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**U.S. DEFENSE POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN:
IN NEED OF AN OVERHAUL**

A STAFF TRIP REPORT
TO THE
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

March 8, 2001.

The Honorable JESSE HELMS,
*United States Senator,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.*

DEAR SENATOR HELMS:

Attached you will find a trip report for my recent travel to Taiwan.

From February 18–23, I toured several Taiwan military installations and met with numerous high-ranking military and civilian defense officials in and around Taipei, Kaoshiung and Hualien. The purpose of my visit was to become better acquainted with Taiwan's defense needs and to gauge the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of U.S. policy in response to those needs.

Installations visited included army, navy, air force and marine corps bases, several defense command centers, the Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology and Taiwan's Institute for National Strategic Studies. Individuals with whom I met included President Chen, several of his top civilian defense advisors, a variety of flag officers from each of Taiwan's services and representatives from Taiwan's Foreign Ministry. All of my interlocutors pleaded for full approval of Taiwan's defense requests and expressed a keen interest in the fate of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, stating that the bill was in Taiwan's interest. At no time did I hear of any opposition to the TSEA. All of the information in this report was gathered from Taiwan Government briefings, meetings and conversations in Taiwan as well as unclassified U.S. Government reports and press accounts.

In general, I found Taiwan's civilian and military officials charged with security to be concerned, thoughtful and prepared vigorously to defend Taiwan's democracy if the need arises. However, Taiwan's military possesses a number of shortcomings, particularly in light of Communist China's sustained military buildup and ever more threatening posture.

While there are steps that Taiwan can and must take by itself to address some of these shortcomings, U.S. assistance is required for many others. Unfortunately, current U.S. policy is totally inadequate to the task. Without radical surgery, U.S. policy toward Taiwan threatens to leave that young democracy dangerously exposed to Communist Chinese attack.

Sincerely,

JAMES P. DORAN,
*Senior Professional Staff Member,
Asian and Pacific Affairs.*

U.S. DEFENSE POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN: IN NEED OF AN OVERHAUL

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Taiwan's military is confronted with a host of needs to counter the People's Republic of China's military buildup and increasingly hostile posture. Specifically, Taiwan desperately needs more advanced, longer-range weaponry, early warning capabilities, and better C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) capabilities. It also needs several new hardware platforms, particularly submarines and advanced destroyers. Taiwan also needs a much better working relationship with the United States military.

However, the U.S. Government imposes a host of petty and humiliating restrictions on our relationship with Taiwan. For instance, it requires Taiwan military personnel to wear civilian clothes or coveralls when they train in the United States. The U.S. Government routinely rejects Taiwan's defense sale requests for reasons that can only be described as a desire to placate China. Examples include not only major hardware items such as submarines, but also maintenance equipment for major weapons systems. Furthermore, the U.S. Government engages in the practice of degrading or "dumbing down" the capabilities of weapons that have been approved for Taiwan (such as the F-16).

Though it may once have made strategic sense, current U.S. policy toward Taiwan is outdated, dangerous and, frankly, embarrassing. A radical change in mind set is needed to pave the way for a series of common sense changes in policy. Some of the changes recommended in this report are:

- Strict adherence to section 3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act when considering defense sales to Taiwan and ending the practice of "dumbing down" Taiwan's approved equipment;
- Lifting petty restrictions on visiting Taiwan officials and military officers, and on U.S. military officer travel to Taiwan;
- Establishing communications links between the Taiwan and U.S. defense establishments;
- Establishing operational training programs with Taiwan's military, including joint exercises;
- Devoting more intelligence community resources to studying the PRC threat to Taiwan and establishing a "Team B" of analysts to provide an alternative assessment of the situation; and
- Making the defense of Taiwan an illustrative case in the Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review.

II. THE PRC THREAT TO TAIWAN

The basic parameters of China's increasing threat to Taiwan are well known, even if downplayed by the Clinton administration and China's many supporters in Washington. China's military budget has increased by double digit percentages for over a decade. Girded by its bulging trade surplus with the United States, cheap loans from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and aid from Japan and other nations, China is procuring a raft of advanced and dangerous weaponry, particularly from Russia.

A 1999 Pentagon report to Congress states that this buildup, combined with China's short-range missile deployments opposite Taiwan (which press reports indicate will number 600–800 by 2005) will give the PRC, by 2005, the ability to attack and degrade Taiwan's key military facilities and damage its economic infrastructure. Furthermore, the report concludes that by 2005, the PRC will possess the ability to gain air superiority over Taiwan and will "retain" its ability to effect a naval blockade of Taiwan. These developments represent a shift in the balance of power away from Taiwan and toward Beijing in the coming years, should current trends continue.

China's buildup is accompanied by ever more threatening rhetoric toward Taiwan, which reflects the growing importance the Chinese Communists place on "re-unifying the motherland" by absorbing Taiwan. This is evidenced by: China's February 2000 White Paper, in which it asserted another, new yardstick for the possible employment of force against Taiwan (that being if Taiwan merely delays reunification talks for too long); Jiang Zemin's November 2000 statement that, "It is imperative to step up preparations for a military struggle so as to promote the early solution of the Taiwan issue. To this end, it is necessary to vigorously develop some 'trump card' weapons and equipment."; and People's Liberation Army (PLA) Chief Zhang Wannian's November 2000 statement that war between China and Taiwan was inevitable by 2005.

The staff of Taiwan's J-2 (intelligence) and various commanders are increasingly worried about China's developing satellite capabilities (including electro-optical and radar satellite capabilities), evolving information warfare capabilities (One general commented that the PRC's IW capabilities will pose a "lethal" threat to Taiwan by 2005 or so) and China's growing missile deployments and related testing. Also of concern to Taiwan is the recently-begun and pending deliveries of Russian Su-30 fighter/bombers armed with the advanced R-77 (AA-12) missile, recent and possible further delivery of Sovremenny destroyers armed with Sunburn missiles, the growing size and complexity of China's military exercises (including efforts to improve their logistical capabilities for Taiwan scenarios), numerous recent simulations of cross-Strait attacks and airborne assaults by the PLA and China's potential for landing huge numbers of troops on Taiwan through irregular means.

Taiwan's military believes the PLA is moving toward a quick strike sort of "solution" to the Taiwan "problem" that can be effected before U.S. forces, should they be so ordered, have a chance to arrive on the scene.

The Taiwan military is also concerned about the security ramifications of the so-called “Three Links” (direct trade, transport and postal links with China), toward which Taiwan seems inexorably to be moving.

III. TAIWAN’S DEFENSE NEEDS

While Taiwan’s military consists of many dedicated, capable leaders and personnel, and a good number of modern weapons platforms, it desperately needs more advanced, longer-range weaponry, early warning capabilities, and better C4I capabilities. For Taiwan’s detractors in the United States, this means that Taipei does not need new weapons platforms. This is not true. Taiwan does need new platforms, particularly submarines and advanced destroyers. Taiwan also needs a much better working relationship with the U.S. military in the fields of defense planning, intelligence, training, operational methods and tactics.

While the Government of Taiwan would not provide its official defense request list, below are some items in which Taiwan has publicly expressed an interest.

MORE ADVANCED, LONGER-RANGE WEAPONRY/PLATFORMS

Many of Taiwan’s high profile weapons platforms, such as the F-16 fighter and the Lafayette-class frigate, are mere shells of what they could be, possessing weapons that have very limited range and/or guidance systems. For instance, the Lafayettes carry only subsonic anti-ship missiles with an effective range of just 35 miles, surface to air missiles with only a two mile range and a Gatling gun that would automatically shut down if the Sunburn were coming toward it. Commanders and operators stressed the need to have better standoff capability to defend against the Chinese threat. This will require air, sea and ground-based weapons with longer ranges and better guidance systems than Taiwan currently possesses. It will also require several new platforms.

AIR FORCE

Taiwan’s pilots stressed the need to be able to take out China’s numerous and increasingly long-range surface-to-air missiles (such as the long-range S-300), which pose a potentially lethal threat to Taiwan’s air force, as well as the ability to counterattack numerically superior Chinese aircraft and naval vessels from a longer distance. The Taiwan Air Force’s current standoff capability is severely limited. As the Pentagon noted in its 1999 report to Congress, China’s increasingly capable air force is on the verge of attaining the ability to achieve air superiority over Taiwan, if it hasn’t already.

To ward off this dangerous development, Taiwan pilots specifically expressed interest in HARM missiles (High-speed anti-radiation missiles, employed to counter SAM sites), Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) and longer range, infra-red guided missiles capable of attacking ground targets. They further requested that the recently approved AIM-120 air-to-air missiles be delivered to Taiwan rather than stored in Arizona (an arrangement imposed on Taiwan by the Clinton administration in 2000).

Taiwan's air force (and navy) also has other significant shortcomings. For instance, it has no identification friend or foe capabilities. Thus, Taiwan aircraft returning home from a dogfight with Chinese fighters over the water could be in substantial danger of being shot down by friendly fire. Taiwan's F-16 pilots also lack night vision equipment and helmet-sighted air-to-air missiles (which the PRC has recently acquired from the Russians).

Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDF) are plagued by the lack of ability to detect illumination by enemy radar and a shortage of guidance systems for their missiles. Attempts to procure technology to solve these problems from the United States have been unsuccessful.

NAVY

To counter the PLA's growing naval threat, Taiwan's naval commanders are interested in improving their sea-based air defenses, acquiring longer range and more accurate ship-to-ship and anti-air missiles, protecting their communications infrastructure, improving their ASW capabilities and developing a survivable force to counter a blockade. Taiwan will also need new naval platforms simply to replace its aging fleet, one-half of which will need to be retired in the coming years.

1. Submarines

Taiwan commanders repeatedly stated that by far the most important item for Taiwan's navy, indeed for Taiwan's entire military, is the acquisition of submarines. China maintains an overwhelming 65-4 advantage in submarines over Taiwan. Two of Taiwan's submarines are WWII-era Guppy-class boats which are unsuitable for combat. Acquisition of new submarines must be a part of any prudent ASW strategy for Taiwan. More importantly, because of their survivability, submarines will be a crucial last line of sea-based defense against a Chinese blockade. Should, as the 1999 Pentagon report intimated, Taiwan's surface fleet be blitzed with air- and sea-launched missiles early in a confrontation, and should Taiwan's air bases be rendered inoperative by SRBM strikes, a fleet of surviving submarines could still possibly allow Taiwan to thwart a Chinese blockade by stealthily attacking the surface ships that would enforce that blockade.

The standard State Department argument against selling submarines to Taiwan—that they are offensive—is an example of moral equivalence at work. It is absurd on its face not to consider that Taiwan is a democracy, has no designs on any of its neighbors, and faces a Communist China that has threatened to “drown it in a sea of fire.”

Others attempt to make “military” arguments against submarines for Taiwan, asserting, among other things, that submarines have a very limited sonar range and need to receive queuing information from elsewhere, rendering them less effective than aircraft at locating Chinese targets. This argument not only ignores the survivability of submarines (especially given China's weak ASW capabilities), but also neglects the fact that a Chinese blockade of Taiwan would have to take place near a few relatively narrow choke points, making it easier for Taiwan's submarines (espe-

cially if aided by an underwater surveillance system) to locate and destroy Chinese ships and submarines. In addition, these “military” arguments usually emanate from voices that are generally dovish on China. Thus, one can see that the principal objection against submarines for Taiwan remains the fact that it would displease the PRC.

2. *Aegis destroyers*

Taiwan has requested four Aegis destroyers for the past three years, only to be turned down by the Clinton administration. It is a common misconception that Taiwan wants Aegis as a Theater Missile Defense system. In fact, Taiwan is currently ambivalent about purchasing TMD from the United States, based upon concern over technological developments and cost. Besides, the Pentagon has identified THAAD, not Aegis, as potentially a more suitable U.S. TMD system for Taiwan in the future.

Taiwan wants, and Taiwan needs, Aegis destroyers to provide it with an adequate sea-based air defense and C4I system to deal with rapidly developing PRC air and naval threats. As of now, Taiwan’s sea-based air defense and C4I capabilities are rudimentary at best. If Taiwan is to have any chance of overcoming China’s 10–1 combat aircraft advantage, 2–1 surface fleet advantage, and its new and pending acquisitions of modern and deadly weapons such as Su–27 and Su–30 fighters, Sovremenny destroyers and Sunburn and AA–12 missiles, a modern integrated sea-based air defense system will be crucial. Aegis will provide exactly that.

One problem with Aegis, however, is that it is now impossible for Taiwan to have Aegis ready by the crucial year of 2005, since it will take 8–10 years for the platform to become operational in Taiwan.

3. *Kidd-class destroyers*

To deal with this problem in the interim, Taiwan is potentially interested in acquiring four existing Kidd destroyers that the U.S. Navy wishes to unload. The Kidds possess a radar system that is nowhere near as capable as Aegis, yet is at least one generation ahead of what Taiwan currently has. Costing a fraction of Aegis destroyers and able to be delivered and operational within a couple of years, the Kidds might provide a practical interim solution to Taiwan’s sea based air defense needs before 2005. However, the Kidds are already 25 years old and will be nearing the end of their useful lives by the time Aegis, if approved this year, is operational. Thus, both Kidds and Aegis need to be approved by the Bush administration this year.

Taiwan’s Navy has also expressed an interest in P–3 submarine hunting aircraft, as well as longer-range and more accurate missiles and torpedoes, all of which will be vital in countering blockade efforts.

ARMY

There has been a tendency by some in the United States to malign Taiwan’s army as less than relevant, given that, at least in the early phases, this battle would be fought in the sea and in the air. Nonetheless, Taiwan’s army commanders are dedicated, tough and

thoughtful. They make a convincing case that, as long as Taiwan's political leadership holds out and as long as the United States will provide them with quality weapons and training, they have the wherewithal to repel a Chinese amphibious and/or airborne assault.

Of course, there is great question as to whether China could even mount an all-out invasion of Taiwan and a serious case could be made that Taiwan's Army may be less relevant than the navy or air force. But deterrence involves raising the potential costs to the aggressor, and every little bit helps. The army is the last resort for Taiwan's defense, and a strong, viable ground force may be the critical factor that could give the Taiwan political leadership confidence and reduce its vulnerability to coercion in a crisis situation. Nor can we ignore China's massive irregular fleet of fishing and merchant vessels which could one day be used to land soldiers on Taiwan. Furthermore, China will almost certainly use Special Operations Forces in an attack against Taiwan. Thus, it would be a mistake to ignore Taiwan's army.

Taiwan's army officers expressed interest in longer-range and more accurate artillery, advanced attack helicopters with advanced radars, and a limited number of advanced tanks, not to engage in a land battle, but to repel Chinese invaders while they are still in the water.

EARLY WARNING

Taiwan's commanders repeatedly mentioned the need for better early warning capabilities. Taiwan's ability to detect missile launches is virtually nil, and though Taiwan can better detect aircraft sorties, the short flying time across the Strait means Taiwan will have very limited warning time of an aerial attack or airborne assault. During that time, Taiwan will desperately need to scramble (or hide) its aircraft, disperse its naval vessels and deploy its rapid reaction ground forces. Extra minutes will be crucial. Thus, Taiwan is seeking from the United States longer range radars with missile detection capabilities. Taiwan commanders also made a desperate plea for U.S. satellite early warning data, which we presently share with several gulf states and Russia.

SOFTWARE AND C41

Some in Washington make the specious and condescending argument that Taiwan's military commanders just want to buy and play around with their "toys," with no regard for the software or C41 systems that make modern weapons work properly, efficiently and in an integrated fashion.

This is not the case. The need for C41 was brought up repeatedly, and in quite urgent tones, by an array of different officers with whom I met. Taiwan's commanders are fully cognizant of the fact that, being outnumbered by the PRC, integration and coordination of their counterattack will be crucial. (To be sure, intensive work by some Pentagon officials over the past few years may be responsible for convincing some Taiwan officers of this necessity.) In fact, Taiwan has been seeking to buy a U.S.-made system that will provide them with integrated C41 capabilities—so far without suc-

cess. Taiwan has also sought to buy other software items and a maintenance facility for one of its premier defense platforms, also unsuccessfully. These items will be detailed in section IV of this report.

WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES

Taiwan's military has been isolated for 22 years. This has inevitably degraded Taiwan's readiness. The lack of interaction between the United States and Taiwan militaries will also result in great confusion, which could unnecessarily cost lives, should U.S. forces have to enter into battle with Taiwan.

Taiwan's commanders expressed an interest in conducting joint exercises with the United States, joint planning, more robust and on-site training, direct, secure communications (both at the policy and operational levels), more technology cooperation, expanded intelligence sharing and joint special forces work (including with Taiwan's impressive Marine Corps).

Finally, there is an unmistakable resentment that simmers in Taiwan toward what they view as shabby and impolite treatment by U.S. Government officials, particularly from the State Department and the American Institute in Taiwan. Taiwan's culture is exceedingly polite and it is unusual to hear direct criticism of anyone. Moreover, the Taiwan Government rightly fears retribution if it is too vocal on these matters. Nonetheless, a palpable sense of dismay and resignation is evident in Taiwan over the way some U.S. Government officials treat their Taiwan counterparts.

IV. SHORTCOMINGS IN CURRENT U.S. POLICY

The aforementioned attitudes on the part of both U.S. and Taiwan officials are undoubtedly an outgrowth of the petty and humiliating restrictions the U.S. Government imposes on its relationship with Taiwan. Examples include:

- requiring Taiwan military personnel to wear civilian clothes or coveralls when they train in the United States (the French impose no such restrictions when Taiwan personnel train in France). In fact, a Taiwan Marine told me that, while training at Quantico on the day after de-recognition in 1979, he was ordered immediately to take off his uniform on orders that came from Washington. (The directives addressing this and other restrictions placed on Taiwan which must have been issued by President Carter have never, to my knowledge, been made public or provided to Congress.);
- forbidding Taiwan pilots from wearing flight suit name badges while training in the United States;
- prohibiting the Taiwan defense minister from traveling to the United States, while at the same time granting red carpet treatment to Communist Chinese officers, including many who were involved in the Tiananmen Square Massacre;
- denying Taiwan military personnel access to the Joint Forces Command, while at the same time granting such access to Communist Chinese officers;

- denying Taiwan personnel access to U.S. submarines, while at the same time granting such access to Communist Chinese officers;
- prohibiting direct training by Americans of Taiwan pilots in Taiwan and limiting other types of training (particularly operational training). In many cases, a handful of Taiwan trainers must come to the United States to learn training techniques and then return home to train their personnel;
- keeping the President of Taiwan under wraps while transiting the United States and forbidding him to meet with Members of Congress;
- forbidding the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office to fly Taiwan’s flag over its building in Washington;
- forbidding U.S. Government personnel to set foot on the grounds of Twin Oaks, the Taiwan Government’s historic estate in Washington; and
- forbidding Taiwan diplomats in the United States from using diplomatic license plates (no such restriction is imposed on Taiwan diplomats in Canada).

The U.S. Government also routinely rejects Taiwan’s defense requests for reasons that can only be described as a desire to placate China. This is, of course, a flat violation of section 3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act, which states that sales to Taiwan shall be based solely on Taiwan’s defense needs. Given China’s military buildup and increasing verbal threats, there can be no legal justification for denying items such as Aegis, submarines and P-3s—all of which have been rejected in recent years—or Maverick G or AIM-120 missiles, which were rejected for several years before being approved in 2000. (The AIM-120s were only partially approved, as they will be stored in the United States until or unless China acquires the AA-12.)

The U.S. has also rejected or delayed the following requests by Taiwan in recent years:

- HARM missiles, which Taiwan needs to counter the PRC’s growing SAM threat;
- Technology to allow Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) pilots to know whether they have been illuminated by enemy radar;
- Guidance systems for the IDF’s missiles;
- Depot-level maintenance facilities for the Patriot anti-missile systems, requiring Taiwan to send faulty parts back to the United States for repair. This can take as long as two years and has resulted in Taiwan’s Patriot system being inoperable for periods of up to one week; and
- K-band traveling wave tubes, to assist in researching and developing anti-missile systems.

“MODEL T”S

In addition to rejecting and delaying defense sales to Taiwan, the U.S. Government also engages in the practice of “dumbing down” (often at late stages in the process) weapons that have been approved for Taiwan. Taiwan officers derisively refer to many of their

U.S. weapons systems at “Model T”s (for Taiwan). Thus, Taiwan did not buy F-16As and F-16Bs from the United States; it bought F-16Ts, which don’t exist anywhere else in the world. The weapons systems, avionics and tactical training given to Taiwan along with the aircraft neither met Taiwan’s expectations nor do they match that which has been given to other foreign recipients of the F-16. In particular, the United States for years did not provide ground attack munitions for the F-16s and has never provided the F-16’s tactical training manual to Taiwan. Similar examples abound with other platforms, weapons and equipment sold to Taiwan.

U.S. policy toward Taiwan has also been almost wholly passive. We have spent 22 years merely responding to Taiwan’s defense sales requests. Only recently have efforts begun to study Taiwan’s real needs, as with the recent Air Defense and Naval Modernization studies prepared by the Department of Defense. But it is frankly unclear whether those studies were ordered to fill a real need or to deflect attention from rejected defense sales.

And it is far from clear that the lessons learned in those studies have been or will be applied. For instance, the Air Defense Review was rumored to have endorsed the sale of Aegis prior to the 2000 defense talks, but Aegis was not approved. Similarly, the more recent Naval Modernization Study is reported by the New York Times to endorse the transfer of submarines, Aegis and P-3s to Taiwan, but the contents of this study have been kept from the public and Congress.

The United States has also not devoted enough attention to collecting and analyzing information regarding the cross-Strait military situation. As a December 2000 Pentagon report to Congress on the implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act stated, there are three main gaps in our knowledge of the situation.

First, we need to know more about how the authorities in the PRC and Taiwan view their military and political situations in order to identify the most important conflict scenarios and to assess whether the balance of forces adequately deters Chinese attack and reassures Taiwan. Second, we need to know more about each side’s training, logistics, doctrine, command and control, special operations and mine warfare capabilities. Third, we cannot confidently assess how each side’s capabilities will develop and how each side will respond to these developments.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Though it may once have made strategic sense, current U.S. policy toward Taiwan is outdated, dangerous and, frankly, an embarrassment. It is difficult to look Taiwan’s pilots, sailors and soldiers in the eye, knowing that one day they might die in combat due to the callousness and negligence of U.S. policy.

An elaborate game that is tantamount to a policy of appeasement of Communist China, U.S.-Taiwan policy threatens to precipitate a war that neither the United States, nor Taiwan, is prepared to fight. A radical change in mind set is needed to pave the way for a series of common sense changes in policy, with the specific goal of deterring a conflict. Such changes should include:

(1) Strict adherence to section 3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act when considering defense sales to Taiwan. This would mandate that all of Taiwan's requests be approved, unless they are obviously militarily unnecessary (for instance, if Taiwan were to request long-range bombers or huge numbers of landing craft) or if the PRC threat were to diminish tangibly, and as long as the requests do not violate U.S. technology transfer policies.

(2) End the practice of "dumbing down" Taiwan's approved equipment; no more "Model T"s. Again, this is so long as deliveries to Taiwan are in line with U.S. global technology transfer policies.

(3) Lift petty restrictions on visiting Taiwan officials and military officers. Taiwan's President should not be kept locked up in a hotel, and Taiwan's proud military men and women should be allowed to wear their uniforms in the United States. Taiwan's access to U.S. military facilities should far exceed, not trail behind, that afforded to Communist China.

(4) Lift restrictions on U.S. military officer travel to Taiwan. The limit is currently set at the relatively junior rank of O-6. American flag officers need to see Taiwan and Taiwan needs to benefit from the experience which U.S. flag officers have to share. In addition, when sending tough messages to urge Taiwan to improve its capabilities in certain areas, it is more effective, and respectful, if delivered by a general officer.

(5) Allow more U.S. military personnel to train Taiwan personnel in Taiwan and allow U.S. pilots to fly backseat with the Taiwan Air Force (as French pilots do).

(6) Establish direct, secure communications between the Taiwan and U.S. defense establishments. At a minimum, this should be done at the policy level, with either a hotline or a video-teleconferencing system linking the Pentagon, the U.S. Pacific Command and Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense. Ideally, an entire set of operational links should be established that allows U.S. and Taiwan aircraft, ships and shore units to communicate. Without this, chaos will certainly ensue should hostilities break out.

(7) Establish operational training programs with Taiwan's military. Taiwan's military needs to work with ours. Ideally, the U.S. and Taiwan should conduct joint exercises. At a minimum, we should allow Taiwan to observe a U.S.-only exercise that is modeled on a Taiwan scenario. A permanent PACOM J-3 presence should also be established at AIT in Taipei.

(8) Enhance intelligence exchanges with Taiwan and establish intelligence contact between Taiwan and PACOM.

(9) Provide Taiwan with satellite shared early warning data. This is simply a one-way flow of information that warns 23 million democratically-governed people that missiles are coming.

(10) Cooperate with Taiwan on information and electronic warfare.

(11) Scrap the annual defense sale process. This is a hoary hold-over from the Carter administration, designed to control Taiwan. There is no good reason why, if an item cannot be approved one year, that Taiwan must wait 12 months for another answer. We

should accept and evaluate Taiwan's requests on a rolling basis, as we do with other countries.

(12) Devote more intelligence community resources to studying the PRC threat to Taiwan (and to U.S. forces) and establish a "Team B" of analysts to provide an alternative assessment of the situation.

(13) Make the defense of Taiwan an illustrative case in the QDR. A conflict in Taiwan is at least as likely as one on the Korean Peninsula, yet it seems little thought has gone into just what would be required for the United States to fight and win a war in the Taiwan theater.

(14) Continue the focused studies on aspects of Taiwan's overall defense needs (we should initiate an Army study and a C41 study), but not as a means of unnecessarily delaying approval of Taiwan's legitimate defense requests. It is time to admit that, absent democratic political change in the PRC, continuing our current policy toward Taiwan will guarantee the destruction of that island democracy by China's rapidly expanding military forces. The fall of Taiwan will usher in an era of Communist Chinese hegemony in Asia, and the United States will be saddled with a new cold war, at the outset of which American credibility in the region will be in tatters.

(15) Last, but not least, the U.S. Government needs to scrap the policy of strategic ambiguity. The U.S. needs to state unambiguously that we will defend Taiwan if it is attacked. In so doing, the U.S. must not fall into the trap of qualifying this assertion by stating that we will not defend Taiwan if it declares independence. In addition to being a betrayal of American values, such an overly clever policy construct would leave too much room for Beijing to try to exploit.

While the corrective measures suggested above will certainly evoke howls of protest from the PRC, they are urgently needed both to deter conflict and, should deterrence fail, to save Taiwanese and American lives in combat.

Naysayers will insist that these measures are inconsistent with our "unofficial" relationship with Taiwan, whatever that means. But these measures are entirely consistent with the law—the Taiwan Relations Act. Nothing in the TRA prohibits these activities; in fact, the TRA seems specifically to allow them. Section 4(a)(1) of the TRA states, "Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan." In other words, other than not recognizing Taipei as the Government of China, we are legally to treat Taiwan as a country.

Pretending Taiwan does not exist is no longer an option. Nor is pretending that Communist China is not a threat. Nor is it an option to pretend that everything is fine between the United States and Taiwan, as some former U.S. officials have recently stated. Things are not just fine, and they need to be fixed. Soon.

