[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 34 (Thursday, March 21, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2245-S2247]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NEXT STEPS IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN
Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, I will ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the Record a very thoughtful speech by my colleague, Mr.
Biden, on U.S. policy toward Iran, which he delivered before the
American-Iranian Council on March 13, 2002.
Mr. Biden offers a realistic assessment of the challenges of dealing
with a divided government in Iran, where an unelected, ``hardcore
clique'' holds the key levers of power and thwarts the democratic will
of the vast majority of Iranians.
More significantly, he lists five specific steps that the United
States can take to increase Iran's international linkages and reach out
to those in Iran who take risks to bring about change and reform. Mr.
Biden's speech has touched off a spirited debate in Iran about how to
respond to his initiative.
Like my colleague from Delaware, I do not believe that our many
differences with the Islamic Republic of Iran should close off
opportunities to influence Iranian behavior and work together
constructively when we may share common interests, such as in
Afghanistan; assisting with and re-locating refugees displaced by the
Afghan war; controlling the international narcotics trade; and,
perhaps, regarding the future of Iraq.
Our policies must also assist those in Iran advocating reform and
change in the Iranian government. Supporting Iranian admittance to the
World Trade Organization, for example, would strengthen the hands of
reformers in the Iranian parliament and elsewhere who seek to undertake
the structural economic reforms that, over time, could lead to more
open political and economic systems for the Iranian people.
I strongly support Mr. Biden's recommendations, including his
invitation to meet with members of the Iranian parliament. I encourage
my colleagues in the Senate to read Mr. Biden's speech when considering
next steps in U.S. policy toward Iran.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Biden's speech be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Remarks by Joseph R. Biden, Jr.--``Prospects for Progress: America and
Iran After 9-11''
It is an honor to be invited to speak before such a
distinguished gathering.
The number of accomplished individuals in the audience
today is a testament to the extraordinary achievements of the
thriving Iranian-American community. You have enriched the
United States with your many talents, and your cultural
traditions have strengthened the diversity of our country.
You also have a critical role to play in serving as a
bridge between Iran and the United States.
Today, I would like to share with you my views on United
States policy toward Iran and the kind of relationship I
believe Iran and the United States should have. To save you
the suspense, the short answer is--a much better relationship
than we currently enjoy.
I say this for one simple reason--I believe that an
improved relationship with Iran is in the naked self-interest
of the United States of America.
Iran sits in the geo-political heart of a region that has
long been important to our security concerns.
On its Eastern frontier sits a newly-liberated Afghanistan
where the military mission is far from over. Farther East is
a nuclear-armed Pakistan that just a short while ago
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stood on the precipice of a potentially devastating conflict
with its arch-rival India.
To the West is a recalcitrant Iraq, with a dangerous leader
who Iranians grew to know all too well during the long and
bloody Iran-Iraq war. To the North are the undemocratic,
potentially energy-rich states of Central Asia and the
conflict-ridden Caucasus.
To the South are several American allies that sit atop the
largest known oil reserves on the face of the earth.
So it is not an understatement to say that the direction
Iran takes in the coming years will have a significant impact
upon American strategic interests in this region.
Clearly, we cannot speak of Iran's direction without
addressing its internal political dynamics. Since President
Khatami's election in 1997, Iran has been embroiled in a
gradually escalating power struggle that the outside world
has watched with considerable interest.
While elections haven't been perfect, the Iranian people
have made clear in four separate ballots over four years that
they are demanding fundamental change.
The result of these elections has been the creation of a
divided government. An elected branch consisting of the
parliament and the Presidency that, by definition, is more in
touch with the will of the people.
Juxtaposed to that is an appointed branch which holds many
of the key levers of power including the judiciary, security
organizations, and other bodies populated by those whose
vision largely revolves around the perpetuation of their own
authority.
It is this hardcore clique which refuses to give way to the
will of the people. Over the past few years they have
thwarted the goals of Iranian reformers. They've arrested
journalists. They've imprisoned close allies of the
President, and often resorted to violence.
They've harassed and persecuted minorities in Iran--Jews
and the Baha'i.
They direct policies that pose a threat to our interests.
Not the least of which is that Iran continues to support
terrorism and the escalation of violence in the Middle East.
Its recent involvement with the Karine-A arms smuggling
incident is a reminder of the policies that Iran must abandon
if there is to be a true rapprochement. And many questions
remain unanswered about the role played by some Iranians in
the Khobar Towers attack that left 19 US servicemen dead.
But shortly after September 11, ordinary Iranians held a
spontaneous candlelight vigil in Tehran in solidarity with
the victims. Yet some of Iran's leaders don't appear to
understand how drastically the world has changed after
September 11.
Their continuing support for groups such as Islamic Jihad
puts them on the wrong side of the new fault-line separating
civilization and those who seek chaos. As you all know, Iran
is continuing an aggressive drive to develop weapons of mass
destruction and long-range missile systems. In these efforts,
it receives considerable foreign assistance, especially from
Russia.
While support for terrorism appears to be directed by those
in the hard-line branch of the government, the support for
Iran's missile and nuclear weapons programs is more broad-
based.
The reason is a combination of three main factors: first,
fears over Iraq and to a far lesser degree, Pakistan. Second,
the belief that nuclear weapons will enhance Iran's stature.
Finally, we cannot dismiss the fact that some elements within
the government see a potential blackmail value in the
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and long-range
missile capability.
Whatever the motivation, the United States must place the
highest priority on preventing Iran from gaining such
dangerous and destabilizing capabilities. There are a number
of options for doing so.
We cannot simply dismiss Iran's security concerns. They've
been the victims of chemical weapons attacks by Iraq. But the
neighborhood has the potential to change for the better.
Already, the Taliban menace no longer threatens Iran. Next
door, Pakistan's President is reigning in religious
extremism.
And I believe that the U.S. will ultimately have to
facilitate a regime-change in Iraq.
These three developments alone would dramatically alter
Iran's security environment for the better.
We must also be willing to hold discussions with Iran to
develop creative solutions as we did in North Korea. And we
must step up our efforts to end support by Russian entities
for Iranian nuclear and missile efforts. In my view, this
hasn't received enough attention over the past year.
Clearly, although we must combat the spread of weapons of
mass destruction to any country, the threat from Iran is not
simply a function of capability, but of intention as well.
If Iran evolves in a more democratic direction and the
U.S.-Iranian relationship improves, then the threat it poses
certainly will be reduced.
This, then, raises the question of the ongoing power
struggle underway in Iran.
The United States is not in a position to have a major
impact on this struggle. Nor should we intervene in any
direct way.
We should be mindful of the painful history between our two
countries, which includes reported CIA support for a coup in
1953. And it still resonates with many Iranians, and it
should counsel us to be extra-cautious.
Nonetheless, we should be clear about where we stand. We
are squarely with the Iranian people in their desire for a
democratic government and a democratic society.
Iran has a disproportionately young population. Half of its
people were born after the Revolution.
These young people and many of their parents and
grandparents have grown wary of Iran's isolation.
They want Iran to take its rightful place in the
international community and to embrace a rapidly-changing
world. They want the same kinds of social, political, and
economic freedoms that others enjoy. And they deserve to have
these aspirations fulfilled. As I said, we should have a
better relationship with Iran. Unfortunately, that is not for
us to decide. And it is unlikely to come about absent a
change in the attitude or composition of the present Iranian
regime.
While the Bush Administration continues the policy of its
predecessors by seeking dialogue with Iran, some in Tehran
have a different view.
Part of the government clearly wants to talk to us and has
talked to us over Afghanistan for example. But hard-liners
regard us as a useful bogeyman to continue to stir up the
passions of their most zealous and ardent stalwarts.
So the question is what can we do from the outside to help
the Iranian people realize their aspirations.
In my judgment, we must direct our policies in a way that
they do not rest on the principle of reciprocity.
In other words, we should assume that the continuing power
struggle will prevent Iran from responding to any particular
American gestures. And take steps that are carefully
calibrated with the aim of assisting those who seek change
within Iran.
How do we do it? First, we must recognize that the most
entrenched elements in Iran seek to perpetuate Iran's
isolation through confrontation with the outside world.
Those who seek change want to increase Iran's international
linkages.
Let me outline five specific steps the United States can
take.
First, the Bush Administration should issue a general
license to permit American non-governmental organizations to
financially support a broad range of civil society, cultural,
human rights, and democracy-building activities in Iran. Such
funding is currently banned by Executive Order.
It is unfortunate that it is our own government, not hard-
line clerics in Tehran, that have prevented practitioners of
democracy in America from aiding their struggling
counterparts in Iran.
Second, we should continue to work with Iran on matters of
mutual interest as we did on Afghanistan.
It is true that some hard-line elements in Iran are clearly
interested in stirring up trouble in Afghanistan, but the
story that many don't know is that Iran and the United States
coordinated their efforts on Afghanistan closely over the
past several months.
The dialogue on Afghanistan should serve as a model and
should be extended to other areas of mutual interest, like
the future of Iraq another topic for discussion and
cooperation.
Third, the United States should acquiesce to Iran's bid to
begin accession talks to the World Trade Organization. The
process of accession would take several years, but Iran would
have to make structural changes that would increase
transparency and undermine the key power bases of the hard-
liners.
Fourth, we should be willing to indirectly assist Iran on
refugee and narcotics matters. Iran has a huge population of
Afghan and Iraqi refugees. American non-governmental
organizations that assist refugees are willing to help and
should be supported in their efforts by our government.
Likewise, Iran has paid a heavy price in blood and treasure
in battling narcotics traffickers on its eastern frontier.
Iran has asked the international community for help and it
makes sense to assist them through the United Nations.
Fifth, we should continue to encourage citizen exchanges. A
track-two circuit has developed in recent years and it is
important to keep it going. Organizations such as the
American Iranian Council, the Open Society Institute, and the
Nixon Center have played a critical role, and I applaud them.
I also applaud the President for his view that there should
be a direct dialogue with Iran. In that regard, let me also
extend an invitation in my capacity as Chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee. I am prepared to receive members
of the Iranian Majlis whenever its members would like to
visit. If Iranian parliamentarians believe that's too
sensitive, I'm prepared to meet them elsewhere.
Without speaking for any of my colleagues, I am confident
that many of them would join in such an historic meeting.
Indeed, some--including my friend Senator Arlen Specter--did
participate in an earlier brief encounter at the Metropolitan
Museum of Art organized by the American Iranian Council.
We should be under no illusions that these steps will by
themselves have a decisive impact. The direction that Iran
takes the form of government it chooses are ultimately
matters for the Iranian people to settle.
As we all know, Nowruz marks the start of Spring. Let us
hope that in this season of renewal that Iranians and
Americans can find a way to build on shared interests and
work constructively to overcome their differences peacefully.
I pledge to do my part and I know that all of you will lend
your energies to this critical effort.
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Thank you.
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