[Senate Prints 110-35] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] 110th Congress S. Prt. COMMITTEE PRINT 1st Session 110-35 _______________________________________________________________________ THE MERIDA INITIATIVE: ``GUNS, DRUGS, AND FRIENDS'' __________ A REPORT TO MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE One Hundred Tenth Congress First Session December 21, 2007U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 39-644 WASHINGTON : 2007 _____________________________________________________________________________ For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800 Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director (ii) ? C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Letter of Transmittal............................................ v Background on United States Counter-Narcotics Assistance to Mexico......................................................... 1 Overall Recommendations.......................................... 2 Analysis......................................................... 3 The Merida Initiative, How It Came To Be and Why Now......... 4 A Committed Friend: Calderon's Efforts to Fight Narcotics.... 6 Areas for Improvement: North-South Arms Trafficking and Funding for Central America................................ 9 North-South Arms Trafficking............................. 9 Central America.......................................... 10 Appendixes Discussions With Individuals in Mexico........................... 13 The Merida Initiative Security Assistance Proposals--Budgets and Item Breakdown................................................. 15 The Central America Security Assistance (CASA) Proposals--Budgets and Item Breakdown............................................. 51 Security Strategy for Central America (Translation)--Estrategia de Seguridad de Centro America (Original)...................... 79 (iii) LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL ---------- United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, December 21, 2007. Dear Colleagues: From November 6-8, 2007, I directed my senior Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff member for Latin America, Carl Meacham, to visit Mexico City to assess a $500 million supplemental budget request for Mexico. This request is intended to support regional efforts to address common threats to our nations by combating transnational crime and drug trafficking. The Merida Initiative, as this proposal is called, is an attempt to seize the opportunity created by Mexico's invigorated anti-crime campaign. The Initiative would fund key programs and build stronger cooperation with the United States. The proposal recognizes that 90 percent of the cocaine entering the United States transits Mexico and that our efforts to combat this drug flow and associated criminal activities depend on a partnership with the Mexican government. It also recognizes that Central America is the primary transit point for people and drugs destined for the United States and Mexico from South America. This illicit activity threatens regional stability, weakens national economies and exacerbates illegal migration to the United States. The legislative process to pass the authorization of the Merida Initiative began after President Bush submitted his supplemental request of $45.9 billion to the U.S. Congress on October 22, 2007. The President made this request to continue the Global War on Terror and address other urgent national security needs. Five hundred million dollars for the Merida Initiative was included as part of this request. In response to the President's proposal the SFRC held a full committee hearing on the Merida Initiative on November 15, 2007. Mr. Meacham's attached report provides significant insight into this initiative. While his report's primary focus is assistance to Mexico, appropriate analysis of Merida's counterpart program in Central America, or Central American Security Assistance (CASA), is also provided. I hope you find it helpful as the U.S. Congress considers support for the supplemental request for Mexico and Central America. I look forward to continuing to work with you on these issues and welcome any comments you may have on this report. Sincerely, Richard G. Lugar, Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Relations. THE MERIDA INITIATIVE: ``GUNS, DRUGS, AND FRIENDS'' ---------- From November 6-8, 2007, Senate Foreign Relations Committee minority staff traveled to Mexico City, Mexico on an official oversight visit to assess President George W. Bush's supplemental budget request of $500 million for Mexico. During this trip, staff met with senior officials of the Government of Mexico (GOM), Members of the Mexican Senate, a senior official of the Guatemalan Foreign Ministry, officials from the Mexican human rights community, members of the Mexican press, and senior officials at the United States Embassy in Mexico City. (See Appendix I for complete list of meetings.) At the request of Senator Lugar, the purpose of the trip was to: Assess the process through which this proposal was formulated; Assess the effectiveness of the current proposal and identify areas for improvement. Background on United States Counter-Narcotics Assistance to Mexico According to the National Drug Intelligence Center somewhere between 530 and 710 metric tons of cocaine departed South America bound for the United States in 2006. In that year, Mexican and U.S. law enforcement estimate that 12.7 tons of heroin was freshly produced within Mexico, to be shipped northwards. That accounts for more than a 58 percent increase in production from the year before. The United States has been engaged in efforts to combat the flow of narcotics into the United States from Mexico and Central America for many years. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), between fiscal years 2000 and 2006, the U.S. government has provided over $250 million for counter-narcotics assistance to Mexico. The State Department provided the bulk of this assistance--$169 million--for port and border security, law enforcement assistance, interdiction and eradication support, aviation support and training. USAID provided $30 million for rule of law and anti-corruption training. The remainder ($58 million) was provided by the Department of Defense through its ``section 1004'' authority (Section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 authorizes the Department to provide support to counter-drug activities of other federal agencies overseas). The Drug Enforcement Administration also expended $124 million during this period to support its field offices in Mexico. Overall Conclusions and Recommendations American politicians on both sides of the aisle have become increasingly concerned about inattention to Latin America. Yet when President Bush recently announced details about the Merida Initiative, the proposal was greeted with Congressional skepticism. Some members have complained about a lack of information and consultation in the formulation of the proposal and have voiced concern over corruption and alleged human rights abuses in Mexico. Others feel more must be done domestically, both in addressing the underlying demand for drugs in the United States and the treatment for drug offenders. There are also those in the U.S. Congress who feel that the proposal for Central America does not go far enough in funding and equipping efforts to deal with land, air, and maritime narcotics trafficking. These are all valid concerns. On human rights, specifically, we are assured that there would be continued efforts in the context of this initiative. But the risks of proceeding with this agreement are small compared to the large potential payoff of authorizing this proposal which would include creating the institutional framework for dealing with many of the problems mentioned by Democrats and Republicans alike. Mexico's historic mistrust of its northern neighbor has long prevented closer ties that could benefit both sides. President Calderon has taken considerable political risk in reaching out to the United States. He has done this because it is in Mexico's best national security interest and because combating this transnational threat requires closer collaboration. Furthermore, Central American willingness to act together in favor of their collective security is an important development that should not have been overlooked by the Bush administration in putting together their funding request. The Merida Initiative represents a rare opportunity to build a base for sustained cooperation with Mexico on a shared agenda. To pass on this opportunity would represent a significant blunder that would have a negative impact on the bilateral relationship, as well as broader U.S. interests in the region. In order to increase the effectiveness of this initiative the following recommendations should be considered. (1) In cooperation with the Mexican government, the U.S. Secretary of State should: Define a comprehensive strategy aimed at disrupting the traffic of arms to Mexico, which emphasizes preventive initiatives, effective controls of the sale of weapons in gun shows, especially along the border. Improve effective and timely exchange of intelligence on major U.S. based trafficking of weapons organizations with links to Mexican and Central American criminal organizations. Work with the Secretary of Homeland Security to direct the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) to work closely with other law enforcement agencies, such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), in operations to interdict weapons crossing U.S. borders and devise new programs to share tracing capabilities with the appropriate Mexican authorities, close-off trafficking corridors, expand actionable, real-time intelligence cooperation, and aggressively pursue prosecutions, interdictions and arrests of individuals seeking to move firearms across the border. Establish a specific program to trace and disrupt the trafficking to Mexico of high powered weaponry such as .50 mm rifles, grenades and grenade launchers. (2) The Merida Initiative will achieve modest results should substantial assistance for public security, law enforcement, specialized police training, air, land and maritime interdiction and interception equipment not be provided for Central American Security Assistance (CASA). Organized crime and narco-trafficking in Central America could directly threaten gains made against the drug cartels in Mexico. In order to promote a real reduction of violence and drug trafficking in Central America and ensure broader success in combating the drug trade in North and Central America, the Bush administration should find additional funds for Central America in the FY09 appropriations cycle (funding in the supplemental request for CASA is $50 million). Analysis Along the border between the United States and Mexico, and far into Central America, there is a war raging. Drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, and violence connected to organized crime are rampant. In the last 10 months alone more than 2,600 Mexicans have lost their lives in police action against the drug trafficking organizations active throughout Central and North America. In response, Mexican President Felipe Calderon and the Mexican Congress have authorized nearly $3 billion and 30,000 troops to help combat the violence. In Central America, drug trafficking and its kingpins exacerbate the declining stability of law and order. Regional street gangs, which the United States Central Command has estimated may total 70,000 members, are a major source of violent crime in a region where the numbers of at risk youth are staggering.\1\ In Guatemala, 70 percent of the population is under the age of 29; 50 percent are under 15 and thus highly susceptible to inducement into criminal behavior when not presented with better economic opportunities.\2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Other estimates, such as USAID's ``2006 Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment'' report, cite regional gang membership to be anywhere from 50,000 to 305,000 individuals. \2\ According to the Government of Guatemala, the typical entry age to these gangs is 13. It asserts there have been cases of children as young as 8 involved in extortion, drug distribution and assassinations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Merida Initiative was envisioned to help address these issues. Details of the supplemental request released by the Department of State include: Non-intrusive inspection equipment, ion scanners, canine units for Mexican customs, for the new federal police and for the military to interdict trafficked drugs, arms, cash and persons. Technologies to improve and secure communications systems to support collecting information as well as ensuring that vital information is accessible for criminal law enforcement. Technical advice and training to strengthen the institutions of justice, such as vetting for the new police force, case management software to track investigations through the system to trial, new offices for citizen complaints and professional responsibility, and witness protection programs. Helicopters and surveillance aircraft to support interdiction activities and rapid operational response of law enforcement agencies in Mexico. (See Appendix II for complete breakdown of the Merida Initiative Mexico.) According to U.S. State Department officials 59 percent of the proposed assistance would go to civil agencies responsible for law enforcement, and a smaller share, 41 percent, to operational costs for the Mexican Army and Navy. While the initial cost for equipment and hardware that the military required is high, it is expected that future budget requests will focus increasingly on training and assistance to civil agencies. While this request includes equipment and training, it does not involve any cash transfers or money to be provided directly to the Government of Mexico or private contractors. ``We won't be given one cent,'' one Mexican official remarked in this regard. ``This proposal provides specific equipment, training and intelligence sharing, it is not a blank check.'' the merida initiative, how it came to be and why now Since President Calderon assumed office on December 1, 2006, he has conveyed a deliberate interest in working collaboratively with the United States in combating mutual threats. In this context, it does not come as a surprise that the Bush administration would respond to this interest through an emergency supplemental budget request rather than through the regular budget appropriations cycle. Recognizing that the Bush administration is nearing the end of their term in office, administration officials wanted to move quickly and seize this window of opportunity. State Department officials are keenly aware that their time is running out and that Calderon's willingness to work with the United States is unprecedented on issues of security, crime, and drugs. Coupled with the record number of trade agreements signed during his administration and a proposal on biofuels with Brazil, there is a desire to do as much as possible regarding Latin America. ``The President sees Latin America as his legacy,'' mentioned one State Department official. If authorized by Congress, the Merida Initiative could lay the groundwork for deeper cooperation between the United States, Mexico and Central America. This would start to correct an imbalance in U.S. policy that has arisen since the September 11, 2001 attacks, when most U.S. focus was directed towards the Iraq War and Afghanistan. In addition, this proposal could also counter some of the resentment that many Mexicans and Central Americans feel regarding the U.S. Congress' failure to enact comprehensive immigration reform. In this regard, interest in pursuing this initiative expeditiously through a supplemental request is understandable. Though well intended, this approach has sparked suspicion and intense criticism in a Democratic-controlled U.S Congress. Many believe that concern pertaining to the proposal stems from lack of information and consultation involved in its formulation. Little information about these negotiations was made available to either the U.S. or Mexican Congresses until the proposal became public on October 22, 2007, which exacerbated partisan suspicion in Washington and popular suspicion in Mexico. Though difficult to understand from a U.S. legislative branch perspective, from the Calderon admistration's standpoint, secrecy regarding the formulation of this proposal was imperative since cooperation with the United States entails certain political sensitivities. Mexican Embassy officials in Washington assert that they have briefed their Congress on the proposal, but that the Merida Initiative is not a treaty or a formal agreement or convention, so it is not subject to Mexican Congressional approval. State Department officials only briefed U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff in mid-September after staff threatened to delay the nomination of David Johnson to be Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. During the September 22, 2007 briefing, State Department officials provided only an outline of the type of assistance contemplated and refused to provide detailed information or budget data. Staff learned about this initiative in the media in the late summer of 2007, but the process had started much earlier. According to GOM sources, during his visit to Washington in November of 2006, President-elect Calderon expressed interest in strengthened bilateral and regional cooperation against drug trafficking and organized crime. This was followed up by a March 2007 Bilateral Presidential Summit held in Merida, Mexico, where the presidents decided to move forward to develop a specific plan for enhanced cooperation. Mexican interagency coordinating meetings were held between April and May 2007 where the Mexican Government developed its proposal. On May 22, 2007, U.S. and Mexican foreign ministers met in Washington to begin bilateral discussions on the basis of the Mexican proposal.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ ``Road Map leading to the Merida Initiative,'' Government of Mexico, November 2007. November 2006: During his visit to Washington President-Elect Calderon expresses interest in strengthened bilateral and regional cooperation against drug trafficking and organized crime. March 2007: Bilateral Presidential Summit held in Merida. Presidents decide to move forward to develop a specific plan for enhanced cooperation. April-May 2007: Mexican interagency coordinating meetings to develop Mexican proposal. May 22, 2007: Foreign ministers meet in Washington to begin bilateral discussions on the basis of Mexican proposal. July 13 2007: President Bush calls President Calderon with positive response. July 26-27 2007: First bilateral inter-agency meeting held in Washington. August-September 2007: Four thematic technical meetings held in Mexico City. September-October 2007: Select consultations are held between the Calderon administration and select members of Mexican Congress. October 22, 2007: Supplemental request presented to Congress and release of Joint Statement on the Merida Initiative. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On Capitol Hill, as a result of the information gap during the run-up to the proposal's introduction to the U.S. Congress, ill will prevails, especially among Democrats. Many question why they should work with the White House on this initiative in the first place. Many believe the proposal needs major changes. Others ask why not wait until a new administration--what's the rush? ``This is a necessary proposal that suffered from poor marketing,'' stated a member of Mexico's legislative branch. ``The focus of this plan is to help Mexico do a better job fighting the drug traffickers who send cocaine, heroin, marihuana and precursor chemicals for methamphetamine into the United States, it's in all of our interests to do this.'' A COMMITTED FRIEND: CALDERON'S EFFORTS TO FIGHT NARCOTICS The motivation for president Calderon's invigorated anti- crime campaign is in large part domestic: drug-related violence is on the increase, with an estimated 2,650 killings so far this year already surpassing last year's total of 2,120. Equally important, Mexico has become a drug consuming nation. Narcotics' corrosive impact has led to an alarming rise of what Mexicans call narco-menudeo--small-time drug dealing by ordinary citizens, poor and middle-class alike. The Merida Initiative is intended as a vital complement to President Calderon's own stepped-up efforts against drugs which he launched when he took office nearly a year ago. Under his leadership, the GOM has accomplished a great deal in the interdiction and eradication of illegal drugs, stepping up efforts already underway in the previous administration. For example, the policies of manual eradication have continued, while at the same time interdiction efforts have greatly increased, aided by the new resources devoted to this mission. Results include the seizure on October 30, 2007 of more than 23.5 tons of cocaine in the port city of Manzanillo, Colima. This is the largest single seizure of cocaine ever recorded. Earlier that same month another 12 tons were interdicted in the city of Tampico.\4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ ``Mexican Authorities Seize the Largest Shipment ever of Cocaine in the State of Colima.'' Mexican Embassy, Washington D.C. November 2007. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- U.S. officials also are seeing better law enforcement cooperation with Mexico--79 criminals have been extradited to the United States this year, including drug cartel kingpins. But much work remains to be done especially regarding the reform of the judicial system within Mexico that some in the human rights community argue ``has encouraged the coercion of confessions often through the use of torture.'' All together, such reform efforts by the GOM have resulted in clear security benefits for the United States. The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) has noted that ``cocaine availability decreased in several U.S. drug markets during the first half of 2007, most likely because of a combination of factors that included large cocaine seizures in transit toward the United States.'' However, reforms have also caused a response. It is estimated that the major drug trafficking organizations are currently reorganizing and readjusting to the new challenges facing their trade; as a result, drug availability is once again on the rise. One recent development is the consolidation of many of the smaller drug trafficking organizations into powerful alliances, escalating the violence between the groups vying for control of the most lucrative smuggling corridors into full fledged turf wars. A notable example of such coalition building is ``The Federation,'' led by representatives from the Sinaloa, Juarez and Valencia cartels.\5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ Cook, Collen W., ``Mexico's Drug Cartels,'' Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, October 16, 2007.
Source: United States Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico, --------------------------------------------------------------------------- November 2007. In general, the major drug trafficking organizations have reached a high level of sophistication. Most now maintain their own paramilitary groups or enforcer gangs; violent rivalry between these gangs accounts for a majority of drug related deaths in Mexico. Targeted assassinations of police and military personnel are also high. Over 200 police have been killed so far this year. In several instances these organizations--the Gulf Cartel's Zetas perhaps the most infamous--draw on considerable expertise from former members of law enforcement and special forces units.\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ Ibid.
Source: United States Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico, --------------------------------------------------------------------------- November 2007. The scale of corruption in the federal police forces has been used as justification for the increased use of the military in more traditional law enforcement roles, especially in States that have seen increased levels of drug-related violence as noted in the slide above. This move has been criticized by several human rights organizations. In Mexico, however, the military remains highly respected among the general populace; and for its part, the military has accepted every recommendation put forth by Mexico's National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH), including training on human rights, drug and alcohol testing for personnel and a commitment to full investigations and prosecution.\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, November 2007. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- President Calderon and military leadership know that the military's participation in domestic law enforcement is temporary. And in order to hasten a transition of law enforcement responsibilities back to traditional law enforcement agencies Calderon has moved to purge those police units most heavily laden with corruption and to reorganize the federal police entirely. In a relevant CRS report entitled ``Mexico's Drug Cartels,'' the level of penetration from drug cartels observed is startling, with ``some agents of Mexico's Federal Investigative Agency (AFI) believed to work as enforcers for the Sinaloa cartel, and the Attorney General's Office (PGR) report[ing] in December 2005 that one-fifth (1,500 of 7,000) of its officers are under investigation for criminal activity.'' \8\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ ``Mexico's Drug Cartels.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT: NORTH-SOUTH ARMS TRAFICKING AND FUNDING FOR CENTRAL AMERICA The Merida Initiative is an attempt to seize the opportunity created by President Calderon's invigorated anti- crime campaign. The Merida portion, and the funding for Central America through CASA, recognizes that successful efforts to combat drug trafficking depend on a partnership with the Mexican government and the Governments of Central America. Though staff believes these proposals are long overdue, they fall short of what is required in two important areas: stopping north-south arms trafficking, funding, and assistance for Central America. North-South Arms Trafficking Important concerns remain regarding how the Merida Initiative would halt arms trafficking from the United States to Mexico. Though assurances have been made by officials from the U.S. State Department that more will be done to formulate agreements to stem the traffic of weapons south of the border, the problem is worsening as highlighted by the chart supplied by the GOM of confiscated weapons and ammunition below: North-South Arms Trafficking--December 1, 2006 to November 7, 2007 (Information provided by the Government of Mexico) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SSPF SHCP (AGA- Joint Concept PGR (AFI) SDN SM-AM (PFP) ACIFA) Others Operations Total ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Short Weapons 60 417 1 39 1 61 251 830 (DRC) Short Weapons 2341,199 7 102 169 632 287 2,630 (OC) Assault Weapons 38 746 0 26 0 29 382 1,221 (DRC) Assault Weapons 73 1,511 17 42 274 106 318 2,341 (OC) Ammunition 6,626 134,634 10 3,569 96 3,537 53,855 202,327 (DRC) Ammunition (OC) 11,096 191,289 4,826 2,892 115,780 11,618 109,940 447,441 Grenades 10 408 0 3 1 7 99 528 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PGR: Procuradura General de la Republica AFI: Agencia Federal de Investigacion SDN: Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional SM-AM: Secretaria de Marina--Armada de Mexico SSPF: Secretaria de Seguridad Publica Federal PFP: Policia Federal Preventiva SHCP: Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico DRC: Drug Related Crimes OC: Other Crimes. American guns pass into Mexico through land ports of entry at the border every day. According to a Mexican government official, as many as 2,000 weapons enter Mexico each day and fuel an arms race between Mexican drug cartels. Mexican government officials suspect that corrupt customs officials (on both sides of the border) help smuggle weapons into Mexico. The weapons are often bought legally at gun shows in Arizona and Texas mostly. Taking these weapons out of the hands of organized crime now would allow Mexican law enforcement to fight drug trafficking in Mexico before they reach the U.S. border; more importantly, into U.S. communities. It also takes the Mexican military out of the law enforcement role it has been assigned. According to a high level SEDENA (Secretaria de la Defense Nacional, Mexican Armed Forces) official, ``the military does not want to be involved in law enforcement any more than it has to, but it has no choice, regular police cannot compete with Ak-47s and grenade launchers.'' As one GOM official noted: ``We understand your Second Amendment, but along the border states thousands of gun shows occur a year, and little is done to make sure that those guns stay in the U.S.'' American Embassy officials in Mexico confirmed that the U.S. is a major source of weapons for Mexican gangs and drug runners. As the Merida Initiative goes forward, U.S. agencies must work closely with Mexican officials to address this problem. It is not in the U.S. interest to create a self-defeating situation in which a critical foreign assistance program meant to assist a neighbor and enhance U.S. security is being undercut by an illegal flow of weapons originating from within our own borders. Central America The Bush administration has requested $50 million in equipment and training for Central America. Over half of this amount ($25.7 million) is currently designated for public security and law enforcement. Within that category, $12.6 million is for the implementation of anti-gang strategies throughout the region. Another $13.1 million is for specialized police training and equipment. Early estimates of a country-by- country breakdown suggest Guatemala would be the largest recipient ($9.2 million). Honduras would receive $7.4 million; El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Nicaragua and Belize would each receive less than $5 million. These tabulations do not include some $20 million that has been designated for regional use or non-country-specific expenditures. (See Appendix III for complete breakdown of CASA.) As highlighted by the slide below, Central America is the primary transit point for cocaine destined for the United States and Mexico from South America. Though drugs are brought into Mexico by sea and land, this slide highlights the severity of the problem by air.
Source: United States Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico, November 2007. Central American officials feel that they will not be able to confront threats effectively without more assistance. They fear that gang members and drug traffickers will flee Mexico for Central America where it will be easier to operate. As one senior Central American government official stated: ``In this case Mexico's gain could be our loss.'' Central America ``has among the highest homicide rates in the world, and in recent years murder rates have been increasing in several countries,'' according to a recent CRS Report. ``Latin America's average rate of 27.5 homicides per 100,000 people is three times the world average of 8.8 homicides per 100,000 people. Based on the most recent crime trend surveys (CTS) data available from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Guatemala and El Salvador are among the most violent countries in the world for which standardized data has been collected.'' \9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ Seelke, Clare Ribando, ``Gangs in Central America,'' Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, August 2, 2007. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Gangs have emerged as major social forces in the region, and they have been expanding their influence in relatively ungoverned areas that they exploit for their drug trafficking operations. Drug lords now openly finance political campaigns and in some instances have shown interest in running for public office themselves. Many of these gang members are prison-hardened former members and associates of U.S. street gangs who were deported directly back to their home countries in Central America after serving their sentences. Central American leaders and public opinion--especially in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras-- have characterized this situation as a regional emergency requiring an urgent response. In the past, political wrangling and resource constraints have hampered Central American governments' response to the drug trade.\10\ Recognizing that they all share these problems, Central American countries have agreed to strengthen regional security through the Central American Integration System (CICA). Together they have produced an unprecedented comprehensive regional security strategy demonstrating a new found political will to work to guarantee their collective security. Unfortunately, the U.S. financial response has not been commensurate with current Central American political will to come together and fight the drug trade. (See Appendix IV for Central American comprehensive regional security strategy-- original and English translation.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ The United States provided a total of $139.4 million in counternarcotics assistance to Central America from FY2000 to FY2006. Just over $77 million in assistance was administered by the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). This total includes money provided for Latin America regional programs. State Department does not provide a breakdown of which countries benefitted from overall Latin America regional assistance. Of the money administered by INL, just over $47 million was provided through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account and nearly $30 million was provided through the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) account. Nearly $63 million in counternarcotics assistance was provided through the Department of Defense under its section 124. Section 124 authority designated the Department of Defense as the lead agency for the detection of aerial and maritime drug shipments. A P P E N D I X I ---------- DISCUSSIONS WITH INDIVIDUALS IN MEXICO Staff held discussions with the following individuals in Mexico: Mexican Government Officials Sigrid Arzt, Office of the President of Mexico (cabinet- level anti-drug adviser to President Felipe Calderon) Marcela Celorio (Centro de Investigacion y Seguridad Nacional--CISEN) Juan Carlos Foncerrada (CISEN) Jose Luis Santiago Vasconcelos (Procuraduria General de la Republica--PGR) Carlos Rico (Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores--SRE) Cecilia Romero Castillo (Instituto Nacional de Migracion-- INM) Senior level officials (Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional-- SEDENA) Mexican Legislative Branch Sen. Luis Alberto Coppola Joffroy (Partido de Accion Nacional, PAN) Sen. Eloy Canta Segovia (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) Sen. Sen. Tomas Torres (Partido de la Revolucion Democratica, PRD) Officials from Foreign Governments Luis Fernando Andrade, Deputy Foreign Minister for the Republic of Guatemala United States Department of State, U.S. Embassy Mexico City, Mexico Tony Garza, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico (DCM, POL, NAS, ECON, USAID, DEA, OPAD, CPB, ICE, CONS, LEGAT) Mexican Human Rights Organizations Comision Nacional de Los Derechos Humanos Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez Mexico Unido contra la Delincuencia Centro de Estudios e Investigacion en Desarrollo y Asistencia Social A.C. Mexican Media Dr. Jorge Chabat, El Universal Newspaper Ana Maria Salazar, El Universal Newspaper Consultants and Collaborators Peter Hakim, The Inter-American Dialogue Armand Peshard-Sverdrup, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Alex Currie, Staff Assistant, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SFRC) A P P E N D I X II ---------- THE MERIDA INITIATIVE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROPOSALS--BUDGETS AND ITEM BREAKDOWN
A P P E N D I X III ---------- THE CENTRAL AMERICA SECURITY ASSISTANCE (CASA) PROPOSALS--BUDGETS AND ITEM BREAKDOWN
A P P E N D I X IV ---------- SECURITY STRATEGY FOR CENTRAL AMERICA (Translation)--ESTRATEGIA DE SEGURIDAD DE CENTRO AMERICA (Original)
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