[Senate Prints 112-30, Volume II]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
112th Congress S. Prt.
1st Session JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT 112-30
_______________________________________________________________________
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 2010
VOLUME II
----------
R E P O R T
SUBMITTED TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
US SENATE
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2010
VOLUME II
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202�09512�091800, or 866�09512�091800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.
112th Congress
1st Session JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT S. Prt.
112-30
_______________________________________________________________________
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 2010
VOLUME II
__________
R E P O R T
SUBMITTED TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
US SENATE
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ ix
Preface.......................................................... xi
Overview and Acknowledgments..................................... xiii
Introduction..................................................... xvii
Volume I
Africa
Angola....................................................... 1
Benin........................................................ 20
Botswana..................................................... 30
Burkina Faso................................................. 41
Burundi...................................................... 51
Cameroon..................................................... 72
Cape Verde................................................... 92
Central African Republic, The................................ 98
Chad......................................................... 122
Comoros...................................................... 137
Congo, Democratic Republic of the............................ 143
Congo, Republic of the....................................... 186
Cote d'Ivoire................................................ 196
Djibouti..................................................... 218
Equatorial Guinea............................................ 227
Eritrea...................................................... 240
Ethiopia..................................................... 257
Gabon........................................................ 284
Gambia, The.................................................. 292
Ghana........................................................ 305
Guinea....................................................... 320
Guinea-Bissau................................................ 335
Kenya........................................................ 344
Lesotho...................................................... 368
Liberia...................................................... 384
Madagascar................................................... 395
Malawi....................................................... 408
Mali......................................................... 419
Mauritania................................................... 429
Mauritius.................................................... 444
Mozambique................................................... 452
Namibia...................................................... 465
Niger........................................................ 479
Nigeria...................................................... 493
Rwanda....................................................... 525
Sao Tome and Principe........................................ 544
Senegal...................................................... 549
Seychelles................................................... 565
Sierra Leone................................................. 571
Somalia...................................................... 589
South Africa................................................. 610
Sudan........................................................ 628
Swaziland.................................................... 655
Tanzania..................................................... 670
Togo......................................................... 692
Uganda....................................................... 702
Zambia....................................................... 728
Zimbabwe..................................................... 744
East Asia and the Pacific
Australia.................................................... 783
Brunei Darussalam............................................ 794
Burma........................................................ 801
Cambodia..................................................... 823
China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau)................. 843
Tibet.................................................... 882
Hong Kong................................................ 891
Macau.................................................... 906
Fiji......................................................... 914
Indonesia.................................................... 928
Japan........................................................ 949
Kiribati..................................................... 961
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of....................... 966
Korea, Republic of........................................... 979
Laos......................................................... 989
Malaysia..................................................... 999
Marshall Islands............................................. 1026
Micronesia, Federated States of.............................. 1032
Mongolia..................................................... 1038
Nauru........................................................ 1050
New Zealand.................................................. 1054
Palau........................................................ 1061
Papua New Guinea............................................. 1066
Philippines.................................................. 1076
Samoa........................................................ 1093
Singapore.................................................... 1101
Solomon Islands.............................................. 1116
Taiwan....................................................... 1123
Thailand..................................................... 1132
Timor-Leste.................................................. 1160
Tonga........................................................ 1169
Tuvalu....................................................... 1175
Vanuatu...................................................... 1180
Vietnam...................................................... 1187
Europe and Eurasia
Albania...................................................... 1213
Andorra...................................................... 1224
Armenia...................................................... 1229
Austria...................................................... 1261
Azerbaijan................................................... 1270
Belarus...................................................... 1295
Belgium...................................................... 1332
Bosnia and Herzegovina....................................... 1340
Bulgaria..................................................... 1358
Croatia...................................................... 1371
Cyprus....................................................... 1389
Czech Republic............................................... 1415
Denmark...................................................... 1433
Estonia...................................................... 1441
Finland...................................................... 1449
France....................................................... 1460
Georgia...................................................... 1472
Germany...................................................... 1515
Greece....................................................... 1530
Hungary...................................................... 1547
Iceland...................................................... 1565
Ireland...................................................... 1573
Italy........................................................ 1581
Kosovo....................................................... 1594
Latvia....................................................... 1615
Liechtenstein................................................ 1626
Lithuania.................................................... 1631
Luxembourg................................................... 1643
Macedonia.................................................... 1648
Malta........................................................ 1663
Moldova...................................................... 1673
Monaco....................................................... 1699
Montenegro................................................... 1703
Netherlands.................................................. 1730
Norway....................................................... 1741
Poland....................................................... 1750
Portugal..................................................... 1766
Romania...................................................... 1773
Russia....................................................... 1796
San Marino................................................... 1840
Serbia....................................................... 1844
Slovakia..................................................... 1861
Slovenia..................................................... 1877
Spain........................................................ 1885
Sweden....................................................... 1896
Switzerland.................................................. 1907
Turkey....................................................... 1917
Ukraine...................................................... 1939
United Kingdom............................................... 1965
Volume II
Near East and North Africa
Algeria...................................................... 1979
Bahrain...................................................... 1996
Egypt........................................................ 2009
Iran......................................................... 2027
Iraq......................................................... 2061
Israel and the occupied territories.......................... 2089
Jordan....................................................... 2139
Kuwait....................................................... 2157
Lebanon...................................................... 2169
Libya........................................................ 2188
Morocco...................................................... 2203
Oman......................................................... 2222
Qatar........................................................ 2230
Saudi Arabia................................................. 2243
Syria........................................................ 2266
Tunisia...................................................... 2288
United Arab Emirates......................................... 2305
Western Sahara............................................... 2317
Yemen........................................................ 2324
South and Central Asia
Afghanistan.................................................. 2347
Bangladesh................................................... 2372
Bhutan....................................................... 2395
India........................................................ 2403
Kazakhstan................................................... 2437
Kyrgyz Republic.............................................. 2457
Maldives..................................................... 2472
Nepal........................................................ 2485
Pakistan..................................................... 2505
Sri Lanka.................................................... 2541
Tajikistan................................................... 2560
Turkmenistan................................................. 2573
Uzbekistan................................................... 2586
Western Hemisphere
Antigua and Barbuda.......................................... 2609
Argentina.................................................... 2614
Bahamas, The................................................. 2630
Barbados..................................................... 2640
Belize....................................................... 2646
Bolivia...................................................... 2655
Brazil....................................................... 2668
Canada....................................................... 2688
Chile........................................................ 2702
Colombia..................................................... 2713
Costa Rica................................................... 2742
Cuba......................................................... 2754
Dominica..................................................... 2768
Dominican Republic........................................... 2775
Ecuador...................................................... 2794
El Salvador.................................................. 2812
Grenada...................................................... 2827
Guatemala.................................................... 2833
Guyana....................................................... 2850
Haiti........................................................ 2859
Honduras..................................................... 2873
Jamaica...................................................... 2892
Mexico....................................................... 2904
Nicaragua.................................................... 2923
Panama....................................................... 2940
Paraguay..................................................... 2957
Peru......................................................... 2970
Saint Kitts and Nevis........................................ 2987
Saint Lucia.................................................. 2991
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines............................. 2997
Suriname..................................................... 3003
Trinidad and Tobago.......................................... 3011
Uruguay...................................................... 3020
Venezuela.................................................... 3028
Appendixes
Appendix A: Notes on preparation of Report................... 3061
Appendix B: Reporting on Worker Rights....................... 3069
Appendix C: Selected International Human Rights Conventions.. 3071
Appendix D: Description of International Human Rights
Conventions in Appendix C.................................. 3079
Appendix E: FY 2010 Foreign Assistance Actuals............... 3081
Appendix F: United Nations General Assembly's Third Committee
Country Resolution Votes 2010.............................. 3107
Appendix G: United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights..................................................... 3115
?
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
Department of State,
Washington, DC, April 8, 2011.
Hon. John F. Kerry,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the Secretary of State, I
am transmitting to you the Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2010, prepared in compliance with sections
116(d)(1) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, and section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as
amended.
We hope this report is helpful. Please let us know if we
can provide any further information.
Sincerely,
Michael H. Posner,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor.
Enclosure.
(ix)
PREFACE
----------
Today, the eyes of the world are focused on the Middle East
and North Africa, where people are demanding that their
governments live up to the guiding principle of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, that all people are ``born free
and equal in dignity and rights.'' The promise of this
principle is the driving power behind every movement for
freedom, every campaign for democracy, every effort to foster
development, and every struggle against oppression. We are
inspired by the courage and determination of these activists,
and we see in their struggles the true manifestation of a
universal yearning for dignity and respect. We stand with them
and with all citizens, activists, and governments around the
world who peacefully work to advance the causes of democracy
and human rights.
As President Obama has said, we are guided by a simple
idea, `` . . . freedom, justice and peace for the world must
begin with freedom, justice, and peace in the lives of
individual human beings.'' This idea represents values we
cherish in the United States, but they are not ours alone. Our
belief in the universal principles of freedom, justice, and
peace guides us on a daily basis as we work to make human
rights a human reality. The world has witnessed that without
meaningful steps toward representative, accountable, and
transparent governance, the gap between people and their
leaders will only grow. We will continue to promote, support,
and defend democracy, in its many forms, knowing that it is the
best political system for allowing individuals to enjoy their
human rights.
The 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices provide
a record of the state of human rights in the world and raise
awareness of the progress made in 2010, the ground lost, and
the work that remains. This year marks the thirty-fifth year we
have reported to Congress on human rights around the world.
These reports were initially envisioned as a tool to help guide
the United States in its foreign policy, but they have grown to
be something much greater. Other governments, individuals, and
organizations now use the human rights reports as essential
sources of information about conditions in countries around the
world. For activists, many of whom confront a shrinking space
in which to operate and do so at great personal risk, these
reports also provide evidence that the world is being made
aware of their struggle.
As I travel the world, I make a point of meeting with those
people working to advance the cause of human rights within
their own countries. I am consistently impressed by the power
of the human spirit, and the unwavering commitment of these
brave individuals. Their work inspires us and confirms the
importance of holding governments, including our own,
accountable for the treatment of their citizens.
Once each year we submit the Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices to Congress, but advancing freedom and human
rights is a daily priority for the men and women of the
Department of State, both in Washington and in our embassies
overseas. Through these reports, through our diplomacy, and
through our example, we will continue to press for the
universal human rights of all individuals. Now is the
opportunity for us to support all who are willing to stand up
on behalf of the rights we cherish.
In that spirit I hereby transmit the Department of State's
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2010 to the
United States Congress.
Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Secretary of State.
OVERVIEW AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
----------
WHY THE REPORTS ARE PREPARED
This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department
of State in compliance with Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended. The law
provides that the Secretary of State shall transmit to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate by February 25 ``a full and
complete report regarding the status of internationally
recognized human rights, within the meaning of subsection (A)
in countries that receive assistance under this part, and (B)
in all other foreign countries which are members of the United
Nations and which are not otherwise the subject of a human
rights report under this Act.'' We have also included reports
on several countries that do not fall into the categories
established by these statutes and thus are not covered by the
congressional requirement.
In the early 1970s the United States formalized its
responsibility to speak out on behalf of international human
rights standards. In 1976 Congress enacted legislation creating
a Coordinator of Human Rights in the Department of State, a
position later upgraded to Assistant Secretary. Legislation
also requires that U.S. foreign and trade policy take into
account countries' human rights and worker rights performance
and that country reports be submitted to the Congress on an
annual basis.
HOW THE REPORTS ARE PREPARED
The Department of State prepared this report using
information from U.S. embassies and consulates abroad, foreign
government officials, nongovernmental and international
organizations, and published reports. The initial drafts of the
individual country reports were prepared by U.S. diplomatic
missions abroad, drawing on information they gathered
throughout the year from a variety of sources, including
government officials, jurists, the armed forces, journalists,
human rights monitors, academics, and labor activists. This
information gathering can be hazardous, and U.S. Foreign
Service personnel regularly go to great lengths, under trying
and sometimes dangerous conditions, to investigate reports of
human rights abuse, monitor elections, and come to the aid of
individuals at risk, such as political dissidents and human
rights defenders whose rights are threatened by their
governments.
Once the initial drafts of the individual country reports
were completed, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor, in cooperation with other Department of State offices,
worked to corroborate, analyze, and edit the reports, drawing
on their own sources of information. These sources included
reports provided by U.S. and other human rights groups, foreign
government officials, representatives from the United Nations
and other international and regional organizations and
institutions, experts from academia, and the media. Bureau
officers also consulted experts on worker rights, refugee
issues, military and police topics, women's issues, and legal
matters, among may others. The guiding principle was to ensure
that all information was assessed objectively, thoroughly, and
fairly.
As has proven the case in the past, we anticipate that the
reports will be used as a resource for shaping policy,
conducting diplomacy, and making assistance, training, and
other resource allocations. They will serve also as a basis for
the U.S. Government's cooperation with private groups to
promote the observance of internationally recognized human
rights.
The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices cover
internationally recognized civil, political and worker rights,
as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
These rights include freedom from torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, from prolonged
detention without charges, from disappearance or clandestine
detention, and from other flagrant violations of the right to
life, liberty and the security of the person.
Universal human rights seek to incorporate respect for
human dignity into the processes of government and law. All
persons have the right to nationality, the inalienable right to
change their government by peaceful means and to enjoy basic
freedoms, such as freedom of expression, association, assembly,
movement, and religion, without discrimination on the basis of
race, religion, national origin, or sex. The right to join a
free trade union is a necessary condition of a free society and
economy. Thus the reports assess key internationally recognized
worker rights, including the right of association, the right to
organize and bargain collectively, the prohibition of forced or
compulsory labor, the status of child labor practices, the
minimum age for employment of children, and acceptable work
conditions.
With this 2010 edition of the country reports, DRL expanded
the use of hyperlinks from these reports to other key human
rights documents produced by the Department of State.
Specifically, readers are asked to follow hyperlinks for
complete information on religious freedom issues by consulting
the 2010 International Religious Freedom Report, the 2010
Trafficking in Persons Report, if applicable, and the several
current publications produced by the Department's Consular
Affairs Bureau on international child abductions, if applicable
to the country in question.
Within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, the
editorial staff of the Country Reports Team consists of: Editor
in Chief Stephen Eisenbraun; Office Directors: Eric Falls,
Robert Boehme, Jeffrey Hawkins, Douglas Kramer, Jessica
Lieberman, Mark Mittelhauser, Susan O'Sullivan; Senior Editors:
Jonathan Bemis, Douglas B. Dearborn, Daniel Dolan, Jerome L.
Hoganson, Patricia Meeks Schnell, Marc J. Susser, and Julie
Turner; Editors: Naim Ahmed, Cory Andrews, Sarah Buckley-Moore,
Laura Carey, Elise Carlson-Rainer, Della Cavey, Eric Concha,
Sharon Cooke, Susan Corke, Stuart Crampton, Kathleen Crowley,
Frank Crump, Bonnie Daley, Tu Dang, Mollie Davis, Mort Dworken,
Sindbad Fennimore, Karen Gilbride, Joan Garner, Carrie George,
Safiya Ghori-Ahmad, Patrick Harvey, Caitlin Helfrich, Matthew
Hicks, Alexandra Hoey, Kimberly Holbrook, Victor Huser, Jill
Hutchings, Stan Ifshin, Dianna James, Sarah Johnston-Gardner,
David T. Jones, Simone Joseph, Malac Kabir, Yelda Kazimi,
Mancharee Junk, Min Kang, Katharine Kendrick, Orly Keiner,
Stephen Kopanos, Alyson Kozma, Douglas Kramer, Sarah Labowitz,
Gregory Maggio, Stacey May, Stephen Moody, Sarah Morgan,
Perlita Muiruri, Sandra Murphy, Daniel L. Nadel, Genevieve
Parente, Blake Peterson, Meredith Ryder-Rude, Peter Sawchyn,
Robert Schlicht, Monica Sendor, Wendy Silverman, Marissa Smith,
Rachel Spring, Jason Starr, Leslie Taylor, Jennifer Terry,
James C.Todd, David Wagner, Micah Watson, Chanan Weissman,
Mareham Youssef, Sarah Yun, Rachel Waldstein, Bernadette
Zielinski; Editorial Assistants: Carol Finerty, Stephanie
Martone, James McDonald, and Regina Waugh.
INTRODUCTION
----------
This report provides encyclopedic detail on human rights
conditions in over 190 countries for 2010. Because we are
publishing this report three months into the new year, however,
our perspectives on many issues are now framed by the dramatic
changes sweeping across countries in the Middle East in 2011.
At this moment we cannot predict the outcome of these changes,
and we will not know the lasting impacts for years to come. The
internal dynamics in each of these countries are different, so
sweeping analysis of the entire region is not appropriate. In
places like Tunisia and Egypt, we are witnessing popular
demands for meaningful political participation, fundamental
freedoms, and greater economic opportunity. These demands are
profound, they are homegrown, and they are being driven by new
activists, many of them young people. These citizens seek to
build sustainable democracies in their countries with
governments that respect the universal human rights of their
own people. If they succeed, the Middle East region, and with
it the whole world, will be improved.
The United States will continue to monitor the situations
in these countries closely, knowing that the transition to
democracy is not automatic and will take time and careful
attention. In Egypt, we await the lifting of the state of
emergency, which the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has
promised to do prior to parliamentary elections. In Tunisia, we
are encouraged by the creation of a fact-finding committee to
investigate human rights abuses that took place during the
uprising.
While we address these and other short-term repercussions,
historians will have the benefit of time and perspective to
help us understand what triggered these popular movements. But
three trends clearly contributed to their development and to
other changes that occurred throughout the world in 2010. The
first is the explosive growth of nongovernmental advocacy
organizations focused on a wide range of democracy and human
rights issues and causes. Fifty years ago, when Amnesty
International was created, few countries outside of North
America or Western Europe had any locally based human rights
organizations. Today, local nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) exist in almost every country in the world. The growth
of these organizations has been dramatic, and in many countries
such citizens' organizations have been created against great
odds and only because individual human rights activists were
willing to face great personal risk. Secretary Clinton
highlighted the importance of these organizations in a speech
she gave in July 2010 in Krakow, Poland, to the Community of
Democracies. As she said, ``societies move forward when the
citizens that make up these groups are empowered to transform
common interests into common actions that serve the common
good.''
In closed societies, where repressive governments seek to
control and stifle the debate on sensitive political and social
issues, governments view these independent local citizens'
organizations as a threat rather than a resource, and democracy
and human rights defenders are singled out for particularly
harsh treatment. For example, in Belarus, over 700 prodemocracy
activists, including seven presidential candidates, were
arrested during public demonstrations following the flawed
December 2010 presidential elections. In the weeks that
followed, the offices and homes of civil society
representatives, independent journalists, and political
activists were raided as part of an effort to stifle
independent political activity and free expression.
In the last several years, more than 90 governments have
sought to pass restrictive laws and regulations, hampering the
ability of organizations to register, operate freely, or
receive foreign funding. A proposed NGO law in Cambodia,
introduced in December, is emblematic of these efforts. The law
would impose burdensome reporting requirements on NGOs, erect
significant barriers to the registration of foreign NGOs,
require foreign NGOs to collaborate with the government, and
outlaw unregistered NGOs. In Ethiopia, a new civil society
organization law entered into force in February, following a
one-year grace period. The law prohibits charities, societies,
and associations that receive more than 10 percent of their
funding from foreign sources from engaging in activities that
promote human rights and democracy; the rights of children and
persons with disabilities; equality among nations,
nationalities, people, genders, and religions; conflict
resolution or reconciliation; and the promotion of justice.
During the grace period, Ethiopia's leading human rights
defender organizations adjusted by re-registering either as
local charities, meaning that they could not raise more than 10
percent of their funds from foreign donors, or as ``Resident
Charities,'' which allowed donations but prohibited activities
in the enumerated areas. There were 3,522 registered
organizations before the civil society organization law was
adopted; after the law only 1,655 remained.
Secretary Clinton acknowledged these troubling restrictions
on civil society in her speech in Krakow, when she identified a
``group of countries where the walls are closing in on civic
organizations'' and cautioned that when ``governments crack
down on the right of citizens to work together, as they have
throughout history, societies fall into stagnation and decay.''
As we have seen in the Middle East and elsewhere, governments
cannot suppress civil society indefinitely, and they can never
suppress it legitimately.
A second important trend is the dramatic growth of the
Internet, mobile phones, and other connective technologies that
allow instantaneous communications to billions of people across
the globe. As Secretary Clinton observed in a recent speech on
Internet freedom, the Internet has become the town square of
the 21st century. Much has been said and written about the
effects of these connective technologies in allowing Egyptians
and Tunisians to mobilize in the weeks and months before
demonstrations actually began. While it is the courage of the
people themselves that led the way and was the driving force,
the amplifying impact of these new technologies, coupled with
the power of television stations and the Internet to broadcast
videos obtained by citizens using these mobile phones, cannot
be denied.
Today there are more than two billion people with Internet
access spread across most countries of the world, and around
five billion mobile phone subscriptions. These numbers are
projected to grow dramatically in the next 15 years. And as
more people gain access to these remarkable technologies, and
use them both to gather and impart information on human rights
and to communicate with other activists, an increasing number
of governments are spending more time, money, and attention in
efforts to curtail access to these new communications outlets.
More than 40 governments are now using a combination of
regulatory restrictions, technical controls on access to the
Internet, and technologies designed to repress speech and
infringe on the personal privacy of those who use these rapidly
evolving technologies.
In Saudi Arabia in 2010, the government restricted access
to the Internet and interfered with citizens' privacy while
online. The official Communications and Information Technology
Commission (CITC) improperly monitored e-mail and Internet chat
rooms and blocked sites, including pages about Hinduism,
Judaism, Christianity, and certain forms of Islam deemed
incompatible with Sharia law and national regulations. In
Sudan, the government monitored Internet communications and,
during the elections, blocked access to the Sudan Vote Monitor
Web site. The Government of China tightly controlled content on
and access to the Internet and detained those expressing views
critical of the government or its policies. In Vietnam, the
government orchestrated attacks against critical Web sites and
spied on dissident bloggers. Police arrested 25 dissidents over
the course of the year and forcibly entered the homes of a
number of others to remove personal computers, cell phones, and
other material.
A third trend, and one that points in a negative direction,
was the continuing escalation of violence, persecution, and
official and societal discrimination of members of vulnerable
groups, often racial, religious, or ethnic minorities or
disempowered majorities. In many countries this pattern of
discrimination extended to women; children; persons with
disabilities; indigenous; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) persons; and members of other vulnerable
groups who lacked the political power to defend their own
interests. Often members of these groups were denied economic
opportunity or the ability to abide by their social or cultural
traditions or practices or were restricted in their ability to
speak freely, to assemble peacefully, or to form associations
or organizations.
In Pakistan, religious freedom violations and violence and
discrimination against religious minorities continued. The
blasphemy laws were used to harass religious minorities as well
as vulnerable Muslims or Muslims with minority views. (In the
first two months of 2011, two senior government officials who
publicly challenged these laws were brutally killed.) In Saudi
Arabia, there were severe restrictions on religious freedom and
discrimination on the basis of religion was common. In China,
the government continued to demonize the Dalai Lama and harshly
repress Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang and Tibetan Buddhists. There
were reports of increases in anti-Semitic acts around the
world, including the desecration of cemeteries, graffiti, and
blood-libel rhetoric, as well as Holocaust denial, revisionism,
and glorification. There have also been spikes in expressions
of anti-Semitism during events in the Middle East.
Persons around the world continue to experience
discrimination and intimidation based on their sexual
orientation or gender identity. Honduras saw an upsurge in
killings of members of the LGBT community by unknown
perpetrators. Meanwhile, in many African, Middle Eastern, and
Caribbean nations, same-sex relations remain a criminal
offense, and through such laws and other measures the state
reinforces and encourages societal discrimination and
intolerance. In Uganda, for example, intimidation and
harassment of LGBT individuals worsened during the year, and
some government and religious leaders threatened LGBT
individuals.
Exploitation of laborers was also a problem in many
countries, often compounded by threats against workers for
attempting to unionize. Again in 2010, the government of
Uzbekistan mobilized thousands of adults and children as forced
laborers during the annual cotton harvest. In Bangladesh, poor
working conditions caused needless deaths, notably in the
garment industry. Bangladesh was also the site of frequent and
at times deadly labor unrest during the year, particularly in
the Ready-Made Garment Sector and Export Processing Zones.
These trends are further illustrated below by the thumbnail
sketches of 27 countries (listed alphabetically by region). The
section on country highlights provides illustrative examples of
the human rights trends in 2010. In some of these countries
there have been negative developments or the human rights
record has been a mix of positive and negative developments. In
other countries highlighted below, we reflect on positive
trends in 2010. The body of this report is a much more detailed
examination of these and an additional 167 countries.
2010 marks the 35th year that the State Department has
produced the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
This year's report covers human rights conditions in 194
countries. What began as the response to a Congressional
mandate to report on the human rights situation in those
countries that were receiving U.S. assistance in the mid 1970s
has blossomed into a detailed analysis of human rights
conditions in all countries that are members of the United
Nations. The country reports provide an overview of the human
rights situation around the world as a means to raise awareness
of human rights conditions, in particular as these conditions
affect the well-being of women, children, racial and religious
minorities, trafficking victims, members of indigenous groups
and ethnic communities, persons with disabilities, sexual
minorities, refugees, and members of other vulnerable groups.
As the scope of the State Department's reporting has
increased, so has the use of these reports around the world. In
addition to providing data to Congress to inform their funding
and policy decisions, these reports are used throughout the
U.S. government and by many foreign governments. And,
importantly, they are increasingly being used by individual
citizens and NGOs as critical sources of information on what is
happening in the world. To facilitate the sharing of this
information, reports are translated into over 50 languages and
made available online.
The U.S. government compiles the human rights report
because we believe it is imperative for countries, including
our own, to ensure that respect for human rights is an integral
component of foreign policy. We provide these reports as a form
of comprehensive review and analysis.
The reports do not cover human rights in the United States,
although this Administration has made a commitment to take a
close and critical look at our own performance on these issues
even as we cast a spotlight on the practices of other
countries. In November, the United States presented its first
report on human rights in the United States to the UN Human
Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva through the Universal Periodic
Review. In preparation for that report we conducted extensive
consultations in the United States with a wide range of civil
society organizations and Native American leaders. Last month
we appeared again at the UNHRC meeting in Geneva to report our
response to the recommendations made to us by other
governments.
We also continually report on our human rights record
pursuant to our treaty obligations. In January 2010, we
submitted periodic reports on our implementation of the
Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child. In 2011 we will be submitting periodic reports regarding
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture, and the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. In
2010, for the first time, a section on the United States was
included in the State Department's Trafficking in Persons
Report, and the United States was ranked based on the same
standards to which we hold other countries.
A final word about the production of these reports. These
194 country reports are comprehensive, if not exhaustive. Their
production is a Herculean endeavor requiring extra-ordinary
efforts by a team of talented and committed human rights
officers at U.S. Embassies around the world, and by their
counterparts in Washington, D.C., including the dedicated staff
in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Each
country team collects, analyzes, and synthesizes information
from a variety of sources, including domestic and international
human rights organizations, other governments, multilateral
organizations, and members of civil society. Once the reports
are drafted, they are rigorously edited, reviewed, and fact-
checked, to ensure accuracy and objectivity.
COUNTRY HIGHLIGHTS
In 2010, governments around the world continued to commit
severe human rights violations and abuses. The paragraphs below
describe the human rights situation and key trends in specific
countries where abuses were especially serious. We also
highlight Ukraine, where in 2010 there was backsliding after
positive developments in previous years. The section begins
with a discussion of several countries--Colombia, Guinea,
Indonesia--that are highlighted for notable positive human
rights developments in 2010.
Colombia is a country where there were notable improvements
in the human rights situation in 2010. Soon after taking office
in August, President Santos and his administration strengthened
the government's relationship with civil society and human
rights defenders, holding high-level consultative sessions,
publicly expressing support for human rights defenders and
engaging them in dialogue, and supporting efforts to increase
penalties for threats and violence against human rights
defenders. The government advanced a Land and Victims' Law to
provide for land restitution and victims' reparations.
Extrajudicial executions decreased substantially from 2008 and
2009, and several senior military officers were convicted of
human rights abuses. Some human rights abuses continued, such
as some threats against human rights defenders and trade
unionists. The Ministry of Defense began implementing an
agreement with the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights to monitor ministry measures to improve adherence to
human rights.
In December 2010, Guinea inaugurated its first
democratically elected president since independence from France
in 1958. The people selected longtime opposition leader Alpha
Conde, the candidate of the Rally of the Guinean People Party,
as their president following two rounds of elections. Although
there was some violence following the second round, the
elections generally were regarded as free and fair.
Respect for human rights in Indonesia continued to improve
in 2010, 12 years after the country's transition to democracy.
While weaknesses in the justice system persisted, President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, democratically reelected in July
2009, remained a strong proponent of the rule of law and
accountability and civil society, and the media remained among
the most vibrant in Asia. Professionalization of the military
continued, although some serious human rights abuses by
military personnel occurred, particularly in Papua, and
punishments, when imposed, were often not commensurate with the
crimes committed.
Africa
Cote d'Ivoire ended 2010 in a standoff over the presidency,
following October elections in which incumbent President
Laurent Gbagbo, candidate of the Ivoirian People's Front, and
opposition party leader Alassane Ouattara, candidate of the
Rally for Republicans, advanced to the November 28 presidential
run-off. On December 2, the Independent Electoral Commission
declared Ouattara the winner with 54.1 percent of the vote as
compared with 45.9 percent for Gbagbo. The election was
declared fair and democratic by the UN and international and
domestic observer missions. Gbagbo refused to accept the
results, alleging voter fraud and intimidation in several
regions, and both Ouattara and Gbagbo took oaths of office on
December 3. At year's end, President Ouattara operated his
government from the Golf Hotel in Abidjan under a blockade from
pro-Gbgabo forces. Gbagbo retained control of state resources
including the national television station, the security forces,
and the treasury. There were credible reports of human rights
abuses during this time. On December 16, security forces fired
on supporters of President Ouattara during a demonstration
march. At least 20 persons were killed, many more wounded, and
hundreds arrested. In the one week period from December 15-22,
the UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire human rights division
reported 173 persons killed, 90 subjected to torture and ill-
treatment, 471 others arbitrarily arrested and detained, and 24
persons missing. The overwhelming majority of these cases of
extrajudicial killings, torture, detention, and disappearance,
were committed by security forces loyal to Gbagbo. Human rights
violations which took place after December 31 are not
documented in the 2010 report.
Serious human rights abuses continued throughout the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), particularly in the
mineral rich, conflict-affected eastern and northeastern
regions, where state authority remained non-existent or
extremely weak. Human rights defenders have been intimidated,
beaten, and, as in the case of prominent activist Floribert
Chebeya, even killed. Armed entities-including elements of
state security forces-perpetrated abuses with impunity and
engaged in the illegal exploitation and trade of natural
resources, particularly minerals. Revenues derived from the
illicit trade in minerals, some of which supported armed
conflict, fueled the continued insecurity in eastern DRC,
aggravating an already precarious human rights situation. Rebel
and militia groups in eastern DRC continued to engage in rape
and looting campaigns in efforts to control communities
residing near lucrative mining areas, and to reap mining-
related profits that sustained the conflict and attendant
abuses. Credible sources such as the UN Group of Experts on the
DRC presented information indicating that some Congolese and
international corporations' supply chains originated with
suppliers who traded with armed entities-including elements of
the state security forces-that committed serious human rights
abuses.
Nigeria continued to be plagued by serious human rights
abuses during the year. Security services personnel, including
police, military, and State Security Service officers,
committed extrajudicial killings and tortured, beat, and abused
demonstrators, criminal suspects, detainees, and convicted
prisoners. The Joint Task Force, formed in 2003 to address the
instability in the Niger Delta and consisting of military,
police, and security services, conducted raids on militant
groups and criminal suspects, resulting in numerous deaths and
injuries to both alleged criminals and civilians. Corruption
was pervasive at all levels of government and throughout the
security forces. Ethno-religious violence also resulted in
deaths and displacement during the year. Jos and the
surrounding farmlands were the site of two major attacks in
January and March. Up to 1,000 individuals, mostly women,
children, and the elderly, were murdered, hacked to death, or
burned alive.
Violence continued in Sudan throughout 2010. Nationwide
elections held in April were not deemed fair and free by the
international community, and observers noted numerous problems
throughout the process. In Darfur, fighting involving
government, government-aligned militias, rebel groups, and
ethnic groups continued to kill, injure, and displace
civilians. This violence killed 2,321 persons during the year,
according to the UN, an increase compared with the 875 persons
killed in 2009. The government continued to conduct aerial
bombardment. Gender-based violence, the use of child soldiers,
and the obstruction of humanitarian organizations and the
United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur continued
to be problems. The government harassed, arrested, and beat
civil society members in the north. In Southern Sudan,
interethnic fighting and Lord's Resistance Army attacks
continued to kill and displace civilians. According to UN
estimates, violence in the south resulted in an estimated 986
deaths and the displacement of 223,708 persons during the year.
Registration for the 2011 Southern Sudan self-determination
referendum occurred in November and December. Lack of progress
on preparations for a separate referendum on whether the border
region of Abyei should be part of the north or the south led to
sporadic violence and rising tensions in the area.
In Zimbabwe, security forces, police, and Zimbabwe African
National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)-dominated elements of
the government continued to commit numerous, serious human
rights violations with impunity, including torture, against
non-ZANU-PF political activists and party members, student
leaders, and civil society activists. ZANU-PF's dominant
control and manipulation of the political process through
trumped-up charges and arbitrary arrest, intimidation, and
corruption effectively negated the right of citizens to change
their government. Although there were fewer incidents in the
first half of 2010, expectations that elections would be held
in 2011 led to an increase in the number of cases of harassment
and intimidation of civil society organizations and members of
the media toward the end of the reporting period. The
government continued to use repressive laws to suppress freedom
of speech, including for members of the press, assembly,
association, and movement. Military forces and other government
agents also continued abuses in the Marange diamond fields.
East Asia and the Pacific
Despite the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, over 2,100
political prisoners remained in custody in Burma at the end of
2010. Many civil society activists were detained indefinitely
and without charges, and regime-sponsored organizations engaged
in harassment and abuse of human rights and prodemocracy
activists. The government routinely infringed on individual
privacy and restricted the freedoms of speech, press, assembly,
association, religion, and movement. The government did not
allow domestic human rights NGOs to function independently, and
international NGOs encountered a difficult environment. The
fall 2010 elections were neither free nor fair. The government
continued its tight control of the activities of Buddhist
clergy. Military forces in Burma continued to commit egregious
abuses and violations against civilians in ethnic minority
regions. These abuses included rape, torture, forced
relocation, and forced labor. Violence and societal
discrimination against women and minority religious communities
continued, as did unlawful recruitment of child soldiers and
trafficking in persons, particularly of women and girls.
Workers' rights remained restricted and forced labor, including
that of children, also persisted.
In Cambodia, members of security forces, acting with
impunity, committed arbitrary killings. Human rights monitors
reported arbitrary arrests and prolonged pretrial detention,
underscoring a weak judiciary and denial of the right to a fair
trial. Restrictions continued on freedom of assembly and
expression, including for members of the press, and there was a
growing abuse of defamation and disinformation lawsuits
targeting opposition voices. Civil society expressed
significant concern that the draft Law on Associations and NGOs
could, if adopted, seriously constrain the ability of NGOs to
operate. The draft law released in December included provisions
that would impose burdensome reporting requirements on NGOs,
prevent associations with fewer than 21(later reduced to a
still-onerous 11) members from attaining legal status, erect
burdensome barriers to the registration of foreign NGOs,
require foreign NGOs to collaborate with the government, and
outlaw unregistered NGOs. Anti-union activity by employers and
weak enforcement of labor laws continued, and exploitative
child labor in the informal sector remained a problem.
In China, the negative trend in key areas of human rights
continued. The government stepped up restrictions on lawyers,
activists, bloggers, and journalists; tightened controls on
civil society; and increased attempts to limit freedom of
speech and control the press, the Internet, and Internet access
in 2010. Authorities also increased the use of extralegal
measures, including forced disappearances, strict house arrest,
arbitrary detention in ``black jails,'' and other forms of
``soft detention'' to silence independent voices and punish
activists and their families. Legal activist Chen Guangcheng,
along with his wife and child, remained under house arrest, as
did other released political prisoners. Public interest
lawyers, who operated within China's legal framework, were
disbarred, beaten, or ``disappeared'' for taking on the defense
of clients and issues deemed sensitive by the government.
Bloggers and Web masters have been arrested and charged with
``subverting state power'' for re-tweeting a post or operating
a Web site where others posted comments. The government also
continued its severe cultural and religious repression of
ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and
Tibetan areas.
In North Korea, the human rights situation remained grim.
During the year, the government maintained tight control over
the flow of information into and out of the country. The
government denied its citizens the right to due process and
arbitrarily arrested and detained individuals, including for
political crimes. Defectors and NGOs indicated that severe and
systematic human rights abuses occurred throughout the
country's extensive network of prisons and detention centers.
In addition, the government continued to enforce rigid controls
over the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association,
religion, and movement and worker rights. There were no
independent domestic human rights monitoring organizations, and
the government denied international organizations and foreign
NGOs access, making it impossible to assess accurately the true
scope of the abuses occurring in the country or the validity of
these reports.
The government of Vietnam continued to suppress dissent,
tightened controls over the press, and limited the freedoms of
expression, assembly, movement, and association. Individuals
were arbitrarily detained for political activities and denied
the right to fair and expeditious trials. The government
arrested at least 25 political activists, convicted 14
dissidents arrested in 2008, 2009, and 2010, and denied the
appeals of another 10 dissidents convicted at the end of 2009.
The judicial system was strongly distorted by political
influence, endemic corruption, and inefficiency. Freedom of
religion continued to be subject to uneven interpretation and
protection, particularly at the provincial and village levels.
Internet freedom was further restricted as the government
orchestrated attacks against critical Web sites and spied on
dissident bloggers. The government limited workers' rights to
form and join independent unions.
Europe
Authorities in Belarus arbitrarily arrested, detained, and
imprisoned prodemocracy activists, journalists, and civil
society representatives. In the wake of December 2010's flawed
presidential election, authorities initiated a broad crackdown
against demonstrators, detaining close to 700 persons and
raiding offices and apartments belonging to members of
independent media, NGOs, and the political opposition. Over 40
individuals, including several presidential candidates, now
face up to 15 years in jail. Through its detentions and trials,
the government of Belarus continually is creating new political
prisoners. The judiciary lacked independence and suffered from
corruption, inefficiency, and political interference; trial
outcomes were often predetermined, and many trials were
conducted behind closed doors. Official corruption throughout
the government continued to be a problem.
In Russia, the government infringed on freedom of
expression, assembly, and association, detaining certain
demonstrators and continuing to pressure select NGOs,
independent media, some religious minorities, independent labor
unions, and political opposition. Attacks on and the murder of
journalists and activists continued. There were reports of
physical abuse by law enforcement, military hazing deaths, and
harsh prison conditions. Rule of law and due process violations
remained a problem, and government corruption was widespread.
Xenophobic, racial, and ethnic attacks and hate crimes
continued to be a significant problem. The conflict between the
government and insurgents, Islamist militants, and criminal
forces in the North Caucasus led to numerous human rights
violations by all parties, which reportedly engaged in killing,
torture, abuse, violence, and politically motivated abductions.
In Ukraine, despite beginning with free and fair
presidential elections, the overall trend for 2010 was negative
due to problematic local elections, intimidation of the media,
and perceived selective prosecution of opposition figures.
International and domestic observers found the October local
elections did not reach the same standards of the presidential
election, citing the registration of fraudulent opposition
candidate lists, government pressure against election monitors
and candidates, and election officials selectively barring or
removing candidates from ballots- all prompting concern about
the government's planned next steps for election reform. In
addition, there were numerous reports that authorities
attempted to direct media content and intimidate journalists.
Although the government took steps in 2009 to better combat
corruption, the international community expressed concern that
politics motivated the new government's 2010 criminal
investigation of 30 members of the previous government for
alleged corruption; several of these people were detained and
subsequently charged.
Near East
Political tensions flared in the weeks preceding the
October elections in Bahrain. The government arrested more than
200 Shia men it accused of inciting or involvement in street
violence. Those arrested included some, but not all, of the
leaders of two groups, Haq and Wafa', which reject the monarchy
and had called for a boycott of the elections. The government
charged 23 of those arrested with involvement in a ``terror
network'' pursuant to the 2006 counterterrorism law. The
electoral process also was marred by the government's banning
of the two main legal opposition parties' Web sites and
newsletters. The government did not allow international
observers to monitor the elections. The government also
continued to restrict freedom of assembly and association.
Security forces intervened in demonstrations and limited and
controlled political gatherings during the year. NGOs and civil
society groups were required to register with the government
and provide membership lists. In September, the Ministry of
Social Development effectively shuttered a local human rights
organization, Bahrain Human Rights Society, when a ministerial
decree ordered the dissolution of the society's board of
directors and appointed a ministry employee to be the group's
interim head.
According to multiple sources, the Government of Iran
executed approximately 312 persons in summary executions during
the year, many after trials that were conducted in secret and/
or did not provide due process. In many cases, persons executed
supposedly for criminal offenses such as narcotics trafficking
were actually political dissidents. Authorities held political
prisoners and continued to crack down on women's rights
reformers, ethnic minority rights activists, student activists,
and religious minorities. There was little judicial
independence and few fair public trials. The government
severely restricted the right to privacy and civil liberties,
including freedoms of expression, including for members of the
press, assembly, association, and movement, and it placed
severe restrictions on freedom of religion. Vigilantes
continued to attack young persons considered ``un-Islamic'' in
their dress or activities, invade private homes, abuse
unmarried couples, and disrupt concerts. Violence and legal and
societal discrimination against women, children, ethnic and
religious minorities, and LGBT persons persisted.
While the credible and legitimate national parliamentary
elections in all 18 provinces on March 7 reflected a
significant achievement in advancing the exercise of human
rights, extremist violence, coupled with weak government
performance in upholding the rule of law, resulted in
widespread and severe human rights abuses in Iraq. There were
reports that the government or its agents committed numerous
arbitrary or unlawful killings, arbitrary detentions, and acts
of torture connected to its security operations, often with
impunity. Attacks by al-Qaida in Iraq and other extremists
continued against Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), government
officials, and civilians, often targeting urban areas,
Christian churches, Shia markets, and mosques. On May 10,
coordinated bombings and shootings resulted in at least 119
fatalities, including ISF and law enforcement personnel. On
August 17, a suicide bomber blew himself up in a crowd of army
recruits in Baghdad, killing 61 persons. During the year, 962
Ministry of Interior personnel were killed and 1,347 were
injured. Police officers, in particular, were targeted.
In Libya, Colonel al-Qadhafi and his close associates
monopolized every aspect of decision-making in the government.
Continuing human rights problems included torture, arbitrary
arrest, official impunity, and poor prison conditions. A large
but unknown number of persons remained in detention or prison
for engaging in peaceful political activity or for belonging to
an illegal political organization. The government significantly
restricted media freedom and continued to restrict freedom of
expression, and routinely monitored telephone calls and
Internet usage, including e-mail communication with foreign
countries. There also was physical surveillance of political
activists and foreign organizations. The government owned and
controlled virtually all print and broadcast media, and
government-controlled media neither published nor broadcast
opinions inconsistent with official policy. The Internal
Security Organization routinely harassed journalists, and
overly broad provisions of the penal code served as the basis
for frequent charges of criminal defamation. The government
severely restricted freedom of assembly and permitted public
assembly only with advance approval. The government restricted
the right of association and generally only allowed
institutions affiliated with the government to operate; no NGOs
functioned in the country. In the early months of 2011,
protests erupted across Libya. Because they occurred outside of
the reporting period, they are not documented in the 2010
report.
In Syria, security forces committed unlawful killings,
detained political and human rights activists, and tortured and
physically abused prisoners and detainees with impunity. The
government also imprisoned several high-profile members of the
human rights and civil society communities, in addition to the
estimated 2,500-3,000 political prisoners previously detained.
Lengthy pretrial and incommunicado detention remained a serious
problem, and the courts systematically used ``confessions''
extracted under duress as evidence. Defendants' claims of
torture were almost never investigated. The government severely
restricted universal freedoms of expression, assembly and
association, religion, and movement.
South and Central Asia
An increasingly difficult security situation in Afghanistan
resulted in a number of serious human rights abuses. Civilians
continued to suffer from intensified armed conflict as
conflict-related deaths increased by 15 percent during the year
compared to 2009. Government and progovernment international
forces were responsible for civilian deaths, specifically 16
percent of total civilian deaths. Human Rights Watch reported
that timely and transparent inquiries or accountability of
forces in the event of wrong-doing were often lacking when
civilians were hurt or killed. Taliban and insurgent attacks,
including politically targeted killings, escalated in both
number and intensity. At least 30 individuals were killed on
September 18, the day of parliamentary elections, and the
Taliban claimed responsibility for killing three candidates
during the campaign period between July and August. In August,
five campaign workers supporting Fauwzia Gilani in Herat were
abducted and killed. There were also attacks on election
officials. The elections themselves were marred by electoral
fraud and widespread irregularities, including the
establishment of a special tribunal to investigate the election
results and complaints; low voter turnout; and insufficient
conditions for participation by women. The government was
plagued by official impunity and corruption and often failed to
conduct effective investigations of human rights abuses
committed by local security forces. Arbitrary arrest and
detention remained a problem, and the judiciary lacked
independence. Freedom of religion, including the right to
change one's religion, was severely restricted. Women continued
to face pervasive human rights abuses, including violence,
insurgent attacks on girls' education, limited access to
justice, and other limitations on their rights.
In Pakistan, allegations of extrajudicial killings and
detention of civilians by the security forces were reported by
several media outlets and NGOs. During the year, there was a
significant increase in the total number of reported torture
and rape cases of individuals in custody, almost double as
compared to 2009. The Society for Human Rights and Prisoners'
Aid reported 72 civilian deaths after encounters with police
and 168 deaths in jails, an increase from the previous year.
Militant and terrorist bombings in all four provinces and in
Federally Administered Tribal Areas continued to result in
deaths and injuries. According to the report, terrorist and
extremist attacks and operations to combat terrorism and
extremism resulted in 7,400 deaths, of which nearly 1,800 were
civilians, over 450 were security forces, and over 5,100 were
terrorists or insurgents. There were numerous reports of
politically motivated killings in Karachi and Balochistan.
According to a report by Dawn, 1,981 persons were killed in
political violence in Karachi, of which 748 were targeted
killings. According to Human Rights Watch, the targeted killing
and disappearance of Baloch leaders, activists, and civilians
increased in 2010. Religious freedom violations and violence
and discrimination against religious minorities continued. Some
people accused of blasphemy against Islam were sentenced to
life imprisonment or capital punishment. One of them was Aasia
Bibi, a Christian woman, who was sentenced to death in
November, becoming the first woman to receive such a harsh
sentence for blasphemy.
Uzbekistan continued to incarcerate individuals on
political grounds. While one political prisoner, human rights
activist Farhad Mukhtarov, was released during the year, 13 to
25 political prisoners remained in custody, and family members
reported that many prisoners were tortured. Human rights
activists, their family members, and members of certain
religious groups reported harassment and arrest by police and
other members of the security forces. Freedom of expression was
severely limited and harassment of journalists increased during
the year. Police and security services subjected print and
broadcast journalists to arrest, intimidation, and violence, as
well as to bureaucratic restrictions on their activity. The
criminal and administrative codes imposed significant fines for
libel and defamation and the government used charges of libel,
slander, and defamation to punish journalists, human rights
activists, and others who criticized the president or the
government. Freedom of association also was restricted. The
government tightly controlled NGO activity and regulated
Islamic and minority religious groups with strict legal
restrictions on the types of groups that could be formed and
registered. Forced adult and child labor was used during the
cotton harvest.
Western Hemisphere
The government of Cuba released more than 40 political
prisoners during the reporting period, including many notable
human rights activists arrested in 2003, although most were
released on the condition that they leave the country. Cuba
continued to hold dozens of other political prisoners. The
government suppressed human rights and fundamental freedoms,
including freedom of speech, the press, assembly and
association, movement, and religion. Human rights groups noted
a marked increase in the use of short-term detentions designed
to disrupt the work of civil society and harass activists. In
addition, the government continued to stage public protests to
harass and abuse activists and their families, particularly the
Damas de Blanco (``Ladies in White''). Although the government
characterized the mobs as spontaneous, participants frequently
arrived in government-owned vehicles or were recruited by local
Communist Party leaders from nearby workplaces or schools. In
extreme cases, government-orchestrated mobs assaulted these
individuals or damaged their homes or property. Members of the
security forces monitored, harassed, and sometimes physically
assaulted human rights and prodemocracy advocates, dissidents,
independent journalists, detainees, and prisoners, and did so
with impunity. The government did not recognize independent
journalism, and subjected some independent journalists to
travel bans, detentions, harassment, equipment seizures, and
threats of imprisonment. Unauthorized assemblies of more than
three persons can be punished by up to three months in prison
and a fine, although these meetings were more likely to be
broken up than prosecuted.
Respect for human rights and democratic institutions
deteriorated over the past year in Nicaragua. Protesting
opposition party members were denied freedom of assembly. March
2010 regional elections on the Caribbean coast were marred by
allegations of widespread irregularities, and credible domestic
NGOs were denied permission to monitor the election. Other
issues include politicization of the judiciary and other
government organs, substantial government interference with
media freedom, and harassment of NGOs and journalists. Police
did not protect demonstrators who protested government policies
and allowed progovernment groups to engage in violent
activities. The government continued to criticize religious
leaders who expressed concerns about government practices and
policies that affected public participation and democratic
freedoms. Government officials publicly excoriated Catholic
Church officials who denounced the manipulation of the
electoral process.
In Venezuela, the government used the judiciary to
intimidate and persecute individuals and organizations that
criticized government policies or actions, including peaceful
protesters, journalists, a judge, members of opposition
political parties, NGOs, union and business leaders, and
ordinary citizens. Government officials also restricted freedom
of expression, harassing and intimidating privately owned
television stations, media outlets, and journalists through
threats, property seizures, targeted regulations, and criminal
investigations and prosecutions. In late December the National
Assembly adopted a package of laws that further undermined
democratic principles and practices in Venezuela, including a
law delegating legislative authority to the executive that
extended beyond the term of office of the outgoing National
Assembly, in violation of the shared values of the Inter-
American Democratic Charter, and laws imposing new restrictions
on the independent media, the Internet, political parties, and
NGOs.
NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
----------
ALGERIA
Algeria is a multiparty republic of approximately 36 million
citizens whose head of state and government (president) is elected by
popular vote for a five-year term. The president has the constitutional
authority to appoint and dismiss cabinet members and the prime
minister. A 2008 constitutional amendment eliminated presidential term
limits, and in April 2009 President Abdelaziz Bouteflika won reelection
to his third term in office. Some opposition parties boycotted the
election, arguing that restrictions on freedom of association skewed
the election outcome in favor of the incumbent. While the state of
emergency law implemented in 1992 remained in effect during the year,
the Government concentrated its enforcement on the provisions
restricting assembly and association. Security forces reported to
civilian authorities.
Principal human rights problems included restrictions on freedom of
assembly and association, which significantly impaired political party
activities and limited citizens' ability to change the Government
peacefully through elections. There were reports of arbitrary killings.
Failures to account for persons who disappeared in the 1990s and to
address the demands of victims' families remained problematic. There
were reports of official impunity, overuse of pretrial detention, poor
prison conditions, abuse of prisoners, and lack of judicial
independence. Additionally, widespread corruption accompanied reports
of limited government transparency. Authorities used security grounds
to constrain freedom of expression and movement. Women faced violence
and discrimination, and the Government maintained restrictions on
workers' rights.
Terrorist groups committed a significant number of attacks against
government officials, members of security forces, and, to a lesser
extent, civilians.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were reports
that the Government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful
killings.
On June 2, a mentally disabled man, Nouradine Nadri, died in police
custody in Saida province, according to the Algerian League for the
Defense of Human Rights' (LADDH) Saida province office. Police arrested
Nadri following an altercation with the driver of a vehicle that
accidentally struck him. According to LADDH, police brought Nadri to
the province's security headquarters instead of transporting him to the
hospital as stipulated by article 51 of the code of criminal
procedures, which requires a medical examination before placing a
suspect in custody. Nadri's family reported to LADDH that their son
died following abuse by police.
Information on terrorism-related violence in the country was
difficult to verify independently. The Ministry of Interior
sporadically released information concerning the total number of
terrorist, civilian, and security force deaths. During the year
security forces killed, injured, or arrested approximately 1,935
suspected terrorists. According to press reports on official estimates,
the total number of deaths was 619: suspected terrorists killed 65
civilians and 91 security force members, and security forces killed an
estimated 463 suspected terrorists in military sweep operations that
resulted in armed clashes. These numbers represent a decrease from the
804 deaths reported in 2009.
Most terrorist attacks during the year were attributed to the
terrorist group al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which emerged
in 2007 after the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat allied itself
with al-Qaida in 2006.
The year was marked by some violence. For example, on April 4, a
terrorist attack killed seven communal guards in the eastern province
of Bejaia. On June 12, a car bomb attack against a unit of the National
Gendarmerie in Ammal between Boumerdes and Bouira left four security
force members dead and at least 17 wounded. An AQIM terrorist killed 11
gendarmes on June 29 during an ambush in Tinzaouatin in the province of
Tamanrasset in the Algerian-Malian border area. AQIM claimed
responsibility for all of these attacks. Former minister of interior
Noureddine Zerhouni stated in 2008 that an estimated 400 terrorists
operated in the country; the figure remained the most recent one
available.
b. Disappearance.--Enforced disappearances, reportedly numbering in
the thousands, were a significant problem during the 1990s and
continued to be a topic covered in the media and raised by local and
international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The Government on
August 26 listed the official number of disappeared cases as 6,544,
which represented a significant reduction in the official number
reported in previous years. During a March 2009 conference in Geneva,
representatives of the Government's human rights advisory office, the
National Consultative Commission for the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights (CNCPPDH), stated that 8,023 persons remained missing or
disappeared as a result of government actions between 1992 and 1999. In
previous years the Government attributed 10,000 disappearances to
terrorist kidnappings and murder. NGOs reported that security forces in
the past played a role in the disappearances of approximately 8,000
persons.
The law provides measures for compensating victims of
disappearances. For courts to hear charges of disappearance, the law
requires at least two eyewitnesses. Many of the disappearances in the
1990s were in later years attributed to the security forces; however,
the Government did not prosecute security force personnel, and there
was no evidence that the Government investigated cases it acknowledged
security forces caused.
In 2005 voters approved by referendum President Bouteflika's
proposed Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which ended the
Ad Hoc Mechanism established in 2003 to account for the disappeared.
The charter went into effect in 2006, granting amnesty to and
preventing investigation into the conduct of the National Popular Army,
the security forces, state-sponsored armed groups, and persons who
fought on behalf of the Government during episodes of civil strife in
the 1990s. On February 2, the Government added two additional
provisions to the charter. The first provision stipulates that 3,455
public employees who were dismissed from their jobs for violent acts
they committed in the 1990s would have the years they were out of their
jobs counted towards their retirement pensions. The second provision
allows families of the disappeared who filed claims after the original
2006 deadline to claim compensation. The amnesty also covered certain
persons involved in Islamist militant and terrorist activities. Persons
implicated in mass killings, rapes, or bomb attacks in public places
were not eligible for amnesty. Some local NGOs, including SOS Disparus,
Djazairouna, and LADDH, criticized the charter for enabling terrorists
to escape justice and security forces for acting with impunity.
On January 11, the local human rights NGO Alkarama presented to the
Government human rights commission the disappearance case of Lakhdar
Bouzenia, who was allegedly arrested by security forces in 1993 and
tortured. The case remained unresolved at year's end.
In a February 2009 report, the UN Human Rights Council Working
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances stated that in 2008 it
transmitted to the Government 768 cases of disappearances that were
reportedly attributed to government forces between 1992 and 1999. Also
in 2008 the UN Committee Against Torture (UNCAT) reported its concerns
that Law 06-01 provides impunity for members of armed groups and state
officials and that the Government had not yet initiated proceedings to
investigate the fate of the disappeared. UNCAT also expressed concern
that the Government had not publicized the criteria for compensating
family members and required those compensated to waive their right to
seek civil damages against the state.
Families of the disappeared reportedly experienced complications
and delays in receiving compensation. In September 2009 then minister
of national solidarity Ould Abbes stated the Government had paid 11
billion dinars (approximately $149 million) in compensation to
families. According to the Government, as of the end of 2008, 25,316
claims had been filed for compensation under the charter. Authorities
approved 13,866 claims and paid compensation on 12,339 of these claims.
In August the Government revised that number, reporting that only 6,544
persons disappeared in the 1990s and that families in 6,420 of the
cases previously received financial compensation.
Armed criminals conducted abuses against civilians including
kidnappings, false checkpoints, and extortion, particularly in areas
east of Algiers and in the southern portion of the country. In 2008
then interior minister Zerhouni reported that 115 of 375 kidnapping
cases in the previous two years were related to terrorism.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices; however, NGO and local
human rights activists reported that government officials sometimes
employed abusive treatment to obtain confessions. Government agents can
face prison sentences of between 10 and 20 years for committing such
acts, and some individuals were tried and convicted in 2008.
Nonetheless, impunity remained a problem.
Local human rights lawyers maintained that abusive treatment
occurred in detention facilities, most often against those arrested on
``security grounds.''
Amnesty International (AI) and other international organizations
documented the mistreatment of terror suspects, where they have been
``held in unrecognized places of detention without contact with the
outside world, at times for prolonged periods, putting them at risk of
torture.''
There were three reports of police abuse during the year.
In mid-April guards at El Harrach prison insulted Khalouf Fares,
Nour Abdel Aziz, Yaakoub Bilal, and Karman Hurfi, who were awaiting
trial on terrorism-related charges, according to AI. The men were also
stripped naked in front of other detainees and guards and slapped.
On October 22, a police inspector in Setif received a 10-year
prison sentence and a 50,000-dinar fine ($677) for abusing his
authority and fraud.
On November 11, a police officer was arrested in the wilaya
(province) of Batna for allegedly sexually assaulting a woman in her
home. The case was pending at year's end.
During a September 2009 visit to El Harrach prison, Minister of
Justice Tayeb Belaiz stated that the ministry had prosecuted and jailed
14 prison workers for mistreating prisoners in 2009.
AI and Human Rights Watch claimed that prisoners affiliated with
hard-line Islamic organizations tended to receive harsher treatment
than others. In 2008 Alkarama reported that after a protest by inmates
related to prayer room space, prison guards handcuffed, stripped, and
beat approximately 80 prisoners with iron bars and sticks. There were
no reports of any such allegations after 2008.
In October the World Organization Against Torture reported
allegations of torture in the case of Abderrahamane Mehalli, who was
reportedly mistreated by the Department of Intelligence and Security
(DRS) immediately following his 2006 arrest. Mehalli, accused of
belonging to an armed terrorist group, was punched and kicked and
suffered simulated drowning at the hands of the DRS according to online
reports.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions.--Prison conditions
generally did not meet international standards, and the Government did
not permit visits to military, high-security, or standard prison
facilities or to detention centers by independent human rights
observers. Overcrowding remained a problem in many prisons. According
to human rights lawyers, prison overpopulation was partially explained
by the Government's excessive use of pretrial detention. In 2008 the
CNCPPDH conducted 34 prison visits and highlighted concerns with
overcrowding, insufficient bed space, and problems with lighting,
ventilation, nutrition, and hygiene.
According to the director general of the Prisons Administration,
there were 58,000 prisoners in the country's penal system held in 137
prisons. Prisons held men and women separately. In some cases
overcrowding meant that juveniles were held with adults; however, in
general the Government maintained separate juvenile detention centers.
Pretrial detainees were held separately from convicted prisoners.
Prisoners were permitted weekly visits by their families; family
members have the right to bring in food and clothes. Prisoners were
permitted religious observance and had a place to perform prayers. All
Muslim religious days were celebrated within prisons. In each prison
inmates can submit complaints to the penitentiary administration or
their lawyers. Follow-up on complaints, and investigation, can take
time based on the content of the complaint, urgency, and the conditions
of prisoner detention.
During the year the Government permitted the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Red Crescent Society to visit
regular, nonmilitary prisons. ICRC visits to persons held in places of
detention run by the Ministry of Justice and to those detained in
police stations and gendarmeries were carried out in accordance with
ICRC standard practices. Visitors to some prisons saw no signs of
torture or mistreatment. Observers also noted an improved quality of
medical care available to inmates in some prisons.
In April 2009 an amendment to the penal code permitted the
substitution of community service for prison sentences for first-time
offenders with a maximum prison sentence of three years. Authorities
reiterated in July that the new law was designed to reduce recidivism
and to alleviate overcrowding in prisons. An ombudsman does not exist
to serve on behalf of prisoners or detainees.
In a 2008 report, UNCAT expressed concern over reports that the
DRS, the intelligence agency tasked with internal security, maintained
secret detention centers inside military barracks that operated outside
judicial authority. During the year AI reported significant concerns
that torture and abuse occurred in DRS facilities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention.--The constitution prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention; however, overuse of pretrial detention
occurred in practice. In 2008 the head of the Government-appointed
CNCPPDH stated the abuse of pretrial detention tarnished the image of
the country's justice system.
The head of the CNCPPDH explained in August that judicial error
resulted in cases of ``unjustified'' pretrial detention due to a lack
of incriminating evidence. On December 7, CNCPPDH president Farouk
Ksentini cited his organization's 2009 human rights report in noting
that ``physical abuse and other brutalities'' were committed against
suspects during questioning and in pretrial detention.
Role of the Police and Security Apparatus.--The national police
force, consisting of more than 140,000 members, falls under the control
of the Ministry of Interior and has national jurisdiction. The National
Gendarmerie, under the Ministry of Defense, also performs police-like
functions outside urban areas. Organizationally the DRS reports to the
Ministry of Defense and exercises internal security functions, but it
also performs functions comparable to the police in terrorism cases.
Impunity remained a problem. The Government did not always provide
public information on the numbers, infractions, or punishments of
police, military, or other security force personnel.
The criminal code provides mechanisms to investigate abuses.
On December 14, a 41-year-old man died in police custody under
suspicious circumstances in Constantine. The man was found strangled in
his cell the morning after his detention. A week after the death, local
residents rioted in the streets. On December 27, national police
director General Abdelghani Hamel said during a radio interview that
police officers had been placed under investigation for not following
procedures (removing the man's shoelaces) prior to the man's
incarceration and that he likely committed suicide.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention.--According to
the law, the police must obtain a summons from the Prosecutor's Office
to require a suspect to appear in a police station for preliminary
questioning. Summonses also are used to notify and require the accused
and the victim to attend a court proceeding or hearing.
Police may make arrests without a warrant if they witness the
offense. Public lawyers reported that procedures for warrants and
summonses were usually carried out properly.
The constitution specifies that a suspect may be held in detention
for up to 48 hours without charge. If more time is required for
gathering additional evidence, the police may request that the
prosecutor extend the suspect's detention to 72 hours. Those suspected
of terrorism or subversion may be held legally for 12 days without
charge or access to counsel under the law. Such individuals are
obligated to answer questions posed to them by security forces, and
they are not authorized to contact anyone. By law the initial court
appearance in terrorism matters is not public.
At the end of the 12-day period, the detainee has the right to
request a medical examination by a physician of choice within the
jurisdiction of the court. Otherwise the judicial police appoint a
doctor. The certificate of the medical examination is then entered into
the detainee's file.
AI and other human rights groups expressed concerns about abuse and
possible torture of suspects during this 12-day period. However,
comments from numerous Guantanamo Bay detainees returned to the country
and their lawyers indicated that these individuals received fair
pretrial treatment in accordance with the law during the 12-day period.
Following the 12-day period, individuals involved in terrorism
cases are placed under judicial control, which requires them to report
weekly to a local police precinct and to reside at an agreed-upon
address. Travel within the country is unrestricted. Travel abroad is
not generally authorized.
Prolonged pretrial detention remained a problem. The law does not
provide a person in detention the right to a prompt judicial
determination of the legality of the detention. Persons charged with
acts against the security of the state, including terrorism, may be
held in pretrial detention as long as 20 months according to the penal
code; the prosecutor must show cause every four months for continuing
pretrial detention. According to local NGOs, pretrial detainees
represented 11-12 percent of individuals held by prison authorities
during the year.
Judges rarely refused prosecutorial requests for extending
preventive detention, which by law can be appealed. Should the
detention be overturned, the defendant has the right to request
compensation.
There is no system of bail, but in nonfelony cases, suspects were
often released on provisional liberty referred to as ``judicial
control'' while awaiting trial. Under provisional liberty status,
suspects are required to report weekly to the police station in their
district and are forbidden to leave the country.
Most detainees have prompt access to a lawyer of their choice, and
the Government provides legal counsel to indigent detainees. The penal
code requires that detainees in pretrial detention are informed
immediately of their rights to communicate with family members, receive
visitors, and be examined by a doctor of their choice at the end of
detention. In addition any suspect can request a medical examination
once on police premises or before facing the judge. In practice there
were continued reports during the year that these rights were not
extended to all detainees. Typically detainees had access to a doctor
only at the end of their detention. Some detainees were held
incommunicado without access to their families or lawyers.
Human rights advocates reported that authorities continued to hold
Mohamed Rahmouni at the military tribunal in Blida on alleged terrorism
charges but had granted him access to a lawyer. Rahmouni remained in
prison at year's end.
In 2009 a court acquitted Mohamed Fatmia of terrorism charges.
Fatmia was detained in Serkadji prison in 2008 and was held
incommunicado throughout 2007.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the president exercises supreme
judicial authority, and the executive branch limited judicial
independence. The constitution provides for the right to a fair trial;
however, in practice authorities did not always respect legal
provisions regarding defendants' rights.
The High Judicial Council is responsible for judicial discipline
and the appointment of all judges. President Bouteflika serves as the
president of the council.
Military courts in Oran, Blida, Constantine, and Bechar tried cases
involving state security, espionage, and other security-related
offenses involving military personnel and civilians. Each tribunal
consisted of three civilian judges and two military judges. Although
the president of each court was a civilian, the chief judge was a
military officer. The permanent military court was composed of three
members: a chairman (civilian magistrate from the civilian courts as
president) and two assessors (from military personnel designated by the
defense minister having at least the same rank of the defendant subject
to trial).
By law defense lawyers must be accredited by the military tribunal
to appear. Public attendance at the trial is at the discretion of the
tribunal and some cases took place behind closed doors. Appeals are
made directly to the Supreme Court. Military tribunals try cases, but
they only occasionally disclosed information on proceedings. There was
no public information available on any cases that were tried before the
tribunals during the year.
The nine-member Constitutional Council reviews the
constitutionality of treaties, laws, and regulations. Although the
council is not part of the judiciary, it has the authority to nullify
laws found unconstitutional, to confirm the results of any type of
election, and to serve as the final arbiter of amendments that pass
both chambers of the parliament before becoming law.
Trial Procedures.--Defendants are presumed innocent and have the
right to be present and to consult with an attorney, provided at public
expense if necessary. Most trials are public and nonjury. Defendants
can confront or question witnesses against them or present witnesses
and evidence on their behalf. Defendants and their attorneys
occasionally were denied access to government-held evidence relevant to
their cases, but there were fewer reports of such incidents during the
year. Defendants have the right to appeal. The testimony of men and
women has equal weight under the law.
Political Prisoners and Detainees.--There were no reports of
political prisoners or detainees.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies.--The judiciary was neither
fully independent nor impartial in civil matters and lacked
independence in some human rights cases. Family connections and status
of the parties involved reportedly influenced some decisions.
Individuals may bring lawsuits, and there are administrative processes
related to amnesty, which may provide damages for human rights
violations and compensation for alleged wrongs.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The constitution prohibits such actions; however, in
practice government authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
According to human rights activists, the Government monitored the
communications of political opponents, journalists, human rights
groups, and suspected terrorists. Security officials reportedly
searched homes without a warrant.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government restricted
these rights in practice through accusations of defamation and informal
pressure on publishers, editors, and journalists.
Individuals generally were able to criticize the Government
privately without reprisal. However, citizens self-censored public
criticism. The Government attempted to impede criticism by monitoring
political meetings.
The law specifies that freedom of speech must respect ``individual
dignity, the imperatives of foreign policy, and the national defense.''
The state of emergency decree, introduced in 1992, gives the Government
broad authority to restrict civil liberties and take legal action
against what it considers to be threats to the state or public order.
A 2006 presidential decree continued to criminalize speech about
the conduct of the security forces during the internal conflict of the
1990s.
Radio and television were government-owned and frequently broadcast
coverage favorable to the Government. During nonelection periods
opposition parties and spokesmen regularly were denied access to public
radio or television. Political parties and independent candidates
received the same amount of radio access time during the three-week
campaign period prior to the 2009 presidential election and prior to
the 2007 legislative and local elections. Several opposition parties
stated that their daily media allotment during the three-week period
was the first time they had been allowed media access since the
previous election cycle.
The country's print media consisted of numerous publications that
supported or opposed the Government to varying degrees. Many political
parties, including legal Islamic parties, had access to the independent
press and used it to express their views. Opposition parties also
disseminated information via the Internet and published communiques.
The law permits the Government to censor, levy fines, and imprison
members of the press. The Government indirectly censored and
intimidated the media into practicing self-censorship by using
defamation laws to harass and arrest some journalists; some members of
the press faced retaliation for criticizing government officials. Other
journalists and many political cartoonists, however, regularly
criticized the Government.
The law defines defamation broadly, and the penal code imposes
prison terms of up to 24 months and fines of 50,000 to 500,000 dinars
($677 to $6,770). Defamation includes ``the insult'' of government
figures, including the president, members of parliament, judges,
members of the military, and ``any other authority of public order.''
Furthermore, a 1990 law protects Islam from defamation, controls access
to external information, and outlaws writing that threatens national
unity. In 2001 the Government amended laws to criminalize writing,
cartoons, and speech that insult or offend the president, parliament,
judiciary, or armed forces. Despite these regulations cartoonists and
editorialists continued to enjoy some latitude in criticizing the
Government.
On January 25, the Government blocked the independent Paris-based
Algerian radio station Radio Kalima from broadcasting its programs to
the country via the European satellite operator Eutelsat, according to
Eutelsat.
In March Riad K., the correspondent of El Bilad in Chlef, received
a two-month prison sentence after Senator Nourredine Belaredj filed a
complaint following the September 2009 publication of an article
criticizing the senator for corruption.
Also in March the Court of Bir-Mourad Rais (Algiers) fined the
publisher of Ennahar El Djadid, Anis Rahmani, 50,000 dinars ($677)
following a complaint filed by the official news agency. He was accused
of defamation.
In May the mayor of Ain Boudinar filed a complaint against Belkacem
Belhamideche, the managing director of La Reflexion newspaper,
following the June 2009 publication of an article quoting an
entrepreneur denouncing corruption. A court sentenced Belhamideche to
six months in prison.
The Government used defamation laws occasionally to pressure
editors, journalists, and the owners of printing houses. In a 2009
letter to President Bouteflika, the international NGO Committee to
Protect Journalists expressed concern for ``the rising incidence of
press freedom violations.'' In 2008 Reporters without Borders (RSF)
criticized the defamation laws as ``repressive legislation.''
Omar Belhouchet, editor of the French-language newspaper El-Watan,
faced government pressure throughout the year for articles published in
his newspaper in 2009. In 2008 authorities brought a case against
Belhouchet and reporter Salima Tlemcani for allegedly libeling a faith
healer in a 2004 article. An Algiers court sentenced both to three
months in prison and a fine of 50,000 dinars ($677). The case remained
pending at year's end. The charges against Belhouchet in connection
with three libel cases relating to articles he published several years
ago about airfare increases and police killings of demonstrators also
remained unresolved. Belhouchet and Tlemcani remained free at year's
end.
In January 2009 freelance journalist Hafnaoui Ghoul stated that
unknown persons threatened him near his home in Djelfa. He claimed that
authorities did not investigate the incident. According to RSF,
officials have targeted Ghoul for years, repeatedly detaining, beating,
and persecuting him for writing articles critical of the Government. At
year's end Ghoul faced 16 pending lawsuits by local officials related
to his articles on corruption.
During a February 2009 appeal hearing, a Mascara court sentenced
Layadi El-Amine Yahia, a journalist for Le Carrefour d'Algerie, to one
year in prison and fined him 20,000 dinars ($271) for libel in an
article implicating Mascara's commerce director in corruption. The
court previously acquitted Yahia, who was unaware of the Government's
appeal of his acquittal. Yahia appealed the February 2009 decision, but
the court had not set a date for the hearing at year's end.
In March 2009 authorities in Ghardaia detained news Web site al-
Waha editor Nedjar El-Hadj Daoud in connection with a 2005 defamation
case, but subsequently released him within days for medical reasons. On
May 11, a Ghardia court sentenced Daoud to six months' imprisonment in
a lawsuit related to an article published in 2006 involving then
presidential chief of staff Labri Belkheir. According to RSF Daoud
faced 20 pending defamation complaints in Ghardaia.
There were no developments in the 2007 appeal of Saad Lounes, who
was given a one-year sentence for tax fraud on the basis of a complaint
by the Ministry of Commerce dating to 1995. Lounes faced legal pressure
for more than 10 years while he operated the only private printing
press in the country.
In 2008 an appeals court reduced the 2007 sentence of journalist
Dhil Talal, convicted of defamation for an article exposing a
government ministry's monetary losses, to a fine of 5,000 dinars ($68)
and a six-month suspended prison sentence. During the year there was no
decision on Talal's 2008 appeal of his reduced sentence.
The Government exercised considerable economic leverage on the
media, as most newspapers were printed at government-owned presses.
The Government continued to influence the independent press through
the state-owned advertising company, National Agency for
Communications, Publication and Advertising (ANEP), which decided
whether independent newspapers would benefit from advertisements placed
by state-owned agencies and companies. ANEP, and therefore the
Government, controlled the largest source of income for most newspapers
and used this economic control to steer content in the press. As has
been the case in recent years, independent advertisers played a
considerably smaller, but increasingly visible, role in advertising
revenue.
The Government continued restrictions on both the local and the
international media's coverage of issues relating to ``national
security and terrorism.'' Al Jazeera's office remained closed, after
the Government banned it from operating in the country in 2004 for
broadcasting a program featuring opposition figures criticizing the
Government. In previous years international journalists had their
accreditations denied, but there were no such occurrences recorded
during the year.
Agence France-Presse (AFP) and Reuters maintained offices in the
country, and the Government reaccredited both in February. In 2008 the
Government revoked the AFP and Reuters bureau chiefs' press
accreditations in response to allegedly inaccurate reports the agencies
filed on terrorist attacks in the country.
In April the then communication state secretary to the prime
minister gave a Tunis-based private channel, Nessma TV, a two-week
notification to close its Algiers bureau, saying that the station did
not have official authorization to work in the country. According to
press reports, 12 complaints were filed against the channel during the
year, including by the National Office of Copyrights. Despite the
notice to close, Nessma continued to operate in the country, working
through a local public relations firm.
Internet Freedom.--Access to the Internet was generally unimpeded;
however, the Government monitored e-mail and Internet chat rooms. In
August 2009 the Government enacted a law on cybercrime that establishes
procedures for using electronic data in prosecutions and established
the responsibilities of service providers to cooperate with
authorities. In November 2009 then minister of post and information
technology Hamid Bessalah announced that his ministry was creating a
National Center for Internet Data Exchange to protect Internet users
from inappropriate content, cybercrime, and hackers.
By law Internet service providers face criminal penalties for the
material and Web sites they host, especially if subject matters are
``incompatible with morality or public opinion.'' The ministries of
justice, interior, and post and information technology have oversight
responsibilities. The cybercrime law provides sentences for six months
to five years in prison and fines between 50,000 and 500,000 dinars
($677 to $6,770) for users who do not comply with the law, including
the obligation to cooperate with law enforcement authorities against
cybercrime.
There were approximately 4.7 million Internet users, which
represented approximately 13.6 percent of the population, according to
figures released on June 30 by Nielsen Online.
In January the public could no longer access the Rachad opposition
movement's Web site (rachad.org) or its Internet television site
(rachad.tv). Rachad organizers accused the Government of jamming and
infiltrating its sites.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events.--Academic freedom generally
was restricted. Academic seminars and colloquiums occurred with limited
governmental interference, and there were delays in issuing visas to
international participants and instances where authorities denied
international experts entrance.
In May the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
required academics to obtain approval before participating in
conferences abroad and called on academics and researchers to
coordinate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before attending or
organizing conferences. Also that month the ministry cancelled the
second Maghreb Forum on Democratic Processes and the Building of a
Modern State two days before its scheduled start, providing no reason.
In June the Government banned three professors from Mouloud Mammeri
University in Tizi Ouzou from participating in two scientific
conferences in Morocco.
In an August interview with Arabic-language newspaper El-Bilad,
director Mohamed Hazourli stated that authorities banned two episodes
of his Ramadan sitcom Aasab wa Awtar wa Afkar (Nerves, Strings, and
Ideas), and the series was taken off the air. The banned episodes
addressed problems with local artists and their treatment from the
Government.
On the margins of the 2009Algiers Book Fair, authorities prevented
anthropologist Tassadit Yacine from holding a conference on the work of
Jean Amrouche, a Berber writer from the Kabylie.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The constitution
provides for freedom of assembly and association; however, the
Government severely restricted the exercise of these rights in
practice.
Freedom of Assembly.--The constitution provides for the right of
assembly; however, the emergency decree and government practice
continued to significantly curtail this right. A decree implemented in
2000 banning demonstrations in Algiers remained in effect. Authorities
required citizens and organizations to obtain permits from the
Government-appointed local governor before holding public meetings. The
Government restricted licenses to political parties, NGOs, and other
groups to hold indoor rallies and frequently granted permissions on the
eve of the event, thereby impeding publicity and outreach.
LADDH reported continuing difficulties in obtaining permission to
hold outdoor meetings and seminars. Groups opposing the Charter on
Peace and Reconciliation also had difficulty securing permission to
hold public gatherings.
On March 7, police prevented a sit-in of 40 broadcast journalists
on a hunger strike protesting low wages and unfair working conditions.
The managing director of the National Company of Radio Broadcasting
filed a complaint on March 12 against seven reporters for illegally
entering a public premise and hindering the work of the public radio
service.
In May security forces sealed the headquarters of the Maison des
Syndicats (Unions House) rented by the autonomous union syndicate. The
action coincided with the beginning of an international social union
forum in Algiers. The Government ordered the property owner to prohibit
the organization of trade union activities at the premises.
In May police blocked a rally organized by the Bezzaf (Enough)
Movement in front of the offices of state television to demand press
freedom. The police detained four protest organizers as they approached
the site on the grounds of inciting a gathering ``that could disturb
public tranquility,'' which is an offense under the penal code. Police
questioned the organizers and released them the same day.
In August the wali of Annaba refused to allow the Abdellah
Djaballah wing of the Islam Movement to organize an iftar at Teleferic
hotel. Annaba officials did not give any justification for the refusal.
SOS Disparus, an NGO representing relatives of persons who
disappeared during the 1990s civil conflict, held weekly sit-ins in
front of CNCPPDH headquarters until August, when government authorities
began preventing this activity. According to witnesses police dispersed
the crowd and beat and arrested some demonstrators on at least one
occasion. In August the group tried again to hold its weekly sit-in,
but police prevented the gathering.
On November 4, Algiers airport authorities denied entry to Tarek
Labidi, a Tunisian lawyer and member of the National Council of
Liberties, who was traveling for a LADDH conference on good governance
and civil society. Authorities provided no justification for his denial
of entry.
In January 2009 police prevented a peaceful demonstration organized
by the Workers' Party to show solidarity with Palestinians in the Gaza
Strip. Police dispersed the crowd and allegedly beat and arrested some
demonstrators. In February 2009 police prevented a sit-in organized by
contract teachers who attempted to demonstrate near the presidential
offices.
Freedom of Association.--The constitution provides for the right of
association; however, the Government and the emergency decree severely
restricted this right in practice. The Ministry of Interior must
approve all political parties before they are legally established. The
Government restricted the registration of certain NGOs, associations,
and political parties on security grounds but declined to provide
evidence or legal justification for refusing to authorize other
organizations that could not be disqualified on security grounds. The
Government frequently failed to grant official recognition to NGOs,
associations, religious groups, and political parties in an expeditious
fashion. The Ministry of Interior may deny a license to or dissolve any
group regarded as a threat to the Government's authority or to public
order. The law implementing the 2006 amnesty prohibits political
activities by anyone responsible for having used religion leading to
the ``national tragedy,'' that is, the 1990s civil conflict.
The Government issued licenses and subsidies to domestic
associations, especially youth, medical, and neighborhood associations.
The Ministry of Interior regarded organizations unable to attain
government licenses as illegal. Domestic NGOs encountered bureaucratic
obstacles to receiving financial support from abroad. Although not
illegal, financial support from abroad is conditioned by law on a
series of authorizations from the ministries of interior and national
olidarity. These authorizations remained difficult to obtain. According
to the Ministry of Interior, there were 81,000 registered associations,
5,000 of which were active during the year. SOS Disparus remained
unrecognized and continued to operate facing government interference.
c. Freedom of Religion.--For a complete description of religious
freedom, please see the 2010 International Religious Freedom Report at
www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/rpt.
d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of
Refugees, and Stateless Persons.--The constitution provides for freedom
of movement; however, the Government restricted the exercise of this
right in practice.
The Government generally cooperated with the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
in providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons,
refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and
other persons of concern.
Under the 1992 emergency decree, the interior minister and
provincial governors may deny residency in certain districts to persons
regarded as threats to public order. The Government also maintained
restrictions for security reasons on travel into the four southern
provinces of Ouargla, El-Oued, Laghouat, and Ain-Salah, where much of
the hydrocarbon industry and many foreign workers were located. The
same decree permits the minister of interior to place individuals under
house arrest. AI reported that the measure was used to assign a
residence to individuals already detained in DRS barracks, thus
concealing prolonged arbitrary detention. The Government also prevented
overland tourist travel between the southern provinces of Djanet and
Tamanrasset, citing the threat of terrorism.
The Government did not permit young men eligible for the draft but
who had not yet completed their military service to leave the country
without special authorization; such authorization was granted to
students and to persons with special family circumstances.
The family code does not permit anyone under 18 to travel abroad
without a guardian's permission. Married women under 18 years of age
may not travel abroad without permission from their husbands.
The law does not provide for forced exile, and it was not known to
occur.
Protection of Refugees.--The country's laws provide for granting
asylum or refugee status, and the Government had a system for providing
protection to refugees. However, there were no reports that the
Government granted refugee status and asylum to new refugee applicants
during the year. According to the UNHCR, the Government did not accept
UNHCR-determined refugee status for individuals from sub-Saharan Africa
fleeing conflict. As of January, 192 asylum seekers, mostly sub-Saharan
Africans, registered with the UNHCR. There were reports that the
Government deported some asylum seekers after trials without legal
counsel. Refugees holding valid UNHCR documentation were less likely to
be deported. The Government provided informal assistance to an
estimated 1,000 Tuaregs in the south fleeing conflict in Mali and
Niger. However, authorities did not extend legal protections to an
estimated 1,400 asylum seekers from sub-Saharan Africa residing in
Algiers. Nonetheless, Algerian authorities tolerated the presence of
these asylum seekers in the country.
The Government provided protection to an estimated 90,000 Sahrawi
refugees who departed Western Sahara after Morocco took control of the
territory in the 1970s. The UNHCR, World Food Program, Algerian Red
Crescent, and other organizations also assisted Sahrawi refugees.
Neither the Government nor refugee leadership allowed the UNHCR to
conduct a registration or complete a census of the Sahrawi refugees.
In practice the Government provided some protection against the
expulsion or return of refugees to countries where their lives or
freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion, as was the case with the Sahrawi refugees.
Sahrawi refugees lived predominantly in camps near the city of
Tindouf, administered by the Popular Front for the Liberation of the
Saguia el Harma and Rio de Oro (Polisario). The remote location of the
camps and lack of government presence resulted in lack of access to
employment, basic services, education, police, and courts for Sahrawis.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The constitution provides citizens the right to change their
government peacefully through periodic elections based on universal
suffrage. However, restrictions on freedom of assembly and association,
as well as restrictions on political party activities, limited this
right.
Elections and Political Participation.--The constitution mandates
presidential elections every five years. In 2008 President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika announced his intention to seek parliamentary approval for a
set of constitutional amendments that included removal of presidential
term limits. One month later the parliament approved the proposed
amendments by a wide margin with minimal debate.
A contested, multiparty presidential election was held in April
2009 in which the incumbent was elected to a third term. Official
election statistics indicated that President Bouteflika won the
election with 90.2 percent of the votes and a voter turnout of 74.6
percent. Opposition parties and defeated candidates estimated voter
turnout was actually in the range of 18 to 55 percent.
Election observers from the Arab League, African Union, and
Organization of the Islamic Conference stated in a press conference
that the 2009 election was fair and transparent. Some international
experts commented, however, that observers monitored only election-day
procedures and were not on the ground to evaluate preelection
activities. Others noted that the complexity of some election
procedures created room for fraud and government influence. Two
opposition parties, the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) and the
Socialist Forces Front (FFS), boycotted the election, arguing that
restrictions on freedom of association disadvantaged potential
challengers and made the outcome of the election a foregone conclusion.
LADDH pointed to a lack of critical debate in the media and favorable
treatment of the incumbent by state-owned media.
There were complaints during the three-week campaign that public
areas dedicated to election propaganda did not display each candidate's
materials equally. Some candidates reported interference from local
election committees when organizing meetings with voters and filed
complaints with the National Election Commission. In March 2009 the
Party of Liberty and Justice (PLJ) reported that one of its campaign
buses was vandalized by a group of youths as PLJ's candidate left a
meeting with supporters in the Algiers neighborhood of Bab El Oued. In
the same month, authorities arrested an FFS official in Tizi Ouzou for
distributing pamphlets calling for a boycott of the election. In April
2009 police blocked a group of RCD party members who attempted to march
in an Algiers suburb to encourage voters to boycott the election. In
general all candidates received equal access to television and radio
media as stipulated in the electoral code.
There were reports of restrictions placed on opposition political
parties. Opposition candidates complained that the Ministry of Interior
regularly blocked registered parties from holding meetings and denied
them access to larger and better-equipped government conference rooms
while facilitating the activities of the pro-Bouteflika National
Liberation Front (FLN). The law requires that potential political
parties receive official approval from the Ministry of Interior to be
established. To obtain approval a party must have 25 founders from
across the country whose names must be registered with the ministry. A
party must have received 4 percent of the vote or at least 2,000 votes
in 25 wilayas in one of the last three legislative elections to
participate in national elections, making it very difficult in practice
to create new political parties.
In 2009 Mohamed Said was a candidate for the April presidential
election. His party's request for accreditation by the Ministry of
Interior remained pending at year's end. The Ministry of Interior did
not approve any political parties during the year.
Membership in the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a political party
banned in 1992, remained illegal. In 2008 Wafa party leader Ahmed Taleb
Ibrahimi announced his withdrawal from politics after the Government's
continued refusal to register his party because of its perceived ties
to the banned FIS. No party may use religion or ethnic heritage as a
basis to organize for political purposes. The law also bans political
party ties to nonpolitical associations and regulates party financing
and reporting requirements. According to the law political parties
cannot receive direct or indirect financial or material support from
any foreign parties. The law also stipulates that resources are
collected from contributions of the party's members, donations, and
revenue from its activities in addition to possible state funding.
There were three women in the cabinet. Women also held 30 of the
389 seats in the Popular Assembly of the Nation, the lower legislative
chamber, and four of the 144 seats in the Council of the Nation, the
upper chamber. A woman led the Workers Party, and three major political
parties--the FLN, National Rally for Democracy, and RCD--had women's
divisions headed by women. The country did not have a quota system
assigning women a certain percentage of seats in the parliament.
In accordance with the law, the Government promoted political
rights for women by encouraging increased female representation within
elected assemblies.
The ethnic Amazigh (Berber) population of approximately 10 million
participated freely and actively in the political process and
represented one-third of the Government.
Section 4. Official Corruption and Government Transparency
The law provides criminal penalties of two to 10 years in prison
for official corruption, and the Government implemented the law more
effectively than in previous years. World Bank governance data
reflected the existence of a corruption problem.
Although a 2006 law established a national anticorruption program,
it does not require elected and senior officials to declare their
assets. The law does not provide parliamentary immunity in certain
cases. Two presidential decrees published in 2006, however, make high-
level government officials subject to financial disclosure laws. The
decrees also stipulate the formation of an anticorruption agency, and
the Government announced its creation in August as well as new policies
to strengthen the role of the accounting court.
Irregularities, including the excessive use of private agreements
often affected public procurement. According to the Ministry of Public
Works, following the president's 2005 prohibition on the use of private
agreements, including sole-source contracts, government agencies began
implementing a public tender policy for all infrastructure and large
government projects. For those public tenders, evaluations were not
released to participating companies, and evaluation methods and
techniques were not clearly defined. Some agencies, however, continued
to use direct contracts for public works projects. In July a
presidential decree mandated that all financial transactions involving
more than 500,000 dinars ($6,770) be conducted by credit card, check,
or other noncash method in an effort to increase financial
transparency, track illegal financing of terrorism, and reduce the
possibility of corruption.
During the year major corruption investigations targeted operations
in four executive branch ministries: Energy, Public Works, Fisheries,
and Transportation. The DRS conducted the investigations of the major
corruption cases throughout the year, rather than the Ministry of
Justice or any other specialized entity.
A notable corruption case during the year involved several private
businessmen and senior executives at the country's national oil
company, Sonatrach. The men apparently awarded contracts in violation
of the public procurement code. In late January police arrested several
top company officials. All defendants in the case were pending trial at
year's end. Following the incident, then energy/mines minister Chakib
Khelil was relieved of his position in May in a broad cabinet
reshuffle.
In April an Algiers court ordered the arrest of the current and
former directors of the Port of Algiers and four other port officials
for misappropriation of public funds. The defendants were pending trial
at year's end.
Also in April police arrested 17 customs officials at the Algiers
Airport for accepting bribes in exchange for foregoing baggage
searches. The officials were under judicial control, awaiting trial, at
year's end.
In July two officials from the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine
Resources received two-year prison sentences for accepting bribes in
exchange for allowing Turkish and Algerian ship owners to exceed catch
limits on bluefin tuna, a species designated endangered by the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources.
According to an August 2009 press report, the court of Cheraga
charged four Algiers police officers with trafficking stolen cars.
Authorities placed one of the officers in pretrial detention in El-
Harrach prison. The court placed the three other officers under
judicial control pending the outcome of their trial.
In October 2009 an Algiers court began questioning high-level
government officials suspected of extortion and influence peddling in
awarding contracts to foreign companies involved in the construction of
the East-West highway, one of the country's largest infrastructure
projects. Authorities arrested and levied corruption charges against
the Secretary General of the Ministry of Public Works, Mohamed
Bouchama, and a DRS colonel who served as a Ministry of Justice
advisor. In December 2009, authorities indicted the Ministry of Public
Works chief of staff, Ferachi Belkacem, in connection with the same
case. Authorities placed Belkacem under judicial control. At year's end
the outcome of the trial remained pending.
In December 2009 the press reported a corruption scandal in the
customs service dating back 10 years. Authorities charged five customs
executives, six customs agents, and five waste exporters with forgery,
filing false declarations, underinvoicing, and embezzlement of public
funds. The report estimated losses between 1998 and 2001 at 100 billion
dinars (approximately $1.35 billion). Officials arrested the five
customs executives and placed the remaining suspects under judicial
control pending the outcome of their trial.
According to a December 2009 press report, the inspector general of
finance conducted 128 audits and issued 160 investigation reports on
corruption during the year. In 2008 press reports quoted Ministry of
Interior officials stating that since 2007, 1,325 employees of
municipal and provincial governments were subject to legal proceedings
for wasting public funds, forgery, and bribery. According to the
report, authorities convicted 324 employees, while the others remained
under investigation or had trials pending.
The media focused on corruption in the customs police. According to
press reports, 960 customs officials faced disciplinary commissions for
official negligence or corruption charges between 2005 and 2008.
Customs officials reported 215 disciplinary cases during the first
quarter of 2008; 118 cases resulted in official reprimands, and nine
cases resulted in suspensions.
Although permitted under the constitution, authorities restricted
access to government information. There is no law facilitating access
to information. Throughout the year the Ministry of Justice, in
cooperation with the UN Development Program, improved access to
information about the country's judicial system and developed a modern
information management system for penitentiaries. As a result, citizens
were able to request personal legal records from the courts and receive
the documents the same day.
In May the Government created the Ministry of Prospective Planning
and Statistics. However, lack of government transparency remained a
serious problem. Although the Government did not release many economic
statistics, the new ministry released such figures. Most ministries had
Web sites, but not all were regularly maintained to provide updated
information. The Ministry of Justice provided information on citizens'
rights and legislation.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government continued to restrict and to harass some local NGOs
and impeded the work of international NGOs. Although some human rights
groups, including the Algerian League of Human Rights (LADH) and LADDH,
were allowed to move about freely, the most active and visible
organizations reported interference by government authorities,
including surveillance, monitoring of telephone calls, difficulty in
securing meeting spaces, and difficulty in obtaining approval for
international speakers to address sensitive issues.
The Government was not responsive publicly to reports and
recommendations from domestic human rights NGOs and interfered with
attempts by some domestic and international human rights groups to
investigate and publish their findings. Domestic NGOs must be licensed
by the Government and are prohibited from receiving funding from abroad
without approval from the ministries of national solidarity and
interior. However, approximately 100 unlicensed NGOs, such as women's
advocacy groups and charity organizations, operated openly. Unlicensed
NGOs did not receive government assistance, and citizens were at times
hesitant associate with these organizations.
The most active independent human rights group was LADDH, a legally
recognized NGO with members throughout the country. LADDH was not
permitted access to government officials for human rights advocacy or
research purposes or to prisons, except for normal lawyer-client
consultations. The smaller LADH, a separate organization based in
Constantine, was licensed, and members throughout the country monitored
individual cases.
By law NGOs not legally recognized by the Ministry of Interior
cannot conduct investigations. Sometimes, however, even legally
recognized NGOs were prevented from conducting investigations. For
example, LADDH did not have access to prisons or detention centers.
International NGOs continued to experience delays in obtaining
visas, and outright refusals occurred. Delays in processing visa
applications prevented some NGOs from conducting programming during the
year. However, during the year the Government granted visas to
personnel of several organizations that had not previously been able to
obtain visas. The Government maintained that legislation did not allow
branches of foreign NGOs to operate legally in the country.
On September 5, authorities detained Djillali Hadjadj, the Algerian
representative of Transparency International. He had been sentenced
without his knowledge to three years in prison for forging
prescriptions. Several international and local NGOs called for
Hadjadj's immediate release. A court gave Hadjadj a six-month suspended
sentence and a 100,000 dinar (approximately $1,350) fine.
The Government continued to deny requests for visits from the UN
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (pending since
1997), the UN special rapporteur on torture (pending since 1997), the
UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions (pending since 1998),
the UN special rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorism (pending
since 2006), and the UN special rapporteur on arbitrary detention
(pending since 2009). The Government accepted visits of UN special
rapporteurs on violence against women in 2007 and freedom of religion
or belief in 2002.
In an August radio interview, CNCPPDH president Farouk Ksentini,
citing Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia, stated that UN special rapporteurs
would have access to the country but that international NGOs would
remain banned because they allegedly supported terrorists in the 1990s.
According to local AI representatives, in November 2009 AI explored
the possibility of visiting the country, but at year's end had not
received a response to its request. AI officials have not visited the
country since 2005 and were denied visas in 2006.
Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
The constitution prohibits discrimination based on birth, race,
gender, language, and social status. In general the Government enforced
the nationality and family codes, although women continued to face
legal and social discrimination.
Women.--Rape, spousal and nonspousal, occurred. The law
criminalizes nonspousal rape but does not address spousal rape. Prison
sentences for nonspousal rape range from one to five years. Claims
filed by women for rape and sexual abuse continued to face judicial
obstacles and many women did not report incidents of rape because of
societal pressures and bureaucratic problems in securing convictions.
Women's rights activists reported that law enforcement authorities
became more sensitive to the issue compared to previous years,
evidenced by the implementation of the 2007-2011 national strategy
combating violence against women. During the year women's rights
activists reported a significant increase in reports of violence
against women.
Spousal abuse occurred. The penal code states that a person must be
incapacitated for 15 days or more and present a doctor's note
certifying the injuries before filing charges for battery.
Domestic NGOs reported that physical violence against women
increased. Since November 2009 approximately 8,500 women were
officially reported victims of domestic violence with 3,500 physically
abused, 2,500 violently assaulted, 1,000 sexually assaulted, 600
sexually harassed, and 100 killed, according to the Algiers-based
Center of Information and Documentation on the Rights of Women and
Children.
In a 2009 report, police registered 9,517 complaints of violence
against women in 2008. According to the CNCPPDH, approximately 4,500
women were victims of assault during the first half of 2008. Police
statistics for 2009 reported 2,675 cases of physical assault, 1,359
cases of abuse, 144 cases of sexual assault, and four deaths.
Approximately 20 percent of assailants were identified as male family
members. During 2009 a national study showed that 67.9 percent of women
acknowledged that spousal abuse occurred in the country.
During the year local women's NGOs, including SOS Femmes en
Detresse, the Wassila Network, and Bent Fatma N'Soumer, spoke against
violence in the family. SOS Femmes en Detresse and the Wassila Network
provided judicial and psychological counseling to abused women. Women's
rights groups experienced difficulty in drawing attention to spousal
abuse as an important social problem, largely due to traditional
societal attitudes. Several rape crisis centers run by women's groups
operated, but they had few resources. The Working Women section of the
General Union of Algerian Workers established a counseling center for
women suffering from sexual harassment in the workplace. SOS Femmes en
Detresse operated one call center in Algiers, but a second call center
in Batna was closed. During the first eight months of the year, the
Algiers call center received more than 2,500 calls.
The punishment for sexual harassment is one to two years'
imprisonment and a fine of 50,000 to 100,000 dinars (approximately $677
to $1,350). The punishment is doubled for a second offense. The police
stated that 107 sexual harassment cases were reported to the police in
2008, the most recent year for which figures were available. The
majority of reported cases of harassment occurred in the workplace. SOS
Femmes en Detresse provided legal advice and counseling to 800 women;
however, only 50 of the women seeking assistance filed formal
complaints.
The Government did not impose restrictions on the right of couples
and individuals to decide the number, timing, and spacing of their
children. There were no restrictions on access to contraceptives, yet
contraceptives were harder to obtain for single women. In 2009 the
Health Ministry's Office of Family Planning conducted a public health
awareness campaign. According to the office, 62 percent of women,
mainly married, regularly used contraceptives. According to UN
estimates, the maternal mortality ratio in the country was 120 deaths
per 100,000 live births in 2008. Government hospitals provided skilled
attendance during childbirth as well as obstetric and postpartum care
and equally diagnosed and treated women for sexually transmitted
infections, including HIV.
The constitution provides for gender equality; however, some
aspects of the law and many traditional social practices discriminate
against women. The family code contains elements of Sharia (Islamic
law). The family code prohibits Muslim women from marrying non-Muslims,
although this regulation was not always enforced. A woman may marry a
foreigner and transmit citizenship and nationality to both her children
and spouse. Muslim men may marry non-Muslim women.
Women can seek divorce for irreconcilable differences and violation
of a prenuptial agreement. In a divorce the law provides for the wife
to retain the family's home until children reach 18 years of age.
Custody of children normally is awarded to the mother, but she may not
make decisions on education or take the children out of the country
without the father's authorization. In practice, more women retained
the family's home if they had custody of the children.
The family code affirms the Islamic practice of allowing a man to
marry as many as four wives. According to the family code, polygamy is
only permitted upon the permission of the first wife and the
determination of a judge as to the husband's financial ability to
support an additional wife. In practice, however, this occurred in 1 to
2 percent of marriages.
Amendments to the family code supersede the Sharia requirement that
a male sponsor consent to the marriage of a woman. Although this
requirement has been formally retained and the sponsor continues to
contract the marriage, the woman may choose any man that she wishes to
be the sponsor. The sponsor represents the woman during the religious
or civil ceremony.
Women suffered from discrimination in inheritance claims and were
entitled to a smaller portion of an estate than male children or a
deceased husband's brothers. The law purports that such a distinction
is justified because other provisions require that the husband's income
and assets be used to support the family, while the wife's remain, in
principle, her own. In practice, women did not often have exclusive
control over assets that they brought to a marriage or that they
earned.
Married women may take out business loans and use their own
financial resources.
Despite constitutional and legal provisions providing for gender
equality, in practice women faced discrimination in employment. Leaders
of women's organizations reported that discriminatory violations were
common and that women were less likely to receive equal pay for equal
work or receive promotions.
In urban areas, there was social encouragement for women to pursue
higher education and/or a career. Girls graduated from high school more
frequently than boys. According to 2010 statistics, women represented
55 percent of the medical profession, 60 percent of the media
profession, 30 percent of the upper levels of the legal profession, and
more than 60 percent of the education profession. In addition, 36
percent of judges were women. Women served at all levels in the
judicial system, and female police officers were added to some
precincts to assist women with abuse claims. Out of nine million
workers nationally, two million were female. Women may own businesses,
enter into contracts, and pursue careers similar to those of men.
Children.--Citizenship and nationality are transmitted from the
mother or father. Under the law, children born to a Muslim father are
Muslim, regardless of the mother's religion.
The Government provides free education for children through high
school. Education is compulsory until the age of 16 years. The
Government provided free medical care for all citizens, including
children with disabilities, albeit in generally rudimentary facilities,
and to both sexes equally.
Child abuse is illegal but continued to be reported as a problem.
NGOs specializing in children cited continued instances of domestic
violence against children, which they attributed to a ``culture of
violence'' stemming from civil strife in the 1990s, including social
dislocations caused by the movement of rural families to the cities to
escape terrorist violence. Experts assumed that many cases went
unreported because of familial reticence. The National Foundation for
Health Progress and Research Development (FOREM), a children's rights
watchdog NGO with EU funding, estimated that approximately 10,000
children suffered some form of abuse.
The criminal code prohibits solicitation for prostitution and
stipulates prison sentences of between 10 and 20 years when the offense
is committed against a minor under the age of 18 years. According to
the law, the age for consensual sex is 16 years. The law stipulates a
prison sentence of between 10 and 20 years for rape when the victim is
a minor but this sentence was rarely carried out. The law prohibits
pornography and establishes prison sentences of between two months and
two years as well as fines up to 2,000 dinars (approximately $27).
The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. For information on
international parental child abduction, please see the Department of
State's annual report on compliance at http://travel.state.gov/
abduction/resources/congressreport/congressreport--4308.html.
Anti-Semitism.--The country's Jewish population numbered fewer than
2,000 persons, and there were no functioning synagogues. The Government
did not promote antibias education, and there is no hate crime
legislation.
Trafficking in Persons.--For information on trafficking in persons,
please see the Department of State's annual Trafficking in Persons
Report at www.state.gov/g/tip.
Persons With Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination
against persons with disabilities in employment, education, access to
health care, or the provision of other state services, although in
practice the Government did not effectively enforce these provisions.
The law provides services, including free medical care, for persons
with disabilities; however, there was widespread social discrimination
against persons with disabilities. Few government buildings were
accessible to persons with disabilities. Public enterprises, in
downsizing their work forces, generally ignored a requirement that they
reserve one percent of jobs for persons with disabilities. Social
security provided payments for orthopedic equipment. The Ministry of
National Solidarity (MNS) provided some financial support to health-
care-oriented NGOs; however, for many NGOs this financial support
represented approximately 2 percent of their budgets.
The MNS maintained that there were two million persons with
disabilities in the country, of whom the largest percentages were
classified as ``chronically ill'' or ``other'' (38 and 30 percent,
respectively). However, according to the Algerian Federation of
Wheelchair Associations, there were three million persons with
disabilities living in the country. The Government estimated that
approximately 44 percent of disabled citizens had some form of motor
disability, 32 percent had communication difficulties, and 24 percent
suffered from a visual disability. The Government classified
approximately 193,000 individuals as ``fully disabled'' and claimed
during the year to have appropriated 9.54 billion dinars (approximately
$129 million) for their welfare.
Societal Abuses, Discrimination, and Acts of Violence Based on
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.--The penal code criminalizes
public homosexual behavior for males and females, and there is no
specific legal protection for lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and
transgender (LGBT) persons. The law stipulates penalties that include
imprisonment of two months to two years and fines of 500 to 2,000
dinars (approximately $7 to $27). If a minor is involved, the adult may
face up to three years' imprisonment and a fine of 10,000 dinars
(approximately $135).
There was societal discrimination against homosexual conduct. While
some LGBT persons lived openly, the vast majority did not, and most
feared reprisal from their families or harassment from authorities.
Other Societal Violence or Discrimination.--HIV/AIDS was widely
considered a shameful disease in the country. According to 2007
statistics released by the Ministry of Health, 2,100 citizens were HIV-
positive, and 736 persons suffered from HIV/AIDS. There were 54 centers
offering free testing services to detect HIV/AIDS. Only 51 percent of
women, both single and married, noted use of condoms to prevent
infection. In response to societal discrimination, during the year the
Health Ministry and the NGO AIDS Algerie launched an HIV/AIDS
prevention campaign, stressing the need to avoid discrimination,
especially in the workplace, against those with HIV/AIDS.
Section 7. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The constitution allows workers who
are citizens to join unions of their choice but requires workers to
obtain government approval to form a union. The labor unions law
requires that the Ministry of Labor approve or disapprove a union
application within 30 days and allows for the creation of autonomous
unions. However, the Government may invalidate a union's legal status
if its objectives are perceived by authorities as contrary to the
established institutional system, public order, good morals, or the
laws or regulations in force. Approximately two-thirds of the labor
force belonged to unions. The General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA)
was the only legally recognized labor confederation. The UGTA includes
specialized national unions; its density is highest in the public
sector. Workers may form independent unions. There were no new unions
formed during the reporting period, but existing unions focused on
increasing their visibility.
Unions have the right to form and join federations or
confederations. Unions may also recruit members at the workplace. In
practice, attempts by new unions to form federations or confederations
were obstructed by delaying administrative maneuvers, such as delays in
processing registration requests. Since 1996 the Autonomous Unions
Confederation, which functions without official status, repeatedly
attempted to organize the autonomous unions, without success. The
Government did not allow the autonomous union of public sector workers
(SNAPAP) to register as a national confederation. SNAPAP and other
autonomous unions faced government interference throughout the year,
including official obstruction of general assembly meetings and police
harassment during sit-in protests.
For example, on May 13, Algiers authorities shut down the House of
Unions after SNAPAP planned to organize a conference on unions in the
Maghreb. Two days ahead of the conference, the wilaya of Algiers sealed
the premises. There were reports that some citizens lodged a complaint
regarding noise in the building housing the House of Unions.
The law permits unions to affiliate with international labor bodies
and develop relations with foreign labor groups. For example, the UGTA
is a member of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
However, the law prohibits unions from associating with political
parties and also prohibits unions from receiving funds from foreign
sources. The courts are empowered to dissolve unions that engaged in
illegal activities.
The law provides for the right to strike, and workers exercised
this right in practice, subject to conditions. All public
demonstrations, including protests and strikes, must receive prior
authorization, according to the emergency law. Several dozen strikes
occurred throughout the country. Under the state of emergency decree,
the Government can require public and private sector workers to remain
at work in the event of an unauthorized or illegal strike. Authorities
rarely give permits for public gatherings. According to the law on
industrial relations, workers may strike only after 14 days of
mandatory conciliation or mediation. On occasion, the Government
offered to mediate disputes. The law states that decisions reached in
mediation are binding on both parties. If no agreement is reached in
mediation, the workers may strike legally after they vote by secret
ballot to do so. A minimum level of public services must be maintained
during public-sector service strikes.
The authorities tolerated strikes but continued to enforce a ban on
marches and demonstrations in Algiers in effect since 2001. The courts
challenged the legality of strikes called by teachers, doctors, and
health-care professionals during the year.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for collective bargaining for all unions, and the Government
permitted the exercise of this right, in practice, for authorized
unions; however, the UGTA remained the only union authorized to
negotiate collective bargaining agreements. According to the UGTA, nine
million workers were covered by collective bargaining agreements, not
including foreign migrant laborers.
On October 7, workers at the ArcelorMittal steel plant in Annaba
halted a strike at the request of the UGTA, which began negotiating
their demands. The workers at the plant received increased pay as a
result of the negotiations.
The law prohibits discrimination by employers against union members
and organizers and provides mechanisms for resolving trade union
complaints of antiunion practices by employers.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The constitution
prohibits all forms of forced or compulsory labor; however, there were
reports from the Ministry of Labor and NGOs that such practices
occurred. Forced labor conditions existed for migrant workers that were
not fully protected by labor law. Construction workers and female
domestic workers were reportedly vulnerable.
Also see the Department of State's annual Trafficking in Persons
Report at www.state.gov/g/tip.
d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment.--The
law prohibits participation by minors in dangerous, unhealthy, or
harmful work or in work that is considered inappropriate because of
social and religious considerations. The minimum legal age for
employment is 15 years, except for apprentice positions. To serve as an
apprentice, minors must have the permission of a legal guardian.
Despite the labor code's prohibition of the practice, child labor
remained a problem in the agriculture and the informal sectors.
Also see the Department of State's annual Trafficking in Persons
Report at www.state.gov/g/tip.
The Ministry of Labor is the entity charged with monitoring and
enforcing child labor laws, with sections across the country
responsible for monitoring violations and conducting a census of
workers in national and private companies. The ministry conducted and
in some cases investigated companies suspected of hiring under aged
workers. However, monitoring and enforcement practices for child labor
were not consistent.
During a November 2009 conference on children's rights, FOREM
representatives stated that there were approximately 300,000 children
under 16 years of age working in the country on farms and in shops.
Including children who work in households and as vendors, the number of
working children in the country stood at approximately 1.5 million in
2010, according to FOREM.
The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing child labor
laws, but enforcement was hindered by insufficient human resources.
During the year FOREM implemented a public awareness campaign to
encourage children to remain in school until 16 years of age, rather
than participating in the workforce. Roughly 300,000 students drop out
of school annually to join the workforce, according to FOREM.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The national minimum wage of
15,000 dinars (approximately $203) per month did not provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. The minimum wage was raised
to this level in 2009 by a tripartite social pact between business,
government, and labor. Autonomous unions, which were not included in
tripartite talks, reported the increase was inadequate and would not
affect the majority of workers who already earn more than the minimum
wage. The previous tripartite negotiation occurred in 2006 and
established a minimum wage of 12,000 dinars (approximately $163).
Ministry of Labor inspectors were responsible for ensuring compliance
with the minimum wage regulation; however, enforcement remained
inconsistent.
The standard workweek was 37.5 hours included one 10-minute break
and one hour for lunch per day. Employees who worked longer than the
standard workweek received premium pay on a sliding scale from time-
and-a-half to double-time, depending on whether the overtime was worked
on a normal workday, a weekend, or a holiday. In general the Ministry
of Labor effectively enforced these labor standards, particularly in
the civil service and in public sector companies; however, enforcement
was less efficient in the private sector because of low union density.
The law contains occupational health and safety standards, but
Ministry of Labor inspectors did not enforce these regulations
effectively. There were no reports of workers being dismissed for
removing themselves from hazardous working conditions. If workers face
such conditions, they reserve the right to renegotiate their contract
or, failing that, resort to the courts. While this legal mechanism
exists, the high demand for employment in the country gave an advantage
to employers seeking to exploit employees. Economic migrants from sub-
Saharan Africa and elsewhere working in the country without legal
immigration status were not protected by the country's labor standards,
making them vulnerable to exploitation. Labor law does not adequately
cover migrant workers.
__________
BAHRAIN
Bahrain is a monarchy with a population of approximately 1,235,000,
including approximately 569,000 who are citizens. King Hamad Bin Isa
Al-Khalifa is the head of state and all branches of government. The
king appoints a cabinet of ministers; approximately half are members of
the minority Sunni Al-Khalifa ruling family. The 2002 constitution
reinstated a bicameral, legislative body consisting of an upper house,
the Shura Council, whose members are appointed by the king, and a lower
house, the elected Council of Representatives. Approximately 67 percent
of eligible voters participated in the October parliamentary and
municipal council elections, the outcome of which was affected by
extensive gerrymandering of districts. The opposition, Shia Islamist
Al-Wifaq political society won all contested 18 seats in the 40-member
Council of Representatives. Security forces reported to civilian
authorities.
Citizens did not have the right to change their government.
Trafficking in persons and restrictions on the rights of foreign
resident workers continued to be significant problems. There were
numerous reports of abuse against foreign workers, particularly female
domestic workers. There were many reports of domestic violence against
women and children. Discrimination on the basis of gender, religion,
nationality, and sect, especially against the Shia majority population,
persisted. There were multiple allegations of mistreatment and torture,
especially of Shia activists associated with rejectionist and
opposition groups. Authorities arbitrarily arrested activists,
journalists, and other citizens and detained some individuals
incommunicado. Some detainees did not always have adequate access to
their attorneys. At least two of the detainees were dismissed from
their public-sector jobs prior to the commencement of judicial
proceedings. The Government restricted civil liberties, including
freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, and some religious
practices. There were instances of the Government imposing and
enforcing official and unofficial travel bans on political activists.
The Shia are underrepresented in positions of leadership in the civil
service, police, and security forces.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports that the Government or its agents committed arbitrary or
unlawful killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The constitution prohibits such practices; however, there
were multiple allegations during the year that security forces employed
them. On February 8, Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report asserting
that ``since the end of 2007, officials have repeatedly resorted to
torture for the apparent purpose of securing confessions from security
suspects.'' The former detainees interviewed for the report claimed
that security officials and prison guards subjected them to ``abusive
tactics'' during interrogation. In some cases in 2009, Ministry of
Health doctors found corroborative evidence of injuries that matched
the detainees' claims of mistreatment. According to senior government
officials, the Government initiated an investigation of HRW's
allegations. At year's end the Government had not published the
investigation's findings.
From August to December, local and international human rights NGOs
asserted that security personnel had tortured more than two dozen
detainees. During court proceedings from October to December, many of
these detainees claimed that officers of the National Security Agency
mistreated and tortured them. Detainees claimed that they had been
beaten, suspended in painful positions, forced to stand for long
periods, deprived of sleep, and subjected to electric shocks. During
trial proceedings in October and November, defense lawyers requested an
independent investigation into the torture allegations, to include
independent medical exams. The prosecutor asserted in December that
claims of torture had been investigated. At year's end neither the
court nor the Government had released the findings of any such
investigation.
Local human rights organizations and lawyers also reported alleged
instances of abuse by law enforcement authorities in connection with
the approximately200 men and juveniles detained between August and
December.
Local human rights activists and attorneys alleged that many of the
23 Shia activists arrested in August and September and charged pursuant
to counterterrorism legislation, including a prominent blogger, were
beaten, subjected to electric shocks, hung upside down, and beaten on
their feet (falaqa). During court sessions in October, November, and
December (see section 1.e.), all detainees claimed they were beaten by
National Security Agency officers, with some claiming they were
subjected to electric shocks, made to stand for long periods of time,
and made to sign confessions during or after mistreatment or torture.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions.--The Government, which
maintained that prison conditions met international standards, did not
release any detailed information about the prison population or prison
and detention center conditions, nor did it permit visits by
independent human rights observers. A UN report in March described
``suboptimal health conditions'' in prisons. In the second half of the
year, some detainees alleged that security personnel physically abused
them and, in some cases, withheld medical care, including access to
medication and medical equipment.
In August approximately 70 prisoners in the country's central
prison in Jaw protested their living conditions, and some prisoners
went on hunger strike. In response members of the quasigovernmental
National Human Rights Authority visited the prison; however, the body
did not issue a public report. A local human rights NGO reported that
the Jaw prison population was more than 1,300, although the prison had
been designed to hold only 500 inmates. According to the Office of the
Inspector General of the Ministry of Interior, the Jaw prison held
1,100 inmates.
Authorities generally permitted inmates reasonable access to
visitors and religious observance. However, the Government temporarily
suspended visitation rights for some inmates in the aftermath of the
unrest in Jaw prison. In addition the Government did not permit family
members to visit dozens of detainees arrested on security-related
charges for at least several weeks.
The Government did not permit independent monitoring of prison or
detention center conditions, nor was there an ombudsman for prison and
detainee issues. It is unknown if prisoners could submit complaints
about treatment for investigation.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention.--The constitution prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention. However, local human rights activists
and attorneys alleged that police and National Guard units arbitrarily
arrested or abducted Shia men and youth during the year, particularly
from August to October, and that security officials held some
incommunicado for days or weeks.
The Office of the Inspector General of the Ministry of Interior
received an unknown number of complaints pertaining to pretrial
detention, although it was not clear how many of these resulted in
investigations or penalties.
Role of the Police and Security Apparatus.--The Ministry of the
Interior is responsible for public security; it controls the public
security force and other specialized security units that are
responsible for maintaining internal order. The Bahrain Defense Force
is responsible for defending against external threats and provides
internal security. The security forces were generally effective in
maintaining internal order.
The Office of the Inspector General of the Ministry of Interior
received 246 complaints between January and October, of which 121 were
not related to police conduct. Nineteen cases were referred to the
Ministry's legal affairs directorate for further action. The ministry
maintained a hotline for citizens to report police abuses; however,
many in the Shia community believed the Government condoned police
misconduct and, therefore, did not report allegations of abuse. In
practice the ministry responded to allegations of abuse and public
complaints by establishing temporary investigation committees, which
did not issue public reports of their findings.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention.--To apprehend a
felony suspect, police must present evidence to a judge who will decide
whether to issue an arrest warrant. Police and security forces must
transfer a suspect's case to the public prosecutor's office within 48
hours, and they generally respected that requirement in practice.
Within seven days of arrest, a suspect must appear before a judge in
the public prosecutor's office. Judges may grant bail to a suspect and
regularly did so. If the judge decides the suspect is a flight risk or
a danger to society, the judge may allow as long as an additional 45
days of detention while the public prosecutor conducts an
investigation. This process may continue through subsequent reviews by
different judges, but pretrial detention may not exceed six months.
Detainee access to attorneys was often restricted in the early stages
of detention; attorneys must seek a court order to confer with clients
and then coordinate with officials at the detention facility for
access. The state provided counsel to indigent detainees. While
detainees were generally allowed prompt access to visiting family
members, many of those arrested on security-related charges between
August and December claimed that they were not allowed to see relatives
or lawyers for several weeks.
In accordance with the 2006 counterterrorism law, law enforcement
agencies must transfer a case to the public prosecutor's office within
five days of the suspect's arrest, although the law permits law
enforcement agencies to request an additional 10 days before the formal
transfer of the case. Prosecutors must commence their formal
questioning of a suspect within three days of receipt of the case.
Other pretrial detention procedures are governed by those concerning
cases that are not related to terrorism.
From August to December, law enforcement agencies arrested
approximately 200 men, including minors, and held some of them pursuant
to the 2006 counterterrorism law. Local human rights groups and
attorneys, as well as international human rights NGOs, alleged that, in
many of these cases, authorities used incommunicado detention,
restricted lawyers' access to their clients, and prevented family
members from visiting detainees. International and local NGOs, as well
as attorneys, asserted that security officials abused and tortured some
of these detainees (see also sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected judicial
independence in practice; however, the king has control of the judicial
system. According to the constitution, the king appoints all judges by
royal decree. The king also serves as chairperson of the Supreme
Judicial Council, the body responsible for supervising the work of the
courts and the public prosecutor.
The trial of 25 Shia activists charged pursuant to the
counterterrorism law--two of whom were based in the United Kingdom and
tried in their absence--commenced on October 28. The trial was
generally open to detainees' family members, journalists,
representatives of local and international NGOs, diplomats, and members
of the general public, but, in some cases, a number of journalists and
human rights activists were denied access to the court. The defendants'
lawyers, together with local NGOs, asserted that security personnel
subjected the men to mistreatment and torture while in pretrial
detention (see section 1.c.), deprived them of adequate access to legal
counsel, and prevented them from meeting with family members for
several weeks. They withdrew from the case on December 9 to protest the
presiding judge's failure to rule on several requests they had made in
the first four sessions of the trial, such as an impartial
investigation into torture allegations.
The minister of justice and Islamic affairs and endowments
appointed 23 new lawyers, and the case was pending at year's end. Human
rights activists and attorneys alleged that the detainees' right to a
fair, public trial was undermined by the detainees' limited access to
legal counsel and the presiding judge's failure to rule on the defense
attorneys' requests.
Two men faced trial in November and December, accused of assaulting
an editor of the progovernment Al Watan newspaper on August 25. The two
men were arrested less than 48 hours after the attack, shortly after
which senior government officials announced that the men had confessed.
Most newspapers carried photographs of the two men, referring to them
as assassins or terrorists. The trial commenced in November. The men
were released on December 12 after the victim of the assault testified
in court that the two defendants were not the men who assaulted him.
The judge agreed to the prosecutor's request that the court examine
other evidence in a hearing scheduled for January 2011.
Trial Procedures.--According to the constitution, defendants are
presumed innocent until proven guilty. Civil and criminal trial
procedures provide for an open trial. There are no jury trials. By law
and in practice, defendants have the right to prompt consultation with
an attorney of their choice within 48 hours (unless they are charged
pursuant to counterterrorism legislation), and the Government provided
counsel to indigent defendants. Defendants are present during trial
proceedings, and they have the right to present witnesses and evidence
on their behalf and question witnesses against them. No law governs
defendants' access to government-held evidence. Defendants have the
right to appeal. Women's legal rights varied according to Shia or Sunni
interpretations of Islamic law (see section 6).
Political Prisoners and Detainees.--Human rights organizations
alleged that some of those arrested on security charges from August to
December were targeted because of their political activism. Many of the
prominent detainees are leaders of, or affiliated with, political
groups.
On August 17, authorities arrested Muhammad Saeed al-Sahlawi, a
member of the board of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR).
Human rights groups report that Al-Sahlawi, a dentist and human rights
activist who supervises the BCHR's Web site, was arrested at his home
during a wave of arrests targeting political and human rights
activists. Al-Sahlawi was previously arrested in 2006 for distributing
publications demanding political reform and in 1997 for contacting
oppositional and international organizations abroad.
Also on August 17, according to the BCHR, authorities arrested
Sheikh Abdul-Hadi Abdullah Al-Mokhadur and Sheikh Mirza Al-Mahroos,
both clerics involved in activities promoting human rights, in Manama.
On September 4, authorities arrested and detained a popular
Internet Web site writer and administrator of a Web site, Ali
Abdulemam, and charged him with involvement in a ``terrorist network,''
together with 24 other men (section 1.e.). This group of 25 also
included a board member of a local human rights organization and
political dissenters.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies.--Citizens may bring civil
suits before the court seeking cessation of or damages for, some types
of human rights violations; however, in many such situations, the law
prevents citizens from filing civil suits against security agencies.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The constitution prohibits such actions, and the
Government generally respected these prohibitions in practice, except
under the provisions of the law and under judicial supervision.
The Government is required to obtain a court order before
monitoring telephone calls, e-mail, and personal correspondence. Many
Shia citizens believed there were extensive police informer networks,
but they were unable to provide concrete evidence.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press ``provided that the fundamental
beliefs of Islamic doctrine are not infringed, the unity of the people
is not prejudiced, and discord or sectarianism is not aroused.'' The
Government limited freedom of speech and press through press laws,
libel and slander laws, and national security-related laws. Both
censorship and self-censorship took place.
The law forbids any speech infringing on public order or morals. In
private settings, individuals openly expressed critical opinions
regarding domestic political and social issues. There was also
considerable freedom of expression on the Internet, in letters to the
editor, and occasionally on state-run television call-in shows.
A Shia cleric aligned with a rejectionist group was temporarily
banned from giving Friday sermons in October. The Ministry of Justice
and Islamic Affairs and Endowments deemed some of the cleric's sermons
to ``threaten civil peace.''
The Government did not own any print media, but the Information
Authority--established in July as an associated element of the Ministry
of Culture and Information--and other government entities exercised
considerable control over domestic, privately owned print media. The
Government owned and operated all domestic radio and television
stations. In August, September, and October, the Information Authority
threatened to shut the Web sites of a number of newspaper and media
outlets unless they stopped broadcasting video content. The Information
Authority stated that it was illegal for media outlets to broadcast
video content until a law regarding online video broadcast is
promulgated by the national legislature.
Radio and television broadcasts in Arabic, Farsi, and English from
countries in the region, including by satellite, were generally
received without interference. However, in May the Ministry of Culture
and Information temporarily closed the Al Jazeera office in Manama and
banned an Al Jazeera news crew from entering the country. The ministry
accused Qatar-based Al Jazeera of ``flouting the laws regulating the
press and publishing'' and requested the network to enter into a
memorandum of understanding with the Government regarding their
activities in the country. At year's end the two sides remained engaged
in negotiations, and there was no Al Jazeera representative in the
country.
At least one journalist faced violence during the year. On August
25, two men attacked an editor of the progovernment Al Watan newspaper,
who was slightly injured. Security forces arrested two men and tried
them for the assault, but a judge released them after the victim of the
attack testified that the men were not his assailants (see section
1.e.).
Government censorship occurred. Information Authority
representatives actively monitored and blocked stories on matters
deemed sensitive, especially those related to sectarianism, national
security, or criticism of the royal family, the Saudi royal family, or
the judiciary. Journalists also practiced widespread self-censorship.
According to some members of the media, government officials contacted
editors directly and asked them to stop writing about certain subjects
or asked them not to publish a press release or a story. In September
Bahraini newspapers inaccurately conveyed an official U.S. government
statement about the country, allegedly at the behest of government
officials. In the lead-up to the elections, observers noted that
political debate was largely absent from media outlets. Domestic and
international human rights groups alleged that the Government imposed a
media restraining order.
The Government enforced at its discretion the press law to restrict
freedom of press. The law provides for fines of as much as 10,000
dinars ($26,500) and prison sentences of at least six months for
criticizing Islam or the king or inciting actions that undermine state
security, as well as fines of up to 2,000 dinars ($5,300) for 14 other
offenses. These offenses include publicizing statements issued by a
foreign state or organization before obtaining the consent of the
president of the information authority, publishing any reports that may
adversely affect the dinar's value, reporting any offense against the
head of a state that maintains diplomatic relations with the country,
or publishing offensive remarks toward an accredited representative of
a foreign country because of acts connected with the person's position.
The Information Authority reviewed all books and publications prior
to issuing printing licenses. The Ministry of Justice and Islamic
Affairs reviewed books that discussed religion. The Government banned
at least one book by a domestic author, Nader Kadim, entitled Unbridled
Hatreds. In June the Government banned the Arabic translation of the
diaries of Charles Belgrave, a British colonial officer in the country
from 1926 to 1957.
In August and September, the Government-run Bahrain News Agency
(BNA) and most daily newspapers repeatedly published photographs of
suspects and detainees. Members of the quasigovernmental National Human
Rights Institution, human rights activists, and detainees' attorneys
asserted that such actions, prior to the commencement of judicial
proceedings, violated the constitution and penal code.
Internet Freedom.--While the Government generally respected
Internet freedom, there were some government restrictions. The
Government's Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) ordered
service providers to block Internet users' access to certain sites. In
the lead-up to the elections, the Government banned opposition Web
sites. In August, September, and October, the Information Authority
threatened to shut the Web sites of a number of newspaper and media
outlets. Reportedly, the Government did not monitor e-mail use.
Internet penetration among citizens exceeded 80 percent.
The Government regularly monitored users' online activities and
blocked residents' regular access to numerous Web sites that officials
considered to be inciting sectarian tensions, were antigovernment, or
were anti-Islamic. The Government also blocked the Web site of at least
one human rights NGO during the year, and it blocked the Web sites of
the two main opposition political societies, Al-Wifaq National Islamic
Society and the National Democratic Action Society (also known as
Wa'ad), during campaigning for the October national elections. Public
discussion of blocked Web sites was widespread, and many users were
able to access blocked sites through alternate servers.
One of the country's most popular oppositionist Internet forums was
blocked in August and September, although officials permitted the site
to operate freely thereafter. On September 4, authorities arrested the
site's administrator, Ali Abdulemam, who is also a popular blogger, and
charged him with involvement in a ``terror network'' together with 24
other citizens (see section 1.d.).
The Government continued to invoke the press code to justify the
questioning of some journalists and bloggers. Web site administrators
legally face the same libel laws that apply to print journalists, and
Web masters are held jointly responsible for all content posted on
their Web sites or chat rooms.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events.--There were no government
restrictions on academic freedom. Some academics self-censored,
avoiding contentious political issues.
The Government banned at least one film, the Indian-produced
Lamhaa, for its political content.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom of
Assembly.--The constitution provides for the right of free assembly,
but the law restricts the exercise of this right, and security forces
intervened in some demonstrations during the year. Organizers must
submit requests for public gatherings or demonstrations to the Ministry
of the Interior at least 72 hours in advance. Three citizens from the
proposed demonstration area must sign the application. If there is no
response to the request, the gathering may proceed. The law prohibits
public gatherings near hospitals, airports, commercial centers,
designated security-related facilities, or funeral processions. The law
prohibits gatherings between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m., unless the chief of
public security or his deputy gives written permission. The law states
that funeral processions may not be turned into political rallies, and
security officials may be present at any public gathering. The head of
public security must notify the organizers about any official changes
to the request (such as location, time, or route) at least 48 hours
prior to the event. Organizers of an unauthorized gathering face prison
sentences of three to six months.
The Government specifically limited and controlled political
gatherings. The law regulates election campaigns and prohibits
political activities at worship centers, universities, schools,
government buildings, and public institutions. The Government did not
allow mosques or ma'tams (Shia religious community centers) or other
religious sites to be used for political gatherings without permission.
Antigovernment demonstrations occurred regularly in numerous Shia
villages throughout the country. Groups of Shia youth, allegedly
instigated by members of the unregistered Haq Movement and the newly
organized al-Waf'a Islamic Movement, regularly appeared at both
registered and unregistered demonstrations where, according to Shia
community members and Ministry of Interior officials, they burned tires
and trash and threw Molotov cocktails and stones at riot police.
Police often dispersed demonstrations with tear gas. Local human
rights NGOs alleged that riot police used tear gas against peaceful
demonstrators; however, the Ministry of the Interior countered that it
used tear gas in response to attacks by demonstrators. Security forces
sometimes fired rubber baton rounds to disperse demonstrations and, on
a number of occasions, security forces allegedly ricocheted shotgun
pellets from the ground to disperse rioters as a last resort.
Freedom of Association.--The constitution provides for the right to
freedom of association; however, the Government limited this right in
practice. Although the Government does not allow the formation of
political parties, it authorized registered political societies to run
candidates and participate in other political activities.
The Government required all groups to register: civil society
groups with the Ministry of Social Development, political societies
with the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs, and labor unions with
the Ministry of Labor. The Government decided whether the group was
social or political in nature based on its proposed bylaws. The law
prohibits any activity by an unlicensed society and any political
activity by a licensed civil society group.
To apply for registration, a political society must submit its
bylaws signed by all founding members, a list of all members and copies
of their residency cards, and a financial statement identifying the
society's sources of funding and bank information. The society's
principles, goals, and programs must not run counter to Sharia law or
the national interest, as interpreted by the judiciary, nor may the
society be based on sectarian, geographic, or class identity.
A civil society group applying for registration must submit its
bylaws signed by all founding members and minutes of the founding
committee's meetings, containing the names of founding members, their
professions, their places of residence, and their signatures. The law
grants the Ministry of Social Development the right to reject the
registration of any civil society group if it finds the society's
services unnecessary, already provided by another society, contrary to
state security, or aimed at reviving a previously dissolved society.
Associations whose applications are rejected or ignored may appeal to
the High Civil Court, which may annul the ministry's decision or refuse
the complaint.
Many NGOs and civil society activists asserted that the Ministry of
Social Development routinely exploited its oversight role to stymie the
activities of NGOs and other civil society organizations. While some
local NGOs asserted that bureaucratic incompetence characterized the
ministry's dealings with NGOs, numerous other local NGOs stated that
officials in the NGOs directorate actively sought to undermine some
groups' activities and to impose burdensome bureaucratic procedures on
NGO board members and volunteers.
In September the Ministry of Social Development effectively
shuttered the prominent local human rights organization Bahrain Human
Rights Society, when a ministerial decree ordered the dissolution of
the society's board of directors and appointed a ministry employee to
be the group's interim head. Soon thereafter the group's ousted chief
filed a lawsuit against the ministry; the case was pending at year's
end. In October the ministry filed a lawsuit against the ousted board
of directors of BHRS but withdrew the suit shortly afterwards. In
December the former BHRS leadership issued a human rights report for
2009 in the name of the BHRS; the Government did not interfere in the
report's release or dissemination.
c. Freedom of Religion.--For a complete description of religious
freedom, please see the 2010 International Religious Freedom Report at
www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/rpt.
d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of
Refugees, and Stateless Persons.--The constitution provides for freedom
of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and
repatriation, and the Government generally respected these rights in
practice. The Government cooperated with the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons,
refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and
other persons of concern.
The law provides that the Government may reject applications to
obtain or renew passports for ``reasonable cause,'' but the applicant
has the right to appeal such decisions before the High Civil Court. In
practice authorities relied on determinations of national security when
adjudicating passport applications.
On September 19, authorities announced they had revoked the
citizenship of a naturalized Shia cleric, Ayatollah Sheikh Hussain al-
Najati, his wife, and their three children. The Government restored the
family's citizenship in November.
In October authorities prevented three activists from leaving the
country. All three were permitted to travel within one to two weeks.
The constitution prohibits forced exile, and there were no reports
of forced exile or return from exile during the year. Some political
oppositionists who refused the 2001 amnesty remained in self-imposed
exile.
Protection of Refugees.--The country is not a party to the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees, and the Government has not
established a system for providing protection to refugees. In practice
the Government provided protection against the expulsion or return of
refugees to countries where their lives or freedom would be threatened
on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion. Such individuals
generally had access to certain social services, education, and
employment.
Stateless Persons.--Citizenship is generally derived from the
father; however, noncitizen men who marry citizen women are not
entitled to citizenship; as a result, children from such marriages are
stateless. The Bahrain Women's Association reported that as of December
the organization was aware of 213 women with stateless children.
The law clearly defines naturalization requirements, but the
adjudication process for naturalization applications was not
transparent. Opposition groups claimed the Government regularly ignored
naturalization rules to manipulate demographics for voting and to
maintain Sunni domination of police and defense forces over Shia.
According to these opposition groups, the Government was more lenient
with naturalization requests from foreign residents in the security
forces, while Shia and other applicants experienced delays in
processing of their cases. The Government occasionally granted
citizenship to Sunni residents from neighboring countries.
Stateless persons had access to limited social services, education,
and employment. Stateless persons were eligible to receive housing and
other government services; however, they were excluded from receiving
scholarships.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government or their
political system; however, the constitution provides for a
democratically elected Council of Representatives, the lower house of
parliament. The king appoints the prime minister, who then proposes
cabinet ministers. Members of the ruling Al-Khalifa family held all
strategic cabinet ministry positions and approximately half of
ministerial slots. The bicameral national assembly consists of the 40-
member Council of Representatives and the 40-member appointed Shura
(Consultative) Council. The king may dissolve the Council of
Representatives at his discretion; he also has the power to amend the
constitution and to propose, ratify, and promulgate laws. Both councils
may question government ministers (except the prime minister), and the
Council of Representatives may require a minister's resignation with a
two-thirds majority vote of no confidence. The Council of
Representatives may introduce a resolution indicating it cannot
cooperate with the prime minister, in which case the joint national
assembly would have the option to pass the resolution by a two-thirds
majority, requiring the king to dismiss the prime minister or to
dissolve the Council of Representatives. A no-confidence vote has never
arisen.
Elections and Political Participation.--Almost all registered
political societies participated in the October elections for the
Council of Representatives and municipal councils. Sixty-seven percent
of eligible voters participated in the two rounds of voting on October
23 and 30. The opposition Shia Islamist political society, Al-Wifaq,
won all 18 races it contested for the Council of Representatives. Two
progovernment, Sunni Islamist parties won a combined five seats (down
from 15), and independents won 17 seats. Most opposition groups and
other activists alleged that the Government gerrymandered electoral
districts in 2002 to provide for a progovernment, mostly Sunni majority
in the Council of Representatives.
Political tensions flared in the weeks preceding the October 23
balloting, largely given the Government's arrests of more than 200 Shia
men it accused of inciting or involvement in, the street violence.
Those arrested included some, but not all, of the leaders of two
fringe, rejectionist groups, Haq and Wafa', which had called for a
boycott of the elections. The Government charged 23 of those arrested
with involvement in a ``terror network'' pursuant to the 2006
counterterrorism law (see section 1.e.). The electoral process was also
marred by the Government's banning of the two main opposition parties'
Web sites and newsletters. The Government did not allow international
observers to monitor the elections.
The Government did not allow the formation of political parties;
however, more than a dozen political societies, which operated somewhat
like political parties, chose candidates for parliamentary and
municipal elections, campaigned for political office, developed
political platforms, held internal elections, and hosted political
gatherings. Political societies were highly critical of provisions in
the law requiring them to notify the Government before contacting
political groups abroad. The law prohibits civil society groups from
engaging in political matters.
The newly elected Council of Representatives includes one woman,
who previously won election as an independent in 2006. Only one of the
major political societies fielded female candidates for the Council of
Representatives. An independent female candidate won a seat on a
municipal council. The newly appointed Shura Council contains 11 women.
Two women served as cabinet ministers, five women sat as judges in the
criminal courts, and one was a judge in the Constitutional Court.
Shia and Sunni citizens have equal rights before the law; however,
Sunnis dominated political life, although Shia comprised the majority
of the citizen population. Government and societal discrimination
against the Shia population remained a problem. Sunnis received
preference for employment in sensitive government positions and in the
managerial ranks of the civil service. The defense and internal
security forces were also predominantly Sunni, and few Shia members
attained high-ranking positions. There were 18 representatives of the
mainstream Shia political society, Al-Wifaq, in the elected Council of
Representatives. The appointed Shura Council included 19 Shia members,
including the speaker, as well as one Jewish member and one Christian
member. Five of the 25 cabinet ministers were Shia, including one of
four deputy prime ministers. The Jafaari Sharia Court consisted of 13
Shia scholars.
Section 4. Official Corruption and Government Transparency
The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption;
however, the Government did not implement the law effectively, and some
officials reportedly engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.
Significant areas of government activity, including the security
services, continued to lack transparency. The press reported that, in a
number of cases, authorities jailed or fined law enforcement officials
for misconduct, most often for accepting bribes. An anticorruption unit
was established in the Ministry of Interior; however, the Government
did not announce any related investigations. The law does not require
government officials to provide financial disclosures, nor does it
provide citizens access to government-held information.
In response to a bipartisan parliamentary inquiry into alleged
illegal or improper sales of public property worth billions of dollars,
the Government formed an interministerial committee to investigate the
matter.
The National Audit Bureau's annual report resulted in the formation
of two parliamentary investigation committees, one of which studied
problems affecting Gulf Air, the other of which investigated problems
at Mumtalakt, the sovereign wealth fund. No prosecutions arose from the
findings of these committees.
In June 2009 the high criminal court found the former chief
executive officer of the quasigovernmental housing bank for trade and
finance guilty of embezzling 1.5 million dinars (four million dollars)
and sentenced him to 10 years' imprisonment. The ruling was the first
guilty verdict in a major corruption case in many years. An appeal was
pending at year's end.
In June 2009 authorities charged the executive director of the
Bahrain Institute for Political Development (BIPD) and two other BIPD
officials with fraud and embezzlement. The case remained pending at
year's end.
On November 9, a court issued a verdict in the corruption case
against two former managers of Alba, an aluminum firm majority-owned by
the Government's sovereign wealth fund, sentencing the men to seven
years' imprisonment and imposing large fines. The two former managers
appealed the verdict; a hearing was scheduled for January 2011.
Activists alleged that the men were scapegoats for more senior Alba and
government officials who engaged in illegal and corrupt activity.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Restrictions on freedom of association and expression and increased
government scrutiny and harassment during the year hindered
investigation and public criticism of the Government's human rights
policies; however, local and international NGOs continued to publish
reports on human rights.
In September the Government effectively shuttered BHRS, a prominent
human rights NGO (see section 2.b.). The Government also exerted
considerable pressure on other NGOs to stymie their activities.
Several women's rights NGOs, notably the Bahrain Women's
Association (BWA), the Bahrain Women's Union, and the Young Ladies
Society, advocated for enhanced political, economic, and social rights
for women and girls. In July police officers questioned two BWA
volunteers after they were interviewed by Al Jazeera.
The Migrant Workers Protection Society (MWPS) provided protection
services for at-risk migrant workers, including operating a small
shelter for runaway female domestic workers, and advocated for domestic
workers' rights, which are not protected by current labor laws.
According to local and international NGOs, a senior official in the
Ministry of Social Development threatened to take administrative action
against MWPS after a domestic employee working for the official sought
refuge in the society's shelter.
The Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR), which the Government
officially dissolved in 2004, continued to issue reports and had strong
ties to international human rights NGOs. The BCHR occasionally
coordinated its activities with leaders of political rejectionist
groups. On August 16, the Government arrested one of the BCHR's board
members, Mohamed Saeed, a dentist, and charged him with involvement in
a ``terror network'' (see section 1.e.). The case was pending at year's
end. On September 4, the Government-run Bahrain News Agency, together
with progovernment newspapers, temporarily labeled BCHR president
Nabeel Rajab a ``terrorist,'' and on September 27, authorities
prevented Rajab from leaving the country. He was permitted to travel
two weeks later.
On April 5, a court fined the head of the Bahrain Youth Human
Rights Society (BYHRS) 500 dinars ($1,325) for operating an
unregistered NGO. According to the BYHRS, the Ministry of Social
Development did not respond to the group's request to register as an
NGO.
The Government-aligned Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society (BHRWS),
headed by a former Shura Council member, undertook a number of advocacy
campaigns during the year, including highlighting abuses against
foreign workers and organizing an elections monitoring initiative.
The Government generally welcomed visits by representatives of
international human rights organizations. Representatives of HRW and
Amnesty International had multiple meetings with government ministers
and other senior officials. Other international NGOs, such as Front
Line, met with senior government officials. However, journalists with
close ties to senior government officials repeatedly attacked
representatives of international human rights organizations. On at
least two occasions in September and October, a progovernment newspaper
published a series of articles attacking HRW representatives.
In April and September, the Government barred two representatives
of a foreign NGO working on institution-building and civil society
strengthening from entering the country.
The UN Development Program (UNDP) maintained an office in the
country, and it advised the Government on developing mechanisms to
encourage respect for human rights. The Government welcomed visits by
both the UN high commissioner for human rights and the UNDP
administrator.
On April 25, the king appointed the 23 members of the National
Human Rights Institution, a government-backed commission created by
royal order in December 2009. Many of the members are government
employees and former or current members of the Shura Council. The
institution's chairman, Salman Kamalaldine, a former BHRS leader,
resigned in September to protest the institution's failure to address
allegations of mistreatment of detainees arrested during the August and
September government reaction to demonstrations. National Human Rights
Institution members staunchly defended the Government's human rights
record in public fora, both domestically and internationally.
Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
The constitution provides for equality, equal opportunity, and the
right to medical care, welfare, education, property, capital, and work
for all citizens. These rights were protected unevenly, depending on an
individual's social status, sect, or gender. The law deprives foreign
workers, who make up approximately half the population, of many
fundamental legal, social, and economic rights.
Women.--Rape is illegal; however, the law does not address spousal
rape. The press reported cases of men arrested for the crime, including
a few cases in which fathers of rape victims sought lighter sentences
for perpetrators. There were numerous reports of employers raping
female domestic workers, but most victims did not seek legal redress
since local courts require witnesses to prove guilt for such assaults.
No government policies or laws explicitly addressed domestic
violence. Human rights organizations alleged that spousal abuse of
women was widespread, particularly in poorer communities. Women rarely
sought legal redress for violence, and there was little public
attention devoted to the problem. The Batelco Care Center for Family
Violence continued to offer free medical, psychological, legal, and
social assistance to victims of violence, primarily women and children.
It also operated an abuse hotline that recorded 206 cases from June to
November.
The law prohibits sexual harassment, but it remained a widespread
problem for women, especially foreigners employed as domestic workers
and in other low-level service jobs. The press reported a number of
cases of men arrested for sexually harassing women. Article 350
stipulates penalties of imprisonment of up to one year or a fine of 100
dinars ($265) for committing an ``act of indecency with a female.''
Reproductive health services, including birth control and maternity
care, were available without charge to all women. According to the
Ministry of Health, maternal mortality was 9.5 per 1,000 births. The UN
Population Fund estimated that the maternal mortality ratio in 2008 was
19 per 100,000 live births. Health centers required women to obtain
spousal consent in order to undergo sterilization; however, this
consent requirement did not apply to provisions of other family
planning services. There was no information as to whether women receive
equal diagnosis and treatment for sexually transmitted infections,
including HIV.
Women faced discrimination under the law. A woman cannot transmit
nationality to her spouse or children. Women have the right to initiate
divorce; however, religious courts may refuse the request. In divorce
cases, the courts routinely granted mothers custody of daughters
younger than age nine and sons younger than age seven. Custody usually
reverted to the father once the children reached those ages. Regardless
of custody decisions, the father retained guardianship, or the right to
make all legal decisions for the child, until the child reached the age
of 21. A noncitizen woman automatically loses custody of her children
if she divorces their citizen father without just cause.
Women may own and inherit property and represent themselves in all
public and legal matters. In the absence of a direct male heir, Shia
women may inherit all property; however, Sunni women without a direct
male heir inherit only a portion as governed by Sharia and the brothers
or male relatives of the deceased divide the balance. In practice
better-educated families used wills and other legal maneuvers to
mitigate the negative effects of these rules.
Labor laws prohibit discrimination against women; however,
discrimination against women was systemic in the country, especially in
the workplace. There were numerous reports of employers mistreating
noncitizen women working as domestic servants. The influence of
religious traditionalists sometimes hampered women's rights. The Labor
Market Regulatory Authority stated that women constituted 20.5 percent
of the labor force, although these statistics excluded the
approximately 75,000 domestic workers, a majority of whom are women.
Children.--Citizenship is derived from one's father. Women cannot
transmit their nationality to their children; therefore, children of
some citizen mothers and noncitizen fathers are born stateless (see
section 2.d., Stateless Persons).
Government-run primary schools are segregated by gender, although
children are subject to the same curricula and textbooks. Schooling is
compulsory for children only through the age of 14, but it is provided
free of charge to citizens and legal residents through grade 12.
NGOs reported an increase in the number of child abuse cases in
recent years but were unsure whether abuse is on the rise or whether
there is greater willingness to report it. Sharia courts, not civil
courts, address crimes involving child abuse, including violence
against children. NGOs expressed concern over the lack of consistent,
written guidelines for prosecuting and punishing offenders and over the
leniency of penalties involving child abuse cases. The Be Free Center,
an associate of the Bahrain Women's Association that focuses on child
abuse awareness and prevention, dealt with 2,371 cases of child abuse
victims during the year.
From August to December, there were numerous reports that security
forces detained boys under the age of 18, including some arrested in
their homes. There were reports that boys were prosecuted and convicted
for security-related crimes, including two 12-year-old cousins who,
after four months of pretrial detention, each received six-month prison
sentences, which the Government said would be served in a juvenile
detention facility run by the Ministry of Social Development.
The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. For information on
international parental child abduction, please see the Department of
State's annual report on compliance at http://travel.state.gov/
abduction/resources/congressreport/congressreport--4308.html. as well
as country-specific information at http://travel.state.gov/abduction/
country/country--3781.html.
Anti-Semitism.--There were no reports of anti-Semitic acts in the
country.
Trafficking in Persons.--For information on trafficking in persons,
please see the Department of State's annual Trafficking in Persons
Report at www.state.gov/g/tip.
Persons With Disabilities.--The law protects the rights of persons
with disabilities, and a variety of governmental, quasigovernmental,
and religious institutions are mandated to support and protect persons
with disabilities. In June the Ministry of Social Development announced
a partnership with the UN Development Program (UNDP) to develop and
implement a National Strategy for Persons with Disabilities.
New public buildings in the central municipality must include
facilities for persons with disabilities. The law does not mandate
access to nonresidential buildings for persons with disabilities.
There were no official reports of discrimination against persons
with disabilities in employment, education, or access to health care,
but according to anecdotal evidence, persons with disabilities
routinely suffered lack of access to education and employment. The one
government school for children with hearing disabilities did not
operate past the 10th grade. Certain public schools had specialized
education programs for children with learning disabilities, physical
handicaps, speech impediments, and Down syndrome, but the Government
did not fund private programs for children with disabilities who could
not find appropriate programs in public schools.
The law requires the Government to provide vocational training for
persons with disabilities who wish to work. The law also requires any
employer of more than 100 persons to hire at least 2 percent of its
employees from the Government's list of workers with disabilities;
however, the Government did not monitor compliance. The Government
placed persons with disabilities in some public-sector jobs.
There were no restrictions on participation in political and
electoral processes for persons with disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The law grants citizenship to
Arab applicants who have resided in the country for 15 years and non-
Arab applicants who have resided in the country for 25 years. There was
a lack of transparency in the naturalization process, and there were
numerous reports that the citizenship law was not applied uniformly.
For example, there were allegations that the Government allowed foreign
Sunni employees in the security services that had lived in the country
for less than 15 years to apply for citizenship. There were also
reports of Arab Shia who had resided in the country for more than 15
years and non-Arab foreign residents who had resided more than 25 years
who had not been granted citizenship.
Although the Government asserted that the labor code for the
private sector applies to all workers, the International Labor
Organization and international NGOs have noted that, in practice,
nonnational migrant workers faced discrimination in the workplace.
In March 2009 a Sunni Pakistani civilian, Mohammed Riyadh, died of
burns he suffered after rioters firebombed his vehicle. Due to his
ethnicity, attackers assumed the victim was an undercover police
officer monitoring activity in the village. On July 5, seven Shia men,
who had been charged under the counterterrorism law, were sentenced to
life imprisonment for their role in the death.
Societal Abuses, Discrimination, and Acts of Violence Based on
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.--The law does not criminalize
homosexual relationships between consenting adults at least 21 years of
age; however, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender activities were
not socially accepted, and discrimination was common.
Other Societal Violence or Discrimination.--The media reported few
cases of HIV/AIDS. There were no reports of societal violence or
discrimination based on persons with HIV/AIDS. The Government mandated
screening of newly arrived migrant workers for infectious diseases,
including HIV/AIDS; migrant workers found to be HIV-positive faced
deportation.
Section 7. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law grants workers, including
noncitizens, a limited right to form and join unions as long as the
union is for lawful objectives and does not disturb the fundamentals of
the religion and public order is not disturbed. Members of the military
are prohibited from joining unions. In the private sector, workers may
form unions without prior authorization. Public-sector workers may join
private sector trade unions and professional societies, but trade
unions are prohibited in the public sector. Foreign workers, excluding
domestic workers, are allowed to join unions and many do so, but they
are not allowed to engage in collective bargaining. Only one trade
union is permitted in each workplace. The Shura Council vetoed a law
that would allow more than one trade union per company. All unions must
join the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU). The law
allows for the establishment of additional federations; however, at
year's end, there were none. According to the GFBTU, approximately 18
percent of the labor force was unionized with employees from the six
major state-owned firms making up 52 percent of total trade union
membership.
The law prohibits unions from engaging in political activities,
although union officials participated in public forums regarding
workers' rights. The GFBTU did not report any government interference
in its activities.
The law states that the right to strike is a legitimate means for
workers to defend their rights and interests; however, this right was
restricted and is not available for all workers. The law prohibits
strikes in certain sectors the Government deems essential. The list of
essential services prohibited from joining unions exceeds international
standards. They include the oil, gas, education, telecommunication,
transportation, and health sectors, as well as pharmacies and bakeries.
For workers permitted to strike, the law requires a lengthy process of
conciliation followed by mandatory arbitration. Workers must approve a
strike with a two-thirds majority in a secret ballot and provide two
weeks' notification to the Ministry of Labor before conducting a
strike. There were no strikes during the year. Although government
sources held that the arbitration provision did not preempt the right
to strike, the law does not specify that a union may proceed to a
strike vote if it disagrees with the arbitrator's decision.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively; however,
foreign workers, who make up approximately 60 percent of the workforce,
are not permitted to engage in collective bargaining. Employers and the
Government are required to treat unions as independent judicial
entities.
In the private sector, the law prohibits antiunion discrimination
and employer interference in union functions. The Government generally
protected this right.
There are no special laws or exemptions from regular labor laws in
export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, including by children; however, there were
reports that such practices occurred, particularly among domestic
workers and those working in the informal sector, many of whom are not
fully protected by the legal code. There were no reports of forced or
compulsory child labor; however, there were reports of children
trafficked into the country for domestic service and sexual
exploitation.
Foreign workers, mostly from South and Southeast Asia, who made up
approximately 60 percent of the workforce (76 percent of the private-
sector workforce), were particularly vulnerable to forced labor and in
some cases were subject to withholding of passports, restrictions on
movement, contract substitution, nonpayment of wages, threats, physical
and sexual abuse. Some foreign workers arrived in the country under the
sponsorship of an employer and then switched jobs while continuing to
pay a fee to their original sponsor, which made it difficult to monitor
and control their employment.
In numerous instances, employers withheld salaries from foreign
workers for months or years and refused to grant them permission to
leave the country. The Government and the courts generally worked to
rectify abuses brought to their attention. The fear of deportation or
employer retaliation prevented many foreign workers from making
complaints to authorities.
The Government continued to conduct extensive awareness campaigns,
yet many foreign workers were unaware of their rights under the law.
The Government published pamphlets on foreign resident workers' rights
in several languages, provided manuals on these rights to local
diplomatic missions, and operated a telephone hotline for victims.
In August 2009 new rules went into effect to allow migrant foreign
workers (excluding domestic workers) to change jobs without employers'
permission, subject to certain restrictions. During the year the
Government reported that more than 7,000 workers switched employers
under the new rules.
Labor laws do not fully cover domestic workers. There were numerous
credible reports that domestic workers, especially women, were forced
to work 12- to 16-hour days, had to give their identity documents to
employers, had little time off, were malnourished, and were subject to
verbal and physical abuse, including sexual molestation and rape.
Between 30 and 40 percent of attempted suicide cases in the
Government's psychiatric hospitals were foreign domestic workers.
Also see the Department of State's annual Trafficking in Persons
Report at www.state.gov/g/tip.
d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment.--The
law prohibits child labor and establishes protections for children from
workplace exploitation, and the Government effectively enforced these
laws. Some children were believed to work in family-run businesses, but
the practice was not widespread. There were reports of children
trafficked into the country for domestic service and sexual
exploitation. Also see the Department of State's annual Trafficking in
Persons Report at www.state.gov/g/tip.
The minimum age for employment is 16 years old. The Ministry of
Labor makes rare exceptions on a case-by-case basis for juveniles
between the ages of 14 and 16 who have an urgent need to assist in
providing financial support for their families. Minors may not work in
industries the Ministry of Health deems hazardous or unhealthy,
including construction, mining, and oil refining. Minors may work no
more than six hours a day and may be present on the employment premises
no more than seven hours a day. These regulations do not apply to
family-operated businesses in which the only other employees are family
members.
According to NGOs, government labor inspectors monitored and
enforced child labor laws effectively in the industrial sector. During
the year the Ministry of Labor employed 43 labor inspectors.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum
wage. Unskilled foreign laborers in particular did not earn as much as
their home countries' guidelines suggested and were at times subject to
nonpayment of wages. The Philippines imposed a minimum wage of 80
dinars ($212) for domestic workers and required a contract signed by
the two parties and approved by the Philippines Embassy. However, in
practice many such employees were paid less than 80 dinars ($212).
The Ministry of Labor enforced the labor law and mandated
acceptable conditions of work for all adult workers except domestic
workers, including a maximum workweek of 48 hours, with special
permission required by the ministry for work in excess of 60 hours per
week. Muslims may not legally be required to work more than six hours
per day and 36 hours per week during Ramadan. Workers are entitled to
one day of rest after six consecutive days of work and to annual paid
vacations of 21 days after one year of service. Work in excess of 48
hours per week is to be paid at a rate of 25 percent above the normal
wage if conducted during the day and 50 percent if completed at night.
In practice many foreign domestic workers worked more than 60 hours per
week and did not receive overtime. The labor inspectorate conducted
periodic comprehensive inspections of private sector enterprises,
including verification of employee hours and wages.
According to NGOs, workplace safety standards were adequate, but
inspection and compliance were substandard. The Ministry of Labor set
occupational safety and health standards and sporadically enforced them
with a team of 11 engineers from multiple specialties. Inspectors had
the authority to levy fines and close worksites if employers did not
improve conditions by specified deadlines. There were reports of
employers being fined for violations. During the year the media
reported several workplace deaths owing to a combination of inadequate
safety procedures, worker ignorance of those procedures, and inadequate
safety standards for equipment. Exact figures were not available.
Particularly hazardous sectors included construction and automotive
repair.
During the year inspectors visited labor camps to verify whether
workers' accommodations met required safety and hygiene standards. In
2009 inspectors visited 1,419 labor camps, of which 126 failed the
inspection because of safety issues such as gas and electricity
problems, overcrowding, poor hygiene, and general disrepair. Inspectors
cited poor hygiene in warnings issued to 148 camps, as well as part of
their rationale for the closure of 31 camps. The inspectors were
authorized to inspect only premises that had a commercial registration;
they could not inspect private homes where most domestic workers lived
or unregistered ``private'' camps where many unskilled laborers lived.
Reports of employers and recruiting agencies beating or sexually
abusing foreign women working in domestic positions were common.
Numerous cases were reported to local embassies, the press, and police;
most victims were too intimidated to sue their employers, although they
had the right to do so. If a victim brings suit against her employer,
she cannot leave the country for the duration of the case. The Migrant
Workers Protection Society continued to support victims who took their
cases to court, but compensation to victims was reportedly low.
When a worker lodges a complaint, the Ministry of Labor opens an
investigation and often takes remedial action. The ministry reportedly
received 5,132 complaints during the year, including complaints from
domestic workers. On average there were 11 complaints from domestic
workers per month. Ministry officials stated that they were able to
resolve most of these cases through mediation. The public prosecutor
took the remaining cases for investigation. Complaints that cannot be
settled though arbitration must be referred to the court within 15
days. However, the vast majority of cases involving abused domestic
workers did not reach the Ministry of Labor or the Public Prosecution.
A ministerial decree prohibits outdoor work between the hours of
noon and 4 p.m. during July and August. The Ministry of Labor reported
it fined 36 companies each 50 to 300 dinars ($132 to $792) per worker
for allegedly violating the ban in 2009, an increase from 29 cases in
2008.
__________
EGYPT
The National Democratic Party (NDP) has governed the Arab Republic
of Egypt, which has a population of approximately 79 million, since the
party's establishment in 1978. Following parliamentary elections in
June and November that were marked by significant irregularities and
preelection restrictions, the NDP continued to dominate national
politics by maintaining an overriding majority in the popularly elected
People's Assembly and the partially elected Shura (Consultative)
Council. The Government derives its governing authority from the 1971
constitution and subsequent amendments. Executive authority resides
with the president and the cabinet. In 2005 President Hosni Mubarak won
a fifth consecutive six-year term with 88 percent of the vote in the
country's first presidential election, which was marred by low voter
turnout, charges of fraud, and government efforts to prevent opposition
candidates from participating effectively. Security forces reported to
civilian authorities.
The Government limited citizens' right to change their government
and extended a state of emergency that has been in place almost
continuously since 1967. Security forces used unwarranted lethal force
and tortured and abused prisoners and detainees, in most cases with
impunity. Prison and detention center conditions were poor. Security
forces arbitrarily arrested and detained individuals, in some cases for
political purposes, and kept them in prolonged pretrial detention. The
executive branch exercised control over and pressured the judiciary.
The Government partially restricted freedom of expression. The
Government's respect for freedoms of assembly, association, and
religion was poor, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) continued
to face restrictions. The Government killed an increased number of
African migrants trying to cross the Egyptian-Israeli border into
Israel.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--The Government did
not commit any politically motivated killings; however, security forces
committed arbitrary or unlawful killings during the year.
On June 7, according to eyewitnesses, two undercover police
investigators beat to death 27-year-old businessman Khaled Sayeed after
approaching him in an Alexandria internet cafe. A government autopsy
concluded on June 23 that Sayeed died from choking on a bag of
cannabis. The autopsy noted bodily injuries that could have resulted
from beating but asserted that these injuries did not cause the death.
On July 3, the Government charged the two investigators with cruel
treatment, torture, and wrongful arrest. A trial began July 27 and
continued at year's end.
On November 6, 19-year-old Ahmed Sha'aban disappeared in
Alexandria, and his body was discovered in a city canal on November 10.
According to NGOs, in December the public prosecutor suspended its
investigation of the family's complaint accusing police officers of
murder. One family member who viewed Sha'aban's body told an NGO it
showed signs of torture.
On November 24, during violent clashes with a large group of Coptic
Christian rioters in the Giza neighborhood of Omraniya, security forces
killed two persons and injured approximately 40, and rioters injured
approximately 20 police. According to reports the violence began when
police moved to halt construction of a church and community center the
Coptic Christians believed they had permission to build. Security
forces arrested 158 persons for participating in the riots. By year's
end the attorney general had ordered the release of all but 23 of the
detainees.
On December 7, according to NGOs, witnesses stated that Mustafa
Attia El-Sayeed fell during a police arrest over a debt dispute.
Witnesses believed the fall aggravated an existing heart condition,
causing El-Sayeed to die of a heart attack. A government autopsy
following a complaint filed by the family ruled El-Sayeed died from
natural causes.
At year's end the Government had not publicly taken action to
investigate the 2008 killing by security forces of four individuals
during violent clashes between police and protesters in Mahalla el
Kubra or the 2008 killing by Central Security Forces (CSF) of three
Bedouin tribesmen during demonstrations that followed the CSF killing
of a suspected drug smuggler.
On January 6, in the town of Naga Hammadi, men with automatic
weapons shot Coptic churchgoers after Coptic Orthodox Christmas Mass.
Seven persons were killed (six Coptic Christians and one off-duty
Muslim police officer) and 11 others wounded (nine Coptic Christians
and two Muslims). Authorities arrested three suspects; at the end of
the year, they remained in detention and were being tried in state
security court on charges of premeditated murder.
b. Disappearance.--According to the most recent UN Human Rights
Council Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances, there were 36 outstanding disappearance cases.
On August 8, two human rights NGOs filed a request that the
Government investigate the whereabouts of Mohammed Sayed Abdo Turk; his
father believed him to be in the custody of the Ministry of Interior's
State Security Investigative Services (SSIS). In July 2009 Turk
reportedly disappeared in the Damanhour area.
In 2008, according to the quasi-governmental National Council for
Human Rights (NCHR), Ahmed Ismail Al Sheikh disappeared from a prison
in Damanhour in the Delta. The Government and the prison gave the
family contradictory accounts of his whereabouts.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Article 42 of the constitution prohibits the infliction of
``physical or moral harm'' upon persons who have been arrested or
detained; however, the law fails to account for mental or psychological
abuse, abuse against persons who have not been formally accused, or
abuse occurring for reasons other than securing a confession. Police,
security personnel, and prison guards often tortured and abused
prisoners and detainees, sometimes in cases of detentions under the
Emergency Law, which authorizes incommunicado detention indefinitely,
subject to a judge's ruling. The Government rarely held security
officials accountable, and officials often operated with impunity.
Domestic and international human rights groups reported that the
SSIS, police, and other government entities continued to employ torture
to extract information or force confessions. In numerous trials
defendants alleged that police tortured them during questioning. Police
and the SSIS reportedly employed methods such as stripping and
blindfolding victims; suspending victims by the wrists and ankles in
contorted positions or from a ceiling or door frame with feet just
touching the floor; beating victims with fists, whips, metal rods, or
other objects; using electric shocks; dousing victims with cold water;
sleep deprivation; and sexual abuse, including sodomy. There was
evidence that security officials sexually assaulted some victims or
threatened to rape them or their family members. Human rights groups
reported that the lack of legally required written police records often
effectively blocked investigations.
The Government investigated torture complaints in some criminal
cases and punished some offending police officers. Courts sentenced
officers to terms of one to six years in prison and ordered officers to
pay compensation to victims in some cases. According to the most recent
government figures, in 2009 the public prosecutor referred nine cases
of cruel treatment to the criminal courts and one case to a
disciplinary tribunal; it also requested administrative sanctions in 10
cases. Of these cases, according to the Government, courts tried and
convicted one police officer for torture, acquitted another officer,
and had not ruled in two other cases in the first six months of the
year. Also in the first six months of 2009, the time period for which
the Government provided information, 16 police officers faced
disciplinary action for committing abuse or torture.
During the year human rights groups and the media documented a case
of abuse of a blogger, and cases of harassment of journalists and
bloggers who reported on controversial topics (see section 2.a.).
The Government did not investigate a February 2009 cell phone video
depicting police officers sodomizing a victim at a Cairo police station
or an August 2009 cell phone video depicting police officers torturing
an unidentified man suspended by his arms in a Port Said police
station.
On March 7 and 8, according to an NGO source, a security officer
beat Taha Abdel Tawab, a supporter of former International Atomic
Energy Association chairman and opposition political activist Mohammed
El-Baradei, in a police station in the city of Fayoum. An officer also
allegedly withheld food and deprived Abdel Tawab of medication, causing
him to be hospitalized. The public prosecutor ordered an investigation
of the officer and questioned him on March 12. By year's end
authorities had not taken further action on the case.
On April 13, according to witnesses, police beat, stripped, and
arrested activist Baha Saber during a demonstration in Cairo after he
pushed police officers to move outside a cordoned area. According to
NGO sources, police subsequently beat and sexually abused Saber in
custody. On April 14, the public prosecutor charged Saber with
resisting arrest and impeding traffic and released him the following
day. The charges remained pending at year's end.
On September 18, according to an NGO source, two police corporals
arrested Mostafa Galal El-Din Abdel Hamid and subsequently shackled and
beat him at Dar El-Salaam police station in Cairo. On September 28, the
day of Abdel Hamid's release, his family filed a complaint with the
public prosecutor, and at year's end the case was under investigation.
In July 2009, according to NGO sources, security forces used
electric shocks and sleep deprivation to torture members of an alleged
terrorist cell arrested for allegedly smuggling weapons to Gaza, among
other charges. At year's end the suspects were on trial in a state
security court.
In March 2009 a court sentenced police corporal Ahmed Antar Ibrahim
to six years' imprisonment for his 2008 assault on anti-torture
activists and doctors Magda Adly and Mona Hamed. Ibrahim had confessed
that police intelligence officer Ahmad Maklad ordered him to attack
Adly, but authorities reportedly did not investigate Maklad's role.
According to NGO sources, Ibrahim's retrial on procedural grounds began
in December 2009, and on April 4, Damanhour Criminal Court sentenced
Ibrahim to two years in prison for assault. According to NGO sources,
Ibrahim remained in prison at year's end.
In November 2009 the Alexandria Criminal Court convicted police
officer Akram Soliman of assaulting a mentally disabled man, Ragai
Sultan, and sentenced Soliman to five years in prison. On July 4, an
appeals court upheld the verdict. According to NGO sources, Soliman
remained in prison at year's end.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions.--Conditions in prisons and
detention centers remained poor, although human rights lawyers and NCHR
reported improvements. According to observers, prison cells were
overcrowded, with a lack of medical care, proper hygiene, food, clean
water, and proper ventilation. Tuberculosis was widespread; abuse was
common, especially of juveniles in adult facilities; and guards
brutalized prisoners. Provisions for temperature control, lighting,
sanitation, and basic and emergency medical care varied but were not
always adequate.
The Government did not announce any investigations into the 2008
alleged beating of detainees from the El-Mahallah demonstrations; the
2008 alleged beating of a foreign detainee; or the killing of one
prisoner and injury of 25 others during a 2008 prison riot in Assiut,
following the alleged torture of a prisoner.
Although separate prison facilities existed for men, women, and
juveniles, adults were not always separated from juveniles. Pretrial
detainees were sometimes held with convicted prisoners. The penal code
provides for reasonable access to visitors; however, according to NGO
observers, the Government sometimes prevented visitors' access to
detainees held under the Emergency Law. Prisoners were permitted
religious observance. Authorities permitted prisoners to submit
complaints to judicial authorities without censorship and to request
investigation of credible allegations of inhumane conditions; however,
NGO observers claimed that prisoners were sometimes reluctant to do so
out of fear of retribution from prison officials. Authorities rarely
investigated credible allegations of inhumane conditions.
The Government did not permit independent human rights observers to
visit prisons or other places of detention during the year, despite
repeated requests from the International Committee of the Red Cross and
other domestic and international human rights monitors. Some prisons
remained completely closed to the public. As required by law, the
public prosecutor continued to inspect all regular prisons. SSIS
detention centers were excluded from all inspections. The NCHR visited
four prisons during the year, their first visits since 2005. The NCHR
reported improved health care, food, and recreation. The NCHR
considered itself an ombudsman serving on behalf of prisoners, but
there was no official government ombudsman.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention.--The constitution prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention; however, during the year police and
security forces engaged in such practices, including continued large-
scale detentions of hundreds of individuals without charge under the
Emergency Law, which was extended in May for two years and limited to
terrorism and drug trafficking cases.
Throughout the year the Ministry of Interior awarded compensation
to members of Islamic groups who were detained without trial in the
1990s.
Role of the Police and Security Apparatus.--The Ministry of
Interior controls local police forces, which operate in large cities
and governorates; the SSIS, which conducts investigations; and the CSF,
which maintains public order. SSIS and CSF officers are responsible for
law enforcement at the national level and for providing security for
infrastructure and key domestic and foreign officials. Single-mission
law enforcement agencies, such as the Tourist and Antiquities Police
and the Antinarcotics General Administration, also work at the national
level.
The security forces operated under a central chain of command and
were considered generally effective in combating crime and terrorism
and maintaining public order. There was no systematic prosecution of
security personnel who committed human rights abuses, and impunity was
a problem. The Government failed to bring cases against police and
security force personnel following credible allegations of torture.
The UN Development Program, with government cooperation, provided
human rights training for 255 judicial and law enforcement officials
during the year.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention.--Individuals
may be arrested and detained under the Emergency Law or the penal code,
both of which give the Government broad powers.
The Emergency Law allows arrest without a warrant and detention of
an individual without charge for as long as 30 days, after which a
detainee may demand a court hearing to challenge the legality of the
detention order. A detainee may resubmit a motion for a hearing at one-
month intervals thereafter; however, there is no limit to the detention
period if a judge continues to uphold the order or if the detainee
fails to exercise the right to a hearing, and there is no possibility
of bail. Many detainees under the Emergency Law remained incommunicado
in state security detention facilities without access to family members
or to lawyers before their cases were transferred to trial, and some
faced torture in detention.
Arrests under the penal code occurred openly and with warrants
issued by a district prosecutor or judge. A prosecutor must bring
charges within 48 hours following arrest or release the suspect.
Detainees under the penal code sometimes were not informed promptly of
charges against them. Authorities may hold a suspect for a maximum of
six months while they investigate the case. There was a functioning
system of bail for persons detained under the penal code. In criminal
cases defendants have the right to counsel promptly after arrest and
access to family members at the discretion of the court. In criminal
cases the court is obligated to provide a lawyer to defendants who
cannot afford one. However, in practice defendants often faced
obstacles and were unable to secure regular access to lawyers or family
visits.
The Government continued to rely on the penal code for the majority
of criminal investigations and prosecutions. In recent years
authorities detained thousands of persons administratively under the
Emergency Law on suspicion of terrorism or engaging in prohibited
political activity. The Human Rights Association for the Assistance of
Prisoners (HRAAP) estimated that the Government continued to hold
between 3,000 and 4,000 persons in administrative detention without
charge or trial under the Emergency Law; most of those detained were
members of Islamic extremist groups arrested in the 1990s.
In August the Government detained between 50 and 100 ``April 6''
activists involved in protests against power shortages and efforts to
collect signatures for a petition calling for political reforms in the
name of Mohammed El-Baradei. The Government released all the activists
within 48 hours.
In August the Government detained Emad El-Kebir for allegedly
participating in a street brawl and charged him with offenses falling
under the penal code's terrorism statutes. A state security court
acquitted El-Kebir on December 19, and he was released from prison on
December 21. El-Kebir was the victim in a high-profile police abuse
case for which a court sentenced two police officers to prison
sentences in 2007.
On September 14, the Government detained an activist in the
opposition Democratic Front Party and released him within 48 hours.
According to observers, security forces questioned him about his
political activities, including support for Mohammed El-Baradei.
Authorities released approximately 240 Bedouin during the year,
while approximately 60 remained in detention.
During the year there were cases of pretrial detention exceeding
legal limits. Failure to implement judicial rulings regarding the
release of detainees remained a problem.
Amnesty.--On July 23, President Mubarak ordered the release of
3,525 prisoners on the country's national day.
On October 6, President Mubarak issued a decree ordering the
partial pardon and permanent release of 409 prisoners on the occasion
of the holiday commemorating the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, but in practice the judiciary was subject to
executive influence and corruption. The constitution provides for the
independence and immunity of judges and forbids interference by other
authorities in the exercise of their judicial functions. The Government
generally respected judicial independence in nonpolitical cases in
civilian courts. The Government ignored court orders to halt
parliamentary elections pending reinstatement of some candidates banned
by the High Electoral Commission. State security courts constituted
under the Emergency Law share jurisdiction with military courts over
crimes affecting national security. State security courts were not
independent, as the Emergency Law stipulates that all state security
court verdicts are subject to the president's review and allows the
president to modify sentences handed down by the judges. The Emergency
Law also allows the president to replace two of an emergency court's
three civilian judges with military judges. The president may refer
criminal cases to state security or military courts, where the accused
does not receive most of the constitutional protections of the civilian
judicial system. The Government continued to use the Emergency Law to
try nonsecurity cases in these courts and to restrict many other basic
rights.
The president can appoint civilian judges to emergency courts upon
the recommendation of the minister of justice or military judges upon
the recommendation of the minister of defense. Military courts were
established under the code of military justice law 25 of 1966. Under
the code of military justice, the president can refer civilians to
military courts for certain offenses in the penal code, such as acts
harmful to the security of the Government or deliberate destruction of
property to harm national security. A 2007 amendment to the law
includes an appeal mechanism for military court verdicts, which lawyers
were sometimes able to use to bring cases on behalf of their clients.
Military verdicts were subject to review by other military judges and
confirmation by the president, who in practice usually delegated the
review function to a senior military officer. Defense attorneys claimed
that they were not given sufficient time to prepare and that military
judges tended to rush cases involving large numbers of defendants. In
June parliament amended the code of military justice to grant military
courts jurisdiction over workers in military factories. In August a
military court ruled on a case involving workers in a military
production factory (see section 7.e.).
According to information from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) website
in October, MB second deputy chairman Khairat El Shater and one other
MB member remained in a military prison. In 2008 a closed military
tribunal had sentenced El Shater and his other civilian colleagues,
seven in absentia, to prison terms ranging from three to 10 years on
charges of money laundering. In November 2009 the Supreme Military
Appeals Court rejected their motion contesting their transfer to a
military tribunal.
Trial Procedures.--Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence.
There are no juries. Trials are usually public; however, observers
needed government permission to attend court sessions. Human rights
activists were generally able to attend trials in civilian courts but
were excluded from most military trials. Defendants have the right to
counsel in civilian courts, and the Government provides a lawyer at the
state's expense if the defendant does not have counsel; however,
detainees in certain high-security prisons continued to allege that
they were denied access to counsel or that such access was delayed
until trial, thus denying them time to prepare an adequate defense.
Defendants in military courts also have the right to counsel, but
lawyers complained they did not have full access to their clients. The
law allows defendants to be present, question witnesses against them,
and present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf. The law
provides defendants and their attorneys the right to access government-
held evidence against them.
In civilian courts defendants have the right of appeal up to the
Court of Cassation. Sentences by military courts and death sentences in
civilian criminal courts are subject to confirmation by the president.
The president may alter or annul a decision of an emergency court,
including a decision to release a defendant.
Political Prisoners and Detainees.--HRAAP estimated that the
Government continued to hold between 3,000 and 4,000 persons in
administrative detention without charge or trial under the Emergency
Law; most of those detained were members of Islamic extremist groups
arrested in the 1990s (see section 1.d.). The Government held
detainees, including many MB activists, for several weeks to several
months or longer and did not permit international humanitarian
organizations access to political prisoners.
According to the Muslim Brotherhood's website, the Government
arrested and detained 6,001 MB members during the year, mostly without
formal charge or trial. According to public MB statements, the
Government released most of these detainees soon after their
detentions. According to public statements by the MB, approximately 702
of their leaders and members remained in prison at year's end.
According to press reports on November 25, MB lawyer Abdel Monem Abdel
Maqsoud announced that authorities arrested 1,400 MB members in advance
of the November 28 parliamentary elections, including 1,206 following
the MB's October announcement that it would participate in
parliamentary elections. According to the same press report,
authorities released 700 MB activists following the elections; those
remaining in detention had been charged for violations of the
prohibition of the use of religion in politics. Maqsoud also claimed
that a court convicted and sentenced 18 MB activists for using the
political slogan ``Islam is the solution'' and that appeal processes in
these cases continued at year's end.
On February 8, the Government detained 15 MB members, including
three members of the group's senior administrative body the Guidance
Bureau (GB), for belonging to a banned organization, damaging ``social
peace,'' and forming an underground organization that it claimed
planned militant activity. On April 4, 13 members of the group were
released. On April 7, the Government released two of the GB members,
Mahmoud Ezzat and Essam El Eryan. On May 13, the Government released
the last detainee, Osama Nasr.
On March 27, the Government arrested ``April 6'' activist Tareq
Khadr after he urged students in Alexandria to sign a petition calling
for political reforms in the name of Mohammed El-Baradei. The
Government detained Khadr without charge under the Emergency Law before
releasing him on June 11.
Approximately 20 members of the prohibited Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami
(Islamic Liberation Party) remained in prison at year's end. In 2004
the Supreme State Security Emergency Court convicted 26 men linked to
Hizb al-Tahrir for belonging to a prohibited organization. Several of
the defendants, including three British citizens, alleged they were
tortured to compel them to sign confessions.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies.--Individuals had access to
civil courts for lawsuits relating to human rights violations and filed
such lawsuits; however, the courts were not entirely independent,
especially in politically high-profile cases.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The constitution provides for the privacy of the home,
correspondence, telephone calls, and other means of communication;
however, the Emergency Law suspends the constitutional provisions
regarding the right to privacy, and the Government used the Emergency
Law to limit these rights. Furthermore, authorities in terrorism cases
may disregard constitutional protections of privacy of communications
and personal residences.
Under the law, police must obtain warrants or court orders before
undertaking searches and wiretaps, but some human rights observers
alleged that the Government routinely violated the law. Police officers
who conducted searches without proper warrants were subject to criminal
penalties, although courts seldom imposed such penalties. The Emergency
Law empowers the Government to place wiretaps, intercept mail, and
search persons or places without warrants. Security agencies frequently
placed political activists, suspected subversives, journalists,
foreigners, and writers under surveillance, screened their
correspondence (especially international mail), searched them and their
homes, and confiscated personal property.
On March 6, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), security
officers entered and searched the home of Maha el-Khadrawy, a member of
the ``April 6'' opposition group.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government partially
restricted these rights in practice through harassment, censorship, and
arrests and detentions, sometimes under the Emergency Law and in other
instances under provisions of the penal code that prohibit incitement
or discrimination.
Many citizens and journalists openly expressed their views on a
wide range of political and social issues, including presidential
succession and President Mubarak's health. There was vigorous criticism
of senior government officials and policies, including direct criticism
of the president, in the independent press, on satellite television,
and on blogs. During the year a number of opposition political
activists, journalists, and NGOs continued to advocate for political
reform and openly criticized the Government. Government actions--
including arrests, wide-scale detentions of MB members, harassment of
independent journalists and activists, and government restrictions on
civil society organizations--led many observers to charge that the
Government sought to curtail criticism and activism.
The penal code and the press and publications law govern press
issues. The constitution restricts ownership of newspapers to public or
private legal entities, corporate bodies, and political parties. There
were numerous restrictions on legal entities seeking to establish
newspapers, including a limit of 10 percent ownership by any
individual; the Government apparently enforced this limit unevenly. The
Government owned stock in the three largest daily newspapers, which
generally followed the Government line, and the president appointed
their top editors. However, in some cases writers in progovernment
newspapers criticized the Government's handling of the People's
Assembly elections. The Government also controlled the licensing,
printing, and distribution of newspapers, including independent papers
and those of opposition political parties that frequently criticized
the Government and gave greater prominence to human rights abuses than
state-run newspapers.
In September, according to observers, a Cairo studio cancelled the
contract of the Saudi-owned channel Orbit for late rent payment,
resulting in the cancellation of the talk show Cairo Today hosted by
prominent host Amr Adeeb, which was generally critical of the
Government. Observers asserted that the cancellations were politically
motivated.
On October 4, according to multiple observers, Al-Sayeed Al-Bedawy,
owner of the independent newspaper Al-Dostour and president of the
opposition Wafd party, forced editor in chief and prominent government
critic Ibrahim Eissa to leave the paper. Observers asserted Al-Bedawy
forced Eissa to leave the paper for political reasons. Eissa continued
to write critically in the separate, online newspaper Al-Dostour Al-
Asli. In mid-September the private satellite television station ONTV
cancelled Eissa's talk show.
The Ministry of Information owned and operated all ground-based
domestic television and radio stations.
The Government detained journalists and one writer and harassed
others during the year.
On April 3, the Government briefly detained publisher and blogger
Ahmed Mahanna in Cairo and confiscated copies of a book he had
published entitled, El-Baradei: Dream of a Peaceful Revolution.
On July 18, independent newspaper Sawt Al-Uma's editor in chief
Wael Ibrashy and journalist Samar El-Dowe went on trial in a suit filed
by Minister of Finance Youssef Boutros-Ghali for allegedly urging
citizens ``not to follow the law'' in two January articles criticizing
the country's new real estate tax. The trial continued at year's end.
On November 19 in Alexandria, the Government arrested Youssef
Shaban, a journalist from the independent e-newspaper Al-Badeel Al-
Gadid, on drug charges and detained him for nine days before releasing
him on November 28. NGO observers asserted the arrest was retribution
for the journalist's coverage of a demonstration against housing
demolitions in Alexandria.
In March 2009 a court in Damanhour sentenced Al Fagr journalist
Kamal Murad to six months' imprisonment and fined him 100 pounds ($17)
for allegedly insulting a police officer in Rahmaniyah in 2008. In July
2009 a Damanhour appeals court overturned the prison sentence but
increased the fine to 200 pounds ($34). Authorities did not investigate
the alleged police assault on Murad.
During the year opposition party and other independent newspapers
published articles critical of the president and foreign heads of state
generally without being charged or harassed. Government officials and
private individuals filed politically and nonpolitically motivated
suits against journalists under the portion of the press and
publication law that forbids malicious and unsubstantiated reporting.
Under the law an editor in chief could be considered criminally
responsible for libel contained in any portion of a newspaper, and
journalists faced fines of as much as 20,000 pounds ($3,426) and
sentences as long as five years in prison for criticizing foreign
leaders or the president. According to the Moltaqa Forum for
Development and Human Rights Dialogue, there were 68 lawsuits against
24 journalists during the year. At year's end, according to a domestic
NGO, approximately 70 defamation suits, some of which were political in
nature, were pending against the leading independent newspaper, Al-
Masry Al-Youm.
On November 20, the defamation trial of journalist and activist
Hamdy Qandil began in Giza Criminal Court. Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit
sued Qandil for alleged defamation in a May article in the independent
daily newspaper Al-Sherouq that criticized the minister's performance.
At year's end the trial continued.
On February 2, courts in Giza sentenced independent newspaper
editor Yasser Barakat to two six-month prison sentences and fines of
20,000 pounds ($3,426) and 40,000 ($6,852) for defaming member of
parliament Mustafa Bakry in two 2008 newspaper articles criticizing
Bakry's business dealings and his relations with foreign governments.
At year's end Barakat remained free pending an appeal. In 2009 police
imprisoned Barakat for approximately five days after a court found him
guilty in a similar case. The prosecutor ordered him released pending
an appeal.
In May 2009 a Cairo appeals court reversed a 2008 decision ruling
against founding chairman of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development
Studies Saad Eddin Ibrahim in a civil lawsuit by an NDP activist for
``tarnishing Egypt's image'' in a series of articles and speeches on
democracy. The appeals court also ruled that other pending civil
lawsuits against Ibrahim on similar grounds be referred to the public
prosecutor for potential investigation. Ibrahim visited the country for
the first time since he left in 2007 and spoke about political matters
in media interviews.
The Emergency Law authorizes censorship for reasons of public
safety and national security. Domestic media practiced some self-
censorship on sensitive issues such as the military and the
intelligence service due to fear of government reprisal. The Government
regularly confiscated publications by Islamists and other critics of
the state. It increasingly ceded confiscatory authority to government-
controlled Al-Azhar University, and authorities acted on the
university's recommendations to confiscate publications.
In February an appeals court upheld a fine and a ban on author
Magdy El-Shafee's graphic novel Metro. In June 2009 El-Shafee was tried
in connection with a lawsuit filed by an NDP member accusing him of
using profanity and depicting nudity in Metro. Observers believed the
suit was politically motivated due to the novel's criticism of the NDP
and the Government.
In 2008 authorities confiscated 5,000 copies of a book written by
former senior police officer Amr Afifi that discussed legal procedures
relating to interactions with police officers and explained citizens'
rights vis-a-vis security forces. Afifi subsequently fled the country
and remained abroad at year's end.
On May 19, a Cairo appeals court upheld the one-year prison
sentences handed down on January 6 and February 2 in absentia against
Abdu Maghrabi and Ihab Agami, an editor and a journalist, respectively,
from the weekly newspaper, Al-Balagh Al-Gadid for alleging that police
questioned a group of popular male actors for engaging in a gay
prostitution ring. The court also upheld the 40,000 pounds ($6,852)
fines included in the sentences. Maghrabi entered prison on May 19 and
remained in prison at year's end. Agami had not been apprehended nor
had he turned himself in by year's end.
Throughout the year the Government routinely searched imported
written material to confiscate items deemed insulting to religious
sensibilities.
On November 27, following a suit brought by an NGO, an
administrative court ordered the cancellation of an October 11
government decree to regulate bulk SMS messages. According to NGO
sources, the court ruled the Government decree violated freedom of
expression and the right to information. The Government appealed the
court's decision, and at year's end the appeal was under review.
Internet Freedom.--According to 2009 International
Telecommunication Union statistics, approximately 21 percent of the
country's inhabitants used the Internet, which the Government actively
promoted through low-cost access. According to the Government, during
the year there were more than 165,000 blogs in the country, and
approximately 20 percent of them focused on politics. On rare occasions
during the year, the Government blocked access to some websites and
monitored the Internet. According to NGO observers, the Government
blocked election-related websites belonging to the MB and an activist
group on the day of the November 28 People's Assembly election and the
December 5 run-off election. According to NGOs the Government required
Internet cafes to gather personal information of Internet users,
including names, e-mail addresses, and telephone numbers.
During the year police harassed, detained, and allegedly abused
certain bloggers and Internet activists.
On March 1, blogger Ahmed Mustafa went on trial in a military court
on charges of ``releasing military information'' for asserting on his
blog in February 2009 that the Government dismissed a student from a
military academy to create space for another student from a well-
connected family. Military police had arrested Mustafa on February 25.
On March 7, the Government dropped its case against Mustafa and
released him.
On November 29, a military court sentenced Ahmed Hassan Bassiouny
to six months in prison on charges of ``disclosing military information
without permission.'' Bassiouny had created a Facebook page to answer
questions about military service such as what documents are required
and how to fill out the documents. The Facebook page also included
patriotic messages and videos, and links to newspaper articles about
the military. Bassiouny remained in prison at year's end.
On May 6, a court acquitted blogger Wael Abbas of providing
Internet services illegally and overturned a six-month prison sentence
handed down in absentia on February 21. Observers believed the cases
were politically motivated due to Abbas' blogging, which was often
critical of the Government.
On July 22, the Government released blogger Hany Nazir, who had
been held without charge under the Emergency Law since 2008 following
his blogging about allegedly sensitive religious issues.
On July 13, the Government released blogger and activist Musad Abu
Fagr, who had been jailed since 2007 without charge under the Emergency
Law following blog posts about the difficulties faced by Sinai
Bedouins.
On November 16, authorities released blogger Karim Amer,
incarcerated since 2006; according to Amer's public statement on
November 24, prison officials beat him on three occasions during his
detention. According to Amer and NGO sources, an SSIS officer beat him
during SSIS detention between November 5 and November 16, and warned
him not to blog upon his release.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events.--The Government restricted
academic freedom through various means. It selected deans rather than
permitting the faculty to elect them, justifying the measure as a way
to combat Islamist influence on campus. Professors published articles
in academic journals covering a wide range of topics, but observers
assessed that professors practiced degrees of self-censorship regarding
commentary on sensitive issues such as the military, the security
forces, and government corruption. According to an NGO source, the
Government excluded MB-affiliated students from participating in
student elections. During the year the Government harassed students
collecting signatures endorsing Mohammed El-Baradei's political reform
petition, and students belonging to the ``April 6'' movement.
In March and April, according to an NGO source, police arrested
under the Emergency Law 10 MB-affiliated students at Menufiya
University in the Delta at parties where students sang songs supporting
the Palestinian cause. The Government released all 10 students by
September 11.
On October 3, according to an NGO source, a police officer beat and
kicked an MB-affiliated female student at Zagazig University, resulting
in slight bruises, after she refused to allow security to check her bag
while she was entering campus.
On October 9, according to an NGO source, students at Ain Shams
University in Cairo affiliated with the ``April 6'' movement, the
National Association for Change, and the MB clashed with police after
the students tried to convince others to sign Mohammed El-Baradei's
political reform petition. According to the NGO, police slightly
injured four students during the clashes.
On October 23, the Supreme Administrative Court upheld a lower
court decision to bar police from university campuses. At year's end
the Government had not implemented the ruling.
The Ministry of Culture must approve all scripts and final
productions of plays and films. The ministry censored foreign films to
be shown in theaters but was more lenient regarding the same films in
videocassette or DVD format. Government censors sometimes tried to
assure that foreign films made in the country portrayed the country in
a favorable light. During the year domestic films playing in theaters
addressed political and socioeconomic issues in a critical manner.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom of
Assembly.--The constitution provides for freedom of assembly, but the
Government restricted this right. Citizens must obtain approval from
the Ministry of Interior before holding public meetings, rallies, and
protest marches. Protests may not be held in or near places of worship,
in accord with a 2008 ministerial decree. The ministry refused to grant
permits for some political events, and the Government tightly
controlled public demonstrations, including some meetings on private
property and university campuses.
Throughout the year authorities tolerated a wide range of peaceful
demonstrations by labor activists protesting labor conditions and
government policies. However, police sometimes responded to political
demonstrations in large numbers to contain the size, location, and
effectiveness of the demonstrations, and they sometimes used excessive
force. In certain demonstrations police detained suspected organizers;
some alleged mistreatment in detention.
On January 15, the Government arrested and detained a group of
approximately 30 activists and bloggers as they arrived in Naga Hammadi
to visit the families of those killed in the January 6 sectarian
shootings. The Government released the detainees on January 16, with
charges pending related to illegal assembly.
Throughout the year police briefly detained members of the ``April
6'' movement who distributed leaflets and planned political events. On
April 6, according to bloggers and activists, police arrested
approximately 70 members of the group during a protest in downtown
Cairo. Witnesses reported several detained protesters appeared to have
been beaten by police.
On May 3, approximately 100 members of opposition groups, political
parties, and independent members of parliament demonstrated in Cairo to
demand electoral reforms and an end to the state of emergency. Security
forces encircled the demonstrators to prevent them from marching a
short distance to parliament to present their demands. When
demonstrators tried to break through the security forces, police pushed
the demonstrators back and beat some of them.
On September 21, approximately 250 demonstrators from opposition
groups and parties staged an antisuccession protest in Cairo against
President Mubarak's son Gamal. When demonstrators tried to exit an area
cordoned off for the protest, police pushed and hit some demonstrators.
Police briefly detained an estimated 15 to 40 demonstrators.
On December 12, several hundred protesters from opposition groups
and parties protested the People's Assembly election results. According
to observers police pushed and shoved protesters who tried to
demonstrate outside a cordoned area but did not make arrests.
Freedom of Association.--The constitution provides for freedom of
association; however, the Government restricted this right. The
minister of social solidarity has the authority to dissolve NGOs by
decree, and the law requires NGOs to obtain permission from the
Government before accepting foreign funds, apart from donations from
foreign governments with established development programs in the
country.
During the year the Ministry of Social Solidarity delayed or did
not grant permission for some NGOs to receive foreign funding, and in a
few cases the Government prevented NGOs from holding events, training,
meetings, and workshops in different cities. In a few cases, the
Government denied entry to foreign consultants supporting international
NGO programs.
c. Freedom of Religion.--For a complete description of religious
freedom, see the 2010 International Religious Freedom Report at
www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/rpt.
d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of
Refugees, and Stateless Persons.--The law provides for freedom of
movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and
repatriation, and the Government generally respected these rights in
practice, albeit with some notable exceptions. Citizens and foreigners
may not travel in areas of the country designated as military zones.
Males who have not completed compulsory military service may not travel
abroad or emigrate, although this restriction may be deferred or
bypassed under special but unclear circumstances. While some Bahai have
obtained national identification cards with a ``dash'' for religion,
married Bahai and their children continued to face difficulties
obtaining national identification cards because the Government does not
recognize Bahai marriages. As a result some Bahai men of draft age were
unable to establish that they have fulfilled or are exempt from
military service obligations and, therefore, faced difficulty obtaining
passports. An unmarried woman younger than 21 years old must have
permission from her father to obtain a passport and to travel, and
police reportedly required such permission for married women in
practice, although the law does not require it. Authorities
occasionally held individuals at the airport to delay or prevent
altogether their travel for what appeared to be political reasons. The
Government also used travel prohibitions to punish dissidents.
On December 28, a court revoked a travel ban imposed by the
Ministry of Interior on Christian convert Maher al-Gohary. The ministry
had reportedly denied foreign travel to al-Gohary since 2009 based on
``security concerns,'' claiming his case would be used internationally
to ``defame'' the country.
The constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government did not
use it during the year; a number of citizens remained outside the
country in self-imposed exile.
The Government did not consistently cooperate with the Office of
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees,
returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other
persons of concern.
Protection of Refugees.--The constitution includes provisions for
the granting of refugee status or asylum; however, the country has no
national legislative framework or system for granting asylum. The
Government admits refugees on the understanding that their presence in
the country is temporary and that the UNHCR assumes full responsibility
for the determination of refugee status on behalf of the Government.
In practice the Government sometimes did not provide protection
against the expulsion or forced return of refugees to countries where
their lives or freedom would be threatened on account of their race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. Compared to past years in which the Government
forcibly repatriated hundreds of Eritreans, during the year there was a
marked decrease in the number of deportations. In April the Government
tried to forcibly repatriate two Darfuris but was prevented by an
administrative court decision. In September the Government attempted to
deport two more Darfuris whose cases are still pending.
Refugees faced violence by security forces, abuse, and
discrimination.
There was a consistent flow of Eritrean, Sudanese, and other
African asylum seekers and economic migrants who attempted to migrate
through the country to Israel during the year. During the year border
police shot and killed at least 28 African migrants attempting to cross
the border into Israel and injured many more. There was no indication
the Government took action to punish border police involved in these
shootings.
There were also increased reports from asylum seekers and migrants
crossing the Sinai into Israel of extortion, rape, torture, and
killings by Bedouin smugglers in Sinai. In December press and NGO
reports alleged that smugglers were holding 250 Eritreans hostage and
torturing them to extort money from their families. Information from
asylum seekers, NGOs, and the UNHCR in Egypt corroborated accounts from
African migrants in Israel that migrants endured extortion and serious
abuse--such as beatings and being cut, burned, and deprived of water
for extended periods of time--while transiting Sinai.
Authorities arrested nearly 500 migrants during the year. Those
apprehended while attempting illegal border crossings were generally
sentenced to one year in prison and were subject to deportation
following completion of the sentence. In a small number of cases,
authorities detained unregistered asylum seekers for more than one year
without access to the UNHCR. The Government maintained that these
measures were necessary to provide for security along the border and
combat smuggling. The UNHCR did not have access to those arrested to
determine their refugee status.
Imprisoned refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants were held in
small cells with convicted criminals, where they had limited or no
access to sunlight for periods of three to five months, no access to
medical treatment, and poor food. African prisoners often faced race-
related beatings and discrimination.
Refugees continued to face limitations with regard to access to
work, education, and health services. African refugees in particular
faced SSIS harassment, restrictions on employment, poor housing,
limited access to health care and education, and societal
discrimination based on race. Iraqi refugees faced restrictions on
employment and on access to health and education services.
Representatives of stateless persons living in Cairo expressed
concern that such individuals often did not qualify for protection
under the local refugee apparatus. Stateless persons made up less than
1 percent of all registered refugees. Nearly all stateless persons,
many of whom were the children of Eritrean fathers and Ethiopian
mothers, lacked refugee status and were not considered citizens by
either of their parents' countries. They received no monetary
assistance, lacked the ability to work, and were isolated from other
members of refugee communities.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The constitution provides that citizens shall elect the president
every six years and the 518-seat People's Assembly every five years,
with 10 of the seats filled by presidential appointment. The
constitution also provides that two-thirds of the 264-member Shura
Council, the upper house of parliament, are elected and one-third are
appointed by the president. Shura Council terms are six years, with
half of the council's elected seats contested every three years. There
continued to be limitations on citizens' rights to change their
government peacefully.
Elections and Political Participation.--On November 28, the country
held elections for the People's Assembly, the lower house of
parliament. Independent media, NGOs, and domestic election observers
reported low voter turnout, widespread fraud, exclusion of accredited
monitors and candidate representatives from polling stations, lack of
independent oversight at polling stations, and interference and
intimidation by security forces. The High Electoral Commission ignored
court orders invalidating election results in some districts due to
problems with candidate registration. Citing reports of electoral fraud
in the first round, the opposition Wafd party and the MB boycotted the
second round of the elections held on December 5. Observers reported
similar instances of fraud and security intervention in the second
round of voting. Non-NDP representation in the parliament declined from
122 to 84 members, most of whom formerly belonged to the NDP. During
the preelection period, authorities arrested hundreds of opposition
activists. Political parties reported that state television refused to
provide equal air time for their political advertisements. NGOs also
reported problems with voter and candidate registration and domestic
observer accreditation. On June 1, the country held elections for the
Shura Council, the upper house of parliament, that were marked by
similar problems.
The NDP continued to dominate national politics by maintaining an
overriding majority in the People's Assembly and the Shura Council. It
also dominated local governments, mass media, labor, and the public
sector and controlled licensing of new political parties, newspapers,
and private organizations. The law prohibits political parties based on
religion (and religious slogans in political campaigns)--and the MB
remained an illegal organization; however, independent MB-affiliated
members of parliament continued to participate in parliament. In
previous years the Government refused to grant official registration to
at least 12 political parties that had filed applications. In July the
political parties committee rejected the Reform and Development Party's
application for registration.
The Government implemented a new 64-seat quota for women in the
518-seat People's Assembly. In addition to the 64 quota seats held by
women, two women won seats, and the president appointed another woman,
for a total of 67 People's Assembly seats held by women. The 264-seat
Shura Council included 12 women. Three women served among the 32
ministers in the cabinet.
There were 10 Christians (seven appointed and three elected) in the
People's Assembly, eight Christians (all appointed) in the Shura
Council, and two Christians in the cabinet. Christians, who represent 8
to 12 percent of the population, held fewer than 2 percent of the seats
in the People's Assembly and Shura Council. A Copt served as one of the
country's 28 governors in Qena. According to available information,
there were very few Christians in the upper ranks of the security
services and armed forces. No other minorities served in political or
other high-ranking positions.
Section 4. Official Corruption and Government Transparency
The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, but
the Government did not consistently and effectively implement the law,
and impunity was a problem. The media routinely reported on confirmed
cases of low-level corruption, including the fraudulent alteration of
official documents, embezzlement, and bribery and on corruption trials
of former senior government officials. The Central Agency for Auditing
and Accounting (CAA) is the Government's anticorruption body and
submits biennial reports to the People's Assembly that are not
available to the public. The CAA stations monitors at state-owned
companies to report corrupt practices. Observers did not judge the CAA
to be effective.
According to observers there was widespread petty corruption in the
police force, especially below senior levels. The Government claimed to
investigate corruption and other instances of police malfeasance using
a nontransparent internal affairs mechanism.
On February 2, former housing minister Mohammed Ibrahim Soliman
resigned from parliament following press reports that the Government
was investigating him for corruption. Independent members of parliament
filed a criminal complaint against Soliman in January 2009 for alleged
corrupt real estate deals.
In 2008 Cairo Criminal Court convicted former deputy agriculture
minister Youssef Abdel Rahman of approving the importation of banned
pesticides, harming the public interest, and receiving bribes and
sentenced him to 10 years in prison. The court sentenced 13 other
government officials to prison sentences of between six months and
seven years. On April 21, an appeals court upheld the verdicts, and the
officials were incarcerated.
There are no financial disclosure laws for public officials, nor is
there a legal framework stipulating how citizens could access
government information. In practice the Government was not generally
responsive to requests for documents regarding government activities
and did not provide reasons for its lack of responsiveness. The
Government released public statements and held press briefings for
foreign and domestic journalists. According to the Government,
ministries provided publications and pamphlets to citizens who
requested information.
In a December study by the Government, 57 percent of respondents
reported that the payment of bribes was required to obtain government
services and that corruption among civil servants had increased over
the previous year. Requests for bribes were reported most often during
interactions with police, courts, the traffic department, and officials
issuing construction permits.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Government restrictions on NGO and international organization
activities, including limits on domestic organizations' ability to
accept foreign funding, continued to limit investigation of and
reporting on human rights abuses.
Local independent human rights NGOs included the Egyptian
Organization for Human Rights, HRAAP, Arab Penal Reform Organization,
Association for Human Rights and Legal Aid, Cairo Institute for Human
Rights Studies, Egyptian Initiative on Personal Rights, Ibn Khaldun
Center, Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal
Profession, Arab Network for Human Rights Information, Nadim Center for
the Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture and Violence, Association for
Freedom of Thought and Expression, and Egyptian Center for Women's
Rights (ECWR). NGOs formed a coalition to advance their objectives
during the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of
the country and issued reports compiled by the UN Office of the High
Representative on Human Rights identifying areas of concern and making
recommendations for issues the Government should address. Internet
activists and bloggers continued to play a significant role in
publicizing information about human rights abuses. Although
unregistered organizations generally were allowed to conduct
operations, they did so in violation of the law with the prospect of
government interference or closure.
The Government did not demonstrate a consistent approach to
cooperating with human rights NGOs, sometimes harassing them or
restricting their activities. In a few cases, the Government prevented
NGOs from holding events during the year. Government officials were
selectively cooperative and responsive to some NGOs' views. Throughout
the year the Government met with a range of NGOs to discuss human
rights, including the minister of state for parliamentary and legal
affairs' meetings with NGOs in the context of the UPR process.
On September 18, a court dismissed a lawsuit filed by Judge Abdel
Fattah Murad alleging that the leaders of two prominent human rights
NGOs and a blogger defamed Murad by publicly claiming he quoted without
attribution from the work of one of the NGO leaders on Arab
governments' policies toward bloggers.
The Government generally allowed international human rights NGOs to
establish informal operations. HRW maintained an office in the country.
Other organizations, such as Amnesty International, made periodic
visits as part of their regional research program and were able to work
with domestic human rights groups. In 2008 the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs withdrew approval for the International Federation for Human
Rights to open a regional office in Cairo. At year's end the NGO was
waiting for official approval. The Government registered the American
Bar Association on October 4 and the International Foundation for
Electoral Systems on December 6. The National Democratic Institute and
the International Republican Institute, which provided technical
assistance in support of expanded political and civil rights, remained
unregistered but were able to pursue limited activities.
The Government cooperated selectively with the UN and other
international organizations. It permitted the visit of the UN special
rapporteur on trafficking in persons. In an April 21 statement issued
at the end of her visit, the special rapporteur congratulated the
Government on the April 20 adoption of a comprehensive trafficking law,
urged the Government to implement the law fully, and called for the
Government to intensify its efforts to combat human trafficking. In
December the special representative of the UN Secretary-General on the
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business
enterprises visited the country and met with government officials and
members of the business community.
According to UN information, the Government did not agree to visit
requests from six special rapporteurs and one working group. The
requests were from the special rapporteur on the independence of judges
and lawyers; the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights
defenders (requested in 2003 and renewed in 2008); the special
rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief (requested in 2005); the
special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment (requested in 1996 and 2007); the Working Group
on Arbitrary Detention (requested in 2008); the special rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions (requested in 2008);
and the UN special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism who visited
in 2009 and requested a subsequent visit. The Government agreed to a
future visit by the special rapporteur on the sale of children, child
prostitution, and child pornography (requested in 2009).
The UNDP Human Development Report on the country focused on the
challenges faced by the country's youth, noting problems such as
unemployment, poverty, and inequality of access to education and
providing recommendations for how to address them. The UN Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women issued a February 5
report welcoming some government steps and recommending action on
matters such as repealing discriminatory legislation.
The NCHR is a consultative subsidiary of the Shura Council that
monitored government abuses of human rights; it formally submitted
citizen complaints to the Government and issued reports critical of the
Government. During the week of March 14, the NCHR issued its sixth
annual report on the status of human rights in the country, covering
2009 and the beginning of the year. The report was critical of some
government practices, including restrictive legislation governing
political parties and NGOs, arbitrary deprivation of life cases,
increased sectarian tensions, MB detentions, and the use of state
security courts and military courts to try civilians. For the first
time, the report made no recommendations. In February the Shura Council
announced the new composition of the NCHR for a three-year term
beginning that month. The Shura Council appointed former chief justice
of the Court of Cassation Moqbel Shaker as the new vice president,
replacing Kamal Aboulmagd, a former minister. The People's Assembly had
a human rights committee that human rights activists deemed
ineffective.
Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
The constitution provides for equality of the sexes and equal
treatment of non-Muslims; however, aspects of the law and many
traditional practices discriminated against women and religious
minorities. The constitution prohibits discrimination based on race,
ethnic origin, language, religion, or creed, but the Government did not
effectively enforce these prohibitions.
Women.--The law prohibits rape, prescribing penalties of 15 to 25
years' imprisonment or life imprisonment for cases involving armed
abduction. The number of cases investigated was small because women
were reluctant to report rape. Spousal rape is not illegal. According
to a 2007 study by the National Center for Criminal and Social
Research, there were approximately 20,000 cases of rape annually.
Although the law does not prohibit domestic violence or spousal
abuse, provisions of law relating to assault may be applied with
accompanying penalties. However, the law requires that an assault
victim produce multiple eyewitnesses, which is a difficult condition
for a domestic abuse victim. Domestic violence continued to be a
significant problem. Several NGOs offered counseling, legal aid, and
other services to women who were victims of domestic violence. The
quasi-governmental National Council for Women (NCW) trained law
enforcement personnel and attorneys on increasing their efforts to
combat domestic violence against women. The NCW and independent NGOs
also held sessions to train women on how to report domestic violence to
attorneys and law enforcement personnel. The NCW had ombudsman
officials in their 27 offices covering all of the country's
governorates.
The law does not specifically address honor crimes, in which a man
violently assaults or kills a woman, usually a family member, because
of a perceived lack of chastity. There were no reliable statistics
regarding the extent of honor killings, but observers believed such
killings took place during the year, particularly in rural areas.
Sex tourism existed in Luxor and at beach resorts such as Sharm El-
Sheikh. Most sex tourists came from Europe and the Persian Gulf region.
There is no specific law criminalizing sexual harassment, but the
Government prosecuted sexual harassment under existing law. Sexual
harassment remained a serious problem. A 2008 ECWR survey found that 83
percent of Egyptian women and 98 percent of foreign women in the
country had been sexually harassed and that approximately half of women
surveyed faced harassment daily. In June 2009, to combat increasing
rates of sexual harassment, the Ministry of Islamic Endowments
distributed a book entitled Sexual Harassment: Its Reasons and How to
Address It to imams and preachers in all governorates. The ECWR noted
the step but criticized the book's discussion of sexual harassment,
which included blaming women for triggering harassment.
The Government did not restrict citizens' family planning
decisions. The Ministry of Health distributed contraception, provided
personnel at no cost to attend births, postpartum care to mothers and
children, and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases at no cost.
According to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women's February 5 report, maternal mortality rates decreased
from 84 per 100,000 live births in 2000 to 55 per 100,000 live births
in 2008. NGO observers reported that poor reproductive health care
contributed to the maternal mortality rate and that government family
planning information and services were not adequate to meet the needs
of the entire population. The UN Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women's February 5 report called on the
Government to strengthen access to affordable contraception throughout
the country, assure women in rural areas do not face barriers in
accessing family planning information and services, promote sex
education for adolescents, and conduct national surveys on maternal
mortality and morbidity. According to the most recent statistics from
the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
the rate of contraception use in 2005 was 59 percent. NGOs expressed
concern over lack of access to reproductive information and services
for adolescent girls.
The law provides for equality of the sexes; however, aspects of the
law and traditional practices discriminated against women.
Laws affecting marriage and personal status generally corresponded
to an individual's religion. For example, a female Muslim citizen may
not marry a non-Muslim man without risking arrest and conviction for
apostasy; under the Government's interpretation of Sharia, any children
from such a marriage could be put in the custody of a male Muslim
guardian. Khul divorce allows a Muslim woman to obtain a divorce
without her husband's consent, provided she is willing to forgo all her
financial rights, including alimony, dowry, and other benefits. The
Coptic Orthodox Church permits divorce only in specific circumstances,
such as adultery or conversion of one spouse to another religion. A
Muslim female heir receives half the amount of a male heir's
inheritance, and Christian widows of Muslims have no inheritance
rights. A sole Muslim female heir receives half her parents' estate,
with the balance going to the siblings of the parents or to the
children of the siblings if the siblings are deceased. A sole male heir
inherits his parents' entire estate. A woman's testimony is equal to
that of a man in courts dealing with all matters except for personal
status, such as marriage and divorce.
Labor laws provide for equal rates of pay for equal work for men
and women in the public sector, although this did not always happen in
practice. Educated women had employment opportunities, but social
pressure against women pursuing a career was strong. Women's rights
advocates claimed that Islamist influence and other traditional and
cultural attitudes and practices inhibited further gains. According to
the most recent government figures from 2007, women filled 19 percent
of private sector jobs, 29 percent of public sector jobs, and 22
percent of the total workforce.
On July 12, the State Council's Special Council decided to stop
hiring women in entry-level judicial positions indefinitely. A variety
of government offices promoted women's legal rights. The Ministry of
Social Solidarity operated more than 150 family counseling bureaus
nationwide to provide legal and medical services. The NCW proposed and
advocated policies to promote women's empowerment and designed
development programs to benefit women. It also provided assistance to
women facing discrimination in employment and housing, domestic
violence, sexual assault, and child custody disputes. A number of
active women's rights groups also worked to reform family law, educate
women on their legal rights, promote literacy, and combat female
genital mutilation (FGM).
Children.--Citizenship is derived through a combination of the
principles of birth within the country's territory and from one's
parents. The February Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women report welcomed a 2004 amendment that grants gender
equality regarding the transfer of Egyptian nationality to the children
of a man or a woman who marries a foreigner. The report expressed
concern that Egyptian women cannot pass their nationality to their
foreign husbands, unlike Egyptian men who have such right after two
years of marriage. The Government generally attempted to register all
births but faced resistance from citizens in some remote areas of the
country, such as the Sinai. The Government worked with NGOs in an
attempt to address this problem.
Education is compulsory, free, and universal until the ninth grade.
FGM remained a problem, but the Government addressed it seriously;
FGM rates declined from previous years. According to the most recent
government statistics, the Government received approximately 5,000
reports of FGM cases from citizens between 2005 and 2009. In 2008 the
minister of population and families stated publicly that FGM rates in
Upper Egypt were 65 percent but did not exceed 9 percent in northern
governorates. The law criminalizes FGM except in cases of medical
necessity, with penalties of three months to two years in prison or a
fine of up to 5,000 pounds ($857).
Partnering with NGOs, the Justice Ministry, and the public
prosecutor, the Ministry for Population and Families continued its
campaign to combat FGM through public outreach and encouraging the
public prosecutor to pursue prosecutions. The ministry organized
renunciation ceremonies and made announcements through the year that
certain villages were FGM-free.
Although reliable data were lacking, several NGOs, including the
Hope Village Society, ECWR, and the Alliance for Arab Women, reported
that child marriages, including temporary marriages intended to mask
prostitution, were a significant problem. In 2008, as part of the Child
Law amendments, the Government raised the legal age of marriage from 16
to 18 years old.
The Ministry of Social Solidarity offered shelters for street
children, but many children chose not to seek refuge there. The
shelters closed at night, forcing the children back onto the street.
The Ministry for Population and Families offered a hotline for street
children and abused children and a day shelter for male street children
that also provided literacy training, computer training, and health
care.
The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. For information on
international parental child abduction, please see the Department of
State's annual report on compliance at http://travel.state.gov/
abduction/resources/congressreport/congressreport--4308.html.
Anti-Semitism.--Anti-Israel sentiment is common in the media and at
times devolved into anti-Semitic rhetoric. Anti-Semitic editorial
cartoons and articles depicting demonic images of Jews and Israeli
leaders, stereotypical images of Jews along with Jewish symbols, and
comparisons of Israeli leaders with Hitler and the Nazis were published
throughout the year, particularly during and following Israeli Defense
Force killings of persons on ships carrying aid headed to Gaza in June.
The Government reportedly advised journalists and cartoonists to avoid
anti-Semitism. Government officials insisted that anti-Semitic
statements in the media were a reaction to Israeli government actions
against Palestinians and did not constitute anti-Semitism. A number of
private satellite television stations, licensed by the Government and
broadcast on government-owned Nilesat, broadcast severe anti-Semitic
programming; the programs used video and pictures of the Holocaust to
glorify it. Other programs denied or diminished the Holocaust's
existence. The Government removed 12 of these channels from Nilesat in
October. On November 27, an administrative court ordered Nilesat to
reinstate five of these stations, which Nilesat did. There were reports
of imams using anti-Semitic rhetoric in their sermons, although the
Minister of Islamic Endowments instructed imams to avoid anti-Semitism
when making anti-Israel remarks. There were no reports of anti-Semitic
violence directed toward the country's approximately 100 Jews.
On February 23, police arrested a man who threw combustible
material from a hotel facing a downtown Cairo synagogue February 21.
The material caught on fire on the street outside the synagogue but
caused no damage or injuries. According to multiple press reports, the
assailant was scheduled to go on trial in 2011.
Trafficking in Persons.--For information on trafficking in persons,
please see the Department of State's annual Trafficking in Persons
Report at www.state.gov/g/tip.
Persons With Disabilities.--The law provides that all businesses
must designate 5 percent of their positions for persons with physical
or mental disabilities; however, there are no laws prohibiting
discrimination against persons with disabilities in education, access
to health care, or the provision of other state services, nor are there
laws mandating access to buildings or transportation. Widespread
societal discrimination continued against persons with disabilities,
particularly mental disabilities, resulting in a lack of acceptance
into mainstream society. Government-operated treatment centers for
persons with disabilities, especially children, were poor.
The ministries of education and social solidarity share
responsibility for protecting rights of persons with disabilities.
Persons with disabilities rode government-owned mass transit buses free
of charge and received special subsidies to purchase household
products, wheelchairs, and prosthetic devices. Persons with
disabilities also received expeditious approval for the installation of
new telephone lines and received reductions on customs duties for
specially equipped private vehicles. The Government also worked closely
with UN agencies and other international aid donors to design job-
training programs for persons with disabilities.
Societal Abuses, Discrimination, and Acts of Violence Based on
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.--Although the law does not
explicitly criminalize homosexual acts, the law allows police to arrest
gays on charges of debauchery. In January 2009 police arrested 10 men
in Cairo on charges of debauchery. Authorities forced the men to
undergo HIV tests and anal examinations in detention. Following a court
order, police released the men in May 2009. Gays and lesbians faced
significant social stigma in society and in the workplace.
Other Societal Violence or Discrimination.--HIV-positive
individuals faced significant social stigma in society and in the
workplace.
Section 7. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law permits workers to form
unions, with several significant restrictions. All unions are required
to join one of the 23 officially recognized industrial federations to
operate, and these federations must affiliate with the Government-
affiliated Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) to be legally
recognized. The Government considers all unions that are not part of
ETUF to be operating as illegal entities. ETUF was strongly influenced
by the ruling National Democratic Party. However, the Government
allowed a number of small, independent unions--including the Real
Estate Tax Collectors Authority (RETA) union--to operate with minimal
interference. In practice there was minimal union representation in the
private sector, and most of that was found in formerly state-owned
factories that have been privatized.
According to ETUF's website, it represents more than five million
workers. ETUF influenced nomination and election procedures for trade
union officers and permitted public authorities to intervene in union
financial activities. State-owned enterprises employed most union
members, who made up approximately one-quarter of the labor force.
Workers seeking to form independent unions may face dismissal or
refusal to register. However, in 2008 the country's 52,000 public-
sector real estate tax collectors announced the formation of the RETA
union and refused to join the ETUF. The Ministry of Manpower and
Migration (MOMM) did not formally reject the RETA application for
registration, but the union continues to have uncertain legal standing
because it has not been formally recognized by the ETUF. ETUF
leadership filed a complaint with the public prosecutor against the
RETA union president in September 2009. The public prosecutor
interviewed the president but took no further action. At the same time,
ETUF formed a rival union for tax collectors and other employees of the
Ministry of Finance and has since directed funding to this
organization, rather than to RETA. Two other workers' groups--medical
technicians and teachers and school administrators--began the process
of forming independent unions during the year.
The 2003 Unified Labor Law permits peaceful strikes, but only after
an extended negotiation process and only if the strike is announced in
advance and approved by a general trade union affiliated with ETUF. In
practice strikes were rarely, if ever, approved. Nevertheless, strikes
and work stoppages occurred very frequently throughout the country.
There were somewhat fewer strikes and worker actions during the year
compared with the previous year, although workers' rights NGOs noted
that they were often larger and more effective in achieving stated
goals than in previous years. To legally call a strike, ETUF must
notify the employer and concerned administrative authority at least 10
days in advance, giving the reason for the strike and the date it would
commence. Prior to this formal notification, approval from two-thirds
majority of the ETUF-member general trade union is necessary. The law
prohibits strikes while collective bargaining agreements are in force
or during the mediation and arbitration process. The law also prohibits
strikes in a lengthy list of ``strategic or vital'' entities, at which
the interruption of work could result in disturbance of national
security or basic services, which covers the majority of workers (see
section 7.e.).
Strikes were largely peaceful, despite the presence of government
security forces at larger strikes. There was an increase in high-
profile strikes during the year, notably in the textile and steel
industries, as well as government workers such as teachers,
journalists, lawyers, and employees of the state statistical agency.
The Government generally did not interfere in strikes in either the
public or private sector, provided they did not become violent and
strikers' demands were focused on economic issues.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for collective bargaining; however, it requires tripartite
negotiations, including the employer, workers, and the Ministry of
Manpower and Migration. In practice the requirement for tripartite
negotiations was seldom followed, and workers negotiated directly with
employers. In a few cases of strikes in the private sector, the
Government reportedly involved itself in negotiations. In many cases,
such as the large state-owned textile factories in Mahalla, the
Government is the employer.
The law does not permit antiunion discrimination; however, there
were reports that such discrimination occurred in practice and that
enforcement efforts were ineffective.
Labor law and practice were the same in the approximately 10
existing export processing zones as in the rest of the country. The
International Trade Union Confederation reported that private sector
workers throughout the country, including in special economic zones,
complained of poor working conditions.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The constitution and
law prohibit forced or compulsory labor. Such practices were reportedly
rare. Also, see the Department of State's annual Trafficking in Persons
Report at www.state.gov/g/tip.
d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment.--The
law prohibits children younger than 17 years old from working in most
sectors. However, in some cases employers abused, overworked, and
generally endangered working children. The law also limits the type and
conditions of work a child younger than 18 may perform. In
nonagricultural work the minimum age for employment is 15. Provincial
governors, with the approval of the minister of education, may
authorize seasonal, often agricultural, work for children who are 13
and 14, provided that duties are not hazardous and do not interfere
with schooling. Children are prohibited from working for more than six
hours per day, and one or more breaks totaling at least one hour must
be included. Several other restrictions apply to children. They may not
work overtime, during their weekly day(s) off, between 7 p.m. and 7
a.m., or on official holidays. Children are also prohibited from
working for more than four hours without a break. Children younger than
16 are prohibited from working in 44 hazardous industries, including
agricultural work involving the use of pesticides. A person convicted
of forcing children below the minimum age to work may face a prison
sentence of three to six months.
According to recent UN, NGO, and American University in Cairo
estimates, between 2.7 million and 5.5 million children worked in the
country, 70 to 80 percent in agriculture. Many of these children worked
legally, especially in agriculture. Children also worked in light
industry, as domestic workers, on construction sites, and in service
businesses such as auto repair shops. According to NGO and media
reports, the number of street children in Cairo was increasing, and
these children were at risk of being sexually exploited or forced to
beg.
The MOMM, working with the National Council for Childhood and
Motherhood and the Ministry of Interior, generally enforced child labor
laws in state-owned enterprises and formal private sector
establishments through labor inspections and supervision of factory
management, although enforcement in the informal sector was weak. As a
result of limited and inconsistent funding for inspector training and
enforcement, child labor enforcement inspectors generally operated
without specific training on child labor issues and performed these
inspections as part of their other duties. Training programs varied in
quality by governorate. When offenders were prosecuted, the fines
imposed were often as low as 500 pounds ($86) and thus had questionable
deterrent effect. Child labor in the informal sector remained
prevalent. Government efforts to address the problem focused on
collecting data to design effective intervention programs and
government support for a package of intervention programs with the
assistance of international agencies. The Government established a
national tripartite committee, which included relevant ministries,
worker and employer representatives, and NGOs to address the problem of
child labor.
According to the independent Hisham Mubarak Center, the
Government's efforts to combat child labor in the informal sector were
ineffective. The Government made progress toward eliminating the worst
forms of child labor, pursuant to the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child; however, challenges remained. The National Council for
Childhood and Motherhood worked during the year to provide working
children with social security safeguards and reduce school dropout
rates by providing families with alternative sources of income. Also,
see the Department of State's annual Trafficking in Persons Report at
www.state.gov/g/tip.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government did not set a
private sector minimum wage, although in November a court ordered the
Government to establish one. There was a public-sector minimum wage,
although it frequently did not provide a decent standard of living.
Base government pay was commonly supplemented by a complex system of
fringe benefits and bonuses that could double or triple a worker's
salary. Following the court order, the National Council on Wages
recommended a minimum wage of 400 pounds ($69) per month, which workers
argued was not enough to provide a decent standard of living, according
to press reports. Parliament had not addressed this recommendation by
year's end. According to the Government, few workers in the formal
private sector and no government workers earned less than this amount.
The National Council of Wages determined working hours for
government and public-sector employees, but there were no standards for
the private sector. The law stipulates that the maximum workweek is 48
hours. Most private-sector employees worked five days per week, usually
Sunday to Thursday. Overtime for hours worked beyond 36 hours per week
is payable at the rate of 35 percent extra for daylight hours and 70
percent extra for work performed at night. The premium for work on rest
days is 100 percent, and workers are supposed to receive 200 percent
for work on national holidays. The labor law permits overtime work in
limited circumstances; the law was enforced through labor inspections.
The MOMM sets and enforces worker health and safety standards;
enforcement and inspections were uneven. The law prohibits employers
from maintaining hazardous working conditions, and workers have the
right to remove themselves from hazardous conditions without risking
loss of employment.
On August 3, an explosion killed one worker and injured six others
at Helwan Engineering Industries military factory. Workers staged a
sit-in protest. On August 30, a military court handed down three
acquittals and five suspended sentences with 1,000 pounds ($171) fines
for stopping work, damaging factory equipment, assaulting a general,
and disclosing military secrets. In June parliament amended a law
covering military courts to grant them jurisdiction over workers in
military factories.
There were reports of employer abuse of citizen and undocumented
foreign workers, especially domestic workers. Many claims of abuse were
unsubstantiated because undocumented workers were reluctant to make
their identities public.
__________
IRAN
The Islamic Republic of Iran,\1\ with a population of approximately
77 million, is a constitutional, theocratic republic in which Shia
Muslim clergy, and political leaders vetted by the clergy, dominate the
key power structures. Government legitimacy is based on the twin
pillars of popular sovereignty--albeit restricted--and the rule of the
supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution. The current supreme leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was not directly elected but chosen by a
directly elected body of religious leaders, the Assembly of Experts, in
1989. Khamenei's writ dominates the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of government. He directly controls the armed forces
and indirectly controls internal security forces, the judiciary, and
other key institutions. The legislative branch is the popularly elected
290-seat Islamic Consultative Assembly, or Majles. The unelected 12-
member Guardian Council reviews all legislation the Majles passes to
ensure adherence to Islamic and constitutional principles; it also
screens presidential and Majles candidates for eligibility. Mahmoud
Ahmadi-Nejad, a member of the Alliance of Builders political party, was
reelected president in June 2009 in a multiparty election that was
generally considered neither free nor fair. There were numerous
instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently
of civilian control.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The United States does not have an embassy in Iran. This report
draws heavily on non-U.S. government sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Government severely limited citizens' right to peacefully
change their government through free and fair elections, and it
continued a campaign of postelection violence and intimidation. The
Government committed extrajudicial killings and executed persons for
criminal convictions as juveniles and through unfair trials, sometimes
in group executions. Security forces under the Government's control
committed acts of politically motivated violence and repression,
including torture, beatings, and rape. The Government administered
severe officially sanctioned punishments, including amputation and
flogging. Vigilante groups with ties to the Government, such as Basij
militia, also committed acts of violence. Prison conditions remained
poor. Security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained individuals,
often holding them incommunicado. Authorities held political prisoners
and continued to crack down on women's rights activists, ethnic
minority rights activists, student activists, and religious minorities.
There was little judicial independence and few fair public trials. The
Government severely restricted the right to privacy and civil liberties
including freedoms of speech and the press, assembly, association, and
movement; it placed severe restrictions on freedom of religion.
Authorities denied admission to or expelled hundreds of university
students and professors whose views were deemed unacceptable by the
regime. Official corruption and a lack of government transparency
persisted. Violence and legal and societal discrimination against
women, children, ethnic and religious minorities, and lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender persons were extant. Trafficking in persons
and incitement to anti-Semitism remained problems. The Government
severely restricted workers' rights and arrested numerous union
leaders. Child labor remained a serious problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were reports
that the Government and its agents committed multiple acts of arbitrary
or unlawful killings, and the Government made only limited attempts to
investigate killings.
There were at least two extrajudicial killings during the year, and
there were few updates or investigations into cases from previous
years.
On February 22, Yavar Khodadoust, held at Gohardasht Prison in
Karaj, reportedly died as a result of severe torture. Prison officials
reportedly warned Khodadoust's family from pursuing an investigation
into his death.
On April 30, according to multiple sources, unknown persons in Sari
Prison reportedly tortured to death Hadi Aravand, a death row prisoner,
who had been convicted of murder. Sari Prison's warden claimed that
Aravand's death was the result of suicide, but the coroner ruled that
Aravand died from suffocation with a plastic bag tied over his head and
confirmed that Aravand's arms were tied behind his back and his legs
tied together at the time of his death. Torture and bruise marks were
reportedly visible on Aravand's body, including a broken arm, wounds on
his back, and a small deep slit around his neck.
There were no updates in the June 2009 killings in separate
incidents of Amir Mirza or Taraneh Mousavi. After Basij militia
arrested Mirza and Mousavi, authorities allegedly beat and tortured
them in custody, including raping Mousavi.
There was no update in the July 2009 killing of Mohammad
Naderipour, chairman of the student chapter in former presidential
candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi's election campaign. According to Iran
Human Rights Voice (IHRV), Naderipour's body was found inside his
vehicle 48 hours after plainclothes security forces had arrested him.
The coroner determined that Naderipour's death was the result of ``a
blow by a blunt object to the back of the head.'' Authorities
reportedly demanded the family bury his body immediately, allegedly to
avoid further investigation.
In June a military court sentenced two unnamed prison officials to
death in connection with the July 2009 beating deaths of university
students and protesters Amir Javadifar, Mohammed Kamrani, and Mohsen
Rouhalamini at Kahrizak Prison; nine others were sentenced to prison
terms and lashes. The 12th was exonerated. The names and identities of
the convicted were not published. In the wake of the torture
allegations and the deaths of the three individuals, the supreme leader
shut down the prison and launched an investigation into the case. In
August Tehran Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi was suspended for his
role in the deaths and promoted to deputy prosecutor general for Iran.
There were no updates in the July 2009 death of former student
activist Alireza Davoudi who suffered a heart attack under suspicious
circumstances while in hospital care. His family said officials warned
them not to publicize his funeral. Davoudi had been expelled from
Isfahan University, reportedly for his political activities, when in
February 2009 Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) officers
allegedly arrested him in his home in Isfahan and took him into
custody. Security officials reportedly burned him with cigarettes, beat
him, and hung him from the ceiling. In April 2009 authorities released
him on bail awaiting trial, but his family hospitalized him soon
afterward due to psychological problems stemming from the alleged
torture.
There were no updates in the September 2009 case of Saeedeh
Pouraghai, whom security forces arrested for chanting ``Allahu Akbar''
(God is the greatest), considered a call to dissent, from the rooftop
of her home in Tehran. Two days later, authorities summoned Pouraghai's
mother to identify and claim her body, which reportedly had been
partially burned to hide evidence of rape and torture.
There were no updates in the November 2009 death under suspicious
circumstances of Ramin Pourandarjani, a physician who worked at
Kahrizak Prison. Officials gave conflicting reports of the cause of
Pourandarjani's death, including a heart attack and an auto accident,
before Police Chief Ismail Ahmadi Moghaddam announced that
Pourandarjani had committed suicide and that a suicide note explained
he feared charges over his alleged failure to give detainees adequate
medical treatment. Some sources accused authorities of poisoning the
26-year-old doctor to silence him. Earlier in the year, Pourandarjani
testified to a parliamentary committee that authorities told him to
list meningitis as the cause of death for Mohsen Rouhalamini (see
above), whom Pourandarjani claimed actually died as a result of
injuries inflicted during torture.
According to multiple sources, the Government executed
approximately 312 persons in summary executions during the year, many
after trials that were conducted in secret or did not adhere to basic
principles of due process. Some human rights groups reported the number
was as high as 500 but had difficulty documenting the additional cases.
Authorities did not release statistics on the implementation of death
sentences, the names of those executed, or the crimes for which they
were found guilty. Exiles and human rights monitors alleged that many
persons supposedly executed for criminal offenses such as narcotics
trafficking were actually political dissidents. The law criminalizes
dissent and applies the death penalty to offenses such as apostasy
(conversion from Islam), ``attempts against the security of the
state,'' ``outrage against high-ranking officials,'' ``enmity towards
god'' (moharebeh), and ``insults against the memory of Imam Khomeini
and against the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic.'' According to
Amnesty International (AI), an increasing number of people were charged
with moharebeh, a vaguely defined offense that carries the death
sentence. According to Philip Alston, the UN special rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, moharebeh is ``imposed
for a wide range of crimes, often fairly ill defined and generally
having some sort of political nature.'' Iran Human Rights (IHR)
reported that 38 individuals were executed for the crime of moharebeh
during the year.
On January 28, the Government hanged Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani and
Arash Rahmanipour for allegedly belonging to a military royalist group,
the Kingdom Assembly of Iran, and for plotting assassinations of
government officials. Rahmanipour was 17 at the time of the crime.
According to AI, authorities denied both men access to legal counsel
and coerced their confessions. Zamani and Rahmanipour were arrested
three months prior to the June 12 election, and they appeared in the
August 2009 ``show trials'' (see section 1.e.) with others who had been
detained during postelection protests. For this reason many
commentators believed that their execution was a warning to prevent
further protests.
On May 9, the Government hanged Kurdish activists Farrad Karmangar,
Ali Heydarian, Farhad Vakili, Shirin Alam Holi, and Mehdi Eslamian at
Evin Prison. In 2008 Karmangar received a death sentence for
``endangering national security'' based on his alleged involvement with
the Turkey-based Kurdish Workers Party. Karmangar, superintendent of
high schools in Kamayaran, was affiliated with a number of civil
society organizations, including the local teachers' union, an
environmental group, and the Human Rights Organization of Kurdistan.
According to the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran
(ICHRI), the defendants' trials lacked due process or proper evidence,
and authorities executed the individuals without prior notification to
the families and lawyers.
During the year the Government practiced public executions and
group executions. The IHR reported that the Government executed at
least 19 persons in public during the year. According to the ICHRI,
judicial authorities ordered the hanging of hundreds of individuals
inside Vakilabad Prison during the year. According to a former prisoner
of Vakilabad, most of those executed were sentenced based on drug-
related charges, and the executions were conducted dozens at a time,
most without the knowledge and presence of the lawyers and families of
those executed.
There were two reports during the year of persons executed for
crimes committed when they were minors. In addition to the execution of
Arash Rahmanipour (see above), according to IHR, in July authorities
executed a juvenile offender known only as Muhammed. Domestic human
rights lawyers reported that at least 100 juvenile offenders were on
death row at year's end, many for offenses such as homosexual conduct,
apostasy, or acts incompatible with chastity.
Adultery remained punishable by death by stoning, but there were no
reported executions by stoning during the year. The law provides that a
victim of stoning is allowed to go free if he or she escapes. It is
much more difficult for women to escape as they are buried to their
necks whereas men are buried only to their waists. According to AI, 10
women and four men were at imminent risk for death by stoning at year's
end (see section 1.e.).
There were no reports of the Government or its agents killing
demonstrators during the year; however, during the June 2009 election
protests, scores of protesters and nonprotesting bystanders were
killed, especially during antigovernment rallies. Government sources
reported the death toll at 37, opposition groups reported approximately
70 individuals died, and human rights organizations suggested as many
as 388. There were no reported arrests, charges, or investigations in
conjunction with these deaths, nor were there updates in the killing
cases of the following individuals: Sohran Arabi, Behzad Mohajer, Neda
Agha-Soltan, Mahmud Raisi Najafi, and Ashkan Sohrabi.
b. Disappearance.--There were reports of politically motivated
abductions during the year. Plainclothes officers or security officials
often seized journalists and activists without warning and detained
them incommunicado for several days or longer before permitting them to
contact family members (see section 1.d.). Families of executed
prisoners did not always receive notification of their deaths.
Sometime after January 2, according to AI, authorities arrested
Sourena Hashemi and Alireza Firouzi, students who had been expelled
from Zanjan University for their role in exposing the sexual abuse of a
female student in 2008. Their arrest was not officially acknowledged
for more than six weeks. Firouzi is a member of Human Rights Activists
in Iran (HRAI), many of whose members were arrested in the wave of
arrests of human rights defenders in March. Evin Prison authorities
released Hashemi on bail on April 4 and Firouzi on May 12.
On November 8, authorities arrested six followers of imprisoned
Ayatollah Hossein Kazemeyni Boroujerdi, who called for separation of
church and state, and on December 6, authorities reportedly detained
Mohammad Mehman Navaz, a civil engineer and supporter of imprisoned
Ayatollah Boroujerdi, in an unknown location after summoning Navaz to
the special clerical court. At year's end there was no information
about where the prisoners were held.
During the year Fayzolah Arabsorkhi, a member of the central body
of the reformist Islamic Revolution Mujahedin Organization and former
deputy minister of commerce, reappeared at Evin Prison. Sources stated
he was serving a six-year term at year's end; however, there was no
information about any trial having been held. In July 2009 unidentified
persons arrested Arabsorkhi without presenting a warrant or identifying
themselves as police. Evin Prison guards allegedly beat Arabsorkhi in
custody, necessitating a visit to the hospital. On April 10, according
to The Green Voice of Freedom Web site, authorities released Arabsorkhi
for five days on a bail of 10 million toman (approximately one million
dollars). On December 19, authorities arrested his reformist daughter
Fatemeh Arabsorkhi and released her on bail at the end of the year.
The Iranian-American Jewish Federation reported that 11 Jewish men
who disappeared in 1994 and 1997 remained missing. In 2007 witnesses
claimed they saw some of the men in Evin Prison.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The constitution and law prohibit torture, but there were
numerous credible reports that security forces and prison personnel
tortured detainees and prisoners. A February 5 study by the UN special
rapporteur on torture stated there were ``credible'' allegations that
the country's security forces committed politically motivated torture
following demonstrations in 2009.
Common methods of torture and abuse in prisons included prolonged
solitary confinement with extreme sensory deprivation (sometimes called
``white torture''), beatings, rape and sexual humiliation, long
confinement in contorted positions, kicking detainees with military
boots, hanging detainees by the arms and legs, threats of execution,
burning with cigarettes, pulling out toenails, sleep deprivation, and
severe and repeated beatings with cables or other instruments on the
back and on the soles of the feet. To intensify abuse, perpetrators
reportedly soaked prisoners before beating them with electric cables,
and there were some reports of electric shocks to sexual organs.
Prisoners also reported beatings on the ears, inducing partial or
complete deafness; blows in the area around the eyes, leading to
partial or complete blindness; and the use of poison to induce illness.
Some prison facilities, including Evin Prison in Tehran, were
notorious for cruel and prolonged torture of political opponents of the
Government. Authorities also maintained unofficial secret prisons and
detention centers outside the national prison system where abuse
reportedly occurred. The Government reportedly used white torture
especially on political prisoners, often in detention centers outside
the control of prison authorities, including Section 209 of Evin
Prison.
There were reports of deaths attributed to torture by government
security forces during the year (see section 1.a.). There were also
reports of torture of political prisoners and labor leaders during the
year, and in 2009 Ahvazi Arabs alleged that authorities tortured and
raped community activists during the year (see section 6, Minorities).
On May 18, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ),
guards at Evin Prison severely beat Kayhan columnist, blogger, and
documentary filmmaker Mohammad Nourizad, causing what the prison
physician classified as a serious head injury that affected his
eyesight. Authorities had detained Nourizad in December 2009 and
sentenced him to three and one-half years in prison and 50 lashes on
charge that included ``propaganda against the regime'' and ``insulting
the supreme leader, the president, and the head of the judiciary.'' The
CPJ sent a letter on June 9 to judiciary chief Sadeq Larijani
expressing concern regarding Nourizad's treatment in prison. On June
24, authorities released Nourizad on 300 million toman ($300,000) bail;
however, on August 20, after he published a critical letter addressed
to the supreme leader on his blog, authorities rearrested him. Nourizad
began a hunger strike on December 10 to protest the irregularities in
his trial and prison conditions. On December 16, authorities arrested
members of his family along with the wife of a reformist leader when
the families gathered outside of Evin Prison to ask about Nourizad's
health. According to the ICHRI, security officials interrogated and
verbally abused them.
On August 25, the brother of Azeri activist Youssef Soleiman
reported that prison authorities administered electric shocks and gave
psychotropic drugs to his brother. Soleiman was arrested on June 16; no
charges had been announced in his case at year's end.
During the year according to an August 3 report by the Iranian
Committee of Human Rights Reporters, interrogators in the Intelligence
Department's isolation cells tortured Ahmad Bab, an activist for
Kurdish minority rights arrested in September 2009, and demanded that
Bab admit to having connections with antigovernment groups. When Bab
refused to confess, one of the interrogators pulled three of his teeth
with pliers. Interrogators allegedly also beat Bab with a baton, tied
his limbs to the bed and pulled them until he fainted, and verbally
abused him.
During the year according to various sources, authorities at Evin
Prison tortured or abused and mistreated Mohammad Davari, who served as
presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi's chief of staff and editor in
chief of the Saham News Web site until his September 2009 arrest.
According to Karroubi's Web site, the torture was intended to force
Davari to publicly cast doubt on Karroubi's 2009 claim that
postelection prisoners had been raped.
On July 22, journalist Reza Rafei-Forushan wrote a letter to
judiciary head Ayatollah Sadegh Larijani describing his abuse in prison
and his forced confession. Authorities arrested Rafei-Forushan in June
2009 after the elections and held him for 43 days in solitary
confinement during his interrogation.
In June Supreme Leader Khamenei granted clemency to journalist and
former Ministry of Intelligence official, reformist, and former
presidential advisor Saeed Hajjarian, and authorities released him from
Evin Prison in August. During his incommunicado detention beginning in
June 2009, prison authorities reportedly interrogated Hajjarian in
direct sunlight at high temperatures and then doused him with ice
water, causing him to have heart palpitations. Since sustaining a
spinal cord injury in an assassination attempt in 2000, Hajjarian has
used a wheelchair and required a number of medications; according to
the ICHRI, authorities denied him medication and allegedly gave him
psychotropic drugs to weaken his mental state. In October 2009, after
Hajjarian's appearance in the ``show trials'' (see section 1.e.), the
Revolutionary Court of Tehran sentenced him to a five-year sentence for
inciting postelection unrest.
At year's end Ibrahim Sharifi remained outside the country. In June
2009 security personnel sexually assaulted Sharifi after his arrest for
participating in antigovernment demonstrations. In August 2009 an
unidentified man Sharifi suspected of being a government agent warned
him against testifying to a parliamentary committee about his
allegations of abuse. There was no evidence that the Government pursued
any investigation into Sharifi's abuse claim.
At year's end Maryam Sabri resided outside the country. In July
2009, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), authorities arrested Sabri
during a vigil after her photo appeared on a Web site connected to the
Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that posted pictures of
protesters and asked viewers to identify persons in the photos for
arrest. According to Sabri, prison guards raped her four times before
they released her in August 2009.
At year's end Ebrahim Mehtari resided outside the country. In
August 2009 security officers believed to be IRGC members abducted the
computer science student and political activist from his workplace and
transferred him to a location in eastern Tehran. Mehtari told HRW that
his jailers beat him severely and repeatedly and sodomized him with a
baton or stick during his detention. Passersby later found him on a
street in Tehran semiconscious, bleeding, and with his hands and feet
tied, and took him to a hospital. A physician from the medical
examiner's office, which reports to the judiciary, examined Mehtari the
next day, but when the medical examiner learned Mehtari had just been
released from detention, officials tried to destroy the report.
There were no updates in the 2008 beating case of Peyman Fatahi.
Some judicially sanctioned corporal punishment constituted cruel
and inhuman punishment, including execution by stoning (see section
1.a.), amputation for multiple-theft offenses, and lashings. According
to an October 11 report published by the semiofficial Iranian Students
News Agency, Mashad prosecutor Mahmoud Zoghi said that amputations,
which were often carried out in the presence of other prisoners, were
an increasingly common punishment. The head of the country's delegation
to the UN Human Rights Council, Mohammad Javad Larijani, told the
council during the year that the Government does not consider such
punishments torture or cruel or inhuman punishment and that they are
culturally justified.
On October 16, a judge sentenced a man convicted of robbing a
confectionary shop to have one of his hands amputated. According to
local press reports, authorities amputated his hand on October 24.
On October 23, according to state media, authorities in Yazd
amputated the hand of an unidentified man convicted of theft. According
to the ICHRI, deputy judiciary head Seyed Ebrahim Raeisi said the
amputation was ``based on the law and divine punishment'' and ``a
source of pride for us.''
On December 11, local press reported that the Supreme Court upheld
a sentence of blinding with acid for a man who blinded his lover's
husband in the same manner. At year's end there was no information as
to whether this sentence was carried out.
During the year the Government initiated limited investigations
into reports of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment; according to AI, these investigations focused more on
covering up abuses than revealing the truth or punishing those believed
responsible.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions.--Prison conditions were
poor. There were frequent water shortages and sanitation problems.
Prisoners were frequently subjected to harassment and discrimination.
Many prisoners were held in solitary confinement or were denied
adequate food or medical care as a way to force confessions.
Overcrowding was a significant problem, forcing many prisoners to sleep
on the floor. According to a June 11 statement by the Student Committee
in Defense of Political Prisoners (SCDPP), Ward 4 of Gohardasht Prison
(also known as Rajai Shahr) held more than 800 prisoners, but had a
capacity for 240,with no bathrooms and only eight toilets. Numerous
prisoners complained that authorities intentionally exposed them to
extreme cold for prolonged periods and said they lacked access to
medical care in prison. AI and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) reported
on July 16 that many prisoners have had heart attacks or other cardiac
problems in different prisons, especially Evin and Gohardasht. RSF also
noted that prison authorities refused to transfer ailing prisoners to
hospitals even when the prisoners urgently needed treatment that can
only be provided outside a prison and even when the prison doctors
themselves recommended it.
On January 13, according to IHRV, Evin Prison authorities brutally
beat Mahdi Mahmudian, a member of Mosharekat Front, who suffered from
kidney disease. Mahmudian had reportedly protested the bathroom
restrictions enforced on him.
On January 19, former commander of the Center for Expert Naval
Training Colonel Alborz Ghasemi died after spending 20 months in
confinement in an intelligence detention center and in Evin Prison.
Ghasemi suffered from stomach cancer and had been tortured; he
allegedly received minimal medical care in detention. He was originally
accused of providing intelligence to the People's Mojahedin
Organization (MEK).
As of mid-August authorities reportedly continued to refuse
hospitalization requests from two imprisoned journalists with serious
health conditions, Isa Saharkhiz, a reformist journalist held in
Gohardasht Prison, and Hangameh Shahidi (see section 2.a.). On November
11, according to a press report, Saharkhiz fainted and authorities
transferred him to a hospital to receive treatment for his heart
condition; however, he returned to prison almost immediately despite a
cardiologist's recommendations that he be released from prison.
On August 19, domestic human rights activists reported that
authorities at Karoun Prison in Ahvaz had banned Abolfazl Abedini Nasr,
a journalist and former head of a domestic human rights organization,
from leaving his cell even though Abedini Nasr was medically required
to visit the prison's clinic every three days to receive medical
treatment (see section 2.a.).
On July 26, after authorities granted him early release, student
activist Iman Sadighi (see section 1.e., Political Prisoners) reported
on conditions in Mati Kola prison in Babol: ``Fighting amongst
prisoners.was a daily occurrence. In one incident two inmates had a
fight with each other and one of them bit the other's ear off, then to
prove how dangerous he was, he chewed and swallowed the ear--you felt
that there was nothing of humanity left inside the prison. Our rooms
were infested with cockroaches. Sometimes the cockroaches would even
get in our food. At night, the cockroaches would get into our beds and
we would wake up with them crawling over our faces. To add to all this,
our blankets were infested with lice, and there were rats that came in
the cell from time to time. There are no toilets in these solitary
cells; prisoners are only ever allowed to use the toilets three times a
day. Many times they can't wait for their turn and they have to do
their toilet in the cell, which is why the solitary wing cells reek of
excrement stench.''
There were no updates, nor was there evidence of any government
investigation, in the cases of two prisoners who allegedly died due to
neglect: Karaj political prisoner Amir Hossein Heshmat Saran in
February 2009 or Evin prisoner and blogger Omid Reza Mirsayafi in March
2009 (see section 2.a., Internet Freedom).
On January 7, the parliamentary special committee investigating
reports of torture and abuse of postelection detainees in Kahrizak
Detention Center in 2009 submitted its final report, which placed
responsibility for the beating deaths of three detainees on then
prosecutor general Saeed Mortazavi. Authorities transferred Mortazavi
to head the country's task force against smuggling. On August 22,
progovernment news sources reported that authorities had also suspended
three top judicial officials at the Tehran prosecutor's office in
connection to the case. In late July 2009 Supreme Leader Khamenei
ordered Kahrizak detention center closed.
In an April 14 interview with the Iran Human Rights Documentation
Center, nongovernmental organization (NGO) activist Ali Kantoori
described conditions in two prisons, Evin and Ghezal Hesar, where he
was detained in 2008. In addition to beatings during interrogation,
solitary confinement, and harassment of family members, Kantoori said
lice infestations were common, prisoners had inadequate access to clean
water or medical care, and the prisons lacked heat and air conditioning
and had an insufficient number of bathing facilities. Guards reportedly
regularly mistreated prisoners, including forcing them to kneel during
prisoner counts. Authorities released Kantoori on bail after five
months, but in August 2009 the Sanandaj General Court sentenced him to
15 years' imprisonment. In mid-March Kantoori left the country, and he
was living outside the country as a refugee at year's end.
In June the UK-based International Center for Prison Studies
reported that more than 166,000 prisoners in the country occupied
facilities constructed to hold no more than 98,000 persons (170 percent
of official capacity). There were reports of juvenile offenders
detained with adult offenders. Pretrial detainees occasionally were
held with convicted prisoners. Political prisoners were often held in
separate prisons or wards--such as Evin Prison, especially Ward 240,
and Ward Eight of Gohardasht Prison, known as the IRGC ward--or in
isolation for long periods of time. Human rights activists and
international media also reported cases of political prisoners confined
with violent felons.
The Government did not permit independent monitoring of prison
conditions by any outside groups, including UN groups or special
rapporteurs. A parliamentary committee investigating prison conditions
paid a visit to Evin Prison in July 2009 and issued its report on
January 10. According to press reports, the committee called for a
complete investigation and blamed prosecutor Mortazavi for the rape and
torture that took place in the prison. At the same time, the committee
also blamed opposition candidates Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Houssein
Mousavi for fomenting abuse; both previously expressed concern about
sexual abuse in Evin Prison. The report claimed that reported sexual
assaults did not occur, despite the testimony of numerous witnesses.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention.--Although the constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, these practices continued
during the year.
Role of the Police and Security Apparatus.--Several agencies share
responsibility for law enforcement and maintaining order, including the
MOIS, the Law Enforcement Forces under the Interior Ministry, and the
IRGC. The Basij and informal groups known as the Ansar-e Hizballah
(Helpers of the Party of God) were aligned with extreme conservative
members of the leadership and acted as vigilantes. In October 2009 the
Government announced the merger of the Basij into the IRGC ground
forces. While some Basij units received formal training, many units
were disorganized and undisciplined. During government-led crackdowns
on demonstrations, the Basij were primarily responsible for the
violence against the protesters.
The security forces were not considered fully effective in
combating crime. Videos posted on the Internet in October documented
two stabbing murders that occurred in public spaces while police failed
to intervene.
Corruption and impunity were problems. Regular and paramilitary
security forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses, but
there were no transparent mechanisms to investigate security force
abuses and no reports of government actions to reform the abusers.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention.--The
constitution and penal code require a warrant or subpoena for an arrest
and state that an arrested person must be informed of charges within 24
hours. Authorities rarely followed these procedures in practice.
Authorities held detainees, at times incommunicado, often for weeks or
months without charge or trial, frequently denying them prompt contact
with family or timely access to legal representation. In practice there
was neither a time limit for detention nor judicial means to determine
the legality of the detention. According to the law, the state is
obligated to provide indigent defendants with attorneys only for
certain types of crimes. The courts set prohibitively high bail, even
for lesser crimes, and in many cases courts did not set bail.
Authorities often compelled detainees and their families to submit
property deeds to post bail. Prisoners released on bail did not always
know how long their property would be retained or when their trials
would be held.
The intelligence arm of the IRGC reportedly conducted arrests
during the year, sometimes without a warrant. Additionally, security
forces executed general warrants to arrest protesters or those
perceived as opponents of the Government. The use of these general
warrants precluded the need for individual warrants.
There were reports of arbitrary and false arrests during the year,
including the arrest of dozens of students and journalists in February
in anticipation of protests planned for February 11, the anniversary of
the revolution.
On February 7, authorities arrested Mahsa Jazini, a women's rights
activist and journalist with Iran Newspaper, at her home in Isfahan.
According to her attorney, charges against her included ``actions
against national security'' and ``cooperation with foreign media'';
however, Jazini reportedly said the officers who arrested her and
confiscated her personal items described her crime as ``being a
feminist.'' On March 1, authorities released her on bail for 100
million toman ($100,000).
On March 2, police arrested physician and blogger Hesam Firouzi on
unknown charges and placed him in Ward 209 of Evin Prison. Firouzi
served as physician to many political prisoners. In June judicial
authorities reportedly set his bail at 100 million toman ($100,000); it
was unknown whether he was in prison at year's end. Firouzi was
previously arrested in March 2009 and served six months of a 15-month
prison term for acting against the country's national security,
distorting public opinion, distributing lies, and giving refuge and
medical treatment to political prisoners.
On November 2, authorities arrested journalist Nazanin Khosravani
and charged her with acting against national security. There was no
information as to the basis of the charges, and Khosravani's mother
reportedly said Khosravani had not been working as a journalist for
more than a year. According to media reports, Tehran Prosecutor General
Abbas Jafari Dolatabadi warned Khosravani's mother not to conduct media
interviews if she wanted to help her daughter. At year's end Khosravani
remained in Evin Prison and had been permitted contact with her family
only once, via telephone.
There was no update in the March 2009 beating and arrest case of
Yasser Torkman, a student at Amir Kabir University and member of the
Islamic Students Organization in Tehran; authorities released Torkman
on bail in April 2009.
At year's end former government spokesman Abdollah Ramezanzadeh was
serving his six-year sentence for ``acting against national security.''
In June 2009 police arrested and seriously beat Ramezanzadeh. He spent
116 days in solitary confinement, 74 of which were incommunicado and
without charge, and then appeared at the August 2009 ``show trial''
(see section 1.e.) and was convicted in December 2009. Ramezanzadeh was
incarcerated due to a letter that he cowrote to the head of the
judiciary calling for the prosecution of IRGC officials for their role
in the June 2009 election and its aftermath.
At year's end Mohammad Mostafaei, a human rights activist who
represented the cases of many juveniles sentenced to death as well as
that of Sakineh Mohammadi-Ashtiani, a woman sentenced to stoning for
adultery, had claimed asylum in Norway. On November 11, media reported
that the Islamic Revolutionary Court sentenced Mostafaei in absentia to
six years in prison for acting against national security for discussing
Mohammadi-Ashtiani's case with foreign-based Farsi-language media. In
July and August, authorities detained Mostafaei's wife and brother- and
father-in-law in an attempt to get Mostafaei to turn himself in, and
the two men faced charges of concealing a suspect at year's end.
Mostafaei was originally arrested by plainclothes police officers in
June 2009.
On May 16, Clotilde Reiss, a French national teaching assistant
formerly employed at Isfahan University, returned to France. In July
2009 authorities arrested Reiss on charges of espionage, and she was
present at the August 2009 ``show trials'' along with French embassy
employee Nazak Afshar and British embassy employee Hossein Rassam, who
were also charged with espionage and plotting to overthrow the
Government. On October 25, an appeals court overturned Rassam's
conviction and four-year prison sentence for espionage, substituting a
one-year suspended sentence for spreading propaganda against the regime
and maintaining a five-year ban against his employment by foreign
embassies or organizations. Afshar was released in August 2009 on bail
of 500 million toman ($500,000).
At year's end, authorities released on bail of 500 million toman
($500,000) one of the U.S. citizens arrested by border guards in July
2009 on the Iran-Iraq border and permitted her to leave the country;
the other two remained in Evin Prison. Authorities held the Americans
in solitary confinement for extended periods of time during the first
months of their detention. Their trial for espionage and illegal entry
into the country was scheduled for February 6, 2011.
In November 2009, according to the ICHRI, security forces
arbitrarily arrested scores of students throughout the country in an
attempt to stifle protests expected on Students' Day, December 7. For
instance, on November 3, media reported that authorities had arrested
civil activists and student leaders Hasan Asadi Zaidabadi and Mohammad
Sadeghi. Zaidabadi was released in December 2009, and Sadeghi was
released after 40 days of detention. There was no information as to
whether the two were ever tried.
During protests in December 2009 after the death of Grand Ayatollah
Hussein-Ali Montazeri and during Ashura celebrations, the ICHRI and
IHRV reported that authorities detained between 200 and 1,000 persons,
many of whom remained in prison at year's end, some facing death
sentences. Death sentences were given to individuals who were accused
of moharebeh (see section 1.a.) for participation in Ashura Day
protests. On March 17, the ICHRI reported that Revolutionary Court
judge Abolqasem Salavati sentenced teacher Abdolreza Ghanbari to death
for moharebeh based on his participation in Ashura protests. According
to the ICHRI, Ghanbari did not have access to a fair trial nor
permission to select a lawyer for his defense. The Prosecutor's Office
requested death sentences for at least 11 other individuals arrested
during 2009 Ashura celebrations.
There were no reports of Iranian-American journalists arrested
during the year; however, in 2009 and previous years, security forces
arrested several Iranian-American journalists and academics on charges
of espionage and ``acting against national security.'' Prison
authorities subjected the activists to harsh interrogation techniques
and solitary confinement and in most cases kept them in prison for
several months. At year's end one academic was free on bail but not
permitted to depart the country.
There were no updates in the 2008 cases of Ebrahim Mirnehad or Dr.
Arash Alaei, both whom remained in prison at year's end. Authorities
sentenced Mirnahad to five years' imprisonment on charges of ``acting
against national security'' and ``spreading propaganda,'' charges that,
according to AI, stemmed from his public condemnation of his brother's
execution earlier in the year. Dr Alaei and his brother, physicians
specializing in the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, were found
guilty of ``cooperating with an enemy government.'' AI reported that
Dr. Kamiar Alaei remained in prison at year's end.
Pretrial detention was often arbitrarily lengthy, particularly in
cases involving alleged violations of national security laws.
Approximately 25 percent of prisoners held in state prison facilities
were reportedly pretrial detainees. According to HRW, a judge may
prolong detention at his discretion, and pretrial detention often
lasted for months.
The Government reportedly put individuals under house arrest
without due process in order to restrict their movement and
communication. Authorities placed former presidential candidates Mehdi
Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi under de facto house arrest during the
year. In previous years the Government used house arrest for senior
Shia religious leaders whose views regarding political and governance
issues were at variance with the ruling orthodoxy; however, there were
no new confirmed instances of this practice since 2009. Grand Ayatollah
Montazeri, the most prominent cleric under such restrictions, died in
December 2009.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--After the 1979 revolution, the
judicial system was revised to conform to an Islamic canon based on the
Qur'an, Sunna (the traditions of the Prophet), and other Islamic
sources. The constitution provides that the judiciary be ``an
independent power''; in practice the court system was corrupt and
subject to political influence. The constitution provides that the head
of the judiciary is a cleric chosen by the supreme leader. The head of
the Supreme Court and prosecutor general also must be clerics.
Islamic revolutionary courts try offenses viewed as potentially
threatening to the Islamic Republic, including threats to internal or
external security, narcotics and economic crimes, and official
corruption. A special clerical court examines alleged transgressions
within the clerical establishment, and a military court investigates
crimes connected with military or security forces. A media court hears
complaints against publishers, editors, and writers, including Internet
cases.
Trial Procedures.--Many aspects of the prerevolutionary judicial
system survive in the civil and criminal courts. According to the
constitution and criminal procedure code, a defendant has the right to
a public trial, presumption of innocence, a lawyer of his or her
choice, and the right of appeal in most cases that involve major
penalties. These rights were not respected in practice. Panels of
judges adjudicate trials; there is no jury system in the civil and
criminal courts. In the media court, a council of 11 persons selected
by the court adjudicates cases. No defendants in any court had the
right to confront their accusers, nor were they granted access to
government-held evidence. During the year human rights groups noted the
absence of procedural safeguards in criminal trials.
During the year AI, HRW, RSF, and several other human rights groups
continued to condemn trials in the revolutionary courts for
disregarding international standards of fairness. In August 2009 the UN
special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment, the special rapporteur on the situation of
human rights defenders, and the vice chairperson of the working group
on arbitrary detention expressed ``serious concern'' about the
situation of detainees in the country.
The Government often charged individuals with vague crimes such as
``antirevolutionary behavior,'' ``moral corruption,'' ``siding with
global arrogance,'' moharebeh, and ``crimes against Islam.''
Prosecutors imposed strict penalties on government critics for minor
violations. When postrevolutionary statutes did not address a
situation, the Government advised judges to give precedence to their
knowledge and interpretation of Islamic law. The head of the judiciary
chose revolutionary court judges in part due to their ideological
commitment to the system. Secret or summary trials of only five
minutes' duration frequently occurred. Other trials were deliberately
designed to publicize a coerced confession.
On February 3, a revolutionary court sentenced student activist
Mohammad Amin Valian to death in a group trial for moharabeh for
allegedly having thrown three stones and shouted ``death to the
dictator!'' during a December 2009 Ashura protest. Government officials
arrested Valian on January 12, after Damghan University's Basij student
publication published an article about him. Authorities denied repeated
requests from his family on his whereabouts, and according to ICHRI
they only said he was held in a ``special location.'' According to the
same report, he was also denied access to counsel. On May 15, an
appeals court rejected the revolutionary court decision and sentenced
him to a three-and-one-half years' imprisonment and a fine of 300,000
toman ($300). As of September authorities had granted Valian
conditional release.
At year's end the ICHRI reported that approximately 600 inmates
remained on death row in Vakilabad, with the majority convicted for
narcotics-related crimes. Some inmates reported that they had been
tortured and forced to make confessions but that judges ignored their
claims of physical coercion.
In August 2009 the Tehran Revolutionary Court convened the first of
a series of televised mass trials for more than 100 opposition
politicians and activists detained after the June 2009 election; the
opposition referred to them as show trials. Among those on trial were
senior proreform politicians, lawyers, and journalists, including
former vice president Muhammad Ali Abtahi; journalist and former
interior ministry official Muhammad Atrianfar; intellectual and
prodemocracy activist Saeed Hajjarian, reportedly tortured in detention
(see section 1.c.); filmmaker and Newsweek reporter Maziar Bahari (see
section 2.a.); an Iranian-American academic; and Mohsen Mirdamadi, the
leader of the largest reformist party, the Islamic Iran Participation
Front. The prosecution accused the defendants of fomenting a ``velvet
revolution,'' acting against national security, and having ties to
British spies. Authorities did not permit any of the defendants access
to legal counsel prior to the trial. Some of those charged read aloud
``confessions'' in which they denounced former colleagues and declared
there had been no fraud in the election. There were allegations that
several defendants, including Abtahi and opposition candidate Mousavi
supporters Mostafa Tajzadeh, Abdollah Ramezanzadeh (see section 1.d.),
and Mohsen Aminzadeh, underwent ``massive interrogation'' in Evin
Prison.
At year's end Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani awaited execution for
alleged adultery and murder while her son and lawyer remained
imprisoned. In 2006 after having already been convicted and punished
with 99 lashes for involvement in her husband's murder, a court
sentenced Ashtiani to death by stoning for adultery. According to the
NGO Women Living Under Muslim Laws, two judges declared her not guilty
based on the lack of evidence in the case, but the other three judges
found her guilty based on ``divine knowledge of the judge'' (elm-e
ghazi), a legal provision that allows judges to make a ruling in the
absence of conclusive evidence. On September 8, a Foreign Ministry
representative declared that the stoning sentence had been suspended
but suggested she might still be hanged on charges related to her
husband's murder. Human rights groups maintained that Ashtiani's
confession was coerced and decried the lack of due process in this
case. One of Ashtiani's lawyers, Mohammed Mostafaei, sought asylum in
Norway during the year (see section 1.d.).
Opposition groups continued to question the legitimacy of the
special clerical court system. The court is headed by a scholar in
Islamic law and is capable of ruling on legal matters through
independent interpretation of Islamic legal sources. Clerical courts,
which investigate alleged offenses and crimes by clerics and which the
supreme leader directly oversees, are not provided for in the
constitution, and they operated outside the domain of the judiciary.
According to a 2007 AI report, defendants could be represented only by
court-nominated clerics who are not required to be qualified lawyers.
According to the AI report, in some cases a defendant was unable to
find a cleric willing to act as defense counsel and was tried without
legal representation. Critics alleged that clerical courts were used to
prosecute clerics for expressing controversial ideas and for
participating in activities outside the sphere of religion, such as
journalism or reformist political activities.
On December 6, the special clerical court summoned Mohammad Mehman
Navaz, a supporter of Ayatollah Boroujerdi (see section 1.d.).
Political Prisoners and Detainees.--Statistics regarding the number
of citizens imprisoned for their political beliefs were not available,
but human rights activists estimated the number in the hundreds.
Approximately 500 democracy activists and journalists were in detention
in Evin Prison alone at year's end. According to opposition press
reports, the Government arrested, convicted, and executed persons on
questionable criminal charges, including drug trafficking, when their
actual offenses were reportedly political. The Government charged
members of religious minorities and others with crimes such as
``confronting the regime'' and apostasy and followed the same trial
procedures as in cases of threats to national security. During the year
the Government rounded up students, journalists, lawyers, and political
activists to silence them or prevent them from organizing protests.
Authorities occasionally gave political prisoners suspended
sentences or released them for short or extended furloughs prior to
completion of their sentences, but they could order them to return to
prison at any time. Suspended sentences often were used to silence and
intimidate individuals. The Government also controlled political
activists by temporarily suspending baseless court proceedings against
them and allowing authorities to rearrest them at any time, and it
attempted to intimidate activists by calling them in repeatedly for
questioning. The Government issued travel bans on former political
prisoners; for instance, authorities continued to prevent former
political prisoner Siamak Pourzand from leaving the country to receive
medical care and to join his wife, also a former political prisoner,
and family abroad.
Authorities routinely held political prisoners in solitary
confinement for extended periods and denied them due process and access
to legal representation. Political prisoners were also at greater risk
of torture and abuse in detention. The Government did not permit
international humanitarian organizations or UN special rapporteurs
access to political prisoners.
The Government imprisoned persons throughout the year for political
reasons (see sections 1.a. through 1.e. and section 7.a.), including
minority activists (see section 6). Human rights organizations reported
that 21 Kurdish political prisoners faced execution and 44 Baha'i
remained in prison at year's end. The Government also reportedly held
some persons in prison for years under charges of sympathizing with
terrorist groups such as the MEK.
On February 28, an appeals court upheld 10-month prison sentences
for three student activists from Babol Norshirvani University (Mohsen
Barzegar, Iman Sadighi, and Nima Nahvi) and one-year suspended
sentences for Hamid Reza Jahantigh, Hessam Bagheri, Siavash Salimi
Nejad, and Ali Taghipour. The students, most of whom were also banned
from educational institutions for one to five years, were convicted of
``actions against national security'' and ``propagation against the
regime,'' based on their alleged planning of and participation in
protests and contacts with antigovernment entities. Authorities
conditionally released Barzegar and Sadighi on July 17, but on November
9, police rearrested Barzegar at his home prior to National Students
Day, allegedly without a warrant (see section 2.b., Freedom of
Association). Nahvi remained in prison at year's end.
On May 5, Revolutionary Court Branch 28 sentenced Bahareh Hedayat,
a prominent student activist, to two years in prison for ``insulting
the supreme leader,'' six months for ``insulting the president,'' and
five years for ``actions against national security, propagation of
falsehoods, and mutiny for congregation.'' An earlier suspended
sentence of two years in prison for participating in a women's rights
protest was added to make Hedayat's total sentence nine and one-half
years in prison. In July Appellate Court Branch 24 upheld her sentence.
In late December authorities reportedly presented her with new charges
of ``disturbing public opinion'' based on a letter she wrote from
prison on National Students Day. At year's end Hedayat was serving her
sentence in Evin Prison where authorities had recently banned her
visitors ``until further notice.''
On August 8, the Supreme Court rejected Jafar Kazemi's death
sentence appeal. Authorities arrested Kazemi, an editor and publisher
of academic books at Amir Kabir University, during the 2009 election
protests and reportedly tortured him physically and psychologically
during his detention. His interrogators allegedly threatened to arrest
his wife and children if he did not confess. Kazemi was convicted of
moharebeh and sympathy with the MEK, but he pled not guilty. At year's
end Kazemi awaited execution.
On September 4, authorities summoned Nasrin Sotoudeh, a prominent
human rights lawyer and women's rights activist, to Evin Prison where
they arrested her on charges of ``propaganda against the state,'' ``a
conspiracy to disturb order,'' and cooperation with Nobel Peace Prize
laureate Shin Ebadi's Defenders of Human Rights Center (DHRC). Shortly
after her detention, Sotoudeh went on a 70-day hunger strike to protest
her treatment, including solitary confinement. On December 27,
authorities presented more charges against her, including ``not wearing
the hijab [headcovering]'' and ``not observing Islamic standards of
conduct.'' At year's end she remained in solitary confinement and
weakened from her hunger strike. During questioning, her interrogators
reportedly told her they controlled the length of her sentence, which
would be at least 10 years.
On April 20, Branch 26 of the Revolutionary Court sentenced Mahdieh
Golrou, student activist and member of the Advocacy Council for the
Right to Education, to two years and four months in prison for
association with the MEK. She began serving the sentence immediately,
along with a suspended one-year sentence for her activities related to
educational rights. In late December authorities reportedly presented
her with new charges of ``disturbing public opinion'' based on a letter
she wrote from prison on National Students Day. Golrou suffered from
intestinal problems during her continuing imprisonment in Evin Prison.
On January 26, a revolutionary court sentenced Shabnam Madadzadeh,
a member of the Islamic Association and deputy general secretary of the
student organization Tahkim Vahdat, and her brother Farzad Madadzadeh
to five years' imprisonment for moharebeh and propaganda against the
state, and in June an appeals court upheld the sentence. Their lawyer,
Mohammad Oliyaeifard, was not present as he was serving a sentence for
speaking out about another client, a juvenile executed for a murder
allegedly committed when he was 17 years old. Authorities arrested the
Madadzadehs in February 2009, and officials in Ward 209 of Evin Prison
allegedly beat and whipped Farzad in front of Shabnam to coerce her to
confess. Human rights groups reported during the year that Shabnam
suffered from digestive ailments and heart problems and that she lacked
medical care. The Madadzadehs remained in Gohardasht Prison at year's
end.
At year's end Abdolfattah Soltani, a prominent human rights lawyer
and DHRC spokesperson, continued to face a pending court case for
security-related charges, In June 2009 authorities arrested him without
a warrant and held him for 72 days without charges, including 17 days
in solitary confinement, until his release in August 2009.
On December 29, an interrogator known as ``Mahdavi'' reportedly
informed Ebrahim Yazdi's wife that authorities had transferred the
ailing former foreign minister and the secretary-general of the Freedom
Movement of Iran to a safe house in a military zone. Authorities
detained 80-year-old Yazdi at least three times since the June 2009
elections, once when he was in an intensive care hospital ward. During
one of his imprisonments, Yazdi spent 50 days in solitary confinement.
On October 1, officials arrested Yazdi in a private home in Isfahan for
allegedly participating in ``illegal prayer'' while he attended the
memorial service for the daughter of a friend. His wife was allowed to
visit him only after he had been jailed for 40 days. Yazdi was
recovering from bladder cancer surgery as well as heart surgery, and
his family believed his life is in danger because of the physical and
psychological strains of prison, lack of medical care, and unsanitary
conditions.
During the year Abdollah Momeni continued to serve a four and one-
half-year prison sentence for disseminating propaganda against the
country by transmitting news of street protests and colluding to harm
national security. In June 2009 police arrested Momeni, spokesperson
for the Alumni Association of Iran (Advar-e Tahkim Vahdat), a legally
registered political organization, and authorities sentenced him in
November 2009 after he appeared at the fifth session of the ``show
trials.'' AI reported that authorities used as evidence against him
Momeni's ``contacts'' with AI and HRW. In August he wrote a letter to
Supreme Leader Khamenei in which he detailed the physical and
psychological abuse he had endured at Evin Prison including severe
beatings and suffocations to the point of unconsciousness during
interrogations, interrogators holding his head in a full toilet bowl,
solitary confinement for 86 days, and repeated threats of rape and
imminent execution. Momeni also said his interrogators forced him to
practice false confessions before his trial.
As of July 7, Naseh Faridi remained free pending an appeal of his
January 7 sentence to six years in prison and 74 lashes for allegedly
passing information to the MEK on account of his activities in the
SCDPP, including interviews with foreign media. On June 29, authorities
released Azeri minority activist Ali Bikas from Evin Prison after an
appeals court acquitted him of all charges. Authorities arrested the
two SCDPP members in June 2009 and tried them in the ``show trials''
later that year.
At year's end there had been no verdict announced in the mid-
October revolutionary court trial of Mohammad-Ali Dadkhah, a member of
the Center for Defending Human Rights and an attorney for several
political activists. In July 2009 police arrested Dadkhah at his office
and charged him with meeting with ``foreign enemies.'' HRW reported
that at the time of his arrest he was meeting with colleagues to
discuss the judiciary's proposal to restrict the independence of the
bar association. Dadkhah remained free on a 500 million toman
($500,000) bail at year's end.
In March authorities released an Iranian-American academic on bail
of 800 million toman ($800,000) but continued to prevent him from
leaving the country at year's end. In July 2009 authorities first
arrested him on charges of espionage based on his association with the
Open Society Institute, which the Government had previously approved.
He appeared before the ``show trials'' in August 2009 and in October
2009 was sentenced to 15 years in prison, later reduced to five years
by an appelate court.
As of November 16, former university student Misagh Yazdan-Nejad
was seriously ill with a respiratory illness, unable to walk or eat.
Gohardasht Prison authorities reportedly refused to grant him leave to
undergo surgery. In September 2009 a revolutionary court sentenced
Yazdan-Nejad to 13 years' imprisonment for participating in a 2007
demonstration. The Government had previously executed three of Yazdan-
Nejad's uncles and imprisoned both his parents on political grounds. At
year's end there were no further updates on Yazdan-Nejad's status.
In September 2009 a reformist Web site reported that police
detained Mohammad Ozlati-Moghaddam, head of opposition leader Mousavi's
veterans' affairs committee, following a search of his home; he was
held for an unknown length of time. On November 15, a reformist Web
site reported that security agents had again arrested Ozlati-Moghaddam,
and his status was unknown at year's end.
On March 16, authorities released economist and journalist Saeed
Leylaz from prison on bail of 500 million toman ($500,000) to seek
medical treatment. In December 2009 authorities sentenced Leylaz to
nine years in prison, later reduced to five, for allegedly maintaining
ties with foreigners and working to overthrow the Government.
At year's end Emaddedin Baghi, founder of the Committee for the
Defense of Prisoners' Rights, was incarcerated in Evin Prison, serving
a six-year sentence for ``propaganda against the system'' and
``colluding against the security of the regime'' in relation to an
interview with the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri and a one-year
sentence for his work advocating for prisoners' rights. A revolutionary
court also banned him from participating in political activity for five
years. In December 2009 authorities arrested Baghi and detained him for
180 days. Authorities imprisoned Baghi on previous occasions since 2000
for his activities as a journalist and his campaigns against the
Government's execution of juvenile offenders.
At year's end Kurdish and women's rights activist Zeinab Bayazidi
continued serving a four-year sentence for acting against national
security. Security forces arrested her in 2008; she was reportedly
tried behind closed doors without access to an attorney of her
choosing. According to human rights organizations, Bayazidi went on a
hunger strike in July to protest a prison official's treatment of
several female prisoners.
At year's end Abbas Khorsandi, a political activist and founder of
the Iran Democratic Party, an Internet forum for political debate,
remained in Evin Prison, where authorities reportedly prevented him
from seeing a doctor despite his poor health. In 2008 a Tehran
revolutionary court upheld an eight-year prison sentence against
Khorsandi for ``acting against national security through formation of
an illegal association.'' During the year Khorsandi's family repeatedly
expressed concern about his poor health, especially his heart disease,
but the Government made no response.
There were no updates in the following 2008 cases; all individuals
were believed to be in prison at year's end: writer and student leader
Amin Ghazain Tehran; human rights lawyer Saleh Kamrani; Hadi Qabel,
reformist cleric and member of the reformist political group Islamic
Iran Participation Front; and Office for Consolidating Unity spokesman
Ali Nikunesbati.
Ayatollah Mohammad Kazemeini Boroujerdi remained in Evin Prison
despite appeals for his release on medical grounds. Human rights groups
claimed he had been in solitary confinement without access to an
independent lawyer since his 2006 arrest. Prior to Boroujerdi's arrest,
the Government had increased pressure on him for his belief that
religion and the state should be separate.
Political prisoner Behrouz Javid-Tehrani, who spent four years in
prison for his activities during the 1999 student uprising and was
sentenced in 2005 to seven more years in prison following a secret
trial without legal representation, remained in prison at year's end.
At the time of the most recent conviction, Javid-Tehrani was in
solitary confinement in Gohardasht Prison in Karaj, where he alleged
security agents severely tortured him on numerous occasions.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies.--By law the judiciary is
independent from the executive and legislative branches; in practice it
remained under the influence of executive and religious government
authorities. According to the constitution, the Court of Administrative
Justice, under the supervision of the head of the judiciary,
investigates the grievances of citizens with regard to government
officials, organs, and statutes. In practice citizens had limited
ability to sue the Government. Citizens were not able to bring lawsuits
against the Government for civil or human rights violations. Dispute
resolution councils are available to settle minor civil and criminal
cases through mediation before referral to courts.
Property Restitution.--The constitution allows the Government to
confiscate property acquired illicitly or in a manner not in conformity
with Islamic law, and the Government particularly targeted religious
minorities, especially members of the Baha'i faith. During the year
there were reports that authorities destroyed several Sufi libraries
containing sacred texts and took over nursing homes and hospitals
connected to Sufi orders.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The constitution states that ``reputation, life,
property, [and] dwelling[s]'' are protected from trespass except as
``provided by law,'' but the Government routinely infringed on this
right. Security forces monitored the social activities of citizens,
entered homes and offices, monitored telephone conversations and
Internet communications, and opened mail without court authorization.
There were widespread reports that government agents entered, searched,
and/or ransacked the homes and offices of reformist activists and
journalists in an attempt to intimidate them.
For example, on several occasions during the year government
security forces raided the home and offices of human rights attorney
Nasrin Sotoudeh (see section 1.e., Political Prisoners), confiscating
her computer and cell phone, along with those belonging to her husband
and children, and many of her clients' files.
On September 16, government security forces raided the office of
former presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi and confiscated
computers and other property (see section 3).
Unlike in 2009, there were no reports that Basij forces carried out
nightly raids throughout Tehran, destroying public property, entering
homes, and beating civilians in an attempt to stop nightly protest
chants. However, there were some reports that Basij forces raided
universities in February to stop protesters.
During the year vigilantes continued to attack young persons
considered ``un-Islamic'' in their dress or activities, invade private
homes, abuse unmarried couples, and disrupt concerts. In May according
to press reports, authorities launched an intensified campaign to
enforce the mandatory hijab and issued a list of acceptable men's
hairstyles. According to press reports, morality police have stopped or
detained more than two million individuals since 2007 for inappropriate
hairstyles (usually related to the length of men's hair or beards) or
bad hijab.
There were reports during the year that the MOIS arrested and
harassed family members of political prisoners and human rights
activists, banning them from speaking to foreign media or traveling
abroad, blocking their telephone conversations, making false criminal
charges against them, and blocking their access to higher education.
From early February to March 9, authorities detained Saleh
Noghrehkar, the nephew of former presidential candidate Mir Hossein
Mousavi and the head of the legal team for Mousavi's campaign, in Evin
Prison, reportedly to intimidate Mousavi and his wife.
Throughout the year authorities issued statements threatening to
arrest Mehdi Hashemi on corruption charges, the expatriate son of
influential cleric and former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Some
human rights organizations alleged these threats were retaliation for
Rafsanjani's criticism of the Government after the 2009 postelection
protests.
On January 13, authorities released from prison Nushin Ebadi, a
professor of dentistry and sister to Nobel Prize-winning human rights
lawyer and activist Shirin Ebadi. Intelligence officers arrested
Nushin, who was not involved in human rights issues and did not
participate in any of the postelection protests, in December 2009.
There were also reports that authorities threatened and arrested
family members of expatriates who posted critical comments about the
country on social networking Web sites such as Facebook. According to
media accounts, an Iranian-American studying abroad reported in 2009
that he received an e-mail warning him that his relatives in Iran would
be harmed if he did not delete an online petition he had created
relating to the imprisonment in Iran of a human rights activist; he
claimed that security agents arrested his father two days later and
held him briefly.
Authorities occasionally entered homes to remove satellite
television dishes, which are illegal in the country.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The constitution provides for
freedom of expression and of the press, except when the words are
deemed ``detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the
rights of the public.'' In practice the Government severely restricted
freedom of speech and of the press. There were no basic legal
safeguards for freedom of expression, and the Government--notably the
judiciary--arbitrarily enforced censorship measures against the
independent press. Government censorship and self-censorship limited
dissemination of information during the year. The Government frequently
threatened and jailed journalists as a consequence of their work. It
also closed the offices of the journalists' union in August 2009.
Individuals could not criticize the Government publicly or
privately without reprisal, and the Government actively sought to
impede criticism.
On December 19, according to RSF, intelligence officials in
civilian dress arrested Fariborz Rais Dana, an economist and a member
of the board of directors of the country's writers' association. Other
sources noted that Dana's arrest occurred shortly after his interview
with BBC Persian in which he criticized the Government's subsidy reform
policies. At year's end there were no updates in his case, and his
whereabouts were unknown.
The Government held significant influence over all media in the
country. The country's media outlets were varied, including state-
controlled television, radio, and print publications, as well as
private newspapers and magazines that cover current affairs, politics,
the arts, and sports. The Government closely monitored reporters and
media outlets, and private media lacked independence in practice.
Journalists who failed to abide by government guidelines faced
intimidation, arrest, or closure of their publications. The Government
required foreign correspondents to provide detailed travel plans and
topics of proposed stories before it granted visas, and it attempted to
influence them to garner more favorable coverage. The Government's
Press Supervisory Board (PSB) was responsible for issuing press
licenses, which it sometimes revoked in response to articles critical
of the Government, and for examining complaints filed against
publications or individual journalists, editors, or publishers.
According to Article 175 of the constitution, private broadcasting
is illegal. The Government controlled and maintained a monopoly over
all television and radio broadcasting facilities through a state-
controlled entity, the Voice and Vision Organization. Radio and
television programming--the principal source of news for many citizens,
especially in rural areas--reflected the Government's political and
socioreligious ideology. Foreign programs such as BBC Persian and Voice
of America were subject to government jamming. Satellite dishes that
received foreign television broadcasts were forbidden, and the
Government periodically confiscated them from homes. For instance,
according to opposition websites, police began confiscating satellite
dishes from rooftops in Tehran ahead of the February 11 anniversary of
the Islamic revolution. However, most satellite dishes in individual
homes reportedly continued to operate.
During the year the Government detained, jailed, tortured, or fined
numerous publishers, editors, and journalists (including Internet
media) for their reporting. RSF reported that 37 journalists remained
in detention as of December 20. The penal code states that ``anyone who
undertakes any form of propaganda against the state'' can be imprisoned
for as long as one year; the law does not define ``propaganda.'' The
law also subjects writers to prosecution for instigating crimes against
the state or national security or ``insulting'' Islam; the latter
offense is punishable by death.
On January 8, according to the CPJ, authorities arrested Mostafa
Dehghan, a freelance journalist who wrote about social issues for
several newspapers and the women's rights Web site, Change for
Equality, and detained him in Evin Prison's Ward 209. According to PBS
Frontline, he remained in prison as of December 10, and there was no
evidence that authorities had charged him with any crime.
On February 1, security officials beat and arrested Abolfazl
Abedini Nasr, a reporter for Bahar Ahvaz, in his home in Ramhormoz and
transferred him to Evin Prison,where he reportedly underwent harsh
torture during interrogation, resulting in severe heart damage. On
April 4, Branch 1 of the Revolutionary Court in Ahvaz sentenced him to
11 years in Karoun Prison in Ahvaz for association with foreign
governments, membership in HRAI, and ``propaganda against the regime''
based on his interviews with foreign media. On April 13, Abedini
collapsed in and was admitted to the prison clinic, according to AI. On
August 19, HRAI reported that prison authorities had banned Abedini
from leaving his cell until further notice, preventing him from
visiting the prison clinic to receive regular required medical
treatment. There was no information about Abedini's status at year's
end, and he remained in prison.
On February 9, according to the CPJ, authorities arrested Ali
Malihi, a journalist for Etemad, Irandokht, Shahrvand-e-Emruz, and
Mehrnameh, and a revolutionary court tried and sentenced him to four
years in prison for ``congregation and mutiny against the regime,''
``propagation against the regime,'' ``participation in illegal
gatherings,'' ``publication of falsehoods,'' and ``insulting the
president.'' As of October 1, authorities reportedly had not permitted
him to meet with his lawyer except during court proceedings. The CPJ
reported he was held in solitary confinement in Evin Prison and went on
at least one hunger strike to protest his treatment.
On March 2, authorities rearrested journalist and activist
Mahboubeh Karami, the fifth time she was arrested in the last three
years (see section 6, Women).
From June 12 until his December 22 release on 500 million toman
($500,000) bail, authorities detained Abdolreza Tajik, who writes for
reformist newspapers Fath, Bonyan, Bahar, and Shargh, in Evin Prison.
This was Tajik's third arrest since the disputed June 2009 elections.
At year's end he faced charges of ``propagation against the regime'' in
connection with his membership in the DHRC, according to news reports.
His sister, Parvin Tajik was also sentenced to 18 months in prison for
pursuing her brother's case.
On July 28, a court sentenced Mostafa Kazzazi, the publisher of
banned reformist daily Seda-ye Edalat, in absentia to 11 months in jail
on charges of ``propaganda against the Islamic regime'' and inciting
unrest. He was in prison at year's end.
In October authorities arrested two German reporters while they
were interviewing the family of Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani (see section
1.e.). At year's end the two reporters remained in custody.
On at least two occasions in December, police officials raided the
offices of reformist daily Sharq and arrested editor in chief Ahmad
Gholami, managing director Ali Khodabaksh, and reporters Kayvan
Mehregan, Amir Hadi Anvari, Rayhaneh Tabatabaee, and Mehran Faraji.
Local news sites reported that Tehran's general and revolutionary
courts prosecutor Abbas Jafari Dolatabadi said the arrests were based
on ``security charges.'' Authorities reportedly released Gholami,
Khodabaksh, and Anvari on bail before year's end, but Mehregan,
Tabatabaee, and Faraji reportedly remained in prison. According to
press reports, an unidentified Sharq journalist said authorities raided
the newspaper offices because of an upcoming Students' Day issue.
On December 9, Branch 28 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court
sentenced Mashallah Shamsolvaezin, head of the journalists' association
and a prominent reform journalist, to 16 months in prison for
``insulting the president'' and ``weakening'' the Government based on
interviews he gave to international media. At year's end it did not
appear as though his sentence had begun.
There were updates in several cases from previous years.
On October 9, the Tehran Revolutionary Court sentenced Saeed
Razavi-Faghih, a former editorial writer for several reformist
newspapers and former member of the Office of Consolidating Unity (a
reformist student organization), in absentia to four years'
imprisonment and 74 lashes for antiregime propaganda, participating in
illegal gatherings, and insulting the supreme leader, and it summoned
him to Evin Prison to begin his sentence. In January 2009 security
agents confiscated his passport when he returned to the country from
France, where he had been studying since 2004. At year's end he
remained in prison.
On February 1, an intelligence court summoned Alireza Saghafi and
held him until February 14. Saghafi, who edited the magazine Rah
Ayandeh until authorities closed it in 2008, was sentenced to three
years in prison. In January an appeals court confirmed the one-year
suspended prison sentence for Amir Yaghoubali, a journalist for the
daily Etemad for ``activities against national security'' and
``disturbing public order'' based on his writings. Authorities arrested
the two journalists along with several others in May 2009 during
International Workers Day demonstrations.
According to RSF, authorities arrested more than 100 journalists
after the June 2009 election, and 30 others fled the country, the
largest exodus of journalists since the 1979 revolution.
Mohammad Ghouchani, a journalist and editor in chief of the banned
Etemad Meli daily, who was detained from June through October 2009,
reported that intelligence agents continued to harass him during the
year.
In January a court sentenced journalist and editor of Khorade-no
Bahman Ahmadi-Amoee to seven years in prison and 34 lashes, reduced in
March by an appeals court to five years' imprisonment. There was no
information as to whether the lashing sentence was upheld. After a
brief visit home, Ahmadi-Amoee began serving his sentence in Evin
Prison on May 30. He remained in prison at year's end. On June 8, the
26th Chamber of the Tehran Revolutionary Court sentenced his wife Jila
Baniyaghoub to one year in prison and banned her from working as a
journalist for 30 years, reportedly due to her writings related to
election events and women's rights, and October 25 press reports stated
that an appeals court had confirmed the verdict. Baniyaghoub's lawyer
said there was no legal basis for the 30-year journalism ban. In June
2009 authorities arrested the two journalists in their home.
Authorities reportedly prevented Ahmadi-Amoee's access to legal counsel
and held him in solitary confinement for 65 days; his lawyer had no
access to any government evidence against him.
On May 10, Branch 26 of the Revolutionary Court sentenced Iranian-
Canadian Newsweek reporter Maziar Bahari in absentia to 13 years in
prison and 74 lashes for conspiring against the state for his presence
at postelection protests, possession of ``secret'' documents based on a
public court document relating to arrests, propagandizing against the
system, insulting the supreme leader by implying that he was a
dictator, disrupting public order by reporting on a clash between
protesters and Basij forces, and insulting the president. Authorities
arrested Bahari in June 2009 and held him until they permitted him to
leave the country in October. Bahari remained in outside the country at
year's end.
At year's end despite serious health problems, journalist and
member of the Committee for Human Rights Reporters Hengameh Shahidi
continued to serve her six-year sentence in Evin Prison for
participating in postelection demonstrations and ``spreading propaganda
against the holy Islamic Regime,'' based on an interview with the
``antirevolutionary'' BBC. On October 28, authorities reportedly
granted medical leave to Shahidi, originally arrested in June 2009, but
returned her to prison on November 14 with no explanation.
At year's end journalist and blogger Shiva Nazar Ahari was free
pending the start of her sentence for four years' imprisonment and 74
lashes based on her political and journalistic activities. In December
2009 authorities arrested her and two of her colleagues from the
Committee for Human Rights Reporters as they were headed to Qom for
Grand Ayatollah Montazeri's funeral; she remained in prison until
released on bail on September 12. On January 20, security forces
released her colleague, Nasrin Vaziri, after detaining her for almost a
month.
According to international media, authorities released Syrian
national Reza al-Bacha on January 10. He was arrested in December 2009
while reporting on demonstrations.
On October 15, authorities released Kalemeh Sabz editor Alireza
Behshtipour Shirazi on a bail of 5 million toman ($5,000) pending trial
for ``acting against national security.'' The editor was arrested in
December 2009.
In December the CPJ reported that writer and journalist Mostafa
Izadi remained in prison.
There was no information as to the status of journalist Mohammad-
Hossein Falahiezadeh, whom authorities transferred to Evin Prison's
medical clinic due to his critical health situation in September 2009.
Falahiezadeh had served his 2008 prison sentence for reporting on
street protests by members of the Ahvazi Arab minority, but MOIS
officials reportedly stated his release was contingent on meeting bail,
which he could not afford.
During the year the Government banned, blocked, closed, and
censored publications that were critical of the Government. The media
law forbids government censorship, but it also forbids disseminating
information that it considered damaging to the Government. Government
officials also routinely intimidated journalists into practicing self-
censorship. Public officials often lodged criminal complaints against
reformist newspapers; the PSB referred complaints to the media court
for further action, including closure and fines. The court conducted
its hearings in public with a jury of appointed clerics, government
officials, and editors of government-controlled newspapers. Some human
rights groups asserted that the increasingly conservative media court
assumed responsibility for cases before PSB consideration. The
Government censored both reformist and conservative newspapers after
they published articles contradicting the official line, and it
permanently closed others during the year, including more than 10
national publications including Etemad, the country's largest
circulation reformist daily, and the weekly Irandokht magazine (early
March), Shahrvand-e Emrouz (November 8), Chelcheragh (November 20), and
Shargh (December 8). The following papers banned in 2009 remained so:
Kalameh Sabz, Etemad-e Melli, the business newspaper Sarmayeh, and
Hayat-e no.
According to an August 18 ruling by the Ministry of Culture and
Islamic Guidance allegedly obtained by an opposition group, the
publication ban on any news or information related to opposition
figures Mehdi Karroubi and Mir-Hossein Mousavi and former president
Mohamad Khatami continued.
In December 2009 according to RSF, the Ministry of Culture and
Islamic Guidance issued a directive banning print and Internet articles
about cleric Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, a critic of the Government who
died on December 19. At year's end the ban remained in effect.
At various times in 2008, government officials advised reporters
not to use the names of unauthorized political parties and to ``censor
pages which are likely to create a dispute,'' observing the country's
``religious, moral, and national sensitivities.''
The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance must grant permission
to publish any book, and it inspected foreign printed materials prior
to their domestic release.
Internet Freedom.--NGOs reported that the Government continued to
increase control over the Internet during the year as more citizens
used it as a source for news and political debate. According to 2010
Internet World Stats, approximately 43 percent of the country's
inhabitants used the Internet.
The Government monitored Internet communications, especially via
social networking Web sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, and
collected individuals' personally identifiable information in
connection with peaceful expression of views. The Government
threatened, harassed, and arrested individuals who posted comments
critical of the Government on the Internet; in some cases it reportedly
confiscated their passports or arrested their family members (see
section 1.f.). Freedom House and other human rights organizations
reported that authorities sometimes stopped citizens at Tehran
International Airport as they arrived in the country, asked them to log
into their YouTube and Facebook accounts, and in some cases forced them
to delete information.
On February 10, the country's telecommunications agency announced
that it had permanently suspended Google's e-mail service; however,
``G-mail'' services continued throughout the year and were only
periodically interrupted.
All Internet service providers (ISPs) must be approved by the
Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. The Government also required
all owners of Web sites and blogs in the country to register with the
Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; in practice, this regulation
was rarely enforced. The Press Law and penal code both apply to
electronic media, and the PSB and judiciary used such laws to close Web
sites during the year. The Government also used filtering software to
block access to domestic blogs on all sides of the political spectrum
and some Western Web sites, reportedly including the Web sites of
prominent Western news organizations and NGOs. According to RSF the
Government blocked access to thousands of Web sites during the year,
and in some cases ISPs redirected computer users from opposition Web
sites to progovernment news sites.
The Government also censored Web site content to control citizens'
access to information. According to Freedom House, content from
opposition leaders' Web sites was deleted during the year. The
Government also imposed limits on Internet speed and technology, making
it difficult to download Internet material or to circumvent government
restrictions to access blocked Web sites. According to multiple sources
the Government's ability to censor the Internet improved during the
year. Internet NGOs reported that the Government was attempting to
block Internet users' access to circumvention technology. According to
RSF, the Committee in Charge of Determining Unauthorized Web Sites--
which included representatives from the Ministry of Communications and
Information Technology, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance,
the Ministry of National Security, and the Tehran Public Prosecutor's
Office--determined blocking criteria.
During the periods prior to the anniversary of the Islamic
Revolution (February 11), the anniversary of the 2009 presidential
election (June 12), and Students' Day (December 7), authorities slowed
Internet access and blocked access to Facebook and Twitter.
During the year the Government prosecuted and punished persons for
peaceful expression of dissenting views via the Internet.
On February 25, authorities issued a 91-day prison sentence for
blogger Mohammad Esmaeelzadeh for ``insulting the supreme leader,'' and
Esmaeelzadeh served the sentence during the year. According to ICHRI,
the Babol prosecutor's office awarded him a four day furlough in April
ostensibly attend his child's birth, although he was not allowed to
leave the town of Babol and travel to Karaj where his family lived.
From June 20 until his temporary release on bail on August 9,
authorities detained Hamed Saber, a freelance photographer, after he
posted photographs he took of Tehran street protests on photo-sharing
Web sites such as Flickr and Picasa. There were no updates on his case
at year's end.
On September 18, according to RSF, eight intelligence ministry
officials entered student blogger Navid Mohebbi's home and arrested
him. Authorities released him from Sari Prison on December 25 after a
revolutionary court sentenced him to a three-year suspended sentence.
He was charged with membership in and support for the One Million
Signatures Campaign (see section 6, Women), acting against national
security, propaganda against the state through connection with foreign
media, insulting the founder of the Islamic Republic, and insulting the
supreme leader. Mohebbi's trial took place behind closed doors; not
even his lawyer attended.
There were developments in several cases from previous years.
In July the Second Branch of the Ghazvin Revolutionary Court
reportedly sentenced blogger and physician Ali Asguar Jamali, to three
years' imprisonment for insulting the supreme leader and antiregime
propaganda. Jamali, who defends workers' rights, wrote a blog called
Dr. Social-Democrat. According to cyberdissidents.org, at year's end he
remained in jail.
At year's end Mohammad Nourizad, originally arrested in December
2009, remained in Evin Prison serving a three-year sentence (see
section 1.c.).
There was no evidence of any government investigation into the
March 2009 death of 25-year-old blogger Omid Reza Mirsayafi in the
medical ward of Evin Prison, reportedly due to an overdose of a
medication he received from the prison clinic for depression. In 2008 a
Tehran revolutionary court sentenced Mirsayafi to 30 months in prison
for propaganda against the state and criticism of the supreme leader.
Internet journalist and cleric Mojtaba Lotfi continued to serve a
four-year prison sentence imposed in 2008 for posting online a sermon
by Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, a well-known opponent of Supreme Leader
Khamenei, that criticized President Ahmadi-Nejad's claim that Iran was
``the world's freest country.'' According to RSF, Lotfi suffered from
lung problems stemming from Iran-Iraq war injuries.
In September a court sentenced well-known blogger and dual Iranian-
Canadian citizen Hossein Derakhshan to 19 and one-half years in prison
and a five-year ban from political or journalistic activities. At
year's end he reportedly remained in Evin Prison pending appeal.
Authorities arrested Derakhshan in 2008 while he was visiting the
country and allegedly subjected him to psychological and physical abuse
in detention, according to the NGO HRAI.
Blogger and women's rights activist Shahnaz Gholami was in asylum
in France at year's end. On April 3, IHRV reported that Branch 2 of the
Revolutionary Court in Tabriz sentenced her to eight years in prison
for publishing articles considered devoid of truth, spreading
propaganda against the regime, and alleged MEK membership. Gholami was
arrested in 2008 for publishing ``propaganda'' and ``jeopardizing
national security.''
There were no updates in the case of bloggers Omid Memarian,
Roozbeh Mirebrahimi, Shahram Rafizadeh, and Javad Gholamtamimi,
sentenced in February 2009 to prison terms of up to three years, fines,
and flogging despite the judiciary head's admission that the bloggers'
confessions were coerced. Memarian, Mirebrahimi, and Rafizadeh were
sentenced in absentia as they remained abroad at year's end;
Gholamtamimi continued to reside in the country during the year. The
four were originally arrested in 2004.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events.--The Government significantly
restricted academic freedom and the independence of higher education
institutions. Authorities systematically targeted university campuses
to suppress social and political activism, including by banning
independent student organizations, imprisoning student activists,
purging faculty, depriving targeted students from enrolling or
continuing their higher education based on political affiliation or
activism (see section 3), and banning social sciences and humanities
curricula. Authorities continued to dismiss university professors in
accordance with a 2006 presidential call for the removal of secular and
liberal professors. To obtain tenure, professors had to refrain from
criticism of authorities.
In August the director of the Office of Development of Higher
Education announced that the Government would begin restricting the
number of students admitted to humanities programs at universities, and
in October authorities placed restrictions on social sciences
education, barring universities from opening new departments of law,
philosophy, management, psychology, political science, women's studies,
or human rights. The Government also announced it would revise at least
70 percent of the existing social sciences curricula, and there were
reports that the changes had begun at year's end.
Also in October the supreme leader declared the private financial
endowment of Azad University was religiously illegitimate, leading the
way for a potential government takeover. Azad University, supported by
former President Rafsanjani, has hundreds of branches in Iran and
several outside the country. Azad University's main branch in Tehran
was a major site for the June 2009 election protests.
According to AI, in October 2009 authorities banned from teaching
five prominent law professors from Alameh Tabatabai University's law
school. Local news reports noted that the professors taught human
rights courses at the university.
The Government censored cultural events with stringent controls on
cinema and theater and a ban on some foreign music. On June 1, the
Government announced a ban on music education in private schools,
already banned in public schools, and on August 3, media reported that
the supreme leader advised against the practice and teaching of music
in general, although music continued in the media at year's end. The
Government monitored cultural associations and continued to crack down
on underground music groups, especially those it considered inspired by
Satan, such as heavy metal or similar foreign music. Authorities banned
broadcasting of certain singers' music and certain songs from
government-owned radio stations for unspecified reasons.
Throughout the year there were reports that security forces raided
recording studios and underground concerts. In May police raided an
underground concert outside of Tehran and arrested 80 individuals for
being improperly dressed and for drinking alcohol. In November Tehran
police reportedly arrested male and female members of an underground
rap group for ``immoral'' and ``un-Islamic'' behavior and for drinking
alcohol. There was no information at year's end about the status or
whereabouts of those arrested in either case.
On July 21, President Ahmadinejad established the High Council for
Cinema to conduct the country's cinema policy, and the group reportedly
held its first meeting on December 30. As the main source of production
funding, the Government effectively censored domestic filmmaking.
Producers were required to submit scripts and film proposals to
government officials in advance of funding approval. Movies promoting
secularism, feminism, unethical behavior, drug abuse, violence, or
alcoholism were illegal, and some domestic directors were blacklisted.
On March 1, plainclothes police officers raided the home of award-
winning film director Jafar Panahi and arrested him along with his wife
and daughter, film director Mohammad Rasulov, and 15 other individuals,
most of whom were released a few days later. According to some sources,
Panahi and Rasulov were working together to make a documentary about
the 2009 postelection protests. On December 20, a court convicted
Panahi and Rasulov with participating in a gathering and making
propaganda against the regime and sentenced them both to six years in
prison, and Panahi also to a 20-year ban from making films, writing
scripts, giving interviews, and traveling abroad. At year's end both
filmmakers remained free pending the outcome of their appeals. Most of
Panahi's films are banned in the country.
In September Culture Minister Sayyed Mohammad Hosseini publicly
criticized the country's annual film festival for supporting the Green
Movement. The Ministry later revoked the production license for Asghar
Farhadi's film Separation of Nader and Simin. Farhardi was permitted to
resume production in October.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom of
Assembly.--The constitution permits assemblies and marches ``provided
they do not violate the principles of Islam''; in practice the
Government restricted freedom of assembly and closely monitored
gatherings to prevent antigovernment protests. Such gatherings included
public entertainment and lectures, student meetings and protests, labor
protests, women's gatherings and protests, funeral processions, and
Friday prayer gatherings. According to activists, the Government
arbitrarily applied rules governing permits to assemble, with
conservative groups rarely experiencing difficulty and groups viewed as
critical of the Government experiencing harassment regardless of
whether a permit was issued. During the year authorities arrested,
tried, and imprisoned individuals who participated in demonstrations
since 2006.
The Government continued to prohibit and forcibly disperse peaceful
demonstrations during the year. Paramilitary organizations such as
Ansar-e Hizballah also harassed, beat, and intimidated those who
demonstrated publicly for reform. They particularly targeted university
students.
According to a February ICHRI release, authorities collected
photographs of expatriate citizens in protest gatherings outside the
country. When those citizens entered or left the country via Imam
Khomeini International Airport in Tehran, security officials
temporarily detained them for questioning.
On December 7, students held peaceful demonstrations at various
universities in the country, including Qazvin Azad University, Tehran
Polytechnic University, Gilan University, and the Tehran School of Art,
to protest the restrictions on humanities studies (see section 2.a.,
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events), as well as the imprisonment of
students. Paramilitary Basij forces responded by breaking up gatherings
and detaining dozens of students.
In a global study released on February 5, the UN special rapporteur
on torture stated that the June 2009 election protests ``were met with
excessive violence by the police and government militias.'' He said he
received ``credible allegations'' of the killing of at least 12
students participating in the protests and pointed at agents of the
Revolutionary Guards, paramilitary Basij, and State Security Force as
employing ``extreme force to suppress protesters by opening fire during
demonstrations and using pepper spray and batons to disperse
demonstrations.''
In September an appeals court rejected the appeal of Mohammad
Tavakoli, charged with ``gathering,'' ``collusion against the regime,''
``propagating against the regime,'' and ``insulting the supreme leader
and the president.'' At year's end he was serving his eight and one-
half-year prison term in Ward 3 of Gohardasht Prison in Karaj. The
ICHRI reported that he had no access to his lawyer during his
imprisonment or trial. In February 2009 authorities arrested
approximately 20 participants in a ceremony commemorating the life of
Mehdi Bazargan, the first prime minister appointed after the 1979
revolution. The group included Tavakoli and at least three other men
from Tehran Polytechnic (Amir Kabir) University's Islamic Students
Association--Esmail Salmanpour, Hossein Torkashvand, and Koroush
Daneshyar--who reportedly were detained in Ward 209 of Evin Prison. All
the detainees except Tavakoli were believed to be free at year's end.
On December 5, prior to Student Day, authorities arrested Esmail
Salmanpour and held him for two weeks.
In February 2009 more than 1,500 Amir Kabir University students
demonstrated against the Government's plan to rebury soldiers from the
Iran-Iraq War on university grounds. According to AI, security forces
arrested four Amir Kabir University students, Abbas Hakimzadeh, Mehdi
Mashayekhi, Nariman Mostafavi, and Ahmad Qasaban, along with 70 other
students during the demonstrations. Authorities later released 40 of
the students. There was no information regarding the status of the
remaining detained students at year's end.
Freedom of Association.--The constitution provides for the
establishment of political parties, professional associations, Islamic
religious groups, and organizations for recognized religious
minorities, as long as such groups do not violate the principles of
``freedom, sovereignty, and national unity'' or question Islam as the
basis of the Islamic Republic. The Government limited freedom of
association in practice through threats, intimidation, imposing
arbitrary requirements on organizations, and arresting group leaders
and members. According to a January 2009 HRW report, under the Ahmadi-
Nejad administration, municipal, provincial, and national councils--
established by 2005 regulations ostensibly to facilitate NGOs' permit
process--instead served to suppress NGO activities. Such councils
generally denied NGOs' applications without written explanation,
especially in minority regions, where those who successfully obtained
permits nevertheless faced harassment (see section 6, National/Ethnic/
Racial Minorities).
In November according to the Wall Street Journal, plainclothes
agents without warrants arrested four of the five new central committee
members of the Office for Fostering Student Unity (Tahkim-e Vahdat), a
politically active student group, immediately after the group's
elections were held. The group said the Government pressured it not to
hold the elections. Authorities released Ali Qolizadeh, Alireza Kiani,
and Mohamad Heydarzadeh by early December, but as of December 7, Mohsen
Barzegar remained in Evin Prison without access to family or a lawyer.
The Ministry of Science, Technology, and Research declared Tahkim-e
Vahdat illegal in 2009. On October 31, Raja News, a Persian-language
Web site HRW believes is affiliated with the Intelligence Ministry, ran
an article accusing several Tahkim-e Vahdat members of having ties with
the MEK. Tahkim-e Vahdat rejected these allegations.
Throughout the year the Government reportedly continued to exert
significant pressure on the DHRC, a Tehran NGO headed by Nobel Peace
Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi (see section 5).
The journalists' union and other labor-related groups also
continued to face problems during the year (see section 7).
c. Freedom of Religion.--For a complete description of religious
freedom, please see the 2010 International Religious Freedom Report at
www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/rpt.www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/rpt
d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of
Refugees, and Stateless Persons.--The constitution provides for freedom
of movement within the country, foreign travel, and emigration, and
repatriation. The Government placed some restrictions on these rights.
The Government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) with regard to refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq.
The Government required exit permits for foreign travel for all
citizens. Some citizens, particularly those whose skills were in demand
and who were educated at government expense, had to post bond to obtain
an exit permit. The Government also restricted foreign travel of some
religious leaders and individual members of religious minorities and
scientists in sensitive fields, and it increasingly targeted
journalists, academics, opposition politicians, and activists--
including women's rights activists--for travel bans and passport
confiscation during the year. The Government banned travel to Israel,
but this ban was reportedly not enforced.
There were no updates on the travel bans on prominent attorney
Naser Zarafshan, academic Mehdi Zakerian, DHRC deputy Narges Mohammadi,
and peace activist Sorayra Azizpanaha.
In March, Simin Behbehani, a renowned Iranian poet, was barred from
boarding a flight to France. Authorities questioned her and confiscated
her passport. At year's end, authorities continued to bar her from
leaving the country.
On December 20, a court sentenced filmmaker Jafar Panahi, who was
restricted from travel in October 2009, to six years in prison (see
section 2.a., Academic Freedom and Cultural Events).
A woman must have the permission of her husband, father, or other
male relative to obtain a passport. A married woman must receive
written permission from her husband before she leaves the country.
The Government did not use forced external exile, but it used
internal exile as a punishment. Many dissidents practiced self-imposed
exile to be able to express their beliefs freely.
There were indications that members of all religious minorities
were emigrating at a high rate, although it was unclear whether the
reasons for emigration were religious or economic.
Protection of Refugees.--The country's laws provide means for
granting asylum or refugee status to qualified applicants, and the
Government reportedly had a system for providing protection to
refugees, but the UNHCR did not have any information as to how the
country made asylum determinations. The Government did not consistently
provide protection against the expulsion or return of refugees to
countries where their lives or freedom would be threatened on account
of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. Unlike in the previous years, there were
no reports of registered refugees included in mass deportations.
As of March, according to information provided by the country's
Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants' Affairs, 1,065,000 refugees
were registered with the authorities, of whom approximately 1,021,600
were Afghans and 43,800 were Iraqis. Approximately 70 percent of the
Afghan refugees and their children had lived in the country for 20 to
30 years. There were 3,590 Iraqis registered with the UNHCR at year's
end. The UNHCR assisted with the voluntary repatriation of Afghan
refugees under a tripartite agreement between the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Afghanistan, and the UNHCR, which came back into force on June 28
after three years of suspension.
Twenty-two of 30 provinces were partially or fully closed to
refugees; therefore, authorities generally required registered Afghan
refugees in these ``No-Go Areas'' to choose either to relocate to
refugee settlements, sometimes in other parts of the country, or to
repatriate. However, the UNHCR noted that some of these refugee
settlements needed rehabilitation. The limited number of resettlement
locations is a major constraint for the UNHCR to assist refugees with
relocation within the country. Of the 7,922 Afghans who repatriated
from January 1 to November 7, the vast majority said they were under
pressure to return due to the Government's No-Go Areas policy.
According to the UNHCR, the Government's reregistration campaign
launched in 2008 to assist male refugees to obtain work permits enabled
more refugees to work in the country. The law allows only male refugees
to work, but UNHCR has in the past provided limited assistance to
female refugees.
In July 2009 according to the UNHCR, the Government announced a
policy to treat the enrollment of all school-age children, including
lawful foreign residents and registered refugees, in the same manner.
However, at year's end there was no information available about how the
new policy was enforced. According to 2009 reports, more than a quarter
of primary-school-aged refugees were not enrolled in school. The U.S.
Committee for Refugees and Immigrants reported in 2008 that Afghan
refugee children were charged fees to attend school, while Iraqi
refugee children were able attend public school for free. In some
cases, local government officials reportedly suspended education
services for refugees to encourage them to repatriate.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The constitution provides citizens the right to peacefully change
the president and the parliament through free and fair elections, but
the authority of unelected representatives over the election process
severely abridged this right in practice. The Assembly of Experts
elects the supreme leader, the recognized head of state, who may be
removed only by a vote of the assembly. The supreme leader exercises
influence over the Government appointments of the 12 clerics and
religious jurists who make up the Guardian Council. The Guardian
Council then approves the list of candidates for the Assembly of
Experts, whose 86 members must also be clerics, who serve eight-year
terms and are chosen by popular vote. There was no separation of state
and religion, and clerical influence pervaded the Government. The
supreme leader also approved presidential candidates.
Elections and Political Participation.--In June 2009 the country
held its 10th presidential election, which outside observers regarded
as neither free nor fair. International observers were not allowed
entry to monitor the election results. The Guardian Council approved
only four candidates out of more than 450 prospective candidates,
including 42 women and former officials. No women were approved to run
as candidates. Authorities increased censorship and surveillance during
the campaign, blocking cell phone signals and access to social
networking and opposition Web sites. The Government also reportedly
harassed and arbitrarily arrested political activists, members of the
country's religious and ethnic minority communities, students, trade
unionists, and women's rights activists during the preelection period.
For example, in April 2009 authorities detained Mehdi Mo'tamedi
Mehr, a member of the Committee to Defend Free, Healthy, and Fair
Elections and the banned political organization the Freedom Movement of
Iran, after the committee published a statement about civil society
institutions as election observers. In December 2009 according to local
press reports, the MOIS summoned Mehr and other members of the Freedom
Movement, and at year's end they remained in detention.
In May 2009 authorities detained Emad Bahavar, also a member of the
Freedom Movement, for ``spreading propaganda against the system'' by
campaigning for presidential candidate Mousavi. According to IHRV, he
was released 96 hours later. He was detained again in June 2009 and was
released after 46 days in solitary confinement. Nine months later on
March 7, Bahavar defended himself at a trial for his June 2009
detention and was immediately arrested. On November 29, Bahavar was
convicted of ``assembly and collusion to act against national
security,'' ``propagating against the regime,'' and ``insulting the
leader.'' He was sentenced to a 10-year prison term and a 10-year ban
on any political activity. At year's end he remained in Evin Prison.
Anecdotal evidence suggested that authorities forced some election
observers representing opposition candidates to leave polling stations
and that millions of unused paper ballots went missing. Before all
polls closed and ballot counting had commenced, government-controlled
media announced that President Ahmadi-Nejad had been reelected in the
first round of elections, obtaining a majority of the votes. Contrary
to the election law, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei approved the
election results before the Guardian Council certified the election and
before the Interior Ministry announced the final results. Independent
analysts studied election data and concluded there were a number of
irregularities, including at least two provinces showing a turnout of
more than 100 percent and the absence of longstanding regional
variations in turnout, which appeared abnormal despite regulations that
allow Iranians to vote at any polling station. According to official
government data, President Ahmadi-Nejad took not only all former
conservative voters, all former centrist voters, and all new voters,
but also up to 44 percent of former reformist voters, a scenario
analysts questioned.
The constitution allows for the formation of political parties,
although the Interior Ministry granted licenses only to parties with
ideological and practical adherence to the system of government
embodied in the constitution. There were more than 240 registered
political organizations that generally operated without restriction or
outside interference, but most were small entities, often focused
around an individual, and did not have nationwide membership. Members
of political parties and individuals with any political affiliation
that the Government deemed unacceptable faced harassment, violence, and
sometimes imprisonment.
In 2009 both former presidential candidates experienced raids on
their homes and offices. Specifically, in early September militants
believed to be connected to the Government repeatedly targeted the home
of former presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi in consecutive evening
attacks. On September 16, security forces raided the office of former
presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi.
In March Minister of Science, Research, and Technology Kamrn
Daneshjoo said that only those who have proven commitment to Islam and
the ``rule of the jurisprudent'' (velayat-e-faghih) can teach or study
at universities, and during the year the Government continued to
dismiss professors and ban students from higher education institutions
based on their political affiliations or actions. According to the
ICHRI, university officials dismissed or forced the retirement of at
least 50 university faculty members during the year for their
affiliation or support of the Green Movement. For example, in August
the Ministry of Science suddenly dismissed Yousef Sobouti, head of the
Institute for Advanced Studies in Basic Sciences in Zanjan Province,
allegedly for political reasons, and replaced him with a scientist
reportedly known to have links with the Basij militia. Following calls
for an investigation into the dismissals and retirements, various
members of the parliament called for a review; however, at year's end,
no formal investigation had been launched.
The two leading reformist political parties, Islamic Iran
Participation Front and the Islamic Revolution Mujahedin Organization,
were banned in September.
Admission to universities was politicized; in addition to
standardized examinations, all applicants had to pass ``character
tests'' in which officials eliminated applicants critical of the
Government's ideology. According to a December ICHRI report, there were
at least 70 such cases during the year. Basij members were given
advantages in the admissions process. During the previous three years,
according to the ICHRI, government interference with university
admissions considerably increased.
Authorities relied on university disciplinary committees to
suspend, transfer, or expel enrolled students based on social and
political activism, involvement in student publications, or
participation in student associations. Student groups reported that a
``star'' system inaugurated by the Government in 2005 to rank
politically active students was still in use. Students deemed
antigovernment through this system reportedly were prevented from
registering for upcoming terms. Repeated suspensions through this
mechanism resulted in effectively denying the rights of targeted
students to complete and continue their studies.
During the year Ministry of Intelligence agents used threats,
intimidation, and arrests to silence students who attempted to seek
accountability and legal justification for their deprivation from
higher education.
For instance, during the year a disciplinary committee at Qazvin
International University expelled Payam Heydar Ghazvini, who was in the
last term of his theology and law studies, and banned him from any
university for three years. Ghazvini was the head student campaigner
for opposition presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi in Qazvin
Province.
Also during the year the Central Disciplinary Committee expelled
Kazem Rezaee from Shiraz University, where he was studying mechanical
engineering. Rezaee was editor in chief of the student publication
Farvardin and was arrested four times for his student activism between
2007 and 2009.
In November the Ministry of Science confirmed the expulsion of
Kaveh Daneshvar from Babol's Noshirvani Industrial University.
Daneshvar went on a hunger strike in 2009 to protest the arrests of
Babol University's student activists during the postelection events.
According to the Guardian Council's interpretation, the
constitution barred women and persons of non-Iranian origin or
religions other than Shia Islam from becoming president. Women were
also barred from serving as supreme leader; as members of the Assembly
of Experts, Guardian Council, or Expediency Council (a body responsible
for mediating between the Majles and the Guardian Council and serving
as a consultative council for the supreme leader); and as certain types
of judges (see section 6, Women). On December 20, President Ahmadi-
Nejad appointed Farahnaz Torkestani to a vicepresidential cabinet post
as head of the National Youth Organization. Women also served as the
vice presidents of legal affairs and science and technology and as the
health minister. Twelve women served in the Majles during the year.
Five Majles seats were reserved for recognized religious
minorities. Other ethnic minorities in the Majles included Arabs and
Kurds. There were no non-Muslims in the cabinet or on the Supreme
Court.
Section 4. Official Corruption and Government Transparency
The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, but
the Government did not implement the law effectively, and official
corruption and impunity remained a serious and ubiquitous problem in
all three branches of government. In a September interview with state
media, former prosecutor general Ayatollah Abdolnabi Namazi alleged
that judiciary officials were under pressure not to pursue corruption
charges against cases referred to the Committee to Fight Economic
Corruption. Many officials expected bribes for providing even routine
service. Individuals routinely bribed officials in order to obtain
permits for illegal construction.
According to a May report by the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies' Iran Energy Project, the supreme leader continued to
transfer a large portion of the country's commerce, industry, oil and
gas, and services sectors to the IRGC. In recent years the Government
gave control over state enterprises to the IRGC through the granting of
special privileges. IRGC companies were large enough to underbid
competitors and were generally favored in the bidding process for large
contracts. In October the IRGC was awarded a road-building contract of
15 trillion toman ($15 billion), the largest in the country's history.
According to the report, the IRGC does not answer to either the
executive or legislative branches with regard to its economic
activities and does not publish any records or reports about its
revenues. Under a 1993 decree, all of the IRGC's economic activities
are exempt from taxation. The IRGC is also widely considered to control
the vast majority of the underground and black market economy. Up to 80
percent of illegal goods enter the country through unregistered ports
and jetties controlled by the IRGC.
According to Freedom House, the hardline clerical establishment
also grew wealthy through its control of bonyads, tax-exempt
foundations that monopolize many sectors of the economy such as cement
and sugar production. Bonyads receive benefits from the Government but
are not required to have their budgets publicly approved.
All government officials, including cabinet ministers and members
of the Guardian Council, Expediency Council, and Assembly of Experts,
were required to submit annual financial statements to the state
inspectorate. There was no information available regarding whether
these officials obeyed the law.
Numerous government agencies existed to fight corruption, including
the Anticorruption Headquarters, the Anticorruption Task Force, the
Committee to Fight Economic Corruption, and the General Inspection
Organization.
In late January according to media reports, intelligence agents
arrested 15 individuals in Karaj, including the mayor and three city
council members, under embezzlement charges. The cases of the detained
were forwarded to the Karaj public prosecutor, but there was no further
information regarding the case at year's end.
On December 20, the judiciary announced that First Vice President
Mohammad Reza Rahimi would face corruption charges. In April members of
parliament had publicly accused Rahimi of corruption. Rahimi denied the
charges. At year's end there were no updates about the status of the
charges, and Rahimi remained in his position.
There were no developments related to the February 2009 National
Audit Office report that revealed that the Oil Ministry had not
returned 1.2 trillion toman ($1.2 billion) in oil revenues to the
treasury or to the November 2009 parliamentary commission's criticism
of the Government's recent privatization efforts, which concluded that
the Government essentially gave the national telecommunications company
to the IRGC.
There were no laws providing for public access to government
information.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government continued to restrict the work of human rights
groups and activists and sometimes responded to their inquiries and
reports with harassment, arrests, monitoring, unlawful raids, and
closures (see also sections 1.d., 1.e., 2.a., 6, and 7). The Government
continued to deny the universality of human rights and stated that
human rights issues should be viewed in the context of a country's
``culture and beliefs.''
Hundreds of domestic NGOs focused on issues such as health and
population, women's rights, development, youth, environmental
protection, human rights, and sustainable development, despite the
restrictive environment, including pressure not to accept foreign
grants. NGOs must register with the Interior Ministry and apply for
permission to receive foreign grants. According to various sources,
independent human rights groups and other NGOs faced intensifying
harassment and threat of closure from government officials as a result
of prolonged and often arbitrary delays in obtaining official
registration.
During the year the Government prevented human rights defenders,
civil society activists, journalists, and scholars from traveling
abroad (see section 2.d.). Human rights activists reported receiving
intimidating phone calls and threats of blackmail from unidentified law
enforcement and government officials. Government officials routinely
harassed and sometimes arrested family members of human rights
activists (see section 1.f.). Courts routinely applied suspended
sentences to human rights activists; this form of sentencing acted as
de facto probation, leaving open the option for authorities to suddenly
and arbitrarily arrest or imprison individuals. This threat was
sometimes enough to silence activists or pressure them into providing
information about other activists.
Professional groups representing writers, journalists,
photographers, and others attempted to monitor government restrictions
in their respective fields, as well as harassment and intimidation
against individual members of their professions. The Government
severely curtailed these groups' ability to meet, organize, or effect
change.
In June according to the ICHRI, a government intelligence official
traveled with the NGO delegation to the UN Human Rights Council's
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the country and reviewed statements
made by the NGOs.
Throughout the year the Government reportedly continued to exert
significant pressure on the DHRC, a Tehran NGO headed by Nobel Peace
Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi, and it systematically harassed and
arrested lawyers affiliated with the organization. On October 30,
Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court sentenced Mohammad Seifzadeh, a
lawyer and one of DHRC's founders, to nine years in prison and a 10-
year ban on practicing law for ``acting against national security'' by
establishing the DHRC. Seifzadeh told the ICHRI that his trial occurred
behind closed doors.
In 2009 a Basij-student mob attacked Ebadi's offices and home, and
the Government pressured at least two of the DHRC's employees to
resign; prevented several DHRC members from traveling outside the
country; arrested and detained a DHRC secretary for 55 days; regularly
summoned DHRC members for interrogation; and warned individuals not to
attend the DHRC's gatherings, some of which police dispersed. On
January 12, authorities released Ebadi's sister, Nushin, a professor of
dentistry, after 17 days in detention. Nooshin reportedly also faced
threats of dismissal from her university job.
Despite numerous appeals, including from the UN, the Government
denied requests from international human rights NGOs to establish
offices in, or conduct regular investigative visits to, the country.
The last visit by an international human rights NGO was AI's 2004 visit
as part of the EU's human rights dialogue with the country.
The International Committee of the Red Cross and the UNHCR both
operated in the country with some restrictions. Since the Government
issued a standing invitation to all UN human rights agencies in 2002,
there have been six visits to the country by UN special human rights
institutions, but none since 2005. The Government generally ignored
recommendations these bodies made and failed to submit required reports
to the UN Human Rights Committee or the UN Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights. The Government ignored repeated requests
for visits by UN special rapporteurs.
A February 5 global study by the UN special rapporteur on torture
and other similar practices stated that there were ``credible''
allegations that the country's security forces used excessive force
against peaceful demonstrators and committed politically motivated
torture following demonstrations.
In a March 11 interview with Radio Free Europe (RFE), then UN
special rapporteur on torture Manfred Nowak said he was ``really
concerned about the situation'' in the country, including allegations
of torture in prisons following the 2009 elections, but that the
Government would not permit him to visit and investigate the claims.
In June the UN Human Rights Council reviewed the country's human
rights record as part of the UPR process. The Government rejected 45 of
the 189 UPR recommendations, including concerns over torture, the lack
of due process, and independence of civil society. Mohammed Javad
Larijani, chief of the country's High Council for Human Rights, said
human rights activists were ``inciting violence.''
On October 29, for the eighth consecutive year, the UN General
Assembly adopted a resolution expressing concern about the country's
``serious ongoing and recurring human rights violations.'' High Council
for Human Rights head Larijani said the resolution was ``illegal'' and
was designed to undermine ``constructive interaction between [his
government] and the UN Human Rights Council.''
The Governmental High Council for Human Rights has not conducted
formal investigations into post-election abuses. Larijani, the
council's head, is the brother of Ali Larijani, speaker of the
parliament, and Sadeq Larijani, head of the judiciary.
Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
Although the constitution formally prohibits discrimination based
on race, gender, disability, language, and social status ``in
conformity with Islamic criteria,'' the Government did not effectively
enforce these prohibitions.
Women.--Rape is illegal and subject to strict penalties including
the death penalty, but it remained a problem. There were reports of
government forces raping individuals in custody (see sections 1.a.,
1.c., and others). Spousal rape is not illegal. Cases of rape were
difficult to document due to social stigma against the victims. Most
rape victims did not report the crime to authorities because they
feared societal reprisal such as ostracism or punishment for having
been raped. According to the penal code, rape is a capital offense, and
four male witnesses or a combination of three male and two female
witnesses are required for conviction. A woman or man found making a
false accusation of rape is subject to 80 lashes.
The law does not specifically prohibit domestic violence. Spousal
abuse and violence against women occurred. According to a study
published in 2008 using 2005 data, 52.7 percent of women reported being
physically abused during their married lives. A study published in 2009
using data from 2006 reported that half of the secondary students
interviewed had witnessed spousal abuse in their families. A survey of
women with infertility from August 2009 to January 2010 revealed that
approximately 62 percent had experienced domestic abuse because of
their infertility. Most women said their abuse was psychological; 22
percent of women had experienced physical or sexual abuse because of
infertility. Abuse in the family was considered a private matter and
seldom discussed publicly, although there were some efforts to change
this attitude, particularly by the ``One Million Signatures for the
Repeal of Discriminatory Laws'' (also known as OMSC and ``Change for
Equality'') campaign. Some nongovernmental shelters and hotlines
assisted victims during the year.
There is no law prohibiting ``honor'' killings, although no cases
were documented during the year. The law permits a man to kill his
adulterous wife and her consorts if he is certain she consented. Women
convicted of adultery may also be sentenced to death, including by
stoning. According to a police official quoted in a domestic newspaper
in 2008, 50 honor killings were reported during a seven-month period,
although official statistics were not available. The punishment for
perpetrators was often a short prison sentence.
There was no update on the February 2009 case where a father killed
his 16-year-old daughter for suspicious activity; the 2008 cases of a
man known as Ahmad, who allegedly killed his daughter after her former
brother-in-law kidnapped and slept with her; or Morteza, who allegedly
killed his sister after she married a man without her family's
permission.
There was a lack of reliable data on the prevalence of sexual
harassment in the country. Media reports indicated that unwanted
physical contact and verbal harassment occurred. Government officials,
however, often blamed women's sexuality for problems in society; for
example, on April 16, cleric Kazem Sadighi said, ``many of the ladies
who do not have a proper appearance cause the hearts of the youth to be
swayed and they become defiled by sin, and this leads to the spread of
adultery in society, which increases earthquakes.'' There are laws
addressing sexual harassment in the context of physical contact between
men and women. Physical contact between unrelated men and women is
strictly prohibited and is punishable by lashing.
The 1993 family planning law recognizes the basic right of married
couples to decide freely and responsibly the spacing and timing of
their first three children and have the information and means to do so
free from discrimination, coercion, and violence. According to the law,
health and maternity benefits are cut for the family after three
children. Local clinics and rural health centers disseminated
information on family planning under the guidance of the Ministry of
Health and Medical Education. There were no restrictions on the right
of married persons to access contraceptives. According to the
Population Reference Bureau, nearly 80 percent of married women of
reproductive age used family planning methods, 75 percent of whom used
modern methods of contraception. Couples who plan to marry must take a
class in family planning. According to the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF),
the 2008 adjusted maternal mortality ratio was 30 per 100,000 live
births. According to UNICEF, 97 percent of women gave birth with a
skilled attendant present. Men and women received equal access to
diagnosis and treatment of sexually transmitted infections, including
HIV. However, women tested less regularly than men because of social
stigmas attached to doing so.
The constitution nominally provides women with equal protection
under the law and all human, political, economic, social, and cultural
rights in conformity with Islam. Provisions in the Islamic civil and
penal codes, particularly sections dealing with family and property
law, discriminate against women. Shortly after the 1979 revolution, the
Government replaced those laws that provided women with increased
rights in the home and workplace with a legal system based largely on
Shari'a practices. In March 2009 President Ahmadi-Nejad instructed the
relevant bodies to implement a law in which women's share of their
husband's inheritance would increase to one-fourth from the previously
stipulated one-eighth of his property. At year's end there was no
information on the law's implementation. The Governmental Center for
Women and Family continued to publish reports on feminism with a
negative slant and limited the debate on women's issues to matters
related to the home. Women cannot directly transmit citizenship to
their children or to a non-Iranian spouse (see section 6, Children).
Although a man (or boy) can marry at age 15 without parental
consent, the law states that a virgin woman or girl needs the consent
of her father or grandfather to wed, or the court's permission, even if
she is older than 18. The country's Islamic law permits a man to have
as many as four wives and an unlimited number of sigheh, based on a
Shia custom in which a woman may become the wife of a Muslim man after
a simple religious ceremony and a civil contract outlining the union's
conditions. Sigheh wives and any resulting children were not granted
rights associated with traditional marriage. The Government does not
recognize marriages between Muslim women and non-Muslim men or Baha'i
marriages.
A woman has the right to divorce only if her husband signs a
contract granting that right, cannot provide for his family, or is a
drug addict, insane, or impotent. A husband was not required to cite a
reason for divorcing his wife. Traditional interpretations of Islamic
law recognized a divorced woman's right to part of shared property and
to alimony. These laws were not enforced. According to a study by the
National Organization for Civil Registration, quoted in a book by a
women's rights activist, more than 89 percent of women did not receive
their due alimony, and 9 percent did not receive their share of the
wedding gift (wedding contracts traditionally stipulate that in case of
divorce the groom give his bride the wedding gift for financial
support). The law provides divorced women preference in custody for
children up to age seven; divorced women who remarry are forced to give
the child's father custody. After the child reaches age seven, the
father is entitled to custody (unless the father has been proven unfit
to care for the child). The court determines custody in disputed cases.
Women sometimes received disproportionate punishment for crimes
such as adultery, including death sentences (see sections 1.a. and
1.e., Trial Procedures). The testimony of two women is equal to that of
one man. The blood money paid to the family of a female crime victim is
half the sum paid for a man.
Women had access to primary and advanced education, and
approximately 65 percent of university students were women. Government
officials acknowledged the use of quotas to limit women's university
admissions in certain fields such as medicine and engineering. In
addition social and legal constraints limited women's professional
opportunities. Women were represented in many fields, including the
legislature, municipal councils, police, and firefighters, but a woman
must seek her husband's consent before working outside the home.
According to a 2009 World Economic Forum report, the unemployment rate
for women, who constituted 33 percent of the workforce, was 15.8
percent, compared with 9.3 percent for men. Cultural discrimination
remained a factor; one member of parliament suggested that banning
women from the workplace could solve the country's unemployment
problems. Women cannot serve in many high-level political positions or
as judges, except as consultant or research judges without the power to
impose sentences.
On November 17, Khadijeh Azadpour, who won a gold medal in martial
arts at the Asian Games, told the local press that authorities told her
she would only receive a promised apartment if she were married.
Previously, she said she was promised an apartment if she won a gold
medal.
The Government enforced gender segregation in most public spaces,
including for patients during medical care, and prohibited women from
mixing openly with unmarried men or men not related to them. Women must
ride in a reserved section on public buses and enter public buildings,
universities, and airports through separate entrances. The penal code
provides that a woman who appears in public without an appropriate
hijab can be sentenced to lashings and fined. However, absent a clear
legal definition of ``appropriate hijab'' or the punishment, women were
subject to the opinions of disciplinary forces or judges. Pictures of
uncovered or immodestly dressed women in the media or in films were
often digitally altered.
In August a controversial family law that would make polygamy more
permissive was reintroduced to the parliament. Women's groups
successfully lobbied to table the bill in 2008; the bill would allow
men to take additional wives without the first wife's permission, tax
women's dowries, and remove conditions for the registration of
temporary marriages.
The Government continued its intense crackdown against members of
the OMSC, which activists launched in 2006 to promote women's rights,
particularly by advocating reform of discriminatory laws. Several
members of the OMSC remained under suspended prison sentences and
travel bans, were in prison, or were in self-imposed exile at year's
end.
On March 2, authorities rearrested Mahoubeh Karami and searched her
house. IRGC officials took her to Evin Prison where according to the
ICHRI she remained for 80 days. She reportedly suffered abuse during
interrogation, including being hit on the head with a water bottle.
According to her brother, her charges stemmed from her membership in
OMSC and her support for the DHRC. On August 18, according to press
reports, a court sentenced her to four years' imprisonment for
membership in a prohibited organization and spreading of propaganda
against the state, but at year's end she was free on bail of 500
million toman ($500,000).
In March according to the Human Rights House of Iran, the Branch 15
of the Revolutionary Court acquitted Khadijeh Moghaddam on two counts
of propaganda activity against the regime and disobeying police orders
but sentenced her to a one-year suspended prison term for assembly and
conspiracy with intent to act against national security.
In March 2009 security forces detained Moghaddam for approximately
one month along with 11 other members from OMSC and the NGO Mothers for
Peace--Delaram Ali, Leila Nazari, Farkhondeh Ehtesabian, Mahboubeh
Karami, Bahara Behravan, Ali Abdi, Amir Rashidi, Mohammad Shoorab,
Arash Nasiri Eghbali, Soraya Yousefi and Shahla Forouzanfar--as the
group met to make traditional Nowruz (New Year) visits to families of
several political prisoners. The ICHR suggested that security and
intelligence forces must have eavesdropped on activists' private
communications to apprehend them. Judge Matin Rasekh charged the 12
with ``disturbing public opinion'' and ``disrupting public order,'' and
they were transferred to Section 209 of Evin Prison under MOIS control.
All 12 were released on bail in June 2009.
On December 5, local news reported that authorities arrested
Hakimeh Shokri at at Behesht Zahara Cemetary along with several other
mothers who were celebrating the birthday anniversary of Amir Arshad
Tajmir, one of the protesters killed during the 2009 Ashura protest.
They were gathered at Behesht Zahra Cemetery and were arrested. At
year's end Hakimeh was transferred to Evin Prison and charged with
``espionage'' and ``acting against national security''; the other women
were released.
There were no developments in the case of Maryam Malek, detained
for several weeks in April 2009 and charged with ``propaganda against
the system'' in connection with her OMSC membership.
On December 29, authorities summoned Maryam Bidogli and Fatemeh
Masjedi to report to prison to serve their one-year sentences for
membership in a feminist organization. In May 2009 authorities in Qom
arrested the OMSC members, along with the male author of The Women's
Movement in the East, Gholamreza Salami. Intelligence agents searched
homes of both women and took personal belongings. According to news
reports, the women had previously been investigating an honor killing.
In January and February, authorities released the activists
reportedly arrested in December 2009, including Zohre Tonkaboni and
Mahin Fahimi, members of Mothers for Peace; and OMSC members Atiey
Youseffi, Somayeh Rashidi, and Mansourreh Shojaaiei. There were no
other updates available in any cases related to these women.
There were no developments reported in the case of Mehri Moshrefi,
sentenced in January 2009 along with her husband to a two-year
suspended sentence. In 2008 authorities arrested Moshrefi, her husband,
and two of her children at a cemetery where One Million Signatures was
staging a protest and transferred them to Evin Prison despite
activists' claims that the family was not involved in the gathering.
As of July Ronek Safazadeh remained in Sanadaj Prison. In April
2009 a court sentenced her to six years in prison for spreading
propaganda about the Government in relation to her distribution of One
Million Signatures pamphlets in 2007 and membership in the armed
opposition group Free Life Party of Kurdistan, with which her lawyer
maintained she was only marginally involved.
Children.--Citizenship is derived by descent when a child is born
to a citizen father regardless of the child's country of birth. In
general birth within the country's borders does not confer citizenship,
except when a child is born to unknown parents; when both parents are
noncitizens, but at least one parent was born in the country; or when a
child born to noncitizens continues to reside in the country for at
least one year after age 18. The birth registration law requires that
all births be registered within 15 days. The responsibility for
implementing birth registration law falls to the Ministries of Justice,
Interior, and Foreign Affairs. According to UNICEF, despite efforts to
register rural births, 13 percent of births were not reported in 2005.
Although primary schooling up to age 11 is free and compulsory for
all, media and other sources reported lower enrollment in rural areas
for girls than for boys. More than 25 percent of refugee children of
primary school age were not enrolled in school.
There was little information available to reflect how the
Government dealt with child abuse, including child labor. Abuse was
largely regarded as a private family matter. In May the Government
announced that approximately 150,000 cases of child abuse had been
recorded in the six months prior, and a prominent attorney added that
the Government did little to address the problem. According a 2005
study by the UN's Integrated Regional Information Network, child sexual
abuse was rarely reported.
The law requires court approval for the marriage of girls younger
than 13 and boys younger than 15, but it was reportedly not unusual in
rural areas for parents to have their children marry before they became
teenagers, often for economic reasons. The age of criminal
responsibility for girls is nine years, while the law does not consider
boys criminally responsible until age 15; thus, if a 12-year-old girl
accuses a 14-year-old boy of rape, the 12-year-old girl would face any
criminal penalties alone. Sex outside of marriage is illegal and is
punishable by death, although media reported that the common punishment
was imprisonment and lashing.
In November 2009 according to the Mehr news agency, the leader of
the student Basij organization, Mohammad Saleh Jokar, announced that
6,000 Basij units would be created in the country's elementary schools.
Jokar said the action aimed to expand and promote Basij and
revolutionary ideals among young persons. He added that approximately
4.5 million students and 320,000 teachers were members of the Basij. An
RFE report noted that the Basij also began a program to register baby
girls for later training in the Basji Hossein Haj Mousaee Basij unit.
The report also discussed ``resource centers'' being built at
elementary schools to prepare children to join the units.
There were reportedly significant numbers of children working as
street vendors in Tehran and other cities and not attending school.
International media sources reported there were as many as 250,000
street children in the country.
International news reported on the plight of children of imprisoned
mothers. According to State Prisons Organization regulations, children
could stay in prison with their mothers until the age of three;
according to a report by the Association for Defending Prisoners'
Rights, children sometimes stayed through the age of six.
In March authorities reportedly released child and women's rights
activist Maryam Zia, arrested in December 2009, on bail of 30 million
toman ($30,000) due to health concerns and, according to some press
reports, a 13-day hunger strike. In September Branch 28 of the
Revolutionary Court sentenced Zia to one year in prison for propaganda
against the regime.
The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. For information on
international parental child abduction, please see the Department of
State's annual report on compliance at http://travel.state.gov/
abduction/resources/congressreport/congressreport--4308.html, as well
as country-specific information at http://travel.state.gov/abduction/
country/country--3781.html.
Anti-Semitism.--The Government's anti-Israel stance, in particular
the president's repeated speeches decrying the existence of Israel and
calling for the destruction of its ``Zionist regime,'' created a
threatening atmosphere for the 25,000-person Jewish community.
Government officials continued to make anti-Semitic statements,
organize events during the year designed to deny the Holocaust, and
sanction anti-Semitic propaganda. The Government also limited
distribution of nonreligious Hebrew texts and required Jewish schools
to remain open on Jewish Sabbath.
Trafficking in Persons.--For information on trafficking in persons,
please see the Department of State's annual Trafficking in Persons
Report at www.state.gov/g/tip.
Persons With Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination
against persons with disabilities. The law also provides for state-
funded vocational education for persons with disabilities, but
according to domestic news reports, vocational centers were confined to
urban areas and were unable to meet the needs of the entire population.
Building accessibility for persons with disabilities remained a
widespread problem. The Welfare Organization of Iran is the principal
governmental agency charged with protecting the rights of persons with
disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The constitution grants equal
rights to all ethnic minorities and allows for minority languages to be
used in the media and in schools; in practice minorities did not have
equal rights, and the Government consistently denied their right to use
their language in school. The Government disproportionately targeted
minority groups, including Kurds, Arabs, Azeris, and Baluch, for
arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention, and physical abuse. These groups
reported political and economic discrimination, particularly in their
access to economic aid, business licenses, university admissions,
permission to publish books, and housing and land rights. The
Government blamed foreign entities, including a number of governments,
for instigating some of the ethnic unrest.
In January 2009 HRW released a report documenting government
persecution of the 4.5 million Kurds in the country, who have
frequently campaigned for greater regional autonomy. The report
documented the Government's use of security laws, media laws, and other
legislation to arrest and persecute Kurds solely for exercising their
right to freedom of expression and association (see section 1.e.,
Political Prisoners and Detainees). According to the report, the
Government consistently banned Kurdish-language newspapers, journals,
and books and punished publishers, journalists, and writers for
opposing and criticizing government policies. Although the Kurdish
language is not banned, schools did not teach it. Authorities
suppressed legitimate activities of Kurdish NGOs by denying
registration permits or bringing spurious charges of security offenses
against individuals working with such organizations. Kurds were not
allowed to register certain names for their children in official
registries.
IHRV reported that two Kurdish students who passed entrance exams
for graduate school in 2009 were denied admission based on their
ethnicity.
There were no developments in the case of Jebraeil Khosravi,
sentenced in January 2009 to a 20-year prison term for membership in an
illegal organization. At year's end he was believed to remain in
Bandar-Abbas Prison.
In November authorities reportedly released Kurdish writer Abbass
Jalilian, who goes by the name ``AKO,'' upon completion of his 15-month
sentence for espionage.
On May 9, the Government executed by hanging Farrad Karmangar,
fellow Kurdish activists Ali Heydarian and Farhad Vakili, and two other
political prisoners at Evin Prison (see section 1.a.). Authorities
originally arrested the three men in 2006 because of their human rights
activism.
Foreign representatives of the Ahvazi Arabs of Khuzestan claimed
their community of two to four million in the country's southwest
encountered oppression and discrimination, including the lack of
freedom to study and speak Arabic. Ahvazi and human rights groups
alleged torture and mistreatment of Ahvazi Arab activists, including
allegations that in September 2009 IRGC intelligence officers raped two
female activists.
In October 2009 relatives of seven men sentenced to death for
killing a clergy member in Ahvaz told local human rights organizations
that authorities had tortured them to coerce confessions.
Ethnic Azeris comprised approximately one-quarter of the country's
population, were well integrated into government and society, and
included the supreme leader among their numbers. Nonetheless, Azeris
complained that the Government discriminated against them, banning the
Azeri language in schools, harassing Azeri activists or organizers, and
changing Azeri geographic names. Azeri groups also claimed a number of
Azeri political prisoners had been jailed for advocating cultural and
language rights for Azeris. The Government charged several of them with
``revolting against the Islamic state.''
On April 2, approximately 10,000 Azeris demonstrated near Lake
Urmia, located between the provinces of West Azerbaijan and East
Azerbaijan, to protest the Government's lack of attention to the drying
out of the lake. The protesters also demanded the preservation of
Azerbaijan's cultural heritage. Authorities arrested more than 100
demonstrators.
On May 25, intelligence officials arrested Akbar Azad, an Azeri
author and journalist, at his home in Tehran. After his arrest,
security forces searched his home and confiscated his computer, books,
and personal property. At year's end he remained in detention.
On August 1, two to three thousand Azeris reportedly demonstrated
for the right to be educated in Azeri Turkish and to condemn
discrimination against their community. According to the RFE report,
Basij militants broke up the demonstration and arrested at least 12
individuals.
On August 25, the brother of Azeri activist Youssef Soleiman
reported that prison authorities abused his brother (see section 1.c.).
In May 2009 media sources reported that 16 ethnic Azeris were
injured during clashes with police in the city of Tabriz and 15
demonstrators were arrested. Protests also took place in the town of
Orumiyeh and in Tehran. The demonstrations commemorated riots of 2006
in Tabriz and other cities protesting a newspaper caricature depicting
Azeris as cockroaches.
Local and international human rights groups alleged serious
economic, legal, and cultural discrimination against the Baluch
minority during the year. Baluch journalists and human rights activists
faced arbitrary arrest, physical abuse, and unfair trials, often ending
in execution. In 2008 authorities executed Baluch journalist and
education activist Yaghoob Mirnehad in Zahedan for alleged membership
in the militant group People's Resistance Movement of Iran (formerly
Jundallah), which the Government considers a terrorist group.
Societal Abuses, Discrimination, and Acts of Violence Based on
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.--The Government censored all
materials relating to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
issues. In 2008 President Ahmadi-Nejad called homosexual activity an
``unlikable and foreign act'' that ``shakes the foundations of
society.''
The Special Protection Division, a volunteer unit of the judiciary,
monitored and reported ``moral crimes.'' The law prohibits and punishes
homosexual conduct; sodomy between consenting adults is a capital
crime. According to a December HRW report, security forces used
discriminatory laws to harass, arrest, and detain individuals they
suspected of being gay. In some cases security forces raided houses and
monitored Internet sites for information on LGBT individuals. Those
accused of sodomy often faced summary trials, and evidentiary standards
were not always met. The punishment of a non-Muslim gay man or lesbian
was harsher if the gay man or lesbian's partner was Muslim. Punishment
for homosexual behavior between men was more severe than for such
behavior between women.
The law defines transgender persons as mentally ill, encouraging
them to seek medical help in the form of gender-reassignment surgery.
The Government provided grants of as much as 4.5 million toman ($4,500)
and loans of as much as 5.5 million toman ($5,500) for transgender
persons willing to undergo gender reassignment surgery. Human rights
activists and NGOs reported that some members of the gay and bisexual
community were pressured to undergo gender reassignment surgery to
avoid legal and social persecutions in the country.
The size of the LGBT community was unknown, as many individuals
feared identifying themselves. There were active LGBT NGOs in the
country, but most activities to support the LGBT community took place
outside the country.
On April 25, according to press reports, police found a 24-year-old
transgender woman known as Mahsa strangled in her apartment. Mahsa had
previously undergone male to female sex-change operations. Her two
brothers confessed to killing her on moral grounds. Although the
brothers were sentenced to prison time of eight years and three years,
respectively, the sentences included suspended jail time, which reduced
their actual sentence in prison to three years and one year,
respectively.
In July according to HRW, a Tabriz court issued an execution order
for Ebrahim Hamidi, who was originally charged at age 16 with raping a
minor. After the victim retracted his accusation, the court acquitted
three other defendants but convicted Hamidi of sodomy based on elm-e
ghazi. According to his lawyer, Mohammed Mostafaei, officials tortured
Hamidi into signing his confession. HRW reported four other men in the
country were in danger of execution for sodomy.
According to the HRW report, family members threatened and abused
many young gay men, who also faced harassment from religious scholars,
schools, and community elders. Some LGBT persons were expelled from
university for allegations of homosexual activities. The HRW report
also alleged that Basij forces attempted to entrap for arrest persons
engaged in homosexual behavior.
On July 10, officers raided a private party in Shirza and arrested
17 gay men. According to a local NGO the charges against the men were
eventually dropped.
Other Societal Violence or Discrimination.--Persons with HIV/AIDS
reportedly faced discrimination in schools and workplaces. The
Government supported programs for HIV/AIDS awareness and generally did
not interfere with private HIV/AIDS-related NGOs. Government hospitals
diagnosed and treated AIDS patients free of charge.
Section 7. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers the right to
establish unions; in practice the Government did not permit independent
unions and severely restricted workers' attempts to organize. Workers
in transportation, education, and other sectors were systematically
suppressed. A national organization known as Workers' House was the
sole authorized national labor organization. It served primarily as a
conduit for government control over workers. The leadership of Workers'
House coordinated activities with Islamic labor councils in industrial,
agricultural, and service organizations comprising more than 35
employees. According to the ICHRI, these councils, which consisted of
representatives of workers and a representative of management, were
essentially management-run unions that undermined workers' efforts to
maintain independent unions, but they nonetheless frequently blocked
layoffs and dismissals in support of workers' demands. During the year
the Government pressured workers to join the Government-sponsored
councils.
The 1990 labor code stipulates that workers may establish an
Islamic labor council or a guild at any workplace or that workers may
appoint an official representative. The law strongly favors Islamic
labor councils; no other form of representation is allowed in a
workplace where such a council has been established. Although Workers'
House oversees Islamic labor councils, the Interior Ministry, the
Ministry of Labor, and the Islamic Information Organization draft
councils' constitutions, operational rules, and election procedures.
There is no representative workers' organization for workers who are
noncitizens.
Restrictions on freedom of association for workers continued during
the year as the Government and the judiciary imprisoned and aimed to
silence labor activists. Because of the severe crackdown on labor
unions from the previous year, many workers groups cancelled annual May
Day protests, including activities focused on the banned teachers
union.
On April 16, leaders of the country's teachers associations met in
the city of Yazd to formulate a statement. Officials from the local
intelligence office telephoned to threaten them and warn them to leave.
The statement by the leaders of the Coordinating Council of Teacher's
Trade Association called for hunger strikes after National Teachers Day
on May 2.
On April 22, intelligence officials summoned Tofigh Mortezapour and
Hasan Kharatian, both from the Teachers' Trade Association in Tabriz.
On April 26, authorities searched Mortezapour's house and confiscated
personal items, including his computer and papers. On April 27,
authorities interrogated both men.
On April 24, intelligence officials summoned three members of the
Teachers' Trade Association in Hamedan--Ali Najafi, Asghar Mohammad
Khani, and Jalal Naderi--to the local intelligence office. The ICHRI
reports that authorities detained Najafi for a day and night. The three
faced interrogations again on April 26.
Also on April 24, the Tehran Investigation Office of the
Intelligence Ministry summoned Ali Akbar Baghani, the secretary general
of the Teacher's Trade Association, and Mohammad Beheshti Langeroudi,
the spokesperson for the association. On April 29, intelligence agents
searched their houses and detained the two men without informing them
of the charges. The events prefaced worker and teacher strikes planned
for May 1 and 2. Both men were released in July after 63 days in
prison.
In a related incident on April 28, the Human Rights Activists News
Agency reported that security forces entered the house of Alireza
Hashemi, head of the Teachers' Organization, and took him to an unknown
location after confiscating his computer and a number of personal
belongings. In June 2009 during a general crackdown on dissidents,
authorities arrested and detained him for 25 days. At year's end he
remained in prison.
On May 1, National Workers Day, union and student protesters
clashed in Tehran, and dozens were reported injured. There were also
reports of demonstrations in other cities including Tabriz, Shiraz,
Kermanshah, Qazvin, and Esfahan. International media reported that more
than 16 persons were injured. Also on May 1, authorities reportedly
briefly detained Mahmoud Salehi, former head of the Saqqez Bakery
Workers' Union who completed a prison term in 2008, and asked him not
to participate in Workers' Day activities.
On June 12, authorities arrested Reza Shahabi, a leader of the bus
syndicate, and kept him in solitary confinement for 40 days. The Tehran
bus company fired Shahabi four years prior for alleged union activity.
The ICHRI reported that the Revolutionary Court had not at year's end
charged Shahabi with any crime. In December Shahabi went on a hunger
strike to protest that he had not been released after payment of his
bail of one million toman ($100,000). At year's end he remained in
prison.
On August 3, a court sentenced Rasoul Bodaghi, a member of the
board of directors of the teachers' association, to six years in prison
and prohibited him from union activity for five years on charges of
``propaganda against the system'' and ``assembly and attempt to disrupt
the national security.'' Authorities arrested the veteran teacher in
September 2009. Gohardasht Prison guards reportedly severely beat him
on May 28.
On November 2, intelligence officials in Karaj briefly detained and
reportedly assaulted bus syndicate leaders Saeed Torabian and
Gholamreza Gholamhosseini. Two days later, intelligence officials
arrested the two as they were posting a message on the Internet about
the November 2 incident. On November 3, authorities reportedly released
Torabian, but Gholamhosseini remained in prison at year's end, along
with other syndicate leaders arrested in November, including Morteza
Komsari and Ali Akbar Nazari. Authorities also detained Torabian from
June 9 to July 20, charging him with acting against national security
and speaking against the regime.
There was no update on the case of journalist and union organizer
Sajad Khaksari, whose final charge was awaiting treatment by a public
court in Tehran in December 2009. Khaksari is the son of Mohammad
Khaksari and Soraya Darabi, both leaders of the Iran Teachers' Trade
Association.
On January 4, security agents arrested the then public relations
officer of the Haft Tapeh Sugar Cane Company's trade union, Reza
Rakhshan, and detained him until his January 20 release on bail of 15
billion toman ($15 million). On December 1, the Avhaz appeals court
reversed a lower court's acquittal of Rakhshan, by that time the new
president of the union, and sentenced him to six months in prison for
``propagation of lies.'' Rakhshan had written an article commemorating
the second anniversary of the union and describing his firing earlier
in the year for union activities. On April 14, authorities released
then union president Ali Nejati on bail. Union leaders Mohammed Heydari
Mehr, Feridoun Nikoufard, Jalil Ahmadi, and Ghorban Alipour were all
released after serving sentences of between four and six months.
In August 2009 security officers closed the offices of the
Association of Iranian Journalists immediately before a union general
meeting and President Ahmadi-Nejad's swearing-in. At year's end the
association was inactive, and many of its members remained in prison.
There was no further information about Ebrahim Madadi, who remained
in prison at year's end on charges from 2007.
On May 28, prison authorities transferred bus-driver syndicate
leader Mansour Ossanloo from Evin Prison to solitary confinement in an
IRGC ward at Gohardasht Prison. The ICHRI reported that intelligence
ministry interrogators reportedly subjected Ossanloo to harsh
interrogations and mental torture. AI noted that authorities denied
Ossanloo medical care. In August Branch 1 of the Revolutionary Court
reportedly sentenced Ossanloo to an additional year in prison for
``propaganda against the regime.'' Ossanloo had no access to a lawyer
during his sentencing, and authorities failed to notify his lawyers
that he was going to court. Ossanloo's original charges dated from
2007.
The law prohibits public sector strikes, and the Government
considered unlawful any strike deemed contrary to government economic
and labor policies, including strikes in the private sector, but
strikes did occur. According to international media reports, security
forces continued to respond with arbitrary arrests and violence to
workers' attempts to conduct labor strikes.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers did not
have the right to organize independently or to negotiate collective
bargaining agreements freely. According to the International Trade
Union Confederation, labor legislation did not apply in export
processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The labor code
prohibits all forms of forced or compulsory labor, including by
children; however, there were reports that such practices occurred. See
also the Department of State's annual Trafficking in Persons Report at
www.state.gov/g/tip.
d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment.--The
law prohibits employment of minors younger than 15 and places
restrictions on employment of minors younger than 18, such as
prohibitions on hard labor or night work; however, it permits children
to work in agriculture, domestic service, and some small businesses.
The Government did not adequately monitor or enforce laws pertaining to
child labor, and child labor was a serious problem.
According to government sources, three million children were
prevented from obtaining education because their families forced them
to work. Unofficial sources claimed the figure was closer to five
million, and credible reports stated that approximately 14 percent of
children in the country were forced to work in dangerous conditions.
There were reportedly significant numbers of children--primarily
Afghan, but also Iranian--working as street vendors in major urban
areas. Traffickers also exploited children for forced commercial sexual
exploitation and involuntary servitude as beggars and laborers.
Children also worked as mechanic apprentices or in clay/brickmaking
operations. Also see the Department of State's annual Trafficking in
Persons Report at www.state.gov/g/tip.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--On March 16, according to
international media, the Supreme Labor Council announced an annual
minimum wage of 303,048 toman ($303); labor rights activists claimed
that amount was insufficient to feed a family of four in Tehran.
The labor law does not cover an estimated 700,000 legal workers, as
it applies in full only to workplaces with 10 or more workers.
Workplaces with fewer than five workers or in export processing zones
are exempt from all labor laws. Afghan workers, especially those
working illegally, often were paid less than the minimum wage.
The law establishes a maximum six-day, 48-hour workweek with a
weekly rest day (normally Friday), at least 12 days of paid annual
leave, and several paid public holidays. Women have the right to
maternity leave.
The law establishes a safety council chaired by the labor minister
or his representative to protect workplace safety and health. Labor
organizations outside the country have alleged that hazardous work
environments were common and resulted in thousands of worker deaths
annually. The quality of safety regulation enforcement was unknown, and
it was unknown whether workers could remove themselves from hazardous
situations without risking the loss of employment.
__________
IRAQ
Iraq, with a population of approximately 29 million, is a republic
with a freely elected government led by Prime Minister Nouri Kamal al-
Maliki. On December 22, the new government was sworn in after the
parliament, the Council of Representatives (COR), approved a power-
sharing agreement reached by all of the country's major political blocs
on November 11, approximately nine months after the March 7 elections.
Despite the controversy surrounding the January 15 decision by Iraq's
Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to ban approximately 500
candidates for alleged ties to the banned Ba'ath Party, and violence
before and on election day, the COR elections met internationally
recognized standards for free and fair elections, and the results of
these legislative elections reflected the general will of the voters.
Iraqi security forces (ISF) reported to civilian authorities, but
continuing violence, corruption, and organizational dysfunction
undermined the Government's ability to protect human rights. During the
year the following significant human rights problems were reported:
arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life; extremist and terrorist
bombings and executions; disappearances; torture and other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; poor conditions in
pretrial detention and prison facilities; arbitrary arrest and
detention; impunity; denial of fair public trials; delays in resolving
property restitution claims; insufficient judicial institutional
capacity; arbitrary interference with privacy and home; limits on
freedoms of speech, press, and assembly and extremist threats and
violence; limits on religious freedom due to extremist threats and
violence; restrictions on freedom of movement; large numbers of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees; lack of transparency
and significant, widespread corruption at all levels of government;
constraints on international organizations and nongovernmental
organizations' (NGOs) investigations of alleged violations of human
rights; discrimination against and societal abuses of women and ethnic,
religious, and racial minorities; human trafficking; societal
discrimination and violence against individuals based on sexual
orientation; and limited exercise of labor rights.
Extremist violence, coupled with weak government performance in
upholding the rule of law, resulted in widespread and severe human
rights abuses. Terrorist groups, such as al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), and
other extremist elements continued to launch highly destructive
attacks, attempting to influence the elections and government formation
process, fuel sectarian tensions, and undermine the Government's
ability to maintain law and order. Extremist and AQI attacks continued
against ISF and government officials. AQI and other extremists also
conducted high-profile bombings targeting urban areas, Shia markets,
and mosques, and Shia religious pilgrims. Religious minorities,
sometimes labeled ``anti-Islamic,'' were often targeted in the
violence.
During the year, despite some reconciliation and easing of tensions
in several provinces, the Government's human rights performance
consistently fell short of according citizens the protections the law
provides. However, the credible and legitimate national parliamentary
elections in all 18 provinces on March 7 reflected a significant
achievement in advancing the free exercise of human rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--During the year
there were press reports and personal accounts that the Government or
its agents committed numerous arbitrary or unlawful killings connected
to its security operations. These numerous accounts and press reports
accused government security forces of being responsible for unlawful
deprivation of life. The outcome of official investigations was often
unpublished, unknown or incomplete.
With the increased exercise of central government authority over
security forces, widespread and confirmed unauthorized government agent
involvement in extrajudicial killings largely ceased, although there
were reports of individuals using their security positions to settle
personal grievances and grudges. In addition, there were reports of
attacks by individuals posing as ISF. On January 17, a group of
approximately 30 men dressed in military uniforms executed three
brothers from the Mjamma'i tribe. On April 2, 16 gunmen in ISF uniforms
killed 24 persons in the Sunni village of Albusaifi. Victims of this
attack included former members of the Sons of Iraq (SOI), government-
paid security forces who turned against al-Qaida. On October 11, gunmen
wearing military uniforms killed four members of a government-supported
Sunni militia in Yusufiya. In response, beginning in January the
Government ordered tailors to sign pledges promising not to make or
sell uniforms to nonsecurity personnel and imposed fines, business
closures, and possible jail sentences for noncompliance.
Violence against the civilian population perpetrated by terrorist
groups remained a problem during the year, and bombings, executions,
and killings were regular occurrences throughout all regions and
sectors of society. For example, on January 25, suicide bombers
attacked several hotels in Baghdad, killing 37 persons. On March 26,
two bombs exploded in a restaurant, killing 57 persons. On May 10,
coordinated bombings and shootings across the country resulted in at
least 119 fatalities, including ISF and law enforcement personnel. On
August 17, a suicide bomber blew himself up in a crowd of army recruits
in Baghdad, killing 61 persons.
Incidents of terrorist attacks by female suicide bombers continued
to occur throughout the year. On February 1, a female suicide bomber
killed 54 Shiite pilgrims in Baghdad. On July 4, a female suicide
bomber killed at least four persons at the entrance to the provincial
government offices in Ramadi.
From January 1 through December 31, an estimated 652 ISF personnel
were killed in combat (noncriminal) actions and 2,204 were wounded.
During the year 962 Ministry of Interior (MOI) personnel were killed
and 1,347 were injured. Police officers, in particular, were targeted.
For example, in the week beginning August 1, gunmen or explosives
killed at least five traffic officers and wounded 19 in Baghdad,
forcing the authorities to arm some of the traffic officers with AK-47
assault rifles. On August 25, coordinated attacks targeting security
forces throughout the country killed at least 56 individuals. On
November 2, a roadside bomb in Sa'diyah exploded near a police convoy,
killing three officers. On December 29, an attack by three suicide
bombers in Mosul killed a prominent police commander and caused the
collapse of the police station. The police commander who was killed,
Lt. Col. Shamel Ahmed al-Jabouri, had been recognized for confronting
terrorist groups in the area. The attack was the sixth attempt on his
life and the second in the previous three months. An AQI-affiliated
group, Islamic State of Iraq, claimed responsibility for the attack.
Terrorists also targeted government institutions and leaders.
Terrorists subjected the International Zone, where many government
institutions and foreign embassies are located, to rocket and mortar
attacks throughout the year. On February 18, a suicide car bomber
killed 13 individuals outside the main government complex in Ramadi.
Suicide attackers targeted the same Ramadi government complex in Anbar
province twice, on December 12 and 27, killing at least 13 in the first
attack and at least 17 in the second attack. On April 4, suicide
attackers detonated car bombs near embassies in Baghdad, resulting in
42 fatalities. On October 19, the UN special representative to Iraq, Ad
Melkert, escaped unharmed when a roadside bomb struck his convoy; one
ISF member died from the attack.
Terrorists also targeted religious institutions and minority groups
(see section 2.c.).
There was an increase in AQI attacks against Sunnis cooperating
with the Government--the SOI and Sunni tribal leaders. On April 20,
gunmen killed five family members, beheading three, of the local anti-
AQI militia in Tarmiyah. On June 17, gunmen killed Khudair Hamad al-
Issawi, his wife, and two sons in a village outside Falluja. On July
18, a suicide bomber killed at least 45 anti-al-Qaida Sunni fighters
waiting for their paychecks. On August 18, gunmen killed an SOI member
at an official checkpoint in Madaen; a bomb attached to a vehicle
killed another SOI member in Baquba. On December 18, Sheik Ahmed Abu
Risha, head of the Anbar Awakening Council, survived an assassination
attempt when police defused a bomb concealed in a laptop.
In Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Dohuk, the three provinces under the
authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), there were
significantly fewer reports of extremist violence than elsewhere in the
country.
There were press reports and credible accounts of KRG security
forces committing arbitrary or unlawful killings and arrests.
Although violence levels were lower in the KRG as compared with the
rest of the country, there were incidents of terrorist attacks. For
example, on September 29, in Qaladiza district, northeast of
Sulamaniyah, a suicide bomber wearing a Peshmerga uniform attempted to
detonate explosives among the Kurdish Peshmerga forces but was
intercepted before gaining access to the facility and chose to detonate
the explosives instead of surrendering to the security forces.
On November 1, in Erbil, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive
device was discovered at a checkpoint approximately three miles south
of the inner city. Two passengers in the vehicle at the checkpoint were
killed.
On May 4, Sardasht Osman, a contributor to the independent news
outlets, was abducted and killed. He was known for his articles
alleging nepotism and corruption in the leadership of the Kurdish
region, including President Massoud Barzani and his immediate family.
His body was found on May 5 in Mosul.
On several occasions throughout the year, the Turkish government
used military aircraft to attack areas where the Kurdistan Workers'
Party (PKK), a terrorist organization, were active in the north.
According to press reports, one civilian was killed and two others were
injured by artillery fire in Iraq on June 18.
Iranian forces occasionally bombarded areas along the Iran-Iraq
border, targeting members of the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan, an
Iranian Kurdish separatist group. According to press reports on
September 25, Iranian forces killed 30 Kurdish insurgents in the Qandil
Mountains in northeastern Iraq as a reprisal for a bombing in the
Iranian city of Mahabad, which killed 12 persons and wounded 80.
There were no known developments in killings that were reported in
2008 or 2009.
Other parts of this report contain related information (see
sections 2.a., 2.c., and 2.d.).
b. Disappearance.--The majority of reported cases of disappearances
or kidnappings appeared to be financially motivated. Religious
minorities and children were often the target of such kidnappings.
Kidnappers who did not receive a ransom often killed their victims.
Police believed that the majority of these cases went unreported.
As in 2009, there were fewer reports that police arrested civilians
without an arrest warrant and held them for ransom. However, there were
numerous reports of the police releasing legally arrested persons from
custody after receiving monetary payment.
New mass graves of thousands of persons who went missing under the
Saddam Hussein-regime were found during the year. On January 5, the
Karbala Provincial Council Human Rights Committee announced the
discovery of a mass grave containing the remains of 23 persons killed
during the al-Shabaniyah (Shiite uprising of 1991). On January 24, the
Ministry of Human Rights (MOHR) in Karbala announced finding a mass
grave also with the remains of victims from the al-Shabaniyah. On
January 24, police found the remains of eight persons, believed to have
died after 2003, at a grave site outside Fallujah. On March 17, the
MOHR announced the discovery of three mass graves containing the
remains of 255 persons killed in the 1980s and 1990s in Wasit Province.
On March 23, the MOHR announced the discovery of a mass grave
containing the remains dating to 1991 of 20 persons in Maysan Province.
On June 20, police discovered the remains of eight persons in Baghdad,
presumed to be victims of sectarian violence during 2006-07. On June
25, police found a mass grave near Samarra containing the remains of 11
persons presumed to be victims of 2006-07 sectarian violence following
the attacks on a revered Shiite shrine during both years. In July the
KRG Ministry of Martyrs Affairs discovered two mass graves in Sorya
village in Dohuk Province: the first containing the remains of 28
persons, mostly children and women; the second, the remains of 14
persons. In October the MOHR in Ramadi announced the finding of a mass
grave with the remains of victims of at least 69 persons who died in
the 1980s.
Reports indicated KRG authorities arrested some minorities without
due process in Iraq's disputed internal boundary region, taking them to
undisclosed locations for detention.
Other parts of this report contain related information (see
sections 1.b. and 2.a.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The constitution expressly prohibits torture in all its
forms under all circumstances, as well as cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment. During the year there were documented instances of torture
and other abuses by government agents and similar abuses by illegal
armed groups. The Government's effectiveness in adhering to the rule of
law in these circumstances faced obstacles from continuing large-scale
violence, corruption, sectarian bias, and lack of civilian oversight
and accountability, particularly in the security forces and detention
facilities.
Local and international human rights organizations, the MOHR, and
the human rights directorates of the MOI and Ministry of Defense (MOD)
continued to report allegations of torture and abuse in several MOI and
MOD detention facilities, as well as in KRG security forces' detention
facilities. A MOHR prisons report for 2009 indicated that there were
326 documented cases of torture and mistreatment at MOI facilities, 152
cases at MOD facilities, 14 cases at Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs (MOLSA) facilities, one case at Ministry of Justice (MOJ)
facilities, and 12 in Peshmerga facilities in the Kurdistan region
during that year.
As in previous years, reports of abuse at the point of arrest and
investigation, particularly by the MOI's Federal Police and MOD
battalion-level forces, continued to be common. Allegations of abuse
included use of stress positions, beatings, electric shocks, sexual
assault, denial of medical treatment, death threats, and death.
On April 19, the local and international media reported the
discovery of a secret prison operated by security forces under control
of the Prime Minister's Office containing more than 400 Sunni
detainees, of which over 100 were reportedly tortured. The detainees
were arrested by the ISF during October 2009 security sweeps in Ninewa
Province and then transferred to a prison in Baghdad. One prisoner
reportedly died in January from the abuse, while others were allegedly
beaten, raped, suffocated with plastic bags, and had electricity
applied to them. Authorities initially arrested three officers, but
they were later released without charge. There were no prosecutions of
any officer or judge associated with the event. Subsequently, 75 of the
prisoners were released and 200 were transferred to other jails,
according to government officials.
In May 2009 three detainees at the MOI's Al Forsan detention
facility in Ramadi were allegedly tortured, and in June 2009 prison
guards allegedly tortured and raped female detainees at an MOI
detention facility in the Adamiya neighborhood of Baghdad. Charges were
brought against the officers involved; no further updates were
available. In June 2009, in response to three COR members' allegations
that 11 detainees had been subjected to abuse and torture by MOI
officials, the Government established a committee that charged 40
police officers with abuse. According to government reports, one
general, two colonels, two majors, and two lieutenants were suspended
pending additional investigation into charges of detainee abuse; no
further updates were available.
Impunity for security forces continued, although there were
indications that some disciplinary action was taken against security
forces accused of having committed human rights abuses and judicial
follow-up in some torture cases, but little information was publicly
available. The MOI Human Rights Directorate, charged with investigating
human rights allegations within the police force, had a staff of 90
investigators based in Baghdad and 14 others, one in each province
excluding the KRG. During 2009 the MOI Human Rights Directorate opened
55 investigations into human rights abuse cases and sent 15 cases to
court for further investigation, nine of which had substantiated
allegations of torture against 14 officers, including one general, five
colonels, and three majors. There was no comparable information
available for 2010 at year's end.
There were fewer reports of torture or abuse in the MOJ's pretrial
detention facilities than in the MOI or MOD facilities.
The KRG's Antiterrorist Law allows abusive interrogation under
certain conditions, and such practices reportedly occurred in some
detention facilities run by the KRG internal security forces, Asayish,
and the party-affiliated intelligence services Parastin of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Zaniyari of the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK). Allegations of abuse included stress positions, broken
fingers, and application of electric shocks. A 2009 MOHR report on
prison conditions in the Kurdistan region noted that inspectors had
observed signs of ``systemic torture'' in Asayish detention facilities,
although cases in prisons run by KRG Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs were limited to isolated instances.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions.--By law the MOJ has full
control and authority over all detention facilities, except for those
administered by the MOD for military justice purposes. This law was not
fully implemented, however, and four separate ministries--the MOJ, MOI,
MOD, and MOLSA--continued to operate detention facilities. KRG social
welfare authorities operated prisons in the KRG, and KRG security
authorities operated pretrial detention facilities. KRG internal
security forces and KRG intelligence services operated separate
detention facilities as well. Kurdish authorities operated eight
detention facilities that combined pretrial and postconviction housing
and eight additional internal security pretrial detention facilities.
Although the Government had not yet provided adequate resources
(personnel, supplies, equipment, and facilities) to the MOJ for it to
assume complete control over all detention operations throughout the
country, there was progress in transferring MOD detainees to MOJ
detention facilities. The country's fractured penal structure, in which
the MOJ held convicts and the MOJ, MOI, and to a lesser extent the MOD,
hold detainees complicated detention and prison operations. For
example, the MOJ oversaw day-to-day operations in the Baghdad prison
formerly known as Camp Honor, but another agency controlled outside
access to the facility, resulting in the denial of family member access
to detainees.
At year's end, there were 12 MOJ prisons and 11 MOJ pretrial
detention facilities.
MOI detention facilities comprise an estimated six Federal Police
facilities and 294 Iraqi Police facilities. There are an estimated
1,200 smaller MOI police holding stations throughout the country
managed, staffed, and operated by the Federal Police, Iraqi Police
Services, Criminal Investigations Division, and the National
Investigative and Information Agency. Although there were no
independently verified statistics, it was estimated that the MOI
facilities held as many as 8,000 pretrial detainees.
The MOD operated 27 Iraqi army pretrial detention centers for
detainees captured during military raids and operations. There were
reports of unofficial detention centers throughout the country. The MOD
lacked the legal authority to detain civilians and was required to
transfer detainees to MOI or MOJ facilities within 24 hours. In May
2009 the MOD began transferring its civilian detainees to MOJ custody.
Approximately 325 civilian detainees remained in MOD custody at year's
end (650 at the end of 2009), the majority located in a detention
facility in the International Zone in Baghdad. After reports of
systematic abuse in this facility, the Government closed it and
transferred the detainees to MOJ facilities.
The majority of individuals in MOI and MOD facilities were pretrial
detainees. Overcrowding of pretrial detainees remained a problem in all
detention facilities throughout the country due to slow case processing
and lack of information sharing among relevant agencies.
The MOJ is the only government entity with the legal authority to
hold, care for, and guard posttrial detainees. The total capacity of
MOJ's Iraqi Corrections Service (ICS) facilities was 26,469 beds for
men (not including emergency capacity) and 553 beds for women. The
total number of prisoners in the ICS was 25,020, 43 percent of whom
were pretrial detainees.
In MOI and MOD detention facilities, conditions and treatment of
detainees were generally reported as poor. The MOI Human Rights
Directorate reported conducting 1,020 inspections during the year, a
significant increase from 270 inspections in 2009, and noted that
overcrowding remained widespread. Many lacked adequate food, exercise
facilities, medical care, and family visitation. Limited infrastructure
or aging physical plants in some facilities resulted in marginal
sanitation, limited access to water and electricity, and poor quality
food. Medical care in MOI and MOD detention facilities was not provided
consistently, and there continued to be allegations of abuse and
torture in some facilities.
Despite limited resources and funds, MOJ detention facilities
provided detainees with better treatment and living conditions than MOI
and MOD detention facilities. Medical care in MOJ's ICS prisons in some
locations exceeded the community standard. ICS personnel made
significant progress in meeting internationally accepted standards for
prisoner needs. The MOJ is responsible for training ICS guards and
correctional executive management staff, providing the facilities with
necessary supplies and equipment, addressing overcrowding, facilitating
case processing, and providing prison rehabilitation programs.
The ICS internal affairs department monitored abuse or violations
of prisoners' human rights. Allegations of abuse resulted in the
disciplining of ICS officers in some cases. During the year there were
seven allegations that ICS staff abused detainees. There was no
information available on the disposition of these cases at year's end.
The law mandates that women and juveniles be held separately from
male adults. Although this law was generally observed, in some cases
women were held in the same detention facility as men but in segregated
quarters and cellblocks. A MOD inspection of a facility in Baghdad's
International Zone found women at the facility, albeit in separate
cells. Juveniles were also occasionally held with adults. MOD
inspections of its International Zone facility and Old Muthanna
detention facilities found juveniles living in the same cells as adult
detainees. Additionally pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners were
sometimes held in the same facility due to space limitations.
During the year MOLSA's juvenile facilities improved. The end-of-
year population of the Tobschi juvenile facility in Baghdad was 297
pretrial juveniles, while the facility's capacity was 327. Legal,
medical, educational, and social services were available on site. The
Karada female juvenile facility, which had a population within its
capacity, had medical services on site. The Shalchiya facility also had
a population within its capacity. The Kharq juvenile facility remained
overcrowded, with a capacity of 245 and a total population of 490
posttrial juveniles. There were no reported instances of abuse or
mistreatment in MOLSA facilities. Small numbers of juveniles were also
held at some MOJ and police stations; for example, 167 juveniles were
at MOJ facilities at year's end.
KRG security authorities operated male pretrial detention
facilities, and KRG social welfare authorities operated male posttrial
and female and juvenile pretrial and posttrial detention facilities in
the Kurdistan region. The KRG internal security forces and the KRG
intelligence services operated separate detention facilities. Domestic
and international human rights NGOs and intergovernmental organizations
generally had access to pretrial and posttrial facilities. Access by
independent organizations to the facilities of the KRG internal
security and intelligence services was limited to the MOHR, the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the UN.
Until the April media reports of an extrajudicial detention
facility appeared, the national detention facilities occasionally
permitted visits by representatives of the national MOHR and members of
parliament. After the press coverage, MOHR officials reported
encountering resistance at some detention facilities to MOHR visits.
KRG detention facilities permitted visits by the national MOHR and KRG
human rights authorities. The MOHR's annual report covering 2009 was
generally critical of prison standards across the country and addressed
general conditions and populations of detention facilities, judicial
processes, and torture allegations.
Domestic and international human rights NGOs and intergovernmental
organizations generally did not have access to national MOI detention
and pretrial facilities, although the MOHR initiated a program in 2009
to train NGOs in how to conduct prison inspections. Some
intergovernmental organizations had access to similar facilities of the
KRG internal security and intelligence forces, which were separate from
the national facilities.
The ICRC had access in accordance with its standard modalities to
MOJ detention facilities, together with access to places of detention
under other ministries, although at times with difficulties. The ICRC
did not have access to the Counterterrorism Center detention facility.
During the year the ICRC carried out 118 visits to 39 central
government detention facilities. The ICRC also regularly visited 40 KRG
detention facilities.
The ICRC had a separate agreement with the KRG for access, although
not full unrestricted access, to KRG detention facilities. They
formally renewed the agreement in December 2009.
Other parts of this report contain related information (see
sections 1.d. and 5).
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention.--The constitution provides for
protection against arbitrary arrest and detention without a warrant,
except in extreme exigent circumstances as provided for in a state of
emergency. In practice there were many instances of arbitrary arrest
and detention.
Role of the Police and Security Apparatus.--The ISF consists of MOI
security forces and MOD military forces and amounted to approximately
793,000 persons at the end of October, consisting of 259,910 military
and 4,120 special forces personnel. The MOI exercised its
responsibilities throughout the country, except in the KRG area. These
responsibilities included providing internal security through police
and domestic intelligence capabilities, facilities protection, and
regulating all domestic and foreign private security companies. The MOI
was also responsible for emergency response, border enforcement,
dignitary protection, firefighting, and internal monitoring of the
conduct of MOI personnel. The army, under direction of the MOD, also
played a part in providing domestic security. Official impunity was a
serious problem.
The MOI security forces included several components: the 301,286-
member Iraqi Police Service primarily deployed to police stations; the
majority Shia 43,957-member Federal Police, organized into commandos
and public order police; the 60,605-member Border Enforcement Police;
and the 94,000 Facilities Protection Service security guards deployed
at MOI direction at individual ministries. The MOI was responsible for
approximately 529,000 employees, almost 10 percent of the country's
male labor force as of the end of October.
During the year the security services grappled with the problem of
integrating the SOI into the ISF, strengthened chain of command and
control, and promoted force modernization, enabling the ISF to improve
operations against extremists. Although oversight by MOI and MOD
internal affairs increased, problems continued with all security
services arising from sectarian divisions, corruption, and
unwillingness to serve outside the areas in which personnel were
recruited. The effort of the head of the largely Shia Federal Police to
have police serve in provinces other than their home provinces to
reduce corruption was only partially successful.
Government efforts to pay the approximately 94,000 SOI personnel,
predominately Sunnis, and integrate them into long-term employment (20
percent with state security agencies and 80 percent with civil
ministries) were stalled in late 2009 in advance of the March 2010
parliamentary elections. Prior to this period, the Government had
transitioned 43 percent of the approximately 95,000 SOI members into
the ISF or various civil ministries. During the elections the
Government put the transition of the SOI into civilian and Iraqi
security forces jobs on hold to afford extra security during and after
the elections. Security needs during government formation extended this
pause in SOI transition.
A history of pay problems and slow transition to other employment,
although coincidental, contribute to negative perceptions among the
SOI. Despite these delays the Government continued to support the Sons
of Iraq. Since May 2009 the Government has been responsible for paying
all SOI salaries, and timeliness continued to improve. In two of the
last four months of the year (September and December), the SOI were
paid early, with only minor delays in four provinces in October and
November. Other recent government actions to address the problem
included establishing a joint interagency coordination center for the
SOI, more timely payments, and the creation by the prime minister of a
committee focused on how best to promote successful SOI integration. In
addition, the Government's draft 2011 budget included $195 million for
salaries and other payments for the SOI. Suspected government targeting
and arrest of SOI personnel for alleged previous terrorist activity
continued to be a point of tension between the Sunni population and the
Government.
The KRG maintained its own regional security forces, the Peshmerga,
as set forth in the constitution. The two main parties of the Kurdish
region maintained ties to these Peshmerga units, which remained
separated in practice along party lines, as well as to other security
and intelligence units currently outside KRG or central government
control. KRG security forces and intelligence services detained
suspects in KRG-controlled areas. The poorly defined borders between
the KRG and the central government and contested areas of authority
remained a cause of confusion, and therefore concern, with regard to
the jurisdiction of security and courts. In April 2009 the chief judge
of Sulaymaniyah Province and the head of the PUK branch of the KRG
internal security forces signed a memorandum of understanding,
acknowledging the supremacy of the civilian court system in all
security matters. KRG internal security forces pledged not to carry out
arrests and other actions without court authority in the memorandum.
Due to a lack of progress in the integration of security forces,
effective control by political leaders continued through political
party channels.
The MOI established the internal security forces disciplinary and
criminal court system in 2008. By year's end, the courts had heard more
than 6,000 cases and returned 2,000 convictions for violations and
crimes committed by MOI police.
A significant number of allegations of MOI and MOD abuses were
raised during the year, although few of these allegations led to
convictions. There were continued reports of torture and abuse
throughout the country in many MOI police stations and MOD facilities;
the incidents generally occurred during the interrogation phases. The
MOI Internal Affairs Division did not release the number of officers
punished during the year.
Security force officials were rarely pursued for suspected crimes
because ministers, responsible for the suspect, have the legal ability
block an arrest warrant. Section 136(b) of the criminal procedure code
gives ministers the opportunity to review and prevent the execution of
arrest warrants that sitting judges presiding over criminal
investigations have issued against members of the security forces.
Permission was rarely given during the year to prosecute higher-level
officials.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention.--The
constitution prohibits ``unlawful detention'' and mandates that
preliminary investigative documents be submitted to an investigative
judge within 24 hours from time of arrest, a period that can be
extended by one day. For offenses punishable by death, the defendant
can be detained for as long as necessary to complete the judicial
process. Law enforcement authorities reportedly continued to detain and
search individuals without an arrest warrant after the state of
emergency law expired in 2007, although there were no reliable
statistics available on such incidents.
In practice many detainees were held for months or years without
access to defense counsel or without being formally charged or brought
before a judge. Police and army personnel frequently arrested and
detained suspects without judicial approval. MOHR and MOD Human Rights
Directorate inspections of the MOD detention facilities in the
International Zone and at Old Muthanna Airfield found many detainees
without case files or valid detention orders. Police often failed to
notify family members of the arrest or location of detention, resulting
in incommunicado detention. Unlike in the previous year, fewer security
sweeps were conducted throughout entire neighborhoods or provinces.
At year's end, the number of detainees in government hands was
estimated at 21,000, not including those in central government
facilities in the KRG or Asayish and KRG intelligence service
facilities. At year's end, the ICS held 11,063; the MOI, an unverified
number estimated at 8,000; the MOD, 325; and MOLSA, approximately 350.
The KRG total was reported to be approximately 338, not including
central government facilities in the KRG or Asayish and KRG
intelligence service facilities.
In practice few detainees saw an investigative judge within the
legally mandated time period. Many complained they did not see the
investigative judge until months or sometimes years after arrest and
detention. Incommunicado detention took place. Lengthy detention
periods without judicial action were a systemic problem. The lack of
judicial review was due to a number of factors that included
undocumented detentions, backlogs in the judiciary, slow processing of
criminal investigations, and an insufficient number of judges. There
were allegations of detention beyond judicial release dates as well as
unlawful releases.
The Government periodically released detainees, usually after
concluding it had insufficient evidence for the courts to convict them.
During the year the Government released approximately 560 detainees.
Detainees initiated hunger strikes to protest either poor detention
conditions or slow case processing. It was unclear if the hunger
strikes resulted in any improvement in detention conditions or case
processing. On February 19, detainees at al-Minaa detention facility in
Basrah went on a hunger strike to protest detention conditions ``not
fit for animals.'' On May 31, the media reported detainees at al-
Rusafah facility in Baghdad initiated a hunger strike to protest
conditions there. On October 30, the media reported detainees at al-
Miqdadiyah facility in Diyala Province embarked on a hunger strike to
protest conditions there and the slow processing of their cases. This
was the second time during the year that al-Miqdadiyah detainees
launched a hunger strike.
There were reports that KRG internal security units detained
suspects incommunicado and without an arrest warrant and that they
transported detainees to undisclosed detention facilities.
Police across the country continued to use coerced confessions and
abuse as methods of investigation.
The law allows release on bond, and in practice criminal (but not
security) detainees were considered for release on bail.
Judges are authorized to appoint paid counsel for the indigent and
did so in practice. Attorneys appointed to represent detainees
frequently complained that poor access to their clients after their
appointment hampered adequate attorney-client consultation.
Other sections of this report contain related information (see
sections 2.a. and 2.d.).
Amnesty.--During the year the Government granted amnesty to 72
persons.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
independent judiciary. Although the judicial system was credited with
efforts to maintain an independent stance, the security situation in
the country rendered the judiciary weak and dependent on other parts of
the Government. Threats and killings by sectarian, tribal, extremist,
and criminal elements impaired judicial independence in many places.
The Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCC-I), Kharkh and the Felony
Court, Rusafa (formerly the Rusafa CCC-I), which operated in heavily
guarded locations in Baghdad, were notable exceptions. The MOI agreed
to supplement security for judges and allowed judges to select which
police officers would be assigned to their security detail.
Approximately 2,000 police officers under MOI authority were assigned
to protect judges.
Judges frequently faced death threats and attacks. Judges' family
members also faced death threats and attacks. On June 6, an appeal
judge survived an assassination attempt when a roadside bomb exploded
near his convoy. On July 14, Judge Hassan Aziz of the Cassation Court
was assassinated after an adhesive bomb was placed in his car in
western Baghdad. Between August 10 and September 7, there were 12
assassination attempts on judges throughout the country.
Although individual judges were generally viewed as objective and
courageous, judges were vulnerable to intimidation and violence. There
were reports that criminal cases at the trial level or on appeal to the
Court of Cassation were decided by corruption or intimidation. There
were reports that court-issued detainee release orders were not
consistently enforced.
The law restricted the free investigation of wrongdoing. As
referenced above, section 136(b) of the criminal procedure code gives
ministers the opportunity to review and prevent the execution of arrest
warrants that sitting judges presiding over criminal investigations
have issued against ministry employees. This provision provided
immunity to selected government employees and enabled a component of
the executive branch to terminate proceedings initiated by the judicial
branch. During the year permission was given to arrest only lower-level
ministry employees under Section 136(b).
The constitution provides for an independent judiciary in all
regions.
The KRG 2007 Judicial Power Law attempted to create a more
independent judiciary. The Kurdish Judicial Council, which had been
part of the executive branch's MOJ, became legally independent and took
responsibility for its own budget, human resource management, and
reporting. KRG judicial authorities no longer have direct operational
control over the judiciary, the KRG financial authorities relinquished
control of the council's budget, and the chief justice was appointed by
other judges and not by the executive branch. Nonetheless, the KRG
executive continued to influence cases in politically sensitive areas,
such as freedom of speech and the press (see section 2.a.).
The NGO Human Rights Watch claimed in a 2008 report that the CCC-I
seriously failed to ensure detainees' rights to due process and fair
trial. The reported failures included long periods of pretrial
detention without judicial review, inability to pursue a meaningful
defense or challenge evidence, and abuse in detention to extract
confessions. The lack of judicial review was due to a number of
factors, whose relative weight was difficult to assess, including a
large number of pretrial detainees, undocumented detentions, backlogs
in the judiciary, slow processing of criminal investigations, and an
insufficient number of judges.
The Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT), formerly the Iraqi Special Tribunal,
tried persons accused of committing war crimes, genocide, crimes
against humanity, and specified offenses from July 1968, through May
2003.
In the 2007 Anfal trial, Ali Hassan al-Majid, widely referred to as
``Chemical Ali,'' and two codefendants, Sultan Hashem Ahmed and Hussein
Rashid Muhamad, were convicted of genocide and related charges and
sentenced to death. The sentences were upheld on appeal. The Anfal
trial concerned the deaths of an estimated 182,000 Kurdish men, women,
and children, caused in part by the use of chemical weapons by the
former Ba'athist regime in a 1986-89 campaign against the Kurds. In
2008 the Presidency Council ratified the death sentence of Ali Hassan
Al Majid, who was executed on January 25. At year's end, the death
sentence for Sultan Hashem Ahmed has not been carried out. No further
information was available regarding Hussein Rashid Muhammad.
Two additional cases were referred to the trial chamber. The
Halabja case, which included five defendants and began in 2008,
involved chemical attacks on the Kurdish town of Halabja in March 1988
that resulted in the death of more than 5,000 civilians. On January 17,
Ali Hassan al-Majid was convicted of genocide and executed on January
25. The remaining defendants were acquitted on genocide charges but
received 15 year sentences for crimes against humanity. In 2008 the
trial began of 24 defendants who were part of the former regime and
were allegedly involved in the persecution of Dawa party members
(religious parties case). During the year there were nine acquittals
and five death sentences (including for former foreign minister and
former deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz, issued on October 26) in the
religious parties case.
In April 2009 the IHT began the ``ethnic cleansing'' case, in which
13 defendants were charged with involvement in forcibly relocating
Kurds from Kirkuk to other areas of the country. The case ended with a
verdict on August 2009 acquitting five defendants and convicting the
remaining eight. All prison sentences in the case ranged from six to
seven years. The prosecutor appealed three of the acquittals. The case
remained under consideration by the appeals court at year's end.
In September 2009 the IHT issued a warrant for the arrest of Abdel
Basit Turki, now in self-exile, who was the former head of the Board of
Supreme Audit responsible for auditing the financial records of all
central government institutions. Turki was charged with ``wasting
national wealth'' during his time as a senior government official under
Saddam Hussein's regime, in particular for the transfer of billions of
dollars in cash out of the country prior to Saddam's removal. Turki
claimed that the allegations resulted from his exposure of corruption
after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The allegations against Turki fell
under the jurisdiction of the IHT due to their nature and the time
period in which the offenses were allegedly committed.
On October 25, the IHT sentenced Tariq Aziz to death for crimes
against humanity, specifically for torture and murder of Shia political
opponents. President Jalal Talabani publicly stated he would not sign
the execution order. At year's end, Aziz remained in prison, serving
sentences for other crimes for which he was convicted.
During the year the IHT continued to investigate a number of crimes
allegedly committed by members of the former regime, including other
atrocities following the 1991 uprising, the draining of the southern
marshes, and the invasion of Kuwait. The IHT also dropped charges
against some detainees.
Trial Procedures.--The constitution provides for the right to a
fair trial, and judges--investigative, trial, and appellate--generally
sought to enforce that right, which is extended to all citizens. An
accused person is considered innocent until proven guilty and has the
right to privately retained or court-appointed counsel. One of the
significant challenges facing the criminal trial courts was
insufficient access to defense attorneys. Many defendants met their
lawyers for the first time during the initial hearing. Defense
attorneys were provided at public expense if needed. Trials, except in
some national security cases were public, and judges assembled evidence
and adjudicated guilt or innocence. Defendants and their attorneys had
access to government-held evidence relevant to their cases before
trial. Criminal judgments of conviction and acquittal may be appealed
to the Court of Cassation, a judicial panel that reviews the evidence
assembled in the investigative and trial stages and renders a decision.
There is the right of appeal also in civil cases.
The constitution provides for the establishment of military courts,
but only military crimes committed by the armed forces and the security
forces may come before such courts. The MOI courts investigate and try
crimes committed by MOI employees related to their employment.
Political Prisoners and Detainees.--Some detainees alleged
political reasons motivating their arrests, which authorities countered
with criminal charges ranging from corruption to facilitating terrorism
and murder. The prevalence of corruption, slow case processing, and
inaccessibility to detainees, especially those held by
counterterrorism, intelligence, and military authorities, made most
claims hard to assess.
In 2009 there appeared to be an orchestrated political campaign
against Sunni politicians from Diyala Province with arrest warrants
issued for four members of the provincial council, the deputy governor,
and a member of the parliament from Diyala. In May 2009 Iraqi special
forces affiliated with the prime minister arrested Abdel Jabbar Ali
Ibrahim on terrorism-related charges; he remained in custody at year's
end. In November 2009 the deputy governor, Muhamad Hassayn Jasim, was
arrested on charges related to terrorism financing. He was being held
in a MOD detention facility at year's end. A former Sunni provincial
council member, Hussayn al-Zubaydi, was convicted in October of
terrorism-related charges and given a life sentence.
There was little information available concerning persons detained
in Kurdish Asayish facilities.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies.--The country has a legal
framework, as well as an independent and impartial judiciary, for
dealing with civil issues in lawsuits seeking damages for or cessation
of human rights violations. Administrative remedies also exist.
However, during the year the priorities of an understaffed judiciary
and government administration focused on issues more directly related
to security, and these procedures as well as administrative remedies
were not effectively implemented.
Property Restitution.--There was a problem with serious delays and
corruption in adjudicating claims for property restitution. The
Property Claims Commission (PCC), formerly the Commission for the
Resolution of Real Property Disputes and originally called the Iraq
Property Claims Commission, is an independent governmental commission.
Its purpose is to resolve claims for real property confiscated,
forcibly acquired, or otherwise taken for less than fair value by the
former regime between 1968 and 2003 for reasons other than land reform
or lawfully applied eminent domain. The PCC process was intended
primarily to benefit those whose land was confiscated for ethnic or
political reasons as part of the former regime's ``Arabization''
program and other policies of sectarian displacements. In response to
the delays and corruption in adjudicating claims, in June the prime
minister installed new management, which initiated a claim verification
process and extended the deadline for filing claims to June 2011.
As of year's end, the PCC had received more than 165,000 claims
nationwide since its founding. At year's end, more than 25,000 claims
had reportedly been reviewed, of which approximately 13,500 were
approved and 11,500 rejected. Of the total claims filed, more than
47,000 were from Kirkuk; of the claims approved, more than 1,780 were
from Kirkuk. The Higher Judicial Council appointed 39 judges and the
KRG appointed five, for a total of 44 judges hearing cases.
Since 2003 a number of wafadin, Arabs previously settled in the
Kirkuk region under Saddam Hussein's anti-Kurdish policies, returned to
their previous homes in the center and south of the country and applied
for compensation. Since the PCC was established, more than 28,000
wafadin have applied for compensation to the Article 140 Committee,
which resolves claims for wafadin who seek compensation for returning
to their original provinces. At the end of 2009, approval for
compensation had been given to 16,500, and 10,917 wafadin had received
compensation and in theory have returned to their original provinces.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The constitution mandates that authorities not enter
or search homes except with a judicial order. The constitution also
prohibits arbitrary interference with privacy. In practice security
forces often entered homes without search warrants and took other
measures interfering with privacy, family, and correspondence, although
this happened less than in previous years.
In the KRG-controlled provinces, there was pressure on citizens to
join the PUK party in the province of Sulaymaniyah and the KDP party in
the provinces of Erbil and Dohuk.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The constitution broadly provides
for the right of free expression, provided it does not violate public
order and morality, and the Government restricted that right in some
circumstances.
Despite this constitutional protection of freedom of expression,
the law provides, if authorized by the prime minister, for fines or a
term of imprisonment not to exceed seven years for any person who
publicly insults the COR, the Government, or public authorities. The
law also restricts media organizations from expressing support for the
banned Ba'ath Party or for ``alterations to Iraq's borders by violent
means.'' In practice the main limitation on the exercise of these
rights was self-censorship due to fear of reprisals by the Government,
political parties, criminal gangs, insurgent and sectarian forces, or
tribes.
Individuals could criticize the Government publicly or privately,
but not without concern of reprisal if the criticism was seen as
``crossing the line'' by challenging one's personal sense of honor.
Individuals exercised self-censorship accordingly. There was no
evidence that the Government attempted to impede criticism by
monitoring political meetings.
Concerning freedom of the press, the independent media were active
and expressed a wide variety of views subject to the Government's
interpretation of lawful restrictions on violations of public order and
morality. Political parties strongly influenced most of the several
hundred daily and weekly publications, as well as dozens of radio and
television stations.
Journalists were subject to violence and harassment. Eight
journalists and media workers were killed during the year in Mosul,
Baghdad, East Fallujah, and Ramadi. At least 12 others were targets of
attacks, nine of whom suffered injuries from bombings of cars or
offices. Journalists were targets of government security forces,
corrupt officials, terrorists, religious groups that were unwilling to
accept media independence, and unknown actors who, for whatever reason,
wished to affect the flow of news. Despite multiple killings of
journalists during the year, there were no convictions for these or
previous killings of journalists.
For example, on April 14, the Iraqi Army's Baghdad Operations
Command allegedly arrested Saad Al-Aossi, the editor in chief of the
independent newspaper Al-Shahed. Baghdad Operations Command denied any
involvement with the disappearance of Al-Aossi, whose fate remained
unknown at year's end. On September 7, gunmen assassinated Riad al-
Sary, a journalist and presenter of political and religious programs
for Al-Iraqiya state-run television, in a Baghdad drive-by shooting.
Al-Saray hosted religious-based programs that promoted reconciliation
between Shia and Sunni. A day later, on September 8, gunmen fired from
a speeding car and killed Safa al-Din Abdel Hamid in front of his home
in Mosul. Abdel Hamid had worked at Al-Mosuliya, a private channel that
covers Ninewa Province in the north. Abdel Hamid's program Our Mosques
detailed the history of religious sites in Ninewa.
Security forces harassed local journalists. On January 15, the
domestic NGO Journalistic Freedoms Observatory (JFO) reported that
Najaf police assaulted journalists and damaged their equipment as they
tried to complete a follow-up report on recent bombings. On January 31,
security forces detained eight journalists in Maysan Province when the
journalists, who were part of the media corps covering a local story,
protested when the security forces attempted to prevent them from
covering the story and confiscated their equipment. On September 21,
police beat several journalists at a Baghdad checkpoint, even though
the journalists had shown their press cards and were lying face down on
the ground.
The Government acted to restrict media freedom in some
circumstances by penalizing those who published items counter to
government guidelines. On February 28, security forces raided three
publishers and confiscated copies of the 16-page booklet, Where has
Iraq's Money Gone?, which accused the Government of financial
corruption. On July 6, a media report alleged that the Baghdad
Operations Command discharged firearms to prevent a crew of the Beladi
satellite channel from covering a Shiite anniversary celebration, even
though the crew possessed the necessary documents to access the area.
On October 31, the Baghdad Operations Command accused and arrested
two Al-Baghdadia television employees, who were released two days
later, for assisting the terrorists who attacked Our Lady of Salvation
Church. The employees received the terrorists' calls, resulting in the
station announcing their demands on television. On November 1, the
media commission ordered the Baghdad Operations Command to close Al-
Baghdadia's Baghdad office, which it did by disconnecting the station's
power and ordering everyone to leave the premises. The station
continued broadcasting into Iraq from Egypt. On December 23, COR
members formed a fact-finding committee to inquire into the closing of
the station's Baghdad office, about which some members expressed
freedom of press/media/speech concerns.
The law prohibits reporters from publishing stories that defame
public officials. Many in the media complained that these provisions
prevented them from freely practicing their trade by creating strong
fears of prosecution. There was widespread self-censorship.
In July the chief justice established a special court (the Court of
Publication and Media) in Baghdad to adjudicate civil and criminal
claims against the press and media, which some media organizations,
journalists, and NGOs fear may have a negative impact on freedom of
speech and press. The court heard a lawsuit against an independent
newspaper that reported irregularities at a construction site in Basra.
In October the court ruled in favor of the newspaper.
On November 12, a court ordered the United Kingdom newspaper The
Guardian to pay damages to the prime minister in a 2008 suit for 1.1
billion dinars (approximately $940,000) for describing Prime Minister
Maliki as ``authoritarian''; the suit also called for the closure of
the paper's Baghdad bureau. The news organization, which continued
operating in the country, appealed the ruling, which the appellate
court overturned on December 28.
Media workers often reported that politicians pressured them to not
publish articles criticizing the Government. They offered accounts of
intimidation, threats, and harassment of the media by government or
partisan officials. The Government frequently used the threat of legal
action against media workers. The Government used its authority to deny
journalists permits to impede potentially unfavorable media coverage.
In compliance with regulations introduced in July 2009, all book
imports were subject to inspection by the Ministry of Culture. Books
produced and published within the country required the ministry's
approval before going on sale. According to the ministry, new vetting
procedures applying to imports were established to stop the entry of
literature promoting sectarianism.
In the Kurdistan region, a 2008 law provides for media freedom, and
imprisonment is no longer a penalty for publication-related offenses.
However, journalists continued to be tried, convicted, and imprisoned
under the 1969 penal code. The Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate (KJS)
documented 44 lawsuits against journalists during the year in the
Kurdistan region, approximately one-third under the penal code.
According to syndicate officials, the 2008 law is the sole basis for
prosecution of journalists for publication offenses, but the law allows
prosecution on the basis of offending public morals and other crimes.
Public officials regularly resorted to punitive fines through legal
actions against individual media outlets and editors, often for
publishing articles on alleged corruption.
During the year political parties filed lawsuits against media
organizations and journalists in Kurdistan ``in self-defense.'' For
example, on August 2, Fadhil Mirani, the KDP politburo secretary, filed
a one billion dinar (approximately $860,000) suit against the
opposition (Goran) newspaper Rozhnama. The suit was in response to a
July 20 report that accused the KDP of receiving money from oil
smuggling deals with Iran. On September 23, the Kurdiu.org news service
reported that the KDP filed a lawsuit against the chief editor of the
Kurdonia news agency regarding an article about the KDP's views towards
the PKK and Kirkuk.
Regarding prosecution for offending public morals, on February 1,
KRG authorities used paragraph 372 of the 1969 penal code to arrest the
editor in chief of Chavder, a Dohuk-based newspaper, and a journalist-
poet for publishing a poem that allegedly compared features of mosque
architecture to parts of the human body. The authorities released the
editor and journalist after 48 hours; however, the director general of
(religious) endowments in Dohuk filed a lawsuit against them. On
December 12, a Dohuk court fined both the editor and poet one million
dinar ($860,000) each for publishing the poem.
On April 2009 KRG minister for martyrs and victims of Anfal Chnar
Sa'ad filed four defamation lawsuits against Jihan magazine editor in
chief Nabaz Goran seeking damages of one billion dinars ($860,000) and
imposition of a travel ban following an article reporting on the
minister's two-month trip to London. On December 7, the court ruled on
two of the cases and permanently blocked Goran from traveling abroad
and, in a decision which Goran appealed, fined him seven million dinars
($6,000). Government and party officials filed five other defamation
lawsuits against Goran during the year.
The KDP subsequently dropped all lawsuits as a gesture of goodwill
to media and journalists.
Libel remains a criminal offense in the Kurdistan region, and
judges may issue pretrial arrest warrants for journalists on this
basis. Journalists were sometimes imprisoned while police investigated
the veracity of published information. When named in a lawsuit,
journalists were typically detained at police stations and were not
released until they posted bail. Police often kept journalists in
custody during investigations.
Journalists in the Kurdistan region asserted that they routinely
encountered personal intimidation by KRG officials, security services,
tribal elements, and business leaders. The KJS documented more than 300
incidents (threats, suits, and attacks) in 2009. In a report that
covered the period from July 1 to December 25, the KJS documented 52
court subpoenas.
On January 19, freelance journalist Sabah Ali Qaraman alleged that
persons affiliated with the PUK tried to abduct him because of his
articles criticizing alleged PUK corruption. On February 24, Hawlati,
an independent Kurdish newspaper, printed a blank front page containing
only the headline, ``You have the guns.and we have the pens'' in
response to alleged abuse and attacks from the intelligence agency
Asayish affiliated with the PUK. The newspaper linked the persecution
with authorities trying to influence press coverage of the elections.
Political parties owned or had significant influence over all but a few
newspapers based in the region. According to the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in April 2009 criticism of the
ruling PUK and KDP in the Kurdish region resulted in intimidation,
beatings, arrest and detention, and extrajudicial killings, with
journalists particularly at risk.
On May 4 in Erbil, men abducted and killed Sardasht Osman, a
contributor to the independent newspaper Ashtiname and news Web sites
Sbei, Awene, Hawlati, and Lvinpress, who was known for his articles
alleging nepotism and corruption in the leadership of the Kurdistan
region, including President Massoud Barzani. In the month preceding his
killing, Osman had written an article appearing in the Sweden-based
Kurdistan Post that accused a high-ranking official of corruption. His
body was found the next day 50 miles away in Mosul; he had been shot in
the head. Even though the Kurdistan Regional Government officially
condemned the crime and launched an investigation, many persons
protested the killing, suspecting that Osman had been silenced by the
leadership he criticized in his articles. After launching an
investigation, Kurdish authorities in September issued a 430-word
report claiming that Osman had been killed by a member of Ansar al-
Islam, a Sunni terrorist group, for not carrying out work he had
promised to do. The report provided no evidence for the assertion. The
Committee to Protect Journalists and other press groups said the report
lacked credibility.
Internet Freedom.--There were no government restrictions on access
to the Internet or reports that the Government monitored e-mail or
Internet chat rooms. According to International Telecommunications
Union June data, there were an estimated 325,000 (1.1 percent of the
population) Internet users. Individuals and groups could engage in the
peaceful expression of views via the Internet, including e-mail. Direct
Internet access was generally low due to a lack of infrastructure in
homes; however, the prevalence of Internet cafes contributed to usage
among youth.
In January the Babylon City Council referred to investigators a
media employee at the council after he published on a Web site the
proceedings from an open, public council meeting. The JFO reported that
the council claimed the media report could hurt the reputations of
members planning to run for parliament seats.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events.--Social, religious, and
political pressures restricted the exercise of freedom of choice in
academic and cultural matters. In all regions, various groups
reportedly sought to control the pursuit of formal education and
granting of academic positions. During the year extremists and
terrorists targeted cultural figures. In the central and southern parts
of the country, there were a number of reports of threats by extremists
and sectarian militants against schools and universities, urging them
to modify activities, favor certain students, or face violence.
Educational institutions at times complied with the threats, and
academics practiced self-censorship to comply with them.
There was a report of a government attempt to restrict academic
freedom. On December 7, Al-Arabiya television reported that the
Ministry of Education banned theater and music classes in Baghdad's
Fine Arts Institute and ordered the removal of statues at the
institute's entrance, all of which the ministry denied. The ministry
said it closed the music and theater department but that the subjects
were still being taught. The Education Ministry did not provide a
reason for its actions, although the demonstrating students and
professors speculated that religious reasons were behind the actions.
At year's end, the subjects continued to be taught at the school.
Unlike in 2009, there was one report of a government effort to
restrict a cultural event for political reasons. On October 1, the
deputy governor of Babil Province banned music and dance, ostensibly in
observance of the birthday of Shia Islam's sixth imam, Jaafar ibn
Muhammad al-Sadiq. Media sources, however, suggested political motives
behind the deputy governor's action, which effectively cancelled the
Ministry of Culture's Babylon Festival.
Other parts of this report contain related information (see
sections 1.b. and 1.d.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom of
Assembly.--The constitution provides for freedom of assembly and
peaceful demonstration, and the Government generally respected this
right in practice, although there were reports of abusive practices
against protesters.
The Government refused permits for demonstrations on electricity
shortages in the summer and also intimidated, arrested, and used
excessive force against protesters. On June 19, police in Basra killed
two persons when it opened fire on demonstrators demanding more
electricity and the resignation of the electricity minister. Following
the incident, police used more traditional nonlethal means to disperse
violent protests, such as water cannons during an August 22 electricity
protest in Nasiriyah.
On November 3, the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament approved a new law,
which the KRG president approved in early December, designed to
regulate demonstrations throughout the region. The law mandates that
protestors obtain permission in advance before demonstrating and that
the local authority has the right to deny the request. Civil society
and opposition parties opposed the law, believing the authorities would
use the requirement to limit their freedom of assembly. There were
demonstrations, both authorized and unauthorized, against the law, all
without incident. There were no reports that KRG security forces killed
or detained demonstrators protesting government acts.
Freedom of Association.--The constitution provides for the right to
form and join associations and political parties and specifically
mandates that this right be regulated by law. The Government generally
respected this right in practice, except for the legal prohibition on
expressing support for the Ba'ath Party.
c. Freedom of Religion.--For a complete description of religious
freedom, please see the 2010 International Religious Freedom Report at
www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/rpt.
d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of
Refugees, and Stateless Persons.--The constitution provides for freedom
of movement in all parts of the country and the right to travel abroad
and return freely. The Government generally respected these rights.
There were some limitations in practice, particularly regarding travel
into and residence in the Kurdistan region, but the KRG allowed
Christian families displaced from Baghdad to Erbil to enter without
restriction. Approximately 1,400 Christian families moved from Baghdad
to Erbil and from Mosul to the Ninewa Plains seeking better security in
the months following the bombing of a church in Baghdad on October 31.
Restrictions by provinces on the entry of new internally displaced
persons (IDPs) had little impact because there was little new
displacement during the year.
The Government generally cooperated with the UNHCR, the
International Organization for Migration, and other humanitarian
organizations in providing protection and assistance to IDPs, refugees,
returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other
persons of concern, although effective systems to assist these
individuals were not fully established by year's end. For example, some
IDPs were unable to access the public distribution system in the
governorate to which they were displaced. In some instances the World
Food Program and the ICRC delivered food rations to these IDPs.
Under the state of emergency, the prime minister can restrict
movement pursuant to a warrant, impose a curfew, cordon off and search
an area, and take other necessary security and military measures (in
the Kurdistan region, only in coordination with the KRG). In practice
the security authorities have recourse to the same powers in response
to security threats and attacks. The security forces tended not to
abuse these powers since they were unpopular with residents.
There are no KRG laws that restrict movement across the areas
administered by the KRG, but due to security procedures in practice
movement was restricted. Citizens (of any ethnicity, including Kurds)
crossing into the region from the south were obliged to stop at
checkpoints, undergo personal and vehicle inspection, and receive
permission to proceed. Officials prevented individuals from entering
into the region if deemed a security threat. Entry for male Arabs was
reportedly more difficult than for others. The officer in charge at the
checkpoint was empowered to decline entry into the region.
To accommodate increasing numbers of summer and holiday visitors,
the KRG security authorities worked out agreements with other provinces
whereby tourist agencies submitted names of visitors in advance for
preclearance. Visitors must show where they are lodging and how long
they intend to stay.
The MOI Passport Office maintained a policy of requiring women to
obtain the approval of a close male relative before receiving a
passport. In the KRG, unlike in the rest of the country, women over the
age of 18 obtained passports without such approval.
The constitution expressly prohibits forced exile of all native-
born citizens. The injunction also applies to naturalized citizens,
unless a judicial decision establishes that the naturalized citizen was
granted citizenship on the basis of material falsifications. Forced
exile did not occur.
There were no known government restrictions on emigration. There
were few reports of citizens having difficulty obtaining passports.
Exit permits were required for citizens leaving the country, but the
requirement was not enforced.
Members of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), a terrorist organization,
who were invited to the country under the Saddam Hussein regime and who
are not considered refugees, stateless persons, or IDPs, reported
allegations during the year that MEK leaders attempted to prevent
defection of some of the 3,400 residents at the MEK's Camp Ashraf in
Diyala Province, under threat of reprisal. MEK leaders denied such
allegations. In the past individuals claimed to have been subjected to
psychological and physical abuse, including threats of reprisal against
family members and solitary confinement in Ashraf, to discourage
defections.
The Government, which assumed security responsibility for Ashraf in
January 2009, engaged in provocative acts against MEK residents. Such
acts included the placement of high-powered loudspeakers that broadcast
anti-MEK propaganda and refusal of entry for some consumer and
industrial goods. In response MEK residents conducted provocative
protests of their own, which reflected the continuing contentious
relations between the MEK and the Government. There were numerous
protests and reaction throughout the year.
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).--The Government officially
estimated at year's end that there were 2.56 million IDPs, including
166,664 post-2003 IDPs present in the KRG. An estimated 1.3 million
were displaced following sectarian violence that began in 2006,
approximately 200,000 were displaced between 2003 and 2005, and
approximately a million were displaced prior to 2003, according to the
UNHCR. The official government estimate was revised down toward the end
of the year to reflect both IDP returns and clarifications in the
database.
The majority of those displaced pre-2003 were moved under the prior
regime's policy of Arabization; many of them had returned to their
areas of origin but were included in the displaced population because
they were unable to regain their original property and residences. Both
Arabs and Kurds displaced in this way had access to compensation under
a process outlined in article 58 of the Transitional Administration
Law, which was further confirmed in article 140 of the constitution. A
structure to implement this process was in place, albeit moving at a
very slow pace.
Throughout the country most IDPs occupied abandoned buildings,
public buildings, or homes other displaced families had abandoned.
Approximately 500,000 lived in ad hoc ``clusters'' or settlements
located throughout the country with limited water, sanitation, and
electricity. The UNHCR identified 116 settlements in Baghdad, with an
estimated 226,118 residents. Other IDPs rented homes at increasingly
high cost or lived with friends or family members. Lack of registration
limited IDPs' access to basic services and legal documentation to
receive food rations from the public distribution system.
Hygiene and sanitation for IDPs were generally better in the KRG
than in other areas, but education, livelihoods, and other concerns
remained critical. Kurds whose villages were destroyed during the Iran-
Iraq war remained without adequate housing. In October the
representative of the UN secretary general on the human rights of
internally displaced persons called on the KRG to assist those IDPs who
have no access to education, shelter, and health care. Access to
education was a particular challenge for Arabic-speaking IDPs in the
KRG. In Kirkuk the representative reported that IDPs had been targets
of harassment and detention, particularly during the run-up to the
anticipated census exercise.
Targeted attacks and threats against Christians in Baghdad, Mosul,
and other cities resulted in the displacement of 1,380 Christian
families to the KRG and Ninewa Plains by year's end. According to the
UNHCR, more than half of the Christian population has left the country
since 2003 and Christian families are disproportionately represented in
the Iraqi refugee population.
Overall, only a small number of the country's displaced persons had
returned to their places of origin. A significant number of IDPs,
420,000, and a smaller number of refugees, nearly 80,000, moved back to
their places of origin, particularly in Baghdad and Diyala provinces,
during the period 2008-09.
During the year there was a significant decline in both IDP and
refugee returns; by the end of October, IDP and refugee return levels
were only 51 percent of returns in 2009. The UNHCR reported that 61
percent of refugees surveyed who returned to Baghdad in the past four
years regretted their return because of terrorism and insecurity, and
87 percent of the total number interviewed said their income was
insufficient to cover their family needs. (The UNHCR does not promote
refugee returns because of insecurity.) Returning refugees also
expressed concerns regarding insufficient health care, poor educational
opportunities, and housing shortages. Of those returning, 77 percent of
refugees did not return to their original residences because of
insecurity or a fear of being targeted. Others reported it was not
possible to return because their homes were damaged or occupied by
others.
There is a legal and administrative process for restitution of
property and eviction of squatters, along with a system of grants and
stipends for returnees and evictees. The Government offered stipends of
1.5 million dinars ($1,290) to returning families who deregistered as
IDPs or refugees. As of mid-November, according to the Ministry of
Displacement and Migration (MoDM), 52,967 families had received the
grant and another 3,856 claims were in process. There were six returnee
assistance centers, although one Baghdad center was inoperable for a
period of several months beginning in April due to lack of MoDM
support. In general the IDP housing assistance program was burdensome
bureaucratically and did not produce satisfactory results.
Prime Minister's Order 440 from mid-2008, which authorized eviction
of IDPs from government buildings, was again not implemented. This stay
expired in mid-year, and evictions rose during the second half of the
year. During the period May to December, 18 verbal and eight written
eviction orders were delivered to IDP settlements in Baghdad; the IDP
communities of Al Ameen and Air Force Camp were evicted. In November,
2,000 IDP families were evicted in Hillah. Two hundred IDP families
were evicted from Furat, and, according to Karbala provincial council
officials, 34 IDP settlements in the province were put under eviction
orders in May. Some communities were able to negotiate with authorities
to postpone their evictions. Communities particularly at risk included
those living in abandoned public buildings that the relevant ministry
wanted to reclaim and those living near oil pipelines. In some
provinces those evicted were provided with land grants in alternate
locations, but in many cases evictions took place without viable
alternatives.
The Government has no comprehensive policy for undoing sectarian
cleansing, but it encouraged returns to secure areas where violence had
occurred previously. The Government promised to provide essential
services to support returnees in Baghdad and Diyala provinces upon
their return home; however, delivery on these promises has remained
largely unfulfilled. Many humanitarian organizations and Sunni leaders
cited the lack of steps to reverse the worst of sectarian cleansing,
claiming that the Government wished to discourage Sunni Arab refugees
and IDPs from returning. Government officials vigorously denied these
charges. In its view practical obstacles often discouraged greater
numbers of returns. For example, the Government's property restitution
policy depended on individual requests for restitution from property
owners, and these requests often became bogged down in an overburdened
legal system. Many property owners did not file claims due to fears of
retribution from those evicted. In addition, the restitution system was
unduly complex to navigate.
A 2008 national policy to address displacement led to some positive
measures for the displaced, including property restitution, but a plan
for a durable solution remained to be agreed upon at year's end. On
September 29, during his visit the representative of the secretary
general for the human rights of IDPs urged the Government, as well as
the international community, to make stronger efforts to meet the human
rights, humanitarian, and longer-term development needs of IDPs in
accordance with international human rights standards.
The Government, through the MoDM, allowed IDPs access to domestic
and international humanitarian organizations, collected information
about IDPs, and provided some protection and assistance in the form of
humanitarian supplies. The Government did not target IDPs or forcibly
return them under dangerous conditions.
Protection of Refugees.--The country is not a party to the 1951 UN
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
Its laws do not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status,
and the Government has not established a system for providing
protection to refugees. In practice the Government provided protection
against the expulsion or return of persons to countries where their
lives or freedom would be threatened on account of their race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.
The Government generally cooperated with the UNHCR and other
humanitarian organizations to provide protection and assistance to the
approximately 40,000 refugees living in the country. Reports of attacks
and arrests of refugees in the central and southern parts of the
country declined during the year, although they continued to be
targeted periodically in attacks by sectarian groups, extremists, and
criminals.
Generally, refugee groups of Turkish and Iranian Kurds in the KRG
achieved a high level of integration. For the majority of the 7,825
Iranian Kurds whom the UNHCR registered as refugees in the north, local
integration remained the best and most likely option. Refugee groups in
central and southern regions, particularly refugees who were perceived
to have been privileged by the former regime, such as Palestinians,
Ahwazis in the south, and Syrian Arabs in Baghdad and Mosul, had less
chance of integration and continued to face discrimination and require
protection.
The Government began a registration of the 15,626 UNHCR-recognized
Kurdish refugees from Turkey in November, most of whom had resided
since 1998 in a UNHCR-administered camp in Makhmour, Erbil Province.
The registration included the issuance of an identification card that
provided greater mobility, employment opportunities, and access to
civil documentation. It was hoped that the registration would lead to
greater possibility for voluntary return and de facto local integration
for the group.
According to the UNHCR, general violence in the central region and
targeted attacks against Palestinians decreased. Notwithstanding
improvements in security, Palestinian refugees continued to experience
a deep level of uncertainty with regard to their place within the
fabric of society. Economic challenges placed Palestinian refugees in
the lowest socioeconomic rankings; their declining economic situation
was in part attributable to a loss of employment opportunities due to
discrimination. The UNHCR reported that it worked with the MoDM to
provide identification cards to the 11,500 Palestinians remaining in
the country. The MOI, in coordination with the UNHCR, issued
approximately 10,000 identification cards to Palestinians, and
approximately 2,000 more were in process at year's end. The cards
facilitate increased mobility within Iraq by the Palestinians.
Stateless Persons.--The UNHCR estimated the total number of
stateless persons in the country as less than 120,000, most of whom had
already commenced the process of reacquiring nationality. The MOI
Nationality Department anticipated resolving all such cases over the
course of the next two years. Since 2003 more than 25,000 persons have
regained their nationality, 4,000 of them during the year, in
accordance with articles 17 and 18 of the nationality law of 2006.
However, approximately 54,500 Bidoun (literally ``without
nationality'') individuals living as nomads in the desert near Basra,
Thi-Qar, and Samawa southern governorates remained stateless at year's
end. In the north an estimated 560 stateless Syrian Kurds were
registered as asylum seekers.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right through
periodic, free, and fair elections based on universal suffrage.
Elections and Political Participation.--In March 7 parliamentary
elections, nearly 12 million votes were cast, drawing from a pool of
more than 18.9 million registered voters. The majority Sunni Iraqi
National Movement (known popularly as Iraqiyya), led by former prime
minister Ayad Allawi, won a plurality with 91 seats in the 325-member
body. Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki's largely Shia State of Law
Coalition was close behind with 89 seats, while the Iraqi National
Alliance and Kurdistan Alliance followed with 70 and 57 seats,
respectively, with the Kurdistan Alliance retaining 47 seats after the
Goran party left the alliance in November. Small minority blocs and
independent candidates won the remainder of the seats. International
observer missions and indigenous observer networks declared the
elections free from widespread or systemic fraud.
The IHEC announced preliminary election results on March 27, based
on 100 percent of the vote tabulation and resolution of approximately
200 complaints. The Federal Supreme Court certified the election
results on June 1. Following the procedural calendar requirements, the
new COR convened on June 14 but adjourned less than 20 minutes later to
allow political blocs more time to negotiate the formation of a
government. Following eight months of negotiations, the COR finally
reconvened on November 11 and elected a speaker and deputy speakers. On
November 25, President Talabani charged Maliki with forming a new
government. The COR gave unanimous approval to this new government on
December 21.
The number of votes cast exceeded that in the 2005 COR elections by
100,000; the turnout of registered voters was 62 percent compared with
76 percent in 2005, attributable in large part to the much higher
number of registered voters that resulted from concerted voter
registration campaigns by IHEC, political parties, and civil society
organizations. IHEC instituted antifraud measures and procedures to
handle complaints in compliance with an April 19 order issued by the
Electoral Judicial Panel. The results of the Baghdad recount closely
mirrored the original tally, dispelling lingering concerns about
electoral irregularities.
A series of terrorist bombings, most targeting Sunni and Iraqiyya
candidates but also Assyrians and Christians, marred the final three
weeks of the election campaign. On election day, 42 persons were killed
and 110 wounded in attacks in Baghdad, while several more were killed
or injured in other cities around the country. According to reports,
228 persons died in election-related violence during the three-week
campaign period prior to March 7, while another 178 were killed in
postelection violence before official results were announced on March
27. Levels of violence were considerably lower than in the 2005
national elections.
IHEC, with nine COR-appointed commissioners, had sole
responsibility for administering the elections, including the 49,640
official polling stations. IHEC welcomed strong civil society
participation and technical assistance and observers from other
countries and international organizations. IHEC credentialed 114,500
domestic monitors from more than 492 national monitoring organizations,
657 observers from 35 international organizations, and 476,366
representatives of political entities.
Political parties and candidates had the right to propose
themselves or be nominated by other groups, including the innovation of
a select number of political parties holding primaries to develop their
respective slates. The Government did not restrict political opponents,
nor did it interfere with their right to organize, seek votes, or
publicize their views, apart from the legal prohibition on supporting
the Ba'ath Party.
A number of candidates were disqualified. The 2008 Accountability
and Justice (de-Ba'athification) Law prevented active Ba'athists and
high-level former Ba'athists from running for elected office. On
January 14, the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC)
disqualified approximately 500 candidates due to alleged Ba'ath Party
ties. Sixty-three candidates were later reinstated under the auspices
of an ad hoc COR committee. Approximately half of the remaining
disqualifications affected secular nationalists including those from
the Iraqiyya bloc. Sunni parties with affected slates could voluntarily
name replacement candidates. Candidates on the disqualified list could
avail themselves of an appeals process through a special cassation
chamber empowered to review AJC decisions.
Because the cassation chamber could not complete its review of 210
appeals prior to the deadline for ballot printing, it issued a legal
opinion on February 3 allowing candidates who formally appealed to run
in the March election, with the proviso that candidates who won seats
during their appeal would be subject to postelection vetting.
Ultimately the cassation chamber completed its vetting process prior to
the elections, reinstating 26 candidates.
The country's political parties tended to be organized along either
religious or ethnic lines. Shia Islamist parties, such as the Islamic
Supreme Council of Iraq, al-Dawa al-Islamiyya Party, and Sadrist Trend,
as well as Kurdish nationalist parties such as the KDP and PUK, were
the predominant political forces. Other political players included the
secular Iraqiyya, Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party, and ethnic minority
parties, such as the Assyrian Democratic Movement. Membership in some
political parties conferred special privileges and advantages in
employment and education. The KDP and PUK reportedly give preference in
government employment to their respective members. In all, 160 regular
parties, 36 independents, and 10 minority parties and candidates
participated in the elections. In the month prior to the elections, the
five major political party coalitions signed an electoral code of
conduct pledging to refrain from inciting sectarian or ethnic tensions
and promising to accept the results of the election.
The 2009 election law calls for an open list election in multiple
districts. The open list measure contributed to enhanced transparency
of electoral politics and accountability of elected officials, but it
created additional challenges for voter education, ballot design, and
related electoral preparations necessitating a postponement from a
January 21 to March 7 polling day for most voters. Polling procedures
included special voting periods for security personnel as well as
citizens who were hospitalized and incarcerated. The law expanded the
number of seats in the parliament from 275 to 325. Of those seats, the
law reserves eight compensatory seats for minorities: five for
Christian candidates from Baghdad, Ninewa, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Dohuk;
one Yazidi representing Ninewa; one Sabean-Mandaean representing
Baghdad; and one Shabak representing Ninewa. The law also harmonized
language defining internally displaced persons and opened the process
to out-of-country voting for refugees and citizens abroad.
The constitution mandates that female members of parliament
constitute 25 percent of the COR. There were 81 women elected to the
COR, including candidates elected through the open list system. In the
previous COR, women chaired two of the 24 standing committees. In the
previous government, there were five female ministers of 37 in the
cabinet: the ministers of state for women's affairs and for provincial
affairs, and the ministers of human rights, environment, and housing
and construction. Three cabinet members were from religious and ethnic
minority groups: the minister of human rights, the minister of industry
and minerals, and the minister of youth and sports. In the current
government, there were two female ministers of 44 in the cabinet
(minister of state for women's affairs and minister of state without
portfolio), and three cabinet members from religious and ethnic
minority groups: minister of environment, minister of youth and sports,
and minister of state for provincial affairs. In the current COR, there
were two women chairing a standing committee.
The KRG had planned provincial elections for November for the
provincial councils in Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, and Dohuk, but the KRG
postponed the elections. At year's end, the Kurdish parliament had not
set a new date for the elections. Press reports suggested that the KRG
postponed the elections in order to avoid anticipated electoral losses
by the PUK party in Sulaymaniyah, where the opposition Goran party was
expected to gain electoral votes.
Section 4. Official Corruption and Government Transparency
Although the law provides criminal penalties for official
corruption, the Government did not implement the law effectively.
Large-scale corruption pervaded the Government, and public perception
of government corruption and impunity continued to be strong.
Intimidation and political influence were factors in some allegations
of corruption, and officials sometimes used the ``de-Ba'athification''
process to pursue political and personal agendas. The World Bank's
worldwide governance indicators reflected that corruption was a serious
problem. In July the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the
United Nations Development Program, and the Central Organization for
Statistics and Technology within the Ministry of Planning and
Cooperation Development released a report on the working conditions and
integrity of civil servants within four ministries. Among the findings,
24 percent of the staff that had daily contacts with private business
within the Ministry of Trade received at least one bribe offer, and 72
percent of all civil servants would not feel adequately protected if
they reported corruption within their ministries, of whom 73 percent
would not feel adequately protected from physical harm. Government
anticorruption officials and the media consistently commented on the
pervasive corruption in society.
During the first six months of the year, prosecution of corruption
cases increased, but officials combating corruption faced persistent
political, social, and capacity restraints. They also faced physical
threats and attacks. One inspector general reported that those involved
in investigating corruption ``are facing serious risks without personal
security details and other protective measures to do their jobs and
stay alive at the same time.'' On September 26, Laieh Muhammed, who
executed arrest warrants for the Commission on Integrity (COI), was
killed on his way to work at a checkpoint into the International Zone.
He was the second COI employee killed by a silenced pistol. According
to the COI, 40 personnel had been murdered in the line of duty since
2004. Credible information on the nature and extent of corruption in
the judiciary was lacking, but such corruption was widely believed to
exist.
Anticorruption institutions were fragmented, and their interaction
was hampered by a lack of consensus about their role, partly due to a
lack of effective legislation as well as to insufficient political will
to eliminate widespread corruption. Lack of accountability continued to
be widespread, reinforced by several statutory provisions, unclear
regulatory processes, and limited transparency.
The law does not provide public access to government information
for citizens or noncitizens, including foreign media. Certain
government officials, such as ministers, governors, and
parliamentarians, are required by law to file financial disclosure
reports, but the Government did not enforce the requirement. The COI
reported that only 24 percent of new COR members had complied with the
law,while 76 percent of former (pre-March 7 elections) COR members had
complied. Ten of the 18 provincial governors had complied. The Council
of Ministers had a 100 percent response rate.
The COI, established in 2004 as the Commission on Public Integrity,
is the Government body charged with preventing and investigating cases
of corruption in all ministries and other components of the Government
nationwide (except for the KRG). The COI, with a staff of approximately
1,300, reports to the commissioner of integrity, and the COR and has
the authority to refer cases to the judicial investigators for possible
criminal prosecution. The commissioner was appointed by the prime
minister in 2007. He has never been confirmed by the COR and was
therefore subject to replacement at the prime minister's discretion.
The same was true of most investigators general (IG).
According to a prime ministerial order, the COI does not initiate
cases and has instructed the ministerial IGs to perform all initial
investigations. Although the order remains in effect with the IGs
initiating 95 percent of all investigations, the COI initiated several
high-profile investigations with the knowledge of the Prime Minister's
Office. Each ministry has an IG charged with performing audits,
inspections, and investigations to reduce fraud, waste, and corruption.
In practice this order placed the ministers in control of any
investigation of corruption within their own ministry and permitted
them to halt corruption proceedings against their employees. There were
documented instances where the ministers have ordered major corruption
investigations to be dropped. As in previous years, ministries
effectively stalled investigations by failing to provide information or
not complying with requests for officials to appear in court.
The prime minister's approval is required before corruption cases
proceed against members of the presidency or the Council of Ministers.
Information on specific instances of the prime minister and ministers
using these tactics during the year was not available. Judicial
authorities reported that the practice constituted a significant
obstacle to the prosecution of corruption cases.
Under a section of the criminal code (136[b]), prosecutors must
receive permission from the relevant minister before an official can be
brought to trial for an offense related to official duties. In 2009, 54
persons were shielded from prosecution by the use of the provision. In
the first half of the year, ministers halted 96 investigations. The
threat of invoking 136[b] or failing to provide information was usually
effective in stopping investigations. For example, the interior
minister terminated an investigation into the ministry's purchase of
fraudulent bomb detectors from a British company, although the
ministry's IG determined that 75 percent of the contract value was
given to government officials in bribes.
While the COI remained undeveloped as an institution, especially in
the provinces, it steadily increased the number of corruption-related
arrests. For the first six months of the year, 982 cases were sent to
court, compared with 972 during 2009. For the first six months of the
year, there were 181 convictions, compared with 285 in 2009. According
to the COI, by October 31, approximately 2,300 defendants were referred
to the courts during the year, resulting in 600 individuals receiving
jail sentences. An estimated 10 percent of the persons convicted were
government officials with the rank of general director or higher. The
Ministry of Defense had the largest number of employees referred to the
judicial system, followed by the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of
Municipalities. On May 30, the COI arrested three state-owned bank
managers and issued arrest warrants for four merchants and an owner of
an Iraqi company for using government funds to fund a private business.
The addition to the ministry IGs and the IGs for the municipality
of Baghdad, the Property Resolution Commission, the Hajj and Umrah
Pilgrimage Commission, the Commission of Political Prisoners, and the
country's multiple religious endowments, and the Board of Supreme
Audits (BSA), which is the country's oldest anticorruption agency,
perform external audits of government ministries and agencies. The BSA
also audits the offices of the prime minister, the Presidency Council,
and the presidency of the COR, as well as expenses claimed by members
of the COR.
Aside from the core institutions of the COI, the inspector general,
and the audit board, the COR maintains an Integrity Committee charged
with oversight of executive branch and anticorruption agencies. By
executive order the prime minister created the Joint Anticorruption
Council in 2007 to integrate anticorruption initiatives; it includes
representatives of the COI, IGs, the BSA, COR's Integrity Committee,
and the Higher Judicial Council and is chaired by the Council of
Ministers secretary general.
The media and NGOs continued to expose corruption, although their
capacity to do so was limited.
Published on March 24, the Government's Anticorruption Strategy for
2010-14 identifies more than 200 specific anticorruption challenges,
along with an action plan for addressing each. The Joint Anticorruption
Council, with the COI acting as the lead, has responsibility for
supervising compliance with the strategy, which also seeks
participation from religious and community leaders, civil society
representatives, and journalists. At the end of the year, 29 of the 34
ministries had complied with the strategy's requirement to submit an
anticorruption plan for COI review.
In 2008 the KRG established a corruption committee, composed of
government officials, to review levels of corruption and make
recommendations on how to prevent corruption. The KRG contracted an
international accounting firm to study KRG institutions and make
recommendations on anticorruption measures. In July 2009 KRG Prime
Minister Nechirvan Barzani announced the summary results of the
accounting firm's report, including a recommended anticorruption
strategy. In December, KRG parliamentarians established the Kurdistan
Integrity Committee with the objective to create a centralized BSA and
a Commission of Integrity in the KRG. As of year's end, the separate
BSAs in Erbil and Suleymaniyah had yet to merge, and the Iraqi COI had
not received permission to operate officially in the KRG.
On April 21, former minister of trade Abd Falah al-Sudani was
acquitted for lack of evidence on certain charges of corruption and
mismanagement within his ministry which oversees the country's vast
public food ration program. Sudani remained at large, and the
Commission of Integrity continued to pursue other corruption charges
against him at year's end, while others indicated an intent to repeal
the acquittal. Al-Sudani resigned from his post in May 2009 and was
then charged with corruption and arrested while fleeing the country.
The court released al-Sudani's brother, Sabah al-Sudani, who was also
arrested after he was stopped with 170 million dinars ($150,000) and
attempted to bribe a police officer. Three Ministry of Trade officials
involved in the case, including the director general of the Grain
Import Board, were convicted of negligence; one received a two-year
prison sentence, and the other two received one-year sentences.
In November 2009 authorities discovered that the head of the
Baghdad Amanat's Accounting Department and 13 other persons, several of
them her relatives, had stolen more than 23 billion dinars ($20
million). The authorities arrested the 13 suspects, but the department
head fled the country. Government authorities worked in coordination
with neighboring countries to arrest her on June 19 as well as recover
a substantial portion of the stolen funds. The suspects remained in
custody at year's end.
As of year's end, the commissioner of integrity and several IGs
lacked full authority because their names had not been submitted for
parliamentary confirmation, as required by law.
The constitution provides COR members immunity from arrest unless
the member was caught in a criminal act or charged with a felony and
the COR overturned immunity by a majority vote.
The central government and the KRG maintained inflated public
payrolls. Ministries and public sector institutions employed
nonexistent ``ghost'' employees, and political patronage was common at
all levels of government. Ministries were beginning to establish
automated payroll deposits and conduct workplace audits with the BSA to
cut back on ``ghost'' employees. Rates of absenteeism and desertion
among the ISF continued to decrease. During the year in the KRG there
were an estimated one million employees on the Government payroll of a
total population of approximately 3.9 million.
Political parties subjected the COI to a number of high-level
attempts to influence prosecutions. Members of the legislature also
reportedly attempted to pressure the court on numerous occasions.
There were reports in all 18 provinces, at the national and
regional levels, of opaque public tender processes, favoritism in
contracting, and excessive discretion of public officials in
procurement decisions.
Corruption along the country's borders existed as well. A September
22 media report detailed a security operation against trucks smuggling
oil outside the country. The Government worked independently and with
the international community to address structural and capacity issues
in this area.
Local and foreign business organizations in the KRG complained that
the KRG did not publicly tender contracts in sufficient time to allow
local business owners to compete, and that political and personal
favoritism determined the results.
Anticorruption, law enforcement, and judicial officials, along with
members of civil society and the media, continued to face threats and
intimidation for vigorous pursuit of corrupt practices.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
During the year the Government had a mixed record cooperating with
NGOs. Although the Government expressed a willingness to cooperate with
the UN and its agencies on human rights issues, as seen in its
participation in the Universal Periodic Review, practical cooperation
was limited, with the Government citing security restrictions.
Government cooperation with NGOs was evident during the election, with
tens of thousands of independent election observers deployed throughout
the country.
During the year activity and advocacy by the country's NGOs
contributed to democratic governance. While domestic human rights NGOs
remained affiliated with a political party or with a particular sect,
space for independent NGOs was opening. Branches of international NGOs
and NGOs serving women remained the most forward leaning. Overall, NGOs
still faced numerous challenges and did not systematically serve as
bulwarks against failures in governance and human rights abuses.
On January 25, the Government passed a law on NGOs that was
designed to facilitate NGO registration and operations while providing
extra protections from onerous and arbitrary government actions.
Provisions in the new law included the following: NGOs are permitted to
receive foreign funding and affiliate with foreign entities (including
the UN and ICRC, for example) without prior approval from the
Government; the Government cannot deny NGO registration without
attributing the denial to a specific provision of law; criminal
penalties (including imprisonment) were removed for membership in an
improperly registered NGO; the Government can only audit or inspect an
NGO office with cause; and the Government must obtain a court order to
suspend an NGO or confiscate its property. The new law became effective
on April 7. The Council of Ministers Secretariat NGO Assistance Office
was in the process of implementing regulations consistent with the new
law. One office in the country located in Baghdad accepted
registrations for NGOs.
During the year there were reports that the police conducted
unannounced and intimidating visits to some NGOs, demanding
photographs, passport details, names, and addresses of all staff and
their family members. NGOs reported that the new law aimed to remedy
this situation.
The poor security situation continued to limit the work of NGOs. On
January 18, gunmen killed five persons of a domestic humanitarian NGO
in its Baghdad office and afterwards detonated a car bomb, wounding two
police responders. However, such direct attacks specifically aimed at
NGOs remained rare. The Government did not take special steps to
protect NGOs from targeting or harassment.
The Kurdish areas had an active NGO community, although local
Kurdish NGOs generally were closely linked to and funded by the PUK and
KDP political parties. The KRG and Kurdish political parties generally
supported humanitarian NGO activities and programs.
The central government's attitude toward international human rights
and humanitarian NGOs was one of moderate cooperation. The Government
did not mandate additional registration requirements for international
human rights and humanitarian NGOs outside visa requirements for
international staff. Information was not available regarding the
existence of any government efforts to refuse visas for international
NGO staff or restrict access into the country. Due to security concerns
and the costs of addressing those concerns, many international NGOs
established offices in Erbil in the KRG and then hired local staff for
activities outside the KRG.
The Government generally cooperated with the UN Assistance Mission
for Iraq (UNAMI) and the international governmental organizations
associated with it. For example, Security Council Resolution 1883
(2009) mandated the UNAMI to advise, support, and assist the Government
and IHEC with the March 7 COR elections, which international observer
missions and Iraqi observer networks declared were free from widespread
or systemic fraud. The Government permitted visits by various UN
representatives of all levels; for example, by the UN representative of
the secretary general on the human rights of internally displaced
persons, Walter Kalin, in late September and the UN secretary general's
high-level coordinator who handles Iraq-Kuwait issues, Ambassador
Gennady Tarasov. UNAMI and its affiliated organizations regularly
release reports on a wide range of issues. There have been no reports
of any government efforts to block release or distribution of UNAMI
publications.
In 2008 the Government signed a headquarters agreement with the
ICRC, granting it legal status and permanent representation in the
country. The COR had not ratified the agreement by year's end, but the
ICRC benefited nonetheless from its provisions.
All nongovernmental investigations of alleged human rights
violations continued to be restricted. The Government attributed
restrictions to the security situation and its policy of allowing only
the MOHR and the ICRC restricted access to detention facilities. The
Government generally did not permit detention center or prison visits
by NGOs. The MOHR met with domestic NGO monitors and responded to their
inquiries by opening MOHR investigations into alleged violations. In
2009 the MOHR also initiated a program to train representatives of 32
domestic NGOs to visit and monitor prison conditions.
The MOHR attempted to monitor human rights abuses and advocate for
and assist victims, and it issued public reports on prisons and
detention centers, minorities, and victims of terrorism. Limited
resources and poor cooperation from other ministries limited the
ministry's effectiveness. The effectiveness of KRG human rights
authorities was limited by a lack of trained personnel and effective
follow-up throughout the Government on human rights issues.
In 2008 the COR's Committee on Human Rights passed legislation
establishing an Independent High Commission on Human Rights. In
December 2009 a Committee of Experts to select the commission's
directors was formed, but the COR had not ratified its membership at
year's end. The Government had not contributed any funds, and support
from the international donor community was limited. The COR committee
advocated publicly for raising standards in government detention
facilities and prisons, and credible human rights organizations
considered that to be valuable. The KRG's legislature formed a special
committee to deal with human rights and detainee issues, but did not
issue any public reports.
Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
The constitution provides that all citizens are equal before the
law without regard to gender, sect, opinion, belief, nationality,
religion, or origin. The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, disability, or social status. The Government did not effectively
enforce these provisions.
Women.--The constitution provides for equal treatment before the
law without discrimination based on gender; in practice, discrimination
existed, and enforcement of equal treatment was uneven. The general
lack of security in the country and increasingly conservative societal
tendencies had a serious negative impact on women.
The penal code criminalizes rape, does not address spousal rape,
and permits a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for rapists. There
was no reliable estimate of the incidence of rape or the effectiveness
of government enforcement of the law.
The constitution prohibits all forms of violence and abuse in the
family, school, and society. Local NGOs and media reporting indicated
that domestic violence often went unreported and unpunished with abuses
customarily addressed within the family and tribal structure.
Harassment of legal personnel working on domestic violence cases, as
well as a lack of police and judicial personnel, further hampered
efforts to bring perpetrators to justice.
There are no specific laws that concern domestic violence. Under
the penal code, a husband is legally entitled to punish his wife
``within certain limits prescribed by law or custom.'' Existing laws
were widely unenforced, including those on domestic violence.
During the year NGOs reported that domestic violence against women
remained a serious problem, although no reliable statistics existed.
Domestic violence was also widespread in the Kurdistan region,
including beatings, shootings, and burnings. Women have an unequal role
in the family and in the social structure of the region. Although
technology has made it easier for women to contact others outside their
immediate family, this has led to sometimes violent disputes over who a
woman can talk to or what she can do outside the home. For the first
eight months of 2009, the domestic NGO Human Rights Data Bank recorded
363 incidents of battery against women, 295 reported threats, 40
murders, and 32 sexual assaults in the KRG.
Honor killings remained a serious problem. Legislation in force
permits honor considerations to mitigate sentences.
According to a 2009 UNHCR report, honor killings were prevalent in
all parts of the country. For the first nine months of 2009, the
domestic NGO Human Rights Data Bank recorded 314 burn victims (125
instances of self-immolation and 189 cases of burning), compared with
234 burn victim during the same period in 2008.
A KRG human rights official reported in 2008 that the KRG does not
consider an honor killing legally different from murder, thus making
punishment for an honor killing equal to punishment for murder. The
nature of the crime made it difficult for authorities to find
sufficient evidence to prosecute cases. KRG human rights authorities
reported that 117 women died in honor killings in 2008; the KRG
reported a total of 528 honor killings in 2009. UNAMI and civil society
observers considered both figures to be low. KRG human rights
authorities and the KRG's Honor Killing Monitoring Commission were
active on women's issues, particularly on steps to end honor killings.
Both public and private shelters for women existed, but space was
limited and service delivery was poor, with private shelters providing
a slightly higher level of service. Shelters closely protected
information regarding their locations. Some NGOs worked with local
community mental health workers, employed by the Ministry of Health,
who provided assistance to victims of gender-based violence. Other NGOs
worked to provide legal assistance to these victims. NGOs played a role
in providing services to victims of domestic violence who received no
assistance from the Government. Authorities frequently attempted to
mediate between women and their families to work out a peaceful
solution for the women to return home. Other than marrying or returning
to their families (which often resulted in the family or community
revictimizing the shelter resident), there were few options for women
who were housed at shelters.
Sexual relations outside of marriage for any reason are prohibited
by law, including sexual solicitation often present in sexual
harassment situations. The penalties include fines and detention. The
criminal code provides relief from penalties if unmarried participants
marry. No information was available regarding the effectiveness of
government enforcement. Due to social conventions and retribution
against both the victim and perpetrator of sexual harassment, victims
of sexual harassment did not usually come forward to pursue legal
remedies.
The Government generally respected the basic rights of couples and
individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, timing, and
spacing of children and to have the means to do so free from
discrimination, coercion, and violence. Apart from the general
insecurity in the country and attendant economic difficulties, there
were no impediments to access to information on family planning,
contraception, and maternal health services, including skilled
attendance during childbirth, prenatal care, and essential obstetric
care and postpartum care. Many women received inadequate medical care
due to a lack of essential drugs, transport to referral institutions,
and medical personnel lacking training in emergency obstetric care.
Women were at increased risk of poor birth outcomes with high rates of
anemia, short birth intervals, early marriage, and early pregnancy.
Although the constitution forbids discrimination on the basis of
gender, in practice conservative societal standards impeded women's
abilities to exercise their rights equally to men. Throughout the
country women reported pressure to wear veils. Islamic extremists
targeted women for undertaking normal activities, such as driving a car
and wearing trousers, in an effort to force them to remain at home,
wear veils, and adhere to a conservative interpretation of Islam.
Islamic extremists also reportedly continued to target women in a
number of cities, demanding they stop wearing Western-style clothing
and cover their heads while in public.
The Ministry of State for Women's Affairs, with an approximately
18-person professional staff, functioned primarily as a policy office
without an independent budget or the ability to hire more employees.
Women experienced economic discrimination in access to, and in
terms of, employment and occupation, credit, and pay equity for
performing similar work or managing similar businesses as men. The
security situation disproportionately affected women's ability to work
outside the home. Weak labor laws and the lack of an equal opportunity
employment law left women vulnerable to arbitrary dismissal. Government
efforts to combat economic discrimination against women are minimal and
unsystematic.
Children.--The constitution states that anyone born with at least
one Iraqi parent shall be considered a citizen. The Government in
general was committed to children's rights and welfare, although it
denied benefits to noncitizen children. Their families had to pay for
services that were otherwise free, such as public schools and health
services. Except for several hundred Palestinian families, they were
not eligible for the national food rationing program.
Primary education is compulsory for citizen children for six years,
and 89 percent of students reached the fifth grade. Education is free
for children at all levels.
Helping street children remained a challenge for the Government,
NGOs, and international organizations. Many street children remained
from the war and the ensuing sectarian fighting. Extremists' attacks
also resulted in orphaned children. There is no adoption under the law,
only guardianship for extended family or friends who can provide for
the child in Iraq. The law does not permit foreigners to obtain legal
guardianship of Iraqi children. Although orphanages existed, there was
little evidence of an established culture of informal adoption for
nonrelated children.
Female genital mutilation (FGM) is not illegal and is a common
practice particularly in the rural areas of the Kurdistan region and
other areas of the country where Kurdish communities live. Several NGOs
that worked to halt FGM had anecdotal evidence that in rural villages
as many as 90 percent of women had undergone the procedure, and in
urban areas as many as 30 percent. The Government offered no
substantive assistance for victims of FGM.
On February 6, the Association for Crisis Assistance and
Development Cooperation (WADI) released the findings of a
representative empirical study on FGM in the Kurdistan region which
noted that the majority of women in the region had undergone FGM. On
June 16, Human Rights Watch released a report describing the
experiences of girls and women who had undergone FGM. On July 6, the
High Committee for Issuing Fatwas at the Kurdistan Islamic Scholars
Union issued a fatwa declaring that ``female circumcision'' was a pre-
Islamic practice that should be avoided for health reasons. On July 12,
the Ministry for Endowments and Religious Affairs in the KRG asked
clerics to note in sermons and Friday prayers that FGM was not an
Islamic practice.
Although there were no statistics, a tradition of marrying young
girls (as young as 14 years old) continued, particularly in rural
areas.
Sexual relations outside of marriage for any reason, including
rape, are prohibited by law. Producing, importing, publishing, or
possessing written material, drawings, photographs, or films that
violates public integrity or decency (including pornography of any
kind) is prohibited. Rape is a serious offense, which can result in
long prison terms, including life imprisonment. The penalties for
violating public integrity or decency include fines and detention. No
information was available regarding the effectiveness of government
enforcement. Due to social conventions and retribution against both the
victim and perpetrator of sexual relations outside marriage, victims of
sexual crimes did not usually come forward to pursue legal remedies.
Individuals do not need parental permission for marriage upon
reaching 18 years old. Consequently, the minimum age of consensual sex
is 18.
Despite laws against child labor, children often worked illegally
on farms or in street commerce. In accordance with the labor law, MOLSA
established an inspection service to ensure compliance with the law as
it relates to prohibitions on child labor in the private and public
sector.
The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. For information on
international parental child abduction, please see the Department of
State's annual on compliance at http://travel.state.gov/abduction/
resources/congressreport/congressreport--4308.html.
Anti-Semitism.--The majority of the Jewish community, which was
estimated to number 117,000 in 1947, left in the years immediately
following the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Virtually all of
the remaining Jews left the country over the passage of the following
decades. Fewer than 10 Jews remained in Baghdad, and none were known to
live in other parts of the country.
The criminal code stipulates that any person promoting Zionist
principles, or who associates himself with Zionist organizations or
assists them by giving material or moral support or works in any way
towards the realization of Zionist objectives, is subject to punishment
by death.
There were no reports of anti-Semitic acts.
Trafficking in Persons.--For information on trafficking in persons,
please see the Department of State's annual Trafficking in Persons
Report at www.state.gov/g/tip.
Persons With Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination in
employment, education, access to health care, and other state services
against persons with physical disabilities. The Government enforced the
law in the Government sector but not in the private sector. The
Government made efforts to ensure access by persons with disabilities
during the March 7 election.
The constitution states that the Government, through laws and
regulations, should care and rehabilitate persons with disabilities and
special needs to reintegrate them into society. There are no laws
prohibiting discrimination against persons with physical, sensory,
intellectual and mental disabilities in employment, education, access
to health care, or the provision of other state services. Access for
persons with disabilities to buildings remained inconsistent.
The Government has programs aimed to help persons with
disabilities; however, numerous media reports documented the challenges
these programs faced, namely in the lack of qualified, trained
personnel and large special needs populations. Amputees, persons with
other major physical injuries, and persons suffering from mental/
psychological trauma were the focus of most media reports. The Health
Ministry provides medical care, benefits, and rehabilitation, when
available, and persons with disabilities may qualify for benefits from
other agencies, including the Prime Minister's Office. The Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs operates several institutions for children and
young adults with disabilities. The Ministry of Health's most recent
estimate of the number of persons with physical and mental disabilities
was two to three million, approximately 10 percent of the population.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population
includes Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Armenians.
The religious mix is likewise varied. Many consider the Assyrians and
Chaldeans to be a distinct ethnic group. These communities speak a
different language, preserve Christian traditions, and do not define
themselves as Arabs. The country also has citizens of African descent,
``Black Iraqis,'' a population that community representatives estimated
to number more than one million. According to Minority Rights Group
International, the largest Black Iraqi community is in Basra; a
significant number reside in Sadr City in Baghdad as well.
The constitution identifies Arabic and Kurdish as the two official
languages of the state. It also provides the right of citizens to
educate their children in their mother tongue, such as Turkmen, Syriac,
or Armenian, in government educational institutions in accordance with
educational guidelines or in any other language in private educational
institutions.
During the year discrimination against ethnic minorities was a
problem. There were numerous reports of Kurdish authorities
discriminating against minorities in the disputed territories under the
de facto control of the KRG, including Turkmen, Arabs, Yazidis, and
Assyrians. According to these reports, authorities denied services to
some villages, arrested minorities without due process, took them to
undisclosed locations for detention, and pressured minority schools to
teach in the Kurdish language. Ethnic and religious minorities in
Tameem (Kirkuk) frequently charged that Kurdish security forces
targeted Arabs and Turkmen. Within the three provinces of the KRG,
there was little evidence of KRG discrimination against religious and
ethnic minorities. Minority communities operated their own schools and
were represented both in the parliament and executive branch of the
KRG.
Palestinians reportedly experienced arrest, detention, harassment,
and abuse by police, by individuals pretending to be police, and by the
general public. A 2006 citizenship law prevents Palestinians from
obtaining citizenship or Jews who emigrated to other countries from
reclaiming citizenship.
A population of 1.5 to 2 million Black Iraqis reported economic and
social discrimination. UNAMI estimated in October 2009 that more than
80 percent of the Black Iraqi population was unemployed. Minority
Rights Group International reported that many were laborers or worked
as domestic workers.
Societal Abuses, Discrimination, and Acts of Violence Based on
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.--There was no law specifically
prohibiting homosexual relationships, although the penal code prohibits
the act of ``buggery,'' or sodomy, irrespective of gender. The law
calls for imprisonment only if the ``victim'' is under the age of 18.
There was no data on how often, if ever, persons were prosecuted for
sodomy. Due to social conventions and retribution against both victim
and perpetrator of nonconsensual homosexual acts and persecution
against participants in consensual homosexual relations, this activity
was unreported.
In light of the law, the authorities rely on public indecency
charges or confessions of monetary exchange, (i.e., prostitution, which
is illegal) to prosecute homosexual acts. Homosexual persons often
faced persecution and violence from family and nongovernmental actors.
The procedures used to arrest such persons were also used to arrest
indiscreet heterosexuals who may be in sexual relations with persons
other than their spouses.
Due to social conventions and potential persecution, including
violent attacks, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
organizations did not operate openly, nor were gay pride marches or gay
rights advocacy events held. Societal discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity in employment, occupation, and housing
was common. Information was not available regarding discrimination in
access to education or health care due to sexual orientation or gender
identity. There were no government efforts to address this
discrimination.
While there were fewer reports of discrimination and violence
against gay men and lesbians than in 2009, discrimination and violence
against such persons continued. On June 23, the London newspaper the
Guardian reported that police in Karbala attacked and detained six
persons, of whom two were gay men, one lesbian, and two transgender
persons. The article reported that one of the men went to a hospital
two days later with a throat wound and allegations of police torture.
On June 29, the newspaper Al-Bayyna Al-Jadidah reported the arrest of
college-age, gay men who allegedly confessed to committing
``unethical'' acts. The article, which highlighted the legal steps
taken to secure a judicial order prior to the search and arrest, ended
with ``greetings to those awake eyes (security/informant forces) that
pursue all homosexuals.''
As of year's end, authorities had not announced any arrests or
prosecutions of any persons for abusing, killing, torturing, or
detaining any LGBT individuals.
Other parts of this report contain related information (see
sections 1.c, 2.c., and 6.d.).
Section 7. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The constitution states that citizens
have the right to form and join unions and professional associations
with certain restrictions. The Saddam-era labor codes, which are still
in effect, place limitations and conditions on these rights. Public
sector workers who are not executives can legally form or join unions,
but regulation classified most public sector workers as executives.
Workers in state-owned enterprises can form or join unions. Unions in
the public sector and state-owned enterprises are not independent; they
are sponsored by the state. Private-sector employees who work at
establishments employing more than 50 persons may form and join unions
that have limited rights. Private-sector unions have the right to seek
government arbitration for labor disputes, but not the right to strike.
Labor Law 150 of 1987 is still in effect and states that trade
union organizations should ``play an effective role in the organization
of labor relations, in the protection of workers' rights, and in the
development of their personalities.'' However, it declares virtually
all public sector workers to be government ``executives,'' and
therefore legally ineligible to form or to join unions. The rights of
migrant workers are not covered under this law. The provision in effect
eliminated unions and the right of association from the large public
sector. Although the number of formal unions and associations remains
undefined, workers in state-owned enterprises have generally been
organized along sectoral lines stemming largely from state employment.
The largest sectors with the most active unions or associations are
oil/petrochemical, industrial and defense manufacturing, and education.
In the private sector, the 1987 Trade Union Organization Law states
that employees can form workers' committees, with limited rights of
association, in private-sector work sites employing more than 50
workers. Originally, this was also intended to remove the right of
association from a majority of private-sector workers because most
private-sector businesses employ fewer than 50 workers. Decree 8750 of
2005, which cancelled unions' leadership boards, froze their assets,
and formed an interministerial committee to administer unions' assets
and assess their capacity to resume activity, also inhibited union
activity.
The legal and regulatory framework, combined with violence,
insecurity, high unemployment, and lack of decent work standards
provided for unacceptable conditions for working people. Nevertheless,
labor organizations in state-owned enterprises were active during the
year despite threats and harassment to union leaders. In January the
Government imprisoned the president of Basra's Iraqi Teachers Union. In
March the president of the Iraqi Federation of Oil Unions was charged
with accusations that he was endangering the economy through union
activity. On March 18, workers of the Southern Refinery Company held a
three-hour strike. On April 1, the company transferred four leaders of
the Refinery Workers Union in Basra. On July 21, the Government
expelled the Electrical Utility Workers Union from its Basra offices.
The MOLSA Labor Directorate has jurisdiction over the labor code,
child labor, wages, occupational safety and health issues, and labor
relations. Although the private sector expanded only modestly during
the year, workers in the private sector continued to enjoy the right to
form workers' committees at work sites employing fewer than 50 persons.
The constitution states that every citizen has the right to
demonstrate and strike peacefully in accordance with the law; however
the 1987 labor code rules out the existence of public sector labor
unions capable of carrying out industrial action and prohibits striking
in the public and private sectors. Strikers were harassed and
threatened for striking during the year. In March the media reported
that security forces (army and police) dispersed an oil worker
demonstration in Basra and arrested two demonstrators. According to
October 10 press reports, Hassan Juma'a and Falih Abood, the president
and general secretary, respectively, of the Federation of Oil Employees
of Iraq were banned from travel outside the country. In June the
authorities surrounded protesting longshoremen in Basra and transferred
union leaders hundreds of miles from their homes.
The Government was the largest employer in the country; reliable
estimates indicated the public sector accounted for approximately 30 to
35 percent of the total workforce. There were no government-sponsored
prosecutions or attacks on trade union activists during the year,
although the Government appeared to use transfers to remove troublesome
union leaders from active union activity.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1987 labor
code in practice ruled out the existence of labor unions able to carry
out free and independent union activity and therefore effectively
prohibited independent organizing and collective bargaining in the
public and private sectors.
Because unions have no legal power to negotiate with employers,
proactive protection of workers' rights through collective bargaining
and written collective contracts is not possible. Unions were able to
play a supportive role in labor disputes, and they had the right to
demand government arbitration, a process the Government only recently
began to address in its commercial courts and judicial training. The
1987 Trade Union Organization Law defined ``labor disputes'' as
collective conflicts arising between workers and employers over the
provisions of the labor code and/or individual employment contracts.
Government labor courts were empowered to rule on labor code violations
and disagreements. MOLSA officials, who were also charged with ensuring
that public- and private-sector employers provided workers government-
mandated social security, pension, health care, and other benefits
regardless of company size, readily acknowledged that enforcing these
social safety net laws was more difficult without the partnership and
cooperation of strong unions.
Migrant workers are prohibited from collective bargaining rights
and are not allowed to join unions. The absence of collective
bargaining and collective contracts at national and local levels
significantly diminished unions' power to defend workers' rights
pertaining to their access to social protection.
The laws and decrees did not prohibit antiunion discrimination by
employers or others.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor; however this is not monitored or enforced.
Migrant workers were sometimes subjected to abusive forced labor. The
MOI, in coordination with MOLSA, reviewed applications for special
worker status. According to MOLSA, most migrant applications were
denied to protect domestic workers and industry. When the Government
uncovered cases of exploitation of foreign workers, it worked in
conjunction with international organizations to repatriate the victims.
The Government did not have an effective means of monitoring or
enforcing decent work standards for the workforce, both citizens and
migrant workers.
Also see the Department of State's annual Trafficking in Persons
Report at www.state.gov/g/tip.
d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment.--The
constitution and law prohibit the worst forms of child labor. The
Government was not able to monitor or enforce these laws effectively.
The law limits working hours for workers younger than 18 and prohibits
their employment in dangerous occupations. The minimum age for
employment is 15. Employment of anyone younger than 16 in work that is
detrimental to health, safety, or morals is prohibited. The MOLSA Child
Labor Unit continued to enforce child labor standards, but its work
suffered from insufficient personnel and budget resources. The ISF
continued to make slow but steady progress in its ability to pursue and
interdict nonviolent crimes such as child labor violations.
Poor families routinely used children to augment their income-
earning potential. This work often took the form of seasonal labor in
rural areas or begging or peddling in urban settings. There were
anecdotal reports of children working in hazardous family-owned
automobile shops or on construction sites. Unconfirmed reports alleged
the sale of children for indentured servitude.
The Government introduced a targeted, means-tested social safety
network program in 2005 to reduce poverty and protect children against
deteriorating living conditions in their households. Millions of
families received benefits and services administered by MOLSA, but
child labor remained problematic. The package included a child
allowance, conditional upon school attendance; the Government also
funded programs to assist former and current street children.
International organizations and NGOs funded additional projects to
enhance the protection of children.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Wages are set by contract in the
private sector and set by the Government in the public sector. The
national minimum wage for a skilled worker was less than 12,000 dinars
(approximately $10) per day and for an unskilled worker less than 5,250
dinars ($4.50) per day. The standard workday is eight hours with one or
more rest periods. Up to four hours of overtime work per day is
permitted, and premium pay for overtime is required. These regulations
were almost entirely unenforced. The Central Organization of Statistics
and Information Technology reported that the average salary in 2009--
the latest year for which information was available--was approximately
2.4 million dinars ($2,100) per year, an increase over the previous
year's figure of 1.78 million dinars ($1,500). These earnings remained
only marginally above poverty level and did not provide an adequate
standard of living for a worker and family.
According to international governmental organizations, NGOs, and
press reports, some foreign workers in the country were subjected to
abusive treatment, including confiscation of travel and identity
documents, restrictions on movement and communication, physical abuse,
sexual harassment and rape, withholding of wages, forced overtime, and
hazardous working conditions. Migrant workers have no legal protections
and were not allowed to form or join unions.
The MOLSA occupational safety and health component had staff
located throughout the country. The law provides that workers have the
right to remove themselves from a situation endangering health and
safety without prejudice to their employment; however, this right is
not afforded to civil servants or migrant workers, who make up the
majority of the country's workforce.
__________
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Israel is a multiparty parliamentary democracy with a population of
approximately 7.7 million, including Israelis living in the occupied
territories. Israel has no constitution, although a series of ``Basic
Laws'' enumerate fundamental rights. Certain fundamental laws, orders,
and regulations legally depend on the existence of a ``State of
Emergency,'' which has been in effect since 1948. The 120-member,
unicameral Knesset has the power to dissolve the Government and mandate
elections. The February 2009 elections for the Knesset were considered
free and fair. They resulted in a coalition government led by Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Israeli security forces reported to
civilian authorities. (An annex to this report covers human rights in
the occupied territories. This report deals with human rights in Israel
and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.)
Principal human rights problems were institutional, legal, and
societal discrimination against Arab citizens, Palestinian residents of
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, non-Orthodox Jews, and other
religious groups; societal discrimination against persons with
disabilities; and societal discrimination and domestic violence against
women, particularly in Bedouin society. While trafficking in persons
for the purpose of prostitution decreased in recent years, trafficking
for the purpose of labor remained a serious problem, as did abuse of
foreign workers and societal discrimination and incitement against
asylum seekers.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--The Government or
its agents did not commit politically motivated killings.
The petitioners withdrew their appeal to the High Court against the
closure of the inquiry by the Department for Investigations against
Police Officers' (DIPO) into the 2008 beating and subsequent coma and
death of Sabri al-Jarjawi, a Bedouin. Instead, they appealed to DIPO,
which denied the petitioners' appeal to reopen the case.
At year's end, an internal Israel Prison Service (IPS)
investigation continued into the 2007 killing of a Palestinian
prisoner, Mohammed al-Askar, during a riot at Ketziot Prison. Prisoners
alleged that security forces improperly used crowd-dispersal weapons,
including rubber bullets and beanbag projectiles. The IPS investigation
was on hold pending the outcome of legal proceedings in the Beer Sheva
Magistrate Court regarding the cause of death.
On July 21, the Supreme Court doubled the manslaughter sentence
imposed by a lower court on police officer Shahar Mizrahi to 30 months
in prison. The lower court convicted Mizrahi in 2009 of manslaughter in
the 2006 shooting death of Mahmoud Ghanayem, who had attacked Mizrahi
with a screwdriver when he tried to apprehend Ghanayem for suspected
car theft.
Terrorist groups routinely fired rockets and mortars from the Gaza
Strip into Israel. According to the Government, terrorists fired
approximately 235 rockets and mortar shells into the country from the
Gaza Strip during the year, an increase from 195 in 2009. On March 19,
a rocket fired from the Gaza Strip killed a Thai citizen near the city
of Ashkelon.
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Military Advocate General Mandelblit
investigated all allegations relating to the 2008-09 Operation Cast
Lead military incursion into the Gaza Strip, examining over 150
incidents, including those contained in the UN Human Rights Council's
2009 Goldstone report. In January and July, Mandelblit released updates
on the majority of investigations, which included details of
indictments against several soldiers for manslaughter, improper use of
civilians in wartime, and misconduct. As of July the military advocate
general launched 47 military police criminal investigations into IDF
conduct during Operation Cast Lead and completed a significant number
of them. On August 1, the IDF issued a new order appointing
humanitarian affairs officers to each battalion to provide further
protections for civilian populations during wartime planning and combat
operations.
During the year the Military Investigative Police launched 147
investigations with regard to cases of death, violence, and property
damage against residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In these
cases the military advocate general filed 10 indictments against 12
soldiers suspected of committing criminal offenses against
Palestinians. There were three convictions of four soldiers, no
acquittals, closure of three cases by the military advocate general,
and seven cases pending as of year's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--A 1999 High Court of Justice ruling held that, although
torture and the application of physical or psychological pain are
illegal, Israel Security Agency (ISA) interrogators may be exempt from
criminal prosecution if they use such methods in extraordinary cases
determined to involve an imminent threat, or ``ticking bomb'' scenario.
During the year nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) filed numerous
complaints alleging that security forces tortured or abused Palestinian
residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On April 26, the Supreme
Court rejected a July 2009 appeal by the NGO Public Committee against
Torture in Israel alleging authorities use painful shackling during
interrogations. The court noted the Government's response that
shackling was governed by strictly defined procedures and observed that
the Government had recently made several policy adjustments, including
no longer shackling a detainee's hands behind the back.
On October 19, officers from the Ministry of Interior's Oz
immigration unit allegedly beat and verbally abused with racial
epithets five members of a black noncitizen family living in Ashkelon
who had converted to Judaism and were awaiting a decision on their
citizenship request. The immigration unit admitted detaining a family
member in error but denied using physical force. The Ashkelon police
department refused to allow the family to file a complaint against the
officers.
On May 12, due to a police procedural error, the Jerusalem
Magistrates Court canceled the indictment and postponed the trial of
two Border Guard officers accused in November 2009 of assaulting
Muhtaseb Muqtada, an Arab resident of Jerusalem. Officers Maor
Malianker and Yossi Dahan allegedly beat Muqtada with a baton after
asking for his identification. Malianker was also indicted on two other
counts for allegedly using a radio device to hit a Jerusalem resident
and falsely reporting he was attacked during a search.
The case of two border guards arrested by police in December 2009
for allegedly beating and stealing NIS 700 ($197) from a Sudanese man
in Eilat remained pending at year's end at the Beer Sheva District
Court.
The case of three police officers who reportedly detained and
severely beat East Jerusalem resident Tareq Abu Laban in 2008 remained
pending at year's end. In November 2009 evidentiary hearings began in
the case following a DIPO investigation.
In October evidentiary hearings began at the Beer Sheva
Magistrates' Court in the case of police officers Iyad Huzeyl and Dani
Havery, who were indicted for assault involving grievous injury against
Fadi Darab'i, an undocumented Palestinian laborer, in 2008 in the town
of Gan Yavneh.
On June 13, a court acquitted three border police officers of
charges of aggravated assault for physically abusing Abd Tareq Ahrub, a
West Bank resident detained for being in Jerusalem without a permit in
2006.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions.--The law provides prisoners
and detainees the right to conditions that do not harm their health or
dignity. While various organizations found deficiencies, conditions in
IPS facilities for common criminals and security prisoners generally
met international standards according to international and domestic
NGOs. (Conditions in four facilities for detainees are covered in the
annex.)
According to news reports, a classified report in December by the
Israel Bar Association (IBA) found that most of the prison service's
isolation cells did not meet international standards. The reports
stated the IBA study also described many isolated inmates' development
of mental and physical health problems such as paranoia, fits of rage,
and eyesight loss due to lack of natural light. The Government
acknowledged the need to improve conditions for Palestinian security
prisoners in response to a 2008 IBA report on Sharon and Hadarim
prisons that noted, among other points, poor health conditions in those
facilities.
The annual report of the Public Defender's Office describing
conditions in prisons and detention centers in 2008 found grave
deficiencies in the infrastructure of most prison facilities and the
living conditions in many of them. In response to the report's claim
that convicts in one-third of the prisons visited complained of violent
and humiliating treatment, the Warden's Investigation Unit within the
National Police (which is independent of the IPS) found complaints to
be unfounded.
According to a December 27 Haaretz article, there were on average
13 unnatural deaths (from suicide, murder, or neglect) in prisons over
the past decade. At year's end both the police and the prison service
were conducting separate investigations into the causes of the
unnatural deaths that occurred during the year. According to news
reports, the state comptroller began an investigation into prison
suicides in 2009 to determine their causes.
On April 16, 27-year-old Raed Abu Hammad died while in solitary
confinement in a prison in the southern part of the country. Hammad was
halfway through a 10-year sentence for attempted murder and suffered
from medical conditions. The prison service was investigating the death
at year's end.
As of December 14, there were 5,935 Arab security prisoners and
detainees, 1,438 Palestinian criminal prisoners, 3,903 Israeli Arab
criminal prisoners, 17 Jewish Israeli security prisoners, and 6,462
Jewish criminal prisoners.
Prisoners and detainees had reasonable access to visitors,
including through a program of the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) that brought relatives from the West Bank into the country
for prison visits. The Government stopped a similar program for
visitors from the Gaza Strip following the Hamas takeover of the Gaza
Strip in 2007. In December 2009 the High Court ruled against a petition
from prisoners' family members from the Gaza Strip, finding such visits
did not constitute a humanitarian need. Travel restrictions into the
country also affected Palestinian administrative prisoners' access to
visitors and lawyers.
Prisoners were permitted religious observance.
The law allows prisoners to submit a petition to judicial
authorities in response to substandard prison conditions, and the
authorities investigated credible allegations of inhumane conditions
and documented results of such investigations publicly.
The ICRC regularly monitored IPS facilities, interrogation
facilities, and the two IDF provisional detention centers but did not
monitor security detainees in military detention centers. The
Government also permitted the IBA and Public Defenders' Office to
inspect IPS facilities, and they did so during the year.
The state comptroller serves as ombudsman and investigates public
complaints received through the Public Complaints Commission against
government ministries, local authorities, state enterprises and
institutions, government corporations, and government employees. It
functions as an effective mechanism for handling accusations of
discrimination within government and public institutions, and it
forwards complaints to the appropriate oversight bodies of
nongovernmental entities that serve the public including banks and
insurance companies. Any person may make a complaint regardless of
citizenship, residency, or visa status.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention.--The law prohibits arbitrary
arrest and detention, and the Government generally observed these
prohibitions for all citizens. Non-Israeli residents of the Israeli-
annexed Golan Heights were subject to the same laws as Israeli
citizens. Noncitizens of Palestinian origin detained on security
grounds fell under military jurisdiction even if detained in Israel.
Role of the Police and Security Apparatus.--Under the authority of
the prime minister, the ISA combats terrorism and espionage in the
country and the occupied territories. The National Police, including
the Border Police and the Immigration Police, are under the authority
of the Ministry of Internal Security. Civilian authorities maintained
effective control over the ISA police forces, and the Government has
effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption.
There were no reports of impunity involving the security forces during
the year. The military is responsible for external security and has no
jurisdiction over citizens.
DIPO investigates complaints against police officers and has the
authority to indict or transfer cases for disciplinary trials.
Continuing a plan to replace police with civil investigators, DIPO was
staffed by 29 civil investigators and 19 police investigators at year's
end.
The National Police carried out training programs in coordination
with academic institutions and human rights NGOs to promote human
rights awareness and cultural sensitivity. During the year the National
Police also provided mandatory Arabic language and culture classes for
all new cadets.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention.--The law
provides that an arrested citizen is considered innocent until proven
guilty and has the right to be represented by an attorney. According to
a report by the Public Defender's Office covering 2008-09, many persons
arrested by police were informed of their right to consult an attorney
only after they were questioned and transferred to a holding facility.
Authorities allowed detainees to contact family members promptly. The
Government may withhold evidence from defense lawyers on security
grounds; however, the evidence must be made available to the court. A
bail system exists, and a decision denying bail can be appealed. As a
general practice, noncitizens of Palestinian origin detained for
security violations were not granted bail. An individual suspected of a
criminal offense may be held without charge for 24 hours before being
brought before a judge, with limited exceptions allowing for up to 48
hours. Authorities respected this right in practice.
Suspects in nonsecurity cases are apprehended openly with warrants
based on sufficient evidence and issued by an authorized official and
generally were informed promptly of charges against them.
Persons detained on security grounds may fall under one or more of
the three legal regimes. First, under a 2006 ``temporary law'' on
criminal procedures that has been renewed three times, the IPS may hold
individuals suspected of a security offense for 48 hours before being
brought to a judge, with limited exceptions allowing up to 96 hours
before being brought to the senior judge of a district court. The law
allows the court to authorize holding a detainee for up to 20 days
without an indictment in exceptional cases for interrogation. On
February 11, the Supreme Court annulled a section of the temporary law
that had barred access to a lawyer for up to 21 days and had enabled a
court to impose further extensions without the detainee being present
or informed of the hearing.
Second, the 1979 Emergency Powers Law allows the Defense Ministry
to detain persons administratively without charge for up to six months,
renewable indefinitely. Administrative detention was used as an
exception when intelligence sources could not be presented as evidence
in regular criminal proceedings. Such detainees, almost all of whom
were Palestinian residents of the West Bank, were permitted legal
representation within seven days, extendable to as long as 21 days in
limited cases with the attorney general's approval. If necessary the
Government provided free legal representation. An administrative
detainee has the right to appeal any decision to lengthen detention to
a military court of appeals and ultimately to the Supreme Court. The
military courts may rely on classified evidence denied to detainees and
their lawyers when determining whether to prolong administrative
detention.
At the end of the year, according to government figures reported by
the NGO B'Tselem, there were 204 administrative detainees in IPS
detention centers, including two minors. Most administrative detainees
were held for less than one year, with 21 administrative detainees
having been held consecutively for more than two years. Administrative
detainees constituted 3.4 percent of the 5,954 security-related
detainees.
Third, the 2002 Illegal Combatant Law permits holding a detainee
for 14 days before review by a district court judge, denying access to
counsel for up to 21 days with the attorney general's approval, and
allowing indefinite detention subject to twice-yearly district court
reviews and appeals to the Supreme Court. In 2008 the Government
extended for an additional four years a temporary provision that
exempts law enforcement personnel from the law requiring them to film
and audio record all interrogations of detainees suspected of security
offenses. Amendments to the law in 2008 expanded its internment powers,
which may be exercised in the event of ``widespread hostilities,'' an
occurrence that has not happened to date. At the end of November,
authorities held three Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip in
detention under the Illegal Combatant Law.
Human rights groups alleged military commanders in the occupied
territories used administrative security detention orders based on
``security reasons'' even when the accused posed no clear danger. NGOs
complained these laws removed the standard procedural safeguards from
security suspects.
The law provides that foreign nationals suspected of immigration
violations be afforded a hearing within four days of detention. They
have the right to, but no assurance of, legal representation. According
to the NGO Hotline for Migrant Workers (Hotline), interpreters in
Ketziot, where most asylum seekers were detained, were rarely present
during hearings despite a 2002 written commitment by the Government to
the Supreme Court to provide interpreters, and persons held in
immigration detention rarely were released prior to judicial
determination of their status. Moreover, if the detainee's country of
origin had no diplomatic or consular representation, the individual
could remain in detention for months.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respected this provision in
practice.
The judicial branch comprises magistrate courts, six district
courts, and the Supreme Court, which also sits as the High Court of
Justice. Magistrate courts adjudicate misdemeanors and lesser civil
disputes. District courts adjudicate felonies, serious civil cases,
appeals from the magistrate courts, and several other largely
administrative matters. There are also military, religious, labor
relations, and administrative courts. The High Court of Justice
exercises judicial review over the other branches of government and can
exercise power on matters that are not within the jurisdiction of any
other court or tribunal. The High Court of Justice is a court of first
instance for claims against the Government. Its members also sit as the
Supreme Court and hear appeals of lower court rulings, Knesset
elections, administrative detentions, prisoners' petitions, and rulings
of the Civil Service Commission and bar association. Religious courts
have jurisdiction over matters of personal status for their adherents;
there are no civil courts for marriage or divorce for the hundreds of
thousands of citizens for whom religious courts are not a legal option.
Trial Procedures.--The law provides for the right to a fair trial,
and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right. However,
administrative detainee hearings are not trials and do not follow trial
procedures.
By law an arrested citizen is considered innocent until proven
guilty. There are no trials by jury. Trials are public except when the
court determines that a closed trial is required to protect state
security, foreign relations, a party's or witness's right to privacy,
or a sexual offense victim. At the discretion of the court, security or
military trials may be open to independent observers but not to the
general public. Defendants have the right to be present and to consult
with an attorney in a timely manner. All indigent defendants facing
trial and imprisonment receive mandatory representation. According to
the Government, counsel represented all defendants in district and
Supreme Court trials and in approximately 80 percent of cases in the
magistrate courts.
Defendants have the right to question witnesses against them,
present witnesses on their behalf, access evidence (except when the
court determines such access would compromise state security), and
appeal.
Military courts provide some, but not all, of the procedural rights
granted in civil criminal courts. The 1970 evidentiary rules governing
trials of Palestinians and others applicable in the occupied
territories under military law are the same as evidentiary rules in
criminal cases. According to the Ministry of Justice, the law does not
permit convictions to be based solely on confessions. In military
trials, prosecutors often present secret evidence that is not available
to the defendant or counsel. Counsel may assist the accused in such
trials, and a judge may assign counsel to defendants. Indigent
detainees do not automatically receive free legal counsel for military
trials, but in practice almost all detainees had counsel even in minor
cases. The defendant and public are read the indictment in Hebrew and,
unless the defendant waives this right, in Arabic. In past years, many
indictments were translated into Arabic, but, since according to the
Government no requests for translations were made, the practice during
the year was to provide written translations of indictments into Arabic
only upon request. At least one interpreter is present for simultaneous
interpretation in every military court hearing, unless the defendant
waives that right. Defendants can appeal through the Military Court of
Appeals and petition the High Court of Justice.
Political Prisoners and Detainees.--There were no reports of
citizen political prisoners or detainees, although NGOs alleged there
were noncitizen political detainees.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies.--An independent and
impartial judiciary adjudicates lawsuits seeking damages for, or
cessation of, human rights violations. Administrative remedies exist,
and court orders were usually enforced. On February 7, former deputy
attorney general Yehudit Karp sent a memo to Attorney General Yehuda
Weinstein listing 11 contempt of court ordinances and Supreme Court
rulings that had not been implemented. On August 1, Attorney General
Weinstein issued guidelines noting the need to implement court orders.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law provides for protection of privacy of the
individual and the home. In criminal cases, the law permits wiretapping
under court order; in security cases, the Ministry of Defense must
issue the order. Under emergency regulations, authorities may open and
destroy mail on the basis of security considerations.
The law provides for police officers and other public investigators
to request court orders to obtain personal information from private
communications companies, including landline and cellular telephones
and Internet service providers. To access private communications
records, investigators must demonstrate that their goal is to save or
preserve life, investigate or prevent crime, or seize property in
accordance with the law.
Separate religious court systems adjudicate matters such as
marriage and divorce for the Jewish, Muslim, Christian, and Druze
communities. Jews can marry only in Orthodox Jewish services, although
the great majority of Jewish Israelis are not Orthodox. Civil
marriages, marriages of some non-Orthodox Jews, marriages in non-
Orthodox ceremonies, or marriage of a Jew to a non-Jew must take place
outside the country to be legal. According to the NGO New Family
Organization, more than 5,000 couples married in civil ceremonies
abroad each year, mostly in Cyprus, and then registered in Israel's
population register. The Rabbinical Court presides over divorces if it
recognizes both spouses as Jewish; the Family Matters Court grants
divorces in all cases outside of the religious tribunal's jurisdiction.
The Government allows consular marriages as long as both parties have
no religion or belong to a religious community that the state does not
recognize.
The law prohibits dismissing a worker who becomes pregnant who has
worked at least six months for the same employer. However, the law also
mandates that foreign workers leave the country no later than three
months after giving birth; those who stay lose their legal status. In
2005 several NGOs appealed to the Supreme Court against this procedure;
the appeal remained pending at year's end.
Many Jewish citizens objected to exclusive Orthodox rabbinic
control over aspects of their personal lives. Approximately 310,000
citizens who immigrated, either as Jews or as family members of Jews,
are not considered Jewish by the Orthodox Rabbinate. They cannot be
married, divorced, or buried in Jewish cemeteries within the country.
The estimated 20,000 Messianic Jews, who believe Jesus is the Messiah
and consider themselves to be Jews, also often experienced this
infringement on their personal lives, since the Orthodox Rabbinate did
not consider them Jewish. A 1996 law requiring the Government to
establish civil cemeteries has not been fully implemented, although
eight civil cemeteries exist.
The authority to grant status (citizenship and residency) to a non-
Israeli spouse, including Palestinian and other non-Jewish foreign
spouses, resides with the Ministry of Interior. On July 27, the Knesset
extended for another year the temporary 2003 Citizenship and Entry Law,
which prohibits a citizen's Palestinian spouse from the occupied
territories not only from acquiring citizenship by marriage, but also
from residing in the country. Palestinian male spouses who are 35 or
older and female spouses who are 25 or older may apply for temporary
visit permits. The Mossawa Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens in Israel
(Mossawa) claimed the law affected more than 21,000 families, including
couples with long-standing marriages. The Government originally enacted
the law following 23 terrorist attacks involving suicide bombers from
the occupied territories who had gained access to Israeli
identification through family unification.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
speech and of the press, and the Government generally respected these
rights in practice. Individuals may criticize the Government publicly
and privately without reprisal. The law prohibits hate speech and
incitement to violence, and the 1948 Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance
prohibits expressing support for illegal or terrorist organizations.
The independent media were active and expressed a wide variety of
views without restriction. The country has 13 daily newspapers, at
least 90 weekly newspapers, more than 250 periodicals, and a number of
Internet news sites. All newspapers were privately owned and managed.
Laws dating from the British mandate require licenses from the Interior
Ministry for newspapers and allow the minister, under certain
conditions, to close a newspaper.
The state-owned Israel Broadcast Authority controls the Hebrew-
language Israel Television and an Arabic-language channel, as well as
Kol Israel (Voice of Israel) radio, which broadcasts news and other
programming in Hebrew, Arabic, and other languages. The Second
Television and Radio Authority, a public body, supervises the two
privately owned commercial television channels and 14 privately owned
radio stations.
The Government prohibited all citizens, including journalists, from
entering the Gaza Strip; those who entered were subject to legal
penalties such as fines and restraining orders, but no journalists were
fined during the year. All foreign journalists operating in the country
require accreditation from the Government Press Office.
All media organizations must submit to military censors any
material relating to specific military issues or strategic
infrastructure issues, such as oil and water supplies. The censor's
decisions may be appealed to the High Court of Justice, and the censor
cannot appeal a court judgment. The Interior Ministry has no authority
over the military censor.
News printed or broadcast abroad is subject to security censorship.
The Government did not fine newspapers or other mass media for
violating censorship regulations during the year. On June 6, the
Supreme Court commuted to community service a sentence of two months in
prison and six-month suspended sentence imposed by a district court on
journalists Khader Shaheen and Muhammad Sarhan for breaching the
military censorship law during the Gaza Strip offensive. Police had
charged the two men in January 2009 with divulging secret information
and transmitting information to the enemy in wartime. The charges were
filming and broadcasting live to Iran the IDF movements toward the Gaza
Strip a half hour before the start of the ground offensive.
Internet Freedom.--There were no government restrictions on
Internet access. Individuals and groups could engage in the peaceful
expression of views via the Internet, including by e-mail, although the
Government monitored cellular and landline telephones and Internet
service providers for security purposes. The International
Telecommunication Union reported that approximately 63 percent of the
country's inhabitants were Internet users in 2009.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events.--There were no government
restrictions on academic freedom or cultural events.
Universities are required to justify to the IDF acceptance of
Palestinian students from the occupied territories. According to
revised government criteria submitted in response to a 2007 High Court
of Justice order, no more than 70 students from the West Bank may
pursue graduate studies in Israeli universities at any given time,
provided there is no practical alternative and the chosen program is
not in a field that could provide knowledge or skills that could be
employed to harm the country. Students from the Gaza Strip are not
eligible to apply.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom of
Assembly.--The law provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice.
Throughout the year weekly protests in the East Jerusalem
neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah took place against the implementation of
court decisions regarding property ownership. On January 15, police
arrested 17 activists, including Association for Civil Rights in Israel
(ACRI) Executive Director Hagai El-Ad, when they held a protest after
being denied a permit. Two days later the Jerusalem Magistrate's Court
ordered the protesters released and ruled that the police could not
require a permit for the protests.
Police have the authority to declare protests illegal and disperse
them to uphold public safety. On November 17, police in Tel Aviv
allowed a peaceful demonstration of students protesting a bill
providing stipends solely to yeshiva students but declared the
gathering illegal following protesters' use of smoke grenades and
attempts to disrupt traffic. The students then violently clashed with
police, resulting in 12 injured students.
At year's end, a DIPO investigation continued into a complaint by
NGOs Adalah and the Arab Association of Human Rights concerning police
behavior during clashes with 15,000 Arab-Israeli demonstrators in 2008
in the former Arab village of Safouriya, now a Jewish community. There
were conflicting claims about responsibility for violence during the
``Nakba'' (catastrophe in Arabic) demonstration that marked the
anniversary of the establishment of the State of Israel. Adalah
released video footage that reportedly showed police beating or kicking
some demonstrators in the head and face as they sat handcuffed on the
ground. According to press and NGO reports, police attacked several
local and international journalists, including a CNN correspondent, and
in some cases confiscated cameras and erased footage.
Freedom of Association.--The law provides for the right of
association, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice.
Under the 1980 Law of Associations, NGOs must register and pay
annual fees. Some registered NGOs were eligible to receive funding from
government ministries. According to government figures, such funding
amounted to approximately NIS 2.5 billion ($703 million) per year.
Government funding for NGOs disproportionately favored Jewish NGOs,
especially those that promote ``traditional and religious Jewish
activities.''
c. Freedom of Religion.--For a complete description of religious
freedom, please see the 2010 International Religious Freedom Report at
www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/rpt.
d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of
Refugees, and Stateless Persons.--The law provides for freedom of
movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and
repatriation, and the Government respected them in practice for
citizens. The Government cooperated with the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
in providing protection and assistance to some refugees, asylum
seekers, and other persons of concern.
Citizens generally were free to travel abroad and to emigrate,
provided they had no outstanding military obligations and no
administrative restrictions. The Government may bar citizens from
leaving the country based on security considerations. In addition no
citizen is permitted to travel to any state officially at war with the
country without government permission. All citizens required a special
permit to enter area A (the area, according to the Interim Agreement,
in which the Palestinian Authority exercises civil and security
responsibility), although the Government allowed Arab citizens some
access without permits. Arab citizens regularly complained of
discrimination and degrading treatment by airport security officials. A
Supreme Court decision in a 2007 petition by ACRI and Adalah regarding
alleged ethnic profiling was still pending at year's end. The court
postponed a December hearing on the Government's comparative legal
analysis of its security screening methods.
The law prohibits forced exile of citizens, and the Government
respected this prohibition in practice.
Protection of Refugees.--The Government has not enacted legislation
implementing the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and
its 1967 Protocol. NGOs criticized new asylum regulations released on
December 13 that require applicants to submit claims within one year of
arriving in the country; authorize the Ministry of Interior to reject
applications without appeal even at the registration stage; and, in
various accelerated procedures, exclude ``enemy nationals'' from
receiving asylum in the country; and lack an independent appeal
process. The Government arrested a number of persons immediately
following rejection of their refugee status claims, causing a decrease
in new applications. A number of formal and informal arrangements
provide for the protection of some asylum seekers.
The Interior Ministry's Authority for Immigration and Border
Crossings implements government policy and is responsible for foreign
nationals and population issues. The authority consolidates all
relevant bodies dealing with immigration issues, including asylum
seekers. In July 2009 the Government assumed from the UNHCR the process
of registering and conducting determinations of refugee status for all
asylum seekers; however, domestic NGOs argued that the new regulations
and procedures for the registration and status determination of asylum
seekers were flawed. According to the Tel Aviv University Refugee
Rights Law Clinic, the Government failed to provide asylum seekers
copies of their interview transcripts or sufficient explanations of
their determinations. After an appeal by the Refugee Rights Law Clinic
and other NGOs, the Supreme Court issued a temporary injunction
mandating that asylum seekers be accompanied by legal representatives
in interviews, but the Government continued to bar paralegals, and most
asylum seekers could not afford counsel for hearings.
The National Status Granting Board (NSGB), composed of four members
from the ministries of interior, justice, and foreign affairs,
processes asylum applications. It makes a recommendation that is sent
to the minister of interior for final approval. Between 2008 and 2009,
the NSGB reportedly reviewed 3,211 cases and provided positive
recommendations in three. The UNHCR participated informally in NSGB
sessions.
The Government issued three-month ``conditional release visas'' for
asylum seekers waiting for a decision from the NSGB and Sudanese and
Eritreans who were not reviewed for refugee status. The visa did not
provide for the right to work or social benefits such as health
insurance or housing subsidies, but in practice the Government
generally allowed refugees to work. The Government generally gave
Eritreans and Sudanese, who constituted the majority of asylum seekers,
conditional release visas with deferred deportation status and
temporary protection, and it did not require or allow them to undergo
refugee status determinations. Asylum seekers of other nationalities
must report to the Ministry of Interior's Refugee Status Unit for
determination of their refugee claim.
On November 17, the Ministry of Interior instituted a new procedure
of marking conditional release visas ``this is not a work visa.'' The
new procedure led to many asylum seekers being fired, according to
NGOs. In August, following a government decision to enforce a
prohibition on employment, the Refugee Rights Law Clinic petitioned the
Supreme Court on behalf of eight human rights organizations, asking the
Government to clarify the right to work for asylum seekers and persons
who are provided deferred deportation status. The case was pending at
year's end.
Refugees recommended by the UNHCR or the Ministry of Interior and
recognized by the NSGB received six-month renewable visas, with status
evaluated after one year. Asylum seekers at the appeal stage were not
provided with this visa but were protected from detention and
deportation by the letter informing them of the rejection of their
claim.
No legal option exists for a refugee to become a naturalized
citizen. In 2009 the Refugee Rights Law Clinic petitioned the Jerusalem
Administrative Court on behalf of an Ethiopian refugee who had been in
the country as a recognized refugee for more than 10 years. The
petitioners argued that under the 1951 Refugee Convention, a state is
obliged to facilitate the naturalization of refugees. The case was
pending at year's end.
In 2009 the Ministry of Interior opened an office in Lod for asylum
seekers to register to receive documents allowing legal residence
without which they would be subject to arrest. The NGO Hotline reported
that many refugees and asylum seekers complained about discriminatory
treatment, inefficiency, refusal to renew papers, and lost documents at
the Lod office, but noted some improvements in operation during the
year.
In practice the Government provided some protection against the
expulsion or return of refugees to countries where their lives or
freedom could be threatened on account of their race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. At year's end the Supreme Court had not ruled on the question
put to it in 2007 of whether it was safe to return asylum seekers to
Egypt. Domestic and international NGOs and the UNHCR continued to be
concerned with the practice of ``coordinated returns'' or ``hot
returns'' of some asylum seekers to Egypt because of allegations that
those individuals were later returned to their countries of origin in
violation of their right to seek asylum and protection against such
return. The Government stated that through October 10, it had summarily
returned to Egypt 136 persons who had crossed the country's border.
This was a decrease from 517 persons who returned to Egypt after
crossing the border in 2008-09. In its petition Hotline submitted to
the Supreme Court the testimony of an IDF soldier describing alleged
incidents of ``hot returns'' he had witnessed at the Egyptian border.
According to the testimony, while officially Egypt refused to accept
asylum seekers returned to its territory, there was a field-level
understanding between the border forces that the Egyptians would
receive persons captured at the border or soon after crossing. NGOs
asserted that these arrangements were temporary conditional agreements
between Egyptian and Israeli border commands and not a uniform policy.
The Government did not grant asylum to persons from states with
which it was officially at war, such as Iraq, but stated that it
attempted to find a third country to accept them. Sudanese, while also
originating from an ``enemy state,'' in practice received conditional
release visas. On December 13, the Government, with NGO assistance,
carried out a voluntary return to Sudan of 150 refugees residing in the
country.
Refugees and asylum seekers were targets of violence. On December
18, an unknown arsonist threw a burning tire at the apartment door of
five Sudanese refugees in Ashdod, setting the apartment on fire. The
Sudanese refugees escaped by breaking through the barred glass window
and were treated for smoke inhalation. Local residents and storeowners
claimed they were attacked because they were refugees from Sudan.
Ashdod police began an investigation that continued at year's end.
Also on December 18, a group of approximately 20 teenagers severely
beat three 16-year-old daughters of African asylum seekers in the
Hatikva neighborhood of Tel Aviv. The victims reportedly did not file a
police report because they feared retribution.
Rhetoric by government officials and community protests concerning
asylum seekers also intensified during the year. On March 22, Knesset
member Yaakov Katz issued a letter that called for the establishment of
an ``infiltrator'' city to hold asylum seekers and stated that in 10
years the ``infiltrators'' could ``ruin'' the country. On July 19,
Minister of Interior Eli Yishai called for IDF soldiers to ``block
infiltrators'' coming from the southern part of the country and stated,
``This is an existential threat to the State of Israel.'' On September
2, Minister of Justice Yaakov Neeman stated that the ``infiltrators at
the southern border create a real danger to the existence of the state
of Israel, and Israel has to fight this phenomenon in every possible
way.'' In July the mayor of Eilat called on city residents to
demonstrate against the large community of ``infiltrators'' who had
taken over the city, created a climate of fear, and lowered real estate
value. Candidates for the October Eilat municipality elections also
used anti-asylee campaigns as part of their platforms.
The Government did not grant temporary status to persons with
disputed nationalities, and prolonged detention of some of these
persons continued throughout the year. According to Hotline and IPS, at
year's end the Government was holding at least 1,000 asylum seekers for
longer than 60 days in violation of the Entry of Israel Law. In
addition authorities detained over 200 women and children in the
Saaronim prison in cloth tents, with limited education services
provided to the children for the detention period and insufficient
health and medical treatment, according to NGOs. While authorities
allowed the UNHCR full access to asylum seekers and refugees in
detention, authorities curtailed access by NGOs to Saaronim prison
following a 2008 petition by Hotline charging the IPS with inhumane
treatment of prisoners. Hotline and a private law firm challenged the
legality of several detention cases. In some decisions the district
court ordered the release of asylum seekers with disputed nationalities
and criticized the prolonged detention. According to an August 13
report in Haaretz, 17 appeals were filed in the district court with
regard to detention of refugees, and all of the asylum seekers were
released. The UNHCR noted the country does not provide an adequate
appeals procedure for asylum seekers, and many persons with disputed
nationality remain in prison for long periods of time if their country
of origin cannot be confirmed by the Ministry of Interior.
According to the African Refugee Development Center, dozens of
pregnant asylum seekers and single mothers were referred to the
organization by authorities upon their release from prisons in the
country. Despite many of them having been the victims of sexual and
gender-based violence in Sinai and some allegedly having been held for
ransom and forced labor there, the Government did not provide health
insurance, pregnancy or postnatal related services, or trauma
counseling to these women, according to Physicians for Human Rights-
Israel. Authorities sent some female victims of trafficking in persons
to government shelters during the year, but many others were not
properly identified in prison as having been trafficking victims.
For a monthly fee of NIS 185 ($52), health services were provided
for minors who stayed continuously in the country for a period of six
months and were not insured by the National Health Insurance Law. Those
services do not apply to previous health conditions or to children of
parents who are residents of the Palestinian territories. Physicians
for Human Rights-Israel (PHR-I) estimated that one-third of families
with children who are not legal residents were able to purchase medical
insurance. Although the law provides for emergency medical care for
every resident, 16 migrant workers and asylum seekers reportedly stated
that they were denied access to emergency medical treatment in
hospitals between September 2009 and September due to lack of health
insurance and inability to pay the required fees.
By law the Government should provide education to all children
living in the country, regardless of their status in the Ministry of
Interior's population registry. NGO and media reports cited instances
in which children of asylum seekers allegedly were not provided access
to the country's educational system due to decisions by local school
and government officials. For example, according to Hotline, children
of asylum seekers in Eilat were not accepted into the local school
system during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The law provides citizens with the right to change their government
peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice through
periodic, free, and fair elections based on universal suffrage.
Elections and Political Participation.--The country is a
parliamentary democracy with an active multiparty system. Relatively
small parties, including those primarily supported by Arab-Israelis,
regularly win Knesset seats. The law requires that a party obtain 2
percent of the vote to win Knesset seats. In 2008 Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert resigned after declining to run in a Kadima Party primary
election. When Kadima Party head Tzipi Livni was unable to form a
government, Olmert remained as caretaker prime minister until a
government was formed following February 2009 elections that were
considered free and fair. In March 2009 following protracted
negotiations, Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister of a Likud-led
coalition government.
The Basic Law prohibits the candidacy of any party or individual
that denies the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the
Jewish people or the democratic character of the state, or that incites
racism. Otherwise political parties operated without restriction or
interference. In January 2009 the Supreme Court overturned a Central
Elections Committee decision to ban the Knesset's two Arab political
parties, the United Arab List-Ta'al and Balad, from participating in
the February 2009 elections on the grounds that they did not recognize
the state and called for armed conflict against it.
At year's end the Knesset had 23 female and 14 Arab members. The
30-member cabinet included two women, but no Arabs; three women were
deputy ministers. Five members of the 15-member Supreme Court,
including its president, were women. One Arab was on the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Official Corruption and Government Transparency
The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, and
the Government implemented the law effectively. There were reports of
government corruption during the year, although impunity was not a
problem. Media routinely reported on corruption. The National Police,
the state comptroller, the attorney general, and the accountant general
were responsible for combating official corruption. Senior officials
were subject to comprehensive financial disclosure laws.
During the year the Government investigated and prosecuted several
senior political figures for alleged misconduct.
On July 13, a court found Knesset Member and former minister of
justice Tzachi Hanegbi guilty of perjury in a case related to political
appointments. In November the judges ruled that the perjury involved
``moral turpitude,'' thereby forcing him to leave the Knesset
immediately; he was also assessed a fine of NIS 10,000 ($2,813).
In September the minister of defense appointed an IDF ombudsman to
investigate allegations of corruption surrounding IDF appointment
processes, widely known as the ``Galant Document'' affair.
On December 30, the Tel Aviv District Court convicted former
president Moshe Katsav of rape and obstruction of justice, as well as
of sexual assault and sexual harassment of three government employees
in 2006.
On May 24, police recommended indicting Foreign Minister Avigdor
Lieberman for breach of trust based on evidence that he received
classified information about an ongoing corruption investigation
against him. The attorney general did not decide whether to issue an
indictment by year's end. In August 2009 police recommended the
attorney general indict Lieberman on bribery, money laundering,
obstruction of justice, and other charges. The attorney general had yet
to make a decision at year's end.
On April 14, police arrested former Jerusalem mayor Uri Lupolianski
on suspicion of accepting NIS three million ($844,000) in bribes. On
August 23, the police recommended indicting him and a list of
individuals for taking a bribe, bribery mediating, and breach of trust
in connection with Jerusalem's Holyland residential construction
project. The list included former prime minister Ehud Olmert for
receiving a bribe while he was mayor of Jerusalem; Bank HaPoalim
Directorate Chairman Danny Dankner for bribery and tax offenses; former
Israel Land Administration head Yaakov Efrati for fraud and breach of
trust; former deputy mayor Yehoshua Polak for bribery, fraud, breach of
trust, money laundering, and tax offenses; Holyland developer Hillel
Cherney; and Olmert's former bureau chief, Shula Zaken. At year's end
state prosecutors had yet to decide whether to indict those whom the
police recommended.
In August 2009 Attorney General Menachem Mazuz indicted former
prime minister Olmert along with his former chief of staff Zaken on
three charges involving breach of trust, falsifying corporate
documents, and fraudulent conduct. Mazuz also charged Olmert with tax
evasion and Zaken with illegal eavesdropping. Olmert and Zaken both
pled not guilty to all charges. At year's end the investigation
regarding Olmert's political appointments was completed and
notification letters were sent to the suspects, but a hearing had not
been scheduled. An additional six persons were indicted on related
charges, including former tax authority chief Jacky Matza, three tax
authority officials, and two businessmen.
The Government did not effectively implement its 1998 Freedom of
Information Law. Many government bodies did not disclose their internal
regulations as required, and others failed to publish annual reports.
The 2008 state comptroller's report found that approximately half of
governmental authorities did not make available to the public their
administrative directives or procedures for requesting information or
services.
On January 13, the High Court of Justice dismissed ACRI's 2005
freedom of information petition to require the Government to provide
timely public access to the ministries' unclassified archives. The
court awarded legal expenses to ACRI, however, as it found the
Government had adjusted its policies in the interim in response to the
petition. In August the Government published the new archives'
regulations shortening the limitation periods on archival materials and
ensuring their public availability.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Numerous domestic and international human rights groups operated
without government restriction, investigating and publishing their
findings on human rights cases. Human rights NGOs have standing to
petition the Supreme Court directly regarding governmental policies and
can appeal individual cases to the Supreme Court. Government officials
were cooperative to varying degrees, and routinely invited domestic
NGOs, including those critical of the Government, such as ACRI,
Mossawa, Adalah, the PHR-I, and Gisha, among others, to participate in
Knesset hearings on proposed legislation. A unit in the foreign
ministry maintained relations with certain international and domestic
NGOs. The Government responded publicly to criticisms that it believed
to be unfounded.
The state comptroller also served as ombudsman for human rights
issues. The ombudsman investigates complaints against statutory bodies
that are subject to audit by the state comptroller, including
government ministries, local authorities, state enterprises and
institutions, government corporations, and their employees. The
ombudsman is entitled to use any relevant means of inquiry and has the
capacity to order any person or body to assist in the inquiry.
During the year the Ministry of Interior, operating under a 2002
order, barred entry to foreign nationals affiliated with certain
Palestinian human rights NGOs and solidarity organizations. The
Government stated this was done on an individual basis, not according
to the activities or platform of the NGOs with which they were
affiliated.
On September 22, the UN Human Rights Council released the report of
a fact-finding mission that accused security forces of summarily
executing six of the nine passengers killed on a Turkish NGO-organized
flotilla of ships intending to reach the Gaza Strip. Prime Minister
Netanyahu's office dismissed the report as ``biased'' and
``distorted.'' On July 12, the IDF investigation into the May 31 events
concluded that the use of live fire was justified, although it
criticized organizational and intelligence failures for not being
prepared for the level of violence committed by some of the flotilla's
passengers. The Turkel Commission, appointed by the Government on June
14 as an independent public commission of inquiry with international
observers, concluded that the blockade was legally imposed and enforced
according to international law; it found no instance of excessive use
of force.
On November 22, the UN Children's Fund criticized the Government
for not having a comprehensive strategy to protect the rights of
children and for excluding the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from the
application of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The Government made several policy changes in response to criticism
from NGOs and international organizations, including the UN Goldstone
Report, regarding the protection of human rights during the 2008-09
Operation Cast Lead incursion into the Gaza Strip. Following IDF
investigations, changes included new limitations on the use of white
phosphorus in urban settings; the introduction of population assistance
officers into combat brigades and battalions to focus on minimizing
civilian casualties and hardship; new written procedures for planners
to provide for civilian safe havens, evacuation routes, medical
treatment, and humanitarian access; and new written policies governing
the destruction of private property and civilian infrastructure.
During the year the Government introduced several programs to spur
economic development in Arab towns and to encourage greater hiring of
minorities. On March 21, the Government allocated NIS 778 million ($219
million) for the economic development of 13 Arab towns to raise
employment, improve transportation, encourage housing development, and
improve security and law enforcement.
Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, gender,
marital status, political beliefs, disability, or age, and the
Government effectively enforced these prohibitions.
Women.--Rape, including spousal rape, is a felony, punishable by 16
years in prison. The law doubles the penalty if the perpetrator
assaults or rapes a relative. The Government reported 727 cases opened
due to rape complaints through October. The Government effectively
enforced rape laws during the year.
On December 30, the Tel Aviv District Court convicted former
president Moshe Katzav of two counts of rape (see section 4).
NGOs supporting victims of sexual abuse reported a 13 percent rise
in requests for assistance during the first half of the year in
comparison with the same period in 2009. The NGOs reportedly received
4,250 requests for assistance. More than 40 percent of applicants said
they were victims of rape or attempted rape, and two-thirds said they
were sexually assaulted before the age of 18. The law prohibits
violence against women, but domestic violence against women was a
problem. As of September women filed 11,123 domestic violence
complaints with police, of which at year's end 2,688 were still being
investigated, 4,364 were transferred to the State Attorney's Office,
340 were heard by courts, and 3,741 were closed.
The Ministry of Social Affairs operated a battered women's shelter
and an abuse reporting hotline. The police operated a call center to
inform victims about their cases. Women's organizations provided
counseling, crisis intervention, legal assistance, and shelters.
Women's rights NGO Kayan Feminist Organization (Kayan) and PHR-I
petitioned the Supreme Court to require the Ministry of Health to
provide health care to battered women living in shelters and to those
who were without legal status in the country. The case was still
pending at year's end.
Several ``honor killings'' occurred within the Arab-Israeli
community. On October 20, police arrested Ramadan and Khaled Musrati on
suspicion of involvement in four ``honor killings'' in Lod. The victims
were alleged to be two men and two women believed to be in
relationships with each other that their families viewed as
inappropriate.
Sexual harassment is illegal but remains widespread. The law
requires that suspected victims be informed of their right to
assistance. Penalties for sexual harassment depend on the severity of
the act and whether blackmail is involved; range from two to nine
years' imprisonment.
According to a survey by the Ministry of Industry published in
June, 35 to 40 percent of women reported experiencing sexual harassment
at work, one-third of whom experienced it in the previous 12 months.
Among the women who reported harassment, 69 percent said they had
received ``proposals,'' 47 percent reported comments of a sexual
nature, 22 percent cited physical violation, 10 percent reported
humiliation, and 7.7 percent reported extortion and threats.
In November DIPO opened an investigation into allegations by a
Public Security Ministry employee that police commander Uri Bar-Lev
sexually harassed her. The investigation continued at year's end.
``Modesty patrols'' continued to harass women in Haredi
neighborhoods. An article in Yediot Ahronot on March 3 reported that
police arrested two Haredi men at the Western Wall compound on
suspicion that they threw chairs at a group of praying women from the
Woman of the Wall organization, a group occasionally targeted by
religious groups for exercising their religion at holy sites.
In March 2009 the Jerusalem District Court sentenced Elhanan
Buzaglo to four years' imprisonment and required him to pay NIS 10,000
($2,813) in compensation to a woman who had divorced her husband and
abandoned her religious way of life. Buzaglo and four other persons
beat the woman at her home and threatened to kill her if she did not
move out of the house.
Couples and individuals had the right to decide the number,
spacing, and timing of children, and had the information and means to
do so free from discrimination. Access to information on contraception
and skilled attendance at delivery and in postpartum care was widely
available, although women in Haredi communities often had to seek
approval from a rabbi to use contraception. According to data from the
UN Population Fund for 2008, the maternal mortality rate in the country
was seven per 100,000 births. Women and men were given equal access to
diagnostic services and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases.
In the secular judicial system, women and men enjoyed the same
rights, but religious courts restricted the rights of Jewish and Muslim
women. A Jewish woman is allowed to initiate divorce proceedings, but
her husband must give his consent to make the divorce final. Because
some men disappear or refuse to grant the divorce, thousands of so-
called ``agunot'' (chained women) may not remarry or give birth to
legitimate children. Rabbinical tribunals may, and sometimes did,
sanction a husband who refused divorce but still did not grant a
divorce without his consent.
A Muslim woman may petition for and receive a divorce through the
Sharia courts without her husband's consent under certain conditions,
and a marriage contract may provide for other circumstances in which
she may obtain a divorce without her husband's consent. A Muslim man
may divorce his wife without her consent and without petitioning the
court.
Christians may seek official separations or divorces, depending on
the denomination, through ecclesiastical courts. During the year Kayan
criticized the Episcopal Ecclesiastical Court in Nazareth, which is not
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, for lack of
transparency, unnecessary delays, and a judge's refusal to rule in an
alimony case.
On September 28, the Supreme Court outlawed public gender
segregation in Jerusalem's Haredi Mea Shearim neighborhood, in response
to a petition submitted by NGOs and a Knesset Member asking the court
to prevent enforcement of gender separation after conservative men
physically and verbally assaulted women for walking on a designated
men's only road. Dozens of women protested on September 29 to demand
immediate enforcement of the court decision.
According to its Web site, the Yad L'Achim's anti-assimilation
department receives approximately 1,000 calls per year identifying
Jewish women who become involved with foreign workers or Arab men. Yad
L'Achim responded in some cases by what it termed ``launching military-
like rescues from hostile Arab villages and setting the women up in
'safe' houses around the country, where they could build new lives for
themselves.'' A December 2009 ``rescue'' from the Gaza Strip of Oshrit
Ohana and her four children, reportedly coordinated with the IDF and
Interior Minister Eli Yishai, was widely popular among the public, but
critics claimed such ``rescues'' sometimes disregarded the will of the
women involved.
Although the law prohibits discrimination based on gender in
employment and wages and provides for class action suits, complaints of
significant wage disparities between men and women persisted.
A May 2009 Yediot Ahronot article described a new regulation in the
ultra-Orthodox Shas' Maayan Torah education network that prohibits
female workers from working without a head covering that completely
covers their hair. Many Haredi women expressed disagreement with the
new regulation that also bans the use of wigs as head coverings.
The Government enacted a number of programs to improve the status
of women in the work place and society. The Authority for the
Advancement of the Status of Women in the Prime Minister's Office
approved 289 scholarships for higher education for Druze, Bedouin, and
Circassian female students in the north. The authority held
professional training courses in Arab, Druze, and Circassian
localities.
Children.--Citizenship is derived by birth within or outside of the
country to at least one citizen parent.
On August 1, the cabinet established guidelines mandating that
children of foreign workers may remain in the country with their
parents only if they meet the following five criteria: the child
studied the preceding year in the state school system; the child is
enrolled for the current school year in the first grade or higher; the
child has lived for at least five consecutive years in the country; the
child's parents entered the country on a valid visa; and the child
speaks Hebrew. According to government statistics released in August,
20,000 children of foreign workers were residing in the country
illegally during the year, 6,000 under the age of five. The Ministry of
Interior threatened to deport hundreds of children who did not meet the
established criteria, and some deportations began during the year. The
Government ensured at least one parent was deported with a child.
Education is compulsory through the ninth grade. The Government
operated separate school systems for Hebrew-speaking children, Arabic-
speaking children, and Orthodox Jews. Ultra-Orthodox Haredi political
parties continued to oppose government regulation of their government-
funded school systems. Large Haredi demonstrations were held in
Jerusalem throughout the year following the Supreme Court's August 2009
ruling that outlawed discrimination between Ashkenazi and Sephardic
students in a religious girls' school in the Emmanuel Settlement.
According to a National Council of the Child (NCC) report, in 2009
hospitals and clinics identified 2,907 children who had suffered
violence within the family and sexual abuse, in comparison with 1,989
in 2000, a rise of 46 percent.
The NCC received more than 10,000 complaints during the year
covering issues of physical and sexual abuse of children, child
pornography, and poor educational, health, and welfare services.
According to the Ministry of Welfare, there were many cases of
children with disabilities who were sexually assaulted that awaited
investigation during the year.
The country is a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction. For information on
international parental child abduction, please see the Department of
State's annual report on compliance at http://travel.state.gov/
abduction/resources/congressreport/congressreport--4308.html
Trafficking in Persons.--For information on trafficking in persons,
please see the Department of State's annual Trafficking in Persons
Report, at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/.
Persons With Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination
against persons with disabilities in employment, education, access to
health care, or the provision of other state services. Legislation
mandates access to buildings and transportation, as well as
accommodations for persons with disabilities in services and the work
place. The Government enforced the laws with limited success but did
not formulate specific regulations. Societal discrimination and lack of
accessibility persisted in employment and housing. Television channels
include subtitles or sign language, and the courts accommodate
testimony from persons with intellectual disabilities or mental
illness. The law mandates accessibility to urban public transportation,
but not interurban buses; as of September 2009, approximately 40
percent of buses did not have such access. Most train stations
maintained access for persons with disabilities.
There are an estimated 120,000 to 160,000 persons with severe
mental illness, and very few receive rehabilitation services, according
to research published by the Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute.
Various ministries and agencies maintained responsibility for
persons with disabilities. The Commission for Equal Rights of People
with Disabilities within the Ministry of Justice is responsible for
protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. It receives public
inquiries, provides legal advice, represents clients, and educates and
promotes best practices. It took legal action in the areas of
accessibility and employment, and issued regulations to provide access
to services and public sites. However, improvements were slow,
according to Bizchut, a domestic NGO that advocates for the rights of
persons with disabilities. On December 20, the commission released a
report which stated that, of approximately 1.5 million citizens who
consider themselves disabled, 43 percent of those with severe
disabilities and 29 percent with moderate disabilities went without
food at some stage over the past year, while more than one-third of
those with severe disabilities and 23 percent with moderate
disabilities could not afford essential medicine during at least one
period in the year. In addition according to the report, 60 percent of
persons with severe disabilities and nearly half of those with moderate
disabilities could not afford heat, and 41 percent had their phone
disconnected in the reporting period.
During the year Bizchut's public inquiries hotline received 2,400
calls from individuals alleging that their rights had been violated due
to their disability. The main complaints focused on national insurance,
education, housing, hospitalization, and legal assistance.
In response to a petition to the Supreme Court submitted by NGOs
including Bizchut, the Ministry of Education began a pilot program in
one town to award each child with special needs a personal education
budget. Bizchut continued to claim throughout the year that the
education system did not provide adequate support to children with
special needs.
The Division for Integrating Persons with Disabilities in the Labor
Market within the Ministry of Industry examines and promotes employment
for persons with disabilities. In August 2009 an amendment to the
National Insurance Law came into effect that allows persons who receive
a disability pension to earn more by permitting a combination of income
and pension, rather than requiring the total forfeiture of the
disability pension.
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services provides out-of-
home placement and sheltered employment for persons with cognitive,
physical, and communication disabilities. It also handles criminal
investigations involving persons with certain disabilities, either
victims or offenders, when police request assistance.
The National Insurance Agency provides financial benefits and
stipends, the Ministry of Health provides mental health and
rehabilitation services, and the Ministry of Education provides special
education services. However, Bizchut continued to criticize the lack of
services provided in practice to mainstreamed pupils, which effectively
limited their integration into regular class settings.
An article in Yediot Ahronot on July 25 described a new IDF program
to allow persons with disabilities to complete basic army training; 19
persons graduated from an initial course held in July.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Citizens of Arab origin and
Palestinian residents of the West Bank and East Jerusalem living in the
country faced discrimination in public and private life. Tensions
between Arabs and Jews were high in areas where the two communities
overlap, such as Jerusalem, the Galilee, and Negev, and in some cities
with historically separate Jewish and Arab neighborhoods.
On November 5, according to police and victim reports, a group of
eight teenagers severely beat a Chilean tourist in downtown Jerusalem
after mistaking him for an Arab. Police arrested the suspects on
charges of committing an attack causing grave bodily harm.
On December 21, police arrested a group of nine Jewish teenagers
suspected of perpetrating a series of violent attacks against Arab
youths in Jerusalem during November and December. In one case the group
allegedly began beating a victim, asked for his identity card to
determine whether he was Arab, and then continued beating him after the
card showed that he was.
In November Arab students in Safed reported experiencing anonymous
harassment including telephone calls threatening to set their apartment
on fire and one of their cars being spray painted, ``Arabs out.'' The
students also alleged that a local rabbi asked them to leave the town
and return to an Arab country, because ``Safed should be Jewish.''
In December dozens of rabbis signed a letter urging Jewish owners
of apartments not to rent their properties to Arabs, claiming it would
deflate the value of their homes as well as those in the neighborhood.
The rabbis also urged neighbors of anyone renting or selling property
to Arabs to caution that individual and to inform the general public. A
subsequent letter signed by 30 rabbis' wives urged Jewish women not to
work, date, or do community service with non-Jews. Numerous government
officials and senior rabbinic authorities expressed concern that the
letters were encouraging racism in the Jewish population.
At year's end a trial continued against Yaakov (Jack) Teitel, a
Jewish settler in the West Bank who was indicted in 2009 for crimes
including the 1997 killings of Palestinian shepherd Issa Jabrin near
Hebron and Samir Akram Balbisi, an Arab taxi driver in Jerusalem, and
the 2008 bombing deaths of professor Ze'ev Sternhell and a Messianic
Jewish leader's 15-year-old son, Ami Ortiz. On August 30, the Jerusalem
District Court ruled he was fit to stand trial.
On January 6, the Tel Aviv District Court convicted Eliyahu Aharoni
of conspiracy to commit arson with a racist motive and for illegally
producing and carrying incendiary bombs. In 2008 police arrested him
and five other young Jewish men in Tel Aviv for allegedly firebombing
three Arab apartments in a Jewish neighborhood. The other five were not
indicted due to lack of evidence.
Arab and other minority residents of the country faced official and
societal discrimination in a number of areas, including employment,
education, land ownership, and naturalization.
The law exempts Arab citizens, except for members of the Druze
religion, from mandatory military service, but some serve voluntarily.
Citizens who do not perform military service enjoy fewer social and
economic benefits. Arab citizens generally were ineligible to work in
companies with defense contracts or in security-related fields if they
did not serve in the military. The Government managed a National Civil
Service program for citizens not drafted for military service, giving
Arab citizens, Haredi Jews, Orthodox Jewish women, and others the
opportunity to provide public service in their own communities and thus
be eligible for the same benefits accorded military veterans. Of the
12,000 volunteers during the 2009-10 academic year, 1,256 were Arab
citizens, half of whom served in education, 22 percent in health, 16
percent in welfare, and the remainder in legal and environmental work
and road accident prevention. Ninety percent of the Arab volunteers
were women.
The law requires that minorities have ``appropriate
representation'' in the civil service and on the boards of government-
owned corporations, but Arab citizens were underrepresented in most
fields of employment, including the Government. According to data as of
June reported by the Committee for the Examination of Appointments,
which works to provide for appropriate representation, 39 out of the 98
governmental corporations satisfied the requirement, and 18 others were
exempt. One percent of government company employees were Arab, Druze,
or Circassian; these groups formed about 20 percent of the overall
population. An affirmative action program undertaken to promote the
hiring of Arabs, Druze, and Circassians in the civil service has
slightly increased their representation each year. According to the
Government, 6.97 percent of government employees in 2009 were Arab,
Druze, or Circassian, compared with 6.17 percent in 2007.
Resources devoted to the education of Arab children were inferior
to those devoted to Jewish children in the public education system. In
January the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) estimated that public spending for children in Arab localities
was at least one-third lower than for children in Jewish
municipalities. There were on average 25 Jewish schoolchildren per
classroom, while Arab children averaged 29 per classroom.
According to the NGO Pedagogic Council for Arab Education,
disparities in education between Jewish and Arab students limit Arab
students' access to higher education. According to the NGO Dirasat,
Arab-Israelis composed just 10.6 percent of all university
undergraduate students and less than 1 percent of all tenured
professors. Of 4,012 tenured university professors, 38 were Arab (34
men and four women).
Approximately 93 percent of land was in the public domain,
including approximately 12.5 percent owned by the NGO Jewish National
Fund (JNF), whose statutes prohibit sale or lease of land to non-Jews.
According to a 2005 attorney general ruling, the Government cannot
discriminate against Arab citizens in marketing and allocating lands it
manages, including those of the JNF. As an interim measure, the
Government agreed to compensate the JNF for any land it leased to an
Arab by transferring an equal amount of land from the Israel Lands
Administration (ILA) to the JNF. Legal petitions against the JNF policy
of leasing public land only to Jews were ongoing at year's end. The NGO
Israel Land Fund continued its program to purchase Arab land throughout
the country and market it to Jewish buyers, including in the diaspora;
the organization claimed that all the land belonged to Jewish people
and described as a ``danger'' the purchase of Jewish-owned lands by
non-Jews.
On November 8, the Supreme Court rejected a petition by Arab
residents in Jaffa arguing that the ILA illegally leased public land to
an organization that will market new apartments built on the land
exclusively to Jewish citizens. The court stated that ILA is obligated
to prevent discrimination, but it denied the petition because the land
rights had already been sold.
New construction is illegal in towns that do not have an authorized
outline plan for development, which is the legal responsibility of
local authorities. At year's end according to the Government, 41 of the
country's 128 Arab communities had fully approved planning schemes, 28
were awaiting approvals from district or national planning committees,
35 had outline plans in the final stages of the localities' approval
process, nine began developing their outline plans, and 15 were still
working towards creating master plans. However, Arab advocacy
organizations continued to challenge the demolition of illegal
buildings in the Arab sector by claiming that the Government unfairly
restricted building permits and rezoned open space areas to exclude
Arabs from expanding built-up areas. In the country's 46 unrecognized
Bedouin ``villages'' constructed haphazardly on state land in the Negev
claimed by various tribes, all buildings were illegal since there were
no recognized local authorities to promote an authorized detailed plan.
Approximately 60,000 Bedouin resided in such unrecognized villages,
while more than 120,000 lived in legally planned and constructed urban
and suburban centers.
On July 27, the police demolished the 45 structures of the
unrecognized Bedouin ``village'' of al-Arakib, which had been built
illegally on state land, after multiple eviction orders and a 2007
Supreme Court decision. For decades the state had leased the area to
Bedouins for agriculture, but in 1998 the el Tory tribe moved from
Rahat and attempted to settle on the land they claimed was wrongly
expropriated from their tribe in 1951. Despite 12 years of court
proceedings producing repeated injunctions, including a 2003 evacuation
notice against the nine individuals then found to be trespassing at Al-
Arakib, the Bedouin clan continued to return to the site. Many advocacy
groups criticized the demolition as enforcing the expropriation of
property that the Bedouin clan claimed was its own prior to 1951,
although it was unable to prove prior ownership in court. Police
repeatedly demolished rebuilt structures on eight separate occasions by
the end of the year.
The law bars family reunification in cases where one spouse is a
non-Jewish citizen of Iran, Iraq, Syria, or Lebanon. Male spouses who
are 35 or older and female spouses who are 25 or older may apply for
temporary visit permits but may not receive residency based on their
marriage and have no path to citizenship. The Government originally
enacted the law following 23 terrorist attacks involving suicide
bombers from the occupied territories who had gained access to Israeli
identification through family unification. During the year human rights
NGOs and international organizations continued to criticize this ban,
which primarily affected Palestinian spouses of Arab citizens. Mossawa
claimed the law affected more than 21,000 families, including couples
with long-standing marriages. In June 2009 in response to a petition by
Kayan, PHR-I, and ACRI, the Supreme Court demanded an explanation
within six months from the Government for its refusal to grant social
and health insurance to an estimated 5,000 Palestinian spouses of
citizens who were granted ``staying permits'' to reside legally in
Israel. On January 27, the court recommended the Government provide a
temporary solution that would be in place until an official policy
could be formulated. On July 4, the Government requested an additional
five months to formulate a response regarding the provision of social
benefits to nonresidents.
Public debate continued over the suggestion of some Jewish
politicians, including the foreign minister and members of his Yisrael
Beitenu party in media interviews and speeches throughout the year, of
``an exchange of populated territories'' of Arab villages in Israel to
the West Bank (in return for transferring Jewish settlements in the
West Bank to Israel, by way of adjusting the border) as part of a
negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Arab citizens
of Israel overwhelmingly condemned the proposal, while Jewish opinion
ranged from support to condemnation.
While Arab communities in the country generally faced economic
difficulties (the NGO Dirasat, the Arab Center for Law and Policy,
stated that 97 percent of all Arab local councils ranked in the bottom
four economic development clusters on a national index), the Bedouin
segment of the Arab population was the most disadvantaged. More than
half of the population of about 160,000 Bedouin lived in seven state-
planned communities, which were among the eight poorest communities in
the country, according to a 2008 report by Human Rights Watch.
Approximately 60,000 Bedouin lived in at least 46 unrecognized tent or
shack villages that did not have water and electricity, and lacked
educational, health, and welfare services.
Government planners noted there were insufficient funds to relocate
Bedouin living in unrecognized villages to new towns, and the average
Bedouin family could not afford to purchase a home in existing towns;
however, the Government maintained a program to encourage such movement
by providing low-cost land and compensation for demolition of illegal
structures for those willing to move to designated permanent locations.
Many Bedouin complained that moving to government-planned towns
required giving up claims to land they had lived on for generations,
while the Government claimed it was difficult to provide services to
clusters of buildings throughout the Negev that ignored planning
procedures.
At year's end a government implementation team was in the final
stages of creating a plan for the Bedouin housing situation in the
Negev, as recommended in 2008 by the Goldberg Committee.
By year's end the Supreme Court had not ruled on a 2006 Adalah
appeal of the Haifa District Court decision not to overturn a Water
Tribunal decision denying water services to unrecognized villages.
Bedouins living in established towns have municipal services; the
Government additionally built water centers in six Bedouin localities.
The Government prohibits Druze citizens, like all citizens, from
visiting Syria. The Government allowed noncitizen Druze from the Golan
Heights to visit holy sites in Syria through the ICRC-managed
pilgrimage program, but it has prevented family visitations since 1982.
A population of about 100,000 Ethiopian Jews faced persistent
social discrimination although officials and the majority of citizens,
quickly and publicly condemned discriminatory acts against them.
On May 4, approximately 200 parents and children protested racial
segregation in Beer Sheva's Otzar Haim kindergarten, where they claimed
that Ethiopian Jewish children were educated in a separate room from
the rest of the children. An official from the Industry, Trade, and
Labor Ministry then visited the site and forced the school to cease the
segregation.
On July 13, the NGO Tebeka, Advocacy for Equality and Justice for
Ethiopian Israelis, filed suit against an Egged bus driver in the Petah
Tikvah Magistrates Court for refusing a student entry and then making
racist statements against Ethiopian Jews. The bus company suspended the
driver, and the Ministry of Transport filed suit against the driver and
the bus company.
In the Bnei Brak neighborhood of Tel Aviv in November, a resident
assaulted an Ethiopian Jewish teenager after refusing to allow her to
enter a religious ritual bath. Police arrested the suspect and he was
indicted before the Tel Aviv Magistrates Court.
During the year the Government introduced several programs to spur
economic development and to encourage greater hiring of minorities.
Societal Abuses, Discrimination, and Acts of Violence Based on
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.--The law prohibits
discrimination based on sexual orientation, and the Government
generally enforced these laws.
Gay pride rallies occurred peacefully in Tel Aviv on June 11 and in
Jerusalem on July 29. An estimated 2,000 persons participated in the
Jerusalem rally. There were police authorization and protection for the
participants. Three separate antigay rallies were held in conjunction
with the Jerusalem rally, including one in Independence Park where
protesters held up signs reading: ``Sick perverts, get out of
Jerusalem,'' according to media reports. There was also a demonstration
against the march in the ultra-Orthodox Jerusalem neighborhood of Mea
Shearim.
There were no reports of violence against the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community during the year; however, in
August 2009 a masked gunman killed Nir Katz, 26, and Liz Trobishi, 16,
and wounded 15 others in the offices of the NGO GLBT Israel in Tel
Aviv. At year's end, a police investigation continued, but the
perpetrator had not been found. High-level politicians, including the
president and prime minister, condemned the attacks. Authorities
arrested settler Yaakov Teitel (see sections 1.a. and the annex) in
October 2009 after he posted signs praising the attack, but police did
not charge him with the killings. On August 30, in commemoration of the
2009 attack, the Tel Aviv municipality launched an educational program
for Tel Aviv schools focusing on LGBT issues, including the prevention
of discrimination.
There were cases of official and societal discrimination against
the LGBT community during the year.
On September 14, the Supreme Court ruled that the Jerusalem
municipality discriminated against a LGBT community center by not
providing similar funding that had been provided to similar community
centers.
An article in Yediot Ahronot on September 19 stated that Jerusalem
Family Court Judge Phillip Marcus called on the Government to
investigate whether LGBT petitioners are ``pedophiles or serial
killers.''
Other Societal Violence or Discrimination.--There were no reports
of societal violation or discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS.
Section 7. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Government effectively
implemented laws concerning the right of association and provided that
citizens may join and establish independent labor organizations of
their choice without previous authorization or excessive requirements.
According to the Government, approximately 33 percent of the total
workforce is unionized. The law allows unions to conduct their
activities without government interference.
Unions have the right to strike, and workers exercised this right.
If essential public services are affected by a strike, the Government
may appeal to labor courts for back-to-work orders while negotiations
continue. Worker dismissals and the terms of severance arrangements
traditionally have been the central issues of disputes.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for the right for citizens to bargain collectively, and it was
enforced. There were no restrictions on collective bargaining
agreements, which covered approximately 58 percent of all workers.
Collective bargaining agreements extend to nonunion workplaces in the
same sector. The law specifically prohibits antiunion discrimination,
and none was reported.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor and criminalizes labor exploitation.
However, according to a March OECD review, the laws concerning minimum
employment conditions and foreign workers were not effectively
enforced.
The law provides that foreign laborers have legal status, decent
working conditions, health insurance, and a written employment
contract; nonetheless, some employers continued to force individual
laborers who entered the country, legally and illegally, to live under
conditions that constituted involuntary servitude.
A 2009 reorganization of the immigration and employment law
enforcement functions left the Ministry of Interior's Population,
Immigration, and Border Crossings Authority with the power to arrest
and detain workers but not to enforce labor or trafficking laws against
employers. As a result, according to Hotline, even in cases when an
illegal worker was detained when working, inspectors were unable to
charge the employer with labor law violations or illegal employment.
Some workers faced conditions of forced labor, including through
such practices as the unlawful withholding of passports, restrictions
on movement, the inability to change or otherwise choose one's
employer, nonpayment of wages, threats, and physical intimidation.
There were numerous documented cases but few resulting employer
prosecutions, concerning foreign laborers' living in harsh conditions
and subject to debt bondage. The NGO Kav LaOved identified several
dozen employees in the agricultural sector held under conditions of
slavery and subjugation and facilitated their release to government-run
shelters. Thai agricultural workers, Chinese construction workers, and
nursing care workers from India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the
Philippines--particularly women--were at greatest risk for abuse,
including trafficking, forced labor, nonpayment, and withholding of
wages.
On February 7, Kav LaOved filed a complaint with police alleging
human trafficking of Thai agricultural workers. According to Kav
LaOved, the employer paid the workers NIS 120 ($34) a day, far below
minimum wage; forced them to work 14-hour days with only one day off
every two weeks; and made them sign falsified reports of hours and
salary. At year's end, police had taken no action against the employer,
but authorities had moved the workers to a government-operated shelter
and found them new jobs.
Kav LaOved also filed complaints with police regarding trafficking
at a moshav (privately owned farm) in the Beit Shean Valley,
underpayment and harassment by an owner of a moshav near the Gaza
Strip, and violations of the Work and Rest Hours Law, the Migrant
Workers Law, and Minimum Wage Law by employers at a moshav in the Beit
Shean Valley.
In the caregiving sector, Kav LaOved filed complaints of violations
in several cases, including allegations that a caregiver employed in
Herzelia was forced to work without compensation in exchange for a
``fee'' for her visa, that two additional caregivers in Herzelia were
not given sufficient food and had wages withheld, and that a caregiver
employed in Ashdod was forced to have sex.
In August 2009 following a complaint by Kav LaOved, a criminal
indictment was filed in the Beer Sheva Magistrate's Court against the
agricultural company Katif Venture and Development Limited and some of
its employees, charging them with employing Thai and Nepalese
agricultural workers in inhumane conditions. The charges included
making the employees work for 15 to 20 hours each day, seven days per
week, paying well below the minimum wage with no overtime compensation;
constantly threatening to accelerate the employees' work pace lest they
be returned to their home countries; and prohibiting use of a
telephone. The workers were also required to live in extremely crowded
conditions in temporary buildings that were completely exposed to the
elements. The employers were charged with exploitation, fraud, and
causing injury by negligence. The case was pending in court at year's
end.
Also see the Department of State's annual Trafficking in Persons
Report at www.state.gov/g.tip.
d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment.--Laws
provide for protection of children from exploitation in the workplace
and prohibit forced or compulsory labor; the Government generally
enforced these laws.
Children at least 14 years old may be employed during official
school holidays in light work that will not harm their health. Children
at least 15 years old who have completed education through grade nine
may be employed as apprentices. Working hours for those children
between16 and 18 years old are restricted in all sectors.
During the year the Labor Laws Enforcement Division in the Ministry
of Industry, Trade, and Labor initiated 250 investigations,
investigated more than 1,000 employers for allegedly violating the law,
filed 55 indictments against employers, and imposed 822 administrative
fines totaling approximately NIS 10.5 million ($3 million).
The Labor Law Enforcement Division also conducted national
campaigns regarding employment terms of youth to promote the
implementation of youth labor laws, especially during summer vacation.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Inspection Service,
along with union representatives, enforced labor, health, and safety
standards in the workplace. Resource constraints affected overall
enforcement, and according to the OECD the country continued to have a
general problem of failing to enforce its labor laws.
The minimum wage was NIS 3,850 ($1,083) per month for a 43-hour
week. There are reduced minimum wages for youths and persons with
disabilities. The Government considered the minimum wage, supplemented
by special allowances for citizens, to provide a citizen worker a
decent standard of living. Some union officials, NGOs, and social
commentators disputed this claim. Noncitizen workers did not receive
the special allowances. Resource constraints limited inspections,
particularly of conditions in the settlements where many Thai citizens
work.
The law allows for citizens a maximum 43-hour workweek at regular
pay. The law provides for citizens a daily break for a period of 45
minutes, which may be divided into two breaks. Premium pay was 125
percent for the first two hours and 150 percent for any additional
hours, with a limit of 15 hours of overtime per week.
The law applies to noncitizens, although with modifications, and
enforcement was not adequate, according to Hotline and other NGOs.
Migrant workers in the homecare sector are not covered by the Work and
Rest Hours Law.
The Government set occupational health and safety standards. The
Ministry of Industry carried out inspections. Health and safety
inspections in the homecare sector were particularly insufficient,
according to Kav LaOved.
Documented foreign workers were not entitled to many of the same
benefits as citizens, including national health care. Employers are
legally required to provide such insurance, and most employers did so.
Female migrant workers in the homecare sector remained particularly
vulnerable to abuse and forced labor. The live-in arrangements and lack
of labor law enforcement led to many cases of women migrant workers
working ``on a 24-hour basis,'' according to Kav LaOved. These workers
also worked without suitable compensation for overtime and were forced
to perform domestic tasks such as cleaning and cooking for all family
members without compensation.
According to Kav LaOved, foreign workers in the agricultural sector
also remained vulnerable to health and safety violations; prolonged
exposure to pesticides led to complaints of breathing difficulties,
burns, skin allergies, and cases of cancer; and there were several
complaints from agricultural foreign workers of nonpayment for
overtime, excessive working hours, and poor living conditions.
According to the Government, workers, including foreign workers,
can remove themselves from a dangerous work situation and seek
alternate employment. However, Kav LaOved maintained that in practice
workers in the homecare and agricultural sectors were not able to seek
alternative employment due to pressures from their sponsoring agencies.
Brokers and employers collected hiring fees from migrant workers.
The Government limited such fees to NIS 3,135 (approximately $883) per
worker.
On August 24, after complaints about excessive commission rates and
profiteering over money transfers, the Ministry of Interior closed
Interman Management Initiatives and Consultations Limited. The company,
which brought migrant workers, largely from Thailand, to the country's
agriculture sector, charged an average commission rate of NIS 35,546
($10,000) for each foreign worker.
The Government reported that, during the last two years, it revoked
at least18 companies' recruitment licenses and their special permits to
recruit foreign workers. Investigations and administrative hearings led
to the closure of some recruitment agencies.
Workers may contest deportation orders, but lack of fluency in
Hebrew placed them at a considerable disadvantage. Interpreters were
provided when available, but no court-appointed attorneys were
provided. According to Hotline, the lack of interpreters in various
governmental agencies continued to be a ``grave problem,'' and public
information in languages other than Hebrew was hard to obtain.
the occupied territories (including areas subject to the jurisdiction
of the palestinian authority)
Israel began occupying the Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, the West
Bank, and East Jerusalem during the 1967 War and continued to occupy
those areas during the year. (For information about the Israeli-
occupied Golan Heights, please see the Israel report above.) During the
year the Palestinian population of the West Bank was approximately 2.5
million, and the Gaza Strip's population totaled 1.6 million, nearly
all of whom were Palestinian. There were an estimated 260,000 Arabs
living in East Jerusalem with residency permits rather than Israeli
citizenship. Approximately 190,000 Israeli citizens, including a small
number of Arab citizens of Israel, also lived in East Jerusalem;
Israelis in the West Bank numbered approximately 300,000; and there
were no Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip.
The Palestinian Authority (PA) had a democratically elected
president and legislative council. The PA exercised varying degrees of
authority over the Palestinian population in the West Bank and none
over Arab residents of East Jerusalem due to the Israel Defense Force's
(IDF) continuing presence in the West Bank and Israel's extension of
Israeli law and authority in 1967 to East Jerusalem; it had little
authority in the Gaza Strip and none over Israeli residents of the West
Bank.
In 2005 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Mahmoud
Abbas won 62 percent of the vote in a presidential election regarded as
generally free and fair. In the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council
(PLC) elections, Hamas (a terrorist organization)-backed candidates won
74 of 132 seats in elections that generally met democratic standards.
In 2007 President Abbas dismissed the national unity government after
Hamas staged a violent takeover of PA government installations in the
Gaza Strip and killed hundreds in the Fatah movement and PA security
forces; he appointed a cabinet of independents led by Prime Minister
Salam Fayyad that continued to govern the West Bank during the year.
Elements of the Hamas government maintained authority in the Gaza
Strip, where they selectively applied the laws and legal structures of
the PA. West Bank authorities postponed municipal PA elections
scheduled to be held in the West Bank in July; however, the Palestinian
courts ruled the postponement illegal in November. Both Israeli and PA
security forces reported to civilian authorities. Hamas maintained
control of security forces in the Gaza Strip. Armed militias and
terrorist organizations were still active in some areas in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Principal human rights problems related to the PA included
mistreatment in detention, arbitrary and prolonged detention, poor
prison conditions, impunity, corruption, and lack of transparency.
Domestic abuse of women, societal discrimination against women and
persons with disabilities, and child labor remained serious problems.
Residents of the Gaza Strip under Hamas had no right to political
participation or to choose their government. Other human rights
problems in the Gaza Strip included reports that Hamas security forces
continued to kill, torture, kidnap, arbitrarily detain, and harass
Fatah members and other Palestinians with impunity. There were reports
of abuse of prisoners and failure to provide fair trials to those
accused. Hamas also strictly restricted the freedom of speech,
religion, and movement of the Gaza Strip residents. Corruption
reportedly was a problem. Hamas promoted gender discrimination against
women. Domestic violence against women also remained a problem. Hamas
and other Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip launched rockets and
mortars against civilian targets in Israel.
Principal human rights problems related to Israeli authorities in
the West Bank were reports of excessive use of force against civilians,
including killings, torture of Palestinian detainees, improper use of
security detention procedures, austere and overcrowded detention
facilities, demolition and confiscation of Palestinian properties,
limits on freedom of expression and assembly, and severe restrictions
on Palestinians' internal and external freedom of movement.
Additionally the IDF, in some cases, failed to pursue investigations
and disciplinary actions related to violations. Violence by Israeli
settlers was also reported. The IDF imposed serious restrictions on the
importation of goods into the Gaza Strip and general prohibition on
external travel for Gazans.
(Note: Throughout the report, human rights concerns related to each
actor (the PA, Hamas, and Israel) follow in sequential order.)
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports that the PA committed political killings; however, PA forces
killed at least one civilian during the year. There were multiple
reports that Palestinian terrorist groups, including Hamas, committed
unlawful killings. The Israeli government reportedly committed at least
one targeted killing in the occupied territories during the year, and
reports of Israeli security forces killing civilian Palestinians,
including protesters, continued.
There was one reported killing by Palestinian security forces
during the year. On May 1, PA security forces shot and killed 18-year-
old Rami Sa'id Salah al-Absi after he drove through a security
checkpoint in Hebron; the PA actors reportedly suspected al-Absi was
involved in the robbery of a Bethlehem clothing store. At year's end no
action had resulted from an investigation of al-Absi's death.
In July a Palestinian military court found five security officers
negligent in the June 2009 death of Haitham Amer but acquitted the
officers of more serious charges, according to Human Rights Watch
(HRW). The court cited a lack of evidence in the case, despite an
official Palestinian autopsy report stating that Amer had died during
detention and interrogation at a General Intelligence Service facility
in Hebron due to torture, as well as testimony by three detainees who
witnessed his death.
Civilian Palestinian factional violence during the year, including
fights, family disputes, and manslaughter, resulted in 35 Palestinian
fatalities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, according to the quasi-
governmental Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR). The PA was
not responsible for these fatalities.
Hamas-controlled security forces and other Palestinian terrorist
groups continued to kill Israelis and Arabs in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. According to Israeli government statistics, Palestinian
terrorist acts emanating from the West Bank killed six Israelis,
including four civilians. No Israeli civilians died in violence
emanating from the Gaza Strip, although the Israeli government
attributed the death of a Thai migrant worker in Israel to a rocket
attack launched from the northern Gaza Strip.
In the Gaza Strip, according to local media and the ICHR, masked
gunmen affiliated with Hamas unlawfully executed at least 32 persons
during the year. By law the PA president must ratify the death penalty,
but Hamas did not contact the PA regarding the executions. In some
cases, such as that of Mohammed Ismail and Nasser Abu Freh on April 15,
the executions were based on allegations that the victims collaborated
with Israel.
Hamas summoned 52-year-old Jamil Shafiq Shaqura for questioning at
an internal security facility in Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip, where he
was tortured, according to Israeli human rights NGO B'Tselem; he died
on January 6 from a stroke as a result of his abuse.
On June 14, unknown actors shot and killed an Israeli police
officer, Yehushua Sofer, in an attack on his patrol car near the
Hebron-area Israeli settlement of Beit Haggai, according to IDF
reports. The attack injured two other police officers. Israeli
authorities opened an investigation and arrested suspects with Hamas
affiliations on July 22. At year's end there were no updates.
On August 31, Hamas gunmen shot and killed four Israeli residents
of the West Bank settlement of Beit Haggai, who were traveling by car
near Hebron. The four victims were identified as married couple Yitzak
and Talia Ames, Avishai Shindler, and Kochba Even-Chaim; retaliatory
skirmishes occurred near a number of West Bank settlements, with
Israeli settlers reportedly throwing stones and Molotov cocktails at
Palestinian villagers.
Israeli security forces killed 79 Palestinians during the year,
including seven minors in the Gaza Strip and two minors in the West
Bank, which was an increase from the 59 killings in 2009 (not including
deaths during Operation Cast Lead), according to statistics maintained
by B'Tselem. Israel described all IDF actions in the occupied
territories as ``operational activities,'' preventing accountability
for breaches of law and investigations, according to B'Tselem.
The Israeli government was responsible for at least one targeted
killing. On September 17, Israeli security personnel shot and killed
Iyad As'ad Abu Shelbaya in his home at the Palestinian Nur ash-Shams
refugee camp during the night. The Israeli government suspected that
Abu Shelbaya, known for his reported links to Hamas, had taken part in
an August 31 attack that killed four Israeli settlers (see above).
At year's end there was no update or investigation into the death
of Khaled Harb Khaled Sh'alan, a 23-year-old resident of Gaza City and
a reported Islamic Jihad commander, who was killed by Israeli
helicopter fire in March 2009.
Reports of Israeli forces killing Palestinians in restricted areas
in the Gaza Strip and in waters off the Gaza Strip coast continued
during the year. Israel acknowledged the land ``buffer zone'' in May
2009 to be 328 yards from the border fence, although it generally
enforced the buffer zone at 547 yards, with reports of Palestinians
being shot at as far away as 1,640 yards from the border fence. Israel
barred access to fishing areas beyond three nautical miles from the
shore; for example, in four incidents in October, Israeli naval forces
fired ``warning'' shots at Palestinian fishing boats, forcing them
ashore. Israel enforced these restrictions with the stated intention of
preventing attacks by Palestinian armed factions. The IDF rarely
launched investigations into buffer zone shootings, although on
September 15, it announced that three Gazans, ages17, 21, and 91,
killed by the IDF earlier in the year near the border fence, had not
been involved in terrorist activities.
On March 21, Israeli security forces shot and killed two
Palestinian 19-year-olds looking for scrap metal on farmland east of
the West Bank village of Awarta, according to several NGOs and press
reports. The two were not in a restricted area. The Israeli soldiers
claimed that Salah Muhammad Kamel Quareq and Muhammad Feisal Mahmoud
Quareq told them that they were on their way to work in the fields but
did not produce identification documents upon request and,
subsequently, attempted to attack the border guards with a pitchfork.
Medical reports indicated that the shots came from close range. The
Israeli chief military prosecutor ordered an investigation into the
killings, the results of which were not available at year's end,
although authorities dismissed the soldiers' squad commander.
On May 14, the IDF shot and killed 75-year-old Fouad Ahmad Yusef
Abu Matar, a resident of Beit Lahiya in the northern Gaza Strip, when
he approached the perimeter fence east of Jabalya Refugee Camp.
On June 11, according to local media sources, Israeli border police
shot and killed Ziad Jilani, a Palestinian resident of East Jerusalem,
while he lay on the ground. Jilani had swerved his vehicle into a group
of officers, injuring several, but eyewitnesses told the media that
Jilani did not pose a danger at the time of the shooting. It was
unclear if Jilani hit the officers deliberately; eyewitness accounts
reported that Jilani swerved to avoid stones that bystanders had thrown
at the officers.
On September 24, according B'Tselem, Israeli naval force machine-
gun fire killed 19-year-old Muhammad Mansur Omar Baqar while he was
fishing off the coast of Jabalya in the Gaza Strip.
Israeli security forces reportedly killed three demonstrators
during the year. In most cases the protesters were demonstrating near
restricted areas or the separation barrier.
On March 20, Israeli security forces in the West Bank village of
Iraq Burin shot and killed two Palestinian adolescents during a local
demonstration related to a water dispute with a nearby settlement,
according to several NGOs and press reports. There were conflicting
reports as to whether Usaied Abd al-Naser Muhammad Qadous, 17 years
old, and Muhammad Ibrahim 'Abd al-Qader Qadous, 15 years old, threw
rocks at Israeli police during the demonstration. Israeli officials
claimed that forces employed tear gas and rubber-coated bullets to
disperse demonstrators but did not use live ammunition. Villagers,
international protesters, PA officials, and Israeli NGOs all claimed
that live ammunition caused the deaths, and PA medical personnel
released an X ray to the media showing what doctors stated was a bullet
lodged in the brain of one of the boys. On March 23, the IDF's chief
prosecutor ordered the army to open an internal investigation into the
circumstances that led the soldiers to open fire; no results were
available at year's end.
On April 28, an IDF soldier shot and killed Ahmad Suliman Salem
Deeb, a 19-year-old resident of Gaza City who was taking part in a
demonstration against the ``buffer zones,'' during which some
demonstrators threw stones, according to press reports.
On May 25, the Israeli central district prosecution filed an
indictment for negligent manslaughter against an unidentified retired
border policeman suspected of shooting 11-year-old Palestinian Ahmed
Moussa in the West Bank in 2008. The incident was one of several
connected to protests against construction of the separation barrier.
On July 12, a judge advocate general (JAG) ordered the Military
Police Investigation Unit to investigate the death of Bassem Abu
Rahmah, who was struck in the chest by a tear gas canister during an
antibarrier demonstration in April 2009. According to B'Tselem, the JAG
initially declined to probe the incident but changed its stance after
forensic evidence indicated that soldiers fired the canister directly
at the victim, contrary to initial debriefing statements. Citing video
footage of the incident, B'Tselem noted that Abu Rahmah remained on the
Palestinian side of the fence and did not endanger soldiers. At year's
end the IDF had not released an update in the case, according to local
NGO reports.
On December 31, Jawaher Abu Rahmah, a resident of the West Bank
village of Bil'in, inhaled tear gas from canisters fired by the IDF to
disrupt protests against the separation barrier, according to NGO and
press reports. She died the following day of complications from the
inhalation, according to the PA. The IDF claimed that she did not die
as a result of the tear gas inhalation, but rather improper medical
treatment.
At year's end no findings were available from an Israeli
investigation into the 2008 death of Yousif Ahmed Amira, whom IDF
soldiers shot in the head during a protest.
Israeli forces also killed civilians during episodes of conflict
throughout the year, including killings from tank fire and tear gas.
The IDF regularly used tanks and remote-controlled weapons stations to
fire on Palestinians inside the Gaza Strip, according to reports from
the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).
IDF personnel maintained secure stations every several hundred yards
along the border fence; each station contained machine guns with a
nearly one-mile firing range. The IDF also used tanks firing
``flechette'' projectiles, which explode in midair, releasing thousands
of 1.5-inch metal darts. In July alone flechettes killed at least two
civilians and injured 10, including four children, according to UNOCHA.
On May 9, during hostilities at the Karmi Tsur settlement north of
Hebron, a one-year-old boy from the southern West Bank village of Beit
Ummar died, reportedly as the result of inhaling tear gas deployed by
Israeli forces. The canister landed outside the boy's window, and he
died of respiratory complications, according to press reports.
B'Tselem reported that on December 9, Israeli tank fire killed 16-
year-olds Husam Khaled Ibrahim Abu Sa'id and Isma'il Walid Muhammad Abu
'Odeh and 91-year-old Ibrahim Abdallah Suliman Abu Sa'id near Biet
Hanoun, while the three grazed livestock. According to B'Tselem, none
had engaged in hostile activity.
The 147 military police investigations of the killings or injuries
of Palestinians by Israeli forces led to few convictions. The NGO Yesh
Din reported that in 2009 only 2 percent of investigations by the
Israeli Military Police Criminal Investigation Division led to
indictment (four investigations). Between 2000 and 2009, the average
rate of indictment was 6 percent. B'Tselem attributed such statistics
to a procedural conflict of interest in the investigation process
because Israeli forces involved in the fatality are also responsible
for collecting the information that the JAG uses to determine whether
to launch a military police investigation. Since 2001 B'Tselem has
monitored 35 cases of Palestinians injured or killed from bullets fired
by Israeli police and border police officers. Only 16 of the cases were
investigated, of which only two cases resulted in indictments.
Human rights organizations also complained that the IDF--through
the JAG--initiated many investigations months or more than a year after
the incident, making it difficult to find evidence or identify
witnesses, and that the investigations unit lacked sufficient Arabic
speakers.
Israeli civilians killed two Palestinians. On May 13, a settler
shot in the back and killed 15-year-old Aysar Yasser Fawaz Zaraqah, who
threw stones at the settler's car near al-Mazra'a as-Sharqiya in the
West Bank. There were no reports of an investigation into his death. On
September 22, an Israeli private security guard shot and killed Samer
Mahmoud Ahmad Sarhan in East Jerusalem. The guard responsible for
Samer's death was released on bail. Yesh Din continued to claim that
settler violence was insufficiently investigated. There was no evidence
of a public investigation at year's end.
The PA and Israel took steps to address and investigate allegations
of abuses related to the 2008-09 Operation Cast Lead conflict; however,
NGOs criticized Hamas for failing to investigate abuses adequately.
During the year the PA established an independent commission to
review the allegations against it in the context of the conflict.
Amnesty International (AI) criticized Hamas authorities for failing
to investigate fully abuses perpetrated by Gazans during the conflict,
citing specifically the firing of indiscriminate rockets by Palestinian
armed groups into southern Israel. AI claimed Hamas did not respond
with legal or any other action against the al-Qassam Brigades, which
claimed responsibility for rocket attacks aimed at civilian targets.
During the year Israel provided specific examples of investigations
relating to Operation Cast Lead and their outcomes, including new
orders to enhance civilian protections. Local and international NGOs
continued to criticize Israel's investigation and disciplinary action
relating to casualties from Operation Cast Lead as insufficient.
B'Tselem reported that 773 of the estimated 1,385 Palestinians killed
were civilians. The Israeli government maintained that the civilian
death count was 295 and noted that Hamas operated within civilian
populations.
Since 2009 the IDF has opened investigations into 150 incidents
involving alleged violations of law of war by its forces. Various human
rights organizations reiterated concern that Israeli army commanders or
military police carried out the investigations, potentially reducing
impartiality. NGOs also criticized the Israeli government's decision
not to investigate fully allegations of serious violations, such as
Israel's use of white phosphorus and the targeting of civilian
infrastructure in the Gaza Strip.
Israel issued two indictments related to Cast Lead in a human
shield case (see section 2.c.) and in a civilian death during the year.
The IDF reprimanded an officer and sanctioned two others for failing to
exercise appropriate judgment during an incident that resulted in
civilian casualties in the al-Maqadmah mosque during Operation Cast
Lead. Additionally, an IDF brigadier general and a colonel were
disciplined for approving the use of explosive shells in violation of
the safety distances required in urban areas during Operation Cast
Lead.
In 2009 the IDF chief of staff ordered operational debriefings for
at least 60 investigations focused on law of war violations during
Operation Cast Lead. Held by the army under the Military Justice Law,
operational debriefing delayed criminal investigations because
information provided cannot be released or used as evidence in a court
of law.
b. Disappearance.--There were few reports of politically motivated
kidnappings and disappearances in connection with internal Palestinian
conflict, largely due to improved security conditions in the West Bank.
In the Gaza Strip, Hamas security operatives carried out
extrajudicial detentions based on political affiliation during the
year; information concerning the whereabouts and welfare of those
detained was not consistently or reliably available, nor were those
detained offered due process or access to family and legal counsel.
In 2006 Popular Resistance Committee and Hamas militants tunneled
from the Gaza Strip to Israel, killed two soldiers, and abducted a
third, Gilad Shalit. At year's end Shalit remained detained in the Gaza
Strip.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The PA Basic Law prohibits torture or use of force against
detainees; however, international human rights groups reported that
torture remained a problem. Following allegations of abuse in the
deaths of four prisoners in PA custody in 2009 (see section 1.a.),
Prime Minister Fayyad dismissed a number of PA security officials and
issued a directive against prisoner mistreatment, abuse, or torture,
with a corresponding order for Palestinian prison and detention center
monitoring. As a result the PA provided all security forces with
written guidelines for interrogation and detention that remained in
effect during the year, including a section on prisoners' rights.
Nevertheless, according to HRW, reports of mistreatment were common
during the year, and the PA was lax in prosecuting security officials
for detainee mistreatment. Palestinian detainees registered 163
complaints of torture with the ICHR during the year. Reported abuse by
PA authorities in the West Bank included forcing prisoners to sit in a
painful position for long periods, beating, punching, flogging,
intimidation, and psychological pressure. International observers noted
that abuse was not systematic or routinely practiced in PA prisons,
although some prisoners experienced abuse during arrest or
interrogation.
A 2009 HRW report alleged abuses by Fatah-affiliated Palestinian
security officials against Hamas members and supporters in the West
Bank, as well as abuses by Hamas security forces against Fatah-
affiliated officials in Gaza Strip. According to reports these trends
continued during the year.
On September 16 and 19, according to HRW, PA security authorities
arrested an unidentified man and Ahmad Salhab and tortured them in
custody in a facility in Jericho. The PA suspected both men of ties to
Hamas. Authorities released the first man after 10 days but held Salhab
until October 16, when they transferred him to a hospital to treat
injuries reportedly related to torture, as well as torn spinal disks
that were a previous result of mistreatment during confinement in 2008.
Torture carried out by the Gaza Strip Hamas Executive Force was not
restricted to security detainees but also included persons associated
with the Fatah political party, those held on suspicion of
``collaboration'' with Israel, or those considered to engage in immoral
activity. There were reports that Hamas deployed undercover officers to
attack, beat, and (in some cases) detain these persons, usually without
intent to kill. Hamas took no action to investigate reports of torture,
and documentation of abuses was limited, due in part to fear of
retribution by victims and, in part, to PA officials and NGOs lacking
access to Gaza Strip prisoners. The ICHR reported that complaints of
abuse included being forced to stand in an uncomfortable stress
positions, flogging, hand binding, suspension, blindfolding, punching,
and beatings with clubs or hoses.
According to human rights NGO reports and photographic
documentation released on May 12, Hamas forces beat Jamal Abu Qumsan,
an unmarried art gallery owner, regarding the accusation that he had
nonmarital sexual relations. Abu Qumsan sustained blows along his back,
legs, and buttocks. Human rights organizations claimed that such
attacks and interrogations were common, but victims were reticent to
come forward.
Hamas organized attacks in the West Bank. On September 1, Hamas
members reportedly shot and wounded two Israeli residents of a Jordan
Valley settlement near Ramallah; Hamas's military wing immediately
claimed responsibility. On November 17, the PA arrested various Hamas
members suspected of planning bomb attacks and abductions and targeting
a prominent Palestinian government official.
There were no reports that Hamas used human shields during the
year. According to a 2009 report released by Israel's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Hamas used human shields, including children, during
Operation Cast Lead by placing launch pads and operation centers in
civilian facilities.
Israeli law, as interpreted by a 1999 High Court decision,
prohibits torture and several interrogation techniques but allows
``moderate physical pressure'' against detainees considered to possess
information about an imminent terrorist attack. The decision also
indicates that interrogators who abuse detainees suspected of
possessing such information may be immune from prosecution. Human
rights organizations reported that ``moderate physical pressure'' in
practice included beatings, requiring an individual to hold a stress
position for long periods, and painful pressure from shackles or
restraints applied to the forearms. Israeli NGOs continued to criticize
what they termed abusive Israeli detention practices, including
isolation, sleep deprivation, protracted handcuffing, shackling, and
psychological abuse, such as threats to interrogate elderly parents or
demolish family homes.
The NGO Defense for Children International-Palestine Section (DCI-
Palestine) claimed Israeli security authorities often tortured and
abused minors in custody to coerce confessions during interrogation,
employing tactics such as beatings, long-term handcuffing, threats,
rape, and solitary confinement. In 40 affidavits collected by DCI-
Palestine in the last six months of the year, 28 children arrested and
detained by the IDF claimed they were beaten and kicked, 24 experienced
some form of position abuse, seven were stripped naked, and three were
subjected to electric shocks.
On March 23, Israeli soldiers arrested a 16-year-old known as Basel
from the West Bank village of at-Tabaqa. According to sworn testimony
collected by DCI-Palestine, soldiers blindfolded, bound, and beat
Basel, then transferred him to local settlers, who also beat him. He
claimed he was pressured into confessing to throwing stones and that he
was threatened with imprisonment and electric shocks. The IDF later
left him barefoot on a road outside a West Bank settlement at 1 a.m.,
approximately 10 miles from his home.
On November 24, Israeli border police beat and kicked seven-year-
old Adam in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Silwan, according to a
DCI-Palestine affidavit.
In 2008, according to the NGO the Public Committee Against Torture
in Israel (PCATI), the Israeli Security Agency (known as the Shin Bet
or ISA) arrested Jalal Sawafta and interrogated him and his parents.
The Shin Bet interrogator allegedly threatened to demolish the family
home if Sawafta's parents did not convince Sawafta to confess to
complicity in rigging a car bomb. PCATI reported that Sawafta's
complaint about the incident was closed at year's end, but the State
Attorney's Office provided no detailed explanation for its decision to
close the complaint, and there had been no investigation.
Degrading treatment by Israeli soldiers was documented on the
Internet. In August former Israeli soldier Eden Abergil posted online
photographs of herself posing with blindfolded and handcuffed
Palestinian detainees. Although Israeli authorities condemned the act
as degrading, there was no evidence of results in any investigation. In
October the IDF launched an investigation into an online video,
purportedly posted in 2008, featuring a soldier mocking and dancing
around a blindfolded Palestinian detainee.
At year's end two policemen from the Ma'ale Adumim police station,
who were arrested in 2008 for severely abusing a Palestinian from
Bethany, remained under house arrest, and investigations continued,
according to PCATI.
Israeli law, high court rulings, and an IDF order prohibit Israeli
forces from using human shields, but the prohibition was reportedly not
always observed. Israeli soldiers used civilians, including three
children, according to DCI-Palestine, as human shields, endangering
their lives by forcing them to remain in or near houses being used as
military positions or carrying out dangerous tasks such as inspecting
properties. According to the Israeli Ministry of Justice, when a human
shield complaint is registered, the Investigative Military Police opens
an investigation.
On February 18, during a raid on a house in Nablus, Israeli
soldiers reportedly forced 16-year-old Dua'a to search her home for
potential booby traps. The soldiers ordered her to open closets and
lift mattresses in the house, according to DCI-Palestine. There was no
investigation or update at year's end.
On April 16, two IDF soldiers detained 14-year-old Sabri in front
of a school in Beit Ummar and forced him to walk in front of them while
Palestinian protesters, urged by the IDF personnel, threw stones. The
incident was photographed and published widely in Palestinian media. On
October 19, the Israeli Military prosecutor for operational matters
indicated that military police had opened an investigation into the
case, but there was no update at year's end.
On August 19, IDF soldiers near Nablus beat a 13-year-old boy known
as Nazzal during a raid and forced him to guide them through an
inspection of his uncle's house, according to DCI-Palestine. There was
no investigation or update at year's end.
In the first conviction by Israeli courts in any human shield case,
on October 3, an Israeli military court convicted two unidentified
Israeli soldiers from the Givati Brigade who used a nine-year-old boy,
identified as Majid Abd Rabbo, to search bags believed to contain
explosives in January 2009 during Operation Cast Lead. Authorities
sentenced the soldiers to three-month suspended prison terms for
exceeding their authority by endangering a life and behavior unbecoming
a soldier; both were also demoted. The IDF also disciplined a
lieutenant colonel for permitting Rabbo to enter a structure where
combatants were present.
Nonstate Palestinian groups attacked Israeli targets in the West
Bank. For example, the Syria-based Abu Musa group claimed
responsibility for the September 26 shooting of two Israelis south of
Hebron.
Israeli civilians committed violent acts against Palestinian
civilians and their property with reportedly little or no intervention
and no subsequent investigation by Israeli officials. Some settlers
reportedly used violence against Palestinians to keep them away from
settlements and land that settlers sought to expropriate. The Palestine
Center estimated that between 2009 and mid-year, settlers committed
approximately 1,000 acts of violence against Palestinians and their
property. DCI-Palestine claimed in July that it had documented 38 cases
of children attacked and injured by settlers between March 2008 and
July 2010 near settlements in the vicinity of Bethlehem, Ramallah,
Salfit, Hebron, and Nablus; in three of those incidents, children were
killed. Six of the attacks, affecting eight children, reportedly
occurred during the year. A November 2009 UNOCHA report cited settler
violence as ``a key factor undermining the physical security and
livelihoods of Palestinians in many areas throughout the West Bank.''
On July 26, settlers conducted a series of attacks for more than 12
hours on the Palestinian village of Burin, during which time settlers
assaulted Palestinians, looted vehicles, and burned nearby Palestinian
fields, according to NGO and media reports. Local officials and NGO
field workers on site stated that the IDF largely observed the attacks
and took no action to prevent the attackers from regrouping. Local
officials claimed PA fire service crews were restricted for more than
an hour from entering the area to put out the flames.
On September 1, following a Hamas-related shooting that killed four
Israeli settlers, approximately 50 settlers from the Kiryat Arba
settlement near Hebron threw rocks at the nearby home of the
Palestinian Idris family. Settlers knocked over outside fixtures and
set fire to grass in front of the house. According to media reports,
IDF soldiers accompanied the settlers and did not prevent the attacks.
On the same day, another settler attack arbitrarily targeted
Palestinian vehicles by breaking windows near the Jet junction, between
Nablus and Qalqilya.
On November 11, settlers targeted a Palestinian woman and her two
children, ages 10 and 11 years old, with rocks as they went to school
in Tuqu village, near Bethlehem in the West Bank, according to media
reports. A Palestinian group later protested the incident by burning
tires and throwing rocks at Israeli vehicles, and a clash with Israeli
forces ensued.
Settler violence against Palestinians in the Old City of Hebron
continued to decline, according to local NGOs, attributed primarily to
Palestinian video documentation of settler harassment. Nevertheless,
residents and several former IDF soldiers reported that Israeli
authorities in the Old City consistently refrained from protecting
Palestinians against settler violence and failed to enforce law and
order on assailants.
In April 2009 two male settlers near Ma'on settlement attacked a
woman who was eight months pregnant. The men, whose faces were covered,
pushed her to the ground, kicked her, and beat her with sticks.
Although B'Tselem reported that Hebron police in May stated that they
had interrogated three suspects, at year's end there was no evidence of
an investigation.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions.--PA prison conditions
improved in recent years, although the PA prison system remained
significantly inadequate for the prison population it served. PA civil
police prisons, which held nonsecurity prisoners, remained severely
overcrowded. Space and capacity issues also reduced the availability of
medical care and vocational or other programs for inmates in civil
police prisons.
Unlike in the previous year, there were no deaths reported in PA
civil police prisons from adverse conditions.
In December there were approximately 1,050 prisoners in the seven
PA civil police prisons; women and male juveniles each constituted
approximately 2 percent of the prison population, according to PA
statistics. Male juveniles were at times housed with adult male
prisoners. PA intelligence services held several hundred security
detainees separately from the general population. PA authorities
undertook prison improvement efforts at various facilities.
All PA civil police prisons allowed visitations on a weekly basis,
religious observance, a procedure for submitting complaints, and an
investigation process for complaints. During the year the PA generally
permitted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to
detainees and allowed regular inspections of prison conditions.
Preliminary, unpublished accounts by human rights groups, humanitarian
organizations, and lawyers indicated that, as in previous years, there
were some difficulties gaining access to specific detainees, depending
on which security organization managed the facility.
Ombudsmen cannot serve on behalf of prisoners.
In the Gaza Strip prison conditions were reportedly poor, and
little information was available. Detention facilities were
unofficially reported below international legal or humanitarian
standards. Hamas authorities announced an inquiry into the 2008 death
of Taleb Mohammed Abu Sitta, who died of injuries following Hamas
police detention. As a result Hamas suspended several police officers
from duty, but there were no reports that any were tried, according to
AI. The ICRC conducted monitoring visits to some prisoners in the Gaza
Strip, but Hamas authorities denied representatives permission to visit
captured IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.
IDF detention centers were less likely than Israeli civilian
prisons to meet international standards, with some, such as the Ofer
detention center, providing living space as small as 15 square feet per
detainee. In November B'Tselem and Hamoked reported unsatisfactory
conditions in Shin Bet's Petah Tikva Prison, including poor hygienic
conditions. Prisoners also continued to claim inadequate medical care.
According to the Israeli Ministry of Justice, the IDF continued to
ameliorate living conditions in two detention centers in the West Bank.
Also, in November 2009 Israel began building a new detention complex
next to the Ofer Camp military courts.
According to Israeli official figures, approximately 5,935
Palestinians were held in Israeli civilian prisons in December.
Palestinian minors arrested in the West Bank were subject to the
Israeli military courts system, which recognizes persons 16 years of
age or older as adults; all minors between the ages of 16 and 18 were
held in pretrial or posttrial detention with adults. Israeli minors
between the ages of 16 and 18 arrested in the West Bank were subject to
Israeli criminal and civil courts.
PCATI reported that approximately 650 prisoner complaints of
mistreatment in Shin Bet facilities were not forwarded to police for
criminal investigation between 2001 and November 2010.
Israel permitted the ICRC to monitor prison conditions. The Israeli
Bar Association and NGOs sent representatives to meet with prisoners
and inspect conditions in prisons, detention centers, and IDF
facilities. Human rights groups reported delays and difficulties in
gaining access to specific detainees, frequent transfers of detainees
without notice, and the limited ability of families of imprisoned
Palestinians, particularly Gazans, to visit.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention.--Palestinian law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention; however, in practice the PA failed to
charge detainees promptly and regularly held detainees for months
without trial. Hamas also charged that the PA detained individuals
during the year solely on the basis of their Hamas affiliation.
Reportedly Hamas practiced widespread arbitrary detention in the
Gaza Strip.
Israeli law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, but Israeli
security services did not always abide by these prohibitions.
Palestinian security detainees were under the jurisdiction of
military law, which permits 10 days' detention without access to a
lawyer or appearing before a court. There is no requirement that a
detainee have access to a lawyer until after interrogation, a process
that may last weeks.
Role of the Police and Security Apparatus.--In West Bank
Palestinian population centers, mostly ``Area A'' as defined by the
Oslo-era agreements, the PA has formal responsibility for security and
civil control; however, Israeli security forces since 2002 have
conducted regular security operations in Area A cities without
coordinating with PA security forces. In ``Area B'' territory in the
West Bank, composed mostly of small Palestinian villages and farmland,
the PA has civil control--including civil policing--but Israel retains
responsibility for security control. In ``Area C,'' which contains
Israeli settlements, military installations, some small Palestinian
villages and farmland, and open countryside, Israel retains full civil
and security control.
Six PA security forces operated in the West Bank. The PA Civil
Police has primary responsibility for civil and community policing. The
National Security Force (NSF) conducts gendarmerie-style security
operations in circumstances that exceed the capabilities of the Civil
Police. The Military Intelligence agency, a subunit of the NSF, handles
intelligence and criminal matters involving PA security force
personnel, including accusations of abuse. The General Intelligence
service is responsible for external intelligence gathering and
operations; the Preventive Security Organization is responsible for
these matters internally. The Presidential Guard protects facilities
and provides dignitary protection. The Civil Defense service provides
emergency services. PA security services are under the operational
control of the minister of the interior. Military Intelligence is
responsible for investigations into allegations of abuse and corruption
involving PA security forces and can refer cases to court.
In the Gaza Strip, forces under Hamas control maintained security.
Press and NGO reports suggested Hamas enforced strict control across
all sectors of society. Hamas police reportedly facilitated and
benefited from illegal activity, such as the operation of smuggling
tunnels.
Israeli authorities maintained their West Bank security presence
through the IDF, Shin Bet, the Israeli National Police, and the Border
Police. Israeli authorities in some instances investigated and punished
abuse and corruption, but there were several reports of failure to take
disciplinary action in cases of abuse.
According to Israeli and Palestinian NGO and press reports, the IDF
was insufficiently responsive to violence perpetrated by Israeli
settlers in the West Bank against Palestinians. The Association for
Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) stated that Israeli security and justice
officials operating in predominantly Arab East Jerusalem displayed bias
against Arab residents in investigating incidents involving Arab and
Israeli actors. Palestinian residents, in several cases, sought to
press charges against Israeli settlers or their security guards, but
many complaints went uninvestigated despite the availability of
evidence. Most complaints filed by Arab residents of East Jerusalem
were of police misconduct from the Shalem and David police stations,
which are responsible for Jerusalem's Old City and surrounding Arab
neighborhoods where some Israeli settlers maintained highly defended
presences.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention.--PA law
provides for prompt judicial determination of the legality of
detention, and this provision was largely--but not uniformly--observed
in practice. PA law allows police to hold detainees without charge for
24 hours and with court approval for up to 45 days; it requires that a
trial must start within six months or the detainee must be released. In
several reported cases, PA security forces detained persons without
warrants and without bringing them before judicial authorities within
the required timeframe; however, PA judicial officials claimed no
detentions extended beyond the time limit without trial. Bail and
conditional release were available upon discretion of judicial
authorities. Authorities generally informed detainees of the charges
against them, albeit sometimes not until interrogation.
PA Military Intelligence in a number of cases reportedly exceeded
its legal authority to investigate other security services' officers
and detained civilians suspected of ``security offenses'' such as
terrorist activities. Hamas charged that the PA detained individuals
during the year solely on the basis of their Hamas affiliation, but the
PA presented evidence that many of these individuals had been charged
with criminal offenses under civil or military codes. For example,
Hamas stated that the PA unnecessarily targeted and in some cases
carried out wave arrests of Hamas affiliates after PA officers detained
seven members of an armed Hamas cell in the West Bank suspected of
killing Israelis in shootings in Hebron and Ramallah on August 31 and
September 2, respectively. Similarly, on December 9, PA authorities
arrested 28 suspected Hamas supporters within 24 hours in Hebron,
Nablus, Bethlehem, Tulkarem, Qalqilia, Salfit, and Jenin.
As in 2009 the PA sought military judicial review and court orders
for detaining civilians suspected of terrorist activity. In several
such cases, the PA disregarded civilian court orders requiring the
release of these suspects, citing countervailing military court orders.
In most of these incidents, the PA was unwilling to provide evidence
required by the civilian court system, and the military courts provided
a more efficient system to deal with any shortcomings in providing
evidence.
There were reports that some PA security forces used
disproportionate force during arrest operations. The PA General
Administration for Reform and Rehabilitation Center, under the
authority of the Ministry of Interior, operated a mechanism for
reviewing complaints of prisoner abuse.
In the Gaza Strip, Hamas reportedly detained a large but
unverifiable number of persons during the year, largely without
recourse to legal counsel, judicial review, or bail. Many of these
detentions were apparently politically based, targeting former PA
officials, Fatah party members, and those suspected of ties to Israel.
In one case, on February 15, Hamas detained British journalist Paul
Martin without charge and held him until March 11. Martin was
reportedly suspected of espionage but never faced charges. He did not
appear before a judge to assess the legality of his detention and had
no access to his lawyer between February 19 and March 1. Reports also
indicated that neither Martin nor his lawyer had access to the evidence
that led to his arrest, according to HRW.
Israeli authorities operate under military and legal codes in the
occupied territories (see also Israel, section 1.d., Arrest Procedures
and Treatment While in Detention). By law detainees can be held for up
to 90 days without access to a lawyer. Israeli authorities stated that
their policy is to post notification of arrests within 48 hours, but
senior officers may delay notification for up to 12 days, effectively
holding detainees incommunicado. A military commander may request that
a judge extend this period indefinitely.
Persons detained on security grounds fall under one or more of
several legal regimes, which allow for the transfer of administrative
detainees from the West Bank to detention in Israel. As a general
practice, Arabs without Israeli citizenship detained for security
violations were not granted bail.
Several NGOs claimed that Israel continued to overuse the
administrative detention process in unexceptional and nonsecurity cases
and as an alternative to standard criminal proceedings, particularly in
cases where evidence is insufficient or cannot be publicly presented.
Administrative detainees, according to B'Tselem, were not provided
sufficient information on the reasons for their detention or the
charges against them; they were rarely given an opportunity to refute
the suspicions or access the evidentiary material presented against
them in court. At year's end, according to B'Tselem, Israel held 204
Palestinians under ``administrative detention'' without having charged
them with a crime; this was a decrease from the 278 held at the end of
2009. A military judge can reportedly issue administrative detention
orders for up to six months, renewable indefinitely. PCATI alleged
military commanders in the occupied territories used administrative
detention orders based on ``security reasons'' even when the accused
posed no clear danger. On December 26, Israel released a 16-year-old
known as Moatasem after holding him in administrative detention since
March 20.
Throughout the year there were reports that Israeli security forces
in East Jerusalem and in the West Bank arbitrarily arrested and
detained Palestinian protesters and activists, particularly those
participating in antibarrier demonstrations. Israeli authorities
generally provided Palestinians held in Israeli military custody inside
Israel access to their lawyers, but impediments to movement on West
Bank roads or at crossings often made consultation difficult and
postponed trials and hearings. The Government frequently delayed
notification to foreign government officials after detaining their
citizens in the occupied territories.
During the year the Shin Bet continued its practice of
incommunicado detention, including isolation from the ICRC, legal
counsel, and family, throughout the duration of interrogation. There
were also reports of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment during interrogation, often to elicit confessions (see
section 1.c.). The Palestinian human rights organization Addameer
reported that 39 Palestinians were held incommunicado during the year.
In a study released in November, PCATI estimated that approximately
8,000 to 10,000 of the 11,790 Palestinians held by Israeli authorities
in the West Bank from 2005 and 2007 were for some period of time
detained incommunicado. According to Physicians for Human Rights-Israel
(PHR-Israel), isolation of prisoners with mental illness was common
(see section 6, Persons with Disabilities). According to the Israeli
government, the Israel Prison Service does not hold detainees in
separate detention punitively or to induce confessions, but rather only
when a detainee threatens himself or others and other options have been
exhausted, or, in some cases, during interrogation to prevent
disclosing information. In such cases the Israeli government maintained
that the detainee had the right to meet with representatives of the
ICRC, Israeli Prison Service personnel, and medical personnel if
necessary.
Nevertheless, NGOs reported that the Government constrained access
to prisoners by the ICRC and other independent groups. On January 21,
the deputy state attorney denied October 2009 requests from PCATI,
ACRI, and PHR-Israel for representatives of the Public Defender's
Office to visit Shin Bet facilities to provide counsel. A study by
PCATI and the Palestinian Prisoner Society revealed in December that up
to 90 percent of Palestinians in Shin Bet detention did not have access
to legal counsel until after signing confessions.
B'Tselem cited a rise in the rate of Palestinian minors arrested
and detained throughout the year in East Jerusalem, particularly in
Silwan, in violation of Israel's youth law, which prohibits arrest or
interrogation of minors after nightfall. NGO reports claimed that
Israeli authorities routinely arrested minors at checkpoints, on the
street, at night, and in early morning house raids, and transferred
them to one of eight detention facilities for interrogation. In
particular B'Tselem reported lack of parental presence at
interrogation, as is permitted by law. In most cases authorities
reportedly failed to inform parents where their children would be
taken. According to DCI-Palestine, authorities also tortured and abused
minors to coerce confessions (see section 1.c.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The 2002 Palestinian Basic Law,
amended in 2005, provides for an independent judiciary. In practice the
PA generally respected judicial independence and the autonomy of the
High Judicial Council, maintained authority over most court operations
in the West Bank. PA courts operated more efficiently than in previous
years, demonstrating improvements in several procedural capacities,
including case management, organization, transparency, evidence
collection, and recordkeeping. Case backlogs were largely related to
restrictions on movement imposed by Israeli authorities (see section
2.d.). Additionally, PA-affiliated prosecutors and judges stated that
these prohibitions hampered their ability to dispense justice,
including restrictions on their ability to transport detainees and
collect witnesses. The PA increased financial allocations to the courts
to fund additional court administrative staff, in response to an
existing lack of personnel. Efforts to expand reforms continued at
year's end. In some cases involving investigations by PA intelligence
services in the West Bank, civilian defendants appeared before the PA's
military court system, which has jurisdiction over security personnel
and crimes by civilians against security forces. Palestinian NGOs
criticized the practice of trying civilian defendants in military
courts, while the PA defended the practice based on the security nature
of the crimes involved.
In 2007 Hamas appointees replaced PA-appointed prosecutors and
judges in the Gaza Strip. The PA declared the action illegal; however,
courts operated by Hamas appointees continued functioning in the Gaza
Strip throughout the year.
Israeli law provides for an independent judiciary, and the
Government generally respected civil court independence in practice.
The IDF tried Palestinians accused of security offenses (ranging from
rock throwing to membership in a terrorist organization to incitement)
in military courts. Israeli law defines security offenses to include a
variety of different charges. Israeli military courts rarely acquitted
Palestinians charged with security offenses; sentences occasionally
were reduced on appeal. Israeli civil law applied to Palestinian
residents of East Jerusalem, and Israeli civil courts generally tended
to rule against Palestinians.
Several NGOs claimed that Israeli military courts, which processed
approximately 7,000 Palestinians in the West Bank during the year, were
not equipped to adjudicate each case properly. In a 2007 study, the
Israeli NGO Yesh Din stated that plea bargains had largely replaced
full legal proceedings. In a sampling of 118 detention hearings
observed, of both minors and adults, the average hearing lasted three
minutes and four seconds. Of the 9,123 detention hearings for
Palestinians in 2006, only 23 hearings, approximately 0.29 percent,
resulted in the defendant being found not guilty. DCI-Palestine, which
represented several hundred Palestinian minors each year in Israeli
military courts, claimed Israeli military justice officials had made
only negligible improvements since 2006.
Trial Procedures.--PA law provides for the right to a fair trial,
and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right. Defendants
enjoy a presumption of innocence. Juries are not used. Trials are
public, except when the court determines privacy is required by PA
security, foreign relations, a party's or witness's right to privacy,
or protection of a victim of a sexual offense or an ``honor'' crime.
Defendants have the right to be present and to consult with an attorney
in a timely matter during the trial, although during the investigation
phase, the defendant only has the right to observe. The law provides
for legal representation, at public expense if needed, in felony cases,
but only during the trial phase. Defendants can confront or question
witnesses against them or present witnesses and evidence during the
trial, but not during the investigation phase; defendants may also
review government-held evidence and have the right to appeal.
Authorities generally observed these rights in practice.
Hamas authorities in the Gaza Strip follow the same criminal
procedure law as the PA in the West Bank. However, Hamas does not use
the same penal code as the PA in the West Bank, following instead the
1936 penal code enacted by the British during the mandate period.
Palestinians held by Israeli authorities in the West Bank or in
Israel were subject to trial in Israeli military courts. Israelis
living in settlements in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem were tried
under Israeli civil law in the nearest Israeli district court.
Signed confessions by Palestinian minors, which were written in
Hebrew, a language most cannot read, constituted a source of evidence
against minors prosecuted in Israeli military courts. Every Palestinian
minor prosecuted in Israeli military courts during the year pleaded
guilty; lawyers stated they were often reluctant to run full
evidentiary hearings for fear the minor would remain longer in
detention.
According to HRW the August conviction of Abdullah Abu Rahmah,
charged in relation to antibarrier protests in 2005 and 2009, did not
specify particular events related to the charges against him and relied
on statements in Hebrew signed by children unable to read the language
that were later retracted. A court validated Abdullah Abu Rahmah's
allegations of unfair trial and lack of proper investigation but
acquitted him only partially (see section 2.b.).
Political Prisoners and Detainees.--The PA during the year tried
approximately 10 cases in which Palestinians were accused of
collaborating with Israel. Following a Supreme Court ruling that found
military court prosecution of civilians illegal, an unknown number of
cases were transferred to governorate authorities during the year.
Independent reports claimed that a variety of these cases may have
included political prisoners. There were no statistics available on the
number of political prisoners and detainees the PA may have held during
the year.
Hamas detained several hundred persons, allegedly because of their
political affiliation, and held them for varying periods of time.
Numerous allegations of denial of due process and some executions were
associated with these detentions.
There was no information at year's end about access to political
prisoners by international humanitarian organizations.
In two politically motivated events on April 12, Fatah stated that
Hamas security forces raided the home of Fatah Revolutionary Council
member Abdullah Abu Samhadana and later arrested Fatah official Ibrahim
at-Tahrawi.
Israel held noncitizen Palestinians in detention in Israel and in
prisons in the West Bank. On March 28, the High Court of Justice
rejected an NGO petition that called for a cessation of Palestinian
prisoner and detainee transfers to Israeli territory inside the Green
Line and an end to the use of military courts in such cases. PA
officials claimed that at year's end there were 130 Palestinians held
inside Israel serving sentences of at least 20 years--most were
political and security prisoners.
Ten Palestinians held by Israel were members of the PLC.
On March 19, Israeli authorities arrested and held in
administrative detention Hamas-affiliated PLC members Nezar Ramadan and
Azzam Salhab; they were released without trial or charges on September
8, according to Addameer.
On October 18, Israeli soldiers arrested PLC member Hatem Qafisha,
affiliated with Hamas via the ``Reform and Change Movement'' (Hamas'
electoral campaign platform, see Section 3). Previously, authorities
arrested Qafisha in 2007 and held him in administrative detention
without charges or trial until November 2009. There were reports that
he faced six months of administrative detention.
On December 30, Israeli authorities rearrested Hamas politician
Khalil al-Rabai in his Hebron home; al-Rabai previously served a three-
year prison term ending in 2009.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies.--The PA civil and
magistrate courts handled civil suits and were able to provide an
independent and impartial judiciary in most matters. However, there
were unconfirmed reports of various factions trying to influence
judicial decisions. A citizen can file a suit against the Government,
including on matters related to alleged abuses of human rights, but
this was uncommon. There are administrative remedies available in
addition to judicial remedies, but they were seldom used. The execution
of court orders was not systematic.
Gaza Strip residents may file civil suits, including those related
to human rights violations. Unofficial anecdotal reports claimed that
Gaza Strip courts operated independently of the Hamas government and
were, at times, impartial. There were reports that enforcement of court
orders improved.
Israeli law permits Palestinians residing in the occupied
territories to seek compensation for death, injury, or property damage
at the hands of the IDF, but a 2002 law denies Palestinians the
possibility of obtaining compensation in most cases for human rights
abuses or injuries resulting from illegal acts by Israeli security
forces. Amendments in 2005, which the High Court in 2006 partially
overturned, added obstacles to Palestinian plaintiffs seeking
compensation.
Property Restitution.--When the IDF offered opportunities for
compensation for demolished or seized homes, subject to an appraisal,
verification, and appeals process, Palestinians generally refused,
citing a desire not to legalize the confiscation. Due to documentation
dating from the Ottoman period, a traditional land tenure system with
communal, family, and individual rights commingled. According to
Israeli-imposed definitions of land ownership, Palestinians had
difficulty verifying ownership in Israeli courts (see section 1.f.).
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The PA required the attorney general to issue warrants
for entry and searches of private property; however, Palestinian
security services often ignored these requirements.
Palestinian civilians targeted Israeli setters' properties. For
example, on August 22, according to Israeli settlers in Shilo,
Palestinians burned approximately 13 acres of settler-owned vineyards.
Hamas authorities in the Gaza Strip frequently interfered
arbitrarily with personal privacy, family, and home, according to
reporting from local media and NGO sources.
There were no reports that Israeli security monitored private
communications or movement of individuals without legal process. Under
occupation orders only IDF officers of lieutenant colonel rank and
above could authorize entry into Palestinian private homes and
institutions in the West Bank without a warrant, based upon military
necessity. There were no reported cases of IDF soldiers punished for
acting contrary to this requirement.
In the West Bank, Israel continued to demolish homes, other
buildings, and other property constructed by Palestinians in areas of
the West Bank under Israeli civil control on the basis that these
buildings lacked Israeli planning licenses. Compensation was generally
not offered in these cases. Properties 328 yards from the separation
barrier or IDF military installations also remained subject to
demolition or confiscation. There were 141 demolitions during the year.
B'Tselem reported in July that more than 20 percent of the settlements'
built-up areas rested on areas that Israel recognized as private
Palestinian land. Exceptions to the November 2009 moratorium (which
expired in September) on new residential settlement construction
occurred on a case-by-case basis for projects with preexisting
foundations and for public construction such as schools and
infrastructure.
During the year Israeli authorities demolished 113 houses and 240
other commercial or community-use structures in ``Area C,'' which is
under the full jurisdiction of Israeli civil and military authority.
The demolitions affected 13,847 persons, including 7,777 children. This
was a significant increase from the 191 demolitions in 2009, which
affected 572 persons, including 332 children, according to UNOCHA. Many
of these demolitions occurred in Bedouin and herder communities in the
Tubas Governorate, where Israeli policies largely prohibit Palestinian
construction.
In March IDF personnel leveled several acres of Palestinian
farmland in the West Bank village of Beit Jala to continue construction
of the separation barrier, in some cases clearing land within feet of
existing residential structures, according to NGO reporting. Lawyers
representing several of the affected families stated that the IDF did
not have valid orders and that the families did not have an opportunity
to appeal the confiscations legally. A Palestinian family in the
Bethlehem area whose property straddled the Jerusalem municipal
boundary was encircled with fencing and concertina wire by the IDF; the
family was allowed limited access in and out of the residence.
On July 19, IDF personnel demolished more than 70 structures in the
small farming village of al-Farisiya in the Jordan Valley; the action
displaced 113 persons, approximately half of whom were children,
according to NGO and media reports. Residents reported the village was
designated a ``closed military zone,'' although military activity was
not observed during the year. IDF troops returned on August 5 and
demolished rebuilt structures.
On October 12, the IDF confiscated 250 acres of Palestinian-owned
land in the West Bank village of Jaloud, near the Israeli settlement of
Eli, for military purposes. This order followed a series of incidents
on October 10-13 in which the IDF, as well as Israeli settlers,
separately bulldozed what residents claimed was Palestinian-owned land
in the vicinity of existing Israeli settlements.
In East Jerusalem home demolitions decreased significantly compared
with 2009, although the Jerusalem Municipality demolished twice as many
nonresidential structures (54 during the year, compared with 23 in
2009), often affecting private family businesses. The Jerusalem
Municipality demolished 24 homes in East Jerusalem that it stated were
built without municipal permits, compared with 57 in 2009, although
seven additional homes were demolished during the year by their owners
after receiving a demolition notice to avoid being charged by the
municipality for the cost of demolition.
Construction did not begin at the site of the historic Shepherd
Hotel in East Jerusalem, although municipal authorities issued
construction permits for the site in March. In July 2009 the Jerusalem
Municipality approved plans to construct two apartment buildings on the
site of the hotel, owned by the Palestinian Husseini family from 1945
to 1967; it was confiscated as absentee property by the Government of
Israel in 1967 and privately purchased in the 1980s.
In 2009 the court ruled against two Palestinian families living in
the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Shaykh Jarrah and ordered evictions
for the Hanoun and al-Ghawi families, affecting 53 persons, including
20 children. The Nakhalat Shimon group took control of the properties
and submitted plans to demolish approximately 28 homes to make way for
a new Israeli settlement, according to UNOCHA.
In the Gaza Strip, B'Tselem reported that Israeli authorities
destroyed 12 homes for alleged military purposes, displacing 38
persons. The Israeli blockade on the Gaza Strip also inhibited all mail
delivery and importation of construction supplies.
There were reports that East Jerusalem municipal authorities
invaded Arab residents' privacy. According to ACRI some security
cameras positioned in Arab neighborhoods pointed directly inside homes.
Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem and the West Bank also claimed
Israeli settlers and security guards often arbitrarily videotaped them
in public.
Israeli settlers reportedly continued to confiscate and vandalize
Palestinian property during the year. As in previous years, violence
and vandalism occurred during the autumn olive harvest, prompting
disputes over land. By October 25, Israeli authorities had recorded 27
official complaints about settler theft of olives from Palestinian
trees. Israeli human rights organizations stated that the olive-harvest
incidents indicated a new trend of disruptive activity by settlers
towards Palestinians in the West Bank. Rabbis for Human Rights reported
that approximately 600 trees were harvested near the Havat Gilad
settlement before being harvested by their Palestinian owners. The ICRC
reported in February that settlers had cut down, burned, or uprooted
approximately 10,000 olive trees since 2008. There were no known
investigations into the incidents. Affected Palestinians and human
rights NGOs reported that the IDF was largely unresponsive to actions
against Palestinians in the West Bank. The Israeli NGO Yesh Din
reported in October that more than 90 percent of investigations into
offenses against Palestinians carried out by Israeli settlers in the
West Bank were unsuccessful. Yesh Din monitored 97 complaints filed
against Israeli settlers for damage caused to Palestinian-owned trees;
police closed every case due to unidentifiable perpetrators or
insufficient evidence. Although IDF and Palestinian officials took
steps for the first time to mitigate olive-harvest violence, in some
instances Israeli security authorities reportedly prevented Palestinian
farmers from accessing their land to harvest the crop.
On August 17, according to residents of the West Bank village of
Qusra, Israeli settlers from newly established settlement outposts
attacked Palestinian olive groves, causing damage to hundreds of trees.
In incidents throughout September and October, Israeli settlers in
Shilo and Ariel confiscated farmland and cut down hundreds of
Palestinian-owned olive trees, prompting retaliations by Palestinians,
who reportedly cut down more than 100 settler olive trees, according to
both NGO and media reporting.
In September Israeli settlers harvested olives from Palestinian
olive trees near Nablus and Qalqiliya, several weeks ahead of the
traditional harvest season.
Settlers also exploited religious tensions to harass Palestinian
villages by vandalizing, breaking into, or burning at least three
mosques. These incidents aimed to accomplish political ends, such as
warning Israeli officials against supporting policies that limit
settlers' presence in the West Bank, in a policy the settlers publicly
referred to as ``price tag.''
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The PA Basic Law provides every
person the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and expression,
orally, in writing, or through any other form. The PA does not have
laws specifically providing for freedom of press; however, PA
institutions applied aspects of an unratified 1995 press law as de
facto law. In practice, however, the PA security forces in the West
Bank and members of the Hamas security apparatus in the Gaza Strip
continued to restrict freedom of speech and press. Self-censorship
continued as a result of political and social pressures.
Although there is no PA law prohibiting criticism of the
Government, there were reports that the Government was not fully
tolerant of criticism. The PA prohibits calls for violence, displays of
arms, and racist slogans but rarely enforced these provisions.
Across the occupied territories, three Palestinian daily and
several weekly newspapers, several monthly magazines, and three
tabloids were published. There were approximately 25 television and 65
radio stations; the PA operated one of each. Since 2008 several
factional satellite stations opened, including the pro-Hamas al-Quds,
established in 2008. Violence between Hamas and Fatah resulted in
polarization of the Palestinian press. International news outlets
continued to maintain offices and stringers in the Gaza Strip.
During the year the PA ministries of information, interior, and
telecommunications established and enforced the registration and
licensing of local Palestinian television and radio stations.
Registration fees ranged from 3,500 to 25,000 Jordanian dinars
(approximately $5,000 to $35,000). During the year a number of smaller
local radio and television stations were forced to close, at least
temporarily, as they raised funds to cover the registration and annual
licensing fees.
PA security forces reportedly harassed, detained, and prosecuted
journalists several times during the year due to their reporting. In
the West Bank, PA security forces raided the offices of several
independent media outlets suspected of filming local demonstrations.
They confiscated videotapes and briefly detained several journalists
working for Gaza-based media. PA security services reportedly
threatened pro-Hamas journalists working in the West Bank and West
Bank-based journalists working for the Gaza-based outlets.
On May 11, PA intelligence services arrested Amer Abu Arfa, a
correspondent of the Gaza-based Shihab news agency, in connection with
his reporting. In June a PA court in Hebron sentenced him to three
months in prison and a fine of 500 Jordanian dinars ($700) for
``resisting the policies of the authorities.'' According to the
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), the PA considered the Shihab
news agency pro-Hamas.
On July 17, PA security forces raided the offices of the
independent Watan television, reportedly because the outlet filmed a
demonstration by the pan-Islamic political organization Hizb al-Tahrir.
In January, according to the CPJ, a PA military court sentenced
Tareq Abu Zaid, a reporter for the Gaza-based al-Aqsa satellite
channel, to 18 months in prison for allegedly ``transferring
information and money.'' The Palestinian Center for Development and
Media Freedoms (MADA) and the International Freedom of Expression
Exchange (IFEX) reported that Abu Zaid was arrested in November 2009
because of his work as a correspondent for al-Aqsa television. On
November 14, according to IFEX, PA authorities released Abu Zaid. The
PA banned the Hamas-affiliated al-Aqsa television in 2007; however,
since it is a satellite station, Palestinians living outside the Gaza
Strip maintained access to it.
The PA maintained a distribution ban in the West Bank on the twice-
weekly pro-Hamas al-Risala and the Filistin daily, both Gaza-based
publications.
For the first time in 10 years, the Palestinian Journalists
Syndicate, a membership-based union representing the majority of
Palestinian journalists based in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the
Gaza Strip, with more than 400 journalists, held an election. The
syndicate's new leadership laid out a detailed agenda of reforms,
including the establishment and adoption of a set of bylaws and the
development of ties with international organizations dedicated to the
protection and promotion of journalists' rights.
In the Gaza Strip, individuals publicly criticizing authorities
risked reprisal by Hamas. On December 5, Hamas internal security forces
dispersed a peace protest in which participants were criticizing the
Government. In January 2009, according to HRW, an unidentified man
criticized a Hamas leader in a conversation on the street. That
evening, he stated, more than a dozen armed men with black masks took
him from his home and shot him three times in the lower legs and
ankles.
Since 2007 only pro-Hamas broadcast media and the Voice of the
People, a radio outlet affiliated with the terrorist organization
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, operated in the Gaza
Strip. Hamas maintained the closure of all Fatah-affiliated television
and radio broadcast outlets in the Gaza Strip. The Fatah-allied
Palestinian television and Voice of Palestine radio continued operating
in Ramallah after relocating there from the Gaza Strip in 2007. Two
other Fatah-affiliated radio stations in the Gaza Strip, al-Hurriyah
and al-Shabab, remained off the air during the year.
Journalists faced arrest, harassment, and other pressure from Hamas
due to their reporting or political affiliation (see also section 1.d.,
Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention). Hamas constrained
journalists' freedom of movement during the year, banning access to
Rafah and hospitals in the Gaza Strip. On several occasions during the
year, according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Hamas detained journalists from independent and Fatah-
affiliated outlets.
On August 14, Hamas raided the Gaza City Reuters office, following
Reuters reporting about a violent Hamas-Salafist incident in Rafah.
On November 10, Hamas representatives raided the Ramattan News
Agency to stop a press conference hosted by the Palestinian National
Action Committee.
On December 13, Hamas authorities detained and questioned Ziad
Ismail Awad, a contributor to the Kuwaiti television channel Wasl and
the office director at the Fatah parliamentary bloc in the Gaza Strip.
According to MADA, Awad stated that he was questioned about producing a
television program depicting Palestinian suffering in the Gaza Strip
and about his connections to the PLC. He was released that evening but
reported poor treatment in detention.
During the year Hamas continued to ban distribution of the PA's
official daily, al-Hayat al-Jadida, in the Gaza Strip. On July 6, local
Palestinian media reported that Israeli authorities agreed to allow the
distribution of Palestinian newspapers into the Gaza Strip starting the
following day. The purported change in policy represented the first
time since February 2009 that Israel agreed to allow Palestinian
newspapers to enter the Gaza Strip. The following day, despite the
well-publicized announcement, Israeli authorities at the border
crossing refused to allow the newspapers to enter the Gaza Strip. Both
Hamas and Israeli authorities claimed that the other prevented
circulation of the dailies.
Israeli authorities placed limits on certain forms of expression in
the occupied territories. For instance, in East Jerusalem, displays of
Palestinian political symbols were punishable by fines or imprisonment,
as were public expressions of anti-Israeli sentiment and of support for
terrorist groups. Authorities reviewed Arabic publications for material
perceived as a security threat; this review pertained to all Jerusalem-
based publications, but al-Quds was the only newspaper in the occupied
territories subjected to regular Israeli censorship.
As a general rule, Israeli media were able to cover the occupied
territories, except for combat zones where the IDF temporarily
restricted access, but closures, curfews, and checkpoints limited the
ability of Palestinian and foreign journalists to do their jobs (see
section 2.d.). Israel revoked the press credentials of the majority of
Palestinian journalists during the Second Intifada in 2000, with the
exception of a few Palestinian journalists who worked as stringers for
prominent international media outlets. As a result most Palestinian
journalists were unable to cover stories outside the Palestinian-
controlled areas of the West Bank.
There were reports of Israeli authorities detaining or assaulting
journalists during the year.
On January 12, Israeli authorities detained and later deported
Jared Malsin, editor in chief of the English-language section of the
independent Bethlehem-based Ma'an News Agency. The CPJ reported that
interrogation transcripts indicated Malsin was deemed a security risk
because of his political beliefs and reporting.
On January 28, Israeli forces reportedly assaulted a group of
Palestinian journalists covering olive tree planting in the West Bank
village of Burin. According to reports by MADA and the CPJ, soldiers
informed the journalists that photographs were prohibited because the
area is a closed military zone. When the reporters refused to stop
taking photographs, the soldiers hit the reporters and attempted to
seize their cameras before employing tear gas and stun grenades.
According to MADA, there was no investigation or prosecution as a
result of the incident.
On April 30, the IDF prevented al-Jazeera from covering an
antibarrier demonstration in Bil'in. Security forces arrested al
Jazeera camera operator Maidi Bannoura and his assistant Nader Abu Zer,
according to media reports. According to al-Jazeera, no investigation
or prosecution took place as a result of the incident.
Internet Freedom.--According to a report issued by the Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics in 2009, 32.3 percent of Palestinians had
access to the Internet. There were no PA restrictions on access to the
Internet or reports that the PA monitored e-mail or Internet chat
rooms. Individuals and groups could engage in the peaceful expression
of views via the Internet, including by e-mail.
On October 31, PA authorities arrested Walid Husayin, a 26-year-old
barber from Qalqilya, and charged him with insulting Islam after he
posted provocative comments about atheism on his blog and on social
media. At year's end he had not been granted a trial and remained in
prison.
Hamas did not restrict Internet access; however, based on anecdotal
reports from Palestinian civil society organizations and social media
practitioners, Hamas authorities monitored Internet activities and
postings of Gaza Strip residents. Individuals posting negative reports
or commentary about Hamas, its policies, or affiliated organizations
faced questioning and were at times required to remove or modify online
postings. No information was available regarding punishment for not
complying with such demands.
In June Hamas authorities arrested Sri Mohammed Qudwah, the editor
of the online al-Sabah newspaper, and confiscated his equipment,
according to Freedom House.
Israeli authorities did not restrict access to the Internet;
however, they monitored some Internet activity. In March 2009 the IDF
central military censor began to monitor blogs, and there was at least
one report that the IDF monitored Internet chat rooms during the year.
On March 20, the IDF reportedly arrested Moatasem Nazzal, a 16-
year-old from Qalandiya refugee camp, in his home and held him in
administrative detention, which was renewed twice. During interrogation
the IDF allegedly asked Nazzal about his Internet friendship with a
Gaza Strip resident, whom he met in an Internet chat room.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events.--In the West Bank, the PA did
not place restrictions on academic freedom or cultural events. During
the year Palestinian authorities did not interfere with education;
however, restrictions on movement adversely affected academic
institutions in the West Bank, and violence affected them in the Gaza
Strip (see section 2.b.).
In the Gaza Strip, Hamas and other groups sought to disrupt UN-run
academic programs that did not teach a strict interpretation of Islam.
Twenty-five masked men of unknown affiliation burned and vandalized a
UN summer camp on June 27; the perpetrators accused the UN of
corrupting Gazan youth with a summer program of human rights studies,
games, and sports.
Israeli authorities generally did not permit students from the Gaza
Strip to attend West Bank universities. On July 7, the Israeli High
Court rejected a petition submitted by the Israeli NGO Gisha and the
Palestinian NGO al-Mezan on behalf of Fatma Sharif, a human rights
lawyer in the Gaza Strip, who had been accepted into a master's degree
program in human rights and democracy studies at Bir Zeit University in
the West Bank, explaining that it would not intervene with the existing
policy.
However, in August the Israeli coordinator of government activities
in the occupied territories granted three Gazans short-term renewable
permits to pursue their undergraduate studies in the West Bank.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom of
Assembly.--Palestinian law permits public meetings, processions, and
assemblies within legal limits. It requires permits for rallies,
demonstrations, and large cultural events, and authorities rarely
denied them. However, there was at least one example of PA forces
disrupting a meeting during the year.
On August 25, according to several NGO and political activists, PA
security officials disrupted a meeting of political activists and
members of civil society organizations who were discussing Palestinian
negotiations with Israel. NGOs and press reports claimed that
plainclothes officers disrupted the event and initiated small
altercations with the activists. On August 30, PA Prime Minister Fayyad
issued a public apology for the disruption of the event; on September
1, the organizers of the original conference staged a public rally
without incident.
Following the 2007 Fatah-Hamas clashes in the Gaza Strip, Hamas
banned rallies and impeded freedom of assembly for Fatah members. In
2008 Hamas decreed that any public assembly or celebration in the Gaza
Strip required prior permission, in contradiction to the PA basic law.
From the beginning of the year, according to B'Tselem reports, the
IDF implemented for the first time since the Oslo peace process, a
military order that effectively prohibited Palestinian demonstrations
and limited freedom of speech in the West Bank. The regulations
stipulate that a gathering of 10 or more persons requires a permit from
the regional commander of military forces if the event relates to any
``political subject'' or might be construed as such. The penalty for a
breach of the order is 10 years' imprisonment or a heavy fine.
According to IDF statistics requested by B'Tselem, there was one
conviction during the year under the order.
Israeli security forces used force against Palestinians and others
involved in demonstrations in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, killing
two West Bank protesters and one antibarrier demonstrator during the
year. The IDF used force particularly against protests by the Popular
Resistance Committee against the construction of the separation
barrier.
On January 15, the Jerusalem District Police arrested 17
demonstrators during a nonviolent protest in Jerusalem, including Hagai
El-Ad, ACRI's executive director. The demonstrators claimed authorities
detained them for 36 hours, then released them without condition after
the Jerusalem Magistrate Court ruled that there was no legal cause for
their arrest. ACRI stated the arrests exemplified what it described as
a growing trend by the police to disperse demonstrators unlawfully and
conduct arbitrary arrests to intimidate demonstrators.
In February the IDF Central Command designated the areas adjacent
to the separation barrier in the villages of Bil'in and Ni'lin as
closed military areas every Friday during the hours in which
Palestinian, Israeli, and international activists regularly
demonstrated. There were frequent skirmishes between the antibarrier
protesters and IDF personnel. IDF and Israeli police personnel
stationed on the far side of the barrier during weekly protests in
Bil'in and Ni'lin, for instance, responded to rock throwing with tear
gas, stun grenades, sound bombs, and rubber-coated bullets. During the
year Israeli forces began using a specially treated water to disperse
the crowds; sprayed as a mist, it has an overwhelming odor of sewage
that lasts for days and can induce vomiting. B'Tselem reported that
Israeli forces also arrested many demonstration organizers, holding
some of them without charge for periods of up to three weeks, and
deported some foreign participants. The IDF continued to detain 80
residents of Bil'in since 2005.
In December 2009 Israeli authorities arrested Abdullah Abu Rahmah
of the Bil'in Popular Committee and charged him in a military court
with arms possession, stone throwing, incitement, and illegal assembly.
In August the court acquitted Abu Rahmah of the charges of arms
possession and stone throwing but convicted him on charges of
incitement (defined as ``the attempt, verbally or otherwise, to
influence public opinion in the area in a way that may disturb the
public peace or public order'') and illegal assembly. On October 11,
the court sentenced Abu Rahmah to one year in prison including time
served, setting a release date of November 18. The military prosecutor
appealed Abu Rahmah's sentence prior to his release date, asking that
his release be delayed ``to serve as a deterrent not only to [Abu
Rahmah] himself, but also to others who may follow in his footsteps.''
The court increased Abu Rahmah's sentence to 16 months. Several NGOs
estimated that the strict sentence was also an attempt by Israeli
authorities to intimidate Palestinian protesters.
During the year Israeli authorities also arrested demonstrators
protesting land ownership decisions, particularly in the East Jerusalem
neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah. On March 4, the Israeli High Court of
Justice ruled that police in Jerusalem had been overly restrictive in
barring protests near contested properties in the Sheikh Jarrah area;
the ruling temporarily prompted increased turnout at the weekly
protests.
Freedom of Association.--In the West Bank, the PA law allowed for
freedom of association, but it was sometimes limited in practice.
In the Gaza Strip, Hamas attempted to prevent various organizations
from operating. On October 12, security forces reportedly closed the
Gaza headquarters of the Palestinian Journalists Syndicate without
prior notification or explanation. In November Hamas blocked a
conciliatory International Federation of Journalists meeting that aimed
to connect West Bank and Gaza journalists.
In July 2009 Hamas closed at least 45 NGO offices. Most of the NGOs
were Fatah-affiliated, but a number were politically independent.
Israel maintained prohibitions on at least seven prominent East
Jerusalem-based Palestinian institutions--the Orient House, the de
facto PLO office in Jerusalem, the East Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce,
the Higher Arab Council for Tourism, the Palestine Research Center, the
Palestinian Prisoners Club, and the Social Research Office--claiming
that the groups violated the Oslo Accords by operating on behalf of the
PA in Jerusalem.
On January 11, IDF and Israeli immigration officials entered
Ramallah and arrested a Czech activist with the International
Solidarity Movement (ISM), later deporting her on the basis that she
lacked a valid Israeli visa. On February 7, according to local press
reports, Israeli officials detained two foreign ISM activists; both
were released on February 8 following their agreement not to reenter
the West Bank. The ISM's stated purpose is to strengthen Palestinian
popular resistance to the Israeli occupation through ``direct-action''
methods, such as demonstrations and protests.
c. Freedom of Religion.--For a complete description of religious
freedom, please see the 2010 International Religious Freedom Report at
www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/rpt.
d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of
Refugees, and Stateless Persons.--The Basic Law provides for freedom of
movement, and the PA generally did not restrict freedom of movement.
The Basic Law does not specify regulations regarding foreign travel,
emigration, or repatriation.
Hamas authorities in the Gaza Strip enforced movement restrictions
on Gazans attempting to exit to Israel via the Erez Crossing and
maintained more relaxed restrictions on transfer to Egypt via the Rafah
Crossing; Hamas authorities did not appear to enforce routine
restrictions on internal movement within the Gaza Strip, although there
were some ``no go'' areas to which Hamas prohibited access.
The PA, Hamas, and Israel governments generally cooperated with the
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian
organizations in providing protection and assistance to internally
displaced persons and refugees, although the ability of the UN Relief
and Works Agency (UNRWA) to operate freely in Gaza was constrained by
both Hamas and Israeli officials.
The IDF restricted Palestinians' movement within the occupied
territories and for foreign travel, and it heightened these
restrictions at times, citing military necessity. Barriers to movement
included checkpoints, a separation barrier between the West Bank and
Israel, internal road closures, and a blockade on the Gaza Strip.
Restrictions on movement affected virtually all aspects of life,
including access to places of worship, employment, agricultural lands,
schools, hospitals, and the conduct of journalism, humanitarian, and
NGO activities. During the year the IDF relaxed restrictions at several
checkpoints and roads that previously posed significant barriers to
movement by Palestinian populations between the West Bank and urban
centers. Nevertheless, according to UNOCHA, as of June there were 505
obstacles to movement inside the West Bank, identified as follows: 66
fully manned checkpoints, 20 occasionally manned checkpoints, 106 road
gates, 167 earth mounds, 46 road barriers, 70 roadblocks, 20 earth
walls, and 10 trenches.
According to UNOCHA, the Israeli government largely halted the
remaining planned construction of a separation barrier along parts of
the Green Line (the 1949 Armistice line) and in the West Bank, mostly
due to a lack of political will and an overall increase in security. If
completed, the barrier would separate approximately 9.5 percent of the
West Bank (135,000 acres inhabited by up to 50,000 Palestinians),
including parts of Jerusalem, from the rest of the West Bank territory
in a ``seam zone.'' Israel continued to restrict movement and
development within this area, including access by some international
organizations. During the year approximately 34 of the checkpoints
along the separation barrier were restricted to Israelis and
Palestinians with permits. Palestinians with worker permits were
required to pass through one of 11 pedestrian crossings. Palestinians
with permits, those working in international organizations, and
biometric card holders and their immediate families were able to pass
in vehicles through any of the crossings. A 2003 petition by the NGO
HaMoked against the legality of the permit system had not been ruled on
by year's end, although a 2004 International Criminal Court advisory
body deemed the barrier contrary to international law.
Private security companies employed by the Israeli government
controlled points of access through the barrier, and international
organizations and local human rights groups claimed these companies did
not respond to requests to move goods and officials through the
barrier. The barrier affected the commutes of school children living on
its eastern side and attending school in Jerusalem. For example,
students from Bir Nabala, which is surrounded by the barrier, took
detours of seven to 10 miles to pass through checkpoints to reach
school. The barrier and the permit system also affected some farmers
who were separated from land and water resources, which curtailed
agricultural practice and resulted in deterioration of the harvest
quality and quantity.
Operating hours of the accessible gates were limited and erratic,
although usually announced. Crossing procedures were relaxed at some
checkpoints to the east of the separation barrier; Israeli authorities
lifted permit requirements, extended operating hours, and performed
fewer searches and random documentation checks in comparison with
previous years, especially during holidays.
Israeli authorities frequently prohibited travel between some or
all West Bank towns. Palestinians who lived in affected villages stated
that such ``internal closures,'' which could last years, had negative
economic effects. During periods of potential unrest and during major
Israeli, Jewish, and Muslim holidays, Israeli authorities enacted
``comprehensive external closures,'' which precluded Palestinians from
leaving the West Bank. The IDF also imposed temporary curfews confining
Palestinians to their homes during arrest operations.
Although Israeli authorities reopened Route 354 and Route 443, with
some restrictions to Palestinian traffic, three other roadblocks on
Route 60 impeded movement for tens of thousands of residents of
Palestinian villages south of Hebron, cutting direct access for
businesses to the city's commercial center. Palestinians not resident
in the Jordan Valley generally were unable to drive on the main north-
south route, Highway 90.
The blockade on the Gaza Strip imposed by Israel since 2007
continued its significant effect on the population in the Gaza Strip,
according to the UNRWA and other humanitarian and human rights groups.
The UN estimated that 80 percent of the population of the Gaza Strip
relied on international food aid during the year. International and
Israeli human rights organizations described the blockade as
``collective punishment'' of the residents of the Gaza Strip, as it
restricted access to basic goods and prevented civilians from temporary
travel abroad or changing their place of residence permanently. During
the year Israel eased the blockade, but with only one open commercial
crossing, the number of truckloads entering the Gaza Strip each week
was less than 40 percent of that before the blockade began.
Israel's strict closure on the Gaza Strip also resulted in the
cessation of postal services. Humanitarian organizations reported that
the closure significantly hindered their ability to operate and limited
opportunities for Gazans to communicate with family and friends outside
the Gaza Strip.
The UNRWA operated 228 schools with more than 206,000 students in
the Gaza Strip, but the agency claimed its capacity was severely
overstretched by the Israeli blockade and that restrictions on movement
and access undermined its ability to provide education. UNRWA schools
in the Gaza Strip ran on a double-shift in ``compressed learning
periods'' and were severely overcrowded with as many as 50 students per
classroom. Thousands of students were schooled in makeshift classrooms,
including one school serving 865 students built entirely from shipping
containers.
Essential infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, including water and
sanitation services, was in a state of severe disrepair due in part to
an inability to bring in spare parts and components under the blockade.
The sewage and water systems were frequently inoperable, and as a
result approximately 21 million gallons of raw or partially treated
sewage was pumped into the ocean each day, according to the UNRWA.
Israel prohibited private sector companies from importing cement and
gravel; entry of these goods was permitted only for specific UN or
other internationally coordinated projects. As a result Gaza Strip
residents lacked the necessary supplies to rebuild homes destroyed
during Operation Cast Lead.
Personal travel in and out of the Gaza Strip was limited to one
crossing point and was restricted to humanitarian cases only; however,
Israeli authorities denied many Gazans access to Israel and Egypt for
medical treatment and detained some during the year. PHR-Israel claimed
that, based on security considerations, Israeli authorities did not
issue medical or humanitarian exit permits to Palestinians in the Gaza
Strip regardless of professional medical opinions. Israeli authorities
also rejected requests for Palestinians to exit the Gaza Strip for
medical treatment due to fears that the patients might emigrate and
unite with family in the West Bank. On January 11, various NGOs,
including al-Mezan Center for Human Rights, Adalah Legal Center, and
PHR-Israel, petitioned the attorney general against the practice of
detaining patients at the border, but on March 2, the General Security
Service stated that Israel may legally arrest persons at the border
seeking medical treatment.
In March 2009 the Israeli Ministry of Defense released a detailed
rubric for determining whether a resident of the Gaza Strip may be
permitted exit and entry under exceptional humanitarian cases. Between
January and June, Israel refused exit to all of the 1,095 orthopedic
and neurology patients in need of medical treatment; in June Israeli
authorities told PHR-Israel that hip and knee replacements did ``not
meet the criteria `` for issuing exit permits. In January Israel
prevented 17 patients from going to Ramallah for cornea transplants,
resulting in the disposal of the donated organs.
Movement to the West Bank from Gaza was severely restricted to a
limited number of Palestinians holding Israeli-issued permits. In one
case, Israeli authorities refused to allow Issam Hamdan, a 40-year-old
man suffering severe back pain, to enter Israel to receive specialized
medical care in Jerusalem because Israeli authorities suspected he
might reunite with his wife and four children in the West Bank. On
February 9, the NGOs PHR-Israel and Gisha filed a petition before the
Supreme Court on behalf of Hamdan, prompting Israeli authorities to
withdraw objection and allow him to seek treatment in Jerusalem.
On October 16, two-year-old Gazan Nasma Abu Lashee died of
treatable leukemia while waiting for permission from Israeli
authorities to receive treatment in Israel.
Israel continued to enforce restrictions on access to farmland in
the Gaza Strip near the border with Israel and to fishing areas along
the coast, with the stated intention of preventing attacks by
Palestinian armed factions. Israel on average enforced an approximately
1,000 yard-wide ``buffer zone'' and at times fired warning shots as far
away as 1,640 yards from the border, according to UNOCHA (see also
section 1.a.). The ``buffer zone'' encompassed approximately 24 square
miles, representing 17 percent of the Gaza Strip's total land mass.
UNOCHA estimated that nearly 35 percent of the Gaza Strip's cultivable
land was located within the restricted area.
Eighty percent of the maritime area designated accessible to Gazans
under the Oslo Accords remained off-limits; the IDF implemented a
three-nautical-mile-wide limit that was strictly enforced by Israeli
naval patrol boats. In the northern Gaza Strip, Israel prevented
Palestinians from accessing a 1.5-nautical-mile-wide strip along the
maritime boundary with Israel and a one-nautical-mile-wide strip in the
south, along the maritime boundary with Egypt, as established in the
1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement. Israeli naval forces regularly fired
warning shots at Palestinian fishermen entering the restricted sea
areas, in some cases directly targeting the fishermen, according to
UNOCHA. The Israeli military often confiscated fishing boats
intercepted in these areas and detained the fishermen.
IDF soldiers at checkpoints sometimes subjected Palestine Red
Crescent Society (PRCS) ambulances from the West Bank to delays or
refused entry to Jerusalem, for security reasons. Patients were moved
across checkpoints from one ambulance to another. The PRCS reported
violations against its teams and humanitarian services during the year.
Most incidents (159) included blocking access to those in need,
preventing their transport to specialized medical centers, or
maintaining delays on checkpoints for periods ranging from 30 minutes
to two hours. Most incidents (142) took place on checkpoints leading to
Jerusalem, while the remainder took place on other checkpoints circling
the West Bank.
On April 13, Israeli Military Order 1650 went into effect,
broadening the definition of ``infiltrator'' in the Prevention of
Infiltration Law to include anyone who enters the West Bank unlawfully
or any persons in the West Bank without permits, making them subject to
criminal charges and potential deportation to the Gaza Strip.
Palestinians and human rights NGOs expressed concern about whether the
order legalized the deportation of up to 35,000 Palestinians living in
the West Bank with registered Gaza Strip addresses. In 2000 Israel
stopped updating changes in address for Palestinians who moved from the
Gaza Strip to the West Bank. As a result thousands of Palestinians,
originally from the Gaza Strip but living in the West Bank for many
years, continued to hold identity cards with home addresses in the Gaza
Strip. There were reports that Palestinians were deported to the Gaza
Strip border on these grounds during the year.
On April 21, Israeli authorities transferred West Bank resident
Ahmad Sabbah Said to the Gaza Strip following his release from an
Israeli prison, where he had served a nine-year sentence on charges for
offenses committed during the Second Intifada. Several NGOs claimed he
was transferred immediately, without a judicial review. Authorities
justified the deportation by his possession of an identity card issued
in the Gaza Strip, where he lived for one year in the 1990s. Sabbah's
wife and children remained in the West Bank city of Tulkarem.
On April 27, the Israeli government expelled 19-year-old Hebron
resident Fadi Aiada al-Azazma to the Gaza Strip. According to HaMoked,
al-Azazma was taken into custody from his workplace and transferred to
the Gaza Strip hours later, without a judicial review. Al-Azazma was
born in the Gaza Strip but moved to the West Bank with his family when
he was seven years old.
Israeli authorities delivered both deportees to the Erez crossing
point at the northern end of the Gaza Strip. According to press
reports, Hamas refused to allow either Sabbah or al-Azazma to pass
through a checkpoint inside the border so as not to ``legitimize''
Israel's removal of Gazan identity card holders from the West Bank.
Both remained in a tent for more than one month in the area between the
Israeli and Hamas positions; however, both were living in the Gaza
Strip at year's end, according to reports.
The IDF since 2000 restricted Gazan students from studying in the
West Bank or Israel and limited West Bank Palestinians from university
study in East Jerusalem and Israel (see section 2.a.). During the year
students were allowed to leave the Gaza Strip only when escorted by
foreign diplomats or contractors of the country accepting them for
study. Some students from the Gaza Strip accepted for university study
abroad were unable to apply for visas in Jerusalem and were therefore
prevented from leaving for further education abroad.
The PA issued passports for Palestinians in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. Because there were no commercial flights from the occupied
territories, and permits to use Ben Gurion airport were not available,
travelers departed by land to Jordan or Egypt. Foreign citizens of
Palestinian ethnicity had difficulty obtaining or renewing visas
permitting them to enter Israel from either Ben Gurion airport or land
entry points.
Palestinians possessing Jerusalem identity cards issued by the
Israeli government needed special documents to travel abroad. Upon the
individual request of Palestinians, the Jordanian government issued
them passports.
Residency restrictions affected family reunification, as it did not
qualify as a reason to enter the West Bank. For any child, access to a
parent in the West Bank was permitted only if no other relative was
resident in the Gaza Strip. Israeli authorities did not permit
Palestinians who were abroad during the 1967 War, or whose residence
permits the Government subsequently withdrew, to reside permanently in
the occupied territories. It was difficult for foreign-born spouses and
children of Palestinians to obtain residency. Palestinian spouses of
Jerusalem residents were required to obtain a residency permit and
reported delays of several years in obtaining them. Palestinians in
Jerusalem also reported delays in registering newborn children.
The PA basic law prohibits forced exile, and the PA did not use
forced exile.
In practice Israeli revocations of Jerusalem identity cards
amounted to forced exile to the occupied territories or abroad and have
continued in recent years. There were no statistics on residency
revocations available at year's end. According to HaMoked, the Ministry
of Interior revoked the Jerusalem residency of more than 700
Palestinians in 2009. In 2008 the Ministry of Interior revoked the
residency of 4,577 Palestinians in East Jerusalem, including 99 minors.
The number of cases of residency revocation in 2008 alone was equal to
approximately one-half the total number of cases of residency
revocation between 1967 and 2007. Reasons for revocation include having
acquired residency or citizenship in a third country, living abroad for
more than seven years, or, most commonly, being unable to prove a
``center of life'' in Jerusalem. Some Palestinians born in Jerusalem
but who studied abroad reported losing their Jerusalem residency
status.
On June 3, the Israeli National Police notified four Hamas-
affiliated PLC members of the revocation of their Jerusalem residency
status, according to the Civic Coalition for Defending Palestinian
Rights and press reports. The decision to revoke their Jerusalem
residency permits came from the Israeli Ministry of Interior shortly
after their election to the PLC in 2006. Israeli authorities arrested
and detained the four individuals for three years; three were released
during the year and continued to reside in Jerusalem under the
administration of the ICRC, and the fourth remained in detention at
year's end awaiting trial on illegal presence charges.
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).--There were approximately
20,500 IDPs in the occupied territories, nearly all of whom remained
displaced as a result of Operation Cast Lead. Although they have no
specific legislation to protect IDPs along UN principles and
guidelines, West Bank and Gaza Strip authorities are bound by
international human rights laws underlying these obligations on
displacement. The PA provided some assistance to those displaced
through rental subsidies and financial assistance to reconstruct
demolished houses. The UNRWA and humanitarian organizations provided
services to aid IDPs in the Gaza Strip.
During the year the UNRWA provided rental assistance to
approximately 2,000 families whose shelters were destroyed during
hostilities, assisted with the living expenses of 3,810 families whose
shelters were destroyed or severely damaged during hostilities, and
identified 10,283 families whose shelters needed to be fully rebuilt.
In March the UNRWA received approval to import construction materials
to complete the construction of 151 shelters in Khan Younis, which had
been stalled since Israel imposed the Gaza Strip blockade in 2007.
However, due to the requirement that UN projects be approved on a case-
by-case basis and the general ban on the importation of cement and
gravel, the UNRWA was unable to begin construction on any additional
shelters. The UNRWA continued to provide psychological support and
counseling, including for children traumatized by hostilities with
Israel, through its community mental health program.
During the year according to the UNRWA, the Israeli government
obstructed IDP access to UNRWA-provided humanitarian assistance in
refugee communities in at least 339 incidents in parts of the West
Bank, causing lengthy detours.
The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center reported that Israeli
demolition of Palestinian property in East Jerusalem added to the
threat of displacement for Palestinians (see section 1.f.).
Protection of Refugees.--There were no reports of persons seeking
asylum or residence in the occupied territories.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Elections and Political Participation.--In 2006 the 132-member PLC
was elected in a process under the Basic Law that international
observers concluded generally met democratic standards in providing
citizens the right to change their government peacefully. Hamas-backed
candidates participated in the 2006 PLC elections under the name
``Reform and Change Movement,'' rather than ``Hamas,'' and won 74 of
132 seats. Fatah won 45 seats; independents and candidates from third
parties won the remaining seats. The PLC lacked a quorum and did not
meet during the year. Although the Israeli government and the PA
followed mutually agreed guidelines for Palestinians residing in
Jerusalem to vote in 2005 and 2006, not all Palestinians were allowed
to vote in East Jerusalem, and those who could vote were required to do
so via post offices (of which there were few), thereby complicating
their efforts to vote.
On June 10, immediately before candidate registration ended, the PA
canceled municipal elections scheduled for July. The Hamas and Islamic
Jihad parties had pledged to boycott the elections, and various Fatah
members claimed plans to run as independents. The Ministry of Local
Government stated that the decision to postpone came in response to the
demands of some Arab nations and a number of ``friends in the world.''
The calls from abroad reportedly advised the PA to postpone the
elections ``to pave the way for a successful end to the siege on the
Gaza Strip and for continued efforts at unity,'' the statement
explained.
There were 17 women in the 132-member PLC (which was not called
into session) and three women in the 16-member cabinet. There were
seven Christians in the PLC and two in the cabinet.
Civil society organizations in the Gaza Strip claimed Hamas
authorities and other conservative Islamist groups did not tolerate
public dissent, opponents, or the promotion of values that ran contrary
to their political and religious ideology.
Section 4. Official Corruption and Government Transparency
Palestinian law provides criminal penalties for official
corruption. The PA operated a functioning anticorruption commission,
special prosecutors, and an anticorruption court consisting of a panel
of three judges. PA ministers were subject to financial disclosure
laws. The PA attorney general had official responsibility for combating
government corruption. Nevertheless, there were allegations of corrupt
practices among Fatah officials, particularly in the theft of public
funds and international assistance money. Supervisors dismissed
anticorruption unit head Fahmi Shabaneh in 2009 after he uncovered a
sex scandal relating to one of President Abbas' aides.
In the Gaza Strip, local observers and NGOs alleged instances of
Hamas complicity in corrupt practices, including involvement by the
Hamas Executive Force, but access to information and reporting were
severely inhibited.
PA law requires official PA institutions to ``facilitate''
acquisition of requested documents or information by any Palestinian,
but it does not require agencies to provide such information. Reasons
for denial generally referred to privacy rights and security necessity.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Palestinian human rights groups and several international
organizations generally operated without PA restriction, and officials
cooperated with their efforts to monitor the PA's human rights
practices.
PA officials generally cooperated with and permitted visits by UN
representatives or other organizations, such as the ICRC. Several PA
security agencies, including the General Intelligence Service and the
Civil Police, appointed official liaisons with human rights groups.
The quasi-governmental ICHR continued serving as the PA's ombudsman
and human rights commission. The ICHR issued monthly and annual reports
on human rights violations within Palestinian-controlled areas; the
ICHR also issued formal recommendations to the PA.
In the Gaza Strip, Hamas authorities pressed international and
local aid organizations providing emergency assistance to coordinate
relief efforts with the Hamas-controlled ``Ministry of Social
Affairs.'' Several Gaza-based NGOs reported that Hamas prevented aid
groups from distributing assistance after they refused to comply with
Hamas regulations. Gaza-based NGOs reported that Hamas representatives
appeared at their offices to assure compliance and summoned NGO
representatives to police stations for questioning. On May 24, Hamas
authorities prevented the ICHR from holding a press conference to
release its annual human rights report.
Israeli, Palestinian, and international NGOs monitored the Israeli
government's practices in the occupied territories and published their
findings, although restrictions on freedom of movement in the West
Bank, fighting, and access restrictions in the Gaza Strip made it
difficult to carry out their work. The Israeli government permitted
some human rights groups to publish and hold press conferences; it
provided the ICRC with access to most detainees.
On January 31, several NGOs including B'Tselem, Gisha, Yesh Din,
and PHR-Israel, submitted a complaint to Israel's president and prime
minister regarding the Government's obstruction of their work in the
occupied territories. They claimed that Shin Bet had summoned
demonstrators and human rights activists for investigation and, in some
cases, warned activists that they must refrain from political activity.
The NGOs claimed that Israeli military authorities placed severe
restrictions on organizations working in the occupied territories to
provide medical care, accompany residents to their agricultural work
and children to school, and help residents file complaints of violence
by Israeli security forces or settlers.
Also in January the Association of International Development
Agencies (AIDA), an umbrella organization for NGOs operating in the
occupied territories, reported that Israel ceased issuing the
appropriate type of work visa to foreign nationals working for most
international NGOs operating in the occupied territories. The
Government instead issued most of these employees tourist visas, which
do not permit employment, and some visas permitted only a single entry.
AIDA claimed the new visa policy would impinge upon the international
NGO community's ability to recruit international staff and operate in
Jerusalem, where many NGOs keep offices. The decision does not apply to
the 12 organizations, including the ICRC, that were active in the West
Bank prior to 1967.
International NGOs reported continued difficulty accessing ``seam
zone'' communities in the northwestern West Bank, particularly Barta'a
al-Sharqiya in the Jenin Governorate, due to excessive demands for
searches of personnel, including UN employees, based on their
nationality.
Israeli authorities throughout the year prevented PHR-Israel's
medical delegations from entering the Gaza Strip to provide treatment
and medical counseling, perform surgery, train Palestinian medical
staff, distribute medication, and refer patients for follow-up
treatment in Israeli hospitals. Israeli authorities also rejected two
requests by a medical delegation from the Musallam Center in Ramallah
to enter the Gaza Strip to perform eye surgery and cornea transplants,
according to PHR-Israel.
UN organizations and international NGOs criticized the Israeli
government in regard to the May 31 flotilla incident, exclusion of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip from the application of the UN Convention on
the Rights of the Child, and the protection of human rights during the
2008-09 Operation Cast Lead incursion into the Gaza Strip (see Israel,
section 5).
Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses
Women.--Rape is illegal under PA law, but the legal definition does
not address spousal rape. Punishment for rape is five to 15 years in
prison.
PA law does not explicitly prohibit domestic violence, but assault
and battery are crimes. A woman must provide two eyewitnesses (who are
not relatives) to initiate divorce on the grounds of spousal abuse.
According to HRW few domestic violence cases have been successfully
prosecuted in recent years. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau
of Statistics, violence against wives, especially psychological
violence, was common in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Specifically,
a 2009 survey by the Palestinian Women's Information and Media Center
found that 52 percent of Gazan women faced regular physical violence
and 14 percent were subjected to sexual violence. Thirty-seven percent
of women in the Gaza Strip cited domestic violence as the primary
safety problem facing women and girls in their communities, according
to a 2009 survey conducted by the UN Gender Task Force. The results
reported increases in domestic violence against women among households
displaced by conflict. Displaced women were more likely than other
women to say they feel unsafe using a bathing or latrine facility, and
they also cited a greater lack of reliable sanitary materials.
During the year the UNRWA initiated a referral mechanism for
refugee women who are victims of violence in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. In some cases women approached village or religious leaders for
assistance. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed
Forces (DCAF) conducted a study of women's issues in the occupied
territories in 2009, reporting that many women and girls were reluctant
to resort to women's organizations, human rights organizations, or
security and justice providers, such as the police and courts, because
of the strong social stigma attached to reporting abuses. Many women
and girls stated they believed the legal system discriminated against
women.
Sexual harassment was a highly sensitive issue in the occupied
territories, particularly abuses committed by family members. The DCAF
reported that Palestinian women and girls claimed public harassment was
commonplace; reports of verbal harassment, unwanted flirting, and
inappropriate touching were frequent, causing anxiety and apprehension
in some young women and girls. The DCAF and other NGOs reported that
for some women, cultural taboos and fear of scandal compelled them to
remain silent. Some young women claimed that they were held responsible
for ``provoking'' men's harassing behavior.
The ICHR reported no ``honor'' killings in the Palestinian
territories during the year. According to NGO reports, the Jordanian
penal code, as applied in the West Bank by the PA, reduces the penalty
for honor-based killings.
Couples and individuals in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and East
Jerusalem had access to contraception. Information regarding family
planning was lacking, although the UNRWA held workshops for Palestinian
men, underscoring their role in family planning. High workload, poor
compensation, and resource shortages continued to affect skilled
attendance during labor and postpartum care, much of which was provided
by midwives. There was no reliable data on figures of maternal
mortality in the occupied territories. While governmental authorities
and community and international NGOs operated HIV/AIDS education,
prevention, and screening programs, limited information was available
about the equality of services provided for women.
A Palestinian Ministry of Women's Affairs existed to promote
women's rights. The law provides for equality of the sexes, but
personal status law and traditional practices discriminate against
women. For Muslims in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, personal status
law is derived from Sharia (Islamic law), which includes inheritance
and marriage laws. Women can inherit, but not as much as men. Men may
take more than one wife, although they rarely did in urban areas (the
practice was more common in small villages). Women may add conditions
to marriage contracts to protect their interests in divorce and child
custody but rarely did so. Muslim women were generally discouraged from
including divorce arrangements in a marriage contract as a result of
societal pressure.
Hamas maintained control of the Gaza Strip and enforced a
conservative interpretation of Islam on the Gaza Strip's Muslim
populations, which particularly discriminated against women.
Authorities prohibited any public mixing of the sexes. Plainclothes
officers routinely stopped, separated, and questioned couples to
determine if they were married; premarital sex is a crime punishable by
imprisonment. Hamas's ``morality police'' also punished women for
riding motorcycles and dressing ``inappropriately.'' Hamas operated a
women's prison to hold women convicted of ``ethical crimes'' such as
``illegitimate pregnancy.'' On July 18, Hamas authorities banned women
from smoking the traditional water pipe in public cafes on the grounds
that it was inappropriate. According to media reports, plainclothes
security officers enforced the decree, and several cafe owners were
questioned or temporarily detained for nonenforcement. Although
enforcement of ``ethical crimes'' was in some cases inconsistent,
according to press reports, it continued to increase.
Across the occupied territories, cultural restrictions associated
with marriage occasionally prevented women from completing mandatory
schooling or attending college. Families often disowned Muslim and
Christian women who married outside their faith. Local officials
sometimes advised such women to leave their communities to prevent
harassment.
Palestinian labor law states that work is the right of every
capable citizen; however, it regulates the work of women, preventing
them from taking employment in dangerous occupations. According to the
UN Development Program's 2005 Arab Human Development Report,
Palestinian women experienced a significant employment gap in
comparison with their male counterparts, with women consisting of
approximately 15 percent of the labor force. Women endured prejudice
and, in some cases, repressive conditions at work. Additionally some
employers reportedly provided preferential treatment to their male
counterparts. According to Freedom House, women earned 65 percent of
men's wages in the West Bank and 77 percent in the Gaza Strip.
The Palestinian Journalists Syndicate, a membership-based union
representing the majority of Palestinian journalists based in East
Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, did not allow female
journalists' membership. There were specific reports that female
journalists in the Gaza Strip faced hurdles in pursuing employment. The
UN Development Fund for Women reported that gender-specific stereotypes
restricted female journalists in their content coverage, limiting them
to issues such as beauty, fashion, women, and children.
Female education rates were high, particularly in the West Bank,
and women's attendance at universities exceeded men's, but female
university students reported discrimination by university
administrators, professors, and their male peers, according to the
DCAF. According to press and NGO reports, in some instances girls not
wearing conservative attire in Hamas-run schools were sent home by
teachers, although enforcement was not systematic.
Children.--Israel registers the births of Palestinians in
Jerusalem. The PA registers Palestinians born in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, and Israel requires that the PA transmit this information
to the Israeli Civil Administration. As the PA does not constitute a
state, the PA does not determine ``citizenship'' alone. Children of
Palestinian parents can receive a Palestinian identity card (issued by
the Israeli Civil Administration) if they are born in the occupied
territories to a father who holds a Palestinian identity card. The PA
Ministry of the Interior and the Israeli Civil Administration both play
a role in determining a person's eligibility.
Education in PA-controlled areas is compulsory from age six through
the ninth grade. Education is available to all Palestinians without
cost through high school.
In the Gaza Strip, primary education was not universal. The UNRWA
and Hamas provided educational instruction.
In Israeli-administered East Jerusalem, Palestinian children did
not have access to the same educational resources as Israeli children
(see section 6, Minorities).
Child abuse was reportedly a widespread problem. The Basic Law
prohibits violence against children; however, PA authorities rarely
punished perpetrators of familial violence. A 2009 study by the UN
Gender Task Force found that in the southern Gaza Strip, survey
participants reported a high level of perceived domestic violence
against children.
Israeli security forces also participated in violence against
children in custody or during arrest (see section 1.c.), according to
NGO and UN reports. The IDF fired at minors working inside or near the
Gaza Strip buffer zone; DCI-Palestine documented 23 cases between March
and December of children shot while collecting building material and
scrap metal, and in one case grazing goats, near the border fence with
Israel. DCI-Palestine reported that most children were shot in the leg
without intent to kill. The IDF fired on children as far as 875 yards
from the border fence.
There were reports of female genital mutilation performed on girls
during the year, although the scope of the practice was unknown.
The PA considers statutory rape a felony, based on the Jordanian
penal code of 1960, which also outlaws all forms of pornography. The
minimum age for consensual sex is 18. Palestinian judges reportedly
issued harsher sentences to persons involved in pornography including
images of children. Punishment for rape of a victim under the age of 15
includes a minimum sentence of seven years.
Anti-Semitism.--In both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank,
Palestinian media published and broadcast material that included both
anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic content, which sometimes amounted to
incitement. Rhetoric by several Palestinian groups included expressions
of anti-Semitism, as did sermons by some Muslim religious leaders. Some
Palestinian religious leaders rejected the right of Israel to exist.
Hamas's al-Aqsa television station carried shows for preschoolers
extolling hatred of Jews and suicide bombings.
Palestinian media not under the control of the PA, particularly
those controlled by Hamas, continued to use inflammatory anti-Semitic
language. Unofficial Palestinian television broadcast content that
sometimes praised holy war to expel the Jewish presence in the region.
Some children's programs shown on Hamas television legitimized the
killing of Israelis and Jews via terrorist attacks.
Persons With Disabilities.--The Basic Law states that all
Palestinians are equal. There is no reference to discrimination or
disability. Access to public facilities was not mandated.
Palestinians with disabilities continued to receive poor quality
services and care. The PA depended on UN agencies and NGOs to care for
persons with physical disabilities and offered substandard care for
persons with mental disabilities.
Familial and societal discrimination against persons with
disabilities existed. Press reports indicated that some parents in the
West Bank performed hysterectomies on mentally ill girls to prevent
them from becoming pregnant; most of these parents stated they intended
to protect their daughters from rape.
There were reports that Israeli authorities placed detainees deemed
mentally ill or a threat to themselves or others in isolation without
full medical evaluation. According to PHR-Israel, isolation of
prisoners with mental disabilities was common. In March PHR-Israel and
Addameer petitioned the Israeli High Court of Justice to amend article
36 of the National Security Orders, which they claimed allows for
indefinite detention of a Palestinian accused of a felony if the
detainee is deemed unfit for punishment on mental health grounds. The
NGOs filed the petition after PHR-Israel received a case in which
Israel Prison Service authorities held an unnamed Palestinian found
unfit for punishment for weeks in a prison psychiatric ward, although
doctors determined it was not medically necessary.
In another case PHR-Israel petitioned for the release of Ibrahim
Abu Mustafa from isolation. Abu Mustafa had been detained in isolation
since 2004 on the grounds that he posed a hazard to his surroundings
due to his mental health condition. On August 25, the state notified
Abu Mustafa that he would be released from isolation; however, at
year's end his release was not confirmed.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Palestinians faced violence and
discrimination in the occupied territories (see also sections 1.c. and
1.f.). Access to social and commercial services, including housing,
employment, education, and health care, in settlement areas in the West
Bank was available only to Israelis. Israeli officials discriminated
against Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem regarding access to
employment and legal housing by denying Palestinians access to
registration paperwork. In both the West Bank and Jerusalem, Israeli
authorities placed often insurmountable hurdles on Palestinian
applicants for construction permits, including the requirement that
they document land ownership in the absence of a uniform post-1967 land
registration process, high application fees, and requirements that new
housing be connected to often-unavailable municipal works. According to
B'Tselem, since 2000 Israel has curtailed the Palestinian population
registry, denying paperwork to Palestinians and effectively declaring
Palestinians illegal residents. Some Palestinians defined as illegal
residents faced harassment, arrest, or deportation to the Gaza Strip.
Israeli settler radio stations broadcasting from the West Bank
depicted Arabs as subhuman and called for expulsion of Palestinians
from the West Bank.
The Municipality of Ma'ale Adumim in the West Bank continued
applying a 1965 Jordanian labor law to Palestinian employees that
denied them some social benefits enshrined in Israeli labor law, such
as rehabilitation pay, pensions, travel expenses, and education
funding.
Israel's system of water distribution in the West Bank
discriminated against Palestinian populations and failed to provide
Palestinian residents with a sufficient, regular, and safe water
supply, according to ACRI. Israel controlled 85 percent of the water
supply in the West Bank and allocated on average 16 gallons of water
per person per day to Palestinians and 63 gallons per person per day to
Israeli settlers. According to the World Health Organization, 26
gallons per person per day is the minimum daily amount required to
maintain basic hygiene standards and food security.
In the West Bank, some NGOs reported an increase in settler
expropriation of natural water springs located on privately owned
Palestinian land. Yesh Din documented settler expropriation of 26
springs and their conversion into recreational ``nature parks.''
Palestinian residents reported that water supplies were intermittent,
and settlers and their security guards denied Palestinians, including
shepherd and farmers, access to the springs. PA officials in July
stated that Israeli authorities closed five Palestinian wells in the
Tubas Governorate, while the Israeli national water company, Mekorot,
drilled 17 new wells in the governorate. Mekorot reduced the water
ration for one Tubas Governorate village, Bardala, from 315 cubic yards
per hour to 120 on average; 30 percent of Bardala residents received no
water on some days.
There were reports that Israeli authorities attempted to reduce the
Palestinian population and limit their movement in areas under Israeli
control. Military authorities severely restricted Palestinian vehicular
and foot traffic in the commercial center of Hebron, citing a need to
protect several hundred Israeli settler residents. Palestinians were
prohibited from driving on most roads in downtown Hebron and from
walking on Shuhada Street and other roads in the Old City; however,
Israeli settlers were permitted free access on these roads. The
prohibition, which began in 2000, has resulted in the closure of 1,829
business and 1,014 Palestinian housing units, according to B'Tselem;
the IDF closed most shops on the street and sealed entrances to
Palestinian houses. Four Palestinian families who maintained residence
on the street had access during the year.
Jerusalem municipal and Israeli national policies aimed to decrease
the number of Palestinian residents and increase Israeli claim to East
Jerusalem. The Israeli government and Jerusalem Municipality used a
combination of zoning restrictions on building by Palestinians,
confiscation of Palestinian lands, and demolition of Palestinian homes
to ``contain'' non-Israeli neighborhoods, while simultaneously
permitting construction of new housing for Israeli residents in
predominantly Palestinian East Jerusalem. The Jerusalem Municipality
maintained its longstanding policy of city planning along
ethnoreligious demographic lines across the city in an effort to keep
the Jewish population at 70 percent.
The Israeli NGOs Bimkom and Ir Amim claimed that Palestinians in
East Jerusalem were unable to purchase property or build on land owned
by the Israeli Land Authority. Land owned or populated by Arabs
(including Palestinians and Israeli Arabs) was generally zoned for low
residential growth. Approximately 30 percent of East Jerusalem was
designated for Israeli residents; Arabs were able in some cases to rent
Israeli-owned property but were generally unable to purchase property
in an Israeli neighborhood due to citizenship or military duty
requirements that Arabs were unable to meet. Israeli NGOs claimed that
of all land designated for housing in West Jerusalem and in the Israeli
neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, at least 79 percent was unavailable
for Arab construction.
The Jerusalem Municipality and Jewish organizations in Jerusalem
made efforts to increase Israeli property ownership or underscore
Jewish history in areas occupied by Arabs or Muslim institutions. The
Jerusalem Municipality advocated increased Jewish influence and
property ownership in East Jerusalem's Kidron Valley, or ``Holy
Basin.'' On June 21, the Jerusalem Municipal Planning Council voted to
demolish at least 22 Arab-owned properties in the al-Bustan
neighborhood to make way for a Jewish-themed historical park. Israeli
NGOs claimed that this project, the evictions in Sheikh Jarrah, and
other projects effectively encircled Jerusalem's Old City and Haram al-
Sharif/Temple Mount with Israeli-owned properties, severing Palestinian
societal connections to the area.
Although Israeli law entitles Arab residents of East Jerusalem to
full and equal services provided by the municipality and other Israeli
authorities, in practice the Jerusalem Municipality failed to provide
sufficient social services, infrastructure, emergency planning, and
postal service for Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. ACRI reported
in October that only 10.3 percent of the Arab population received
social services. Approximately 160,000 Arab residents of East Jerusalem
had no suitable or legal connection to the municipal water network.
Trash collection was insufficient in most Arab neighborhoods of East
Jerusalem and nonexistent in others.
Disparities in social services provided by Israeli authorities in
East Jerusalem correlated to ethnicity. The Jerusalem Municipality did
not provide sufficient educational resources for Palestinian children
in East Jerusalem, according to ACRI and the NGO Ir Amim, which claimed
that thousands of Palestinian students studied in crowded classrooms,
often in ill-fitting structures that did not meet municipal standards.
Most municipal forms were not available in Arabic. Bus services in
Jerusalem were largely segregated. According to ACRI, eight post office
stations in East Jerusalem served a population of approximately
300,000, whereas 42 post office stations in West Jerusalem served a
population of 500,000. Only one postman, serving 260,000 residents,
delivered mail in Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem.
On August 6, the Israeli High Court ruled that an ultraorthodox
school in the West Bank settlement of Emmanuel must stop separating
students based on their ethnicity and remove all signs of
discrimination. Since 2007 the school had separated students of
different ethnic backgrounds and required them to wear different
uniforms.
Societal Abuses, Discrimination, and Acts of Violence Based on
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.--Palestinian law, based on the
1960 Jordanian penal code, prohibits homosexual activity, although in
practice the PA did not prosecute individuals suspected of such
activity. Cultural and religious traditions rejected homosexuality, and
some Palestinians claimed that PA security officers and neighbors
harassed, abused, and sometimes arrested homosexuals because of their
sexual orientation.
Israeli press reported that Majed Koka, a gay Palestinian man from
the West Bank who immigrated illegally to Israel, was continued to
await a response from the Israeli Interior Ministry regarding his
petition for legal residency on humanitarian grounds. Koka in September
stated that he could not safely live in Nablus, his hometown, as an
openly gay man.
In the Gaza Strip, an unidentified 19-year-old man remained in
prison without trial because of his homosexual orientation, according
to HRW.
Other Societal Violence or Discrimination.--The PA Ministry of
Health provided treatment and privacy protections for patients with
HIV/AIDS; however, societal discrimination against affected individuals
was common.
Section 7. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law permits workers to form and
join independent unions of their choice, and this right was respected
in practice. Labor unions in the Gaza Strip continued to operate
despite a severely weakened economy. However, in many cases Hamas
replaced Fatah-affiliated union leaders with Hamas members or
sympathizers, and during the year Hamas detained a number of non-Hamas-
affiliated union activists.
The two most active unions were the General Union for Palestinian
Workers and the Palestine General Federation of Trade Unions, which was
a member of the International Trade Union Confederation. Both unions
were registered with the PA Ministry of Labor. Membership in the Union
of Arab Employees (UAE) is automatic and mandatory for all West Bank
UNRWA employees.
According to the NGO United Civilians for Peace, Palestinians
working in West Bank settlements reported hostile responses to their
efforts to organize unions.
Workers in Jerusalem may establish unions but may not join West
Bank federations. Despite this restriction the West Bank-based PA
Employees' Union and Teachers' Union counted East Jerusalem members
among their ranks, and Israeli authorities rarely took steps to enforce
this restriction unless high-profile events or senior PA officials were
involved. Workers holding Jerusalem identity cards may belong to the
Israeli General Federation of Labor (Histadrut), but they may not vote
in Histadrut elections.
PA law provides for the right to strike. In practice, however,
strikers had little protection from retribution. Prospective strikers
must provide written warning two weeks in advance of the basis for the
strike (four weeks in the case of public utilities), accept Ministry of
Labor arbitration, and submit to disciplinary action if they reject the
result. If the ministry cannot resolve a dispute, it can be referred to
a special committee and eventually to a court. Accordingly, in practice
the right to strike remained questionable.
PA employees organized fewer strikes than in previous years, in
large part because the PA was able to pay salaries during the year in
the West Bank. In general PA employees staged strikes over nonpayment
of wages, to protest disparities between union claims and official cost
of living statistics, or to demand payment of arrears. There were no
reports of private-sector strikes during the year.
UAE employees called for strikes throughout the year. The union
engaged in some coercive actions during employee strikes in October and
November by physically preventing nonstriking employees from entering
the workplace and reportedly engaging in physical violence in a few
incidents.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
protects collective bargaining, and this was enforced in certain cases.
However, there were reports that PA enforcement of collective
bargaining rights for unions serving other than PA employees was
limited. Collective bargaining agreements covered 20 percent of
workers.
Antiunion discrimination and employer interference in union
functions are illegal, and the Government enforced these prohibitions.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--While the PA labor
law does not expressly forbid forced or compulsory labor, PA law states
that work is a right and that the PA will attempt to provide it for any
capable individual. The Ministry of Labor interpreted this statement to
prohibit forced and compulsory labor. However, children were vulnerable
to forced labor conditions.
d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment.--By
law children under the age of 15 are not permitted to work in PA-
administered areas, and Ministry of Labor inspectors enforced this
prohibition through factory visits and inspections. PA officials
reported that the Ministry of Labor employed 45 labor inspectors, who
investigated child labor violations. However, they are not specifically
trained for child labor inspections, and they perform this function as
part of their other duties as inspectors. The ministry acknowledged
their need for more inspectors. Hiring of children between the ages of
15 and 18 for limited types of employment is permitted under set
conditions, including limited hours and a prohibition on operating
certain types of machines and equipment. The law states that children
shall not be allowed to perform work that might damage their safety,
health, or education and prohibits working at night, hard labor, and
travel beyond their domicile. Nevertheless, many underage children--
with estimates as high as 72 percent of Palestinian children--in PA-
administered areas worked on family farms and in shops, as street
vendors, in factories, or in small enterprises.
In the Gaza Strip, the UN estimated that hundreds of children were
forced to find work, as the poor economy made it difficult for families
to provide adequate resources solely through parental income. Children
worked in high-risk activities and zones, including as laborers in the
tunnel networks between the Gaza Strip and Egypt and in collecting
scrap materials from areas close to the Israeli border, where they were
at risk of live fire from Israeli troops (see sections 1.c. and 6,
Children). Some children were used as informants and human shields in
armed conflict. Information on respect for child labor laws in the Gaza
Strip was not available.
The PA Ministry of Labor stated that Palestinian children working
in Israeli settlements faced security problems, exploitation, and
harassment since there was no enforceable law to monitor and protect
child laborers, and there were no Israeli inspectors in West Bank
settlements and industrial zones. The Israeli government stated that it
did not issue permits for Palestinian West Bank residents younger than
18 years old to work in Israeli settlements, except in the Jordan
Valley, where the law allows work permits for persons from the age of
16 and older. Migrant workers living in the Jordan Valley during the
harvest season brought their families with them, but their children did
not have proper structures for schools because the Israeli government
prohibited the construction of classrooms.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There was no minimum wage in
Palestinian-controlled areas. Prior to 2000, average wages for full-
time workers provided a decent living standard; however, living
standards dropped significantly over the past decade due to increases
in cost of living that outpaced salary increases. The average wage in
the occupied territories was 1,000 Jordanian dinars (approximately
$1,400) per month, approximately the same as the Israeli minimum wage.
The NGO United Civilians for Peace and the Israeli NGO Kav laOved
reported that the Israeli minimum wage was generally the highest wage
paid to Palestinians working in settlements and that such workers
complained of receiving much lower wages than Israelis working in the
same areas. Palestinians reported that they continued to receive wages
lower than the Israeli minimum wage, despite a 2008 high court ruling
that Israeli labor laws apply to relations between Palestinian workers
and Israeli employers in settlements in the occupied territories. The
ruling granted Palestinian workers the same rights and benefits as
workers in Israel. However, several cases brought by Palestinians
against Israeli employers who offered less than the minimum wage
remained pending in Israeli courts at year's end.
On October 20, Palestinian workers in an Israeli Sol-Or factory on
the Green Line went on strike for multiple days, demanding their legal
entitlement to the Israeli minimum wage. The workers claimed they
received an inadequate 90 shekels (approximately $24) for an eight-hour
workday involving hazardous tasks.
In the West Bank, the average workweek was 43 hours, and in the
Gaza Strip it was approximately 40 hours, according to the Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics. The maximum official Sunday to Thursday
workweek was 48 hours. There were reports that PA government employees
were pressured to work additional hours to be promoted. Employers are
required to allow Christians to attend church on Sunday if the employee
desires. Some employers offered Christians the option of not working on
Sunday rather than Friday.
The PA Ministry of Labor was responsible for safety standards, but
its enforcement ability was limited. There were no reported exceptions
for any sector, industry, or company to labor ministry standards.
However, employees of small construction and service firms were at
greatest risk for workplace injuries, according to union officials.
Unions complained that the PA did not effectively monitor smaller
worksites, which were at times below legal standards for safety.
__________
JORDAN
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a constitutional monarchy ruled
by King Abdullah II bin Hussein, with a population of six million. The
constitution concentrates executive and legislative authority in the
king. The multiparty parliament consists of the 55-member House of
Notables (Majlis al-Ayan), appointed by the king, and a 120-member
elected lower house, the Chamber of Deputies (Majlis al-Nuwwab).
Parliamentary elections, which international observers deemed credible,
were held on November 9 after the king dissolved parliament in November
2009. Security forces reported to civilian authorities.
There were limitations on the right of citizens to change their
government peacefully, and a newly drafted electoral law perpetuated
the significant underrepresentation of urban areas and citizens of
Palestinian origin in leadership positions. Domestic and international
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported cases of arbitrary
deprivation of life, torture, poor prison conditions, impunity,
arbitrary arrest and denial of due process through administrative
detention, prolonged detention, and external interference in judicial
decisions. Citizens continued to describe infringements on their
privacy rights. Restrictive legislation and regulations limited
freedoms of speech and press, and government interference in the media
and threats of fines and detention further encouraged self-censorship,
according to journalists and human rights organizations. The Government
also continued to restrict freedoms of assembly and association. Legal
and societal discrimination and harassment remained a problem for
women, religious minorities, converts from Islam, members of the
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community, and some
persons of Palestinian origin. Local human rights organizations
reported widespread violence against women and children. The Government
restricted labor rights, and local and international human rights
organizations reported high levels of abuse of foreign domestic
workers.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports during the year that the Government or its agents committed
unlawful killings.
In November 2009 Saddam al-Saoud died of injuries allegedly
sustained in police custody at the Al Hussein Police Station. Saoud's
family said Public Security Directorate (PSD) officers caused Saoud's
injuries when they hit him on the head with a gun. At year's end,
felony cases against six PSD officers remained pending.
Also in November 2009 Fakhri Kreishan died of injuries sustained
during an altercation with police two days earlier in the southern city
of Ma'an. A police officer reportedly hit him on the head with a baton.
At year's end, the felony case against the officer was pending.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices; however, international
NGOs continued to report incidences of torture and widespread
mistreatment in police and security detention centers. Article 208 of
the penal code prohibits torture by public officials, including
psychological harm, and provides penalties of as long as three years'
imprisonment for the use of torture, with an increased penalty of up to
15 years if serious injury occurs. Human rights lawyers found the law
ambiguous and supported amendments to better define ``torture'' and
strengthen sentencing guidelines. The Government has not charged an
individual under article 208.
Local and international NGOs criticized the use of special police
prosecutors and courts to try PSD personnel accused of torture and
police misconduct as ineffective and not transparent. As part of the
2009 reform process, the Government gave civilian prosecutors authority
to assist in the investigation of torture allegations, even though such
cases were tried in a police court.
International and domestic organizations stated that security
forces continued to practice torture, particularly in police stations;
however, observers commented that allegations of torture in prisons
decreased during the year. On May 14, as part of its periodic review
process, the UN Committee against Torture expressed ``deep concern'' at
``the numerous, consistent, and credible allegations of a widespread
and routine practice of torture and ill-treatment of detainees in
detention facilities and that such allegations were seldom investigated
or prosecuted.'' A August 30 National Center for Human Rights (NCHR)
report on prisons and police detention centers cited 33 complaints of
mistreatment in detention centers and three complaints from prison
inmates between January 1 and June 30. The NCHR report also commented
on individual violations perpetrated by law enforcement staff in some
police stations and observed that several forms of torture were
practiced against the defendants and detainees. A report issued in
January by the international NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) also noted
that torture continued to be practiced in the country's prisons and
police stations. HRW claimed that the reform program does not address
accountability for abuses and that initiatives by the NCHR and other
groups were ``far from sufficient considering the lack of both
political will and effective mechanisms to bring perpetrators to
justice.''
On March 1, members of the Criminal Investigation Unit with the
Public Security Directorate in Irbid reportedly arrested Sayed Mahmoud
Hamed Talafha on allegations of attempted robbery and beat him severely
in custody. Officers reportedly struck him on the right leg where he
had metal pins from a previous operation, hung him by the wrists to the
back of a door, and pierced one wrist with a drill. The PSD
spokesperson claimed that Talafha inflicted the wounds himself.
According to his lawyer, on March 2, he had emergency surgery to repair
his hand. The general prosecutor dropped the charges against Talafha on
November 13, but he remained in administrative detention on the Maffraq
governor's order. Talafha was released from administrative detention on
December 2.
In 2008 the director of the Sahab Police Station, a police officer
of the Criminal Investigations Department, and the director of public
security allegedly tortured and mistreated an individual known only as
Raad. On March 22, Raad reportedly filed a civil case in the amount of
7,000 dinars ($10,000) for psychological, physical, and moral damages
resulting from torture, beatings, and other forms of cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment at Sahab prison facility. Additionally he
claimed the defendants forced him to remove his clothes, leaving him
naked, and used an electric baton on him. Also in 2008 an individual
known only as Wasfi, together with the directors of North Marka
Security Center and the director of public security, allegedly beat and
insulted an individual known only as Dawood. On March 10, Dawood filed
a civil case for psychological, physical and moral damages resulting
from torture and cruel and degrading treatment. Both cases were pending
at year's end.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions.--Significant problems
remained in prisons, including poor legal services, understaffing,
inadequate food and health care, poor sanitation standards, poor
ventilation, extreme temperatures, inadequate access to potable water,
ineffective prerelease and postrelease programs, and insufficient basic
and emergency medical care. Some detainees reported abuse and
mistreatment by guards during the year. Hunger strikes remained common,
but prison riots and allegations of mistreatment reportedly decreased.
Prisoners filed complaints of poor prison conditions with the PSD and
the NCHR. The construction of four prisons during the year alleviated
overcrowding to some extent.
On July 19, a Web site published a report detailing stories of
government authorities physically and verbally abusing children in
government-run juvenile detention centers. In response to the
allegations, the Ministry of Social Development (MOSD) investigated
these claims and concluded that there was no evidence to support the
children's claims; however, some local children's rights activists
noted that abuse occurred in some government-run juvenile detention
centers. In 2009 former and current residents and parents of children
in several ministry-operated juvenile rehabilitation centers and
orphanages reported verbal and physical abuse of children by
supervisors. For example, parents of children in an Irbid juvenile
center and former residents of an orphanage in Madaba reported physical
abuse of children. At year's end, the Government investigation remained
pending.
In November 2009 the Council of Ministers passed amendments placing
stiffer disciplinary measures, including salary deductions and
termination, on civil servants who used corporal punishment on
children, including those in schools and juvenile centers. However,
authorities rarely used this punishment in practice.
The PSD reported that some prisoners went on hunger strikes during
the year to protest mistreatment, poor prison conditions, and a
prisoner classification system under which some prisoners had been
moved to different wards or prisons based on the type of crime, number
of offenses, and other factors. The NCHR reported 205 prison strikes
from January 1 to August 1.
In February 2009 the Institute of Forensic Medicine, a part of the
Ministry of Health, issued a report stating that prison clinic
conditions were unsuitable and deteriorating and that inmates did not
have access to basic health services. The report also criticized the
lack of psychiatric treatment and follow-up care.
According to government statistics, there were approximately 18,449
inmates in 14 correctional and rehabilitation center (CRC) facilities.
The Government generally held men, women, and juveniles in separate
prisons and detention facilities; however, pretrial detainees were
often held in the same detention facilities as convicted prisoners. The
General Intelligence Directorate (GID) held some persons detained on
national security charges in separate detention facilities. According
to the NCHR, GID detainees are generally held in solitary confinement
and are not allowed to meet unsupervised with visitors, including their
lawyers. Islamist prisoners in Jweidah were held in a separate wing and
kept in small-group isolation. International and domestic NGOs also
reported that in some instances Islamist prisoners faced harsher prison
conditions than other inmates.
Prisoners and detainees had restricted access to visitors and were
permitted religious observance. Authorities permitted prisoners and
detainees to submit complaints to judicial authorities without
censorship and to request investigation of credible allegations of
inhumane conditions. Authorities did not investigate credible
allegations of inhumane conditions. The Government investigated and
monitored prison and detention center conditions.
The Government permitted local and international human rights
observers to visit prisons and conduct private interviews. During the
year the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visited
prisoners and detainees in all prisons, including those controlled by
the GID and the military intelligence directorate, according to
standard ICRC modalities. The Ombudsman's Bureau, a national
institution that receives complaints about federal agencies, is unable
to serve on behalf of prisoners to consider matters such as
alternatives to incarceration, although it is permitted to look into
cases of inhumane treatment. The NCHR conducted routine and unannounced
prison inspections during the year, including visits to GID facilities.
The Government continued its large-scale, long-term prison reform
to transfer CRC management from the PSD to the Ministry of Justice. At
year's end the Government had finished constructing four new CRCs with
cells that meet international standards, raising the number of prisons
from 14 to 18.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention.--The law prohibits arbitrary
arrest and detention. According to local and international human rights
groups, the Government did not always observe these prohibitions in
practice. In particular, the governors of the country's 12 governorates
continued to use the Crime Prevention Law to administratively detain
individuals without due process.
Role of the Police and Security Apparatus.--The PSD controls
general police functions. The PSD, GID, gendarmerie, Civil Defense
Directorate, and military share responsibility for maintaining internal
security. Members of the gendarmerie assist police in emergencies,
provide diplomatic security, and respond to riots, protests, and
demonstrations. The Civil Defense Directorate is responsible for public
safety during natural disasters and civil disturbances. The PSD and
gendarmerie report to the minister of interior with direct access to
the king when necessary, and the GID in practice reports directly to
the king.
Civilian authorities maintained control over security forces.
According to local and international NGOs, the Government did not
thoroughly investigate and punish all credible reports of corruption or
abuse by security forces. The Government used mechanisms to investigate
abuse and corruption, but there were wide-scale allegations of
impunity. Citizens may file complaints of police abuse or corruption
with the PSD's human rights office or with one of 50 police prosecutors
stationed throughout the country. Complaints of abuse and corruption by
the gendarmerie may be filed directly with the gendarmerie. A GID
liaison officer receives complaints against the GID and refers them to
GID personnel for investigation. Complaints against the PSD,
gendarmerie, and GID may also be filed with the NCHR or several other
NGOs, such as the Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR). The PSD's
preventive security office is tasked with investigating allegations of
police corruption. The PSD and gendarmerie try their personnel
internally with their own courts, judges, and prosecutors, in a manner
not transparent to the public.
Allegations of torture and mistreatment continued, according to
numerous credible observers. During the year citizens filed 46
complaints, including allegations of mistreatment against PSD
personnel. NGOs noted that victims may be reluctant to file formal
complaints due to impunity within the police and security apparatus.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention.--The law allows
suspects to be detained for up to 24 hours without a warrant in all
cases. The criminal code requires that police notify authorities within
24 hours of an arrest and that authorities file formal charges within
15 days of an arrest. Human rights observers claimed that police
continued to make arrests before obtaining warrants and prosecutors did
not file charges or seek extensions in a timely manner. The period to
file formal charges can be extended for as long as six months for a
felony and two months for a misdemeanor. Local NGOs stated that
prosecutors routinely requested extensions and judges granted them.
This practice generally lengthened pretrial detention for protracted
periods. As of year's end, approximately 800 persons were reportedly
being held in prison without formal charge. Bail is allowed under the
penal code and used in some cases. Some detainees reported not being
allowed timely access to a lawyer, but authorities generally permitted
family member visits. Authorities appointed lawyers to represent
indigent defendants charged with felonies, although legal aid services
remained minimal. There were allegations of long periods of
incommunicado detention in GID facilities, and the UN Committee against
Torture's May 14 report expressed serious concern about the
Government's failure in practice to afford all detainees, including
detainees held in GID and PSD facilities, with ``all fundamental legal
safeguards from the very outset of their detention,'' including the
right to notify a relative and to be informed of their rights and
charges against them at the time of detention.
The State Security Court gives judicial police, charged with
conducting criminal investigations, authority to arrest and keep
persons in custody for 10 days. This authority includes arrests for
alleged misdemeanors. In cases purportedly involving state security,
the security forces arrested and detained citizens without warrants or
judicial review, held defendants in lengthy pretrial detention without
informing them of the charges against them, and did not allow
defendants to meet with their lawyers or permitted meetings only
shortly before trial. Defendants before the State Security Court
usually met with their attorneys at the start of a trial or only one or
two days before. A case may be postponed for more than 48 hours only
under exceptional circumstances determined by the court. In practice,
cases routinely involved postponements of more than 10 days between
sessions with proceedings lasting for several months. In most cases the
accused remained in detention without bail during the proceedings.
Several inmates were in detention without charge at year's end.
Under the Crime Prevention Law, provincial governors may detain
individuals suspected of planning to commit a crime or those who
allegedly shelter thieves, habitually steal, or constitute a danger to
the public, and in practice they used this provision widely. Those
accused are subject to imprisonment or house arrest as ``administrative
detention'' without formal charges. A detention order may be for as
long as one year, but governors can impose new orders to prolong
detentions. During the year governors administratively detained 12,345
individuals. Several international and national NGOs noted that
governors routinely abused the law, imprisoning individuals when there
was not enough evidence to convict them and prolonging detentions of
prisoners whose sentences had expired. The law was also widely used to
incarcerate women at risk of being honor crime victims. The NCHR and
other human rights organizations called for the abolishment of the
Crime Prevention Law.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary's independence in
practice was compromised by allegations of nepotism and the influence
of special interests. Unlike the previous year, there were no reports
of interference by senior judges in junior judges' cases. The Judicial
Council, a committee led by the president of the Court of Cassation, is
composed of other high-ranking judges from various courts and the
Ministry of Justice. The council approves judicial appointments after
initial nominations by the ministry, and it assigns and evaluates
judges. The executive branch, through the ministry, controls most
judicial functions, giving the Government the ability to influence
judicial decisions. The Judicial Council continued to lack the internal
capacity to effectively manage judicial administrative and financial
matters and therefore lacked independence. Unlike the previous year,
there were no allegations that the former council's head reassigned
judges or forced them to retire early for personal instead of policy
reasons.
Trial Procedures.--The law presumes that defendants are innocent.
All civilian court trials, including state security court trials, are
open to the public unless the court determines otherwise. Juries are
not used. Defendants are entitled to legal counsel, provided at public
expense for the indigent in cases involving the death penalty or
potential life imprisonment. In many cases defendants have no legal
representation. In July 2009 the Government passed an amendment that
made court rulings legally binding without the presence of the
defendant if an attorney for the defendant is present. Defendants could
present witnesses on their behalf and question witnesses presented
against them. Defense attorneys were generally granted access to
government-held evidence relevant to their clients' cases. Defendants
can appeal verdicts; appeals are automatic for cases involving the
death penalty. In the State Security Court, defendants convicted of
felonies have the right to appeal their sentences to the Court of
Cassation, which is authorized to review issues of both fact and law.
All citizens were accorded these rights. Civil, criminal, and
commercial courts accord equal weight to the testimony of men and
women; however, in Sharia courts, which have jurisdiction over Muslim
marriage, divorce, and inheritance cases, the testimony of two women
was equal to that of a man in most circumstances.
Political Prisoners and Detainees.--Citizens and NGOs alleged that
the Government continued to detain individuals, including political
opposition members, for political reasons during the year, and that
governors continued to use administrative detentions for what appeared
to be political reasons. In a few cases, the media and human rights
organizations reported that authorities kept detainees in solitary
confinement and denied them access to lawyers.
A 2008 HRW report stated that political prisoners, including
Islamists convicted of crimes against national security, reportedly
received greater abuse than other prisoners.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies.--There is an independent
judiciary in civil matters. Individuals may bring lawsuits related to
human rights violations and did so during the year. The High Court of
Justice hears administrative complaints. The courts are open to all
residents. Courts also have jurisdiction over any person in civil
matters, including lawsuits in which the Government is a plaintiff or a
defendant.
During the year at least two individuals who alleged being tortured
in 2008 filed civil cases for damages (see section 1.c.).
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits arbitrary interference in private
matters, but the Government did not respect this prohibition in
practice. Citizens widely believed that security officers monitored
telephone conversations and Internet communication, read private
correspondence, and engaged in surveillance without court orders.
The law requires that security forces obtain a warrant from the
prosecutor general or a judge before conducting searches; however,
during the year foreign migrant workers with valid work and residency
permits reported that police forcibly entered their homes without
warrants as part of a joint police and labor inspection campaign to
verify the legal status of workers.
A few religious activists reported that the GID withheld their
certificates of good behavior required for job applications or to open
a business, or threatened not to allow their children to enter or
graduate from university. The GID usually withholds a certificate of
good behavior if there is a criminal record; however, there is no
public information outlining the GID's policies for issuing the
certificates.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government did not
respect these rights in practice. A 2009 Freedom House report on media
freedom called the country ``not free.'' On May 8, the Amman-based
National Center for Defending the Freedom of Journalists (CDFJ) issued
its 2009 annual report, which concluded that media freedoms
deteriorated in 2009. Journalists reported that the threat of detention
and imprisonment under the penal code for a variety of offenses, and
stringent fines of as much as 20,000 dinars ($28,000) under the press
and publications law for defamation led to self-censorship. There were
several incidents during the year in which the Government prohibited
journalists from reporting on high-profile court cases. The
Government's use of ``soft containment'' of journalists, such as
financial support, scholarships for relatives, and special invitations,
led to significant control of media content. In March the Government
amended the Press and Publication Law to remove administrative
detention as a punishment for journalists and created a court to deal
specifically with matters of freedom of expression and speech. The
amended law prohibits journalists from being referred to State Security
Courts for freedom of expression or speech issues, and none were
referred there during the year.
The law provides punishment up to three years' imprisonment for
insulting the king, slandering the Government or foreign leaders,
offending religious beliefs, or stirring sectarian strife and sedition.
In practice citizens were generally able to criticize the Government,
although they reportedly exercised caution in regard to the king, the
royal family, the GID, and other sensitive topics such as religion.
On February 13, in response to a lawsuit brought by private
citizens, state security forces detained journalist Muwaffaq Mahadin
and environmentalist Sufian al-Tal for two weeks for having given
separate public interviews criticizing the army's security role in
Afghanistan. State security charged them with ``harming relations with
a foreign country,'' ``stirring sectarianism,'' ``harming the stature
of the state and the army,'' instigation, and slander. The case was
sent to the State Security Court, which did not have jurisdiction, then
to the prosecutor general. At year's end, the court case was pending.
In late February the GID arrested university student Imad al-Ash
for allegedly sending an instant message that ``insulted the monarchy''
and participating in online forums expressing ``controversial religious
opinions.'' Ash denied the charges. On July 13, the security court
sentenced him to two years in prison. Ash appealed the ruling, and the
court upheld his two-year prison sentence on October 2.
On July 25, PSD officers arrested university student Hatim al-
Shuili on charges of ``causing national strife'' and ``insulting the
monarchy'' over a poem he denied writing that reportedly criticized the
king. Shuili was detained until September 8, when the king pardoned him
along with 17 others accused of insulting the monarchy.
As of year's end, the PSD had not yet released any findings in its
alleged investigation of the October 2009 beating of opposition figure
Layth Shbeilat in an Amman bakery. Shbeilat and many local observers
connected the assault to a lecture he presented at the Socialist
Thought Forum two days earlier in which he called for increased efforts
to fight government corruption and the need to question and hold
officials accountable.
Independent print media existed, including several major daily
newspapers; however, such publications must obtain licenses from the
state to operate. The independent print and broadcast media largely
operated without restriction, but media observers reported governmental
pressure to avoid sensitive topics such as the royal family, the GID,
and religion. Media organizations and journalists reported that the
Government influenced the appointment of editors in chief at some major
publications, whether by virtue of officials' positions on the boards
of directors of government-affiliated publications or through
undisclosed contacts. The Government has a majority share on the board
of directors for one major daily newspaper and a minority share in
another. The Governmental Audiovisual Commission, whose mandate is to
license private broadcast agencies, has authority to recommend
rejection of a broadcast license without a stated reason. Media
observers note that when covering controversial subjects, government-
owned Jordan Television, Jordan News Agency, and Radio Jordan reported
only the Government's position.
Apart from the arrest of Muwaffaq Mahadin, there were no reports of
physical violence or harassment of journalists during the year. As of
year's end, the Government had not released any findings of its alleged
investigation into the January 2009 gendarmerie attack on an Al Jazeera
television crew. There were no updates in the June 2009 case of poet
and reporter Islam Samhan, sentenced to one year in prison and a fine
of 10,000 dinars ($14,200) on charges of slandering Islam and insulting
``religious sentiment'' for his use of Qur'an verses and prophets in
his poetry, or the 2008 arrest of El-Ekhbariya editor in chief Fayez
Al-Ajrashi on charges of ``inflaming sectarian strife'' and ``sowing
national discord.'' Both men remained free on bail at year's end.
The Government directly and indirectly censored the media.
Authorities monitored and censored printing presses and edited articles
deemed offensive before they could be printed. Journalists claimed the
Government used informants in newsrooms and that GID officials
monitored reporting. Editors reportedly received telephone calls from
security officials instructing them how to cover events or to refrain
from covering certain topics or events. Government officials also
reportedly bribed journalists to influence their reporting. According
to a 2009 Center for Defending the Freedom of Journalists survey, 95
percent of journalists polled exercised self-censorship. The survey
also reported that 70 percent of journalists thought the Government
used ``soft containment'' to control the media at a medium to high
degree. Ninety-four percent said they avoid writing about or
broadcasting military matters, and 83 percent said they avoid
discussing religious topics.
On March 10, a State Security Court attorney general prohibited the
press from reporting or commenting on the case of the Jordan Petroleum
Refinery Company expansion project without his personal approval,
purportedly to allow the judicial authorities to work ``calmly'' on the
case.
The Government continued to enforce bans on the publication of
selected books for religious, moral, and political reasons. Some
foreign films were edited prior to release.
Internet Freedom.--There were government restrictions on access to
the Internet. Citizens and activists widely believed that the
Government monitored electronic correspondence and Internet chat sites;
therefore, they practiced self-censorship over such media. Individuals
and groups were unable to express their views via the Internet,
including by e-mail. According to the 2010 International Research and
Exchange Board Jordan Media Strengthening Program, Internet usage was
30 percent. Internet speech is regulated by the Press and Publication
Law.
On August 3, the Government issued the Information Systems Crime
Law, a ``temporary'' law (see section 3) that would require law
enforcement officials to have probable cause and a warrant before
entering and searching any place suspected of being used to commit a
cybercrime or to seize property and make arrests based on suspicion of
illegal cybercrime activity.
On August 5, authorities blocked 50 domestic news Web sites in
government institutions and offices purportedly to ``end confusion
about topics related to the Government.''
During the year the Ministry of Interior continued to monitor
Internet cafes for ``security reasons'' via video cameras. The ministry
also required cafe owners to register users' personal data, submit
records of visited Web sites, and prevent access to questionable Web
sites, as defined by the ministry.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events.--The Government placed some
limits on academic freedom. Some members of the academic community
claimed there was an ongoing intelligence presence in academic
institutions, including monitoring of academic conferences and
lectures.
On April 29, the administration of Hashemite University introduced
an amendment requiring that candidates running for student elections
must have participated in religious and national occasions and
cultural, scientific, social, artistic, and voluntary activities at the
university. Local organizations and the media criticized the amendment,
calling it a government attempt to control student elections by
ensuring that the candidate is familiar to the administration.
In September 2009 the National Campaign for Defending Students'
Rights criticized the interference of security services in student
activities, especially in university student council elections.
Security personnel reportedly told students to vote for specific
candidates. The group also noted that universities had punished or
expelled students for distributing literature expressing solidarity
with Palestinians.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom of
Assembly.--The constitution provides for freedom of assembly, but the
Government restricted this right. The Public Gatherings Law stipulates
that organizations do not need approval to hold routine internal
meetings and activities but that routine public meetings--including
workshops and training sessions--require approval. Governors are not
required to provide a legal reason for denial of permission to hold an
event, and there is no standard in the law for what constitutes an
impermissible public gathering. If an organization fails to apply for
permission for an event, its members face imprisonment from one to six
months and a fine of as much as 3,000 dinars ($4,300). If a governor
does not issue a response within 48 hours, applicants are entitled to
hold the event without legal liability.
Throughout the year several civil society organizations and
political parties accused the Government of being stringent in issuing
permits for public gatherings based on political factors rather than
security concerns. Governors sometimes denied requests for peaceful
demonstrations and civil society gatherings. In some cases the
Government granted approval at the last moment, making it difficult for
organizers to plan events.
On May 10, Muhammad al-Sunaid and Ahmad al-Luwansa, leaders of the
Committee of Day Laborers, gathered with 30 other day laborers to hold
a peaceful protest outside an office where the minister of agriculture
was scheduled to speak. After the protest they attended the minister's
speech, where they questioned the firing of day laborers working at the
ministry and called for the minister's removal. The governor ordered
the PSD to arrest Sunaid and al-Luwansa and charged them with holding
an unlawful gathering. Luwansa was detained at the Security Directorate
in Madaba for one day and was released without charges. Sunaid was
detained for 10 days and was charged with ``unlawful gathering,'' which
carries a sentence of up to one year. On July 27, the Security Court
sentenced Sunaid to three months in prison, and he was appealing the
sentence at year's end.
In late October the Islamic Action Front requested permission to
hold a protest. On November 3, the Government denied their request;
however, on November 6, the group staged a sit-in to protest the
rejection of their permit request. There was no response from the
Government.
On November 6, the governor of Amman rejected a sit-in request by
the Popular Unity Party's ``boycotters for change'' campaign.
Government investigation committees cleared the gendarmerie of
excessive use of force in the January 2009 case when the gendarmerie
allegedly used batons, tear gas, and water cannons to disperse
demonstrators throwing rocks and protesting outside the Israeli
embassy. The gendarmerie were also cleared in the July 2009 incident in
which they were accused of using batons to disperse a sit-in at the
Ministry of Agriculture protesting importation of Israeli fruit and
vegetables.
Freedom of Association.--The constitution provides for the right of
association, but the Government limited this freedom in practice. The
law gives the MOSD the right to reject applications to register an
organization or to receive foreign funding for any reason, and it
prohibits the use of associations for the benefit of any political
organization. The law also gives the ministry significant control over
the internal management of associations, including the ability to
dissolve associations, appoint new boards of directors, send government
representatives to any board meeting, prevent associations from merging
their operations, and appoint an auditor to examine an association's
finances for any reason. The law requires associations to inform the
ministry of board meetings, submit all board decisions for approval,
disclose members' names, and obtain the Ministry of Interior's security
clearances for board members. The law includes severe penalties,
including fines up to 10,000 dinars ($14,200).
The MOSD advisory board overseeing NGOs is chaired by the minister
of social development and includes representatives from seven other
government bodies and four civil society representatives. As of year's
end, the prime minister had not appointed the civil society
representatives. Local and international NGOs claimed that the law
severely restricted the work of independent organizations. During the
year the Government did not deny any organizations permission to
register or to receive foreign funding; however, a local NGO reported
that prolonged bureaucratic procedures to secure government approval of
foreign funding led to the organization losing the proposed funding.
c. Freedom of Religion.--For a complete description of religious
freedom, please see the 2010 International Religious Freedom Report at
www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/rpt.
d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of
Refugees, and Stateless Persons.--The law provides for freedom of
movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and
repatriation; however, there were some restrictions. The UN reported
that the Government cooperated with the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and other humanitarian
organizations in providing protection and assistance to internally
displaced persons, refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers,
stateless persons, and other persons of concern.
Some mothers claimed that they were prevented from departing the
country with their children because authorities enforced requests from
fathers to prevent their children from leaving. However, authorities
did not stop fathers from exiting the country with their children when
the mother objected. There were reports some women were required to
obtain the permission of either their husband or father in order to
acquire or renew a passport, despite the 2003 Passport Law, which
stipulates that women do not need a custodian to renew passports. The
GID sometimes withheld passports from citizens for alleged security
reasons. Employers or authorities sometimes held the passports of
foreign workers.
Some persons of Palestinian origin living in the country were
citizens and received passports; however, the Government reported that
there were approximately 165,000 Palestinian refugees, mostly of Gazan
origin, who did not qualify for citizenship. Approximately half of
these persons received two-year travel documents that do not connote
citizenship and do not contain a national number. West Bank residents
without other travel documentation were eligible to receive five-year
travel documents that do not connote citizenship. Local and
international human rights organizations continued to charge that the
Government did not consistently apply citizenship laws, especially in
cases in which passports were taken from citizens of Palestinian origin
or in which national identification numbers were revoked, thereby
revoking citizenship.
A HRW report issued in February claimed that more than 2,700
Jordanians of Palestinian origin had their citizenship revoked between
2004 and 2007. The Government maintained this policy was in line with
its efforts to implement its disengagement from its former claims to
the West Bank. For example, government officials stated that a national
number may be revoked if an individual obtains Palestinian travel
documents, works for any part of the Palestinian Authority, or does not
renew a family reunification permit. Activists complained that the
disengagement regulations did not outline such procedures, that the
process was not transparent, and that the Ministry of Interior's appeal
process was virtually nonexistent. Claimants reported that appeals were
not resolved to their satisfaction. Human rights activists also claimed
the Government refused to renew the passports of former residents of
Palestinian origin at overseas embassies.
The law prohibits internal and external forced exile, and the
Government did not use forced exile in practice.
Protection of Refugees.--The country is not a party to the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. Its
laws do not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and
the Government has not established a formal system of providing
protection to refugees and does not have any national legislation
pertaining to the status and treatment of refugees. The Government
respected the UNHCR's eligibility determinations regarding asylum
seekers, including those who entered the country clandestinely. A 1998
memorandum of understanding between the Government and the UNHCR
contains the definition of a refugee, confirms the principle of
nonrefoulement, and allows recognized refugees a maximum stay of six
months, during which period the UNHCR must find a durable solution. In
practice the Government provided protection against the expulsion or
return of refugees to countries where their lives or freedom would be
threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion. However, according
to observers, the Government did not accept refugees for resettlement
from third countries or facilitate local integration, particularly of
refugees in protracted situations.
The UNRWA and the Government continued to provide services, such as
health care, education, the right to work, and social services, to
Palestinian refugees during the year. At year's end, approximately two
million Palestinian refugees were registered with the UNRWA in the
country.
The Government granted nationality to approximately 700,000 persons
displaced from former territories during the 1967 war with Israel. An
additional 120,000 persons displaced during the 1967 war held temporary
residency permits, and an additional 200,000 Palestinian refugees were
also estimated to be living in the country without any direct
assistance.
The Government generally recognized the UNHCR's requests to grant
temporary protection for all Iraqi asylum seekers, including new
arrivals, rejected asylum or resettlement cases, and recognized
refugees whose cases had been suspended by resettlement countries. The
Government estimated there were 450,000 to 500,000 Iraqi refugees in
the country; NGO estimates varied from 100,000 to 200,000. As of years'
end, a total of 30,800 Iraqi refugees in the country were registered
with the UNHCR. Most registered refugees received legal and material
assistance from the UNHCR and other international and nongovernmental
humanitarian organizations. The Government provided education and
health care to Iraqis and tolerated the prolonged stay of many Iraqis
beyond the expiration of the visit permits under which they entered the
country. During the year the Government waived any overstay fines and
exit fees for those returning to Iraq. Few Iraqi refugees received work
permits due to bureaucratic hurdles and significant overstay fines they
would have to pay when applying for such permits.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The law does not provide citizens the right to change their monarch
or government. The king appoints and dismisses the prime minister,
cabinet, and the House of Notables, dissolves parliament, and directs
major public policy initiatives. Citizens may participate in the
political system through their elected representatives in the Chamber
of Deputies. The cabinet, based on the prime minister's recommendation,
appoints the mayors of Amman, Wadi Musa (Petra), and Aqaba, a special
economic zone. The mayors of the other 93 municipalities are elected.
The king proposes and dismisses extraordinary sessions of
parliament and may postpone regular sessions for as long as 60 days. In
November 2009 the king dissolved parliament and called for
parliamentary elections in the final quarter of 2010. Although the
constitution states that elections must be held within four months of
parliament's dismissal or the previous parliament is reinstated, the
king exercised his constitutional authority to extend this period. If
the Government amends or enacts a law when parliament is not in
session, it must submit the law to parliament for consideration during
the next session; however, such ``temporary'' laws do not expire.
Although they are technically subject to action by parliament when it
returns to session, in practice they typically remain in force in the
absence of legislative action.
Elections and Political Participation.--On November 9, the country
held parliamentary elections, which international observers stated in
their preliminary reports were ``credible'' and ``a clear improvement
over the nation's 2007 polls,'' while recommending future reforms such
as establishing an independent electoral management body, preprinting
ballots to mitigate concerns over voting procedures for the illiterate,
strengthening representation for all citizens, and introducing
regulations to allow for systematic appeals of the election results.
The country was without an elected parliament for the majority of
the year, during which time the cabinet issued a number of temporary
laws. On May 19, the cabinet issued a ``temporary'' elections law that
increased the women's quota in the parliament to 12, added four
parliamentary seats to underrepresented urban districts, and divided
the existing electoral districts into nongeographic subdistricts based
on the number of seats within each district. The new subdistricting
system served to change the rules for candidate registration by
requiring candidates to run for a specific subdistrict, while still
allowing voters to cast their single ballots for any candidate within
the electoral district as a whole. Civil society groups and media
commentators criticized the law for not going far enough in its reforms
to address concerns about fairness and transparency, especially for
persons of Palestinian origin. Many analysts commented that government
did not adequately explain to citizens the new law's system of
nongeographic subdistricts.
The Government licensed political parties and other associations
but prohibited membership in unlicensed political parties. The High
Court of Justice may dissolve a party if it concludes that the party
violated the constitution or the law. The law stipulates that a
political party must have a minimum of 500 founding members from five
governorates. Opposition parties complained that the law was
unconstitutional and obstructed political dynamism. Political parties,
NGOs, and independent candidates found the registration process onerous
and costly and criticized the GID's annual screening process of
founding party members. Political parties also complained that the
mandated public funding of 50,000 dinars ($71,100) was insufficient to
operate effective campaigns. Political analysts and opposition parties
called on the Government to take active measures to promote party
development, including amendments to the electoral system that would
place greater emphasis on parties.
Women have the right to vote. On November 9, 13 women were elected
to parliament, exceeding the quota by one. There was one female
governor, and three women served in the appointed 30-member cabinet.
The law provides a 20 percent quota for women in municipal council
seats and a 10 percent quota for women in the lower house of
parliament.
Citizens of Palestinian origin were underrepresented at all levels
of government and the military. Many observers believed the electoral
system was intended to reduce the representation of areas heavily
populated by citizens of Palestinian origin in favor of tribal
interests. The law allows voters to choose one candidate in multiple-
seat districts, which in the largely tribal society meant citizens
tended to cast their vote for members of their own tribe. The law
reserves nine seats in the lower house of parliament for Christians and
three seats for the Circassian and Chechen ethnic minorities together,
constituting an overrepresentation for these minorities. No seats were
reserved for the relatively small Druze population, but they were
permitted to hold office under their government classification as
Muslims. The law also stipulates that Muslims must hold all seats not
reserved for specified minority religions. Christians served as cabinet
ministers and ambassadors. The Government traditionally reserves some
positions in the upper levels of the military for Christians (4
percent); however, Muslims held all senior command positions.
Section 4. Official Corruption and Government Transparency
The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption;
however, it remained a problem. Domestic and international NGOs noted
the Government did not implement the law effectively and officials
often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. During the year the
Government investigated allegations of corruption; however, there were
few convictions. Many observers noted that investigations into official
corruption typically focused on small-scale corruption. The use of
family, business, and other personal connections to advance personal
business interests was widespread. There were allegations of lack of
transparency in government procurement, government appointments, and
dispute settlement.
During the year the Anticorruption Commission investigated 890
cases of corruption. The cases dealt with fraud, misuse of public
office, forgery, bribery, and embezzlement, as well as cases related to
food and drug laws. Despite increased investigations, some local
observers questioned the commission's effectiveness due to the limited
amount of investigations involving senior officials or large government
projects despite allegations against them.
On July 7, the State Security Court sentenced three former
officials--a former finance minister, a former Jordan Petroleum
Refinery Company (JPRC) chairperson, and a former economic advisor to
the prime minister--and a businessman to three years in prison after
convicting them of bribery in connection with the JPRC expansion
project. The defendants were acquitted on the charges of abuse of
public office. The defendants appealed the conviction and were free on
bail at year's end.
In a 2009 high-profile case, the Government formed an ad hoc
committee to investigate the embezzlement of 1.2 million dinars ($1.7
million) from the Ministry of Agriculture. On August 31, the court
found two men guilty of embezzlement and sentenced them to 22 years in
prison.
During the year citizens filed more than 2,776 complaints against
public agencies with the Governmental Ombudsman Bureau. The bureau
rejected 1,537 of the complaints because they did not fall under its
mandate, but it amicably resolved 80 percent of the accepted cases and
issued recommendations in 19 percent of the accepted cases. The bureau
is charged with investigating complaints regarding any decision or
action by public offices or their employees.
The law requires certain government officials to declare their
assets privately; in the event of a complaint, the chief justice may
review the disclosures. Under the law failure to disclose assets could
result in prison sentences from one week to three years or fines from
five to 200 dinars ($7 to $280). As of year's end, no officials had
been punished for failing to submit a disclosure.
The law provides for public access to government information that
is a matter of legal record but allows requests to be denied for
reasons of ``national security, public health, and personal freedoms.''
Journalists criticized the law, claiming it permits the Government to
deny requests without justification. A 2008 study by the Al Urdun Al
Jadid Research Center showed that 58 percent of journalists were
unaware of the law and nearly 85 percent did not know they had the
right to request information. Fifty percent of journalists who had
attempted to obtain government information characterized the
Government's response as inadequate, and 13.8 percent said their
requests triggered verbal abuse. In a 2008 Higher Media Council survey,
nearly half of the journalists surveyed reported difficulty accessing
information or said their requests had been denied outright.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Domestic and international human rights groups operated in the
country with some restrictions. The law gives the Government the
ability to control NGOs' internal affairs, including acceptance of
foreign funding. NGOs were generally able to investigate and report
publicly on human rights abuses throughout the year, although
government officials were not always cooperative. Senior government
officials accused local human rights organizations of having
``Western'' or foreign agendas and focusing only on the negative
aspects of an issue. Major local human rights organizations included
the NCHR and several independent organizations, such as the MIZAN Law
Group for Human Rights, the Amman Center for Human Rights Studies, the
AOHR, the CDFJ, and the Adaleh Center for Human Rights Studies.
Government entities met with members of these organizations and
participated in many projects the organizations undertook.
The Government generally cooperated with international NGOs, the
UN, and other international governmental organizations. On May 14, as
part of its periodic review process, the UN Committee against Torture
expressed ``deep concern'' at continuing allegations of torture and
mistreatment of detainees in the country (see section 1.c.).
The Government-funded NCHR's reporting was largely regarded as
objective and critical, although some local human rights groups and
activists complained that the NCHR did not speak out sufficiently
during the year on some controversial issues, such as freedom of
expression, students' rights, citizenship, and religious freedom. The
prime minister appoints the NCHR board chair and commissioner general.
In April the NCHR issued its sixth annual report on the state of human
rights in the country, which highlighted a range of continuing human
rights problems in 2009, including excessive use of administrative
detention, new restrictions on the right to establish civil society and
professional associations, limitations on protests and demonstrations,
restrictions on the right to access information, and physical attacks
by students against their professors and vice versa.
Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
The constitution states that all citizens are equal under the law
and prohibits discrimination based on race, language, and religion;
however, discrimination on the basis of gender, disability, and social
status is not specifically prohibited. The penal code does not address
discrimination, thereby severely limiting judicial remedies.
Women.--Violence and abuse against women continued, including
widespread domestic violence, numerous honor crimes, and spousal rape.
In rural areas violence against women was reported more frequently than
in major cities, but women's rights activists speculated that many
incidents in cities went unreported.
The law stipulates a sentence of at least 10 years' imprisonment
with hard labor for rape of a girl or woman age 15 years or older.
Spousal rape is not illegal. During the year the PSD Family Protection
Department (FPD) treated and investigated 395 cases of sexual assault,
131 cases of rape against women, and 223 rape cases against children.
There was no information available regarding prosecutions or
convictions for rape during the year.
In a survey of women in rural southern areas that the Higher
Population Council and the Ministry of Health released in January 2009,
30 percent of women 15 to 49 years old reported psychological abuse and
20 percent reported physical abuse. Spousal abuse is technically
grounds for divorce, but husbands can claim religious authority to
strike their wives. A woman may file a complaint against her spouse for
physical abuse with the FPD, certain NGOs, or directly with judicial
authorities. During the year the FPD forwarded 2,021 complaints of
domestic violence for prosecution. Violators of protection orders may
face as long as six months in prison. Observers noted that judges
generally supported a woman's claim of domestic abuse in court;
however, due to societal and familial pressure, few women sought legal
remedies. A 2007 survey by an international organization showed that
only 22 percent of domestic violence victims sought any form of
assistance. In 2008 the Jordan Center for Social Research conducted a
survey indicating that women often did not admit they were subjected to
violence and did not seek help because they were afraid of breaking up
or damaging the reputation of their families. The results also showed
some degree of acceptance of abuse, particularly among less-educated
women. Of the respondents who reported a case of violence, 83 percent
identified their husband, father, or brother as the perpetrator. There
were few services available to victims of domestic violence, and most
women were not aware of them.
The Government-run shelter Dar al-Wafaq assisted approximately 730
women and 160 children who were victims of domestic violence. It
provided reconciliation services to victims and their families and
worked with NGOs to provide services, such as legal and medical
assistance. However, observers noted a lack of a comprehensive approach
for victims and the absence of psychosocial counseling. The FPD
continued to operate a domestic violence hotline during the year and
received inquiries and complaints via the Internet and e-mail. The
Jordanian Women's Union, a domestic NGO, maintained a hotline for
victims of domestic violence and provided shelter to abuse victims. The
Jordan River Foundation operated a child and family center in East
Amman that provided shelter and assistance to domestic violence
victims. During the year the quasi-governmental Jordanian National
Commission for Women received 583 gender-related complaints ranging
from domestic violence to discrimination.
Authorities prosecuted 16 officially reported instances of
homicides related to ``honor'' crimes that occurred over the past three
years. Activists reported that many such crimes went unreported. An
Information and Research Center study released in October 2009 on the
causes of ``honor'' crimes in the country showed a high correlation
between poverty and education with ``honor'' crimes. The study found
that 73 percent of victims since 2000 were classified as poor, a group
that constituted only 30 percent of the country's population. The
brother of the victim was the perpetrator in 76 percent of the cases
and the father in 13 percent.
In July 2009 the Government established a specialized section
within the criminal courts to hear all cases of ``honor'' crimes.
During the year the court sentenced 15 perpetrators to 10 years in
prison and one perpetrator to five years in prison. In most cases
during the year, the family dropped the criminal charges, and the court
issued a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment. Judges have the
discretionary right, but not an obligation, to reduce sentences by as
much as half if the victim's family does not press charges, even if the
perpetrator and victim are from the same family.
Prior to the creation of the specialized unit within the criminal
court, some lower courts handed down 15-year sentences for second-
degree murder, but in every case the court immediately cut the sentence
in half. In previous years the courts usually found perpetrators of
honor killings guilty of a ``crime of passion,'' which merited a
maximum sentence of three years. Although defendants were almost always
found guilty, they often received token sentences of no more than six
months. The maximum sentence for first-degree murder is death.
On June 1 in East Amman, a man stabbed his sister 30 times on a
busy street with the assistance of his 19-year-old cousin. The brother
suspected that his sister was pregnant. The victim was rushed to the
hospital where she was declared dead on arrival. The prosecutor general
charged the brother and cousin with premeditated murder, and at year's
end the case was pending.
On July 23 in Deir Alla, a man shot and killed his 16-year-old
niece with a machine gun at her wedding, confessing he did it to
``cleanse his family's honor'' over suspicions the girl had lost her
virginity a month earlier. The father and husband pressed criminal
charges against the perpetrator; the case was pending at year's end.
At year's end the March 2009 case of a man in Zarqa who beat to
death his 19-year-old daughter with the assistance of two of her
brothers remained pending at the criminal court.
On April 23, the criminal court convicted and sentenced a man to 15
years in prison for publicly stabbing his 24-year-old daughter 16 times
on a main street in October 2009. The court reduced his sentence to 10
years because the family dropped the charges.
Through the administrative detention authority granted to governors
under the Crime Prevention Act, authorities continued to place
potential victims of honor crimes in involuntary protective custody in
the Women's Correctional and Rehabilitation Center in Jweideh, a
detention facility where some women had remained for more than four
years. A woman detained in protective custody can be released only
after her family signs a statement guaranteeing her safety and both the
local governor and the woman agree to the release. During the year the
Government released a number of women who had been detained for more
than 10 years. Unlike in previous years, there were no cases of women
being killed after release from protective custody. A human rights
organization estimated that approximately 12 women were in protective
custody. One NGO continued to work for the release of these women
through mediation with their families. The NGO also provided a
temporary but unofficial shelter for such women as an alternative to
protective custody.
According to the law, sexual harassment in the workplace is
strictly prohibited. The law does not make a distinction between sexual
assault and sexual harassment; both carry a minimum prison sentence of
four years with hard labor. Women's groups stated that harassment was
common, but many victims were hesitant to file a complaint and rarely
did so because they often were blamed for inciting it, they feared
losing their job, or they faced pressure to keep silent.
Couples have the basic right to decide freely and responsibly the
number, spacing, and timing of their children. Contraceptives were
generally accessible to all men and women, both married and single, and
provided free of charge in public clinics. Almost 99 percent of births
in the country take place in hospitals with trained professionals.
Comprehensive essential obstetric, prenatal, and postnatal care is
provided throughout the country in the public and private sectors.
According to data compiled by international organizations, in 2008
there were approximately 59 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births.
There was no discrimination against women in the diagnosis and
treatment of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections.
Women experienced legal discrimination in pension and social
security benefits, inheritance, divorce, ability to travel, child
custody, citizenship, and (in certain limited circumstances) the value
of their Sharia court testimony.
Under Sharia law as applied in the country, female heirs receive
half the amount that male heirs receive, and non-Muslim widows of
Muslim spouses have no inheritance rights; however, a Muslim spouse can
designate some of his property to his non-Muslim spouse through a will.
A sole female heir receives half of her parents' estate; the balance
goes to designated male relatives. A sole male heir inherits both of
his parents' property. Male Muslim heirs have the duty to provide for
all family members who need assistance. The existing temporary divorce
law allows women to seek divorces in return for waiving financial
rights or alimony. The law allows retention of financial rights under
specific circumstances, such as spousal abuse. Special courts for each
denomination adjudicate marriage and divorce for Christians.
The Government provided men with more generous social security
benefits than it gave women. The Government continued pension payments
of deceased male civil servants to their heirs, but it discontinued
payments to heirs of deceased female civil servants. Laws and
regulations governing health insurance for civil servants do not permit
married women to extend their health insurance coverage to dependents
or spouses. However, divorced and widowed women may extend coverage to
their children.
Women's rights activists complained that the law granting women
equal pay for equal work was not enforced. Many women said traditional
social pressures discouraged them from pursuing professional careers,
especially after marriage. The official unemployment rate for women was
20 percent, compared with 11.9 percent for the country as a whole. A
Jordanian National Council for Family Affairs study released in April
2009 found that women were often denied basic labor rights, such as pay
equality and the working hours and conditions outlined in the labor
law. The study called for legislative changes and awareness campaigns
to inform women of their rights.
The law states that a woman has the right to obtain or renew a
passport without the written permission of her husband; however, some
women reported that authorities required a male custodian's permission.
Married women do not have the legal right to transmit citizenship
to their children. In practical terms this affects thousands of
families whose father is of Palestinian origin. Female citizens married
to noncitizen men may pass citizenship to their children only with the
permission of the cabinet; however, the cabinet rarely took such
action, the public was widely unaware of this mechanism, and permission
was usually not granted in cases in which the father was of Palestinian
origin. Women may not petition for citizenship for their noncitizen
husbands, who must apply for citizenship after fulfilling a requirement
of 15 years' continuous residency. Once a husband has obtained
citizenship, he may apply to transmit citizenship to his children.
However, in practice such an application may take years, and the
Government may deny the application, resulting in the children becoming
stateless.
During the year a female citizen married to a Palestinian man from
Gaza was not allowed to enroll her son in preschool because her son was
not considered Jordanian. Furthermore, her husband was unable to work
legally because the family could not afford to renew his residency
permit on a yearly basis.
In 2009 a female citizen whose Egyptian husband died after falling
at a construction site had to reapply annually for a residency permit
for her three Egyptian-citizen children to continue to enable them to
live legally in the country and have access to education and health
services. The cost of applying for residency every year was a
significant burden, and the Government's approval was not guaranteed.
Children.--Citizenship is derived only through the father. Children
of female citizens and noncitizen husbands receive the nationality of
the father and lose the right to attend public school or to seek other
government services if they do not hold legal residency, which must be
applied for every year and is not guaranteed. The Government did not
issue birth certificates to all children born inside the country during
the year. The Government deemed some children--including children of
unmarried women, certain interfaith marriages, and converts from Islam
to another religion--illegitimate and denied them proper registration,
making it difficult or impossible for them to attend school, access
health services, or receive other documentation. In one such case in
2009, a single mother had to illegally bury her baby who died during
childbirth because she was unable to obtain a birth or death
certificate.
Education is compulsory from ages six through 16 years and free
until age 18. However, no legislation exists to enforce the law or to
punish guardians for violating it.
During the year authorities received and investigated 128
complaints of child abuse and 223 complaints of child rape. A February
2009 UN Children's Fund report stated that 71 percent of children were
subjected to verbal abuse and 57 percent had experienced some form of
physical abuse in school. Statistics on child abuse within households
were not available. The law specifies punishment for abuses against
children. For example, conviction for rape of a child younger than 15
years potentially carries the death penalty. However, local
organizations working with abused children pointed to gaps in the legal
system that regularly resulted in lenient sentencing, particularly for
family members. For example, the penal code gives judges the ability to
reduce a sentence when the victim's family does not press charges. In
child abuse cases, judges routinely accorded leniency per the wishes of
the family. The National Council for Family Affairs and other local
organizations stated that legislation does not provide children
sufficient protection from abuse, specifically citing the legal
authorization for parents to discipline their children using force.
Some local children's rights activists noted that abuse occurs in
some government-run juvenile detention centers (see section 1.c.). The
defendants in a February 2009 shaken baby syndrome case and April 2009
torture and killing of a five-year-old boy remained in jail at year's
end, pending the outcome of their court cases.
The Government continued to fund a child protection center that
provided temporary shelter and medical care for abused children between
the ages of six and 12. During the year the shelter housed 158 abused
children. Observers noted that the shelter lacked qualified staff,
psychosocial counselors, and a comprehensive approach to deal with
victims of abuse.
The minimum age for marriage is 18. With the consent of both a
judge and a guardian, a child as young as 15, in most cases a girl, may
be married. Judicial statistics indicated that in 2008-09 judges
granted consent in 14,000 cases in which at least one person was
between 15 and 18 years old. According to the May 2010 Jordan
Population and Family Health Survey conducted in 2009, 6 percent of
persons between ages 15 and 19 were married, the majority of those
having been married between the ages of 17 and19. Instances of forced
marriage as an alternative to a potential honor killing were reported
in rural areas during the year. Observers note that, if a woman marries
her rapist, according to customary belief, her family members would not
need to kill her to ``preserve the family's honor.''
The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. For information on
international parental child abduction, please see the Department of
State's annual report on compliance at http://travel.state.gov/
abduction/resources/congressreport/congressreport--4308.html, as well
as country-specific information at http://travel.state.gov/abduction/
country/country--3781.html.
Anti-Semitism.--Anti-Semitism was present in the media, and
editorial cartoons, articles, and opinion pieces sometimes depicted
negative images of Jews without government response. Aside from
expatriates, there was no resident Jewish community in the country.
Trafficking in Persons.--For information on trafficking in persons,
please see the Department of State's annual Trafficking in Persons
Report at www.state.gov/g/tip.
Persons With Disabilities.--The law provides equal rights to
persons with disabilities, who numbered around 200,000, according to
government and NGO estimates. The Higher Council for the Affairs of
People with Disabilities works with government ministries, the private
sector, and NGOs to formulate and implement strategies to assist
persons with disabilities. In July 2009 the council issued national
accreditation standards for rehabilitation centers for persons with
disabilities. According to the council there were more than 15,000
students with disabilities attending 255 specialized centers and
schools.
Citizens and NGOs universally reported that persons with
disabilities faced problems accessing education, transportation, and
other services, particularly in rural areas. The Special Buildings Code
Department is tasked to enforce accessibility provisions and oversees
retrofitting of existing buildings to comply with building codes. Many
private and public office buildings continued to have limited or no
access for persons with disabilities.
The law mandates that public and private sector establishments with
between 25 and 50 workers employ at least one person with disabilities,
and establishments with more than 50 workers must reserve 2 percent of
their positions for persons with disabilities. However, these
requirements were rarely enforced. Local organizations received
complaints from persons with disabilities regarding employers who
discriminated against them.
In 2009 the Government provided monetary assistance to citizens
with severe mental and multiple physical disabilities whose families
earned less than 250 dinars ($360) per month, and the higher council
and local NGOs operated assistance programs. During the year the higher
council discontinued financial assistance previously provided to cover
a portion of education, training, or rehabilitation expenses for
persons with disabilities due to budget cuts.
In September the Government announced that it would allow persons
with disabilities to vote with the aid of personal assistants rather
than verbally, ensuring them greater ballot secrecy and electoral
access. Takafo, an NGO aiming to increase voter participation for
persons with disabilities, confirmed that the Government made the
necessary changes for the November 9 parliamentary elections to allow
voters with disabilities greater accessibility and greater ballot
secrecy.
National/Ethnic/Racial Minorities.--There were three groups of
Palestinians residing in the country, many of whom faced some
discrimination. Those who migrated to the country and the Jordan-
controlled West Bank after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war received full
citizenship, as did those who migrated to the country after the 1967
war and hold no residency entitlement in the West Bank. Those still
residing in the West Bank after 1967 were no longer eligible to claim
full citizenship but were allowed to obtain temporary travel documents
without national identification numbers, provided they did not also
carry a Palestinian Authority travel document. These individuals had
access to some government services but paid noncitizen rates at
hospitals, educational institutions, and training centers. Refugees who
fled Gaza after 1967 were not entitled to citizenship and were issued
temporary travel documents without national numbers. These persons had
no access to government services and were almost completely dependent
on UNRWA services.
Several human rights organizations stated that the Ministry of
Interior revoked national numbers of many longtime citizens of
Palestinian origin during the year, despite codified passport issuance
procedures (see section 2.d.).
Palestinians were underrepresented in parliament and senior
positions in the Government and the military, as well as in admission
to public universities. They had limited access to university
scholarships.
During the year there were reports of societal discrimination
against Iraqis living in the country. Some employers reportedly refused
to pay or underpaid Iraqis working illegally, and some landlords
reportedly would not rent or sell to Iraqis.
Societal Abuses, Discrimination, and Acts of Violence Based on
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.--Homosexuality is not illegal
in Jordan; however, societal discrimination against LGBT persons
existed. A number of citizens reported sporadic police mistreatment of
suspected LGBT persons. There were reports of individuals who left the
country due to fear their families would punish them for their sexual
orientation.
In March 2009 the municipality of Amman reportedly denied an
application to establish a gay rights organization.
In 2008 security forces arrested four gays in a park in West Amman
for ``lewd acts'' following a targeted operation by the police. The
individuals were placed in solitary confinement in Jweidah Prison until
they promised that they would not carry out any such acts in the
future.
Other Societal Violence or Discrimination.--HIV/AIDS was a largely
taboo subject. Lack of public awareness remained a problem; many
citizens believed the disease exclusively affected foreigners and gays.
There was a social stigma against HIV-positive individuals in general.
The Government continued efforts to inform the public about the disease
and to eliminate negative attitudes against persons with HIV/AIDS,
including a media strategy launched in September 2009. The Government
continued to test all foreigners annually for HIV/AIDS, hepatitis B,
syphilis, malaria, and tuberculosis, and it deported foreigners who
tested HIV positive.
Section 7. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides citizens working in
the private sector, in some government-owned companies, and in certain
professions in the public sector the right to form and join unions, but
in practice this right was restricted. According to official figures,
more than 10 percent of the workforce was organized into 17 unions
which fall under a government-subsidized centralized federation, the
General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions (GFJTU). On August 15, the
Ministry of Labor issued a temporary law that allows foreign workers to
join unions; however, foreign workers are not permitted to create
unions or hold key positions.
Government influence in union policies and activities reportedly
continued. The Government required unions to be members of the GFJTU,
the sole trade union federation, and new unions must be directly linked
to 17 professions and sectors in which unions already exist before
being approved by the Ministry of Labor. The Government subsidized and
audited the GFJTU's salaries and activities, and it monitored union
elections. Observers noted that the minister of labor may dissolve
unions without judicial due process.
Teachers employed in public schools held several sit-ins during the
year to demand their own professional association and better work
conditions. The Government did not agree to establish an association
but approved the creation of a teachers' union, which would have
broader legal restrictions and less autonomy than associations. As of
year's end, the teachers had not agreed to this proposal and were in
negotiations with the Government. In June the Government forced
approximately 40 teachers, many of whom were actively calling on the
Government to create an independent association, into early retirement
but reinstated them just before school started on September 14.
On July 15, the Government issued an amendment to the labor law
allowing companies with more than 25 employees to form workers'
committees to look into labor conditions. The amendment also allowed up
to 28 days of sick leave per year and the recalculation of annual leave
to exclude weekends.
The law permits workers to strike only under certain conditions,
including a minimum 14 days' notice to both the employer and the
Government. Strikes are prohibited if a labor dispute is under
mediation or arbitration. In practice workers generally went on strike
without notifying the Government in advance, and the union or workers
requested penalty waivers for the illegal strike as part of subsequent
labor negotiations. During the year the gendarmerie broke up one strike
deemed illegal due to lack of prior notice and briefly detained some
strikers.
As of year's end, a joint PSD-gendarmerie investigation continued
into the alleged July 2009 case of gendarmerie forces using excessive
force to break up a sit-in by workers at the general cargo port in
Aqaba. Workers held the two-day sit-in to protest job losses and a
housing compensation agreement connected to the sale of the port. The
Government transferred the strike leader from the port of Aqaba to
another position in Amman. Labor activists and NGOs noted no
significant improvements at the Aqaba port; however, the workers
received some of their demands, such as monetary support of between
3,000 and 5,000 dinars ($4,200-$7,000) for moving expenses.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have the
right to bargain collectively, and in practice the Government respected
this right, although observers stated that the legal procedures are
cumbersome and discourage collective bargaining.
The constitution prohibits antiunion discrimination, and the
Ministry of Labor received no complaints of antiunion discrimination
during the year; however, some nonunionized workers alleged retaliation
from the Government based on strike activity and attempts to organize.
This was particularly the case for foreign workers and contracted
domestic employees, such as day laborers.
Nearly 76 percent of the workers in the qualified industrial zones
(QIZs) were noncitizens and for most of the year were not permitted to
participate in unions or to engage in collective bargaining. As of
year's end, foreign workers were not permitted to form unions but could
join existing unions.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, except in a state of emergency
such as war or natural disaster. However, there were reports of forced
labor, particularly of domestic workers and garment sector factory
workers. With the August 2009 passage of new domestic worker
regulations, labor inspectors have the authority to inspect a labor
complaint in a private home but only after receiving the employer's
permission or with a court order. According to local NGOs, as of year's
end, labor inspectors had not investigated reports of labor abuse in
private homes. Domestic workers can file in-person complaints with the
Ministry of Labor's Domestic Workers Directorate or the PSD; however,
many domestic workers complained that there was no follow up to their
cases either from the Ministry of Labor or the PSD. Domestic workers
are covered by the labor laws, although not fully or effectively.
Women, including some minors with forged documents, from countries
including Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the Philippines migrated to work as
domestic servants, but some were subjected to conditions of forced
labor, including withholding of passports, restrictions on movement,
nonpayment of wages, threats, excessively long working hours, and
physical or sexual abuse. The Philippines, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka
prohibited the emigration of migrant workers for domestic work because
of a high rate of employer abuse of domestic workers and administrative
problems with overstay fines when employers filed to renew the
employees' work permits. However, the prohibition did not reduce the
flow of migrant workers.
During the year an estimated 300 domestic workers from the
Philippines, 275 Indonesian workers, and 400 Sri Lankan workers were
sheltered at their respective embassies in Amman. Most had reportedly
fled some form of forced labor, including unpaid wages and to a lesser
extent sexual or physical abuse. By law employers are responsible for
renewing residency permits but often fail to do this for their domestic
helper employees. As a result most of the embassy-sheltered domestic
workers were considered illegal residents, and many were stranded in
the country because they were unable to pay the daily overstay fees of
1.5 dinars ($3) to depart the country. Due to the large number of
domestic workers sheltered at their respective embassies, the
Government created a working group in August to examine the cases
individually. In some cases this resulted in overstay fines being
waived.
Chinese, Bangladeshi, Indian, Sri Lankan, and Filipino men and
women encountered conditions indicative of forced labor in some garment
sector factories, including unlawful withholding of passports, late or
nonpayment of wages, and excessive overtime. The Government actively
inspected factories and investigated allegations of forced labor in
garment factories, and reports of withholding of passports declined
during the year. The Ministry of Labor required violators to conform to
the requirements of the labor law and other governing legislation and
imposed fines when appropriate. The ministry also publicized the
outcomes of its findings.
Also see the Department of State's annual Trafficking in Persons
Report at www.state.gov/g/tip.
d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment.--The
labor law forbids employment for children younger than 16 years of age,
except as apprentices in nonhazardous positions. The law provides that
employers who hire a child younger than 16 must pay a fine of as much
as 500 dinars ($710), which is doubled for repeat offenses. The law
bans those between the ages of 16 and 18 from working in potentially
hazardous jobs, limits working hours for such children to six hours per
day, mandates one-hour breaks for every four consecutive working hours,
and prohibits these children from working after 8 p.m., on national or
religious holidays, and on weekends.
Children worked in mechanical repair, agriculture, fishing,
construction, and the hotel and restaurant industry, as well as in the
informal sector as street vendors, carpenters, blacksmiths, domestic
workers, and painters, and in small family businesses. Child labor was
reportedly concentrated in larger cities, such as Amman, Zarqa, and
Irbid. A 2008 Department of Statistics study estimated that more than
32,000 children between the ages of five and 17 were working in the
country. Activists estimated the number to be higher, as many
businesses and families tended to hide the practice.
During the year the Ministry of Labor conducted 53,825 labor
inspections including 19,165 child labor visits. In June officials
inspected 412 institutions, issuing warnings to 75 employers and fining
another 19 for recruiting children under the age of 16, mostly in
mechanic shops, bakeries, blacksmith shops, carpentries, restaurants,
and gas stations.
On September 20, the Ministry of Labor reported that 32.4 percent
of working children were in Amman, with the remainder distributed
across the country, mainly in impoverished areas. Eighty-nine percent
of the working children were boys employed in the car repair
(approximately 36 percent), agricultural (27 percent), or hotel and
restaurant (4 percent) sectors.
The Government's capacity to implement and enforce child labor laws
was not sufficient to deter the practice. The Ministry of Labor's Child
Labor Unit coordinates government action regarding child labor and
receives, investigates, and addresses child labor complaints. The unit,
with three employees, coordinated child labor inspections for the 129
labor inspectors.
In 2009 the Government reinstated the National Committee to Combat
Child Labor and initiated development of a new national strategy;
however, as of year's end, the Government had not implemented the new
national strategy. During the year international organizations trained
78 general labor inspectors on techniques of combating child labor.
Sixty-two inspectors participated in several labor training courses
during the year.
Labor inspectors issue fines for child labor violations but
reportedly attempt alternative approaches first, such as ensuring safe
work conditions and cooperating with employers to permit working
children to attend school concurrently.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The national minimum wage was
150 dinars ($213) per month, which did not provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. Ministry of Labor inspectors enforced
the minimum wage but were unable to ensure full compliance due to
limited resources.
The law requires overtime pay for hours worked in excess of the 48-
hour standard workweek. The law prohibits compulsory overtime but
allows the employer to require the employee to work more than 48 hours
a week for specific purposes, such as conducting an annual inventory,
closing accounts, preparing to sell goods at discounted prices,
avoiding loss to goods that would otherwise be exposed to damage, and
receiving special deliveries. In such cases actual working hours may
not exceed 10 hours per day, the employee must be paid overtime, and
the period may not last more than 30 days. Employees can lodge a
complaint directly with the Ministry of Labor or through organizations
such as their union or the NCHR. Employees are entitled to one day off
per week. Provisions for domestic workers were similar.
The law specifies a number of health and safety requirements that
the Ministry of Labor is authorized to enforce; however, workers do not
have a statutory right to remove themselves from hazardous conditions
without risking the loss of their jobs and may be fired if they attempt
to do so. Foreign workers were more susceptible to dangerous or unfair
conditions.
Foreign workers, who make up the vast majority of workers in the
QIZs and Export Processing Zones, were vulnerable to poor work
conditions such as mandatory overtime, withholding of passports, and
unacceptable living conditions in dorms. On August 18, the Phoenix
Center for Economic and Informatics Studies issued a report claiming
that approximately 10,000 attendants and cafeteria staff in the health
support services sector were denied basic rights such as annual leave,
health and safety conditions, and minimum wage as guaranteed under the
labor law. The report indicated that a majority of the 23,000 day
laborers were being denied their rights to job security and safety.
Throughout the year day laborers held several strikes and sit-ins to
demand job security, payment of overdue wages, and wage increases.
On December 1, the Government issued a directive making the
International Labor Organization project, Better Work Jordan, mandatory
in all garment factories in the country. The project aimed to improve
labor standards compliance through monitoring of factories and
reporting on conditions as well as providing technical assistance.
__________
KUWAIT
Kuwait is a constitutional, hereditary emirate ruled by the Al
Sabah family. The country has a population of 3.44 million, of whom 1.1
million are citizens. Local observers and the press considered the May
16, 2009, parliamentary election generally free and fair. Security
forces reported to civilian authorities.
Principal human rights problems included limitations on citizens'
right to change their government. There were reports of security forces
abusing prisoners. Authorities limited freedoms of speech, press,
assembly, association, and religion. The Government limited freedom of
movement for certain groups, including foreign workers and stateless
Arab residents (called ``Bidoon''). The status of the Bidoon remained
unresolved and they faced social and legal discrimination. Trafficking
in persons remained a problem. Women did not enjoy equal rights. Worker
rights were limited, and expatriate workers were subject to severe
limitations of rights and discrimination as well, especially in the
domestic and unskilled service sectors.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no
reports that the Government or its agents committed arbitrary or
unlawful killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Articles 53, 159, and 184 of the criminal law code
prohibit torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or
punishment; however, there were reports that some police and members of
the security forces abused detainees during the year. Police and
security forces were more likely to inflict such abuse on noncitizens,
particularly non-Gulf Arabs and Asians, and there were several reported
accounts of police abuse of transgender persons. The Government stated
that it investigated all allegations of abuse and punished some of the
offenders; however, in most cases the Government did not make public
either the findings of its investigations or any punishments it imposed
(see section 6).
In February the Court of Appeals upheld a two-year prison sentence
for three police officers accused of torturing a young man in prison in
2008.
There were no further developments concerning the allegations that
security officials abused hundreds of Bangladeshi workers in the wake
of 2008 labor strikes.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions.--The Ministry of Interior
permitted independent monitoring of prison conditions by international
and local human rights groups, the media, and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC visited all three prisons
and the detention center and, unlike in 2009, the Government did not
obstruct representatives of the Kuwait Human Rights Society from
visiting prisons several prisoners during the year.
The Central Prison Complex houses the country's only three prisons:
a low-security men's prison, a high-security men's prison, and a
women's prison. The prison complex exceeded its 3,200-person capacity;
there were 201 inmates in the women's prison and 3,978 inmates in the
men's prisons. Within the prisons, juveniles were detained separately
from adults. The country also has a 1,000-person capacity deportation
center in Talha that is not part of the prison complex. Some detention
facilities lacked adequate sanitation and sufficient medical staff.
There were reports of security forces abusing prisoners.
Prisoners had reasonable access to personal visitors and were
permitted religious observance. Authorities permitted prisoners and
detainees to submit complaints to judicial authorities without
censorship and to request investigation of credible allegations of
inhumane conditions.
Ombudsmen may not serve on behalf of prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention.--The law prohibits arbitrary
arrest and detention, and the Government observed these prohibitions,
apart from a few reports that police arbitrarily arrested nonnationals.
Role of the Police and Security Apparatus.--The police have sole
responsibility for the enforcement of laws not related to national
security, and State Security oversees intelligence and national
security matters; both are under the purview of civilian Interior
Ministry authorities. The military is responsible for external
security.
The police were generally effective in carrying out core
responsibilities. There were reports that some police stations did not
take seriously the requests of complainants, especially foreign
nationals. In cases of alleged police abuse, the district chief
investigator examines abuse allegations and refers cases to the courts
for trial; there was no evidence of police impunity.
Security forces sometimes failed to respond effectively to societal
violence against family members or domestic workers.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention.--A police
officer generally must obtain an arrest warrant from a state prosecutor
or a judge before making an arrest, except in cases of hot pursuit.
There were few reports of police arresting and detaining foreign
nationals without a warrant during the year. The courts generally do
not accept cases without warrants issued prior to arrests. Detainees
were generally allowed access to their lawyers and family members.
However, in compliance with the penal code a suspected criminal may be
held at a police station without charge for as long as four days,
during which time authorities may prevent lawyers and family members
from visiting. During this time lawyers are permitted to attend legal
proceedings but are not allowed to have direct contact with their
clients. The law provides the detained person the right to a prompt
judicial determination about the detention's legality; however, this
right was not always respected. If charges are filed, a prosecutor may
remand a suspect to detention for an additional 21 days. Detainees were
informed promptly of the charges against them. Prosecutors also may
obtain court orders for further detention pending trial. There is a
functioning bail system for defendants awaiting trial. The bar
association provides lawyers for indigent defendants; in these cases
defendants do not have the option of choosing which lawyer will be
assigned to them.
Of the 4,179 persons serving sentences or detained pending trial,
an estimated 150 were held in the ``state security ward'' on security
grounds, including some held for collaborating with Iraq during the
1990-91 occupation. On March 23, the Ministry of Interior, in
cooperation with the Kuwait Red Crescent Society, arranged for six
Iraqi families to visit their relatives, imprisoned since 1991 for
collaborating with Iraq during the occupation.
Arbitrarily lengthy detention before trial was a problem, and
approximately 10 percent of the prison population consisted of pretrial
detainees. Pretrial detainees were held separately from convicted
prisoners.
During the year foreign nationals at the Talha Deportation Center
were generally incarcerated between 10 days and two months awaiting
deportation. Some prisoners were held for longer periods if they lacked
required travel documents. There were reports of security forces
abusing prisoners in the deportation center.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
independent judiciary and the right to a fair trial and states that
``judges shall not be subject to any authority;'' however, the emir
appoints all judges, and the renewal of judicial appointments is
subject to government approval. Judges who are citizens have lifetime
appointments; however, many judges are noncitizens who hold one- to
three-year renewable contracts. The Ministry of Justice may remove
judges for cause but rarely does so. Foreign residents involved in
legal disputes with citizens frequently claimed the courts showed bias
in favor of citizens.
Trial Procedures.--By law, criminal trials are public unless a
court or the Government decides the ``maintenance of public order'' or
the ``preservation of public morals'' necessitates closed proceedings.
There is no trial by jury. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence
and have the rights to confront their accusers and to appeal verdicts.
Defendants in felony cases are required by law to be represented in
court by legal counsel, which the courts provide in criminal cases. The
bar association is obligated upon court request to appoint an attorney
without charge for indigent defendants in civil, commercial, and
criminal cases, and defendants used these services. Defendants have the
right to confront witnesses against them and to present their own
witnesses. Defendants and their attorneys generally have access to
government-held evidence relevant to their cases and to appeal their
cases to a higher court. The law affords these protections to all
citizens.
Political Prisoners and Detainees.--There were no reports of
political prisoners or detainees.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies.--The law provides for an
independent and impartial judiciary in civil matters; however, rulings
occasionally were not enforced. Administrative punishments, such as
travel bans, are also available in civil matters.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law provides for individual privacy and the
sanctity of the home, and the Government generally respected these
rights in practice. The law permits security forces to monitor private
communications with the approval of the attorney general, and this
monitoring occurred occasionally.
The law forbids marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men
and requires male citizens serving in the police force or military to
obtain government approval to marry foreign nationals. In practice the
Government offered only nonbinding advice in such matters and did not
prevent any such marriages.
The Government may deny a citizenship application by a Bidoon
resident based on security or criminal violations committed by the
individual's family members.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press ``in accordance with the conditions
and in the circumstances defined by law.'' In practice the Government
sometimes did not respect these rights, and journalists and publishers
practiced self-censorship. Restrictions on the country's press freedoms
increased during the year.
The Government restricted freedoms of the press and of speech,
particularly in instances related to national security. The law also
specifically prohibits the publication of material insulting Islam, the
emir, the constitution, or the neutrality of the courts or public
prosecutor's office. The law mandates jail terms for anyone who
``defames religion,'' and any Muslim citizen may file criminal charges
against an author the citizen believes has defamed Islam, the ruling
family, or public morals. The number of such cases filed against
journalists and television stations continued to increase
significantly; 678 were filed during the year, most of which resulted
in fines. In comparison, fewer than 200 were filed in 2009.
Pointed criticism of other ministers and other high-ranking
government officials continued to be widespread and was permitted.
During the reporting period, several individuals were charged with
insulting the ruling family and, under separate legal provisions,
slandering the prime minister.
On March 7, parliamentarian Muhammad Hayef was fined 3,000 dinars
(approximately $10,400) for comments he made in parliament during the
May 2009 session deemed insulting to the ruling family. The daily
newspaper Al-Ruia, which published his comments, was fined the same
amount.
Also on March 7, parliamentarian Marzouk al-Ghanem and the
newspaper Al-Nahar were each fined 3,000 dinars ($10,400) for an
article deemed insulting to the ruling family.
On June 30, National Democratic Alliance head and Member of the
National Assembly Khaled al-Fadala was sentenced to three months in
prison and fined 150 dinars (approximately $525) for slandering the
prime minister. On July 12, an appeals court released al-Fadala after
reducing his sentence from three months to ten days.
On December 13 authorities shut the local offices of the Al-Jazeera
TV network and withdrew its accreditation after it broadcast footage of
police using force to break up an unauthorized gathering of
oppositions, and subsequently gave airtime to opposition
parliamentarians who strongly criticized the Government for the
police's actions.
Journalist Muhammad Abdulqader al-Jassem continued facing various
charges of insulting public officials. A lower court sentenced al-
Jassem on April 1 to six months in jail and fined him 5,000 dinar
(approximately $17,400) for making slanderous remarks about the prime
minister in 2009, but an appeals court overturned the conviction on
July 12. Police rearrested al-Jassem on May 11 on separate charges of
undermining the emir's status, attacking the regime, and spreading
false information damaging to the country's national interests. On June
28, after posting a 2,000-dinar (approximately $7,000) bail, al-Jassem
was released. The case was pending at year's end.
On November 22, in a third case of allegedly defaming the prime
minister in a blog post, which claimed that the premier engaged in
embezzlement, money laundering, and association with Iranian
intelligence agents, a court convicted and sentenced al-Jassem to one
year in prison. On December 15, the sentence was reduced to three
months following an appeal.
Throughout the year the Government restricted media freedoms on
national security grounds. On May 4, citing security concerns, an order
prohibited the media from publishing any more reports about the alleged
dismantling of an Iranian spy network.
On September 20, the Government revoked the citizenship of exiled
Shia cleric Yasser al-Habib on the grounds that he disparaged the wife
and companions of the Prophet Muhammad. The Government briefly
detained, but did not charge, Sunni Islamist Mubarak al-Bathali who, in
response to al-Habib's statements, advocated violence against the Shia
community and two Shia parliamentarians.
On October 13, police arrested the owner of the Scope TV channel,
Fajr al-Saeed, on charges that her channel's airing of the satirical
comedy Sawtak Wasal (Your Voice Has Been Heard) fomented insurrection.
On October 14, Al-Saeed's case was transferred to a criminal court
where it was pending at year's end.
On October 17, relatives of Faisal al-Homoud al-Malik al-Sabah, who
believed he had been slandered by al-Saeed's brother, talk show host
Muhammad Talal al-Saeed, attacked the Scope TV office.
On December 12, police arrested Kuwait University law professor
Obaid al-Wasmi, who had taken part in a December 8 diwaniya, an
informal weekly social and political gathering that has generally been
considered a space for free and open discourse on economic, political,
and social issues, at parliamentarian Jam'an al-Hirbish's home that was
deemed illegal and subsequently broken up by the police. Al-Wasmi was
charged with spreading false news abroad, taking part in a public
gathering with criminal intent, exhorting the security forces not to
break up the diwaniya (i.e., to disobey a lawful instruction), and
infringing on the emir's authority. His case was pending at year's end.
All print media were privately owned, although their independence
was limited. They exhibited a diversity of opinion, but censored
themselves to avoid criminal charges or fines, or to keep their
licenses. All forms of media may be banned by the Ministry of Commerce
at the request of the Ministry of Information.
By law newspaper publishers must obtain an operating license from
the Ministry of Information. Publishers may lose their licenses if
their publications do not appear for three months in the case of a
daily newspaper, or six months in the case of a less frequent
publication.
There were no developments in the case former parliamentary
candidate Muhammad al-Juwaihel, arrested in 2009 on charges of
unlicensed broadcasting, making false claims, and compromising national
security. The Government filed charges for public remarks broadcast by
al-Juwaihel on his satellite outlet in which he reportedly insulted
certain parliamentarians and made derogatory comments about Kuwaitis
with dual citizenship and those of tribal and Bidoon origin. He was
released on a 5,000-dinar (approximately $17,400) bail in December
2009.
Fuad al-Hashem of the daily newspaper Al-Watan continued to refuse
to pay a 2008 fine of 7,190 dinars (approximately $25,000) for
defamation as a result of convictions in three cases brought to court
by the Qatari prime minister, who accused al-Hashem of harming his
reputation in articles dealing with his relations with Israel.
The Ministry of Information censored all books, commercial films,
periodicals, videotapes, CDs, DVDs, and other imported material that it
deemed morally offensive, although satellite dishes were widely
available and allowed some citizens to receive unfiltered media.
According to Ministry of Information censorship guidelines, material
offensive to Islam or other religions, material which insults the emir
and crown prince, and the display of immoral conduct are prohibited.
The ministry also controlled the publication and distribution of
all informational materials. In October, before the annual Kuwait
international book fair, the ministry added 25 books to the thousands
of titles already banned for being ``contrary to the fair and state
policies.'' The newly forbidden titles included Egyptian Alaa al-
Aswani's bestselling novel ``The Yacoubian Building.''
Internet Freedom.--According to International Telecommunications
Union statistics for 2009, approximately 39 percent of the country's
inhabitants used the Internet. The Government monitored Internet
communications, such as blogs and discussion groups, for defamation and
security reasons. The Ministry of Communications continued to block Web
sites considered to ``incite terrorism and instability'' and required
Internet service providers to block religious and pornographic Web
sites that ``violate Kuwait's customs and traditions,'' in addition to
political sites which the Government finds offensive. For example, the
Web site of UK-based Shia cleric Yasser al-Habib was blocked. There
were reports that the Government attempted to collect the personally
identifiable information of a person in connection with that person's
peaceful expression of political, religious, or ideological opinion or
beliefs. Internet cafe owners were obligated to obtain the names and
civil identification numbers of customers and to submit the information
to the Ministry of Communication upon request.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events.--The law provides for freedom
of opinion and of research; however, academic freedom was limited by
self-censorship, and the law prohibits academics from criticizing the
emir or Islam.
The Ministry of Interior reserved the right to approve or reject
annual public events and rejected those it considered politically or
morally inappropriate.
According to the Middle East Studies Association, on February 11
the Government revoked an entry visa for Madawi al-Rasheed, a professor
at King's College London, who was scheduled to give a public lecture in
the country on ``Suspended Political Reform in the Arab World'' to the
Institute for Women's Development and Training. Although authorities
issued a visa on January 26, it was reportedly revoked due to al-
Rasheed's widely published theories that conservative Islam inhibits
democratization. The Government gave no official reason for denying al-
Rasheed's entry.
In December 2009 authorities denied entry to Egyptian Qur'anic
scholar Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd on the grounds that his already approved
visa was invalid. Abu Zayd was scheduled to give two lectures on
``Religious Reform in the Constitutional State'' and on ``Women's
Issues: Between the Qur'an and Accepted Jurisprudential Thought.''
There were no updates in the Commercial Attorney's Office's
investigation of a hotel owner and party organizers for sponsoring a
mixed-gender dance in 2008.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom of
Assembly.--The law provides for freedom of assembly. Organizers of
public gatherings of more than 20 persons must obtain prior approval
from the Ministry of Interior.
Many adult male citizens, including members of the Government and
of the National Assembly, and increasing numbers of female citizens,
hosted or attended diwaniyas. A few women held female-only diwaniyas,
and a small number of diwaniyas were open to both sexes.
Authorities curbed freedom of assembly in some political or
security-related cases. On April 10, the Government deported 17
Egyptian expatriates who participated in a meeting in support of
Egyptian opposition presidential candidate Muhammad El Baradei on the
grounds that the assembly was not approved by the Ministry of Interior.
On September 13, the Government invoked the 1979 Public Gatherings
Law (which had previously been only sporadically enforced) to ban
gatherings of more than 20 persons in an effort to head off sectarian
strife resulting from an exiled Shia cleric's disparaging the Prophet
Muhammad's wife. On December 8, in accordance with the same law, the
emir issued a formal decree banning outdoor public gatherings exceeding
20 persons. Later that day Ministry of Interior forces enforced the
decree, forcibly shutting down a seminar at Member of Parliament Jam'an
al-Hirbish's diwaniya, which the Government contended was an illegal
public gathering. On December 14, the police disbanded another similar
public gathering without incident.
Freedom of Association.--The law provides for freedom of
association; however, the Government restricted this right in practice.
The law prohibits officially licensed groups from engaging in political
activities.
The Government uses its power to license associations as a means of
political control. There were 73 officially licensed nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) in the country, including a bar association,
professional groups, and scientific bodies. The Ministry of Social
Affairs and Labor (MOSAL) did not license any new NGOs during the year.
There remained 149 NGOs pending licensing by the MOSAL; many have been
waiting years for approval.
The 45 NGOs licensed prior to 2004 continued to receive an annual
government subsidy of 12,000 dinars (approximately $41,800) for their
operating expenses, including travel to international conferences. NGOs
licensed since 2004, when the MOSAL resumed issuing licenses following
a period of refusing to do so, received no financial assistance. The
only local independent NGOs dedicated specifically to human rights were
the Kuwait Human Rights Society and the Kuwaiti Society for Fundamental
Human Rights. The MOSAL rejected some license requests on the grounds
that established NGOs already provided services similar to those the
petitioners proposed. It can also reject an NGO's application if it
deems that the NGO does not provide a public service. The minister has
discretion to change a proposed NGO's name prior to licensing and
sometimes did so on the grounds that the name was too close to that of
an already existing NGO. Members of licensed NGOs must obtain
permission from the MOSAL to attend international conferences as
official representatives of their organization. The degree of
government supervision and financing called into question the NGOs'
independence and nongovernmental status.
There were dozens of unlicensed civic groups, clubs, and unofficial
NGOs in the country. These unofficial associations did not receive
government subsidies and had no legal status.
c. Freedom of Religion.--For a complete description of religious
freedom, see the 2010 International Religious Freedom Report at
www.state.gov/g/drl//irf/rpt.
d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of
Refugees, and Stateless Persons.--The constitution generally provides
for freedom of movement within the country; however, numerous laws
constrain foreign travel, and the Government placed some limits on
freedom of movement in practice. Although the Government contributed
288,000 dinars (approximately $1 million) to the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) during the year, it was uncooperative
with most UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations' efforts to
provide implementation of protection and assistance to refugees,
returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other
persons of concern.
Women and Bidoon faced problems with or restrictions on foreign
travel. In October 2009 the Constitutional Court issued and began
enforcing a final ruling confirming a woman's right to obtain a
passport without her husband's approval. However, a husband may still
request that immigration authorities prevent his wife's departure from
the country for up to 24 hours, after which a court order may extend
the travel ban. The Government restricted the ability of the Bidoon
population to travel abroad. It permitted some Bidoon to travel to
Saudi Arabia for the annual hajj and continued to issue ``Article 17''
passports (temporary travel documents that do not confer nationality)
for Bidoon.
The law also permits travel bans on citizens or foreigners accused
or suspected of violating the law, and it allows other citizens to
petition authorities to do so. In practice, this resulted in arbitrary
delays and difficulties for citizens or foreigners in leaving the
country.
The law prohibits the deportation or forced exile of citizens,
although the Government can revoke citizenship of naturalized citizens
for various causes, including felony conviction, and subsequently
deport individuals. The Government cannot revoke the citizenship of an
individual who is born a citizen, unless that individual has obtained a
second nationality, which is against the country's law.
During the year several hundred Bidoon emigrated.
Protection of Refugees.--The country is not a party to the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or the 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees. The laws do not provide for
granting asylum or refugee status. There is no system for providing
protection to refugees, and the Government did not grant refugee status
or asylum during the year. The country's immigration regulations
prohibit local settlement for asylum seekers. In practice, however, the
Government provided protection against the expulsion or return of
refugees to countries where their lives or freedom would be threatened
on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion. The constitution
prohibits the extradition of political refugees; the Government often
kept such persons in detention until they agreed to return to their
home country or made alternative travel arrangements, and it rarely
granted them permission to live and work in the country.
Stateless Persons.--According to the law, citizenship is derived
entirely from the father; children born to citizen mothers and
nonnational fathers do not inherit citizenship unless the mother is
divorced or widowed from the nonnational father. The law further fails
to provide nonnationals, including Bidoon and non-Muslims, a clear or
defined opportunity to gain nationality. In July, the Ministry of
Interior issued a regulation that allows female citizens to sponsor
their nonnational children (regardless of their age) and husbands for
residency permits.
Although the exact number of Bidoon residents was unknown, the
Ministry of Planning estimated there were more than 100,000 Bidoon in
the country at the end of 2006, the last year the Government collected
those statistics. The Government continued to discriminate against
Bidoon in areas such as education, employment, medical care, and
freedom of movement. Bidoon children may not attend public schools. The
Government accepted Bidoon in some government positions. Although some
Bidoon worked in the armed forces or police and there are no legal
strictures that prevent their service, the Bidoon have effectively been
barred from enlisting in either force since 1985. Bidoon often faced
difficulty in qualifying for the subsidized health care that citizens
received, and the Government also made it difficult for Bidoon to
obtain official documents necessary for employment or travel, such as
birth certificates, civil identification cards, driver licenses, and
marriage certificates.
On March 19, the National Assembly's Health and Labor Committee
issued a two-month ultimatum for the Ministry of Health to issue birth
certificates to Bidoon newborns. On May 18, the Council of Ministers
passed a resolution to issue birth certificates to all children of
citizens married to Bidoon women. This resolution was based on
precedents set in 2009. In March 2009 the Court of First Instance
issued a marriage certificate to a Bidoon woman married to a citizen.
In April 2009 and again in May 2009, the same court affirmed a Bidoon
man's right to receive a marriage certificate and birth certificates
for his children. Neither the justice nor health ministry complied with
these 2009 court orders or the resolution of the Council of Ministers
during the year.
During the year as in 2009, the Government did not grant
citizenship to any Bidoon. More than 80,000 Bidoon citizenship requests
were pending at year's end. Many Bidoon were unable to provide
documentation proving sufficient ties to the country or to present
evidence of their original nationality. However, the Government
maintained that the vast majority of Bidoon were concealing their true
identities and were not actually stateless.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens had only a limited, indirect impact on control of the
executive branch, as the constitution stipulates that the country is a
hereditary emirate. The 50 elected National Assembly members (along
with government-appointed ministers) must by majority vote approve the
emir's choice of crown prince (the future emir). The crown prince must
meet three requirements: that he has attained the age of majority, is
of sound mind, and is a legitimate son of Muslim parents. The National
Assembly may remove the emir from power with a two-thirds majority vote
if it finds that any of these three conditions is no longer accurate.
The law provides citizens with the right to change their
representatives in the legislative branch of government, and citizens
exercised this right in practice through elections.
Elections and Political Participation.--In May 2009, two months
after the emir dissolved the National Assembly, a parliamentary
election was held that was generally considered free and fair. It was
the third election in three years, due to the emir's constitutional
dissolutions of parliament in May 2006, March 2008, and March 2009.
The Government did not recognize any political parties or allow
their formation, although no formal law bans political parties. Several
tribal affiliations and well-organized unofficial blocs operated as
political groupings and held illegal primary elections to maximize
their impact in National Assembly. Tribal leaders excluded women from
the tribal primaries. Assembly candidates must nominate themselves as
individuals and may run for election in any of the country's electoral
districts. Tribes dominated two of the five constituencies and exerted
influence on the other three.
Section 4. Official Corruption and Government Transparency
The law mandates criminal penalties for official corruption;
however, the Government did not implement the law effectively, and on
occasion officials were believed to have engaged in corrupt practices
with impunity. The Audit Bureau is the Government agency responsible
for combating government corruption, and though it and a government-
formed committee reported various allegations of corruption and
irregularities, there were no public high-profile corruption cases
before the courts during the year. Parliament also frequently announced
inquiries into suspected misuses of public funds, but none of these
resulted in prosecution during the year. The World Bank's Worldwide
Governance Indicators for 2009 reflected a decline from 2008 in public
authorities' perceived control of corruption, which remained a problem.
There were also reports of citizens' complaints about having to pay
intermediaries to receive routine government services. Additionally,
there were some reports of police corruption, especially when one party
to a dispute had a personal relationship with a police official
involved in a case. In addition, there were widespread reports that
police showed favoritism towards citizens.
The Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Labor revealed dozens of cases during the year of ministry employees
forging documents to enable the importation of foreign workers.
Violations were referred to investigative bodies within the ministries
and then sent to the attorney general's office for action. Courts
rarely took rigorous action against the violators.
Public officials were not subject to financial disclosure laws.
The law provides for public access to unclassified government
information by citizens and noncitizens alike. The Government enforced
the law.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government restricted the operations of domestic and
international human rights groups and limits cooperation with them. The
law permits the existence of NGOs; however, the Government continued to
deny licenses to some NGOs. NGOs may not engage in political activity
and are prohibited from encouraging sectarianism. They must also
demonstrate that their existence is in the public interest. The only
local independent NGOs dedicated specifically to human rights were the
Kuwait Human Rights Society (KHRS) and the Kuwaiti Society for
Fundamental Human Rights. Local licensed NGOs devoted to specific
groups, such as women, children, foreign workers, prisoners, and
persons with disabilities, were permitted to operate without government
interference. A few dozen local unlicensed human rights groups operated
without government restriction during the year. The Government and
various National Assembly committees met regularly with local NGOs, and
responded to their inquiries.
The Government permitted international human rights organizations
to visit the country. In January, Human Rights Watch officials visited
and conducted interviews, including with government officials,
principally concerning the protection of foreign domestic workers.
The Government cooperated with international governmental
organizations and permitted visits of their representatives. On her
visit on April 20-21, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay
emphasized the desirability of eliminating the labor sponsorship system
requiring migrant works to secure local sponsors.
The National Assembly's Human Rights Committee, which operates
independently of the Government, is an advisory body that primarily
hears individual complaints of human rights abuses. Committee members
also visited the Central Prison during the year (see section 1.c.). The
committee had access to adequate resources and was considered
effective; it did not issue reports.
Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
The law prohibits discrimination based on race, origin, disability,
or language; discrimination based on social status is not addressed. In
practice the Government did not uniformly or consistently enforce laws
against discrimination, and a number of laws and regulations
discriminated against women, Bidoon, noncitizens, and domestic and
expatriate workers.
Women.--Violence against women continued to be a problem. Rape
carries a maximum penalty of death, which the country occasionally
imposed for the crime; however, spousal rape is not a crime. The media
reported hundreds of rape cases during the year. Many of the victims
were noncitizen domestic workers. Police occasionally arrested alleged
rapists, and several were tried and convicted during the year; however,
laws against rape were not always enforced effectively to protect
noncitizen women.
According to foreign diplomatic sources, victims reported that the
majority of police stations and hospitals handled their cases in a
professional way.
The law does not specifically prohibit domestic violence; cases are
tried instead as assault, and a victim of domestic violence may file a
complaint with police requesting formal charges be brought against the
alleged abuser. On March 21, the MOSAL released the results of an
interministerial study of domestic violence, drawn from a sample of
1,569 families. The study defined the phenomenon as physical, material,
psychological, and sexual violence and found the causes to be divorce,
continued disputes between the couples, deviation, infidelity, and
psychological problems. One-third of the families reported that they
had experienced domestic violence; 17 percent of women reported that
they had experienced it, compared to 42 percent of men.
Each of the country's 83 police stations reportedly received
complaints of domestic abuse. However, poor incentive to report abuse
resulted from the strong social stigma associated with publicly
acknowledging such problems. Even with documented evidence of the
abuse--such as eyewitness accounts, hospital reports, and social worker
testimony--police officials rarely arrested perpetrators of domestic
violence. Noncitizen women married to citizens reported domestic abuse
and inaction or discrimination by police during the year. A woman may
petition for divorce based on injury from abuse, but the law does not
provide a clear legal standard as to what constitutes injury. In
addition, a woman must provide at least two male witnesses (or a male
witness and two female witnesses) to attest to the injury.
Although courts found husbands guilty of spousal abuse in previous
years, most domestic abuse cases were not reported, especially outside
the capital, and individuals reportedly bribed police officials to
ignore domestic abuse charges. Abusive husbands, if convicted, rarely
faced severe penalties. There were no shelters or hotlines specifically
for victims of domestic violence, although a temporary shelter for
domestic workers housed victims during the year.
Honor crimes, according to the penal code, are penalized as
misdemeanors. The law states that a man who sees his wife, daughter,
mother, or sister in the ``act of adultery'' and immediately kills her
and/or the man with whom she is committing adultery faces a maximum
punishment of three years' imprisonment and a 225 dinars (approximately
$800) fine, slightly less than a month's earnings at the public sector
minimum wage. There were no reported honor crimes in recent years.
There is no specific law that addresses sexual harassment; however,
the law criminalizes ``encroachment on honor,'' which encompasses
everything from touching a woman against her will to rape, and police
strictly enforced this law. During the year, the Government deployed
female police officers specifically to combat sexual harassment in
shopping malls and other public spaces. Perpetrators face fines and
jail time. Human rights groups characterized sexual harassment against
women in the workplace as a pervasive, yet unreported, problem.
There were no reports of interference in the right to decide freely
and responsibly the number, spacing, and timing of children, matters
subject to agreement between husband and wife. Decisions regarding
access to contraceptives, family size, and procedures involving
reproductive and fertility treatments required the consent of both
husband and wife. The information and means to make those decisions, as
well as skilled attendance during childbirth were freely available.
There was no formal family planning program; oral contraceptives were
available over the counter. Women had ready access to essential
obstetric and postpartum care. According to estimates developed by the
World Health Organization, the UN Children's Fund, the United Nations
Population Fund, and the World Bank, there were approximately nine
maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in the country in 2008.
Information was not available regarding diagnosis and treatment of
sexually transmitted infections.
Women have some political rights; however, they do not enjoy the
same rights as men under family law, property law, or in the judicial
system, and they continued to face discrimination in many social and
legal areas. Nevertheless, some women attained prominent positions in
government and business. A parliamentary committee for women's and
family affairs exists, and female parliamentarians made up four of its
five members.
Women continued to experience legal, economic, and social
discrimination. Sharia (Islamic law) discriminates against women in
judicial proceedings, freedom of movement, and marriage. Inheritance is
also governed by Sharia, which varies according to the school of
Islamic jurisprudence that different populations in the country follow.
In the absence of a direct male heir, a Shia woman may inherit all
property, while a Sunni woman inherits only a portion, with the balance
divided among brothers, uncles, and male cousins of the deceased.
When the children o