[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 185 (Friday, December 18, 2015)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8844-S8859]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2016
Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I ask the Chair to lay before the
Senate the message to accompany H.R. 2029.
The Presiding Officer laid before the Senate the following message
from the House of Representatives:
Resolved, That the House agree to the amendment of the
Senate to the bill (H.R. 2029) entitled ``An Act making
appropriations for military construction, the Department of
Veterans Affairs, and related agencies for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 2016, and for other purposes,'' with
amendments.
Motion to Concur
Mr. McCONNELL. I move to concur in the House amendments to the Senate
amendment to H.R. 2029.
Mr. BURR. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Joint
Explanatory Statement for Division M--Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2016 be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT TO ACCOMPANY THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016
The following consists of the joint explanatory statement
to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2016.
This joint explanatory statement reflects the status of
negotiations and disposition of issues reached between the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (hereinafter, ``the
Agreement''). The joint explanatory statement shall have the
same effect with respect to the implementation of this Act as
if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of
conference.
The joint explanatory statement comprises three parts: an
overview of the application of the annex to accompany this
statement; unclassified congressional direction; and a
section-by-section analysis of the legislative text.
Part I: Application of the Classified Annex
The classified nature of U.S. intelligence activities
prevents the congressional intelligence committees from
publicly disclosing many details concerning the conclusions
and recommendations of the Agreement. Therefore, a classified
Schedule of Authorizations and a classified annex have been
prepared to describe in detail the scope and intent of the
congressional intelligence committees' actions. The Agreement
authorizes the Intelligence Community to obligate and expend
funds not altered or modified by the classified Schedule of
Authorizations as requested in the President's budget,
subject to modification under applicable reprogramming
procedures.
The classified annex is the result of negotiations between
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. It reconciles the
differences between the committees' respective versions of
the bill for the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the
Homeland Security Intelligence Program for Fiscal Year 2016.
The Agreement also makes recommendations for the Military
Intelligence Program (MIP), and the Information Systems
Security Program, consistent with the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, and provides certain
direction for these two programs.
The Agreement supersedes the classified annexes to the
reports accompanying H.R. 4127, as passed by the House on
December 1, 2015, H.R. 2596, as passed by the House on June
16, 2015, and S. 1705, as reported by the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence on July 7, 2015. All references to
the House-passed and Senate-reported annexes are solely to
identify the heritage of specific provisions.
The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated
into the bill pursuant to Section 102. It has the status of
law. The classified annex supplements and adds detail to
clarify the authorization levels found in the bill and the
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified annex
shall have the same legal force as the report to accompany
the bill.
Part II: Select Unclassified Congressional Direction
Enhancing Geographic and Demographic Diversity
The Agreement directs the Office of the Director for
National Intelligence (ODNI) to conduct an awareness,
outreach, and recruitment program to rural, under-represented
colleges and universities that are not part of the IC Centers
of Academic Excellence (IC CAE) program. Further, the
Agreement directs that ODNI shall increase and formally track
the number of competitive candidates for IC employment or
internships who studied at IC CAE schools and other
scholarship programs supported by the IC.
Additionally, the Agreement directs that ODNI, acting
through the Executive Agent for the IC CAE program, the IC
Chief Human Capital Officer, and the Chief, Office of IC
Equal Opportunity & Diversity, as appropriate, shall:
1. Add a criterion to the IC CAE selection process that
applicants must be part of a consortium or actively
collaborate with under-resourced schools in their area;
2. Work with CAE schools to reach out to rural and under-
resourced schools, including by inviting such schools to
participate in the annual IC CAE colloquium and IC
recruitment events;
3. Increase and formally track the number of competitive IC
internship candidates from IC CAE schools, starting with
Fiscal Year 2016 IC summer internships, and provide a report,
within 180 days of the enactment of this Act, on its plan to
do so;
4. Develop metrics to ascertain whether IC CAE, the Pat
Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program, the Louis Stokes
Educational Scholarship Program, and the Intelligence Officer
Training Program reach a diverse demographic and serve as
feeders to the IC workforce;
5. Include in the annual report on minority hiring and
retention a breakdown of the students participating in these
programs who serve as IC interns, applied for full-time IC
employment, received offers of employment, and entered on
duty in the IC;
6. Conduct a feasibility study with necessary funding
levels regarding how the IC CAE could be better tailored to
serve under-resourced schools, and provide such study to the
congressional intelligence committees within 180 days of the
enactment of this Act;
7. Publicize all IC elements' recruitment activities,
including the new Applicant Gateway and the IC Virtual Career
Fair, to rural schools, Historically Black Colleges and
Universities, and other minority-serving institutions that
have been contacted by IC recruiters;
8. Contact new groups with the objective of expanding the
IC Heritage Community Liaison Council; and
9. Ensure that IC elements add such activities listed above
that may be appropriate to their recruitment plans for Fiscal
Year 2016.
ODNI shall provide an interim update to the congressional
intelligence committees on its efforts within 90 days of the
enactment of this Act and include final results in its annual
report on minority hiring and retention.
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Analytic Duplication & Improving Customer Impact
The congressional intelligence committees are concerned
about potential duplication in finished analytic products.
Specifically, the congressional intelligence committees are
concerned that contemporaneous publication of substantially
similar intelligence products fosters confusion among
intelligence customers (including those in Congress), impedes
analytic coherence across the IC, and wastes time and effort.
The congressional intelligence committees value competitive
analysis, but believe there is room to reduce duplicative
analytic activity and improve customer impact.
Therefore, the Agreement directs ODNI to pilot a repeatable
methodology to evaluate potential duplication in finished
intelligence analytic products and to report the findings to
the congressional intelligence committees within 60 days of
the enactment of this Act. In addition, the Agreement directs
ODNI to report to the congressional intelligence committees
within 180 days of enactment of this Act on how it will
revise analytic practice, tradecraft, and standards to ensure
customers can clearly identify how products that are produced
contemporaneously and cover similar topics differ from one
another in their methodological, informational, or temporal
aspects, and the significance of those differences. This
report is not intended to cover operationally urgent analysis
or current intelligence.
Countering Violent Extremism and the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant
The Agreement directs ODNI, within 180 days of enactment of
this Act and in consultation with appropriate interagency
partners, to brief the congressional intelligence committees
on how intelligence agencies are supporting both (1) the
Administration's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program
first detailed in the 2011 White House strategy Empowering
Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United
States, which was expanded following the January 2015 White
House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, and (2) the
Administration's Strategy to Counter the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant, which was announced in September 2014.
Analytic Health Reports
The Agreement directs the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
to provide Analytic Health Reports to the congressional
intelligence committees on a quarterly basis, including an
update on the specific effect of analytic modernization on
the health of the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program
(DIAP) and its ability to reduce analytic risk.
All-Source Analysis Standards
The Agreement directs DIA to conduct a comprehensive
evaluation of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise's all-
source analysis capability and production in Fiscal Year
2015. The evaluation should assess the analytic output of
both NIP and MW funded all-source analysts, separately and
collectively, and apply the following four criteria
identified in the ODNI Strategic Evaluation Report for all-
source analysis: 1) integrated, 2) objective, 3) timely, and
4) value-added. The results of this evaluation shall be
included as part of the Fiscal Year 2017 congressional budget
justification book.
Terrorism Investigations
The Agreement directs the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) to submit to the congressional intelligence committees,
within 180 days of enactment of this Act, a report detailing
how FBI has allocated resources between domestic and foreign
terrorist threats based on numbers of investigations over the
past 5 years. The report should be submitted in unclassified
form but may include a classified annex.
Investigations of Minors Involved in Radicalization
The Agreement directs the FBI to provide a briefing to the
congressional intelligence committees within 180 days of
enactment of this Act on investigations in which minors are
encouraged to turn away from violent extremism rather than
take actions that would lead to Federal terrorism
indictments. This briefing should place these rates in the
context of all investigations of minors for violent extremist
activity and should describe any FBI engagement with minors'
families, law enforcement, or other individuals or groups
connected to the minor during or after investigations.
Furthermore, the Agreement directs the FBI to include how
often undercover agents pursue investigations based on a
location of interest related to violent extremist activity
compared to investigations of an individual or group believed
to be engaged in such activity. Included should be the number
of locations of interest associated with a religious group or
entity. This briefing also should include trend analysis
covering the last five years describing violent extremist
activity in the U.S.
Declassification Review of Video of the 2012 Benghazi
Terrorist Attacks
Numerous investigations have been conducted regarding the
2012 terrorist attack against U.S. facilities in Benghazi.
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence produced one of
the first declassified Congressional reports and continues to
believe that the public should have access to information
about the attacks, so long as it does not jeopardize
intelligence sources and methods.
The closed circuit television videos from the Temporary
Mission Facility (TMF) captured some of the activity that
took place at the State Department facility on September 11,
2012, and their release would contribute to the public's
understanding of the event without compromising sources or
methods.
Therefore, the Agreement directs the Director of National
Intelligence, or the appropriate federal official, to conduct
a declassification review and to facilitate the release to
the public of the declassified closed circuit television
videos of the September 11, 2012, terrorist attack on the TMF
in Benghazi, Libya, consistent with the protection of sources
and methods, not later than 120 days after the enactment of
this Act.
Part III: Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of Legislative
Text
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2016.
Title I--Intelligence Activities
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists the United States Government departments,
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities for Fiscal Year 2016.
Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities and the applicable personnel
levels by program for Fiscal Year 2016 are contained in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the classified
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of
Representatives and to the President.
Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 is intended to provide additional flexibility
to the Director of National Intelligence in managing the
civilian personnel of the Intelligence Community. Section 103
provides that the Director may authorize employment of
civilian personnel in Fiscal Year 2016 in excess of the
number of authorized positions by an amount not exceeding
three percent of the total limit applicable to each
Intelligence Community element under Section 102. The
Director may do so only if necessary to the performance of
important intelligence functions.
Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the Director of
National Intelligence and sets the authorized personnel
levels for the elements within the ICMA for Fiscal Year 2016.
Section 105. Clarification regarding authority for flexible
personnel management among elements of intelligence
community
Section 105 clarifies that certain Intelligence Community
elements may make hiring decisions based on the excepted
service designation.
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2016 for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
Title III--General Provisions
Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits
authorized by law
Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and
other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence
activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that
is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of
the United States.
Section 303. Provision of information and assistance to
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Section 303 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
clarify the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community's
authority to seek information and assistance from federal,
state, and local agencies, or units thereof.
Section 304. Inclusion of Inspector General of Intelligence
Community in Council of Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency
Section 304 amends Section 11(b)(1)(B) of the Inspector
General Act of 1978 to reflect the correct name of the Office
of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. The
section also clarifies that the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community is a member of the Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.
Section 305. Clarification of authority of Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board
Section 305 amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) to clarify that nothing in the
statute authorizing the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board should be construed to allow that Board to gain access
to information regarding an activity covered by section 503
of the National Security Act of 1947.
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Section 306. Enhancing government personnel security programs
Section 306 directs the Director of National Intelligence
to develop and implement a plan for eliminating the backlog
of overdue periodic investigations, and further requires the
Director to direct each agency to implement a program to
provide enhanced security review to individuals determined
eligible for access to classified information or eligible to
hold a sensitive position.
These enhanced personnel security programs will integrate
information relevant and appropriate for determining an
individual's suitability for access to classified information
or eligibility to hold a sensitive position; be conducted at
least 2 times every 5 years; and commence not later than 5
years after the date of enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016
Intelligence Authorization Act, or the elimination of the
backlog of overdue periodic investigations, whichever occurs
first.
Section 307. Notification of changes to retention of call
detail record policies
Section 307 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to notify the congressional intelligence committees in
writing not later than 15 days after learning that an
electronic communication service provider that generates call
detail records in the ordinary course of business has changed
its policy on the retention of such call details records to
result in a retention period of less than 18 months. Section
307 further requires the Director to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees within 30 days of
enactment a report identifying each electronic communication
service provider (if any) that has a current policy in place
to retain call detail records for 18 months or less.
Section 308. Personnel information notification policy by the
Director of National Intelligence
Section 308 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to establish a policy to ensure timely notification to the
congressional intelligence committees of the identities of
individuals occupying senior level positions within the
Intelligence Community.
Section 309. Designation of lead intelligence officer for
tunnels
Section 309 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to designate an official to manage the collection and
analysis of intelligence regarding the tactical use of
tunnels by state and nonstate actors.
Section 310. Reporting process for tracking country clearance
requests
Section 310 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to establish a formal reporting process for tracking requests
for country clearance submitted to overseas Director of
National Intelligence representatives. Section 310 also
requires the Director to brief the congressional intelligence
committees on its progress.
Section 311. Study on reduction of analytic duplication
Section 311 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to carry out a study to identify duplicative analytic
products and the reasons for such duplication, ascertain the
frequency and types of such duplication, and determine
whether this review should be considered a part of the
responsibilities assigned to the Analytic Integrity and
Standards office inside the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence. Section 311 also requires the Director
to provide a plan for revising analytic practice, tradecraft,
and standards to ensure customers are able to readily
identify how analytic products on similar topics that are
produced contemporaneously differ from one another and what
is the significance of those differences.
Section 312. Strategy for comprehensive interagency review of
the United States national security overhead satellite
architecture
Section 312 requires the Director of National Intelligence,
in collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop a strategy,
with milestones and benchmarks, to ensure that there is a
comprehensive interagency review of policies and practices
for planning and acquiring national security satellite
systems and architectures, including the capabilities of
commercial systems and partner countries, consistent with the
National Space Policy issued on June 28, 2010. Where
applicable, this strategy shall account for the unique
missions and authorities vested in the Department of Defense
and the Intelligence Community.
Section 313. Cyber attack standards of measurement study
Section 313 directs the Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Secretary of Defense, to carry out a study to determine the
appropriate standards to measure the damage of cyber
incidents.
Title IV--Matters Relating to Elements of the Intelligence Community
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 401. Appointment and confirmation of the National
Counterintelligence Executive
Section 401 makes subject to Presidential appointment and
Senate confirmation, the executive branch position of
National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), which was
created by the 2002 Counterintelligence Enhancement Act.
Effective December 2014, the NCIX was also dual-hatted as the
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center.
Section 402. Technical amendments relating to pay under title
5, United States Code
Section 402 amends 5 U.S.C. Sec. 5102(a)(1) to expressly
exclude the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI) from the provisions of chapter 51 of title 5, relating
to position classification, pay, and allowances for General
Schedule employees, which does not apply to ODNI by virtue of
the National Security Act. This proposal would have no
substantive effect.
Section 403. Analytic Objectivity Review
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence's
Analytic Integrity and Standards (AIS) office was established
in response to the requirement in the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) for the designation
of an entity responsible for ensuring that the Intelligence
Community's finished intelligence products are timely,
objective, independent of political considerations, based
upon all sources of available intelligence, and demonstrative
of the standards of proper analytic tradecraft.
Consistent with responsibilities prescribed under IRTPA,
Section 403 requires the AIS Chief to conduct a review of
finished intelligence products produced by the CIA to assess
whether the reorganization of the Agency, announced publicly
on March 6, 2015, has resulted in any loss of analytic
objectivity. The report is due no later than March 6, 2017.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency and Other Elements
Section 411. Authorities of the Inspector General for the
Central Intelligence Agency
Section 411 amends Section 17 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 to consolidate the Inspector General's
personnel authorities and to provide the Inspector General
with the same authorities as other Inspectors General to
request assistance and information from federal, state, and
local agencies or units thereof.
Section 412. Prior congressional notification of transfers of
funds for certain intelligence activities
Section 412 requires notification to the congressional
intelligence committees before transferring funds from the
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund or the
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund that are to be used for
intelligence activities.
Title V--Matters Relating to Foreign Countries
Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia
Section 501. Notice of deployment or transfer of Club-K
container missile system by the Russian Federation
Section 501 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to submit written notice to the appropriate congressional
committees if the Intelligence Community receives
intelligence that the Russian Federation has deployed, or is
about to deploy, the Club-K container missile system through
the Russian military, or transferred or sold, or intends
to transfer or sell, such system to another state or non-
state actor.
Section 502. Assessment on funding of political parties and
nongovernmental organizations by the Russian Federation
Section 502 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to submit an Intelligence Community assessment to the
appropriate congressional committees concerning the funding
of political parties and nongovernmental organizations in the
former Soviet States and Europe by the Russian Security
Services since January 1, 2006, not later than 180 days after
the enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence
Authorization Act.
Section 503. Assessment on the use of political
assassinations as a form of statecraft by the Russian
Federation
Section 503 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to submit an Intelligence Community assessment concerning the
use of political assassinations as a form of statecraft by
the Russian Federation to the appropriate congressional
committees, not later than 180 days after the enactment of
the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence Authorization Act.
Subtitle B--Matters Relating to Other Countries
Section 511. Report of resources and collection posture with
regard to the South China Sea and East China Sea
Section 511 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to submit to the appropriate congressional committees an
Intelligence Community assessment on Intelligence Community
resourcing and collection posture with regard to the South
China Sea and East China Sea, not later than 180 days after
the enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence
Authorization Act.
Section 512. Use of locally employed staff serving at a
United States diplomatic facility in Cuba
Section 512 requires the Secretary of State, not later than
1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, to ensure
that key supervisory positions at a United States diplomatic
facility in Cuba are occupied by citizens of the United
States who have passed a thorough background check. Further,
not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the provision requires the Secretary of State, in
coordination with other appropriate government agencies, to
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan to
further reduce the reliance on locally employed staff in
United
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States diplomatic facilities in Cuba. The plan shall, at a
minimum, include cost estimates, timelines, and numbers of
employees to be replaced.
Section 513. Inclusion of sensitive compartmented information
facilities in United States diplomatic facilities in Cuba
Section 513 requires that each United States diplomatic
facility in Cuba--in which classified information will be
processed or in which classified communications occur--that
is constructed, or undergoes a construction upgrade, be
constructed to include a sensitive compartmented information
facility.
Section 514. Report on use by Iran of funds made available
through sanctions relief
Section 514 requires the Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, to submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report
assessing the monetary value of any direct or indirect form
of sanctions relief Iran has received since the Joint Plan of
Action (JPGA) entered into effect, and how Iran has used
funds made available through such sanctions relief. This
report shall be submitted every 180 days while the JPOA is in
effect, and not later than 1 year after an agreement relating
to Iran's nuclear program takes effect, and annually
thereafter while that agreement remains in effect.
Title VI--Matters Relating to United States Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba
Section 601. Prohibition on use of funds for transfer or
release of individual detained at United States Naval
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the United States
Section 601 states that no amounts authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the
Intelligence Community may be used to transfer or release
individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay to or within the
United States, its territories, or possessions.
Section 602. Prohibition on use of funds to construct or
modify facilities in the United States to house detainees
transferred from United States Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba
Section 602 states that no amounts authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the
Intelligence Community may be used to construct or modify
facilities in the United States, its territories, or
possessions to house detainees transferred from Guantanamo
Bay.
Section 603. Prohibition on use of funds for transfer or
release to certain countries of individuals detained at
United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Section 603 states that no amounts authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the
Intelligence Community may be used to transfer or release an
individual detained at Guantanamo Bay to the custody or
control of any country, or any entity within such country, as
follows: Libya, Somalia, Syria, or Yemen.
Title VII--Reports and other Matters
Subtitle A--Reports
Section 701. Repeal of certain reporting requirements
Section 701 repeals certain reporting requirements.
Section 702. Reports on foreign fighters
Section 702 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to submit a report every 60 days for the three years
following the enactment of this Act to the congressional
intelligence committees on foreign fighter flows to and from
Syria and Iraq. Section 702 requires information on the total
number of foreign fighters who have traveled to Syria or
Iraq, the total number of United States persons who have
traveled or attempted to travel to Syria or Iraq, the total
number of foreign fighters in Terrorist Identities Datamart
Environment, the total number of foreign fighters who have
been processed with biometrics, any programmatic updates to
the foreign fighter report, and a worldwide graphic that
describes foreign fighter flows to and from Syria.
Section 703. Report on strategy, efforts, and resources to
detect, deter, and degrade Islamic State revenue
mechanisms
Section 703 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to submit a report on the strategy, efforts, and resources of
the Intelligence Community that are necessary to detect,
deter, and degrade the revenue mechanisms of the Islamic
State.
Section 704. Report on United States counterterrorism
strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the Islamic
State, al-Qa'ida, and their affiliated groups, associated
groups, and adherents
Section 704 requires the President to submit to the
appropriated congressional committees a comprehensive report
on the counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and
defeat the Islamic State, al-Qa'ida, and their affiliated
groups associated groups, and adherents.
Section 705. Report on effects of data breach of Office of
Personnel Management
Section 705 requires the President to transmit to the
congressional intelligence communities a report on the data
breach of the Office of Personnel Management. Section 705
requires information on the impact of the breach on
Intelligence Community operations abroad, in addition to an
assessment of how foreign persons, groups, or countries may
use data collected by the breach and what Federal Government
agencies use best practices to protect sensitive data.
Section 706. Report on hiring of graduates of Cyber Corps
Scholarship Program by intelligence community
Section 706 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the employment by the Intelligence Community of
graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholarship Program. Section 706
requires information on the number of graduates hired by each
element of the Intelligence Community, the recruitment
process for each element of the Intelligence Community, and
the Director recommendations for improving the hiring
process.
Section 707. Report on use of certain business concerns
Section 707 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report of covered business concerns--including minority-
owned, women-owned, small disadvantaged, service-enabled
veteran-owned, and veteran-owned small businesses--among
contractors that are awarded contracts by the Intelligence
Community for goods, equipment, tools and services.
Subtitle B--Other Matters
Section 711. Use of homeland security grant funds in
conjunction with Department of Energy national
laboratories
Section 711 amends Section 2008(a) of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 to clarify that the Department of Energy's
national laboratories may seek access to homeland security
grant funds.
Section 712. Inclusion of certain minority-serving
institutions in grant program to enhance recruiting of
intelligence community workforce
Section 712 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
include certain minority-serving institutions in the
intelligence officer training programs established under
Section 1024 of the Act.
Mr. BURR. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Joint
Explanatory Statement for Division N--Cybersecurity Act of 2015 be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT TO ACCOMPANY THE CYBERSECURITY ACT OF 2015
The following consists of the joint explanatory statement
to accompany the Cybersecurity Act of 2015.
This joint explanatory statement reflects the status of
negotiations and disposition of issues reached between the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the House
Committee on Homeland Security. The joint explanatory
statement shall have the same effect with respect to the
implementation of this Act as if it were a joint explanatory
statement of a committee of conference.
The joint explanatory statement comprises an overview of
the bill's background and objectives, and a section-by-
section analysis of the legislative text.
Part I: Background and Need for Legislation
Cybersecurity threats continue to affect our nation's
security and its economy, as losses to consumers, businesses,
and the government from cyber attacks, penetrations, and
disruptions total billions of dollars. This legislation is
designed to create a voluntary cybersecurity information
sharing process that will encourage public and private sector
entities to share cyber threat information, without legal
barriers and the threat of unfounded litigation--while
protecting private information. This in turn should foster
greater cooperation and collaboration in the face of growing
cybersecurity threats to national and economic security.
This legislation also includes provisions to improve
Federal network and information system security, provide
assessments on the Federal cybersecurity workforce, and
provide reporting and strategies on cybersecurity industry-
related and criminal-related matters. The increased
information sharing enabled by this bill is a critical step
toward improving cybersecurity in America.
Part II: Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of Legislative
Text
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015.
Title I--Cybersecurity Information Sharing
Section 101. Short title.
Section 101 states that Title I may be cited as the
``Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015.''
Section 102. Definitions.
Section 102 defines for purposes of this title key terms
such as ``cybersecurity purpose,'' ``cybersecurity threat,''
``cyber threat indicator,'' ``defensive measure,'' and
``monitor.'' The definition of ``cybersecurity purpose'' is
meant to include a broad range of
[[Page S8848]]
activities taken to protect information and information
systems from cybersecurity threats. The authorizations under
this Act are tied to conduct undertaken for a ``cybersecurity
purpose,'' which both clarifies their scope and ensures that
the authorizations cover activities that can be performed in
conjunction with one another. For instance, a private entity
conducting monitoring activities to determine whether it
should use an authorized ``defensive measure'' would be
monitoring for a ``cybersecurity purpose.'' Significantly,
the authorization for ``defensive measures'' does not include
activities that are generally considered ``offensive'' in
nature, such as unauthorized access of, or execution of
computer code on, another entity's information systems, such
as ``hacking back'' activities, or any actions that would
substantially harm another private entity's information
systems, such as violations of section 1030, of title 18,
United States Code.
Section 103. Sharing of information by the Federal
Government.
Section 103 requires the Director of National Intelligence,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense,
and the Attorney General to jointly develop and issue
procedures for the timely sharing of classified and
unclassified cyber threat indicators and defensive measures
(hereinafter referenced collectively in this joint
explanatory statement as, ``cyber threat information'') with
relevant entities.
These procedures must also ensure the Federal Government
maintains: a real-time sharing capability; a process for
notifying entities that have received cyber threat
information in error; protections against unauthorized
access; and procedures to review and remove, prior to sharing
cyber threat information, any information not directly
related to a cybersecurity threat known at the time of
sharing to be personal information of a specific individual
or that identifies a specific individual, or to implement a
technical capability to do the same. These procedures must be
developed in consultation with appropriate Federal entities,
including the Small Business Administration and the National
Laboratories.
Section 104. Authorizations for preventing, detecting,
analyzing, and mitigating cybersecurity threats.
Section 104 authorizes private entities to monitor their
information systems, operate defensive measures, and share
and receive cyber threat information. Private entities must,
prior to sharing cyber threat information, review and remove
any information not directly related to a cybersecurity
threat known at the time of sharing to be personal
information of a specific individual or that identifies a
specific individual, or to implement and utilize a technical
capability to do the same.
Section 104 permits non-Federal entities to use cyber
threat information for cybersecurity purposes, to monitor, or
to operate defensive measures on their information systems or
on those of another entity (upon written consent). Cyber
threat information shared by an entity with a State, tribal,
or local department or agency may be used for the purpose of
preventing, investigating, or prosecuting any of the offenses
described in Section 105, below. Cyber threat information is
exempt from disclosure under any State, tribal, local, or
freedom of information or similar law.
Section 104 further provides that two or more private
entities are not in violation of antitrust laws for
exchanging or providing cyber threat information, or for
assisting with the prevention, investigation, or mitigation
of a cybersecurity threat.
Section 105. Sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive
measures with the Federal Government.
Section 105 directs the Attorney General and Secretary of
Homeland Security to jointly develop policies and procedures
to govern how the Federal Government shares information about
cyber threats, including via an automated real-time process
that allows for information systems to exchange identified
cyber threat information without manual efforts, subject to
limited exceptions that must be agreed upon in advance.
Section 105 also directs the Attorney General and Secretary
of Homeland Security, in coordination with heads of
appropriate Federal entities and in consultation with certain
privacy officials and relevant private entities, to jointly
issue and make publicly available final privacy and civil
liberties guidelines for Federal entity-based cyber
information sharing.
Section 105 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
coordination with heads of appropriate Federal entities, to
develop, implement, and certify the capability and process
through which the Federal Government receives cyber threat
information shared by a non-Federal entity with the Federal
Government. This section also provides the President with the
authority to designate an appropriate Federal entity, other
than the Department of Defense (including the National
Security Agency), to develop and implement an additional
capability and process following a certification and
explanation to Congress, as described in this section. The
capability and process at the Department of Homeland
Security, or at any additional appropriate Federal entity
designated by the President, does not prohibit otherwise
lawful disclosures of information related to criminal
activities, Federal investigations, or statutorily or
contractually required disclosures. However, this section
does not preclude the Department of Defense, including the
National Security Agency from assisting in the development
and implementation of a capability and process established
consistent with this title. It also shall not be read to
preclude any department or agency from requesting technical
assistance or staffing a request for technical assistance.
Section 105 further provides that cyber threat information
shared with the Federal Government does not waive any
privilege or protection, may be deemed proprietary
information by the originating entity, and is exempt from
certain disclosure laws. Cyber threat information may be used
by the Federal government for: cybersecurity purposes;
identifying a cybersecurity threat or vulnerability;
responding to, preventing, or mitigating a specific threat of
death, a specific threat of serious bodily harm, or a
specific threat of serious economic harm, including a
terrorist act or a use of a weapon of mass destruction;
responding to, investigating, prosecuting, preventing, or
mitigating a serious threat to a minor; or preventing,
investigating, disrupting, or prosecuting an offense
arising out of certain cyber-related criminal activities.
Finally, Section 105 provides that cyber threat information
shared with the Federal Government shall not be used by any
Federal, State, tribal, or local government to regulate non-
Federal entities' lawful activities.
Section 106. Protection from liability.
Section 106 provides liability protection for private
entities that monitor, share, or receive cyber threat
information in accordance with Title I, notwithstanding any
other provision of Federal, State, local, or tribal law.
Section 106 further clarifies that nothing in Title I creates
a duty to share cyber threat information or a duty to warn or
act based on receiving cyber threat information. At the same
time, nothing in Title I broadens, narrows, or otherwise
affects any existing duties that might be imposed by other
law; Title I also does not limit any common law or statutory
defenses.
Section 107. Oversight of Government activities.
Section 107 requires reports and recommendations on
implementation, compliance, and privacy assessments by agency
heads, Inspectors General, and the Comptroller General of the
United States, to ensure that cyber threat information is
properly received, handled, and shared by the Federal
Government.
Section 108. Construction and preemption.
Section 108 contains Title I construction provisions
regarding lawful disclosures; whistleblower protections;
protection of sources and methods; relationship to other
laws; prohibited conduct, such as anti-competitive
activities; information sharing relationships; preservation
of contractual rights and obligations; anti-tasking
restrictions, including conditions on cyber threat
information sharing; information use and retention; Federal
preemption of State laws that restrict or regulate Title I
activities, excluding those concerning the use of authorized
law enforcement practices and procedures; regulatory
authorities; the Secretary of Defense's authorities to
conduct certain cyber operations; and Constitutional
protections in criminal prosecutions.
Section 109. Report on cybersecurity threats.
Section 109 requires the Director of National Intelligence,
with the heads of other appropriate Intelligence Community
elements, to submit a report to the congressional
intelligence committees on cybersecurity threats, including
cyber attacks, theft, and data breaches.
Section 110. Exception to limitation on authority of
Secretary of Deftnse to disseminate certain information.
Section 110 clarifies that, notwithstanding Section
393(c)(3) of title 10, United States Code, the Secretary of
Defense may authorize the sharing of cyber threat indicators
and defensive measures pursuant to the policies, procedures,
and guidelines developed or issued under this title.
Section 111. Effective period.
Section 111 establishes Title I and the amendments therein
are effective during the period beginning on the date of
enactment of this Act and ending on September 30, 2025. The
provisions of Title I will remain in effect however, for
action authorized by Title I or information obtained pursuant
to action authorized by Title I, prior to September 30, 2025.
Title II--National Cybersecurity Advancement
SUBTITLE A--NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATION
CENTER
Section 201. Short title.
Section 201 establishes that Title II, Subtitle A may be
cited as the ``National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement
Act of 2015''.
Section 202. Definitions.
Section 202 defines for purposes of Title II, Subtitle A,
the terms ``appropriate congressional committees,''
``cybersecurity risk,'' ``incident,'' ``cyber threat
indicator,'' ``defensive measure,'' ``Department,'' and
``Secretary.''
Section 203. Information sharing structure and processes.
Section 203 enhances the functions of the Department of
Homeland Security's National Cybersecurity and Communications
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Integration Center, established in section 227 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (redesignated by this Act). It
designates the Center as a Federal civilian interface for
multi-directional and cross-sector information sharing
related to cybersecurity risks, incidents, analysis and
warnings for Federal and non-Federal entities, including the
implementation of Title I of this Act. This section requires
the Center to engage with international partners; conduct
information sharing with Federal and non-Federal entities;
participate in national exercises; and assess and evaluate
consequence, vulnerability and threat information regarding
cyber incidents to public safety communications.
Additionally, this section requires the Center to collaborate
with state and local governments on cybersecurity risks and
incidents. The Center will comply with all policies,
regulations, and laws that protect the privacy and civil
liberties of United States persons, including by working with
the Privacy Officer to ensure the Center follows the privacy
policies and procedures established by title I of this Act.
Section 203 requires the Department of Homeland Security,
in coordination with industry and other stakeholders, to
develop an automated capability for the timely sharing of
cyber threat indicators and defensive measures. It is
critical for the Department to develop an automated system
and supporting processes for the Center to disseminate cyber
threat indicators and defensive measures in a timely manner.
This section permits the Center to enter into voluntary
information sharing relationships with any consenting non-
Federal entity for the sharing of cyber threat indicators,
defensive measures, and information for cybersecurity
purposes. This section is intended to provide the Department
of Homeland Security additional options to enter into
streamlined voluntary information sharing agreements. This
section allows the Center to utilize standard and negotiated
agreements as the types of agreements that non-Federal
entities may enter into with the Center. However, it makes
clear that agreements are not limited to just these types,
and preexisting agreements between the Center and the non-
Federal entity will be in compliance with this section.
Section 203 requires the Director of the Center to report
directly to the Secretary for significant cybersecurity risks
and incidents. This section requires the Secretary to submit
to Congress a report on the range of efforts underway to
bolster cybersecurity collaboration with international
partners. Section 203 allows the Secretary to develop and
adhere to Department policies and procedures for coordinating
vulnerability disclosures.
Section 204. Information sharing and analysis organizations.
Section 204 amends Section 212 of the Homeland Security Act
to clarify the functions of Information Sharing and Analysis
Organizations (ISAOs) to include cybersecurity risk and
incident information beyond that pertaining to critical
infrastructure. ISAOs, including Information Sharing and
Analysis Centers (ISAOs) have an important role to play in
facilitating information sharing going forward and has
clarified their functions as defined in the Homeland Security
Act.
Section 205. National response framework.
Section 205 amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to
require the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security,
with proper coordination, to regularly update the Cyber
Incident Annex to the National Response Framework of the
Department of Homeland Security.
Section 206. Report on reducing cybersecurity risks in DHS
data centers.
Section 206 requires the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security to submit a report to Congress not later
than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act on
the feasibility of using compartmentalization between systems
to create conditions conducive to reduced cybersecurity risks
in data centers.
Section 207. Assessment.
Section 207 requires the Comptroller General of the United
States not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of
this Act to submit a report on the implementation of Title
II, including increases in the sharing of cyber threat
indicators at the National Cybersecurity and Communications
Integration Center and throughout the United States.
Section 208. Multiple simultaneous cyber incidents at
critical infrastructure.
Section 208 requires the appropriate Department of Homeland
Security Under Secretary to draft and submit to Congress not
later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act a
report on the feasibility of producing a risk-informed plan
to address the risks of multiple simultaneous cyber incidents
affecting critical infrastructure as well as cascade effects.
Section 209. Report on cybersecurity vulnerabilities of
United States ports.
Section 209 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security not
later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act
to submit to Congress a report on the vulnerability of United
States ports to cybersecurity incidents, as well as potential
mitigations.
Section 210. Prohibition on new regulatory authority.
Section 210 clarifies that the Secretary of Homeland
Security does not gain any additional regulatory authorities
in this subtitle.
Section 211. Termination of reporting requirements.
Section 211 adds a 7-year sunset on the reporting
requirements in Title II, Subtitle A.
SUBTITLE B--FEDERAL CYBERSECURITY ENHANCEMENT
Section 221. Short title.
Section 221 establishes that Title II, Subtitle B may be
cited as the ``Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of
2015''.
Section 222. Definitions.
Section 222 defines for purposes of Title II, Subtitle B,
the terms ``agency,'' ``agency information system,''
``appropriate congressional committees,'' ``cybersecurity
risk,'' ``information system,'' ``Director,'' ``intelligence
community,'' ``national security system,'' and ``Secretary.''
Section 223. Improved Federal network security.
Section 223 amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by
amending Section 228, as redesignated, to require an
intrusion assessment plan for Federal agencies and adding a
Section 230 to authorize a federal intrusion detection and
prevention capabilities'' for Federal agencies.
Section 230 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added
by Section 223(a) of the bill, authorizes the Secretary of
Homeland Security to employ the Department's intrusion
detection and intrusion prevention capabilities,
operationally implemented under the ``EINSTEIN'' programs, to
scan agencies' network traffic for malicious activity and
block it. The Secretary and agencies with sensitive data are
expected to confer regarding the sensitivity of, and
statutory protections otherwise applicable to, information on
agency information systems. The Secretary is expected to
ensure that the policies and procedures developed under
section 230 appropriately restrict and limit Department
access, use, retention, and handling of such information to
protect the privacy and confidentiality of such information,
including ensuring that the Department protects such
sensitive data from disclosure, and trains appropriate staff
accordingly.
Section 223(b) mandates that agencies deploy and adopt
those capabilities within one year for all network traffic
traveling to or from each information system owned or
operated by the agency, or two months after the capabilities
are first made available to the agency, whichever is later.
The subsection also requires that agencies adopt improvements
added to the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities
six months after they are made available. Improvements is
intended to be read broadly to describe expansion of the
capabilities, new systems, and added technologies, for
example: non-signature based detection systems such as
heuristic- and behavior-based detection, new countermeasures
to block malicious traffic beyond e-mail filtering and Domain
Name System (DNS)-sinkholing, and scanning techniques that
allow scanning of encrypted traffic.
Section 224. Advanced internal defenses.
Section 224 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to
add advanced network security tools to the Continuous
Diagnostics and Mitigation program; develop and implement a
plan to ensure agency use of advanced network security tools;
and, with the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, prioritize advanced security tools and update metrics
used to measure security under the Federal Information
Security Management Act of 2002.
Section 225. Federal cybersecurity requirements.
Section 225 adds a statutory requirement for the head of
each agency not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act to implement several standards on their
networks to include identification of sensitive and mission
critical data, use of encryption, and multi-factor
authentication.
Section 226. Assessment; reports.
Section 226 includes a requirement for a Government
Accountability Office study to be conducted on the
effectiveness of this approach and strategy. It also requires
reports from the Department of Homeland Security, Federal
Chief Information Officer, and the Office of Management and
Budget. Required reporting includes an annual report from the
Department of Homeland Security on the effectiveness and
privacy controls of the intrusion detection and prevention
capabilities; information on adoption of the intrusion
detection and capabilities at agencies in the Office of
Management and Budget's annual Federal Information Security
Management Act report; an assessment by the Federal Chief
Information Officer within two years of enactment as to
continued value of the intrusion detection and prevention
capabilities; and a Government Accountability report in three
years on the effectiveness of Federal agencies' approach to
securing agency information systems.
Section 227. Termination.
Section 227 creates a 7-year sunset for the authorization
of the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities in
Section 230 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by
Section 223(a).
Section 228. Identification of information systems relating
to national security.
Section 228 requires the Director of National Intelligence
and the Director of the Office of Management, in coordination
with
[[Page S8850]]
other agencies, not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act to identify unclassified information
systems that could reveal classified information, and submit
a report assessing the risks associated with a breach of such
systems and the costs and impact to designate such systems as
national security systems.
Section 229. Direction to agencies.
Section 229 authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security
to issue an emergency directive to the head of an agency to
take any lawful action with respect to the operation of an
information system for the purpose of protecting such system
from an information security threat. In situations in which
the Secretary has determined there is an imminent threat to
an agency, the Secretary may authorize the use of intrusion
detection and prevention capabilities in accordance with
established procedures, including notice to the affected
agency.
Title III--Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment
Section 301. Short title.
Section 301 establishes Title III may be cited as the
``Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015''.
Section 302. Definitions.
Section 302 defines for purposes of Title III the terms
``appropriate congressional committees,'' ``Director,''
``National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education,'' and
``work roles.''
Section 303. National cybersecurity workforce measurement
initiative.
Section 303 requires the head of each Federal agency to
identify all positions within the agency that require the
performance of cybersecurity or other cyber-related
functions, and report the percentage of personnel in such
positions holding the appropriate certifications, the level
of preparedness of personnel without certifications to take
certification exams, and a strategy for mitigating any
identified certification and training gaps.
Section 304. Identification of cyber-related work roles of
critical need
Section 304 requires the head of each Federal agency to
identify information technology, cybersecurity, or other
cyber-related roles of critical need in the agency's
workforce, and substantiate as such in a report to the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management. Section 304
also requires the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management to submit a subsequent report not later than 2
years after the date of the enactment of this Act, on
critical needs for information technology, cybersecurity, or
other cyber-related workforce across all Federal agencies,
and the implementation of this section.
Section 305. Government Accountability Office status reports.
Section 305 requires the Comptroller General of the United
States to analyze and monitor the implementation of sections
303 and 304 and not later than 3 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act submit a report on the status of such
implementation.
Title IV--Other Cyber Matters
Section 401. Study on mobile device security.
Section 401 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security not
later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act
to conduct a study on threats relating to the security of the
mobile devices used by the Federal Government, and submit a
report detailing the findings and recommendations arising
from such study.
Section 402. Department of State international cyberspace
policy strategy.
Section 402 requires the Secretary of State not later than
90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act to
produce a comprehensive strategy relating to United States
international policy with regard to cyberspace, to include a
review of actions taken by the Secretary of State in support
of the President's International Strategy for Cyberspace and
a description of threats to United States national security
in cyberspace.
Section 403. Apprehension and prosecution of international
cyber criminals.
Section 403 requires the Secretary of State, or a designee,
to consult with countries in which international cyber
criminals are physically present and extradition to the
United States is unlikely, to determine what efforts the
foreign country has taken to apprehend, prosecute, or
otherwise prevent the carrying out of cybercrimes against
United States persons or interests. Section 403 further
requires an annual report that includes statistics and
extradition status about such international cyber criminals.
Section 404. Enhancement of emergency services.
Section 404 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security not
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act to establish a process by which a Statewide
Interoperability Coordinator may report data on any
cybersecurity risk or incident involving any information
system or network used by emergency response providers within
the state. Reported data will be analyzed and used in
developing information and recommendations on security and
resilience on measures for information systems and networks
used by state emergency response providers.
Section 405. Improving cybersecurity in the health care
industry.
Section 405 requires the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to establish a task force and not later than 1 year
after the date of enactment of the task force to submit a
report on the Department of Health and Human Services and the
health care industry's preparedness to respond to
cybersecurity threats. In support of the report, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services will convene health
care industry stakeholders, cybersecurity experts, and other
appropriate entities, to establish a task force for analyzing
and disseminating information on industry-specific
cybersecurity challenges and solutions.
Consistent with subsection (e), it is Congress's intention
to allow Health and Human Services the flexibility to
leverage and incorporate ongoing activities as of the day
before the date of enactment of this act to accomplish the
goals set forth for this task force.
Section 406. Federal computer security.
Section 406 requires the Inspector General of any agency
operating a national security system, or a Federal computer
system that provides access to personally identifiable
information, not later than 240 days after the date of
enactment of this Act to submit a report regarding the
federal computer systems of such agency, to include
information on the standards and processes for granting or
denying specific requests to obtain and use information and
related information processing services, and a description of
the data security management practices used by the agency.
Section 407. Stopping the fraudulent sale of financial
information of people of the United States.
Section 407 amends 18 U.S. Code Sec. 1029 by enabling the
Federal Government to prosecute overseas criminals who profit
from financial information that has been stolen from
Americans.
Mr. HATCH. Madam President, the bill we are considering today
contains a provision in section 305 providing for some tax relief for
refiners whose costs will increase as a result of the repeal of the ban
on oil exports. This provision permits refiners to modify the
calculation of production activities income to lessen the impact of
high transportation costs in bringing crude oil to their refineries.
The provision permits adjusting such activities income for properly
allocable transportation costs. Many times transportation costs are
embedded within an invoice and not broken out as a separate line item,
such as included in the delivered price of crude. These are clearly
transportation costs intended to be taken into account for purposes of
this section.
Mr. REID. Madam President, in Section 303 of the House amendment No.
1 to the Senate amendment to H.R. 2029, the text of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2016, the section 48 Investment Tax Credit, 26
U.S.C. section 48, is extended for 5 years, beginning on January 1,
2017, and phased down to 26 percent in 2020 and 22 percent in 2021.
Section 303 inadvertently only extends the credit for solar energy
technologies, rather than all of the technologies currently eligible to
receive the credit.
The intention of the agreement that I reached with the majority
leader was to extend the section 48 Investment Tax Credit for all of
the eligible technologies for 5 years and to treat each technology
eligible for a 30 percent credit the same with respect to a phase down
in the years 2020 and 2021. The permanent 10 percent credit for
eligible technologies under section 48 will remain in place.
The majority leader and I hope to address this early next year in an
appropriate legislative vehicle.
Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, for several weeks, negotiations have
been ongoing on a multitude of controversial provisions relating to the
omnibus. While those debates were raging in different parts of the
Capitol, work on the Defense appropriations bill continued quietly and
efficiently.
I believe many Americans would be surprised to know about the
exemplary level of bipartisanship that went into crafting this
legislation, which provides the funding to take care of the women and
men serving our country in uniform.
This bill provides for the pay and benefits of each member of the
Armed Forces, equips them with the tools they need, and develops the
next generation of technology to improve our national security.
Neither the chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee,
Senator Cochran, nor I got everything we wanted out of this bill. Tough
decisions had to be made.
Chairman Cochran supported a number of my suggestions for the bill,
we worked together on others, and we disagreed on a few. The end result
is a
[[Page S8851]]
good bill that meets the needs of our national security.
The Defense appropriations bill provides all the needed resources for
ongoing military operations, including the funds requested by the
President to carry out anti-ISIL operations in Syria and Iraq.
It adds $1.2 billion to the request to account for maintaining a
larger presence in Afghanistan through 2016. And because the situation
in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq is so fluid, it includes additional OCO
reprogramming authority--a total of $4.5 billion--to respond to
unexpected events.
We also maintain robust funding for intelligence collection on
traditional and nontraditional threats to this country, so that our
Nation can continue to be a step ahead of threats to Americans and our
allies.
The DOD has a long history of scientific innovation for the purpose
of keeping our troops safe and providing an edge over our adversaries.
We also know that millions of Americans who have never served in
uniform often benefit from these defense breakthroughs. This bill
provides a total of $1.94 billion for DOD medical research programs,
which is 5 percent real growth over last year's funding level.
The medical research funding in this bill is directed toward
competition, whether it is the $667 million in core research funding,
the $278 million in the Peer-Reviewed Medical Research Program, the
$120 million for breast cancer research, or the variety of other
research programs provided in the legislation.
I have heard criticism that medical research doesn't belong in a
defense bill.
Defense medical research is relatively small--NIH research funding is
15 times larger--but DOD has made important breakthroughs that help
servicemembers, their families, and all Americans.
As one example, Army researchers have developed E75, a vaccine that
cuts in half the chance that breast cancer will return. Women around
the country benefited from that breakthrough, including those in
uniform and those in military families seeking care at DOD hospitals.
The bill also provides $2.3 billion for nonmedical basic research, a
$220 million increase over the President's request. These funds help
expand our knowledge of the universe in a variety of disciplines and
may eventually lead to the next technology breakthrough that will
enrich our lives.
The bill includes $487 million for U.S.-Israeli cooperative missile
defense programs, fully funding the request from the Government of
Israel.
We provide for a strong stand against Russian aggression in Europe.
The European Reassurance Initiative, which increases U.S. troop
presence and training in more than a dozen countries, is fully funded.
An additional $250 million is provided for lethal and nonlethal aid to
the Ukraine security services. The bill also includes $412 million to
fully fund upgrades to the Army's Stryker fleet because of the threat
from Russia.
However, the agreement takes a more cautious view of DOD's program to
train the Syrian opposition. It is one of many programs for which the
Department can request funds by reprogramming from the Counterterrorism
Partnerships Fund. This process improves congressional oversight as
well as places the onus on DOD to justify further expenses for the
Syrian training program.
The bill includes a long list of increases to defense programs that
were underfunded in the President's request. These programs are
essential to maintaining the military advantage against our opponents
and also support a strong and stable defense industrial base.
Some of the highlights include: $1 billion for an additional DDG-51
destroyer, 12 additional F-18 aircraft, 11 additional F-35 Joint Strike
Fighters, $300 million for the Navy's UCLASS drone, sufficient funding
to keep the A-10 operating for another year, and $1 billion for the
National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account.
Finally, the bill includes a provision to guarantee competition for
the launch of DOD satellites. I have studied the history of DOD's space
launch programs, and it is a testament to how poor oversight leads to
taxpayers being stuck with an expensive bill.
In the mid-2000s, United Launch Alliance gained a monopoly on
satellite launches. Over a few short years, the cost of its rockets
escalated by 65 percent. Just this year, SpaceX was certified to
compete against ULA. These competitions have barely begun, and already
we are seeing large savings in launch costs. But provisions in the
Defense Authorization Act are threatening to create a new launch
monopoly, this time with SpaceX in charge.
The issue is that ULA uses a Russian rocket engine, and a new
American-made engine will not be ready to compete until 2022. During
that time, DOD wants to compete 37 launches, but under Defense
authorization bills, ULA is only allowed to win four of those
contracts.
We all want to eliminate reliance on Russian engines. This bill adds
$144 million to make a new U.S.-built rocket a reality as soon as
possible.
I must remind Senators that NASA and NOAA are not restricted from
using Russian engines for its satellites. Why should we agree to a
double standard--a looming monopoly for national security space
launches but full and open competition for scientific missions?
The provision in this bill simply guarantees that the Air Force for
the next year will live under the same rules as NASA and NOAA, while a
new American-made rocket is developed and will hopefully be ready in
2022.
This large and complex bill amounts to half of the discretionary
budget of the United States. It is essential to our national security,
and this bill improves on DOD's budget proposals in many ways.
Once again, I would like to thank my friend, Chairman Cochran, for
his steady hand in moving this legislation forward in a constructive
and bipartisan manner. The Defense Subcommittee has a long history of
strong partnerships, and I am pleased that this tradition carries on
today.
Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, hard-working Americans deserve more than
living paycheck to paycheck, worrying about having to choose between
paying an electric bill or putting healthy food on the table. This
appropriations law ends a year of continuing budget uncertainty and
extends tax credits for millions of hard-working families. We have kept
out harmful riders that would have undermined everything from Wall
Street reform to clean air and water laws. There are many steps forward
in this bill for Vermonters and all Americans, but we need stronger
steps. We need to carry this into the new year and strengthen it, to
help lift the middle class and to protect the most vulnerable among us.
We need much more progress in creating well-paying jobs in rural
areas like Vermont, not just in the Nation's urban centers. We need to
do more to protect Social Security and Medicare and other programs in
the safety net. We need to do more to make college affordable for
students and families.
This bill will let Congress begin the new year with focusing on
America's middle class, taking stronger steps to help working families.
By standing together, Senate Democrats have made it possible to cancel
the harmful sequester and to lift caps to make investments possible
that will make a difference in communities across Vermont--from cleanup
efforts on Lake Champlain, to ramping up our fight against opioid
addiction, to equipping our police officers with lifesaving bulletproof
vests.
This omnibus spending bill is good news for my home State of Vermont,
too. It includes important funds for the EPA's Lake Champlain
Geographic Program, which will be critical as Vermont and the EPA take
on ambitious new work and regulations to address water quality and
phosphorus levels in Lake Champlain. As much as Vermonters and millions
of visitors to our State enjoy Lake Champlain, we know that business as
usual simply will not cut it. We need serious action, measurable work
on the ground, and strong Federal resources in order to make real
progress to clean up Lake Champlain. That is why I made supporting the
EPA's geographic programs a top priority for fiscal year 2016. That
this final bill maintains the strong Federal investments that were made
last year reflects a real partnership among Federal, State, and local
partners.
[[Page S8852]]
The omnibus makes essential investments to help States and local
municipalities fight the scourge of opioid and heroin addiction, which
continues to devastate too many communities. Vermont has been a
national leader in calling attention to this problem and bringing
together communities to find solutions. This spending package includes
a number of programs that will continue to support those efforts. We
know that it will require strong Federal support to join State and
local efforts to address this heroin crisis. In particular, this
omnibus package includes funding for the Anti-Heroin Task Force Program
that began last year to provide support to State law enforcement
efforts like those of the Vermont Drug Task Force in dismantling supply
chains trafficking heroin into our States.
Because we know that enforcement alone cannot solve this problem,
this bill also includes increased funding for grants to expand
medication assisted treatment programs, and funding to distribute
lifesaving naloxone to prevent overdoses. It offers continued support
for drug court programs that prevent individuals suffering from
addiction from needlessly entering our criminal justice system and
instead helps set them on a path towards treatment and recovery. I am
proud to support for funding these critical programs that provide a
lifeline to communities struggling to eliminate this opioid crisis.
This omnibus bill will grow jobs in Vermont and across the country.
When I walk down the street in Montpelier or talk to people at the
grocery store in Waterbury, I hear too many stories from Vermonters who
are working two, even three jobs to make ends meet. Congress needs to
do more to spur job growth, and I believe this bill will make a
measurable impact.
The heart and soul of Vermont's economy are our small businesses. In
fact, over 90 percent of the employers in Vermont are small businesses,
employing more than half of all Vermonters that work in the private
sector. So naturally, the Small Business Administration, SBA, and the
programs it supports are critically important to ensuring that Vermont
businesses have access to the capital they need to expand. Year after
year, we see all sectors of the Vermont economy utilizing SBA programs
from manufacturing, to agriculture, clean energy, and even craft
brewing. Vermont Precision Tools in Swanton, which manufactures high-
quality burs for the medical device industry, is one such example.
Pete's Greens, a certified organic vegetable farm that has been a
leader in Vermont's agricultural renaissance, is another. This past
year, the SBA had its highest level of lending in Vermont, backing more
than $53 million in loans. This omnibus bill will ensure that
Vermonters have access to just as much capital in 2016.
Another critical source of capital for Vermont's businesses has been
made possible through the Treasury Department's Community Development
Financial Institutions Fund, CDFI. Community Capital of Vermont is one
of our State's organizations that have leveraged CDFI funds and the
SBA's microloan program to help neighborhood businesses--such as Barrio
Bakery in the Old North End of Burlington, Patchwork Farm Bakery in
Hardwick, Liberty Chocolates in Montpelier, and Bent Hill Brewery in
Randolph. This year we were able to increase funding for the CDFI
program, while also increasing access to healthy food and expanding
work in rural areas.
Vermont is a northern border State, and the connection we share with
our Canadian neighbors is an important one for our cultural and
economic identity. Senators from neighboring States know well that some
communities have experienced unique economic challenges, and that is
why we worked together to create the Northern Border Regional
Commission, NBRC. I appreciate their support and joining with me to
increase the NBRC budget to $7.5 million for the coming year. In the
short time the commission has existed, it has helped companies like
Superior Technical Ceramics in St. Albans develop a plan to increase
their exports; the Vermont Sustainable Jobs Fund is helping grow
Vermont's wood products sector; an industrial park in Franklin County
has received funds for improvements to entice Canadian companies to
expand in the United States; and--a jewel of the Northeast Kingdom--
Willoughby Lake, will have increased amenities resulting in more travel
and tourism.
As a result of the Bipartisan Budget Act Congress approved in
October, critical funding was restored to the HOME program, which helps
States and communities preserve existing and produce new units of
affordable housing. The Senate-passed Transportation, Housing and Urban
Development bill decimated the HOME program, providing a paltry $66
million. Because of the Bipartisan Budget Act, in fiscal year 2016, the
HOME program will receive $950 million--an increase of $50 million over
2015 funding--which will help every State, including Vermont, address
critical housing needs.
The National Institutes of Health, the Nation's leading medical
research hub, will receive a $2 billion increase in funding, which will
benefit research institutions like the University of Vermont.
The bill continues to support community health centers that will be
funded at just over $5 billion next year. In Vermont alone, 11
federally qualified community health centers with 56 delivery sites
provided care over the past 2 years to nearly 200,000 patients. These
health centers employ over 900 people.
The omnibus reauthorizes for 3 years the Land and Water Conservation
Fund, and provides needed funding to support it. Early next year, I
hope Congress will redouble its efforts to ensure that this critical
conservation program--which supports projects in every State, in every
corner of our country--receives permanent authorization and full
funding--all at no expense to the taxpayer.
Important, too, is that this omnibus rejects efforts by industry
giants to block Vermont's Act 120, which requires the labeling of
genetically engineered foods. Vermonters support their law, because
they believe--as do I--that consumers have the right to know what is in
the food they are eating. An omnibus spending bill is no place to make
national policy that undermines carefully crafted laws at the state
level.
As ranking member of the Department of State and Foreign Operations
Appropriations Subcommittee, I want to thank Chairman Lindsey Graham,
Chairwoman Kay Granger, and Ranking Member Nita Lowey for the way they
worked with me and my staff to reach agreement on the State and foreign
operations title of this omnibus bill. Their expertise was invaluable
in producing a bill that provides funding for important diplomatic,
development, security, and humanitarian priorities of the United States
and that reflect our Nation's values.
Division K of the omnibus, for the Department of State and foreign
operations, provides a total of $52.7 billion in discretionary budget
authority. This funding helps protect U.S. personnel, including our
diplomats, working overseas; funds programs to combat trafficking in
persons, wildlife poaching, and drug smuggling; provides historic
levels of funding to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other
diseases that threaten hundreds of millions of people around the world;
supports key allies in countering ISIL and other terrorist
organizations; provides funds to promote renewable energy and protect
the environment; and funds relief programs for refugees and other
victims of conflict and natural disasters. These are just a few
examples. Division K also includes important provisions to ensure
transparency, combat corruption, and prevent assistance to and
encourage accountability for those who would misuse U.S. assistance by
violating human rights or engaging in corruption or other financial
crimes.
I am particularly pleased that the bill includes increased funding
for agent orange remediation and health and disability programs in
Vietnam; the Leahy War Victims Fund to assist innocent victims of war,
clear unexploded bombs in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world;
and educational and cultural exchange programs including the amount
requested for the Fulbright exchange program. In addition, authority is
provided to help threatened scholars around the world find academic
institutions where they can continue their work in safety.
The bill also supports programs that directly benefit Vermonters,
including the amount requested for the Peace
[[Page S8853]]
Corps and funding above the amount requested for the Great Lakes
Fishery Commission to support additional sea lamprey control in the
Great Lakes and the Lake Champlain Basin.
I am disappointed that a provision I authored, which was included in
the Senate bill, to enable the U.S. to provide technical assistance to
support investigations, apprehensions, and prosecutions of those who
commit genocide and other crimes against humanity, was not included.
There are also some things that I wish were not in this bill, including
a provision carried from last year that would weaken limits on carbon
emissions from projects financed by the Export-Import Bank and Overseas
Private Investment Corporation. No bill is perfect, and we will
undoubtedly revisit these and other issues next year.
I have heard from many Vermonters concerned that controversial policy
provisions were to be included in this final spending bill. While I am
grateful this final bill does not include many of the poison pill
policy riders included in the House and Senate passed bills--measures
that would have eroded health care services, repealed Dodd-Frank, and
threatened key environmental protections, among other issues--I am
concerned that it includes a giveaway to Big Oil by lifting the
decades-long ban on crude oil exports. While I understand that, in
exchange for lifting the ban, the omnibus is free of several proposed
policy riders that would undermine Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act
regulations and extends several environmental and renewable energy tax
measures, I share the concerns of many environmentalists that lifting
this ban will result in increased oil development and we could see
higher gasoline prices in New England.
I am disappointed that the omnibus includes two policy riders that
will further wear away transparency and accountability in our campaign
finance system. These provisions will only promote the spending of dark
money in Federal elections and further erode the trust of the American
people in their political system.
I am also disappointed that the omnibus is being used to jam cyber
security information sharing legislation through Congress. This is not
the way to pass major legislation, particularly one that threatens to
significantly harm Americans' privacy rights. This new version of the
cyber security information sharing bill--which was negotiated behind
closed doors by leaders of the Senate and House Intelligence
Committees--rolls back a number of significant consumer and privacy
protections that were included in the Senate-passed bill and over which
the Judiciary Committee has primary jurisdiction, including language
that could affect the scope of liability protections and that would
expand Federal preemption of State FOIA and transparency laws. These
changes are dangerous and unnecessary. Congress should have been given
an opportunity to study, debate, and vote on a bill of this magnitude
under regular order--not choose between this bill and a government
shutdown. I hope that, when the Senate returns next year, we can
consider legislation to mitigate the potential harm of this
legislation.
Of course, with this omnibus spending bill, the Senate will consider
the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes, PATH, Act. Last year, in the
closing days of Congress, I opposed a 1-year, retroactive extension of
expiring tax credits, not because I do not support those credits, but
because our small businesses, middle-class families, and entrepreneurs
need more certainty. The PATH Act provides that in some instances
through 2016 and in other instances with permanency.
I am pleased that the PATH Act extends permanently the earned income
tax credit, EITC, and the child tax credit, CTC. These credits have
helped Vermont families recover from the recession. Vermont was one of
the first States in the nation to supplement federal EITC dollars. In
2013, low-income families in Vermont received an estimated $2,400 in
State and Federal tax credits that year. For the many families who
qualify for these programs, these credits provide a significant
increase in take-home pay. This not only has the potential to lift
families out of poverty, it also motivates many to return to the
workforce. While I would have preferred that these extensions be paired
with an indexing proposal, extending permanency to them is welcomed
news for millions of American families.
The PATH Act also supports small businesses by encouraging hiring,
promoting investment in low-income areas, promoting domestic renewable
energy development, and encouraging research and development. I am
grateful that the bill includes a permanently extension of the
charitable deduction for contributions of food inventory. I have long
championed this deduction. It helps organizations like the Vermont Food
Bank and encourages donors to support food shelfs across the country.
Finally, I am deeply disappointed that, despite bipartisan, bicameral
agreement, needed reforms to the EB-5 regional center program were not
included in this final bill. On Tuesday evening, just hours before the
bill became public, congressional leaders inexplicably decided to
extend the EB-5 program without any reform. The program was given a
free pass despite broad, bipartisan agreement that it is in urgent need
of an overhaul. Time and again, concerns have been raised about the
regional center program's susceptibility to fraud, its lack of
oversight and transparency, and the rampant abuse of its incentives to
invest in underserved communities--undermining a core premise of the
program. Homeland Security Secretary Johnson, the Government
Accountability Office, and the Department of Homeland Security Office
of Inspector General have all raised concerns.
While the program's flaws are obvious to anyone paying attention, the
necessary fixes are as well. I have long worked to improve the regional
center program, and my EB-5 amendment to the Senate's comprehensive
immigration reform bill in the last Congress was unanimously approved
in the Judiciary Committee. This Congress, I authored far-reaching
reforms with Chairman Grassley and House Judiciary Chairman Goodlatte
and Ranking Member Conyers. We had the support of by far the largest
trade association representing the EB-5 industry, as well as the civil
rights community. We pushed hard to include our reforms in the omnibus,
but some congressional leaders inexcusably rejected these vital
reforms.
We have a comprehensive, bipartisan reform bill that the chairmen and
ranking members of both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees
support. These reforms would address the many troubles that plague this
program, including increasing oversight and transparency, protecting
investors, and promoting investment and job growth in underserved
communities as Congress always intended. We cannot again squander this
opportunity. We should act on our bill when we return in January to
ensure integrity and to demand ongoing oversight of the program.
Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, the bill before us today represents a
colossal addition to our Nation's debt, which currently stands at $18.4
trillion. Earlier this year, the Budget Committee worked hard to
develop a budget plan that would balance in the next 10 years by saving
money, cutting costs, and examining inefficient programs and
provisions. It was not easy to find the cuts necessary to achieve the
goals laid out in that proposal. But the tax extenders bill costs are a
large step away from getting our Nation back on a sound fiscal footing
and accomplishing the objectives laid out in the budget plan.
When the Joint Committee on Taxation, JCT, scored the bill, they
found that in just the next year, it will add $157 billion to the debt,
and that cost will swell to $622 billion over the next 10 years. The
government will have to borrow this money; we do not have it to spend.
The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, CRFB, headed by Maya
MacGuiness, took an independent look at these tax provisions. According
to the CRFB, the United States will have to pay an additional $130
billion in interest charges over the next 10 years on the money
borrowed to finance this legislation. Maya's organization makes one
more important point that many here in Congress have not sufficiently
considered. The $622 billion advertised cost will balloon even further
to $2 trillion over the next
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two decades. Certainly, many of the provisions in this package are
good, but President Obama and Congress need to recognize there are
limits.
The bill also extends costly tax credits that are scored rightly by
the Congressional Budget Office as support payments, not tax
deductions; and allows tax credits, earned income tax credits, for
illegal aliens favored by President Obama's Executive amnesty and the
additional income tax credit, which allows billions to go to illegal
aliens. These provisions are unwise and need serious reform before
extending.
There are indeed some good provisions in this bill. Businesses across
the nation will benefit by the research and development and section 179
bonus depreciation tax credits being made permanent. Many businesses in
my State rely on the credits and making them permanent provides
consistency for better planning. But the $611 billion cost in new
expenditures and lost revenues is huge. This Congress has to know that
a $2 trillion addition to the debt over the next 20 years is simply too
much. This is a step away not towards fiscal responsibility.
It is these kinds of rationalizations that can cause a country to go
broke. For perspective, Congress struggled mightily to find $77 billion
above the gas tax to pay for the 5-year highway bill. This tax package
is so huge it will make the highway bill costs look insignificant.
Colleagues, we cannot be in denial about how much this bill costs. We
all have a strong desire for tax cuts and tax reform. I have supported
such bills many times in the past, but this bill has little reform and
great cost. I am disappointed that I cannot support this bill.
Mr. KAINE. Madam President, I want to speak today about the Omnibus
appropriations and tax bill. First, I want to applaud my colleagues who
have worked tirelessly towards this deal for over a year now. Our
leadership and the leaders of our Appropriations, Finance, and Budget
Committees have been setting the stage for this action and I want to
thank them.
This bill, H.R. 2029, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016,
addresses many priorities that I have been fighting for since joining
the Senate in 2013. It comes on the heels of the Bipartisan Budget Act
we passed in October of this year, which addressed for 2 years the
arbitrary budget caps set by sequestration and implements the first
year of that agreement.
First enacted as part of the Bipartisan Budget Control Act of 2011,
these arbitrary budget caps have been hurting our national defense and
domestic priorities since sequestration went into effect in 2013 by
arbitrarily forcing critical agencies such as the Department of Defense
to set strategy and policy based on artificial caps. As a former mayor
and Governor I have a lot of experience with budgets and
decisionmaking. I understand using budgets gimmicks to set policy is
the opposite of what we should be doing. It is a strategy that is
unsustainable and must be addressed if we are to properly manage our
finances.
In 2013, on the heels of the devastating government shutdown,
Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 to reduce
uncertainty, adjust the budget caps to reflect current needs, and put
the idea of another government shutdown behind us. That deal was a
bipartisan compromise, heralded by Members from both sides of the
aisle. We learned from that exercise that both parties can come
together to give budget certainty to families and businesses.
This year, we faced the prospect of another harmful episode of
sequestration whereby Congress's priority setting was once again to be
determined by the budget law passed in 2011. Once again, lawmakers came
together, and we passed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, another 2-
year bill which set appropriate spending targets and gave appropriators
time to write full appropriations bills for the remainder of this
fiscal year, thereby avoiding the risk of shutdowns or fiscal cliffs at
the end of the year.
Because of all that activity, we find ourselves here today with this
bill. Within this bill there is a lot of good: strong funding for
Defense Department priorities like shipbuilding and the Ohio-class
replacement; strong funding for educational programs like Head Start,
Preschool Development Grants, and Teacher Quality Partnership Grants;
strong funding for State Department embassy security training programs;
strong funding for military construction projects around Virginia;
strong commitments for the environment such as the American Battlefield
Protection Act, Chesapeake Bay Program, and the Army Corps programs in
Norfolk; strong funding for the National Park Service and for NASA's
programs at Wallops Island; and strong funding for Plan Central
America.
This bill also includes critically important programs on the revenue
side. Three critical low- and middle-income tax programs--the child tax
credit, earned income tax credit, and American opportunity tax credit--
have been made permanent in this bill, so has the research and
development tax credit, along with an expansion in this credit for
startups championed by Senator Coons that I have cosponsored. Also made
permanent are tax programs for teachers, for conservation, and for
military families. We have made other programs last for another 5
years. And others will be extended for 2 years, a step forward for
these programs we have been extending for only 1 year at a time.
This package also contains energy policy that will advance our
national goal of generating energy cleaner tomorrow than today, while
ensuring that our short-term need for fossil fuels is met by American
supplies and developed by American workers. The deal lifts the 40-year
old ban on export of U.S. crude oil, which will create American jobs.
The deal extends wind and solar tax incentives for 5 years.
The deal also hikes funding for the Land and Water Conservation Fund
by 50 percent this year, which will support open space preservation
efforts around the country and in Virginia at Rappahannock River Valley
National Wildlife Refuge, George Washington and Thomas Jefferson
National Forests, the Captain John Smith Chesapeake National Historical
Trail, and elsewhere. Finally, it includes assistance for U.S. oil
refineries, while stopping virtually all policy riders seeking to
undermine critical air and water pollution laws.
This bill is by no means perfect. In particular, while I agree with
many of the tax provisions included in this bill, a must-pass
government funding bill is not the place to have the important tax
policy debates facing this country. By passing this bill with so many
tax provisions with little debate, we put off a broader agreement on
comprehensive tax reform. I do agree with many aspects of this tax
deal. But by taking this action now, we leave other critical tax policy
decisions on the table with no debate on how we as a body should
prioritize these issues.
And I am struck by the irony that all year long we debated how to
provide sequester relief of about $100 billion for our national
security and for education and health and research funding that will
improve our economy. Those policies needed offsets. But this tax
package will increase the deficit by nearly $700 billion, and there has
not been discussion of offsetting this cost. That seems to me to be a
bad precedent and an unfair distinction. In an era dominated by
conversations about our national debt and deficits, we should do better
to seek ways address these changes in a fiscally responsible way.
In the end, I choose to support this bill. The good in this
legislation and the need for our Federal agencies to be able to plan
and set the priorities of this country makes support the right
decision. And the bipartisan character of the agreement will hopefully
encourage more such cooperation.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, the cyber security bill included in the
omnibus is a first step towards improving our Nation's dangerously
inadequate defenses against cyber attacks. I know that the chairman and
vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee worked hard to
ensure that a cyber security bill passed this year.
Unfortunately, however, the American people and economy will remain
vulnerable to a catastrophic cyber attack against our critical
infrastructure even after this bill becomes law.
Critical infrastructure refers to entities that are vital to the
safety, health, and economic well-being of the American people, such as
the major utilities that run the Nation's electric grid, the
[[Page S8855]]
national air transportation system that moves passengers and cargo
safely from one location to another, and the elements of the financial
sector that ensure the $14 trillion in payments made every day are
securely routed through the banking system.
The Senate-passed cyber bill included an important provision I
authored with the support of Senators Mikulski, Coats, Reed, Warner,
Heinrich, King, Hirono, and Wyden that would have required the
Department of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the appropriate
Federal agencies, to undertake an assessment of the fewer than 65
critical infrastructure entities at greatest risk of causing
catastrophic harm if they were the targets of a successful cyber
attack.
By ``catastrophic harm,'' the Department of Homeland Security means a
single cyber attack that would likely result in 2,500 deaths, $50
billion in economic damage, or a severe degradation of our national
security. In other words, if one of these entities upon which we depend
each day were attacked, the results would be devastating.
Following the assessment, the provision then required a report to
Congress describing the steps that could be taken to lessen the
vulnerability of these entities and to decrease the risk of
catastrophic harm resulting from such a cyber attack against our
critical infrastructure.
Inexplicably, this provision, which was supported by a majority of
the members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, was eliminated in the
negotiations between the leaders of the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees.
I am told that this important provision was dropped because of
opposition from certain industry groups that claimed that the current
investment and regulatory structure is sufficient to protect our
critical infrastructure; yet our provision explicitly included existing
regulators in the assessment process and required no new mandates.
Compromise language that would have made this even clearer was also
rejected.
Our provision appropriately distinguished between the vast majority
of businesses, such as a retail store or a chain of small ice cream
shops, and the fewer than 65 critical infrastructure entities that
could debilitate the U.S. economy or our way of life if attacked; yet
the final version of the cyber bill treats these very different
entities in exactly the same way.
I ask unanimous consent that a November 30, 2015, letter sent from a
majority of the Senators on the Senate Intelligence Committee to the
chairmen and vice chairmen of the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees that corrects the Record on what this provision does and why
it is necessary be printed in the Record following my remarks.
These fewer than 65 entities warrant our special attention because
there is ample evidence, both classified and unclassified, that
demonstrates the threat facing critical infrastructure and the
deficiencies in the cyber security capability to defend them.
The Director of National Intelligence, Jim Clapper, has testified
that the greatest threat facing our country is in cyber space. He has
stated before the Armed Services Committee that the number one cyber
challenge that concerns him the most is an attack on our Nation's
critical infrastructure.
His assessment is backed up by several intrusions into the industrial
controls of critical infrastructure. Since 2009, the Wall Street
Journal has published reports regarding efforts by foreign adversaries,
such as China, Russia, and Iran, to leave behind software on American
critical infrastructure and to disrupt U.S. banks through cyber
intrusions.
Multiple natural gas pipeline companies were the target of a
sophisticated cyber intrusion campaign beginning in December 2011, and
Saudi Arabia's oil company, Aramco, was subject to a destructive cyber
attack in 2012.
When I asked Admiral Rogers, the Director of the National Security
Agency with responsibility for cyber space, how prepared our country
was for a cyber attack against our critical infrastructure in a hearing
this summer, he replied that we are at a ``5 or 6.''
Last month, the Deputy Director of the NSA, Richard Ledgett, was
asked during a CNN interview if foreign actors already have the
capability of shutting down key U.S. infrastructure, such as the
financial sector, energy, transportation, and air traffic control. His
response? ``Absolutely.''
When it comes to cyber security, ignorance is not bliss. The least we
should do is to ask DHS and the appropriate Federal agencies to
describe what more could be done to prevent a catastrophic cyber attack
on critical infrastructure that could cause thousands of deaths and/or
a devastating blow to our economy or national defense.
Congress has missed an opportunity to improve our Nation's cyber
preparedness by refusing to even ask DHS or the appropriate Federal
agencies to understand and identify what more could be done to prevent
a catastrophic cyber attack on the fewer than 65 critical
infrastructure entities.
A cyber attack on our critical infrastructure is not a matter of
``if,'' but a matter of ``when.'' We are at September 10 levels in
terms of cyber preparedness--a sentiment expressed by former Secretary
of Defense Leon Panetta in 2012 and in the 9/11 Commission's 10th
anniversary report released last year.
We cannot afford to wait for a ``cyber 9/11'' before protecting our
critical infrastructure. By rejecting this provision, this Congress has
elected to take just such a risk.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, November 30, 2015.
Hon. Richard Burr,
Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington
DC.
Hon. Michael T. McCaul,
House Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Devin Nunes,
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington,
DC.
Hon. Dianne Feinstein
Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Bennie G. Thompson,
House Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Adam B. Schiff,
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington,
DC.
Dear Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Feinstein, Chairman
McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, Chairman Nunes, and Ranking
Member Schiff: We strongly support the enactment of a
voluntary cybersecurity information sharing bill, which will
promote better communication between the private sector and
the federal government on cyber threats and vulnerabilities.
For 99 percent of businesses, the voluntary information
sharing framework established in law should be sufficient to
avoid catastrophic harm.
It would be a mistake, however, to treat the country's most
critical infrastructure, upon which our people and our
economy depend, the same way as a retail business, such as a
chain of small ice cream shops. That is why Section 407 of S.
754, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA)
appropriately distinguishes between the vast majority of
businesses and those entities already designated by the
federal government as critical infrastructure at greatest
risk. Unless Section 407 of S. 754, the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act (CISA) is retained in the final
cybersecurity bill, these very different entities will be
treated exactly the same way under this legislation.
Critical infrastructure refers to entities that are vital
to the safety, health, and economic wellbeing of the American
people, such as the major utilities that run the nation's
electrical grid. Section 407, however, only applies to the
fewer than 65 entities that have already been designated by
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the critical
infrastructure entities where a cyber attack would likely
result in catastrophic harm. By catastrophic harm, DHS means
a single cyber attack that would likely result in 2,500
deaths, $50 billion in economic damage, or a severe
degradation of our national security.
Given these devastating consequences, we urge you to retain
Section 407 of CISA. Ample evidence, both classified and
unclassified, testifies to the threat facing critical
infrastructure and the deficiencies in the cybersecurity
capability to defend them. Since 2009, the Wall Street
Journal has published reports regarding efforts by foreign
adversaries, such as China, Russia, and Iran, to leave behind
software on American critical infrastructure or to disrupt
U.S. banks through cyber intrusions. Multiple natural gas
pipeline companies were the target of a sophisticated cyber
intrusion campaign beginning in December 2011, and Saudi
Arabia's oil company, Aramco, was subject to a destructive
cyber attack in 2012.
Admiral Mike Rogers, the Director of the National Security
Agency, has said publicly
[[Page S8856]]
that ``We have . . . observed intrusions into industrial
control systems . . . what concerns us is that . . .
capability can be used by nation-states, groups or
individuals to take down the capability of the control
systems.''
At a recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on
cybersecurity, the Director of National Intelligence was
asked what one cyber challenge concerned him the most. He
testified that it was a large-scale cyber attack against the
United States' infrastructure. At a subsequent open hearing
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator
Collins asked Admiral Mike Rogers how prepared our country
was for such an attack against our critical infrastructure.
His answer, on a scale of 1-10, was that we are at a ``5 or
6''. That is a failing grade that we cannot ignore.
Section 407 has been mischaracterized in correspondence we
have received, so we would also like to clarify some key
facts about it. First, Section 407 is not counter to the
overall voluntary nature of CISA, and it does not impose new
incident reporting requirements on the fewer than 65 covered
entities. Of course, many critical infrastructure entities,
such as those in the electrical sector, are already subject
to mandatory incident reporting to their federal regulators.
Section 407 simply requires DHS to undertake an assessment
of the critical infrastructure that it has identified where a
single catastrophic cyber attack could cause deaths and
devastation and then report to Congress what actions could be
taken to lessen their vulnerability and to decrease the risk
of catastrophic harm resulting from such an attack.
Despite claims to the contrary, Section 407 is also
consistent with existing government authority, regulations,
and programs. The text of the provision clearly states that
the report and strategy required by DHS must be produced ``in
conjunction with the appropriate agency head . . .''
Appropriate agency head means the head of the existing
sector-specific agency for such an entity or the existing
federal regulator for that entity.
Section 407 will also likely reduce, rather than increase,
the existing liability risk for the critical infrastructure
entities that have already been identified as being at
greatest risk of cyber attack. Liability risk is incurred
when an entity actually fails to mitigate cyber
vulnerabilities that they should have known about and
addressed. Rather than increasing this risk, Section 407
seeks to share the burden of defending critical
infrastructure against the most sophisticated cyber attacks
by requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct an
assessment of the cybersecurity of only the fewer than 65
entities. Following this assessment, Section 407 would
require the Secretary to develop a strategy to mitigate the
risk of catastrophic effects. The least we should do is to
ask DHS and the appropriate federal agencies to describe what
more could be done to prevent a catastrophic cyber attack on
critical infrastructure that could cause thousands of deaths
and/or a devastating blow to our economy or national defense.
Finally, we urge you to review the list of entities that
are, in fact, covered by Section 407. Ironically, many of the
trade associations who oppose this provision do not represent
a single entity that would be covered by this amendment
because none of their members has been designated as critical
infrastructure at greatest risk. The list of entities and the
classified intelligence regarding the threats to critical
infrastructure have been provided to your respective
committees.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to
contact us.
Sincerely,
Susan M. Collins.
Daniel Coats.
Martin Heinrich.
Mazie K. Hirono.
Barbara A. Mikulski.
Mark R. Warner.
Angus S. King, Jr.
Jack Reed.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I rise today to speak on the fiscal
year 2016 Omnibus appropriations bill. I want to highlight the
Transportation and Housing and Urban Development division of the bill,
which is critically important to meeting the housing needs of low-
income, disabled, and older Americans, to shelter the homeless, and to
boost our economy and create jobs through much needed infrastructure
investments in our roads, bridges, railroads, transit systems, and
airports.
Let me begin by thanking Chairman Cochran and Vice Chairwoman
Mikulski for their leadership in advancing these appropriations bills.
I also want to acknowledge Senator Jack Reed, the ranking member of
the subcommittee, who worked closely with me in our negotiations with
the House.
I would be remiss if I did not also acknowledge the tireless efforts
staff have put into this bill throughout the entire process. My staff:
Heideh Shahmoradi, Ken Altman, Jason Woolwine, Rajat Mathur, Lydia
Collins, and Gus Maples have made enormous contributions.
I also want to thank Dabney Hegg, Rachel Milberg, Christina Monroe,
and Jordan Stone on Senator Reed's staff.
This bill represents priorities from Members on both sides of the
aisle in both Chambers. Through considerable negotiation and
compromise, we have crafted a bipartisan bill that targets limited
resources to meet our most essential transportation and housing needs
while ensuring effective oversight of these important programs.
The bill makes important investments, supporting millions of jobs and
economic development. It invests in our Nation's transportation
infrastructure by continuing to provide $500 million for the TIGER
Program. This highly competitive program creates jobs and supports
economic growth in every one of our home States.
The bill provides increased funding for our Nation's highway,
transit, and safety programs, consistent with the recently enacted
highway authorization bill, the FAST Act. State DOTs are also provided
with the flexibility to repurpose approximately $2 billion in old,
unused congressionally directed spending and direct it toward
infrastructure projects that are of higher priority today within the
same geographic location of the original designation.
Turning to air travel, the aviation investments will continue to
modernize our nation's air traffic system and help to keep rural
communities connected to the transportation network. It will ease
future congestion and help reduce delays for travelers in U.S.
airspace. The bill provides funding for FAA programs at 99.97 percent
of the budget request to ensure FAA's operations and safety workforce
are fully funded, which includes 14,500 air traffic controllers and
more than 25,000 engineers, maintenance technicians, safety inspectors,
and operational support personnel.
In addition to aviation safety, the bill provides $50 million in rail
safety grants in response to the devastating rail accidents in recent
years. These grants will support infrastructure improvements and safety
technology, including positive train control.
There are also several provisions to enhance truck safety on our
Nation's highways. For example, the bill requires the Department of
Transportation to publish a proposed rule on speed governors, which
limits the speed at which these trucks can operate. The Department
continues to delay this rulemaking, which was initially petitioned by
the industry itself. It is time to get this important safety rule
completed and implemented.
The bill also protects critical housing programs by preserving
existing rental assistance for vulnerable families and individuals,
including our seniors, and strengthens the Federal response to the
problem of youth homelessness. Sufficient funding is provided to keep
pace with the rising cost of housing vulnerable families, ensuring that
more than 4.7 million individuals and families currently receiving
assistance will not have to worry about losing their housing. Without
this assistance, many of these families might otherwise become
homeless.
Youth homelessness is especially troubling and warrants more
attention. Reflecting this concern, our bill provides $42.5 million to
expand efforts to reduce youth homelessness. These efforts build on our
success in reducing veterans homelessness, which has been reduced by 36
percent since 2010. This bill continues that effort by providing an
additional 8,000 vouchers for our homeless veterans despite the
administration's failure to request funding for this critically
important program.
To support local development, we provide $3 billion for the Community
Development Block Grants Program. This is an extremely popular program
with the States and communities because it allows them to tailor the
Federal funds to support local economic and job creation projects.
I appreciate the opportunity to speak about this legislation, and I
urge my colleagues to support final passage of the omnibus.
Section 702 in Division O
Mr. BROWN. Madam President, today I wish to discuss section 702 in
division O of the Omnibus appropriations bill. It is a provision that
would prohibit the Treasury Department
[[Page S8857]]
from selling, transferring or otherwise disposing of the senior
preferred shares of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for 2 years.
In 2008, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and Federal Housing Finance
Agency Director James Lockhart placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into
conservatorship and created an agreement that gave the Treasury
Department senior preferred shares in both entities. Since that time,
the GSEs helped stabilize the housing market by ensuring that families
had access to 30-year fixed-rate mortgages at reasonable rates and
lenders had access to a functioning secondary market. While the
government was initially forced to inject $188 billion into shoring up
these two agencies, it has since collected $241 billion. Taxpayers have
thus earned $53 billion during the conservatorship.
Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, will the Senator yield for a question?
I am concerned that someone could read the provision as limiting a
future administration's authority to end the conservatorship after the
2-year prohibition absent congressional action. Does the provision
prohibit a future administration from taking any action after January
1, 2018, if it is in the best interest of the housing market, taxpayers
or the broader economy?
Mr. BROWN. I will say to my colleague from New York that it does not.
That is not the effect of the language. Any number of decisions could
be made after that date, when a new Congress and a new President will
be in place. Nor does this provision have any effect on the court cases
and settlements currently underway challenging the validity of the
third amendment. As the Senator from Tennessee said yesterday, ``this
legislation does not prejudice'' any of those cases.
Mr. REID. I associate myself with the comments of the Senator from
Ohio, Mr. Brown. If it turns out to be in the best interest of
borrowers, the economy or to protect taxpayers, the next administration
could elect to end the conservatorship on January 2, 2018. This is the
view of the Treasury Department as well. I would like to submit a
letter written to me on this issue that states that the provision binds
the Treasury only until January 1, 2018, and has no effect after that.
The agreement for this language to be included in the omnibus was
that the prohibition would sunset after 2 years and not create a
perpetual conservatorship. As then-Secretary Paulson described,
conservatorship was meant to be a ``time out'' not an indefinite state
of being.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Treasury letter be
printed in the Record at the conclusion of the remarks by Senator
Brown.
Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I thank the Majority Leader. The FHFA and
Treasury Department could have placed the GSEs into receivership if the
intent was to liquidate them. The purpose of a conservatorship is to
preserve and conserve the assets of the entities in conservatorship
until they are in a safe and solvent condition as determined by their
regulator.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Department of the Treasury,
Washington, DC, December 17, 2015.
Hon. Harry Reid,
Democratic Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Leader: In response to your request for our view,
the Treasury Department interprets the language of Section
702 of Division O of the Military Construction and Veterans
Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016, to
mean that subsection (b) imposes a prohibition that is
binding until January 1, 2018. It would not be binding after
that date.
Sincerely,
Anne Wall,
Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs.
Title IX
Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Madam President, I am joined by Senator Thune, the
chair of the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, to
discuss title IX--National Oceans and Coastal Security, of Division O
of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016. The legislation on which
this title was based, the National Oceans and Coastal Security Act, S.
2025, is a bill I introduced earlier this year, which was referred to
the Senate Commerce Committee. I appreciate the assistance Senator
Thune and his committee staff have provided on this legislation.
The National Oceans and Coastal Security Act establishes a fund to
support research, conservation, and restoration projects on our coasts
and in our oceans and Great Lakes. The National Fish and Wildlife
Foundation and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration--two
organizations with significant expertise in ocean, coastal, and Great
Lakes issues, as well as managing grants--will coordinate the grant
programs supported by the fund.
I thank Senator Thune for joining me today to help clarify this
important legislation.
As you know, our coastal communities and marine economies depend upon
healthy oceans and Great Lakes. The projects supported by this fund
will provide the science and on-the-ground action that will help ensure
a healthy environment and vibrant economy for generations to come.
Any money appropriated or otherwise made available to the fund will
be used to ``support programs and activities intended to better
understand and utilize ocean and coastal resources and coastal
infrastructure, including baseline scientific research, ocean
observing, and other programs and activities.''
Funds may not be used for litigation or advocacy, or the creation of
national marine monuments, marine protected areas, marine spatial
plans, or a National Ocean Policy. It is the intent of the authors that
no grants be provided through this fund for the creation or federal
implementation of any of these programs or policies. With specific
regard to the National Ocean Policy, its creation has already occurred
by Executive order, and its implementation is the responsibility of the
National Ocean Council. It is the expectation of the authors that no
funds would be used to support the activities of the National Ocean
Council.
Mr. THUNE. Thank you, Senator Whitehouse, for inviting me to join you
today to discuss the National Oceans and Coastal Security Act. I know
the creation of an ocean fund has been a longstanding priority of
yours.
I share Senator Whitehouse's understanding of the eligible uses for
money granted from the fund. It is also worth noting that the National
Fish and Wildlife Foundation, a congressionally chartered nonprofit
organization, is explicitly prohibited in its authorizing legislation
from providing grants that support litigation or advocacy.
Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Thank you for making that important point. I would
like to further highlight that the legislation authorizes two grant
programs. The first would direct funding to coastal States, Indian
tribes, and U.S. territories. The other would create a national
competitive grant program open to States, local governments, and Indian
tribes, as well as associations, nongovernmental organizations, public-
private partnerships, and academic institutions to support oceans and
coastal research and restoration efforts.
Mr. THUNE. Thank you for that clarification.
Cloture Motion
Mr. McCONNELL. I have a cloture motion at the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under
rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.
The senior assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
Cloture Motion
We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the
provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate,
do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the motion to
concur in the House amendments to the Senate amendment to
H.R. 2029, an act making appropriations for military
construction, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and related
agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2016, and
for other purposes.
Mitch McConnell, John Cornyn, Thom Tillis, Bob Corker,
Richard Burr, Lisa Murkowski, Roger F. Wicker, John
Hoeven, Roy Blunt, James M. Inhofe, Orrin G. Hatch,
Mark Kirk, Thad Cochran, Kelly Ayotte, Susan M.
Collins, Daniel Coats.
Mr. McCONNELL. I ask unanimous consent that the mandatory quorum
under rule XXII be waived.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
There is 2 minutes of debate on this motion.
[[Page S8858]]
Who yields time?
Mr. McCONNELL. I yield back the time on this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Cloture Motion
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, pursuant to rule
XXII, the Chair lays before the Senate the pending cloture motion,
which the clerk will state.
The senior assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
Cloture Motion
We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the
provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate,
do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the motion to
concur in the House amendments to the Senate amendment to
H.R. 2029, an act making appropriations for military
construction, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and related
agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2016, and
for other purposes.
Mitch McConnell, John Cornyn, Thom Tillis, Bob Corker,
Richard Burr, Lisa Murkowski, Roger F. Wicker, John
Hoeven, Roy Blunt, James M. Inhofe, Orrin G. Hatch,
Mark Kirk, Thad Cochran, Kelly Ayotte, Susan M.
Collins, Daniel Coats.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, the mandatory quorum
call has been waived.
The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on the
motion to concur in the House amendments to the Senate amendment to
H.R. 2029 shall be brought to a close?
The yeas and nays are mandatory under the rule.
The clerk will call the roll.
The senior assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. CORNYN. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator
from Florida (Mr. Rubio).
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from California (Mrs. Boxer)
is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 72, nays 26, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 336 Leg.]
YEAS--72
Alexander
Ayotte
Baldwin
Barrasso
Bennet
Blumenthal
Blunt
Booker
Brown
Burr
Cantwell
Capito
Cardin
Carper
Casey
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Coons
Corker
Cornyn
Donnelly
Durbin
Feinstein
Franken
Gardner
Gillibrand
Graham
Grassley
Hatch
Heinrich
Heitkamp
Heller
Hirono
Hoeven
Inhofe
Isakson
Johnson
Kaine
King
Kirk
Klobuchar
Lankford
Leahy
Markey
McCaskill
McConnell
Menendez
Merkley
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murphy
Murray
Nelson
Perdue
Peters
Portman
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rounds
Schatz
Schumer
Shaheen
Stabenow
Tillis
Udall
Warner
Warren
Whitehouse
Wicker
Wyden
NAYS--26
Boozman
Cassidy
Cotton
Crapo
Cruz
Daines
Enzi
Ernst
Fischer
Flake
Lee
Manchin
McCain
Moran
Paul
Risch
Sanders
Sasse
Scott
Sessions
Shelby
Sullivan
Tester
Thune
Toomey
Vitter
NOT VOTING--2
Boxer
Rubio
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 72, the nays are
26.
Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn having voted in
the affirmative, the motion is agreed to.
Cloture having been invoked, under the previous order, all
postcloture time is yielded back.
The majority leader.
Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I am going to ask everybody to take
their seats. I am going to ask everyone to sit in their seat.
I ask unanimous consent for the next votes to be 10 minutes, which I
think would be widely applauded, if anybody is listening.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Motion to Table
Mr. McCONNELL. I move to table the first House amendment to the
Senate amendment to H.R. 2029 and ask for the yeas and nays.
Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
Under the previous order, there is 2 minutes of debate equally
divided.
Who yields time?
Mr. McCONNELL. I yield back.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Madam President, I urge a ``no'' vote on the motion to
table. This is the time to avoid a shutdown or a slow time. It is time
to pass the omnibus, protect America, help the middle class, and meet
our constitutional responsibilities.
Vote no on the motion to table, and let's get on with the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion.
The clerk will call the roll.
Mr. CORNYN. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator
from Florida (Mr. Rubio).
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from California (Mrs. Boxer)
is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 31, nays 67, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 337 Leg.]
YEAS--31
Boozman
Burr
Cassidy
Cotton
Crapo
Cruz
Daines
Enzi
Ernst
Fischer
Flake
Gardner
Grassley
Heller
Lankford
Lee
Manchin
McCain
Moran
Paul
Portman
Risch
Sanders
Sasse
Scott
Sessions
Shelby
Sullivan
Thune
Toomey
Vitter
NAYS--67
Alexander
Ayotte
Baldwin
Barrasso
Bennet
Blumenthal
Blunt
Booker
Brown
Cantwell
Capito
Cardin
Carper
Casey
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Coons
Corker
Cornyn
Donnelly
Durbin
Feinstein
Franken
Gillibrand
Graham
Hatch
Heinrich
Heitkamp
Hirono
Hoeven
Inhofe
Isakson
Johnson
Kaine
King
Kirk
Klobuchar
Leahy
Markey
McCaskill
McConnell
Menendez
Merkley
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murphy
Murray
Nelson
Perdue
Peters
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rounds
Schatz
Schumer
Shaheen
Stabenow
Tester
Tillis
Udall
Warner
Warren
Whitehouse
Wicker
Wyden
NOT VOTING--2
Boxer
Rubio
The motion was rejected.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. MANCHIN. Madam President, I raise a point of order that the
pending motion to concur violates section 311(a)(2)(B) of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
Mr. WYDEN. Madam President, pursuant to section 904 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and the waiver provisions of
applicable budget resolutions, I move to waive all applicable sections
of that act and applicable budget resolutions for purposes of the House
message to accompany H.R. 2029, and I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 2 minutes of debate on the motion.
The Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. MANCHIN. Madam President, all I am asking for in raising this
point of order--the tax extender legislation will reduce revenues below
the fiscal year 2016 budget agreement and would violate section 311.
All I am asking for is to separate the votes. If you are proud and you
want to vote for the extender, please do so. Voting no on this
separates it, so you will have a vote on the extenders and a vote on
the omnibus bill. Go home and explain it. There are good things in
both. But give us a chance--basically, those who don't agree--and do
not take the cowardly way out by putting them all into one. That is all
we are doing.
If Tom Brokaw writes his new book after ``The Greatest Generation,''
we are going to be the worst generation by saddling this debt on our
children and grandchildren. What we are doing here is something
unconscionable--2,200 pages all wrapped into one.
All I am asking for is a ``no'' vote so we can separate it, go home,
and explain it. I think we owe that to the people.
We are at 16 percent now. We can't go much lower, but we are trying,
I know
[[Page S8859]]
that. So I appreciate that very much. I encourage a ``no'' vote on
this. We will separate the two, vote them up or down, go home and
explain them, and be proud of what we are doing in the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
Mr. WYDEN. Madam President, colleagues, this bipartisan package is
the biggest tax cut for working families and the biggest anti-poverty
plan Congress has moved forward in decades, and it is the biggest
bipartisan tax agreement in 15 years.
All together, 50 million Americans are going to benefit from the
child tax credit and the expanded earned-income tax credit because they
are made permanent. And on a permanent basis, students will be able to
count on the American opportunity tax credit to cover up to $10,000 of
a 4-year college education. That is a lot of money they won't have to
borrow.
This also includes a permanent tax break for research and
development, which for the first time will be available on a widespread
basis to help small businesses and startups pay wages--a booster shot
for the innovation economy in America. There will be permanent small
business expensing that is going to help our employers invest and grow.
To just wrap up, it will include permanent small business expensing
to help many employers invest and grow and create new highways and
high-skilled jobs for our people. I believe, finally, this clears the
deck for us to move to comprehensive bipartisan tax reform because it
provides the breathing room Congress needs to throw the broken Tax Code
into the trash can and get bipartisan tax reform.
So I urge my colleagues to waive the budget point of order, give
millions of families across this country the predictability and
certainty they need on their taxes, and put this Congress on a path
toward achieving bipartisan comprehensive tax reform in the days ahead.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion.
The yeas and nays have been ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The senior assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. CORNYN. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator
from Florida (Mr. Rubio).
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from California (Mrs. Boxer)
is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 73, nays 25, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 338 Leg.]
YEAS--73
Alexander
Ayotte
Baldwin
Barrasso
Bennet
Blumenthal
Blunt
Booker
Boozman
Brown
Cantwell
Capito
Cardin
Casey
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Coons
Corker
Cornyn
Cotton
Donnelly
Durbin
Ernst
Feinstein
Franken
Gardner
Gillibrand
Graham
Grassley
Hatch
Heinrich
Heitkamp
Heller
Hirono
Hoeven
Inhofe
Isakson
Johnson
Kaine
Kirk
Klobuchar
Leahy
Markey
McCain
McConnell
Merkley
Mikulski
Moran
Murkowski
Murphy
Murray
Nelson
Perdue
Peters
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rounds
Schatz
Schumer
Scott
Shaheen
Stabenow
Sullivan
Thune
Tillis
Toomey
Udall
Vitter
Whitehouse
Wicker
Wyden
NAYS--25
Burr
Carper
Cassidy
Crapo
Cruz
Daines
Enzi
Fischer
Flake
King
Lankford
Lee
Manchin
McCaskill
Menendez
Paul
Portman
Risch
Sanders
Sasse
Sessions
Shelby
Tester
Warner
Warren
NOT VOTING--2
Boxer
Rubio
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 73, the nays are
25.
Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn having voted in
the affirmative, the motion to waive is agreed to.
Motion to Concur
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on the motion to
concur.
There is 2 minutes for debate equally divided.
The majority's time is yielded back.
The Senator from Maryland.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Madam President, this is a bill that protects America.
It rebuilds it and invests in the future. I think it is a great bill,
as a result of bipartisan effort.
Let's vote for it, and may the force be with us.
Mr. MENENDEZ. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The question is on agreeing to the motion to concur.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. CORNYN. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator
from Florida (Mr. Rubio).
Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Florida (Mr. Rubio)
would have voted ``No.''
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from California (Mrs. Boxer)
is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coats). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 65, nays 33, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 339 Leg.]
YEAS--65
Alexander
Ayotte
Baldwin
Barrasso
Bennet
Blumenthal
Blunt
Booker
Brown
Cantwell
Capito
Cardin
Carper
Casey
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Coons
Corker
Cornyn
Donnelly
Durbin
Feinstein
Franken
Gardner
Gillibrand
Graham
Hatch
Heinrich
Heitkamp
Heller
Hirono
Hoeven
Inhofe
Isakson
Johnson
Kaine
King
Kirk
Klobuchar
Lankford
Leahy
McConnell
Menendez
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murphy
Murray
Nelson
Perdue
Peters
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rounds
Schatz
Schumer
Shaheen
Stabenow
Tillis
Udall
Warner
Warren
Whitehouse
Wicker
NAYS--33
Boozman
Burr
Cassidy
Cotton
Crapo
Cruz
Daines
Enzi
Ernst
Fischer
Flake
Grassley
Lee
Manchin
Markey
McCain
McCaskill
Merkley
Moran
Paul
Portman
Risch
Sanders
Sasse
Scott
Sessions
Shelby
Sullivan
Tester
Thune
Toomey
Vitter
Wyden
NOT VOTING--2
Boxer
Rubio
The motion was agreed to.
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