[Congressional Record Volume 162, Number 114 (Thursday, July 14, 2016)]
[House]
[Pages H4939-H4957]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
{time} 1015
IRAN ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2016
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 819, I call up
the bill (H.R. 5631) to hold Iran accountable for its state sponsorship
of terrorism and other threatening activities and for its human rights
abuses, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate
consideration.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 819, the bill
is considered read.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 5631
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Iran
Accountability Act of 2016''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
Sec. 5. Definitions.
TITLE I--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ENTITIES OWNED BY IRAN'S
REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS
Sec. 101. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the IRGC.
Sec. 102. Additional sanctions with respect to foreign persons that
support or conduct certain transactions with Iran's
Revolutionary Guard Corps or other sanctioned persons.
Sec. 103. IRGC watch list and report.
Sec. 104. Imposition of sanctions against Mahan Air.
Sec. 105. Modification and extension of reporting requirements on the
use of certain Iranian seaports by foreign vessels and
use of foreign airports by sanctioned Iranian air
carriers.
TITLE II--IRAN BALLISTIC MISSILE SANCTIONS
Sec. 201. Expansion of sanctions with respect to efforts by Iran to
acquire ballistic missile and related technology.
Sec. 202. Expansion of sanctions under Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 with
respect to persons that acquire or develop ballistic
missiles.
Sec. 203. Imposition of sanctions with respect to ballistic missile
program of Iran.
Sec. 204. Expansion of mandatory sanctions with respect to financial
institutions that engage in certain transactions relating
to ballistic missile capabilities of Iran.
Sec. 205. Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission of
activities with certain sectors of Iran that support the
ballistic missile program of Iran.
Sec. 206. Regulations.
TITLE III--SANCTIONS RELATING TO IRAN'S SUPPORT OF TERRORISM
Sec. 301. Special measures with respect to Iran relating to its
designation as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering
concern.
TITLE IV--SANCTIONS RELATING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRAN
Sec. 401. Expansion of list of persons involved in human rights abuses
in Iran.
Sec. 402. Identification of, and imposition of sanctions with respect
to, certain Iranian individuals.
Sec. 403. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons who conduct
transactions with or on behalf of certain Iranian
individuals.
Sec. 404. Mandatory sanctions with respect to financial institutions
that engage in certain transactions on behalf of persons
involved in human rights abuses or that export sensitive
technology to Iran.
Sec. 405. United States support for the people of Iran.
Sec. 406. United States Special Coordinator on Human Rights and
Democracy in Iran.
Sec. 407. Broadcasting to Iran.
Sec. 408. Report on United States citizens detained by Iran.
Sec. 409. Sense of Congress on role of the United Nations in promoting
human rights in Iran.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) On April 2, 2015, in announcing a framework agreement
for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, President Obama
stated that ``other American sanctions on Iran for its
support of terrorism, its human rights abuses, its ballistic
missile program, will continue to be fully enforced''.
(2) On July 14, 2015, President Obama stated that ``we will
maintain our own sanctions related to Iran's support for
terrorism, its ballistic missile program, and its human
rights violations''.
(3) On January 16, 2016, President Obama stated that ``We
still have sanctions on Iran for its violations of human
rights, for its support of terrorism, and for its ballistic
missile program. And we will continue to enforce these
sanctions, vigorously.''.
(4) On January 21, 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry
admitted that sanctions relief under the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action would go to terrorist organizations, stating:
``I think that some of it will end up in the hands of the
IRGC or other entities, some of which are labeled terrorists
. . . You know, to some degree, I'm not going to sit here and
tell you that every component of that can be prevented.''.
(5) Secretary of State John Kerry stated on July 23, 2015,
``We will not violate the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA)] if we use our authorities to impose sanctions on
Iran for terrorism, human rights, missiles, or other
nonnuclear reasons. And the JCPOA does not provide Iran any
relief from United States sanctions under any of those
authorities or other authorities.''.
(6) Director of National Intelligence James Clapper wrote
on February 9, 2016, ``[T]he Islamic Republic of Iran
presents an enduring threat to U.S national interests because
of its support to regional terrorist and militant groups and
the Assad regime, as well as its development of advanced
military capabilities. Tehran views itself as leading the
`axis of resistance' which includes the Asad regime and sub-
national groups aligned with Iran, especially Lebanese
Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia militants . . . Tehran might even
use American citizens detained when entering Iranian
territories as bargaining pieces to achieve financial or
political concessions in line with heir strategic
intentions.''.
(7) Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew stated on July 14,
2015, ``We harbor no illusions about the Iranian government's
nefarious activities beyond its nuclear program. Make no
mistake: we will continue to impose and aggressively enforce
sanctions to combat Iran's support for terrorist groups, its
fomenting of violence in the region, and its perpetration of
human rights abuses.''.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Iran's ballistic missile program and support for
terrorism represents a serious threat to allies of the United
States in the Middle East and Europe, members of the Armed
Forces deployed in those regions, and ultimately the United
States; and
(2) the United States should impose tough primary and
secondary sanctions against any person that directly or
indirectly supports the ballistic missile program of Iran,
its state sponsorship of terrorism and human rights abuses,
as well as against any foreign person or financial
institution that engages in transactions or trade that
support those efforts.
[[Page H4940]]
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to continue to impose pressure on the Government of
Iran for its role as the foremost state sponsor of terrorism,
its ongoing human rights abuses against the citizens of Iran
and other peoples, and its unjust detention of United States
citizens; and
(2) to continue to use sanctions as an element of that
pressure and to discourage financial institutions and
entities from engaging in business and commerce with Iranian
entities tied to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and to
Iranian officials involved in human rights abuses.
SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Entity.--The term ``entity'' means any corporation,
business association, partnership, trust, society, or any
other entity.
(2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an
individual or entity that is not a United States person.
(3) IRGC.--The term ``IRGC'' means--
(A) Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and any official,
agent, or affiliate of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps; or
(B) any person owned or controlled by Iran's Revolutionary
Guard Corps.
(4) Own or control.--The term ``own or control'' means,
with respect to an entity--
(A) to hold more than 25 percent of the equity interest by
vote or value in the entity;
(B) to hold any seats on the board of directors of the
entity; or
(C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or
personnel decisions of the entity.
(5) Person.--The term ``person'' means an individual or
entity.
(6) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence to the United States; or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States
or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a
foreign branch of such an entity.
TITLE I--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ENTITIES OWNED BY IRAN'S
REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS
SEC. 101. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE IRGC.
(a) Amendments.--Subtitle A of title III of the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8741
et seq.) is amended--
(1) by redesignating section 304 as section 306; and
(2) by inserting after section 303 the following new
sections:
``SEC. 304. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN'S
REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS, ANY OFFICIAL, AGENT,
OR AFFILIATE OF IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD
CORPS, AND ANY PERSON OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY
IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS.
``(a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date
of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and
as appropriate thereafter, the President shall impose the
sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to Iran's
Revolutionary Guard Corps, any official, agent, or affiliate
of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, and any person owned or
controlled by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.
``(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are the following:
``(1) Sanctions applicable with respect to an organization
that is designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign
terrorist organization pursuant to section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).
``(2) Sanctions applicable with respect to a foreign person
pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (September 23, 2001;
relating to blocking property and prohibiting transactions
with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support
terrorism).
``SEC. 305. DEFINITIONS.
``In this title:
``(1) Entity.--The term `entity' means any corporation,
business association, partnership, trust, society, or any
other entity.
``(2) Foreign person.--The term `foreign person' means a
person that is not a United States person.
``(3) Person.--The term `person' means an individual or
entity.
``(4) United states person.--The term `United States
person' means--
``(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence to the United States; or
``(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United
States or of any jurisdiction within the United States,
including a foreign branch of such an entity.
``(5) Own or control.--The term `own or control' means,
with respect to an entity--
``(A) to hold more than 25 percent of the equity interest
by vote or value in the entity;
``(B) to hold any seats on the board of directors of the
entity; or
``(C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or
personnel decisions of the entity.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is
amended by striking the item relating to section 304 and
inserting the following:
``Sec. 304. Imposition of sanctions with respect Iran's Revolutionary
Guard Corps, any official, agent, or affiliate of Iran's
Revolutionary Guard Corps, and any person owned or
controlled by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.
``Sec. 305. Definitions.
``Sec. 306. Rule of construction.''.
SEC. 102. ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN
PERSONS THAT SUPPORT OR CONDUCT CERTAIN
TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD
CORPS OR OTHER SANCTIONED PERSONS.
(a) Identification.--Section 302(a)(1) of the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C.
8742(a)(1)) is amended--
(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking
``Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and every 180 days thereafter,'' and inserting
``Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of
the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and every 60 days
thereafter,'';
(2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``, provide
significant financial services to, or provide material
support to'' after ``transactions with'';
(3) in subparagraph (C)--
(A) in the matter preceding clause (i), by inserting ``,
provide significant financial services to, or provide
material support to'' after ``transactions with'';
(B) in clause (i), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(C) in clause (ii), by striking the period at the end and
inserting a semicolon; and
(D) by inserting after clause (i) the following:
``(iii) a person designated as a foreign terrorist
organization under section 219(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)) or that has provided
support for an act of international terrorism (as defined in
section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-
172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note)); or
``(iv) a foreign person whose property and access to
property has been blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13224
(September 23, 2001; relating to blocking property and
prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to
commit, or support terrorism).''.
(b) Imposition of Sanctions.--Section 302(b) of the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22
U.S.C. 8742(b)) is amended by striking ``the President--''
and all that follows and inserting ``the President shall, in
accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all
transactions in property and interests in property with
respect to such foreign person if such property and interests
in property are in the United States, come within the United
States, or are or come within the possession or control of a
United States person.''.
(c) Waiver of Imposition of Sanctions.--Section 302(d) of
the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012
(22 U.S.C. 8742(d)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``for a period of not
more than 60 days, and may renew that waiver for additional
periods of not more than 60 days,'' after ``may waive''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(3) Sunset.--The provisions of this subsection and any
waivers issued pursuant to this subsection shall terminate on
December 31, 2018.''.
(d) Waiver of Identifications and Designations.--Section
302(e) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights
Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8742(e)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Notwithstanding'' and inserting the
following:
``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding'';
(2) in paragraph (1) (as so designated), by striking ``and
subject to paragraph (2)'';
(3) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as
subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, and moving the
margins 2 ems to the right; and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Sunset.--The provisions of this subsection and any
waivers issued pursuant to this subsection shall terminate on
December 31, 2018.''.
(e) Application of Provisions of Iran Sanctions Act of
1996.--Section 302(f) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria
Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8742(f)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``The following provisions'' and inserting
the following:
``(1) In general.--The following provisions'';
(2) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (8) as
subparagraphs (A) through (H), respectively, and moving the
margins 2 ems to the right; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Sunset.--Sections 4(c) and 9(c) of the Iran Sanctions
Act of 1996 shall not apply with respect to the imposition
under subsection (b) of sanctions relating to activities
described in subsection (a)(1), in accordance with the
provision of paragraph (1) of this subsection, after December
31, 2018.''.
SEC. 103. IRGC WATCH LIST AND REPORT.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall
establish, maintain, and publish in the Federal Register a
list (to be known as the ``IRGC Watch List'') of--
(1) each entity in which the IRGC has an ownership interest
of less than 25 percent;
(2) each entity in which the IRGC does not have an
ownership interest if the IRGC maintains a presence on the
board of directors of the entity or otherwise influences the
[[Page H4941]]
actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity; and
(3) each person that owns or controls an entity described
in paragraph (1) or (2).
(b) Reports Required.--
(1) Treasury report.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to Congress a report
that includes--
(i) the list required by subsection (a) and, in the case of
any report submitted under this subparagraph after the first
such report, any changes to the list since the submission of
the preceding such report; and
(ii) an assessment of the role of the IRGC in, and its
penetration into, the economy of Iran.
(B) Form of report.--Each report required by subparagraph
(A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
a classified annex if necessary.
(2) Government accountability office report.--
(A) In general.--The Comptroller General of the United
States shall--
(i) conduct a review of the list required by subsection
(a); and
(ii) not later than 180 days after each report required by
paragraph (1) is submitted to Congress, submit to Congress a
report on the review conducted under clause (i).
(B) Consultations.--In preparing the report required by
subparagraph (A)(ii), the Comptroller General shall consult
with nongovernmental organizations.
SEC. 104. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST MAHAN AIR.
(a) In General.--The President shall impose the sanctions
described in subsection (b) with respect to--
(1) a person that provides, directly or indirectly, goods,
services, technology, or financial services, including the
sale or provision of aircraft or aircraft parts, fuel, ramp
assistance, baggage and cargo handling, catering, refueling,
ticketing, check-in services, crew handling, or other
services related to flight operations, to or for Mahan Air or
its agents or affiliates; or
(2) any person owned or controlled by, or any person that
owns or controls, a person described in paragraph (1).
(b) Sanctions Described.--
(1) Blocking of property.--The President shall block, in
accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), all transactions in all
property and interests in property of any person subject to
subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are
in the United States, come within the United States, or are
or come within the possession or control of a United States
person.
(2) Exclusion from united states.--The Secretary of State
shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security
shall exclude from the United States, any person subject to
subsection (a) that is an alien.
(c) Compliance With United Nations Headquarters
Agreement.--Subsection (b)(2) shall not apply to the head of
state of Iran, or necessary staff of that head of state, if
admission to the United States is necessary to permit the
United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the
Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success
June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947,
between the United Nations and the United States.
(d) Applicability of Additional Sanctions.--A person with
respect to which the President imposes sanctions under
subsection (a) shall be considered an agent or affiliate of
the IRGC for purposes of sections 104 and 104A of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513 and 8513b).
(e) Additional Measures.--
(1) In general.--The President shall require each covered
person to provide a certification to the President that the
person does not conduct transactions with any person that
provides, directly or indirectly, goods, services,
technology, or financial services, including the sale or
provision of aircraft or aircraft parts, fuel, ramp
assistance, baggage or cargo handling, catering, refueling,
ticketing, check-in services, crew handling, or other
services related to flight operations--
(A) to Mahan Air or its agents or affiliates;
(B) for aircraft owned or operated by Mahan Air or its
agents or affiliates; or
(C) to a person described in section 105(a).
(2) Covered person defined.--In this subsection, the term
``covered person'' means--
(A) an air carrier or foreign air carrier, as those terms
are defined in section 40102 of title 49, United States Code;
or
(B) a United States person that exports aircraft or
components for aircraft.
(f) Reports Required.--
(1) DNI list.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of the Act, and annually thereafter, the
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to Congress a list of
each person described in subsection (e).
(B) Form of list.--Each list required by subparagraph (A)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex if necessary.
(2) Report.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of the Act, and annually thereafter, the
President shall submit to Congress a report that includes--
(i) a list of countries where aircraft of Mahan Air or its
agents or affiliates land;
(ii) a description of the efforts of the President to
encourage countries to prohibit aircraft of Mahan Air or its
agents or affiliates from landing in the territory of those
countries; and
(iii) if the President has not imposed sanctions under
section 105(a) with respect to any person described in
subsection (e), an explanation for why the President has not
imposed such sanctions.
(B) Form of report.--Each report required by subparagraph
(A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
a classified annex if necessary.
(3) Government accountability office report.--
(A) In general.--The Comptroller General of the United
States shall--
(i) conduct a review of the certifications required by
subsection (a), the lists required by paragraph (1), and the
reports required by paragraph (2); and
(ii) not later than 180 days after the submission of each
list required by paragraph (1) and each report required by
paragraph (2), submit to Congress a report on the review
conducted under clause (i).
(B) Consultations.--In preparing the report required by
subparagraph (A)(ii), the Comptroller General shall consult
with nongovernmental organizations.
SEC. 105. MODIFICATION AND EXTENSION OF REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN IRANIAN
SEAPORTS BY FOREIGN VESSELS AND USE OF FOREIGN
AIRPORTS BY SANCTIONED IRANIAN AIR CARRIERS.
(a) In General.--Section 1252(a) of the Iran Freedom and
Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8808(a)) is
amended--
(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking
``2016'' and inserting ``2019'';
(2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(3) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
``(3) a description of all efforts the Department of State
has made to encourage other countries to prohibit the use of
air space and airports by Iranian air carriers described in
paragraph (2) during the period specified in subsection
(b).''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a)
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and
apply with respect to reports required to be submitted under
section 1252(a) of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation
Act of 2012 on or after such date of enactment.
TITLE II--IRAN BALLISTIC MISSILE SANCTIONS
SEC. 201. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO EFFORTS BY
IRAN TO ACQUIRE BALLISTIC MISSILE AND RELATED
TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Certain Persons.--Section 1604(a) of the Iran-Iraq Arms
Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-484; 50 U.S.C.
1701 note) is amended by inserting ``, to acquire ballistic
missile or related technology,'' after ``nuclear weapons''.
(b) Foreign Countries.--Section 1605(a) of the Iran-Iraq
Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-484; 50
U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended, in the matter preceding
paragraph (1), by inserting ``, to acquire ballistic missile
or related technology,'' after ``nuclear weapons''.
SEC. 202. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS UNDER IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF
1996 WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS THAT ACQUIRE OR
DEVELOP BALLISTIC MISSILES.
Section 5(b)(1)(B) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
(Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) in clause (i), by striking ``would likely'' and
inserting ``may''; and
(2) in clause (ii)--
(A) in subclause (I), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(B) by redesignating subclause (II) as subclause (III); and
(C) by inserting after subclause (I) the following:
``(II) acquire or develop ballistic missiles and the
capability to launch ballistic missiles; or''.
SEC. 203. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC
MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN.
(a) In General.--Title II of the Iran Threat Reduction and
Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8721 et seq.) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``Subtitle C--Measures Relating to Ballistic Missile Program of Iran
``SEC. 231. DEFINITIONS.
``(a) In General.--In this subtitle:
``(1) Agricultural commodity.--The term `agricultural
commodity' has the meaning given that term in section 102 of
the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).
``(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
`appropriate congressional committees' means the committees
specified in section 14(2) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
(Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
``(3) Correspondent account; payable-through account.--The
terms `correspondent account' and `payable-through account'
have the meanings given those terms in section 5318A of title
31, United States Code.
``(4) Foreign financial institution.--The term `foreign
financial institution' has the meaning of that term as
determined by the
[[Page H4942]]
Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to section 104(i) of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(i)).
``(5) Government.--The term `Government', with respect to a
foreign country, includes any agencies or instrumentalities
of that Government and any entities controlled by that
Government.
``(6) Medical device.--The term `medical device' has the
meaning given the term `device' in section 201 of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
``(7) Medicine.--The term `medicine' has the meaning given
the term `drug' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
``(b) Determinations of Significance.--For purposes of this
subtitle, in determining if financial transactions or
financial services are significant, the President may
consider the totality of the facts and circumstances,
including factors similar to the factors set forth in section
561.404 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any
corresponding similar regulation or ruling).
``SEC. 232. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS
THAT SUPPORT THE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF
IRAN.
``(a) Identification of Persons.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date
of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and
not less frequently than once every 180 days thereafter, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report identifying persons that have provided
material support to the Government of Iran in the development
of the ballistic missile program of Iran.
``(2) Elements.--Each report required by paragraph (1)
shall include the following:
``(A) An identification of persons (disaggregated by
Iranian and non-Iranian persons) with respect to which there
is credible evidence that such persons have provided material
support to the Government of Iran in the development of the
ballistic missile program of Iran, including persons that
have--
``(i) engaged in the direct or indirect provision of
material support to such program;
``(ii) facilitated, supported, or engaged in activities to
further the development of such program;
``(iii) transmitted information relating to ballistic
missiles to the Government of Iran; or
``(iv) otherwise aided such program.
``(B) A description of the character and significance of
the cooperation of each person identified under subparagraph
(A) with the Government of Iran with respect to such program.
``(C) An assessment of the cooperation of the Government of
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the Government
of Iran with respect to such program.
``(3) Classified annex.--Each report required by paragraph
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain
a classified annex.
``(b) Blocking of Property.--Not later than 15 days after
submitting a report required by subsection (a)(1), the
President shall, in accordance with the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block
and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests
in property of any person specified in such report that
engages in activities described in subsection (a) if such
property and interests in property are in the United States,
come within the United States, or are or come within the
possession or control of a United States person.
``(c) Exclusion From United States .--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the
Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any
alien subject to blocking of property and interests in
property under subsection (b).
``(2) Compliance with united nations headquarters
agreement.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the head of
state of Iran, or necessary staff of that head of state, if
admission to the United States is necessary to permit the
United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the
Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success
June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947,
between the United Nations and the United States.
``(d) Facilitation of Certain Transactions.--The President
shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict
conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a
correspondent account or a payable-through account by a
foreign financial institution that the President determines
knowingly, on or after the date that is 180 days after the
date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016,
conducts or facilitates a significant financial transaction
for a person subject to blocking of property and interests in
property under subsection (b).
``SEC. 233. BLOCKING OF PROPERTY OF PERSONS AFFILIATED WITH
CERTAIN IRANIAN ENTITIES.
``(a) Blocking of Property.--
``(1) In general.--The President shall, in accordance with
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all
property and interests in property of any person described in
paragraph (2) if such property and interests in property are
in the United States, come within the United States, or are
or come within the possession or control of a United States
person.
``(2) Persons described.--A person described in this
paragraph is--
``(A) an entity that is owned or controlled--
``(i) by the Aerospace Industries Organization, the Shahid
Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group,
or any agent or affiliate of such organization or group; or
``(ii) collectively by a group of individuals that hold an
interest in the Aerospace Industries Organization, the Shahid
Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group,
or any agent or affiliate of such organization or group, even
if none of those individuals hold a 25 percent or greater
interest in the entity; or
``(B) a person that owns or controls an entity described in
subparagraph (A).
``(b) Facilitation of Certain Transactions.--The President
shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict
conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a
correspondent account or a payable-through account by a
foreign financial institution that the President determines
knowingly, on or after the date that is 180 days after the
date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016,
conducts or facilitates a significant financial transaction
for a person subject to blocking of property and interests in
property under subsection (a).
``(c) Iran Missile Proliferation Watch List.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and not
less frequently than annually thereafter, the Secretary of
the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees and publish in the Federal Register a list of--
``(A) each entity in which the Aerospace Industries
Organization, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid
Bakeri Industrial Group, or any agent or affiliate of such
organization or group has an ownership interest of more than
0 percent and less than 25 percent;
``(B) each entity in which the Aerospace Industries
Organization, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid
Bakeri Industrial Group, or any agent or affiliate of such
organization or group does not have an ownership interest but
maintains a presence on the board of directors of the entity
or otherwise influences the actions, policies, or personnel
decisions of the entity; and
``(C) each person that owns or controls an entity described
in subparagraph (A) or (B).
``(2) Reference.--The list required by paragraph (1) may be
referred to as the `Iran Missile Proliferation Watch List'.
``(d) Comptroller General Report.--
``(1) In general.--The Comptroller General of the United
States shall--
``(A) conduct a review of each list required by subsection
(c)(1); and
``(B) not later than 180 days after each such list is
submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under
that subsection, submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the review conducted under
subparagraph (A) that includes a list of persons not included
in that list that qualify for inclusion in that list, as
determined by the Comptroller General.
``(2) Consultations.--In preparing the report required by
paragraph (1)(B), the Comptroller General shall consult with
nongovernmental organizations.
``SEC. 234. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN
PERSONS INVOLVED IN BALLISTIC MISSILE
ACTIVITIES.
``(a) Certification.--Not later than 120 days after the
date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016,
and not less frequently than once every 180 days thereafter,
the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a certification that each person listed in an
annex of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), or 1929 (2010) is not directly or
indirectly facilitating, supporting, or involved with the
development of or transfer to Iran of ballistic missiles or
technology, parts, components, or technology information
relating to ballistic missiles.
``(b) Blocking of Property.--If the President is unable to
make a certification under subsection (a) with respect to a
person and the person is not currently subject to sanctions
with respect to Iran under any other provision of law, the
President shall, not later than 15 days after that
certification would have been required under that
subsection--
``(1) in accordance with the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and
prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in
property of that person if such property and interests in
property are in the United States, come within the United
States, or are or come within the possession or control of a
United States person; and
``(2) publish in the Federal Register a report describing
the reason why the President was unable to make a
certification with respect to that person.
``(c) Exclusion From United States .--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the
Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any
alien subject to blocking of property and interests in
property under subsection (b).
``(2) Compliance with united nations headquarters
agreement.--Paragraph (1)
[[Page H4943]]
shall not apply to the head of state of Iran, or necessary
staff of that head of state, if admission to the United
States is necessary to permit the United States to comply
with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United
Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered
into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and
the United States.
``(d) Facilitation of Certain Transactions.--The President
shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict
conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a
correspondent account or a payable-through account by a
foreign financial institution that the President determines
knowingly, on or after the date that is 180 days after the
date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016,
conducts or facilitates a significant financial transaction
for a person subject to blocking of property and interests in
property under subsection (b).
``SEC. 235. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN
SECTORS OF IRAN THAT SUPPORT THE BALLISTIC
MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN.
``(a) List of Sectors.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date
of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and
not less frequently than once every 180 days thereafter, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees and publish in the Federal Register a list of the
sectors of the economy of Iran that are directly or
indirectly facilitating, supporting, or involved with the
development of or transfer to Iran of ballistic missiles or
technology, parts, components, or technology information
relating to ballistic missiles.
``(2) Certain sectors.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date
of enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a determination as to whether each of the
chemical, computer science, construction, electronic,
metallurgy, mining, research (including universities and
research institutions), and telecommunications sectors of
Iran meet the criteria specified in paragraph (1).
``(B) Inclusion in initial list.--If the President
determines under subparagraph (A) that the sectors of the
economy of Iran specified in such subparagraph meet the
criteria specified in paragraph (1), that sector shall be
included in the initial list submitted and published under
that paragraph.
``(b) Sanctions With Respect to Specified Sectors of
Iran.--
``(1) Blocking of property.--The President shall, in
accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all
transactions in all property and interests in property of any
person described in paragraph (4) if such property and
interests in property are in the United States, come within
the United States, or are or come within the possession or
control of a United States person.
``(2) Exclusion from united states.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United
States, any alien that is a person described in paragraph
(4).
``(B) Compliance with united nations headquarters
agreement.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the head of
state of Iran, or necessary staff of that head of state, if
admission to the United States is necessary to permit the
United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the
Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success
June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947,
between the United Nations and the United States.
``(3) Facilitation of certain transactions.--Except as
provided in this section, the President shall prohibit the
opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the
maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account
or a payable-through account by a foreign financial
institution that the President determines knowingly, on or
after the date that is 180 days after the date of the
enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, conducts or
facilitates a significant financial transaction for a person
described in paragraph (4).
``(4) Persons described.--A person is described in this
paragraph if the President determines that the person, on or
after the date that is 180 days after the date of the
enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016--
``(A) operates in a sector of the economy of Iran included
in the most recent list published by the President under
subsection (a);
``(B) knowingly provides significant financial, material,
technological, or other support to, or goods or services in
support of, any activity or transaction on behalf of or for
the benefit of a person described in subparagraph (A); or
``(C) is owned or controlled by a person described in
subparagraph (A).
``(c) Humanitarian Exception.--The President may not impose
sanctions under this section with respect to any person for
conducting or facilitating a transaction for the sale of
agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices
to Iran or for the provision of humanitarian assistance to
the people of Iran.
``SEC. 236. IDENTIFICATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS THAT SUPPORT
THE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN IN
CERTAIN SECTORS OF IRAN.
``(a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date
of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and
not less frequently than annually thereafter, the President
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and
publish in the Federal Register a list of all foreign persons
that have, based on credible information, directly or
indirectly facilitated, supported, or been involved with the
development of ballistic missiles or technology, parts,
components, or technology information related to ballistic
missiles in the following sectors of the economy of Iran
during the period specified in subsection (b):
``(1) Chemical.
``(2) Computer Science.
``(3) Construction.
``(4) Electronic.
``(5) Metallurgy.
``(6) Mining.
``(7) Petrochemical.
``(8) Research (including universities and research
institutions).
``(9) Telecommunications.
``(10) Any other sector of the economy of Iran identified
under section 235(a).
``(b) Period Specified.--The period specified in this
subsection is--
``(1) with respect to the first list submitted under
subsection (a), the period beginning on the date of the
enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016 and ending
on the date that is 120 days after such date of enactment;
and
``(2) with respect to each subsequent list submitted under
such subsection, the one year period preceding the submission
of the list.
``(c) Comptroller General Report.--
``(1) In general.--With respect to each list submitted
under subsection (a), not later than 120 days after the list
is submitted under that subsection, the Comptroller General
of the United States shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees--
``(A) an assessment of the processes followed by the
President in preparing the list;
``(B) an assessment of the foreign persons included in the
list; and
``(C) a list of persons not included in the list that
qualify for inclusion in the list, as determined by the
Comptroller General.
``(2) Consultations.--In preparing the report required by
paragraph (1), the Comptroller General shall consult with
nongovernmental organizations.
``(d) Credible Information Defined.--In this section, the
term `credible information' has the meaning given that term
in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law
104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
``Subtitle D--General Provisions
``SEC. 241. DEFINITIONS.
``In this title:
``(1) Entity.--The term `entity' means any corporation,
business association, partnership, trust, society, or any
other entity.
``(2) Foreign person.--The term `foreign person' means a
person that is not a United States person.
``(3) Own or control.--The term `own or control' means,
with respect to an entity--
``(A) to hold more than 25 percent of the equity interest
by vote or value in the entity;
``(B) to hold any seats on the board of directors of the
entity; or
``(C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or
personnel decisions of the entity.
``(4) Person.--The term `person' means an individual or
entity.
``(5) United states person.--The term `United States
person' means--
``(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence to the United States; or
``(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United
States or of any jurisdiction within the United States,
including a foreign branch of such an entity.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 224
the following:
``Subtitle C--Measures Relating to Ballistic Missile Program of Iran
``Sec. 231. Definitions.
``Sec. 232. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons that
support the ballistic missile program of Iran.
``Sec. 233. Blocking of property of persons affiliated with certain
Iranian entities.
``Sec. 234. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain persons
involved in ballistic missile activities.
``Sec. 235. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain sectors of
Iran that support the ballistic missile program of Iran.
``Sec. 236. Identification of foreign persons that support the
ballistic missile program of Iran in certain sectors of
Iran.
``Subtitle D--General Provisions
``Sec. 241. Definitions.''.
SEC. 204. EXPANSION OF MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN
TRANSACTIONS RELATING TO BALLISTIC MISSILE
CAPABILITIES OF IRAN.
Section 104 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513)
is amended--
[[Page H4944]]
(1) in subsection (c)(2)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)--
(i) in clause (i), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(ii) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii); and
(iii) by inserting after clause (i) the following:
``(ii) to acquire or develop ballistic missiles and
capabilities and launch technology relating to ballistic
missiles; or''; and
(B) in subparagraph (E)(ii)--
(i) in subclause (I), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(ii) by redesignating subclause (II) as subclause (III);
and
(iii) by inserting after subclause (I) the following:
``(II) Iran's development of ballistic missiles and
capabilities and launch technology relating to ballistic
missiles; or''; and
(2) in subsection (f)--
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as
subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, and moving those
subparagraphs, as so redesignated, two ems to the right;
(B) by striking ``Waiver.--The'' and inserting ``Waiver.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2),
the''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Exception.--The Secretary of the Treasury may not
waive under paragraph (1) the application of a prohibition or
condition imposed with respect to an activity described in
subparagraph (A)(ii) or (E)(ii)(II) of subsection (c)(2).''.
SEC. 205. DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION OF ACTIVITIES WITH CERTAIN SECTORS
OF IRAN THAT SUPPORT THE BALLISTIC MISSILE
PROGRAM OF IRAN.
(a) In General.--Section 13(r)(1) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(r)(1)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``; or'' and inserting
a semicolon;
(2) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E);
and
(3) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following:
``(D) knowingly engaged in any activity for which sanctions
may be imposed under section 235 of the Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012;''.
(b) Investigations.--Section 13(r)(5)(A) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 is amended by striking ``an Executive
order specified in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(D)''
and inserting ``section 235 of the Iran Threat Reduction and
Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, an Executive order specified
in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(E)''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 13(r)(5) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended, in the matter
preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``subparagraph
(D)(iii)'' and inserting ``subparagraph (E)(iii)''.
(d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall take effect with respect to reports required to be
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission after the
date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
SEC. 206. REGULATIONS.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the President shall prescribe regulations to carry
out this title and the amendments made by this title.
TITLE III--SANCTIONS RELATING TO IRAN'S SUPPORT OF TERRORISM
SEC. 301. SPECIAL MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO IRAN RELATING TO
ITS DESIGNATION AS A JURISDICTION OF PRIMARY
MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERN.
(a) Prohibition on Direct Use of Correspondent Accounts.--A
covered financial institution shall terminate any
correspondent account that--
(1) is established, maintained, administered, or managed in
the United States for, or on behalf of, an Iranian banking
institution; and
(2) is not blocked under any Executive Order issued
pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
(b) Special Due Diligence Measures for Correspondent
Accounts.--
(1) In general.--A covered financial institution shall
apply special due diligence measures to correspondent
accounts of the financial institution that are reasonably
designed to guard against the improper indirect use of such
accounts by Iranian banking institutions.
(2) Requirements.--The special due diligence measures a
covered financial institution is required to apply to
correspondent accounts under paragraph (1) shall include, at
a minimum--
(A) notifying the holders of such accounts that the covered
financial institution knows or has reason to know provide
services to Iranian banking institutions, that such holders
generally may not provide Iranian banking institutions with
access to such accounts; and
(B) taking reasonable steps to identify any indirect use of
such accounts by Iranian banking institutions, to the extent
that such indirect use can be determined from transactional
records maintained by the covered financial institution in
the normal course of business.
(3) Risk-based approach.--A covered financial institution
shall take a risk-based approach when deciding what, if any,
other due diligence measures the financial institution should
adopt to guard against the improper indirect use of its
correspondent accounts by Iranian banking institutions.
(4) Response to indirect access by iranian banking
institutions.--A covered financial institution that obtains
credible information that a correspondent account is being
used by a foreign bank to provide indirect access to an
Iranian banking institution, shall--
(A) take all appropriate steps to prevent such indirect
access, including notifying the holder of the account under
paragraph (1)(A); and
(B) where necessary, terminate the account.
(c) Recordkeeping and Reporting.--
(1) In general.--A covered financial institution shall
document its compliance with the notice requirement set forth
in subsection (b)(2)(A).
(2) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this section shall
require a covered financial institution to report any
information not otherwise required to be reported by law or
regulation.
(d) Termination.--This section shall terminate on the date
that is 30 days after the date on which the President submits
to Congress--
(1) the certification described in section 401(a) of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)); and
(2) a certification that the Financial Action Task Force
has lifted its call for countermeasures against Iran and Iran
has become a member of a regional body of the Financial
Action Task Force.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Correspondent account.--The term ``correspondent
account'' has the meaning given that term in section 1010.605
of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the
day before the date of the enactment of this Act).
(2) Covered financial institution.--The term ``covered
financial institution'' has the meaning given that term under
paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 1010.605(e) of title 31,
Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the day before
the date of the enactment of this Act).
(3) Foreign bank.--The term ``foreign bank'' has the
meaning given that term in section 1010.100(u) of title 31,
Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the day before
the date of the enactment of this Act).
(4) Iranian banking institution.--The term ``Iranian
banking institution'' means--
(A) any foreign bank chartered by Iran, including--
(i) any branches, offices, or subsidiaries of such a bank
operating in any jurisdiction; and
(ii) any branch or office within Iran of any foreign bank
licensed by Iran;
(B) the Central Bank of Iran; and
(C) any foreign bank of which more than 50 percent of the
voting stock or analogous interest is owned by two or more
foreign banks chartered by Iran.
TITLE IV--SANCTIONS RELATING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRAN
SEC. 401. EXPANSION OF LIST OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRAN.
(a) In General.--Section 105 of the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22
U.S.C. 8514) is amended--
(1) in the section heading, by striking ``certain persons
who are responsible for or complicit'' and inserting
``persons involved'';
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Who Are
Responsible for or Complicit'' and inserting ``Involved'';
(B) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following:
``(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a list of persons the President determines have
committed or facilitated, directly or indirectly, human
rights abuses or other acts of violence, intimidation, or
harassment, on behalf of the Government of Iran on or after
June 12, 2009, regardless of whether such abuses or acts
occurred in Iran.''; and
(C) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking ``this Act'' and
inserting ``the Iran Accountability Act of 2016''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(e) Inclusion of Actions That Violate Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.--For purposes of subsection
(b)(1), the term `human rights abuses' includes actions that
violate the rights listed in the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted at Paris December 10,
1948.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 is amended by striking the item relating to
section 105 and inserting the following:
``Sec. 105. Imposition of sanctions on persons involved in human rights
abuses committed against citizens of Iran or their family
members after the June 12, 2009, elections in Iran.''.
SEC. 402. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH
RESPECT TO, CERTAIN IRANIAN INDIVIDUALS.
(a) In General.--Section 221 of the Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8727) is
amended to read as follows:
[[Page H4945]]
``SEC. 221. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS
WITH RESPECT TO, CERTAIN IRANIAN INDIVIDUALS.
``(a) Identification of Individuals.--Not later than 90
days after the date of the enactment of the Iran
Accountability Act of 2016, and every 180 days thereafter,
the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees and publish in the Federal Register a list of all
individuals the President determines are described in
subsection (b).
``(b) Individuals Described.--An individual described in
this subsection is--
``(1) the Supreme Leader of Iran;
``(2) the President of Iran;
``(3) a current or former key official, manager, or
director of an entity that is owned or controlled after
November 14, 1979, by--
``(A) the Supreme Leader of Iran;
``(B) the Office of the Supreme Leader of Iran;
``(C) the President of Iran;
``(D) the Office of the President of Iran;
``(E) Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps;
``(F) the Basij-e Motaz'afin;
``(G) the Guardian Council;
``(H) the Ministry of Intelligence and Security of Iran;
``(I) the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran;
``(J) the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran;
``(K) the Assembly of Experts of Iran;
``(L) the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of
Iran;
``(M) the Ministry of Justice of Iran;
``(N) the Ministry of Interior of Iran;
``(O) the prison system of Iran;
``(P) the judicial system of Iran, including the Islamic
Revolutionary Courts; or
``(Q) any citizen of Iran included on the list of specially
designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the
Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the
Treasury;
``(4) a citizen of Iran indicted in a foreign country for,
or otherwise suspected of, participation in a terrorist
attack;
``(5) a person that ordered, controlled, directed, or was
otherwise complicit in the kidnaping or politically motivated
detention of a United States citizen, including a United
States citizen who is also a citizen of another country; or
``(6) a significant foreign political figure associated
with an individual described in any of paragraphs (1) through
(5) who is not a United States person.
``(c) Exclusion From United States.--Except as provided in
subsection (f), the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to,
and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the
United States, any alien who is on the list required by
subsection (a).
``(d) Blocking of Property.--Except as provided in
subsection (f), the President shall, in accordance with the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property
and interests in property of any individual who is on the
list required by subsection (a) if such property and
interests in property are in the United States, come within
the United States, or are or come within the possession or
control of a United States person.
``(e) Report.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and
every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report that describes
the efforts the President has taken during the 90 days
preceding the submission of the report to locate and block
all property and interests in property of any individual who
is on the list required by subsection (a).
``(2) Form of report.--Each report required by paragraph
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
a classified annex if necessary.
``(f) Exceptions.--
``(1) In general.--The President may not include an
individual on the list required by subsection (a) if the
President determines that, during the 10-year period
preceding the determination, the individual has not in any
way engaged in, facilitated, or otherwise supported--
``(A) human rights abuses;
``(B) acts of international terrorism; or
``(C) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
``(2) Compliance with united nations headquarters
agreement.--Subsection (c) shall not apply to the head of
state of Iran, or necessary staff of that head of state, if
admission to the United States is necessary to permit the
United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the
Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success
June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947,
between the United Nations and the United States.
``(g) Waiver.--
``(1) In general.--The President may waive the application
of subsection (c) or (d) with respect to an individual for a
period of 180 days, and may renew that waiver for additional
periods of 180 days, if the President--
``(A) determines that the waiver is vital to the national
security of the United States; and
``(B) not less than 7 days before the waiver or the renewal
of the waiver, as the case may be, takes effect, submits a
report to the appropriate congressional committees on the
waiver and the reason for the waiver.
``(2) Form of report.--Each report submitted under
paragraph (1)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex if necessary.
``(3) Sunset.--The provisions of this subsection and any
waivers issued pursuant to this subsection shall terminate on
December 31, 2018.
``(h) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Own or control.--The term `own or control' means,
with respect to an entity--
``(A) to hold more than 25 percent of the equity interest
by vote or value in the entity;
``(B) to hold any seats on the board of directors of the
entity; or
``(C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or
personnel decisions of the entity.
``(2) Significant foreign political figure.--
``(A) In general.--The term `significant foreign political
figure' includes a current or former senior political figure,
the immediate family of such a figure, and close associates
of such a figure.
``(B) Additional definitions.--For purposes of subparagraph
(A):
``(i) Close associate.--The term `close associate', with
respect to a senior political figure--
``(I) means an individual who is widely and publicly known
to maintain an unusually close relationship with the senior
political figure; and
``(II) includes an individual who is in a position to
conduct substantial domestic and international financial
transactions on behalf of the senior political figure.
``(ii) Immediate family.--The term `immediate family', with
respect to a senior foreign political figure, means the
parents, siblings, spouse, children, and in-laws of the
senior political figure.
``(iii) Senior political figure.--The term `senior
political figure' means a senior official in the executive,
legislative, administrative, military, or judicial branches
of the Government of Iran (whether elected or not), a senior
official of a major political party in Iran, or a senior
executive of an entity owned or controlled by the Government
of Iran.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22
U.S.C. 8701 et seq.) is amended by striking the item relating
to section 221 and inserting the following:
``Sec. 221. Identification of, and imposition of sanctions with respect
to, certain Iranian individuals.''.
SEC. 403. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS WHO
CONDUCT TRANSACTIONS WITH OR ON BEHALF OF
CERTAIN IRANIAN INDIVIDUALS.
(a) In General.--Subtitle B of title II of the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8721
et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 221 the
following:
``SEC. 221A. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS
WHO CONDUCT TRANSACTIONS WITH OR ON BEHALF OF
CERTAIN IRANIAN INDIVIDUALS.
``(a) Sale, Supply, or Transfer of Goods and Services.--The
President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described
in section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law
104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) with respect to a person that
knowingly, on or after the date that is 120 days after the
date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016,
sells, supplies, or transfers goods or services to an
individual who is on the list required by section 221(a).
``(b) Facilitation of Certain Transactions.--The President
shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict
conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a
correspondent account or a payable-through account by any
foreign financial institution that has knowingly conducted or
facilitated a significant financial transaction on behalf of
an individual who is on the list required by section 221(a).
``(c) Application of Certain Provisions of the Iran
Sanctions Act of 1996.--The following provisions of the Iran
Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701
note) shall apply with respect to the imposition of sanctions
under subsection (a) to the same extent that such provisions
apply with respect to the imposition of sanctions under
section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996:
``(1) Subsections (c), (d), and (f) of section 5.
``(2) Section 8.
``(3) Section 11.
``(4) Section 12.
``(5) Section 13(b).
``(d) Definitions.--In this Act:
``(1) Account; correspondent account; payable-through
account.--The terms `account', `correspondent account', and
`payable-through account' have the meanings given those terms
in section 5318A of title 31, United States Code.
``(2) Foreign financial institution.--The term `foreign
financial institution' has the meaning given that term in
section 561.308 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or
any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22
U.S.C. 8701 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 221 the following:
``Sec. 221A. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons who
conduct transactions with or on behalf of certain Iranian
individuals.''.
[[Page H4946]]
SEC. 404. MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN
TRANSACTIONS ON BEHALF OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OR THAT EXPORT SENSITIVE
TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN.
(a) In General.--Section 104(c)(2) of the Comprehensive
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
(22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in subparagraph (E), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(F) facilitates a significant transaction or transactions
or provides significant financial services for a person that
is subject to sanctions under section 105(c), 105A(c),
105B(c), or 105C(a);''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a)
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and
apply with respect to any activity described in subparagraph
(F) of section 104(c)(2) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as added by
subsection (a)(3), initiated on or after the date that is 90
days after such date of enactment.
(c) Regulations.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury
shall prescribe regulations to carry out the amendments made
by subsection (a).
SEC. 405. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR THE PEOPLE OF IRAN.
(a) In General.--Subtitle B of title IV of the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8751
et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 416. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR THE PEOPLE OF IRAN.
``(a) Policy of the United States.--It is the policy of the
United States--
``(1) to support the efforts of the people of Iran to
promote the establishment of basic freedoms in Iran;
``(2) to lay the foundation for the emergence of a freely
elected, open, and democratic political system in Iran that
is not a threat to its neighbors or to the United States and
to work with all citizens of Iran who seek to establish such
a political system;
``(3) to support the emergence of a government in Iran that
does not oppress the people of Iran and does not persecute,
intimidate, arrest, imprison, or execute dissidents or
minorities;
``(4) to advocate on behalf of those in Iran persecuted for
their religion or belief;
``(5) to assist the people of Iran to produce, access, and
share information freely and safely through the Internet and
other media; and
``(6) to defeat all attempts by the Government of Iran to
jam or otherwise obstruct international satellite broadcast
signals.
``(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress
that--
``(1) the United States should support citizens of Iran
that actively work to advance political, economic, and social
reforms, including freedom of the press, freedom of assembly,
freedom of religion, and representative government;
``(2) the President should use all available nonviolent
means to support citizens of Iran that advocate for
pluralistic, prosperous, and participatory societies;
``(3) programs of the Department of State to support reform
in Iran have not resulted in a more democratic Iran;
``(4) the Government of Iran continues to play a pernicious
role in the Middle East, undermining democratic consolidation
in Iraq, supporting international terrorism through
Hezbollah, and aiding the autocratic regime of Bashar al-
Assad in Syria;
``(5) the Secretary of State should make every effort to
deliver support directly to people working in Iran to
implement programs carried out using assistance provided by
the Department of State when possible and all possible means
of delivering such assistance should be used; and
``(6) oversight, management, and implementation of programs
of the Department of State to support reform in Iran should
be under the direction of the Special Coordinator on Human
Rights and Democracy in Iran established under section 406 of
the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, in consultation with the
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor.
``(c) Assistance To Support Reform in Iran.--
``(1) Assistance authorized.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the Secretary of State may provide
assistance (including through the award of grants) to
individuals and entities working in Iran for the purpose of
supporting and promoting the rule of law, good governance,
civil society, and economic opportunity in Iran.
``(2) Eligibility for assistance.--Assistance authorized
under this subsection should be provided only to a person
that--
``(A) officially opposes the use of violence and terrorism
and has not been designated as a foreign terrorist
organization under section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) at any time during the 4-year
period ending on the date of the enactment of the Iran
Accountability Act of 2016;
``(B) advocates the adherence by Iran to nonproliferation
regimes for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
materiel, and ballistic missiles;
``(C) is dedicated to democratic values and supports the
adoption of a democratic form of government in Iran;
``(D) is dedicated to respect for human rights, including
the fundamental equality of women; and
``(E) supports freedom of the press, freedom of speech,
freedom of association, and freedom of religion.
``(3) Notification requirement.--Not later than 15 days
before each obligation of assistance under this subsection,
the Secretary of State shall notify the Committee on Foreign
Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives in accordance
with the procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications
under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2394-1).
``(4) Termination.--The authority to provide assistance
under this subsection shall expire on December 31, 2020.
``(d) Reports.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and
every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
on the implementation of this section that includes the
following:
``(A) An identification of the actions the President has
taken during the 180-day period immediately preceding the
submission of the report to advance each of the policies
described in subsection (a).
``(B) A clear strategy for advancing political, economic,
and social reform in Iran that includes benchmarks for
success that lead to a set of identified discrete goals and
objectives.
``(C) A plan to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of
the provision of assistance authorized under subsection (c),
including measures of effectiveness.
``(D) The status of the programming of assistance under
subsection (c).
``(E) An analysis of any past programming of assistance
under subsection (c) and its effectiveness with respect to
supporting and promoting the rule of law, good governance,
civil society, and economic opportunity in Iran.
``(2) Form of report.--Each report required by paragraph
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
a classified annex if necessary.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 415
the following:
``Sec. 416. United States support for the people of Iran.''.
SEC. 406. UNITED STATES SPECIAL COORDINATOR ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AND DEMOCRACY IN IRAN.
(a) Designation.--The President shall designate within the
Department of State a Special Coordinator on Human Rights and
Democracy in Iran (in this section referred to as the
``Special Coordinator'').
(b) Consultation and Qualifications.--Before the President
designates a Special Coordinator under subsection (a), the
Secretary of State shall consult with the chairmen and
ranking members of the appropriate congressional committees.
The role of Special Coordinator should be filled by an
official of the Department of State appointed by and serving
at the pleasure of the President in a position not lower than
Under Secretary on the day before the date of the enactment
of this Act.
(c) Duties.--The Special Coordinator shall carry out the
following duties:
(1) Coordinate the activities of the United States
Government that promote human rights, democracy, political
freedom, and religious freedom inside Iran.
(2) Coordinate the activities of the United States
Government that promote human rights, political freedom, and
religious freedom for Iranian refugees and asylees living
outside Iran.
(3) Ensure the comprehensive investigation and designation
of Iranian human rights abusers in accordance with section
105 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8514).
(4) Coordinate the documentation and publicizing of
political dissidents and cases of human rights abuse inside
Iran.
(5) Coordinate multilateral efforts to build international
support for the promotion of human rights, democracy,
political freedom, and religious freedom in Iran, including
broadcasting, Internet access, and dissemination of
information.
(6) Encourage the United Nations, multilateral
organizations, and human rights nongovernmental organizations
to more robustly investigate and report on human rights
abuses in Iran.
(7) Encourage foreign governments to downgrade or sever
diplomatic relations with the Government of Iran, enact
economic sanctions, and assist Iranian dissidents in response
to the continued violations of human rights by the Government
of Iran.
(8) Encourage foreign governments to expel Iran from
international fora and organizations with a human rights
component, including the United Nations Commission on the
Status of Women, the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Children's
Fund, and the International Labour Organization.
(9) Coordinate all programs to promote human rights,
democracy, political freedom, and religious freedom inside
Iran.
[[Page H4947]]
(d) Authority.--
(1) Coordination of activities.--The Special Coordinator
shall coordinate all activities related to Iran carried out
by the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and the Bureau of
Population, Refugees and Migration of the Department of
State, the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious
Freedom, the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-
Semitism, the United States Commission on International
Religious Freedom, the National Endowment for Democracy, and
the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
(2) Coordination of use of funds.--The Special Coordinator
shall coordinate and oversee the obligation and expenditure
of funds related to human rights, democracy, Internet
freedom, and broadcasting activities in Iran, including funds
made available for such purposes to the Middle East
Partnership Initiative, the United States Commission on
International Religious Freedom, the Broader Middle East and
North Africa Initiative, the Human Rights and Democracy Fund,
and the Near Eastern Regional Democracy Fund.
(e) Diplomatic Representation.--Subject to the direction of
the President and the Secretary of State, the Special
Coordinator shall represent the United States in matters and
cases relevant to the promotion of human rights, democracy,
political freedom, and religious freedom in Iran in--
(1) contacts with foreign governments, intergovernmental
organizations, and specialized agencies of the United
Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe, and other international organizations of which the
United States is a member; and
(2) multilateral conferences and meetings relevant to the
promotion of human rights, democracy, political freedom, and
religious freedom in Iran.
(f) Consultations.--The Special Coordinator shall consult
with Congress, domestic and international nongovernmental
organizations, labor organizations, and multilateral
organizations and institutions as the Special Coordinator
considers appropriate to fulfill the purposes of this
section.
(g) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 407. BROADCASTING TO IRAN.
(a) In General.--Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the
Voice of America services broadcasting to Iran shall--
(1) provide news and information that is accessible,
credible, comprehensive, and accurate;
(2) emphasize investigative and analytical journalism
provided by Iranian or pro-Iranian media outlets; and
(3) strengthen civil society by promoting democratic
processes, respect for human rights, and freedom of the press
and expression.
(b) Programming Surge.--Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and
Voice of America programming to Iran shall--
(1) provide programming content 24 hours a day and 7 days a
week to target populations using all available and effective
distribution outlets, including at least 12 hours a day of
original television and video content, not including live
video streaming of breaking news;
(2) create mobile platforms with an embedded proxy to offer
the people of Iran the opportunity to securely listen to
programming;
(3) increase number of staffers based in the region to
allow for more direct contact with the people of Iran;
(4) expand the use, audience, and audience engagement of
mobile news and multimedia platforms by the Voice of America
and the Radio Farda service of Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, including through Internet-based social networking
platforms; and
(5) establish fellowships for Iranian journalists who have
fled the country to learn about free, competitive media and
be trained in surrogate reporting.
SEC. 408. REPORT ON UNITED STATES CITIZENS DETAINED BY IRAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on United States citizens, including dual
citizens, detained by Iran or groups supported by Iran that
includes--
(1) information regarding any officials of the Government
of Iran involved in any way in the detentions; and
(2) a summary of efforts the United States Government has
taken to secure the swift release of those United States
citizens, including United States citizens who are also
citizens of other countries.
(b) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex if necessary.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
has the meaning given that term in section 14 of the Iran
Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701
note).
SEC. 409. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN
PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United Nations has a significant role to play in
promoting and improving human rights in Iran;
(2) the United States should continue to support the work
of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran; and
(3) the egregious human rights violations in Iran warrant
country-specific attention and continued reporting by the
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, the Special Rapporteur on torture
and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary
executions, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression,
the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, and
the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes,
and consequences, of the United Nations.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. Royce)
and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel) each will control 30
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
General Leave
=========================== NOTE ===========================
July 14, 2016, on page H4947, the following appeared: Engel)
each will control 30 minutes. GENERAL LEAVE
The online version has been corrected to read: Engel) each will
control 30 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
California. GENERAL LEAVE
========================= END NOTE =========================
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to
include extraneous material on the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I rise in support of H.R. 5631, the Iran Accountability Act of 2016.
This week marks the first anniversary of President Obama's agreement
with Iran. I wish I could say that it has been a win, or the win that
the proponents had hoped for. But a sober assessment is that both the
short-term and long-term national security interests of the United
States have been deeply impacted here. We have suffered as a result of
this agreement.
Under the deal, the Obama administration promised that we would be in
a position to verify all of Iran's commitments under the agreement.
This just has not been the case. A year later, we have less public
information about Iran's nuclear activities than we did before the
pact.
International inspectors were to have full and unrestricted access to
any military or suspicious location in Iran. Now, it turns out that the
deal included an unprecedented arrangement that relies on Iran to
``self-inspect'' its Parchin military complex.
The administration insisted that a U.N. Security Council resolution
would continue to prohibit Iran's ballistic missile development. The
reality is that it has a loophole big enough for Iran to shoot an
intercontinental ballistic missile through, and Iran has shot through
that loophole. Some of those tested missiles that they have shot
through that loophole are marked ``Israel must be wiped off the
Earth.'' That is what is in writing in Farsi on the side of them. And
if anybody should not get the message, it is also written in Hebrew.
When the Obama administration was strong-arming its allies in the
other body to save its Iran deal, many promises were made. Central to
the White House story line was the President's claim that sanctions on
Iran for terrorism, sanctions for human rights, and sanctions on the
ballistic missiles, in their words, ``will continue to be fully
enforced.''
This, unfortunately, has not happened. Unfortunately, the
administration's words have not matched its actions. The administration
has meekly responded to Iran's provocative acts, thanks in part to the
weak U.N. Security Council language in which we watered down the
previous language on ballistic missiles. That was agreed to by the
administration. And just one, only one Iranian, one sole individual,
has been sanctioned for human rights abuses since negotiations began--
one.
Indeed, last month, a top Treasury official publicly proclaimed that
terrorism and missile sanctions would undermine the Iran agreement.
That is not what this committee was originally told before this
agreement was voted on. We were told exactly the opposite.
By now, every Member should know the pattern, and the pattern is
this. If
[[Page H4948]]
Iran objects, the administration bends over backwards to accommodate.
Effectively, the Supreme Leader now holds the veto pin over future
congressional action. This policy of what I call ``walking on egg
shells'' in deference to Tehran hurts our U.S. national security
interest.
And it doesn't have to be this way. The nuclear agreement permits
sanctions on the Iranian regime for activities such as missile tests,
terrorism, and human rights abuses. Indeed, that is what the
administration said they would do after they struck their deal. This
legislation before the House holds the administration to their promises
to us.
Among other provisions, this legislation increases sanctions against
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. That is what we call the
IRGC. It expands sanctions against Iran for its ballistic missile
development, and we should. It stresses the fundamental human rights of
the Iranian people as key to our national security concerns.
I would just say Congress has an obligation to look for ways to stem
the tide of Iranian aggression in the region and to stem the tide of
its repression of the Persian, of the Iranian people at home.
I strongly urge all of my colleagues to support this legislation.
I reserve the balance of my time.
House of Representatives,
Committee on Ways and Means,
Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.
Hon. Edward R. Royce,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Royce, I am writing with respect to H.R.
5631, the ``Iran Accountability Act of 2016.'' As a result of
your having consulted with us on provisions in H.R. 5631 that
fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways
and Means, I agree to waive consideration of this bill so
that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.
The Committee on Ways and Means takes this action with the
mutual understanding that by forgoing consideration of H.R.
5631 at this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over the
subject matter contained in this or similar legislation, and
the Committee will be appropriately consulted and involved as
the bill or similar legislation moves forward so that we may
address any remaining issues that fall within our Rule X
jurisdiction. The Committee also reserves the right to seek
appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any
House-Senate conference involving this or similar
legislation, and requests your support for such request.
Finally, I would appreciate your response to this letter
confirming this understanding, and would ask that a copy of
our exchange of letters on this matter be included in the
Congressional Record during floor consideration thereof.
Sincerely,
Kevin Brady,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.
Hon. Kevin Brady,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for consulting with the
Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 5631, the Iran
Accountability Act of 2016, and for agreeing to be discharged
from further consideration of that bill.
I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure
does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of
your Committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives
on this bill or similar legislation in the future. I would
support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate
number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving
this legislation.
I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 5631 into the
Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill.
I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and
look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as
this measure moves through the legislative process.
Sincerely,
Edward R. Royce,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence,
Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.
Hon. Ed Royce,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Royce: On July 6, 2016, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (``the Committee'') received a
referral for H.R. 5631, the ``Iran Accountability Act of
2016.''
In order to expedite the House's consideration of this
important legislation, the Committee will forego
consideration of the measure. This waiver is, however,
conditioned on our mutual understanding that it does not
diminish or otherwise affect any future jurisdictional claim
over the subject matter contained in the bill or any similar
legislation.
Please place a copy of this letter and your response
acknowledging the Committee's jurisdictional interest into
any committee report on H.R. 5631 and into the Congressional
Record during its floor consideration. I would also
appreciate your support for the appointment of Committee
members to any House-Senate conference on this legislation.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation.
Sincerely,
Devin Nunes,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.
Hon. Devin Nunes,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for consulting with the
Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 5631, the Iran
Accountability Act of 2016, and for agreeing to be discharged
from further consideration of that bill.
I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure
does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of
your Committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives
on this bill or similar legislation in the future. I would
support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate
number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving
this legislation.
I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 5631 into the
Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill.
I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and
look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as
this measure moves through the legislative process.
Sincerely,
Edward R. Royce,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.
Hon. Jason Chaffetz,
Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for consulting with the
Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 5631, the Iran
Accountability Act of 2016, and for agreeing to be discharged
from further consideration of that bill.
I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure
does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of
your Committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives
on this bill or similar legislation in the future. I would
support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate
number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving
this legislation.
I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 5631 into the
Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill.
I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and
look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as
this measure moves through the legislative process.
Sincerely,
Edward R. Royce,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform,
Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.
Hon. Edward Royce,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I write concerning H.R. 5631, the Iran
Accountability Act of 2016. As you know, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs received an original referral and the
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform a secondary
referral when the bill was introduced on July 6, 2016. I
recognize and appreciate your desire to bring this
legislation before the House of Representatives in an
expeditious manner, and accordingly, the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform will forego action on the
bill.
The Committee takes this action with our mutual
understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 5631 at
this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over the subject
matter contained in this or similar legislation. Further, I
request your support for the appointment of conferees from
the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform during any
House-Senate conference convened on this or related
legislation.
I would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on H.R.
5631 be included in the bill report filed by the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, as well as in the Congressional Record
during floor consideration, to memorialize our understanding.
Sincerely,
Jason Chaffetz,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Financial Services,
Washington, DC, July 12, 2016.
Hon. Ed Royce
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Royce: I am writing concerning H.R. 5631, the
``Iran Accountability Act of 2016.''
As a result of your having consulted with the Committee on
Financial Services concerning provisions in the bill that
fall within our Rule X jurisdiction, I agree to forgo action
on the bill so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House
Floor. The Committee on Financial Services takes this action
with our mutual understanding that, by foregoing
[[Page H4949]]
consideration of H.R. 5631 at this time, we do not waive any
jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in this or
similar legislation, and that our Committee will be
appropriately consulted and involved as this or similar
legislation moves forward so that we may address any
remaining issues that fall within our Rule X jurisdiction.
Our Committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of
an appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate
conference involving this or similar legislation, and
requests your support for any such request.
Finally, I would appreciate your response to this letter
confirming this understanding with respect to H.R. 5631 and
would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this
matter be included in the Congressional Record during
consideration of the bill.
Sincerely,
Jeb Hensarling,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.
Hon. Jeb Hensarling
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for consulting with the
Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 5631, the Iran
Accountability Act of 2016, and for agreeing to be discharged
from further consideration of that bill.
I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure
does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of
your Committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives
on this bill or similar legislation in the future. I would
support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate
number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving
this legislation.
I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 5631 into the
Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill.
I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and
look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as
this measure moves through the legislative process.
Sincerely,
Edward R. Royce,
Chairman.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I rise in opposition to this measure.
Mr. Speaker, I just walked here from our hearing room where the
Foreign Affairs Committee marked up 13 measures. We had a committee
meeting this morning. Some were written by Republicans, some by
Democrats. When these bills and resolutions were first introduced, a
lot of Members had questions and concerns. But the committee went to
work ironing out differences, and now all 13 pieces of legislation have
been favorably reported with bipartisan support.
That is how our committee works. That is how our chairman, Ed Royce,
runs things. That is why we say that the Foreign Affairs Committee is
the most bipartisan committee in the entire Congress, and I am proud of
that as a ranking member.
I believe, and we believe, that partisanship should end at the
water's edge. When it comes to fighting for our country, there should
be no Democrats and Republicans. We should be working together on this.
Partisanship should end at the water's edge. And that is our best how
we legislate, especially when it comes to advancing American interests
and security overseas. So it is rather jarring, Mr. Speaker, to walk
onto the floor to debate the majority leader's bill--80 pages of new
sanctions on the Iranian regime, introduced literally in the middle of
the night last week, rammed through the Rules Committee, brought to the
floor without any chance to improve it or any input from the Foreign
Affairs Committee.
That is a disappointment, Mr. Speaker, because there are plenty of us
on both sides of the aisle who think we should be doing more to hold
Iran's leaders accountable for their bad behavior. After all, Iran is
the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism. Iran props up the Assad
regime, detains Americans on trumped-up charges, and has racked up the
worst record on human rights you could imagine.
Congress could speak with a unified voice on these issues, but not
with the bill we are considering today. I don't like the regime.
Everyone knows I oppose the deal with Iran. I think if we work
together, we can move forward on legislation; but not this way, not
ramming it through the Rules Committee so it doesn't get to the Foreign
Affairs Committee and it gets to the floor where nobody had any kind of
input whatsoever. That is not how we should be running this house. So
it is not with the bill we are considering today. My friends on the
other side know that. This isn't a serious bill. It would force the
United States to violate our obligations under the nuclear deal.
Now, I think that is a mistake. As I said before, I opposed the Iran
nuclear deal, but I was on the losing side of that debate. We shouldn't
relitigate this issue. We shouldn't have 62 votes again and again to
try to upend this issue, like we do with the Affordable Care Act. We
should not relitigate this issue. Our work now should be to hold Iran
to its obligations and make sure the deal is being fully implemented.
One of the ways we could do this is to ensure there is a viable
snapback of sanctions if Iran violates the deal. That is why I have
been saying we should reauthorize the Iran Sanctions Act before it
expires by the end of the year.
But here in front of us in this 80-page bill, what is missing?
A reauthorization of the Iran Sanctions Act. That shows me that this
isn't a serious undertaking.
Regardless of what I think, we know that this bill has zero chance of
becoming law. It most certainly won't pass the Senate. If it did, the
White House would veto it. So we can only conclude, Mr. Speaker, that
this is a political exercise, and that troubles me.
One of our greatest traditions in American foreign policy is that
politics and partisanship stop at the water's edge. That principle has
been especially true in the way Congress has dealt with Iran in recent
years. That principle has guided our work on the Foreign Affairs
Committee. Maybe that is why the Foreign Affairs Committee was cut out
of this process. We have avoided letting foreign policy turn to
everyday politics. But make no mistake, what we are doing today is
politics, plain and simple.
I worry about that precedent. I worry about what it means when Iran
sees us playing politics with global security, when Iran's leaders see
us engage in political grandstanding instead of serious policymaking. I
also worry about what it means for the Foreign Affairs Committee.
Our committee's jurisdiction gives us oversight of diplomacy,
development, foreign assistance, war powers. Yet, here we are debating
a major, major sanctions bill that never passed through the doors of
our committee room. Yesterday, the House voted on another Iran bill
that completely bypassed our committee as well. The House just approved
the Defense Authorization Act that includes dozens of provisions that
fall within the jurisdiction of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Who
knows how many foreign policy riders will find their way into our
spending bills this year, all without the Foreign Affairs Committee
saying a word.
This is a bad trend, Mr. Speaker. This is not regular order, which
the Speaker promised us. By the way, I wonder what our friends in the
Freedom Caucus and Liberty Caucus have to say about the process that
got this bill to the floor. I wonder what happened to the Speaker's
commitment to regular order that put the gavel in his hands in the
first place. I didn't see a lot of concern over regular order as this
bill was being rushed through the Rules Committee.
We have a legislative process that cut out the most experienced
legislators on this issue. We have an important foreign policy concern
turned into a political football. We have a bill that has no chance of
becoming law. I am starting to think this has something to do with the
calendar. Today, when we finish our business, Members will rush to the
exits. But next week, many of my friends on the other side will descend
on Cleveland for their convention.
Now, let me say a bit with tongue and cheek that I sympathize with my
friends on the other side. Their standard-bearer has some pretty
unusual ideas about foreign policy. He thinks more countries should get
nuclear weapons. He wants to withdraw from our alliances. He thinks we
ought to be neutral in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and start a
trade war with China. He looks to people like Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong-
un, and Saddam Hussein as apparent role models.
If I were in the majority's shoes, I would want to change the
conversations, too. But this bill is the way to do it. This bill
doesn't make the majority appear strong on foreign policy. It only
makes Congress appear to be divided on
[[Page H4950]]
issues on which we cannot afford division. This bill weakens us as a
Congress when Congress should be finding ways to make Americans safer.
I oppose this measure, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I always prefer to work things out with the ranking member. Working
together, we put three bipartisan bills on the President's desk this
last week alone. In this Congress, Mr. Engel and I, working together on
the Foreign Affairs Committee, have seen some 14 bills signed into law.
So he is right, this isn't the norm.
Earlier this year, there were intense discussions with the minority
on legislation to push back on Iran's missile program. I compromised
more than I wanted, inserting a waiver. We were close, but at the end
of the day, it became clear that the White House would aggressively
fight any legislation with the words ``Iran'' written on it.
For the White House, it is accommodation of Iran at all costs, and
that includes essentially giving the Supreme Leader the veto pen over
steps Congress might press the administration to take. So on this, we
are stuck. Until the Democratic leadership is ready to look past this
President's legacy, I imagine we will be stuck.
Lastly, I would note that these pieces of legislation are tightly
focused on Iran's behavior outside of the nuclear agreement. That is
the point. Whether one was for the agreement or against the agreement,
these are outside of the nuclear agreement.
{time} 1030
These bills do not undo or kill the Iran deal but, instead, press
back on the administration's promises when campaigning for their deal.
This goes to the issue of what we were told, what was in the talking
points on the floor of the House, in terms of how this deal would be
implemented and that it would not impact our ability to stop this
ballistic missile testing by Iran and these other abuses.
I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. McCarthy), the
majority leader.
Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, today marks the 1-year anniversary of the signing of the
administration's Iran deal--1 year, and the world has already become a
more troubled place.
I personally think the deal sets a dangerous precedent. It
strengthens the largest state sponsor of terror in the world and gives
that state sponsor of terror a pathway to nuclear weapons at some point
in its future.
I think that all of the arguments to defend this deal can't stand
against the great weight of reality, including the fact that Iran isn't
holding up its side of the bargain and is more interested in
embarrassing American military men and women than in becoming a
responsible nation.
I understand a few people disagree. However, there is something we
have always agreed on from the start. Deal or no deal, good or bad
deal, we have always agreed to hold Iran accountable for terrorism, for
its development of ballistic missiles, and for its human rights abuses
committed against its own people.
In April alone, President Obama said we have to ``hold Iran to
account where it is acting in ways that are contrary to rules and
norms.''
Secretary Kerry said last year, ``We will never, ever stop standing
up for the Iranian people's rights.''
Treasury Secretary Jack Lew also said last year, ``We are going to
continue to prosecute our unilateral sanctions on things like
terrorism, on things like regional destabilization and human rights.''
What about today? Iran has conducted eight ballistic missile tests
since the deal was signed. The State Department's own Stephen Mull said
in May, ``There have not been any sanctions imposed for human rights
grounds since July of last year.'' Iran continues to imprison
journalists--Americans--and to torture its people.
In February, the administration's Director of National Intelligence,
James Clapper, said, ``Iran continues to be the foremost state sponsor
of terrorism. Iran and Hezbollah remain a continuing terrorist threat
to U.S. interests and partners worldwide.''
Those are the facts right there, Mr. Speaker.
What has the Obama administration done? How has the administration
held Iran accountable, as they said they would? The administration has
done nothing.
And it only gets worse. German intelligence has found that Iran is
violating its pledges under this nuclear deal. Iran is procuring
material for nuclear weapons in what is ``by international standards, a
quantitatively high level.'' Coupled with its missile program, the
report reads, ``It is safe to expect that Iran will continue its
intensive procurement activity.''
Wasn't this deal supposed to stop Iran from developing nuclear
weapons? Where is the accountability? Where is the administration when
they so clearly said they would hold them accountable? Where is the
bipartisanship in the sanctions now?
Now, I understand on the other side, Mr. Speaker, some will accuse
Republicans of engaging in a purely partisan exercise and never
intending to work with our friends on the other side of the aisle.
Well, you know that is just not true. You know for the last 6 months
we worked with the other side of the aisle, we worked in a bipartisan
manner with the chairmen on both sides. But every time we would deal
with the missiles and the ballistic sanctions against them, the White
House would thwart any bipartisan effort.
So why are we here today? It is because, for 6 months, he found every
reason to say ``no.'' For 6 months, he went back on every word that was
said about holding them accountable when the facts stood before us.
Frankly, Mr. Speaker, I don't understand opposition to this bill. We
are simply holding Iran accountable, which is exactly what the
administration said they would do.
We have had tremendous leaders in this country, and we have learned
the lessons time and again. Ronald Reagan taught us this lesson: that
peace without freedom is meaningless. Human nature craves that we all
have peace, but you cannot secure peace without freedom. We have
watched in history when leaders have failed. Chamberlain, ``peace for
our time,'' but there was no freedom in that.
Ronald Reagan had this same dilemma late in his second term, in
Iceland, when he stood across from Gorbachev, trying to negotiate a
reduction in nuclear weapons. He was securing almost everything that he
had asked for, but Gorbachev asked for one last item. He asked that
America would end their SDI program. Reagan didn't say no. He said, we
will share it with you so the world can be safe. But Gorbachev said no.
Reagan had a decision to make. He could have signed that deal, and I
am sure the elite would have probably given him the Nobel Peace Prize.
Other Presidents have won them. But he realized there was no freedom in
that agreement. So he got up, he held the Soviet Union accountable, and
he walked away.
Had he not, would the Berlin Wall have collapsed? Had he not, would
the Soviet Union have collapsed?
Words have meaning, and words have consequences. The quotes from this
administration and from around the world were to hold Iran accountable.
That is what is happening today.
Mr. Speaker, there are going to be some Members in this Chamber who
will sit back and say, ``But it didn't happen just the way I wanted it
to before it came to the floor.''
I don't want you to look your grandchildren in the eyes and explain
to them why we don't have freedom in the world. I want you to look your
grandchildren in the eyes and say you stood up--you stood up for the
words and what that meant when we were to hold Iran accountable.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode
Island (Mr. Cicilline), a very respected member of the Foreign Affairs
Committee.
Mr. CICILLINE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 5631.
Nothing is more important to our national security interests in the
Middle East than continuing to prevent a nuclear Iran while, at the
same time, effectively containing Iran's influence
[[Page H4951]]
and confronting their destabilizing activities in the region.
Iran's ongoing ballistic missile program and its continued support
for terrorism constitute an existential threat to our allies in the
Middle East, including Israel. In its blatant disregard for human
rights, we can hear the echoes of Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and
other failed totalitarian regimes that now reside in the dustbin of
history.
It is imperative that we do more to exert pressure on the Iranian
regime to change its behavior, including meaningful sanctions for human
rights and ballistic missile violations and terrorism. But any steps
that we take cannot undermine the progress that we have already made
over the past year to deny Iran a nuclear weapons program.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is working. Since its
implementation, Iran has dismantled two-thirds of its installed uranium
enrichment capacity, ended all uranium enrichment activity at its
Fordow facility, and removed the core of the Arak heavy water reactor
and rendered its only source of weapons-grade plutonium permanently
useless.
Iran is now complying with the most comprehensive transparency and
monitoring regime ever negotiated in the nuclear age. Israel's Chief of
the General Staff, Lieutenant General Gadi Eizenkot, has called this
agreement ``a historic turning point. It is a big change in terms of
the direction that Iran was headed and in the way we saw things.''
There is no question that the world is safer today and that our
allies in the Middle East, especially in Israel, are more secure
because the JCPOA has denied Iran the opportunity to develop a nuclear
weapon. We can and should continue to build on this work and confront
the Iranian regime's behavior without undermining the JCPOA.
We should impose sanctions for ballistic missiles, for human rights
violations, and for terrorism, but these sanctions must be carefully
drawn, must be carefully written to protect the agreement that denies
Iran a nuclear weapon.
The bill that we are voting on today does not do this. As a result,
it won't make us safer. It will, in fact, undermine every single
achievement we have made over the past year.
It will impose insurmountable limits on the President's ability to
work with our allies around the world and to implement effective
sanctions on Iranian human rights abusers, their ballistic missile
program, and their support for terrorism. If this bill becomes law, it
will immediately put Iran back on a path to develop a nuclear weapon.
I sit on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I have attended dozens
and dozens of hearings on Iran. I have heard hours and hours of
testimony from expert witnesses on how we can effect change in Iran.
But no one asked for our input on this bill. It was introduced by the
Republican leadership in the dead of night, entirely bypassing the
Foreign Affairs Committee, and came straight to the floor.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. ENGEL. I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.
Mr. CICILLINE. Let's call this bill for what it is: a cynical
proposal that is designed to score political points in an election year
even at the expense of our national security interests.
Mr. Speaker, we need serious, thoughtful strategies to confront the
Iranian regime, not partisan politics. The stakes are too high.
I urge my colleagues to protect this agreement that prevents Iran
from having a nuclear weapon, to work with us in a bipartisan way, to
impose sanctions that are carefully drawn with the full participation
of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and to reject this bill in its
current form.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.
I would just counter with some observations.
First, the nuclear deal does not dismantle key aspects of Iran's
nuclear program. That, in fact, is its fatal flaw.
At its essence, this agreement traded permanent comprehensive
sanctions relief for temporary, limited constraints on Iran's nuclear
program. Under this deal, Iran will keep much of its nuclear
infrastructure and continue to develop advanced centrifuges, gaining
the ability to produce nuclear fuel on an industrial scale.
Due to the deal's fatal flaw--and that is the sunset clause--the
ayatollah won't even have to cheat to be just steps away from a nuclear
weapon. All he has to do is wait 10 or 15 years until the deal expires.
We cannot be sure that Iran is truly living up to its obligations
under this agreement. I heard the assertion that it was. It is
certainly not. In its annual report, published last month, the German
intelligence reports:
The illegal proliferation-sensitive procurement activities
by Iran in Germany, registered by the Federal Office for the
Protection of the Constitution, persisted in 2015 at what is,
even by international standards, a quantitatively high level.
This holds true in particular with regards to items which can
be used in the field of nuclear technology.
If this deal is working, why is Iran secretly violating it? Why is
Iran buying nuclear technology?
{time} 1045
Now, the point is that these activities we are curtailing aren't
related to the nuclear deal, and that is the other point I would make.
Unlike the administration, I am not willing to be able to be held
hostage to the nuclear deal, doing nothing as Iran develops ICBMs in
defiance of U.N. Security Council resolutions.
We realize what is happening here, I hope, is the ayatollah, on a
weekly basis, leads these chants of ``death to Israel,'' ``death to
America'' and asserts that it is every military man's responsibility to
figure out how to mass-produce intercontinental ballistic missiles.
When he is talking about ``intercontinental,'' that means between
continents; that means between there and here.
``Death to America'' is not a confusing thing that we might be
misinterpreting. And it is worth noting that, in the last week, it
surfaced that Iran continued trying to illegally procure nuclear
equipment.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from North
Carolina (Mr. Price).
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition
to this and the other two bills before the House this week regarding
Iran, all of which would weaken our national security and our
international standing, and all of which the President has rightly
threatened to veto.
If there is a silver lining in this debate, it is that the majority
has given us an opportunity to acknowledge the 1-year anniversary of
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which has made the world safer
by severely constraining Iran's nuclear activities and subjecting them
to unprecedented international oversight.
Yet, instead of celebrating this landmark achievement, the majority
is seeking to undo it. H.R. 5119, H.R. 4992, and H.R. 5631,
collectively, would deny Iran even the limited access to foreign
investment and other meaningful incentives that encourage compliance
with the JCPOA.
These are just the latest in a series of Republican efforts to
undermine this historic agreement negotiated with the world's major
powers. Since the deal was finalized, Republicans have tried again and
again and again to undermine not just the JCPOA, but also the
credibility of the President of the United States on the international
stage.
It appears the Iran nuclear agreement has become the ObamaCare of
foreign policy. What I mean is that Republicans proclaim it a failure
repeatedly, despite its objective success. They call for its immediate
repeal without offering any viable alternatives, despite the
potentially disastrous consequences of such action; and they continue
to clutter the congressional calendar with so-called message votes
about Iran, instead of addressing the major issues facing our Nation.
Now, these legislative antics continue even though opponents of the
JCPOA know full well that strong sanctions on Iran remain in place
targeting the country's human rights violations, ballistic missile
development, and support of terrorism.
The bill before us, H.R. 5631, would impose additional mandatory
sanctions on Iran for these same violations. There is no one in this
Chamber about to let Iran off the hook for its egregious human rights
violations or its
[[Page H4952]]
proliferation of terrorism and ballistic missile technology. And our
Republican friends know full well that if a violation of the JCPOA were
to occur, we can put sanctions like these in place immediately.
So why are we doing this bill now? Must we conclude that our
colleagues are more interested in unravelling one of President Obama's
signature accomplishments than they are with the facts of the matter?
Let's look at the facts: Because of this agreement, an Iranian
nuclear weapon is not an imminent threat to the United States or our
allies, including Israel. Because of this agreement, the breakout time
for Iran to develop enough weapons-grade material for a nuclear weapon
went from 2 or 3 months to a year or more. The international community
has 24/7 access to Iran's nuclear sites, and we possess an enforcement
mechanism to verify Iran's compliance.
By all objective accounts, Iran has upheld its end of the bargain,
and it is vital that we uphold ours. This isn't just my opinion. This
week a bipartisan group of more than 75 national security experts sent
a letter to the President stating that ``Iran has remained in
compliance with its commitments'' and ``all pathways to an Iranian
nuclear weapon have been blocked.''
I include in the Congressional Record this letter in its entirety.
The Iran Project,
New York, NY, July 12, 2016.
Letter to the President on the Anniversary of the Nuclear
Agreement with Iran.
Dear Mr. President: On the first anniversary of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, Americans
should be proud of your leadership in bringing about this
landmark diplomatic agreement.
As a result of the JCPOA all pathways to an Iranian nuclear
weapon have been blocked, thereby providing greater security
to our friends and partners in the region and to the world.
From November 2013, when the interim nuclear agreement was
reached, until today, Iran has remained in compliance with
its commitments as verified by regular reports of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
We applaud your Administration's commitment to the rigorous
verification of Iran's compliance and remaining in close
contact with the U.S. negotiating partners on the JCPOA
implementation. This will be essential to ensure their
cooperation should action be required to respond to an
Iranian violation. As your policies have shown, it will also
be essential for the U.S. to continue to assure Israel and
the Gulf states of its resolute commitment to their security
as our traditional partners in the region. It will be
necessary to ensure adequate long-term funding for the IAEA
so that it can carry out its inspection and reporting
functions as required by the JCPOA.
Future relations with Iran can improve or get worse and
become dangerous for U.S. interests in the region as Iran
continues to support the Assad regime and Hezbollah. The U.S.
should develop policies that increase the chances of
cooperation with Iran, minimize confrontation, and influence
Iran's actions in the region. We acknowledge that
opportunities will be limited for testing Iran's willingness
to work directly with the U.S. due to the political
uncertainties in both countries in the coming year, but
engagement should be the U.S. government's long-term goal.
Your diplomatic undertaking with Iran was to seek a safer
world and stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons. To
achieve those ambitious goals you engaged in prolonged and
intense diplomatic negotiations that enabled you to deal
directly with Iran and to test its willingness to work with
the U.S. and others in some areas of common purpose. The
alternative strategy would be to return to an earlier era of
treating Iran as America's principal enemy in the region,
thereby: risking the unraveling of the JCPOA; drawing strong
opposition from negotiating partners; returning to a period
of nuclear danger; missing important opportunities for
collaboration in the fight against ISIS and the search for
solutions to other regional problems; and risking another
armed conflict involving the U.S. in the Middle East.
We, therefore, encourage your Administration to put in
place an institutional structure for conducting relations
with Iran in all areas essential to U.S. interests. We
suggest several channels that could be set up for your
successor:
A direct diplomatic channel at the deputy level to continue
the communications currently being conducted between the
Secretary of State and Iranian Foreign Minister. Without such
continuity during the transition period, the next
Administration will lack the diplomatic means to enlist or
pressure Iran in the management of important and urgent
issues such as ISIS, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan where the
U.S. and Iran have some common but often clashing interests.
An emergency communications capability with Iran's
government to avoid misunderstandings or the escalation of
incidents or accidents.
A regular and direct bilateral channel between the U.S.
Treasury and Iranian Central Bank to address all U.S. and
Iranian questions about the implementation of sanctions
relief commitments under the JCPOA. Treasury and State will
need to stay in close harmony in talks with Iran on sanctions
relief.
Iran's leaders appear reluctant now to engage the U.S.
beyond the implementation of the JCPOA, and Iran's actions in
the region may make engagement difficult for the U.S. But the
one lesson learned from your diplomatic efforts with Iran is
that persevering patiently in pursuit of careful diplomacy
can lead to progress. A variety of channels with Iran will be
needed to drive home messages and to improve mutual
understanding on our positions on issues of importance to the
U.S.--including regional security questions and the treatment
of dual nationals--among others.
You have shown that well-conceived and tough-minded
diplomacy can protect U.S. national security interests. Given
the stakes, the U.S. will need more, not less, engagement
with Iran.
With respect,
Amb. (ret.) Morton Abramowitz, Assistant Secretary of State
for Intelligence and Research, Ambassador to Thailand and
Turkey
Graham Allison, Assistant Secretary of Defense
Les AuCoin, U.S. Representative
Amb. (ret.) Barbara K. Bodine, Ambassador to Yemen
David Bonior, U.S. Representative
BGen Stephen A. Cheney (ret.), U.S. Marine Corps
Joseph Cirincione, President of the Ploughshares Fund
Amb. (ret.) James F. Collins, Ambassador at Large for the New
Independent States and to the Russian Federation
Leon N. Cooper, Brown University, Nobel Laureate Physics
Amb. (ret.) Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs
Amb. (ret.) James B. Cunningham, Ambassador to Israel,
Afghanistan, and the United Nations
Tom Daschle, U.S. Senator, Senate Majority Leader
Suzanne DiMaggio, Director and Senior Fellow at New America
Amb. (ret.) James Dobbins, Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan
Freeman Dyson, Professor of Physics Emeritus, Institute for
Advanced Study, Princeton University
Major General Paul D. Eaton (ret.), U.S. Army, Managing
Director Vet Voice Foundation
Robert Einhorn, Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation, the
Secretary of State's Special Advisor for Nonproliferation
and Arms Control
Harold A. Feiveson (ret.), Senior Research Scientist,
Princeton University
Richard L. Garwin, Chair of the Arms Control and
Nonproliferation Advisory Board
F. Gregory Gause III, Chairman and Head of the International
Affairs Department at the Bush School of Government and
Public Service, Texas A&M University
Leslie H. Gelb, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-
Military Affairs, Director of Policy Planning and Arms
Control at the Department of Defense
Amb. (ret.) Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs, Special Representative for Afghanistan
and Pakistan, and Ambassador to Turkey
Morton H. Halperin, Director of Policy Planning Department of
State, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Planning
and Arms Control
Lee H. Hamilton, U.S. Representative, Chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee
Gary Hart, U.S. Senator, Special Envoy to Northern Ireland
Amb. (ret.) William C. Harrop, Ambassador to Israel,
Inspector General of the State Department
Stephen B. Heintz, President, Rockefeller Brothers Fund
James Hoge, Former Editor of Foreign Affairs Magazine
Amb. (ret.) Robert Hunter, National Security Council Director
of Middle East Affairs and Ambassador to NATO
Lt. Gen. (ret.) Arlen D. Jameson, U.S. Air Force, Deputy
Commander U.S. Strategic Command
J. Bennett Johnston, U.S. Senator
Nancy Landon Kassebaum, U.S. Senator
LTG. Frank Kearney (ret.), U.S. Army, Deputy Director for
Strategic Operational Planning at the National Counter-
Terrorism Center
LTG. Claudia J Kennedy (ret.), U.S. Army, Former Deputy Chief
of Staff for Intelligence
Amb. (ret.) Daniel Kurtzer, Ambassador to Israel and Egypt
Ellen Laipson, Vice Chair of the National Intelligence
Council, President Emeritus of Stimson Center
Carl Levin, U.S. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Armed Services
Mel Levine, U.S. Representative
Amb. (ret.) John Limbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Iran
[[Page H4953]]
Amb. (ret.) Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asia and the Pacific Ambassador to China, Director
of Policy Planning, Department of State
Amb. (ret.) William H. Luers, Ambassador to Czechoslovakia
and Venezuela
Richard G. Lugar, U.S. Senator, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations
Suzanne Maloney, Policy Planning Department of State, Deputy
Director of the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings
Institution
Jessica T. Mathews, Director of the Office of Global Issues,
National Security Council
Gen. (ret.) Merrill McPeak, U.S. Air Force, Chief of Staff
Amb. (ret.) William G. Miller, Ambassador to Ukraine
Amb. (ret.) Cameron Munter, Ambassador to Pakistan and Serbia
Amb. (ret.) Richard W. Murphy, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia,
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs
Vali Nasr, Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, Dean of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies
Richard Nephew, Director for Iran at the National Security
Council, Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy at the
Department of State
Amb. (ret.) Ronald E. Neumann, Ambassador to Afghanistan,
Algeria, and Bahrain
Gen. (ret.) Lloyd Fig Newton, U.S. Air Force, Commander, Air
Education and Training Command
Joseph Nye, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the
National Intelligence Council
Admiral (ret.) Eric Olson, US. Navy, Commander of U.S.
Special Operations Command
Amb. (ret.) Thomas Pickering, Permanent Representative to the
United Nations; Undersecretary of State for Political
Affairs; Ambassador to Israel, Russia, India, El
Salvador, Nigeria and Jordan
Paul R. Pillar, National Intelligence Officer for the Near
East and South Asia
Amb. (ret.) Nicholas Platt, Ambassador to Pakistan,
Philippines, and Zambia
Joe R. Reeder, Deputy Secretary of the Army, Chairman of the
Panama Canal Commission
Amb. (ret.) Francis J. Ricciardone, Ambassador to Egypt,
Turkey, the Philippines, and Palau
Burton Richter, Professor Emeritus, Stanford University;
Nobel Laureate in Physics
Barnett R. Rubin, Senior Adviser to the Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
Gary S. Samore, White House Coordinator for Arms Control and
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Senior Director for
Nonproliferation and Export Controls at the National
Security Council
Gen. Brent Scowcroft (ret.), U.S. National Security Advisor
Patricia Schroeder, U.S. Representative
Gary Sick, Director of the Office of Iran and the Persian
Gulf of the National Security Council
Jim Slattery, U.S. Representative
Mark Udall, U.S. Senator
Amb. (ret.) Bill vanden Heuvel, Ambassador to the European
Office of the United Nations, Deputy U.S. Ambassador to
the United Nations
Frank N. von Hippel, Assistant Director for National
Security, White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy
Jane Wales, Special Assistant to the President, Senior
Director of the National Security Council, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State
Amb. (ret.) Edward S. Walker, Jr., Ambassador to Israel,
Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates
James Walsh, Research Associate at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Security Studies Program
Frank Wilczek, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Nobel
Laureate in Physics
Timothy E. Wirth, U.S. Senator
Amb. (ret.) Frank Wisner, Under Secretary of State for
International Security Affairs; Ambassador to India,
Egypt, the Philippines, and Zambia.
The signers of this statement are either former senior
officials of the U.S. government or prominent national
security leaders who have not held senior government
positions. The positions listed after the names of the former
government officials are the senior posts held while in
government. The positions listed after the names of those who
were not from the government are listed with their current
position.
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, this agreement is too
important and the stakes are too high to treat this issue as just
another political football. The safety and security of the United
States, of Israel, and of the region depend on the successful
implementation and diligent enforcement of the JCPOA.
Instead of scoring political points, or seeking to deny the President
a significant achievement, we should be working together in a
bipartisan fashion to ensure the agreement's success.
We should be working together to explore ways to enhance coordination
and cooperation with Israel and the international community to address
unacceptable Iranian behavior, such as support for Hezbollah and abuse
of human rights. Yet we find ourselves here, 1 year after the
agreement's announcement, still dealing with ObamaCare-style
gamesmanship.
It is beneath this institution. The world is watching. We may think a
bill that has no chance of being signed into law doesn't matter; but to
the leaders of China or Russia or Iran, it sends a signal from our
country of hesitation and disunity.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this bill and any bills that come
before us with similar intent and to focus, instead, on ensuring the
success of the JCPOA and reinforcing the agreement's role in making the
world a safer place.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Zeldin), a valued member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
Mr. ZELDIN. Mr. Speaker, it is a little insulting to hear the remarks
that were just made, as if any objection not toeing the line of this
President, having objections to this arrangement, is partisan politics.
The gentleman may have misspoken when he suggested that the Iran
nuclear deal was signed. I would offer that the Iran nuclear deal
actually hasn't been signed. The President has acknowledged not only is
this not a treaty, but Secretary Kerry, when he was before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, said it is not even an executive agreement.
It is a political commitment, a signed letter from the State Department
saying that this is an unsigned political commitment. Now, we are
allowed to have objections to that.
I would suggest that the best interest of national security is to
join in support of this bill and putting that over party politics.
I rise today in support of the Iran Accountability Act introduced by
House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy.
I also commend Chairman Ed Royce for all of his incredibly valuable
leadership, chairing the House Foreign Affairs Committee; and I also
commend Ranking Member Eliot Engel, who I know is deeply passionate
about U.S. security and the relationship with and accountability with
Iran and strengthening our relationship with Israel. I know his heart
is absolutely in the right place.
So it is not a difficult position for all the Democratic colleagues
who voted against the Iran nuclear agreement. I know that that takes an
incredible amount of courage to stand up to a President of your own
party. You did it for all the right reasons, putting national security
over party politics.
That wasn't partisanship. It was actually a bipartisan vote in this
House to disapprove of that Iran nuclear deal. Democrats who decided to
put American security first voted against the Iran nuclear deal, an
unsigned political commitment.
Why were the Iranians at the table? Sanctions relief. It is not
because we asked nicely, not because they want to be good world
citizens. It is because they wanted the money.
Then we gave them the money. They got through their election.
By the way, those who say that the most moderate members were
elected, that is discounting the fact that the 12,000 most moderate
members weren't even allowed access to the ballot. There were only the
hardliners left on the ballot.
So the Iranians get the money; they get past their elections; and
here we are today. And you are insulting us in this Chamber by saying
that any concern that we have, if it doesn't toe the President's party
line, is partisan politics.
I don't care who the President is, whether it is Republican or
Democrat, this one or the next one, the fact is what brought the
Iranians to the table, the leverage, was the sanctions relief. And the
sanctions relief that they received is now gone.
So as they test-fire intercontinental ballistic missiles in violation
of international law, they unjustly imprison Americans as they commit
their human rights abuses. Everything that they are doing today, we
take exception with and we are acting on, and that's why I rise.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
[[Page H4954]]
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 1 minute to the
gentleman from New York.
Mr. ZELDIN. Mr. Speaker, everything that we come to this well on this
day to vote in favor of this legislation and Chairman Royce's
legislation, three pieces of legislation to hold the Iranians
accountable, it is the fact that, if we want the Iranians to come back
to the table, we need to put the leverage back on the table. They are
not coming back if we ask nicely. They haven't changed who they are.
They are not good world citizens.
I am not going to sit here and allow this script of a White House
taxpayer-funded fiction writer, Ben Rhodes, going to the media to
spread whatever false lies and narratives to help sell the Iran nuclear
deal.
We are here to represent our constituents and the American public.
This is not about a narrative of a President and his legacy. This is
about American security and doing what is best and doing what is right
for our constituents and the American public.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Levin), the ranking member of the Ways and Means
Committee.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, this bill is more than deeply troubling. You
talk about bipartisanship, and you come forth with a bill that
completely breaks it down. This issue is too essential to become a
total tool of partisan jockeying. Our relationship with Israel is too
vital to become a total political plaything.
I refer, as my colleague from North Carolina did, to the statement of
75 national security leaders. I quote:
``Dear Mr. President,
``On the first anniversary of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) with Iran, Americans should be proud of your leadership in
bringing about this landmark diplomatic agreement.
``As a result of the JCPOA all pathways to an Iranian nuclear weapon
have been blocked, thereby providing greater security to our friends
and partners in the region and to the world. From November 2013, when
the interim nuclear agreement was reached, until today, Iran has
remained in compliance with its commitments as verified by regular
reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency.''
This letter is signed by 75, including Brent Scowcroft.
Why don't you totally partisan Republicans, who are approaching a
convention and a Presidential race, listen to very much-respected
people within your own party? Instead, you are thumbing your nose like
this at them and at all of those who endeavor to bring about an
effective policy regarding nuclear weaponry.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the
gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, today is simply unmasked political chicanery.
This issue deserves better than the majority leader coming here
without any notice, really, and putting forth a resolution that does
nothing but harm what used to be a centerpiece of foreign policy:
bipartisanship when it comes to the Middle East and the security of
Israel.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. Carter).
{time} 1100
Mr. CARTER of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 5631 to hold Iran
accountable for its state sponsorship of terrorism and for its human
rights abuses.
As a Member of Congress, I believe one of our most important duties
is to ensure that Americans continue to remain secure from other
countries that wish to harm us.
Last year, President Obama entered into an agreement with Iran, which
now allows Iran to advance their nuclear energy program. In turn, the
President has allowed sanctions against Iran to be removed even though
entities of the Iranian Government continue to conduct human rights
violations. In addition, Iran continues to refine their ballistic
missile program and support terrorism, which represents a serious
threat to the United States and our allies.
It should be the clear intent of this body that the continued use of
economic sanctions against the country of Iran is necessary to ensure
Iran does not have the resources necessary to harm or even eliminate
our country or its allies. H.R. 5631 does this. It ensures that the
policy of this country is to continue to take aggressive action against
Iran to prevent the development of weapons that could harm our country
or our allies.
We must also continue to ensure that it is the policy of this country
that efforts be taken to prevent human rights violations by any
country.
I would like to thank my colleague, Majority Leader McCarthy, for
bringing this bill to the floor, and I encourage all of my colleagues
to support this measure.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, may I ask how much time remains on both
sides?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California has 13\1/2\
minutes remaining, and the gentleman from New York has 12 minutes
remaining.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Deutch), a very hardworking and respected member of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Mr. DEUTCH. I thank my friend for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, this week we approach the 1-year anniversary of the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the JCPOA, the agreement negotiated
by the P5+1 countries over Iran's illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons.
One year later, Iran remains far outside the community of responsible
countries. Iran continues to sponsor terrorism around the region. It
funds and supports the murderous Assad regime. It spouts anti-Semitic
and anti-Israel vitriol. It foments unrest in other countries. It
denies basic human rights to its citizens, and it unlawfully detains
American citizens. Iran has still not returned my constituent, Robert
Levinson, who went missing in Iran in 2007 and is now the longest-held
American hostage.
My friends on the other side of the aisle know that, and I commend
Chairman Royce for his diligence in looking for ways to strengthen our
sanctions regime and to vigilantly enforce the Iran nuclear deal in
order to keep the pressure on Iran.
Iran's subversive actions have not relented despite the agreement.
Iran has explicitly and repeatedly violated U.N. Security Council
resolutions by testing its ballistic missile technology, weapons
capable of delivering nuclear warheads. In addition, recent
intelligence reports from Germany expose that Iran sought technology
related to the development of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons. So there is a lot that needs to be done to keep the pressure
on Iran.
For all of these reasons, Congress needs to reauthorize the Iran
Sanctions Act, the law that actually serves as the foundation for our
sanctions policy. We have to pass new sanctions to address Iran's
repeated ballistic missile tests, and we have to crack down on Iran's
financial support for terrorism. These are items that have always
enjoyed broad bipartisan support. All of the areas that Iran is doing
harm throughout the region--support for terrorism, violation of the
human rights of their people, ballistic missile tests--everything that
falls outside of the nuclear deal, we should be working together to
strengthen with this bipartisan support.
But rushing through legislation that is designed to undermine the
JCPOA and put the United States in violation of our commitments under
the JCPOA not only fail to punish Iran's malfeasance--which is our
goal, and it is the shared goal--but it weakens America's ability to
lead a global effort against Iran's destabilizing efforts throughout
the world. We can't do this on our own. We need to work with our
allies. We need to lead our allies. That is the role that the United
States has always played.
Mr. Speaker, I did not support the Iran nuclear agreement, but it is
in effect, and it must be enforced with vigilance.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Curbelo of Florida). The time of the
gentleman has expired.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the
gentleman.
Mr. DEUTCH. I thank my friend.
[[Page H4955]]
Mr. Speaker, we have to maintain immense pressure on the Iranian
regime so long as it violates human rights, supports terrorism, and
tests ballistic missiles; but failure by the United States to uphold
the deal will only weaken--I repeat for my colleagues who share my
commitment to standing up to Iran, it will only weaken--our efforts to
lead the international community in taking strong action to counter
Iran's actions both under and outside of the JCPOA.
These three bills this week that have been rushed to the floor
without having the opportunity to discuss them, to debate them, and to
develop broad bipartisan support on them in ways that will not
jeopardize our role under the JCPOA weaken our ability to lead. That is
why I oppose them, and that is why I urge my colleagues to oppose them
as well.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), our Democratic whip.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I regret that I rise to oppose this bill. I
have historically and repeatedly worked in a bipartisan fashion to
bring bills to this floor that were supported by both parties as it
relates to the security of Israel.
This bill comes to the floor as we take stock of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Iran nuclear deal. This bill,
disappointingly, was written without any input from Democrats or any
committee or through regular order. By not acting in a bipartisan
manner, we are missing the opportunity to send an important message to
Iran of our steadfast resolve in holding it accountable both to their
commitments under the JCPOA and under applicable U.S. laws and U.N.
resolutions.
We need to remember that it was toughness born from bipartisan unity
that brought Iran to the table in the first place. That, again, is what
will be required to ensure its full compliance. As much as Iran has
mostly complied with the letter of the deal, it has pushed the limits
when it comes to its spirit.
One of my major concerns about the deal from a year ago remains, and
it is that the deal is limited in scope only to Iran's nuclear
activities. It does not cover the other areas in which Iran has proven
to be a dangerous and threatening actor.
Mr. Speaker, U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which implemented
the JCPOA, called for Iran to halt its ballistic missile program.
Instead, Iran has continued to develop and test missiles that could
carry a nuclear payload. There have also been reports that it is
attempting to acquire ballistic missile technology in violation of U.N.
Resolution 2231.
Iran's sponsorship of global terror has continued unabated, and its
arms and fighters stream into Syria, exacerbating the instability there
and threatening regional security. Hamas and Hezbollah continue to
threaten Israel with Iranian arms and financial support, and Iran's
leaders continue to call for the end of the Jewish State of Israel.
That is why, even as Iran has received sanctions relief through the
JCPOA, it was always understood that we would need and be able to
increase pressure on Iran with additional sanctions targeting its
ballistic missile program and other destabilizing actions. We must not
allow Iran to violate the nuclear deal.
If Iran does not feel that it is sufficiently benefiting from the
nuclear deal, frankly, that is because its malign activities and its
outdated banking system are continuing to deter foreign investment.
Iran and the world need to understand that it is not America's job to
fix the problems that Iran has created for itself. That is why, as Iran
continues to flaunt its obligations and sponsor terrorism around the
world, its leaders must know with certainty that there will be real
consequences from the United States and our allies for those actions.
I am opposing this bill and urging that Democrats and Republicans--
and my friend, Mr. Royce, has done that repeatedly throughout his
leadership of the Committee on Foreign Affairs--return to our
successful bipartisan partnership, as we have in the past, to
reauthorize the Iran Sanctions Act as soon as possible, and then work
toward enacting sanctions targeting Iran's ballistic missile program.
Let's come back here with legislation that sends a powerful message
to Iran that there is no daylight between the parties in Congress when
it comes to our shared resolve that Iran must abandon its sponsorship
of terror, end its ballistic missile program, and comply fully with the
JCPOA. My friends, Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, and my
colleagues, our commitment to Israel and international peace and
security demands no less.
Let us return to bipartisanship on which Israel has relied and the
message that we sent was stronger, firmer, and more effective. Let us
defeat this partisan legislation and return to the bipartisan table.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The goal of the Iran Accountability Act, the goal of this measure we
are talking about today is not to force the administration to violate
its flawed Iran deal. The goal here, the goal of this bill is to call
upon the President to uphold his pledge to remain vigilant and respond
to Iran's continued support for its ballistic missile program and
terrorism and its human rights abuses. Okay?
The sanctions in this bill would force the administration to act
decisively with respect to the twin threats of Iran's effort to develop
and acquire ballistic missiles and to support terrorism. It would seek
to bolster the effect of secondary sanctions that apply outside the
United States on Iran's development of ballistic missiles in the wake
of the administration's wholesale retreat from multilateral sanctions
regarding ballistic missiles.
If the administration was actually involved in enforcing this, this
legislation would not be necessary. Last July, Secretary of State John
Kerry testified that the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which
implemented the deal, contains the exact same language prohibiting Iran
from developing ballistic weapons as the previous resolution. That
sounded pretty encouraging to us. Oh, if only it were true. If only it
had been true.
The text of the resolution appears to suggest it is quite the
opposite. In U.N. SCR 2231, Iran is nonbindingly called upon--those are
the words, ``called upon''--to refrain from developing ballistic
missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear warheads. By
contrast, the original resolution bindingly stated that Iran shall
not--shall not--develop ballistic missiles capable of delivering
nuclear warheads.
Now, here is where we have to focus, my friends. Here is where we
have to focus. This past spring, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad
Zarif bragged on this very point, and here are his words. He said that
he negotiated a loophole. He negotiated a loophole that would enable
the regime to continue to develop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.
That is why we are here debating this today.
What did he say?
The new resolution, he claimed--and these are his words--doesn't call
upon Iran not to test ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear
warheads. No. It calls upon Iran not to test ballistic missiles that
were designed to be capable.
And he adds: ``That word took me about 7 months to negotiate, so
everybody knew what it meant.''
As such, Iran could develop a ballistic missile capable of carrying a
nuclear warhead but then claim it was not designed for that specific
purpose.
{time} 1115
Later reports indicated that the United States and its European
allies issued a joint letter. Now, remember, Iran has now fired off
eight tests. The last test, on the ballistic weapons, on the side of
them, it said ``Death to Israel'' in Farsi and in Hebrew. And that
joint letter stated that Iran's recent ballistic missile tests were--
what was the word used by the United States now?--were inconsistent
with, rather than a violation of, the resolution. So which is it?
Ultimately, the U.N. fails to impose new sanctions despite Iran's
continued missile tests. During this entire debate on the floor this
House, the talking points indicated that Iran would be
[[Page H4956]]
prevented from developing and using and testing these ballistic
missiles for the next 8 years. Now we find out that, apparently, the
administration intends to allow this continued buildup of their
capabilities of an intercontinental ballistic missile.
Thus, what this legislation seeks to restore is the necessary
deterrent effect with respect to ballistic missiles and correct the
administration's debilitating mistakes.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Connolly), a very respected and hardworking member of the
Foreign Affairs Committee.
Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend, the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Engel).
I rise in opposition to H.R. 5631, the so-called Iran Accountability
Act.
The majority has decided, on its own, without any bipartisanship, to
co-opt traditional action on a bipartisan basis to counter Iran by
fast-tracking sharply partisan legislation that would undermine not
only the Iran nuclear agreement but fracture the very delicate
international coalition that allowed us to reverse the nuclear
development in Iran. I guess that is something that happens when
amateurs write a bill without any foreign policy background.
This bill was drafted, as Mr. Hoyer indicated, with no input from the
minority and was brought to the floor under a closed rule. How can
anyone, much less our adversary Iran, take this seriously?
If the majority really cared about countering Iran, it would
safeguard longstanding bipartisan consensus and bring to the floor a
clean reauthorization of the Iran Sanctions Act, which I would support
and I am sure most people on my side of the aisle.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman an additional 15
seconds.
Mr. CONNOLLY. Instead, the majority is scrambling to pass at the last
hour of this part of our session, just before a 7-week recess, the bill
before us today.
It is a farce. It is a dangerous gambit by the majority to play
election-year politics at the expense of U.S. bipartisan foreign
policy.
I urge rejection of this ill-considered bill.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
You know, the question is not whether Iran is a good player. Iran is
not a good player. The question is: What should be our response to it?
It is not a question of whether the Iranian regime is good or bad. Of
course it is bad. I opposed the Iran deal. The question is: How do we
react to it?
Mr. Speaker, we had an opportunity to work on meaningful legislation
that would have held Iran's feet to the fire and ensured the nuclear
deal was being fully, fairly implemented. It could have been a
reauthorization of the Iran Sanctions Act. It could have been another
bipartisan approach.
But, instead, we are going to vote on this bill, which will pass
mostly on partisan lines, and then skip town for 7 weeks. I think that
is a shame, because I don't think we have done our job. And there is no
job more important than protecting America's security.
Ramming through partisan bills that don't stand a chance of becoming
law is just irresponsible. It diminishes Congress' role in making
foreign policy. It certainly diminishes the Foreign Affairs Committee's
role.
So I hope when we return from the break we can hit the reset button
on the way we deal with these issues. I think it is important for us to
work together in a bipartisan fashion. As I have said so many times on
this floor, it has been a pleasure working with Chairman Royce on the
committee in a bipartisan fashion.
Give the committee a chance to formulate a bill that will hold Iran's
feet to the fire. It is a terrible regime. It is a bloody regime. We
are all united on both sides of the aisle in wanting to confront that
regime. The question is how to do it. You don't do it by ramming
through a partisan bill. You do it by working in a bipartisan fashion.
For now, we should reject this bill, go back to the drawing board,
and work together to confront the Iranian murderous regime. They are a
regime that we need to confront. Nobody disagrees on that on both sides
of the aisle. The question is: Should we do it together?
Let's do it together. The Foreign Affairs Committee has been a
bipartisan mecca of how Congress should work. Let's go back to that,
particularly with foreign policy. Let's go back to that.
So I urge my colleagues to reject the bill. We have good people on
both sides of the aisle. We all want to see the same thing. Let's put
our heads together and come up with a consensus and confront Iran.
Reject the bill.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The first point I would make, Mr. Speaker, is that, under the
agreement, Iran has kept much of its nuclear infrastructure. It
continues to develop advanced centrifuges. It continues to gain the
ability to produce nuclear fuel on an industrial scale.
This means, if we are looking at the long haul on enforcement and
challenges ahead, that the ayatollah won't even have to cheat to be
just steps away from a nuclear weapon when the clock runs out.
In the meantime, tens of billions of dollars in sanctions relief is
now starting to flow to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Now, the assurances that we have been given--and these underlying
concerns, by the way, are why so many Members, including many from the
Foreign Affairs Committee, opposed the administration's deal with Iran
in the first place.
But these long-term problems now of Iran beginning to use that money
for terrorist activity, for the IRGC, and for support for Hezbollah is
what is prompting our effort now to try to get some kind of an
enforcement, not necessarily on the deal itself, but on original
assurances we had been given by the President.
For example, when he presented this deal, he claimed that the United
States would remain vigilant in countering Iran's sponsorship of
terrorism, its support for proxies who destabilize the Middle East, its
threats against America's friends and allies, like Israel.
Some of us supported the nuclear deal with Iran; some of us didn't.
But, regardless, I don't think any of us thought that Iran should be
given carte blanche to continue and even escalate its dangerous
hostility in that region and its hostility to us and our allies and
hostility to the Iranian people, frankly, which is another issue. That
is not what the administration told us last year.
It makes sense to do all we can to check this very dangerous trend in
Iranian activity. The problem is that the administration refuses to do
this. This is what drives us to bring the bill to the floor. The
administration refuses to negotiate, as I said before, on anything with
the word ``Iran'' in it. So that is why we are here.
I would ask my colleagues who oppose this measure: We were told, all
right, we are going to hold them on human rights. How many Iranian
officials has the administration designated for human rights abuses
since the negotiations ended? The answer to that is zero. There have
been no human rights designations in the past year. Talk about walking
on eggshells.
Despite the fact that Iran's Minister of Justice and head of the
judiciary--they are clear human rights violators, but they have not
been designated, as the number of executions inside Iran go up.
Iranian regional aggression has increased exponentially since this
agreement was reached. The administration has been reluctant to act
decisively on that.
In March, the CENTCOM Commander, General Joe Votel, testified that
Iran has become more aggressive in the days since the agreement.
Similarly, our Director of National Intelligence says Iran--in his
words, the foremost state sponsor of terrorism--continues to exert its
influence in regional crises in the Middle East through the
International Revolutionary Guard Corps, through the Quds Force, its
terrorist partner Lebanese Hezbollah, and its proxy groups. It also
provides military and economic aid to its allies in the region. Iran
and
[[Page H4957]]
Hezbollah remain a continuing terrorist threat to U.S. interests and
partnerships worldwide.
Now, if the IRGC ends up with $100 billion--because it is the
International Revolutionary Guard Corps that, in fact, nationalized
most of the companies inside Iran. If they get their hands on this
money and if this terrorist-sponsoring organization continues its
proliferation, then Hezbollah is going to be the primary beneficiary of
the sanctions relief.
We were assured that steps were going to be taken on that point. That
was supposed to be our end goal, right?
Secretary Kerry even admitted immediately after the implementation
day, ``I think that some of it will end up in the hands of the IRGC or
other entities, some of which are labeled `terrorists.' You know, to
some degree, I am not going to sit here and tell you that every
component of that can be prevented.''
Okay, it can't all be prevented, but surely some of it can. The
Secretary of State was basically saying that there was nothing the U.S.
could do to prevent the IRGC and terrorists from benefiting
exponentially from sanctions relief. No wonder Iran's efforts to
destabilize the region are picking up steam.
Consider Iran's smuggling of weapons to militants throughout the
region. According to the State Department, Iran arms Hezbollah with
advanced, long-range Iranian manufactured missiles, in violation of the
U.N. Security Council resolution. We are trying to do something to at
least say: Stop that.
Just days after the announcement of the JCPOA, here is what Hezbollah
leader Hassan Nasrallah asserted that that deal would not stand in the
way of Iranian support for Hezbollah.
How right he was, because in June 2016 Nasrallah boasted that all of
Hezbollah's weapons and rockets came from the Islamic Republic of
Iran--150,000 rockets pointed at our ally, Israel. And now they say
they are going to be able to target those with GPS technology. Aren't
we going to stand in the way of that?
Similarly, Iran continues to destabilize our partners in the Gulf.
They already overthrew the Government in Yemen with their support for
the Shiite Houthis there; particularly, also, in Bahrain, where they
carry out a low-level insurgency as well.
I beg to differ with the Secretary of State. There is something we
can do. We can act on the administration's stated commitment to our
allies and hold Iran's feet to the fire on this issue.
The Iran deal should not come at the cost of the domestic security of
our regional allies. We could have the original deal, and we could
still enforce what we were told on this floor would be enforced.
For 8 years, they were not supposed to be proliferating or developing
ballistic missiles. For 5 years, they were not supposed to be
transferring to Hezbollah additional weapons capability.
Now we are turning a blind eye. Now we are walking on eggshells with
respect to their treatment of their own people, as the human rights
violations and the executions become worse and as they hold two more
Americans.
Frankly, that is why this legislation is before us on the House
floor. I urge an ``aye'' vote.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
{time} 1130
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 819, the previous question is ordered on
the bill.
The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this question will be postponed.
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