[Congressional Record Volume 162, Number 6 (Monday, January 11, 2016)]
[House]
[Pages H229-H241]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
{time} 1600
NORTH KOREA SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2016
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill
(H.R. 757) to improve the enforcement of sanctions against the
Government of North Korea, and for other purposes, as amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 757
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``North
Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2016''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
TITLE I--INVESTIGATIONS, PROHIBITED CONDUCT, AND PENALTIES
Sec. 101. Statement of policy.
Sec. 102. Investigations.
Sec. 103. Briefing to Congress.
Sec. 104. Designation of persons for prohibited conduct and mandatory
and discretionary designation and sanctions authorities.
Sec. 105. Forfeiture of property.
TITLE II--SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREAN PROLIFERATION, HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES, ILLICIT ACTIVITIES, AND SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES UNDERMINING
CYBER SECURITY
Sec. 201. Determinations with respect to North Korea as a jurisdiction
of primary money laundering concern.
Sec. 202. Ensuring the consistent enforcement of United Nations
Security Council resolutions and financial restrictions
on North Korea.
Sec. 203. Proliferation prevention sanctions.
Sec. 204. Procurement sanctions.
Sec. 205. Enhanced inspections authorities.
Sec. 206. Travel sanctions.
Sec. 207. Exemptions, waivers, and removals of designation.
Sec. 208. Report on those responsible for knowingly engaging in
significant activities undermining cyber security.
Sec. 209. Sense of Congress that trilateral cooperation among the
United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea is
crucial to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region.
Sec. 210. Report on nuclear program cooperation between North Korea and
Iran.
TITLE III--PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Sec. 301. Information technology.
Sec. 302. Report on North Korean prison camps.
Sec. 303. Report on persons who are responsible for serious human
rights abuses or censorship in North Korea.
TITLE IV--GENERAL AUTHORITIES
Sec. 401. Suspension of sanctions and other measures.
Sec. 402. Termination of sanctions and other measures.
Sec. 403. Authority to consolidate reports.
Sec. 404. Regulations.
Sec. 405. No additional funds authorized.
Sec. 406. Effective date.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The Government of North Korea has repeatedly violated
its commitments to the complete, verifiable, irreversible
dismantlement of its nuclear weapons programs, and has
willfully violated multiple United Nations Security Council
resolutions calling for it to cease its development, testing,
and production of weapons of mass destruction.
(2) North Korea poses a grave risk for the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
(3) The Government of North Korea has been implicated
repeatedly in money laundering and illicit activities,
including prohibited arms sales, narcotics trafficking, the
counterfeiting of United States currency, and the
counterfeiting of intellectual property of United States
persons.
(4) The Government of North Korea has, both historically
and recently, repeatedly sponsored acts of international
terrorism, including attempts to assassinate defectors and
human rights activists, repeated threats of violence against
foreign persons, leaders, newspapers, and cities, and the
shipment of weapons to terrorists and state sponsors of
terrorism.
(5) North Korea has unilaterally withdrawn from the 1953
Armistice Agreement that ended the Korean War, and committed
provocations against South Korea in 2010 by sinking the
warship Cheonan and killing 46 of her crew, and by shelling
Yeonpyeong Island, killing four South Koreans.
(6) North Korea maintains a system of brutal political
prison camps that contain as many as 120,000 men, women, and
children, who live in atrocious living conditions with
insufficient food, clothing, and medical care, and under
constant fear of torture or arbitrary execution.
(7) The Congress reaffirms the purposes of the North Korean
Human Rights Act of 2004 contained in section 4 of such Act
(22 U.S.C. 7802).
(8) North Korea has prioritized weapons programs and the
procurement of luxury goods, in defiance of United Nations
Security Council resolutions, and in gross disregard of the
needs of its people.
(9) The President has determined that the Government of
North Korea is responsible for knowingly engaging in
significant activities undermining cyber security with
respect to United States persons and interests, and for
threats of violence against the civilian population of the
United States.
(10) Persons, including financial institutions, who engage
in transactions with, or provide financial services to, the
Government of North Korea and its financial institutions
without establishing sufficient financial safeguards against
North Korea's use of these transactions to promote
proliferation, weapons trafficking, human rights violations,
illicit activity, and the purchase of luxury goods, aid and
abet North Korea's misuse of the international financial
system, and also violate the intent of relevant United
Nations Security Council resolutions.
[[Page H230]]
(11) The Government of North Korea's conduct poses an
imminent threat to the security of the United States and its
allies, to the global economy, to the safety of members of
the United States Armed Forces, to the integrity of the
global financial system, to the integrity of global
nonproliferation programs, and to the people of North Korea.
(12) The Congress seeks, through this legislation, to use
nonmilitary means to address this crisis, to provide
diplomatic leverage to negotiate necessary changes in North
Korea's conduct, and to ease the suffering of the people of
North Korea.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Applicable executive order.--The term ``applicable
Executive order'' means--
(A) Executive Order No. 13382 (2005), 13466 (2008), 13551
(2010), 13570 (2011), or 13687 (2015) to the extent that such
Executive order authorizes the imposition of sanctions on
persons for conduct, or prohibits transactions or activities,
involving the Government of North Korea; or
(B) any Executive order adopted on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act, to the extent that such Executive
order authorizes the imposition of sanctions on persons for
conduct, or prohibits transactions or activities, involving
the Government of North Korea.
(2) Applicable united nations security council
resolution.--The term ``applicable United Nations Security
Council resolution'' means--
(A) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1695 (2006),
1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or 2094 (2013); or
(B) any United Nations Security Council resolution adopted
on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, to the
extent that such resolution authorizes the imposition of
sanctions on persons for conduct, or prohibits transactions
or activities, involving the Government of North Korea.
(3) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways
and Means, and the Committee on Financial Services of the
House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
(4) Designated person.--The term ``designated person''
means a person designated under subsection (a) or (b) of
section 104 for purposes of applying one or more of the
sanctions described in title I or II of this Act with respect
to the person.
(5) Government of north korea.--The term ``Government of
North Korea'' means--
(A) the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea or any political subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof; and
(B) any person owned or controlled by, or acting for or on
behalf of, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea.
(6) International terrorism.--The term ``international
terrorism'' has the meaning given such term in section 140(d)
of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988
and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)), and includes the conduct
described in section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)), to the extent
such conduct involves the citizens of more than one country.
(7) Luxury goods.--The term ``luxury goods'' has the
meaning given such term in subpart 746.4 of title 15, Code of
Federal Regulations, and includes the items listed in
Supplement No. 1 to such regulation, and any similar items.
(8) Monetary instrument.--The term ``monetary instrument''
has the meaning given such term under section 5312 of title
31, United States Code.
(9) North korean financial institution.--The term ``North
Korean financial institution'' means--
(A) a financial institution organized under the laws of
North Korea or any jurisdiction within North Korea (including
a foreign branch of such institution);
(B) any financial institution located in North Korea,
except as may be excluded from such definition by the
President in accordance with section 207(d);
(C) any financial institution, wherever located, owned or
controlled by the Government of North Korea; and
(D) any financial institution, wherever located, owned or
controlled by a financial institution described in
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
(10) Other stores of value.--The term ``other stores of
value'' means--
(A) prepaid access devices, tangible or intangible prepaid
access devices, or other instruments or devices for the
storage or transmission of value, as defined in part 1010 of
title 31, Code of Federal Regulations; and
(B) any covered goods, as defined in section 1027.100 of
title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, and any instrument or
tangible or intangible access device used for the storage and
transmission of a representation of covered goods, or other
device, as defined in section 1027.100 of title 31, Code of
Federal Regulations.
(11) Person.--The term ``person'' has the meaning given
such term in section 510.306 of title 31, Code of Federal
Regulations.
(12) Significant activities undermining cyber security.--
The term ``significant activities undermining cyber
security'' means--
(A) significant efforts to--
(i) deny access to or degrade, disrupt, or destroy an
information and communications technology system or network;
or
(ii) exfiltrate information from such a system or network
without authorization;
(B) significant destructive malware attacks;
(C) significant denial of service activities; or
(D) such other significant activities as may be described
in regulations promulgated to implement section 104.
(13) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' has the meaning given such term in section 510.311
of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.
TITLE I--INVESTIGATIONS, PROHIBITED CONDUCT, AND PENALTIES
SEC. 101. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
In order to achieve the peaceful disarmament of North
Korea, Congress finds that it is necessary--
(1) to encourage all states to fully and promptly implement
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2094 (2013);
(2) to sanction--
(A) persons that facilitate proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, illicit activities, arms trafficking,
imports of luxury goods, cash smuggling, censorship, and
knowingly engage in significant activities undermining cyber
security by the Government of North Korea; and
(B) persons that fail to exercise due diligence to ensure
that financial institutions do not facilitate any of the
activities described in subparagraph (A) by the Government of
North Korea;
(3) to deny the Government of North Korea access to the
funds it uses to obtain nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles,
offensive cyber capabilities, and luxury goods instead of
providing for the needs of its people; and
(4) to enforce sanctions in a manner that avoids any
adverse humanitarian impact on the people of North Korea to
the extent possible and in a manner that does not unduly
constrain the enforcement of such sanctions.
SEC. 102. INVESTIGATIONS.
The President shall initiate an investigation into the
possible designation of a person under section 104(a) upon
receipt by the President of credible information indicating
that such person has engaged in conduct described in section
104(a).
SEC. 103. BRIEFING TO CONGRESS.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and periodically thereafter, the President shall
provide to the appropriate congressional committees a
briefing on efforts to implement this Act, to include the
following, to the extent the information is available:
(1) The principal foreign assets and sources of foreign
income of the Government of North Korea.
(2) A list of the persons designated under subsections (a)
and (b) of section 104.
(3) A list of the persons with respect to which sanctions
were waived or removed under section 207.
(4) A summary of any diplomatic efforts made in accordance
with section 202(b) and of the progress realized from such
efforts, including efforts to encourage the European Union
and other states and jurisdictions to sanction and block the
assets of the Foreign Trade Bank of North Korea and Daedong
Credit Bank.
SEC. 104. DESIGNATION OF PERSONS FOR PROHIBITED CONDUCT AND
MANDATORY AND DISCRETIONARY DESIGNATION AND
SANCTIONS AUTHORITIES.
(a) Prohibited Conduct and Mandatory Designation and
Sanctions Authority.--
(1) Conduct described.--Except as provided in section 207,
the President shall designate under this subsection any
person the President determines to--
(A) have knowingly engaged in significant activities or
transactions with the Government of North Korea that have
materially contributed to the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction or their means of delivery (including
missiles capable of delivering such weapons), including any
efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport,
transfer, or use such items;
(B) have knowingly imported, exported, or reexported to,
into, or from North Korea any significant arms or related
materiel, whether directly or indirectly;
(C) have knowingly provided significant training, advice,
or other services or assistance, or engaged in significant
transactions, related to the manufacture, maintenance, or use
of any arms or related materiel to be imported, exported, or
reexported to, into, or from North Korea, or following their
importation, exportation, or reexportation to, into, or from
North Korea, whether directly or indirectly;
(D) have knowingly, directly or indirectly, imported,
exported, or reexported significant luxury goods to or into
North Korea;
(E) have knowingly engaged in or been responsible for
censorship by the Government of North Korea, including
prohibiting, limiting, or penalizing the exercise of freedom
of expression or assembly, limiting access to print, radio or
other broadcast media, Internet or other electronic
communications, or the facilitation or support of intentional
frequency manipulation that would jam or restrict an
international signal;
(F) have knowingly engaged in or been responsible for
serious human rights abuses by the Government of North Korea,
including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
[[Page H231]]
treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges
and trial, forced labor or trafficking in persons, causing
the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine
detention of those persons, and other denial of the right to
life, liberty, or the security of a person;
(G) have knowingly, directly or indirectly, engaged in acts
of money laundering, the counterfeiting of goods or currency,
bulk cash smuggling, narcotics trafficking, or other illicit
activity that involves or supports the Government of North
Korea or any senior official thereof, whether directly or
indirectly; or
(H) have knowingly attempted to engage in any of the
conduct described in subparagraphs (A) through (G) of this
paragraph.
(2) Effect of designation.--With respect to any person
designated under this subsection, the President--
(A) shall exercise the authorities of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705 et seq.) to
block all property and interests in property of any person
designated under this subsection that are in the United
States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that
are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any
United States person, including any foreign branch; and
(B) may apply any of the sanctions described in sections
204, 205(c), and 206.
(3) Penalties.--The penalties provided for in section 206
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1705) shall apply to a person who violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of any
prohibition provided for in this subsection, or of an order
or regulation prescribed under this Act, to the same extent
that such penalties apply to a person that commits an
unlawful act described in section 206(a) of that Act (50
U.S.C. 1705(a)).
(4) Definition.--In paragraph (1)(F), the term
``trafficking in persons'' has the meaning given the term in
section 103(9) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of
2000 (22 U.S.C. 7102(9)).
(b) Discretionary Designation and Sanctions Authority.--
(1) Conduct described.--Except as provided in section 207
and paragraph (3) of this subsection, the President may
designate under this subsection any person that the President
determines to--
(A) have knowingly engaged in, contributed to, assisted,
sponsored, or provided financial, material or technological
support for, or goods and services in support of, any
violation of, or evasion of, an applicable United Nations
Security Council resolution;
(B) have knowingly facilitated the transfer of any funds,
financial assets, or economic resources of, or property or
interests in property of a person designated under an
applicable Executive order, or by the United Nations Security
Council pursuant to an applicable United Nations Security
Council resolution;
(C) have knowingly facilitated the transfer of any funds,
financial assets, or economic resources, or any property or
interests in property derived from, involved in, or that has
materially contributed to conduct prohibited by subsection
(a) or an applicable United Nations Security Council
resolution;
(D) have knowingly facilitated any transaction, including
any transaction in bulk cash or other stores of value,
without applying enhanced monitoring to ensure that such
transaction does not contribute materially to conduct
described in subsection (a) an applicable Executive order, or
an applicable United Nations Security Council resolution;
(E) have knowingly facilitated any transactions in cash or
monetary instruments or other stores of value, including
through cash couriers transiting to or from North Korea, used
to facilitate any conduct prohibited by an applicable United
Nations Security Council resolution;
(F) have knowingly, directly or indirectly, engaged in
significant activities undermining cyber security for, in
support of on behalf of, the Government of North Korea or any
senior official thereof, or have knowingly contributed to the
bribery of an official of the Government of North Korea, the
misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement of public funds by,
or for the benefit of, an official of the Government of North
Korea, or the use of any proceeds of any such conduct; or
(G) have knowingly and materially assisted, sponsored, or
provided significant financial, material, or technological
support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the
conduct described in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this
paragraph or the conduct described in subparagraphs (A)
through (G) of subsection (a)(1).
(2) Effect of designation.--With respect to any person
designated under this subsection, the President--
(A) may apply the sanctions described in section 204;
(B) may apply any of the special measures described in
section 5318A of title 31, United States Code;
(C) may prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that
are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and in
which such person has any interest;
(D) may prohibit any transfers of credit or payments
between financial institutions or by, through, or to any
financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or
payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
and involve any interest of the person; and
(E) may exercise the authorities of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705 et seq.)
without regard to section 202 of such Act to block any
property and interests in property of any person designated
under this subsection that are in the United States, that
hereafter come within the United States, or that are or
hereafter come within the possession or control of any United
States person, including any foreign branch.
(3) Limitation.--If the President determines that a person
has engaged in any conduct described in subparagraphs (A)
through (F) of paragraph (1) that may also be construed to
constitute conduct described in subparagraphs (A) through (H)
of subsection (a)(1), the President may not designate the
person under this subsection but rather shall designate the
person under subsection (a).
(c) Blocking of All Property and Interests in Property of
the Government of North Korea and the Worker's Party of
Korea.--Except as provided in section 207, the President
shall exercise the authorities of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705 et seq.) to block all
property and interests in property of the Government of North
Korea or the Worker's Party of Korea that on or after the
date of the enactment of this Act come within the United
States, or that come within the possession or control of any
United States person, including any foreign branch.
(d) Application.--The designation of a person under
subsection (a) or (b) and the blocking of property and
interests in property under subsection (c) shall also apply
with respect to a person who is determined to be owned or
controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on
behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property
and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this
section.
(e) Licensing.--
(1) License required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of enactment of this Act, the President shall promulgate
regulations prohibiting United States persons from engaging
in any transaction involving any property or services--
(A) in which the Government of North Korea has an interest;
(B) located in North Korea;
(C) of North Korean origin; or
(D) knowingly transferred, directly or indirectly, to the
Government of North Korea.
(2) Transaction licensing.--The President shall deny or
revoke any license for any transaction that, in the
determination of the President, lacks sufficient financial
controls to ensure that such transaction will not facilitate
any of the conduct described in subsection (a) or subsection
(b).
(3) Licensing authorization.--The President may issue
regulations to authorize--
(A) transactions for the purposes described in section 207;
and
(B) transactions and activities authorized under North
Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7801 et seq.).
SEC. 105. FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY.
(a) Amendment to Property Subject to Forfeiture.--Section
981(a)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(I) Any property, real or personal, that is involved in a
violation or attempted violation, or which constitutes or is
derived from proceeds traceable to a violation, of section
104(a) of the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of
2016.''.
(b) Amendment to Definition of Civil Forfeiture Statute.--
Section 983(i)(2)(D) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by striking ``or the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act'' and inserting ``, the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act''; and
(2) by adding at the end before the semicolon the
following: ``, or the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act
of 2016''.
(c) Amendment to Definition of Specified Unlawful
Activity.--Section 1956(c)(7)(D) of title 18, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``or section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954'' and inserting ``section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following: ``, or section
104(a) of the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of
2016;''.
TITLE II--SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREAN PROLIFERATION, HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES, ILLICIT ACTIVITIES, AND SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES UNDERMINING
CYBER SECURITY
SEC. 201. DETERMINATIONS WITH RESPECT TO NORTH KOREA AS A
JURISDICTION OF PRIMARY MONEY LAUNDERING
CONCERN.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Undersecretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence, who is responsible for safeguarding
the financial system against illicit use, money laundering,
terrorist financing, and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, has repeatedly expressed concern about North
Korea's misuse of the international financial system as
follows:
(A) In 2006, the Undersecretary stated that, given North
Korea's ``counterfeiting of U.S. currency, narcotics
trafficking and use of accounts worldwide to conduct
proliferation-related transactions, the line between illicit
and licit North Korean money is nearly invisible'' and urged
financial institutions worldwide to ``think carefully about
the risks of doing any North Korea-related business.''.
[[Page H232]]
(B) In 2011, the Undersecretary stated that ``North Korea
remains intent on engaging in proliferation, selling arms as
well as bringing in material,'' and was ``aggressively
pursuing the effort to establish front companies.''.
(C) In 2013, the Undersecretary stated, in reference to
North Korea's distribution of high-quality counterfeit United
States currency, that ``North Korea is continuing to try to
pass a supernote into the international financial system,''
and that the Department of the Treasury would soon introduce
new currency with improved security features to protect
against counterfeiting by the Government of North Korea.
(2) The Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental
body whose purpose is to develop and promote national and
international policies to combat money laundering and
terrorist financing, has repeatedly--
(A) expressed concern at deficiencies in North Korea's
regimes to combat money laundering and terrorist financing;
(B) urged North Korea to adopt a plan of action to address
significant deficiencies in these regimes and the serious
threat they pose to the integrity of the international
financial system;
(C) urged all jurisdictions to apply countermeasures to
protect the international financial system from ongoing and
substantial money laundering and terrorist financing risks
emanating from North Korea;
(D) urged all jurisdictions to advise their financial
institutions to give special attention to business
relationships and transactions with North Korea, including
North Korean companies and financial institutions; and
(E) called on all jurisdictions to protect against
correspondent relationships being used to bypass or evade
countermeasures and risk mitigation practices, and take into
account money laundering and terrorist financing risks when
considering requests by North Korean financial institutions
to open branches and subsidiaries in their jurisdiction.
(3) On March 7, 2013, the United Nations Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 2094, which--
(A) welcomed the Financial Action Task Force's
recommendation on financial sanctions related to
proliferation, and its guidance on the implementation of
sanctions;
(B) decided that Member States should apply enhanced
monitoring and other legal measures to prevent the provision
of financial services or the transfer of property that could
contribute to activities prohibited by applicable United
Nations Security Council resolutions; and
(C) called on Member States to prohibit North Korean banks
from establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships
with banks in their jurisdictions, to prevent the provision
of financial services, if they have information that provides
reasonable grounds to believe that these activities could
contribute to activities prohibited by an applicable United
Nations Security Council resolution, or to the evasion of
such prohibitions.
(b) Sense of Congress Regarding the Designation of North
Korea as a Jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering
Concern.--Congress--
(1) acknowledges the efforts of the United Nations Security
Council to impose limitations on, and require enhanced
monitoring of, transactions involving North Korean financial
institutions that could contribute to sanctioned activities;
(2) urges the President, in the strongest terms, to
immediately designate North Korea as a jurisdiction of
primary money laundering concern, and to adopt stringent
special measures to safeguard the financial system against
the risks posed by North Korea's willful evasion of sanctions
and its illicit activities; and
(3) urges the President to seek the prompt implementation
by other states of enhanced monitoring and due diligence to
prevent North Korea's misuse of the international financial
system, including by sharing information about activities,
transactions, and property that could contribute to
activities sanctioned by applicable United Nations Security
Council resolutions, or to the evasion of sanctions.
(c) Determinations Regarding North Korea.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall, not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, determine, in consultation with the Secretary of State
and Attorney General, and in accordance with section 5318A of
title 31, United States Code, whether reasonable grounds
exist for concluding that North Korea is a jurisdiction of
primary money laundering concern.
(2) Special measures.--If the Secretary of the Treasury
determines under this subsection that reasonable grounds
exist for finding that North Korea is a jurisdiction of
primary money laundering concern, the Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Federal functional
regulators, shall impose one or more of the special measures
described in paragraphs (1) through (5) of section 5318A(b)
of title 31, United States Code, with respect to the
jurisdiction of North Korea.
(3) Report required.--
(A) In general.--If the Secretary of the Treasury
determines that North Korea is a jurisdiction of primary
money laundering concern, the Secretary of the Treasury
shall, not later than 90 days after the date on which the
Secretary makes such determination, submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the determination made
under paragraph (1) together with the reasons for that
determination.
(B) Form.--A report or copy of any report submitted under
this paragraph shall be submitted in unclassified form but
may contain a classified annex.
SEC. 202. ENSURING THE CONSISTENT ENFORCEMENT OF UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND
FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS ON NORTH KOREA.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) all states and jurisdictions are obligated to implement
and enforce applicable United Nations Security Council
resolutions fully and promptly, including by--
(A) blocking the property of, and ensuring that any
property is prevented from being made available to, persons
designated by the Security Council under applicable United
Nations Security Council resolutions;
(B) blocking any property associated with an activity
prohibited by applicable United Nations Security Council
resolutions; and
(C) preventing any transfer of property and any provision
of financial services that could contribute to an activity
prohibited by applicable United Nations Security Council
resolutions, or to the evasion of sanctions under such
resolutions;
(2) all states and jurisdictions share a common interest in
protecting the international financial system from the risks
of money laundering and illicit transactions emanating from
North Korea;
(3) the United States Dollar and the Euro are the world's
principal reserve currencies, and the United States and the
European Union are primarily responsible for the protection
of the international financial system from these risks;
(4) the cooperation of the People's Republic of China, as
North Korea's principal trading partner, is essential to the
enforcement of applicable United Nations Security Council
resolutions and to the protection of the international
financial system;
(5) the report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant
to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, dated
June 11, 2013, expressed concern about the ability of banks
in states with less effective regulators and those unable to
afford effective compliance to detect and prevent illicit
transfers involving North Korea;
(6) North Korea has historically exploited inconsistencies
between jurisdictions in the interpretation and enforcement
of financial regulations and applicable United Nations
Security Council resolutions to circumvent sanctions and
launder the proceeds of illicit activities;
(7) Amroggang Development Bank, Bank of East Land, and
Tanchon Commercial Bank have been designated by the Secretary
of the Treasury, the United Nations Security Council, and the
European Union;
(8) Korea Daesong Bank and Korea Kwangson Banking
Corporation have been designated by the Secretary of the
Treasury and the European Union;
(9) the Foreign Trade Bank of North Korea has been
designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for facilitating
transactions on behalf of persons linked to its proliferation
network, and for serving as ``a key financial node''; and
(10) Daedong Credit Bank has been designated by the
Secretary of the Treasury for activities prohibited by
applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions,
including the use of deceptive financial practices to
facilitate transactions on behalf of persons linked to North
Korea's proliferation network.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the President should intensify diplomatic efforts, both in
appropriate international fora such as the United Nations and
bilaterally, to develop and implement a coordinated,
consistent, multilateral strategy for protecting the global
financial system against risks emanating from North Korea,
including--
(1) the cessation of any financial services whose
continuation is inconsistent with applicable United Nations
Security Council resolutions;
(2) the cessation of any financial services to persons,
including financial institutions, that present unacceptable
risks of facilitating money laundering and illicit activity
by the Government of North Korea;
(3) the blocking by all states and jurisdictions, in
accordance with the legal process of the state or
jurisdiction in which the property is held, of any property
required to be blocked under applicable United Nations
Security Council resolutions;
(4) the blocking of any property derived from illicit
activity, from significant activities undermining cyber
security, from the misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement
of public funds by, or for the benefit of, officials of the
Government of North Korea;
(5) the blocking of any property involved in significant
activities undermining cyber security by the Government of
North Korea, directly or indirectly, against United States
persons, or the theft of intellectual property by the
Government of North Korea, directly or indirectly from United
States persons; and
(6) the blocking of any property of persons directly or
indirectly involved in censorship or human rights abuses by
the Government of North Korea.
[[Page H233]]
SEC. 203. PROLIFERATION PREVENTION SANCTIONS.
(a) Export of Certain Goods or Technology.--
(1) In general.--Subject to section 207(a)(2)(C) of this
Act, a license shall be required for the export to North
Korea of any goods or technology subject to the Export
Administration Regulations (part 730 of title 15, Code of
Federal Regulations) without regard to whether the Secretary
of State has designated North Korea as a country the
government of which has provided support for acts of
international terrorism, as determined by the Secretary of
State under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of
1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2045), as continued in effect under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
(2) Presumption of denial.--A license for the export to
North Korea of any goods or technology as described in
paragraph (1) shall be subject to a presumption of denial.
(b) Transactions With Countries Supporting Acts of
International Terrorism.--
(1) Arms export control act prohibitions.--The prohibitions
and restrictions described in section 40 of the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), and other provisions provided
for in that Act, shall also apply to exporting or otherwise
providing (by sale, lease or loan, grant, or other means),
directly or indirectly, any munitions item to the Government
of North Korea without regard to whether or not North Korea
is a country with respect to which subsection (d) of such
section (relating to designation of state sponsors of
terrorism) applies.
(2) Financial transactions.--Except as provided in section
207 of this Act and the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004
(22 U.S.C. 7801 et seq.), the penalties provided for in
section 2332d of title 18, United States Code, shall apply to
a United States person that engages in a financial
transaction with the Government of North Korea on or after
the date of the enactment of this Act to the same extent that
such penalties apply to a United States citizen that commits
an unlawful act described in section 2332d of title 18,
United States Code.
(c) Transactions in Lethal Military Equipment.--
(1) In general.--The President shall withhold assistance
under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et
seq.) to any country that provides lethal military equipment
to, or receives lethal military equipment from, the
Government of North Korea.
(2) Applicability.--The prohibition under this subsection
with respect to a country shall terminate on the date that is
1 year after the date on which such country ceases to provide
lethal military equipment to the Government of North Korea.
(3) Waiver.--The President may, on a case-by-case basis,
waive the prohibition under this subsection with respect to a
country for a period of not more than 180 days, and may renew
the waiver for additional periods of not more than 180 days,
if the President determines and so reports to the appropriate
congressional committees that it is vital to the national
security interests of the United States to exercise such
waiver authority.
SEC. 204. PROCUREMENT SANCTIONS.
(a) In General.--Except as provided in this section, the
United States Government may not procure, or enter into any
contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from
any designated person.
(b) FAR.--The Federal Acquisition Regulation issued
pursuant to section 1303 of title 41, United States Code,
shall be revised to require a certification from each person
that is a prospective contractor that such person does not
engage in any of the conduct described in subsection (a) or
(b) of section 104. Such revision shall apply with respect to
contracts in an amount greater than the simplified
acquisition threshold (as defined in section 134 of title 41,
United States Code) for which solicitations are issued on or
after the date that is 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(c) Termination of Contracts and Initiation of Suspension
and Debarment Proceeding.--
(1) Termination of contracts.--Except as provided in
paragraph (2), the head of an executive agency shall
terminate a contract with a person who has provided a false
certification under subsection (b).
(2) Waiver.--The head of an executive agency may waive the
requirement under paragraph (1) with respect to a person
based upon a written finding of urgent and compelling
circumstances significantly affecting the interests of the
United States. If the head of an executive agency waives the
requirement under paragraph (1) for a person, the head of the
agency shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees, within 30 days after the waiver is made, a report
containing the rationale for the waiver and relevant
information supporting the waiver decision.
(3) Initiation of suspension and debarment proceeding.--The
head of an executive agency shall initiate a suspension and
debarment proceeding against a person who has provided a
false certification under subsection (b). Upon determination
of suspension, debarment, or proposed debarment, the agency
shall ensure that such person is entered into the
Governmentwide database containing the list of all excluded
parties ineligible for Federal programs pursuant to Executive
Order No. 12549 (31 U.S.C. 6101 note; relating to debarment
and suspension) and Executive Order No. 12689 (31 U.S.C. 6101
note; relating to debarment and suspension).
(d) Clarification Regarding Certain Products.--The remedies
specified in subsections (a) through (c) shall not apply with
respect to the procurement of eligible products, as defined
in section 308(4) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (19
U.S.C. 2518(4)), of any foreign country or instrumentality
designated under section 301(b) of such Act (19 U.S.C.
2511(b)).
(e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this subsection may
be construed to limit the use of other remedies available to
the head of an executive agency or any other official of the
Federal Government on the basis of a determination of a false
certification under subsection (b).
(f) Executive Agency Defined.--In this section, the term
``executive agency'' has the meaning given such term in
section 133 of title 41, United States Code.
SEC. 205. ENHANCED INSPECTIONS AUTHORITIES.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days
thereafter, the President, acting through the Secretary of
Homeland Security, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees, the Committee on Homeland Security
of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, a
report identifying foreign sea ports and airports whose
inspections of ships, aircraft, and conveyances originating
in North Korea, carrying North Korean property, or operated
by the Government of North Korea are deficient to effectively
prevent the facilitation of any of the activities described
in section 104(a).
(b) Enhanced Security Targeting Requirements.--Not later
than 180 days after the identification of any sea port or
airport pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall, utilizing the Automated Targeting System
operated by the National Targeting Center in U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, require enhanced screening procedures to
determine if physical inspections are warranted of any cargo
bound for or landed in the United States that has been
transported through such sea port or airport if there are
reasonable grounds to believe that such cargo contains goods
prohibited under this Act.
(c) Seizure and Forfeiture.--A vessel, aircraft, or
conveyance used to facilitate any of the activities described
in section 104(a) that comes within the jurisdiction of the
United States may be seized and forfeited under chapter 46 of
title 18, United States Code, or under the Tariff Act of
1930.
SEC. 206. TRAVEL SANCTIONS.
(a) Aliens Ineligible for Visas, Admission, or Parole.--
(1) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien (or an alien who
is a corporate officer of a person) who the Secretary of
State or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or a designee of
one of such Secretaries) knows, or has reasonable grounds to
believe, is described in subsection (a)(1) or (b)(1) of
section 104 is--
(A) inadmissible to the United States;
(B) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to
enter the United States; and
(C) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the
United States or to receive any other benefit under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(2) Current visas revoked.--
(A) In general.--The issuing consular officer, the
Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or
a designee of one of such Secretaries) shall revoke any visa
or other entry documentation issued to an alien who is
described in subsection (a)(1) or (b)(1) of section 104
regardless of when issued.
(B) Effect of revocation.--A revocation under subparagraph
(A)--
(i) shall take effect immediately; and
(ii) shall automatically cancel any other valid visa or
entry documentation that is in the alien's possession.
(b) Exception To Comply With United Nations Headquarters
Agreement.--Sanctions under subsection (a)(1)(B) shall not
apply to an alien if admitting the alien into the United
States is necessary to permit the United States to comply
with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United
Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered
into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and
the United States, or other applicable international
obligations.
SEC. 207. EXEMPTIONS, WAIVERS, AND REMOVALS OF DESIGNATION.
(a) Exemptions.--
(1) Mandatory exemptions.--The following activities shall
be exempt from sanctions under section 104:
(A) Activities subject to the reporting requirements of
title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413
et seq.), or to any authorized intelligence activities of the
United States.
(B) Any transaction necessary to comply with United States
obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations
and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters
of the United Nations, signed June 26, 1947, and entered into
force on November 21, 1947, or under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, signed April 24, 1963, and entered into
force on March 19, 1967, or under other international
agreements.
(2) Discretionary exemptions.--The following activities may
be exempt from sanctions under section 104 as determined by
the President:
[[Page H234]]
(A) Any financial transaction the exclusive purpose for
which is to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of
North Korea.
(B) Any financial transaction the exclusive purpose for
which is to import food products into North Korea, if such
food items are not defined as luxury goods.
(C) Any transaction the exclusive purpose for which is to
import agricultural products, medicine, or medical devices
into North Korea, provided that such supplies or equipment
are classified as designated ``EAR 99'' under the Export
Administration Regulations (part 730 of title 15, Code of
Federal Regulations) and not controlled under--
(i) the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
2401 et seq.), as continued in effect under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.);
(ii) the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);
(iii) part B of title VIII of the Nuclear Proliferation
Prevention Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6301 et seq.); or
(iv) the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and
Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (22 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.).
(b) Waiver.--The President may waive, on a case-by-case
basis, the imposition of sanctions for a period of not more
than one year, and may renew that waiver for additional
periods of not more than one year, any sanction or other
measure under section 104, 204, 205, 206, or 303 if the
President submits to the appropriate congressional committees
a written determination that the waiver meets one or more of
the following requirements:
(1) The waiver is important to the economic or national
security interests of the United States.
(2) The waiver will further the enforcement of this Act or
is for an important law enforcement purpose.
(3) The waiver is for an important humanitarian purpose,
including any of the purposes described in section 4 of the
North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7802).
(c) Removals of Sanctions.--The President may prescribe
rules and regulations for the removal of sanctions on a
person that is designated under subsection (a) or (b) of
section 104 and the removal of designations of a person with
respect to such sanctions if the President determines that
the designated person has verifiably ceased its participation
in any of the conduct described in subsection (a) or (b) of
section 104, as the case may be, and has given assurances
that it will abide by the requirements of this Act.
(d) Financial Services for Certain Activities.--The
President may promulgate regulations, rules, and policies as
may be necessary to facilitate the provision of financial
services by a foreign financial institution that is not
controlled by the Government of North Korea in support of the
activities subject to exemption under this section.
SEC. 208. REPORT ON THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR KNOWINGLY ENGAGING
IN SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES UNDERMINING CYBER
SECURITY.
(a) In General.--The President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on significant
activities undermining cyber security conducted, or otherwise
ordered or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the
Government of North Korea, including--
(1) the identity and nationality of persons that have
knowingly engaged in, directed, or provided material support
to significant activities undermining cyber security by the
Government of North Korea;
(2) the conduct engaged in by each person identified;
(3) the extent to which a foreign government has provided
material support to significant activities undermining cyber
security conducted, or otherwise ordered or controlled by,
the Government of North Korea; and
(4) the efforts made by the United States to engage foreign
governments to halt the capability of North Korea to conduct
significant activities undermining cyber security.
(b) Submission and Form.--
(1) Submission.--The report required under subsection (a)
shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for a
period not to exceed 3 years.
(2) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a
classified annex.
SEC. 209. SENSE OF CONGRESS THAT TRILATERAL COOPERATION AMONG
THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, AND THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA IS CRUCIAL TO THE STABILITY OF THE ASIA-
PACIFIC REGION.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea
(South Korea) share the values of democracy, free and open
markets, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.
(2) The alliance relationship between the United States,
Japan, and South Korea are critical to peace and security in
the Asia-Pacific region.
(3) The United States, Japan, and South Korea are committed
to continuing diplomatic efforts to ensure continued peace
and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
(4) On December 28, 2014, the United States, Japan, and
South Korea finalized a trilateral military intelligence-
sharing arrangement concerning the nuclear and missile
threats posed by North Korea.
(5) The trilateral military intelligence-sharing
arrangement reinforces and strengthens the commitment between
the United States, Japan, and South Korea toward a Korean
Peninsula free of nuclear weapons.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs are of
mutual concern to the United States, Japan, and South Korea
and a trilateral military intelligence-sharing arrangement is
essential to the security of each nation and the Asia-Pacific
region.
SEC. 210. REPORT ON NUCLEAR PROGRAM COOPERATION BETWEEN NORTH
KOREA AND IRAN.
(a) In General.--The President shall submit to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report
on cooperation between North Korea and Iran on their nuclear
programs, including the identity of Iranian and North Korean
persons that have knowingly engaged in or directed the
provision of material support or the exchange of information
between North Korea and Iran on their respective nuclear
programs.
(b) Submission and Form.--
(1) Submission.--The report required under subsection (a)
shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act.
(2) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a
classified annex.
TITLE III--PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
SEC. 301. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY.
Section 104 of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004
(22 U.S.C. 7814) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ``radios capable of
receiving broadcasting'' and inserting ``radio, Internet, and
electronic mass communications capable of receiving
content''; and
(2) by adding after subsection (c) the following new
subsection:
``(d) Information Technology Study.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this subsection, the President shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
setting forth a detailed plan for making unrestricted,
unmonitored, and inexpensive, radio, Internet, and electronic
mass communications available to the people of North Korea.
``(2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex.''.
SEC. 302. REPORT ON NORTH KOREAN PRISON CAMPS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report describing,
with respect to each political prison camp in North Korea to
the extent information is available--
(1) the camp's estimated prisoner population;
(2) the camp's geographical coordinates;
(3) the reasons for confinement of the prisoners;
(4) the camp's primary industries and products, and the end
users of any goods produced in such camp;
(5) the natural persons and agencies responsible for
conditions in the camp;
(6) the conditions under which prisoners are confined, with
respect to the adequacy of food, shelter, medical care,
working conditions, and reports of ill-treatment of
prisoners; and
(7) imagery, to include satellite imagery of each such
camp, in a format that, if published, would not compromise
the sources and methods used by the intelligence agencies of
the United States to capture geospatial imagery.
(b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) may be
included in the first report required to be submitted to
Congress after the date of the enactment of this Act under
sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n(d) and 2304(b)) (relating to the annual
human rights report).
SEC. 303. REPORT ON PERSONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OR CENSORSHIP IN NORTH
KOREA.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report that contains
an identification of each person the Secretary determines to
be responsible for serious human rights abuses or censorship
in North Korea and a description of such abuses or censorship
engaged in by such person. The report shall include a
description of actions taken by the Department of State to
implement or support the recommendations of the Commission of
Inquiry's Report on Human Rights in the Democratic People's
Republic of North Korea, including efforts to press China and
other countries to implement Commission recommendations.
(b) Consideration.--In preparing the report required under
subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall give due
consideration to the findings of the United Nations
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea, and
shall make specific findings with respect to the
responsibility of Kim Jong Un, and of each natural person who
is a member of the National Defense Commission of North
Korea, or the Organization and Guidance Department of the
Workers' Party of Korea, for serious human rights abuses and
censorship.
[[Page H235]]
(c) Designation of Persons.--The President shall designate
under section 104(a) any person listed in the report required
under subsection (a) as responsible for serious human rights
abuses or censorship in North Korea.
(d) Submission and Form.--
(1) Submission.--The report required under subsection (a)
shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for
a period not to exceed 3 years, shall be included in each
report required under sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n(d) and
2304(b)) (relating to the annual human rights report).
(2) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex. The Secretary of State shall also publish
the unclassified part of the report on the Department of
State's Web site.
TITLE IV--GENERAL AUTHORITIES
SEC. 401. SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS AND OTHER MEASURES.
(a) In General.--Any sanction or other measure provided for
in title I (or any amendment made by title I) or title II may
be suspended for up to 365 days upon certification by the
President to the appropriate congressional committees that
the Government of North Korea has--
(1) verifiably ceased its counterfeiting of United States
currency, including the surrender or destruction of
specialized materials and equipment used for or particularly
suitable for counterfeiting;
(2) taken significant steps toward financial transparency
to comply with generally accepted protocols to cease and
prevent the laundering of monetary instruments;
(3) taken significant steps toward verification of its
compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions
1695, 1718, 1874, 2087, and 2094;
(4) taken significant steps toward accounting for and
repatriating the citizens of other countries abducted or
unlawfully held captive by the Government of North Korea or
detained in violation of the 1953 Armistice Agreement;
(5) accepted and begun to abide by internationally
recognized standards for the distribution and monitoring of
humanitarian aid;
(6) provided credible assurances that it will not support
further acts of international terrorism;
(7) taken significant and verified steps to improve living
conditions in its political prison camps; and
(8) made significant progress in planning for unrestricted
family reunification meetings, including for those
individuals among the two million strong Korean-American
community who maintain family ties with relatives in North
Korea.
(b) Renewal of Suspension.--The suspension described in
subsection (a) may be renewed for additional consecutive
periods of 180 days upon certification by the President to
the appropriate congressional committees that the Government
of North Korea has continued to comply with the conditions
described in subsection (a) during the previous year.
SEC. 402. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS AND OTHER MEASURES.
Any sanction or other measure provided for in title I (or
any amendment made by title I) or title II shall terminate on
the date on which the President determines and certifies to
the appropriate congressional committees that the Government
of North Korea has met the requirements of section 401, and
has also--
(1) completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantled all
of its nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological
weapons programs, including all programs for the development
of systems designed in whole or in part for the delivery of
such weapons;
(2) released all political prisoners, including the
citizens of North Korea detained in North Korea's political
prison camps;
(3) ceased its censorship of peaceful political activity;
(4) taken significant steps toward the establishment of an
open, transparent, and representative society;
(5) fully accounted for and repatriated all citizens of all
nations abducted or unlawfully held captive by the Government
of North Korea or detained in violation of the 1953 Armistice
Agreement; and
(6) agreed with the Financial Action Task Force on a plan
of action to address deficiencies in its anti-money
laundering regime and begun to implement this plan of action.
SEC. 403. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.
Any or all reports required to be submitted to appropriate
congressional committees under this Act or any amendment made
by this Act that are subject to a deadline for submission
consisting of the same unit of time may be consolidated into
a single report that is submitted to appropriate
congressional committees pursuant to such deadline.
SEC. 404. REGULATIONS.
(a) In General.--The President is authorized to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this Act (which may include regulatory
exceptions), including under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702
and 1704).
(b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act or any
amendment made by this Act shall be construed to limit the
authority of the President pursuant to an applicable
Executive order or otherwise pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
SEC. 405. NO ADDITIONAL FUNDS AUTHORIZED.
No additional funds are authorized to carry out the
requirements of this Act and the amendments made by this Act.
SEC. 406. EFFECTIVE DATE.
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, this Act and the
amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the date of
the enactment of this Act.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Royce) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel) each
will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
General Leave
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to
include extraneous materials on this resolution.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
Mr. ROYCE. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I appreciate Leader McCarthy working with myself,
working with Ranking Member Eliot Engel of New York to schedule this
legislation for floor consideration.
Last week, North Korea conducted its fourth known nuclear test. The
Kim regime has developed increasingly destructive weapons.
What we are concerned about here is the miniaturization of nuclear
warheads that fit onto its most reliable missiles. We are also
concerned about the submarine tests for firing from a sub these
missiles that would be capable of launching those devices. We are
concerned about the ongoing efforts to make certain that they have got
the range now on a three-stage rocket, ICBM, to hit the United States.
This threat is unacceptable, and it has to be aggressively challenged.
The legislation that we are considering here is the most
comprehensive North Korea sanctions legislation to come before this
body. Importantly, what this bill does is use targeted financial and
economic pressure to isolate Kim Jong-un and his top officials from the
assets that they maintain in foreign banks and from the hard currency
that sustains their rule.
These assets are derived primarily from illicit activities, such as
counterfeiting U.S. currency, something that North Korea has been
caught doing with hundred-dollar bank notes, such as selling their
missile systems around the world, contraband in cigarettes, drugs, and
other illicit activities. And all of that is used to advance North
Korea's nuclear program.
They also pay for the luxurious lifestyle of the ruling elites, as we
have seen in some of the exposes that come out of North Korea, and it
is used to repress the people. In other words, the money from that hard
currency pays for the generals, pays for the secret police, pays for
the missile program and the nuclear weapons program.
A strategy of financial pressure is the approach we took a decade ago
when the previous administration targeted Banco Delta Asia. That was a
Macao-based bank. This was in 2005. They were targeted for their role
in laundering money for North Korea, and this cut it off from the
financial system, really. This led other banks in the region to shun
North Korean business, because when the option is out there between
whether or not you are going to bank with North Korea or bank with the
U.S. and the rest of the world, it is a fairly easy choice for these
banks to make. At that point, they freeze the accounts, and that,
obviously, isolates the regime.
At that time, according to one former top U.S. official who was
speaking to the issue of what the North Koreans would say when they
would come into the meetings with the State Department, at every
conversation we had with the North Koreans, he said, every one of them
began and ended with the same question: ``When do we get our money
back?''
Now, the part that got my interest at the time was not only the
report that, because he couldn't pay his generals, there were problems
for the regime--it is not a good position for a dictator to be in--but
also that missile production
[[Page H236]]
lines had come to a halt because they couldn't buy on the black market;
they didn't have the hard currency anymore to do it, the parts that
they needed for their programs.
Unfortunately, the pressure at the time was lifted. I think it was
lifted prematurely for certain because the representation was made that
Kim Jong Il was going to make concessions on his nuclear program,
concessions that ultimately were never made. From my standpoint, what a
mistake. From the standpoint of the people I talk to over at Treasury,
what a mistake. They had a different vision on how those sanctions
should be maintained.
Today, the Obama administration has let its North Korea policy drift.
A year ago, it promised a proportional response to the massive cyber
terrorist attack against the United States. But to date, the
administration's response has been dangerously weak. A mere 18 low-
level arms dealers have been sanctioned. That has been it. Failing to
respond to North Korea's belligerence, I think, only emboldens their
leader.
Disrupting North Korea's illicit activities will place tremendous
strain on that country's ruling elite who have so brutalized the people
of North Korea. I spoke to the defector who used to run their
propaganda machinery about this. He defected through China. And he
discussed this issue. He said: Look, that hard currency goes, not to
the people; it goes for the military apparatus and the political
apparatus of the regime. So we have got to go after those illicit
activities like we went after organized crime in the United States:
identify the network, interdict shipments, disrupt the flow of money.
North Korea, after all, has been called a ``gangster regime.'' You
have seen that term in the press. Well, it is pretty apt. This regime
is a critical threat, frankly, to our national security. Under this
bill's framework, anyone laundering money, counterfeiting goods,
smuggling, or trafficking narcotics will be subject to significant
sanctions.
It is also important to remember the deplorable state of human rights
in North Korea. Two years ago, a U.N. Commission of Inquiry released
the most comprehensive report on North Korea to date, finding that the
Kim regime ``has for decades,'' in their words, ``pursued policies
involving crimes that shock the conscience of humanity.'' So this bill
requires the State Department to use this report's findings to identify
the individuals responsible for these abuses and to press for more ways
in which to get information into North Korea so as to move the
attitudes of the population inside the country.
Mr. Speaker, a return to the strategy of effective financial pressure
on North Korea is our best bet to end North Korea's threat to its own
people, to our South Korean allies, and ultimately to us.
I reserve the balance of my time.
House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC, February 26, 2015.
Hon. Ed Royce,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I write concerning H.R. 757, the North
Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2015. As you know, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs received an original referral
and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform a
secondary referral when the bill was introduced on February
5, 2015. I recognize and appreciate your desire to bring this
legislation before the House of Representatives in an
expeditious manner, and accordingly, the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform will forego action on the
bill.
The Committee takes this action with our mutual
understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 757 at
this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over the subject
matter contained in this or similar legislation. Further, I
request your support for the appointment of conferees from
the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform during any
House-Senate conference convened on this or related
legislation.
Finally, I would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters
on this matter be included in the bill report filed by the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, as well as in the Congressional
Record during floor consideration, to memorialize our
understanding.
Sincerely,
Jason Chaffetz,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, January 8, 2016.
Hon. Jason Chaffetz,
Chairman, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for consulting with the
Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 757, the North Korea
Sanctions Enforcement Act, and for agreeing to be discharged
from further consideration of that bill.
I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure
does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of the
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, or prejudice
its jurisdictional prerogatives on this bill or similar
legislation in the future. I would support your effort to
seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any
House-Senate conference involving this legislation.
I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 757 into the
Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill.
I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and
look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as
this measure moves through the legislative process.
Sincerely,
Edward R. Royce,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Ways and Means,
Washington, DC, May 29, 2015.
Hon. Edward R. Royce,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Royce: I am writing with respect to H.R. 757,
the ``North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2015.'' As a
result of your having consulted with us on provisions in H.R.
757 that fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee
on Ways and Means, I agree to waive consideration of this
bill so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.
The Committee on Ways and Means takes this action with the
mutual understanding that by forgoing consideration of H.R.
757 at this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over the
subject matter contained in this or similar legislation, and
the Committee will be appropriately consulted and involved as
the bill or similar legislation moves forward so that we may
address any remaining issues that fall within our Rule X
jurisdiction. The Committee also reserves the right to seek
appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any
House-Senate conference involving this or similar
legislation, and requests your support for such request.
Finally, I would appreciate your response to this letter
confirming this understanding, and would ask that a copy of
our exchange of letters on this matter be included in the
Congressional Record during floor consideration thereof.
Sincerely,
Paul Ryan,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, June 4, 2015.
Hon. Paul Ryan,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for consulting with the
Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 757, the North Korea
Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2015, and for agreeing to be
discharged from further consideration of that bill.
I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure
does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of the
Committee on Ways and Means, or prejudice its jurisdictional
prerogatives on this bill or similar legislation in the
future. I would support your effort to seek appointment of an
appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate
conference involving this legislation.
I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 757 into the
Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill.
I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and
look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as
this measure moves through the legislative process.
Sincerely,
Edward R. Royce,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC, January 7, 2016.
Hon. Ed Royce,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Chairman Royce: I am writing with respect to H.R. 757,
the ``North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2015,'' which
was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and in
addition to the Committee on the Judiciary. As a result of
your having consulted with us on provisions in H.R. 757 that
fall within the rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on the
Judiciary, I agree to discharge our Committee from further
consideration of this bill so that it may proceed
expeditiously to the House floor for consideration.
The Judiciary Committee takes this action with our mutual
understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 757 at
this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over subject
matter contained in this or similar legislation, and that our
Committee will be appropriately consulted and involved as
this bill or similar legislation moves forward so that we may
address any remaining issues in our jurisdiction. Our
Committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of an
appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate
conference involving this or similar legislation, and asks
that you support any such request.
[[Page H237]]
I would appreciate a response to this letter confirming
this understanding with respect to H.R. 757, and would ask
that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be
included in the Congressional Record during Floor
consideration of H.R. 757.
Sincerely,
Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, June 4, 2015.
Hon. Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for consulting with the
Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 757, the North Korea
Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2015, and for agreeing to be
discharged from further consideration of that bill.
I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure
does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of the
Committee on the Judiciary, or prejudice its jurisdictional
prerogatives on this bill or similar legislation in the
future. I would support your effort to seek appointment of an
appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate
conference involving this legislation.
I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 757 into the
Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill.
I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and
look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as
this measure moves through the legislative process.
Sincerely,
Edward R. Royce,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Financial Services,
Washington, DC, January 8, 2016.
Hon. Ed Royce,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Royce: I am writing concerning H.R. 757, the
North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2015, and H.R. 3662,
the Iran Terror Finance Transparency Act, both of which were
referred to the Committee on Financial Services in addition
to your Committee.
As a result of your having consulted with the Committee on
Financial Services concerning provisions of the bills that
fall within our Rule X jurisdiction, I agree to discharge our
Committee from further consideration of the bills so that
they may proceed expeditiously to the House Floor. The
Committee on Financial Services takes this action with our
mutual understanding that, by foregoing consideration of H.R.
757 and H.R. 3662 at this time, we do not waive any
jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in this or
similar legislation, and that our Committee will be
appropriately consulted and involved as this or similar
legislation moves forward so that we may address any
remaining issues that fall within our Rule X jurisdiction.
Our Committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of
an appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate
conference involving this or similar legislation, and
requests your support for any such request.
Finally, I would appreciate your response to this letter
confirming this understanding with respect to H.R. 757 and
H.R. 3662 and would ask that a copy of our exchange of
letters on this matter be included in your Committee's report
to accompany the legislation and in the Congressional Record
during floor consideration thereof.
Sincerely,
Jeb Hensarling,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, January 8, 2016.
Hon. Jeb Hensarling,
Chairman, House Committee on Financial Services, Washington,
DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for consulting with the
Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 757, the North Korea
Sanctions Enforcement Act, and for agreeing to be discharged
from further consideration of that bill.
I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure
does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of the
Committee on Financial Services, or prejudice its
jurisdictional prerogatives on this bill or similar
legislation in the future. I would support your effort to
seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any
House-Senate conference involving this legislation.
I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 757 into the
Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill.
I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and
look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as
this measure moves through the legislative process.
Sincerely,
Edward R. Royce,
Chairman.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I rise in support of this measure.
I want to first thank our chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee,
Ed Royce, for authoring this very good, bipartisan bill. I am very
pleased to be the lead Democratic cosponsor. I think this is an
important bill, and it ties in with what we have tried to do for these
past years on the Foreign Affairs Committee, being bipartisan and
letting politics stop at the water's edge when we are talking about
international affairs.
Mr. Speaker, last week's nuclear test in North Korea was a stark
reminder of just how dangerous the Kim regime is. A nuclear weapon in
the hands of a rogue power is a threat to peace and stability around
the world. North Korea continues to have a destabilizing influence on
the peninsula and across the region, and the potential for nuclear fuel
from North Korea to end up on the black market in the hands of violent
extremists only compounds the threat.
Yet, despite the burden of some of the toughest sanctions imaginable,
despite constant pressure from the global community, despite the
increasing isolation of North Korea from the rest of the world, leaders
in Pyongyang persist on this dangerous and destabilizing course.
The latest test demands a response. We need to work with our allies,
particularly South Korea and Japan. We need to make sure this issue is
at the top of the agenda in our engagement with China. China can have a
lot of influence and does have a lot of influence over North Korea. We
need to act unilaterally to make clear to the North Koreans that their
actions have consequences.
This bill would broaden our sanctions and strengthen enforcement. Let
me say I am very proud, again, in a bipartisan way, this bill passed
unanimously out of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
North Korea has become more and more savvy at evading sanctions, and
that is why this bill broadens our sanctions. The country's elites do
business with shell companies and cover up the money trail. This allows
hard currency to flow into North Korea. This bill would crack down on
this practice and go after anyone helping prop up the Kim regime
through these illegal activities.
I must say that I have been to North Korea twice, to Pyongyang twice.
We watched in the morning when people were going to work. The elites do
very well there. It is just the rest of the country that is starving.
This bill would include the important exceptions for the humanitarian
aid that benefits the North Korean people. We help them with food aid.
We are the most generous country with feeding North Korea. It is
important to point this out because our quarrel is not with the North
Korean people. It is with the despot and his aides that run North
Korea.
We know that the people of North Korea endure deplorable treatment at
the hands of a corrupt regime. I can tell you the country's citizens
deserve much, much better. That is why we will keep up the pressure on
North Korea's leaders and that is why we need to pass this legislation.
I urge a ``yes'' vote.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Smith), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International
Organizations.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished
chairman for yielding.
I rise in strong support of H.R. 757, the North Korea Sanctions
Enforcement Act of 2016.
Mr. Speaker, there is a compelling need to pass tough and effective
legislation to freeze the assets of the Kim Jong-un regime.
I want to commend Chairman Royce for his long and hard work on North
Korea and his determination to bring this bill to the floor. I again
thank Ranking Member Eliot Engel for his good, strong sense of
bipartisanship. This is a one-two punch against a cruel dictatorship,
and this legislation has to get to the President as soon as possible.
Mr. Speaker, whether it be North Korea or Iran, when will we learn
the hard lesson that totalitarian states do not negotiate in good
faith, cannot be trusted to hold up their end of the bargain, and use
our goodwill and our foreign capital to keep on proliferating? They
will not allow intrusive inspections because they cheat and because it
weakens their status at home. They use nuclear weapons negotiations to
[[Page H238]]
enhance their own diplomatic status and to gain concessions.
In the end, nuclear negotiations earn rogue nations like Iran and
North Korea foreign capital and other investments from the West. They
use that to fund additional missile technology, to fund criminal and
terrorist activities, and to continue with clandestine nuclear
programs.
During the Bush administration, the most effective tools in bringing
the North Korea dictatorship to heel were the freezing of its assets in
the Banco Delta Asia in Macao and the building of an international
coalition to interdict suspect North Korea shipping. These should be
our priorities now, especially in the shadow of North Korea's nuclear
tests, by imposing mandatory sanctions on the perpetrators of human
rights abuses, censorship, arms and human trafficking, money
laundering, as well proliferation.
Nearly 2 years ago, the U.N. Commission of Inquiry reported that the
ongoing crimes against humanity in North Korea have no ``parallel in
the contemporary world.'' These crimes include ``extermination, murder,
enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other
sexual violence, persecution on political, religious, and racial, and
grounds, the forcible transfer of populations, the enforced
disappearance of persons, and the inhumane act of knowingly causing
prolonged starvation.''
{time} 1615
Kim Jong-un cares not at all about the welfare of his own people. We
should expect that he cares even less about the welfare of the people
of Japan, South Korea, or even U.S. citizens who face the threat of
North Korean nuclear weapons.
The U.N. Commission recommended that the U.N. impose targeted
sanctions on the North Korean leaders responsible for its human rights
crimes. However, China blocks U.N. action.
Without U.N. action, the U.S. must act, using our position as the
steward of the global financial system. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on
North Korea welcomes such action, supporting targeted sanctions of
those most responsible for these heinous crimes against humanity.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Connolly), my friend and colleague and a valued member of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my dear friend from New York, the
distinguished ranking member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
I rise today in support of the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act
of 2016. I want to thank the chairman and ranking member for their
leadership in bringing this legislation before us.
I especially appreciate the inclusion of two of my amendments, one to
provide for the reunification of Korean families separated by the 38th
parallel, and another to ensure that U.S. policy toward North Korea is
informed by the recommendations made in the landmark Commission of
Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea conducted by the United Nations.
Amidst the tense geopolitical standoffs and irresponsible actions of
the North Korean regime, we must always remember the human cost of this
enduring conflict. I believe this bill, through these amendments and
important exceptions to sanctions for humanitarian relief
organizations, does just that. This is timely, if not overdue,
legislation.
North Korea is a reckless, paranoid state devoid of virtually all
aspects of human autonomy, now armed with a nuclear umbrella. That
makes the Korean peninsula one of the most dangerous flash points on
the globe.
There have been recent developments in North Korea that are
profoundly troubling and deserve an immediate response from this
Congress. Reports that North Korea has conducted its fourth nuclear
weapons test confirm that the regime in Pyongyang is committed to
defying international norms and risks destabilizing the entire Asia-
Pacific region.
As co-chairman of the Congressional Caucus on Korea, I remain deeply
concerned with the volatility and the ever-present potential of
conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
It is a specter that looms over 75 million Koreans and, for their
sake and that of the region, the U.S., the Republic of Korea, China,
and other regional stakeholders must demonstrate commitment to
addressing this threat.
By targeting the individuals and entities that support the Kim regime
through illicit activities, this bill will hopefully weaken the resolve
and capability of Pyongyang to endanger regional stability.
Mr. Speaker, I urge passage of the bill.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Poe), chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation,
and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. He is also an original
cosponsor with me on this legislation.
Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman and the ranking
member for bringing this piece of legislation up to the House floor.
Mr. Speaker, North Korea is a world threat, a nuclear world threat.
Its leaders are outlaws with no redeeming social character in their
souls, and we need to operate with them knowing this.
Last week, North Korea tested another nuclear weapon. As chairman of
the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, I held a
hearing in October and predicted that this test would happen again.
With Iran about to receive hundreds of billions of dollars for its
illegal nuclear program, we shouldn't be surprised that North Korea
wants a piece of the pie, too. Illegal nuclear programs and material
can bring a lot of money to a regime.
In the hearing that we had in October, we learned of deep connections
between Iran and North Korea. Both nations, among other things, sponsor
worldwide terror. They have a history of working together on missile
development. There is mounting evidence that they have worked together
on their nuclear weapons programs as well. We should expect Iran to
keep working with North Korea to advance its own nuclear weapons
program.
We have sanctions on North Korea, but all those sanctions have not
been fully implemented. The administration's policy of strategic
patience is not working because this barbaric regime continues to
develop nuclear weapons and ICBMs. I say our patience has run out in
dealing with them.
This bill is Congress showing North Korea that there are consequences
for their testing of nuclear weapons. We cannot let North Korea develop
its nuclear program even more.
North Korea already has submarines with missiles on them that can
reach the United States, over 10 nuclear bombs, and for some reason has
Austin on its hit list. I take that personally, Mr. Speaker, that
Austin is their number one target in the United States.
North Korea is a state that imprisons Christians for their faith,
starves its citizens, controls the Internet and the media, tortures
anyone in its domain who dares to disagree with the regime, and is
engaged in cyberterrorism.
Dangerous actions by a ruthless dictator must be met by forceful
responses. I am glad to be an original cosponsor of this bill. I urge
its passage. It is time for them to pay the price for going rogue.
And that is just the way it is.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Hawaii (Ms. Gabbard), our colleague on the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, a rising star in our committee.
Ms. GABBARD. Mr. Speaker, I am rising today in strong support of H.R.
757, the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act, which I am proud to be
a cosponsor of.
North Korea continues to pose a serious and dangerous threat to my
constituents in Hawaii, the Pacific, and the West Coast of the United
States. Our communities and our families lie within range of North
Korea's intercontinental ballistic missiles.
North Korea's nuclear tests just a week ago and their continued
pursuit of developing more nuclear weapons and miniaturizing those
weapons serve as a reminder of the threat that North Korea poses to our
country, which my constituents in Hawaii know all too well.
There are some necessary steps that the United States must take to
deal with this threat: We need to increase the strength and
capabilities of our Pacific fleet and forces. We need to stop
[[Page H239]]
the downward trend in investment of ballistic missile defense
development and capabilities, and strengthen our ballistic missile
defense capabilities, specifically in Hawaii and the Pacific, to
counter this threat. We need to completely reexamine our strategy of
so-called strategic patience with North Korea, recognizing that North
Korea has continued to grow in their nuclear and missile capabilities,
telling us that the status quo is not working.
This bill, however, deals with another important area where we need
to act, and that is sanctions. It gives us the tools to respond to
North Korea's provocations. One provision would apply sanctions that
prohibit the export of munitions to North Korea and severely restrict
export licenses for controlled goods and technologies. It would
prohibit financial transactions between U.S. persons and the Government
of North Korea and sanction those who send or receive lethal military
equipment to or from North Korea.
The bill will also give us the tools to reapply some of the most
effective sanctions that we have ever had against hard currency for
those who do business with North Korea. We saw how these sanctions were
effective before.
Following U.S. action against the Banco Delta Asia based in Macao in
2005, the assets of North Korean banks and leaders were frozen and
completely blocked from the international financial system. This
directly affected the money being used to develop these nuclear and
ballistic missile capabilities, and the money also supported the
regime's leadership and its elites and their lifestyle.
This severely increased the pressure in North Korea, causing them to
engage with the international community, coming to an agreement to lift
the sanctions in 2007--prematurely, in my view--made in exchange for
shutting down and sealing the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and
discussing a list of its nuclear-related activities with the U.S. and
other parties in the region.
The agreement was violated by North Korea in 2009 when they tested a
missile, and the sanctions on Banco Delta showed us earlier a way to
impact North Korean leadership and business directly. Those sanctions
should have been immediately reinstated upon North Korea breaking that
agreement, but that is why we are here today--to act.
While sanctions alone are not enough, this bill could provide some
very important tools to countering North Korea's aggression and
ultimately achieving our objective of a denuclearized North Korea.
Lastly, this bill recognizes the terrible human rights abuses
inflicted on the people of North Korea. For many years, State
Department human rights reports, as well as private organizations'
reports, have depicted a pattern of extreme human rights abuses by the
tyrannical North Korean regime, including the denial of basic human
freedoms: withheld access to food and deplorable prison camps where
extrajudicial killings, enslavement, torture, and sexual abuse are
widespread.
I would like to thank our Chairman Royce and our Ranking Member Engel
for their steadfast, bipartisan dedication and leadership to taking
action on this global and domestic security issue. This bill provides a
critical step forward.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen), chairman emeritus of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs and author of multiple North Korea human rights and
sanctions laws. She is also a cosponsor of this bill.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am so proud and pleased to be here
speaking on behalf of this bill, H.R. 757, the North Korea Sanctions
Enforcement Act. I thank Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel for
introducing this important bill which, once again, is presented in
their usual bipartisan manner.
While initial reports, Mr. Speaker, cast doubt on North Korea's
claims that it carried out a hydrogen bomb test, any enhancement of the
regime's nuclear capability should be--must be--a cause for concern.
Both U.S. and South Korean intelligence assessments indicate that North
Korea already possesses the capability to install a nuclear warhead on
a missile that can reach United States territory or that of our allies.
Despite some doubt about that capability's effectiveness, it is just
a matter of time before North Korea finishes developing this dangerous
technology that it is seeking or, worse, shares this technology with
Iran, as these two rogue regimes are bosom buddies and have long been
known to collaborate on their ballistic missile programs.
What is clear is that our current policy toward North Korea is not
working. Administrations from both parties, Mr. Speaker, have made
mistakes with North Korea over the years. They have failed to respond
to North Korea's violation of its nuclear deal and have failed to hold
the regime accountable for its illicit activity. Administration after
administration have removed North Korea off the State Sponsors of
Terrorism list and continue to keep the regime off that list despite
mounting evidence that would support its inclusion back on the
terrorism list. Various administrations have utterly failed to enforce
the North Korea sanctions that we already have on the books.
The Obama administration's so-called strategic patience policy with
North Korea has proven to be a disaster, and it is time that we fully
and vigorously enforce the existing sanctions and expand upon those to
implement new sanctions on Pyongyang until its nuclear program is
dismantled.
By some estimates, North Korea might already have 10 to 15 nuclear
weapons, and Kim Jong-un has shown that he will stop at nothing to get
the weapons and the technology that he desires. This bill would help
ensure that our sanctions on North Korea are finally being enforced the
way they always should have been, but we can't forget that North Korea
cannot make progress on its nuclear program alone.
North Korea has a long history of collaborating with other rogue
regimes, and we must ensure that we are enforcing sanctions on all of
its collaborators. Any government entity or individual that has sold or
transferred weapons or technology to North Korea in violation of U.S.
law or U.N. Security Council resolution should also be targeted for
sanctions.
Mr. Speaker, I will end with this note: North Korea has been writing
the playbook for rogue regimes to follow, and unless this
administration gets serious about confronting Pyongyang's aggressions,
I worry that it will continue to allow Iran to take advantage of us,
that we won't enforce sanctions on Tehran, just like we are not
enforcing them on North Korea.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 1 minute to the
gentlewoman.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. In a few years' time, we will be back here debating
what to do after another nuclear device test by North Korea, by Iran,
or by other rogue actors.
North Korea poses an imminent threat now to our security as well as
that of our allies. We cannot afford to ignore it nor look the other
way.
I urge all of my colleagues to vote for this important bill and urge
its passage.
I thank the chairman and the ranking member for this bill.
{time} 1630
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Colleagues, a nuclear weapon in the hands of North Korea, a rogue,
destabilizing country on the peninsula and across the region, is simply
a nonstarter. It is unthinkable. Despite our tough sanctions and
increasing isolation from the global community, Pyongyang continues
down a dangerous and destabilizing course.
Last week's nuclear test in North Korea is a jarring reminder of just
how dangerous the Kim regime is and demands a response from the United
States and our allies as well. We must work with South Korea and Japan
to make sure this issue is at the top of our agenda in our engagement
with China. We must act unilaterally to make sure to North Koreans that
their leadership's actions have consequences.
H.R. 757 would broaden our sanctions and strengthen enforcement. The
bill
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would crack down on North Korean elite who do business through shell
companies to evade detection and go after anyone helping to prop up the
Kim regime through illegal activities. This bill would include
important exceptions for the humanitarian aid that benefits the North
Korean people.
North Koreans deserve much more than what its leaders are providing,
which is why we need to pass this legislation. We cannot allow North
Korea to continue to be dangerous and frivolous. We have to stand up
and say no. They have to understand that we mean business. They have to
understand that what they have done is unacceptable and will not stand.
I urge my colleagues to support this measure.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
We have the opportunity today to show Americans and the world that
Congress is willing to lead on this vital national security issue. This
is an issue that Congress has been focused on, obviously, for some
time.
I have spent much of my time on the Foreign Affairs Committee focused
on the North Korean threat. Ranking Member Eliot Engel and I, in one of
our first trips together as chairman and ranking member of the
committee, traveled to visit our South Korean ally and toured the
wreckage of the Cheonan.
This was a corvette ship that was hit and split right in half by a
torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine, costing the lives of 46
sailors. It is a reminder of the attitude that North Korea has in terms
of its provocative action.
Both Eliot Engel and I have been to North Korea on separate trips,
and we can tell you it is a totalitarian state with an ever-present
cult of personalities. If you have ever read Orwell's book, ``Nineteen
Eighty-Four,'' the society in that book seemed almost more rational
than this police state.
I was talking to the former Minister of Propaganda. In the no-go
areas, 1.9 million were starved to death in North Korea. You ask why.
Well, with the paranoia of the police state, they are not considered
particularly loyal out there.
Besides, the food can be sold on the food exchange in the capital for
hard currency. Donated food often is used in this way to support what
he calls ``juche,'' to support this philosophy which leads them forward
with this desire to have a nuclear weapon and the capability to deliver
it.
This bipartisan bill, which I authored with Eliot Engel as our
principal coauthor, is based on legislation that unanimously passed the
House last Congress. Its implementation will help sever a key subsidy
for North Korea's weapons of mass destruction program, for only when
the North Korean leadership realizes that its criminal activities are
untenable do prospects for peace and security in Northeast Asia
improve.
This bill will return us to the one strategy that has worked to
pressure North Korea at a time when Kim Jong-un is trying to blackmail
his way to consolidating power.
Congress must send the message to the Kim regime that they can either
reform and disarm or the system can implode. Without hard currency,
without being able to pay the generals, that system would implode. By
cutting off Kim Jong-un's access to the hard currency he needs for his
army and his weapons, this bill, H.R. 757, will squarely present the
North Korean regime with that choice.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, recent news of North Korea's claim that
it successfully conducted an H-bomb test for the first time, in
defiance of United Nations' resolutions ups the ante on why we must
remain steadfast in expediently addressing insecurity in our nation and
across the globe, as anticipated in this bill by Representative Royce
of California, entitled the North Korean Sanctions Enforcement Act of
2,315 which has enjoyed bi-partisan support.
Our world today is faced with resurgent and evolving threats from
weapons of mass destruction to destructive nuclear ambitions.
Indeed, news events inform us of the far-ranging spectrum we must
contend with, ranging from persistent nation state-based dangerous
nuclear ambitions in North Korea, to continued chemical weapons used in
Syria, to terrorist organizations such as Daesh ramping up their
destructive capabilities through vitriolic recruitment strategies, that
pose an existential threat beyond the borders from which ISIS is
operating.
I am confident that these are issues that President Obama will be
addressing and proposing durable solutions to during his last state of
the Union Address as our nation's Commander In Chief.
Under his leadership, our nation has achieved foreign policy feats
that have worked to maintain our security, promote our geopolitical
objectives and advance our diplomatic relationships with key allies.
Let's just take a quick look back at some of the President's foreign
policy achievements:
The capture and neutralization of Osama Bin Laden which brought an
end to a nearly decade long manhunt.
The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq which helped to bring an end
to a costly war, helping our country save billions of dollars in U.S.
taxpayer funds.
The current Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which has been
instrumental in deterring and stemming Iran's nuclear ambitions and
enabling security in the global society.
The repealing of Don't Ask, Don't Tell, an aspersion on the personal
private matters of those who have dedicated their lives to protect our
nation.
Signing into law the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), an
important treaty that showcases how the U.S. leads by example by
signing a treaty that requires both the United States and Russia to
reduce their nuclear warhead arsenals to 1,550 each, a 30 percent
reduction from the 2002 Treaty of Moscow and a 74 percent reduction
from the 1991 START treaty.
Neutralization of al Qaeda propagandist and foreign fighter recruiter
Anwar Al Awlaki, one of the main leaders in the Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP).
Indeed, under President Obama's leadership, our country's military
aid to Israel has increased remarkably with the eye towards deepening
and expanding U.S./Israeli relations-an important aspect of our
nation's foreign policy and geopolitical efforts to promote peace in
the region.
This president's foreign policy achievements in promoting the
security of our nation are irrefutable and this is why I support the
North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2015 because it will empower
him to continue his impressive work in this arena.
Much like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) championed
by this Administration, this bill encourages our President to
investigate any credible information of sanctionable activities
involving North Korea.
Furthermore, this bill will designate and implement sanctions against
persons and entities who knowingly engage in or contribute to
activities in North Korea whether it is through their exporting or
importing of weapons of mass destruction, significant arms, significant
luxury goods, money laundering, censorship, or engage in human rights
abuses.
Pursuant to the bill, the President is empowered to exercise
authorities under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA) as it relates to persons, entities and the government of North
Korea.
This bill empowers our President with discretionary authority to
designate and apply sanctions to persons involved in certain other
kinds of conduct.
This bill will facilitate civil forfeiture of assets, real or
personal, if said properties inure from any attempted or actual
violation of this Act, or which constitutes or is derived from proceeds
traceable to such a violation.
Other core provisions of the bill is the empowerment of our Treasury
Secretary to:
determine whether reasonable grounds exist for concluding that North
Korea is a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern; and
In the event our Treasury Secretary makes this determination, he is
empowered to impose one or more special measures with respect to the
jurisdiction of North Korea.
Finally, our sense of Congress in this bill is in comity with and
ensures the consistent enforcement of United Nations Security Council
resolutions and financial restrictions on North Korea.
Through this bill, our president will be empowered to withhold
assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to any country that
provides lethal military equipment to, or receives it from the
government of North Korea.
This bill is also important because it will put into place an
enhanced screening procedure whereby our Secretary of Homeland Security
(DHS) will be able to determine if physical inspections are warranted
of any cargo bound for or landed in the United States that has been
transported through a foreign seaport or airport whose inspections are
deficient if there are reasonable grounds to believe that such cargo
contains goods prohibited under this Act.
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This will facilitate expedient seizure of vessels or aircraft used to
facilitate sanctionable activities.
The President will also be supported in his efforts to produce
progress reports on significant activities undermining cyber security
conflicted, or otherwise ordered or controlled, directly or indirectly,
by the government of North Korea.
Our Secretary of State will be supported in his human rights efforts
of reporting on each political prison camp in North Korea, which will
include a detailed description of those abuses or censorship.
Again, I thank Chairman Royce for championing this bill and look
forward to working with him and other members of this House in
promoting our national security and supporting our President's
objective of establishing us as a credible and trusted leader in the
global landscape.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Royce) that the House suspend the rules
and pass the bill, H.R. 757, as amended.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this motion will be postponed.
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