Mrs. MALONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I thank you, Congresswoman THURMAN for organizing this important special order on the need for prescription drug coverage.

Medicare provides health care coverage to forty million retired and disabled Americans.

For decades, Medicare has worked to provide needed, lifesaving health care to millions, but it is missing a fundamental component: a prescription drug benefit.

If we have courage, this Congress can make history and give our nation's seniors what they desperately need: a real, and meaningful prescription drug plan.

I am proud to joint my Democratic Colleagues, lead by Mr. DINGELL, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. STARK and Mr. BROWN, as an original cosponsor of the ''Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit and Discount Act.''

I come to the floor this evening to discuss two points:

Number 1: unlike the Republican drug plan, the Democratic plan is simple because it builds upon a proven model—Medicare.

Just like seniors pay a Part B premium today for doctor visits, under our plan, seniors would pay a voluntary Part D premium of $25 per month for drug coverage. For that, Medicare or the government will pay 80 percent of drug costs after a $100 deductible. And NO senior will have to pay more than $2,000 in costs per year.

There is an urgent need for this plan. The most recent data indicates that almost 40 percent of serniors—an estimated 11 million—have no drug coverage. Problems are particularly acute for low income seniors and seniors over the age of 85 (the majority whom are women). Additionally, those older Americans who do have coverage find that their coverage is often inadequate for their needs.

The Democratic plan is a real plan with real numbers, not estimates.

Point 2: the Republican Plan does nothing to bring down the cost of prescription drugs. The Democratic plan is the only plan that provides real Medicare prescription drug coverage for our seniors by stopping soaring drug costs.

Under the buying power of Medicare, through competition and bargaining we can rein in drug costs. Prescription drug costs are too high for our older Americans. They need help now!

For instance, look at Prevacid. Prevacid is an unclear medication, and the second most widely used drug by American seniors. The cost for this prescription is on average $137.54 per month in New York City—cut only $45.02 in the United Kingdom, a price different of 200 percent.

Or look at Celebrex, a popular arthritis medication and a drug needed by many older women, especially, since older women are stricken more often than men by arthritis. According to a Government Reform Committee report released by Mr. WEINER and myself, a monthly supply of this drug costs $86.26 in New York City. In France, a monthly supply of Celebrex costs only $30.60. This is a price differental of 182 percent. Seniors in New York City without drug coverage must pay almost three times as much as purchasers in France.

Prices for prescriptions have risen 10 percent per years for the last several years, leading to over $37 billion in profits last year for the giant drug companies. While these corporations wallow in their spoils, seniors suffer without coverage.

Unfortunately, the brunt of the problem falls squarely on our nation's olderly women, who are nearly sixty percent of our senior citizens. We need to take care of America's older women, we need to help all of our senior citizens.

Mr. Speaker, we must pass the Democratic prescription drug plan without delay. It is built on a proven model medicare. The Republican plan only offers gap-ridden coverage. The Republican bill is about privatization. The Republican plan is all about election year politics.

For the sake of our seniors, we must pass the democratic plan, and we must pass it now.

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GENERAL LEAVE

Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on the subject of my Special Order.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. KERNS). Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Florida?

There was no objection.

NINTH CIRCUIT RULES PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 3, 2001, the gentleman from California (Mr. COX) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, I rise this evening to bring to the attention of the House the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Michael A. Newdow v. United States Congress. This case, Mr. Speaker, even though it was decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals only a few hours ago, has already attracted considerable national attention. Indeed, it has drawn the comment of the President of the United States.

The reason is rather simple. It is a decision involving something that is well known to all of us in this Chamber, the Pledge of Allegiance. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that the Pledge of Allegiance, written into statute a half century ago, is unconstitutional. Of course this Chamber is opened each day with a recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance. Public schools across the country begin their day this way. Some Members and some students may, if they choose, listen or absent themselves, indeed, because there is no requirement of Members of Congress as we open our day this way or of students that they recite the Pledge. It is a voluntary act.

Nonetheless, a parent, Michael A. Newdow, of a student in a California public school, brought a lawsuit, one of several that he has brought, urging an injunction against the President of the United States and an injunction against this Congress. In the latter case, he wished us to be ordered by court immediately to rewrite the statute, the statute he wished that we would rewrite so that the words ''under God'' would be deleted from the Pledge of Allegiance.

I think because the Pledge is so familiar to us, particularly the Pledge has been recited by so many so often in so many public ways, whether it be at sporting events or public gatherings since September 11, that it comes as something of an unexpected surprise that a court would rule this way. I will devote a brief portion of my brief remarks this evening to the substance of the question and, that is, whether or not Congress, which was a defendant in this case, was within its rights to write the law as we did a half century ago; but I would spend most of my time drawing attention to what I consider to be the sloppy jurisprudence in this case.

What is really at issue in what shall become a very well known decision of Newdow v. U.S. Congress is the rule of law. Precious little respect was paid to precedent in this case, because many of the questions, procedural questions indeed, not just the substance here, many of the questions have already been decided. But this court chose to decide the same questions differently, and that lack of respect for precedent raises questions about the rule of law in America, about the predictability of the law, about the ability of any of us to know in advance what are the rules to which we must conform our conduct.

Let me begin by just describing a little bit about the case, a little bit about the facts of the case. Newdow, the fellow who brought the lawsuit, is an atheist whose daughter attends public elementary school in the Elk Grove Unified School District in my State of California. In the public school that she attends, like many public schools, they start the day with the Pledge of Allegiance.

But Newdow, according to the Ninth Circuit, does not allege that his daughter's teacher or school district requires his daughter to participate in reciting the Pledge. Rather, he claims that his daughter is injured when she is compelled to watch and listen. That is what this lawsuit is all about, according to the Ninth Circuit. The gravamen of the complaint is there is injury, that is the word that is used, and it is an important word, as I shall return to in just a moment. There is injury when someone is required to be in the presence of others who are reciting something in which they believe. The United States Supreme Court was asked to decide this question, this very question, in another case, Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Incorporated, 1982. Here is what the Court said in the Valley Forge case:

''The psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees is