

## AMENDMENT NO. 4261

At the request of Mr. CHAMBLISS, the names of the Senator from Montana (Mr. BAUCUS), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. DODD), the Senator from Texas (Mrs. HUTCHISON), the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. DOMENICI), the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. BINGAMAN), the Senator from Maine (Ms. COLLINS) and the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. NELSON) were added as co-sponsors of amendment No. 4261 intended to be proposed to S. 2766, an original bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2007 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

## AMENDMENT NO. 4288

At the request of Ms. CANTWELL, the name of the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. LIEBERMAN) was added as a co-sponsor of amendment No. 4288 intended to be proposed to S. 2766, an original bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2007 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

## AMENDMENT NO. 4309

At the request of Mr. SCHUMER, the name of the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. LIEBERMAN) was added as a co-sponsor of amendment No. 4309 intended to be proposed to S. 2766, an original bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2007 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

## STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. REID (for himself, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. LEVIN, and Mr. DURBIN):

S. 3536. A bill to ensure oversight of intelligence on Iran, and for other purposes; to the Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, we live in a dangerous time, and that is an understatement. The threats to our freedom are many. They range from terrorist attacks such as those that hit our shores on 9/11 to rogue nations with nuclear ambitions such as North Korea and Iran.

It is important that we, as a country, address each of these threats. Recent history is rife with examples of what happens if we fail to do so. The threats don't go away; they only get worse.

This is a fact we can see in today's headlines about North Korea's new missile tests—they have not fired a missile since 1998; and from all reports

we have been able to pick up on the news, they are now fueling another missile just prior to launch—and also in Iran, where efforts to halt the country's nuclear program have been delayed and complicated by the administration's, I believe, failures in Iraq.

This weekend, the Washington Post reported that top Bush administration officials ignored an offer from Iran in 2003, when American leverage in the region was at its height. The offer from Iran was to curtail its nuclear activities. This is very troubling.

Paul Pillar, the former head of Middle East analysis for the intelligence community, said that the U.S. position regarding Iran is "inherently weaker now" because of Iraq, and that "there have been a lot of lost opportunities." One expert analyst said the administration's mismanagement "strengthened the hands of those in Iran who believe the only way to compel the United States to talk or deal with Iran is not by sending peace offers but by being a nuisance."

Today, I am introducing legislation which would improve Congress's oversight of the administration's efforts on Iran—the Iran Intelligence Oversight Act. The legislation will ensure that Congress is fully engaged in the Iran debate, and it will also push the Bush White House to develop and implement the right policy for dealing with Iran.

All of us are painfully aware of this Congress's unwillingness to hold this administration accountable for its mistakes and misjudgments. There has been virtually no oversight on anything.

I have said before that there has been a lack of a legislative branch of Government. The executive exists, the judicial branch exists, but the Founding Fathers' view to have three separate but equal branches of Government has not been in existence for the last 5½ years. The reason the President has not had to veto a single bill is he has gotten anything he wants from this Republican Congress.

The Senate Intelligence Committee has led the way in terms of stonewalling and rubber-stamping the Bush administration. Nearly 3 years into its investigation of the White House's politicization of Iraq intelligence, we still don't have a report.

Unfortunately, the committee record on Iran is not any better.

U.S. News and World Report had a quote earlier this spring from the committee's chairman, saying:

[W]e have not made the progress on our oversight of Iran intelligence, which is critical.

U.S. News further said the panel had done only piecemeal scrutiny of the spy agencies' work on Iran, quoting a Republican staffer as saying:

There is no organized committee staff effort to look at Iran right now. . . . It's all sort of on hold.

That is really too bad.

Perhaps Tehran will be kind enough to wait for them, but the Senate should

not. The Senate must be engaged as we move our diplomacy forward with Iran. We must take seriously our responsibility to insist on a thorough review of the facts, a full debate of the threat, and full consultation as events move forward.

The legislation I am introducing today would put in place the rigorous oversight necessary to hold the administration accountable for its rhetoric and its all too frequent tendency to spin and distort the facts.

The act requires the administration to give Congress and the American people solid answers to three questions.

First, what is the judgment of the Government's professional intelligence analysts about the threat of Iran, and what tools are most likely to influence the Iranians to change their ways?

Second, what are the President's policy objectives with Iran, and what is his strategy for achieving these objectives?

Currently, we are only left to guess.

To the best of my knowledge, Congress has not yet been briefed on any of the key details of the deal offered to Iran a few weeks ago. The Iranians have been briefed, the Europeans have been briefed, the Russians have been briefed, the Chinese have been briefed—but not the U.S. Senate.

Congress needs to be in on the take-off, not asked to board the plane for the crash landing.

Third, this legislation asks the question: What is the process for making sure that senior administration officials do not publicly mischaracterize the evidence and the challenge of Iran?

Much of what we heard from the administration in the run-up to Iraq about mushroom clouds, yellow cake, and aluminum tubes turned out to be overstated or based on intelligence that was known to be very, very suspect.

I am told that the most famous of the Vice President's speeches on Iraq—the August 2002 VFW speech that set the rush to war and dramatically overstated the threat from Iraq—was never even cleared by the intelligence community.

With my legislation in place, and with vigilance from Congress, we will be one step closer to ensuring this kind of misleading information does not happen regarding the threat posed by Iran.

I want to be clear: President Bush must take seriously the challenge of Iran, as I know he does, but the way to success will be a policy based on the facts. Under my legislation, the administration will be held accountable for anything less.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 3536

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

**SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

This Act may be cited as the “Iran Intelligence Oversight Act”.

**SEC. 2. INTELLIGENCE ON IRAN.**

(a) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS OF UPDATED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAN.—

(1) SUBMITTAL REQUIRED.—As soon as is practicable, but not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress an updated National Intelligence Estimate on Iran.

(2) NOTICE REGARDING SUBMITTAL.—If the Director determines that the National Intelligence Estimate required by paragraph (1) cannot be submitted by the date specified in that paragraph, the Director shall submit to Congress a report setting forth—

(A) the reasons why the National Intelligence Estimate cannot be submitted by such date; and

(B) an estimated date for the submittal of the National Intelligence Estimate.

(3) FORM.—The National Intelligence Estimate under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form. Consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, an unclassified summary of the key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate should be submitted.

(4) ELEMENTS.—The National Intelligence Estimate submitted under paragraph (1) shall address the following:

(A) The foreign policy and regime objectives of Iran.

(B) The current status of the nuclear programs of Iran, including—

(i) an assessment of the current and projected capabilities of Iran to design a nuclear weapon, to produce plutonium, enriched uranium, and other weapons materials, to build a nuclear weapon, and to deploy a nuclear weapon; and

(ii) an assessment of the intentions of Iran regarding possible development of nuclear weapons, the motivations underlying such intentions, and the factors that might influence changes in such intentions.

(C) The military and defense capabilities of Iran, including any non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction programs and related delivery systems.

(D) The relationship of Iran with terrorist organizations, the use by Iran of terrorist organizations in furtherance of its foreign policy objectives, and the factors that might cause Iran to reduce or end such relationships.

(E) The prospects for support from the international community for various potential courses of action with respect to Iran, including diplomacy, sanctions, and military action.

(F) The anticipated reaction of Iran to the courses of action set forth under subparagraph (E), including an identification of the course or courses of action most likely to successfully influence Iran in terminating or moderating its policies of concern.

(G) The level of popular and elite support within Iran for the Iran regime, and for its civil nuclear program, nuclear weapons ambitions, and other policies, and the prospects for reform and political change within Iran.

(H) The views among the populace and elites of Iran with respect to the United States, including views on direct discussions with or normalization of relations with the United States.

(I) The views among the populace and elites of Iran with respect to other key countries involved in nuclear diplomacy with Iran.

(J) The likely effects and consequences of any military action against the nuclear programs or other regime interests of Iran.

(K) The confidence level of key judgments in the National Intelligence Estimate, the

quality of the sources of intelligence on Iran, the nature and scope of any gaps in intelligence on Iran, and any significant alternative views on the matters contained in the National Intelligence Estimate.

(b) PRESIDENTIAL REPORT ON POLICY OBJECTIVES AND UNITED STATES STRATEGY REGARDING IRAN.—

(1) REPORT REQUIRED.—As soon as is practicable, but not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the following:

(A) The objectives of United States policy on Iran.

(B) The strategy for achieving such objectives.

(2) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex, as appropriate.

(3) ELEMENTS.—The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) address the role of diplomacy, incentives, sanctions, other punitive measures and incentives, and other programs and activities relating to Iran for which funds are provided by Congress; and

(B) summarize United States contingency planning regarding the range of possible United States military actions in support of United States policy objectives with respect to Iran.

(c) DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON PROCESS FOR VETTING AND CLEARING ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS' STATEMENTS DRAWN FROM INTELLIGENCE.—

(1) REPORT REQUIRED.—As soon as is practicable, but not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the process for vetting and clearing statements of Administration officials that are drawn from or rely upon intelligence.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The report shall—

(A) describe current policies and practices of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the intelligence community for—

(i) vetting and clearing statements of senior Administration officials that are drawn from or rely upon intelligence; and

(ii) how significant misstatements of intelligence that may occur in public statements of senior public officials are identified, brought to the attention of any such officials, and corrected;

(B) assess the sufficiency and adequacy of such policies and practices; and

(C) include any recommendations that the Director considers appropriate to improve such policies and practices.

**SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS**

**SENATE RESOLUTION 515—EX-  
PRESSING THE SENSE OF THE  
SENATE ON THE CONTINUED  
PRESENCE OF UNITED STATES  
TROOPS IN IRAQ UNTIL AT  
LEAST 2009**

Mr. WYDEN submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. RES. 515

*Resolved*, That it is the sense of the Senate that—

(1) the members of the Armed Forces deserve the enormous respect and support of the Senate and the American people for the sacrifices that they are making on behalf of our country; and

(2) the President's intention, as stated on March 21, 2006, that “future Presidents” will

determine whether to keep members of the Armed Forces in Iraq undermines the preparedness of the United States military to respond to other crises and should not be supported.

**SENATE RESOLUTION 516—RECOGNIZING THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JUNETEENTH INDEPENDENCE DAY AND EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT HISTORY SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A MEANS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE PAST AND SOLVING THE CHALLENGES OF THE FUTURE**

Mr. OBAMA (for himself, Mr. FRIST, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. REID, and Mr. BROWN-BACK) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to:

S. RES. 516

Whereas news of the end of slavery did not reach frontier areas of the United States, and in particular the Southwestern States, for more than 2 years after President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation of January 1, 1863, and months after the conclusion of the Civil War;

Whereas on June 19, 1865, Union soldiers led by Major General Gordon Granger arrived in Galveston, Texas, with news that the Civil War had ended and that the enslaved were free;

Whereas African Americans who had been slaves in the Southwest celebrated June 19, commonly known as “Juneteenth Independence Day”, as the anniversary of their emancipation;

Whereas African Americans from the Southwest continue the tradition of Juneteenth Independence Day as inspiration and encouragement for future generations;

Whereas, for more than 135 years, Juneteenth Independence Day celebrations have been held to honor African American freedom while encouraging self-development and respect for all cultures;

Whereas, although Juneteenth Independence Day is beginning to be recognized as a national, and even global, event, the history behind the celebration should not be forgotten; and

Whereas the faith and strength of character demonstrated by former slaves remains an example for all people of the United States, regardless of background, religion, or race: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That—

(1) the Senate—

(A) recognizes the historical significance of Juneteenth Independence Day to the Nation;

(B) supports the continued celebration of Juneteenth Independence Day to provide an opportunity for the people of the United States to learn more about the past and to understand better the experiences that have shaped the Nation; and

(C) encourages the people of the United States to observe Juneteenth Independence Day with appropriate ceremonies, activities, and programs; and

(2) it is the sense of the Senate that—

(A) history should be regarded as a means for understanding the past and solving the challenges of the future; and

(B) the celebration of the end of slavery is an important and enriching part of the history and heritage of the United States.