side. The gentlewoman from California (Ms. ESHOO) will control 1 minute, and the gentleman from California (Mr. COX) will control 1 minute.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRIES

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from California (Mr. COX) is for the bill and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. ESHOO) is for the bill. They are going to share the time equally, half the time over there and half the time to the supporters on this side? I am curious, is that a fair ruling?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair heard no objection to the unanimous consent request.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Speaker, it is my understanding that the proponents of the bill would like to insert a statement to put in as an addition to the debate. Instead of taking up 2 minutes, can we just do it by unanimous consent? That way we do not have to worry about division of time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Colloquy must be spoken and not inserted in the record.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from California?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from California (Ms. ESHOO) is recognized for 1 minute.

Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute, and would ask the gentleman from California (Mr. COX) to begin the colloquy.

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?

Ms. ESHOO. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from California, the coauthor of the bill, for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, earlier on the floor we had discussed our understanding, our clear understanding, that Congress did not, in adopting the Reform Act, intend to alter standards of liability under the Exchange Act. I would add, and I believe the gentlewoman is in agreement, that in Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme Court left open the question of whether conduct that was not intentional was sufficient for liability under the Federal securities laws. The Supreme Court has never answered that question. The court expressly reserved the question of whether reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in a subsequent case, Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, where it stated, ''We have explicitly left open the question of whether recklessness satisfies of the scienter requirement.''

The Reform Act did not alter the standard for liability under the Exchange Act. The question was expressly left open by the Reform Act for resolution by the Supreme Court on the basis of the statutory language of the Exchange Act.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo) has expired.

The gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, I will just ask the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo), if that is her understanding as well?

Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COX of California. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.

Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, that is my understanding. I thank everyone concerned for the additional time in the debate. This is important language supported by certainly the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and I think it will serve the House well.

Mr. DAVIS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, as a cosponsor of this legislation, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1689, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act. This bipartisan initiative is narrowly tailored to address a problem which has arisen since enactment of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. While the 1995 Act was designed to help end abuses in Federal securities class actions, these reforms have been subverted through the use of State courts, undermining the potential benefits to investors, consumers, workers, and the overall economy.

This bill prevents plaintiffs from circumventing the reforms enacted in 1995 by creating a uniform standard for class action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities. The principle behind this legislation is simple. Nationally traded securities, which are primarily regulated by the Federal Government, should be subject to Federal securities law. By establishing fair and consistent rules, Congress not only will protect companies from abuses in class action lawsuits but also will improve the climate for greater forward-looking disclosures for investors.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to support this common-sense legislation and reinforce the reforms that Congress passed by an overwhelming majority in 1995.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. BLILEY) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1689, as amended.

The question was taken.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 5, rule I, and the Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO TERRORISTS THREATENING TO DISRUPT MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, without objection, referred to the Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:

I hereby report to the Congress on the developments concerning the national emergency with respect to terrorists who threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process that was declared in Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 1995. This report is submitted pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c), and section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c).

1. On January 23, 1995, I signed Executive Order 12947, ''Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process'' (the ''Order'') (60 Fed. Reg. 5079, January 25, 1995). The Order blocks all property subject to U.S. jurisdiction in which there is any interest of 12 terrorist organizations that threaten the Middle East peace process as identified in an Annex to the Order. The Order also blocks the property and interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction of persons designated by the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, who are found (1) to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of violence that have the purpose or effect of disrupting the Middle East peace process, or (2) to assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or services in support of, such acts of violence. In addition, the Order blocks all property and interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction in which there is any interest of persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of, any other person designated pursuant to the Order (collectively ''Specially Designated Terrorists'' or ''SDTs'').

The Order further prohibits any transaction or dealing by a United States person or within the United States in property or interests in property of SDTs, including the making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of such persons. This prohibition includes donations that are intended to relieve human suffering.

Designations of persons blocked pursuant to the Order are effective upon the date of determination by the Secretary of State or her delegate, or the