government.
The National Assembly may consider and amend draft legislation but
may not propose new laws. The Constitution gives the right to submit
draft legislation to the National Assembly standing committee and the
ruling executive structure.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics; however,
women increased their representation in the National Assembly in 1997
elections from 9 percent to 20 percent, as 20 of the 27 female
candidates won seats. Four members of the 49-member LPRP Central
Committee are women, 2 of whom are also members of the 7-member
Standing Committee in the National Assembly. There are no women in the
Politburo or the Council of Ministers.
The number of ethnic minority members in the National Assembly--9
Lao Soung (highland tribes) and 26 Lao Theung (mid-slope dwelling
tribes)--matches their proportions in the general population. Men of
lowland Lao origin dominate the upper echelons of the Party and the
Government. Nonetheless, the President, two Deputy Prime Ministers,
three Ministers, and 35 members of the National Assembly are believed
to be members of ethnic minority groups.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no domestic nongovernmental human rights organizations,
and the Government does not have a formal procedure for registration.
Any organization wishing to investigate and publicly criticize the
Government's human rights policies would face serious obstacles if it
were permitted to operate at all. The Government cooperates on an
uneven basis with international human rights organizations.
A human rights unit in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Department
of International Treaties and Legal Affairs has responsibility for
inquiry into allegations of human rights violations. This government
unit rarely responds to inquiries regarding individual cases.
In September 1998, at the invitation of the Government, a special
U.N. Rapporteur on Trafficking in Children visited various locations
and made inquiries into possible incidents of child prostitution and
child pornography.
The Government maintains contacts with the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC); government officials received ICRC training on
human rights law in 1998, and the Government is translating some
international conventions with ICRC support. The Government has
permitted U.N. human rights observers to monitor the treatment of
returning refugees in all parts of the country with minimal
interference but occasionally places obstacle in the way of
international standards of monitoring.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal treatment under the law for all
citizens without regard to sex, social status, education, faith, or
ethnicity. Children are similarly protected. Although the Government
has been known to take action when well-documented and obvious cases of
discrimination came to the attention of high-level officials, the legal
mechanism whereby a citizen may bring charges of discrimination against
an individual or organization is neither widely developed nor widely
understood among the general population.
Women.--There are reports that domestic violence against women
occurs, although it is not widespread. Sexual harassment and rape
reportedly are rare. In cases of rape that are tried in court,
defendants generally are convicted.
The Constitution provides for equal rights for women, and the Lao
Women's Union operates nationally to promote the position of women in
society. Discrimination against women is not generalized; however,
varying degrees of traditional culturally based discrimination persist,
with greater discrimination practiced by some hill tribes. Many women
occupy responsible positions in the civil service and private business,
and in urban areas their incomes are often higher than those of men.
The Family Code prohibits legal discrimination in marriage and
inheritance.
In the period from 1997-99, the Government increased support for
the position of women in society in development programs, some of which
are designed to increase the participation of women in the political
system.
Children.--Government funding to provide fully for children's basic
health and educational needs is inadequate. Education is compulsory
through the fifth grade, but children from rural areas and poor urban
families rarely comply with this requirement. Violence against children
is prohibited by law, and violators are subject to stiff punishments.
Reports of the physical abuse of children are rare.
People With Disabilities.--With donor assistance, the Government is
implementing limited programs for the disabled, especially amputees.
The law does not mandate accessibility to buildings or government
services for disabled persons. However, a government committee is
formulating policies regarding the disabled, and a national association
worked to provide greater opportunities.
Religious Minorities.--The enhanced status given to Buddhism in
Luang Prabang--famed for its centuries-old Buddhist tradition and
numerous temples--apparently led some local officials there to act more
harshly toward minority religious sects, particularly toward Christian
and Baha'i, than in other areas of the country (see Section 2.c.).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution provides for
equal rights for citizens of all minorities, and there is no legal
discrimination against them. However, societal discrimination persists.
Approximately half the population is ethnic Lao, also called
``lowland Lao.'' Most of the remainder is a mosaic of diverse upland
hill tribes whose members, if born in Laos, are Lao citizens. There are
also ethnic Vietnamese and Chinese minorities, particularly in the
towns. There is a small community of South Asian origin. The
implementation in 1994 of the 1990 Law on Nationality provided a means
for Vietnamese and Chinese minorities to regularize their Lao
citizenship, and, in sharp contrast with past practice, hundreds did so
during the year. The Government encourages the preservation of minority
cultures and traditions; however, due to their remote location and
difficult access, minority tribes have little voice in government
decisions affecting their lands and the allocation of natural
resources.
The Hmong are one of the largest and most prominent highland
minority groups. Societal discrimination against the Hmong continues,
although there are a number of Hmong officials in the senior ranks of
the Government. In recent years, the Government focused assistance
projects in Hmong areas in order to overcome disparities in income
along regional and ethnic lines. Some international observers claim
that governmental policies aimed at assimilating the Hmong into larger
society--such as regional boarding schools--are not respectful of Hmong
native culture; others see this approach as an avenue out of centuries
of poverty.
During the year, the Government continued to assist citizens,
largely members of ethnic minorities, who returned to Laos after having
fled in 1975. Central and local government officials worked with
organizations such as the UNHCR to provide land and a sustainable level
of economic security. Repatriated Hmong generally face no greater
discrimination than those Hmong who remained. Two U.N. observers who
monitored repatriation efforts reported no serious incidents of abuse
or discrimination during the year. However, a number of Hmong returnees
were detained in Thoulakhom district, some for 2 months, before an
apparently fabricated charge was dropped.
Under the Constitution, aliens and stateless foreign citizens are
protected by ``provisions of the laws,'' but do not in fact enjoy
rights provided for by the Constitution. During the year, there were
isolated cases of persons of Lao ethnic background who, as citizens of
other nations, suffered discrimination when arrested or detained and
were denied due process, apparently on the basis of their Lao ethnic
background.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Under the 1990 Labor Code and a 1995
prime ministerial decree, labor unions can be formed in private
enterprises as long as they operate within the framework of the
officially sanctioned Federation of Lao Trade Unions (FLTU), which in
turn is controlled by the LPRP. Most of the FLTU's 78,000 members work
in the public sector, overwhelmingly as public servants.
The State employs the majority of salaried workers, although this
situation is changing as the Government reduces the number of its
employees and privatizes state enterprises, and as foreign investors
open new factories and businesses. Subsistence farmers comprise an
estimated 85 percent of the work force.
Strikes are not prohibited by law, but the Government's ban on
subversive activities or destabilizing demonstrations (see Section
2.b.) makes a strike unlikely, and none were reported during the year.
However, the Labor Code does not prohibit temporary work stoppages.
With advice from the International Labor Organization (ILO),
including a foreign expert provided by the ILO to work with the
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, the Government revised the Labor
Code in an effort to clarify the rights and obligations of workers and
employers.
The FLTU is free to engage in contacts with foreign labor
organizations, which during the year included the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Trade Union and the Asia-Pacific
American Labor Alliance. The FLTU is a member of the World Federation
of Trade Unions (WFTU).
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There is no
right to organize and bargain collectively. The Labor Code stipulates
that disputes be resolved through workplace committees composed of
employers, representatives of the local labor union, and
representatives of the FLTU, with final authority residing in the
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. Labor disputes are infrequent.
The Government sets wages and salaries for government employees, while
management sets wages and salaries for private business employees.
The Labor Code stipulates that employers may not fire employees for
conducting trade union activities, for lodging complaints against
employers about labor law implementation, or for cooperating with
officials on labor law implementation and labor disputes. Workplace
committees are one mechanism used for resolving complaints.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
prohibits forced labor except in time of war or national disaster, when
the State may conscript laborers. The code also applies to children
under the age of 15, and generally is enforced effectively. However,
reports that children are being lured into other countries for sexual
exploitation and slave labor continued, although there were fewer such
reports than before 1997 (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Under the Labor Code, children under the age of 15 may not
be recruited for employment. However, many children help their families
on farms or in shops. The Labor Code accordingly provides that children
may work for their families, provided that such children are not
engaged in dangerous or difficult work. Such employment of children is
common in urban shops, but rare in industrial enterprises. The
Ministries of Interior and Justice are responsible for enforcing these
provisions, but enforcement is ineffective due to a lack of inspectors
and other resources. Education is compulsory through the fifth grade,
but this requirement rarely is observed in the rural areas or among the
urban poor. The Labor Code prohibits forced and bonded labor performed
by children under age 15, and the law generally is enforced
effectively; however, there were reports that children were lured into
sexual exploitation and slavery abroad (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code provides for a
broad range of worker entitlements, including a workweek limited to 48
hours (36 hours for employment in dangerous activities), safe working
conditions, and higher compensation for dangerous work. The Code also
provides for at least 1 day of rest per week. Employers are responsible
for all expenses for a worker injured or killed on the job, a
requirement generally fulfilled by employers in the formal economic
sector. The daily minimum wage is $0.25 (1,820 kip), which is
insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. Most civil servants receive inadequate pay. However, few
families in the wage economy depend on only one breadwinner. Some
piecework employees, especially on construction sites, earn less than
the minimum wage. Many persons are illegal immigrants, particularly
from Vietnam and are more vulnerable to exploitation by employers.
Although workplace inspections reportedly have increased, the Ministry
of Labor and Social Welfare lacks the personnel and budgetary resources
to enforce the Labor Code effectively. The Labor Code has no specific
provision allowing workers to remove themselves from a dangerous
situation without jeopardizing their employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The penal code prohibits abduction and
trade in persons as well as the constraint, procuring, and prostitution
of persons. However, the Government only recently has focused on the
trafficking of persons across its borders. Although there are no
reliable data available on the scope and severity of the problem, there
are indications that the numbers are considerable. The Government has
increased monitoring and educational programs provided by the Lao
Women's Union and the Youth Union, both party-sanctioned organizations,
designed to educate girls and young women about the schemes of
recruiters for brothels and sweatshops in neighboring countries and
elsewhere. In the past, the Government has prosecuted some persons for
involvement in such recruiting activities. During the year, law
enforcement agencies conducted a minimal number of raids on
entertainment establishments accused of fostering prostitution.
The Government is increasingly concerned about Lao children being
lured for sexual exploitation and slave labor in other countries. The
National Commission for Mothers and Children, established in 1992 and
chaired by the Foreign Minister, continues an active program with
support from the U.N. Children's Fund (see Section 6.c.). The
Commission, working with the Lao Women's Union, Youth Union, Justice
Ministry, and Labor Ministry, has conducted workshops around the
country designed to make parents and teenagers aware of the dangers of
HIV. At the Government's invitation, a special U.N. Rapporteur on
Trafficking in Children visited in September 1998 (see Section 4).
______
MALAYSIA
Malaysia is a federation of 13 states and two federal territories
with a parliamentary system of government based on periodic multiparty
elections in which the ruling National Front coalition has held power
for more than 40 years. Opposition parties actively contest elections,
but face serious obstacles in competing with the long-entrenched ruling
coalition. However, in November elections opposition parties won
roughly 25 percent of the seats in the Federal Parliament, and an
opposition party also won control of two state governments. The
Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, government
action, constitutional amendments, legislation, and other factors
undermine judicial independence and strengthen executive influence over
the judiciary. The impartiality of the judiciary continued to
deteriorate during the year.
The Royal Malaysian Police have primary responsibility for internal
security matters. The police report to and are under the effective
control of the Home Minister. Some members of the police committed
human rights abuses.
Malaysia is an advanced developing country with an estimated per
capita gross domestic product (GDP) of $3,745 and an unemployment rate
of 3.0 percent. Following nearly a decade of strong economic growth
averaging over 8 percent annually, it was hit hard by the 1997 regional
financial and economic crisis. After contracting by 7.5 percent in
1998, the economy began to recover during the year, posting an
estimated 4.8 percent growth rate. During 1998 the Government adopted
stimulative fiscal and monetary policies to promote economic recovery
and established institutions to recapitalize distressed financial
institutions and to remove nonperforming loans from the banking system.
It also enacted selected capital controls to eliminate offshore trading
in the local currency (ringgit) and to insulate the domestic economy
from the effects of short-term, speculative capital flows. The
Government takes an active role in the development of the export-
oriented economy. Manufacturing accounts for 27.9 percent, services for
52.2 percent, agriculture for 9 percent, and construction and mining
for 10.9 percent of GDP. Principal manufactured products include
semiconductors, consumer electronics, electrical products, textiles,
and apparel. Palm oil exports and production of natural rubber, cocoa,
and tropical timber also are significant.
There continued to be serious problems in the Government's human
rights record in certain areas. Police committed a number of
extrajudicial killings, although fewer than in previous years. Police
on occasion tortured, beat, or otherwise abused prisoners, detainees,
and demonstrators. The former chief of police admitted to having beaten
the handcuffed and blindfolded former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar
Ibrahim in 1998. For political reasons, Anwar was charged with
obstruction of justice in 1998 and convicted in April. Improper conduct
by the police and prosecutors, along with many questionable rulings by
the judge, denied Anwar a fair opportunity to defend himself. At year's
end, Anwar was being tried on a charge of sodomy and being held without
bail. Police continued to arrest and detain many persons without trial
or charge. Prolonged pretrial detention is a serious problem. Detained
criminal suspects are denied access routinely to legal counsel prior to
being charged formally. An Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) delegation
found that prison conditions were not in accord with international
norms. Conditions of detention of illegal alien detainees continued to
pose a threat to life and health; the trial of a prominent human rights
activist on charges arising from her criticisms of such conditions
continued. A Western journalist was jailed after losing an appeal of a
1997 conviction for contempt of court stemming from an article that
raised questions of judicial favoritism. The Attorney General practiced
politically motivated, selective prosecution. Many observers expressed
serious doubts about the independence and impartiality of the
judiciary. The courts defied an International Court of Justice (ICJ)
ruling that a United Nations Special Rapporteur was immune from several
libel suits. Government restrictions, pressure, and intimidation led to
a high degree of press self-censorship. The Government cracked down on
newsstand sales of an opposition party newspaper. A U.N. Special
Rapporteur reported that the Government systematically curtailed
freedom of expression. Proliferating slander and libel suits threatened
to stifle freedom of speech. Authorities infringed on citizens' privacy
rights. The Government placed some restrictions on freedom of assembly
and some peaceful gatherings. The Government continues to restrict
significantly freedom of association. The Government continued to
prohibit students from participating in some political activities.
Religious freedom is subject to some restrictions, in particular the
right of Muslims to practice teachings other than Sunni Islam. In
addition the right of Muslims to change their religion was hindered by
many practical obstacles. The Government continued to impose some
restrictions on freedom of movement. Government restrictions and
policies prevent opposition parties fromcompeting effectively with the
ruling coalition. The Election Commission's lack of independence
prevents it from properly implementing and monitoring elections. The
Government passed legislation to form a National Human Rights
Commission; however, opposition and nongovernmental organization (NGO)
leaders were skeptical of its potential independence and effectiveness.
The Government continued to criticize harshly human rights NGO's.
Despite government efforts, societal violence and discrimination
against women remain problems. Malaysia is a source, transit, and
destination country for trafficking in women and girls for the purpose
of forced prostitution. Sexual abuse of children occurs, although it is
punished severely. Indigenous people face discrimination and often are
exploited, especially in regard to land issues. Longstanding policies
give preferences to ethnic Malays in many areas, and ethnic minorities
face discrimination. Some restrictions on worker rights persist. Child
labor persists, although the Government has taken vigorous action
against it.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings; however, police committed a number of
extrajudicial killings.
The press reported 11 incidents of police killings in the course of
apprehension with a total of 18 persons killed. Reports of police
killings decreased significantly shortly after a change in senior
police personnel in January (see Section 1.c.). However, some cases
still raised concerns. In January a bank teller was killed in a police
shoot-out. Police personnel announced later that they were
investigating the case; however, the results of the investigation were
not disclosed. Also in January, an opposition figure in Sabah alleged
that police brutality led to the death from renal failure of a murder
suspect. Police denied the allegation, and there was no report of any
investigation. In January the Bar Council called on the police to
implement a standard procedure to investigate every lethal shooting by
police; however, the police did not implement such a procedure. In
March a suspected kidnaper fell to his death from a 4th floor window at
Selangor state police headquarters. Police said that the suspect threw
himself from the window while being questioned. No investigation into
this death was reported.
In February a customs officer was detained after a man was shot and
killed during a high-speed chase in Sarawak. In July the customs
officer was convicted of manslaughter and fined roughly $1,580 (6,000
ringgit). In August two police officers were detained in connection
with the death of a suspected drug trafficker in Sabah. Police claimed
that the trafficker died after falling and hitting his head on a stone.
At year's end there were no reports of further developments. In
September a police agent was charged with culpable homicide not
amounting to murder after he shot a man seated in his car. In February
the acting inspector general of police said that police investigations
into two previous shooting incidents had shown that police conduct in
each incident was justified. The families of the victims in the two
shooting incidents said that they plan to sue the police. In October a
man asked police authorities to investigate the death of his son in
prison. The man said that his son previously had been beaten in prison
and that he did not believe that his son really had died of natural
causes, as claimed by police officials. Police responded that the
prisoner had died of heart disease in a hospital emergency room after
prison guards had found him unconscious in his cell. There were no
reports of investigations into any other police killings.
There were numerous allegations that inhuman conditions of
detention caused the deaths of illegal aliens (see Section 1.c.).
A spate of questionable police killings of suspects in the course
of apprehension in 1998 led the president of a leading human rights NGO
to question publicly whether police sometimes were acting as ``judge,
jury, and executioner.'' In February a group of 119 domestic NGO's
called for an independent commission to look into these and other
police killings. The Government did not form such a commission. In
October the Deputy Home Minister informed Parliament that police had
shot and killed 387 persons over the past 5 years.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--No constitutional provision or law specifically prohibits
torture, although laws that prohibit ``committing grievous hurt''
encompass torture; however, at times some police tortured, beat, and
otherwise abused prisoners, detainees, and ordinary citizens. The
authorities investigated some police and other officials for such
abuses; however, the Government does not routinely release information
on the results of investigations, and whether those responsible are
punished is not always known.
Police continued to abuse detainees. Police sometimes subjected
criminal suspects and illegal alien detainees to physical and
psychological torture during interrogation and detention. During the
1998 trial of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, senior police
officers testified that the police had institutionalized techniques to
subject some ``national security'' detainees to coercive and abusive
treatment. A senior police officer said that police did not consider
the legality of such tactics. During the year, police instituted
mandatory community relations and ethics courses to address public
concerns over police misconduct.
In February former Inspector General of Police Tan Sri Rahim Noor
admitted before a Royal Commission of Inquiry that in September 1998 he
personally had beaten the handcuffed and blindfolded former Deputy
Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim while the latter was detained by police
(see Section 1.d.). The beating badly bruised Anwar's face, neck, and
arms, and reportedly temporarily left him with impaired balance and
unclear vision. Rahim said that Anwar had provoked him. The Royal
Commission found Rahim culpable in the beating of Anwar. Police
subsequently charged Rahim with attempted assault and his trial is
scheduled for March 2000. If convicted, he faces a maximum sentence of
3\1/2\ years in prison.
Prime Minister Mahathir formed the Royal Commission after a long
police internal investigation, the results of which were announced by
Attorney General Tan Sri Mohtar Abdullah in January, established that
police had been responsible for the beating of Anwar (however, the
police investigation failed to identify a culprit). The Commission
found no other members of the police culpable or complicit in the
beating of Anwar or in the subsequent cover-up. In April the Malaysian
Bar Council expressed shock that the Royal Commission had recommended
that no action be taken against senior police officers who failed to
report or arrest Rahim after the beating. Anwar's supporters called on
the Prime Minister, who (at the time) oversaw the police as Home
Minister, to take responsibility for Anwar's beating.
In February a fashion designer, Mior Abdul Razak bin Yahya, swore
in an affidavit that police had threatened and abused him after he was
detained in September 1998. Mior said that because of police threats
and coercion he had confessed falsely to having had sexual relations
with the former Deputy Prime Minister. In 1998 two other alleged
homosexual partners gave consistent descriptions of how police used
psychological and physical abuse to force similar false confessions
from them. Police have not been investigated or punished for misconduct
in any of these cases. In 1998 lawyers for former Deputy Prime Minister
Anwar Ibrahim made public allegations of another lawyer, who
represented a business associate of Anwar. The associate's lawyer had
alleged that prosecutors threatened his client with a firearms charge
that carried a mandatory death sentence unless the client agreed to
fabricate evidence against Anwar. In February the businessman was
sentenced to 42 months imprisonment under an amended charge. In August
the sentence was reduced on appeal to time served.
In March opposition activist Abdul Malek bin Hussin filed a police
report accusing police of torturing him in 1998 while he was under
detention without charge under the Internal Security Act (see Section
1.d.). Malek alleged that police had, among other abuses, beaten him
unconscious and forced him to drink their urine. The police have not
responded publicly to Malek's allegations.
There were several press reports of others who alleged police
torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment while in custody.
For example, in December ten murder suspects alleged in court that
police had humiliated and beaten them after they refused to confess.
There were no reports of investigations into these or any other similar
allegations.
During the year, riot police several times forcibly dispersed
peaceful demonstrators, using truncheons, water cannons, and tear gas
(see Section 2.b.).
Criminal law prescribes caning as an additional punishment to
imprisonment for those convicted of some nonviolent crimes such as
narcotics possession, criminal breach of trust, and alien smuggling.
Judges routinely include caning in sentences of those convicted of such
crimes as kidnaping, rape, and robbery. Some state Islamic laws, which
bind only Muslims (see Section1.e.), also prescribe caning. The caning,
which is carried out with a \1/2\-inch-thick wooden cane, commonly
causes welts, and sometimes causes scarring. Male criminals age 50 and
above and women are exempted from caning. According to the provisions
of the Child Act passed in October, male children may be given up to
ten strokes of a ``light cane.''
An Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) report issued in February,
stemming from a late 1998 investigation of the case of imprisoned
opposition Parliamentarian Lim Guan Eng (see Section 1.e.) stated that
the conditions of Lim's imprisonment did not comply with the U.N.
Standard Minimum Rules (Treatment of Prisoners) and the U.N. Body of
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment. The report cited portions of the Minimum
Rules that concern light, ventilation, and proper bedding, and
Principle 6 of the Body of Principles, which prohibits torture, or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. However, the delegation that
drafted this report did not visit Lim in prison, and therefore could
not make direct observations. The Government said that Lim was detained
under the same conditions as other prisoners and in accord with the
colonial-era Prison Rules (1952) and the Prisons Act (1995), which, the
Government contended, met the standards of the U.N. Minimum Rules. In
April Deputy Home Minister Ong Ka Ting told Parliament that the
Government had completed a review of prison rules and made amendments
that would improve the management of prisoners. Ong said that the
amendments would be promulgated after the approval of the Attorney
General. In November Deputy Home Minister Datuk Onk Ka Ting said that a
mattress would soon be issued to every prisoner. There were no other
developments reported by year's end.
Credible reports by former prisoners indicate that guards at some
prisons regularly beat prisoners convicted of criminal offenses.
Prison overcrowding is a serious problem. In August the prisons
director general said that the Government plans to build a new prison
and expand others. He said that the country's 35 prisons hold 27,400
prisoners; total designed capacity is 20,000. ``Security'' prisoners
(see Section 1.d.) are detained in a separate detention center.
The Government holds many illegal aliens under inhuman conditions.
NGO's, former detainees, and others make credible allegations of
inadequate food, poor medical care, poor sanitation, and abuse by
guards. Detention conditions are so bad that they pose a serious threat
to life and health. There were many allegations that such inhuman
conditions caused the deaths of an unknown number of illegal aliens. In
July, after 3 days without adequate supplies of water, 192 illegal
aliens escaped from the Lenggeng detention center. Testimony during the
trial of NGO activist Irene Fernandez (see Section 2.a.) described past
inhuman conditions at illegal alien detention camps.
The Government has an agreement with the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) providing for visits to certain categories of
prisoners and has not posed any objection to such visits. However, the
ICRC has not visited for several years. Other NGO's and the media
generally are not allowed to monitor prison conditions. Access to
illegal alien detention camps is restricted and the Government in some
cases even prevents representatives of foreign embassies from visiting
their nationals in the camps.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Suspects in some crimes
(called ``seizable offenses'') may be arrested without warrants;
suspects in other crimes (``nonseizable offenses'') may be arrested
only based on a warrant from a magistrate. Suspects in some crimes
(``bailable offenses'') may present bail at the police station
according to a schedule. Bail is not available for other crimes
(``nonbailable offenses'') and sometimes also is denied in other
circumstances (e.g., great risk of flight). Police may hold suspects
for 24 hours without charge. Police may request a magistrate to extend
the period of remand without charge for up to 2 weeks. After this
extension, the police, if they wish to hold the suspect must charge him
and seek an order of detention from a magistrate. In some cases, police
have released suspects under remand and quickly rearrested them on new
but similar charges. In general, police practice is in accord with
these legal provisions.
Police may deny remand prisoners access to legal counsel and
routinely do so. During this period of remand, police also may question
suspects without giving them access to counsel. Police justify this
practice as necessary to prevent interference in ongoing
investigations. Judicial decisions have upheld this practice.
Defendants' advocates say the lack of access to counsel seriously
weakens defendants' legal rights.
Crowded, understaffed courts and the legal safeguards and appeals
available to the accused often result in lengthy pretrial detention,
sometimes lasting several years. In 1998 the prisons director general
said that roughly half of the prison population consisted of prisoners
who had not yet been sentenced. Most of these prisoners either have
been convicted and are awaiting sentence or are in the midst of their
trials. Detainees awaiting trial constitute much less than half of all
detainees.
Three laws permit the Government to detain suspects without
judicial review or the filing of formal charges: The 1960 Internal
Security Act (ISA), the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of
Crime) Ordinance of 1969, and the Dangerous Drugs Act (Special
Preventive Measures) of 1985. The press reported one ISA detention
during the year: In February police detained a computer technician for
alleged involvement in the falsification of official documents. Some
opposition and NGO leaders contended that the computer technician might
have been involved in the political reform movement.
According to the Home Ministry, in late 1998 223 persons were being
detained under the ISA. No later figures are available. During the
year, police detained 1375 persons under the Dangerous Drugs Act
(Special Preventive Measures). It is not known how many were detained
at year's end. The Government has not disclosed how many persons are
detained under the Emergency Ordinance.
Enacted more than 30 years ago when there was an active Communist
insurgency, the ISA empowers the police to hold for up to 60 days any
person who may act ``in a manner prejudicial to the security of
Malaysia.'' The Home Minister may authorize further detention for
periods of up to 2 years. Those released before the end of their
detention period are subject to ``imposed restricted conditions'' for
the balance of their detention periods. These conditions limit their
rights to freedom of speech, association, and travel outside the
country.
According to the Government, the goal of the ISA is to control
internal subversion. In November 1998, the Deputy Home Minister said
that in the previous 10 years no person had been detained under the ISA
beyond the initial 60-day period for political reasons other than
Communist activity. He said that of the 867 persons detained for more
than 60 days, 359 were involved in Communist activities, 447 falsified
documents or otherwise abetted illegal alien smuggling, 21 were
``religious extremists,'' 9 ``leaked intelligence secrets,'' and 1 was
associated with the Free Aceh Movement. He further said that of the 223
persons detained at the time, 131 were for document forgery, 89 for
illegal alien smuggling, 2 for deviant Islamic teaching, and 1 for
activities associated with the Free Aceh Movement. Some of these
detainees (exactly how many has not been disclosed), including the
Islamic teachers and the alleged Free Aceh Movement leader, have since
been released.
As these figures indicate, the ISA often is used against
nonpolitical crimes, including against what the Government considers
``deviant'' Muslim groups. The Government states that deviant groups
pose a danger to national security because of their radical beliefs.
The ISA, and the threat of the ISA, also are used to intimidate and
restrict political dissent. For example, in 1998 the police detained
Anwar Ibrahim and 27 of his followers under the ISA, after a series of
largely peaceful antigovernment demonstrations. The Government claimed
that the demonstrations threatened national security. By the end of
1998, Anwar and the others either had been released or detained under
criminal charges.
Security authorities sometimes wait several days after detention
before informing an ISA detainee's family. Even when there are no
formal charges, the authorities must inform detainees of the
accusations against them and permit them to appeal to an advisory board
for review every 6 months. However, advisory board decisions and
recommendations are not binding on the Home Minister, are not public,
and often are not shown to the detainee. In the past, some ISA
detainees have refused to participate in the review process under these
circumstances.
Amendments to the ISA in 1997 sharply circumscribed judicial review
of ISA detentions. Although the Bar Council has in the past asserted
that detentions under the ISA should be subject to judicial review on
both procedural and substantive grounds, the courts have not concurred
with this interpretation and review ISA detentions only on technical
grounds. Detainees freed on technical grounds nearly always are
detained again immediately.
In May the Government announced new procedures for ISA detention.
According to press reports, the new amendments stipulated that senior
police officials must concur with ISA detentions. Details were not
reported. Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's Department Datuk
Ibrahim Ali claimed that the amended procedures would help prevent
misuse of the ISA.
Opposition leaders and human rights organizations continue to call
on the Government to repeal the ISA and other legislation that deprive
persons of the right to defend themselves in court, as they have for
years. During the year, several ruling coalition party politicians and
organizations also called for the repeal of the ISA. Other ruling
coalition parliamentarians called for the ISA to be strengthened. The
Government stated that the ISA still was necessary and would not be
repealed.
Under the 1969 Emergency Ordinance, which was instituted after
intercommunal riots in that year, the Home Minister can issue a
detention order for up to 2 years against a person if he deems it
necessary to protect public order, or for the ``suppression of
violence, or the prevention of crimes involving violence.'' In fact,
the Government has used the Emergency Ordinance for other reasons. No
emergency ordinance detentions were reported during the year, and the
Government has not disclosed the total number of persons now detained
under this law.
Provisions of the 1985 Dangerous Drugs Act (Special Preventive
Measures) give the Government specific power to detain without trial
suspected drug traffickers. The suspects may be held for up to 39 days
before the Home Minister must issue a detention order. Once the
Ministry has issued an order, the detainee is entitled to a hearing
before a court. In some instances, the judge may order the detainee's
release. Suspects may be held without charge for successive 2-year
intervals with periodic review by an advisory board, whose opinion is
binding on the Home Minister. However, the review process contains none
of the due process rights that a defendant would have in a court
proceeding. The police frequently detain suspected narcotics
traffickers under the special preventive measures after the traffickers
are acquitted of formal charges--often as they leave the courtroom.
During the year, the Government detained over 1,300 persons under this
law. It is not known how many were detained at year's end.
Immigration laws are used to detain possible illegal aliens without
trial or hearing. The detainees are not accorded any administrative or
legal hearings and are released only after their employers prove their
legal status. Those who can produce legal documents normally are
released immediately; those who cannot prove their legal status often
are held for extended periods before deportation. Illegal aliens are
kept in detention centers that are separate from prisons (see Section
1.c.).
Law enforcement authorities also used the Restricted Residence Act
to restrict movements of criminal suspects for an extended period. The
act allows the Home Ministry to place criminal suspects under
restricted residence in a remote district away from home for 2 years.
The Ministry is authorized to issue the banishment orders without any
judicial or administrative hearings. Human rights activists have
questioned the need for this law, which was passed more than 60 years
ago under very different circumstances, and have called for its repeal.
The Government has continued to justify the act as a necessary tool and
has used it in the recent past primarily against vice and gambling
offenses. In July the Terengganu state chief of police warned publicly
that operators of illegal gambling machines would be banished under the
act if they did not cease their activities. In August Director-General
of the Anticorruption Agency (ACA) Datuk Ahmad Zaki Husin proposed
using the act to banish officials suspected of corruption. After the
Bar Council expressed concerns over the proposal, Zaki clarified that
the Restricted Residence Act might be used only for ``syndicated
graft.'' In August the Deputy Prime Minister warned ``get-rich-quick''
scheme operators that they might face banishment under the act. The
Government has not disclosed how many persons are subject to the
Restricted Residence Act and no accurate estimate is available.
In 1997 the Malaysian Bar Council expressed its concern about 44
prisoners held ``at the pleasure of the Sovereign'' for inordinate
periods, often well exceeding the maximum sentences for their original
crimes. In one case, a prisoner had been held for 37 years. Most of
these ``forgotten prisoners'' committed their crimes as minors or while
of unsound mind. In 1998 the Attorney General stated that the
Government had expedited hearings on the cases. No results of these
hearings have been reported.
Section 396 of the Criminal Procedure Code allows the detention as
a material witness of a person whose testimony is necessary in a
criminal case if that person is likely to abscond. In August an
Indonesian woman was released after being detained for over a year as a
material witness, though she herself was accused of no crime.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, since 1988, government action,
constitutional amendments, legislation restricting judicial review, and
other factors have eroded steadily judicial independence and
strengthened executive influence over the judiciary. A number of high-
profile cases continued to cast doubts on judicial impartiality and
independence, and to raise questions of arbitrary verdicts, selective
prosecution, and preferential treatment of some litigants and lawyers.
Members of the bar, NGO's, and other observers (including those who
attended the September Commonwealth Law Conference held in the country)
continued to express serious concern about the deterioration of the
independence and overall fairness of the judiciary.
In April the ICJ ruled that U.N. Special Rapporteur on the
Independence of Judges and Lawyers Datuk Param Cumaraswamy, because of
his status as a U.N. Special Rapporteur, was immune from several
Malaysian libel suits. Several large companies, prominent businessmen,
and one prominent lawyer had brought suits for libel and slander
against Param and former Malaysian Bar Council secretary general Tommy
Thomas. The suits stemmed from an article in an international legal
journal that alleged that certain plaintiffs and their lawyers, enjoyed
improper preferential treatment in the courts. In judgments that were
widely thought to be politically motivated and improperly influenced by
favoritism, the courts had rejected Param's claim of immunity. In May
the Prime Minister said that the Government would abide by the ICJ's
decision; however, in October a court defied the ICJ and ruled that
Param would have to defend himself. Similar decisions were handed down
in the other three suits. The U.N. expressed its regret over the
court's decisions, and in December asked the Government to reimburse it
for legal expenses. Param currently is appealing the rulings. The case
against Tommy Thomas, who had no claim to immunity, was settled out of
court in 1998. After Thomas told reporters that insurers had forced the
settlement (which included a large cash payment and a humiliating
apology) on him, he was charged with contempt of court and convicted in
December 1998. In November an appeals court reserved judgement on the
appeal.
In 1996 the Bar Council filed a complaint with the legal profession
disciplinary board against one of the plaintiffs in the Param case. The
Bar Council charged the lawyer Datuk V. Kanagalingam, with improper
manipulation of the court system on behalf of a corporate client.
Kanagalingam sued the Bar Council over the complaint and won an award
of $160,000 (600,000 ringgit). In July the Bar Council lost its final
appeal of Kanagalingam's lawsuit. Widely circulated photos have shown
Kanagalingam on overseas vacations with the Chief Justice and,
separately, with the Attorney General. Human rights activists called on
the Chief Justice and the Attorney General to explain these apparent
conflicts of interest. The Attorney General said that he had nothing to
hide and had a right to take vacations with friends. The Chief Justice
made no public response. In September an Asian Wall Street Journal
reporter being sued for libel alluded to the photos in a proposed
amendment to his defense statement. He said that Kanagalingam had
``cultivated inappropriately close relations'' with the Chief Justice.
The reporter also claimed to have evidence that Kanagalingam had
partially drafted a high court judge's decision in a case Kanagalingam
had argued before the judge (the judge, who since has been made an
appeals court judge, has not responded publicly). The judge in the
libel case rejected the reporter's proposed amendment to his statement
of defense. After the substance of the amendment was reported in a
newspaper, Kanagalingam threatened to lodge contempt charges against
the reporter.
In November a judge granted an injunction preventing the Bar
Council from calling an extraordinary meeting to discuss declining
confidence in the judiciary. The judge said that the plaintiff, a
private lawyer, made a convincing prima facie case that the holding of
such a meeting would constitute contempt of court and sedition.
The cases against former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and
some of his associates, Lim Guan Eng, Irene Fernandez (see Section
2.a.), and Murray Hiebert (see Section 2.a.) also have raised questions
about judicial independence and impartiality. Nonetheless, the Courts
do not rule exclusively in favor of the Government. The courts
dismissed several cases against opposition figures during the year.
High courts have original jurisdiction over all criminal cases
involving serious crimes and most civil cases. Civil suits involving
automobile accidents and landlord-tenant disputes are heard by sessions
courts. Magistrate's courts hear criminal cases in which the maximum
term of sentence does not exceed 12 months. Juvenile courts try
offenders under age 18. The Special Court tries cases against the King
and sultans. The Court of Appeal has appellate jurisdiction over high
court andsessions court decisions. The Federal Court hears appeals of
court of appeal decisions.
Islamic religious laws administered by state authorities through
Islamic courts bind ethnic Malays and other Muslims in some matters. In
1997 the Government announced that it would harmonize Islamic law at
the federal level and appoint an Islamic law federal attorney general.
However, the Government has not been able to obtain the necessary
agreement of all the states and the proposal has not been implemented,
though it is still under discussion.
Indigenous people in Sarawak and Sabah also have a system of
customary law to resolve matters such as land disputes between tribes.
Penghulu (village head) courts may adjudicate minor civil matters,
but these are rarely used.
The military has a separate system of courts.
The secular legal system is based on English common law. Trials are
public, although judges may order restrictions on press coverage. For
example, in the corruption trial of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar,
the judge often restricted press coverage of defense testimony and
remarks that might embarrass senior government leaders. However, the
judge generally did not restrict press coverage of testimony and
remarks that might embarrass Anwar.
Defendants have the right to counsel, bail is sometimes available,
and strict rules of evidence apply in court. Witnesses are subject to
cross-examination. The defense in both ordinary criminal cases and
special security cases is not entitled to a statement of evidence
before the trial. In general, limited pretrial discovery in criminal
cases hobbles defendants' ability to defend themselves.
Defendants enjoy the presumption of innocence and may appeal court
decisions to higher courts. In criminal cases, defendants also may
appeal for clemency to the King or local state rulers as appropriate. A
single judge hears each criminal trial. There are no jury trials.
Some lawyers expressed concern that a 1997 amendment to the
Criminal Procedure Code could erode defendants' presumption of
innocence. Before the 1997 amendment, the prosecution was required to
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt or the defendant would receive
a summary dismissal without having to present the defense case. Now,
after the amendment, the prosecution only needs to prove a prima facie
case and the defense must be called. In August a man was convicted of
murder after electing to enter no defense. The judge ruled that the
prosecution had proven a prima facie case and, when the man chose to
offer no defense, the judge convicted him and sentenced him to death.
In 1998 Parliament passed amendments to the Courts of Judicature
Act (1964) that limited the rights of defendants to appeal in some
circumstances. The Government stated that these amendments would
expedite the hearing of cases in the upper courts. The president of the
Bar Association said in 1998 that the amendments imposed too many
restrictions on appeals.
The Attorney General may restrict the right to a fair trial in
criminal cases by invoking the Essential (Security Cases) Regulations
of 1975. These regulations governing trial procedure normally apply
only in firearm cases. In cases tried under these regulations, the
standards for accepting self-incriminating statements by defendants as
evidence are less stringent than in normal criminal cases. Also, the
authorities may hold the accused for an unspecified time before making
formal charges. The Attorney General has the authority to invoke these
regulations in other criminal cases if the Government determines that
the crime involves national security considerations, but such cases are
rare. There were no reported cases involving this restriction during
the year.
Even when the Essential Regulations are not invoked, defendants and
defense lawyers lack legal protections against interference. For
example, police can during a trial call in and interrogate witnesses
who have given testimony not helpful to the prosecution. Human rights
advocates accuse police of using this tactic to intimidate witnesses.
One instance of this practice led the Bar Council in July to issue a
statement of concern. Police also have used raids and document seizures
to harass defendants. Selective prosecution, i.e., prosecution based on
political rather than legal considerations, is a serious problem in the
legal system. According to the law, the decision to prosecute a case
rests solely with the Attorney General. In August the Chief Justice
publicly reminded magistrates and judges not to question the Attorney
General's sole discretion to prosecute. Opposition leaders and some
NGO's credibly accuse the current Attorney General of sometimes acting
at thedirection of Prime Minister Mahathir. In April the Prime Minister
publicly denied that he interferes in the decisions of the Attorney
General and in September reiterated that the Government does not
practice selective prosecution.
However, in practice, the Attorney General uses his power to
prosecute selectively. In May the Attorney General warned that those
accusing the Government of selective prosecution could be charged with
sedition or criminal defamation. The Bar Council criticized the
Attorney General's statement and stated that it showed ``a lack of
respect or understanding of the concept of democracy and the rule of
law.'' At year's end no one had been charged with sedition or criminal
defamation on these grounds.
Contempt of court charges also have restricted the ability of
defendants and their attorneys to defend themselves. Attorney Zainur
Zakaria, after raising a legal issue on behalf of his client Anwar
Ibrahim, was charged with contempt in 1998. Zainur's appeal still is
pending. The Bar Council expressed concern over Zainur's case and other
contempt of court cases several times during the year. In March the Bar
Council prepared a draft contempt of courts act to spell out what would
constitute contempt. In April the Chief Justice said that there was no
need for a contempt of courts act because judges do not abuse their
power. In August Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's Department
Datuk Ibrahim Ali said that the Government would study the Bar
Council's proposal. At year's end the Government had not passed or
considered such a bill.
Following a number of high-profile corruption cases, the Government
amended the Anticorruption Act in 1997. The new law, which came into
effect in January 1998, gives the Attorney General new powers that
impinge on the presumption of innocence and requires accused persons to
prove that they acquired their wealth legally.
Under the Evidence Act, the testimony of children is accepted only
if there is corroborating evidence. This poses special problems for
molestation cases in which the child victim is the only witness. Some
judges and others have recommended that the Evidence Act be amended to
accept the evidence of children and that courts implement special
procedures to hear the testimony of children.
Islamic courts do not give equal weight to the testimony of women.
Many NGO's have complained that women do not receive fair treatment
from Islamic courts, especially in matters of divorce.
Former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim is a political prisoner.
In 1998, after a political conflict, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad
removed Anwar as Deputy Prime Minister. Later the same year, after a
large, peaceful demonstration in which he called for Mahathir's
resignation, Anwar was detained for alleged sodomy. While in detention,
Anwar was beaten by then-Inspector General of Police Rahim Noor (see
Section 1.c.). For several days, Anwar was denied medical treatment for
the injuries he received at the hands of Rahim. Presumably to avoid
bringing a visibly injured Anwar to court, police changed Anwar's
status to detention without charge under the Internal Security Act.
Anwar's status subsequently was changed again to criminal detention.
Anwar later was tried and convicted on four counts of corruption. He
now is being tried on a single count of sodomy.
During Anwar's corruption trial, the judge made several
questionable rulings that greatly limited Anwar's ability to defend
himself against what clearly were politically-motivated charges. For
example, the judge sentenced one of Anwar's attorneys to 3 months'
imprisonment for contempt after the attorney raised in court charges of
prosecutorial misconduct. The judge greatly restricted the scope of
Anwar's defense (on occasions during the trial the judge explicitly
said that he did not care if there was a conspiracy to bring down
Anwar) and tolerated improper activities by the police and prosecutors.
The judge allowed prosecutors to amend the charges in the middle of the
trial, which is permitted under national law but in this case clearly
was unfair to Anwar. Anwar was denied the ability to rebut evidence of
sexual misconduct presented by prosecution witnesses when the judge, at
the end of the prosecution's case, allowed prosecutors to amend the
charges, and then expunged the record of all evidence of sexual
misconduct. Since his arrest, Anwar has been denied bail on
questionable legal grounds.
Anwar now is being tried on a separate charge of sodomy. At the
beginning of the trial, prosecutors changed the dates of the alleged
acts of sodomy, allegedly because the defense had discovered that the
apartment building where the sodomy allegedly took place had not been
completed by the original dates. Despite testimony detailing how police
had coerced a confession from an alleged homosexual partner, on July 26
the judge ruled that the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that this confession had been voluntary. On August 4,another
witness admitted that police had couched part of his testimony. On
August 18, the lead police investigator materially contradicted his
testimony (in order to make it consistent with the amended dates of the
alleged offense); the next day the judge ruled that the policeman had
not lied. At year's end, the sodomy trial still continued.
In August political prisoner Lim Guan Eng was released after
completing his sentence. Lim had been convicted on charges under the
Sedition and Printing Presses and Publications Acts. The charges
stemmed from Lim's questioning, in a speech and in a pamphlet, the
justice of detaining for 3 years a 15-year-old victim of statutory rape
while allowing her rapists, including, allegedly, the former chief
minister of Malacca, Rahim Thamby Chik, to go free. In November shortly
before elections were held, the alleged rape victim retracted her
charges against Rahim Thamby Chik, stating that she was coerced into
fabricating them. The woman's grandmother, who had accompanied the
woman when she made the charges, questioned the woman's motives for
recanting and continued to assert that Rahim had been guilty of
statutory rape.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law provides for these rights; however,
authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Provisions in the
security legislation (see Section 1.d.) allow the police to enter and
search without a warrant the homes of persons suspected of threatening
national security. Police also may confiscate evidence under these
acts. In some cases each year, police use this legal authority to
search homes and offices, seize books and papers, monitor
conversations, and take persons into custody without a warrant.
The law permits the Home Ministry to place criminal suspects under
restricted residence in a remote district away from home for a 2-year
period (see Section 1.d.).
The Government bans membership in unregistered political parties
and in unregistered organizations (see Section 2.b.).
A clause in the 1997 Anticorruption Act empowers the Attorney
General to authorize the interception of mail and the wiretapping of
telephones. Such information would be admissible as evidence in a
corruption trial.
Certain religious issues pose significant obstacles to marriage
between Muslims and adherents of other religions (see Section 2.c.).
Muslim couples must take premarital courses. Women's activists have
complained that the courses, as implemented, perpetuate gender
discrimination by misinforming women of their rights in marriage (see
Section 5).
Singaporean newspapers and magazines may not circulate in Malaysia
(see Section 2.a.); however, these publications are easily available on
the Internet.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, some important legal
limitations exist, and the Government restricts freedom of expression
and intimidates most of the print and electronic media into practicing
self-censorship.
The Constitution provides that freedom of speech may be restricted
by legislation ``in the interest of security (or) public order.'' For
example the Sedition Act prohibits public comment on issues defined as
sensitive, such as racial and religious matters. In practice, the
Sedition Act, the Official Secrets Act, criminal defamation laws, and
some other laws have been used to restrict or intimidate dissenting
political speech.
In February the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and
Expression issued a report stating that freedom of opinion is curtailed
systematically in Malaysia. The Special Rapporteur said that the
Internal Security Act, the Sedition Act, and the Printing Presses and
Publications Act were used to suppress or repress expression and curb
peaceful assembly. He further stated that defamation laws ``appear to
be having a very chilling effect.'' The Government stated that the
Special Rapporteur's report was ``baseless and distorted.''
The Prime Minister and other senior officials continued to ascribe
seditious or treasonous motives to critics of government policies.
Although many persons still criticized the Government publicly, the
Government's statements made many persons more cautious in exercising
their rights of free speech.
In August Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi warned
that political parties that raise sensitive issues and cause an
``undesirable situation'' would be charged under the Sedition Act.
However, government and ruling party officials sometimes make
statements on sensitive racial and religious issues with no fear of
being charged with sedition. For example, on the same day that the
Deputy Prime Minister threatened to invoke the Sedition Act, he stated
that voting for the opposition would be ``disastrous'' for ethnic
Malays.
In September a United Malays National Organization (UMNO--the
dominant component of the ruling National Front coalition) official
lodged a police report charging the chief minister of the opposition-
controlled state of Kelantan with sedition. The chief minister
allegedly had said that the state's populace no longer held the royal
family in high regard. In September police announced that they had
questioned 10 members of the opposition Islamic party about this case.
At year's end, there were no reports of further developments.
In March the Prime Minister said that slanderous statements had
become a ``security problem'' and claimed that some statements
advocated violence and assassination. Police later said that they were
monitoring all slanderous statements, including news reports that
amounted to incitement. It was unclear from the Prime Minister's and
police officials' statements whether security concerns were confined to
the advocating of violence or whether these concerns also encompassed
legitimate criticism of the Government.
In March UMNO formed a legal panel to identify slanderous and
libelous statements and to take legal action against them. The panel
subsequently sued several government critics for public statements and
statements reported in the press. Deputy Minister in the Prime
Minister's Department Datuk Ibrahim Ali, the chairman of the panel,
warned that those who made allegations against the Government or the
ruling party also might face prosecution for criminal defamation. In a
separate statement in May, Datuk Ibrahim Ali said that the ruling party
had identified 40 to 50 individuals from the opposition and academia
who often make defamatory statements. He reportedly said that UMNO
wanted to ensure that the critics did not get away ``scot free.''
Government opponents accused the Government of using the panel to
stifle legitimate dissent. In June UMNO secretary general Tan Sri
Khalil Yaakob said that the panel had countered opposition slander
successfully.
During the question and answer period after a February speech in
London to Malaysian students studying in the United Kingdom, Prime
Minister Mahathir told a student that the student could be sued for
defamation because he suggested that Mahathir apologize to Anwar
Ibrahim and resign. Mahathir later denied that he intended to
intimidate the student. The student was never sued.
Aside from the UMNO legal panel, many other government officials,
opposition figures, and private citizens filed multimillion-dollar
lawsuits for libel and slander. In May the Bar Council stated that the
proliferation of multimillion-dollar libel and slander lawsuits ``would
end up stifling freedom of speech.''
Police detained four persons under the ISA in 1998 for ``cyber
rumor-mongering.'' Police accused the four of spreading false reports
of rioting and potential violence against Chinese Malaysians via the
Internet. The four later were charged under a section of the Penal Code
that prohibits statements that cause fear or alarm. At year's end, the
four still were being tried. Several times during the year, government
leaders blamed critics on the Internet for ``spreading lies'' and
``sowing hatred.'' However, Energy, Communications, and Multimedia
Minister Datuk Leo Moggie said on several occasions that the Government
had no plans to censor the Internet.
The Official Secrets Act (OSA) also restricts freedom of
expression. The Bar Council and other NGO's in the past have called for
a review of certain provisions of the OSA that grant considerable
discretion to the authorities. In August opposition National Justice
Party leader and former Anwar aide Ezam Nor said publicly that Anwar
had stored abroad documents that corroborated charges of corruption
against senior government leaders. After the remarks, police
investigated a possible violation of the OSA. Anwar and the NJP
official later said that none of the documents involved national
security. Opposition leaders accused the Government of using the OSA to
cover up corruption. No charges were filed by year's end.
The Printing Presses and Publications Act of 1984 limits press
freedom. Under the act, domestic and foreign publications must apply
annually to the Government for a permit. The act was amended in 1987 to
make the publication of ``malicious news'' a punishable offense, expand
the Government's power to ban or restrict publications, and prohibit
court challenges to suspension or revocation of publication permits.
Government power over license renewal and other policies create
anatmosphere that inhibits independent or investigative journalism and
results in extensive self-censorship.
The English and Malay mainstream press provide generally laudatory,
uncritical coverage of government officials and policies, and usually
give only limited and selective coverage to political views of the
opposition or political rivals. Editorial opinion almost always
reflects government positions on domestic and international issues.
Chinese-language newspapers are much freer in reporting and commenting
on sensitive political and social issues, but are not immune to
government pressure. However, self-censorship and biased reporting in
the print media was not uniform and the English-, Malay-, and Chinese-
language press all, at times, provided balanced reporting on sensitive
issues.
The Government often conveys its displeasure with press reporting
directly to a newspaper's board of directors or chief editors. In
addition leading political figures in the ruling coalition, or
companies controlled by them, own most major newspapers, thus limiting
the range of views. At times, the susceptibility of the press to
government pressure has a direct and public impact on operations. For
example, in 1998 the editors of two of the country's largest daily
newspapers and a television operations director were removed,
apparently because of government displeasure. The removals apparently
stemmed from political rivalries within the ruling party.
A petition signed by 581 journalists from 11 newspapers and
released on May 3, World Press Freedom Day, urged the Government to
repeal the Printing Presses and Publications Act. The petition stated
that government controls on the press had resulted in self-censorship
and diminished the credibility of the mainstream press. The Bar Council
issued a statement in support of the journalists' petition. The leader
of the youth wing of UMNO said that he hoped that the Government would
review existing laws regulating the press. The journalists' petition
also called for the formation of an independent media council to
regulate the press. Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister Datuk Seri
Abdullah Badawi said in May that the Government would study the
proposal for a media council, but the Government gave no sign that it
plans to amend or scrap the act.
The Government continued to prosecute human rights activist Irene
Fernandez under the Printing Presses and Publications Act for charges
that she made in 1995 of mistreatment of detainees at illegal alien
detention centers. Fernandez's supporters accuse the Government of
purposely prolonging the trial, one of the longest in the country's
history, to harass Fernandez. As of year's end, the trial still
continued (see Section 5).
The Government also sometimes directly restricts the dissemination
of information that it deems embarrassing or prejudicial to national
interests. In June the Government stated that it no longer would
disclose publicly the readings of an air pollution index. In August
Minister of Science, Technology, and Environment Datuk Law Hieng Ding
said that the decision was made so as not to ``drive away tourists.''
In February the Government forbade all state health departments from
commenting on the outbreak of a deadly virus. The Government later
restricted reporters' access to sites of the outbreak. However, the
issue was widely reported.
Publications of opposition parties, social action groups, unions,
and other private groups actively cover opposition parties and
frequently print views critical of government policies. The circulation
of the Islamic opposition party's twice-weekly newspaper, Harakah, now
rivals that of mainstream newspapers. However, the Government retains
significant influence over these publications by requiring annual
renewal of publishing permits and limiting circulation only to members
of the relevant organization. Senior government leaders publicly warned
Harakah several times during the year not to print ``slanderous''
remarks and to limit distribution to party members. Harakah was also
the target of several ruling party-sponsored libel suits. In December
the Home Ministry issued a show cause letter to Harakah's publisher
asking him to explain why Harakah should not be banned for violating
the terms of his permit. Acting on a Home Ministry directive, police
officers cracked down on newsstands that distributed Harakah to the
public and confiscated many copies. Harakah stated that it would abide
by the Home Ministry directive and at year's end the newspaper was no
longer openly sold. There were no cases of denial of renewal requests
during the year.
Some legal magazines and illegal (i.e., lacking publishing permits)
publications also frequently print criticism of the Government. In May
police seized over a thousand copies of illegal antigovernment
magazines at a printing company and charged the company owner for
violating the Printing Presses and Publications Act.
The Communications and Multimedia Act (CMA), which came into force
on April 1, requires certain Internet and other networkservice
providers to obtain a license from CMA. Details of the implementation
of this act were unclear at year's end.
There were instances of violence against journalists. In May
demonstrators protesting the conviction of former Deputy Prime Minister
Anwar Ibrahim attacked a car carrying television reporters from a
television station that is widely perceived as progovernment. Those
responsible for the attack later were arrested and charged. In July a
group of supporters of the Islamic opposition reportedly verbally
abused a television cameraman and demanded that he turn over his
videocassettes. There were no reports of arrests in the case.
The foreign press continues to be a target of government criticism
for allegedly biased reporting. Senior government officials often
accused the foreign press of bias and malicious motives. In February
several government ministries announced plans to boycott three foreign
publications that were said to criticize Malaysia overzealously.
In September Far Eastern Economic Review correspondent Murray
Hiebert lost his appeal of a 1997 conviction for contempt of court.
Hiebert, who had not been free to leave Malaysia for over 2 years
pending his appeal, chose to forgo another appeal to the country's
highest court and served his 6-week sentence (reduced to roughly 1
month after time off for good behavior). The contempt charges stemmed
from a 1997 article, in which Hiebert described a civil suit brought by
the wife of a prominent judge, Gopal Sri Ram, against the International
School of Kuala Lumpur. (The judge's wife had alleged in the suit that
the school had discriminated unlawfully against her son by dropping him
from a school debating team after charges that the son had acted
improperly.) Hiebert's article noted, among other things, the unusual
speed with which the courts had disposed of the lawsuit. The Court of
Appeals upheld the contention that Hiebert had ``scandalized the
court.'' Hiebert's case, the first in which a journalist has been
sentenced to jail for contempt in the ordinary course of his duties,
raised serious questions of freedom of the press and of judicial
impartiality.
The electronic media is restricted more tightly than the print
media. Radio and television are almost uniformly laudatory of the
Government. News on the opposition is restricted tightly and reported
in a slanted fashion. In July the Deputy Information Minister said
candidly that government television and radio channels would not
broadcast the views of opposition parties. He said that opposition
parties were welcome to use private news stations or apply for
broadcasting licenses of their own. In fact the two private television
stations have close ties to the ruling coalition and are unlikely to
provide a forum for the opposition parties, and it is unlikely that the
Government would grant the opposition a broadcasting license. In
January the chief minister of the opposition-controlled state of
Kelantan, complained that after several years the Government still had
not approved a license application for a state radio station. Every
other state has such a station.
In March a private television station announced that it would
revamp its news programming. The government-influenced print media
shortly before had published a letter criticizing the station's
reporting of the trial of Anwar Ibrahim.
A government censorship board censors films for profanity, nudity,
sex, violence, and certain political and religious content. Television
stations censor programming in line with government guidelines. The
Government bans certain books for political and religious reasons or
because of sexual or profane content. Some foreign newspapers and
magazines are banned (see Section 1.f.) and, infrequently, foreign
magazines or newspapers are censored, most often for sexual content.
However, the increased prevalence of the Internet is undermining such
restrictions. The Government maintains a ``blacklist'' of local and
foreign performers, politicians, and religious leaders who may not
appear on television or radio broadcasts.
The Government generally restricts remarks or publications that
might incite racial or religious disharmony; it also attempts to
restrict the content of sermons at government-affiliated mosques.
Occasionally state governments ban certain Muslim clergymen from
delivering sermons (see Section 2.c.).
In December Prime Minister Mahathir said that the Government should
find ways to prevent the opposition from ``spreading lies'' at mosques.
In December Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah also instructed the
Religious Affairs Department to conduct background checks on religious
speakers.
In two additional incidents that occurred in December, Selangor
state government officials announced that they were investigating
mosque committee members with links to the opposition, and Johor state
government officials said that they had identified several
``political'' religious leaders who had criticized the Government. In
Selangor, officials threatened to expel opposition sympathizers from
mosque committees, and inJohor state officials threatened ``stern
action.'' At year's end, no action had been taken in either case.
In the past, the Government generally had respected academic
freedom in the areas of teaching and publication. Academics are
sometimes publicly critical of the Government. However, there is self-
censorship among public university academics whose career advancement
and funding depend on the Government. Private institution academics
also practice self-censorship due to fear that the Government may
revoke licenses for their institutions. Legislation also imposes
limitations on student associations and student and faculty political
activity (see Section 2.b.). A university vice chancellor must approve
campus demonstrations.
The Government was increasingly intolerant of teachers and students
who expressed dissenting views. Several senior government leaders
warned that some teachers were ``poisoning the minds'' of their
students and that students should not be involved in partisan politics.
Then-Education Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Abdul Razak and other
senior government officials said on several occasions that teachers who
opposed the Government and students who took part in antigovernment
activities faced disciplinary actions, including dismissal and
expulsion. In August an education ministry official said a disciplinary
panel had received reports from several states concerning teachers who
had ``incited'' their students against the Government. In September an
education ministry official said that the Ministry had ``acted
against'' several teachers involved in antigovernment activities.
The Government has long said that students should be apolitical and
used that position as a pretext for denying opposition parties access
to student forums. According to student leaders, students who sign
antigovernment petitions sometimes are expelled or fined. In fact the
Government enforces this policy selectively and does not refrain from
acquainting students and teachers with government views on political
issues. In May the Government announced that 33,870 students had
attended a 1-day seminar ``to improve understanding of national
policies.''
In February the University of Malaya declined to renew the contract
of Professor Chandra Muzaffar. Chandra, a well-known supporter of
political reform and long-time government critic, charged that the
University had fired him for political reasons. The University stated
that it had declined to renew Chandra's contract for economic and
personnel reasons. In June the High Court agreed to hear Chandra's
application to quash the University's decision.
In 1997 the Government prohibited academics from making any public
statements or publishing any writings on Malaysia's air pollution
crisis. The Government appears to have feared that unauthorized remarks
on the air pollution crisis might harm the country's image and hurt
tourism. Academics and others openly protested this order. The gag
order remains in effect.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Government
places significant restrictions on this right. These rights may be
limited in the interest of security and public order, and the 1967
Police Act requires police permits for all public assemblies except for
workers on picket lines. The decision to grant a permit theoretically
rests with the district police chief; however, in practice senior
police officials and political leaders influence the grant or denial of
some permits. Police grant permits easily to government and ruling
coalition supporters; however, they use a more restrictive policy with
government critics, although the police do grant permits for many
opposition meetings.
Opposition leaders frequently alleged that police issue permits for
public assemblies in an unfair manner that discriminates against the
opposition. Various state and local police departments rebutted these
allegations by providing statistics that indicated that most requests
for permits are granted; however, in certain sensitive cases political
considerations clearly led to the denial of permits. For example, in
February the police denied a permit for a large opposition rally to
protest the raising of road tolls on the basis that it would interfere
with repairs and renovations at the planned venue. However, a ruling
coalition component party, the Malaysian Chinese Association, held a
large dinner at the same venue just 1 day before the planned antitoll
rally. In March police forcibly prevented opposition leader Lim Kit
Siang from addressing a group of farmers living in an area afflicted by
a deadly virus.
Police, especially early in the year, had a clear policy barring
large ``reformasi'' gatherings and street demonstrations. However,
later in the year, especially in the period prior to the election,
police allowed many opposition political gatherings.
In April thousands of persons assembled in downtown Kuala Lumpur
and in front of the courtroom to protest the conviction of Anwar
Ibrahim on charges of corruption (see Section 1.e.). Riot police beat
and arrested some of these demonstrators. In some instances, police
dispersed demonstrators with no prior warning. In other cases, they
waited for up to 45 minutes before moving in with tear gas, water
cannons, and truncheons. In the ensuing fracas sometimes violence broke
out.
Police arrested hundreds of demonstrators, including peaceful
demonstrators, for illegal assembly. Police also dispersed other
peaceful ``reformasi'' demonstrations earlier in the year and made many
arrests. On September 18 and 19, supporters of Anwar held
demonstrations in several cities throughout the peninsula. The largest
one took place on September 19 in Kuala Lumpur, where up to 10,000
demonstrators gathered at the national mosque. After demonstrators
ignored orders to disperse, police fired tear gas canisters and
chemical-laced water from a water cannon. Some demonstrators then
responded by throwing rocks, iron bars, and other objects at police.
Police arrested an unknown number of protesters and beat others with
batons. Some domestic press reports stated that the demonstrators
initiated the violence. Government-controlled media on September 20
reported that three policemen were injured. In contrast, foreign
journalists gave consistent accounts of the way that police started the
fracas that led to violence.
At the April, September, and other, smaller opposition pro-Anwar
demonstrations throughout the year, police arrested hundreds of
demonstrators, including many peaceful demonstrators. Many of these
demonstrators later were acquitted, a handful were convicted, and some
cases still were pending at year's end. Among those arrested were many
opposition party leaders. Police detained them under the Police Act for
allegedly participating in an illegal assembly and under the Penal Code
for allegedly causing a riot. All were released on bail and still were
awaiting trial at year's end.
In February the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion
criticized the Government's use of various laws to curb peaceful
assembly (see Section 2.a.).
In July five social activists were arrested for illegal assembly
when they tried to prevent police from demolishing a squatter
settlement. The case still is pending.
In August the secretary general of UMNO accused supporters of the
Islamic opposition party of disrupting several ruling coalition
meetings.
In January three members of the opposition Malaysian People's Party
said that police had detained them illegally in December 1998. The
police stated that the three were only brought in for questioning.
In 1997 police detained 55 Islamic opposition party members who
demonstrated in protest of an Israeli team's participation at an
international cricket championship. The case against the demonstrators
still is pending.
Government and opposition candidates campaign actively. Previous
restrictions on freedom of assembly during campaign periods (including
bans on rallies and required lists of times and places for proposed
discussion sessions) were not implemented strictly during the year.
Opposition parties reported some harassment but generally were able to
campaign vigorously in the Sabah state elections held in March, and in
national elections held in November.
The Constitution provides for the right of association; however,
the Government places significant restrictions on this right. For
example, certain statutes limit this right. Under the Societies Act of
1966, only registered, approved organizations of seven or more persons
may function. The Government sometimes refuses to register
organizations, or may impose conditions when allowing a society to
register. For example, the Government has not allowed Amnesty
International to set up a branch in the country, and it also prohibits
the Communist Party and affiliated organizations (see Section 1.f.).
The Government also has the power to revoke the registration of an
existing society for violations of the act, a power it has enforced
selectively against political opposition groups. This threat of
possible deregistration inhibits political activism.
To avoid the burdensome requirements of the Societies Act, many
NGO's register as companies under the Companies Act or as businesses
under the Registration of Businesses Act. Amendments to the Companies
Act passed in 1998 empowered the Registrar of Companies to refuse
registration of a proposed company if he is satisfied that the company
is likely to be used for any purpose prejudicial to national security
or the public interest. The Registrar also can cancel the registration
of an existingcompany and disband it on the same grounds. Opposition
parties and NGO activists charged that the sweeping powers granted to
the Registrar of Companies were designed to stifle criticism. The
Government denied such charges and stated that financial irregularities
were the amendments' main target. Government claims were undercut
somewhat by later police statements that alluded threateningly to the
status of certain NGO's under the Companies or Societies Acts.
In May the Government announced that it was planning amendments to
the Registration of Businesses Act to enable the Government to track
the activities and movements of organizations registered under the act.
Minister of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs Datuk Megat Junid said
that the amendments were necessary because some NGO's registered under
the act were operating as ``semi-political'' organizations. Megat said
that the Government feared that ``after registering under the
Registration of Businesses Act, NGO's would not do business but instead
raise issues threatening national security with the sponsorship,
perhaps, of outsiders.'' At year's end, the Government still had not
tabled these amendments in Parliament.
NGO activists believe that recent changes in law and government
investigations are a prelude to an attempt to deregister several NGO's.
In May Deputy Home Minister Datuk Abdul Kadir told Parliament that the
Government had deregistered 981 societies under the Societies Act since
1966. Details were not reported. No human rights NGO has been
deregistered in recent years.
In February the Registrar of Societies rejected an application to
form a new political party, the Socialist Party of Malaysia. The
Registrar said that information on the application form was incomplete.
Supporters of the new party said that the denial was politically
motivated and filed an appeal.
The Bar Council often was the target of government criticism. In
March Deputy Minister Datuk Ibrahim Ali said that the Bar Council
should not question the appointment of judges. In May Ali said the Bar
Council should stop meddling in government affairs. In June government
leaders threatened to pass legislation making the Attorney General the
head of the Bar Council. In the past, the Government has threatened to
legislate an expansion of the membership of the Bar Council to include
government lawyers and legal professors. Some members of the bar fear
that such a measure would dilute the Council's independence. So far, no
such measures have been implemented.
The Universities and University Colleges Act also affects freedom
of association. This act mandates university approval for student
associations and prohibits student associations, as well as faculty
members, from engaging in political activity. In 1998 six students were
suspended for their role in the opposition victory in a by-election.
Restrictions are not enforced as vigorously on students who participate
in proruling coalition political activities. A university vice
chancellor must approve campus demonstrations. Many students, NGO's,
and opposition political parties called for the repeal or amendment of
the act. A number of ruling coalition organizations and politicians
also supported reexamination of the act, but the Government stated the
act is still necessary.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion; however, the Government places some restrictions on this
right. Islam is the official religion; however, the practice of Islamic
beliefs other than Sunni Islam is restricted severely. Religious
minorities, which include large Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, and Sikh
communities, generally worship freely, although with some restrictions.
Government funds support an Islamic religious establishment, and it is
official policy to ``infuse Islamic values'' into the administration of
the country. The Government imposes Islamic religious law on Muslims
only in some matters and does not impose Islamic law beyond the Muslim
community. Adherence to Islam is considered intrinsic to Malay ethnic
identity and therefore Islamic religious laws administered by state
authorities through Islamic courts bind all ethnic Malays (and other
Muslims) in some matters. The Government also grants funds to non-
Islamic religions, but to a more limited degree.
According to government census figures, in 1991 59 percent of the
population was Muslim; 18 percent practiced Buddhism; 8 percent
Christianity; 6 percent Hinduism; 5 percent Confucianism, Taoism, or
other religions that originated in China; 1 percent animism; and 0.5
percent other faiths, including Sikhism and the Baha'i faith. The
religious practices of the remainder were not stated.
For Muslims, particularly ethnic Malays, the right to leave the
Islamic faith and adhere to another religion is a controversial
question. The legal process of conversion is unclear; in practice, it
is very difficult for Muslims to change religions. Persons who wish to
do so face severe obstacles. In March the country's highest court ruled
that secular courts have nojurisdiction to hear applications by Muslims
to change religions. According to the ruling, the religious conversion
of Muslims is solely the jurisdiction of Islamic courts. The ruling
makes conversion of Muslims nearly impossible in practice.
In 1998 the Government stated that ``apostates'' (i.e., those who
wish to leave or have left Islam for another religion) would not face
government punishment as long as they did not defame Islam after their
conversion.
The Government generally respects non-Muslims' right of worship;
however, state governments carefully control the building of non-Muslim
places of worship and the allocation of land for non-Muslim cemeteries.
Approvals for such permits sometimes are granted very slowly. In
September after objections by representatives of non-Muslim religions,
the Government agreed to revise proposed guidelines governing the
establishment of non-Muslim places of worship. In July the Malaysian
Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Sikhism
(MCCBCHS), an NGO representing minority religions, protested the
planned implementation of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government
guidelines. The MCCBCHS specifically complained that the guidelines
required an area to have at least 2,000 to 5,000 adherents of a
particular non-Muslim faith for a non-Muslim place of worship to be
approved. No such requirement exists for Muslim places of worship. The
group also complained that, under the guidelines, the state Islamic
council must approve the setting up of all non-Muslim places of
worship. There were no further reports of the status of the revision of
the proposed guidelines.
During the controversy over the proposed new guidelines on non-
Muslim places of worship, the MCCBCHS and the Federal Territory
Counseling and Service Center separately urged the Prime Minister to
create a national non-Muslim religious council.
In December the press reported that the new opposition Islamic
party administration of the state of Terengganu planned to introduce a
special tax on non-Muslims. Non-Muslims expressed strong opposition to
this proposal. State government leaders said that the press had
distorted their plans. No special tax was imposed by year's end.
After a violent conflict in Penang between Hindus and Muslims in
1998, the Government announced a nationwide review of unlicensed Hindu
temples and shrines. Implementation is not vigorous and in June the
leader of the ruling coalition's ethnic Indian-based political party
complained that Hindu temples and shrines had returned only 800 of
30,000 registration forms.
Proselytizing of Muslims by members of other religions is
prohibited strictly; proselytizing of non-Muslims faces no obstacles.
The Government discourages, and in practical terms forbids, the
circulation in peninsular Malaysia of Malay-language translations of
the Bible and distribution of Christian tapes and printed materials in
Malay. However, Malay-language Christian materials can be found. Some
states have laws that prohibit the use of Malay-language religious
terms by Christians, but the authorities do not always enforce them
actively. The distribution of Malay-language Christian materials faces
few restrictions in east Malaysia. Visas for foreign Christian clergy
are restricted severely.
The Government opposes what it considers deviant interpretations of
Islam, maintaining that the ``deviant'' groups'' extreme views endanger
national security. In the past, the Government has imposed restrictions
on certain Islamic sects, primarily the small number of Shi'a. The
Government continues to monitor the activities of the Shi'a minority.
In 1998 the Government stated that it was monitoring the activities of
55 religious groups believed to be involved in deviant Islamic
teachings. In May authorities said that the banned Al-Arqam sect was
attempting to reconstitute itself.
The Government periodically has detained members of what it
considers Islamic deviant sects without trial or charge under the ISA.
After release, such detainees are subject to restrictions on their
movement and residence. In 1997 10 persons, 2 of whom were over 75
years old, were detained under the ISA for spreading Shi'a teachings.
All of those detained have now been released and at year's end there
were no religious detainees or prisoners.
The Government generally restricts remarks or publications that
might incite racial or religious disharmony. This includes some
statements and publications critical of particular religions,
especially Islam. The Government also restricts the content of sermons
at mosques. The Government periodically warns against those who deliver
sermons in mosques for ``political ends'' and, occasionally, state
governments ban certain Muslim clergymen from delivering sermons at
mosques. In July the Negeri Sembilan state government banned a state
religious department officerfrom preaching sermons because the officer
allegedly had given a political speech during a sermon. In February the
state of Selangor lifted a ban on a former mufti (the highest state
Muslim leader) of Selangor. He allegedly had called the Prime Minister
an apostate (see Section 2.a.).
In December Prime Minister Mahathir said that ways should be found
to prevent the opposition from ``spreading lies'' at mosques. Also in
December, Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi directed the
religious affairs department to conduct background checks on religious
speakers. Abdullah said ``we need to find out whether the speakers
disseminated wrongful information which may have influenced civil
servants to stop supporting the Government.'' Also in December,
Selangor state government officials announced that they were
investigating mosque committee members with links to the opposition.
Officials threatened to expel opposition sympathizers from mosque
committees. At year's end, no action had been taken. Also in December,
Johor state officials said that they had identified several
``political'' religious leaders who had criticized the Government. The
state government threatened ``stern action,'' but at year's end no
action had been taken.
For Muslim children religious education according to a government-
approved curriculum is compulsory. There are no restrictions on home
instruction.
In August a court reinstated three primary school students who had
been expelled for wearing turbans in 1997. In September Hindus
protested a school's prohibition on students' applying sacred ash to
their foreheads.
In July the Government announced a plan to take control of state
religious schools (under the Constitution religion is a state matter).
The chief minister of the opposition-controlled state of Kelantan
rejected the plan. In response, federal Education Minister Datuk Seri
Najib said that the Government would find a way to take over Kelantan's
religious schools. In October the Government announced that religious
schools could choose to be absorbed wholly or partially into the
federal school system beginning in 2000. At year's end, the plan had
not yet been implemented and its implications were unclear.
As part of its campaign to infuse Muslim values, in 1998 the
military services forbade the sale of alcoholic beverages on all
military installations, including sale to non-Muslims. The ban on
alcohol reportedly is not always enforced.
In January the Selangor state government announced the formation of
a government interreligious consultative council that included
representatives of all major religions. The council's stated objectives
were to prevent interreligious conflict, to promote interreligious
understanding, and to address moral and social problems jointly.
The Government has a comprehensive system of preferences for ethnic
Malays and members of a few other groups known collectively as
``bumiputras,'' most of whom are Muslim.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens generally have the right to
travel, live, and work where they please; however, the Government
restricts these rights in some circumstances. The East Malaysian states
of Sabah and Sarawak have the right to control immigration into them
and to require citizens from peninsular West Malaysia and foreigners to
present passports or national identity cards for entry. In 1998 the
Court of Appeal ruled that Sabah and Sarawak, despite their autonomy,
still are bound by the federal Constitution in all matters. Thus, the
court voided Sabah's expulsion of a West Malaysian attorney who had
been involved in several lawsuits against the state government. In May
the Sabah state government filed an appeal of the ruling. The Federal
Government regulates the internal movement of provisionally released
ISA detainees (see Section 1.d.). The Government also uses the
Restricted Residence Act to limit movements of those suspected of some
criminal activities (see Section 1.d.).
The Government generally does not restrict emigration.
Citizens must apply for the Government's permission to travel to
Israel. Travel to Jerusalem for a religious purpose is allowed
explicitly.
The Government has not ratified the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and rejects customary international law. The
Government does not recognize the principle of first asylum; however,
it sometimes grants temporary refuge to asylum seekers. In September
Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar said, ``we allow people
for temporary stay and when that stay is over they have to go back. We
have never granted anybody refugee status.'' In 1998 the Government
forcibly returned several hundred Acehnese, despiterepresentations from
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the international
community, and evidence that the Acehnese might face persecution upon
return to Indonesia. The Government continues to refuse to acknowledge
that any Indonesian illegal aliens, including Acehnese, have a claim to
refugee status. However, there were no incidents of deportation,
harassment, and detention of Acehnese persons during the year.
The Government did not restrict the access of undetained asylum
seekers to the UNHCR office and cooperated in the resettlement of some
refugees. However, the Government only infrequently granted the UNHCR
and other humanitarian organizations access to detained aliens. There
were some forced expulsions of asylum seekers and refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
By law citizens have the right to change their government through
periodic elections; however, while votes generally are recorded
accurately, there are some irregularities that affect the fairness of
elections, and in practice opposition parties cannot compete on equal
terms with the governing coalition (which has held power at the
national level since 1957) because of severe restrictions on
campaigning, freedom of association, freedom of assembly. Nevertheless,
opposition candidates campaign actively. In the November elections, the
opposition roughly doubled its strength to 25 percent of federal
parliamentary seats and an opposition party won control of two state
governments (the opposition won control of one state government in the
1995 elections). Prime Minister Mahathir has held power since 1981.
Malaysia has a parliamentary system of government. National
elections are required at least every 5 years and have been held
regularly since independence in 1957. The Malay-based United Malay
National Organization (UMNO) party dominates the ruling National Front
coalition, which has ruled Malaysia continuously since independence.
Since 1969 the National Front coalition always has maintained a two-
thirds majority in Parliament, which enables the Government to amend
the Constitution at will. Over the years, power increasingly has been
concentrated in the executive branch, i.e., the Prime Minister.
The lack of equal access to the media was the most serious problem
encountered by the opposition in the November elections (see Section
2.a.). Government officials frankly stated that government television
and radio would not carry reporting on the opposition. The country's
two private television stations also had virtually no impartial
reporting on the opposition. The mainstream English-language and Malay-
language newspapers also carried slanted coverage of domestic politics.
In addition opposition parties encountered difficulties in placing paid
advertisements in newspapers; however, a few opposition advertisements
did appear, after editing by the newspapers, in English- and Chinese-
language newspapers.
Opposition leaders credibly stated that the Election Commission,
which is responsible for holding and monitoring elections, did not
carry out its duties impartially. The Election Commission is nominally
independent but widely perceived by the opposition to be under the
control of the Government. In June Deputy Prime Minister and Home
Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi said that there was no need to
consult the opposition on the appointment of a new election commission
chairman. Opposition leaders said that Prime Minister Mahathir's remark
in June that the Government would ``not entertain'' an opposition
demand for a long campaign period in upcoming elections demonstrated
the lack of independence of the Election Commission (supposedly the
Commission has the sole power to set the length of the campaign
period). After the election, several government officials publicly
disputed opposition claims that the Election Commission was biased.
Opposition leaders also complained that local government officials
who serve as election officers are not always neutral. For example in
July the opposition National Justice Party filed a complaint with the
Election Commission accusing a district officer in the state of Perak
of participating in an UMNO party event. The Election Commission later
announced that it completed its investigation but did not reveal its
findings. After the election, there were some complaints about
irregularities during the counting of ballots. At year's end, these
complaints were not substantiated, and there is no evidence that the
conduct of election officers significantly affected the results of the
election; however, the Government did not permit international
monitoring or adequately allow for domestic NGO monitoring efforts.
Opposition parties and some NGO's also alleged that defective
voting rolls led to some fraudulent votes. In the Sabah state elections
in March, opposition leaders accused the ruling coalition of employing
``phantom'' voters (illegal aliens andother fraudulently documented
voters). NGO's analysis of the voting roll used in the November
national elections also revealed irregularities, such as dead persons
on the rolls, multiple voters registered under single identity card
numbers, and other anomalies; however, there is no evidence that these
irregularities significantly affected the results in more than a
handful of races. After the election, an election monitoring NGO
renewed its calls for a national reregistration exercise to produce a
clean electoral roll.
``Postal votes,'' or absentee ballots by police and military
personnel and their spouses, also are a concern. The Government, citing
security concerns, does not allow party agents to monitor absentee
ballot boxes placed on military and police installations. Opposition
parties question the rationale for such security restrictions.
Opposition parties and NGO's have raised credible allegations of
improper manipulation of postal votes, including statements by former
military personnel that their ballots were filled out by others or
under they eye of commanding officers. In the November elections, the
Election Commission changed some procedures to allow better monitoring
by Election Commission officers. Opposition parties continue to call
for monitoring of postal votes by party agents. Election Commission
officials estimated before the November election that roughly 235,000
postal votes would be cast. No count of the actual number of postal
votes was published by year's end.
The anonymity of balloting also is a potential concern. Ballots are
marked with a serial number that could be matched against a voter's
name. While there is no evidence that the Government has ever traced
individual votes, some opposition leaders allege that the potential to
do so has a chilling effect on some voters, particularly civil
servants.
Gerrymandering dilutes the votes of some citizens. The Constitution
states that parliamentary constituencies should have roughly equal
numbers of eligible voters, although the same section states that
greater weight should be given to rural constituencies. In practice
these guidelines often are ignored. For example in Sabah constituencies
are weighted strongly against the state's large Christian population.
Nationwide the constitutional provision giving greater weight to rural
constituencies greatly dilutes the voting power of urban residents.
Finally, the single member, winner-take-all system diminishes the
political power of the minority ethnic Indians. Because of the changing
dynamics of ethnic politics, ethnic gerrymandering of parliamentary
constituencies, used against the opposition in the past, is believed to
no longer be as great an advantage to the ruling coalition.
Other government measures hamper the opposition's ability to
compete with the incumbent ruling coalition. For example the Government
on several occasions issued oblique public warnings to civil servants,
including teachers (see Section 2.a.) not to support the opposition. An
application to form a new political party was rejected (see Section
2.b.). Students face certain restrictions on political activity (see
Section 2.b.). Government leaders routinely and openly threaten to cut
off federal funds beyond the constitutionally mandated minimum to
constituencies that elect opposition representatives. Ruling coalition
Members of Parliament receive a government allocation totaling in
aggregate roughly $25 million (95 million ringgit). Opposition Members
of Parliament receive no such funds. In July a government minister told
Parliament that the money only was given to ruling coalition Members of
Parliament because it came from the Government.
The opposition has complained in the past about restrictions on
public assemblies during the campaign period (see Section 2.b.). In the
period prior to the November elections, police did not implement
vigorously restrictions and the opposition held many large rallies. The
opposition also has stated that the short official campaign period
gives an advantage to the incumbent ruling coalition. However, de facto
campaigning began long before the November elections and there is
little evidence that the short official campaign period had much
practical effect.
In August Prime Minister Mahathir stated that the ruling
coalition's failure to win a two-thirds majority in Parliament in 1969
had resulted in widespread rioting and said that if a ``weak
government'' were elected, ``the peace of the country could not be
guaranteed.'' Opposition leaders complained that these statements were
a threat to instigate violence if the ruling coalition should lose the
two-thirds majority in the upcoming elections (which did not happen).
Opposition leader Lim Kit Siang called on the Government to pledge to
accept the results of the upcoming election. The Government made no
response.
Prime Minister Mahathir said in June that he expected upcoming
elections to be ``the dirtiest ever.'' For different reasons, the
opposition expressed similar fears. The Government did not respond to
the opposition's call for an election code to ensure that the upcoming
elections would be free, fair, and clean. A group of NGO's formed an
independent elections watchorganization. The Election Commission stated
that the NGO's were free to do so, but the election watch organization
was accorded no special privileges. (The law does not provide for
monitoring of polling stations except by political party agents.) In
June the Government publicly rejected the idea of foreign observers.
The Government also rejected opposition calls for foreign observers in
Sabah state elections in March. (The last time that foreign observers
monitored elections was in 1990.) After the election, the Prime
Minister continued to allege that the opposition engaged in dirty
tactics, including slander. At year's end, the election results still
were not gazetted officially and it was unclear if the ruling coalition
or the opposition parties would, as allowed by law, appeal the results
of any parliamentary races.
Opposition parties filed objections to the results of 17 of 48
seats contested in the Sabah state elections in March. In July and
August, courts rejected the first of two of these petitions. In October
a third petition was dropped. The other petitions still were pending at
year's end.
In the past, within the ruling UMNO party there had been active
political debate. ``No-contest'' rules for leadership positions and
generally increased intolerance of dissent limited but did not
eliminate UMNO's role as a vehicle for public debate. After the removal
of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar in 1998, intolerance of dissent within
UMNO increased. In 1998 an extraordinary UMNO Assembly approved a
series of measures designed to limit independent grassroots
initiatives. During the year, there were no contests for leadership
positions in UMNO.
Over the years, Parliament's function as a deliberative body has
deteriorated. Legislation proposed by the Government rarely is amended
or rejected. Legislation proposed by the opposition is never given
serious consideration. Opposition opportunities to hold legislation up
to public scrutiny have diminished. The Parliament in 1995 amended its
rules to strengthen the power of the Speaker and curb parliamentary
procedures heavily used by the opposition. The amendments empowered the
Speaker to ban unruly members for up to 10 days, imposed limits on
deputies' ability to pose supplementary questions and revisit
nongermane issues, and established restrictions on the tabling of
questions of public importance. Further measures in 1997 and 1998
limited even more severely members' opportunities to question and
debate government policies. Nonetheless, government officials often
face sharp questioning in Parliament, although this is not always
reported in detail in the mainstream press.
State assemblies also limit debate. For example in December the
speaker of the Penang state assembly refused to allow an independent
assemblyman to ask which constituencies had received the largest budget
allocations for road repairs. The speaker said that the question was
``prejudicial to the public interest.'' After the 1969 intercommunal
riots, the Government abolished elected local government in favor of
municipal committees and village chiefs appointed by state governments.
Some politicians and NGO activists have advocated reintroduction of
local government. Even some ruling party municipal officials have noted
that local bodies are simply ``rubber stamps'' for the Government.
Because of racial and political factors (non-Malays are more
concentrated in urban areas), the Government is not expected to
reintroduce elected local government soon.
Women face no legal limits on participation in government and
politics; however, they remain underrepresented due to social and other
factors. At year's end, 2 of 28 cabinet ministers were women. Women
hold 20 of 193 seats in the elected lower house of Parliament and 18 of
69 seats in the appointed upper house. Women also hold some high-level
judgeships. In 1998 the Minister of National Unity and Social
Development stated that the country would not achieve its goal of 30
percent female representation in the Government by 2005. The Minister
stated that the 1998 rate of participation (defined as the percentage
of female representatives in Parliament and in state assemblies) was 6
to 7 percent. The Islamic opposition party does not allow female
candidates. In the past, it has supported female candidates of other
parties.
Ethnic minorities are represented in cabinet-level positions in
government, as well as in senior civil service positions. Nevertheless,
the political dominance of the Malay majority means in practice that
ethnic Malays hold the most powerful senior leadership positions. Non-
Malays fill 9 of the 28 cabinet posts. An ethnic Chinese leader of a
component party of the ruling coalition holds executive power in the
state of Penang.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of NGO's, including the Bar Council and other public
interest groups, devote considerable attention to human rights. The
Government generally tolerates their activities but oftendoes not
respond to their inquiries or press statements. Government officials
harshly criticize domestic NGO's for collaborating with foreigners,
including international human rights organizations. However, at year's
end, no group had been banned or decertified. Public apathy and racial
divisions (non-Malays had dominated most human rights NGO's) have
limited the effectiveness of NGO's in past years. However, public
discontent over the 1998 removal of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar has
given some impetus to NGO agendas among the Malay community.
In 1998 the Government amended the Companies Act to grant the
Registrar of Companies wide powers to block or disband organizations
deemed prejudicial to national security or the national interest. In
May the Government announced that it was planning to table amendments
to the Registration of Businesses Act to enable the Government to track
the activities and movements of organizations registered under the act
(see Section 2.b.).
The Government generally does not allow international human rights
organizations to form branches; however, it generally does not restrict
access by representatives of international human right organizations. A
February report issued by the IPU on prison conditions (see Section
1.c.) notes that, while the Government welcomed the December 1998
investigative mission, the IPU delegation was not able to make
important appointments and was not allowed to meet privately with Lim
Guan Eng. Several foreign human rights observers have attended sessions
of Anwar's two trials.
In July Parliament passed legislation to form a National Human
Rights Commission. The Commission's functions and powers would include
promoting awareness of human rights, helping the Government to draft
laws and regulations concerning human rights, advising the Government
on acceding to human rights treaties, inquiring into human rights
complaints, inspecting places of detention, and hearing witnesses and
receiving evidence on human rights questions. At year's end, the 20
members of the Commission had not yet been appointed. The Government
pledged that the Commission would be independent, but opposition
leaders were skeptical. The legislation creating the Commission defines
human rights as ``the fundamental liberties provided for'' in the
federal Constitution and restricts the application of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to those provisions consistent with the
Constitution. Opposition leaders and NGO's, including the Bar Council,
criticized the definition as too narrow. At year's end, it was unclear
how these provisions would be implemented.
In February the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and
Expression issued a report stating that freedom of opinion is curtailed
systematically in Malaysia (see Section 2.a.).
A February IPU report stated that the conditions of imprisonment of
opposition Member of Parliament Lim Guan Eng did not comply with
international standards (see Section 1.c.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal protection under the law and
prohibits discrimination against citizens based on religion, race,
descent, or place of birth. Although neither the Constitution nor laws
explicitly prohibit discrimination based on sex or disabilities, the
Government has tried to eliminate discrimination against women and
promote greater public acceptance of the disabled. Government policies
give preferences to ethnic Malays in housing, home ownership, the
awarding of government contracts, educational scholarships, and other
areas.
Women.--Reports of rape are common in the press and among women's
rights groups and NGO's, although the Government has not released
comprehensive statistics. In December a women's NGO issued a report
that stated that the incidence of rape had increased since 1993 and
that more than 50 percent of rape victims are age 16 or younger. Many
hospitals have set up crisis centers where victims of rape and domestic
abuse can make reports without going to a police station. NGO's and
political parties also cooperated in providing counseling for rape
victims. Nonetheless, cultural attitudes and a perceived lack of
sympathy from the largely male police force lead many victims not to
report rapes. Some rapists receive heavy punishments, including caning,
but women's groups complain that some rapists receive inadequate
punishments.
Spousal abuse is a serious problem that has drawn considerable
government, NGO, and press attention. Awareness of the severity and
prevalence of this problem is growing. In 1997 (the last year for which
comprehensive statistics have been published), police investigated
5,730 cases of spousal abuse, made 800arrests, and charged 693
suspects, of whom 495 were tried and 198 were sentenced. The Malaysian
Chinese Association Public Services and Complaints Department reported
that the number of domestic violence complaints that it had received in
the first 3 months of the year was roughly double that of the same
period of the previous year. Whether this signifies a rise in the
overall rate of domestic violence is unclear.
The 1996 Domestic Violence Act addresses spousal abuse. However,
women's groups criticized the act as inadequate and called for
amendments to strengthen it. Obtaining a restraining order against an
abusive spouse is a lengthy and cumbersome procedure. Moreover,
enforcement of the order is split between the police and the Welfare
Department so that violations often go unpunished.
Although the Government, NGO's, and political parties have formed
shelters and offer other assistance to battered spouses, activists
assert that support mechanisms remain inadequate. Police responses to
complaints of domestic violence are more professional and sensitive
than in previous years, but problems remain and cultural attitudes are
still an impediment.
Domestic violence complaints are rare in Islamic (Shari'a) courts
(six cases in 1997). Some Islamic law experts have urged Muslim women
to become more aware of the provisions of Islamic law that prohibit
spousal abuse and provide for divorces on grounds of physical cruelty.
Nonetheless, Islamic law generally (each state has a separate code)
prohibits wives from disobeying lawful orders of their husbands. These
provisions often present an obstacle to women pursuing claims,
including charges of abuse, against their husbands.
Spousal rape is not a crime. Theoretically a man who raped his wife
could face charges of assault, but women's rights activists cannot
remember any man being convicted in such circumstances.
A 1998 International Labor Organization (ILO) study estimated that
there were roughly 40,000 to 140,000 prostitutes in 1998. The
Government heatedly disputed this estimate and the police stated that
they would investigate NGO's that might have provided information that
formed the basis of the study. Sex tourism is not legal and the level
of such activity is not high.
A women's rights NGO stated in 1998 that the economic downturn was
forcing more women into prostitution. The NGO cited government
statistics showing an upturn in the number of arrests for prostitution.
A government source disputed this claim, saying that the increase in
arrests was due to more vigorous enforcement. In February the press
reported a 1998 study by the national population and family development
board that showed that the economic downturn had dampened the demand
for prostitution.
Malaysia is a source, transit, and destination country for
trafficking in women for sexual purposes (see Section 6.f.).
In August the Ministry of Human Resources issued a Code of Practice
designed to prevent and eradicate sexual harassment in the workplace.
Women's groups welcomed the code but noted that further public
education on sexual harassment was still necessary. The Code of
Practice has no legal effect and earlier plans for a sexual harassment
law apparently have been abandoned. Women's rights activists said that
a law on sexual harassment would be more effective than a code of
practice. Deputy Human Resources Minister Datuk Dr. Affifuddin Omar
responded that the Government preferred social engineering rather than
a ``big brother approach'' to the problems of sexual harassment. In
addition there are still many cultural obstacles to women who try to
pursue sexual harassment charges. The Ministry of Human Resources
stated in 1998 that it had received reports of only six sexual
harassment cases in the first 6 months of that year (the most recent
statistics available) and only a total of about 30 since 1996.
Women are still victims of legal discrimination. The cultural and
religious traditions of the major ethnic groups also heavily influence
the condition of women in society. In family and religious matters,
Muslim women are subject to Islamic law. Polygyny is allowed and
practiced to a limited degree. Islamic inheritance law varies by state,
but generally favors male offspring and relatives. However, one state,
Negeri Sembilan, provides for matrilineal inheritance. The number of
women obtaining divorces under the provisions of Islamic law that allow
for divorce without the husband's consent, while small, is increasing
steadily.
There were increasing complaints about the treatment of women by
Islamic courts. An April press report described complaints by NGO's and
women's groups of rude and insensitive treatment by staff and officers
of Islamic courts. In May the women's wing of UMNO stated that it would
act to help accelerate and improve the handling of women's problems by
Islamic courts.
Muslim couples must take premarital courses. Women's activists have
complained that the courses, as implemented, perpetuate gender
discrimination by misinforming women of their rights in marriage (see
Section 1.f.).
Non-Muslim women are subject to civil (secular) law. Changes in the
Civil Marriage and Divorce Act in the early 1980's increased protection
of married women's rights, especially those married under customary
rites. Nonetheless, many statutes, such as the Women and Girls
Protection Act still provide for paternalistic or discriminatory
treatment of women. The Guardianship of Women's and Infants Act was
amended in July to give mothers equal parental rights. Four states
extended the provisions of the amended bill to Muslim mothers. Women's
groups urged all states to do the same. In June the Land and
Cooperative Development Ministry announced that it was considering
amending the Group Settlement Act to give wives of settlers a stake in
the land awarded to their husbands.
Government policy supports women's rights and the Government has
undertaken a number of initiatives to promote equality for women.
Specifically the Government promotes the full and equal participation
of women in education and the work force. Women are represented in
growing numbers in the professions, but women's groups argue that the
level of participation is still disproportionately low. In the
scientific and medical fields, women make up more than half of all
university graduates and the total intake of women into universities
increased from 29 percent in 1970 to one-half of the student population
in recent years. In August National Unity and Social Development
Minister Datin Paduka Zaleha Ismail said that the rate of participation
of women in the labor force (30 percent in 1970) would be 52 percent by
the end of 2000. The proportion of women in the civil service has risen
from roughly 33 percent in 1990 to roughly 41 percent and women occupy
some high-ranking civil service positions. In April Malaysian Trade
Union Congress President Zainal Rampak urged trade unions to fulfill
the ILO policy of filling 30 percent of leadership positions with women
(current statistics were not disclosed).
Children.--The Government has demonstrated a commitment to
children's rights and welfare; it spends roughly 20 percent of the
national budget on education. The Government provides free compulsory
education for children through the age of 15. Actual attendance at
primary school is nearly universal (99 percent). Secondary school
attendance also is high (82 percent). A variety of programs provide low
cost health care for most children. An office in the Ministry of
National Unity and Social Development oversees children's issues.
In October the Parliament passed a new Child Act. The Act
stipulates heavier punishments for child abuse, molestation, neglect,
and abandonment. The act also mandated the formation of a children's
court, which, the Government stated, would better protect the interests
of children.
The Government recognizes that sexual exploitation of children and
incest are problems. In 1997 police announced a special effort to
prosecute the crime of incest, which is in particular a problem in
rural areas. Child abuse receives wide coverage in the press. The
Government sternly prosecutes cases of child abuse and child molesters
receive heavy jail sentences and caning. The Ministry of National Unity
and Social Development reported that in 1997 there were 1,117 reported
cases of child abuse, while from January through August 1998 there were
600 cases. In August a Malaysian physician who studies child abuse said
publicly that the sexual abuse of children was common in Malaysia.
Child labor also is a problem (see Section 6.d.).
Female genital mutilation (FGM) is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to physical and psychological
health; however, extreme forms of FGM are not practiced in the country.
Many Malay girls receive a tiny ritual cut to the clitoris. Almost all
Malay women, including Muslim women's activists, do not believe that
this constitutes mutilation or reduces a woman's future capacity for
sexual pleasure.
Statutory rape occurs and is prosecuted. However, Islamic law
provisions that consider a Muslim girl an adult after she has had her
first menstruation sometimes complicate prosecution of statutory rape.
Such a girl can be charged with ``khalwat'' or ``close proximity'' (the
charge usually used to prosecute premarital or extramarital sexual
relations) even if she is under the age of 18 and her partner is an
adult. Moreover Shari'a courts sometimes are more lenient with males
who are charged with ``close proximity.'' Thus, Shari'a sometimes
punishes the victims of statutory rape. However, in many cases Muslim
men are charged and punished for statutory rape under secular law.
Child prostitution exists. However, child prostitutes often are
treated as delinquents rather than victims. In 1998 the Minister of
National Unity and Social Development stated that 150 to 160 underage
girls are detained ``each year'' for involvement in immoral activities
and sent to rehabilitation centers. Authorities prosecute traffickers
in child prostitution vigorously. Statistics for apprehension of
traffickers are not available (see Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--The Government does not discriminate
against physically disabled persons in employment, education, and
provision of other state services. However, few public facilities are
adapted to the needs of the disabled, and the Government has not
mandated accessibility to transportation or public buildings for the
disabled. In August Minister of National Unity and Social Development
Zaleha said that only 10 percent of residential and commercial
buildings were ``disabled-friendly''. In September Minister Zaleha
announced a cabinet decision to require that 10 percent of houses in
all new housing projects be disabled-friendly. In December Zaleha
reportedly said that ``all buildings'' would be made accessible to the
disabled within 2 years.
Special education schools exist, but they are not sufficient to
meet the needs of the disabled population. The Government and the
general public are becoming more sensitive to the needs of the
physically disabled. The Government has taken many initiatives to
promote public acceptance of the disabled, to make public facilities
more accessible to disabled persons, and to increase budgetary
allotments for programs aimed at aiding them.
In August an NGO representing the disabled said that the disabled
make up 7 percent of the population. The NGO urged the Government to
increase its support for the disabled. Disabled persons do not enjoy
explicit legal protection against discrimination. In August the parents
of a disabled child sued a private international school for
discrimination after the school refused to enroll their child. A court
ruled that the school must accept the disabled child.
Indigenous People.--Indigenous groups and persons (i.e., the
descendants of the original inhabitants of peninsular Malaysia and the
Borneo states) generally enjoy the same constitutional rights as the
rest of the population. However, in practice federal laws pertaining to
indigenous people vest almost total power in the minister responsible
for indigenous people (currently the Minister of National Unity and
Social Development) to protect, control, and otherwise decide issues
concerning them. As a result, indigenous people, particularly in
peninsular Malaysia, have very little ability to participate in
decisions.
Under the 1954 Aboriginal People's Act (amended in 1974),
indigenous people in peninsular Malaysia (known as Orang Asli) who had
been granted land on a group basis had no right to own land on an
individual basis or to receive titles to land. The Social Development
Ministry announced in 1996 that state governments, which make decisions
affecting land rights, had agreed to issue titles to Orang Asli.
Amendments were drafted to enable Orang Asli to hold titles on an
individual basis. Surveying and transfer of title apparently has
proceeded very slowly. In July Minister Zaleha said that no Orang Asli
had yet been given individual land titles on this basis.
The uncertainty surrounding Orang Asli land ownership makes them
vulnerable to exploitation. There were many reports of Orang Asli who
had been cheated, misled, or otherwise exploited by land developers. In
some cases, the Orang Asli have sued. Finance Minister Tun Daim
Zainuddin announced in May that a total of 314,715 acres of land would
be gazetted and reserved for Orang Asli. The Federal Government urged
the states to follow up on Daim's announcement. The leader of a leading
Orang Asli NGO welcomed the announcement, but urged the Government to
proceed quickly. This NGO pointed out that the total area of land
actually gazetted and reserved for Orang Asli had declined, not
increased, since 1990.
The indigenous people in peninsular Malaysia, who number roughly
100,000, are the poorest group in the country; however, according to
government officials, Orang Asli gradually are catching up to other
citizens in their standard of living, and the percentage of Orang Asli
who lead a nomadic lifestyle has dropped to less than 40 percent.
Government development projects for the Orang Asli are announced from
time to time.
In east Malaysia, although state law recognizes the right of
indigenous people to land under ``native customary rights,'' the
definition and extent of these lands are in dispute. Indigenous people
in the state of Sarawak continued to protest the alleged encroachment
by state and private logging and plantationcompanies onto land that
they consider theirs because of customary rights. Laws allowing
condemnation and purchase of land do not require more than perfunctory
notifications in newspapers to which indigenous people may have no
access. The net result is that many indigenous people are deprived of
their traditional lands with little or no legal recourse. In July the
Government announced that it was scaling back the large Bakun Dam
project in Sarawak, which would have resettled many residents.
In September after a long-simmering feud with neighboring
villagers, four plantation company workers were killed in the state of
Sabah. Allegedly, indigenous residents, angered over the plantation
company's repeated encroachments on what the residents regarded as
their native land, killed the workers.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government implements
extensive preferential programs designed to boost the economic position
of the Malay majority, which remains poorer on average than the Chinese
minority. Such preferential programs and policies limit opportunities
for non-Malays in higher education, government employment, business
permits and licenses, and ownership of land. According to the
Government, these programs have been instrumental in ensuring ethnic
harmony and political stability. Ethnic Indian Malaysians continue to
lag behind in the country's economic development. A small component
party of the ruling coalition proposed in August to abolish ethnic
quotas. The Government rejected the proposal.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--By law most workers have the right to
engage in trade union activity and approximately 11 percent of the work
force belong to 544 trade unions. Exceptions include certain limited
categories of workers labeled ``confidential'' and ``managerial and
executive,'' as well as defense and police officials. Within certain
limitations, unions may organize workplaces, bargain collectively with
employers, and associate with national federations. In April the
Government reiterated that it discourages foreign workers from joining
unions and that labor laws adequately protect the rights of foreigners.
In practical terms, foreigners are not allowed to join trade unions
(see Section 6.e.).
The Trade Unions Act prohibits interfering with, restraining, or
coercing a worker in the exercise of the right to form trade unions or
in participating in lawful trade union activities. However, the act
restricts a union to representing workers in a ``particular
establishment, trade, occupation, or industry or within any similar
trades, occupations, or industries,'' contrary to ILO guidelines. The
Director General of Trade Unions may refuse to register a trade union
and, in some circumstances, may also withdraw the registration of a
trade union. When registration has been refused, withdrawn, or
canceled, a trade union is considered an unlawful association. The
Government justifies its overall labor policies by positing that a
``social compact'' exists wherein the Government, employer, and worker
are part of an overall effort to create jobs, train workers, boost
productivity and profitability, and ultimately provide the resources
necessary to fund human resource development and a national social
safety net. Trade unions from different industries may join in national
congresses, but the congresses must register as societies under the
Societies Act (see Section 2.b.).
In January the Trade Unions Department reported that in 1998 it had
issued notices to 206 trade unions threatening them with deregistration
for failing to submit reports of their accounts. A leading trade union
leader said that he was ``puzzled'' by the Trade Union's Department
statement and would seek further clarification. Also in February, the
Human Resources Minister said publicly that union members' complaints
against union leaders were increasing. In February the Human Resources
Minister said that the Government would amend the Trade Unions Act to
make all principal officers of a union liable if the union commits any
wrongdoing (now only the secretary general is liable). There were no
reports that these amendments were adopted. Some trade unionists claim
that unions that defy government policies face more intense scrutiny,
potentially leading to deregistration. However, there were no reports
that unions were deregistered.
In September Malaysian Trade Union Congress (MTUC) leader Zainal
Rampak said that the MTUC was fed up with delays in registering new
unions, and that new unions often faced delays of several years in
registering. Zainal called on the Government to amend the Industrial
Relations Act to allow automatic union recognition.
In April the MTUC called on the Government to ratify ILO Convention
87, which provides for the freedom to join a union. At year's end, the
Government had not ratified the Convention.
Government policy discourages the formation of national unions in
the electronics sector; the Government believes that enterprise-level
unions are more appropriate for this sector. In 1997 the MTUC dropped
its longstanding objection to this practice, stating that it would be
better for the workers to have the in-house unions ``than none at
all.'' However, in February MTUC secretary general G. Rajasekaran said
that a national union for electronics workers was still on the MTUC
agenda.
Even in-house unions sometimes face difficulties. For example, an
electronics company was picketed by workers several times during the
year. Workers called on the company to end litigation and conclude a
collective bargaining agreement that has been pending for 10 years.
Workers claimed that the company had refused to meet union officials,
even though the Department of Trade Unions recognized the union.
Unions maintain independence both from the Government and from
political parties, but individual union members may belong to political
parties. Although union officers by law may not hold principal offices
in political parties, individual trade union leaders have served in
Parliament. Trade unions are free to associate with national labor
congresses, which exercise many of the responsibilities of national
labor unions, although they cannot bargain for local unions. In l997
longtime labor leader Zainal Rampak joined the ruling party, and in
1998 was appointed to the Senate. Some union leaders are concerned that
the MTUC, under Zainal's leadership, is losing its independence.
Although strikes are legal, the right to strike is restricted
severely. The law contains a list of ``essential services'' in which
unions must give advance notice of any industrial action. The list
includes sectors not normally deemed essential under ILO definitions.
The Industrial Relations Act of 1967 requires the parties to notify
the Ministry of Human Resources that a dispute exists before any
industrial action (strike or lockout) may be taken. The Ministry's
Industrial Relations Department then may become involved actively in
conciliation efforts. If conciliation fails to achieve settlement, the
Minister has the power to refer the dispute to the Industrial Court.
Strikes or lockouts are prohibited while the dispute is before the
Industrial Court. The Industrial Relations Act prohibits employers from
taking retribution against a worker for participating in the lawful
activities of a trade union. Where a strike is legal, these provisions
would prohibit employer retribution against strikers and leaders.
Although some trade unions question their effectiveness, it is not
possible to assess fully whether these provisions are being enforced
effectively, given the limited number of cases of alleged retribution.
Strikes are extremely rare. In January the Deputy Human Resources
Minister said that the (1997 and 1998) economic downturn was ``not
affecting industrial harmony'' and noted that the country still seldom
had strikes.
In April 500 taxi drivers in the state of Penang held an informal
strike to protest stricter government enforcement of a rule requiring
meters. In May a group of truck drivers blocked the country's main
north-south highway to protest road rules.
There are two national labor organizations. The MTUC is a
federation of mainly private sector unions. CUEPACS is a federation of
civil servant and teacher unions. Public servants have the right to
organize at the level of ministries and departments. There are three
national joint councils representing management and professional civil
servants, technical employees, and nontechnical workers. In May various
trade unions representing port workers announced plans to form a
federation potentially including 12,000 workers. There were no reports
of further developments.
In 1998 the Government announced plans to include foreign workers
in the national workers compensation scheme. Exclusion of foreign
workers from this scheme had been a longstanding concern of the ILO. In
August Human Resources Minister Lim Ah Lek said that the Cabinet would
soon receive the final report on extending the compensation scheme to
foreign workers. There were no reports of further developments.
Enterprise unions can associate with international labor bodies and
do so.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have
the legal right to organize and bargain collectively, and collective
bargaining is widespread in those sectors where labor is organized. The
law prohibits antiuniondiscrimination by employers against union
members and organizers. Charges of discrimination may be filed with the
Ministry of Human Resources or the Industrial Court. Critics say that
the Industrial Court is slow in adjudicating worker complaints when
conciliation efforts by the Ministry of Human Resources fail. However,
other critics point out that the Industrial Court almost always sides
with the workers in disputes. In August the press reported an MTUC
survey that indicated that employers often ignore with impunity
Industrial Court judgments.
Companies in free trade zones (FTZ's) must observe labor standards
identical to those in the rest of the country. Many workers in FTZ
companies are organized, especially in the textile and electrical
products sectors. The ILO continues to object to legal restrictions on
collective bargaining in ``pioneer industries.''
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and the Government generally
enforces this prohibition; however, trafficking in women for the
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.). In
theory certain laws allow the use of imprisonment with compulsory labor
as a punishment for persons who express views opposed to the
established order or who participate in strikes. The Constitutional
prohibition renders these laws without effect.
The Constitutional prohibition also applies to forced and bonded
labor by children; however, trafficking in girls for the purpose of
forced prostitution is a problem. Bonded labor is rare, and there were
no cases reported during the year.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Children and Young Persons (Employment) Act of 1966
prohibits the employment of children younger than the age of 14. The
act permits some exceptions, such as light work in a family enterprise,
work in public entertainment, work performed for the Government in a
school or in training institutions, or work as an approved apprentice.
In no case may children work more than 6 hours per day, more than 6
days per week, or at night.
Child labor occurs in certain sectors of the country. A 1993 joint
report by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the
Asian and Pacific Regional Organization put the child work force at
75,000. However, government officials maintain that this figure is
outdated, since it was based on a nationwide survey of child labor
undertaken in 1980, which estimated that more than 73,400 children
between the ages of 10 and 14 were employed full time. There is no
reliable recent estimate of the number of child workers. Most child
laborers work in the urban informal sector in food businesses, night
markets, and small-scale industries, as well as on rubber and palm oil
plantations. Government officials do not deny the existence of child
labor but maintain that foreign workers largely have replaced child
labor and that the Government vigorously enforces child labor
provisions. Forced and bonded labor by children is prohibited and
generally is rare; however, occasional trafficking in girls for the
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.c. and
6.f.).
e. Acceptable conditions of work.--There is no national minimum
wage, but the Wage Councils Act provides for a minimum wage in those
sectors or regions of the country where a need exists. Under the law,
workers in an industry who believe that they need the protection of a
minimum wage may request that a wage council be established. Few
workers are now covered by minimum wages set by wage councils and the
Government prefers to let market forces determine wage rates. Minimum
wages set by wage councils generally do not provide for a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. However, prevailing wages,
even in the sectors covered by wage councils, are higher than the
minimum wages set by the wage councils and often do provide a decent
living. In May Human Resources Minister Datuk LIM Ah Lek said that the
Government was not against a minimum wage, but that it was not ready to
set the amount at $316 (1,200 ringgit) per month (as proposed by some
unions). MTUC President Zainal Rampak subsequently again called on the
Government to introduce a minimum wage.
Under the Employment Act of 1955, working hours may not exceed 8
hours per day or 48 hours per workweek of 6 days. Each workweek must
include one 24-hour rest period. The act also sets overtime rates and
mandates public holidays, annual leave, sick leave, and maternity
allowances. The Labor Department of the Ministry of Human Resources
enforces these standards, but a shortage of inspectors precludes strict
enforcement.
Plantation workers generally receive either piecework or daily
wages. Many NGO's and union officials proposed a monthly wagefor
plantation workers. The Government stated that it would study the idea,
but at year's end, had taken no action.
Legal and illegal foreign workers from Indonesia, the Philippines,
Burma, Thailand, India, Bangladesh, and other countries constitute
about 20 percent of the workforce. These workers, who occupy a wide
range of menial jobs in the agricultural, industrial, and service
sectors, are not allowed to join trade unions. The MTUC stated in
December that foreign workers should be unionized. In February the
Government reiterated that it did not ``encourage'' foreign workers to
join unions and that labor laws were adequate to protect foreign
workers' interests.
Significant numbers of contract workers, including numerous illegal
immigrants, work on plantations and in other sectors. Working
conditions on plantations for these laborers compare poorly with those
of direct-hire plantation workers, many of whom belong to the national
union of plantation workers. Moreover, immigrant workers in the
construction and other sectors, particularly if they are illegal
aliens, generally do not have access to the system of labor
adjudication. Government investigations into this problem have resulted
in a number of steps to eliminate the abuse of contract labor. For
example, besides expanding programs to regularize the status of
immigrant workers, the Government investigates complaints of abuses,
endeavors to inform workers of their rights, encourages workers to come
forward with their complaints, and warns employers to end abuses. Like
other employers, labor contractors may be prosecuted for violating the
labor laws.
In 1993 Parliament adopted an Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA), which covers all sectors of the economy, except the maritime
sector and the military. The act established a national Occupational
Safety and Health Council, composed of workers, employers, and
government representatives, to set policy and coordinate occupational
safety and health measures. It requires employers to identify risks and
take precautions, including providing safety training to workers, and
compels companies that have more than 40 workers to establish joint
management-employee safety committees. The act requires workers to use
safety equipment and to cooperate with employers to create a safe,
healthy workplace. Trade unions maintain that relatively few committees
have been established and, even in cases where they exist, that they
meet infrequently and generally are ineffective.
Employers or employees that violate the OSHA are subject to
substantial fines or imprisonment for up to 5 years. There are no
specific statutory or regulatory provisions that provide a right for
workers to remove themselves from dangerous workplace conditions
without arbitrary dismissal.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution prohibits slavery;
however, this provision has not been invoked in cases of human
trafficking. The Protection of Women and Girls Act explicitly prohibits
trafficking and other forms of exploitation of women and girls and
forms the legal basis for prosecuting trafficking cases.
Malaysia is a source, transit, and destination country for
trafficking in women and girls for sexual exploitation. In 1998 the
Deputy Home Minister stated that 2,250 foreign prostitutes had been
arrested in Malaysia. Police believe that the overwhelming number of
prostitutes in the country are foreigners from Indonesia, the
Philippines, Burma, Thailand, and China. These women often work as
karaoke hostesses, ``guest relations officers,'' and masseuses. Russian
women work in smaller numbers as prostitutes. Malaysian women are
trafficked for sexual purposes mostly to Singapore, Macau, Hong Kong,
and Taiwan, but also to Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United
States. According to police and Chinese community leaders, Malaysian
women who are victims of traffickers are almost exclusively ethnic
Chinese, though ethnic Malay and ethnic Indian women work as
prostitutes domestically. Police and NGO's believe that Chinese
criminal syndicates are behind most of the trafficking (both incoming
an outgoing) of women of all nationalities. The Deputy Home Minister
stated in 1997 that 4,200 Malaysian girls and young women were reported
missing in 1997. Political parties and NGO's estimate that a portion of
these women and girls were victims of traffickers.
A few government officials may provide bogus documents illicitly to
traffickers (although no specific cases were reported), but the
Government investigates and punishes those involved in such cases. The
Government assists underage girls and has rescued some kidnaped women.
Police often raid venues of prostitution. For example, Selangor state
police said that they had raided 1,230 suspected ``vice dens'' during
the year. However, NGO's and women's rights activists complain that
police have no coherent policy to protect victims of trafficking.
Rather than prosecute traffickers, police generally arrest or deport
individual women for prostitution. In 1998 the press quoted an
anonymous police official as saying that Malaysia had become a ``safe
haven'' for traffickers. A police spokesman asked for official comment
responded by questioning whether press reporting on trafficking in
women was in the national interest.
Authorities prosecute traffickers in child prostitution vigorously.
Statistics for apprehension of traffickers are not available.
______
MARSHALL ISLANDS
The Republic of the Marshall Islands, a self-governing nation under
the Compact of Free Association with the United States, is composed of
34 atolls in the central Pacific, with a total land area of about 70
square miles. The approximately 56,000 inhabitants are of Micronesian
origin and concentrated primarily on Majuro and Kwajalein atolls. The
Constitution provides for free and fair elections, and executive and
legislative branches. The legislature consists of a 33-member
Parliament (Nitijela), and a Council of Chiefs (Iroij), which serves a
largely consultative function dealing with custom and traditional
practice. The President is elected by majority Nitijela vote and he
appoints his Cabinet from its membership. The Constitution provides for
an independent judiciary; however, the Government attempted to
influence the judiciary.
Under the Compact of Free Association, the United States is
responsible for defense and national security, and the Marshall Islands
has no external security force of its own. The national and local
police forces have responsibility for internal security. These agencies
honor constitutional and legal civil rights protections in executing
their responsibilities.
The economy depends mainly on transfer payments from the United
States. Coconut oil and copra exports, a small amount of tourism,
import and income taxes, and fishing licensing fees generate limited
revenues.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. However, government influence leads
to occasional media self-censorship, and also affects the judiciary.
There were occasional instances of denial of due process for detainees.
Violence against women and child abuse are problems.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution expressly forbids such practices, and
there were no reports that officials employed them. Security forces
generally respect this prohibition. There was one case in which a
police officer was charged with bodily assault of a detainee.
Prison conditions, while Spartan, meet minimum international
standards.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government
generally observes this prohibition. Nonetheless, there were several
reported cases of arbitrary detention lasting over 24 hours in which
persons were denied their rights to be charged or released within the
specified time, or to be informed of the charges against them.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the Government attempts to influence
judicial matters through legislative or administrative means. A High
Court seat vacated in July 1998 remains unfilled. The Constitution
provides for the removal of a judge only by a resolution adopted by at
least two-thirds of the Nitijela members and only on certain specific
grounds (e.g., clear failure to discharge duties; treason; or bribery).
In late 1998, the President and his cabinet ministers had criticized
publicly the Chief Justice's decision concerning a constitutional
interpretation with which the Government disagreed. On April 19, during
a preliminary hearing on a criminal case involving the Government's
passport sales program, the Chief Justice remarked that it seemed
unfair for the Government to single out one defendant when there
appeared to be evidence of illegal activity by several other members of
the Government involved in the passport program. In June the Cabinet
prematurely terminated the contract of the foreign national High Court
Chief Justice and appointed the President's and Cabinet's attorney to
replace him as chairman of the independent JudicialServices Commission.
During the past 4 years, three chief justices have resigned or been
terminated by the Government.
The judiciary consists of a Supreme Court with appellate
jurisdiction, a High Court with general jurisdiction in civil and
criminal matters and appellate jurisdiction over subordinate courts at
the district and community levels, and a Traditional Rights Court with
jurisdiction in cases involving matters of customary law and
traditional practice.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and the
Government generally respects this right.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for freedom from such
practices, government authorities respect these prohibitions, and
violations are subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally honors
these rights in practice. However, government influence leads to
occasional self-censorship by the media in areas of political or
cultural sensitivity.
There is a privately owned weekly newspaper with articles and
opinions in both English and the Marshallese language.
There is one radio station, which is government owned. The
President and cabinet members control the programming of the station
and generally allow nonadministration viewpoints to be broadcast. Live
broadcasts of the legislative session have been cut when remarks are
critical of the Government. The Government also has used the radio
station to attack verbally the judiciary and opposition members. There
is a cable television company that broadcasts a variety of foreign news
and entertainment programs and occasional videotaped local events.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and these
provisions are observed in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
There are no recent reports of refugees. The Government has not
formulated a policy regarding refugees, asylees, or first asylum.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right through
periodic elections. The Nitijela (Parliament) and mayors are elected by
secret ballot every 4 years with universal suffrage for citizens 18
years of age and older. The Nitijela election was held on November 15,
and, in a record turnout, voters signaled dissatisfaction with the
incumbent government by defeating five of the eight incumbent ministers
seeking reelection. In January 2000, the President is to be selected by
the Nitijela from among its 33 members. The President then selects
approximately nine cabinet ministers from among the Nitijela members.
Executive power is centralized in the President and his Cabinet. This
group dominates the legislature as well. There are no restrictions on
the formation of political parties. Political activity by foreigners is
prohibited.
On September 7, 1998, the President and his Cabinet walked out of
the legislative session when the Speaker of the Nitijela ruled that
there would be a secret ballot on a motion of no confidence. On
September 29, 1998, the High Court ruled the walkout illegal. The
Cabinet appealed the High Court decision to the Supreme Court, and the
President and Cabinet continued to use walkouts to avoid critical votes
during the legislative session, at times precipitating a virtual
shutdown of the legislature. On September 8, the Supreme Court upheld
the High Court ruling.
There are no legal impediments to women's participation in
government and politics. One woman was elected to the Nitijela in the
November elections. Society is matrilineal, and those men and women who
exercise traditional leadership and land ownership powers derive their
rights either from their own positions in the family, or from
relationships deriving from their mother's and sister's lineage.
However, urbanization and the movement of the population away from the
lands that they control, is leading to a decline in the traditional
authority exercised by women. Women's cultural responsibilities and
traditionally passive roles are not seen to be managerial or executive
in nature, and women remain underrepresented in Parliament and in
senior government positions.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigations of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
While there are no official restrictions, no local nongovernmental
human rights organizations have been formed. No international human
rights organization has expressed interest or concern or visited the
country.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex,
race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, place of birth, family status or descent, and the
Government generally respects these provisions.
Women.--The Government identifies spousal abuse as common. Wife
beating is not condoned in society, and most assaults occur while the
assailant is under the influence of alcohol. The Government's health
office provides counseling for reported spouse and child abuse cases,
but advises that many cases go unreported. Assault is a criminal
offense, but women involved in domestic violence are reluctant to
prosecute spouses in the court system. Women's groups publicize women's
issues and attempt to create a greater awareness of the rights of
women. Violence against women outside the family occurs, and women in
the urban centers would assume a risk by going out alone after dark.
Inheritance of property and of traditional rank is matrilineal,
with women occupying positions of importance within the traditional
system. No instances of unequal pay for equal work or of sex-related
job discrimination were reported. However, while women workers are very
prevalent in the private sector, many of them are in low paying jobs
with little hope of advancement.
Children.--The Government is committed to children's welfare
through its programs of health care and free education, but these have
not been adequate to meet the needs of the country's sharply increasing
population.
It is estimated that up to 20 percent of elementary school age
children do not attend school on a regular basis. The Government's
enrollment report indicates that only two-thirds of those completing
eighth grade attend high school. Of that number, 50 percent eventually
graduate.
Child abuse and neglect are criminal offenses. Although the
Government has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
awareness of the Convention and its provisions remain low among the
general population. The law requires teachers, caregivers, and other
persons to report instances of child abuse and exempts them from civil
or criminal liability as a consequence of making such a report.
However, there are few reports and few prosecutions. Child abuse and
neglect are considered to be on the increase. Apparently contributing
to the problem are the influences on family life and traditional values
arising from increased urbanization, unemployment, population
pressures, two-earner households, and the availability of alcohol and
illegal gambling.
People With Disabilities.--There is no apparent discrimination
against disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision
of other state services. There are no building codes, and there is no
legislation mandating access for the disabled.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of free association in general, and the Government interprets
this right as allowing the existence of labor unions, although none has
been formed to date. The Constitution does not provide for the right to
strike, and the Government has not addressed this issue.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There is no
legislation concerning collective bargaining or trade union
organization. However, there are no impediments to the organization of
trade unions or to collective bargaining. Wages in the cash economy are
determined by market factors in accordance with the minimum wage and
other laws.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits involuntary servitude, and there is no evidence of its
practice. The law does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded
labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law does not prohibit the employment of children.
Children typically are not employed in the wage economy, but some
assist their families in fishing, agriculture, and other small-scale
domestic enterprises. The law requires compulsory education for
children from 6 to 14 years of age, but the Government does not enforce
this law due to a lack of classrooms and teachers. There is no law or
regulation setting a minimum age for employment of children.
The law does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by
children, but such practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is a government-specified
minimum wage established by law, and it is adequate to maintain a
decent standard of living in this subsistence economy where extended
families are expected to help less fortunate members. The minimum wage
for all government and private sector employees is $2.00 per hour. (The
U.S. dollar is the national currency.) The Ministry of Resources and
Development oversees minimum wage regulations, and its oversight has
been deemed adequate. Foreign employees and Marshallese trainees of
private employers who have invested in or established a business in the
country are exempt from minimum wage requirements. This exemption does
not affect a significant segment of the work force.
There is no legislation concerning maximum hours of work or
occupational safety and health. Most businesses are closed and people
generally refrain from work on Sunday.
A government labor office makes recommendations to the Nitijela on
working conditions, such as the minimum wage, legal working hours and
overtime payments, and occupational health and safety standards in
accordance with International Labor Organization conventions. The
office periodically convenes board meetings that are open to the
public. There is no legislation specifically giving workers the right
to remove themselves from situations that endanger their health or
safety without jeopardy to their continued employment, and there is no
legislation protecting workers who file complaints about such
conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no specific laws concerning
trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons
were trafficked in, to, or from the country.
______
FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) is composed of 607 small
islands extending over a large area of the central Pacific. Four
states--Chuuk (formerly Truk), Kosrae, Pohnpei, and Yap--make up the
federation. The population is estimated at 130,000, mostly of
Micronesian origin. The four states were part of the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands and were administered by the United States from
1947 to 1986 pursuant to an agreement with the United Nations.
Political legitimacy rests on the popular will expressed by a majority
vote through elections in accordance with the Constitution. There are
three branches of government: An executive branch led by a president
who also serves as head of state; a unicameral legislature elected from
the four constituent states; and an independent judicial system that
applies criminal and civil laws and procedures closely paralleling
those of the United States.
Under the Compact of Free Association, the United States is
responsible for the islands defense. The FSM has no security forces
aside from national police operating under the office of the Secretary
of Justice and public safety officers operating under the authority of
the attorney generals of the individual state governments.
The economy depends heavily on transfer payments from the United
States, fishing, tourism, and subsistence agriculture.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens.
Traditional customs distinguish between persons on the basis of social
status and sex. There is evidence of an increase in both spousal abuse
and child neglect, and government agencies often ignore such problems
due to the constraints imposed by traditional society. Neither the
Government nor other organizations successfully have filled the role of
the traditional extended family in protecting and supporting its
members.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--There was no pattern of torture or other cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards.
No local organizations concern themselves solely with human rights,
and the question of prison visits by human rights monitors has not
arisen.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Legal procedures, for
the most part patterned after U.S. law, provide for due process, which
is carefully observed.
Exile is not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is appointed by the
President, with the advice and consent of the Congress.
Public trial is provided for in the Bill of Rights, and trials are
conducted fairly. Juveniles may have closed hearings. Despite these
provisions, cultural resistance to litigation and incarceration as
methods of maintaining public order has allowed some persons to act
with impunity. Serious cases of sexual and other assault and even
murder have not gone to trial, and suspects routinely are released
indefinitely.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such arbitrary interference, and in
practice there is none.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
these rights, and the Government generally respects these rights in
practice. No newspapers now are published in the country. The biweekly
Island Tribune closed in April because the owners could not find a
local or foreign journalist to manage the newspaper. The newspaper is
expected to reopen if a qualified journalist is found. Until the Island
Tribune closed, it reported on domestic events and addressed
controversial issues.
The national Government and the four states publish newsletters.
Each of the four state governments controls a radio station that
broadcasts primarily in the local language. One religious group
operates a private radio station. The population of Pohnpei has
increasing access to live satellite-televised information from around
the world and tape-delayed broadcasts of programming by the major U.S.
networks. However, none of the other three states has a television
receiver station, and few residents have individual satellite dishes.
There is an increasing level of open public discussion of social
and governmental issues on various Internet sites. The Internet plays
an important role in allowing citizens in the four states, as well as
those residing outside the country, an opportunity to share views and
opinions.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Bill of
Rights provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government
respects this right in practice. During political campaigns, citizens
often question candidates at public meetings and social gatherings.
The Bill of Rights provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice. Formal associations are
uncommon, but organizations for students and women exist.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Bill of Rights forbids the
establishment of a state religion and governmental restrictions on
freedom of religion, and the Government respects this freedom in
practice. Missionaries of many faiths work in the country without
hindrance.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement within the country. It is silent on foreign travel,
emigration, and repatriation, but in practice none of these is
restricted.
The three Vietnamese who fled a U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
camp in Indonesia and sailed to Yap state in November 1998 are still
there. The Government has not found another country willing to accept
them.
The Government has not formulated a policy regarding refugees,
asylees, or first asylum.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government. The Congress is
elected by popular vote from each state; the Congress then chooses the
President and Vice President from among its four at large senators by
majority vote. State governors, state legislators, and municipal
governments are elected by direct popular vote. Political campaigning
is unrestricted, and, since there are no established political parties,
political support generally is sought from family and allied clan
groupings, as well as religious groups.
There are no restrictions on the formation of political groups, but
there have been no significant efforts to form political parties.
Cultural factors in the male-dominated society have limited women's
representation in government and politics. Although women hold midlevel
positions at both the federal and state level, women are severely
underrepresented in leadership roles at the highest government levels.
The first woman to hold a national government cabinet position was
appointed in June as Public Defender.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There were no known requests for investigations of alleged human
rights violations. While there are no official restrictions, no local
groups exclusively concern themselves with human rights. However, there
are women's groups that address rights for women and children.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Although the Constitution provides explicit protection against
discrimination based on race, sex, language, or religion, there is
extensive societal discrimination, notably discrimination and violence
against women. Government enforcement of these constitutional
protections is weak.
Women.--Most violence against women occurs in the family context.
In the traditional Micronesian extended family unit, spouses and
children were accorded strong protections from violence, abuse, and
neglect. These actions were deemed offenses against the family, not
just the individuals and were dealt with by a complex system of
familial sanctions. However, with increasing urbanization and
monetarization of the economy, greater emphasis has been placed on the
nuclear family, and the traditional methods of coping with family
discord are breaking down. No government agency, including the police,
has succeeded in replacing that extended family system or in addressing
the issue of family violence directly.
Incidents of spousal abuse, often of increasing severity, continue
to rise. Effective prosecution of such offenses is rare. In many cases,
the victim is pressured by family, is fearful of further assault, or is
convinced that the police will not involve themselves actively in what
is seen as a private family problem and decides against initiating
legal charges. There are no laws against domestic abuse, and there are
no governmental or private facilities to shelter and support women in
abusive situations. The number of cases of physical and sexual assaults
against women outside the family context also are growing. These
assaults are perpetrated against both citizens and foreigners.
Unmarried women sometimes are considered to have invited such violence
by living or traveling alone.
Women have equal rights under the law, and there are no cultural or
institutional barriers to education and employment. Women receive equal
pay for equal work and are well represented in the lower and middle
ranks of government. Women are active and increasingly successful in
private business and enterprises. A National Women's Advisory Council
has been in existence since 1992, and several small nongovernmental
groups are interested in women's issues, particularly those associated
with spousal and family violence and abuse.
Children.--The Government is committed to children's welfare
through its programs of health care and education, but these activities
have not been adequate to meet the needs of the country's sharply
growing population in an environment in which the extended family is
breaking down.
A compulsory education law that requires all children begin school
at the age of 6. Children may leave school when they reach the age of
14 or after completing the eighth grade, whichever comes first.
People With Disabilities.--Neither laws nor regulations mandate
accessibility to public buildings and services for the disabled.
Schools established special education classes to address problems
encountered by those who exhibit learning disabilities, although such
classes are completely dependent on outside funding sources.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The law prohibits noncitizens
from purchasing land, and the national Congress grants citizenship to
non-Micronesians only by individual acts (an authority exercised during
1998, following a lapse of almost 20 years). However, for the most
part, noncitizens share fully in the social and cultural life of the
country.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Under the Bill of Rights, citizens
have the right to form or join associations, and national government
employees by law may form associations to ``present their views'' to
the Government. However, neither associations nor trade unions have
been formed in this largely nonindustrial society. The country is not a
member of the International Labor Organization.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--No law deals
specifically with trade unions or with the right to collective
bargaining. Individual employers, the largest of which are the national
and state governments, set wages.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
specifically prohibits involuntary servitude, and there is no evidence
of its practice. Children are not cited specifically in this
prohibition, but forced and bonded labor by children is not known to
occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--There is no law establishing a minimum age for employment
of children. While in practice there is no employment of children for
wages, they often assist their families in subsistence farming
activities. A compulsory education law requires all children to begin
school at the age of 6. Children may leave school when they reach the
age of 14 or after completing the eighth grade, whichever comes first.
Neither the Constitution nor the law specifically prohibits forced and
bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur
(see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The four state governments have
established minimum wage rates for government workers. Pohnpei has a
minimum hourly wage rate of $2.00 for government and $1.35 for private
workers. The other three states have established minimum hourly rates
only for government workers: $1.25 for Chuuk; $1.49 for Kosrae; and
$0.80 for Yap. The minimum hourly wage for employment with the national
Government is $1.68. These minimum wage structures and the wages
customarily paid to skilled workers are sufficient to provide a decent
standard of living under local conditions.
There are no laws regulating hours of work (although a 40-hour
workweek is standard practice) or prescribing standards of occupational
safety and health. A federal regulation requires that employers provide
a safe workplace. The Department of Health has no enforcement
capability; working conditions vary in practice.
Two states permit foreign laborers to work in garment manufacturing
enterprises. The foreign laborers are paid at a lower rate than
citizens who work at the factories, work longer hours per day, and work
a 6-day week in contrast to the 5-day week for citizens.
There is no law for either the public or private sector that would
permit workers to remove themselves from dangerous work situations
without jeopardy to their continued employment. f. Trafficking in
Persons
The law does not specifically address the subject of trafficking in
persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
in, to, or from the country.
______
MONGOLIA
Mongolia made further progress in its transition from a highly
centralized, Communist-led state to a full-fledged, multiparty,
parliamentary democracy, although the process continues to evolve and
these gains still must be solidified. The Prime Minister is nominated
by the majority party and, with the agreement of the President, is
approved by the State Great Hural (Parliament), the national
legislature. National progress in the development of democratic
institutions was demonstrated by the unexpected June 1996 election
defeat of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), which had
been in power since 1921. The MPRP accepted its defeat and has entered
into its role in opposition. There are 20 political parties, 4 of which
hold seats in the Parliament. The judiciary is independent.
Security forces are under civilian control, and the Minister of
Defense is a civilian. The national police have primary responsibility
for law enforcement. The military forces are responsible for external
security, including border security. Reduced government spending
continued to force downsizing of the military forces. The State
Security Agency (SSA), formerly the Mongolian Central Intelligence
Agency is responsible for internal security; its head has ministerial
status and reports directly to the Prime Minister. A parliamentary
committee oversees the military forces, the police, and the SSA. Some
members of the police on occasion committed human rights abuses.
Despite reforms in the 1990's, most large economic entities remain
under state control; the Government had planned to privatize 60 percent
of these entities by 2000. The economy continued to expand and
strengthen, and inflation stayed below 10 percent. Mongolia remains a
poor country with per capita income approximately $453 per year. It
relies heavily on foreign economic assistance. The mainstays of the
economy continue to be copper production and other mining, livestock
raising, which is done by a majority of the rural population, and
related food-, wool-, and hide-processing industries, which meet both
local needs and produce goods for export. A growing trade and small
entrepreneurial sector in the cities provides basic consumer goods.
Garment manufacture and minerals, especially copper, constitute the
bulk of export earnings. Lack of transportation and other
infrastructure, legal and regulatory deficiencies, petty corruption,
and a small domestic market discourage foreign investment.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, problems remain in some areas. Members of the police
at times beat prisoners and detainees. Pretrial detention and prison
conditions are poor, and arbitrary arrest and detention are problems.
There are restrictions on due process for persons arrested or suspected
of crimes. Official harassment of some religious groups that sought to
register persists. Violence against women is a serious problem;
however, efforts to assist victims increased during the year. Child
abuse also is a problem. There were some instances of forced labor.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings; however, it is suspected that the murder
of the Minister of Infrastructure in October 1998 was politically
motivated. Although the investigation is ongoing, the inability to
solve this case has been a major problem for the democratic coalition
Government.
Approximately 200 prisoners died in custody during the year,
largely due to disease and inadequate prison management (see Section
1.c.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Although the Constitution forbids such practices and
reports of such actions diminished, members of the police occasionally
beat prisoners and detainees in the countryside, and unnecessary force
in the arrest process is not uncommon. Reforms undertaken by the
Ministry of Justice upon Parliament's recommendation, following reports
by international human rights observers, have changed significantly the
way that accused persons and prisoners are treated. The Ministry's
Department for the Enforcement of Court Decisions now monitors
conditions; however, the new laws and procedures have not been
publicized widely, especially in the countryside, and citizens are not
aware always of their rights with respect to detention and arrest.
Pretrial detention and prison facilities are poor--including
insufficient food and heat--and threaten the health of
inmates.Different authorities administer the pretrial detention system
and the prison system, which creates tensions between the two and
limits management improvements. Many inmates entered prison already
infected with tuberculosis or contracted it in prison. With the help of
foreign donors, the prisons continued a 1997 program for surveying and
treating tuberculosis among inmates, bringing the number of cases down
by 1,500 in 2 years; the percentage of inmates who die of the disease
also has decreased. Approximately 200 prisoners died in custody,
largely due to disease and inadequate management by the authorities.
Pretrial detention facilities, where suspects can be held for up to 36
months, are often worse than the prisons and contribute significantly
to the tuberculosis problem. Although the number of inmates has
remained fairly constant, the seriousness of crimes has increased.
Severe crowding in both prisons and detention facilities is common,
aggravating management, health, and funding problems. To address these
problems under the continuing reform process, prison inmates in the
capital were divided into smaller groups managed by trained personnel
and provided better clothing and food, as well as health and hygiene
instructions. The much-publicized case of the detention of three
Members of Parliament (M.P.'s) from April to July highlighted the harsh
conditions of the detention facilities and served as a catalyst for
releasing over 100 detainees held without adequate cause. Improvements
in detention and prison conditions outside of the capital are
significantly less or nonexistent due to lack of funding.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides that no person shall be searched, arrested, detained, or
deprived of liberty except by law, but these protections have not been
codified fully, and arbitrary arrest and detention are problems. Under
the Criminal Procedures Code, police may arrest those caught committing
or suspected of a crime and hold them for up to 72 hours before the
decision is taken to prosecute or release. A prosecutor must issue a
warrant for incarceration of longer duration or when the actual crime
was not witnessed. A detainee has the right to a defense attorney
during this period and during any subsequent stage of the legal
process. If a defendant cannot afford a private attorney, the State
appoints an attorney. Detainees may be released on bail with the
agreement of the prosecutor.
However, citizens are not always aware of their rights in regard to
arrest and detention (see Section 1.c.). When a new prosecutor general
was appointed in June, with the pressure created by publicity
surrounding the detention of three M.P.'s, the Government authorized
the release of over 100 persons determined to have been detained
unjustifiably for minor crimes (see Section 1.c.). The police may
detain a suspect up to 10 months, and the prosecutor can authorize up
to an additional 26 months of pretrial detention.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the courts are independent in practice.
The court system consists of local courts, provincial courts, and
the Supreme Court. The 17-member Supreme Court is at the apex of the
judicial system, hearing appeals from lower courts and cases involving
alleged misconduct by high-level officials. Local courts hear mostly
routine criminal and civil cases; provincial courts hear more serious
cases such as rape, murder, and grand larceny and also serve as the
appeals court for lower court decisions. The Constitutional Court,
separate from the criminal court system, has sole jurisdiction over
constitutional questions. The General Council of Courts, an
administrative body within the Ministry of Justice, nominates
candidates for vacancies on both the Supreme and lower courts; the
President has the power to approve or refuse such nominations. The
Council also is charged with ensuring the rights of judges and
providing for the independence of the judiciary.
All accused persons are provided due process, legal defense, and a
public trial, although closed proceedings are permitted in cases
involving state secrets, rape cases involving minors, and other cases
provided by law. Defendants do not enjoy a presumption of innocence.
Defendants may question witnesses and appeal decisions. There were few
complaints about the legal system to the local office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), because most citizens do not
know about the organization. Complaints were usually about corruption
that allegedly resulted in unfair court decisions. The UNHCHR staff
referred the complaints to nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) and
the Ministry of Justice.
There were no reports of political prisoners. In a program that
began in 1998, the State Rehabilitation Commission pays a one-time
allowance to the families of those individuals who were persecuted from
1922 through the 1960's. By year's end, approximately 5,000 families
received payments of $1,000 (1 million tugrik) each.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides that the State shall not
interfere with the private beliefs and actions of citizens, and the
Government generally respects this in practice. The head of the SSA
may, with the knowledge and consent of the Prime Minister, direct the
monitoring and recording of telephone conversations. The extent of such
monitoring is unknown.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech, press, and expression, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice. An increasing variety of newspapers
and other publications represent major political party viewpoints as
well as independent views. On January 1, a new media law went into
effect that bans censorship of public information and also bans future
legislation that would limit the freedom to publish and broadcast. This
law also bars state ownership or financing of the media or media
organizations. The law took effect without agreement on regulations and
procedures for the privatization of assets, and its implementation was
difficult and controversial. Lack of access to information and of
transparency in government continue to inhibit political dialog in the
media, and led to media complaints. Nonetheless, the independent media
reports freely, and, unlike previous years, there were no attempts to
manipulate the media by the Government.
Although in the past the Government controlled access to newsprint,
all newspapers now buy newsprint directly from private suppliers, and
neither party-affiliated nor independent news media report difficulty
securing an adequate supply. Due to transportation difficulties, uneven
postal service, and fluctuations in the amount of newsprint available,
access to a full range of publications is restricted in outlying
regions.
The court system places the burden of proof on the defendants in
libel and slander cases. This creates a stifling effect upon the free
media.
There is a government-financed television station with countrywide
broadcasting capability, a limited-operation international joint
venture private television channel, a private television station, a
local television station controlled by the Ulaanbaatar mayor's office,
and several radio stations in Ulaanbaatar. State-owned radio is
particularly important as the major source of news in the countryside,
but the one independent radio station broadcasts widely. The media
presents opposition and government news. Many residents of the country
have access to television, and Ulaanbaatar residents receive broadcasts
from China, Russia, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the
United States, and other countries by commercial satellite and cable
television systems. An estimated 60 percent of households have
television.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for the right
both to worship and not to worship, and the Government generally
respects these provisions in practice; however some groups that sought
to register faced official harassment. Although the Constitution
explicitly recognizes the separation of church and State and the
country has no official state religion, the Government has contributed
to the restoration of several Buddhist sites. These are important
religious, historical, and cultural centers. It does not subsidize the
Buddhist religion in other ways.
Although under the provisions of a 1993 law on relations between
church and state, the Government may supervise and limit the numbers of
both places of worship and clergy for organized religions, there are no
reports that it has done so. However, religious groups must register
with the Ministry of Justice. Proselytizing by registered religious
groups is allowed, although a Ministry of Education directive bans the
mixing of foreign language or other training with religious teaching
orinstruction. Contacts with coreligionists outside the country are
allowed.
Religious groups reported bureaucratic obstacles but less
harassment during the registration process. The application of the
regulations for registration of religious groups and places of worship
sometimes varied with locality. Groups that did not comply with the
registration requirement were forced to close their offices and places
of worship.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement within the country as well as the right to travel and return
without restriction, and the Government generally respects these rights
in practice.
The country is not a party to the 1951 U.N. Convention Regarding
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol and it has no laws for
granting refugee status. The Constitution contains a provision that
addresses political asylum, but there are no implementing regulations.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees in
the small number of cases reported in which such status has been
claimed. There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons with
a valid claim to refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government through periodic, free elections by secret ballot and
universal suffrage. Presidential, parliamentary, and local elections
are held separately. In July the Prime Minister and his Government were
forced to resign by a vote of the parliamentary majority, and in a
peaceful transition within the framework of the Constitution, a new
prime minister and cabinet were selected. This was the fourth
government of the democratic coalition elected in 1996. These political
changes highlighted constitutional questions concerning the powers of
the President as Head of State and the President's relationship to
Parliament and the Government, particularly the power to approve the
candidate for head of government as proposed by the majority party.
These questions remain unresolved.
There are 20 registered political parties; 4 are represented in the
Parliament.
Although there are no legal impediments to the participation of
women or minorities in government and politics, women are
underrepresented in the Government, with 8 female members in the 76-
member Parliament. In December 1998, Parliament approved the
appointment of the first female minister, the Foreign Minister. Women
and women's organizations are vocal in local and national politics and
actively seek greater representation by women in government
policymaking.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and
responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that ``no person shall be discriminated
against on the basis of ethnic origin, language, race, age, sex, social
origin, or status,'' and that ``men and women shall be equal in
political, economic, social, cultural fields, and family.'' The
Government generally enforces these provisions in practice.
Women.--Violence against women is a serious problem. Although there
are no reliable or exact statistics regarding the extent of such abuse,
a wide range of qualified observers believe that it is common. After
many years of government and societal denial, there is increasing
public and media discussion of domestic violence, including spousal and
child abuse. The large economic and societal changes underway have
created new stresses on families, including loss of jobs, inflation,
and lowered spending on social and educational programs. Some
statistics show that over 70 percent of the cases of family abuse are
related to alcohol abuse. The high rate of alcohol abuse has
contributed to increased instances of family abuse and abandonment, and
has added to the number of single-parent families, most of which are
headed by women. Although women's groups advocate new statutesto cope
with domestic violence, there is no known police or government
intervention in cases involving violence against women beyond
prosecution under existing assault laws after formal charges have been
filed.
However, the new family law which went into effect on July 1
details rights and responsibilities regarding alimony and parents'
rights to bring about timely dispute settlement and avoid the causes of
some domestic violence. The National Center Against Violence made
progress in providing hot line services, shelters, and conducting
training for police on how to deal with domestic violence cases and
began to expand its work outside the capital. Rape is illegal, and
offenders can be prosecuted and convicted, but there is no law
specifically prohibiting spousal rape.
The Constitution provides men and women with equal rights in all
areas and, both by law and practice, women receive equal pay for equal
work and have equal access to education. Women represent about half the
work force, and a significant number are the primary earners for their
families. Many women occupy midlevel positions in government and the
professions, and many are involved in the creation and management of
new trading and manufacturing businesses. There is no government agency
that oversees women's rights.
There are approximately 36 women's rights groups that concern
themselves with such issues as maternal and children's health, domestic
violence and equal opportunity. The law prohibits women from working in
certain occupations that require heavy labor or exposure to chemicals
that could affect infant and maternal health. The Government enforces
these provisions.
Children.--Increased stress on the family structure and throughout
society has had adverse effects on many children, and the Government
has been unable to keep pace with the educational, health, and social
needs of the most rapidly growing segment of its population. The
Government provides children of both sexes with free, compulsory public
education through the age of 16, although family economic needs and
state budgetary difficulties make it difficult for some children to
attend school. In addition there continues to be a severe shortage of
teachers and teaching materials at all educational levels.
The society has a long tradition of support for communal raising of
children. The Government is now more willing to admit the extent of the
problem of orphaned children, but it lacks the resources to improve the
welfare of children who have become the victims of larger societal and
familial changes. NGO's continue to assist orphaned and deserted
children. Groups working in this field disagree on the number of street
children; some report that the figure is 400 to 500, while others count
all poor children who may or may not be homeless and estimate that it
is as high as 2,000. The Government is committed in principle to
children's rights and welfare, but it provides only minimal support for
the few shelters and orphanages that exist; those facilities must turn
to private sources to sustain their activities.
The new family law, which took effect on July 1, increases the
obligations regarding divorce, custody, and alimony to the benefit of
the parent caring for children. It provides for more speedy resolution
of divorce cases where the relevant agencies have determined that
domestic violence is involved.
There is growing awareness that child abuse, often associated with
parental alcoholism, is a problem. In conjunction with efforts to
counter violence against women, NGO's, have begun to address the issue.
People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
disabled persons in employment and education, and the Government
provides benefits to the disabled according to the nature and severity
of disability. Those who have been injured in industrial accidents have
the right to be reemployed when ready to resume work. The Government
also provides tax benefits to enterprises that hire the disabled, and
some firms hire the disabled exclusively. There is no legislation
mandating access for the disabled and, therefore, it is difficult for
the disabled to participate fully in public life. Some disabled
citizens groups are lobbying for higher government subsidies.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution entitles all workers
to form or join union and professional organizations of their choosing.
Union officials estimate that union membership dropped from 450,000
persons in 1998 to 430,000, and now is less than half of the
workforce.Union membership decreased due to restructuring and
privatization of former state enterprises and as increasing numbers of
workers either become self-employed or work at small, nonunionized
firms. No arbitrary restrictions exist on who may be a union official;
officers are elected by secret ballot.
Union members have the right to strike. Those employed in essential
services, which the Government defines as occupations critical for
national defense and safety, including police, utility, and
transportation workers, do not have the right to strike.
Most union members are affiliated with the Mongolian Trade Unions
Confederation, but some are affiliated with the newer Association of
Free Trades Unions. Both organizations have ties with international
labor organizations and confederations in other countries.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The new labor
law, which went into effect on June 1, defines conditions and regulates
relations between employers, employees, the trade unions, and the
Government, making adjustments for the changes in the structure of the
economy. The Government's role is limited to ensuring that the contract
meets legal requirements as to hours and conditions of work. Wages and
other employment issues are to be set between the employer, whether
state or private, and the employee, with trade union input, if
appropriate. The new labor law also streamlines the process for dealing
with labor conflicts.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law specifically
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including forced labor by
children. The Government generally enforces this law; however, most
members of the military forces are required to help with the fall
harvest. In many cases, prisoners work to support the detention
facility in which they are held, and detained alcohol abusers and petty
criminals are sometimes required to perform menial tasks such as street
sweeping.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits children under the age of 16 from
working, although those who are 14 or 15 years of age may work up to 30
hours per week with parental consent. Those under 18 years of age may
not work at night, engage in arduous work, or work in hazardous
occupations such as mining and construction. Enforcement of these
prohibitions, as well as all other labor regulations, is the
responsibility of state labor inspectors assigned to regional and local
offices. These inspectors have the authority to compel immediate
compliance with labor legislation, but enforcement is limited due to
the small number of labor inspectors and the growing number of
independent enterprises. Due to pressures of the economic transition,
there are indications that fewer children are staying in school until
age 18, especially in the countryside. The Government is aware of this
development and, with foreign assistance organizations, it is
monitoring such socioeconomic trends. The Government prohibits forced
and bonded labor by children, and enforces this prohibition effectively
(see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--According to the new labor law,
the legal minimum wage ranges from under $13 (13,000 tugriks) in some
regions to $17 (17,600 tugriks) per month in the capital. This level
applies to both public and private sector workers and is enforced by
the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The lowest wage is for manual
labor, such as janitorial work; virtually all civil servants earn more
than this amount, and many in private businesses earn considerably
more. The minimum wage alone is insufficient to provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family.
The standard legal workweek is 40 hours, and there is a minimum
rest period of 48 hours between workweeks. For those under 18 years of
age, the workweek is 36 hours, and overtime work is not allowed.
Overtime work is compensated at either double the standard hourly rate
or by giving time off equal to the number of hours of overtime worked.
Pregnant women and nursing mothers are prohibited by law from working
overtime.
Laws on labor, cooperatives, and enterprises set occupational
health and safety standards, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare
provides enforcement. The near-total reliance on outmoded machinery and
problems with maintenance and management lead to frequent industrial
accidents, particularly in the mining, power, and construction sectors.
Effective enforcement of occupational health and safety standards is
difficult, but the Government increased the number of full-time
inspectors to 86 to cover the growing number of small enterprises.
According to the labor law, workers have the right to remove themselves
from dangerous work situations and still retain their jobs.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
trafficking in persons; and there is evidence that Mongolian women and
teenagers are working in the sex trade in Asia and Eastern Europe. The
problem is beginning to attract increased attention, and debate on its
legal and social aspects is underway.
______
NAURU
The Republic of Nauru, a small Pacific island with approximately
10,500 inhabitants, gained independence in 1968, at which time it
adopted a modified form of parliamentary democracy. Nauru has two
levels of government, the unicameral Parliament and the Nauru Island
Council (NIC). Parliamentary elections must be held at least
triennially. The Parliament, consisting of 18 members from 14
constituencies, is responsible for national and international matters.
It elects the President, who is both Chief of State and Head of
Government, from among its members. The NIC acts as the local
government and is responsible for public services. The judiciary is
independent.
Nauru has no armed forces, although it does maintain a small police
force (less than 100 members) under civilian control.
The economy depends almost entirely on the country's declining
phosphate deposits. Secondary reserves and residual mining may extend
the productivity of its mines. The government-owned Nauru Phosphate
Corporation (NPC) controls the mining industry. The Government places a
large percentage of the NPC's earnings in long-term investments meant
to support the citizenry after the phosphate reserves have been
exhausted. The Governments of Nauru and Australia reached a $70.4
million out-of-court settlement in 1993 for rehabilitation of the
Nauruan lands damaged by Australian phosphate mining. Two new banks
opened during the year. Media reports indicate that significant
offshore deposits are associated with these new banking facilities. The
Government is working with the Pacific Finance Technical Assistance
Center (an International Monetary Fund facility based in Fiji) to
update its banking regulations.
Fundamental human rights are provided for in the Constitution, and
the Government generally respected them in practice. There were no
reports of specific human rights abuses, but in the traditional
culture, women occupy a subordinate role, with limits on their job
opportunities.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits these practices, and the
Government respects these prohibitions in practice.
The Government attempts to provide internationally accepted minimum
prison conditions within its limited financial means and in accordance
with local living standards. However, prison conditions are basic, and
food and sanitation are limited. There are no local human rights
groups, and the question of visits to prisons by human rights monitors
has not been raised. Visits by church groups and family members are
permitted.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The constitutional
prohibition against arbitrary arrest and detention is honored. The
police may hold a person for no more than 24 hours without a hearing
before a magistrate.
The Government does not practice forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent, and
constitutional provisions for both a fair hearing and a public trial
are respected. Defendants may have legal counsel, and a representative
will be appointed when required ``in the interest of justice.''
However, many cases never reach the formal legal process, as
traditional reconciliation is used--usually by choice but sometimes
under communal (not government) pressure. Contract workers from
Kiribati and Tuvalu are employed predominantly in the mining sector and
do not have recourse to effective communal assistance; they are
particularly at a disadvantage in complaints against citizens. There
are only two trained lawyers, and many people are represented in court
by ``pleaders,'' trained paralegals certified by the Government.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution generally prohibits these abuses.
Searches not sanctioned by court order are prohibited, and there is no
surveillance of individuals or of private communications. Citizenship
and inheritance rights are traced through the female line. Marriage
between women and foreign males may still draw social censure. The law
extends the right of citizenship--subject to approval by the NIC--to
both male and female spouses, provided that marital and residency
requirements are met.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of expression. News and opinion circulate freely, rapidly, and
widely by the press and word of mouth. The country has no regular print
media. Occasional publications include the government bulletin. The
sole radio station is owned and operated by the Government; it
broadcasts Radio Australia and British Broadcasting Corporation news
reports. Local television includes Nauru TV, which is government owned,
as well as a privately owned sports network.
There are no prohibitions or restrictions on academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice. No permits are required for public meetings, and there are no
limitations on private associations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights for
citizens, and the Government respects them in practice.
Foreign workers must apply to their employers for permission to
leave during the period of their contracts. They may break the contract
and leave without permission but would lose their positions and often a
sizable bond as a result. In most cases, foreign employees whose
contracts are terminated by their employers must leave Nauru within 60
days.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. No person in recent memory has applied for refugee
status, and the Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding
refugees, asylees, or first asylum.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have, and exercise, the right to change their government.
Although there are no organized political parties, persons with diverse
points of view run for and are elected to Parliament and to the NIC.
Parliament elects the President. There was a change in government
in April, the seventh change in government in the past 3 years. All the
changeovers were peaceful and in accordance with the Constitution.
Voting by secret ballot is compulsory for all citizens over the age of
20 for parliamentary elections. There have been multiple candidates for
all parliamentary seats during recent elections. The approximately
3,000 guest workers have no voice in political decisions.
There are no legal impediments to participation in politics by
women; however women are underrepresented in government and politics.
There are no female Members of Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no restrictions on establishing local groups that concern
themselves specifically with human rights, but to date none has been
formed. No allegations have been made by outside organizations of human
rights violations in the country, nor have there been any requests for
investigations.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Government policy prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, religion, disability, language, or social status.
Women.--The Government does not keep track of incidents of physical
abuse against women. However, credible reports indicate that sporadic
abuse, often aggravated by alcohol use, occurs. Families normally seek
to reconcile such problems informally, and, if necessary, communally.
The judiciary and the Government treat major incidents and unresolved
family disputes seriously.
Nauru law assures women the same freedoms and protections as men.
The Government officially provides equal opportunities in education and
employment, and women are free to own property and pursue private
interests. However, in practice, societal pressures limit opportunities
for women to exercise these rights fully. The Government has appointed
a women's development officer to assist with the development of
professional opportunities for women.
Children.--The Government devotes considerable attention to the
welfare of children, with particular stress on their health and
educational needs. Education is compulsory until age 16. Child abuse
statistics do not exist, but alcohol abuse sometimes leads to child
neglect or abuse. The NIC treats child abuse as a serious communal
matter. There were no reported cases of child abuse during the year.
People with Disabilities.--There is no reported discrimination in
employment, education, and the provision of state services to persons
with disabilities. However, no legislation mandates access to public
buildings and services for the disabled. The Government has assisted
persons with disabilities by building access ramps to homes and
workplaces and by purchasing office equipment adapted for persons with
disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Non-Nauruan Pacific island
workers experience some discrimination. While guest workers are
provided free housing, the shelters they are given often are maintained
poorly and overcrowded. In the past, some guest workers alleged that
the police rarely act on complaints they made against citizens.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of citizens to form and belong to trade unions or other
associations. However, the country has virtually no labor laws, and
there are no trade unions. Past efforts to form unions were discouraged
officially. The transient nature of the mostly foreign work force and
the relative prosperity of the citizenry also have served to hamper
efforts to organize the labor force. The right to strike is neither
protected, prohibited, nor limited by law. No strikes took place during
the year. Nauru is not a member of the International Labor
Organization. There are no prohibitions or limits on the right of
unions to affiliate with international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While there are
no legal impediments, collective bargaining does not take place. The
private sector employs only about 1 percent of salaried workers. For
government workers, public service regulations determine salaries,
working hours, vacation periods, and other employment matters.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
forbids forced or compulsory labor, including forced and bonded labor
by children, and the Government effectively enforces these
prohibitions.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Education is compulsory until age 16; the law sets 17 as
the minimum age of employment. The only two large employers, the
Government and the NPC, honor this. Some children under the age of 17
years work in the few, small, family-owned businesses. The Government
prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and enforces this
prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wages exist for office
workers and manual laborers and provide an adequate, if modest,
standard of living. Most families live in simple but adequate housing,
and almost every family owns some sort of motor vehicle. The Government
sets the minimum yearly wage administratively for the public sector.
Since November 1992, that rate has been $6,562 ($A9,056) for those 21
years of age or older. The rate is progressively lower for those under
21 years of age. Employers determine wages for foreign contract workers
based on market conditions and the consumer price index. Usually
foreign workers and their families receive free housing, utilities,
medical treatment, and often a food allowance. Some noncitizen contract
workers have complained about conditions in company living compounds.
By regulation the workweek for office workers is 36 hours and for
manual laborers 40 hours in both the public and private sectors.
Neither law nor regulations stipulate a weekly rest period; however,
most workers observe Saturdays and Sundays as holidays.
The Government sets health and safety standards. The NPC has an
active safety program that includes an emphasis on worker education and
the use of safety equipment such as helmets, safety shoes, and dust
respirators. The NPC has a safety officer who is specifically
responsible for improving safety standards and compliance throughout
the company.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically address
trafficking; however, there were no reports that persons were
trafficked in, to, or from the country.
______
NEW ZEALAND
New Zealand is a parliamentary democracy, with executive authority
vested in an 18-member cabinet led by a prime minister. Five seats in
the 120-member Parliament are reserved for the native Maori minority
population. The judiciary is independent.
The police and defense forces are responsible to and firmly
controlled by civilian officials.
New Zealand is a highly efficient producer of agricultural
products. The mainstay of its market-based economy is the export of
wool, meat, and dairy products. An expanding manufacturing sector is
engaged primarily in food processing, metal fabrication, and the
production of wood and paper products. Tourism is also a significant
sector of the economy, and niche industries are developing in such high
technology sectors as software production. Disparities in wealth are
small but increasing. Most citizens enjoy a comfortable standard of
living.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens,
and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with
instances of abuse. The Government has taken steps to address the
problems of overcrowded prisons, violence against women, and societal
discrimination against indigenous people and Pacific islanders.
Trafficking in persons is a small but growing problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other forms of mistreatment,
and the Government respects these prohibitions in practice.
Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards.
The average inmate population during the year was 5,300, with a maximum
capacity of 5,869. An additional 500 to 600 persons were in custody on
remand at any one time. In response to complaints about overcrowding,
the Government added 348 new prison cells in 1998. With the inmate
population projected to increase to about 6,040 by 2002, the Government
also announced plans to build three new contract-managed prisons by
2003. The first of these, the Auckland Central Remand Prison, is under
construction and scheduled to open in May 2000, with capacity for up to
360 inmates. Conditions at older remand facilities in Auckland and
Christchurch were a source of concern. In November a new 184-cell
remand facility opened in Christchurch, in which each cell is equipped
with its own toilet and shower. Addington prison (where slop buckets
were used in place of toilets) was closed. An 80 percent recidivism
rate within the first 24 months of release is the primary penal
concern.
Special issues exist concerning treatment of youth and Maori
offenders. As of 1998, 18 percent of the total inmate population was
under age 20. In February the Government announced plans to build seven
youth units to segregate young inmates from adults, in an effort to
reduce recidivism by juveniles. The first of the youth units contained
17 beds and opened October 15. An additional 35-bed unit is scheduled
to open in early 2000. Maori inmates constitute over half of the prison
population, although Maori make up only 15 percent of the general
population. During the year, three Maori ``focus units'' opened in the
prison system, which integrate Maori values into the rehabilitation
program. A special program for sex offenders, ``kia marama,'' has
halved the rate of recidivism among those who participate. Higher Maori
suicide rates are also a concern, but the most recent data indicate a
declining suicide rate in the entire prison population and among Maori
inmates. There were eight suicides in custody during 1998-99. Over 98
percent of prison officers are trained in suicide awareness. Assaults
in custody (mostly inmate on inmate) also declined from 113 to 97 in
1998-99.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes
these prohibitions.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
There is an impartial judiciary, with the right of appeal to the
Privy Council in London, although this option rarely is invoked. Within
the country, the Court of Appeal is the highest appellate court, and it
determines appeals from the High Court, which has original jurisdiction
for major crimes and important civil claims. The High Court also
handles appeals from lower courts and reviews administrative actions.
Remaining original jurisdiction rests with 110 judges of the district
courts. Special courts include: The Employment Court; family courts;
youth courts; Maori Land Court; Maori Appelate Court; and the
Environment Court.
The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and the judiciary
implements this provision.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
authorities respect these prohibitions, and violations are subject to
effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in
practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press.
During the year the nongovernmental Human Rights Commission noted
an unusually high number of complaints about restrictions on free
speech, often from persons who suggested that their views were censored
because they were not ``politically correct.'' For example the Auckland
City Council's refusal to publish in its newsletter a column critical
of the 1999 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit hosted by New
Zealand drew criticism.
Academic freedom is not limited.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion,
and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees. Under its own refugee quota, the Government accepts up to 750
UNHCR-approved refugees per year. During the year, the Government
supplemented its quota by pledging to accept up to 600 Kosovar Albanian
refugees for family reunification. There were no reports of the forced
expulsion of persons with a valid claim to refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The law provides citizens with the right to change their government
peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
suffrage. Parliamentarians are elected under a mixed-member
proportional representation system, and general elections were held in
November.
Women and minorities are accorded full opportunity to participate
in political life, but are underrepresented in government. In the 120-
member Parliament, 36 seats are held by women; 16 by Maori; 3 members
are of Pacific Island origin; and 1 is of Asian heritage. The Executive
Council has 26 ministers (20 within the Cabinet and 6 outside the
Cabinet) including 11 woman (one of whom is the Prime Minister), 4
Maori, and 1 Pacific Islander. The Cabinet has seven women, two Maori,
and one Pacific Islander.The Prime Minister, the opposition leader, and
the Chief Justice are women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of domestic and international nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) operate without government restriction,
investigating allegations and publishing their findings on human rights
cases. Government officials are cooperative and responsive to the views
of these human rights groups. The Human Rights Commission, a U.N.-
accredited national human rights institution, investigates complaints
of human rights violations and unlawful discrimination and acts as a
conciliator. There is also a governmental race relations conciliator.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of these factors, and
the Government effectively enforces it. The 1993 Human Rights Act
prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex, marital status, religious
belief, ethical belief, color, race, ethnic or national origins,
disability, age, political opinion, employment status, and family
status.
Women.--Violence against women is a major problem that cuts across
all socioeconomic groups. A 1997 government-sponsored academic survey
indicated that 1 woman in 16 was likely to be sexually assaulted each
year and that 35 percent of men have abused a female partner physically
at some time in their lives. It found that Maori and Pacific Islander
women were particularly at risk and that multiple, violent
victimization in these communities was common. In 1998 5,054 men were
prosecuted for domestic assault, and 1,000 more face less serious
family violence charges.
The law penalizes spousal rape. The Government convicted
individuals on this charge during the year. The National Collective of
Rape Crisis groups, a private, nonprofit organization, claimed that the
majority of cases go unreported each year and that, of the cases that
go to the police, only 10 to 15 percent end in convictions. The group
reported that husbands and boyfriends commit about 25 percent of all
sexual assaults.
The Domestic Violence Act, which came into effect in 1996,
broadened the definition of violence to include psychological abuse,
threats, intimidation, harassment, and allowing children to witness
psychological abuse. It expanded intervention measures, such as the use
of protection orders; education programs for men, women, and children;
stronger police powers to arrest and detain offenders; improved access
to legal services for women eligible for legal aid; and tougher
penalties for breach of a protection order.
The Government's strategy to prevent family violence included a
range of objectives such as providing victim support, incorporating
successful innovations and proven methods from family violence centers
into the national family violence programs (that is, the promotion of
``best practice''), ensuring safety from violence, and implementing
Maori-designed and delivered programs. The Government partially funded
women's refuges, rape crisis centers, sexual abuse counseling, family
violence networks, and violence prevention services.
Prostitution is legal, although organizing and recruiting women
into prostitution is outlawed. There were reports of abuse and the
involuntary detention of women involved in prostitution during the year
(see Section 6.f.).
While the law prohibits discrimination in employment and in rates
of pay for equal or similar work, government documents acknowledge that
in practice a gender earnings gap persists. Many statistics show that
women earn 81 percent of men's average ordinary hourly wage, a rate
that has been fairly static over the last decade. A 1997 report by the
New Zealand Institute of Economic Research indicated that the gender
pay gap was unlikely to narrow over the next 5 years based on current
industry trends. The Council of Trade Unions has launched a campaign to
achieve equal pay in the work force. Effective legal remedies are
available for women who experience discrimination.
Children.--The law provides specific safeguards for children's
rights and protection. The Government demonstrates its commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and medical care.
Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical
andpsychological health, traditionally was not practiced. It is illegal
to perform FGM or to make arrangements for a child to be taken outside
the country in order to perform it. The Government has been concerned
due to a continuing increase in arrivals in the immigrant communities
most likely to practice FGM, that is, Somali, Sudanese, and Ethiopian
immigrants. A national FGM awareness campaign organized workshops and
distributed educational materials in the African refugee communities in
1998 and 1999.
While no societal pattern of abuse of children exists, the
Government recognizes the problem of violence within the family. Both
government-sponsored and charitable organizations work to prevent child
abuse in the home.
People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination against
people with disabilities in employment, education, and the provision of
other state services. Compliance with access laws, mandated by the
Human Rights Act and the Disabled Persons Community Welfare Act, varies
as business owners and others strive to make necessary adaptations. The
Government has not complied fully with equal access laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of disability in areas such as public
transportation and public accommodation. Under legislation that became
effective on October 1, the Government extended its exemption from
nondiscrimination laws for 2 more years, which means that it does not
have to comply with equal access laws for the disabled until January 1,
2001. In the interim, the Minister of Justice is required to report
semiannually on public sector compliance with equal access laws.
Indigenous People.--Approximately 15 percent of the population
claim at least one ancestor from the country's indigenous Maori or
Moriori minorities. While the law prohibits discrimination against the
indigenous population, a 1999 government report noted the continuing
disproportionate number of Maori included on the unemployment and
welfare rolls, among the prison population, among school dropouts, in
infant mortality statistics, and among single-parent households. For
example the official Maori unemployment rate (19 percent) is over three
times that for non-Maori. Similarly Maori inmates account for over 50
percent of the prison population. Government policy recognizes a
special role for indigenous people and their traditional values and
customs, including cultural and environmental issues that have an
effect on commercial development. The Ministry of Maori Development, in
cooperation with several Maori NGO's, seeks to improve the status of
indigenous people. A special tribunal continues to hear Maori tribal
claims to land and other natural resources stemming from the 1840
Treaty of Waitangi.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Pacific Islanders, who make up
5 percent of the population, are not an indigenous people, but they
experience difficulties similar to Maori.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to establish
and join organizations of their own choosing. The principal labor
organization is the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions. A second,
smaller national labor federation, the New Zealand Trade Union
Federation, was established in 1993. There are also a number of
independent labor unions.
Labor organization is rudimentary in the territory of Tokelau
(population 1,800) and in the Freely Associated State of Niue
(population 2,000). In the more developed Associated State of the Cook
Islands (population 18,000), most workers in the public sector, the
major employer, belong to the Cook Islands Workers' Association, an
independent local union inspired by New Zealand models. Industrial
relations in the Cook Islands are governed by a simplified version of
older national legislation.
The law protects unions from governmental interference, suspension,
and dissolution. Unions, in fact, influence legislation and government
policy. Some unions are affiliated with the Labor Party; others operate
independently of political parties; all are free to support parties
whose policies they favor. Unions often exercise the right to strike,
although this right is limited to strikes related to the negotiation of
a collective contract.
The Council on Trade Unions reported 35 work stoppages in 1998
involving over 15,200 workers and the loss of approximately $1 million
($NZ 1.9 million) in wages. Of these 19 involved the public sector and
16 involved the private sector. As of October, work stoppages occurred
at a similar pace, including major disruptions involving teachers and
pilots of the country's secondairline, Ansett NZ. The law prohibits
strikes designed to force an employer to become party to a multicompany
contract. Under the Police Act of 1958 and amendments, ``sworn police
officers,'' that is, all uniformed and plainclothes police but
excluding clerical and support staff, are barred from striking or
taking any form of industrial action. However, police, have freedom of
association and the right to organize and to bargain collectively.
Issues that cannot be settled by negotiation between the Police
Association and management are subject to compulsory, final-offer
arbitration.
A committee of the International Labor Organization (ILO) ruled
that the Employment Contracts Act of 1991 limits the right of freedom
of association and the right to strike in a manner inconsistent with
ILO conventions. The Labor-led Government, which came to power in
December, has pledged to abolish it.
Unions can affiliate internationally. The New Zealand Council of
Trade Unions is affiliated with the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for the right of workers to organize and contract
collectively, and this right is observed in practice. An ILO committee
ruled that the 1991 Employment Contracts Act limits the right to
bargain collectively. The law prohibits uniformed members of the armed
forces from organizing unions and bargaining collectively.
Unions represent fewer than a quarter of all wage earners. Under
the Employment Contracts Act, employment relationships are based on
contracts. Individual employees and employers may choose to conduct
negotiations for employment contracts on their own behalf, or they may
authorize any other person or organization to do so on their behalf.
Although choosing a union is entirely voluntary, unions have remained
the most common agents used by workers to negotiate with employers.
Employers must recognize a representative authorized by an employee or
employees. However, neither employers nor employees are required to
negotiate or to agree to a contract. Decisions by the Court of Appeals
during the year emphasized the parties' freedom to contract to such an
extent that union officials believe that it undermines work conditions.
The Government does not control mediation and arbitration
procedures. The Employment Court hears cases arising from disputes over
the interpretation of labor laws. A less formal body, the employment
tribunal, is available to handle wage disputes and assist in
maintaining effective labor relations. Firing an employee for union
activities is grounds for a finding of unjustified dismissal and may
result in reinstatement and financial compensation.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, including forced and bonded labor by
children. Inspection and legal penalties ensure respect for the
provisions. However, there were reports of the involuntary detention of
women involved in prostitution, and in October, in what appears to be
an isolated case, seven Thai women were freed from slave labor
conditions in an Auckland factory (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and
enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.). Department of
Labor inspectors effectively enforce a ban on the employment of
children under the age of 15 years in manufacturing, mining, and
forestry. Children under the age of 16 may not work between the hours
of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. In addition to explicit restrictions on the
employment of children, compulsory education ensures that children
under the minimum age for leaving school (16 years) are not employed
during school hours. By law children enrolled in school may not be
employed, even outside school hours, if such employment would interfere
with their education.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law provides for a minimum
3-week annual paid vacation and 11 paid public holidays. A 40-hour
workweek is traditional, but under the Employment Contracts Act
employers and employees may agree to longer or shorter workweeks. While
the law does not provide specifically for a 24-hour rest period weekly,
management and labor accept the practice, and it is the norm. The
government-mandated hourly minimum wage of approximately $3.50 ($NZ
7.00) applies to workers 20 years of age and older. Combined with other
regularly provided entitlements and welfare benefits for low-income
earners, this wage is generally adequate to provide a decent standard
of living for a worker and family. In 1994 a minimum wage for younger
workers was introduced at 60 percent of the adult minimum. A majority
of the work force earns more than the minimum wage. The current youth
minimum wage of approximately $2.10 ($NZ 4.20) applies to workers ages
16 to 19.
An extensive body of law and regulations govern health and safety
issues, notably the 1992 Health and Safety in Employment Act. Under
this legislation, employers are obliged to provide a safe and healthy
work environment, and employees are responsible for their own safety
and health as well as ensuring that their actions do not harm others.
However, the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions has criticized the
act, for not providing sufficient employee involvement in workplace
decisions affecting health and safety. Under the Employment Contracts
Act, workers have the legal right to strike over health and safety
issues. Unions, and members of the general public may file safety
complaints on behalf of workers. Department of Labor inspectors enforce
safety and health rules, and they have the power to shut down equipment
if necessary. The Department of Labor standard is to investigate
reports of unsafe or unhealthy working conditions within 24 hours of
notification. Workers have the right to withdraw from a dangerous work
situation without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not address trafficking in
persons specifically, and the applicable related crime, aiding and
abetting breach of immigration regulations, carries relatively light
penalties. Laws against child sexual exploitation and slavery carry
penalties of up to 14 years in prison and recently have been used to
prosecute citizens working with foreign prostitutes. However,
prostitution is legal.
Trafficking in women and children largely from Thailand for the sex
industry is a small but growing problem. In addition in October seven
Thai women were freed from slave labor conditions in an Auckland
factory (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
______
PALAU
Formerly a United Nations trusteeship administered by the United
States, Palau became an independent nation in free association with the
United States on October 1, 1994. Under the Compact of Free
Association, the United States is responsible for the Republic of
Palau's defense. An archipelago of more than 300 islands in the Western
Pacific, Palau has a total land area of 188 square miles and is
organized politically into 16 states. More than two-thirds of its
approximately 18,000 population resides in or near the temporary
capital, Koror.
The democratically elected government is modeled after that of the
United States. The Constitution provides for free and fair elections,
executive and legislative branches, and an independent judiciary. The
legislature, the Olbiil Era Kelulau, is composed of two equal houses,
the 14-member Senate and the 16-member House of Delegates. The
judiciary is independent.
Palau has no security forces other than local police and civilian
law enforcement personnel, all are under the firm control of civil
authorities. Palau also has a Marine Law Enforcement Division that
patrols its borders with assistance from the Australian Government.
With a household median income of over $12,000, Palau is a medium
income country with a small, market-based economy largely sustained by
transfer payments from the United States. The Government employs nearly
half of the work force. Tourism and other service sectors account for
most other paid employment. Tuna, harvested by foreign-operated fleets,
is the dominant export. Several small-scale operations, employing
foreign workers, assemble clothing from imported materials for export.
Traditional subsistence agriculture and fishing is diminishing as
people move to the city in search of employment. Also an increasing
number of Chinese farmers operate vegetable farms that compete with
indigenous farmers; most indigenous farmers are work and sell what they
produce from their own land.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. Traditional customs sustain a value
system that distinguishes between people on the basis of social status
and sex. The loosening ties of the extended family and the increasing
abuse of alcohol and other drugs are major contributing factors that
lead to instances of domestic violence and child neglect. Societal
discrimination against certain foreign workers, who account for nearly
30 percent of the population and 46 percent of the paid work force, is
also a serious problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
no reports that officials employed them.
In April the special prosecutor filed charges against a police
officer involving 11 counts, including assault and misconduct in public
office, for threatening a former girlfriend in March. The police
officer was given a sentence of 7 years.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government
observes these prohibitions.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice.
The judiciary comprises the Supreme Court, the National Court, and
the Court of Common Pleas. The President appoints judges to the Supreme
Court and National Court from a list recommended by the Judicial
Nominating Commission. Appointments are for life.
The Government has an independent special prosecutor and an
independent public defender system. The Constitution provides for the
right to a fair trial, and an independent judiciary vigorously enforces
this right.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
The Government has not formulated a policy regarding refugees,
asylees, or first asylum, and government practice remains undefined.
However, there were no reports of the forced expulsion of anyone having
a valid claim to refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
There are no legal impediments to women participating in government
and politics; however, women are severly underrepresented in
government. As a result of the 1996 general elections, a woman gained a
Senate seat for the first time. Women hold office in 10 of the 16 state
legislatures, where they constitute 7 percent of the membership.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government has a history of openness to a variety of human
rights groups without restriction. Government officials have met with
representatives of these groups and foreign officials regarding the
civil rights of foreign minority workers. Government officials
generally are cooperative and responsive to their views. The Palau Red
Cross Society opened its office in 1996; having satisfied all
requirements, the Society has applications pending for full membership
in the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex,
race, place of origin, language, religion or belief, social status, or
clan affiliation, and the Government generally respects these
provisions.
Women.--There are occasional allegations of violence against women,
mainly domestic abuse. Alcohol and other drug abuse increasingly
contribute to this problem. According to the Attorney General's office,
the Government's Public Health Office, and women's groups, only a few
such cases are reported to the authorities every year, but many more
are believed to be unreported. Although assault is a criminal offense,
women are reluctant to prosecute their spouses.
The inheritance of property and of traditional rank is matrilineal,
with women occupying positions of importance within the traditional
system. Women serve by presidential appointment as bureau directors for
women's interests, human resources, and clinical services. There were
no reported instances of unequal pay for equal work or sex-related job
discrimination.
The sixth annual Women's Conference was held on March 24-25. The
Conference's theme focused on children and families. Panel participants
included government ministers, and issues discussed included health,
education, drug abuse, prostitution, and traditional customs and
values.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. There is no societal pattern of abuse
directed against children. Child prostitution is neither accepted
within the culture nor practiced. There is no difference in the
treatment of girls and boys in educational opportunities, or in the
availability of scholarships to attend postsecondary education abroad.
Girls and boys receive equal treatment in health care services.
Child abuse is thought to be uncommon, and there have been few
child abuse prosecutions. While children's rights generally are
respected, there were reports of several instances of child neglect,
which is a byproduct of the breakdown of the extended family.
Both panel members and other participants at the sixth Women's
Conference agreed that although education and drug abuse had been
discussed since the first Women's Conference, little has changed to
improve the education system or reduce drug abuse among youth.
People With Disabilities.--The National Code includes a Disabled
Persons Antidiscrimination Act and a Handicapped Children Act. No
instances of discrimination against the disabled were reported.
Building codes and legislation do not require access for the disabled.
The public schools have established special education programs to
address problems encountered by those with disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Non-Palauans are prohibited
from purchasing land or obtaining citizenship. The rapid increase in
the number of foreign workers, who now constitute nearly 30 percent of
the population and 46 percent of the work force, is viewed negatively
by a majority of citizens. Foreign residents are subject to some forms
of discrimination and are targets of petty, and sometimes violent,
crimes, as well as other random acts against person and property.
Credible complaints are made by foreign residents that crimes against
non-Palauans are not pursued or persecuted by authorities with the same
vigor as crimes against citizens. Certain foreign nationalities
experience generalized discrimination in employment, pay, housing,
education, and access to social services, although such discrimination
is prohibited by law. While precise data is lacking, there continue to
be anecdotal reports about abuse of workers' civil rights perpetrated
against domestic helpers, bar girls, construction laborers, and other
semiskilled workers, the majority of whom are from the Philippines,
China, and Bangladesh. The most common abuses identified are
misrepresentation of contract terms and conditions of employment,
withholding of pay or benefits, and, sometimes, physical abuse. In a
number of instances, local authorities have taken corrective action
when alerted by social service and religious organizations to which
foreign workers have turned for assistance. Nonetheless, foreign
workers often are reluctant to seek legal redress for fear of losing
their employment and, thus, permission to remain in the country.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of all persons to assemble peacefully or to associate with others
for any lawful purpose, including the right to organize and to bargain
collectively. There are no active employee organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution does not provide for the right to strike, and the
Government has not addressed this issue. There is no legislation
concerning collective bargaining or trade union organizations, although
there are no legal impediments to either. Wages in the cash economy are
determined by market factors.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits slavery or involuntary servitude except to punish crime. The
law does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by children,
but such practices are not known to occur. Instances were reported of
foreign workers, especially domestic helpers and unskilled laborers,
who were forced to do jobs different from those for which they were
recruited. The freedom of foreign workers to leave employment
situations not to their liking may be hindered by physical barriers or
the withholding of passports and return tickets to their country of
recruitment.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution states that the Government shall protect
children from exploitation, and children are protected by the general
constitutional prohibition against forced and bonded labor (see Section
6.c.). There is no minimum age for employment. Children typically are
not employed in the wage economy, but some assist their families with
fishing, agriculture, and other small-scale family enterprises. The law
requires compulsory education for children between 6 and 17 years of
age, and the Government generally enforces this law. By regulation no
foreigner under the age of 21 may be admitted into the country for
employment purposes.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In July 1998, Palau passed its
first minimum wage law. The law sets the minimum wage at $2.50 per
hour, effective January 1; foreign workers are exempt from the minimum
wage law. This amount appears to be sufficient, given the level of
economic development, to provide a worker and his family with a decent
standard of living. Anecdotal evidence indicates that unskilled workers
for commercial firms are paid only $1.50 to $2.00 per hour. However,
foreign workers usually are provided, in addition to their wages, with
basic accommodations and food at no or nominal cost. Although these
wages are low, the country continues to attract large numbers of
foreign workers from the Philippines, China, and Bangladesh. There are
more than 6,000 foreign nationals with work permits in the country,
two-thirds from the Philippines.
As the number of foreign workers increases, there continue to be
increasing numbers of reports of mistreatment of such workers by their
employers. These incidents of alleged mistreatment are common knowledge
among the general public but rarely are reported to law enforcement
authorities by the foreign workers themselves due to fear of their
employers. Some types of mistreatment that foreign workers consistently
complain about are: Physical and verbal abuse; working overtime and on
days off without pay; withholding monthly salary; deductions from
salary for the amount of airfare; and substandard housing. Some workers
also complained that they are not given enough food. The foreign
workers most likely to be abused are those who work under contracts and
earn between $100 and $300 a month as domestic helpers, construction
workers, farmers, waitresses, beauticians, and hostesses in karaoke
bars and massage parlors. Under the terms of their contracts, they also
are to be provided room and board and air travel from their home
country to Palau and back after the termination of their contracts. It
generally is assumed that legislators specifically exempted contract
workers in the 1998 minimum wage bill to ensure a continued supply of
low cost labor in industries that the legislators often control.
There is no legislation concerning maximum hours of work, although
most businesses are closed on either Saturday or Sunday. The Division
of Labor has established some regulations regarding conditions of
employment for nonresident workers. The Division may inspect the
conditions of the workplace and employer-provided housing on specific
complaint of the employees, but actual enforcement is sporadic; working
conditions vary in practice. No legislation specifically gives workers
the right to remove themselves from situations that endanger their
health or safety without jeopardy to their continued employment, and no
legislation protects workers who file complaints about such conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution prohibits trafficking
in persons, and there are no reports that persons were trafficked in,
to, or from the country.
______
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Papua New Guinea (PNG) comprises some 1,000 tribes and over 800
distinct languages in a population of about 4 million. It has a federal
parliamentary system, based on universal adult suffrage with periodic
free and fair elections, and has an independent judiciary.
The Government has constitutional authority over the Defense Force
(PNGDF), the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC), and
intelligence organizations. Members of the police force committed
serious human rights abuses.
The economy relies heavily on the export of minerals, hydrocarbons,
tropical timber, and tree crops such as coffee, cocoa, and copra. The
value of the national currency fell, prices rose sharply, and many
government services were underfunded as a result of poor commodity
prices abroad and economic mismanagement at home. This in turn
exacerbated the already high crime rate. Approximately 85 percent of
the population resides in isolated villages and engages in subsistence
and smallholder agriculture. For a majority of citizens, income and
educational levels are low and infant and maternal mortality rates are
high.
The Government continued to be responsible for human rights abuses.
Police committed extrajudicial killings, beat suspects, and engaged in
excessively punitive and violent raids. The Government on occasion
investigated allegations of abuse and prosecuted those believed
responsible. Prison conditions in several areas continued to be poor.
Court understaffing reduced court sittings and increased pretrial
detention periods for many persons. Police infringed on citizens'
privacy rights. The Government continued to limit freedom of assembly
in the form of marches or demonstrations, and imposed some restrictions
on freedom of movement. Extensive violence and discrimination against
women are problems, and abuse of children appears to be growing.
Discrimination against the disabled persists, and violence between
tribes remains a serious problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Several instances of
killing by police were reported during the year. According to police
reports, most occurred during gunfights with criminal suspects who were
resisting arrest. However, in at least one case in Port Moresby, family
members told the press that their relative was shot in both knees after
he surrendered and left to bleed to death. They offered a post mortem
as evidence.
All police shootings are investigated by the police department's
internal affairs office and reviewed by a coroner's court. If the court
finds that the shooting was unjustifiable or due to negligence, the
police officers involved are tried. Families of persons killed or
injured by police in such circumstances also may challenge the
coroner's finding in the National Court, with the assistance of the
Public Solicitor's Office.
Cases of accidental shootings of bystanders by police during police
operations are also investigated and reviewed by a coroner's court.
Such a case was initiated in the western highlands where police shot
and killed a man who they said charged them when they went to
investigate reports of hijacking on the main highway. The man's family
contends that he was mentally disabled and not part of the criminal
activity. In May police reportedly killed a child during a raid on
cargo cultists (see Section 1.c.).
No human right violations were reported in connection with military
operations during the year. However, although four soldiers suspected
of complicity in the killing of Bougainville Transitional Government
Premier Theodore Miriung in 1996 were questioned by police, no arrests
were made and no further progress has been reported.
There were occasional instances of mob violence. In September a 17-
year-old who was believed to have participated in the armed robbery of
the college canteen was caught and beaten to death by residents on the
grounds of the police training college. In November police reported
that villagers in Kerowagi district, Chimbu province, threw three
fellow villagers who were ill with AIDS into the Wahgi River, where
they drowned.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture and other cruel or
degrading treatment or punishment; however, police often beat suspects
during arrests and allowed members of the public to beat suspects as
well. During the year, policemen in three different localities were
charged with soliciting sex from or raping female detainees.
Although police policy continued to emphasize good community
relations and showed results in several communities during the year,
police in other areas destroyed houses and other property in the course
of poorly controlled raids that employed excessive force. For example,
in May in the course of a raid on cargo cultists who were reported to
be extorting money from the community police burned nearly 80 houses
and their contents in 2 villages in the highlands of Gulf Province.
During the raid, a child was reported killed (see Section 1.a.) and a
man was paralyzed. Police management investigated, but there was no
report of further action. In September when unlicensed street vendors
resisted a cleanup raid, Port Moresby police burned their equipment and
stock, eliciting a warning from the Chief Justice that such actions may
have violated the vendors' constitutional rights.
Prison conditions are poor. The prison system suffers from serious
underfunding, which results in the deterioration of infrastructure and
poor delivery of services. Three prisons in which conditions were
previously described as ``life threatening'' remained closed because of
unsanitary conditions; prisoners in some of those areas are confined in
crowded conditions in police stations. Some prisons, particularly those
in urban areas, are seriously overcrowded. Prison guards' living
conditions are as poor as those of the prisoners. During the year,
there were several prison breaks and, at the new year, the Government
released 141 nonviolent offenders to relieve the overcrowding.
Overcrowding is exacerbated in rural areas by infrequent court sessions
and bail restrictions for certain crimes (see Section 1.d.).
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The courts generally
enforce constitutional protections against arbitrary arrest and
detention. In 1994 the Supreme Court found unconstitutional portions of
the 1993 Internal Security Act which were inconsistent with due process
provisions of the Constitution. Under 1993 amendments to the Bail Act
and the Criminal Code, only National or Supreme Court judges may grant
bail to persons charged with willful murder or aggravated robbery. In
all other cases, the police or magistrates may grant bail. Suspects who
are arrested have the right to legal counsel, to be informed of the
charges against them, and to have their arrests subjected to judicial
review.
Due to limited police and judicial resources and a high crime rate,
suspects often are held in pretrial detention for a long time,
particularly in rural areas. Pretrial remand is subject to strict
judicial review through continuing pretrial consultations, especially
at the National Court level. Nonetheless cases are frequently delayed
for months awaiting results of police investigations. Also circuit
court sittings were infrequent because of a shortage of judges and
budget difficulties, delaying both the trial process and the rendering
of decisions. Some detainees have been held in jail for as long as 2
years because of the shortage of judges. An increase in the number of
full-time judges, which was granted in September, is expected to
improve the situation.
Following the election of the new Government, government
departments issued orders preventing foreign advisers to the former
government from leaving the country. To date the authorities have shown
no legal basis for these actions, and they were dropped after court
reviews.
Exile is prohibited by the Constitution and is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the courts are independent of executive,
legislative, and military authorities. At times political interests
interfere with due process. For example following allegations in
Parliament in 1998 that a politician had made an illegal videotape of
his sexual activity with an underage girl, two police officers from
another city enticed the girl allegedly involved from her home, took
her to a second jurisdiction where they charged her with an offense,
and then took her to a third jurisdiction where she was committed for
trial. During the year, the charges against both the girl and the
politician were dropped on technicalities or for lack of evidence. An
investigation of the police officers who arrested the girl never was
concluded.
The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal and has original
jurisdiction on constitutional matters. The National Court hears most
cases and appeals from the lower district courts established at the
provincial level. There are also village courts headed by lay persons,
who judge minor offenses under both customary and statutory law.
The legal system is based on English common law. The Constitution
provides for due process, including a public trial, and the court
system generally enforces these provisions. Defendants have the right
to an attorney. Legal counsel is provided by the Public Solicitor's
office for those accused of serious offenses who are unable to afford
counsel. ``Serious offenses'' are defined as charges for which a
sentence of 2 years or more is the norm. Defendants and their attorneys
may confront witnesses, present evidence, plead cases, and appeal
convictions. The shortage of judges creates delays both in the process
of trials and in the rendering of decisions (see Section 1.d.).
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The authorities generally respect citizens' privacy
rights, although there were instances of abuse, such as police
destruction of property in May (see Section 1.c.). In another instance,
a large force of heavily armed police searched the home of a man
accused of a nonviolent offense in January. He protested to the court
that the search procedures were politically inspired. The court agreed
and found police methods excessive and contrary to constitutional
protections of privacy.
Although provisions in the Constitution require warrants, the
police continued to conduct warrantless searches and raids.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for free
speech, including freedom of the media, and the Government generally
respects this freedom in practice.
The media provided independent coverage and analysis of major
issues, including accusations of corruption and immoral behavior
directed at leading political figures.
The combined circulation of two daily English-language newspapers
is less than 60,000. Two weekly newspapers, one in English and one in
Pidgin (the national lingua franca), also are published. All freely
express a variety of editorial viewpoints and report on controversial
issues such as alleged abuses by police and security forces, cases of
alleged corruption by government officials, and political opposition
views. A Malaysian firm, which has invested heavily in the country's
timber industry, owns one of the dailies; the newspaper publishes
little on the controversial subjects of logging and forestry, but it is
generally independent and unbiased on other issues.
The television broadcasting company, EM-TV, is independent.
Television reception is limited mostly to the capital and provincial
centers. The government-owned National Broadcasting Corporation owns
two radio networks whose effectiveness is limited by inadequate funding
and deteriorating equipment. A privately owned radio network, NAU-FM,
is popular in Port Moresby and is expanding to other areas of the
country.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government limits this
right in practice. Public demonstrations require police approval and
14-days' notice. Police assert that they fear violence from unruly
spectators and rarely give approval. Even a march against domestic
violence organized by national women's leaders was refused permission
until the afternoon of the day for which it was scheduled, preventing
advance publicity and an effective turnout.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice. Associations that
wish to open a bank account and conduct financial transactions are
required to register for this purpose. The process of registration may
be slowed by bureaucratic inefficiency, but there is no policy of
denying registration. International affiliation of church and civic
groups is freely permitted.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government usually does not restrict
freedom of movement within and outside the country. However, following
the election of the present Government, with no legal basis the
authorities prevented foreigners engaged as advisers by the previous
government from leaving the country (see Section 1.d.). A reservation
to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
regarding the issuance of travel documents restricted the travel of
some Irian Jayans residing in a refugee camp in western part of the
country.
Movement within Bougainville is free for all groups. Internally
displaced persons are free to return to their homes, and most have done
so. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there
are fewer than 50 persons from Bougainville in the Solomon Islands who
meet the criteria for refugee status. The Solomon Islands Red Cross
reports that other Bougainvillians sheltering in the Solomon Islands
have begun to return home and that none are any longer under their
care. Those remaining are employed professionals. The Government
negotiated agreements with the Government of the Solomon Islands to
establish the means for traditional border crossers in southern
Bougainville and the northern Solomon Islands to pass easily between
the two countries.
Although a party to the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the Government has not enacted enabling
legislation. The Government cooperates with the UNHCR, and has not
forced any persons to return to countries where they feared
persecution. The Government provides first asylum for approximately
3,500 persons who fled from the neighboring Indonesian province of
Irian Jaya. An equal number reside in informal, unrecognized camps
adjacent to the border with Indonesia. The Government cooperates with
the UNHCR in assisting the Irian Jayans who live in the East Awin
refugee camp in Western Province and has administered the camp since
1996, when the UNHCR office closed. The UNHCR planned to withdraw all
program and financial support for the East Awin camp at year's end. The
Government has a policy of limited integration for Irian Jayans with
certain skills or other qualifications, who are accorded limited
residency status and are permitted to leave the refugee settlement.
During the year, the Government distributed over 1,500 permissive
residency certificates to Irian Jaya refugees. Irian Jayans who choose
not to apply for permissive residency may seek voluntary repatriation
to Indonesia under the supervision of the Government and the UNHCR.
Those who violate conditions of their refugee status can be
repatriated. There were no known forced repatriations of Irian Jayans
to Indonesia. Several thousand traditional border crossers live in the
border area and move freely between the two countries.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens freely exercise their right to change the government
through direct elections with a secret ballot and universal adult
suffrage. Voters elect a unicameral parliament with 109 members from
all 19 provinces and the National Capital District. Any citizen can
stand for election. Because of the high number of candidates for
Parliament, some members have won election with less than 10 percent of
the total votes cast.
The most recent general election was held in June 1997. Of the 109
seats in Parliament, 55 changed hands. A coalition government, led by
Prime Minister Bill Skate, was formed following the election. In early
July, faced with a threatened vote of no confidence, Prime Minister
Skate resigned. On July 14, the Parliament elected Sir Mekere Morauta
as Prime Minister. He formed a coalition government that includes
nearly two-thirds of the Members of Parliament. Skate now leads the
opposition.
The law provides that a losing candidate may dispute the election
of the winning candidate by filing a petition with the National Court.
Such petitions may question actions of the candidate and his supporters
or allege malfeasance by the election officials. The procedure is fair,
but is time consuming and expensive both to initiate and to defend.
Following the 1997 election, 88 such petitions were filed. The majority
of complaints were made against winning candidates or their supporters.
The court accepted 40 of the petitions for trial. As of September,
several of these cases were still undecided.
Although there are no legal barriers to the participation of women
in political life, they are underrepresented in government and
politics. Two women were elected to the 109 member Parliament in the
1997 elections.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no official barriers to the formation of human rights
groups. The Government cooperates with human rights nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's), but sometimes is slow in responding to their
requests for information. The International and Community Rights
Advocacy Forum, formed in 1993, concentrated on human rights and the
environment.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal protection under the law
irrespective of race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, color,
creed, religion or sex. Despite these constitutional and other legal
provisions, women often face discrimination.
Extreme geographic diversity prevents any one tribe or clan from
dominating the country. The democratically elected government, based on
loose coalitions, consistently has avoided favoring any group.
Virtually all citizens share Melanesian ethnicity, and violence between
groups is not ethnically based. Skirmishes and conflicts tend to be
based on disputes between clans over issues such as boundaries, land
ownership, injuries, and insults suffered by one clan at the hands of
another. In May a serious tribal conflict erupted over the outcome of
the 1997 parliamentary election in Southern Highlands province. In the
past, clan and tribal warfare was ritualized and fought with
traditional weapons; the availability of firearms has made such
conflicts deadlier.
Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence and
gang rape, is a serious and prevalent problem. Traditional village
mores, which served as deterrents, are weakening and are largely absent
when youths move from their village to a larger town or to the capital.
Although rape is punishable by imprisonment, and sentences are imposed
when assailants are found guilty, few assailants are apprehended. The
willingness of some communities to settle incidents of rape through
material compensation rather than criminal prosecutions makes the crime
difficult to combat. Domestic violence, such as wife beating, also is
common and is a crime. However, since most communities view domestic
violence as a private matter, and few victims press charges,
prosecutions are rare.
Violence committed against women by other women frequently stems
from domestic disputes. In areas where polygyny is still customary, an
increasing number of women have been charged with the murder of another
of their husband's wives. According to one report, 65 percent of women
in prison are there for attacking or killing another woman.
The Constitution and laws have provisions for extensive rights for
women dealing with family, marriage, and property issues. Some women
have achieved senior positions in business, the professions, and civil
service. However, traditional patterns of discrimination against women
persist. Many women, even in urban areas, are considered second-class
citizens. Village courts tend to impose jail terms on women found
guilty of adultery, while penalizing men lightly or not at all.
Circuit-riding National Court justices frequently annulled such village
court sentences. In 1996 the Government approved amendments to the
Village Courts Act requiring that orders for imprisonment be endorsed
by a district court before they take effect.
Polygyny and the custom of paying a bride price tend to reinforce the
view that women are property.
In addition to the purchase of women as brides, women also are
sometimes given as compensation to settle disputes between clans. The
courts have ruled that such settlements are a denial of the women's
constitutional rights.
According to statistics published in the U.N. Development Program's
1999 report on human development, women are gaining rapidly on men in
literacy and education. Adult literacy has risen to 73 percent of the
population. Sixty-five percent of women are literate, trailing men by
21 percent. There are 15 percent fewer girls in primary schools than
boys. Maternal mortality levels remain relatively high at 930 deaths
per 100,000 live births.
There is an Office of Women's Affairs in the Office of Church and
Family Services of the Ministry of Provincial Affairs.
Children.--The Government did not dedicate significant resources to
protecting the rights and welfare of children. Most programs to protect
and develop youth and children are operated by NGO's andreligious
organizations. Many government programs are underfunded. In the past,
children have been well cared for within the family and under
traditional clan and village controls. However, preliminary, small-
scale studies indicate that this situation has changed over the last
decade, especially in areas where households have become isolated from
the extended family support system and depend on the cash economy for a
livelihood. According to a report prepared by the Government and the
U.N. Children's Fund, the sexual abuse of children is believed to be
prevalent. Because of the geographic isolation and remoteness of many
villages, malnutrition and infant mortality rates are very high. More
than 60 of every thousand children born do not survive their first
year.
People with Disabilities.--Through the National Board for the
Disabled, the Government provides funds to a number of NGO's that
provide services to the disabled. The Government does not provide
programs or services directly. Services and health care for the
disabled, except for those provided by the traditional clan and family
system, do not exist in several of the country's provinces. There is no
legislation mandating accessibility for the disabled. Disabled persons
face discrimination in education, training, and employment. Most
disabled persons do not find training or work outside the family
structure.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The right to form and join labor
unions is provided by law, subject to registration by the Department of
Industrial Relations. The Government does not use registration to
control unions. However, an unregistered union has no legal standing
with the Department of Labor and Employment or before the courts and
thus cannot operate effectively. About half of the 250,000 wage earners
in the formal economy are organized and are members of approximately 50
trade unions. Most of the unions representing private-sector workers
are associated with the Trade Unions Congress. The Public Employees
Association represents an estimated 23,000 persons employed by
national, provincial, and municipal governments, or one-third of the
public sector work force. Unions are independent of the Government and
of political parties.
Both public and private sector unions exercised their legal right
to strike during the year. Engineers working for the national airline
staged an unauthorized strike in July. Airline management fired them
all and then selectively rehired some. The courts ruled that both the
union and the airline acted illegally, and at year's end, talks were
underway to resolve the situation.
Unions may affiliate freely with international organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution provides for the right to engage in collective bargaining
and to join industrial organizations. These rights are exercised
freely. Under the law, the Government has discretionary power to cancel
arbitration awards or declare wage agreements void when they are
contrary to government policy. This law was criticized by the
International Labor Organization in 1994. The law prohibits antiunion
discrimination by employers against union leaders, members, and
organizers. The Department of Industrial Relations and the courts are
involved in dispute settlement. Wages above the minimum wage are set
through negotiations between employers and employees or their
respective industrial organizations.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
forbids slavery and all forms of forced, compulsory, or bonded labor,
including that performed by children, and there were no reports of such
practices.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Employment Act establishes the minimum working age as
18. However, children between the ages of 11 and 18 may be employed in
a family-related business or enterprise provided they have parental
permission, a medical clearance, and a work permit from a labor office.
This type of employment is rare, except in subsistence agriculture.
Forced and bonded labor by children is prohibited and is not known to
occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wages for the private
sector are set by the Minimum Wage Board, a quasi-governmental body
with labor and employer representatives. The Board made a determination
in 1992, which is still valid, that reduced the minimum wage for newly
hired urban workers to the level of the minimum wage for rural workers.
Also in 1992, the national youth wage, for new entrants into the labor
force between 16 and 21 years of age, was set at 75 percent of the
adult minimum wage. The adult minimum wage of $9.87 (22.96 kina) per
week does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family who live solely on the cash economy. The Minimum Wage Board
reconvened in mid-year to review the current minimum wage and made no
change. Although the Department of Labor and Employment and the courts
attempt to enforce the minimum wage law, enforcement is not effective
due to a lack of resources. Minimum wage levels, allowances, rest
periods, holiday leave, and overtime are regulated by law. The workweek
is limited by law to 42 hours per week in urban areas and 44 hours per
week in rural areas. The law provides for at least one rest period of
24 consecutive hours every week. Enforcement is lax.
Enforcement of the Industrial Health and Safety Law and related
regulations is the responsibility of the Department of Labor and
Employment. The law requires that work sites be inspected on a regular
basis. However, due to a shortage of inspectors, inspections take place
only when requested by workers or unions. Workers' ability to remove
themselves from hazardous working conditions varies by workplace.
Unionized workers have some measure of protection in such situations.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution does not prohibit
trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons
were trafficked in, to, or from the country.
______
PHILIPPINES
The Philippines is a democratic republic with an elected president,
a bicameral legislature, and a functioning political party system.
President Joseph Estrada took office in June 1998. The Government is
pursuing actively a negotiated settlement with Muslim separatists. An
uneasy truce exists between insurgents and government forces. Sporadic
clashes between government forces and the main Communist insurgent
group led to a variety of human rights abuses by both sides. The
judiciary is independent, but suffers from inefficiency and corruption.
The Department of National Defense directs the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) has authority over the civilian Philippine National Police
(PNP). The AFP, which has primary responsibility for antiinsurgency
operations, also is involved in traditional law enforcement efforts,
including the pursuit of kidnapers, a chronic criminal problem. Some
members of the security forces, including police, soldiers, and local
civilian militias, committed human rights abuses, often in the context
of counterinsurgency operations.
The Philippines has a market-based, mixed economy. Agriculture
contributes about 20 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), but
accounts for nearly 40 percent of employment. Principal crops include
corn, sugar, and rice, most of which are consumed domestically. Export
crops include coconut and fruits. Manufacturing, particularly
electronics and electronic components, accounts for nearly two-thirds
of export receipts; this export growth continued to be strong in spite
of the recent regional economic downturn. Per capita GDP in January was
approximately $886. Income distribution is highly skewed: The richest
30 percent of families earned about 63.4 percent of the national
income, while the poorest 30 percent receive only 9.3 percent of
income. Urban incomes average 2.43 times rural incomes.
The Government generally respected the human rights of citizens;
however, there were problems in some areas. Members of the security
services were responsible for extrajudicial killings, torture,
disappearances, arbitrary arrest and detention, and other physical
abuse of suspects and detainees. Police corruption remains a problem.
Prison conditions are harsh. The Government's Commission on Human
Rights (CHR), established by the 1986 Constitution, in January
described the PNP as the leading abuser of human rights, followed by
the Communist New People's Army (NPA), and the AFP. Some abuses were
committed by police and military personnel while involved in criminal
activities such as kidnap gangs, drug trafficking, and illegal logging.
Police leaders at times appeared to sanction brutality and extralegal
killings as expedient means of fighting crime. The Government has taken
few effective steps to stop military and police abuses, although police
officers have been sentenced to death for murder convictions. The
Government has been ineffective in reforming the police, the military
forces, or the court system, with its poorly paid, overburdened judges
and prosecutors. The court system remains susceptible to the influence
of the wealthy and powerful, while failing to provide equal justice for
others. The courts are hobbled by backlogs and limited resources, and
long delays in trials are common. The authorities failed to prosecute
many persons who broke the law.
The President's Antiorganized Crime Task Force made significant
progress during the year against kidnap gangs; however, the Estrada
administration's support for the Task Force Chief, an otherwise
effective police officer often accused of human rights abuses, caused
some to question the Government's commitment to police reform. The
Government at times infringed on citizens' privacy rights. There was an
increase in the Government's forcible displacement of squatters from
their illegal urban dwellings to make way for industrial and real
estate development projects, which often led to disputes and human
rights abuses.
An estimated 5 to 6 million citizens living abroad are
disenfranchised because the Congress still has not enacted absentee
voting, as required by the Constitution. The CHR, whose primary mission
is to investigate complaints of human rights violations, expanded the
local monitoring system; at midyear there were more than 13,000 local
human rights officers nationwide, up from 8,000 at the end of 1998.
However, some local military and police forces harassed human rights
activists. Violence and discrimination against women and abuse of
children continued to be serious problems. Discrimination against
indigenous people and Muslims persists. Rural poverty and family
displacement are major causes of the continuing child labor problem,
which the Government has addressed only partially. Forced labor,
including forced child prostitution, is a problem. Trafficking in women
and children is a problem.
Communist and Muslim insurgent groups, including the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF), and the Communist New Peoples' Army (NPA)
committed serious abuses, including extrajudicial killings, kidnapings,
torture, and detentions. The NPA's use of children as armed combatants
and noncombatants increased significantly.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police and military
forces committed extrajudicial killings. The CHR investigated 185
extrajudicial killings during the year, compared with 201 in 1998. The
CHR includes killings by antigovernment insurgents in its totals. The
nongovernmental organization (NGO) Task Force Detainees of the
Philippines (TFDP) reported that 18 civilians were killed for political
reasons from mid-1998 through June; 11 were victims of extrajudicial
executions carried out by government forces.
In combating criminal organizations, police personnel sometimes
resorted to summary execution of suspects, or ``salvaging.'' Police
spokesmen later reportedly misrepresented these killings as an
unavoidable result of a reported exchange of gunfire with the suspects.
The CHR reported that members of the PNP were responsible for 22
percent of the human rights violations involving deaths that it
investigated during the year.
In April the head of President Estrada's Antiorganized Crime Task
Force, Police General Panfilo Lacson, won a controversial dismissal of
murder charges against himself and 25 police colleagues for their
alleged involvement in the Kuratong Baleleng case, in which 11 robbery
suspects allegedly were killed while in PNP custody in 1995. Despite
eyewitness testimony, the case languished without trial for 4 years.
The witnesses eventually retracted their testimony after facing
reported intimidation and apparent bribery.
In March a member of the anticrime task force was charged with
killing a community leader in Quirino province, reportedly on the
orders of a senior provincial official. Also in March, three mid-
ranking police officers were indicted for the murder of three criminal
suspects. Investigations indicated that the police killings were in
retribution for the suspects' failure to pay for police protection with
a portion of the money that they stole. In Tarlac province in March, a
survivor of a failed police ``execution'' in March pressed charges
against the officers and was killed by a local police chief while
ostensibly under guard at a hospital. The police chief, a graduate of
the Philippine Military Academy, was dismissed from the PNP and faces
criminal charges.
According to the TFDP, three migrant workers at a sugar plantation
in Negros Occidental province were killed by AFP members in March. The
military services stated that the victims were members of the
Revolutionary Proletarian Army (RPA), an offshoot of the NPA. However,
the plantation owner reportedly claimed that the victims were farmers
from Panay island who had come to Negros island in search of work.
In August the bodies of four men, two of whom were confirmed NPA
members, were recovered in Mawab in the province of Compostela Valley
in Mindanao. Three of the bodies bore multiple gunshot wounds and
torture marks (see Section 1.c.). The four men had been arrested by
members of the PNP's 60th Infantry Battalion the day before.
MILF ``courts'' executed many persons during the year (see Section
1.e.).
The NPA claimed responsibility for several killings, including the
December 31 ``execution'' of former priest and former NPA leader
Conrado Balweg.
b. Disappearance.--The CHR cited 10 instances of involuntary
disappearance for the first 9 months of the year, compared with 10 in
1998. The TFDP reported two disappearances from mid-1998 through mid-
1999. One victim in March was a labor leader who failed to return home
after a meeting. The international NGO Families of Victims of
Involuntary Disappearance (FIND), reported 6 instances of involuntary
disappearance from mid-1998 through year's end.
The courts and the police have failed to address complaints of
victims' families concerning numerous past disappearances. FIND and
Amnesty International's Manila office continued to support the efforts
of the victims' families' to press charges, but in most cases evidence
and documentation are unavailable. Court inaction on these cases
contributes to a climate of impunity that undermines confidence in the
justice system.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and evidence obtained
through its use is legally inadmissible in court; however, members of
the security forces and police continued to use torture and otherwise
abuse suspects and detainees. The CHR provides the police with human
rights training, including primers on the rights of suspects; however,
such training is voluntary. Police awareness of the rights of those in
custody remains poor. Attorneys in legal reform and public defender
groups reported that the most common forms of abuse during arrest and
interrogation as ``mauling,'' slapping, hitting with clubs, and using
guns to poke suspects.
Authorities reportedly tortured three suspected NPA members after
their arrests in Compostela Valley province in January. The
perpetrators reportedly were former members of a civilian armed forces
geographical unit, a militia supported by the army.
The PNP, in response to growing criticism of alleged criminal
activity by its officers, established a ``Human Rights Desk'' to take
complaints and strengthen human rights training. The PNP dismissed one
officer and detained or suspended nine others through November.
Prison conditions are harsh. Provincial jails and prisons are
overcrowded, have limited exercise and sanitary facilities, and provide
prisoners with an inadequate diet. Administrators reportedly budget a
daily subsistence allowance of about $0.75 (30 pesos). Prison inmates
often depend on their families for food because of the insufficient
subsistence allowance. Male and female inmates are held in separate
facilities, overseen by guards of the same sex. The exception is the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation detention facility, which
segregates male and female inmates, but both are overseen by male
guards. Women and children still are being held in facilities not fully
segregated from adult male inmates. There were reports that guards
abused prisoners. Female prisoners in particular are at risk of sexual
assault.
Official corruption is a serious problem in the prison system. Jail
administrators reportedly delegate authority to maintain order to
senior inmates. Some prominent prisoners and jailed celebrities receive
preferential treatment. Favored inmates reportedly enjoy access to
outside contacts, enabling them to trade in prostitution and drugs.
According to the penal authorities, there were over 57,000 persons
held in national and provincial prisons in November. Many were detained
there at the discretion of local law enforcement authorities without
benefit of a trial. Through September the CHR helped 46 prisoners and
detainees obtain paroles or pardons.
International monitoring groups, the International Committee of the
Red Cross, and foreign embassy officials are allowed free access to
jails and prisons. There were no credible reports that prisoners died
due to prison conditions or treatment during the year.
d. Arbitrary arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
requires a judicial determination of probable cause before issuance of
an arrest warrant and prohibits holding prisoners incommunicado or in
secret places of detention; however, police in some cases arrested and
detained citizens arbitrarily. The CHR listed 98 cases of illegal
arrest and detention during the first 9 months of the year, compared
with 59 in 1998. The TFDP documented 48 politically motivated arrests
during the period from mid-1998 to mid-1999. With regard to civil and
political rights, the TFDP documents only violations committed by the
Government against suspected members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, the NPA, or other insurgent or opposition groups. The
Government denies that there are any political detainees.
Detainees have the right to a judicial review of the legality of
their detention and, except for offenses punishable by a life sentence
or death (when evidence of guilt is strong), the rightto bail.
Authorities are required to file charges within 12 to 36 hours of
arrests made without warrants, depending on the seriousness of the
crime for which the arrest was made.
In June Vicente Ladlad, a National Democratic Front consultant and
Communist peace negotiator, was arrested for illegal possession of a
firearm. He was detained for 9 days before being released on bail.
Subsequently he was accused of plotting the killing of top government
leaders. Left-wing groups insisted that Ladlad was a victim of a
government effort to eliminate members of revolutionary groups by
depicting them as common criminals.
The NPA and the MILF were responsible for a significant number of
arbitrary arrests and detentions, often in connection with informal
courts set up to try military personnel, police, local politicians, and
civilians for ``crimes against the people.'' (see Section 1.e.).
In February two army officers, one a general, were abducted by the
NPA near Davao City. In a separate incident also in February, the NPA
kidnaped a police officer in Bicol province. In March the NPA kidnaped
an army sergeant. In April these four persons, together with a police
officer held by the NPA since February 1998, were freed after the
Government refused to meet the NPA's demand to release NPA prisoners
convicted of crimes.
Forced exile is illegal and is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, but the judicial system suffers from corruption
and inefficiency. Personal ties undermine the commitment of some
employees of some government institutions to ensuring due process and
equal justice, resulting in impunity for those who commit offenses but
who are rich and influential.
The national court system consists of four levels: Local and
regional trial courts; a national court of appeals divided into 15
divisions; a 15-member Supreme Court; and an informal local system for
arbitrating or mediating certain problems outside the formal court
system. The Sandiganbayan, the Government's anticorruption court, hears
criminal cases of misconduct brought against officials.
The Constitution provides that those accused of crimes be informed
of the charges against them, have the right to counsel, and be provided
a speedy and public trial. Defendants are presumed innocent and have
the right to confront witnesses against them, to present evidence, and
to appeal convictions. The authorities respect the right of defendants
to be represented by a lawyer, although poverty often inhibits a
defendant's access to effective legal representation. The public
attorney's office is staffed by highly skilled and motivated defense
lawyers, but the workload is daunting and resources are scarce.
Legal experts inside and outside the justice system also criticize
personal and professional relationships between some judges and
individual or corporate litigants. Some lawyers act as ``case fixers,''
gaining the favor of judges and other court officials, and allegedly
bribe some witnesses. Technically it is illegal to settle criminal
cases out of court, but the practice of reaching an ``amicable
settlement'' is routine. In some cases, without key victims or
witnesses to testify, prosecution is problematic.
The pace of justice is slow. The court system is unable to assure
detained persons expeditious trials. There is a widely recognized need
for more prosecutors, judges, and courtrooms. Approximately 700 of
2,130 judgeships nationwide remain vacant for lack of qualified
applicants. Vacancies in provincial capitals are unattractive to many
jurists. In other cases, judges' salaries are considered too low in
comparison with other opportunities. Low pay also renders some
prosecutors susceptible to corruption.
According to the Constitution, cases are to be resolved within set
time limits once submitted for decision: 24 months for the Supreme
Court; 12 for the court of appeals; and 3 months for lower courts.
There are no time limits for trials. Because of numerous technical
delays and frequent failures of judges and prosecutors to appear,
trials can last many months. Officials in the Labor and Social Welfare
Departments complain that prosecutors often fail to follow up on cases
involving child labor violations (see Section 6.d.).
The CHR reported that about 36 percent of the human rights cases
that it referred to courts and other government agencies were resolved,
and that the courts dismissed 158 cases that went to trial. The Supreme
Court, which reviews all death sentences, commuted some death sentences
and overturned others.
The Crusade Against Violence, an NGO representing families of crime
victims, reported some success in providing families with legal advice,
monitoring court processes, and spurring prosecutors to address cases
despite the efforts of local criminal organizations or public officials
to hinder proceedings.
There were no credible reports of attempts to intimidate attorneys
involved in human rights cases.
Amnesty International criticized the apparent unfairness in many of
the court proceedings that result in death sentences, stating that the
judicial system does not ensure the rights of defendants to due process
and legal representation. At times defendants in such cases had no
lawyers to assist them when they were arrested, indicted, and brought
to trial.
Indemnification claims for alleged human rights abuses during the
Ferdinand Marcos era, which ended in 1986, remain unsolved. A
government-brokered agreement that appeared near success early in the
year collapsed under criticism of its immunity provisions for the
Marcos family, and the presiding judge of the Sandiganbayan refused to
release $150 million in escrowed Marcos funds.
Reflecting the MILF's claim to recognition as an independent state
in areas that it controls, MILF spokesmen asserted their Shari'a
(Islamic law) courts have criminal jurisdiction, and the MILF executed
several alleged criminals during the year.
The NPA and the MILF were responsible for a significant number of
arbitrary arrests and detentions, often in connection with informal
courts set up to try military personnel, police, local politicians, and
civilians for ``crimes against the people.'' The NPA continued to try
these defendants in its courts. The NPA claimed responsibility for
several killings, including the December 31 ``execution'' of former
priest and former NPA leader Conrado Balweg (see Section 1.a.).
The TFDP and the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates, a
leading NGO network, reported that there were at least 160 political
prisoners held at year's end, compared with 147 held at the end of
1998. The Government denies that it holds political prisoners,
contending that those jailed for political reasons in fact were
convicted for common crimes. Frequently political prisoners counted by
the TFDP were convicted of the illegal possession of firearms. The TFDP
asserts that the authorities deliberately ``criminalize'' political
offender cases in order to strip political prisoners of public
sympathy. There are differences of opinion even within the CHR; some
members of the Commission believe that certain persons are incarcerated
for political reasons, but other members believe that the same persons
are guilty of common crimes.
The Presidential Committee on Grant of Bail, Release, or Pardon
claims that some political prisoners remain in custody.
In February the Technical Working Group of the Presidential
Committee on Grant of Bail, Release, or Pardon Committee recommended
the release of 61 prisoners whom it deemed had been convicted mainly
because of the legitimate exercise of their political beliefs. However,
after the NPA kidnaped an AFP general and four other members of the
armed forces early in the year, President Estrada deferred action on
the Working Group's recommendation. The AFP prisoners were released by
the NPA in April. In December the President pardoned and ordered the
release of 11 of the 61 prisoners. He reportedly stated that most of
those given pardon were political prisoners. The Government indicated
its intention to pardon and release the remaining 50 if their appeals
were withdrawn.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides that a judge may issue
search warrants on a finding of probable cause. Restrictions on search
and seizure within private homes generally are respected, although
searches without warrants do occur. Judges have declared evidence
obtained illegally to be inadmissible.
There were reports that the Presidential Antiorganized Crime Task
Force placed illegal wiretaps on the telephones of government officials
and military officers identified with opposition parties.
Having campaigned as the ``pro-poor'' candidate, President Estrada
early in his administration sought to avoid confrontations with
squatter communities; however, there was an increase in the forcible
displacement of urban ``squatters'' to make room for infrastructure and
commercial developments. The law provides certain protections for
squatters; eviction often is difficult, especially because politicians
generally recognize squatters' voting power. The CHR classified as
human rights violations nine instances of community demolition by the
Government through September. In many instances, the Government did not
offer relocation sites to displaced families, as required by law. The
NGO Ecumenical Commission for Displaced Families (ECDFC) reported seven
mass displacements due to government demolition of houses for economic
purposes. These actions affected 15,876 citizens in 2,646 families,
mostly in the Manila area.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--Periodic AFP clashes with the main remaining
Islamic Insurgent Group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
continued to inflict hardships on civilians. Most of the fighting took
place in western Mindanao provinces and was related to the control of
territory, a central issue in the Government's peace talks with the
MILF. Displaced families fear being caught in the crossfire or becoming
casualties as a result of artillery exchanges or bombings near their
areas of residence.
According to the ECDFC, 27 incidents of armed clashes between the
AFP and the MILF, NPA, or other paramilitary groups in Mindanao and in
Bohol provinces in the Visayas displaced an estimated 304,908
noncombatants. Some Muslim families in Mindanao suffered recurrent
displacements. Although neither the government forces nor the
insurgents appeared to target civilian populations or restrict food
supplies, there were periodic food shortages in some areas associated
with the large number of displaced families.
During November Government and the MILF clashed in North Cotabato
and Maguindanao provinces in Mindanao. A reported 45 combatants on both
sides were killed in the fighting. An estimated 6,000 persons
reportedly were displaced during the skirmishes.
In June the CHR protested the increased recruitment of minors (boys
and girls under the age of 18) by the Communist NPA. The growing number
of NPA members under 18 years of age who were captured or surrendered
to government forces confirmed the widespread use of children in both
combat and noncombat roles by the NPA. The Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) provided care and assistance to these children
after they were turned over by the military to the civilian authorities
(see Sections 5 and 6.d.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects this right in practice.
The Philippine Press Institute (PPI) is active in helping
investigate cases of harassment of journalists. The PPI favors the
repeal of legislation banning political advertising in the media. It
believes that the total ban, enacted in the interest of fairness,
favors incumbents and deprives new candidates of the opportunity to
make their views known.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and the
Government respects these rights in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens enjoy the freedom to change
their places of residence and employment. Travel abroad is limited only
in rare circumstances, such as pending court cases. Government
authorities discourage travel by vulnerable workers such as young women
to areas where they face personal risk (see Section 6.f.). The
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) seeks to limit
departures for work abroad to only those persons whom the POEA
certifies as qualified for the jobs. An estimated 5 to 6 million
citizens work overseas and remit money home amounting to nearly 10
percent of the GNP.
There is no comprehensive legislation that provides for granting
refugee and asylee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol. The Refugee Unit in the Department of Justice determines
which asylum seekers qualify as refugees; this serves to implement many
of the basic provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention.
The Government provides first asylum.
The Government continued to allow approximately 1,600 asylum
seekers from Vietnam to remain in the country. All were ``screened
out'' from refugee status. Most now live in major urban areas. There is
significant popular support, particularly from the Roman Catholic
Church, for allowing the permanent stay of those asylum seekers who do
not wish to repatriate and are ineligible for resettlement in other
countries. The Government continued to encourage voluntary repatriation
of these asylum seekers. The Government has not ruled out forcible
repatriation, although that action is unlikely. There were no reports
of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right through
periodic elections that are largely free and fair and held on the basis
of universal suffrage. However, Congress has yet to enact a system for
absentee voting as required by the Constitution. This affects an
estimated 5 to 6 million potential voters or about 10 percent of the
electorate, most of whom are expatriates. The party of President
Estrada continued to hold large majorities in both the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
The Government attempted to bring disadvantaged groups into the
political process using the party list system. Along with many other
citizens, Muslims argue that the method of election of senators from a
nationwide list favors the established political figures from the
Manila area. Election of senators by region would require a
constitutional amendment, but it is favored by many Muslims and members
of other disadvantaged groups who are underrepresented in the national
legislature. There are no Muslim senators, and none of President
Estrada's cabinet members are Muslims. However, the House of
Representatives has nine Muslim members, including some elected from
Christian majority districts.
There are no restrictions in law or practice on participation by
women and members of minorities in politics. The Vice President is a
woman; she received more votes than the President did in the last
national elections. There are two female cabinet members. There are 4
women in the 22-member Senate, and 25 women in the 222-member House of
Representatives.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operated without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Many government officials, including those of the CHR,
are responsive to their views. Some domestic NGO's were critical of the
Estrada administration's human rights record; these NGO's also had
criticized previous Presidents' human rights records. In September the
CHR hosted a regional conference of national human rights commissions
with participation by domestic, regional, and international NGO's.
Domestic NGO's were given the opportunity to criticize the CHR publicly
and did so.
The Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates, a leading NGO
network, effectively monitors human rights problems and seeks redress
through its contacts with government agencies, the Congress, and the
CHR. Human rights activists continued to encounter minor harassment,
chiefly by police or military units or detachments based in the
localities in which the incidents were reported.
The CHR further augmented the system of local (``barangay'') human
rights officers who monitor local authorities and report complaints to
regional CHR offices. There were more than 13,000 local human rights
officers at year-end compared with approximately 8,000 in December
1998.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination against women, children,
and members of minorities. Implementation of constitutional protections
at times is hindered by the lack of specific regulations and by
budgetary constraints.
Women.--Violence against women, particularly domestic violence,
remains a serious societal problem. Rape is illegal and in certain
cases punishable by death. Spousal rape and abuse also are illegal, but
enforcement is ineffective. Women's advocates cite the lack of laws on
domestic violence, double standards of morality, and a traditional
societal reluctance to discuss private family affairs as some of the
reasons for domestic violence. The absence of divorce under the law and
limited job opportunities combine to limit the ability of both poor and
wealthy women to escape destructive relationships.
The PNP and DSWD both maintain women's help desks to protect
victims of violence against women and to encourage the reporting of
crimes. Their role was strengthened further by Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, who served concurrently as the secretary of the DSWD
and continued to give women's issues a high public profile during the
year. Many PNP stations included female officers. With the assistance
of NGO's, some male officers received gender sensitivity training to
assist victims of sexual crimes and domestic violence.
Rape continued to be a major problem as the number of rapes
reported to the police has risen by about 16 percent annually since
1992. The PNP reported that it investigated 3,283 cases of rape through
November; 70 percent of the alleged perpetrators were arrested.
However, some women's groups stated that courts' imposition of death
sentences for rape convictions might inhibit some victims from pressing
charges. The number of prisoners awaiting execution for rape exceeds
the number awaiting execution for murder.
Many women suffer exposure to violence through their recruitment,
often through deception, into prostitution. Although illegal,
prostitution remains widespread. An International Labor Organization
(ILO) study estimated that 500,000 Filipino women are engaged in
prostitution within the country. Most work independently or in small
brothels rather than in prominent ``entertainment clubs.'' Penalties
for the offense are light, but detained prostitutes are subjected to
administrative indignities. The Antivagrancy Act often is used by
police officers as a pretext to extort money from prostitutes; those
unable to pay may be subjected to sexual abuse. Hotel and travel
industry leaders failed to honor their pledges to cooperate with a code
endorsed by international tourism groups to stop sex tourism.
Local officials condone a climate of impunity for those who exploit
prostitutes--both the ``entertainment club'' owners and their patrons.
Highly publicized official campaigns to close clubs and brothels fail
to rescue young women from the abuse, since a few days after such
raids, the offending establishments usually are back in business.
The DSWD reported that it rescued victims of illicit recruitment
who were trapped in prostitution. DSWD officials noted that the number
failed to reflect the true extent of the prostitution problem since it
reflected only those who obtained temporary shelter and counseling
through the DSWD and local governments. NGO's argue that the Government
should first address the abuses of dislocation and homelessness in
order to treat effectively the problem of women's exposure to the
structural violence inherent in prostitution.
Trafficking in women and children for forced prostitution and
forced labor is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
Sexual harassment in the workplace also continues to be a problem;
it is thought to be widespread yet underreported due to victims' fear
of losing their jobs. Harassment by managers in Special Economic Zones
(SEZ's) is thought to be a common practice. Most of the female
employees at SEZ's are economic migrants who are required to work long
hours and have no independent workers' organization to assist with
filing complaints. Women also are hired as contractual employees
without benefits in the pressing and sewing industry. Many are
subjected to long hours in inadequately ventilated facilities.
In law but not always in practice, women have most of the rights
and protections accorded men. The Presidential Commission on the Role
of Filipino Women seeks to coordinate programs for women, working
closely with NGO's such as the 10 million-member National Council of
Women in the Philippines. More women than men enter secondary and
tertiary education. A 1997 study by the Asian Development Bank found
that women had made important gains toward gender equity in recent
years, but the negative effects of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis
still have not been overcome. Unemployment rates among women are
consistently higher than those among men. Women's salaries averaged
about 47 percent lower than their male counterparts. Except for
government service and jobs in government-owned or government-
controlled corporations, women continued to face discrimination in
employment.
Church opposition to divorce in this predominantly Roman Catholic
nation is strong. However, changes in the legal code have made marriage
annulment fairly easy and increasingly common. However, the legal cost
precluded this option for many women. The practice of ``unofficial
divorce'' or permanent separation was common among lower income
families. In such cases, the wife usually was left with the children,
and the husband provided little or no financial support.
Children.--Several government agencies have programs devoted to the
education, welfare, and development of children. Nevertheless, children
faced serious problems in their development. Family poverty forces many
school dropouts. Only about 65 percent of children complete the sixth
grade. As the grade level goes up, the number of children who stay
continues to decline. Public primary and secondary schools are free of
tuition charges, but poor families are unable to meet numerous
peripheral costs for uniforms, school supplies, shoes, and
transportation. The Asian Development Bank expressed concern over an
apparent growing inequity in the opportunity for an education as public
spending per pupil declines. In the 1980's, public spending covered 80
percent of the cost of elementary education; however, this share
declined to only 69 percent by the mid-1990's.
Widespread poverty forces many young children to work. The
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) worked with the ILO and NGO's
to address the problem of widespread child labor. According to the U.N.
Children's Fund (UNICEF) and ILO studies, over 2 million children were
exposed to hazardous working environments such as quarries, mines, and
at docksides in order to earn their living (see Section 6.d.).
Trafficking in children for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem (see Section 6.f.).
The DSWD reported that there were over 50,000 street children in
Manila and over 100,000 nationwide. Welfare officials believe that the
number is increasing as a result of widespread unemployment in rural
areas. Many of these apparently are abandoned children engaged in
scavenging or begging.
The family court system adopted in 1998 has helped expedite
juvenile and domestic relations cases and served to strengthen
safeguards against the sale and trafficking of children abroad.
Previously, less specialized courts had tended to regard children as
extensions and property of the parents and to favor parental authority
over the rights of a child.
Greater public awareness eroded traditional reticence to report
abuses against children. DSWD offices cared for children who were the
victims of rape. The problem of foreign pedophiles continued to receive
significant reporting in the press. The Government continued to
prosecute accused pedophiles.
Despite government efforts at law enforcement and expanded
children's programs, it is estimated that some 60,000 children are
involved in the commercial sex industry. Children in the``entertainment
industry'' work long, odd hours (10 to 12 hours) from evening until
early morning. Typically they come from families with unemployed or
irregularly employed parents.
In June the CHR protested the increased recruitment of minors (boys
and girls under the age of 18) by the Communist NPA. The growing number
of NPA members under 18 years of age who were captured or surrendered
to government forces confirmed the widespread use of children in both
combat and noncombat roles by the NPA. The DSWD provided care and
assistance to these children after they were turned over by the
military to the civilian authorities (see Section 1.g.).
People with Disabilities.--The law provides for equal physical
access for the disabled to all public buildings and establishments, and
for ``the rehabilitation, self development, and self-reliance of
disabled persons and their integration into the mainstream of
society.'' Advocates for the rights of the disabled contend that the
law has been ineffective because implementing regulations have not been
published, and because government programs are palliative rather than
focused on reintegration. Reportedly only about 2 percent of an
estimated 3.5 million disabled citizens received access to services.
In July the Supreme Court ruled that 27 deaf mute bank workers were
regular employees, entitled to security of tenure, and who could be
terminated only for authorized cause. The workers had been dismissed as
nonpermanent employees after from 3 to 6 years' service.
Indigenous People.--Indigenous people live throughout the country
but primarily in the mountainous areas of northern and central Luzon
and Mindanao. They account for about 18 percent of the national
population. Although no specific laws discriminate against indigenous
people, the remoteness of the areas that many inhabit and cultural bias
prevent their full integration into society. Indigenous children suffer
from lack of basic services, health, and education. Because they
inhabit mountainous areas also favored by guerrillas, indigenous people
suffer disproportionately from counterinsurgency operations.
The 1997 Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, which was intended to
implement constitutional provisions to protect indigenous people,
established a National Commission of Indigenous People staffed by
tribal members empowered to award certificates of title to lands
claimed by the over 12 million native people in the country. It awards
``ancestral domain lands'' on the basis of communal rather than
individual ownership, impeding sale of the lands by tribal leaders. The
law requires a process of ``informed'' consultation and written consent
by the indigenous group to allow mining on tribal lands. The law also
assigns the indigenous groups the responsibility to preserve forest,
watershed, and biodiversity areas in their domains from inappropriate
development. However, the Government has been slow to implement the
legislation, as it faces strong opposition from mining and agribusiness
interests.
Other measures have affected indigenous communities in adverse
ways. The 1995 Mining Act continued a legislative trend of promoting
mining operations, hydroelectric dams, and other large-scale projects
that force indigenous people to relocate and abandon farming and
hunting land used for generations.
Indigenous people continued to face legal threats to their claims
to ancestral lands from developers, mining interests, and local
political interests. The Higaonon people in Mindanao continue to be
deprived of portions of their ancestral land by a powerful local
landowning family that enforced their removal through a violent
demolition conducted by the PNP and private security forces in 1997.
The Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines continues to express
concern over the effects of existing and planned large-scale mining on
the livelihood of the many indigenous people of Mindanao.
Religious Minorities.--About 5 million Muslims, who constitute 7
percent of the population, reside principally in Mindanao and nearby
islands and are the largest single minority group in the country.
Historically, they have been alienated from the dominant Christian
majority, and government efforts to integrate Muslims into the
political and economic fabric of the country have met with only limited
success. The national culture, with its emphasis on familial, tribal,
and regional loyalties, createsinformal barriers whereby access to jobs
or resources is provided first to those of one's own family or group.
Many Muslims claimed that they continue to be underrepresented in
senior civilian and military positions. Provinces in Mindanao that are
predominantly Muslim lag behind the rest of the island in almost all
aspects of socioeconomic development.
There was progress in improving Christian-Muslim relations
following a 1996 government agreement with the insurgent MNLF. In
accordance with the agreement, a Southern Philippines Council on Peace
and Development was established to coordinate economic growth in 14
provinces in Mindanao, and MNLF chairman Nur Misuari became its chair.
Misuari later was elected governor of the autonomous region of Muslim
Mindanao, which was established in 1990 to meet the demand of Muslims
for local autonomy in areas where they are a majority or a substantial
minority. The accord also provided for the integration of MNLF fighters
into the armed forces and police.
Although the MNLF agreement has brought somewhat more regional
stability, intermittent military clashes with insurgent MILF forces
still result in family displacements. In September the plebiscite
promised in the 1996 peace agreement between the Government and the
MNLF on autonomy for an expanded Islamic region was postponed for 1
year. Misauri favored an even longer delay.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and laws provide for
the right of workers, including public employees, to form and join
trade unions. Although this right is exercised in practice, aspects of
the public sector organization law restrict and discourage organizing.
Trade unions are independent of the Government and generally free of
political party control. Unions have the right to form or join
federations or other labor groups.
Although unions claimed to have organized more than 12 percent of
the total work force of 29.5 million, only about 541,000 workers, or
14.6 percent of union members, are covered by collective bargaining
agreements. According to the DOLE Bureau of Labor Relations, the number
of new union registrations fell continuously since 1995. The number of
firms, primarily large employers, that used ``contractual'' labor
continued to grow.
Subject to certain procedural restrictions, strikes in the private
sector are legal. However, the law requires that all means of
reconciliation must be exhausted and that the strike issue must be
relevant to the labor contract or the law. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment can intervene in some labor disputes by ``assuming
jurisdiction'' and mandating a settlement if the Secretary views the
industry involved in the strike as ``vital to national security.''
Legislation that the ILO Committee of Experts criticized for
placing undue restrictions on the right to strike in nonessential
services remained unchanged. The Committee remained concerned by the
imposition of penalties in cases where strikes were deemed illegal, by
restrictions on the right of government workers to strike, and by some
restrictions on the right to organize and form a bargaining unit that
are in conflict with ILO Convention 87 on freedom of association.
Strikes were fewer and shorter in duration. The National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB reported 53 strikes through
November, compared with 89 strikes the previous year. There were
189,000 workdays lost to strikes, compared with 548,000 in 1998.
In May the Associated Labor Unions called a strike of longshoremen
at the port of Cebu after a shipping company had fired 14 union
members. The DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction and the situation was
stabilized until July, when 21 union members were fired and a second
brief strike was called. In September company security officers fired
on striking workers, injuring two persons. In October the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) cited the company for unfair labor
practices and the fired workers for conducting an illegal strike. The
case remained unresolved at year' end.
Union leaders and NGO's express concern that workers involved in
union activity face intimidation tactics by management, including
physical assaults by security guards. In late 1997, the ILO's Committee
on Freedom of Association expressed concernover the violent dispersal
of pickets and the brief police detention of union leaders during a
1995 strike at the Telefunken Semiconductor plant near Manila. The
management ignored repeated the DOLE Secretary's orders to reinstate
workers fired for their strike decision. The company has not reinstated
the workers.
Unions have the right to affiliate with international trade union
confederations and trade secretariats. Two of the largest trade union
centrals, the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines and the
Federation of Free Workers, are affiliated with the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the World Confederation of
Labor, respectively.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution provides for the right to organize and bargain
collectively. The Labor Code provides for this right for private sector
employees and for employees of government owned or government
controlled corporations, but the law limits the rights of government
workers.
Allegations of intimidation and discrimination in connection with
union activities are grounds for review as possible unfair labor
practices before the quasijudicial NLRC. Before disputes reach the
NLRC, the DOLE provides the services of the NCMB, which settles most of
the unfair labor practice disputes raised as grounds for strikes before
the strikes can be declared.
Labor law is uniform throughout the country, including the
industrial zones, where tax benefits encourage the growth of export
industries. However, local political leaders and officials governing
these special economic zones have tried to frustrate union organizing
efforts by maintaining ``union free/strike free'' policies. A conflict
over interpretation of the SEZ law's provisions for labor inspection
has created further obstacles to enforcement of workers' rights to
organize. Despite objections from the DOLE, SEZ local directors claim
authority to conduct their own inspections as part of the zones'
privileges intended by Congress. Hiring often is controlled tightly
through ``SEZ labor centers,'' where political ties to local figures
play a role in gaining job eligibility. Despite sporadic labor unrest
and some organizing efforts, union successes in the SEZ's have been few
and marginal. Some mainstream unions avoid a major unionizing effort in
the lower-wage SEZ industries such as the garment industry. They
consider it unpromising in view of both the organizers' restricted
access to the closely guarded zones and the rapid turnover of the
young, mainly female staff working on short-term contracts in the
zones' many electronics and garment factories.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is
prohibited, including forced and bonded labor by children; however,
despite the Government's generally effective prohibition of forced
labor, there were reports of forced or bonded labor by children, mainly
in the informal sector. Over 300,000 children aged 17 and younger work
as family domestic workers, for whom the minimum age is 15. Some
recruiters reportedly bring girls between the ages of 13 and 17 to work
in Manila or Cebu homes under terms that involve a ``loan'' advanced to
their parents that the children are obliged to repay through their
work. The DOLE continued to address the problem of underage workers in
family work settings. Some children reportedly worked to help their
parents repay loans from planters. NGO's and the ILO reported that
``piggeries'' in Bulacan province near Manila no longer appeared to
employ underage workers. Trafficking in women and children for purposes
of forced prostitution and forced labor is a problem (see Section
6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children below age 15,
except under the direct and sole responsibility of parents or
guardians, or where employment in cinema, theater, radio, or television
is essential to the integrity of the production. The Labor Code allows
employment of those between the ages 15 and 18 for such hours and
periods of the day as are determined by the Secretary of Labor but
forbids the employment of persons under 18 years of age in hazardous or
dangerous work. However, a significant number of children are employed
in the informal sector of the urban economy or as unpaid family workers
in rural areas.
There are few child labor violations in the formal manufacturing
sector. However, children reportedly continue to be employedillegally
on the docks of some Mindanao and Visayan ports. Working at a piece
rate in the unloading of bulk cargo, the children earn far less than
adults would demand for the same work even though they are exposed to
harmful dust and chemicals in the ships' holds. Employment of children
as divers in dangerous conditions on coral reef fishing vessels
reportedly continued. In Mindanao plantations raising bananas for
export frequently used children as day laborers in trimming and
fertilizing plants and clearing irrigation ditches.
The DOLE and other agencies continue to work closely with UNICEF
and the ILO's International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor
to reduce violations of child labor laws. The DOLE works with local
NGO's to educate the community on the negative aspects of child labor
while providing counseling and other outlets for children. The
Department of Education, Culture, and Sport participates in an
interagency effort to put children back in school.
The DOLE increased its efforts to prosecute violators of child
labor laws. In April a labor recruiter was imprisoned after a child
whom he had recruited to work at a soybean factory in Mindanao fell
into a hopper and was suffocated.
The DOLE and other government agencies applied considerable
pressure throughout the year on the companies licensed to engage in
hazardous pa-aling fishing methods to enforce the prohibition of
underage employees.
The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children. However,
despite government enforcement efforts, there were reports of its use,
mainly in prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Tripartite regional wage boards
set minimum wages. A round of wage increases was implemented late in
the year, the first in 2 years. The highest rates are in the National
Capital Region (NCR) and the lowest in rural regions. The minimum daily
wage for NCR nonagricultural workers is about $5.60 (223.50 pesos),
which does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. With this pay level, at least two family members would have to
work full-time to support a family of six above the level of the
Government's minimum daily cost of living for the Manila area. The
lowest minimum wages are in the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao,
where the daily agricultural wage is approximately $2.95 (118 pesos).
Large numbers of workers do not receive the minimum wage set for their
area.
Regional wage board orders cover all private sector workers except
domestic helpers and those employed in the personal service of another.
Boards outside the NCR exempted some employers because of factors such
as establishment size, industry sector, involvement with exports,
financial distress, and level of capitalization. These exemptions
excluded substantial additional numbers of workers from coverage under
the law.
Violation of minimum wage standards is common. Many firms hire
employees at subminimum apprentice rates even if there is no approved
training in their production-line work. DOLE officials estimate a 30 to
40 percent noncompliance rate with the minimum wage requirement and
acknowledge that the shortage of inspectors makes the law difficult to
enforce. The Government relies on administrative procedures and moral
suasion to encourage voluntary employer correction of violations.
The standard legal workweek is 48 hours for most categories of
industrial workers and 40 hours for government workers, with an 8-hour
per day limit. An overtime rate of 125 percent of the hourly rate is
mandated on ordinary days and 130 percent on rest days and holidays.
The law mandates a full day of rest weekly. However, there is no legal
limit on the number of overtime hours that an employer may require.
Enforcement of work week hours is managed through periodic inspections
by the DOLE.
Several NGO's seek to protect the rights of the country's more than
5 million overseas workers. The Government uses financial sanctions and
criminal charges against unfair practices by domestic recruiting
agencies. Although the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency has
registered and supervised domestic recruiters' practices successfully,
the Government largely is unable to ensure workers' protection
overseas. It seeks cooperation from receiving countries and proposes
migrant worker rights conventions in international forums. The
Government also provides assistance through its diplomatic missions in
countries with substantial numbers of migrant workers.
A comprehensive set of occupational safety and health standards
exists in law. The DOLE has responsibility for policy formulation and
review of these standards, but with fewer than 300 inspectors
nationwide, actual enforcement often is carried out by local
authorities. DOLE officials acknowledge that the number of inspectors
is inadequate for the number of work sites in need of visits.
Statistics on actual work-related accidents and illnesses are
incomplete, as incidents (especially in agriculture) are underreported.
Workers do not have a legally protected right to remove themselves from
dangerous work situations without risking loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
trafficking in persons, but the Government used laws against related
illegal commerce to address trafficking. Trafficking in women and
children is a problem. Many women seek employment overseas and are
particularly vulnerable to exploitation by unethical recruiters who
promise attractive jobs or, in some cases, arrange marriages with
foreign men. Some eventually work as prostitutes or suffer abuse by
their foreign employers or husbands. Those recruited to work as maids,
entertainers, or models may while overseas be forced to participate in
public shows or dances where nudity and the prospect of sex are the
principal attractions. Others knowingly accept questionable jobs to
support parents, children, or siblings with their remittances. The
Government has continued its efforts to end illegal recruiting and, by
raising age, educational, and professional standards for young women
seeking jobs abroad, has tried to discourage employment migration. The
1995 Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act sought to provide the
Government with greater financial resources and improved authority to
combat these problems. However, NGO's believe that these measures have
not been adequate since traffickers remain numerous and effective in
luring women with promises of lucrative overseas contracts. The
Government is the host and cosponsor of the Asian Regional Initiative
Against Trafficking in Women and Children, scheduled for March 2000.
The goal of this conference is the formulation of a comprehensive
action plan to combat trafficking within and from Asia, including
strategies for prevention, protection, and prosecution.
Child trafficking by illegal recruiters often brought children from
poor rural areas to low-paying jobs in cities. The family court system
adopted in 1998 has helped expedite juvenile and domestic relations
cases and served to strengthen safeguards against the sale and
trafficking of children abroad. Previously, less specialized courts had
tended to regard children as extensions and property of the parents and
to favor parental authority over the rights of a child.
______
SAMOA
Samoa is a parliamentary democracy that incorporates certain
traditional practices into its legislative system. The Constitution of
this Pacific island country of approximately 170,000 persons provides
for a head of state, a unicameral legislature composed of family heads,
or ``matai,'' who are elected by universal suffrage, the protection of
land rights and traditional titles, and guarantees of fundamental
rights and freedoms. Executive authority is vested in the Head of State
with the Government administered by the Cabinet, consisting of the
Prime Minister and 12 ministers chosen by him. All laws passed by the
Legislative Assembly need the approval of the Head of State, Malietoa
Tanumafili II, who holds the position for life. The Legislative
Assembly is to elect his successors for 5-year terms. The judiciary is
independent.
The country does not have a defense force. The small national
police force is controlled by the Government but has little effect
beyond Apia, the capital city. Enforcement of rules and security within
individual villages is vested in the ``fono'' (Council of Matai), which
settles most internal disputes. Judgments by the fono usually involve
fines or, more rarely, banishment from the village.
The country is poor with a market-based economy in which more than
60 percent of the work force are employed in the agricultural sector.
Fish, kava, and coconut products are the principal exports. The small
industrial sector is dominated by a Japanese factory that assembles
automotive electrical parts for export. The Government has initiated a
major effort to promote tourism. Per capita gross domestic product is
$1,100 per year. The country is heavily dependent on foreign aid and on
remittances sent to family members by the more than 100,000 Samoans
living overseas.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens. Principal human rights abuses arise from political
discrimination against women and nonmatai and violence against women
and children. Societal pressures and customary law may interfere with
the ability to conduct fair trials. Those who do not conform to
accepted societal values may face pressure, threats, and violence.
There are some restrictions on freedom of speech, press, and religion.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Minister of Public
Works Luaglau Levaula Kamu was shot and killed on July 16. Three
persons were charged in the case: The former Minister of Women's
Affairs; his son; and the former Minister of Telecommunications.
Eletise Leafa Vitale, the son of the former minister of Women's
Affairs, confessed and was sentenced to death on August 7. At year's
end, all three remained in custody. They also are charged with the
attempted assassination of the Prime Minister. The trial of the two
former ministers is ongoing.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no
reports that officials practiced them.
Although jail conditions are fairly basic so far as food and
sanitation are concerned, they appear to meet minimum international
standards, and there have been no reports of abuses in prisons. While
there are human rights groups, the question of monitoring prison
conditions by them has not arisen. Prison visits by family members and
church representatives are permitted.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes
these prohibitions. However, villages are governed by customary law,
and the fono may mete out banishment when deemed necessary. Banishment
is one of the harshest forms of punishment in this collective society.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice.
The law provides for the right to a fair public trial, and this is
honored by the official court system. However, many civil and criminal
matters are not handled by courts but by village fono, which vary
considerably both in their decisionmaking style and in the number of
matai involved in the decisions. The 1990 Village Fono Act gives legal
recognition to the decisions of the fono and provides for limited
recourse of appeal to the Lands and Titles Courts and to the Supreme
Court.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law provides substantive and procedural safeguards
from invasion of the home or seizure of property, including a need for
search warrants, which are issued by the judicial branch. However,
there is little or no privacy in a village. While village officials by
law must have permission to enter homes, there can be substantial
social pressure to grant such permission.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice. However, in 1997 the then Prime
Minister banned coverage of the leader of the opposition on state-run
radio and television stations. This ban has not been lifted, but
remarks by the leader of the opposition received limited coverage
during the year. However, in practice the Government's ban remains
largely symbolic, since opposition statements receive prominent
coverage in the private news media.
The Newspapers and Printers Act and the Defamation Act require
journalists to reveal their sources in the event of a defamation suit
against them. There has been no court case requiring that these acts be
invoked.
On February 15, the Supreme Court granted government-owned
Polynesian Airlines an injunction to prevent an independent daily, the
Samoa Observer, from publishing news about the company's expenses for
senior staff. In response to a subsequent editorial published about the
incident, the airline filed a petition asking the court to jail the
newspaper's editors. At year's end, the case was still pending.
Two English-language newspapers and a number of Samoan-language
newspapers are printed regularly. The Government operates a radio
station and the sole television station. There are two private radio
stations, and a satellite-cable system is now available in parts of
Apia. Television from American Samoa is readily available.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, along with freedom of thought and conscience. Nearly 100
percent of the population is Christian. While the Constitution grants
each person the right to change religion or belief and to worship or
teach religion alone or with others, in practice the matai often choose
the religious denomination of the aiga (extended family). There is
strong societal pressure to support church leaders and projects
financially, and such contributions often total more than 30 percent of
family income.
Despite the constitutional protection, village councils sometimes
banish or punish families that do not adhere to the prevailing
religious belief in the village.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
internal movement, but in practice some citizens have been banished
either from village activities or completely from the village. The
Government actively supports emigration as a ``safety valve'' for
pressures of a growing population, especially for potentially
rebellious youths, and because it generates foreign income through
remittances. The Government does not restrict foreign travel
arbitrarily or the right of citizens to return from abroad.
Samoa has not had any refugees or asylum seekers, and it is not a
party to any international agreement concerning them. TheGovernment has
not formulated a policy regarding refugees, asylees, or first asylum.
However, the authorities have indicated that they would conform to
international norms if such cases should arise.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government through direct,
multiparty elections, but women's political rights are restricted by
the fact that few of them are traditional family leaders (matai). While
all citizens above the age of 21 may vote, the right to run for 47 of
the 49 seats in the Legislative Assembly remains the prerogative of the
approximately 25,000 matai, 95 percent of whom are men. The remaining
two seats are reserved for citizens not of Samoan heritage. While all
adult Samoans may vote for the Legislative Assembly, matai continue to
control local government through the village fono, which are open to
them alone.
The political process is more a function of personal leadership
characteristics than of party. The Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP)
has dominated the political process, winning five consecutive elections
since 1982. The 1996 general elections again gave the HRPP a majority,
but in November 1998 ill health forced then-Prime Minister Tofilau Eti
Alesana to resign. The HRPP caucus selected former Deputy Prime
Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi as Acting Prime Minister. Tofilau
died in March, and Tuilaepa became Prime Minister. Although candidates
are free to propose themselves for electoral office, in practice they
require the blessing of the village high chiefs. Those who ran in the
1996 elections in spite of fono objections faced ostracism and even
banishment from their village. Following the 1996 elections, there were
multiple charges of fraud and bribery. Four elections subsequently were
overturned by the Supreme Court, and by-elections were held.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics; however,
they occasionally reach high public office. The 12-member Cabinet has 1
female member, and women hold 3 of the 49 seats in the Legislative
Assembly. The first female Attorney General was appointed in 1997.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operated without government
restriction. Government officials are usually cooperative.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
religion, disability, language, or social status. Society is
homogeneous with no significant ethnic minorities. Politics and culture
are the product of a heritage of chiefly privilege and power, and
members of certain families have some advantages. While there is
discrimination against women and nonmatai, women (and particularly
female matai) play an important role in society and occasionally may
reach high office.
Women.--While the law prohibits the abuse of women, social custom
tolerates their physical abuse within the home. The role and rights of
the village fono and tradition prevent police from interfering in
instances of domestic violence, unless there is a complaint from the
victim--which village custom strongly discourages. While police receive
some complaints from abused women, domestic violence offenders
typically are punished by village councils, but only if the abuse is
considered extreme. (``Extreme abuse'' would be visible signs of
physical abuse.) The village religious leader may also intervene in
domestic disputes.
The State punishes persons responsible for extreme assault cases,
which can result in imprisonment.
Many cases of rape still may go unreported because tradition and
custom discourage such reporting. In spite of this, the authorities
note a greater number of reported cases of rape, as women slowly become
more forthcoming with the police. Rape cases that reach the courts are
treated seriously. Convicted offenders often are given relatively stiff
sentences of several years' imprisonment.
The traditional subordinate role of women is changing, albeit
slowly, especially in the more conservative parts of society. The
Ministry of Women's Affairs oversees and helps ensure the rights of
women.
Children.--The Government has made a strong commitment to the
welfare of children through the implementation of various youth
programs by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health. Law
and tradition prohibit severe abuse of children, but tradition
tolerates corporal punishment. The police noted an increase in reported
cases of child abuse, attributed to citizens becoming more aware of the
need to report physical, emotional, and sexual abuse of children.
People with Disabilities.--The Government has passed no legislation
pertaining to the status of disabled persons or regarding accessibility
for the disabled. Tradition dictates that the family cares for a
disabled person, and this custom is observed widely in practice.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers legally have unrestricted
rights to establish and join organizations of their own choosing. To
date two trade unions have been organized. The Samoa National Union,
organized in 1994, is a six-member association, which includes workers
from the three major banks. A second union represents members at the
sole factory in the country. Both unions are independent of the
Government and political parties. There are no laws specific to union
activity. The Commissioner of Labor would adjudicate any cases of
retribution against strikers or union leaders on a case-by-case basis.
The Public Service Association, representing government workers, an
increasingly important sector of the work force, also functions as a
union. The Supreme Court has upheld the right of government workers to
strike, subject to certain restrictions imposed principally for reasons
of public safety. Workers in the private sector have the right to
strike, but there were no strikes during the year. The Public Service
Association freely maintains relations with international bodies and
participates in bilateral exchanges.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While workers
have the legal right to engage in collective bargaining, they have
seldom practiced it, due to the newness of union activity and the
inexperience of union leaders. However, the Public Service Association
engages in collective bargaining on behalf of government workers,
including bargaining on wages. An advisory commission to the Minister
of Labor sets minimum wages. Wages in the private sector are determined
by competitive demand for the required skills. Any antiunion
discrimination case would be reported to and adjudicated by the
Commissioner of Labor. Arbitration and mediation procedures are in
place to resolve labor disputes, although these rarely arise.
Labor law and practice in the one export processing zone are the
same as in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--While the Government
does not demand compulsory labor and it is prohibited by law, in this
collective society persons, including minors, frequently are called
upon to work for their villages. Most people do so willingly, but if
not, the matai can compel them to do so.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Under the 1972 Labor and Employment Act (LEA) as amended,
it is illegal to employ children under 15 years of age except in ``safe
and light work.'' The Commissioner of Labor refers complaints about
illegal child labor to the Attorney General for enforcement. Children
frequently are seen hawking goods and food on Apia street corners.
Although a violation of the LEA, local officials mostly tolerate and
overlook the child vendors. There are no reports of bonded labor by
children, but the LEA does not apply to service rendered to the matai,
some of whom require children to work for the village, primarily on
village farms (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The LEA established for the
private sector a 40-hour workweek and an hourly minimum wage of $0.47
(WS$ 1.40). This minimum wage suffices for a basic standard of living
when supplemented by the subsistence farming and fishing in which most
families engage.
The act provides that no worker should be required to work for more
than 40 hours in any week.
The act also establishes certain rudimentary safety and health
standards, which the Attorney General is responsible for enforcing.
However, independent observers report that the safety laws are not
enforced strictly except when accidents highlight noncompliance. Many
agricultural workers, among others, are inadequately protected from
pesticides and other dangers to health. Government education programs
are addressing these concerns. The act does not apply to service
rendered to the matai. While the act does not specifically address the
right of workers to remove themselves from a dangerous work situation,
a report of such a case to the Commissioner of Labor would prompt an
investigation, without jeopardy to continued employment. Government
employees are covered under different and more stringent regulations,
which are enforced adequately by the Public Service Commission.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to,
or from the country.
______
SINGAPORE
Singapore is a parliamentary republic in which politics is
dominated overwhelmingly by the People's Action Party (PAP), which has
held power uninterruptedly since Singapore gained autonomy from the
United Kingdom in 1959. Opposition parties exist and regularly contest
elections; however, the PAP holds 80 of 83 elected parliamentary seats
(1 is vacant) and all the ministerial positions. Elections take place
at regular, constitutionally mandated intervals. The judiciary is
efficient and constitutionally independent; however, there has been a
perception that it reflects the views of the executive in politically
sensitive cases as government leaders historically have utilized court
proceedings, in particular defamation suits, against political
opponents and critics.
The police are responsible for routine security within the country
and for the protection of the borders, including action against illegal
immigrants and patrolling the island's territorial waters. The military
forces are responsible for external defense. The Internal Security
Department (ISD) in the Ministry of Home Affairs operates under the
Internal Security Act (ISA) to counter such perceived threats to the
nation's security as espionage, international terrorism, threats to
racial and religious harmony, and subversion. The civilian Government
maintains tight control over all security activities. The Government's
use of the ISA to control what it considers serious security threats
has decreased, although the Government continues to rely on the ISA and
related security laws to deal with espionage, organized crime, and
narcotics. There were reports that members of the security forces
occasionally committed human rights abuses.
Singapore has an open free market economic system. The financial
services industries and manufacturing of computer-related components
are key sectors of the economy. During the year, the economy began to
recover from a substantial slowdown. Gross domestic product (GDP) rose
approximately 5.6 percent during the year, compared with 0.3 percent in
1998. The annual per capita GDP was approximately $26,000 in 1998.
Wealth is distributed relatively equally in an economy that, despite
the economic crisis, maintained a low rate of unemployment.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were significant problems in some areas. The
Government has wide powers to limit citizens' rights and to handicap
political opposition. There were occasional instances of police abuse;
however, the Government investigates and punishes those found guilty
and the media fully cover allegations of mistreatment. Caning, in
addition to imprisonment, is a routine punishment for numerous
offenses. The authorities sometimes infringe on citizens' privacy
rights. Government intimidation and pressure to conform result in the
practice of self-censorship among journalists. Government leaders
historically have utilized court proceedings, in particular defamation
suits, against political opponents and critics. However, while it
initiated no new defamation suits against its political opponents or
critics during the year, this practice, plus the consistency of
judgments in favor of government plaintiffs, has had a chilling effect
on political speech and action and highlighted concerns about the
ruling party's use of the judicial system for political purposes.
During the year, a prominent opposition figure was convicted for
speaking in public without a permit. Despite a continuing discussion of
the possibility of an expansion of free speech rights and the
Government's role regarding these rights, the Government still did not
take significant concrete steps to change the wide array of laws and
government practices, or the informal levers of government influence,
that lie behind the limitations on civil and political rights. The
Government significantly restricts freedom of assembly and association.
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Unification Church are banned; however,
freedom of religion otherwise generally is respected. There is some
legal discrimination against women, which affects benefits for children
and husbands in limited cases. The Government has moved actively to
counter societal discrimination against women and minorities, but some
discrimination persists. Foreign workers are vulnerable to mistreatment
and abuse. Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution is a
limited problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture; however, there have been
occasional instances of police mistreatment of detainees, and there
were a few reports of police abuse during the year. For example, a
Malaysian youth claimed that Central Narcotics Bureau officers punched
him when he was picked up for a random drug test on December 7. The
media report fully on, and the Government takes action against,
allegations of police abuse of those arrested. The press reported that
approximately 10 law enforcement officers were jailed for using brute
force on prisoners and suspects in the 1995-99 period. During the year,
three prison guards were sentenced to between 6 and 10 years in prison
and caned for attacking and killing a prisoner in 1995. In February a
police officer was sentenced to 8 months in prison for throwing a
prisoner against a wall in 1997.
The Government has been known to investigate and punish instances
of such practices as sleep deprivation or interrogation of detainees in
very cold rooms where the prisoners may be stripped of their clothes
and doused with water. In 1993, the last year for which statistics are
available, of the 94 complaints of police abuse investigated, 14 were
substantiated.
The Penal Code mandates caning, in addition to imprisonment, as
punishment for some 30 offenses involving the use of violence or threat
of violence against a person, such as rape and robbery, and also for
such nonviolent offenses as vandalism, drug trafficking, and violation
of immigration laws. Caning is discretionary for convictions on other
charges involving the use of criminal force, such as kidnaping, or
voluntarily causing grievous hurt. Women, men over age 50 or under age
16, and those determined unfit by a medical officer are exempted from
caning. Although current statistics were not available, caning is a
commonly administered punishment within the stipulations of the law. In
1993, the last year for which statistics are available, the courts
included a caning sentence in 3,244 cases. Prison conditions generally
are good and meet minimum international standards.
The Government does not allow human rights monitors to visit
prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides that,
in most instances, arrests are to be carried out following the issuance
of an authorized warrant; however, some laws provide for arrests
without warrants. Those arrested must be charged before a magistrate
within 48 hours. The great majority of those arrested are charged
expeditiously and brought to trial. Those who face criminal charges are
allowed counsel, and the Law Society of Singapore administers a
criminal legal aid scheme for those who cannot afford to hire an
attorney. A functioning system of bail exists for persons who are
charged. In death penalty cases, defendants who cannot afford their own
counsel have two attorneys appointed by the Supreme Court on their
behalf.
Some laws--the Internal Security Act (ISA), the Criminal Law
(Temporary Provisions) Act (CLA), the Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA), and
the Undesirable Publications Act (UPA)--have provisions for arrest
without warrant. The ISA historically has been employed primarily
against suspected Communist-related security threats. The CLA
historically has been employed primarily against suspected organized
crime (i.e., mainly secret society activities), and drug trafficking;
however, it also has been used against suspected espionage activities.
Opposition politicians have called for the abolition of the ISA, but
the Government has rejected these calls, claiming that citizens accept
the act as an element of the nation's security.
The ISA and the CLA permit preventive detention without trial for
the protection of public security or safety or the maintenance of
public order. The ISA gives broad discretion to the Minister for Home
Affairs to order detention without charges at the direction of the
President, if the latter determines that a person poses a threat to
national security. The initial detention may be for up to 2 years and
may be renewed without limitation for additional periods up to 2 years
at a time. Detainees have a right to be informed of the grounds for
their detention and are entitled to counsel. However, they have noright
to challenge the substantive basis for their detention through the
courts. The ISA specifically excludes recourse to the normal judicial
system for review of a detention order made under its authority.
Instead detainees may make representations to an advisory board, headed
by a Supreme Court Justice, which reviews each detainee's case
periodically and must make a recommendation to the President within 3
months of the initial detention. The President may concur with the
advisory board's recommendation that a detainee be released prior to
the expiration of the detention order but is not obligated to do so. No
one was detained under the ISA from 1989 through 1996. Two persons were
detained in 1997, and four in 1998, all for alleged espionage. Of these
six, two remained in detention at the end of 1998. There were no
reports of any new detentions under the ISA during the year.
The CLA, which comes up for review every 5 years, was strengthened
and extended for another 5 years in April. Under the terms of the CLA,
the Minister for Home Affairs can order preventive detention, with the
concurrence of the Public Prosecutor, for an initial period of 1 year,
and the President can extend detention for additional periods up to 1
year at a time. The Minister must provide a written statement of the
grounds for detention to the Criminal Law Advisory Committee (CLAC)
within 28 days of making the order. The CLAC then reviews the case at a
private hearing. CLAC rules require detainees to be notified of the
grounds of their detention at least 10 days prior to the hearing. The
detainee may represent himself or be represented by a lawyer. After the
hearing, the Committee makes a written recommendation to the President,
who may cancel, confirm, or amend the detention order. However, persons
detained under the CLA may have recourse to the courts via an
application of a writ of habeas corpus. Persons detained without trial
under the CA are entitled to counsel but only may challenge the
substantive basis for their detention to the CLAC. The CLA is used
almost exclusively in cases involving narcotics and secret criminal
societies and has not been used for political purposes. At the end of
1998, the last year for which statistics are available, 450 persons
were detained under the CLA.
Persons alleging mistreatment under detention may bring criminal
charges against government officials who are alleged to have committed
such acts; there were no reports during the year that persons were
discouraged from making such accusations by fear of official
retaliation (see Section 1.e.).
Both the ISA and the CLA contain provisions that allow for such
modified forms of detention as curfews, residence limitations,
requirements to report regularly to the authorities, limitations on
travel, or, in the case of the ISA, restrictions on political
activities and association.
The MDA permits detention without trial. Under the MDA, the
director of the CNB also may commit--without trial--suspected drug
users to a drug rehabilitation center for up to 6 months, with
subsequent extensions in cases of positive urinalysis tests.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government respects the
prohibition in practice.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respects this
provision; however, control over the assignment of judges and laws that
limit judicial review allow for some restrictions in practice. Many
judicial officials, especially Supreme Court judges, have close ties to
the ruling party and its leaders. The President appoints judges to the
Supreme Court on the recommendation of the Prime Minister in
consultation with the Chief Justice. The President also appoints
subordinate court judges on the recommendation of the Chief Justice.
The term of appointment is determined by the Legal Service Commission,
of which the Chief Justice is the chairman. The 1989 constitutional
amendments that eliminated judicial review of the objective grounds for
detention under the ISA and subversion laws allow the Government to
restrict, or even eliminate, judicial review in such cases and thereby
restrict, on vaguely defined national security grounds, the scope of
certain fundamental liberties provided for in the Constitution. Under
the ISA and the CLA, the President and the Minister of Home Affairs
have substantial de facto judicial power, which explicitly (in the case
of the ISA) or implicitly (in the case of the CLA) excludes normal
judicial review.
Government leaders historically have used court proceedings, in
particular defamation suits, against political opponents andcritics.
Both this practice and consistent awards in favor of government
plaintiffs have raised questions about the relationship between the
Government and the judiciary and led to a perception that the judiciary
reflects the views of the executive in politically sensitive cases. A
series of decisions in favor of political leader plaintiffs was taken
as an indication of a compliant judiciary in these particular cases.
The two most recent cases--defamation actions against Workers' Party
(WP) politicians Tang Liang Hong and J.B. Jeyaretnam for statements
they made during the 1996-97 election campaign (see Sections 2.a. and
3)--perpetuated the perception of undue judicial sympathy to government
plaintiffs. During the February trial and May appeal of Chee Soon Juan
on charges of speaking in public without a permit (see Sections 2.a.
and 3), the appeal judge did not specifically address a key defense
challenge to the constitutionality of the law under which Chee was
convicted.
The judicial system has two levels of courts: The Supreme Court,
which includes the High Court and the Court of Appeal; and the
subordinate courts. Subordinate court judges and magistrates, as well
as public prosecutors, are civil servants whose specific assignments
are determined by the Legal Service Commission, which can decide on job
transfers to any of several legal service departments. If they wish,
Supreme Court Justices may remain in office until the mandatory
retirement age of 65, after which they may continue to serve at the
Government's discretion for brief, renewable terms at full salary. The
Constitution has a provision for the Prime Minister or the Chief
Justice to convene a tribunal in order to remove a justice ``on the
ground of misbehavior or inability . . . to properly discharge the
functions'' of office, but it has never been used.
The subordinate courts handle the great majority of civil and
criminal cases in the first instance. The High Court may hear any civil
or criminal case, although it generally limits itself to civil matters
involving substantial claims and criminal matters carrying the death
penalty or imprisonment of more than 10 years. The Court of Appeal is
the highest and final court of review for matters decided in the
subordinate courts or the High Court.
In addition the law provides for Islamic courts whose authority is
limited to Islamic family law.
The judicial system provides citizens with an efficient judicial
process. In normal cases, the Criminal Procedures Code provides that a
charge against a defendant must be read and explained to him as soon as
it is framed by the prosecution or the magistrate. Defendants enjoy a
presumption of innocence and the right of appeal, in most cases. They
have the right to be present at their trials, to be represented by an
attorney, to confront witnesses against them, to provide witnesses and
evidence on their own behalf, and to review government-held evidence
relevant to their cases. Trials are public and by judge. There are no
jury trials.
The Constitution extends these rights to all citizens. However,
persons detained under the ISA or CLA are not entitled to a public
trial. In addition proceedings of the advisory board under the ISA and
CLA are not public (see Section 1.d.).
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Although the Government generally respects the privacy
of homes and families, it has a pervasive influence over civic and
economic life and sometimes uses its wide discretionary powers to
infringe on these rights. Normally, the police must have a warrant
issued by a magistrate's court to conduct a search. However, they may
search a person, home, or property without a warrant if they decide
that such a search is necessary to preserve evidence. The Government
has wide discretionary powers under the ISA, CLA, MDA, and UPA to
conduct searches without a warrant if it determines that national
security, public safety or order, or the public interest are at issue.
Defendants may request judicial review of such searches.
Divisions of the Government's law enforcement agencies, including
the Internal Security Department and the Corrupt Practices
Investigation Board, have wide networks for gathering information and
highly sophisticated capabilities to monitor telephone and other
private conversations and conduct surveillance. It is believed that the
authorities routinely monitor telephone conversations and use of the
Internet, and there were credible reports of such practices during the
year. Government monitoring of Internet use first became widely known
7in 1996 when authorities aided Interpol in a case that led to the
arrest and conviction of a citizen for downloading child pornography.
This incident made all citizens keenly aware that, even if the
Government does not regularly monitor their use of the Internet, it has
the ability to do so. In April at the request of Singnet (a proxy
server), the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) probed the computers of
200,000 Singnet customers to determine whether they had been infected
with a computer virus. Although Singnet explained that it asked for the
probe after several of its customers' computers had been interfered
with in March, the probe caused popular anger over a perceived
violation of privacy rights. Subsequently, the MHA stated that it would
reject future requests to conduct such scans (see Section 2.a.).
The Misuse of Computers Act and 1998 amendments to it stipulate
that unauthorized access to computers, interference with another
person's use of a computer, or disclosure of another person's password
are crimes. However, it is widely believed that the authorities
routinely conduct surveillance on some opposition politicians and other
government critics, although there were no specific allegations that
they did so during the year.
The Government is active in some areas normally considered private,
in pursuit of what it considers the public interest. For example, in
publicly subsidized housing, where the majority of citizens live and
own their own units, the Government continues to enforce ethnic ratios
designed to achieve an ethnic mix more or less in proportion to that in
the society at large.
The Government does not permit the import of newspapers from
Malaysia and bans the import of other publications (see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and expression but permits official restrictions on
these rights, and in practice, the Government significantly restricts
freedom of speech and of the press. Government intimidation and
pressure to conform result in the practice of self-censorship among
journalists. The Government's authoritarian style has fostered an
atmosphere inimical to fully free speech and the press. However, there
was some limited progress towards greater openness during the year.
The Government has defined certain topics as out of bounds. The ISA
permits the Government to prohibit or to place conditions on
publications that incite violence, that counsel disobedience to the
law, that might arouse tensions among the various segments of the
population (races, religions, and language groups), or that might
threaten national interests, national security, or public order. The
Government uses a broad definition of these laws to restrict political
opposition and criticism. Strict defamation and press laws, and the
Government's demonstrated willingness to defend vigorously against what
it considers personal attacks on officials have led journalists to be
cautious about publishing items about such issues as alleged government
corruption, nepotism, or a compliant judiciary. Furthermore, political
leaders have challenged publicly the legitimacy of political speech
articulated outside the boundaries of the formal political system. In a
case that continues to have an impact, the Prime Minister in 1994
publicly castigated the writer Catherine Lim for two opinion pieces
published in the local press that were mildly critical of the ruling
party's authoritarian style. The Prime Minister suggested that such
comments would be legitimate only if uttered in a formal political
context.
The Government strongly influences both the print and the
electronic media. Singapore Press Holdings Ltd. (SPH), a private
holding company with close ties to the Government, owns all general
circulation newspapers in the four official languages--English,
Chinese, Malay, and Tamil. The Government must approve, and can remove,
the holders of SPH management shares, who have the power to appoint or
dismiss all directors or staff. Hence, while newspapers print a large
and diverse selection of articles from domestic and foreign sources,
their editorials, coverage of domestic events, and coverage of
sensitive foreign relations issues closely reflect government policies
and the opinions of government leaders. Government leaders often
criticize what they call the ``Western model'' of journalism, in which
the media are free to report the news as they see it. Government
officials argue that the role of the domestic media is to act
responsibly, which generally isunderstood to mean support for the goals
of the elected leadership and preservation of social and religious
harmony.
A wide range of international magazines and newspapers may be
purchased uncensored, although newspapers printed in Malaysia may not
be imported. A 1990 law requires foreign publications that report on
politics and current events in Southeast Asia to register and post a
$141,000 (S$234,000) bond, and name a person in the country to accept
legal service. These requirements strengthen government control over
foreign media. The Government may ban the circulation of domestic and
foreign publications under provisions of the ISA and the UPA.
Under amendments to the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act, the
Government may limit the circulation of foreign publications that it
determines interfere in domestic politics. The weekly circulation of
the Asian Wall Street Journal (AWSJ), Asiaweek, and the Far Eastern
Economic Review (FEER) is limited (or ``gazetted''). The fact that the
Government gradually has raised the weekly circulation of the FEER and
Asiaweek more or less commensurate with actual demand allows the
Government to maintain this aspect of control over the press while
still giving the appearance of flexibility.
The Government has become more receptive to the presence of foreign
correspondents and to the establishment of regional headquarters by
foreign or international media, whose numbers have increased in recent
years. According to the Foreign Correspondents Association, journalists
were expected to stay in the country for 3 years, and then depart.
However, there are a number of journalists who have been in the country
for many years, and some report that they feel increasingly welcome.
In March the Government announced that foreign electronic media
would have to meet the same reporting standards as foreign print media.
Although this was interpreted as signaling a higher level of
censorship, specific guidelines were not provided and it was unclear
how the policy would be enforced.
Import of some publications is barred, and the authorities censor
movies, television programs, video materials, computer games, and
music. The ISA, the UPA, and the Films Act allow banning, seizing,
censoring, or restricting written, visual, or musical materials if it
is determined that they threaten the stability of the State, are pro-
Communist, contravene moral norms, are pornographic, show excessive or
gratuitous sex and violence, glamorize or promote drug use, or incite
racial, religious, or linguistic animosities. Polls indicate that there
is strong public support for continued censorship of sex and violence
in films. There is a list of banned films, which is not made public.
Certain films that might be barred from general release may be allowed
limited showings, either censored or uncensored, with a special rating.
The UPA was amended in 1998 to include compact discs, sound
recordings, pictures, and computer-generated drawings, and to raise the
fine for distribution or possession of banned publications. The list of
banned English-language publications consists primarily of sexually
oriented materials, but also includes some religious and political
publications. The Films Act was amended in 1998 to ban political
advertising using films or videos. The Government justified the ban as
protecting politics from sensationalism, innuendo, and inaccuracy, but
one effect was to further restrict an already limited range of what was
deemed acceptable political discourse (see Section 3). Opposition
politician Chee Soon Juan alleged that prominent bookstores, influenced
by the Government, refused to carry copies of a book he authored. He
also alleged that, after his book was printed in Malaysia, the
Government would not allow its import. The government-linked holding
company, Singapore International Media Pte Ltd., has a near monopoly on
broadcasting. Subsidiaries operate all 4 broadcast television channels
and 10 of the 15 domestic radio stations. Of the five remaining radio
stations, four are owned by organizations with close government
affiliation--two by the Singapore Armed Forces Reservists' Association
(SAFRA) and two by the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC). Only one,
the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World Service, is completely
independent of the Government. Some Malaysian and Indonesian television
and radio programming can be received, but satellite dishes are banned,
with few exceptions.
The Singapore Broadcasting Authority (SBA), established in 1994 to
regulate and promote the broadcasting industry, develops censorship
standards with the help of a citizen advisory panel. Since 1996 the SBA
has regulated access to material on the Internet, using a framework of
web site licenses to encourage accountability and responsible use of
the Internet. It alsoregulates Internet material by licensing Internet
service providers who install ``proxy servers'' through which local
users must route their Internet connections. These act as a filter for
objectionable content and can block access to certain sites. While the
Government does not classify regulation of the Internet as censorship,
the SBA directs service providers to block access to web pages that, in
the Government's view, undermine public security, national defense,
racial and religious harmony, and public morals. In September 1996, the
SBA ordered Internet service providers to block access to about a dozen
sites deemed to violate these rules. A number of prohibited sites are
blocked. Most of these sites are believed to be pornographic in nature;
however, it is difficult to verify this because the list of sites is
not a matter of public record.
In 1997 the SBA announced a new Internet Code of Practice to
further clarify what types of material were forbidden and specify the
responsibilities of Internet providers. The SBA has stated that it has
no intention of monitoring Internet or e-mail use but intended to block
access to material that contained pornography or excessive violence or
that incites racial or religious hatred. However, several recent
incidents demonstrate how closely the Government can monitor Internet
use (see Section 1.f.).
Under the Public Entertainment Act (PEA), a permit is required for
any form of public speech or entertainment. Two cases in late 1998 and
early 1999 sparked discussion on whether laws that regulate freedom of
speech should be changed. Chee Soon Juan, secretary-general of the
opposition Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) gave two public speeches to
crowds of approximately 200 persons without first obtaining a permit;
one on December 29, 1998, and the other on January 5. In his speeches,
Chee attacked the Government for lack of accountability in its
stewardship of public funds, and called for greater freedom of speech.
He was tried and convicted in both cases for violating the PEA. In the
first case Chee served 7 days in prison after refusing to pay an $840
(S$1,400) fine, and in the second case he served an additional 12 days
in prison after refusing to pay a $1,140 (S$1,900) fine. Chee claimed
that on several previous occasions, his party applied for public
speaking permits under the PEA that were denied or approved so late
that the event had to be canceled. As a consequence, he said, he
believed that he had no alternative but to speak without a permit. In
the second instance, Chee appealed the fine, whose level would have, by
law, made him ineligible to stand for election for 5 years. The Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal but nonetheless
lowered the fine below the election-barring limit. In February after
Chee's second conviction, the SDP released a statement on his behalf
that argued that Chee's right to free speech provided for in the
Constitution had been violated by an unconstitutional and undemocratic
law implemented by the ruling regime to deny the opposition from the
opportunity to reach out effectively to the citizenry (see Section 3).
In the second trial, Chee was tried with Wong Hong Toy, another SDP
member; Wong was convicted of abetting Chee by carrying a speaker,
adjusting the volume of the speaker during the speech, and adjusting a
microphone.
Government leaders from time to time have used defamation suits or
the threat of such actions to discourage public criticism and
intimidate opposition politicians and the press. The unbroken success
of government leaders' suits has fostered caution about political
speech among the public and a culture of self-censorship within the
news media, and has demonstrated vividly the perils of engaging in
opposition politics.
In November 1998, a group of 10 plaintiffs, including a PAP M.P.,
won a defamation suit against the WP, based on an editorial in the
party newspaper that accused organizers of a Tamil language promotion
of ``prostituting'' themselves for political gain. The defendants, who
included party secretary general J.B. Jeyaretnam and the writer of the
editorial, as well as the party itself, lost their May appeal. When the
defendants did not pay, the plaintiffs threatened to dissolve the WP on
grounds of insolvency, and threatened bankruptcy proceedings against
the other two defendants, which also would have deprived Jeyaretnam of
his parliamentary seat. These bankruptcy proceedings later were
suspended (see Section 3).
There were no new defamation cases filed directly by government
figures during the year. However, four cases decided since 1995
continued to have a strong influence on public perceptions of how
freely citizens could speak and publish, particularly on political
matters. These included a record 1995 defamation judgment of $678,000
(S$950,000) against the International Herald Tribune (IHT) in a case
brought by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong,
and Lee's son, DeputyPrime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, for a 1994 article
that allegedly suggested that the younger Lee was appointed to his post
on account of his father. Also in 1995, a then-visiting academic, Dr.
Christopher Lingle, the IHT, and the IHT's Singapore printer were fined
for contempt of court and, in a related civil libel suit, agreed to pay
damages for an IHT article that was interpreted as critical of the
country's judiciary. More recently, two defamation suits instituted by
the Prime Minister and other political leaders in 1997 against two
Workers' Party members--Tang Liang Hong and J.B. Jeyaretnam--led to the
award of substantial damages to the plaintiffs for statements made by
the defendants during the 1997 election campaign (see Section 3). The
Prime Minister began, but later suspended, bankruptcy proceedings
against Jeyaretnam during the year.
Following the two convictions of Chee Soon Juan, members of an
independent political discussion group proposed, in a newspaper opinion
piece, the creation of ``Hyde Park-like'' free speech areas in the
country. Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew indicated in an interview that
such free speech areas might be possible, but the Prime Minister later
explicitly ruled them out for the time being. He contended that, given
regional and internal ethnic and religious sensitivities, the country
was not ready for such a development.
During the year, the print media included an extensive and more
open discussion of the issue of free speech and of a free press. This
included reporting of public figures' comments on the subject, press
opinion pieces, and letters to the editor, which included the Prime
Minister's response to opinion pieces that contained criticism of the
Government. This discussion was prompted partly by the arrests of Chee
Soon Juan for speaking without a permit. However, while the media gave
Chee's two speeches fairly prominent coverage, local media reported the
events more or less factually, emphasizing Chee's challenge of the law
but giving the substance of his speech or his replies to government
attacks on the right to free speech only passing mention. None of the
local press made any specific editorial comment. The Government also
solicited the views of citizens on free speech issues through a set of
committees established to explore policy alternatives; however, the
Government controlled the committees' agendas and membership.
All public institutions of higher education and think tanks are
linked closely to the Government. Although faculty members technically
are not government employees, in practice, they are subject to
potential government influence. Academics speak and publish widely, and
engage in debate on social and political issues. However, they are
aware that public comments outside the classroom or academic
publications that venture into the ``out of bounds'' areas--criticism
of political leaders or sensitive social and economic policies, or
comments that might disturb ethnic or religious harmony or that appear
to advocate partisan political views--could subject them to sanctions.
Publications by local academics and members of think tanks rarely
deviate substantially from government views.
During the year, the Prime Minister appeared to encourage greater
political involvement among university students by urging them to
establish political ``associations''; however, such associations are to
be formed only with the understanding that they can not become
alternative parties.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
grants citizens the right of peaceful assembly but permits Parliament
to impose restrictions ``as it considers necessary or expedient'' in
the interest of security, and the Government restricts this right in
practice. Assemblies of more than five persons in public, including
political meetings and rallies, must have police permission.
Spontaneous public gatherings or demonstrations virtually are unknown.
The Government closely monitors political gatherings regardless of the
number of persons present. Persons who wish to speak at a public
function, excluding functions provided by or under the auspices of the
Government, must obtain a public entertainment license from the police.
Opposition politicians routinely experienced delays before being
notified of the decision on their applications, although the Government
claims that the delays come only because the applications were
submitted late (see Section 3). In one trial during the year, the
police officer charged with approving applications admitted that he
routinely sent all opposition speech permit applications to the
Ministry for Home Affairs. Following his convictions for speaking in
public without a permit, opposition politician Chee Soon Juan applied
for a permit but was refused (see Sections 2.a. and 3).
In May there were two small, peaceful demonstrations by Chinese
students in front of a foreign embassy. The police, who arrived
promptly on the scene for both demonstrations, allowed the
demonstrators to remain despite the fact that the demonstrations
violated the law. Such noninterference in an unlawful demonstration
virtually was unprecedented.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association but permits
Parliament to impose restrictions that ``it considers necessary or
expedient'' in the interest of security, and the Government restricts
this right in practice. Most associations, societies, clubs, religious
groups, and other organizations with more than 10 members must be
registered with the Government under the Societies Act. The Government
denies registration to groups it believes likely to be used for
unlawful purposes or for purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare,
or public order (see Section 2.c.). The Government has absolute
discretion in applying this broad and vague language to register or
dissolve societies. It prohibits organized political activities, except
by organizations registered as political parties. This prohibition
limits opposition activities, and, along with other factors, restricts
the scope of unofficial political expression and action (see Section
3). The prohibition has less of an effect on the PAP, which, because of
its long domination of the Government and its overwhelming
parliamentary majority, can ostensibly use nonpolitical organizations
such as residential committees and neighborhood groups for political
purposes far more extensively than can opposition political parties.
Furthermore, the recent development of government-organized and
predominantly government-funded community development councils (CDC's)
to promote community development and cohesion, and to provide welfare
and other assistance services, strengthens the PAP, which monopolizes
these CDC's even in opposition-held constituencies.
There are relatively few nongovernmental organizations (NGO's),
apart from ostensibly nonpolitical organizations such as religious
groups, ethnic-affiliated organizations, and providers of welfare
services. The dominant role of the Government in almost every facet of
life and the limiting effect of the law on the formation of publicly
active organizations are, in large part, responsible for this
situation. However, during the year, a group of NGO's formed what they
called ``the Working Committee'' as an umbrella group through which
various NGO's can share information and cooperate to promote the
development of civil society.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
however, the Government bans some religious groups.
There is no state religion. However, all religious groups are
subject to government scrutiny and must be registered legally under the
Societies Act. The 1990 Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA)
made illegal what the Government deems to be the inappropriate
involvement of religious groups and officials in political affairs. The
act also prohibits judicial review of its enforcement or of any
possible denial of rights arising from it. According to the Government,
all citizens are free to practice their religion as long as the manner
of carrying out religious activities does not breach laws relating to
public order, public health, or morality.
The Government plays an active, but limited, role in religious
affairs. It does not tolerate speech or actions, including ostensibly
religious speech or actions, that affect racial and religious harmony,
and sometimes issues restraining orders barring persons from taking
part in such activities. The Presidential Council for Religious Harmony
must review such orders, and make recommendations to the President on
whether to confirm, cancel, or alter a restraining order. The
Government also seeks to assure that citizens, the great majority of
whom live in publicly subsidized housing, have ready access to
religious organizations traditionally associated with their ethnic
groups by assisting religious institutions to find space in these
public complexes. The Government maintains a semiofficial relationship
with the Muslim community through the Islamic Religious Council (MUIS)
established under the Administration of Muslim Law Act. The MUIS
advises the Government on the Muslim community's concerns and has some
regulatory functions over Muslim religious matters. The Government
facilitates financial assistance to build and maintain mosques.
Under the Societies Act, the Government has barred meetings of
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Unification Church. The Government
deregistered and banned Jehovah's Witnesses in 1972 on the grounds that
its roughly 2,000 members refuse to perform military service (which is
obligatory for all male citizens), salute the flag, or swear oaths of
allegiance to the State. The Government regards such refusal as
prejudicial to public welfare and order. While the Government has not
outlawed the profession or propagation of the beliefs of Jehovah's
Witnesses, and does not arrest members merely for being believers, the
result of deregistration has been to make meetings of Jehovah's
Witnesses illegal. The Government also has banned all written materials
published by the International Bible Students Association and the Watch
Tower Bible and Tract Society, both publishing arms of Jehovah's
Witnesses. In practice this has led to confiscation of Bibles published
by the group, even though the Bible itself has not been outlawed.
In 1998 two members of Jehovah's Witnesses were convicted of
possession of unlawful written materials. One of the two, who had a
similar conviction in the past, was jailed for 1 week. The second
person was fined $1,320 (S$2,190). Also in 1998, a member of Jehovah's
Witnesses lost his lawsuit against a government school for wrongful
dismissal in 1994, allegedly because he refused to sing the national
anthem or salute the flag. In March the chief justice dismissed his
appeal, stating that the application was frivolous and groundless. In
1996 a number of members of Jehovah's Witnesses were found guilty of
holding a meeting of a ``banned society'' and publications in their
possession were confiscated.
The Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World
Christianity, also known as the Unification Church, was dissolved in
1982 by the Minister for Home Affairs. Missionaries, with the exception
of members of Jehovah's Witnesses and representatives of the
Unification Church, are permitted to work and to publish and distribute
religious texts. However, while the Government does not prohibit
evangelical activities in practice, it discourages activities that
might upset the balance of intercommunal relations.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution grants citizens the
right to move freely throughout the country; however, while the
Government generally respects this right in practice, it limits it in a
few respects. For example, citizens' choice of where to live may be
limited by the Government's policy of assuring ethnic balance in
publicly subsidized housing, in which the great majority of citizens
live (see Section 1.f.). The Government requires all citizens and
permanent residents over the age of 12 to register and to carry
identification cards. The Government may refuse to issue a passport and
has done so in the case of former ISA detainees. Under the ISA, a
detainee's movement may be restricted, although this provision normally
is a part of the process of relaxing the conditions of detention and
has been used very seldom in recent years.
The right of voluntary repatriation is extended to holders of
national passports. The Government actively encourages citizens living
overseas to return home or, at least, to maintain active ties with the
country. A provision of law for the possible loss of citizenship by
Singaporeans who reside outside the country for more than 10 years
consecutively seldom is used.
Male citizens who still have national service reserve obligations
(normally until age 40 for enlisted men, and age 50 for officers) must
advise the Ministry of Defense if they plan to travel overseas for less
than 6 months, and must receive an exit permit for trips over 6 months.
Beginning at age 11, boys' passports are restricted to 6 months. Males
who are eligible for national service must obtain an exit permit for
travel abroad of more than 6 months, with the exception of travel to
peninsular Malaysia on a restricted passport.
The law stipulates that former members of the Communist Party of
Malaya (CPM) residing outside the country must apply to the Government
to be allowed to return. They must renounce communism, sever all
organizational ties with the CPM, and pledge not to engage in
activities prejudicial to the State's internal security. In addition
the law requires them to submit to interview by the Internal Security
Department and to any restrictive conditions imposed on them.
Faced with the potential for significantly increased numbers of
migrants seeking to enter the country illegally from countries affected
by the regional economic crisis, the Government in 1998 announced that
none of these migrants would be regarded as refugees and that all would
be prosecuted under the law, and, if found guilty, would be punished
and repatriated. The Government took active steps to intercept those
seeking to enter the country illegally by boat or across the two
causeways linking the country with Malaysia. Approximately 65,000
illegal immigrants were arrested in 1998, a 23 percent rise over 1997.
The law does not include provision for granting refugee/asylee status
in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention relating to the status of
refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government does not offer first
asylum. There were no reports that persons were returned forcibly to a
country where they feared persecution. The Government neither accepted
the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese seeking refugee status
nor offered first asylum to refugees. Prior to 1991, the Government
permitted Indochinese asylum seekers to disembark if a resettlement
country promised to remove them within 90 days and if the rescuing
vessel was in Singapore on a scheduled port of call. In 1991 the
Government halted disembarkation on the grounds that resettlement
countries had not honored their commitment for removal. Five Vietnamese
asylum seekers have been allowed to remain in the country. The
authorities permit persons of other nationalities who make claims for
asylum to have their status determined by the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) for possible resettlement elsewhere.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully through democratic means, opposition parties are
free to contest elections, and the voting and vote-counting systems are
fair, accurate, and free from tampering. However, the PAP, which has
held power continuously and overwhelmingly for over 3 decades, uses the
Government's extensive powers to place formidable obstacles in the path
of political opponents. The PAP has maintained its political dominance
in part by developing genuine voter support through honest, effective
administration and its strong record in bringing economic prosperity to
the country, and, in part, by manipulating the electoral framework,
intimidating organized political opposition, and circumscribing the
bounds of legitimate political discourse and action. It attempts to
intimidate the members of the opposition through the threat of libel
suits and the subsequent loss of their political future, since large
judgments in libel suits can lead to bankruptcy, and under the law
bankrupt persons are ineligible to sit in Parliament. The Government
also intimidates the opposition through the threat of potential loss of
employment or professional licenses. Opposition politicians report that
potential employers are reluctant to hire them or their supporters. As
a result of these and other factors, opposition parties have been
unable to challenge seriously the PAP's domination of the political
system since the late 1960's.
Singapore has a parliamentary system in which the majority party in
Parliament has the authority to constitute the Government, which is
headed by a Prime Minister. Parliamentary elections may be called at
any time but must be held no later than 5 years from the date a new
parliament first sits. During the year, the PAP held 80 of 83 elected
seats; the opposition Singapore People's Party and the Workers' Party
each held 1 seat. One seat, won by the PAP in the 1997 election, was
vacated during the year by the incumbent's resignation and was not
filled. The WP holds one ``nonconstituency'' seat based on a
constitutional amendment that assures at least three opposition members
in Parliament even if fewer than three actually are elected. In
addition, the Government nominates and the President appoints
``prominent citizens'' to serve as nominated members of parliament
(NMP's) for 2-year terms. Nine NMP's currently sit in Parliament.
Nonconstituency members' and NMP's voting rights are restricted.
The country's economic success and generally honest, effective
government under the PAP has helped the PAP maintain a solid base of
voter support. The party has an extensive grassroots system and a
carefully selected, highly disciplined membership, including Members of
Parliament (M.P.'s) who maintain close contact with their constituents,
which is responsive to constituent needs and delivers effective
government services. However, the PAP, which virtually is synonymous
with the Government, is not averse to using the threat to withdraw
benefits as a way of assuring popular support. For example, during the
1997 election campaign, the Prime Minister and other senior government
officials pointedly warned voters thatprecincts that elected opposition
candidates would have the lowest priority in government plans to
upgrade public housing facilities. This heightened concerns among some
observers about voters' genuine freedom of choice.
The PAP also maintains its grip on power by other means, including
patronage; strong political influence over the press and the courts;
restrictions on opposition political activities; and complete control
of the political process. Often these means are fully in keeping with
the law and the normal prerogatives of government, but the overall
effect (and, many argue, ultimate purpose) is to disadvantage and
weaken the political opposition. The Government altered the boundaries
of election districts in 1996, 3 months before the 1997 elections. In
recent years, it has changed most single-seat constituencies into group
representational constituencies (GRC's) of three, four, five, or six
parliamentary seats, where the party with a plurality wins all the
seats. According to the Constitution, the purpose of this change is to
ensure ethnic minority representation in Parliament since each GRC
candidate list must contain at least one Malay, Indian, or other ethnic
minority candidate. However, this change has made it more difficult for
opposition parties, all of which have very limited memberships, to fill
multimember candidate lists, especially when one member must be an
ethnic minority. The PAP does not suffer from this disadvantage.
Although political parties legally are free to organize, they
operate under the same limitations that apply to all organizations, and
the authorities impose strict regulations on their constitutions,
fundraising, and accountability. Government regulations hinder attempts
by opposition parties to rent office space in government housing or to
establish community foundations. In addition government influence
extends in varying degrees to academic, community service, and other
NGO's.
A 1998 amendment to the Films Act that banned political videos and
films put opposition parties at a disadvantage. The ban, ostensibly to
prevent the sensationalist or emotional effect that videos or films
could have on political issues, applied to the PAP as well as
opposition parties. Nonetheless, it had the effect of denying
opposition parties, which already receive far less coverage than does
the PAP in the government-influenced press and media, a potential
outlet for their political messages (see Section 2.a.).
The threat of civil libel or slander suits, which government
leaders have used consistently against political opponents and critics,
continues to have a stifling effect on the full expression of political
opinion and to disadvantage the formal political opposition. The Penal
Code also provides for criminal defamation offenses; however, there are
no reports that it is used politically.
In the wake of the 1997 elections, a group of senior PAP leaders--
Prime Minister Goh, Senior Minister Lee, and nine other current or
former M.P.'s--sued defeated WP candidate Tang Liang Hong for
defamation. Most of the suits arose from responses Tang had made to the
PAP leaders' claim, made during and after the election, that he was an
``anti-Christian, anti-English-educated, Chinese-language chauvinist.''
Immediately after the election, Tang fled the country, citing death
threats, and had not returned at year's end. In 1997 the High Court
ordered Tang to pay the PAP leaders a record $5.77 million (S$9.58
million) in damages. Revenue authorities also charged Tang with tax
evasion.
Also in 1997, the same PAP leaders who had sued Tang also filed
defamation claims against Tang's WP colleague, party secretary general
and nonconstituency M.P. J.B. Jeyaretnam. The plaintiffs claimed that
Jeyaretnam defamed them by implying that they were guilty of a serious
crime when he told an election rally that Tang had filed police reports
against ``Goh Chok Tong and his people.'' In the first of these cases
to be decided, that of the Prime Minister, the High Court in 1997
awarded the Prime Minister 10 percent of the requested damages and 60
percent of all legal costs. The Prime Minister appealed the judgment
and, in 1998, the Appeals Court raised the damages to half of the
requested amount and full legal costs. During the year, Goh began
bankruptcy proceedings against Jeyaretnam that would have dissolved the
WP and deprived Jeyaretnam of his parliamentary seat, but suspended
them while Jeyaretnam was making payments. The remaining defamation
suits against Jeyaretnam still were pending at year's end (see Sections
1.e., 2.a., and 4).
The Government also sometimes uses parliamentary censure or the
threat of censure to humiliate or intimidate opposition leaders. For
example in 1995, Parliament censured Chee Soon Juan, secretary general
of the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP), for allegedly endorsing
attacks on the judiciary by failing to contradict criticisms made by
others on a panel of which he was a member. The SDP also was censured.
The Government did not attribute any statement directly attacking the
judiciary or endorsing the views of the other panelists to Chee or the
SDP. Rather, government parliamentary leaders said that the failure of
Chee and other SDP leaders to contradict the attacks constituted
positive assent by ``clever omission.'' In 1996 Parliament levied fines
on Chee and three other SDP members for alleged perjury, contempt of
parliament, and other offenses for providing incorrect statistics to a
special parliamentary committee examining government health care
subsidies. Chee and his colleagues claimed that they had submitted some
incorrect figures to the committee in error but that they had not
intended to mislead anyone.
Government entities also have used libel or slander suits, and
dismissal from positions in government-related entities, to intimidate
prominent opposition politicians. For example, in 1993 Chee was
dismissed from his teaching position at the National University of
Singapore for alleged irregularities involving the use of research
funds. In the context of this case, his department chairman, who also
was a PAP M.P., successfully sued Chee for defamation.
The Government also has put significant obstacles in the way of
opposition political figures' candidacy for the presidency, a largely
ceremonial position that nonetheless has significant budget oversight
powers, as well as some powers over civil service appointments and
internal security affairs. In the first election of a president, in
1993, the requirements that candidates demonstrate suitable character
and experience in managing the financial affairs of a large
institution, among other qualifications, were used to rule out two WP
aspirants. The fact that many of the country's large institutions are
government run or government linked strongly limits the chance that an
opposition political figure could satisfy this particular criterion. On
August 18, S.R. Nathan was declared the duly elected President. Nathan
was the only one of four potential candidates who met all of the
Government's strict requirements; once the others were disqualified,
the law allowed for the actual voting to be cancelled and permitted the
election of Nathan to be declared.
Opposition political figures claim that such impediments are the
root cause of the weakness of the opposition parties. The PAP claims
that the lack of an effective opposition is due to disorganization,
lack of leadership, and lack of persuasive alternative policies.
During the year, Chee Soon Juan attacked the Public Entertainments
Act as a ``sham'' that allowed the ruling party to abuse its power and
discriminate against opposition politicians. At Chee's trial for
violating the PEA, the judge did not permit testimony that the SDP had
filed about 10 applications for licenses during the period 1988 through
1995, of which about half were rejected (see Sections 1.e. and 2.a).
There is no legal bar to the participation of women in political
life; however, women are underrepresented in government and politics.
Women hold 4 of the 83 elected parliamentary seats and 2 of the 9 NMP
seats. There are no female ministers. The highest ranking woman in
government is a senior minister of state, who in July publicly called
for greater participation of women in the upper echelons of government.
The Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister supported her call for
greater female participation in government.
There is no restriction in law or practice against minorities
voting or participating in politics; they actively participate in the
political process and are well represented throughout the Government,
except in some sensitive military positions. Malays make up about 15
percent of the general population and hold about the same percentage of
regularly elected seats in Parliament. Indians make up about 7 percent
of the general population and hold about 10 percent of the regularly
elected seats in Parliament. Minority representation in Parliament is,
in part, the result of a legal requirement that candidate slates in
every multi-seat constituency must have at least one minority
representative.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no NGO's that actively and openly monitor alleged human
rights violations. This situation is consistent with the general lack
of NGO's and the Government's dominance of society. While the
Government does not formally prohibit them, efforts by independent
organizations to investigate and evaluate government human rights
policies would face the same obstacles as those faced by political
parties.
In the past, the Government denied that international organizations
had any competence to look into human rights matters in the country
and, for years, barred Amnesty International (AI) from visiting the
country. During the year, a member of the International Commission of
Jurists (ICJ) observed the appeal of Chee Soon Juan and another SDP
member of their conviction for giving a speech without a permit (see
Sections 1.e., 2.a., and 3). In 1997 the Government allowed observers
from both AI and the ICJ to observe the proceedings in the defamation
suits brought against WP Secretary General J.B. Jeyaretnam (see Section
3). The ICJ'S and AI'S criticisms of these cases were reported fully in
the local press, and the Government responded vigorously in the press,
alleging bias and citing alleged factual errors.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that all persons are equal before the law
and entitled to the equal protection of the law, and the Government
carries out these provisions in practice. The Constitution contains no
explicit provision providing equal rights for women and minorities.
Mindful of the country's history of intercommunal tension, the
Government takes affirmative measures to ensure racial, ethnic,
religious, and cultural nondiscrimination. Social, economic, and
cultural benefits and facilities are available to all citizens
regardless of race, religion, or sex.
Women.--There is no evidence of any widespread practice of violence
or abuse against women. The Penal Code and the Women's Charter protect
women against domestic violence and sexual or physical harassment. A
battered wife can obtain court orders barring the spouse from the home
until the court is satisfied that he has ceased his aggressive
behavior. The Penal Code prescribes mandatory caning and a minimum
imprisonment of 2 years for conviction on a charge of ``outraging
modesty'' that causes the victim fear of death or injury. The press
gives fairly prominent coverage to instances of abuse or violence
against women. There are several organizations that provide assistance
to abused women. The Association of Women for Action and Research
(AWARE) has a hotline that offers counseling and legal advice. The
Family Protection Unit documents physical and psychological abuse, and
provides counseling and legal services to abused women. In July the
Council of Women's Organizations established a crisis center for abused
persons. The Star shelter accepts children, women, and men, and can
accommodate up to 30 persons.
In 1998 2,730 persons applied for court orders to protect
themselves against violent family members, compared with 2,019 in 1997,
and 1,306 in 1996. The great majority of those applying were women.
Some of the increase is attributable to a 1997 amendment to the Women's
Charter Act that broadened the definition of violence to include
intimidation, continual harassment, or restraint against one's will.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution is a limited
problem (see Section 6.f.).
Women enjoy the same legal rights as men in most areas, including
civil liberties, employment, commercial activity, and education. The
Women's Charter, enacted in 1961, gives women, among other rights, the
right to own property, conduct trade, and receive divorce settlements.
Muslim women enjoy most of the rights and protections of the Women's
Charter. For the most part, Muslim marriage law falls under the
administration of the Muslim Law Act, which empowers the Shari'a court
to oversee such matters. Those laws allow Muslim men to practice
polygyny. Both men and women have the right to unilateral divorce;
however, women face significant difficulties in initiatingunilateral
divorce proceedings, which often prevents them from trying. However,
the Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP) reported in October that
57 percent of the calls that its help line received were from women who
wanted to initiate divorce proceedings.
Women constitute 42 percent of the labor force and are well
represented in many professions but hold few leadership positions in
the private sector. They still hold the preponderance of low-wage jobs
such as clerks and secretaries. The average salary of women is only 75
percent of that of men in comparable jobs (compared to 68 percent 10
years ago). In 1962 the Government instituted the principle of equal
pay for equal work in the civil service and abolished separate salary
scales in 1965.
Some areas of discrimination remain. Children born overseas to
female citizens are not granted citizenship automatically, while those
of male citizens are. Female civil service employees who are married do
not receive health benefits for their spouses and dependents as do male
government employees. However, for the first time, beginning on January
2, female citizens were able to sponsor their noncitizen husbands for
citizenship.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. Access to public education and medical care
is equal for all children in society. Although school is not
compulsory, virtually 100 percent of children are enrolled through
grade 6 and the dropout rate for secondary school is low. The Children
and Young Persons Act establishes protective services for orphaned,
abused, disabled, or refractory children, and creates a juvenile court
system. The Ministry of Community Development works closely with the
National Council for Social Services to oversee children's welfare
cases. Voluntary organizations operate most of the homes for children,
while the Government funds up to 50 percent of all child costs, which
include normal living expenses and overhead, as well as expenses for
special schooling, health care, or supervisory needs.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
People with Disabilities.--The Government implemented a
comprehensive code on barrier-free accessibility in 1990, which
established standards for facilities for the physically disabled in all
new buildings and mandated the progressive upgrading of older
structures. Although there is no legislation that addresses the issue
of equal opportunities for the disabled in education or employment, the
National Council of Social Services, in conjunction with various
voluntary associations, provides an extensive job training and
placement program for the disabled. Informal provisions in education
have permitted university matriculation for visually impaired, deaf,
and physically disabled students. The Government allows a $2,400
(S$4,000) tax deduction for families with a disabled person. Press
coverage of the activities and achievements of the disabled is
extensive.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Malays constitute
approximately 15 percent of the total population. The Constitution
acknowledges them as ``the indigenous people of Singapore'' and charges
the Government to support and promote their political, educational,
religious, economic, social, cultural, and language interests. Ethnic
Malays have not reached the educational or socioeconomic levels
achieved by the ethnic Chinese majority, the ethnic Indian minority, or
the Eurasian community. Malays remain underrepresented at the uppermost
rungs of the corporate ladder, and, some have claimed, in certain
sectors of government and the military, a reflection of their
historically lower education and economic position, but also a result
of employment discrimination. During the year, there was great debate
over the fact that advertisements often specify ethnicity and gender
requirements or require fluent Mandarin speakers. The Government
responded by issuing ``guidelines'' that called for eliminating
language referring to age, gender, or ethnicity; restrictive language
that referred to attributes relevant to a job, such as ``Chinese
speaker'' or ``physically strong'' remains acceptable. These guidelines
generally are obeyed.
A January revision in the Chinese language curriculum in the
country's schools, which expanded opportunities for higher Chinese
language ignited a longstanding debate over the perceived objective of
creating a ``Chinese elite.''The Government has taken steps to
encourage greater educational achievement among Malay students as a key
to economic advancement.
The Presidential Council on Minority Rights examines all pending
bills to ensure that they are not disadvantageous to a particular
group. It also reports to the Government on matters affecting any
racial or religious community and investigates complaints.
Section 6. Worker rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides all
citizens with the right to form associations, including trade unions;
however, Parliament may impose restrictions based on security, public
order, or morality grounds. The right of association is delimited by
the Societies Act and by labor and education laws and regulations.
Under these laws, any group consisting of 10 or more persons is
required to register with the Government. The Trade Unions Act
authorizes the formation of unions with broad rights, albeit with some
narrow restrictions, such as prohibitions on the unionization of
uniformed employees. According to government statistics the national
labor force comprises about 1.9 million employees, approximately
260,000 of whom are represented by 82 employee unions. Seventy-three of
these unions (which represent 256,000 workers), are affiliated with the
National Trades Union Congress (NTUC), an umbrella organization that
has a close relationship with the Government.
The NTUC unabashedly acknowledges that its interests are closely
linked with those of the ruling PAP, a relationship often described by
both as ``symbiotic.'' For example, the NTUC secretary general (SG),
Lim Boon Heng, a PAP M.P., is Minister without Portfolio and was
formerly Second Minister for Trade and Industry. His predecessor, Ong
Teng Cheong, the country's first elected President (1993-99) was
simultaneously NTUC SG and Deputy Prime Minister. It is common for
young PAP M.P.'s to be given leadership positions in the NTUC or a
member union. NTUC policy prohibits union members who actively support
opposition parties from holding office in affiliated unions. While the
NTUC is financially independent of the PAP, with income generated by
NTUC-owned businesses, the NTUC and the PAP share the same ideology and
work closely with management in support of nonconfrontational labor
relations.
Workers, other than those in essential services, have the legal
right to strike but rarely do so. No strikes have occurred since 1986.
Most disagreements are resolved through informal consultations with the
Ministry of Manpower. If conciliation fails, the disputing parties
usually submit their case to the Industrial Arbitration Court, which
has representatives from labor, management, and the Government. Besides
these labor dispute mechanisms and the close working relationship and
shared views among labor, management, and the Government, the
maintenance of labor peace has been a product of high economic growth
rates, regular wage increases, and a high degree of job mobility in a
virtual full-employment economy. In addition the widely held view that
labor conflict would undermine the country's economic competitiveness
and attractiveness to investors, and a cultural aversion to
confrontation help to maintain a harmonious labor situation. The
economic downturn from mid-1997 to early-1999 did not alter
significantly the tripartite consensus that labor peace is essential to
the country's economic well being.
The NTUC is free to associate regionally and internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining is a normal part of labor-management relations in the
industrial sector. Agreements between management and labor are renewed
every 2 to 3 years, although wage increases are negotiated annually.
Yearly guidelines on raises and bonus pay issued by the National Wages
Council (NWC), a group composed of labor, management, and government
representatives, serve as the starting point for bargaining agreements.
In mid-1999, in response to the economic downturn, the NWC announced a
proposal in which a portion of future wage increases would be
considered ``variable,'' allowing companies to eliminate that portion
of pay on 30 days notice if financial problems necessitated it. The
Industrial Relations Act makes it an offense to discriminate against
anyone who is or proposes to become a member or an officer of a trade
union. Labor laws and regulations are enforced uniformly.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including forced and bonded labor
by children, and generally enforces this provision effectively. Under
sections of the Destitute Persons Act, any indigent person may be
required to reside in a welfare home and engage in suitable work. The
International Labor Organization (ILO) has criticized the coercive
terms of this act, which includes penal sanctions, as not in compliance
with the ILO Convention on Forced Labor. The Government maintains that
the act is social legislation that provides for the shelter, care, and
protection of destitute persons, and that work programs are designed to
reintegrate individuals into society.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Government enforces the Employment Act, which
prohibits the employment of children under the age of 12. Although
schooling is not compulsory, virtually 100 percent of school age
children attend school (see Section 5). Restrictions on the employment
of children between the ages of 12 and 16 are rigorous and enforced
fully. Children under the age of 14 are prohibited from employment in
any industrial undertakings. A child who is 12 years old or above may
be engaged in ``light work suited to his capacity.'' A medical officer
must certify suitability for such light work. Employers must notify the
Commissioner of Labor within 30 days of hiring a child between the ages
of 14 and 16 and must attach medical certification of fitness for
employment. The incidence of children taking up permanent employment is
low, and abuses are almost nonexistent. The Government prohibits forced
and bonded labor by children and enforces this provision effectively
(see Section 6.c.).
Ministry of Manpower regulations prohibit night employment of
children and restrict industrial work for children between the ages of
14 and 16 to no more than 7 hours a day, including the hours spent in
school. Children may not work on commercial vessels, with any machinery
in motion, on live electrical apparatus lacking effective insulation,
or in any underground job. The Minister of Manpower effectively
enforces these laws and regulations.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There are no laws or regulations
on minimum wages or unemployment compensation. The labor market offers
good working conditions and relatively high wages, which provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family.
The Employment Act sets the standard legal workweek at 44 hours and
provides for 1 rest day each week.
Because of a domestic labor shortage, approximately 500,000 foreign
workers are employed legally, constituting about 24 percent of the
total work force. There are no reliable estimates of the number of
foreigners working illegally. Most foreign workers are unskilled
laborers and household servants from other Asian countries. Foreign
workers face no legal wage discrimination. However, they are
concentrated in low-wage, low-skill jobs and often are required to work
long hours. Most foreign construction workers live on-site in
substandard conditions. Although the great majority of the more than
100,000 maids (mainly from the Philippines, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka)
work under clearly outlined contracts, their low wages, their
dependence on their employers for food and lodging, and the fact that
they often live and work relatively isolated from the rest of society
make them vulnerable to mistreatment and abuse. In 1998 Parliament
passed an amendment to the Penal Code, in response to a reported
increase in cases of maid abuse, which raised the punishment for
confining or sexually or physically abusing a maid. The authorities
have fined or imprisoned employers who have abused domestics, often
with great publicity. During the year, newspapers ran several stories
on maids who had misused the law, filing wrongful abuse charges.
Most maids work 6 days per week from very early morning until late
in the evening. Many contracts allow only 1 day off per month.
Contracts often stipulate that, even when she is ostensibly not
working, a maid must remain on the premises except for official duties
or on her day off. According to Ministry of Manpower Statistics, wages
average around $250 per month (not including free room and board).
Maids must often put aside most or all of their wages for the first
several months of employment to reimburse their placement agents. Work
permits for low-wage workers stipulate the cancellation of such permits
if workers apply to marry or marry a citizen or permanent resident.
Although many lower paid foreign workers not covered under the
Employment Act are ineligible for the limited free legal assistance
that is available to citizens, the Ministry of Manpower also offers
mediation services for all employees, foreign or local. The Government
allows complainants to seek legal redress.
The Ministry of Manpower effectively enforces laws and regulations
establishing working conditions and comprehensive occupational safety
and health laws. Enforcement procedures, coupled with the promotion of
educational and training programs, have been implemented to reduce the
frequency of job-related accidents. While a worker has the right under
the Employment Act to remove himself from a dangerous work situation,
his right to continued employment depends upon an investigation of the
circumstances by the Ministry of Manpower.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The three major laws that govern
trafficking and prostitution are the Women's Charter, the Children and
Young Person's Act, and the Penal Code. The laws make trafficking in
women and children--whether or not it is related to prostitution--
punishable by up to 5 years' imprisonment, a $10,000 (S$16,600) fine,
and caning. The Penal Code covers trafficking and wrongful constraint
of men.
There is evidence that the country is a destination for trafficking
in women for the purpose of prostitution, primarily from Thailand and
Malaysia. Police reportedly conduct raids about once a month in an
effort to maintain some control over the situation.
One local NGO offers sex workers counseling services; it is not
empowered to provide protection.
______
SOLOMON ISLANDS
Solomon Islands, with a population of approximately 450,000, is an
archipelago stretching over 840 miles in the South Pacific. Its
government is a modified parliamentary system consisting of a single-
chamber legislative assembly of 50 members. Executive authority is
vested in the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. The Prime Minister,
elected by a majority vote of Parliament, selects his own Cabinet.
Political legitimacy derives from direct election by secret ballot.
There have been five general elections since independence in 1978, most
recently in August 1997. The judiciary is independent.
A police force of approximately 900 persons under civilian control
is responsible for law enforcement and border security.
About 75 percent of the population engage to some extent in
subsistence farming and fishing and have little involvement in the cash
economy. Commercial activities include some plantation production of
copra, cocoa, and palm oil, one fish cannery, a gold mine on
Guadalcanal, and small resort and diving enterprises. During the year,
the Government successfully realized economic reform goals by repaying
debt and reducing the size of the public service. However, ethnic
conflict on Guadalcanal closed the nation's largest palm oil
plantation, seriously disrupted economic activity in and around the
city of Honiara, and disrupted tourism. The Government estimates that
it will lose about $10 million in revenue as a result of the plantation
closure and will have to spend an unbudgeted $10 million to protect and
resettle displaced persons.
Basic individual rights are provided for in the Constitution,
generally respected by authorities, and defended by an independent
judiciary; however, some rights were suspended during a state of
emergency. There was one instance of extrajudicial killing by police.
During the year, ethnic violence perpetrated by some indigenous
residents of Guadalcanal against immigrants from Malaita (both
constituent parts of the country) led to several deaths, kidnapings,
and the flight of nearly 23,000 persons from Guadalcanal. To deal with
this crisis, the Parliament enacted a 4-month state of emergency on
June 17, which extended the arrest and search powers of the police and
resulted in infringements on citizens' rights and also included limits
on press reporting and freedom of association. The police commissioner
denied a demonstration permit to a labor group. Violence and
discrimination against women continued to be problems.
Guadalcanal militants committed a number of abuses.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--In confrontations
with armed Guadalcanal militants, police shot and killed at least two
persons and perhaps as many as six. In one of the cases, a police
shooting in January, New Zealand police invited to investigate the
incident by the Government found that the police officer who fired the
shot acted outside his orders. He was tried and found guilty of
manslaughter.
The violence began in January when Guadalcanal militants began
attacking homesteads and workplaces of persons originally from the
island of Malaita. There is considerable confusion, but it is estimated
that the militants killed 12 persons (see Section 1.b.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances due to the actions of government officials. Guadalcanal
militants admitted to kidnaping a prison officer, and 17 other persons
were reported missing on Gualdalcanal. Some of the missing may have
been killed; others are believed to be held by militants.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--These practices are prohibited by law, and authorities
generally respect these provisions in practice. Complaints of excessive
use of force by police when making arrests, as well as other complaints
about police behavior, are handled by an internal police department
investigations office or by the courts. In 1998 the police opened a
public complaints office in the capital. There were no reports of
excessive use of force by the police during the year, with the
exception of the police officer found guilty of manslaughter for
killing a Guadalcanal militant (see Section 1.a.).
Conditions in the country's two prisons meet minimum international
standards. Following the outbreak of militant attacks, the rural prison
in Gualdalcanal was closed, and theprisoners were moved to the prison
in Honiara for their safety. Although the prison buildings are old,
they are clean, the plumbing appears to work, and the prisoners appear
healthy. Due to the influx of prisoners from the minimum-security
prison and additional arrests due to the ethnic strife, the prison
population is now greater than the capacity of the prison. Several
cells built for four persons now hold six, and a number of prisoners
sleep dormitory style on the floor of the covered inner courtyard of
one of the prison buildings. The female wing of the prison is being
used for male prisoners, and the sole female prisoner is housed in the
warden's conference room, next to the jail reception area. A new prison
complex, slated for completion in 1997, was to have provided separate
facilities for short-, medium-, and long-term prisoners, as well as for
juvenile offenders. It remains uncompleted due to a lack of funds. A
government-appointed Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy, composed of
church and social leaders, recommends pardons for rehabilitated
prisoners, and at year's end the Government at the Committee's
recommendation pardoned 11 prisoners serving life sentences.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors. An
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) team in Honiara
monitors the prisons regularly, and an Amnesty International team
visited the prison in late September.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--In general there were no
reports of politically motivated arrests or detentions; however, the
emergency order allowed police to arrest persons for association with
militant groups on Guadalcanal.
Exile is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
The judicial system consists of a High Court and magistrates'
courts. Accused persons are entitled to counsel. However, during the
year, the public solicitor, who is charged with providing counsel to
persons who cannot afford a private attorney, reported that due to
limited resources, his office could accept only those cases in which
persons faced serious charges or those involving the protection of
children. The law provides for a judicial determination of the legality
of arrests. Officials found to have violated civil liberties are
subject to fines and jail sentences.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--In addition to legal provisions, the traditional
culture provides strong protection against these types of abuses;
however, during the emergency order police were allowed to search
without warrant, and vehicles were searched routinely for weapons. A
constitutionally provided ombudsman, with the power of subpoena, can
investigate complaints of official abuse, mistreatment, or unfair
treatment. The Ombudsman's Office did not report any incidents
involving interference with these rights. While the Ombudsman's Office
has potentially far-ranging powers, it is limited by a shortage of
investigators and other resources.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government generally respects
the constitutional provisions for freedom of speech and of the press.
Although the emergency order prohibited the publication of anything
that might incite further violence or ethnic hatred, press sources
confirm that factual reporting was not stopped. No censor was
established, although the Government exercised its powers under the
order to prevent the publication of a classified government document.
The national radio station stopped rebroadcasting items on the ethnic
unrest from foreign sources. However, foreign journalists continued to
work freely in the country.
The media comprise the Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation
(SIBC), a statutory body that comes directly under the Prime Minister's
office and whose radio broadcasts are heard throughout the country; a
privately owned FM radio station; and three privately owned weekly or
semiweekly newspapers. Given the high rate of illiteracy, the SIBC is
more influential than the print media. The Department of Information in
the Prime Minister's office publishes a monthly newspaper, which is
strongly progovernment. At least two nongovernmental organizations
(NGO's) publish periodic news journals; their environmental reporting
frequently is critical of theGovernment's logging policy and foreign
logging companies' practices. A private company transmits one
Australian television channel to the country. The system incorporates
occasional government press conferences in its program.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of association; however, under the emergency
order, the Government banned membership in Guadalcanal militant groups.
Demonstrators must obtain permits. In March the police commissioner
denied a permit to a labor group that, he said, had not used normal
consultative means to attain the purposes for which its member intended
to demonstrate.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion,
and the Government respects this provision in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government places no restrictions on
the movement of citizens within or out of the country. However, the
militants are demanding that the people indigenous to each island be
given authority to determine who may or may not enter their island.
Native-born citizens may not be deprived of citizenship on any grounds.
The Red Cross estimates that nearly 23,000 Malaitans fled their
homes on Guadalcanal for Malaita during the year. The Government,
assisted by national and international organizations, provided the
refugees with temporary shelter in Honiara, transport, and some
resettlement assistance. An uncounted number of Guadalcanal villagers
also abandoned their homes to hide in the bush for extended periods,
due to fear of militant and police activity or retribution from
dispossessed Malaitans.
Although a party to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the Government has not enacted
domestic legislation or procedures for making formal refugee
determinations. The Government cooperates with the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Red Cross in determining
refugee status, and has not returned persons to a country where they
fear persecution.
The Government provided first asylum to persons from Papua New
Guinea's Bougainville Island, who fled the conflict that started there
in 1989. Following the 1998 peace settlement, many have returned home.
According to the UNHCR, there are less than 50 persons from
Bougainville in the country who meet the criteria for refugee status.
In September the Solomon Islands Red Cross reported that
Bougainvillians sheltering in the country, who were not considered
refugees, had been returning to Bougainville during the year. Most of
those who remained were employed professionals, and none were in Red
Cross care shelters.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government through periodic
free elections. Since independence in 1978, there have been five
parliamentary elections, most recently in August 1997, and several
elections for provincial and local councils. On four occasions, changes
of government resulted from either parliamentary votes of no confidence
or the resignation of the Prime Minister. Suffrage is universal for
those 18 years of age and over.
Traditional male dominance has limited the role of women in
government. Although 14 women ran for Parliament in the 1997 elections,
only 1, an incumbent, was elected.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no restrictions on the formation of local organizations
to monitor and report on human rights. The Solomon Islands Development
Trust has both development and human rights objectives. The ICRC has an
office in Honiara, and an Amnesty International team visited the
country in mid-September.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides that no person--regardless of race, place
of origin, political opinion, color, creed, or disability--shall be
treated in a discriminatory manner in respect of access to public
places. The Constitution further prohibits any laws that would have
discriminatory effects and provides that no person should be treated in
a discriminatorymanner by anyone acting in an official capacity.
Despite constitutional and legal protections, women remain the victims
of discrimination in this tradition-based society. Unemployment is
high, and there are limited job opportunities for the disabled.
Women.--While actual statistics are scarce, incidents of wife
beating and wife abuse appear to be common. In the rare cases that are
reported, charges often are dropped by the women before the court
appearance or are settled out of court. The magistrates' courts deal
with physical abuse of women as with any other assault, although
prosecutions are rare. During the year, the Police Department continued
a series of lectures on domestic violence and child abuse for police
officers and for the community. Police officers are now ordered to
treat all such incidents like any other criminal offense.
The law accords women equal legal rights. However, in this
traditional society men are dominant, and women are limited to
customary family roles. This situation has prevented women from taking
more active roles in economic and political life. A shortage of jobs
inhibits the entry of women into the work force. The majority of women
are illiterate; this is attributed in large part to cultural barriers.
The National Council of Women and other NGO's have attempted to make
women more aware of their legal rights through seminars, workshops, and
other activities. The Government's Women Development Division also
addresses women's issues.
Children.--Within the limits of its resources, the Government is
committed to the welfare and protection of the rights of children.
There is no compulsory education, and, according to some estimates,
only 60 percent of school-age children have access to primary
education; the percentages of those attending secondary and tertiary
institutions are much smaller. Children are respected and protected
within the traditional extended family system, in accordance with a
family's financial resources and access to services. As a result,
virtually no children are homeless or abandoned. Although some cases of
child abuse are reported, there is no societal pattern of abuse. The
Constitution grants children the same general rights and protection as
adults. Existing laws are designed to protect children from sexual
abuse, child labor, and neglect.
People with Disabilities.--There is no law or national policy on
the disabled, and no legislation mandates access for the disabled.
Their protection and care are left to the traditional extended family
and nongovernmental organizations. With high unemployment countrywide
and few jobs available in the formal sector, most disabled persons,
particularly those in rural areas, do not find work outside the family
structure. The Solomon Islands Red Cross continued to conduct private
fund-raising efforts to build a new national center for disabled
children.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country is composed of over
27 islands with approximately 70 language groups. In the precolonial
era, these groups existed in a state of endemic warfare with one
another, and even today many islanders see themselves first as members
of a clan, next as inhabitants of their natal island, and only third as
citizens of their nation. Over the past century, many persons from the
poor, heavily populated island of Malaita have settled on Guadalcanal
where the resentment they engendered culminated in violence this year
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution implicitly
recognizes the right of workers to form or join unions, to choose their
own representatives, to determine and pursue their own views and
policies, and to engage in political activities. The courts have
confirmed these rights. Only about 10 to 15 percent of the population
participate in the formal sector of the economy. Approximately 60 to 70
percent of wage earners are organized (90 percent of employees in the
public sector and about 50 percent of those in the private sector).
The law permits strikes. Disputes are usually referred quickly to
the Trade Disputes Panel (TDP) for arbitration, either before or during
a strike. In practice the small percentage of the work force in formal
employment means that employers have ample replacement workers if
disputes are not resolved quickly. However, employees are protected
from arbitrary dismissal or lockout while the TDP is deliberating.
Unions are free to affiliate internationally, and the largest trade
union, the Solomon Islands' National Union of Workers, is affiliated
with the World Federation of Trade Unions, the South Pacific Oceanic
Council of Trade Unions, and the Commonwealth Trade Union Congress.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Trade
Disputes Act of 1981 provides for the rights to organize and to bargain
collectively, and unions exercise these rights frequently.
Wages and conditions of employment are determined by collective
bargaining. If a dispute between labor and management cannot be settled
between the two sides, it is referred to the TDP for arbitration. The
three-member TDP, composed of a chairman appointed by the judiciary, a
labor representative, and a business representative, is independent and
neutral.
The law protects workers against antiunion activity, and there are
no areas where union activity is officially discouraged.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor, including forced and bonded labor by children,
and, except as part of a court sentence or order, this prohibition is
observed.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law forbids child labor by children under the age of
12, except light agricultural or domestic work performed in the company
of parents. Children under age 15 are barred from work in industry or
on ships; those under age 18 may not work underground or in mines. The
Labor Division of the Ministry of Commerce, Trade, and Industry is
responsible for enforcing child labor laws. Given low wages and high
unemployment, there is little incentive to employ child labor.
Forced and bonded labor by children is prohibited constitutionally
and is not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage rate is $0.31
per hour (1.50 Solomon Islands dollars) for all workers except those in
the fishing and agricultural sectors, who receive $0.25 (1.25 Solomon
Islands dollars). The legal minimum wage is not sufficient to support
an urban family living entirely on the cash economy. However, most
families are not dependent solely on wages for their livelihoods.
The Labor Act of 1969, as amended, and the Employment Act of 1981,
as well as other laws, regulate premium pay, sick leave, the right to
paid vacations, and other conditions of service. The standard workweek
is 45 hours and is limited to 6 days per week. There are provisions for
premium pay for overtime and holiday work and for maternity leave.
Malaria is endemic in the country and affects the health of many
employees. Agricultural workers have a high risk of contracting
malaria. Ethnic tensions on Guadalcanal, the most economically
developed island in the country, resulted in the disruption of economic
activity and some employment opportunities. In June Solomon Islands
Plantation Ltd. closed its facilities following attacks on its workers.
About 2,000 employees were evacuated. Militants have prevented the
return of the work force, 60 percent of whom are Malaitan.
Both an active labor movement and an independent judiciary ensure
widespread enforcement of labor laws in major state and private
enterprises. The Commissioner of Labor, the Public Prosecutor, and the
police are responsible for enforcing labor laws. However, they usually
react to complaints rather than routinely monitoring adherence to the
law. The extent to which the law is enforced in smaller establishments
and in the subsistence sector is unclear. Safety and health laws appear
to be adequate. The Safety at Work Act requires employers to provide a
safe working environment and forbids retribution against an employee
who seeks protection under labor regulations or removes himself from a
hazardous job site.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution does not prohibit
trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons
were trafficked in, to, or from the country.
______
THAILAND
Thailand is a democratically governed constitutional monarchy that
until 1992 had a history of military coups and powerful bureaucratic
influences on political life. Since 1992 there have been four national
multiparty elections, which transferred power to successor governments
through peaceful, democratic processes. The King exerts strong informal
influence, but has never used his constitutionally mandated power to
veto legislation or dissolve the elected House of Representatives.
There is a bicameral Parliament. The coalition Government, led by Prime
Minister Chuan Leekpai's Democrat Party, was formed in November 1997,
following the resignation of Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. The
judiciary is independent, but is subject to corruption.
The security forces have wide-ranging legal powers, derived
primarily from past militarily controlled administrations. Since 1992
the armed forces have become increasingly professional and increasingly
subject to civilian control. Their influence in politics has been
diminishing. The Royal Thai Police have primary responsibility for
internal security and law enforcement. Elements of both the armed
forces and the police have a reputation for corruption. Some members of
the security forces committed serious human rights abuses.
Thailand is a newly industrializing country with a strong tradition
of private enterprise, although state enterprises play a significant
role in some sectors. A financial crisis that began in July 1997 led to
a severe contraction in economic growth through early 1999. The economy
returned to moderate positive growth in April, reaching 4 percent for
all of 1999. Annual per capita income, which peaked at $3,000 in 1996,
was about $2,000, largely due to the depreciation of the baht. Although
the manufacturing and services sectors accounted for approximately half
the gross domestic product, between 50 and 60 percent the population is
rural and agrarian. Government efforts to close the gap between urban
and rural living standards have met with only mixed success. Government
regulations generally provide protection for individual economic
interests, including property rights. However, lack of transparency in
bureaucratic decisionmaking and a gap between regulation and
enforcement sometimes leads to uneven commercial treatment for some
firms and institutions, and some areas of the Government remain subject
to corruption.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, some significant problems remain in several areas.
Police officers killed a number of criminal suspects while attempting
to apprehend them. The Government investigated some members of the
security forces who were accused of extrajudicial killings; however, it
remained reluctant to prosecute vigorously those who committed such
abuses, resulting in a climate of impunity. Police occasionally beat
suspects, at times to coerce confessions; authorities investigated an
incident in which 3 prisoners were beaten to death during an escape
attempt. An ingrained culture of corruption persists in many parts of
the civilian bureaucracy and in the security forces. Routine demands
for bribes undermine the rule of law and permit the continuation of
various illegal activities, such as income tax evasion, gambling,
trafficking, goods smuggling, and prostitution. Enforcement of a broad
range of laws and regulations by police continues to be noticeably lax.
Conditions in prison and immigration detention facilities are poor
due to severe overcrowding, and lengthy pretrial detention and the
prolonged detention of some aliens remain problems. The judiciary
suffers from corruption, and at times security forces infringed on
citizen's privacy rights. The media practiced some self-censorship, and
there were some restrictions on freedom of movement.
At times the Government hindered the activity of human rights
groups. Although the enactment of the 1997 Constitution resulted in
increased legal protections for women and the disabled, some inequities
in the law remain. Violence against women, societal discrimination
against women, trafficking in women and children, and forced
prostitution are problems. Societal discrimination against indigenous
people, and religious and ethnic minorities persists. Forced labor, and
illegal child labor also remain problems.
The 1997 Constitution contains provisions designed to combat
corruption and increase government accountability, transparency, and
public participation in the political process. The Government has
adopted implementing legislation to bring government practice in line
with these reforms over the last 2 years. In November, as mandated by
the Constitution, new legislation established a permanent National
Commission on Human Rights.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of politically motivated killings by government agents;
however, legal organizations, reputable nongovernmental organizations
(NGO's), and the press continued to provide credible reports that some
police officers used unwarranted lethal force in apprehending criminal
suspects. Armed narcotics traffickers, in particular, continue to
confront police officers, resulting in the use of deadly force by
officers during some narcotics-related arrests. Police killed several
criminal suspects during the year. The Law Society of Thailand also
stepped up its monitoring of extrajudicial killings in May after police
killed five suspected car thieves during arrest attempts in that month.
The police carried out internal investigations into some cases of
alleged extrajudicial killing; however, the authorities prosecuted few
police or military officers accused of such abuses. A highly publicized
case involved police officers in Pak Kret in Nonthaburi Province who in
June shot and killed a man suspected of car theft. Police ordered an
internal investigation after witnesses claimed that the suspect had
been abducted the previous day. There was physical evidence that
suggested that the suspect may have been handcuffed before he was shot.
In August police arrested the two senior police officers on the Pak
Kret arrest team on charges of abduction and murder. The officers were
released on bail, and the case has not yet been brought to trial. In a
case of death in official custody, in June three would-be escapees from
Udon Thani provincial prison who reportedly killed a prison guard
during their escape attempt were intercepted and beaten to death by a
group that included guards and other prison inmates who were not
restrained. Civil authorities forwarded the case to the Udon Thani
provincial court, which started legal proceedings to determine whether
the killings were justified; these proceedings were still underway as
of September. The Department of Corrections also initiated an internal
investigation.
The Government investigated some extrajudicial killings; however,
it prosecuted few police or military officers accused of such abuses. A
senior prosecutor stated that 99 percent of all cases in which
government officials have been accused of extrajudicial killings were
dropped on the basis of insufficient evidence. Through September none
of the 43 cases in which government officials were accused of
extrajudicial killing during the year had been brought to court. Senior
prosecutors and legal associations claim that most cases eventually are
dismissed because regulations outlined in the Criminal Code require
public prosecutors to rely exclusively upon the recommendations of the
police when determining whether to bring a case for criminal
prosecution. Initial inquiries are carried out by police officers,
often from the same units responsible for the killing. Well-informed
sources report that police investigators routinely determined that
police took no wrongful action. Routine exoneration of police officers
contributes to a climate of impunity that is a significant factor in
preventing any major change in police behavior. It also discourages
relatives of victims from pressing for prosecution. Families rarely
take advantage of a provision in the law that allows them to bring
personal lawsuits against police officers for criminal action during
arrest. If pursued by the family, the case is handled by the same
office--in some instances by the same prosecutor--who already has ruled
that no criminal action occurred. There is no information available to
determine how many cases are settled out of court. However, in cases in
which suits are filed, the official charged often compensates the
family of the deceased, and the lawsuit is waived. Some lawsuits filed
during the year remained under consideration at year's end.
In January 1998, prison guards shot and killed four inmates
attempting to escape from the Bangkok remand prison. The Corrections
Act allows prison guards to fire on a group of three or more prisoners
who are armed, harm officials, or refuse to surrender. However, local
legal associations claimed that the guards responded with excessive
force. A Department of Corrections investigation found that the guards
had acted legally and appropriately, but at year's end, a new
investigation that could lead that could lead to criminal proceedings
was ongoing.
The Government continued to prosecute two cases of suspected
extrajudicial killing from 1996. In October a provincial court ruled
that three police officers had killed six suspected drug dealers in
their custody in Suphan Buri in 1996. The case had been passed to the
Attorney General, who will determine whether to proceed with murder
charges, or whether the killings were in self-defense. In the case of
the 1996 killing during arrest of farmer activist Joon Bhoonkhuntod,
the Chaiyaphum provincial court decided to pursue criminal charges
against the police officer involved; his trial was still in progress at
year's end.
The 1996 case of the suspected political killing of environmental
protester Thong-in-Kaew-wattha is still under consideration by the
courts.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
There were no developments in the 1994 disappearance of
environmental activist Suchada Khamfubutra. Police no longer are
pursuing this case actively. The results of a government investigation
into the 1991 disappearance of Labor Congress of Thailand president
Thanong Po-an conducted by the House Justice and Human Rights Standing
Committee have never been released to the public.
In June the Government released the eight-page executive summary of
a Defense Ministry report on the military forces' suppression of
political demonstrations in May 1992, but the release of this long-
anticipated document provided no new information on the whereabouts of
the remaining 38 prodemocracy protesters still listed as missing. Most,
if not all, are presumed by family members and NGO's to be dead. In
August the Supreme Court dismissed a long-running civil case brought
against then-commanding General Suchinda Kraprayun and members of the
military and police forces, upholding two lower court rulings that
found that the defendants were protected by a 1992 amnesty decree.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and the Criminal Code forbid torture and
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; however, NGO's
and legal organizations continue to report that some members of the
police occasionally beat suspects in order to coerce confessions.
Authorities also investigated police officers accused of raping and
extorting sex from female suspects in detention.
Authorities continued to prosecute the case of a 14-year-old female
prisoner who was raped in custody in Bang Pu Police Station in Samut
Prakan in 1998. The case was in litigation in the Samut Prakan
provincial court as of year's end. The police sergeant charged with the
assault was released on bail.
In June the authorities began construction of additional jail cells
in 40 of the 76 provinces in order to separate suspects charged with
engaging in prostitution from other detainees. The separate cells are
mandated by a provision in the 1996 Prostitution Prevention and
Suppression Act, which legislators enacted in response to claims that
several female suspects had been abused sexually in detention.
In July a parliamentary committee investigated the case of a
narcotics offender serving detention in place of a fine in a local jail
in Pathum Thani; the detainee allegedly suffered deep cuts to his
wrists that exposed the bones as a result of being kept in handcuffs by
authorities for 7 days.
A soldier reportedly shot a refugee (see Section 2.d.).
Some corrupt police and soldiers are involved in trafficking in
women and children (see Section 6.f.).
Prison conditions are poor but in general they do not threaten the
life or health of inmates. Prisons are severely overcrowded. Sleeping
accommodations and access to medical care remain areas of concern that
require continued attention to meet minimum international standards.
Medical care in prisons is inadequate. To care for a total prison
population of 207,328 inmates, the Corrections Department employs only
14 full-time doctors and seven full-time dentists. It alsoreestablished
9 of the 11 part-time medical officer positions that it had eliminated
in 1998.
Prison authorities sometimes used solitary confinement to punish
difficult prisoners. They also used heavy leg irons without apparent
cause. Credible sources continued to report that prisoners captured in
escape attempts were beaten severely, and in one case guards and fellow
inmates killed three would-be escapees (see Section 1.a.).
Conditions in Bangkok's Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Center
(IDC) were poor, and conditions in provincial detention centers were
significantly worse. Some detainees transferred to Bangkok arrived in a
debilitated state. Immigration detention facilities are not
administered by the Department of Corrections and are not subject to
many of the regulations that govern the regular prison system. The
immigration detention population dropped to 1,113 in September as a
result of a 1998 Interior Ministry policy that allows illegal
immigrants arrested in border areas to be deported without first being
sent to an immigration detention center. Most long-term detainees had
been held for several years because they could not afford repatriation.
They now have been deported, but some foreigners still face delays of
up to 6 months. Despite the drop in population, overcrowding and
shortages of food and water remain significant problems.
Access to prisons is not restricted, and the Government permits
visits by human rights monitors and the Thai International Red Cross.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--With few exceptions,
including crimes in progress, the law requires that police officers
making an arrest have warrants, and authorities respect this provision
in practice. Under the new Constitution, persons must be informed of
likely charges against them immediately after arrest and must be
allowed to inform someone of their arrest. Detainees have a right to
have a lawyer present during questioning and the police generally
respected this right in practice during the year. Foreign prisoners
often are forced to sign confessions and stand trial without benefit of
a translator.
Police also are required to submit criminal cases to prosecutors
for the filing of court charges within 48 hours of arrest. However,
lawyers report that the police rarely bring their cases to court within
this period since the Criminal Procedure Code allows an extension
period of up to 3 days. Police also can seek court permission to hold
suspects for additional periods (up to a maximum of 82 days) to carry
out investigations. In addition laws and regulations place any offense
for which the maximum penalty is less than 3 years under the
jurisdiction of the district courts, which have special procedures; in
these cases, police are required to submit cases to public prosecutors
within 72 hours of arrest. There is a functioning bail system.
The only legal basis for detention by the police without specific
charges for long periods (up to 480 days) is the Anti-Communist
Activities Act, which authorities did not invoke during the year. The
Government continued to consider legislation to abrogate this law (see
Section 2.a.).
As of mid-September, there were 207,328 prison inmates.
Approximately 67,000 were charged with narcotics violations.
Approximately 29 percent of the total prison population were pretrial
detainees. Pretrial detainees usually are not segregated from the
general prison population. According to one lawyers' association,
pretrial detainees are held an average of 60 days.
Exile is not used as a means of political control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, while the judiciary generally is
regarded as independent, it is subject to corruption and has a
reputation for venality.
The civilian judicial system has three levels of courts: Courts of
first instance; courts of appeal; and the Supreme Court. A separate
military court hears criminal and civil cases pertaining to military
personnel as well as those brought during periods of martial law. There
is no right to appeal military court decisions. The Constitutional
Court, charged with interpreting the Constitution, began operating in
1998; the Court provides a mechanism to implement the charter fully.
The Constitution requires that courts must be independent of
theMinistry of Justice. However, they officially remained with the
Ministry at year's end. Islamic (Shari'a) courts provide due process
and hear only civil cases concerning members of the Muslim minority.
The Constitution provides for the presumption of innocence. Access
to courts or administrative bodies to seek redress is provided for and
respected.
There is no trial by jury. Trials for misdemeanors are decided by a
single judge, and more serious cases require two or more judges. While
most trials are public, the court may order a trial closed. This is
done most often in cases touching on national security or the royal
family. Career civil service judges preside over the courts. Judicial
appointments and structures are not subject to parliamentary review.
Defendants tried in ordinary criminal courts enjoy a broad range of
legal rights, including access to a lawyer of their choosing. A
government program provides free legal advice to the poor, but indigent
defendants are not provided with counsel at public expense
automatically. Most free legal aid comes from private groups, including
the Thai Lawyers Association and the Thai Women Lawyers Association.
There are no known political prisoners aside from one Muslim
mullah, Sorayut Sakunnanasantisat, who is serving a lengthy criminal
sentence of 12 years' imprisonment for leading a 1990 political protest
in Pattani. He was convicted in 1994 of offenses against the monarchy
and violating national security.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
Correspondence.--With few exceptions, including crimes in progress, the
law requires police to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search;
however, at times security forces infringed on citizens' privacy
rights. Under the new Constitution, warrants must be issued by a court,
rather than by the police. However, the procedures for issuing warrants
are not standardized, primarily because various laws such as the
Criminal Procedure Code and internal government regulations, including
those that apply to the police department, have not been amended to
comply with the new Constitution. Lawyers' associations reported that
police at times endorsed blank search warrants or used legitimate
warrants to conduct intrusive searches outside the stated evidentiary
domain. NGO's concerned with the welfare of tribal people also reported
that police and military units carried out several warrantless searches
of villages for narcotics in Chiang Rai province during the year. This
type of operation is permitted under both the Constitution and the
Narcotics Prevention and Suppression Act of 1976 in cases where there
is reasonable suspicion and an urgent search is deemed necessary.
However, some academic groups claimed that the searches were arbitrary
and violated the villagers' civil rights. The Anti-Communist Activities
Act also allows officials engaged in ``Communist suppression
operations'' to conduct searches without warrants, but these powers
have been invoked rarely in recent years and were not invoked during
the year (see Section 1.d.).
Security services monitor persons who espouse extremist or highly
controversial views, including foreign visitors.
NGO's concerned with the welfare of women report that hospital and
district officials sometimes changed the identification of unwed
expectant mothers from ``Miss'' to ``Mrs.,'' although it is illegal to
do so, and despite the fact that these women possess no marriage or
divorce certificates. Lacking these documents, the women encounter
severe difficulties in obtaining official documents needed for some
business and government transactions. They also report that female
government officials face disciplinary action for failing to register
their marriages or for having children out of wedlock.
Section 2. Respect For Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for, and
citizens generally enjoy, a large measure of freedom of speech and of
the press, and the Government generally respects these rights in
practice. However, the Government may restrict these rights to preserve
national security, maintain public order, preserve the rights of
others, and protect public morals. In practice this rarely has been
done. Laws prohibiting criticism of the royal family (lese majeste),
threats to national security, or speech likely to incite disturbances
or insult Buddhism remain in place under the Constitution.
The Constitution makes it unlawful for the Government to censor,
ban, license, or restrict print or broadcast media, except by specific
legislation in times of crisis. There were no reported attempts to
intimidate journalists who reported adverse economic news. While
newspapers and periodicals practice some self-censorship, especially
with regard to the monarchy and national security problems, media
criticism of political parties, public figures and the Government is
common and vigorous. Journalists generally are free to comment on
governmental activities without fear of official reprisal, although
allegations of intimidation of the press involving a secretary to a
deputy prime minister remain unresolved. In July the secretary,
accompanied by seven unidentified men who reportedly were armed,
allegedly entered the offices of the Thai Post newspaper, made
threatening remarks to newspaper staff there, and demanded the
retraction of an article that criticized the deputy prime minister. In
late July, the secretary acknowledged that he made threats to Thai Post
staff, but the involvement of the deputy prime minister implicated in
the incident remains unclear. The Thai Post did not retract the
article.
Under the 1941 Printing and Advertisement Act, the Royal Thai
Police Special Branch issues warnings to publications for various
violations such as disturbing the peace, interfering with public
safety, or offending public morals. It issued 14 warnings through
November, compared with 9 warnings in 1998. The 1941 Act permits police
closure of newspapers or printing presses in times of war or national
emergency, but only with a court order. No such closures occurred
during the year. Legislation was proposed during the year to revoke the
Act. In October the Cabinet forwarded this proposed legislation to the
Office of the Juridical Council for further action.
Domestic publications continued to present a wide range of
political and social commentary. Unless critical of the royal family or
the monarchy, foreign and domestic books normally are not censored and
circulate freely. Police have the authority to ban the importation of
publications but generally do not exercise it. Legislation to abolish
the 1952 Anti-Communist Activities Act created to counter the threat of
Communism through media restriction passed the House of
Representatives, but at year's end it remained pending due to
differences with a Senate proposal related to the time of abolition.
The act provides for censorship and monitoring of television and radio,
as well as investigations into the contents of books, newspapers, and
advertisements, and prohibitions on their publication, distribution,
and dissemination (also see Section 1.d.). Revolutionary Order Number
43, which prohibited the public from possessing publications deemed
detrimental to national security, including a list of books written by
Communists, was abolished in late 1998.
Radio and television stations enjoy the same constitutional
protections of freedom of expression and speech as the print media. All
radio and television stations are licensed by the Government, and most
are operated under the direct or indirect oversight of the Government
or the armed forces. Radio and television station profits are retained
by organizations that control frequencies such as government
ministries, universities, and the military services. The military
services seek to retain 40 to 50 radio and television frequencies for
national security purposes, despite civilian government assurance that
the military services may use all broadcasting frequencies in the event
of a national emergency without the need to own them.
Radio stations must renew their licenses every year, and their
signals are broadcast via government transmitters. They are required by
law to broadcast government-produced newscasts twice daily, 30 minutes
each in the morning and evening.
There is one cable television network. It enjoys almost complete
autonomy under the indirect oversight of the Mass Communications
Authority of Thailand. In addition a wholly independent ultra-high
frequency television station managed by a private consortium including
the outspoken Nation Multimedia Group began operating in 1996.
Programmers are generally free to determine the content and nature
of television broadcasts. However, as with the print media, self-
censorship exists. Stations occasionally censor or ``black out''
portions of programming deemed politically sensitive or pornographic. A
government internal censorship board exists in the Prime Minister's
office, but it rarely restricts television or radio broadcasts.
An antipornography law allows police to restrict or confiscate
printed publications and other materials deemed obscene; the
interpretation generally is limited to hard-core pornographic material.
Under the 1930 Film Act, theater owners and broadcasters must
submit films that they plan to show to the film censorship board for
review. The board can require that portions of the film be removed, or
it can ban the film. Reasons for censoring films include violating
moral and cultural norms and disturbing the public order and national
security. Theater owners and broadcasters frequently censor films
themselves before submitting them to the board. The Film Censorship
Board reported that it bans 3 to 4 films of an average of 300 films
submitted yearly. It banned one foreign film that it said presented a
distorted view of the monarchy.
Activity on the Internet remains unregulated.--The Constitution
provides for the right to engage in academic pursuits, and academic
freedom is respected. The Ministry of Education edits public school
textbooks. In October it disapproved a published history textbook that
it considered biased regarding the 1973 overthrow of the then-
government.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice. Permits are not required
for private meetings or gatherings unless held on public property or
organized by foreign nationals; these are granted routinely. However,
in May an interagency government committee rejected an application for
a meeting permit for a proposed international trade union conference on
democracy in Burma for national security reasons. The Government stated
that the organizers had no mandate as labor organizations to hold a
conference on a human rights problem, and that the meeting would damage
Thai-Burmese relations because the organizers' proposed speaker list
was ``not balanced.''
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice. Private
associations must register with the Government; such registration is
approved routinely.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion is protected by law,
and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The
Constitution requires that the monarch be a Buddhist. The state
religion is in effect Therevada Buddhism; however, it is not designated
as such.
When the Constitution was being drafted in 1997, the Constitutional
Drafting Assembly rejected a proposal to name Therevada Buddhism the
official religion on the grounds that it would create social division
and be ``offensive'' to other religious communities in the country.
The Government plays an active role in religious affairs. The
Religious Affairs Department (RAD), which is located in the Ministry of
Education, registers religious organizations. In order to be
registered, a religious organization must first be accepted into an
officially recognized ecclesiastical group.
In practice unregistered religious organizations operate freely.
However, There was at least one report that unregistered groups had
been subjected to extortion by local officials.
Under the provisions of the Religious Organizations Act of 1969,
the Department of Religious Affairs recognizes a new religion if a
national census shows that it has at least 5,000 adherents, has a
uniquely recognizable theology, and is not politically active. However,
since 1984 the Government has maintained a policy of not recognizing
any new religious faiths. This has restricted the activities of some
groups that have not been accepted into one of the existing religious
governing bodies on doctrinal or other grounds.
Two branches of the Government recently investigated religious
groups alleged to be engaged in cult activities. In January the House
Standing Committee on Religion, Arts, and Cultural Affairs moved to
consider a petition filed by a senator requesting that the activities
of the Hope of Thai People Foundation be investigated. Complaints had
been filed at the Religious Affairs Department by parents who claimed
that their childrenhad isolated themselves from friends and family
after joining the foundation.
The Constitution requires the Government ``to patronize and protect
Buddhism and other religions.'' The State subsidizes the activities of
the three largest religious communities (Buddhist, Islamic, and
Christian). Since mid-1998, the Government has provided more than $38
million to support Buddhist and Muslim institutes of higher education;
to fund religious education programs in public and private schools; to
provide daily allowances for monks and Muslim clerics that hold
administrative and senior ecclesiastical posts; and to subsidize travel
and health care for monks and Muslim clerics. This figure also includes
an annual budget for the renovation and repair of Buddhist temples and
Muslim mosques, the maintenance of historic Buddhist sites, and the
daily upkeep of the Central Mosque in Pattani.
The Government permitted foreign missionary groups to work freely
throughout the country, although it also maintained policies that
favored proselytizing by citizens.
The number of foreign missionaries officially registered with the
Government is limited to a quota that originally was established by the
RAD in 1982; this quota has not changed since that date. There were no
reports that foreign missionaries were deported or harassed for working
without registration, although the activities of Muslim professors and
clerics were subjected disproportionately to scrutiny on national
security grounds because of continued government concern about the
potential resurgence of Muslim separatist activities in the south.
Laws prohibiting speech likely to insult Buddhism remain in place
under the 1997 Constitution. The police, who have legal authority under
the Printing and Advertisement Act of 1941 to issue written warnings or
orders suspending the publication or distribution of printed materials
considered offensive to public morals, did not use it to restrict the
publication or distribution of religious literature during the period
covered by this report. The act requires all theater owners and
broadcasters to submit films scheduled for screening to a government
film censorship board for review. The Government also sought to revoke
the act during the year (see Section 2.a.).
National identity cards produced by the Ministry of Interior since
April 12 for the first time included designation of the religious
affiliation of the holder. The change was implemented in response to
the demands of parliamentarians who wanted easier identification of
individuals requiring Muslim burial. Individuals who fail or choose not
to indicate religious affiliation in their applications can be issued
cards without religious information.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
of citizens to change their residence or workplace, and authorities
generally respect this right in practice; however, there were some
exceptions. Longstanding restrictions on the travel and domicile of
certain Vietnamese resident aliens who immigrated to Thailand in 1945
and 1946 and Chinese who immigrated between 1953 and 1961 remain in
place. In addition other long-term noncitizen residents, including
several hundred tribal people, are required to seek permission from
local authorities or the army for foreign or domestic travel. In
practice authorities rarely enforce these restrictive measures, and
registered resident aliens are able to move freely within the country.
The Government did not extend work permits for approximately
100,000 alien workers when their temporary employment permits expired
in August. The Government issued revised labor regulations to allow a
maximum of 86,895 illegal Burmese, Cambodian, and Laotian workers
already in the country to register for a period of 90 days to obtain
work permits for manual labor jobs in 18 sectors. Aliens who took
advantage of this regulation would be allowed to work in 37 of the 76
provinces and move freely until August 2000, after which the Government
reserves the right to deport them formally. During the year, the
Government deported about 108,000 migrant workers and families.
However, NGO's reported that a large number of those deported returned
during the year.
The Government continued to provide asylum to small numbers of
Vietnamese and Lao asylum seekers pending their resettlement in other
countries, as well as to persons unable to meet the refugee definition
pending arrangements to return them to theircountries of origin. Along
the border with Burma, the Government generally followed its policy of
providing first asylum to new arrivals, but continued to condition
entry on ``flight from fighting,'' rather than on broad grounds of
persecution on the basis of race, religion, ethnic group, social class,
or political opinion. Consequently, there were several thousand asylum
seekers from Burma, mostly of the Karen ethnic group, who resided in
Thailand but were not acknowledged officially as refugees, and were not
permitted to receive assistance and protection in designated refugee
camps. A significant number of ethnic Shan also reside near the Thai-
Burma border. Authorities do not acknowledge that members of the Shan
ethnic minority have displaced person status.
There were no reports that security personnel or civilian
authorities forcibly repatriated any asylum seekers to Burma during the
year. Nor were there reports that officials forcibly returned persons
to a country where they feared persecution. However, the Armed Forces
Supreme Command is investigating one incident in September in which a
soldier shot and wounded a refugee when a dispute broke out during the
transfer of a camp population to a new camp located farther inland at
Umpien; NGO's involved in the care of refugees and the authorities
consider the new camp to be in a safer location.
There is no legislation regarding the treatment of refugees.
However, the Government continued to permit the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to exercise its mandate with regard
to small numbers of Vietnamese and Lao asylum seekers, most of whom
were screened out and awaiting return to their countries of origin, as
well as more than 30,000 Cambodians who had crossed into Surin, Sa
Kaew, and Trat provinces since 1997 to escape factional fighting in
Cambodia. All Cambodian refugees returned safely to their home country
by the end of March. The Government also upheld its 1998 decision to
allow the UNHCR to play a formal role in monitoring and providing
protection to about 113,000 refugees from Burma, mostly ethnic
minorities, in more than a dozen sites near the border with Burma. The
UNHCR's previous mandate had been limited to a few hundred ethnic
Burman students at the Burmese Center, formerly known as the Burmese
Student Safe Area, located in Ratchaburi province. The Government
continued to restrict access to the Center to those persons from Burma
to whom the UNHCR had accorded refugee status. In February it admitted
890 persons recognized under the UNHCR's mandate who had been awaiting
entry, some for more than 2 years.
The Government accelerated the pace of resettlement of Burmese
students following the peaceful resolution of the October 1 takeover of
the Embassy of Burma in Bangkok by Burmese dissidents. In November the
Interior Ministry approved a list of 1,700 persons submitted by the
UNHCR for admittance to the Burmese Center. Approximately one-half this
number had been admitted by year's end. The Government requested
expedited third country resettlement.
The Government also continued to allow NGO's to provide food,
medical services, housing, and other services to Burmese refugees near
the border. Government officials periodically arrested Burmese outside
designated camps as illegal aliens, including some recognized as
``persons of concern'' by the UNHCR.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to choose or
change their government peacefully through free and fair elections
based on universal suffrage. Citizens last exercised this right in an
election in 1996 that generally was viewed as free, but was marred by
widespread vote buying, a recurrent problem. The Constitution prohibits
Buddhist monks and nuns from voting or seeking public office. It also
created an independent Election Commission, which was appointed in
November 1997 to supervise elections. Voting is compulsory. Eligible
voters who fail to exercise their voting responsibilities, except those
excused on reasonable grounds, are subject to the loss of certain
rights, including the right to be a candidate in future elections.
The Constitution and the 1998 Election Law allow eligible voters
who are living outside their home districts to register to vote at
their temporary residences, provided that they have resided there for
more than 90 days. Voters who have lived in their temporary abodes less
than 90 days, or who fail to register there, must return to their home
districts at election time to vote. The Constitution and the Election
Law also allow citizens living overseas to vote by absentee ballot.
While there are no legal restrictions on their political
participation, women generally are underrepresented in national
politics, especially at senior levels. There was essentially no change
in the number of women assigned or elected to positions of leadership.
Women make up less than 10 percent of the Senate, the House of
Representatives, and civil service. There are 21 women in the 377-
member House of Representatives, and 21 in the 253-member Senate. The
number of women in the 52-member Cabinet increased from 2 to 3 after a
cabinet reshuffle in July.
No laws prohibit the participation of ethnic minorities, but few
hold positions of authority in national politics. Members of ethnic
minorities in the north often lack documentation of citizenship,
effectively barring their participation in the political process (see
Section 5). Muslims from the south hold significant elected posts in
the Government, although they continue to be underrepresented in local
and provincial government positions, which are appointed by the central
Government. Muslims make up 4 percent of Parliament. There are 8 Muslim
Members of the Senate, and 17 Muslim Members of Parliament, including
House Speaker Wan Muhamad Noor Matha and Foreign Minister Surin
Pitsuwan.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of local, domestic, and international human rights
organizations work on controversial problems without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases freely. Government officials generally were cooperative
and responsive to their views; however, at times the Government
hindered the activity of a few human rights groups.
Very few NGO's are accorded tax-exempt status, and this sometimes
hampers the ability of domestic human rights organizations to secure
adequate funding. A coalition of academics and NGO representatives
continued to lobby the Treasury Ministry to change its tax policies
during the year. In May the Government refused to grant a permit for a
labor organization to hold a conference on democracy in Burma, citing
reasons of national security (see Section 2.b.).
The 1997 Constitution mandates the establishment of a permanent 11-
member National Commission on Human Rights, The National Assembly
enacted enabling legislation in November; the Commission is scheduled
to become active in early 2000. The Commission would be a government,
rather than an independent, body, with a mandate to prepare an annual
evaluation of the human rights situation for the National Assembly,
propose policies and recommendations for amending laws to the National
Assembly, promote measures to educate citizens on human rights, and
investigate cases of human rights abuse.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal treatment under the law without
respect to race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social status.
In practice some discrimination exists, and government enforcement of
equal protection statutes is uneven.
Women.--Domestic abuse continues to be a serious problem affecting
the welfare of many women; reliable reports indicate that domestic
abuse occurs across all social classes. Specific laws concerning
domestic violence have not been enacted. Spousal and child abuse are
covered by assault provisions in the Criminal Code, but rules of
evidence often make prosecuting such cases difficult. Police do not
enforce laws against such violence vigorously, and domestic violence
often goes unreported because many victims and authorities continue to
regard domestic abuse as a private, not a legal, matter. NGO's
supported programs designed to aid victims, including emergency hot
lines, temporary shelters, and counseling services. In addition a
weekly public service television program designed to increase public
awareness of domestic violence issues began during the year. The
Government also established seven ``one-stop'' crisis centers in state-
run hospitals to handle abused women and children.
Under the Criminal Code, rape is illegal. However, a husband cannot
be prosecuted for spousal rape. In 1998 the Government proposed changes
to the Criminal Code that would redefine the term rape to include
marital rape. The Cabinet approved theproposed legislation in May but
had not forwarded it to the National Assembly for scrutiny by year's
end.
According to credible sources, rape and domestic assault cases are
underreported, in part because law enforcement agencies are widely
perceived to be incapable of bringing perpetrators to justice. Since
1994 police have sought to ameliorate this perception and encourage
women to report sexual crimes through the use of teams of female police
officers that operate in three Bangkok police stations with a total of
13 female investigators. In July the police took preliminary steps to
expand this program to the nine metropolitan districts in the capital
and three provinces and recruited 21 additional female officers.
Prostitution, although illegal, flourishes, is ingrained deeply,
and often is protected by local officials with a commercial interest in
its continuation (see Section 6.f.). Thailand is a source, transit
place, and destination for the trafficking in women and children.
Government and NGO estimates of the number of women and children
engaged in prostitution vary widely. Many NGO's and government
departments use a figure of 200,000 persons, which is considered a
credible estimate. This figure includes children under age 18 and
foreigners. Some women are forced into prostitution, but the number of
such cases is difficult to determine. The majority of prostitutes are
not kept under physical constraint, but a large number labor in debt
bondage (see Section 6.c. and 6.f.). The 1996 Prostitution Prevention
and Suppression Act makes prostitution illegal and states that
customers who patronize child prostitutes are punishable by law.
Parents who allow a child to enter the trade are also punishable.
Prosecutions remained low. NGO's and government agencies continued to
provide shelter, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs for
children and women involved in the sex industry during the year.
The 1998 Labor Protection Law made sexual harassment illegal for
the first time, but covers only persons working in the private sector.
NGO's claim that the term is vague and that this ambiguity makes it
difficult for women to pursue cases through the legal system. No sexual
harassment cases were prosecuted under the Labor Protection Act during
the year. One sexual harassment case brought by a female civil servant
working in a state-owned enterprise was prosecuted under the Penal
Code.
The Constitution has six gender-related articles designed to
provide women with equal rights and protections, but some inequalities
in the law remain. A man may sue for divorce on the grounds that his
wife committed adultery, but a women faces the additional legal burden
of proving that her husband has acknowledged publicly another women as
his wife. In an action that elicited strong public debate, the
Government considered adopting legislation to amend the 1962 Individual
Names Act, a law that authorities seldom enforce which requires a woman
to adopt her husband's surname at marriage.
Women generally have access to higher education, and more than half
of university graduates each year are women. However, police and
military academies do not accept female students. Women represent 44
percent of the labor force and hold an increasing share of professional
positions. Women are able to own and manage businesses freely, and
government regulations require employers to pay equal wages and
benefits for equal work regardless of gender. However, there is a
significant gap between the average salaries earned by men and women
because women are concentrated in lower paying jobs. In practice, women
also receive lower pay for equal work in virtually all sectors of the
economy.
The Women and Constitution Network, a league of 35 women's
organizations, lobbied for legal reforms to address legal inequities in
the treatment of women. It continued to play an important role in
securing the inclusion of gender equality clauses in legislation
creating new government organizations mandated by the 1997
Constitution, including an article that specifies that one-third of the
members of the new National Human Rights Commission be women.
Children.--The Government took steps to promote the rights and
welfare of children. The Constitution provides for the right of access
to free public education through grade 12, and in March the Government
raised compulsory education requirements from 6 to 9 years. The
Government's 1997 Social Welfare Plan for Underprivileged People
doubled the budget for children's programs for 1997-2001, compared with
the previous 5-year plan.
Child labor remains a problem, and some international
organizations, government-funded research organizations, and members of
the news media continued to report an increase in the number of
children leaving school due to the economic downturn (see Section
6.d.). According to the U.N. Development Program, 88 percent of
children of primary school age were enrolled in schools, but only 44.7
percent of children of secondary school age enrolled in the first year
of secondary education.
Child prostitution, including forced prostitution and trafficking
of children, is a serious problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). The
Government estimates that there are as many as 20,000 prostitutes under
the age of 18.
The Criminal Code provides for the protection of children from
abuse, and laws on rape and abandonment provide for harsher penalties
when the victim is a child. However, as with domestic abuse, police are
reluctant to investigate abuse cases, and rules of evidence make
prosecution of child abuse cases difficult. In July the Government
enacted legislation designed to allow children to give evidence on
videotape and in private surroundings in the presence of a
psychologist, psychiatrist, or other social worker; the legislation
requires a 1-year training period and is to become effective in
September 2000.
People With Disabilities.--The Government has enacted legislation
designed to ensure access to public facilities and to prohibit
employment and education discrimination against the disabled; however,
it has not enforced these laws effectively. Government sources estimate
that only 8 percent of the estimated 4.8 million persons with physical
disabilities receive formal schooling due to the inaccessibility of
most public school buildings and, in some cases, educators who have
discouraged children with disabilities from enrolling. To remedy this
situation, the Government worked to equip 4,000 primary schools with
the facilities needed to admit disabled children during the year.
Nationwide, there are also 8 government-operated and 10 NGO-operated
training centers for the disabled. However, with little education, very
few disabled adults are able to find employment. Many of those who do
report being subjected to wage discrimination. The law requires that
private firms hire 1 disabled person for every 200 other workers or
contribute to a fund that benefits the disabled, but this provision has
not been enforced since it came into effect in 1994. Some state
enterprises maintain discriminatory hiring policies.
The Constitution mandates access to public buildings for the
disabled, but laws implementing the provisions have not yet been
enacted. A 1998 cabinet resolution directed state agencies to modify
facilities for disabled access, but most government agencies have not
done so; however, in December a regulation was promulgated that makes
compliance mandatory. Disabled persons who register with the Government
are entitled to free medical examinations, wheelchairs, and crutches.
Indigenous People.--The Government classifies hill tribe groups as
either indigenous or migrant. Members of indigenous groups enjoy the
rights of other citizens, while members of migrant groups generally are
considered illegal aliens; they possess extremely limited civil and
political rights. Hill tribe members who settled in the country before
a 1991 countrywide hill tribe survey are eligible for citizenship.
However, eligible members frequently face lengthy delays in
regularizing their status. This is partly due to the difficulty in
determining the legal status of hill tribe members. Less than one-half
the estimated 700,000 to 800,000 members of hill tribes reportedly
possess documentation that either identifies them as citizens or
certifies their eligibility for future citizenship. A significant
remaining number enjoy legal resident status, but many in this category
still faced employment discrimination and official harassment of
various kinds, including threats of arrest or deportation. Those
residing in national parks or wildlife sanctuaries sometimes are
subject to eviction. Those that lack documentation sometimes are denied
adequate education and health care. As noncitizens they also are barred
from participating in the political process. Undocumented members of
hill tribe cannot own land and are not protected by labor laws,
including minimum wage requirements.
Credible sources reported that societal discrimination, arising
from widely-held beliefs that hill tribe members are involved in
narcotics trafficking and forms of environmental degradation, worsened.
Hill tribes occasionally were subjected to indiscriminate searches of
villages for narcotics (see Section1.f.). Popular dissatisfaction with
the Government's handling of problems affecting hill tribe members was
the focus of large gatherings in Chiang Mai in May. The Tribal Assembly
of Thailand, an organization representing 7 tribes and 170 tribal
villages, lobbied the Government for greater transparency in decisions
affecting hill tribes, including procedures addressing citizenship,
allocation and management of natural resources, and community
relocations. The Government responded by offering public hearings on
draft forest legislation and new forums where tribal members can
participate in decisions affecting natural resource allocation and
protection of their civil and political rights. The Government also
agreed to form a joint committee to review forestry laws and a joint
panel to oversee the citizenship process for hill people. As of
September, the Government had created one committee (to consider the
citizenship process), but took no action on public hearings or forest
law.
Religious Minorities.--There were no reports of violence against
members of religious minorities, but some societal discrimination
remains. The police investigated a suspected case of
intradenominational conflict in which a prominent Buddhist theologian's
home was attacked with a fire bomb in Nonthaburi in March. Muslims, who
represent up to 10 percent of the country's population nationwide, and
constitute the majority in four of the five southernmost provinces that
border Malaysia, experienced some discrimination. The Government
continued to address the problem by maintaining longstanding policies
designed to integrate Muslim communities into society through
developmental efforts and expanded educational opportunities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Sino-Thai population is
well integrated and does not face discrimination. However, about 50,000
former Chinese soldiers and dependents of a Kuomintang army that fled
China after the Communist takeover, and approximately 45,000 Vietnamese
immigrants who reside in five northeastern provinces, live under a set
of laws and regulations that restrict their movement, residence,
education, and occupations (see Section 2.d.). Despite a strong desire
for Thai citizenship, fewer than 100 Vietnamese and 3,000 to 4,000
Chinese have been naturalized in the last 34 years. Children who were
born in Thailand of these legal permanent resident immigrants may
request citizenship through district offices. These requests are
granted routinely. Approximately 10,000 Vietnamese children born in
Thailand have acquired citizenship in this manner, as have 8,000
Chinese children born in the country.
In March the Government removed amendments to the 1941 Land Act
that it considered unconstitutional. These amendments had barred Thai
citizens with foreign spouses, and their children, from buying or
inheriting real property.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1975 Labor Relations Act grants
freedom of association to private sector workers. Workers have the
right to form and join unions of their choosing without prior
authorization; to decide on the constitutions and rules of these
associations and unions; to express their views without government or
employer interference; to confederate with other unions; to receive
protection from discrimination, dissolution, suspension, or termination
by any outside authority because of union activities; and to have
employee representation in direct negotiations with employers. However,
no law explicitly protects workers from discrimination who have
participated in organizing new unions that have not been registered
officially. Union leaders report that employers often discriminate
against workers seeking to organize unions. During the year employers
used loopholes in the Labor Relations Act to fire union leaders prior
to government certification of new unions.
Workers in the public sector do not have the right to form unions.
For state enterprises, the law allows workers in each state enterprise
to form a single ``association'' after at least 30 percent of the
enterprise's employees submit a petition to the Ministry of Labor to
register such an association. These associations submit employee
grievances to management and propose changes in benefits and working
conditions but may not negotiate wages.
Associations do not have the right to confederate or to join
private sector federations. However, unofficial contactsbetween public
and private sector unions continue, and the Government has not
interfered with these relationships.
The law denies all state enterprise workers the right to strike. In
the private sector a proposed strike must be approved by the majority
of the union members in a secret ballot and be registered beforehand
with the Ministry of Labor to be considered legal.
The Government has the authority to restrict private sector strikes
that would ``affect national security or cause severe negative
repercussions for the population at large,'' although it seldom invokes
this provision and did not do so during the year. Labor law also
forbids strikes in ``essential services,'' defined much more broadly
than in the ILO criteria for such services. No strikes were disapproved
during the year.
The Government did not enforce these legal restrictions vigorously.
During the year, the Government reiterated its commitment to passing a
new version of the State Enterprise Labor Relations Act (SELRA) that
was suspended in 1991; SELRA would restore the rights enjoyed by state
enterprise unions prior to their abolition. In 1998 the Government
reintroduced legislation that the National Assembly had passed earlier
that year but that subsequently was ruled unconstitutional by the
Constitutional Court because of a drafting technicality. In August the
House rejected antiunion amendments that the Senate attempted to attach
to the revised bill. According to the law, the House can act to pass
the new legislation after a 180-day waiting period. The bill is
scheduled for consideration in February 2000.
Less than 2 percent of the total work force, but nearly 11 percent
of industrial workers, are unionized. Cultural traditions,
unfamiliarity with the concept of industrial relations, and efforts by
the Government to diminish union cohesiveness often are cited as the
reasons for low rates of labor organization.
While violence against labor leaders is rare, the 1991
disappearance of outspoken labor leader Thanong Po-an remains unsolved
(see Section 1.b.).
There is a legacy of corrupt private sector union leaders who were
exploited by the military forces, politicians, or employers for their
own purposes, but public unions generally operate independently of the
Government and other organizations.
Unions are free to associate internationally with other trade
organizations, and they maintain a wide variety of such affiliations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1975 Labor
Relations Act recognizes the right of private sector workers to
organize and bargain collectively and defines the mechanisms for such
negotiations and for government-assisted conciliation and arbitration
in cases under dispute. In practice, genuine collective bargaining
occurs only in a small fraction of workplaces and in most instances
continues to be characterized by a lack of sophistication on the part
of employee groups and autocratic attitudes on the part of employers.
Wage increases for most workers come as a result of increases in the
minimum wage, rather than as a result of collective bargaining. A new
process of setting minimum wages locally through provincial tripartite
committees may further limit union influence; many of these provincial
committees have excluded labor representatives and have placed factory
managers on the wage committees to represent worker interests.
The Government sets wages for both civil servants and state
enterprise employees. A system of labor courts created in 1980
exercises judicial review over most aspects of labor law for the
private sector. Workers also may seek redress for their grievances
through the Tripartite Labor Relations Committee. Redress of grievances
for state enterprise workers is handled by the State Enterprise
Relations Committee. Labor leaders generally were satisfied with the
treatment that their concerns received in these forums, although they
complained that union leaders dismissed unjustly usually are awarded
only monetary compensation.
No separate labor legislation applies in export processing zones,
where wages and working conditions are often better than national norms
because of the preponderance of Western and Japan-based multinational
firms.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor except in the case of national
emergency, war, or martial law; however, while these provisions
generally are enforced in the formal business sector, forced labor
remains a problem. The Constitution does not specifically prohibit
forced or bonded labor by children, and limited instances of such
practices occur. There are reports of sweatshops in the informal sector
where employers restrain workers from leaving the premises. There are
no estimates of how many such workshops exist, but the growing number
of illegal aliens from Burma, Cambodia, and Laos increases the
opportunities for such abuse. Trafficking in women and children for the
purpose of forced prostitution also remains a problem (see Section
6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--In 1998 the Government raised the legal minimum age for
employment to 15 years. The law permits the employment of children
between the ages of 15 and 18 only in ``light work,'' where the lifting
of heavy loads and exposure to toxic materials or dangerous equipment
or situations is restricted. The employment of children at night (from
10 p.m. to 6 a.m.), or in places where alcohol is served, is prohibited
by law. An analysis based on population and school enrollment data
showed that from 850,000 to 1,480,000 children work, mostly on family
farms. An estimated 240,000 to 410,000 (2 to 4 percent of children
between the ages of 6 and 14) work in urban employment and are at
particular risk of labor abuse. Most children employed in urban areas
work in the service sector, primarily at gasoline stations and
restaurants. Child labor is not evident in larger foreign-owned or Thai
export oriented factories. However, no comprehensive survey of child
labor in smaller enterprises exists, since NGO's do not have access to
shop house factories. The Ministry of Labor has increased the number of
inspectors responsible for investigating child labor problems, although
not all officers are engaged in full-time inspection work. Enforcement
of child labor laws is not rigorous, and inspectors usually respond
only to specific public complaints or exposes in newspapers. Their
inclination when dealing with violators is to negotiate promises of
better future behavior, rather than to seek prosecution and punishment.
The Constitution does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor
by children, and limited instances of such practices occur (see Section
6.c.). The Government has attempted to address the problem of child
labor by extending compulsory education from 6 to 9 years (see Section
5).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage ranges from
$3.42 to $4.26 (130 to 162 baht) per day, depending on the cost of
living in various provinces. This wage is not adequate to provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family. With extended family
members' financial contributions, the minimum wage provides the basis
for a marginally adequate overall standard of living. However,
nationwide, more than half of workers receive less than the minimum
wage, especially in rural provinces.
Unskilled migrant workers, as well as illegal aliens, often work
for wages that are significantly lower than the minimum wage. The
minimum wage does not apply to undocumented hill tribe members, who
also are not protected by other labor laws. The Ministry of Labor is
responsible for ensuring that employers adhere to minimum wage
requirements. Despite encouragement of employees to report violations
to labor inspectors, the enforcement of minimum wage laws is mixed.
In 1998 the Government mandated a uniform maximum workweek of 48
hours, with a limit on overtime of 35 hours per week. Employees engaged
in ``dangerous'' work, such as in the chemical, mining, or other
industries involving heavy machinery, may work a maximum of 35 hours
per week. The petrochemical industry is excluded from these
regulations.
Working conditions vary widely. The rate of injury from industrial
accidents has remained relatively constant over the last 10 years at
4.5 percent of the total work force. However, NGO's claim that in the
last 8 years, the average rate of work-related deaths was high at 25
per 1,000 workers. Occupational diseases rarely are diagnosed or
compensated, and few doctors or clinics specializing in occupational
diseases exist. In medium-sized and large factories, government health
and safety standards often are applied, but enforcement of safety
standards is lax. In the large informal sector, health and safety
protections are substandard.
Provisions of the Labor Protection Act include expanded protection
for pregnant workers with prohibitions on working night shifts,
overtime, or holidays, as well as for those working with dangerous
machinery or on boats.
Foreign migrant workers are subject to deportation (see Section
2.d.). The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare promulgates health and
safety regulations regarding conditions of work. Labor inspectors are
responsible for enforcement of health and safety regulations; the
strictest penalty is 6 months' imprisonment. Provisions in the Labor
Protection Law include the establishment of welfare committees, which
include worker representatives, in factories employing over 50 persons.
These committees are to set and review health and safety conditions in
each factory. There is no law affording job protection to employees who
remove themselves from dangerous work situations.
There were no new developments in the criminal lawsuit brought
against factory owners and management in the case of the May 1993 Kader
Toy Factory fire near Bangkok.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in women
and children; however, Thailand is a source, a transit place, and a
destination for trafficking in women and children for the purpose of
prostitution (see Section 5). Government and NGO estimates of the
number of women and children engaged in prostitution vary widely. Many
NGO's and government departments use a figure of 200,000 persons, which
is considered a credible estimate. This figure includes children under
age 18 and foreigners.
Some women are forced into prostitution, but the number of such
persons is difficult to determine. Coerced prostitution often involves
women from hill tribes and neighboring countries. Because foreign women
frequently cannot speak Thai and are considered illegal immigrants,
these women are particularly vulnerable to physical abuse, confinement,
and exploitation. Some women are lured with promises of jobs as
waitresses or domestic helpers, but then forced to work as prostitutes.
Those women who are illegal immigrants have no rights to legal counsel
or health care if arrested (see Section 2.d.). Nor do the amnesty
provisions under UNHCR auspices apply. Government agencies, diplomatic
observers, and domestic NGO's reported that many Burmese, Lao,
Cambodian, and Chinese women continued to be trafficked, and in some
cases abducted for prostitution. Vietnamese and Russian citizens also
reportedly were trafficked to Thailand in smaller numbers. According to
domestic NGO's, girls between the ages of 12 and 18 continued to be
trafficked from Burma, southern China, and Laos to work in the
commercial sex industry.
The majority of prostitutes are not kept under physical constraint,
but a large number labor in debt bondage. Brothel procurers often
advance parents a substantial sum against their daughter's future
earnings, often without the consent of the young woman involved. The
women are then obligated to work in a brothel to repay the loan.
The Prostitution Prevention and Suppression Act of 1996 made
prostitution illegal and states that customers who patronize child
prostitutes are punishable by law. Parents who allow a child to enter
the trade are also punishable. The 1997 Prevention and Suppression of
Trafficking in Women and Children Act increased the penalties for
trafficking in women and children for the purposes of prostitution or
slave labor, and provided for wide powers of search and assistance to
victims. The authorities utilized these powers during the year, but the
number of prosecutions remained low. A new money laundering law became
effective in August that includes provisions designed to enable
authorities to confiscate the assets of persons convicted of
trafficking or engaging in the business of prostitution. NGO's and
government agencies continued to provide shelter, rehabilitation, and
reintegration programs for children and women involved in the sex
industry during the year. However, there continue to be credible
reports that some corrupt police, soldiers, and government officials
are involved in trafficking schemes. In April the Government reassigned
some senior immigration officials based in two airports; they were
found to be complicit in trafficking schemes, but no systematic plan to
address the problem has been formulated.
The Government and NGO's estimate that there are as many as 20,000
prostitutes under the age of 18. In 1996 the Government enacted a
stronger law against trafficking in, patronizing, or profiting from
child prostitutes. Since the promulgation of the 1996 act, government
sources confirm that 355 persons individuals have been arrested for
violating this law. As of September, 14 of these persons had been
convicted and sentenced. Some NGO's reported that there was a small
decline in the trade in children for commercial sex; however, there are
no comprehensive surveys to determine the accuracy of these claims, and
it is uncertain whether the new laws are contributing to the reported
decline.
______
TONGA
The Kingdom of Tonga consists of 169 small islands scattered over a
wide area of the South Pacific. Most of the approximately 105,000
inhabitants are Polynesian. Tonga is a constitutional monarchy in which
political life is dominated by the King, the nobility, and a few
prominent commoners. The judiciary is independent.
The security apparatus is composed of the Tonga Defense Services
(TDS) and a police force. The 430-man TDS force is responsible to and
controlled by the Minister of Defense.
The economy is based primarily on the cultivation of tropical and
semitropical crops. Demand for imported manufactured goods and products
has led to a substantial trade deficit. This deficit has been offset
largely by remittances from Tongans employed abroad, overseas aid, and,
to a lesser degree, tourism. Remittances through the formal banking
system are diminishing.
The principal human rights abuse remains severe restrictions on the
right of citizens to change their government. A relatively small group
of commoners vocally challenges the Constitution, arguing for a more
representative and accountable government. To discourage dissent the
Police Minister filed lawsuits against government critics. Some women
suffer from domestic violence, and discrimination limits the
opportunities available to women.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture and inhuman or degrading
punishment or other such treatment, and there were no reports of such
practices. Prison conditions are Spartan but in accordance with local
living standards. Church representatives and family members are
permitted to visit prisoners. No nongovernmental organizations (NGO's)
attempt human rights monitoring visits to prisons, and the
permissibility of such visits has not arisen.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
proscribes arbitrary arrest or detention and provides for the right to
judicial determination of the legality of arrest; these provisions are
observed in practice. There is no preventive detention, although there
are no statutory limits to the length of time a suspect may be held
prior to being charged. The law does not limit access by counsel and
family members to detained persons.
There is no forced exile, internal or external.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary, whose top judges
have been expatriates, is independent of the King and the executive
branch.
The court system consists of the Supreme Court (which has original
jurisdiction over all major cases), the police magistrates' courts, a
general court, a court martial for the TDS, a court tribunal for the
police force, and a court of review for the Inland Revenue Department.
In addition, the Court of Appeals, as the appellate court of last
resort, is the highest court. The King's Privy Council presides over
cases relating to disputes over titles of nobility and estate
boundaries. The King has the right to commute a death sentence in cases
of murder or treason.
The law provides for the right to a fair public trial, and the
Government honors it in practice. A court may not summon anyone without
providing the person a written indictment stating the offenses the
person is accused of committing. Defendants are entitled to counsel,
and lawyers have free access to defendants.
There were no reports of political prisoners. Some observers allege
that Parliament's 1996 conviction and imprisonment of a parliamentarian
and two journalists for contempt were politically motivated.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--By law and in practice, no one may enter or search the
home of another or remove any item unless in possession of a
warrantissued by a magistrate. Neither the State nor political
organizations intrude arbitrarily into a person's private life.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, at times the authorities
infringed on these rights.
There are two weekly newspapers (one of which is government owned)
and one privately owned national magazine. A Christian network owns the
one television station, which has plans to expand from one to at least
three channels. The Government owns one AM and one FM radio station.
Three FM stations (one purely religious) are run privately. While there
is generally little editorializing in the government-owned media,
opposition opinion appears regularly alongside government statements
and letters. A privately owned newspaper, Kele'a, openly criticizes the
Government without interference. However, infringements on freedom of
the press occur. The Minister of Police, apparently to inhibit dissent,
has filed civil suits in Magistrates Court against people who allegedly
angered public servants. While such suits often are dismissed on
appeal, they can be costly for the defendants. In July 1998, the
Government refused entry to a New Zealand journalist who wished to
cover the King's birthday celebration, because his reporting had
displeased authorities in the past.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. No person in recent memory has applied for refugee
status, and the Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding
refugees, asylees, or first asylum.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the ability to change their leaders or the
system of government. The King and 33 hereditary nobles dominate
political life. They assert authority largely through control of
substantial landholdings and their dominant numbers in the Legislative
Assembly (Parliament). While the Constitution allows the monarch broad
powers, many of which do not require the legislative branch's
endorsement, the King sometimes permits ``the system'' to work its will
without his guidance. The King appoints the Prime Minister and appoints
and presides over the Privy Council (called the Cabinet when the King
is not presiding), which makes major policy decisions. Currently, the
Cabinet is made up of nine ministers and two governors; it includes
both nobles and commoners, who serve at the King's pleasure.
The unicameral legislature, the Legislative Assembly, consists of
the Cabinet, nine nobles elected by their peers, and nine people's
representatives elected by the general population. The King appoints
the Speaker from among the representatives of the nobles. Elections
were held in March to select the people's representatives to
Parliament.
Cabinet members and nobles usually vote as a bloc; however, recent
votes related to impeachment charges against a commoner member of the
Cabinet demonstrated that nobles and people's representatives can
override the Cabinet's wishes at times.
In recent years, a number of people both inside and outside the
establishment have called for democratic change, usually emphasizing
the importance of more government accountability. Very few challenge
retention of the monarchy; the King is greatly respected. A
prodemocracy movement continues, although it currently lacks formal
structure due to differences of views among its leaders. All nine
current people's representatives advocate various degrees of democratic
reform. Proposals for constitutional revision tend to center on the
popular election of all parliamentarians, with the parliamentarians
then selecting their speaker.
Women are severely underrepresented in government. There are no
female Members of Parliament, although there have been in the past.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no known barriers to the formation of local NGO's that
concern themselves with human rights. Some local NGO's include among
their interests human rights problems, although none currently
undertakes investigations of alleged violations. No outside
organizations are known to have made requests to investigate alleged
human rights violations, but some publicly criticized the Government's
refusal to grant a New Zealand journalist a visa in 1998 (see Section
2.a.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Social, cultural, and economic facilities are available to all
citizens regardless of race or religion. However, members of the
hereditary nobility have substantial advantages. These include control
over most of the land and a generally privileged status. Nonetheless,
it is possible for commoners to rise to cabinet positions in government
and to accumulate great wealth and status in the private sector.
Women.--Domestic violence seldom is publicized, but it is a
problem. Incidents of wife beating generally are addressed in
traditional ways within families or by village elders. Such abuse is
seldom reported to the police. Abused wives sometimes return to their
families if mediation fails.
The country is male dominated, and women generally occupy a
subordinate role. For a woman to rise to a position of leadership, she
usually needs to have the support of the nobility or to possess
exceptional talent. The King's mother reigned for many years, and a
royal princess is one of the country's most prominent businesspersons.
Some female commoners hold senior leadership positions in business.
Some village women, with help from NGO's, are leading local
development projects.
The Government has a women's unit in the Prime Minister's office.
Although some NGO's initially viewed this unit with suspicion, it
appears to be functioning cooperatively with them. Many young, educated
women still consider the unit to be ineffective. A government-sponsored
National Council of Women is making positive contributions.
Children.--The Government is committed to children's human rights
and welfare and provides commensurate funding for children's welfare
within the context of the total resources available to the State. Child
abuse, if it occurs, is rare and has not become a source of concern in
a society where the extended family participates in child rearing.
Education has been compulsory since 1882. Although it is sometimes
criticized as being of poor quality, education is provided for all
children through Form 6 (high school). Compliance rates are good.
People with Disabilities.--No mandated provisions for accessibility
to buildings and services for the disabled exist. There were no known
complaints of discrimination in employment, education, or provision of
other state services. The education of children with special needs has
been a longstanding priority of the Queen.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form unions
under the 1964 Trade Union Act, but to date no unions have been formed,
presumably because of the small size of the wage economy and the lack
of a perceived need for unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Since no unions
have been formed, collective bargaining is not practiced. There is no
legislation permitting and protecting collective bargaining or the
right to organize. Labor laws and regulations are enforced in all
sectors of the economy, including in the two small export enhancement
zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced labor including forced and bonded labor by children, and it is
not practiced.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Child labor is not used in the wage economy, although
there is no legislation prohibiting it. The Government prohibits forced
and bonded labor by children and enforces this prohibition effectively
(see Section 6.c.).
Education has been compulsory since 1882 and is provided for all
children through Form 6 (high school).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage law,
although there are government guidelines for wage levels. Labor laws
and regulations, enforced by the Ministry of Labor, Commerce, and
Industry, limit the workweek to 40 hours. The Ministry of Labor
enforces laws and regulations reasonably well in the wage sector of the
economy, particularly on the main island of Tongatapu. Enforcement in
agriculture and on the outer islands is limited by isolation.
Industrial accidents are rare, since few industries exist that
would expose workers to significant danger. Due to these factors,
little or no work has been done on industrial safety standards.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically address
trafficking; however, there were no reports that persons were
trafficked in, to, or from the country.
______
TUVALU
Tuvalu, with a population of approximately 10,000 primarily
Polynesian persons, occupies a land area of a little more than 10
square miles on 9 atolls in the central South Pacific. Independent
since 1978, its Constitution provides for a Westminster-style
parliamentary democracy. The Head of State is the British Queen,
represented by the Governor General, who must be a Tuvaluan citizen.
The judiciary is independent.
A 32-member police constabulary, the only security force, is
responsible to and effectively controlled by civilian authority.
The primarily subsistence economy relies mainly on coconuts, taro,
and fishing. With donor assistance, Tuvalu has developed a well-managed
trust fund, which is supplemented by significant annual payments for
use of its international telephone-dialing prefix. An agreement was
completed in 1998 with a Canadian telecommunications company for use of
the country's Internet address. However, anticipated revenues of up to
$50 million have not materialized. Remittances from Tuvaluans working
abroad as well as the sale of postage stamps and of fishing licenses to
foreign vessels provide additional foreign exchange. The country's
isolation and meager natural resources limit the prospects for economic
development.
Society is egalitarian, democratic, and respectful of human rights.
However, social behavior, as determined by custom and tradition, is
considered as important as the law and is ensured by village elders.
There were no specific reports of human rights abuses. However, in the
traditional culture of the islands, women occupy a subordinate role,
with limits on their job opportunities. Recently there has been a
substantial effort to accord women equality in employment and
decisionmaking.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture and inhuman or degrading
punishment, and there were no reported instances of such practices.
Local hereditary elders exercise considerable traditional authority--
including the seldom-invoked right to inflict corporal punishment for
infringing customary rules, which can be at odds with the national law.
Prison facilities consist of several holding cells at the back of
the police station. There have been no serious crimes within the memory
of local officials. It is rare for a prisoner to spend as long as a
week in a cell; more commonly, a person is incarcerated overnight
because of drunkenness. While prison conditions are somewhat Spartan as
regards to food and sanitation, complaints seem to be minimal or
nonexistent.
Since there are no local human rights groups, the question of
prison monitoring by them has not arisen. Visits by church groups and
family members are permitted.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government
observes these prohibitions.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and it is free of governmental interference.
The judicial system consists of the higher courts: The Privy
Council, the Court of Appeal, and the High Court; and the lower courts:
The senior and resident magistrates, the island courts, and the land
courts. The Chief Justice, who is also Chief Justice of Nauru, sits on
the High Court about once a year.
The right to a fair public trial is ensured by law and observed in
practice. The Constitution provides that accused persons must be
informed of the nature of the offenses with which they are charged and
be provided the time and facilities required to prepare a defense. The
right to confront witnesses, present evidence, and appeal convictions
is provided by law. Procedural safeguards are based on English common
law. An independent people's lawyer is required by statute. The
services of this public defender are available to all citizens without
charge.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect such prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides these
rights, and the Government respects these provisions and academic
freedom in practice.
The one radio station is under government control.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly and association, and there are no
significant restrictions in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for this right,
and the Government respects it in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens are free to travel within the
country and abroad. The Government does not restrict repatriation.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. No
person in recent memory has applied for refugee status, and the
Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding refugees,
asylees, or first asylum.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The people freely and directly elect a 12-member unicameral
Parliament whose normal term is 4 years. Each of Tuvalu's nine atolls
is administered by a six-person council, also elected by universal
suffrage to 4-year terms. The minimum voting age is 18 years.
The Cabinet consists of the Prime Minister, elected by secret
ballot from among the Members of Parliament, and up to four other
ministers, appointed and removed from office by the Governor General
with the advice of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister may appoint
or dismiss the Governor General on behalf of the British monarch. The
Prime Minister may be removed from office by a parliamentary vote of no
confidence. A change in government occurred in April following the
passage of a motion of no-confidence in the Government. Former
Education Minister Ionatana heads the new Government. There are no
formal political parties.
For cultural reasons, women are underrepresented in politics. At
present there are no female Members of Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There have been no allegations of human rights violations by the
Government and no known requests for investigations. While no known
barriers block their establishment, there are no local nongovernmental
organizations concerned with human rights.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
creed, sex, or national origin, and the Government generally respects
these prohibitions. However, the traditional culture has limited
women's job opportunities.
Women.--Violence against women is rare. If wife beating occurs, it
is infrequent and has not become a source of societal concern.
Women increasingly hold positions in the health and education
sectors and also are more active politically.
Children.--The Government is committed to children's human rights
and welfare and provides commensurate funding for children's welfare
within the context of its total available resources. Education is
compulsory for children from 6 through 13 years of age. There are no
reports of child abuse.
People with Disabilities.--Although there are no mandated
accessibility provisions for the disabled, there are no known reports
of discrimination in employment, education, or provision of other state
services.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers are free to organize unions
and choose their own labor representatives, but most of the population
lacks permanent employment and is engaged in subsistence activity. The
law provides for the right to strike, but no strike has ever been
recorded.
In the public sector, civil servants, teachers, and nurses--who
total less than 1,000 employees--are grouped into associations that do
not have the status of unions. The only registered trade union, the
Tuvalu Seamen's Union, has about 600 members, who work on foreign
merchant vessels. Unions may affiliate with international bodies. The
Seamen's Union is a member of the International Transportation Workers'
Federation.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1978
Industrial Relations Code provides for conciliation, arbitration, and
settlement procedures in cases of labor disputes. Although there are
provisions for collective bargaining, the practice in the private
sector is for wages to be set by employers. For both the private and
public sectors, the legal procedures for resolving labor disputes are
seldom used; instead, the two sides normally engage in
nonconfrontational deliberations in the local multipurpose meeting
hall.
Tuvalu is not a member of the International Labor Organization.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The 1978 Employment
Law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including by children, and
there have been no reports of either being practiced.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Employment Law prohibits children under the age of 14
from working. Education is compulsory for children from 6 through 13
years of age. The law also prohibits children under 15 years of age
from industrial employment or work on any ship and stipulates that
children under the age of 18 years are not allowed to enter into formal
contracts, including work contracts. Children rarely are employed
outside the traditional economy. The Government prohibits forced and
bonded labor by children and enforces this prohibition effectively (see
Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage, set
administratively by the Government, is sufficient to allow a worker and
family in the wage economy to maintain a decent standard of living. The
present biweekly minimum wage in the public (government) sector is
$81.25 ($A130). This rate applies regardless of sex and age. In most
cases, the private sector adopts the same minimum wage rate.
The Labor Office may specify the days and hours of work for workers
in various industries. The workday by law is set at 8 hours. The
majority of workers are outside the wage economy. The law provides for
rudimentary health and safety standards. It requires employers to
provide an adequate potable water supply, basic sanitary facilities,
and medical care. Specific provisions of the law provide for the
protection of female workers. The Ministry of Labor, Works, and
Communications is responsible for the enforcement of these regulations,
but it is able to provide only minimum enforcement.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically mention
trafficking; however, there were no reports that persons were
trafficked in, to, or from the country.
______
VANUATU
Vanuatu, a small South Pacific island nation of approximately
183,000 persons that was administered jointly by Britain and France
prior to its independence in 1980, has a parliamentary form of
government with a 52-member Parliament, a Prime Minister, and a
President. The latter's powers are largely ceremonial, except when
acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers. Political legitimacy
is based on majority rule. The courts normally are independent of
executive interference.
The civilian authorities control the small police force and its
paramilitary wing, the Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF). Under current
regulations, the police commissioner commands the entire force,
including the VMF.
Subsistence and small-scale agricultural production and fishing
support more than 80 percent of the population. Nonsubsistance
agricultural products include copra, cocoa, and beef cattle. The
service sector--government, tourism, and an offshore financial center--
provides most formal employment and represents the largest component of
the country's gross domestic product.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in a few areas. Poor prison
conditions, an extremely slow judicial process, and violence and
discrimination against women were the major human rights problems.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Constitutional provisions against torture and cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment usually are observed in practice and
enforced by the courts.
In November the presiding magistrate dismissed the case against 18
police officers charged with intentional assault of rioters in Port
Vila in January 1998. The public prosecutor has appealed to the Supreme
Court to reinstate the case.
Prison conditions are poor. As a result of criticism of prison
conditions following the 1998 riots, the Government closed the main
prison in Port Vila, moved the male prisoners there to a smaller,
somewhat better constructed building, and arranged for the
incarceration of female prisoners in one apartment in the unmarried
policewomen's barracks. The prison on Tanna Island was painted and
cleaned by a church youth group using materials donated by local
companies. As of the beginning of September, there were 45 male
prisoners in the country (which is the average prison population under
normal conditions); there were no female prisoners. The prison
buildings in Port Vila and Luganville are in poor condition. Apart from
the dilapidated state of the prison buildings, prisoners appear to be
treated humanely.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and there were no reports of
such arrests. Arrest is by warrant.
The constitutional provision that suspects must be informed of the
charges against them and given a speedy hearing before a judge is
observed in practice.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the courts are normally free of military or
executive interference. However, in 1996 the Government dismissed the
foreign Chief Justice prior to the end of his appointment. In 1998 the
Acting Chief Justice, who argued that his predecessor's dismissal
constituted unconstitutional interference with the judiciary, sponsored
a ``joint declaration'' of judges and magistrates on ``the basic
principles on the independence of the judiciary'' to remind the
executive branch of the principle of judicial independence. There were
no reports of interference with the judiciary by the present
Government.
Magistrates' courts deal with most routine legal matters. There is
also a Supreme Court, and above the Supreme Court an Appeals Court with
three judges, two of whom are appointed by the President and chosen
from among Supreme Court judges in other South Pacific nations as
required.
The judicial system is based on British law. The courts uphold
constitutional provisions for a fair public trial, a presumption of
innocence until guilt is proven, a prohibition against double jeopardy,
a right of judicial determination of the validity of arrest or
detention, and a right of appeal to an appellate court.
Judges, prosecutors, and the police all complain about large
backlogs of cases in the courts due to a lack of resources. For example
most of the members of the VMF accused of kidnaping public officials in
the course of a mutiny in 1996 still are awaiting trial. Procedures
were changed during the year to allow the public prosecutor to present
new cases to the magistrates more frequently, but the limited number of
qualified judges and prosecutors remains a serious problem.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--There were no reports of arbitrary interference with
privacy, family, home, or correspondence.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respected these
provisions in practice during most of the year. In September reporters
for the government-owned radio station were dismissed, and the editor
of the station was threatened with dismissal, in connection with
stories about the then-ruling coalition. The reporters eventually were
reinstated.
The Government controls much of the country's media, including a
weekly newspaper, one AM and one FM radio station, and a limited-
service television station confined to the capital, Port Vila, which
provides English and French news service three times a week. There is
one independent newspaper published semiweekly and another weekly
newspaper published by a political party.
Throughout the year, both the government-owned and the independent
press reported criticisms of political leaders freely and apparently
without hindrance. Some individual politicians and their supporters are
sensitive to public criticism and sometimes threatened the media, but
without any apparent effecton press freedom. Such incidents in April
and September resulted only in further embarrassing press coverage for
the critics. Correspondents for international media also are allowed to
report without interference.
The Government respects academic freedom. Vanuatu has three
institutions of higher education--a teachers college, an agricultural
school, and an annex of the University of the South Pacific.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the freedoms of assembly and association, and the
Government respects these rights in practice. Permits must be obtained
to hold public demonstrations and rallies; they are granted routinely.
The Government does not restrict the formation of political parties
or other groups.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion,
and the Government respected it in practice. Missionaries of various
Christian denominations work without restriction. The 1995 Religious
Bodies Act, which requires religious organizations to register with the
Government, was never signed by the President and was never enforced,
although some churches registered under the act voluntarily. Although
the act has not been repealed by Parliament, and technically remains in
force, it remains dormant and its constitutionality is in question.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--All citizens are free to travel
internally and to leave and return to the country without restrictions.
The Government has not formulated a policy regarding refugees,
asylees, or first asylum. The issue of the provision of first asylum
has never arisen.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for parliamentary elections every 4
years, through which citizens can freely change their government.
Parliamentary majorities have been unstable, with legislators spending
much time and energy accumulating support for votes of confidence. The
last national elections were held in March 1998. In November 1999,
Barak Sope of the Melanesian Progressive Party assembled a
parliamentary majority, and formed the Government.
Outside observers consider the 1998 elections to have been
generally free and fair. A total of 216 candidates contested 52 seats.
Voter turnout was 63.6 percent.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Traditional
attitudes, in which men are dominant and women frequently are limited
to customary family roles, hamper women from taking a more active role
in economic and political life. Six women, including the sole sitting
female member, ran for parliament in 1998; none were elected.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no restrictions on the formation of local human rights
organizations. The Vanuatu Human Rights Education Association no longer
functions. However, other nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), such
as the National Council of Women and the Family Health Association,
include human rights education as part of their programs.
Angered over her vigorous investigations of corruption allegations,
in 1997 Parliament repealed the 1995 Ombudsman's Act, and, in June
1998, the Supreme Court upheld the repeal, and the President signed the
legislation. A new Ombudsman's Act was passed by Parliament in November
1998; among other provisions it requires that members of the
Ombudsman's staff be appointed by the Public Service Commission rather
than by the Ombudsman and that persons interviewed by the Ombudsman may
have legal representation present at the interview.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides fundamental rights and freedoms for ``all
persons . . . without discrimination on the grounds of race, place of
origin, religious or traditional beliefs, political opinions, language,
or sex.'' Despite constitutional and legal protections, women remain
victims of discrimination in this tradition-based society. Due to high
rates of unemployment, few jobs are available for the disabled.
Women.--Violence against women, particularly wife beating, is
common, although no accurate statistics exist. Courts occasionally
prosecute offenders using common law assault as a basis for
prosecution, since there are no specific laws against wife beating.
However, most cases of violence against women, including rape, go
unreported because women, particularly in rural areas, are ignorant of
their rights or fear further abuse. In addition police are frequently
reluctant to intervene in what are considered to be domestic matters.
While women have equal rights under the law, they are only slowly
emerging from a traditional culture characterized by male dominance, a
general reluctance to educate women, and a widespread belief that women
should devote themselves primarily to childbearing. During the year, in
the course of a downsizing in the public service, a disproportionate
number of women's positions were abolished. Policies to guide the
Department of Home Affairs in protecting and furthering the rights of
women currently are being drafted under the Government's reform
program.
The majority of women enter into marriage through ``bride-price
payment,'' a practice that encourages men to view women as property.
Women also are inhibited by tradition from owning land, and at least
one women's advocate believes this limitation serves to underpin their
secondary status. Many female leaders view village chiefs as a major
obstacle to attaining social, political, and economic rights for women.
Women interested in running for public office get encouragement and
help from an NGO, Vanuatu Women in Politics (VANWIP). Four of the six
women who ran for Parliament in the 1998 election ran under the VANWIP
banner.
Children.--Although the Government has made education a priority,
access to education is limited and school attendance is not compulsory.
Children are protected within the traditional extended family system.
Members of the extended family, particularly paternal uncles, play an
active role in a child's development. As a result, virtually no
children are homeless or abandoned. NGO's and law enforcement agencies
report increased complaints of incest and rape of children, although no
statistics are available.
People with Disabilities.--There is no known governmental or
national policy on the disabled and no legislation mandating access for
them. Their protection and care is left to the traditional extended
family and to voluntary NGO's.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Most of the population is made
up of Melanesians. Small minorities of Chinese, Fijians, Vietnamese,
Tongans, and Europeans generally are concentrated in two towns and on a
few plantations. Most of the land belongs to indigenous tribes that
inhabit it, and it cannot be sold, although it sometimes is leased to
others. However, within the limits of this system of land tenure, there
were no reports of discrimination against noncitizens. There is no
evidence to suggest a pattern of ethnic discrimination in the provision
of the limited basic services that the Government provides.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers with the
right to organize unions.
Approximately 29,000 persons participate in the formal economy as
wage earners. There are five trade unions. The unions are grouped under
an umbrella organization, the Vanuatu Council of Trade Unions (VCTU).
The trade unions are independent of the Government.
The high percentage of the population still engaged in subsistence
agriculture and fishing deters extensive union activity. In addition
membership in the Vanuatu Public Servants Union fell dramatically
following the Government's wholesale dismissal of hundreds of full-time
public servants during a protracted general strike in 1994. The Supreme
Court in 1994 ruled that the union had not complied with its own rules
when it undertook the general strike and declared the strike illegal.
Combined union membership in the private and public sectors reportedly
has fallen from more than 4,000 to less than 1,000 in the aftermath of
the 1994 strike.
The law prohibits retribution if a strike is legal. In the case of
private-sector employees, violations would be referred to the Labor
Department for conciliation and arbitration. In the public sector, the
Public Service Commission would handle violations.
In 1995 Parliament passed a law requiring unions to give 30 days'
notice of intent to strike, with a list of the names of intending
strikers.
There was no significant strike activity during the year.
Unions may not affiliate with international labor federations
without government permission. The VCTU is a member of the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions exercise
the right to organize and bargain collectively. Labor unions negotiate
wages and conditions directly with management. If the two sides cannot
agree, the matter is referred to a 3-member arbitration board appointed
by the Minister of Home Affairs. The board consists of one
representative from organized labor, one from management, and the
senior magistrate of the magistrate's court. While a dispute is before
the board, labor may not strike and management may not dismiss union
employees. However, unions and management generally reach agreement on
wages without having to refer the matter to arbitration. Complaints of
antiunion discrimination are referred to the Commissioner of Labor.
While the law does not require union recognition, once a union is
recognized, it does prohibit antiunion discrimination.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, including forced and bonded labor by
children, and there were no reports that either adults or children were
subject to forced, bonded, or compulsory labor.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits children under 12 years of age from
working outside of family-owned agricultural production, where many
children assist their parents. There were no reports of forced or
bonded labor by children, which is prohibited by law (see Section
6.c.). The employment of children from 12 to 18 years of age is
restricted by occupational category and conditions of labor, that is,
restrictions on employment in the shipping industry and on nighttime
employment. The Labor Department effectively enforces these laws.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--A legislated minimum wage is
effectively enforced by the Labor Department. Since 1995 it has been a
flat rate of approximately $143 (16,000 vatu) per month for both urban
and rural workers. The minimum wage does not support an urban family
living entirely on the cash economy. Most families are not dependent
solely on wages for their livelihoods.
Various laws regulate benefits such as sick leave, annual
vacations, and other conditions of employment, including a 44-hour
maximum workweek, with at least one 24-hour rest period weekly. An
Employment Act, enforced by the Labor Department, includes provisions
for safety standards. However, the 1987 safety and health legislation
is inadequate to protect workers engaged in logging, agriculture,
construction, and manufacturing, and the single inspector attached to
the Labor Department is hard pressed to enforce the act fully. Workers
have the right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations
without jeopardy to their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution does not prohibit
trafficking in persons specifically; however, there were no reports
that persons were trafficked in, to, or from the country.
______
VIETNAM
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a one-party state ruled and
controlled by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). The VCP'S
constitutionally mandated leading role and the occupancy of all senior
government positions by party members ensure the primacy of party
Politburo guidelines, and enable the party to set the broad parameters
of national policy. During the year, the Party continued to reduce
gradually its formal involvement in government operations and allowed
the Government to exercise significant discretion in implementing
policy. The National Assembly remains subject to party direction;
however, the Government made progress in strengthening the capacity of
the National Assembly and in reforming the bureaucracy. The National
Assembly, chosen in elections in which most candidates are approved by
the party (not all delegates are party members), played an increasingly
independent role as a forum for local and provincial concerns and as a
critic of local and national corruption and inefficiency. The Assembly
was more active in revising legislation, screening ministerial and
other senior candidate appointments, and dismissing senior officers.
The judiciary remains subservient to the VCP.
The military services, including the border defense force, are
responsible for defense against external threats. The military forces
are assuming a less prominent role as the ultimate guarantor of
internal security, which is primarily the responsibility of the
Ministry of Public Security. However, in some remote areas, the
military forces are the primary government agency, providing
infrastructure and all public safety functions, including maintaining
public order in the event of civil unrest. The Government continued to
restrict significantly civil liberties on grounds of national security.
The Government's Ministry of Public Security controls the police, a
special national security investigative agency, and other units that
maintain internal security. The Ministry of Public Security enforces
laws and regulations that significantly restrict individual liberties
and violate other human rights. The Ministry of Public Security
maintains a system of household registration and block wardens to
monitor the population, concentrating on those suspected of engaging,
or being likely to engage in, unauthorized political activities.
However, this system has become less obvious and pervasive in its
intrusion into citizens' daily lives. Members of the security forces
committed human rights abuses.
Vietnam is a very poor country undergoing transition from a
centrally planned to a market-oriented economy. Estimated annual gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita is $330, up between 4 and 5 percent
from 1998 according to government statistics. The Asian financial
crisis caused a significant slowdown; trade and foreign investment
declined markedly. Agriculture, primarily wet rice cultivation, employs
70 percent of the labor force, but accounts for a shrinking part (24
percent) of total output. Industry and construction contribute 34
percent, while services account for 42 percent. Disbursed official
development assistance in 1998 was $939 million, roughly 4 percent of
GDP. Particularly in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, economic reforms have
raised the standard of living and reduced party and governmental
control over, and intrusion into, citizens' daily lives. Reforms have
created a popular expectation in urban areas of continued social,
legal, educational, and physical improvements. For many large rural
populations close to larger cities, this is also true. Many citizens in
isolated rural areas, especially members of ethnic minorities in the
northern uplands, central highlands, and the north central coastal
regions, live in extreme poverty. Gains from agricultural reform in
recent years have improved the lot of many farmers, but the rural
poverty level is approximately 30 percent.
The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there
was some measurable improvement in a few areas, the situation worsened
in others, and serious problems remain. The Government continued to
repress basic political and some religious freedoms and to commit
numerous abuses. Although the VCP continued its efforts to reform
procedures and internal debate and to allow a mechanism for citizens to
petition the Government with complaints, the Government continued to
deny citizens the right to change their government. Prison conditions
remain harsh. There were credible reports that security officials beat
detainees. The Government arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens,
including detention for peaceful expression of political and religious
views. For example, geophysicist Nguyen Thanh Giang was detained for 2
months for writing letters calling for pluralism and respect for human
rights. The Government denied citizens the right to fair and
expeditious trials and continued to hold a number of political
prisoners. The Government restricts significantly citizens' privacy
rights, although the trend toward reduced government interference in
the daily lives of most citizens continued. TheGovernment significantly
restricts freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and association. The
Government continued its longstanding policy of not tolerating most
types of public dissent, although it made exceptions in some instances.
For example, a number of persons circulated letters that were highly
critical of senior leaders and called for political reform; these
authors were subjected to close surveillance by public security forces.
The Government allowed citizens somewhat greater freedom of expression
and assembly to express grievances, including by delegates in the
National Assembly, citizens in local forums with delegates, and small
groups of protesters outside government offices. The Government
prohibited independent political, labor, and social organizations; such
organizations exist only under government control. The Government
restricts freedom of religion and significantly restricts the operation
of religious organizations other than those entities approved by the
State. However, in some respects, conditions for religious freedom
improved during the year. For example, a Hoa Hao organization was
recognized for the first time officially. In July a festival gathering
of up to 500,000 Hoa Hao in An Giang province took place and in August,
an estimated 200,000 Roman Catholics attended the annual La Vang
pilgrimage. The Government imposes some limits on freedom of movement.
Societal discrimination and violence against women remained problems.
Trafficking in women and children for the purpose of prostitution
within the country and abroad continued to grow, and there were reports
of the increased trafficking of women to China for forced marriages.
The Government made efforts to combat these problems. Discrimination
against ethnic minorities and child labor are problems. There were some
reports of forced child labor and that certain prisons employed forced
labor, sometimes as part of commercial ventures. The Government
restricts worker rights.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no known
politically motivated killings. Little information was available on the
extent of deaths in police custody or on official investigations into
such incidents.
There were no reports of deaths of inmates due to prison conditions
during the year.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits physical abuse; however, police beat
persons, including suspects during arrests, and also beat street
children in their attempts to get them off the streets. There were no
known reports of torture of detainees. Little information is available
on the extent of police brutality during interrogations.
Prison conditions are harsh. Conditions generally did not threaten
the lives of prisoners, although anecdotal evidence suggests that the
death rate among male prisoners was higher than among female prisoners.
Overcrowding, insufficient diet, and poor sanitation remained serious
problems. Conditions in pretrial detention reportedly were particularly
harsh, and there were credible reports that authorities sometimes
denied inmates access to sunlight, exercise, and reading material. Most
prisoners had access to basic health care and, for those with money, to
supplemental food and medicine. However, some political prisoners were
denied visitation rights, and there were reports that some prisons
employed the use of forced labor, sometimes as part of commercial
ventures (see Section 6.c.). Prisoners sentenced to hard labor
complained that their diet and medical care were insufficient to
sustain health, especially in remote, disease-ridden areas. Several
political prisoners with serious medical conditions were held under
harsh conditions in remote prisons, with limited access to medical
care. For example, Do Van Thac, sentenced to 14 (reduced to 12) years'
imprisonment on charges of attempting to overthrow the Government,
remained imprisoned in remote Nam Ha province, despite reports that he
had suffered a stroke and had heart disease.
The Government did not permit independent monitoring of its prison
and detention system.
d. Arbitrary arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government continued
to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily, including arrest and
detention for the peaceful expression of their political and religious
views. The 1990 Criminal Procedures Code provides for various rights of
detainees, including time limits on pretrial detention and the right of
the accused to have a lawyer present during interrogation; however, in
practice the authorities often ignored these legal safeguards.
Moreover, a 1997 directive on administrative detention gives security
officials broad powers to monitor citizens closely and control where
they live and work for up to 2 years if they are believed to be
threatening ``national security.''
The Government continued to utilize its l997 decree on
``administrative detention,'' which gives authorities extremely broad
powers to place persons under surveillance, and to monitor citizens
closely. However, the regulations define administrative detention as an
administrative penalty imposed on persons who break the law and violate
national security, as determined by the definition of crimes in the
Criminal Code, but whose offenses are not yet at the level that
warrants ``criminal responsibility.'' Persons under administrative
detention must live and work in a designated locality and remain
subject to the management and education of the local authorities and
population. These measures are used against suspected political
dissidents. The time span of administrative detention ranges from 6
months to 2 years; the regulations apply also to persons under 18 years
of age. The Ministry of Public Security is the lead agency in
implementing the decree.
The Supreme People's Procuracy approves the issuance of arrest
warrants, but law enforcement officials appear able to arrest and
incarcerate persons without presenting arrest warrants. Once arrested,
detainees often are held for lengthy periods without formal charges or
trial. In general time spent in pretrial detention counts toward time
served upon conviction and sentencing.
Geophysicist Nguyen Thanh Giang was detained for 2 months during
the period from March to May for circulating letters calling for
pluralism and respect for human rights. After his release, he was
informed by police in writing that he could not leave Hanoi without
permission. Protestant pastors Tran Dinh ``Paul'' Ai and Lo Van Hen
were detained and questioned by police in Hanoi after a religious
training course that they were leading was raided by local police in
May. Ai was forced to remain in a government-run hotel, at his own
expense, and appear for daily questioning by police for more than 2
weeks regarding his religious activities, and Hen, a member of the
Black Tai ethnic minority, was returned to Dien Bien Phu for further
questioning by police. Both were released in May after paying fines for
participating in an illegal religious meeting (see Section 2.c.). In
December Ai and his family obtained Vietnamese passports and traveled
abroad on a religious worker visa.
There were credible reports that during the year more than 25 Hmong
Protestants were detained illegally in Lai Chau province. Of these, 15
were released by year's end. Among those who remained in detention
were: Sinh Phay Pao, Va Sinh Giay, Vang Sua Giang, and Phang A Dong
(see Section 2.c.).
Persons arrested for the peaceful expression of views opposed to
official policy were subject to charge under any one of several
provisions in the criminal code that outlaw acts against the state.
No official statistics are available on the percentage of the
prison population that consists of pretrial detainees or the average
period of time that such detainees have been held.
It is difficult to determine the exact number of political
detainees, in part because the Government usually does not publicize
such arrests and because the Government does not consider these persons
to be detained for political reasons.
The Government continued to isolate certain political and religious
dissidents by placing restrictions on the movements of some dissidents
and by pressuring the supporters and family members of others. For the
past 5 years, Thich Huyen Quang, the Supreme Patriarch of the Unified
Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV), has been at a pagoda in Quang Ngai
province under conditions resembling administrative detention. From
1981 until 1994, he was held at another pagoda in that province. In
March he was visited by senior UBCV leader Thich Quang Do for the first
time in 18 years, but after 3 days of meetings both were held for
questioning by police, and Thich Quang Do was escorted by police to his
pagoda in Ho Chi Minh City. Thich Huyen Quang has confirmed that he
must request permission before leaving thepagoda and is not allowed to
lead prayers or participate in worship activities as a monk. He is able
to receive visits from sympathetic monks, sometimes several per week;
UBCV monk Thich Khong Thanh visited in November. After meeting with
him, visitors are questioned by police. Thich Huyen Quang has called
for the Government to recognize the UBCV. He is receiving good medical
care. In December, because of heavy flooding in the province, police
temporarily evacuated him from the pagoda, then returned him there 2
days later, after the waters receded.
Family members of Nguyen Dan Que in Ho Chi Minh City were
questioned by police, their telephone service was suspended
periodically, and the family's Internet account also was suspended
following the publication abroad in May of several of his writings
critical of the Government.
Cao Daists Le Kim Bien and Pham Cong Hien in Kien Giang province
were sentenced during the year to 2 years' imprisonment. They had been
detained since October 1998. They had requested to meet with visiting
United Nations Special Rapporteur Amor.
An ethnic Hre church leader, Dinh Troi, remained in detention in
Quang Ngai province at year's end; two of his church colleagues, Dinh
Bim and Dinh Hay, were released in July and September, respectively.
In 1998 the Government released two dozen political and religious
prisoners. Prior to their release, long-time political prisoners Doan
Viet Hoat and Nguyen Dan Que were told by public security officials
that they would have to leave the country in order to be released. Hoat
agreed and left the country. Que refused to leave the country, but was
released from prison despite his refusal. He now lives in Ho Chi Minh
City.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Although the Constitution provides
for the independence of judges and jurors, in practice the Party
controls the courts closely at all levels, selecting judges primarily
for their political reliability. Credible reports indicate that party
officials, including top leaders, instruct courts how to rule on
politically important cases. The National Assembly votes for candidates
that are presented by the President for Supreme People's Court
president and Supreme People's procurator. The President appoints all
other judges.
The court system consists of the Supreme People's Court in Hanoi,
provincial courts, district courts, and military tribunals. The Supreme
People's Court can review cases from the lower courts or tribunals.
Separately, economic courts handle commercial disputes. Administrative
courts deal with complaints by citizens about official abuse and
corruption. The economic and administrative courts have addressed few
cases since their creation in 1994 and 1995, respectively. Local mass
organizations, such as those under the Fatherland Front, are empowered
to deal with minor breaches of law or disputes.
The Supreme People's Procuracy has unchecked power to bring charges
against the accused and serves as prosecutor during trials. A judging
council, made up of a judge and one or more people's jurors (lay
judges), determines guilt or innocence and also passes sentence on the
convicted. The relevant people's council appoints people's jurors, who
are required to have high moral standards but need not have legal
training.
The Government continued its effort to develop the legal system as
part of expanding the rule of law. In May the National Assembly passed
a new enterprise law that broadened the legal framework supporting
private businesses. A 1998 commercial code helps regulate business
transactions. Many judges and other court officials lacked adequate
legal training, and the Government conducted training programs to
address this problem. A number of foreign governments and the U.N.
Development Program provided assistance to the Government to strengthen
rule of law and develop a more effective judiciary. However, the lack
of openness in the judicial process and the continuing lack of
independence of the judiciary undermined the Government's efforts to
develop a fair, effective judicial system.
Trials generally are open to the public, although judicial
authorities sometimes closed trials or strictly limited attendance in
sensitive cases. Defendants have the right to be present at their trial
and to have a lawyer. The defendant or the defense lawyer have the
right to cross-examine witnesses. However, in political cases, there
are credible reports that defendants are not allowed access to
government evidence in advance of the trial, to cross-examine
witnesses, or to challenge statements. Little information is available
on theextent to which defendants and their lawyers have time to prepare
for trials. Those convicted have the right to appeal. On December 27,
Nguyen Thi Thuy, a Protestant house church leader in Phu Tho province
was sentenced to 1 year in prison for ``interfering with an officer
doing his duty.'' Thuy had been arrested in October when police raided
a house church meeting that she was hosting. Church sources stated that
her defense lawyer provided only a superficial defense at the trial.
The Government continued to imprison persons for the peaceful
expression of dissenting religious and political views. There are no
reliable estimates of the number of political prisoners, in part
because the Government usually does not publicize such arrests and
frequently conducts closed trials and sentencing sessions. In 1998
Amnesty international listed more than 40 prisoners held for political
reasons, but suggested that the total may be higher. Other sources put
the figure at from 100 to 150 persons. The Government claims that it
does not hold any political prisoners and that persons described as
political prisoners were convicted of violating national security laws.
Among those believed to be imprisoned at year's end for peaceful
political activities are: Do Van Hung, Do Van Thac, Nguyen Dinh Huy,
Nguyen Ngoc Tan, Pham Hong Tho, Pham Quang Tin, and Vo Van Pham. Among
those believed to be held at year's end for religious offenses are:
UBCV monks Thich Thien Minh and Thich Hue Dang, and Thich Thanh Quang,
held in administrative detention; Catholic priests Reverends Mai Duc
Choung (Mai Huu Nghi), Pham Minh Tri, Nguyen Van De, Pham Ngoc Lien,
Nguyen Thien Phung, and Nguyen Minh Quan; Cao Dai provincial leaders Le
Kim Bien, Pham Cong Hien, Lam Thai The, Do Hoang Giam, and Van Hoa Vui;
Hoa Hao leader Le Minh Triet (Tu Triet); about 10 Hmong Protestant
Christians in Lai Chau and Ha Giang provinces, including Sung Phai Dia,
Vu Gian Thao, Vang Gia Chua, Sung Va Tung, Sung Seo Chinh, Sinh Phay
Pao, and Va Sinh Giay. Credible reports from multiple sources suggest
that at the beginning of the year, there were more than 25 Hmong
Protestants imprisoned in Ha Giang province after being charged either
with ``teaching religion illegally'' or ``abusing the rights of a
citizen to cause social unrest.'' By year's end, Vietnamese church
leaders reported that 15 Hmong Protestants had been released, including
Ly A Giang, Giang A To, Giang A Cat, Cha A Cua, Thao A Chinh, Ma Truong
Chinh, and Giang A Vang (see Section 2.c.).
No current information is available concerning imprisoned
dissidents Nguyen Van Thuan and Le Duc Vaong who were arrested in 1998.
As part of a national day amnesty on September 2, the Government
commuted the prison sentences of 1,712 prisoners and released them
early for good behavior. However, unlike 1998, there apparently were no
political or religious prisoners included in this amnesty.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy of
home and correspondence; however, the Government restricts this right
significantly. It operates a nationwide system of surveillance and
control through household registration and block wardens who use
informants to keep track of individuals' activities. The authorities
continued to monitor citizens, but with less vigor and efficiency than
in the past, as they focused on persons with what they regarded as
dissident views, whom they suspected of involvement in unauthorized
political or religious activities. Citizens formally are required to
register with police when they leave home, remain in another location
overnight, or when they change their residence (see Section 2.d.).
However, these requirements rarely are enforced, since many citizens
move around the country to seek work or to visit family and friends
without being monitored closely. However, there were reports that some
families have been unable to obtain household registration or residence
permits, causing serious legal and administrative problems. In urban
areas, most citizens were free to maintain contact and work with
foreigners, but police questioned some individual citizens and families
of citizens with extensive or close relations with foreigners. The
Government also exerts control over citizens who work for foreign
organizations by requiring that citizens be vetted and hired through a
government service bureau. However, many foreign organizations hire
their own personnel and only ``register'' them with the service bureau.
The Government opened and censored targeted persons' mail,
confiscated packages, and monitored telephone, electronic mail, and
facsimile transmissions. The Party exerted little pressure on citizens
to belong to one or more mass organizations, which exist for villages,
city districts, schools, workers (trade unions), youth, veterans, and
women. Membership in the VCPremains an aid to advancement in the
Government or in state companies and is vital for promotion to senior
levels of the Government. At the same time, diversification of the
economy has made membership in mass organizations and the VCP less
essential to financial and social advancement.
The Government continued to implement a family planning policy that
urges all families to have no more than two children; this policy
emphasizes exhortation rather than coercion. In principle the
Government can deny promotions and salary increases to government
employees with more than two children, and local regulations permit
fines based on the cost of extra social services incurred by a larger
family. In practice these penalties rarely are enforced. For others,
there are no penalties for those with more than two children, but local
regulations permit fines based on the cost of extra social services
incurred by the larger family or reductions in state subsidies for
those services. These penalties are not applied uniformly or
universally.
Foreign language periodicals are widely available in cities, and
the Government only rarely censors articles about the country that are
available for sale.
The Government allows access to the Internet and owns and controls
the country's only Internet access provider, Vietnam Data
Communications. Four Internet service providers compete for
subscribers. (A fifth provider, Vietel, owned by the military services,
is inactive.) There are roughly 28,000 Internet subscribers and an
increasing number of cyber cafes in major cities. The Government
appeared to limit access to those persons who are allowed to have
Internet accounts. However, in their homes and in certain settings such
as universities, students have widespread access to the Internet. The
Government uses firewalls to block access to some sites operated by
Vietnamese exile groups abroad. Vietnam Data Communications is
authorized by the Government to monitor the sites that subscribers
access. Ho Chi Minh City police interrupted and periodically suspended
Nguyen Dan Que's Internet service after he circulated articles critical
of the Government (see Section 1.d.). By law access to satellite
television was limited to top officials, foreigners, luxury hotels, and
the press. The law was not enforced uniformly, and some persons in
urban and rural areas have access via home satellite equipment.
The Government generally did not limit access to international
radio; however, it jammed Radio Free Asia.
In July Binh Phuoc provincial authorities demolished three
Protestant churches. However, following the intervention of the central
Government, the provincial official responsible for the destruction of
these churches was removed from office. There were no further church
demolitions (see Section 2.c.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government severely
limits these freedoms, especially concerning political and religious
subjects. Reporters and editors practiced self-censorship concerning
sensitive subjects. A new press law, passed by the National Assembly in
May, provides for monetary damages to be paid by journalists to
individuals or organizations who are harmed by reporting, regardless of
whether the reports are true or false. The media continued to publish
articles that criticized party and government actions; however, the
freedom to criticize the Communist Party and its leadership continued
to be restricted.
Both the Constitution and the criminal code include broad national
security and antidefamation provisions that the Government used to
limit such freedoms strictly. The Party and Government tolerate public
discussion and permit somewhat more criticism than in the past. In
December the Government established a mechanism for citizens to
petition the Government with complaints. Citizens could and did
complain openly about inefficient government, administrative
procedures, corruption, and economic policy. However, the Government
imposed limits in these areas as well.
The Government requires journalists to obtain approval from the
Ministry of Culture and Information before providing any information to
foreign journalists.
Retired General and war hero Tran Do was expelled from the
Communist Party in January after he refused to cease circulating
writings critical of the Party and the Government. In July Tran Do
submitted an application to publish an independent newspaper,but the
authorities refused to grant him permission to do so. Foreign diplomats
are not allowed to visit Tran Do.
The Government continued to prohibit free speech that strayed
outside narrow limits to question the role of the Party, criticize
individual government leaders, promote pluralism or multiparty
democracy, or questioned the regime's policies on sensitive matters
such as human rights. The few persons who spoke out on these matters,
such as Nguyen Dan Que and Thich Quang Do, were subjected to
questioning and close monitoring by security officials. There continued
to be an ambiguous line between what constituted private speech about
sensitive matters, which the authorities would tolerate, and public
speech in those areas, which they would not. Several authors whose
works attracted official censure in past years continued to be denied
permission to publish, to speak publicly, or to travel abroad. Security
forces harassed novelist Duong Thu Huong, and authorities would not
issue her a passport. Some persons who express dissident opinions on
religious or political issues are not allowed to travel abroad (see
Section 2.d.).
The Party, the Government, and party-controlled mass organizations
controlled all print and electronic media. The Government exercises
oversight through the Ministry of Culture and Information, supplemented
by pervasive party guidance and national security legislation
sufficiently broad to ensure effective self-censorship in the domestic
media. With apparent party approval, several newspapers published
reports on high-level government corruption and mismanagement as well
as sometimes-heated debate on economic policy. The Government
occasionally censors articles about the country in foreign periodicals
that are sold in the country. The Government generally did not limit
access to international radio, except to Radio Free Asia, which it
jammed (see Section l.f.).
Foreign journalists must be approved by the Foreign Ministry's
Press Center and must be based in Hanoi. Two Western foreign
correspondents were forced to curtail their assignments in Vietnam. The
first, based in Hanoi for several years for a wire service, was forced
to leave after his bureau chief was informed by the Press Center that
the length of his visa was being shortened because of the critical
nature of his reporting. The second was required to leave before his
temporary assignment was completed. The number of foreign staff allowed
each foreign media organization is limited, and most Vietnamese staff
who work for foreign media are provided by the Foreign Ministry. All
foreign correspondents are required to base themselves in Hanoi. The
Press Center monitors journalists' activities and decides on a case-by-
case basis whether to approve their interview, photograph, film, or
travel requests, all of which must be submitted 5 days in advance.
Foreign Ministry officials no longer accompany foreign journalists on
all interviews. The Government censored television footage and delayed
export of footage by several days.
The Government allowed artists some latitude in choosing the themes
of their works. Many artists received permission to exhibit their works
abroad, receiving exit permits to attend the exhibits and export
permits to send their works out of the country. Artists are not allowed
to exhibit works of art that censors regard as criticizing or
ridiculing the Government or the Party. Authorities required a foreign-
produced film, parts of which had been filmed in Vietnam, to be
censored in two places before allowing it to be shown publicly in the
country. However, the Government permitted a more open flow of
information within the country and into the country from abroad,
including the university system. Foreign academic professionals
temporarily working at universities stated that they were able to
discuss nonpolitical issues widely and freely in the classroom.
Government monitors regularly attended, without official notification,
classes taught by foreigners and citizens. Academic publications
usually reflected the views of the Party and the Government and
exhibited greater freedom for differing views on nonpolitical subjects
than for political ones.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The right of
assembly is restricted in law and practice. Persons who wish to gather
in a group are required to apply for a permit, which local authorities
can issue or deny arbitrarily. However, persons routinely gather in
informal groups without government interference. During the year there
were a number of small protests (of from 10 to 25 persons) outside
government and party office buildings and the National Assembly Hall.
These protests usually focused on local grievances, and the authorities
generally allowed them to run their course without interference.
Similarly, a group of up to 50 protesters demonstrated peacefully in
public in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City including once demonstrating in
front of a Western diplomaticmission in Ho Chi Minh City. However, the
Government does not permit demonstrations that could be seen as having
a political purpose. Although it was more tolerant than in the past of
occasional demonstrations by citizens about specific grievances against
local officials, the Government did not tolerate extended
demonstrations. The Government allowed large gatherings of Roman
Catholic and Hoa Hao religious believers for preapproved festivals (see
Section 2.c.).
The Government restricts freedom of association. With a few
exceptions, the Government prohibits the establishment of private,
independent organizations, insisting that persons work within
established, party-controlled organizations, often under the aegis of
the Fatherland Front. Citizens are prohibited from establishing
independent organizations such as political parties, labor unions, and
religious or veterans' organizations. Such organizations exist only
under government control.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Both the Constitution and government
decrees provide for freedom of worship; however, the Government
continued to restrict significantly those organized activities of
religious groups that it defined as being at variance with state laws
and policies. The Government generally allowed persons to practice
individual worship in the religion of their choice, and participation
in religious activities throughout the country continued to grow
significantly. However, government regulations control religious
hierarchies and organized religious activities, in part because the
Communist Party fears that organized religion may weaken its authority
and influence by serving as political, social, and spiritual
alternatives to the authority of the central Government.
The Government requires religious groups to be registered and uses
this process to control and monitor church organizations. Officially
recognized religious organizations are able to operate openly, and they
must consult with the Government about their religious operations,
although not about their religious tenets of faith. In general
religious organizations are confined to dealing specifically with
spiritual and organizational matters. The Government holds conferences
to discuss and publicize its religion decrees.
Religious organizations must obtain government permission to hold
training seminars, conventions, and celebrations outside the regular
religious calendar, to build or remodel places of worship, to engage in
charitable activities or operate religious schools, and to train,
ordain, promote, or transfer clergy. Many of these restrictive powers
lie principally with provincial or city people's committees, and local
treatment of religious persons varied widely. In some areas such as Ho
Chi Minh City, local officials allowed religious persons wide latitude
in practicing their faith, including allowing some educational and
humanitarian activities. However, in other areas such as the northwest
provinces, local officials allowed believers little discretion in the
practice of their faith. In general religious groups faced difficulty
in obtaining teaching materials, expanding training facilities,
publishing religious materials, and expanding the clergy in training in
response to increased demand from congregations.
The Government officially recognizes Buddhist, Roman Catholic,
Protestant, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Muslim religious organizations.
However, some Buddhists, Protestants, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao believers do
not recognize or participate in the government-approved associations
and thus are not considered legal by the authorities.
Among the country's religious communities, Buddhism is the dominant
religious belief. Many believers practice an amalgam of Mahayana
Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucian traditions that sometimes is called
Vietnam's ``triple religion.'' Three-fourths of the population of
approximately 80 million persons are at least nominally Buddhist, visit
pagodas on festival days, and have a world view that is shaped in part
by Buddhism. One prominent Buddhist official estimated that 30 percent
of Buddhists are devout and practice their faith regularly. The
Government's Office of Religious Affairs uses a much lower estimate of
7 million practicing Buddhists. Mahayana Buddhists, most of whom are
part of the ethnic Kinh majority, are found throughout the country,
especially in the populous areas of the northern and southern delta
regions. There are proportionately fewer Buddhists in certain highlands
and central lowlands areas, although migration of Kinh to highland
areas is changing the distribution somewhat.
A Khmer minority in the south practices Theravada Buddhism.
Numbering from perhaps 700,000 to 1 million persons, they live almost
exclusively in the Mekong delta.
The Government requires all Buddhist monks to work under a party-
controlled umbrella organization, the Central Buddhist Church of
Vietnam. The Government opposed efforts by the non-government-
sanctioned Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV) to operate
independently, and tension between the Government and the UBCV
continued. Several prominent UBCV monks, including Thich Quang Do, were
released in wide-ranging government amnesties in September and October
1998.
The Government continued to isolate certain political and religious
dissidents by placing restrictions on the movements of some dissidents
and by pressuring the supporters and family members of others. For the
past 5 years, Thich Huyen Quang, the Supreme Patriarch of the Unified
Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV), has been at a pagoda in Quang Ngai
province under conditions resembling administrative detention. From
1981 until 1994, he was held at another pagoda in that province. In
March he was visited by senior UBCV leader Thich Quang Do for the first
time in 18 years, but after 3 days of meetings both were held for
questioning by police, and Thich Quang Do was escorted by police to his
pagoda in Ho Chi Minh City. Thich Huyen Quang has confirmed that he
must request permission before leaving the pagoda and is not allowed to
lead prayers or participate in worship activities as a monk. He is able
to receive visits from sympathetic monks, sometimes several per week;
UBCV monk Thich Khong Thanh visited in November. After meeting with
him, visitors are questioned by police. Thich Huyen Quang has called
for the Government to recognize the UBCV. He is receiving good medical
care. In December, because of heavy flooding in the province, police
temporarily evacuated him from the pagoda, then returned him there 2
days later, after the waters receded.
In September Thich Quang Do complained that fellow UBCV monk Thich
Khong Tanh was summoned by police for questioning in Ho Chi Minh City.
There are an estimated 6 to 7 million Roman Catholics in the
country (about 8 percent of the population). The largest concentrations
are in southern provinces around Ho Chi Minh City, with other large
groups in the northern and central coastal lowlands. In recent years,
the Government eased its efforts to control the Roman Catholic
hierarchy by relaxing the requirements that all clergy belong to the
government-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association. Few clergy
actually belonged to this association.
Authorities allowed the Vatican's ordination of a new archbishop in
Ho Chi Minh City in 1998, as well as the ordination of five bishops in
other dioceses in 1998 and 1999. A high-level Vatican envoy visited the
country in March. A number of bishops traveled to Rome for a synod of
Asian bishops. Up to 200,000 Catholics gathered in August at an annual
Marian celebration in La Vang in the central part of the country and
celebrated their faith freely there.
The local Catholic Church hierarchy remained frustrated by the
Government's restrictions but has learned to accommodate itself to them
for many years. A number of clergy reported a modest easing of
government control over church activities in certain dioceses. The
Government relaxed its outright prohibition on the Catholic Church's
involvement in religious education and charitable activities but still
restricted such activity.
The degree of government control of church activities varied
greatly among localities. In some areas, especially in the south,
churches and religious groups operated kindergartens and engaged in a
variety of humanitarian projects. At least six priests belonging to the
Congregation of the Mother Co-redemptrix reportedly remain imprisoned.
The Government allowed many bishops and priests to travel freely
within their dioceses and allowed greater, but still restricted,
freedom for travel outside these areas, particularly in many ethnic
areas. The Government discourages priests from entering Son La and Lai
Chau provinces. Upon return from international travel during the year,
citizens, including clergy, officially were required to surrender their
passports; this law is enforced unevenly. Some persons who express
dissident opinions on religious or political issues are not allowed to
travel abroad (see Section 2.d.). Seminaries throughout the country
have approximately 500 students enrolled. The Government limits the
Church to operating 6 major seminaries and to recruit new seminarians
only every 2 years. All students must be approved by the Government,
both upon entering the seminary and prior to their ordination as
priests. The Church believes that thenumber of graduating students is
insufficient to support the growing Catholic population.
There are approximately 600,000 Protestants in the country (less
than 1 percent of the population), with more than half these persons
belonging to a large number of unregistered evangelical ``house
churches'' that operate in members'' homes or in rural villages, many
of them in ethnic minority areas. Perhaps 150,000 of the followers of
house churches are Pentecostals, who celebrate ``gifts of the spirit''
through charismatic and ecstatic rites of worship.
The network of Tin Lanh (Good News) churches, originally founded by
the Christian and Missionary Alliance early in the 20th century,
generally operated with greater freedom than did the house churches.
The roughly 300 Tin Lanh churches in the country are concentrated in
the major cities, including Ho Chi Minh City, Danang, Hanoi, and in
lowland areas. Some 15 Tin Lanh churches in the northern provinces are
the only officially recognized Protestant churches.
Reports from believers indicated that Protestant church attendance
grew substantially, especially among the house churches, despite
continued government restrictions on proselytizing activities. The
Government restricts Protestant congregations from cooperating on joint
religious observances or other activities, although in some localities
there was greater freedom to do so. There is some ecumenical networking
among Protestants, particularly in Ho Chi Minh City.
Based on believers' estimates, two-thirds of Protestants are
members of ethnic minorities, including ethnic Hmong (some 120,000
followers) in the northwest provinces and some 200,000 members of
ethnic minority groups of the central highlands (Ede, Jarai, Bahnar,
and Koho, among others). The house churches in ethnic minority areas
have been growing rapidly in recent years, sparked in part by radio
broadcasts in ethnic minority languages from the Philippines. This
growth has led to tensions with local officials in some provinces.
There have been crackdowns on leaders of these churches, particularly
among the Hmong in the northwest. The secretive nature of the house
churches, particularly among ethnic minorities, has contributed to
greater repression against these groups. Provincial officials in
certain northwest provinces do not allow churches or pagodas to operate
and have arrested and imprisoned believers for practicing their faith
nonviolently in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
The authorities in the northwest provinces severely restrict the
religious freedom of evangelical Protestants, including ethnic Hmong
and ethnic Tai. Credible reports from multiple sources stated that at
the beginning of the year, there were more than 25 Hmong Protestants
imprisoned primarily in Lai Chau province for ``teaching religion
illegally'' or ``abusing the rights of a citizen to cause social
unrest.''
Following protests by church leaders and international attention to
the detentions, Protestant church leaders reported that 15 of the
detainees had been released by year's end. Among the remaining
detainees were four Hmong Protestant leaders: Sinh Phay Pao, Va Sinh
Giay, Vang Sua Giang, and Phang A Dong. These persons had been arrested
in Ha Giang province late in the year. Phang A Dong was charged with
illegally traveling to China without a visa or passport.
The Government's repression of the Hmong is complicated by several
factors which include religious practices. Some Hmong citizens fought
against the Government in the past, and they live in sensitive border
regions with China and Laos, which together lead the Government to
question their loyalty. Among the Hmong there are two distinct
religious groups: One group's members follow a traditional form of
Christianity, and another group's beliefs are characterized by an
element that is cultic in nature. The latter group's eschatological
world view includes a predicted cataclysmic event in 2000. However, the
Government does not differentiate between the two groups; their beliefs
exacerbate the authorities' anxiety about the Hmong.
In December Nguyen Thi Thuy, a Protestant house church leader in
Phu Tho province, was sentenced to 1 year's imprisonment for
``interfering with an officer doing his duty.'' Thuy was arrested
during a police raid on her home, where she was leading a Bible study
group.
An ethnic Hre church leader, Dinh Troi, remained in detention in
Quang Ngai province at year's end; two of his church colleagues, Dinh
Bim and Dinh Hay, were released in July and September, respectively.
In July Binh Phuoc provincial authorities demolished three
Protestant churches. Their congregations, composed of ethnic Mnong and
Stieng Christians, protested to the central government authorities and
the international community. Church officials reported that the central
authorities intervened to prevent the further razing of churches. In
December the provincial official responsible was removed from office.
Binh Phuoc province Christians reported that they were able to
celebrate Christmas openly and peacefully.
The Government's Office of Religious Affairs estimates that there
are 1.1 million Cao Dai followers (just over 1 percent of the
population). Some nongovernmental organization (NGO) sources estimate
that there may be from 2 to 3 million followers. Cao Dai groups are
most active in Tay Ninh province, where the Cao Dai holy see is
located, and in Ho Chi Minh City, the Mekong delta, and Hanoi. There
are separate sects within the Cao Dai religion, which is syncretistic,
combining elements of many faiths. Its basic belief system is
influenced strongly by Mahayana Buddhism, although it recognizes a
diverse array of persons who have conveyed divine revelation, including
Siddhartha, Jesus, Lao-Tse, Confucius, and Moses.
A government-controlled management committee has been established
with full powers to control the affairs of the Cao Dai faith, thereby
managing the church's operations, its hierarchy, and its clergy.
Independent church officials oppose the edicts of this committee as not
being faithful to Cao Dai principles and traditions. Despite the
Government's statement in 1997 that it had recognized the Cao Dai
church legally and encouraged Cao Dai believers to expand their groups
and practice their faith, many top-level clerical positions remain
vacant, and some believers were detained arbitrarily. In October 1998,
the authorities detained two Cao Daists in Kien Giang province, Le Kim
Bien and Pham Cong Hien, who sought to meet with U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance Abdelfattah Amor. They were
sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment. Three Cao Daists, Lam Thai The, Do
Hoang Giam, and Van Hoa Vui, arrested several years ago, remain
imprisoned in Xuan Loc prison in Dong Nai province. Ly Cong Cuong, a
Cao Daist arrested in 1983 in An Giang province, was released in July.
Hoa Hao, considered by its followers to be a ``reform'' branch of
Buddhism, was founded in the southern part of the country in 1939. Hoa
Hao is a privatistic faith that does not have a priesthood and rejects
many of the ceremonial aspects of mainstream Buddhism. Hoa Hao
followers are concentrated in the Mekong delta, particularly in
provinces such as An Giang, where the Hoa Hao were dominant as a
political and religious force before 1975. According to the Office on
Religious Affairs, there are 1.3 million Hoa Hao believers; church-
affiliated expatriate groups suggest that there may be 2 million to 3
million. A government-organized group of 160 Hoa Hao held a congress in
May in An Giang. The congress established an 11-member committee to
oversee the administrative affairs of the religion. Establishment of
the committee constituted official governmental recognition of the
religion for the first time in 25 years.
The Hoa Hao have faced restrictions on their religious and
political activities since 1975 because of their previous armed
opposition to the Communist forces. Since 1975 all administrative
offices, places of worship, and social and cultural institutions
connected to the faith have been closed, thereby limiting public
religious functions. Believers continue to practice their religion at
home. The lack of access to public gathering places has contributed to
the Hoa Hao community's isolation and fragmentation. In July, following
official recognition of a Hoa Hao religious organization, up to 500,000
Hoa Hao believers gathered for a religious festival in An Giang
province in the largest Hoa Hao gathering since 1975. The authorities
continue to restrict the distribution of the sacred scriptures of the
Hoa Hao, and believers say that a number of church leaders continue to
be detained. One prominent Hoa Hao activist, Tran Huu Duyen, was
released in the September 1998 prisoner amnesty.
Mosques serving the country's small Muslim population, estimated at
100,000 persons, operate in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and several
provinces in the southern part of the country. The Muslim community
comprises ethnic Vietnamese, ethnic Cham in the southern coastal
provinces and western Mekong delta, and migrants originally from
Malaysia, Indonesia, and India. Most practice Sunni Islam.
The Muslim Association of Vietnam was banned in 1975 but authorized
again in 1992. It is the only official Muslim organization. Association
leaders say that they are able to practice their faith, including daily
prayer, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and the pilgrimage to
Mecca, Saudi Arabia.The Government no longer has a policy of
restricting exit permits to prevent Muslims from making the Hajj. About
1 dozen Muslims made the Hajj to Mecca during 1998.
There are a variety of smaller religious communities. An estimated
8,000 Hindus are concentrated in the south, including some ethnic Chams
on the south central coast who practice Hinduism.
There are several hundred members of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) who are spread throughout the country,
primarily in the Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi areas.
The prominent position of Buddhism does not affect religious
freedom for others adversely, including those who wish not to practice
a religion. The secular government does not favor a particular
religion. Of the country's 80 million citizens, 14 million or more
reportedly do not appear to practice any organized religion. Some
sources define strictly those considered to be practicing Buddhists,
excluding those whose activities are limited to visiting pagodas on
ceremonial holidays; using this definition, the number of nonreligious
persons would be much higher--perhaps up to 50 million persons.
In some respects, conditions for religious freedom improved. In
many areas, Buddhists, Catholics, and Protestants reported an increase
in religious activity and observance. However, at the same time,
government restrictions remained, and worshipers in several Buddhist,
Catholic, and Cao Dai centers of worship reported that they believed
that undercover government observers attended worship services and
monitored the activities of the congregation and the clergy.
The Government released at least eight prominent religious
prisoners as part of a wide-ranging prisoner amnesty in the Fall of
1998. Among these were five UBCV monks, including two of the most
senior-ranking, Thich Quang Do and Thich Tue Sy; Catholic priests Dinh
Viet Hieu and Nguyen Chau Dat; and Hoa Hao Buddhist Tran Huu Duyen.
However, operational and organizational restrictions on the
hierarchies and clergy of most religious groups remain in place. While
there were releases of religious prisoners, including others in
addition to the eight prominent ones, detention and imprisonment of
other persons for practicing religion illegally continued.
In April the Government issued a new decree on religion that
prescribes the rights and responsibilities of religious believers.
Similar to the Government's 1991 decree on religion, the decree also
states for the first time that no religious organization can reclaim
lands or properties taken over by the State following the end of the
1954 war against French rule and the 1975 Communist victory in the
south. The decree also states that persons formerly detained or
imprisoned must obtain special permission from the authorities before
they may resume religious activities.
There were credible reports that Hmong Protestant Christians in
several northwestern villages were forced to recant their faith and to
drink blood from sacrificed chickens mixed with rice wine. Hmong church
leaders told a North American church official that one Hmong Christian,
Lu Seo Dieu, died in prison in Lao Cai province from mistreatment and
lack of medical care. This report could not be confirmed. Prison
conditions are poor in remote regions, and prison conditions in general
are harsh.
Police authorities routinely question persons who hold dissident
religious or political views. In May two prominent pastors of the
unsanctioned Assemblies of God, pastors Tran Dinh ``Paul'' Ai and Lo
Van Hen, were detained and questioned by police after a Bible study
session that they were conducting in Hanoi was raided by local police.
Ai was questioned daily for more than 2 weeks regarding his religious
activities, and Lo Van Hen, a member of the Black Tai ethnic minority,
was returned to Dien Bien Phu for further questioning by police. Both
were released before the end of May and allowed to return home. Ai
later was issued a passport and allowed to travel abroad with his
family on a religious worker visa.
There were numerous reports that police arbitrarily detained
persons based on their religious beliefs and practice. A 1997 directive
on administrative detention gives security officials broad powers to
monitor citizens and control where they live and work for up to 2 years
if they are believed to be threatening ``national security.'' In their
implementation of administrative detention, authorities held some
persons under conditions resembling house arrest.
The Penal Code, as amended in 1997, established penalties for
offenses that are only vaguely defined, including ``attempting to
undermine national unity'' by promoting ``division between religious
believers and nonbelievers.'' In some cases, particularly involving
Hmong Protestants, when authorities charge persons with practicing
religion illegally they do so using provisions of the Penal Code that
allow for jail terms up to 3 years for ``abusing freedom of speech,
press, or religion.'' There were reports that officials fabricate
evidence, and some of the provisions of the law used to convict
religious prisoners contradict international covenants such as the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights.
There are no precise estimates available of the number of religious
detainees and religious prisoners. There reportedly are at least 10
religious detainees, held without arrest or charge; however, the number
may be greater. These persons include: Le Minh Triet (Tu Triet), a Hoa
Hao leader detained at a government house in the south; and a number of
Hmong and other ethnic minority Protestant detainees. The authorities
use administrative detention as a means of controlling persons whom
they believe hold dissident opinions. Anecdotal reports indicate that
small groups of Protestants are detained briefly--sometimes for only a
few days, at other times for weeks or months. Some persons are subject
to prolonged detention without charge.
According to rough estimates, there are from 20 to 40 religious
prisoners. This number is difficult to verify with any precision
because of the secrecy surrounding the arrest, detention, and release
process. The following persons reportedly continue to be held as
religious prisoners: UBCV monks Thich Thein Minh and Thich Hue Dang;
Catholic priests Mai Duc Chuong (Mai Huu Nghi), Pham Minh Tri, Nguyen
Van De, Pham Ngoc Lien, Nguyen Thien Phung, and Nguyen Minh Quan; and
Cao Daists Le Kim Bien and Pham Cong Hien. About 10 Hmong Protestant
Christians in Lai Chau and Ha Giang provinces remain in detention; they
include: Sung Phai Dia, Vu Gian Thao, Vang Gia Chua, Sung Va Tung, Sung
Seo Chinh, Sinh Phay Pao, and Va Sinh Giay.
Officials acknowledge that the following Hmong Christians were
sentenced and imprisoned under the section of the Penal Code that
prohibits ``abusing the freedom of religion'': Sung Phai Dia, Vu Gian
Thao, Ly A Giang, Giang A To, and Giang A Cat.
Unconfirmed reports from the central highlands suggest that some
local officials have extorted cattle and money from Protestants in
those areas. It is unclear whether their religious affiliation or other
factors were the causes of these alleged crimes. Provincial officials
in Ha Giang and Lai Chau provinces in the north have sought to pressure
Hmong Christians to recant their faith.
The Government bans and actively discourages participation in
``illegal'' religious groups, including the UBCV, Protestant house
churches, and unapproved Hoa Hao and Cao Dai groups. The Government
restricts the number of clergy that the Buddhist, Catholic, Protestant,
and Cao Dai churches may train. Restrictions are placed on the numbers
of Buddhist monks and Catholic seminarians. Protestants are not allowed
to operate a seminary or to ordain new clergy.
The Government restricts and monitors all forms of public assembly,
including assembly for religious activities. On some occasions, large
religious gatherings have been allowed, such as the 1998 and 1999
celebrations at La Vang. Within the past year, the Hoa Hao also have
been allowed to hold two large public gatherings.
Religious and organizational activities by UBCV monks are illegal,
and all UBCV activities outside private temple worship are proscribed.
Protestant groups in central and southern provinces and some groups of
Hoa Hao believers not affiliated with the group that held the May
congress have petitioned the Government to be recognized officially.
They have been unsuccessful thus far. Most evangelical house churches
do not attempt to register because they believe that their applications
would be denied, and they want to avoid government control.
The Government does not permit religious instruction in public
schools. The Government restricts persons who belong to dissident and
unofficial religious groups from speaking about their beliefs. It
officially requires all religious publishing to be done by government-
approved publishing houses. Many Buddhist sacred scriptures, Bibles,
and other religious texts and publications are printed by these
organizations and allowed to be distributed to believers. The
Government allows, and in some cases encourages, links with
coreligionists in other countries when the religious groups are
approved by theGovernment. The Government actively discourages contacts
between the illegal UBCV and its foreign Buddhist supporters, and
between illegal Protestants, such as the house churches, and their
foreign supporters. Contacts between the Vatican and the domestic
Catholic Church are permitted, and the Government maintains a regular,
active dialog with the Vatican on a range of issues, including
organizational activities, the prospect of establishing diplomatic
relations, and a possible papal visit. The Government allows religious
travel for some, but not all, religious persons; Muslims are able to
undertake the Hajj, and many Buddhist and Catholic officials also have
been able to travel abroad. Persons who hold dissident religious
opinions generally are not approved for foreign travel.
The Government does not designate persons' religions on passports,
although citizens' ``family books,'' which are household identification
books, list religious and ethnic affiliation.
The law prohibits foreign missionaries from operating in the
country. Proselytizing by citizens is restricted to regularly scheduled
religious services in recognized places of worship. Immigrants and
noncitizens must comply with the law when practicing their religions.
Catholic and Protestant foreigners exercise leadership in worship
services that are reserved for foreigners.
The government Office on Religious Affairs hosts periodic meetings
to address religious issues according to government-approved agendas
that bring together leaders of diverse religious traditions.
Adherence to a religious faith generally does not disadvantage
persons in civil, economic, and secular life, although it likely would
prevent advancement to the highest government and military ranks.
Avowed religious practice bars membership in the Communist Party,
although anecdotal reports indicate that a handful of the 2 million
Communist Party members are religious believers.
The Government remained sensitive about international and
nongovernmental organization investigations. In October 1998, the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, Abdelfattah
Amor, visited Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Hue, and Tay Ninh province. He
met with government officials and representatives of the government-
sanctioned Central Buddhist Church, the Catholic Church, Cao Dai, a
Protestant church, and the small Muslim community. However, security
officials prevented Amor from meeting several senior representatives of
the non-government-sanctioned UBCV, including Thich Huyen Quang and
Thich Quang Do, despite his repeated requests to do so.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government imposes some limits on
freedom of movement. Most citizens enjoyed freedom of movement within
the country; however, some local authorities required members of ethnic
minority groups to obtain permission to travel outside certain highland
areas. Officially, citizens had to obtain permission to change their
residence (see Section l.f.). In practice many persons continued to
move without approval, especially migrant or itinerant laborers moving
from rural areas to cities in search of work. However, moving without
permission restricted their ability to obtain legal work permits.
Citizens formally are required to notify police if they intend to be
away from their residence overnight and must register with police
anywhere that they stay overnight; however, these requirements
generally are not enforced. Holders of foreign passports must register
to stay in private homes. In practice visitors of Vietnamese origin
from overseas do not appear to have problems with this requirement and
are allowed to stay with family and friends. Other foreigners complain
that they are not allowed to do so.
The Government employs internal isolation to restrict the movement
of political and religious dissidents (see Section 1.d.). The
Government continued to use its 1997 decree on administrative detention
to restrict where citizens live and work (see section l.f.).
Foreigners generally are free to travel throughout the country,
except in some areas restricted on grounds of national security.
The Government retained the right to approve travel to border
areas, to some areas in the central highlands, and to some islands, but
in practice foreigners can travel to most border areas without prior
approval. However, on several occasions, local police detained and
fined foreigners whom police found had ventured too close to
international borders and other sensitive military areas.
Although the Government no longer required citizens traveling
abroad to obtain exit or reentry visas, the Government sometimes
prevented persons from traveling by refusing to issue passports to
persons who wished to travel. Persons who depart the country using
passports marked dinh cu or ``resettlement'' appear to need a reentry
permit to return.
Some persons who express dissident opinions on religious or
political issues are not allowed to travel abroad (see Section 2.d.).
Citizens must demonstrate eligibility to emigrate to another
country and show sponsorship abroad before the Government issues
passports, which are required before a person is able to emigrate.
Persons emigrating under refugee status are required to have a letter
of introduction from the Ministry of Public Security before the
passport office will issue them passports. Citizens' access to
passports frequently was constrained by factors outside the law, such
as bribery and corruption. Refugee and immigrant visa applicants
sometimes encountered local officials who arbitrarily delayed or denied
passports based on personal animosities or on the officials' perception
that an applicant did not meet program criteria, or in order to extort
a bribe.
Because citizens who live overseas are considered a valuable
potential source of foreign exchange and expertise for the country but
also a potential security threat, the Government generally encourages
them to visit but monitors many of them carefully.
The United States continued to process for admission and
resettlement immigrants and refugee applicants, including Amerasians,
former reeducation camp detainees, and family reunification cases.
There are some concerns that some members of minority ethnic groups,
particularly nonethnic Vietnamese such as the Montagnards, may not have
ready access to these programs. The Government denied passports for
emigration to certain Montagnard applicants.
The Government generally permits citizens who emigrate to return to
visit, but it considers them Vietnamese citizens and therefore subject
to the obligations of a Vietnamese citizen under the law, even if they
have adopted another country's citizenship. The Government no longer
requires reentry visas for citizens holding regular passports but who
reside in another country. Holders of Vietnamese passports marked dinh
cu or resettlement appear to need a reentry visa. However, emigrants
are not permitted to use Vietnamese passports after they adopt other
citizenship.
Vietnam and the United States continued to work together on the
Resettlement Opportunity for Vietnamese Returnees Program (ROVR) in
processing the residual few hundred ROVR persons who had returned from
refugee camps elsewhere in southeast Asia.
Vietnam cooperated with the international community in implementing
the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA), which was in effect in Vietnam
between 1989 and June 1997, to resolve the situation of the thousands
of Vietnamese who departed the country illegally. In 1989 as part of
the CPA, Vietnam had signed a memorandum of understanding with the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to accept voluntary repatriates
from camps in countries of first asylum, provided that there was
financial assistance. The agreement included a commitment to waive
prosecution and punitive measures for the illegal departure from
Vietnam of persons who return under the UNHCR voluntary repatriation
program. The UNHCR, which monitored repatriates reported that they do
not face retribution or discrimination.
The Constitution allows consideration of asylum under certain
circumstances for foreigners persecuted abroad. Otherwise, the country
does not have provisions for the granting of asylum or refugee status
in accordance with the standards of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. There were no reports
that any individuals requested asylum. In the 1970's and 1980's, the
Government admitted refugees from Cambodia, most of whom were ethnic
Chinese.
Between 1993 and 1995, it admitted 30,000 persons from Cambodia,
mainly ethnic Vietnamese. The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and
other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. There were no
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. Party
control over the selection of candidates in elections forthe National
Assembly, the Presidency, the Prime Ministership, and local government
undermines this right. All authority and political power is vested in
the VCP; political opposition movements and other political parties are
not tolerated. The VCP Central Committee is the supreme decisionmaking
body in the nation, with the Politburo as the locus of policymaking. A
standing board, consisting of the five most senior members of the
Politburo, oversees day-to-day implementation of leadership directives.
Senior advisors to the Party, including the former party general
secretary, President, and Prime Minister, also continue to exert
significant influence on Politburo decisionmaking. The Government
limited public debate and criticism to certain aspects of individual,
state, or party performance determined by the VCP itself. No public
challenge to the legitimacy of the one-party state is permitted;
however, there were isolated instances of unsanctioned letters from
private citizens critical of the Government that circulated publicly
(see Section 2.a.).
Eligible citizens are required to vote in elections, although there
is no penalty for not voting. Citizens elect the members of the
National Assembly, ostensibly the main legislative body, but the Party
must approve all candidates, most of whom are Party members. Most
National Assembly members belong to the VCP, although 15 percent do
not.
The National Assembly, although subject to the control of the Party
(all of its senior leaders are party members), played an increasingly
independent role, as a forum for the expression of local and provincial
concerns and as a critic of corruption and inefficiency. However, the
National Assembly generally does not initiate legislation and may not
pass legislation that the Party opposes. Party officials occupied most
senior government and National Assembly positions and continued to have
the final say on key issues. During the year, the National Assembly
continued to engage in vigorous debate on economic, legal, and social
issues, including a business enterprise law and a press law.
Legislators questioned and criticized ministers in sessions broadcast
live on television.
The law provides the opportunity for equal participation in
politics by women and minority groups, but in practice they are
underrepresented. Most of the top leaders are men. There is one woman
in the Politburo. Women are better represented in the National
Assembly, where more than one-fourth of the 450 members are women.
Women hold a few important positions. The Vice President is a woman, as
are several ministers and vice ministers.
The president of the National Assembly, who is also a Politburo
Standing Committee member, is a member of an ethnic minority.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government does not permit private, local human rights
organizations to form or operate. It generally prohibits private
citizens from contacting international human rights organizations,
although some dissidents were able to do so despite opposition from the
Government. The Government permitted the UNHCR and international
visitors to monitor implementation of its repatriation commitments
under the CPA and carried on a limited dialog with foreign human rights
organizations based outside Vietnam.
The Government generally was willing to discuss human rights
problems bilaterally with other governments if such discussions take
place under the rubric of ``exchanges of ideas'' rather than as
``investigations.'' Several foreign governments held official talks
during the year concerning human rights.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on gender,
ethnicity, religion, or social class; however, enforcement of these
prohibitions was uneven. Persons formerly interned in reeducation camps
on the basis of pre-1975 association with the government of the former
Republic of South Vietnam continued to report varying levels of
discrimination as they and their families sought access to housing,
education, and employment. Some military veterans of the former
Republic of Vietnam remain incarcerated for activities after 1975. They
and their families generally are not allowed employment with the
Government. This prohibition is less restrictive than in past years
because of the growth in private sector job opportunities.
Women.--International NGO workers and many women reported that
domestic violence against women was common. The law addresses the
problem of domestic violence, but authorities do not enforce it
effectively. Many divorces reportedly are due to domestic violence, but
many women likely remain in abusive marriages rather than confront the
stigma of divorce.
Some women are forced to work as prostitutes, and trafficking in
women for the purpose of forced prostitution, both domestically and
internationally, is a serious problem (see Section 6.f.). Women and
girls are trafficked from southern delta and highlands provinces to
Cambodia, and from northern provinces into China. Women and girls
frequently are misled by promises of well-paying jobs in those
countries. Prostitution, although officially illegal, appears to be
widely tolerated. The Ho Chi Minh City People's Committee recently
acknowledged that more than 10,000 women in the city engaged in
prostitution. Hanoi and the port cities of Danang and Haiphong also
have large numbers of women engaged in prostitution. There are reports
that some exploiters in Ho Chi Minh City addicted young girls to heroin
and forced them to work as prostitutes to earn cash for drugs. Many
more women are compelled to work as prostitutes because of poverty, a
lack of other employment opportunities, or because they are victimized
by false promises of lucrative work. The Vietnam Women's Union and
Youth Union, as well as international and domestic NGO's, are engaged
actively in education and rehabilitation programs to combat these
abuses.
While there is no legal discrimination, women face deeply ingrained
societal discrimination. Despite extensive provisions in the
Constitution, in legislation, and in regulations that mandate equal
treatment, and although some women occupy high government posts, few
women compete effectively for higher status positions. The Constitution
provides that women and men must receive equal pay for equal work, but
the Government does not enforce this provision. Very poor women,
especially in rural areas but also in cities, perform menial jobs in
construction, waste removal, and other jobs for extremely low wages.
Despite the large body of legislation and regulations devoted to the
protection of women's rights in marriage as well as in the workplace,
and Labor Law provisions that call for preferential treatment of women,
women do not always receive equal treatment. Nevertheless, women play
an important role in the economy and are widely engaged in business and
in social and educational institutions. Opportunities for young
professional women have increased markedly, with greater numbers
entering the civil service, universities, and the private sector.
The party-controlled Women's Union has a broad agenda to promote
women's rights, including political, economic, and legal equality, and
protection from spousal abuse. The Women's Union operates micro-credit
consumer finance programs and other programs to promote the advancement
of women. International NGO's and other international organizations
regard the union as effective, but they and Women's Union
representatives believe that much time is required to overcome societal
attitudes that relegate women to lower status than men. The Government
also has a Committee for the Advancement of Women, which coordinates
intraministerial programs affecting women.
Children.--International organizations reported that despite the
government's promotion of child protection and welfare, children
increasingly were at risk of economic exploitation. While education is
compulsory through the age of 14, the authorities did not enforce the
requirement, especially in rural areas where government and family
budgets for education are strained. Thousands of children work in
exploitative child labor (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.). The Government
continued a nationwide immunization campaign, and the government-
controlled press regularly stressed the importance of health and
education for all children. Reports from local sources indicate that
responsible officials generally took these goals seriously but were
constrained by severely limited budgets. According to a recent World
Bank report, despite growth in incomes over the past decade, severe
malnutrition remains an entrenched problem; about 45 percent of
children under 5 years of age suffer from stunted growth.
Widespread poverty contributed to continued child prostitution,
especially of girls, but also some boys as well, in major cities. Many
prostitutes in Ho Chi Minh City are girls of ages 15 through 17. One
NGO advocate stated that some child prostitutes, such as those from
abusive homes, are forced into prostitution for economic reasons,
having few other choices available to them. There are reports that some
exploiters in HoChi Minh City addicted young girls to heroin and forced
them to work as prostitutes to earn money for drugs.
Other children are trafficked domestically, as well as to foreign
destinations for the purpose of forced prostitution. Although
statistics are not reliable, children are trafficked from southern
delta and highland provinces to Cambodia, and from northern provinces
into China. Government agencies were engaged in combating these abuses.
The Vietnam Women's Union and Youth Union are active in drawing
attention to them and helping with education programs to warn
vulnerable families of the dangers of deception by those who would lure
young women and children into prostitution. Press reports documented
the conviction and imprisonment of some traffickers (see Section 6.f.).
Street children often are subjected to abuse, including beatings by
police (see Section 1.c.).
People With Disabilities.--Government provision of services to the
disabled is limited, and the Government provides little official
protection or effective support for the disabled. Government agencies
responsible for services to the disabled worked with domestic and
foreign groups to ``identify measures'' to provide protection, support,
and physical access for the disabled. Implementation is hampered by
limited budgets. The 1995 Labor Law requires the State to protect the
rights and encourage the employment of the disabled. It includes
provisions for preferential treatment for firms that recruit disabled
persons for training or apprenticeship and a special levy on firms that
do not employ disabled workers. It is uncertain whether the Government
enforces these provisions. The Government permitted international
groups to assist those disabled by war or by subsequent accidents
involving unexploded ordnance and has developed indigenous prosthetics-
manufacturing capabilities. There are no laws mandating physical access
to buildings.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although the Government states
that it is opposed to discrimination against ethnic minorities,
societal discrimination against minorities is widespread. In addition
there continued to be credible reports that local officials sometimes
restricted ethnic minority access to education, employment, and mail
services. The Government continued to implement policies designed to
narrow the gap in the standard of living between ethnic groups living
in the highlands and richer lowland ethnic Vietnamese by granting
preferential treatment to domestic and foreign companies that invest in
highland areas. The stated goal of government resettlement policy in
mountainous provinces is to move disadvantaged minorities provide
incentives for disadvantaged minorities to relocate from inaccessible
villages to locations where basic services are easier to provide;
however, the effect of the policy sometimes has been to dilute the
political and social solidarity of these groups. The Government
continued to repress some highland minorities, particularly the Hmong,
for practicing their religion without official approval (see Section
2.c.). Unlike the previous year, there were no reports that the
Government repressed some highland minorities for suspected ties with
resistance groups.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Unions are controlled by the Party
and have only nominal independence; however, union leaders influence
some key decisions, such as on health and safety issues and on minimum
wage standards. Workers are not free to join or form unions of their
choosing; such action requires approval from the local office of the
Party-controlled Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL). The
VGCL is the umbrella organization under which all local trade unions
must operate, and it claims 4 million members in branches in each of
the major cities and provinces. VGCL officers report that the VGCL
represents 95 percent of public sector workers, 90 percent of workers
in state-owned enterprises, and nearly 70 percent of private sector
workers. The Labor Law requires provincial trade union organizations to
establish unions within 6 months at all new enterprises with more than
10 employees as well as at existing enterprises that operate without
trade unions. Management of those companies is required by law to
accept and cooperate with those unions. In addition, while the Labor
Code states that all enterprise level and professional trade unions are
affiliated with the VGCL, in practice hundreds of unaffiliated ``labor
associations'' have been organized in occupations such as those of
taxi, motorcycle and cyclo drivers, cooks, and market porters. Foreign
governments are providing technical assistance and training to the
Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs and to the VGCL.
The Labor Law provides for the right to strike under certain
circumstances. The law requires that management and labor resolve labor
disputes through the enterprise's own labor conciliation council. In a
recent report, the ILO stated that many labor organizations failed to
establish labor conciliation councils, and that without one, or if one
fails to resolve the matter, it is referred to the provincial Labor
Arbitration Council, which does not exist in some provinces. If the
Council's decision is unsatisfactory to the union or if the province
does not have an arbitration council, unions have the right to appeal
to the Provincial People's Labor Arbitration Council. Labor courts,
which were established in 1996 within the People's Court System, heard
approximately 500 cases; most cited wrongful dismissal and matters of
labor discipline. Since January 1995, the Labor Ministry has organized
150 training courses on the Labor Code for its staff and for managers
of large enterprises.
The government-controlled labor unions stipulate written procedures
for managing labor disputes that permit unresolved disputes to be
arbitrated before a court. Unions have the right to appeal a council
decision to the provincial people's court and the right to strike.
There were approximately 60 private and public strikes during the
year, primarily against foreign-owned or joint venture companies, but
some also involved state-owned and private firms. The Government
tolerated these strikes, even though most were spontaneous and
supported by organized labor after the fact. Approximately 250 strikes
were reported from January 1995 through September 1999. Of these, some
132 strikes were in enterprises with foreign investment, about 40 in
state-owned enterprises, and 80 in private enterprises. The majority of
these strikes took place in Ho Chi Minh City, Dong Nai province, and
other southern provinces. The strikes mainly were caused by disputes
over wages and related problems, including late payment of overtime pay
and inappropriate labor disciple. Although most of the strikes did not
follow an authorized conciliation and arbitration process, and thus
were illegal, the Government tolerated the strikes and did not take
action against the strikers. Although the VGCL or its affiliate unions
did not sanction these strikes officially, they were supported
unofficially at the local and provincial levels of the VGCL on an
informal basis. The Labor Law prohibits retribution against strikers,
and there were no credible reports of such retribution. In some cases,
the Government disciplined employers for illegal practices that led to
strikes. VGCL officials stated that their general policy was not to use
strikes to settle investment disputes, but only as a last resort. They
stressed the need to educate workers on lawful strike procedure.
The Labor Code prohibits strikes at enterprises that serve the
public and at those considered by the Government to be important to the
national economy and defense. A subsequent decree defined these
enterprises to be those involved in: Electrical production; post and
telecommunications; railway, maritime, and air transportation; banking;
public works; and the oil and gas industry. The law also grants the
Government the right to suspend a strike considered detrimental to the
national economy or public safety. Strikes are prohibited in 54
occupational sectors and businesses, including public services,
businesses producing ``essential'' goods, and businesses serving
national defense under the Ministries of Public Security and National
Defense.
Individual unions legally are not free to affiliate with, join, or
participate in, international labor bodies, and they do not do so in
practice. However, the VGCL has relations with 95 labor organizations
in 70 countries.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers must
have the approval of the provincial or metropolitan branch of the VGCL
in order to organize unions in their enterprises, but they also can
bargain collectively through the Party-approved unions at their
enterprises. During the year, many contracts were negotiated that ended
the practice of annual renewal, as collective bargaining increased in
importance. Multiyear contracts became more common despite initial
resistance from foreign companies. Labor leaders became more active in
supporting their workers by agreeing to place more workplace issues in
collective bargaining agreements. Issues that are not in a contract,
such as working on Sundays, have been spelled out so that companies
cannot order workers to work a seventh day. Market forces also play a
much more important role in determining wages. The Labor Law prohibits
antiunion discrimination on the part of employers against employees
seeking to organize.
There are a number of export processing zones and industrial zones,
which are governed by the same labor laws as the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Law
prohibits all forms of forced and bonded labor, including such labor by
children; however, there were reports that thousands of children work
in exploitative child labor. Some women are forced into prostitution,
and trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). A study of child labor in Ho Chi
Minh City found cases in which poor families had entered into ``verbal
agreements'' with employers, who put the families' children to work;
their salaries generally are sent to their parents. Officials state
that juveniles in reeducation camps, which function much as reform
schools or juvenile detention centers do elsewhere, are assigned work
for educational purposes that does not generate income. Children were
trafficked both domestically and internationally and forced to work as
prostitutes (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
During the year, the Government suspended the practice of required
labor in the construction of national infrastructure projects; however,
there is a long local tradition under which persons living along flood-
prone levees voluntarily help to build or repair their critical flood
control system. In 1998 the Government denied the use of prison labor
without compensation, and there were no reports of this practice during
the year.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Law prohibits most child labor but allows
exceptions for certain types of work. The Labor Law sets the minimum
age for employment at 18 years of age, but enterprises may hire
children between the ages of 15 and 18, as long as the firm obtains
special permission from their parents and the Ministry of Labor,
Invalids, and Social Affairs. The firm also must ensure that these
young workers do not undertake hazardous work or work that would harm
their physical or mental development. These occupations are specified
in the Labor Law. Children may work a maximum of 7 hours per day and 42
hours per week and must receive special health care. It is not clear
whether authorities have the resources to enforce these regulations.
Children as young as 13 years of age can register at trade training
centers, which are a form of vocational training. There were no reports
that state-owned enterprises or companies with foreign investors used
child labor.
Restrictions on working in hazardous operations apply to persons
under the age of 18. The Labor Code permits the vocational training of
children at the age of 13.
In rural areas, children work primarily on family farms and in
other agricultural activities. They often begin working at the age of 6
and are expected to work as adults by the time they are 15 years of
age. In urban areas, children work in family-owned small businesses.
There are compulsory education laws that are not enforced effectively
in rural areas, where children are needed to work in agriculture.
However, the culture's strong emphasis on education leads parents who
can afford to send their children to school to do so rather than allow
them to work.
Many urban schools operate two sessions, allowing children to
attend classes and to work.
In 1997 the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) announced that Children
below the age of 16 face increased risk of economic exploitation. The
Government estimated in 1997 that approximately 29,000 children below
the age of 15 were victims of exploitative labor. That estimate may
have been low, since most of these children are working in the informal
sector. In 1997 UNICEF cited evidence of children working in gold mines
and as domestic servants, or working up to 14 hours a day in hazardous
conditions for meager pay or no payment.
The Government did not commit sufficient resources to enforce its
laws providing for children's labor safety, especially for children
working in coal mines and as domestic servants. The ILO stated that
street children both in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi usually participate
in night education courses.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Law requires the
government to set a minimum wage, which is adjusted for inflation and
other economic changes. The official monthly minimum wage for foreign-
investment joint ventures is $45 (621,000 dong) in Hanoi and Ho Chi
Minh City,and $40 (552,000 dong) elsewhere. The Government can exempt
temporarily certain joint ventures from paying the minimum wage during
the first months of an enterprise's operations, or if the enterprise is
located in a very remote area, but the minimum wage in these cases can
be no lower than $30 (414,000 dong). These minimum wage rates are
inadequate to provide a worker and family with a decent standard of
living. However, many workers receive bonuses and supplement their
incomes by engaging in entrepreneurial activities, and households often
include more than one wage earner. A decreasing number of workers
receive government-subsidized housing. The Government enforces the
minimum wage only at foreign and major Vietnamese firms.
In October the Government reduced the length of the workweek for
government employees and employees of companies in the state sector
from 48 hours to 40 hours; it intends to encourage the private business
sector and foreign and international organizations that employ
Vietnamese workers to implement a 40-hour week.
The Labor Law sets working hours at a maximum of 8 hours per day,
with a mandatory 24-hour break each week. Additional hours require
overtime pay at 1.5 times the regular wage and 2 times the regular wage
on holidays. The law limits compulsory overtime to 4 hours per week and
200 days per year. Annual leave with full pay for various types of work
is also prescribed by the law. In a recent report, the ILO pointed out
that the limit of 200 hours a year of overtime work is too low, and
that workers and employers should have the right to agree to a greater
amount of overtime work. It is uncertain how well the Government
enforces these provisions.
According to the law, a female employee who is to be married, is
pregnant, is on maternity leave, or is raising a child under 1 year of
age cannot be dismissed unless the enterprise is closed. Female
employees who are at least 7 months pregnant or are raising a child
under 1 year of age cannot work overtime, at night, or in distant
locations.
The Labor Law requires the Government to promulgate rules and
regulations that ensure worker safety. The Ministry of Labor, in
coordination with local people's committees and labor unions, is
charged with enforcing the regulations. In practice, enforcement is
inadequate because of the ministry's inadequate funding and a shortage
of trained enforcement personnel. The VGCL reported that there are 300
labor inspectors in the country but that at least 600 are needed. There
is growing evidence that workers, through labor unions, have been
effective in improving working conditions.
Some foreign companies with operations in the country have
established independent monitoring of problems at their factories. In
some instances, they used NGO's and other nonprofit organizations to
monitor workplace conditions and report abuses to the Ministry of
Labor.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Penal Code prescribes harsh
punishment for persons convicted of trafficking in women and children;
however, some women are forced to work as prostitutes, and trafficking
in women for the purpose of forced prostitution, both domestically and
internationally, is a serious problem.
The Government, international NGO's, and the press reported an
increase in recent years in trafficking in women. Women and girls are
trafficked from the southern delta and highland provinces into Cambodia
and from northern provinces into China. Women and girls frequently are
misled by promises of well-paying jobs in those countries.
Prostitution, although officially illegal, appears to be widely
tolerated. The Ho Chi Minh City People's Committee recently
acknowledged that more than 10,000 women in the city engaged in
prostitution. Hanoi and the port cities of Danang and Haiphong also
have large numbers of women engaged in prostitution. There are reports
that some persons in Ho Chi Minh City addicted young girls to heroin,
then forced them to work as prostitutes to earn money to support their
drug addiction. Many more women are compelled to work as prostitutes
because of poverty, a lack of other employment opportunities, or
because they are victimized by false promises of lucrative work. The
Vietnam Women's Union and Youth Union, as well as international and
domestic NGO's, are engaged actively in education and rehabilitation
programs to combat these abuses.
The Government is working with international NGO's to supplement
law enforcement measures and is cooperating with other national
governments to prevent trafficking. NGO's reported that the problem
appeared to grow during the year. Organized groups lure poor, often
rural, women with promises of jobs or marriage and force them to work
as prostitutes (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). Press and NGO reports noted
that some women were kidnaped and transported to China and other
countries against their will, where they were sold into forced
marriages. The Government took measures to address this problem.
There is reported trafficking in women to the Macau Special
Administrative Region of China with the assistance of organizations in
China that are ostensibly marriage service bureaus, international labor
organizations, and travel agencies. After arrival, many women are
forced into conditions similar to indentured servitude; some may be
forced into prostitution.
Children also are trafficked domestically and overseas to work as
prostitutes. Government agencies were engaged in efforts to combat this
abuse. One NGO advocate estimated that, among trafficked girl children,
the average age was from 15 through 17 years; many were trafficked to
Cambodia and China.
Government agencies and mass organizations are engaged to combat
this problem. Some traffickers have been convicted and imprisoned. The
Vietnam Women's Union and Youth Union's programs, as well as state-
owned media, publicized the problem. Women's union advocacy and
rehabilitation efforts help women and girls who have been trafficked.