[Congressional Record Volume 150, Number 33 (Tuesday, March 16, 2004)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E379-E384]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
PREVENT INDONESIA FROM RECEIVING IMET FUNDING IN FISCAL YEAR 2004
______
HON. JOEL HEFLEY
of colorado
in the house of representatives
Tuesday, March 16, 2004
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I offered an amendment that was intended to
cut $600,000 out of the IMET account to prevent Indonesia from
receiving IMET funding in fiscal year 2004.
As many members are aware, I offered an amendment to the Foreign
Service Re-Authorization Act of 2004 and 2005 that would limit
Indonesia's participation in the IMET program. My amendment would limit
Indonesia from receiving International Military Education and Training
(IMET) funds until the President certifies to Congress that the
Government of Indonesia and the Indonesian Armed Forces are taking
effective measures, including cooperating with the Director of the FBI,
in conducting a full investigation of the attack and to criminally
prosecute the individuals responsible for the attack.
For those members that are not aware, on August 31, 2002, the staff
of the International School in West Papua, Indonesia decided to take a
picnic. The teachers lived and worked in Tembagapura, a company town
located high in the mountains near the Grasberg gold
[[Page E380]]
and copper mine. The group of eleven people, including a 6-year-old
child, drove in two vehicles to a picnic site about 10 miles away on
the road to Timika. Because it began to rain, they decided to return to
town for lunch.
The road they were traveling on is not an ordinary road. The road is
surrounded by the gold and copper mine, and is heavily guarded by the
Indonesian military. At both ends of this mountain road are military
check points, which seals the road and control access to Tembagapura.
As they returned home, the group was brutally attacked by a band of
terrorists. Two Americans, Ted Burgon (from Oregon) and Rick Spier
(from Colorado), and an Indonesian man were killed in the ambush. The
attack, which occurred less than a half-mile away from an Indonesian
military check point, went on for approximately 45 minutes. Hundreds of
rounds were fired at the teachers and their vehicles. Most of the
survivors, including the 6-year-old child, were shot. Several of the
teachers were shot multiple times and suffered horrible injuries.
Ted Burgon of Sunriver, Oregon was killed and his wife Nancy suffered
facial cuts and abrasions. Rick Spier of Littleton, Colorado was
killed, and his wife Patsy was shot in the back and foot. Francine
Goodfriend of Rockford, Illinois was shot and has a spinal cord injury.
Steven Emma of Broward County, Florida was shot in the legs, buttocks,
and suffered injuries to his back. Lynn Poston of Olga, Washington was
shot in the shoulder and legs. Suandra Hopkins of Sunriver, Oregon was
shot in the side, legs, and pellets around the eye and his wife Taia
was shot in the buttocks.
Following the attack, the Indonesian Police promptly began an
investigation. They collected evidence, interviewed witnesses and
reconstructed the ambush. The Indonesian Police issued a report (that I
ask for unanimous consent to submit for the Record) concluding, ``there
is a strong possibility that the Tambagapura case was perpetrated by
members of the Indonesian National Army Force, however, it still needs
to be investigated further.''
In early November 2002, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that
``United States intelligence agencies have intercepted messages between
Indonesian army commanders indicating that they were involved in
staging an ambush at the remote mine in which three school teachers,
two of them Americans, were killed. . . .'' The Washington Post has
reported these same intelligence intercepts.
Despite this intelligence, the investigation of the attack has
faltered. The Indonesian Police have been effectively removed from the
case due to their report that implicated the military. The two senior
Indonesian police officers who uncovered evidence of the army's
involvement have been transferred to new posts, and the investigation
has now been handed over to a joint military police team. Not
surprisingly, the Indonesian military has exonerated itself. American
investigative teams, including the FBI, have not been able to complete
their investigations due mainly to the Indonesian military's refusal to
cooperate and its tampering of evidence.
The evasions and obstructions of the Indonesian military are wholly
unacceptable, and it is incumbent upon this Congress to see that a
thorough investigation is conducted. The victims of this brutal attack
deserve no less. My amendment is, therefore, intended to ensure that
the perpetrators of this heinous crime against Americans are brought to
justice. To the extent that the Indonesian military was involved, the
United States should insist on criminal prosecution of all involved
parties.
Mr. Speaker, the amendment is important. It gives voice to our
commitment that the United States will hold accountable the
perpetrators and protectors of terrorism. We will exhaust every means
to protect our citizens. We will pursue terrorists wherever they may be
and hold to account. We will demand justice for attacks against our
citizens and withhold aid from those countries that do not cooperate in
bringing terrorists to justice. As President Bush has stated, ``if you
are not with us you are against us.'' It is time for Indonesia to
choose who it will align itself with, the terrorists or the coalition
of nations that bring them to justice.
Report Summary
I. SATURDAY, AUGUST 31, 2002
1. Location of the Incident: Mile 62-63. In between two
Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and
Security stations, height, steep gorge on the right hand
side, hill on the left hand side, foggy, difficult to escape.
2. Victim: 3 (three) died, 11 (eleven) heavy/light injured,
not specified.
3. Evidence:
2 (two) Toyota LWB land cruiser, 2 (two) dump trucks, 1
(one) trailer truck;
94 (ninety four) bullet shells--5.56 mm caliber;
6 (six) bullet shells--7.62 51 mm caliber;
1 (one) broken magazine;
134 (one hundred thirty four) shooting holes on 5 (five)
evidence vehicles (not included those that hit the
windshields, approximately more than 200 (two hundreds)
rounds; and
Broken windshields.
4. Witnesses: 3 (three) witnesses saw that there were
around 3 (three) shooters with the following identifications:
Wore striped dress without any attributes;
Wore green ``sebo'' (camouflage paint that is worn on the
face); and
Carried black long barrel rifle.
5. The victims: They saw approximately 11 (eleven) shooters
with the following identifications:
1 (one) person wore a black shirt and striped pants;
1 (one) person wore military boots;
6 (six) persons ran into the bushes in front of the
location of the incident; and
3 (three) persons ran in the direction of Timika.
II. SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 2002
1. 08:45 East Indonesian Time (EIT): Processing team, led
by the Head of the County Police of Mimika and the Head of
the Detective Unit, was repeatedly shot at around the
location of the incident.
2. 11:00 EIT: Vacuum Condition (VC) of the member of
Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and
Security--
11:40 EIT:
Mr. X was shot to death; and
Mr. Suherman, Private of the Highest Rank, was shot in his
right thigh.
13:30 EIT:
Head of the Provincial Police, Territorial Military
Commander, Military Regiment Commander, Military District
Commander, Head of the County Police, and Task Force
Commander and Security #515 of Army Strategic Reserve Command
+ the journalists arrived at the location of the incident;
Mr. X's dead body was laid down on the side of the road;
No puddle of blood or flowing of blood occurred in the
location where Mr. X was placed on the side of the road;
Stiff dead body (left hand cannot be folded); and
The dead body has not been identified, approximate age is
25 years old, without shoes, Papuan ethnic.
15:30 EIT: Mr. X's dead body was transferred to Tembagapura
Hospital, based on Dr. Kunto Rahardjo's report, the person
had been dead for more than 6 (six) hours, small maggots/
larvas was found on the intestine in the open stomach.
3. 3 (three) witnesses have seen Mr. X around Station #515
in Banti village.
III. MR X'S CORPSE CONDITION (AUTOPSY RESULT BY DR. AGUNG, FORENSIC
SPECIALIST FROM INDONESIAN POLICE HEADQUARTERS)
1. 4 (four) wounds were caused by the shooting:
2 (two) shots on the left-hand side of the back;
1 (one) shot on the upper right hand; and
1 (one) shot on the right side.
2. The wound direction on the body: vertical.
3. The victim was suffering from Testicle Hydrocele for
approximately 2 (two) years (the scrotum diameter is 16 cm.).
IV. RECONSTRUCTION ON TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2002
1. Nothing significant happened on August 31, 2002.
2. September 1, 2002:
The distance between First Rank Corporal Mr. Wayan (Mr. X's
shooter) and Mr. X is approximately 75 meters, there are many
sight hindrances and shooting impediments in between).
The colleagues of the First Rank Corporal Mr. Wayan
standing within 1-4 meters from Mr. Wayan could not see Mr.
X. and his friends.
The location where Mr. X was shot is very narrow
(approximately 0.5 meter), on the side of a very deep gorge,
there was no blood stain in that place.
In between the evening of August 31 (aftermath of the
incident 13:40 EIT) and September 1, 2002, the location of
the incident was guarded strongly by the Task Force and
Security of Army Strategic Reserve Command #515, and has been
searched carefully so there will be very small probability
that the Rebellious Movement Group still exists there.
V. FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2002
1. There was shooting to the vehicle of the Army Strategic
Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security at Mile 63 (1300
meters from the station of Army Strategic Reserve Command
#515 Task Force and Security at Mile 64).
2. No victim and no evidence.
VI. SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2002
1. 09:30 EIT, a combined patrol between the Mobile Brigade
and the Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and
Security crossed the bridge at Mile 62, saw that there were 3
(three) members of the Army Strategic Reserve Command #515
Task Force and Security around the bridge at Mile 62.
2. 11:00 EIT, a combined patrol between the Mobile Brigade
and the Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and
Security crossed the Mile 62 bridge, saw that there was 1
(one) member of the Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task
Force and Security around the bridge at Mile 62.
3. 11:30 EIT, the investigation team that was led by Police
Commissioner Adjunct Mr. Helmy Kwarta was on the way to
Tembagapura Sectional Police and was shot
[[Page E381]]
at repeatedly at Mile 61 (Translator's note: the original
Indonesian language does not say specifically, whether the
vehicle was shot at or the person, whether anyone was injured
or died).
4. 10:30 EIT, the logistic vehicle of the Army Strategic
Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security was shot at
repeatedly by an unidentified shooter. 8 (eight) bullet
holes, 2 (two) from outside and 6 (six) from the inside of
the vehicle were found on the vehicle body.
5. Approximately 1 (one) hour before, the Territorial
Military Commander group went down from Tembagapura and
passed the shooting area down to Timika.
6. While the investigation team continued their travel to
Tembagapura Sectional Police, the Vice Commander of the Army
Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security on
behalf of Infantry Major Mr. Aksan Widjaya stopped the team
at the place close to the bridge at Mile 62 and told the team
that there is/are bomb/s under the bridge. (Translator's
note, in the Indonesian language it is not clear about
the singular or plural, so it is not clear if there was
only one bomb, or more than one).
7. 3 (three) Power Gel sticks, 4 (four) Detonators, 2 (two)
ABC brand batteries and 3 (three) detonator cables
approximately 20 meters long were found.
8. At the same time, the Vice Commander of the Army
Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security said,
``This is to inform the Head of the Provincial Police and
Territorial Military Commander, please do not always accuse
the Indonesian Army Force.''
9. The Power Gel (the same as the one that is used by PT
FIC = Freeport Indonesia Corporation) has expired.
10. The investigation that has been done in the PT FIC
explosive storage showed that there is no indication that
this power gel came from this storage, probably this power
gel came from the field, the remaining explosion operation in
the field.
11. The XVII Trikora Territorial Military Commander had
made a statement in Jakarta, he said that this Tembagapura
case probably was caused by the PT FIC internal conflict and
it was not caused by the people from the inside of the
forest.
VII. SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2002
There were 2 (two) unidentified threatening telephone
calls:
1. Number 0901-422907 received a call that came from #358
that was used by Task Force and Security (It is confirmed by
the print out or a hard copy of the call issued by the MIS
Department of PT FIC, and this can be used as evidence).
2. Number 0901-422907 received a call from a cellular phone
number 08124887486. This cellular phone belongs to Sergeant
First Class Mr. Jatmiko, the member of the Army Special Force
Command Cendrawasih Task Force. (Lieutenant Colonel Mr.
Siburian acknowledged in front of Papuan Vice Chairman of the
Provincial Police that the cellular phone belonged to one of
the member of his team, but it has been sold to a bar
waitress on Bar Boulevard).
3. The following was found on Friday, September 20, 2002: 2
(two) bullet shells on the hill, at the location where the
Papuan Freedom Organization people had gathered to shoot the
Mr. Suherman, Private of the Highest Rank, 7 (seven) bullet
holders, and 3 (three) bullet shells of 5.56 caliber.
VIII. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 11, 2002
Interrogation result from the victim PATRICIA LYNN SPEIR
(from Colorado):
1. At the time right after the shooting on August 31, 2002
and before the ambulance came, the victim saw 3 (three)
persons who wore dark blue T-shirts, the victim did not pay
attention at the color of the pants. 2 (two) Papuans and 1
(one) newcomer were helping the victims.
2. The victim saw 1 (one) other person with the following
identification: non Papuan, wore a black vest, without
weapon, at the location of the incident.
3. While waiting for the ambulance to come, a soldier, non
Papuan, in a complete uniform with a jungle hat, wearing a
shirt without an insignia, with his long barrel gun still hot
(the victim felt it without touching it, the victim felt the
heat transfer from the gun barrel to the victim's leg at a
510 cm distance), was standing up for approximately 10
minutes and almost stepped on the victim's leg without doing
anything, with an unfriendly radiant eye.
IX. COMMUNITY OPINION
1. Papuan Freedom Organization does not have the quantity
of bullets as the number of bullets that were shot during the
incident (approximately 200 bullets were found on August 31,
2002), and usually this Papuan Freedom Organization will not
spend that much ammunition.
2. There was no indication of the initiation from the tribe
around PT FIC that they were going to attack (such as a
traditional ritual, statement, a demonstration, etc.).
3. Mr. Kelly Kwalik had made a statement that his group was
not involved in that incident.
4. The separatist groups leaders (Tom Beanal, Thaha
Alhamid, etc.) stated that they were not involved.
5. Papuan Freedom Organization never kills white people.
6. Papuan Freedom Organization always gets involved in a
``Hit and Run'' when they make an attack. The fact is that
between September 1 until September 14, 2002 there still were
shootings.
7. The Non Government Organization or NGO such as LSM
ELSHAM PAPUA and Toga, Tomas, which are pro-separatists
groups, were very active in helping the investigation
process.
X. OTHERS
1. The morale of the Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve
Command #515 Task Force and Security is relatively low
because of the following:
a. They only receive the incentive of Rp.125,000. per month
for the rank of Tamtama (Private Second Class up to the Head
of Corporal) and Rp.150,000. per month for the rank of
Bintara (from Lower Ranking Sergeant up to Sergeant Major) (a
Javanese anecdote says ``Satu Selawe Njaluk Slamet'' or in a
free translation it gives a sarcastic meaning ``For One and
Twenty Five you are looking for a Safe'') (Translator's note:
Rp. Is the Indonesia currency and stands for Rupiah, in
August 2002 the approximate exchange rate is US$1.=Rp.9000.,
so Rp.125,000/month=US$13.89/month and Rp. 150.000/month
US$16.67/month).
b. For a side income they are often selling food and raw
material for food to Timika.
c. On June 23, 2002, 12 (twelve) members of the Indonesian
Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security
were caught because they stole copper wire.
d. Their perks, such as vehicles, telephones, etc., were
reduced.
e. They had a high expectation when they transferred to the
location of PT FIC (copper and gold mining), but in fact it
is very minimal.
2. The ``Demonstration Effect'' that took place was caused
by the excessive living standard of the PT FIC employees
(especially those white employees), including the glaring
facilities.
XI. SEPTEMBER 29, 2002: REPETITION OF INCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION ON THE
SEPTEMBER 1, 2002
1. It was very difficult to see from the place where the
First Rank Corporal Mr. Wayan was shooting, whether those 2
(two) friends of Mr. X were hiding, or whether they were
going to take Mr. X's weapon away from him, or whether they
were trying to run away.
2. It was seen that Mr. X's dead body was dragged by 4
(four) members of the Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve
Command #515 Task Force by taking turns, 78 meters through
trees roots, wet land and sharp gravels.
3. Blood spots and hair and broken clothes of Mr. X's were
not found along the trail that was used to drag Mr. X's dead
body.
4. Mr. Margono, Private of the Highest Rank, stated that he
examined the corpse after the corpse had been laid down on
the side of the street, the result was; 5 (five) shooting
wounds were found, many charms or amulets and fresh blood
were found around the corpse and on Mr. X's clothes.
XII. FACT FINDING
1. The vehicle plate numbers DS 20 PD and DS 54 PD that
were used by the Task Force of Cendrawasih Army Special Force
Command were vague numbers, and they were not issued by
Mimika Police Department.
2. The number on the sides of the vehicles had been erased.
3. The PT FIC Management Information System (MIS)
Department felt regret because they had given the print out
or hard copy of the telephone usage to the Indonesian Police,
this is related to the unidentified telephone threats: ``If I
knew that this is for the police, I will not print it.''
XIII. TEMPORARY CONCLUSION
1. Based on the above-mentioned indicators, there is a
strong possibility that the Temabagapura case was perpetrated
by the member of the Indonesian National Army Force, however,
it still needs to be investigated further.
2. Maybe the Indonesian National Army Force investigators
should be involved, in order to alleviate further misleading
circumstances that could harm somebody's life.
SUGGESTION FOR FURTHER PROCESSING OF THE WITNESS'S INVESTIGATION OFFICIAL REPORT, MR. DECKY MURIP (OPERATIONAL
TEAM ASSISTANCE OF ARMY SPECIAL FORCE COMMAND)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contents of investigation official report (witnesses
No. has been sworn in) Material to be evaluated and analyzed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 At 7:30 EIT, August 31, 2002, Mr. Decky Murip Information should be taken from the First
(Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force
Command) was invited by the First Lieutenant Mr. Command), First Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army
Markus (Army Special Force Command) and other 9 Special Force Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr.
(nine) persons among others are 3 (three) persons-- I Wayan Suradnya (Army Special Force Command),
First Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi, Lower Ranking Private First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army
Sergeant Mr. I Putu Suradnya and Private First Special Force Command).
Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas with white Freeport Note:
vehicle (side number 0609 that used to be used by --Indonesian Police does not have the authority.
First Lieutenant Mr. Markus to go from Serayu Hotel --The information should be taken by a Solid Team
in Timika to Freeport Tembagapura. that is founded by the Government of Indonesia.
--Almost all the community in Timika (Police/
Indonesian Army/community) know First Lieutenant
Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command).
[[Page E382]]
2 On August 31, 2002, before Decky Murip went with a Information should be taken from First Lieutenant
vehicle with a side number 0609 (used to be used by Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command), First
First Lieutenant Mr. Markus), in Serayu Hotel Mr. Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army Special Force
Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. I Wayan
Special Force Command) was given two bottles of Suradnya (Army Special Force Command), Private
beer with plastic covers tied with a string, the First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army Special Force
others drank from the bottle with the original Command).
cover. Because Decky Muruip drank those two bottles Note:
with a plastic cover, he lost his Identity Card --Indonesian Police does not have the authority.
that was saved in his pocket. --The information should be taken by a Solid Team
that is founded by the Government of Indonesia.
--Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army
Special Force Command) was given a special drink
and then invited to go with the group.
3 Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Information should be taken from First Lieutenant
Special Force Command), after he drank the two Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command), First
bottles with plastic covers and strings jumped into Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army Special Force
the white Freeport vehicle with side number 0609 Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. I Wayan
with the First Lieutenant Mr. Markus and the driver Suradnya (Army Special Force Command), Private
called ``Mas'' with the other 8 (eight) persons First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army Special Force
that wore black vests carrying short black barrel Command).
guns (approximately 50 cm. length) and one of them Note:
wore a black hat with the white command knife logo. --Indonesian Police does not have the authority.
They stared from Serayu Hotel in Timika to go up to --The information should be taken by a Solid Team
Freeport Tembagapura, and Decky Murip (Operational that is founded by the Government of Indonesia.
Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) with --Why parts of the group was dropped off, Decky
the other 4 (four) persons, the staff members of Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army
First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Special Force Command) + 4 (four) persons had to
Command) were dropped off after Mile 50 (after wait and listen to the 4 (four) shots? Was it a
passing the tunnel), and their task was to wait for code? Or an execution, was it possible that Mr.
further command and to listen to the explosion of X was executed during the sound of explosion
gun shots for 4X. that was heard by Decky Murip and the other 4
(four) persons with black vests?
4 Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Information should be taken from First Lieutenant
Special Force Command) with the other 4 (four) Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command), First
persons, the staff members of First Lieutenant Mr. Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army Special Force
Markus (Army Special Force Command) after waiting Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. I Wayan
in the place that they were dropped off (after Mile Suradnya (Army Special Force Command), Private
50) for a while, they were picked up again by First First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army Special Force
Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command) Command).
with a driver called ``Mas'' with the other 4 Note:
(four) persons, the staff members of First --Indonesian Police does not have the authority.
Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command) --The information should be taken by a Solid Team
with the same vehicle (white vehicle with side that is founded by the Government of Indonesia.
number 0609) and the total of people were 11 Question: Why after the vehicle went round and
(eleven) including First Lieutenant Mr. Markus round without any direction and without stopping,
(Army Special Force Command) and the driver, they Markus Cs then brought the group with black vests
were brought from Mile 50 down toward Timika and up to the location of the incident at Mile 63, and
went round and round without any direction and then asked Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant
without stopping and then went back up to the of Army Special Force Command) to go to the hill
location of the incident at Mile 63. in order to chase the Rebellious Movement Group?
Answer: If Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant
of Army Special Force command) followed the
command to go to the hill with the bushes (where
it was guessed there were people there around the
location of the incident at Mile 63), probably
that black vested group that was brought by First
Lieutenant Mr. Markus, would execute Decky Murip
(Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force
Command) considered to be the attacker of the
attack that had just happened on August 31, 2002,
this would show as if that First Lieutenant Mr.
Markus and the black vested group had rendered a
good service in chasing and finding the attacker
in that day of August 31, 2002. This scenario plan
in the location of the incident will damage the
image of the Army Special Force Command
Cendrawasih Team, because Decky Murip is the
Operational Team Assistant of the Army Special
Force Command.
5 When the group (that was led by First Lieutenant Mr. Information should be taken from First Lieutenant
Markus (Army Special Force Command) with a driver Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command), First
and 8 (eight) staff members and Decky Murip Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army Special Force
(Operational Team Assistant of the Army Special Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. I Wayan
Force Command) arrived at the location of the Suradnya (Army Special Force Command), Private
incident at Mile 63 toward Tembagapura, they First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army Special Force
stopped and all of them got out of the vehicle and Command).
saw the evidence (the victim's vehicle), at that Note:
same time Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant --Indonesian Police does not have the authority.
of Army Special Force Command) was ordered by the --The information should be taken by a Solid Team
First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force that is founded by the Government of Indonesia.
Command) to go to the hill in order to check if Question: What will happen if Decky Murip
there were people in the bushes on the hill, but (Operational Team Assistant of the Army Special
Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Force Command) would go to the bushy hills around
Special Force Command) rejected the order of the the location of the incident at Mile 63?
First Lieutenant Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Answer: Probably he would be a target for shooting
Command) because he said he felt dizzy which was by the black vested group that was led by First
caused by that drink (two bottles with plastic Lieutenant Mr. Markus.
covers and strings), and he did not want to go to
the hill to check the area in the location of the
incident at Mile 63.
6 The result of the investigation, Freeport vehicle Information should be taken from First Lieutenant
with side number 0609 usually was driven by a Mr. Markus (Army Special Force Command) First
driver named Nathan, on a daily basis Nathan served Lieutenant Mr. Wawan Suwandi (Army Special Force
as a driver for the Commander of the Task Force of Command), Lower Ranking Sergeant Mr. I Wayan
Cendrawasih Army Special Force Command, if the Suradnya (Army Special Force Command), Private
Commander was on duty in Timika and Tembagapura. First Class Mr. Jufri Uswasnas (Army Special Force
Command).
Note:
--Indonesian Police does not have the authority.
--The information should be taken by a Solid Team
that is founded by the Government of Indonesia.
7 The August 31, 2002 chronological group plan was Referring to the information that was given by
begun from Serayu Hotel at 7:30 EIT where Decky Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army
Murip (Operational Team Assistant of the Army Special Force Command) that was supported by
Special Force Command) drank the two bottles with ELSHAM (ELSHAM is one of the NGO group). The Head
plastic covers and strings, with the other 4 (four) of the Tribe, and a Pastor, and they spontaneously
persons (the staff of the First Lieutenant Mr. willing to do the Press Conference on the
Markus member of Army Special Force Command), and television, therefore it is important for the
then they were dropped at Mile 50 and the rest of government of Indonesia to develop a team in order
the group went up (Tembagapura), but then they came to clarify the case so it will alleviate the
back and picked up Decky Murip (Operational Team conflict between the Indonesian Police that act as
Assistant of Army Special Force Command) and the the investigator for managing the case in the
other 4 (four) people (the staff of the First location of the incident that is located in a
Lieutenant Mr. Markus member of Army Special Force vital project (PT Freeport) and the misunderstood
Command), and then they all went back down toward group. According to January 14, 2002 Operational
Timika, the vehicle went round and round and then Regiment Tembaga (Ren Ops Tembaga) that is valid
went back up and stopped after the incident of for 365 days (one year) until January 2003, the
shooting at the location of the incident at Mile location of the incident that is located in PT
63, then the group went down from the vehicle (with Freeport is under the authority of The XVII
side number 0609) in order to see the evidence, the Trikora Regional Military Command.
vehicle that was shot by the ambush. Then Decky Note:
Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army special --The vehicles that were used by Army Special
Force Command) did not want to follow the order of Force Command without side numbers (had been
the First Lieutenant Mr. Markus member of Army erased) with vague numbers ``DS'' were freely
Special Force Command) to investigate the hill driven in the area of Timika and go up and down
around the location of the incident at Mile 63, and vice versa to Tembagapura.
then went back down to Timika. Need explanation --The Indonesian Police that conducted the
from the Army Special Force Command in order to investigation in the area that is under the
clarify the information from Decky Murip authority of the Indonesian National Army Force,
(Operational Team Assistant of the Army Special needs to be backed up by a solid team that is
Force Command). If the information was vague, it developed by the government of Indonesia,
was a violation of Article 242 KUPH that said ``to because it is very sensitive and easy to become
provide vague information'' to the Police a conflict between the Indonesian Police and the
Investigator or to the Army Special Force command. Indonesian National Army Force (PAM PROVITNAS PT
And the person will also be charged by Article 310 FREEPORT/OPS TEMBAGA 14 2002 by Trikora Regional
KUPH that said about ``damaging somebody's Military Command).
reputation'' because he/she has defiled the
reputation of the Special Armed Force Command
(Indonesian Armed Force). It was getting worse
since the Press Conference on the television on
September 25, 2002 at 23:30 EIT or 21:30 West
Indonesian Time (WIT).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional Information:
1. All of the information about Decky Murip (Operational Team Assistant of Army Special Force Command) has been
submitted by Vice Chairman of the Provincial Police to The Commander of the Task Force of the Army Special
Force Command (Cendrawasih Team) in his residence on September 24, 2002 between 09:00-23:00 EIT.
2. The Press Conference, led by Mr. Jhon Rumbiak--EILSHAM (one of the NGO group), was held at September 25, 2002
at 23:30 IT or 21:30 WIT.
3. Mr. Siburian, the Lieutenant Colonel Infantry and the Commander of Task Force of the Army Special Force
Command (Cendrawasih team), said that the information provided by those people and the Operational Team
Assistant did not mean to mention the Cendrawasih Team of Army Special Force Command, and the purpose of Jhon
Rumbiak and Decky Murip was to manipulate the public opinion in order to make the Army Special Force Command--
Indonesian National Army Force look bad.
the triangle authentication
The Location of the Incident (TKP)
1. August 31, 2002--block on Mile 62.
2. September 1, 2002--block Mile 61 (Police).
3. September 13, 2002--some members of 515 Task Force
regiment were shot at. That happened at Mile 63.
4. September 14, 2002--the investigation team was shot at.
That happened at Mile 62.
5. September 14, 2002--some members of 515 Task Force
regiment were shot at Mile 62, 2 (two) holes from the outside
and 4 (four) holes from the inside.
6. September 14, 2002--found bomb at Mile 62.
7. September 20, 2002--found explosive at Mile 63.
8. September 20, 2002--found 7 (seven) bullet holders, 2
(two) SS-1 bullet shells, 1 (one) M-16 bullet shell.
The Rectangle on the Top Left Hand Corner (the explanation is
connected to Mr. X)
1. Larva/maggot inside the intestine of the victim seen
from the open stomach.
2. The stomach and the intestine was empty, found brown
color liquid, the person had not eaten for more than 12
hours.
3. The victim had been dead for more than 6 hours when the
Tembagapura Hospital received the dead body.
4. All of the dead body was rigid (rigor mortis).
5. There were 4 (four) horizontal shooting holes that
caused the death of the victim.
6. The diameter of the testicle is approximately 17 cm.,
the victim was suffering Testicle Hydrocele.
7. The last position was at the dent of the hill, with
80 deg. steep grade (steep down to a deep gorge).
8. The dead body was thrown away down 8 meters and was
dragged for approximately 78 meters through the tree roots
and sharp gravel.
The Rectangle on the Bottom Left Hand Corner (the explanation
is connected to the evidence)
1. The case of August 31, 2002:
a. 95 bullet shells 5.56 and 7.62 caliber;
b. The vehicles of the victim (3 trucks and 2 jeeps);
c. 3 victims were dead & 11 heavy/light injured; and
d. Approximately 134 bullet holes.
2. The case of September 1, 2002:
a. Mr. X;
b. The accessories of Mr. X (bag, flashlight, m. tawon, ABC
battery, pepsodent, etc.);
c. Bullet shells 5.56 + 7.62 + 1 broken M-16 magazine;
[[Page E383]]
d. Mr. X hat with Special Army Force Command logo; and
e. Black shirt, black jacket, brown short pant.
Note: m. tawon = minyak tawon = a special medicated oil
that is normally used by the people from Indonesia especially
people that come from the eastern part of Indonesia.
The Rectangle on the Right Hand Side (the explanation is
connected to the Witnesses)
1. Dwi Lasmono (the 515 driver), Agus Rahmat (Freeport
Security) & Darius (the owner of a local pub in Banti) know
Mr. X who was often hanging around close to 515 Station in
Banti.
2. Daud Tandirerung, Yonan Djikwa, and Kamame Mum (driver &
passenger of TDS pick up) saw at the location of the incident
2 (two) soldiers without attributes shooting at them, these
witnesses faced down instantaneously, switched the gear,
accelerated the vehicle, and drove away.
3. Stephen Emma & Francene saw 5-6 young men near
adulthood, arose on the side of a trailer, carried long
barrel gun and ran into the bushes in front of the location
of the incident.
4. Sandra Hopkins & Kenneth Balk saw (for a minute) a black
male, with black shirt, striped pants, with pendant hair, who
was looking out toward Tembagapura direction.
5. The second rank corporal Mr. Wayan shot Mr. X (tsk) from
the top of the hill to the exact position of Mr. X (slanted
80 deg. at down direction).
6. The second rank of corporal Mr. Melky was the first
person who saw the dead body of Mr. X.
7. The second lieutenant infantry Mr. Yanto/Highest Rank of
Private Mr. Sugi Private Second Class Mr. Slamet/Highest Rank
of Private Mr. Margono/Private Second Class Mr. Suriyadi/
Second Rank Corporal Mr. Putu Dharma & Lower Ranking Sergeant
Mr. Ketut, they were all the people who dragged the dead body
approximately for 78 meters through rocks and sharp gravel to
the side of the road between Timika and Tembagapura.
8. Dr. Kunto (the head of Tembagapura Hospital) was the
first person that saw the larva or maggots in Mr. X
intestines.
9. The Head of the Forensic Laboratory confirmed the
findings of Dr. Kunto (Tembagapura Hospital).
10. Highest Rank of Private Mr. Suherman (his right thigh
was shot).
11. Timika Military District Commander (the first person
who called the Mimika Head of County Police at 12:45 EIT; Mr.
X was shot + Highest Rank of Private Mr. Suherman was shot).
12. The trailer driver (Mastur) saw one shooter with
pendant hair, black face, clean face without beard/moustache
wearing striped shirt and pants without attributes, with a
long barrel gun.
THE CASES OF AUGUST 31, 2002 UP TO SEPTEMBER 1, 2002 (TEMBAGAPURA)
A. Motive
1. To create a situation that makes people pay attention.
2. To create a feeling of insecurity for those who use the
road between Timika and Tembagapura.
B. Modus Operandi
1. Brutal shooting with a fully automatic gun.
2. There is no specific target for the victim.
3. Shooting and placing expired explosives around Mile 62
and Mile 62.5 and Mile 63 with the position always on the
right side of the road between Timika and Tembagapura
direction.
C. Deception:
1. On August 31, 2002 after the event, Second Lieutenant
Infantry Mr. Yanto was shot with an empty bullet at Mile 62.5
(the evidence of the bullet shell was kept by Mimika County
Police).
2. On September 1, 2002 the Highest Rank of Private Mr.
Suherman was shot in his right thigh at Mile 62.5 (the exact
location of the incident was not known yet).
3. The community around Freeport does not know Mr. X (they
kept their mouths shut).
4. On September 13, 2002, the shooting at the Indonesian
Army Strategic Reserve Command #515 Task Force and Security
at Mile 63 (the attacker was still around the location of the
incident).
5. On September 14, 2002 the vehicle of 515 Bama was shot,
2 from outside & 6 bullet holes from the inside of the
vehicle itself at Mile 62 (the attacker was still around the
location of the incident).
6. On September 14, 2002 the explosive was found, 3 (three)
Power Gel sticks, 4 (four) detonators, 2 (two) ABC batteries
and 3 (three) 20 meters detonator cables at Mile 62 (was
crystallized & expired)(the attacker was still around the
location of the incident).
7. On September 14, 2002 after the finding of the
explosive, the 515 Vice Battalion Commander said, this event
will acknowledge to The Territorial Military Commander and
Head of the Provincial Police what is the true situation
around here, so please do not always blame the Indonesian
National Army Force.
8. In his statement, the Jakarta Territorial Military
Commander said that this Tembagapura case may be caused by
the PT Freeport Indonesia internal, and not by the people
from the forest (the attacker was still around the location
of the incident).
9. On September 14, 2002 the individuals at Mile 50 station
were threatened by two phone calls stating that the station
would be attacked. The person, making the threats, called
from no. 358 (that was used by the Army Strategic Reserve
Command #515 Task Force and Security station, The Head of the
Section II 515 Task Force Security), where this number at
that time was used by Cendrawasih Task Force, and from a
cellular phone number 08124887486 that was owned by First
Class Sergeant Mr. Jatmiko, the member of Army Special Force
Command, Cendrawasih Task Force to 0901-422907 (the
supporting document is the call list print out that can be
used for evidence)(the attacker was still around the location
of the incident).
10. On September 20, 2002, the Second Lieutenant Infantry
Mr. Rahmat found the explosive at Mile 63, 2 Power Gel & 2
Cassuary bones (the attacker was still around the location of
the incident).
11. The PT Freeport vehicles still existed and were based
on the EPO consideration (EPO=Exploration Production
Operation) they might be used without side numbers and with
vague license plate numbers, those are:
a. DS 1154 PD, used by Intelligence Detachment First
Lieutenant Mr. Hartono, this vehicle originally has the side
number 01-2234.
b. DS 1149 MA, used by Special Army Force Command Captain
lrwan, this vehicle originally has the side number 01-2229.
c. DS 20 PD, used by Special Army Force Command Mas Jen,
this vehicle did not have side number and was not registered
in the office of Timika.
d. DS 54 PD, used by Special Army Force Command and driven
by the EPO employee Mr. Nathan and was not registered in the
office of Timika.
e. DS 1330 FB, was under contract by EPO and in that time
was used by the Special Army Force Command the First
Lieutenant Mr. Lukito, and this vehicle originally has the
side number 01-1432 with the newest (renewal) DS 1301 MA, but
was not put on yet.
f. On September 29, 2002 The Head of Unit Traffic Mimika
County Police had the pictures as proof of evidence for the
above explanation from point (a) up to point (e).
D. The Alternative of the Existence Mr. X.
1. Mr. X came by himself with 2 (two) of his friends and
they came to the position on the hill below the position of
the Second Rank Corporal Mr. Wayan at the top of the hill.
Wayan was planning to shoot the police on the road that will
come at 8:00 in the morning together with the investigators
team at the location of the incident. Then there was an
approximate lapse of 3 hours and at 11:40 EIT Mr. X. was
pronounced dead because of the shooting by the Second Rank of
Corporal Mr. Wayan. Those two friends of Mr. X. with black
and red shirts ran away and carried Mr. X's weapon, they ran
down through the steep gorge. After that, Mr. X dead body was
brought down 8 m. and then dragged 78 m to the side of the
road after Territorial Military Commander/Head of the
Provincial Police/Commander of the Cendrawasih Special Army
Force Command/Battalion Commander of 515 Army Strategic
Reserve Command/Regiment Commander of Sorong/Head of the
Directorate IPP Papuan Regional Police came to see and
witnessed the dead body of Mr. X, then Mr. X dead body was
brought to Tembagapura Hospital and then handled directly by
Dr. Kunto Rahardjo (who saw the larva/maggots on the
intestines of the open stomach of Mr. X).
2. Mr. X was shot to death in another location and then
brought to the forest and placed on the hill below Wayan's
position on the top of the hill, and then there was a lapse
of approximately 3 hours, then at 11:40 Mr. X was pronounced
dead because of the shooting by the Second Rank of Corporal
Mr. Wayan at the location of the incident on the back of the
hill. Then the dead body of Mr. X was brought down 8 m. and
then dragged 78 m to the side of the road after Territorial
Military Commander/Head of the Provincial Police/Regiment
Commander/Battalion Commander of 515 Army Strategic Reserve
Command/Head of the Directorate IPP came to see and witnessed
the dead body of Mr. X, then
Mr. X's dead body was brought to Tembagapura Hospital and
then handled directly by Dr. Kunto Rahardjo (who saw the
larva/maggots on the intestines of the open stomach of Mr.
X).
3. Mr. X was shot to death and then his dead body was
delivered and placed on the side of the road in order to be
seen and witnessed by Territorial Military Commander/Head of
the Provincial Police/Regiment Commander/Commander of the
Cendrawasih Special Army Force Command/Battalion Commander of
515 Army Strategic Reserve Command/Head of the Directorate
IPP Papuan Regional Police, then Mr. X's dead body was
brought to Tembagapura Hospital and then handled directly by
Dr. Kunto Rahardjo who saw the larva/maggots on the
intestines of the open stomach of Mr. X.
E. Evaluation Analysis
1. First Alternative: Mr. X suffered from Testicle
Hydrocele acute disease (the inflammation of both testicles
for approximately more than 1 year and the diameter of the
testicle approximately 17 cm.). With his health condition it
is impossible for Mr. X to go up to the hill to the location
of the incident. (Mr. X's physical/health and mental
condition does not support the first alternative).
2. Second Alternative: It is impossible for the persons who
create the scenario. Because it took too long of a time and
it was too exhausting for them to go up to the hill and carry
the dead body of Mr. X and then carry Mr. X back down to the
side of the road in
[[Page E384]]
order to be seen and witnessed by the Territorial Military
Commander/Head of the Provincial Police/Regiment Commander/
Commander of the Cendrawasih Special Army Force Command/
Battalion Commander of 515/Head of the Directorate IPP Papuan
Regional Police.
3. Third Alternative: It is the most possible scenario that
has been proposed. Mr. X was shot to death before. Then Mr.
X's dead body was brought and placed on the side of the road
in order to ``invite'' the police investigator team to come
and to investigate the location of the incident and at the
same time to wait for the coming of the group that consisted
of the Territorial Military Commander/Head of the Provincial
Police/Regiment Commander/Commander of the Cendrawasih
Special Army Force Command/Battalion Commander of 515/Head of
the Directorate IPP Papuan Regional Police to witness that it
is true that Mr. X was the attacker on August 31, 2002 and
also the attacker on September 1, 2002.
4. Referring to the third alternative that it was the most
possible scenario. In order to make the case more clear, 10
(ten) questions need to be asked:
(1) Who is Mr. X?
(2) Where is the exact location where Mr. X was picked up
at?
(3) Where is the exact location where Mr. X was shot before
he was placed on the side of the road?
(4) Who picked up Mr. X and who shot Mr. X?
(5) Why did they create this kind of scenario for Mr. X?
(6) Who are the parties that have worked together to
develop this Mr. X scenario?
(7) Is this Mr. X scenario known by the responsible
security of PT. FI (OPS TEMBAGA-14)?
(8) Who is the initiator (the first person) to create this
plan or create this Mr. X scenario?
(9) What kind of vehicle was used to pick up Mr. X and to
drop Mr. X's dead body on the side of the road?
(10) What is the background reason that had triggered the
creation of this scenario for Mr. X?
F. Closing
This is all about the findings pertaining to Mr. X. It is
supported by the data and the facts from:
1. The condition of Mr. X while he was still alive.
2. The condition of dead Mr. X at the location of the
incident.
3. The condition of Mr. X when the autopsy was performed.
4. The condition of Mr. X after he was buried in the Timika
public cemetery.
____________________