[Senate Executive Report 104-10]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
104th Congress Exec. Report
SENATE
1st Session 104-10
_______________________________________________________________________
START II TREATY
_______
December 15, 1995.--Ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Helms, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany Treaty Doc. 103-1]
The Committee on Foreign Relations to which was referred
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation of Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (the START II Treaty) signed at Moscow on
January 3, 1993, including the following documents, which are
integral parts thereof: the Elimination and Conversion
Protocol; the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol; and the
Memorandum of Attribution having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon and recommends that the Senate give its
advice and consent to ratification thereof subject to 6
conditions and 7 declarations as set forth in this report and
the accompanying resolution of ratification.
CONTENTS
Pages
I. Purpose.........................................................2
II. Treaty Terms.....................................................3
III. Bilateral Military Implications..................................6
IV. Multilateral Implications.......................................21
V. Verification and Compliance.....................................29
VI. START II Implementation.........................................38
VII. Committee Action................................................40
VIII.Resolution of Ratification......................................46
IX. Article-by-Article Analysis.....................................49
X. Additional Views................................................60
I. Purpose
The Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (The START II Treaty) will commit the
United States and Russia to deeper reductions in strategic
offensive nuclear weapons, building upon the Treaty between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (The START Treaty). Whereas START theoretically
limits each States Party to 6,000 total warheads deployed on
1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (a 30 to 40 percent
reduction in existing arsenals), the START II Treaty
contemplates a substantially lower limit of 3,500 deployed
warheads, a ban on all land-based, multiple warhead ballistic
missiles, and limitations on the number of warheads deployed on
submarine launched ballistic missiles. Furthermore, unlike
START, all warheads deployed on heavy bombers will be
attributable under START II counting rules. Taken together,
START and START II will reduce the deployed strategic offensive
arms of the United States and Russia by roughly two-thirds.
CENTRAL LIMITS IN START II
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase II
Weapon System Phase I (complete by
2003)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total warheads.......................... 3,800-4,250 3,000-3,500
MIRVed ICBM warheads................ 1,200 0
Heavy ICBM warheads................. 650 0
SLBM warheads....................... 2,160 1,750
------------------------------------------------------------------------
START II is a bilateral treaty between the United States
and the Russian Federation, in contrast with START, which also
includes Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine as Parties. In
accordance with Lisbon Protocol, the other three Parties to the
START Treaty have joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty and have
pledged and are proceeding to eliminate strategic offensive
arms located on their territories. No nuclear warheads or
deployed strategic offensive arms should be located on their
territories by the completion of the first phase of the
reductions under START II.
START II is to be implemented simultaneously with START.
Seven years after START's entry into force neither Party may
deploy in excess of 4,250 strategic warheads. By January 1,
2003, the total number of warheads deployed by each Party will
not exceed 3,500. Furthermore, beyond that date no warheads are
to be deployed on land-based, intercontinental ballistic
missiles with multiple independently targetable nuclear
warheads (MIRVed ICBMs) or on heavy ICBMs.
In addition to central limits, the Treaty contains a number
of other prohibitions and exemptions, such as provisions
allowing for the downloading of all SLBMs and some multiple
warhead ICBMs, the elimination or conversion of launchers
(including the conversion of 90 SS-18 launchers to accommodate
the single-warhead SS-25), the elimination of the SS-18 class
of heavy ICBMs and conversion of SS-18 silos, and procedures
for inspecting and counting warheads deployed on heavy bombers.
The inspection regime established under START will be used
to verify START II provisions, except as otherwise provided. In
addition to the use of national technical means, on-site
inspection, and technical exhibitions, the START II Treaty
provides for additional inspections to confirm the elimination
of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters and to confirm ICBM
silo conversions. The Treaty also provides for exhibitions and
inspections to observe the variety of nuclear weapons with
which heavy bombers are actually equipped in order to ascertain
their relevant observable differences. For the U.S. this means
Russian inspection of the weapons carriage areas of a B-2
bomber--something not allowed under START inspection
provisions. Portions of the B-2 can be ``shrouded,'' however,
to safeguard the bomber's sensitive technical characteristics
during inspections.
Negotiations on START II, conducted throughout 1992, were
premised on U.S. interest in eliminating MIRVed ICBMs and
Russian interest in reducing nuclear arsenals to a sustainable
level given political and economic realities following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. As a result, Presidents Bush
and Yeltsin agreed at a June 1992 summit to a complete ban on
MIRVed ICBMs, warhead limitations on SLBMs, and a central limit
of 3,500 accountable warheads. They also issued the Joint
Statement on a Global Protection System, endorsing the concept
of U.S.-Russian cooperation on ballistic missile defense as a
stabilizing complement to well-structured reductions in
strategic offensive forces.
However, a number of developments in the fall of 1992
complicated negotiations, including a number of new Russian
proposals that differed from the agreed framework and which
raised concerns regarding new break-out opportunities for
Russia. During the final weeks of December 1992, the United
States made two significant concessions. Specifically, the
downloading rule established in START was relaxed to permit
Russia to maintain 105 of its 170 SS-19 ICBMs as single-warhead
missiles, and it was further agreed that Russia would be
allowed to deploy single-warhead missiles in 90 of its 154 SS-
18 silos. In return, Russia agreed to destroy all of its SS-18
missiles. Russia also agreed that the 90 SS-18 launchers it
retained would be converted using procedures designed to make
reconversion difficult.
Notwithstanding these modifications, the critical
components of the START II Treaty remained intact. Presidents
Bush and Yeltsin signed the Treaty on January 3, 1993 and it
was submitted to the Senate for advice and consent and referred
to the Committee on Foreign Relations on January 20, 1993.
Discussions on ballistic missile defense cooperation continued
throughout the Bush Administration but were discontinued by the
Clinton Administration.
II. Treaty Terms
The Treaty between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (The START II Treaty) consists of the
main Treaty text and three documents formally transmitted to
the Senate by the President on January 20, 1993, for the
Senate's advice and consent to ratification. START II is a
treaty with a preamble and 8 articles of an initial duration
the same as that of the START Treaty, two protocols, and a
memorandum of understanding as follows:
--The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of
Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of
Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (the Elimination and
Conversion Protocol);
--The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of
Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Russian Federation on Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
(the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol); and
--The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead
Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Memorandum on
Attribution).
The President also transmitted documents associated with,
but not integral parts of, the Protocols or the START II
Treaty. These documents are three exchanges of letters
embodying legally binding commitments from the Russian
Federation and the United States concerning the removal of SS-
18 missiles from Kazakstan, the deployment of nuclear weapons
on heavy bombers, and Russian conversion of SS-18 missile
silos. These documents are relevant to the consideration of the
START II Treaty by the Senate. No new U.S. security assurances
or guarantees are associated with any of these letters.
a. the treaty text
Article I obligates the Parties to meet START reductions
and to reduce their ICBMs, SLBMs, respective launchers, and
heavy bombers so that by January 1, 2003, the aggregate number
for deployed warheads does not exceed 3,500. The following
sublimits are also applied: 1,750 for deployed SLBMs, no ICBMs
to which more than one warhead is attributed, no deployed heavy
ICBMs, no deployed launchers of an ICBM to which more than one
warhead is attributed, no deployed launchers of heavy ICBMs,
and no heavy ICBMs. Launchers may either be destroyed or
converted (the procedures for which are specified elsewhere)
and, in most cases, the missiles need not be destroyed. To
reach the above levels there is not a specific legal obligation
to reduce at a given rate.]
Article II states an exception to the requirement for
launchers. Ninety heavy ICBM silo launchers may be converted to
accommodate SS-25 type ICBMs. Russia further pledges its best
efforts to reach an agreement with Kazakstan on the return of
heavy SS-18 ICBMs for destruction. Each party has the right to
inspect the destruction of heavy ICBMs and their launch
canisters, as well as the conversion of silo launchers for
heavy ICBMs. Both Parties agree not to transfer heavy ICBMs to
any recipient whatsoever; nor will they produce, acquire,
flight-test, or deploy ICBMs to which more than one warhead is
attributed.
Article III sets forth the rules for reducing the warhead
attribution (i.e. ``downloading'') of existing types of ICBMs
and SLBMs other than heavy ICBMs. START II bans downloading of
heavy ICBMs as well as new types of ICBMs and SLBMs but it
allows the Parties to exceed the START limit of 1,250 on total
warhead downloading and the 500 warhead limit on downloading
ICBMs and SLBMs other than the U.S. Minuteman III and the
Russian SS-N-18. The Parties also are allowed to download by up
to five warheads up to 105 of one of the two types of ICBMs or
SLBMs permitted to be downloaded by subparagraph 5(c)(ii) of
Article III of the START Treaty. As a practical matter, this
means Russia will retain 105 SS-19 missiles whose elimination
otherwise would be required. Reentry vehicle platform
destruction is not required. The uploading of ICBMs or SLBMs
which have been downloaded is banned.
Article IV establishes constraints on heavy bombers,
specifying that the number of nuclear warheads attributed to a
deployed heavy bomber shall be equal to the number of nuclear
weapons with which any bomber of that type or variant is
actually equipped. The number of warheads attributed to a heavy
bomber of a given type or variant of a type is listed in the
Memorandum on Attribution. The Memorandum requires a one-time
exhibition, no later than 180 days after entry into force, of
one heavy bomber of each type and variant to demonstrate the
number of nuclear weapons for which such bombers are actually
equipped. Each Party can increase or decrease the number of
warheads for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped, but
this requires a repeated exhibition. Each party may reorient to
a conventional role heavy bombers not accountable under START
as being equipped with air launched cruise missiles. This is in
addition to the right under START to convert up to 76 heavy
bombers, using specified procedures, to a non-nuclear role.
Reoriented heavy bombers must have segregated basing and may
not be used in nuclear missions, nuclear exercises, nor can
their crews train or exercise for nuclear missions. Each party
has the one-time right, with a 90-day notice, to return heavy
bombers to a nuclear role. Reoriented bombers must be based at
least 100 kilometers away from storage areas for heavy bomber
nuclear armaments, and are subject to inspection. If only some
bombers of a given type are reoriented, then those bombers must
be distinguished from the nuclear types in a manner observable
by National Technical Means.
Article V establishes that the provisions of the START
Treaty, including its verification provisions, shall be used
for implementing START II. The Bilateral Implementation
Commission (BIC) shall be established to serve as the framework
within which the Parties will seek to resolve any questions
related to compliance with the START II Treaty, and the forum
by which Parties might agree on any additional measures
necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of START
II.
Article VI specifies that the Treaty is subject to
ratification prior to entering into force, and will not enter
into force prior to the START Treaty. The ban on the transfer
of heavy ICBMs to a third state or states shall be
provisionally applied as of the date of signature of START II.
The START II Treaty will remain in force for the duration of
the START Treaty. Both Parties have the right to withdraw from
the Treaty with six months notice if extraordinary events
related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized a
Party's supreme interests.
Article VII is identical in content to Article XVIII of the
START Treaty, providing for amendments to the START II Treaty.
Such amendments would be subject to ratification as specified
in Article VI of the Treaty.
Article VIII provides for the registration of the Treaty
with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Final Provision of the START II Treaty records that the
Treaty was done at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies,
each in the English and Russian languages, and each being
equally authentic.
b. integral additional documents
The Treaty includes other documents which the President and
the Secretary indicated are ``integral'' parts of the Treaty,
and are submitted for consideration as legally binding parts of
the Treaty:
--an Elimination and Conversion Protocol setting
forth elimination and conversion procedures for heavy
ICBMs and heavy ICBM launchers;
--an Exhibition and Inspections Protocol setting
forth requirements on exhibitions and inspections of
heavy bombers; and
--a Memorandum of Understanding that includes the
required data on the treaty-limited items possessed by
the Parties.
c. separate letters
Associated with the START II Treaty are three separate,
legally binding exchanges of letters, two of which were signed
by Andrey Kozyrev, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and
Lawrence Eagleburger, U.S. Secretary of State, and one exchange
of letters signed by Pavel Grachev, Russian Minister of
Defense, and Richard Cheney, U.S. Secretary of Defense. No new
U.S. obligations are entailed in these letters.
III. Bilateral Military Implications
The committee considered the START II Treaty during a
period of fundamental transformation in the international
security environment. START II is a bilateral arms control
agreement committing the United States and Russia to even
deeper reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals than
contemplated under the START Treaty. The Treaty provides that
by the year 2003 the United States and Russia must reduce their
deployed strategic warheads to a level at or below 3,500--a
more than two-thirds reduction over current levels. When fully
implemented, it will eliminate completely all land-based
multiple warhead (MIRVed) ICBMs, including all of the Russian
``heavy'' SS-18 ICBMs, thereby accomplishing two longstanding
U.S. negotiating goals. However, both U.S. nuclear doctrine and
U.S. strategic forces must evolve to meet the challenges of the
post-Cold War era. Consequently, as shall be discussed later in
this report, any assessment of the military implications of the
START II Treaty must consider the changing nature of a complex
and multipolar world. More directly, START II's bipolar
military significance and verifiability both are linked
integrally to the full implementation of START and the
anticipated composition of the post-START II Russian strategic
forces. It should also be recalled that START II was negotiated
in the context of a robust national missile defense program
intended to enhance strategic stability and possible
cooperation with Russia on the same. A national missile defense
system remains imperative to enhance stability under START II;
safeguard against potential changes in Russia; and defend
against other emerging ballistic missile threats to the United
States.
Linkages with the START Treaty
The START Treaty provides for the following principal,
maximum numerical limitations on the strategic arsenals of the
United States and Russia:
1,600 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles
(ICBMs, SLBMs, and Heavy Bombers);
6,000 accountable warheads (ICBMs, SLBMs, and Heavy
Bombers);
4,900 ballistic missile warheads (ICBMs and SLBMs);
1,100 warheads on land-mobile ICBMs;
1,540 warheads deployed on no more than 154 Soviet
SS-18s;
1,250 total warhead limit on downloading;
500 total warhead sublimit on downloading for ICBMs
and SLBMs other than the U.S. Minuteman III and the
Russian SS-N-18 SLBM; and
3,600 metric tons throw-weight ceiling.
Further, a set of politically binding side agreements under
START limits each side to 880 deployed sea-launched cruise
missiles (SLCMs) in any one year, and limits Russia to 500
Backfire bombers, which are understood not to possess
intercontinental range nor in-flight refueling capability.
In addition to these limits, START requires the destruction
of strategic launchers (bombers, silos, and submarine
launchers), but does not require destruction of nuclear
warheads or missiles (other than mobile missiles beyond the
non-deployed limit of 250). Instead, START allows the use of
retired missiles as space-launch vehicles and for missile
defense programs, with corresponding verification provisions
designed to constrain illicit activities.
Taken altogether, the START Treaty will produce the
following reductions:
TOTAL ACTUAL WARHEADS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of EIF START limits Net reduction Percent reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States (MOU)................. 13,000 8,500 4,500 35
Soviet (MOU)........................ 11,000 6,500 4,500 41
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACCOUNTABLE START WARHEADS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of EIF \1\ START limits Net reduction Percent reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States (MOU)................. 10,563 6,000 4,563 43
Soviet (MOU)........................ 10,271 6,000 4,271 42
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Entry into Force
BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of EIF START limits Net reduction Percent reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States (MOU)................. 8,210 4,900 3,310 40
Soviet (MOU)........................ 9,416 4,900 4,516 48
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of EIF START limits Net reduction Percent reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States (MOU)................. 2,246 1,245 1,00 145
Soviet (MOU)........................ 2,500 1,424 1,076 43
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note.--Estimates depend upon particular force structure assumptions.
HEAVY ICBM's
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of EIF START limits Net reduction Percent reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States (MOU)................. 0 0 0 0
Soviet (MOU)........................ 308 154 154 50
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The START Treaty was signed as a bilateral agreement
between the United States and the Soviet Union on July 31,
1991, after nine years of negotiation. Although the Treaty was
transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification on November 25, 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved
formally on December 25, 1991. The dissolution of the Soviet
Union introduced a number of complex state succession issues
into the Senate's consideration of the START Treaty. Most
importantly, strategic offensive nuclear weapons were left
deployed in four former Soviet republics: Russia, Belarus,
Ukraine and Kazakstan:
1992 DISPOSITION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION (FSU)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kazakstan Ukraine Belarus Russia Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBM's........................... 104 SS-18s 46 SS-24s (silo), 54 SS-25s (mobile) 1,067 1,401
130 SS-19s (silo)
ICBM warheads.................... 1,040 1,240 54 4,278 6,612
SLBM's........................... 0 0 0 940 940
SLBM warheads.................... 0 0 0 2,804 2,804
SSBN's........................... 0 0 0 0 62
Bombers.......................... 40 Bear Hs 14 Bear Hs, 16 0 88 162
Blackjacks, 4
Heavy Bombers
Bomber warheads.................. 370 416 0 800 1,600
IC/HB bases...................... 3 4 2 2 31
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note.--Estimates of the total number of warheads on Ukrainian territory are open to question. In testimony
before the committee on October 4, 1994, Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter indicated that Ukraine
had 1,734 warheads prior to START's EIF, as opposed to the 1,564 cited in the START MOU.
In order to resolve this key succession problem, the START
Treaty was converted into a multilateral treaty among the
United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine by means
of the May 23, 1992, Lisbon Protocol (Treaty Doc. 102-32).
Constituting an amendment to, and an integral part of, the
START Treaty, the Protocol provided that the four former Soviet
republics would together assume the legal obligations of the
USSR for the START Treaty. It further obligated the four states
to make arrangements among themselves as necessary to implement
the Treaty's limitations, to permit verification of the
Treaty's provisions on their territory, and to allocate costs.
It also obligated Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakstan to accede to
the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the status
of non-nuclear-weapons states as soon as possible.
In letters submitted with the Protocol, Belarus, Ukraine
and Kazakstan pledged to eliminate all nuclear weapons and
strategic offensive arms on their respective territories within
seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty. All
tactical nuclear weapons have been removed from the three
states and transferred to Russia. However, the committee notes
that Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakstan are under no legal
obligation to transfer any nuclear weapons to Russia. They
could--in theory--elect to eliminate such weapons on their own
territories. Yet, because these countries lack the necessary
facilities for local elimination, the Bush Administration's
Article-by-Article Analysis of the Lisbon Protocol concluded:
``As a practical matter, we expect that nuclear weapons will be
transferred to and eliminated in Russia.''
In addition to obligations undertaken with respect to the
Lisbon Protocol, Belarus and Kazakstan have also concluded
bilateral agreements with Russia to deactivate and transfer
their strategic arsenals to Russia. Prior to START's entry into
force, all Parties began deactivating and eliminating strategic
systems to meet Treaty obligations. In this regard, as of
September the Parties have achieved the following levels for
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) and warheads (WH).
NUMBER OF WEAPONS ATTRIBUTED TO THE FOUR PARTIES TO THE UNITED STATES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SNDV/WH
---------------------------------------
As of Sept. 1,
1990 Sept. 1, 1995
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Belarus......................... 54/54 18/18
Kazakstan....................... 144/1,360 48/480
Russia.......................... 2,092/7,345 1,513/6,769
Ukraine......................... 210/1,512 220/1,592
---------------------------------------
Total for the former
Soviet Union............. 2,500/10,271 1,799/8,859
United States................... 2,246/10,563 1,727/8,345
------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of September 1995, the United States has:
Removed all nuclear warheads--approximately 3,900--
from 450 Minuteman II ICBMs and from 384 Poseidon C-3
and C-4 SLBMs;
Destroyed 120 Minuteman II ICBM silo launchers and
removed ICBMs from the remaining Minuteman II silo
launchers;
Destroyed 320 Poseidon C-3 and C-4 SLBM launchers,
which represents 20 ballistic missile submarines
destroyed, and removed SLBMs from the remaining 64
launchers;
Eliminated 251 heavy bombers from Treaty
accountability; roughly 135 heavy bombers remaining to
be eliminated under START have been retired from
operation and moved to an elimination facility.
The United States has thus completed 56 percent of its
overall missile launcher and heavy bomber eliminations to be
accomplished under START. As a result, the United States is
already below START's first phase limits on delivery vehicles
and accountable warheads, which do not take effect until
December 1997.
Also as of December 1995, over 3,000 strategic warheads
have been removed from deployment in Belarus, Kazakstan, and
Ukraine, and over 2,500 of these have been transferred to
Russia, including all warheads formerly located Kazakstan. The
remaining warheads in Belarus and Ukraine are scheduled to be
transferred to Russia in 1996. Furthermore, over 700 missile
launchers and heavy bombers have been eliminated throughout the
former Soviet Union. As a result of these eliminations, the
combined total number of delivery vehicles and accountable
warheads in the new independent states is also below START's
first phase limits on these items.
From START to START II
In January 1992, President Bush proposed to ban MIRVed
ICBMs and to limit actual warheads to 4,700. He further offered
to reduce the number of U.S. Trident warheads by one-third.
Although President Yeltsin agreed with the ban in principle, he
considered the Bush proposal inequitable since it would affect
primarily the land-based leg of Russia's strategic triad--
traditionally Russia's forte--while allowing U.S. retention of
a nuclear advantage in both heavy bombers and submarine-
launched ballistic missile warheads. The impasse was resolved
by U.S. agreement to deeper cuts in SLBMs. On June 17, 1992,
Presidents Bush and Yeltsin signed a Joint Understanding in
Washington that paved the way for the formal negotiation of the
START II Treaty. On that same day they issued the Joint
Statement on a Global Protection System providing for
discussion of U.S.-Russian cooperation on ballistic missile
defense. This followed-up on President Yeltsin's speech at the
United Nations on January 31, 1992.
The START II Treaty, in contrast with START, is relatively
brief and straightforward, calling for two phases of reductions
in ICBMs, ICBM launchers, ICBM warheads, SLBMs, SLBM launchers,
SLBM warheads, heavy bombers, and the nuclear payloads loaded
onto heavy bombers. START II contains limits in some categories
of weapons not addressed in the START Treaty, and in turn does
not alter all START limits. In those cases where no limit is
expressed in the latter treaty, START limits remain applicable.
COMPARISON OF CENTRAL LIMITS IN START AND START II
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapon system START START II
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total delivery vehicles....... 1,600........... No limit specified.
Warheads attributed to all 6,000........... 3,000-3,500.
delivery vehicles.
Warheads attributable to all 4,900........... No limit specified.
ballistic missiles.
Warheads attributed to MIRVed No limit 0.
ICBMs. specified.
Warheads attributed to heavy 1,540........... 0.
ICBMs.
Warheads attributed to mobile 1,100........... No limit specified.
ICBMs.
Warheads attributed to SLBMs.. No limit 1,750.
specified.
Warheads attributed to heavy Discounted by As actually deployed.
bombers. 50%, or counted
as a single
warhead.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Besides the deeper cuts, the practical effect of the START
II Treaty is the elimination of the U.S. MX missile,
significant reductions in U.S. heavy bombers, and a sublimit on
the number of warheads to be deployed on SLBMs--all areas of
comparative advantage for the United States--in exchange for
elimination of the Russian SS-18 heavy ICBM and a ban on MIRVed
ICBMs.
Maintenance of the U.S. strategic deterrent
The committee has concluded that the START II Treaty will
enhance U.S. security through reducing the overall levels of
strategic nuclear arms possessed by both Russia and the United
States, eliminating the Russian SS-18 heavy ICBM, and banning
the deployment of ICBMs with more than one warhead. At the same
time, START II does not fundamentally alter the deterrence
value of the U.S. nuclear force posture, maintaining instead
the two fundamental concerns of strategic parity and strategic
stability. Parity undergirds U.S. deterrence strategy by
ensuring a retaliatory capability threatening unacceptable
costs that would outweigh benefits. Strategic stability--at
least in the Cold War, bipolar vein--derives from the types of
strategic offensive arms deployed by both Parties. In
particular, stability depends upon an environment in which
neither side has the incentive to engage in a pre-emptive
strike. As such, these two concepts are intertwined. In
testimony before the committee, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvilli, offered his
judgment that the START II Treaty not only maintains the
deterrent value of U.S. nuclear forces, but goes further than
the START Treaty to ensure stability by emphasizing a
survivable mix of forces. On the subject of parity, General
Shalikashvilli noted:
It was our view that with the 3,500 warheads allowed
under this treaty we would remain capable of holding at
risk a broad enough range of high value political and
military targets to deter any rational adversary from
launching a nuclear attack against our nation or our
allies.
Last September, we completed the Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR)--an effort chartered to determine what
roles our nuclear forces must meet to protect against
future challenges to U.S. National Security interests.
The NPR assumed the post-START II nuclear force levels
and its analysis reconfirmed the calculations that were
done before and during the negotiations for START II.
The review reaffirmed both that we must maintain a
viable nuclear deterrent in the post-Cold War world and
that 3,500 warheads will be sufficient to hold at risk
those assets which any foreseeable enemy would most
value--the core determinant of effective deterrence.
On the question of strategic stability, General Shalikashvilli
further concluded:
In the past, with MIRVed ICBMs a significant part of
the forces of both sides, there was much greater
incentive to shoot first during a crisis. The inherent
vulnerability of land-based missiles to a first strike,
compounded by the consideration of losing the multiple
warheads on MIRVed missiles, argued for launching these
weapons before they could be disabled by an enemy
strike. Thus, eliminating this entire category of
nuclear weapons relieves the incentive to launch first,
adding greatly to crisis stability. START II also
eliminates the last of the heavy ICBMs--the remaining
Russian SS-18s--which are hostage to the same logic and
are therefore equally destabilizing in a crisis.
In addition to eliminating these two kinds of
systems, the restructuring of our triad made under the
terms of this Treaty will improve stability in its own
right. Our START II ICBM leg will be a less attractive
target than has been the case in the past. That all of
our remaining ICBMs will have single warheads will make
them less valuable targets than MIRVed missiles. But,
in addition, the combined calculus of rough equivalency
in overall warheads between us and the Russians, and
the fact that all remaining ICBMs will be equipped with
single warheads, will make it highly unlikely that
Russia will consider launching an effective first
strike to disarm our ICBMs. Under the warhead calculus
of this Treaty, to achieve the levels of confidence
needed to disarm this one leg of our triad would
require such a high proportion of Russia's overall
warheads that this course would leave the attacker at a
significant disadvantage. By any rational calculation,
the costs would greatly outweigh any potential gains.
The committee finds the logic and objectives underpinning
the U.S. negotiating position on START II to be based on sound
reasoning concerning the size and composition of nuclear forces
necessary to retain a credible deterrent force beyond the year
2003. Notwithstanding significant reductions under START and
START II, U.S. nuclear forces will continue to be robust enough
to sustain an appropriate targeting strategy and a suitable
range of response options, even in the unlikely event of a
massive first strike. The START II force levels provide enough
survivable forces which, when coupled with survivable,
sustained command and control systems, maintain U.S. national
security. Stability would be further enhanced by a national
missile defense against limited strikes whether by accidental
launch or from third countries.
U.S. force survivability
The START Treaty limits each side to 6,000 accountable
warheads (of which no more than 4,900 may be deployed on ICBMs
and SLBMs). START II will limit the two Parties to roughly half
of that ceiling--to between 3,500 and 3,000 warheads, of which
no more than 1,750 may be deployed on SLBMs and of which none
may be deployed on MIRVed or ``heavy'' ICBMs. As can be seen in
the table below, the Treaty will accomplish deep reductions in
both U.S. and Russian strategic forces. This table reflects the
judgment of Secretary of Defense Perry, who stated in testimony
before the committee that the U.S. allocation of 3,500
warheads:
* * * will be divided among ICBM, SLBMs and the bombs
and warheads on our bombers. An approximate disposition
of this force would be 500 ICBM warheads, fewer than
1700 SLBM warheads, and approximately 1300 warheads on
bombers. * * * Based on present planning, that is the
way we would distribute our forces under START II. I
believe this would be, of course, entirely capable of
carrying out our mission of strategic deterrence.
ILLUSTRATIVE COMPARISON OF U.S. AND RUSSIAN FORCES UNDER START AND START II
[As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 1994 START START II
-----------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Russia U.S. Russia U.S. Russia
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBM warheads....................................... 2,499 6,078 1,444 2,800 500 805
SLBM warheads....................................... 3,648 2,560 3,456 2,096 1,680 1,712
Bomber weapons...................................... 4,884 1,784 4,504 1,888 1,260 744
-----------------------------------------------------------
Totals........................................ 11,031 10,422 9,404 6,784 3,440 3,261
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Because weapons that are deactivated but not eliminated continue to count under the force limits
established in both START and START II, some of the warheads included on this table may be attributable to non-
operational systems.
In general, the survivability of U.S. forces depends upon
the nature of the attack, the mix of strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles employed, and force preparedness. It is commonly
accepted that the following percentages of warheads would
survive a first-strike attack:
--ICBMs in silos (roughly 10 percent survivable)
--ICBMs on mobile trucks/trains in garrisons (roughly
10 percent)
--ICBMs on mobile platforms scattered to deployment
areas (roughly 80-100 percent)
--SLBMs under normal U.S. operational practices
(roughly 65 percent for Tridents)
--Heavy bomber weapons under day-to-day alert
(roughly 30 percent).
Given these ratios, the committee finds that reductions
under both START and START II have resulted in a more
survivable U.S. force structure. Whereas these calculations
yielded a survivable force estimate of just over 37 percent for
the pre-START U.S. force posture, that estimate increases to 40
percent with START fully implemented, and to 44 percent, or
1,520 warheads, for a post-START II force structure. (500
ICBMs10%=50 warheads; 1,680 SLBMs65%=1,092
warheads; 1,260 Bomber Weapons30%=378 warheads;
total=1,520 warheads.)
Post-START II structure of U.S. forces
United States maintains a triad of strategic offensive
forces. In this combination, ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers
provide a redundant mix of mutually supporting capabilities.
This is designed, in part, to complicate an aggressors attack
by requiring the targeting of each independent leg in an effort
to reduce the effectiveness of a retaliatory second strike.
Further, the triad serves as a hedge against both a system-wide
flaw in one or another leg and the possibility of technological
breakthrough, which might render a component of the triad
obsolete or vulnerable. Finally, the triad offers flexibility
in striking military targets. While the bomber leg of the triad
will undergo deep reductions under START II--28 B-52H bombers
will be eliminated and all B-1B bombers will be reoriented to
conventional bombing roles--the composition of the ICBM and
SLBM legs of the U.S. triad will remain fairly constant. The
U.S. will operate four fewer Trident submarines and fifty fewer
ICBMs (all MX missiles having been slated for elimination) than
it would have under START. General Shalikashvilli contended in
his testimony before the committee on March 1, 1995, that START
and START II will improve the viability of the triad by
eliminating those elements of the Russian force posture which
most directly threatened its integrity.
Yet despite the effective retention of the nuclear triad
posture in the post-START II force structure, the committee is
concerned that no U.S. bombers are on day-to-day alert at
present, having been removed from nuclear alert in September
1991. A short or no-notice attack therefore holds the prospect
of destroying nearly all of the air-breathing leg of the triad
as well as the vast majority of U.S. ICBMs, leaving the United
States dependent upon those Trident submarines patrolling at
sea. During the Cold War, the U.S. fielded 40 SSBNs. The post-
START II force recommended in the Nuclear Posture Review will
consist of just 14 Trident submarines (of which only 8 to 10
would be at sea at any given time). Thus the number of
submarines that an adversary would need to locate at sea is
markedly less.
Second, the committee is concerned that, with no new
strategic systems under development, the United States will
possess for the next several decades an aging fleet of
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The last B-52 was produced
in 1964, and the last Minuteman III ICBM was deployed in 1975.
Yet these two systems comprise 61 percent of all U.S. nuclear
delivery vehicles, and will carry 42 percent of the warheads
allowed the United States. In contrast, it is likely that fully
three quarters of all of Russia's post-START II strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles will have been produced after 1985.
The committee concurs with Admiral Chiles, Commander in Chief,
U.S. Strategic Command, when he noted in a letter to Secretary
Perry prior to the public release of the Nuclear Posture Review
findings:
With no new strategic systems anticipated for the
foreseeable future, the challenge is to maintain
existing systems in the absence of a supporting
production base. Preservation of key strategic
industrial-base capabilities is required to attract and
retain the experienced personnel that will be needed to
resolve inevitable problems with aging systems.
If the United States is to maintain a credible nuclear
deterrent, it must accord a high priority to Minuteman life-
extension programs and retention of both the bomber and
submarine industrial bases.
Implications for the U.S. defense industrial base
Nowhere are qualitative and quantitative issues so
intertwined as in the case of the B-2 bomber. The fact that the
platform is so well positioned to capitalize upon technological
innovations such as stealth capability, new precision-guided
munitions, and information warfare, has much to do with its
cost. Nor is it is surprising to find that the defense
industrial base responsible for B-2 production has proven very
sensitive to decreases in procurement. Reduction in the number
of B-2s to be purchased to a total of 20 aircraft from the
original plan for 132 has caused dramatic attrition in the
ranks of subcontractors involved in B-2 production. Nearly half
of the industry has '``haken out'' between 1989 and 1995. Most
importantly, key components of the bomber will no longer be
produced after the construction of the twentieth aircraft. For
example, the sole producer of the radar-absorbent body core of
the B-2, the Hexcel Corporation, declared bankruptcy in late
1993.
There has been much discussion of late regarding the merits
of commercial and military integration. Certainly it has often
been the case that the technologies which have spurred
technological revolutions originated outside the defense sector
and were subsequently imported. Both the railroad and
telegraph, and the rise of commercial automotive and aircraft
production are excellent examples. Indeed, even the casting
methods employed to fashion church bells proved applicable to
creation of artillery tubes, leading the military historian
Bernard Brodie to comment that ``the early founders, whose task
had been to fashion bells which tolled the eternal message of
peace * * * contributed unintentionally to the discovery of one
of man's most terrible weapons.''
However, the committee does not agree with Secretary of
Defense Perry's testimony on March 1, 1994, before a Senate
Armed Services subcommittee that:
The rationale for not maintaining the bomber
industrial base is that we have a robust commercial
base in building large transport planes * * * and
[that] we could, in time, pivot from the commercial
base to the building of bombers again as we have done
in earlier eras in our history.
This policy ignores the fact that some elements of the
defense industrial base are so uniquely military in their
orientation that they are without parallel in the commercial
sector. Such would be the case for the B-2, whose large
composite structures depend upon facilities and know-how the
reconstitution of which would prove an expensive proposition.
The original development of the B-2, for example, involved $24
billion in sunk costs. Once dissipated, the loss of
institutional memory and personnel would prove costly.
Debate on the preservation of the B-2 industrial base is in
many respects similar to the discussion over the submarine
industrial base. While the committee believes uniqueness, in
and of itself, is not a convincing argument for retention of
either capability, it does find central to both the B-2 and the
submarine debates the question of whether or not these
platforms fulfill important roles, and the extent to which
their respective industrial capabilities are critical to future
security requirements. The criticality of these systems to the
post-START II deterrent posture of the United States is beyond
question. Together, these two platforms will bear the onus of
carrying 61 percent of the U.S. nuclear arsenal--just 20 B-2
bombers will carry over 12 percent of the total, and an even
fewer number of Trident submarines will carry 49 percent. In
particular, the stealth capabilities and flexibility of the B-2
will become increasingly important in a world littered with
sophisticated technologies such as radar systems, surface-to-
air missiles, and nuclear, chemical, and biological threats.
The ongoing technological revolution
A number of defense planners have suggested that the United
States finds itself in the midst of an ongoing ``military-
technical revolution.'' Developments associated with this
revolution are particularly relevant to the question of how
U.S. strategic forces will be structured, as well as to efforts
at anticipating future threats. The Senate is challenged, in
its consideration of the START II Treaty, to conceptualize
future conflict in an environment already undergoing dramatic
transformations. While the United States may seek to use
emerging technologies in the future to compensate for force
structure reductions and to maximize platform capabilities, it
must be well positioned to capitalize upon such a development.
Naturally the identification of such technologies becomes
critical. Failure in this respect threatens the U.S. military
with obsolescence. Just as importantly, such a failure would
afford other countries the opportunity to offset current
numerical or qualitative inferiorities vis-vis the U.S.
deterrent with innovation, or to possibly to realize a sudden
jump to parity.
Military-technical revolutions depend not only on the
emergence of new technologies, but upon the adaptation of
operations and organizations to maximize the employment of
cutting-edge capabilities. German integration of aircraft
operations and radios following the First World War enabled
them to defeat the French and British in a six-week-long
combined arms offensive. Today's global positioning receiver
holds for the future battlefield what the radio posed for the
Western Front in 1940.
However, the comparative advantage conferred by a given
technology tends to be short-lived. The initial advantage by no
means suggests continued dominance, or even competitiveness.
This is a lesson of particular relevance to the submarine leg
of the U.S. triad. It was, after all, the French who made
substantial advances in sub-surface warfare during the
nineteenth century, but the Germans who ultimately employed the
submarine to devastating effect in both World Wars. Forty years
later, it would seem that current U.S. superiority in this
dimension of warfare make the Trident SSBN leg of the triad the
most invulnerable of the three. Yet financial pressures may
cause this advantage to evaporate, along with the submarine
industrial base. This is a particularly troubling prospect
given that Russian work on a fifth generation SSN continues
apace and that a new Russian SSBN is scheduled to enter
production shortly after the turn of the century. According to
a public report issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence:
``For the first time, Russia's front-line submarines are as
quiet or quieter in some respects than America's best.'' The
committee is concerned that, in light of continued Russian
technological advances and the global spread of sophisticated
technologies, the loss of the United States' industrial
capability in either the subsurface or aerospace dimension of
the battlefield would prove a serious error.
SLBMs
Under START II the United States will deploy 14 Trident
submarines, each equipped with 24 D-5 SLBMs. As was to be the
case under START, roughly half of all U.S. warheads will be
deployed on submarines. SLBMs will comprise 77 percent of all
ballistic missiles in the post-START II arsenal (versus 71
percent under START).
ILLUSTRATIVE U.S. SUBMARINE FORCES UNDER START AND START II
[As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 1994 Expected, START Expected, START II
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
SLBMs Warheads SLBMs Warheads SLBMs Warheads
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Poseidon C-3...................... 48 480 0 0 0 0
Poseidon C-4...................... 96 768 0 0 0 0
Trident C-4....................... 192 1,536 192 1,536 0 0
Trident D-5....................... 168 1,344 240 1,920 336 1,680
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals...................... 456 3,648 432 3,456 336 1,680
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Heavy bombers
START II's attribution rules for heavy bombers differ
significantly from those in START. Under the START Treaty, each
of the first 150 U.S. bombers equipped to carry air-launched
cruise missiles (ALCMs) was counted as having 10 warheads,
though these bombers in fact are capable of carrying as many as
20 ALCMs. Similarly, each of the first 210 Russian bombers
equipped with cruise missiles was counted as 8 warheads though
in reality each could carry up to 16. Every additional ALCM-
equipped bomber would be attributed with the full number of
warheads that they were equipped to carry. All other bombers
carrying nuclear gravity bombs or short-range nuclear missiles
were attributed one warhead (despite the fact that U.S.
bombers, for example, can carry up to 24 of these weapons).
These counting rules would have allowed both sides to deploy
nuclear weapons in excess of the 6,000 warhead limit imposed on
delivery vehicles by START.
Under the START II Treaty, bombers are attributed with the
actual number of warheads with which they can be equipped. As a
practical matter, this will produce major changes in the heavy
bomber leg of the U.S. strategic triad. In order to meet the
3,500 warhead central limit of START II, all B-1B bombers are
likely to be reoriented to conventional missions. Further, the
U.S. will retain fewer B-52s in inventory, and may equip many
of those with 12 ALCMs rather than the 20 allowed under START.
The committee anticipates that the net effect of changes in
attribution rules, coupled with lower warhead limits, will be a
much reduced heavy bomber force of less than 90 bombers
carrying roughly 1,260 warheads. The committee notes that, all
other considerations aside, the incorporation of an additional
20 B-2 bombers into the U.S. force structure would only require
the retirement of 16 B-52H bombers, thereby increasing the
number of U.S. strategic nuclear delivery platforms without
altering the basic warhead allocations of the triad.
As it now stands, the heavy bomber component will likely
constitute less than 40 percent of the total number of deployed
warheads in the total strategic force--a decrease of roughly 10
percent from the expected START nuclear force posture.
ILLUSTRATIVE U.S. HEAVY BOMBER FORCES UNDER START AND START II
[As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 1994 Expected, START Expected, START II
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aircraft Warheads Aircraft Warheads MOU Aircraft Warheads
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B-52G........................................................ 53 636 0 0 12 0 0
B-52H........................................................ 94 1,880 94 1,880 20 \1\ 66 940
B-1B......................................................... 96 2,304 96 2,304 16 0 0
B-2.......................................................... 4 64 20 320 16 20 320
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals................................................. 247 4,884 210 4,504 ........... 86 1,260
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ B-52G and B-52H.
ICBM's
The land-based component of the U.S. triad will also be
significantly reduced under the START II Treaty. Whereas the
United States planned to field 550 ICBMs under the START force
posture, under START II it will field 500 missiles, eliminating
its arsenal of 50 MX Peacekeeper ICBMs with 10 warheads each.
The Minuteman III, which is to be deployed with one warhead
under force planning for both Treaties, will become the sole
ICBM in the U.S. inventory. The land-based share of the total
U.S. warhead allotment remains unchanged from START to START II
(at 15 percent). However, the number of ballistic missiles that
will be deployed on land versus the number deployed at sea will
decrease to less than one quarter of the total.
ILLUSTRATIVE U.S. ICBM FORCES UNDER START AND START II
[As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 1994 Expected, START Expected, START II
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBMs Warheads ICBMs Warheads ICBMs Warheads
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minuteman II...................... 409 409 0 0 0 0
Minuteman III..................... 530 1,590 500 944 500 500
MX................................ 50 500 50 500 0 0
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals...................... 989 2,499 550 1,444 500 500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Post-START II structure of Russian forces
Like the United States, Russia maintains a strategic triad
of land-based, submarine, and bomber forces. Unlike the United
States, however, Russia's strategic forces are dominated by the
land-based component. Even more so than in the case of START,
ICBMs will bear the brunt of Russia's reductions under START
II. Under START, Russia could be expected to deploy roughly 60
percent of its ballistic missile warheads on ICBMs. The
committee anticipates that START II will produce a significant
shift in the composition of Russian strategic forces, leading
Russia to deploy approximately 30 percent of its ballistic
missile warheads on land-based systems. The other 70 percent
likely will be deployed on SLBMs. Even with this shift in
priorities, START II will have very little effect on either the
submarine or bomber-based legs of the Russian strategic triad
since--in any event--Russia would have eliminated the bulk of
these systems to comply with START and to reduce maintenance
and operations costs.
SLBM's
In the case of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as
noted previously, START II contains a sublimit of 1,750 SLBMs.
Projections of Russia's future SLBM force structure are
contingent upon a number of variables. Given Russian Defense
Minister Grachev's high prioritization of a new generation of
ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), the committee believes it
reasonable to assume that Russia will deploy roughly the
treaty-maximum number of warheads. One difference, however, may
be that the SS-N-18 missiles, which would have been downloaded
under START from seven to three warheads, will instead be
eliminated.
ILLUSTRATIVE RUSSIAN SUBMARINE FORCES UNDER START AND START II
[As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
December, 1994 Expected, START Expected, START II
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
SLBM's Warheads SLBM's Warheads SLBM's Warheads
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SS-N-6............................ 32 32 0 0 0 0
SS-N-8............................ 256 256 0 0 0 0
SS-N-17........................... 0 0 0 0 0 0
SS-N-18........................... 208 624 128 384 0 0
SS-N-20........................... 120 1,200 120 1,200 120 1,200
SS-N-23........................... 112 448 128 512 128 512
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals...................... 728 2,560 376 2,096 248 1,712
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bombers
According to President Yeltsin, Russia has ceased
production of heavy bombers. Soviet declarations on bombers in
the START MOU were already within START limits, and thus no
reduction in the size of the Russian heavy bomber force was
anticipated. However, the counting rules for START II differ
from those of START, attributing the actual number of warheads
deployed on every heavy bomber. Whereas under START, 150 U.S.
and 180 Soviet bombers equipped with long-range air-launched
cruise missiles (ALCMs) were discounted by up to 50 percent,
and all other bombers equipped with nuclear weapons other than
ALCMs were counted as having only one warhead, under START II
these platforms are attributed with their actual nuclear
payloads. Thus, in a departure from a Russian force structure
designed to meet START limits, the committee expects that
Russia may choose to retire or reorient the Bear B/G heavy
bomber.
ILLUSTRATIVE RUSSIAN HEAVY BOMBER FORCES UNDER START AND START II
[As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
December, 1994 Expected, START Expected, START II
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aircraft Warheads Aircraft Warheads MOU Aircraft Warheads
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bear B/G..................................................... .35 140 60 240 1 or 2 0 0
Bear H....................................................... 84 1,344 85 1,360 6 or 16 57 912
Blackjack.................................................... 25 300 24 288 12 5 60
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals................................................. 144 1,784 169 1,888 ........... 62 972
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBM's
In order to reach a mix of forces permitted under START II,
Russia will be required to remove from service roughly 2,500
warheads deployed on 250 missiles. However, most of this
reduction will be achieved by the total elimination of the SS-
18 MIRVed heavy ICBM force. Furthermore, because of the MIRV
ban and the limitations on down-loading, Russia will also be
forced to eliminate its mobile SS-24 ICBM force (the Russian
equivalent of the MX).
While the central numerical limits of START II are
important, START II requirements for the downloading or
elimination of all MIRVed ICBMs and the elimination of all of
Russia's SS-18 missiles--believed to be the only Russian
missile capable of destroying hardened targets such as ICBM
silos--are even more important. MIRVed ICBMs deployed in fixed
silos have long been considered destabilizing by the U.S. since
they make inviting targets--one attacking warhead delivered
onto a silo holds the prospect for pre-emptively destroying up
to ten warheads per missile. This vulnerability in turn is
thought to contribute, at a minimum, to a ``launch-on-warning''
posture, and--in a worst-case scenario--to a first-strike
nuclear strategy. The committee notes that in 1983, the
Scowcroft Commission found that ``the Soviets now probably
possess the necessary combination of ICBM numbers, reliability,
accuracy, and warhead yield to destroy almost all of the 1,047
U.S. ICBM silos, using only a portion of their own ICBM
force.''
The START Treaty did little to alleviate this concern.
Although it reduced the number of deployed SS-18s from 308 to
154, it also reduced the number of U.S. silo-based ICBMs from
1,000 to 550. Thus the ratio of SS-18 warheads to U.S. silos
decreased only marginally, from 3.08:1 to 2.80:1. Under START
II, the elimination of all SS-18 missiles assuages this
longstanding concern. By altering fundamentally the
capabilities of the Russian strategic rocket forces, shifting
Russian emphasis to more survivable platforms such as
submarines and mobile ICBMs, it is possible that the Treaty
will also prompt revision of Russia's nuclear posture and
doctrine.
START II creates a managed process of nuclear arms
reductions. While much of Russia's motivation to engage in
deeper cuts may stem from economic imperatives, reliance upon
these incentives alone can provide no assurance that reductions
would be undertaken in a sustained or stabilizing fashion. In
his testimony before the committee, Ambassador Linton Brooks
noted that:
* * * I do not believe that economics and goodwill
exchange of information is a substitute for these
treaties, because economics will in fact not drive you
to a stabilizing force structure. The cheapest way for
the Russian Federation to reduce is to keep the new SS-
24s and the new SS-18s and throw away all that
expensive single warhead mobile stuff and all those
submarines. That is not in our interest, because it
would then lead to a very destabilizing force
structure.
Retention of the SS-18 is not an option under START II.
Furthermore, by allowing Russia to convert 90 SS-18 silos and
by relaxing START downloading rules--which will have the
cumulative effect of allowing Russia to deploy 90 additional
SS-25 type missiles and to maintain 105 SS-19 missiles--the
START II Treaty makes more palatable the elimination of the
newer, ten-warhead SS-24, which probably would have been
retained by Russia in a START force structure. In addition,
Russia may deploy several hundred new, single-warhead missiles
to build-up to the central limits of the START II Treaty. The
post-START II Russian ICBM force will be significantly smaller
and different in composition than it is currently.
ILLUSTRATIVE RUSSIAN ICBM FORCES UNDER START AND START II
[As estimated by the Congressional Research Service]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 1994 Expected, START Expected, START II
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBMs Warheads ICBMs Warheads ICBMs Warheads
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SS-11............................. 20 20 0 0 0 0
SS-13............................. 20 20 0 0 0 0
SS-17............................. 11 44 0 0 0 0
SS-18............................. 292 2,920 154 1,540 0 0
SS-19............................. 300 1,800 0 0 105 105
SS-24 silo-based.................. 56 560 0 0 0 0
SS-24 rail-based.................. 36 360 96 960 0 0
SS-2520........................... 354 354 300 300 700 700
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals...................... 1,089 6,078 550 2,800 805 805
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. Multilateral Implications
The committee recognizes that familiar Cold War assumptions
about Soviet military power as the key threat to U.S. survival,
the predictability of the rigid, bipolar arena and attendant
East-West alliances, the rationality of actors and the primacy
of mutual-assured destruction in deterrence strategy, the
political, military, and economic role of the United States
within NATO, the strategic value of nuclear weapons, and the
global nature of U.S. security concerns can be called into
question as bases for strategic thought, planning, and action.
At the same time, the committee believes that we have only a
rudimentary understanding of the emerging environment with
which the United States will be forced to contend. The end of
the Cold War ushered in unprecedented change in several key
respects, each with significant strategic military
implications. Already the world has witnessed an increased
assertiveness by states with regional ambitions; the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; and
the proliferation of conventional armaments, sensitive, dual-
use technologies, and ballistic missile capability.
The juxtaposition of these trends in countless combinations
at the regional, state, and sub-state level offer the potential
for a wide range of conflicts, some of which may impinge upon
U.S. national security interests. Consequently, this new
security environment will demand greater recourse to a broad
range of political, economic, and military responses than did
the relatively predictable Cold War era. Recent commitments to
reductions in the U.S. strategic arsenal notwithstanding, the
committee finds that nuclear deterrence will remain the
fundamental guarantor of U.S. security. Nuclear weapons will
serve an indispensable role in U.S. national security policy
for the foreseeable future. The objective of nuclear arms
control must therefore be the maintenance of nuclear forces at
a level commensurate with the nation's national security needs,
and specifically its targeting requirements. The task of
understanding the military implications of the START II Treaty
is rendered challenging since a variety of new threats such as
regional assertiveness by various states increasingly is likely
to be coupled with the spread of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and sophisticated conventional weapons systems such as
ballistic missiles. This creates the potential for an expansion
in the number of strategic targeting requirements at precisely
the same time that the U.S. arsenal is being dramatically
reduced. The committee therefore believes that the United
States should only proceed with strategic nuclear arms control
to the extent that an equilibrium is maintained between targets
and strategic capability.
Further reductions
The committee finds that nuclear targeting policy and arms
control can prove mutually reinforcing. Both START and START II
reduce moderately the U.S. target list, thereby decreasing the
need for strategic weapons. It has been estimated in open
source literature that START will eliminate roughly 20 percent
of the U.S. targeting requirement. Implementation of START II
will further reduce the number of targets in the single
integrated operational plan (SIOP), as long as other countries
do not deploy additional strategic offensive arms. However, the
committee notes other countries are seeking nuclear capability.
For example, China not only fields two dozen SLBMs, several
hundred heavy bomber warheads, and roughly 24 medium and long-
range ballistic missiles, but has several modernization
initiatives ongoing. The following table uses estimates of
China's nuclear arsenal drawn from the Carnegie Endowment's
``Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1995'':
ESTIMATES OF CHINA'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type Operating parameters Number
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dong Feng-3(3A)/CSS-2 (IRBM).... DF-3: 2,650 km range/2,150 kg 50
payload/1-3 Mt Warhead DF-
3A: 2,800 km/2,159 kg/2 Mt
Warhead.
Dong Feng-4/CSS-3 (IRBM)........ 4,750 km/2,200 kg/3.3 Mt 20
Warhead/1-3 Mt Warhead.
Dong Feng-5(5A)/CSS-4 (ICBM).... DF-5: 12,000 km/3,200 kg/3.3 4
Mt Warhead DF-5A: 13,000 km/
3,200 kg/4-5 Mt Warhead.
Dong Feng-21(21A)/CSS-6 (Road- DF-21: 1,700 km/600 kg DF- 36
Mobile IRBM). 21A: 1,800 km/600 kg.
Julang-1/CSS-N-3 (SLBM)......... 1,700 km/600 kg/200-300 Kt 24
Warhead.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to these forces, the Chinese military operates
several tactical, solid-fuel, road-mobile missiles such as the
M-9. Further, China is also developing for deployment by the
end of the 1990s four intermediate and long-range ballistic
missile systems: the land-mobile Dong Feng-25 (1,700 km/2,000
kg); the land-mobile Dong-Feng-31 (8,000 km/700 kg/200-300 Kt
Warhead); the silo-based Dong Feng-41 (12,000 km/800 kg/200-300
Kt Warhead; and the Julang-2 second-generation SLBM (8,000 km/
700kg/200-300 Kt Warhead).
Based upon a U.S. Army memorandum provided to the
Congressional Budget Office detailing the 1991/1992 SIOP for a
large military-industrial economy, the committee believes the
counter-force target reductions afforded by START II, largely
in the areas of silos and launch centers, will allow the United
States to meet narrowly its targeting requirements. However,
this depends upon U.S. deployment of the full START II Treaty--
allowable number of warheads, the down-sizing of a sizeable
percentage of the infrastructure supporting Russia's nuclear
arsenal, the absence of significant, new nuclear deployments
elsewhere in the world, and the replacement--rather than
augmentation--of aging Chinese delivery vehicles with second or
third generation systems.
General Colin Powell's stated before the Senate Committee
on Armed Services on July 28, 1992, that the viability of the
U.S. strategic triad depends upon the avoidance of ``pressure
to go lower than START II, precipitously lower than START II,
so it makes it hard for all three legs to remain coherent legs,
to make the land-based size too small or the number of bombers
too low or the number of submarines and warheads and missiles
aboard too small.'' This statement highlights the importance of
evaluating carefully further reductions beyond START II. The
committee will review any such a possibility in light of its
broad effect upon U.S. national security, targeting
requirements, and the effect upon the U.S. triad and strategic
stability.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
R. James Woolsey, former Director of Central Intelligence,
testified in February, 1993, before a Senate Governmental
Affairs subcommittee that more than twenty-five countries
either possess or are in the process of acquiring WMD
capabilities, as well as the means for delivering these
weapons. The committee is concerned that this trend may be
exacerbated by the fact that more than thirty thousand warheads
are scattered throughout Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakstan, and
Russia. Adding to this problem--as a consequence of the START
II Treaty--is the fact that thousands of additional warheads
will be removed from Russian delivery vehicles and stored in
facilities where security is suspect. On this matter, the
committee notes that neither START nor START II require the
dismantlement of the warheads downloaded to meet treaty limits.
Thus the size of Russia's fissile material stocks likely will
increase as warheads are withdrawn to Russia from Belarus,
Ukraine, and Kazakstan.
Weakened centralized control in Russia over nuclear
materials stocks has created a serious proliferation problem.
Former Director Woolsey also stated in testimony before
Congress that Russian criminal organizations, in particular,
have established elaborate infrastructures that ultimately may
be used to facilitate the transfer of this material to rogue
states. In the last ten years, the number, size, and range of
activities of non-state ``criminal'' organizations has
burgeoned in most regions of the world. President Boris
Yeltsin, for example, stated in 1993 that organized crime
constituted a major threat to Russia's strategic interests. The
committee believes these organizations also threaten the
security of the United States by potentially accelerating the
spread of nuclear weapons.
Regardless of the means by which states seek to acquire
weapons-grade material, their motivations invariably are
similar, and may be categorized as either fundamentally
military, political, or economic in nature. The following list
of rationales also apply to chemical and biological weapons
proliferation. In that respect, five Middle Eastern countries
reportedly possess undeclared offensive biological weapons
programs--Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, and Syria. These five,
plus Egypt, also possess chemical arsenals. Thus just as it is
conceivable that a growing number of states will possess
nuclear devices, is it also likely that the ``poor man's
bomb''--either biological or chemical weapons--will spread to
new countries for the following reasons:
RATIONALES FOR THE ACQUISITION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military Political Economic
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) To deter or coerce a (1) To obtain (1) To obtain
regional adversary. international ``more bang for
prestige and the buck.''
political leverage.
(2) To deter a larger power, (2) To garner (2) For the
such as the United States. domestic support benefits and
and pride. backward-linkages
of a national
technical
infrastructure.
(3) To possess a weapon of (3) To offset a (3) For their ease
last resort. lack of extended of acquisition as
security bi-products of
guarantees, real civilian
or perceived. biological and
chemical
industrial
development.
(4) To equalize a military
imbalance, real or perceived.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The importance accorded to WMD by states is not limited
solely to the deterrence value these types of weapons afford.
In fact, the cost-benefit calculus for the acquisition and use
of these weapons likely will not conform to U.S. conceptions of
``rationality.'' The committee views this as important since
General Shalikashvili unequivocally linked the value of U.S.
strategic offensive weapons to their deterrent effect upon
``rational'' actors.
The spread of ballistic and cruise missile technology
The proliferation of WMD is rendered all the more troubling
by the increasing availability of sophisticated weapons systems
and sensitive technologies. The collapse of the Soviet Union
led to a reduction in barriers traditionally blocking arms
collaboration between many states. Moreover, the increasingly
competitive nature of the global arms market and reductions in
military budgets have led many governments and defense
industries to conclude that collaborative arms development and
production offer the best prospects for maintaining research,
development, and production capabilities. As a consequence, the
transnational design, development, and production of weapons
systems is becoming increasingly common. Economic trends have
changed the structure of defense industries worldwide, made
many sorts of critical and dual-use technology affordable and
available, and altered states' perspectives on the enforcement,
efficacy, and economic wisdom of various export controls.
Although these controls can serve as important retardants on
the development of ballistic missiles, they have been weakened
in the United States, Europe, Russia, and elsewhere by the
quest for access to export markets and an ``export or die''
mentality on the part of many firms and governments. This trend
has increased the diffusion of sensitive technologies and know
how around the globe.
Roughly thirty countries already possess ballistic missile
systems. Nine developing countries also produce ballistic
missiles--Argentina, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North
Korea, South Korea, and South Africa. Four others--Brazil,
Libya, Pakistan, and Syria--are pursuing the means for
production. The committee is concerned that the number of
states with ballistic missile arsenals continues to grow, and
that several states are in the process of acquiring large
inventories.
Several industrialized countries also possess cruise
missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. At least thirty
other countries are currently seeking to develop cruise missile
systems. While few cruise missiles can carry a 500 kg nuclear
warhead, at this point, and while most have a range of less
than 200 km, most are capable of delivering chemical or
biological warheads and some missiles exceed 300 km in range.
The spread of dual-use technologies will enable more effective
integration of global positioning systems, larger turbojet,
turbofan, and ramjet engines, larger fuel tanks, and larger
wings. This will extend range and payload capabilities for
cruise missiles and reduce their circular error probable (CEP).
The committee notes that China, for example, has tested a
supersonic unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and Israel is building
an air-launched cruise missile with a range of over 400 km.
Many countries engaged in the development of ballistic and
cruise missile capabilities have proven alarmingly willing to
collaborate, both covertly and in some cases quite openly. At
least ten countries in the Third World and four republics of
the former Soviet Union field either Soviet-made missiles or
some variant. The most prevalent evidence of cooperation in
ballistic missile development is the prominence of the single-
stage, liquid-fueled SCUD-B, which has a range of 300 km and is
capable of carrying a 1,000 kilogram payload. Libya, North
Korea, and Egypt have all transferred missiles to other
countries, and the committee believes China may have sold
intermediate range missiles to Saudi Arabia, M-11s to Pakistan,
and missiles or technology to Iran, Syria, and North Korea. The
latter of these states is now the predominant source of both
missiles and missile production facilities.
Ballistic missiles provide an extremely efficient means for
delivering weapons of mass destruction. When coupled with a
nuclear, chemical, or biological program, missiles enable
states to hold at risk neighboring populations, and potentially
the United States as well. Indeed, the primary motivation for
acquiring such systems may not be military in nature, but
political. First and foremost, ballistic missiles armed with
WMD are instruments of intimidation.
However, as suggested in the preceding table, they also may
be used to achieve military objectives. Drawing a number of
lessons from the Gulf War, Iranian defense planners with recent
acquisitions have oriented their country's military towards a
posture presumably designed to deter the United States from
engaging in military activities in the Gulf. Iranian analysts
have openly claimed that missile systems represent a critical
deterrent to outside attack, arguing in the Iranian press that
Iran should ``build up its own short, medium and long-range
surface-to-surface as well as surface-to-air missiles.''
Another country of concern is North Korea, which is developing
a series of missiles--the Taepo Dong-1 and -2--with ranges in
excess of 3,000 kilometers. In sum, the committee believes that
countries with interests antithetical to those of the United
States view nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as
affording the opportunity to offset numerical and qualitative
conventional inferiorities with the U.S. military.
The problem of post-cold-war deterrence: Who-whom?
Deterrence during the Cold War was based upon assumptions
of rationality which allowed states to predict reactions with a
fair degree of success. Communication and the centralization of
command and control allowed for mutual familiarity between the
United States and the Soviet Union over one another's plans for
reaction in crisis situations. In other words, the potential
for an action-reaction spiral was controlled by strategic
parity at the top of the escalatory ladder. The committee
believes that the Nuclear Posture Review puts forward a START
II Treaty-compliant force based on Cold War deterrence
assumptions despite the fact that the post-Cold-War era has
none of the predictability or parity of its balanced, bipolar
predecessor.
The conventional/nuclear balance seems to have reversed
completely in this new era. Whereas strategic forces were
previously essential to the U.S. as a means of countering the
conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact, now the commitment
of conventional forces may prove critical to countering or
reversing the proliferation of WMD in the Third World. In
parallel, the acquisition of WMD may be accelerated by desires
to counter conventional imbalances. This shift was aptly
enunciated by Chairman Aspin in 1992, when he declared that
while nuclear weapons may still serve as ``great equalizers,''
it is now the United States that is the potential
``equalizee.''
In short, the psychological assumptions underpinning the
doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) may no longer
prove applicable. The security environment is no longer such
that deterrence can be postulated in a consistent, reliable
framework. Instead, the U.S. is posed with the problem of
determining who is to be deterred and how.
National objectives and strategic cultures will prove
critical variables affecting the utility of deterrence. Perhaps
the greatest challenge for the United States in the next
century will be to deter regional aggressors that may use
tactics common to low-intensity conflicts in order to secure
their objectives. Military power may prove markedly
asymmetrical in favor of the U.S., thus if conventional
military action alone does not offer future aggressors
prospects for success, it will be relegated to a secondary
role. Operations might be characterized by terrorism,
subversion, and efforts at blackmail using WMD capabilities. In
other words, future aggressors may increasingly employ
strategies that tend towards the indirect and unconventional,
emphasizing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to deter
the U.S. and/or allies.
Accordingly the most important aspects of the country's
order of battle will not be the number of main battle tanks,
armored fighting vehicles, and artillery that it fields, but
the number of nuclear, chemical, and biological munitions,
types of delivery systems, and access to commercial satellite
communications networks it possesses, and the way it seeks to
shield these capabilities--presumably among civilians or
hostages--from the deep-strike capabilities of the United
States. The committee therefore concludes that nuclear
deterrence will require additional flexibility, require a case
by case approach, and may prove to have reduced efficacy in
some instances.
Theater missile defense
The threat to the United States is changing. In responding
to the challenge of proliferation, the United States has four
options at its disposal: (1) deterrence against the use of the
system in question; (2) unilateral counter-proliferation
initiatives; (3) the use of arms control and nonproliferation
endeavors to restrict the spread of WMD systems and dual-use
technologies; and (4) passive and active defenses against the
use of WMD and ballistic/cruise missiles.
At the theater level, WMD proliferation and the spread of
missile delivery vehicles will likely circumscribe U.S. crisis
response capability. The use of forward-based tactical
platforms such as aircraft carriers will become more difficult
with the increased likelihood that U.S. forces will be detected
and engaged at their points of entry into theater. Indeed, the
fact that a number of regional powers are actively seeking
missile capability and nuclear weapons may ultimately preclude
the U.S. military from forward deployments unprotected by
ballistic missile defenses. It is with this logic that the
Director of the Defense Department's Office of Net Assessment,
Andrew Marshall, has warned against the creation of ``large,
juicy targets.'' Moreover, the spread of these technologies
raises the possibility that states may seek to deter the U.S.
from intervening at all in a region in defense of its security
interests. Some on the committee therefore view as critical the
development of effective theater missile defenses (TMD) to
protect U.S. troops, and is concerned that the effectiveness
and capability of programs such as the Theater High Altitude
Area Defense, Navy Upper Tier, and Brilliant Eyes systems not
be constrained. Other members would oppose any program or
development that jeopardizes the continued viability of the ABM
Treaty. In response, some feel that any deliberate degradation
of a TMD system's capability holds the prospect of rendering
U.S. troops more vulnerable than need be the case, or than is
acceptable, in the turbulent post-Cold War environment.
The committee is concerned that the Administration is
considering an expansion of the ABM Treaty's limitations to
include TMD systems through a joint declaration, and intends to
exercise its constitutional responsibilities to review
carefully for advice and consent any proposed modification or
multilateralization of the Treaty, or agreement to limit the
location or deployment of theater missile defenses.
National missile defense
The committee notes that the United States remains a party
to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which limits the
development and deployment of national missile defenses. The
intent of that treaty, formulated in the midst of the Cold War,
was to circumvent the possibility of an expensive and
potentially dangerous action-reaction spiral whereby the United
States and the Soviet Union sought to overcompensate for one
another's ballistic missile defenses by increasing their
offensive arsenals.
Some on the committee feel that robust missile defense
programs have proven conducive to promoting arms control
initiatives. In the 1980s, the Strategic Defense Initiative
helped break the ``log-jam'' on offensive reductions, directly
contributing to conclusion of the Intermediate-range Nuclear
Force Treaty, and indirectly to START and the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The committee notes that
the Joint Understanding of June 17, 1992--which created the
framework for the START II Treaty--was concluded in conjunction
with a Joint Statement on a Global Protection System signed on
the same day. This fact is explicitly referenced in the
Preamble to the START II. However, the committee is concerned
that U.S.-Russian discussions on cooperation on defenses
against ballistic missiles have fallen by the wayside.
The Chairman believes a number of factors combine to bring
into question the value of the ABM Treaty in the post-Cold War
world. Major technological advances have been made by Russia
and the U.S. in the last quarter of a century. Also, there has
been a considerable improvement in relations between the two
countries following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. At its
most basic level, the logic of the ABM Treaty assumes hostility
between Russia and the United States. Clearly, while a certain
degree of wariness still permeates U.S.-Russian relations, the
world has moved beyond the Cold War. Further, the mounting
problem of WMD and ballistic missile proliferation, the
uncertainties of the new security environment which complicate
the role of deterrence, and continuing concerns over the
potential for turbulence in the former Soviet Union all suggest
that--in a world of multiple potential nuclear threats--the
most likely nuclear danger to the U.S. is not a massive, pre-
emptive Russian strike, but the deliberate or accidental launch
of a few warheads. Such a danger is unpredictable,
undeterrable, and something to which the United States--
currently without any national missile defense whatsoever--is
completely vulnerable.
Some on the committee believe that this argument can easily
be carried too far. They believe it ignores the fact that the
United States has no effective defense against bomber attack or
transport of a nuclear device by terrorists. More importantly,
it completely discounts U.S. intelligence capabilities and our
considerable economic, diplomatic, and military strengths to
deal with such a threat. Consistent with this view, the least
desirable solution would be to spend tens of billions of
dollars developing and deploying a terminal defense, anti-
ballistic missile system.
In this later respect, the committee notes that though the
possibility of an outright nuclear exchange between Russia and
the United States is at an all-time low, the risk of mishap has
not decreased proportionately to reductions in the Russian
nuclear arsenal. In fact, the post-START II Russian force will
be far more mobile than its predominantly silo-based
predecessor. This poses a potential problem for command and
control of the arsenal in the event of internal turmoil in
Russia
While some on the committee disagree with this assessment,
others conclude that the reduction of the U.S. strategic
offensive arsenal under START and START II must be conducted in
connection with a review of U.S. deterrence doctrine and the
value of strategic missile defenses in ensuring U.S. national
security. In conclusion, the Chairman notes that a clearly
articulated defense strategy and credible national missile
defense system can possess a deterrent value of their own, and
need not threaten the viability of the Russian nuclear triad.
V. Verification and Compliance
START II builds upon the verification provisions
established in the START Treaty. Unless otherwise specified,
the counting rules, notifications, verification, conversion,
and elimination procedures from START are used in START II.
Having already concluded that the START Treaty is essentially
verifiable (see Exec. Rept. 102-53, pp. 27-64 for the
committee's analysis of START's verifiability), the Joint
Chiefs of Staff analyzed START II to determine whether its
additional verification procedures, in conjunction with those
of START, offer the United States an acceptable level of
confidence in verifying compliance and in detecting significant
violations, and whether the verification procedures provide
essential safeguards for protecting U.S. national security
assets against unnecessary or unwarranted intrusion. The
committee concurs, in general, with the Joint Chiefs'
assessment that START II's verification procedures are adequate
for monitoring Russian compliance while remaining sufficiently
restrictive to safeguard U.S. interests.
Militarily significant violations
The committee notes that a lack of consensus exists over
the definition of ``military significance.'' All violations,
intentional or otherwise, are significant. With dramatically
lower levels of strategic offensive arms, the degree of risk to
national security posed by possible violations is
proportionately greater for even minor cases of noncompliance.
The danger is that the resulting inequalities may undermine
strategic parity. Thus a military significant violation would
be one upsetting the strategic equilibrium maintained between
the United States and Russia, and between U.S. targeting
requirements and strategic nuclear assets. Such a violation
inevitably would necessitate an adjustment in the U.S. force
structure. Therefore, as then-Secretary of State James Baker
put it in testimony before the committee in January, 1992, a
key criterion in evaluating whether a treaty is verifiable ``is
whether, if the other side attempts to move beyond the limits
of the Treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be
able to detect such a violation before it became a threat to
national security.''
That said, the quantifiability of ``significance'' is less
than clear. Secretary of Defense Perry set a fairly high
benchmark when he argued before the committee on March 1, 1995,
that:
It is clear that * * * the violation would have to
result in an increase of a substantial number of
warheads, certainly measured in the many hundreds to
have a chance of meeting this definition of military
significance.
For its part, the committee assesses a lower threshold to the
question of military significance, and is more concerned about
noncompliance in terms of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles
than warheads. The committee expects the projected U.S. warhead
stockpile after implementation of START II to total roughly
8,500 (including spares), and to be adequate to ensure U.S.
national security in the near term.
THE PROJECTED U.S. STOCKPILE AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF START II
[Prepared for Tri-Valley CARE's by Greg Mello]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapon Use Yield (Kt) No. Produced IHE \1\ FRP \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B61-7........ Strategic bomb..... c. 10-350....... 450 1985-(pits 1966-1971)........... yes no
B61-mods 3/4/ Tactical bomb...... 1-150........... 100 1979-1990....................... yes no
10.
W76.......... SLBM C-4/D-5....... 100............. 1,280 1978-1987....................... no no
W80-0........ SLCM............... 5 & 150......... 350 1984-1990....................... yes no
W80-1........ ALCM............... 5 & 150......... 400 1982-1990....................... yes no
B-83......... Strategic bomb..... low to 1,200.... 500 1983-1990....................... yes yes
W87-0........ ICBM............... 300............. 500 1986-1989....................... yes yes
W88.......... SLBM D-5........... 475............. 400 1989-1990....................... no no
Reserve stockpile after START II (``Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,'' Jan./Feb. 1995)
W76.......... SLBM C-4/D-5....... 100............. 1,000 1978-1987....................... no no
W78.......... ICBM............... 335............. 1,000 1979-........................... no no
B53-1(?), B61 Gravity bombs and 5 to 1,200; 1,500 B-53: 1962-1965.................
& B83, W80-1. ALCM's. 9,000 for B53-1.
(1)B53 lacks
IHP, FRP, or
full
electrical
safety
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total weapons after START II: Roughly 8,500 (including spares).
\1\ IHE: Internal High Explosive; FRP: Fire Resistant Pit.
In order to retain a sufficiently-sized stockpile, the
committee expects the Department of Energy to regulate its
warhead disassembly process. According to a Clinton
Administration response to questions asked by Senator Lugar
during the course of committee consideration of START II, DOE
has dismantled nearly 8,200 warheads in the last six fiscal
years as follows:
Weapons dismantled
Year: No.
1989.......................................................... 1,208
1990.......................................................... 1,151
1991.......................................................... 1,595
1992.......................................................... 1,303
1993.......................................................... 1,556
1994.......................................................... 1,371
The committee notes that the assembly of a nuclear weapon
is an exacting procedure requiring approximately 2,000 steps to
combine hundreds of subassemblies and parts (depending upon the
type of weapon or warhead). Because reconstitution of the U.S.
stockpile would prove a time-consuming enterprise, a balance
must be struck between warhead dismantlement and the
maintenance of a hedge against Russian noncompliance. The same
can be said for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. However,
the committee finds that the potential uploading of all
multiple warhead Trident II D-5 buses and reorientation of the
B-1B heavy bomber provide acceptable interim assurances against
even a dramatic breakout in SNDVs deploying as many as 2,500
additional warheads. It is in this context that the committee
believes the aforementioned U.S. stockpile will prove adequate,
and expects all C-4 SLBMs to be back-fitted for the D-5. The
committee further urges the Administration, as an additional
assurance, to retain in storage all multiple warhead Minuteman
III buses if they are replaced with single-warhead buses.
These measures will prove sufficient to meet the national
security needs of the United States in the near term. However,
some on the committee are concerned that through neglect and
the application of some types of environmental restrictions the
infrastructure supporting the U.S. nuclear deterrent has
entered a precipitous decline. With the last U.S. warhead
having been manufactured five years ago, and a cut-off on
tritium production (which has a half-life of 12.3 years), U.S.
warheads will eventually lose their effectiveness. Purified
tritium gas from retired warheads will only meet U.S. stockpile
requirements for perhaps another fifteen years--yet the restart
of tritium production likely will take that long. Russia, on
the other hand, continues the manufacture of highly-enriched
uranium, plutonium, and tritium, and will not encounter such a
dilemma. The committee believes this issue to be of looming
importance to the maintenance of a viable nuclear deterrent
under the START II Treaty.
U.S. verification issues under START II
Verification of START II will be based largely upon
capabilities and provisions designed to verify START, and
generally reflect the same assumptions and considerations. The
two central elements of START II are the elimination of MIRVed
ICBMs (including all heavy ICBMs) by the year 2003, and deeper
reductions in the same basic categories of strategic offensive
arms as START. Accordingly, the conceptual basis for
verification of START II verification is the same as that for
START. The same capabilities and measures that provide for
verification of START limits on launchers, missiles, and
attributable warheads will be relied upon to verify the lower
aggregate limits of START II. The combination of START and
START II-mandated on-site inspections, U.S. National Technical
Means, and the increasing transparency of Russian society will
afford the United States opportunity to detect in a timely
fashion a violation of the magnitude contemplated by Secretary
Perry in his aforementioned testimony. The committee notes,
though, that there are some types of violations which the U.S.
will find difficult to detect. The Deputy Director of
Intelligence for the Central Intelligence Agency, Douglas
MacEachin, stated in testimony before the committee on February
28, 1995:
As with monitoring START I, the Intelligence
Community will be able to monitor many--and the most
significant--provisions of START II with high
confidence. In some areas, though, we will have
uncertainty.
START II will necessitate--in addition to the monitoring of
locational prohibitions and qualitative restrictions on
technical characteristics and capabilities (such as re-entry
vehicle telemetry data and throw-weight) as provided for by
START--the following new tasks:
Monitoring deployed warhead reduction to 3,500;
Monitoring the sublimit of 1,750 for SLBMs;
Monitoring the ban on the flight-testing,
acquisition, and deployment of MIRVed ICBMs after
January 1, 2003;
Verifying the conversion of up to 90 SS-18 silos to
accommodate the smaller, SS-25 type missile, and
continued compliance with START II's conversion
provisions;
Monitoring Russian compliance with START II
downloading rules for 105 SS-19 ICBMs;
Monitoring the payloads of Russian heavy bombers; and
Monitoring the activities of Russian heavy bombers
reoriented to conventional roles.
To augment the intelligence community's capabilities in
fulfilling these responsibilities, the START II Treaty provides
for four new types of on-site inspections in addition to the
thirteen types allowed under START. These inspections consist
of observations of all the eliminations of SS-18s that are not
launched to destruction, inspection of converted SS-18 silos,
four additional re-entry vehicle inspections per year at
converted SS-18 silo sites, and weapons bay inspections of
heavy bombers during all short-notice and special heavy bomber
exhibitions. Furthermore, START II provides for a detailed
exchange of data beyond that required under START on heavy
bombers, the downloading of missiles, heavy ICBM elimination,
and SS-18 silo conversion. For a full discussion of the
intelligence community's monitoring responsibilities for the
START Treaty, the committee refers to its report for that
treaty (Exec. Rept. 102-53, pp. 27-64 for the committee's
analysis of START's verifiability).
All of these measures depend in some fashion upon Russian
cooperation. Even with new inspections and data exchanges, the
committee underscores the necessity for the intelligence
community to continue to rely upon U.S. NTM to verify the
Treaty. Given uncertainties about Russia's political future,
the committee believes the maintenance of an independent
collection means to be critical and is concerned about Deputy
Director Douglas MacEachin's statement from the aforementioned
testimony that:
The Intelligence Community has reduced its resources
devoted to Russian military developments across the
board and since 1993, when the Senate first considered
the START II Treaty we have witnessed a steady erosion
of trained analysts on Russian strategic forces issues.
Furthermore, there are differences in the two treaties that add
to, modify, or in a few cases reduce, U.S. verification
challenges. For example, while the ability of the United States
to verify aggregate numbers of deployed ICBM silo-based
missiles and their associated launchers and deployed SLBM
launchers and their associated missiles is generally the same
and subject to the same concerns and considerations, START II
requires the elimination or conversion of all deployed and non-
deployed mobile launchers of MIRVed ICBMs, with the exception
of launchers for ICBMs (other than heavy ICBMs) permitted at
space launch facilities. The Treaty also requires that the
number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to
which more than one warhead is attributed be reduced to zero.
It further allows downloading by more than four warheads of the
SS-19 missile. Since the SS-24 ICBM is attributed with ten
reentry vehicles, all SS-24 launchers (except those permitted
for space launch purposes) must be eliminated or converted to
launchers of single-warhead ICBMs. Consequently, after the end
of the elimination period, the problems associated with
verifying numbers of deployed rail-mobile ICBMs and launchers
(generally the most difficult deployed systems to verify) will
be reduced since any single detection of such a launcher
(except at a space launch facility), or of an SS-24 missile
loaded in any launcher, would be a clear Treaty violation.
Heavy ICBMs must be eliminated under START II, and their
launchers must be eliminated or converted. Currently, the
United States can confidently verify the number of deployed
heavy ICBMs and their silo launchers. This should remain true
even after the conversion of up to 90 heavy ICBM silos. For a
cheating scenario involving the covert deployment of illegal
heavy ICBMs in converted heavy ICBM silos to be successful,
several things would have to be achieved. First, the silo would
have to be reconverted without detection (or the conversion
would have to be successfully ``faked''). Second, a clandestine
supply of heavy ICBMs would have to be available. Third, the
illegal missiles would have to be transported to the silos,
installed, and fueled without detection. Each of these steps
likely would prove complicated enough that, taken together,
such an effort would be very difficult for the Russians to
accomplish without detection.
Under current Russian practices, the United States has high
confidence in its ability to identify the type of ICBM deployed
in a given launcher. Since the U.S. also has similarly high
confidence in which types of ICBMs have been tested with more
than one warhead, the U.S. expects to remain capable of
verifying the ban on fixed launchers for MIRVed ICBMs once it
goes into effect. Further, the ban on flight testing or
launching (other than space launches) of MIRVed ICBMs should
reinforce these confidences over time.
However, there are scenarios for which U.S. confidences
could be significantly lower. These involve covert deployment
of previously developed MIRVed ICBMs, the deployment of MIRVed
missiles such as SLBMs in heavy ICBM silos instead of the
single-warhead missile allowed, the uploading of warheads on
existing buses such as on the SS-19, the deployment of heavy
bombers with more warheads than currently attributed, and
Russian break-out of the SS-25 mobile missile.
Warheads on deployed ballistic missiles
Cheating scenarios involving the testing of ICBMs in ways
designed to conceal the maximum numbers of warheads with which
they have been tested, with which they are capable of
releasing, or involving deception with respect to the weight of
the lightest re-entry vehicle released, will be countered
significantly by U.S. interpretation of telemetry data.
Furthermore, after January 1, 2003 launches of MIRVed ICBMs
with re-entry vehicles will be prohibited. The committee notes
that Russia will be allowed to launch non-heavy, MIRVed ICBM
airframes without reentry vehicles from space launch facilities
after 2003, though these activities too will be monitored by
U.S. NTM. On the other hand, since MIRVed SLBMs will still be
permitted, no similar restriction will be applied. The
committee is concerned with the possible development of a
common missile (one developed for use as both an ICBM and an
SLBM) that would complicate verification questions.
Further, because for the purposes of economy the U.S.
agreed to relax the START requirement that multiple reentry
vehicle buses be removed, Russia will be allowed to retain its
six-warhead bus on the SS-19. The START II Treaty contains
provisions tailored to allow Russian retention of 105 SS-19s.
The committee notes that this provides one of the most obvious
break-out potentials in the START II Treaty, since over a short
period of time Russia could upload these ICBMs and restore 525
warheads to its arsenal. The United States, on the other,
likely will remove its three-warhead buses for the Minuteman
III arsenal and will be unable to respond without a massive
retrofit operation. This possible liability can be offset only
by the uploading potential of the Trident II D-5 which, though
having a smaller ``footprint'' than the Minuteman III, is also
widely believed to have hard-target kill-capability, and by
continued viability of the U.S. strategic triad.
The conversion of SS-18 silos
START II presents a different problem with regard to
converted heavy ICBM silos. START II provides for on-site
inspection to confirm the required conversion procedures for
heavy ICBM silos. After the completion of these specified
procedures, the Treaty also allows Russia to carry out further
conversion measures, presumably to complete conversion for a
single-warhead missile. However, the Treaty does not provide
for any on-site inspection or other specified access to observe
or fully identify the nature of these later conversion
procedures. Although the Treaty prohibits emplacement in such
converted silos of a missile with a launch canister greater
than 2.5 meters in diameter, and the Russians have undertaken a
political commitment to deploy in these converted launchers
only a single-warhead ICBMs of the SS-25 type, the possibility
exists that Russia could further modify the converted SS-18
silos to enable them to launch a different missile than the one
declared.
Heavy bombers and attributable warheads
The START II Treaty requires that, unless all of a given
type or variant of heavy bomber are reoriented to a
conventional role, there must be differences observable to NTM
and visible during inspections, between heavy bombers. However,
these required differences are left to the choice of the
reorienting Party, and there is no requirement that they be
functionally related. Moreover, inspections of heavy bombers
reoriented to a conventional role are limited to inspecting
only the observable differences in the bombers, and not the
internal portions of weapons bays. Under these circumstances,
it would not be difficult for the Russians to actually load
reoriented bombers with nuclear weapons if they so chose. The
committee recognizes that Russia might plan to use them in that
fashion in either a breakout scenario, or in contingency
planning surrounding Russian verification of U.S. compliance
with START II. Though START II provides additional restrictions
on reoriented bombers, these only modestly increase the risk of
detection in this scenario. Separate basing makes easier the
counting of declared bombers, but due to the inherent mobility
of aircraft, this will not prove meaningful in terms of
preventing the pickup (or delivery) of nuclear weapons.
Warhead attribution for bombers is meant to capture the
number of nuclear weapons for which the type bomber is actually
equipped. In other words, bombers will be attributed with a
number of warheads supposedly equal to the number with which
that type of bomber is operationally deployed. Inspecting
Parties will only be able to confirm at an exhibition the
number of nuclear weapons that the exhibiting Party loads on
the bomber at that time. This number may not necessarily prove
the maximum number for which the bomber is designed to carry or
is capable of carrying. The committee believes it is possible
for both the United States and Russia to equip a bomber with
more weapons than specified. However, while the detection of
such activities designed to equip a bomber with more weapons
than specified might be difficult, the testing and regular
training required to maintain this sort of capability on a day-
to-day operational basis would likely be detected over time. As
a consequence, such scenarios would appear to be more suited to
breakout than cheating.
Monitoring mobile missiles
Perhaps the most significant verification concern for the
United States is a potential mismatch between Russia's
anticipated modernization programs and U.S. capabilities to
monitor mobile missile deployments and missile inventories.
According to testimony before the committee on several
occasions, the Intelligence Community's confidence will be
highest when monitoring mandated restrictions such as the
elimination of SS-18 ICBMs and when accounting for the number
of deployed silo-based single-warhead ICBMs, submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers remaining in the Russian
arsenal. In addition, the ban on MIRVed ICBMs will be managed
through tracking the elimination of MIRVed ICBM launchers and
by analyzing the flight test data of new missiles.
With the signing of the START Treaty, Russia and the United
States have demonstrated telemetry tapes and installed
telemetry playback equipment on one another's territory. Thus
the Intelligence Community is now receiving telemetry tapes and
associated interpretive data which will provide the United
States a measure of confidence that many START and START II
provisions, such as the ban on flight-testing more than one re-
entry vehicle, are being observed.
However, as MIRVed ICBM systems are eliminated, the
committee expects the single-warhead SS-25 road-mobile force to
expand. The monitoring of missile production activity and
mobile missile deployments has proven more difficult than the
monitoring of reductions in other systems. During its
consideration of the START Treaty, then-Director of Central
Intelligence, Robert Gates, testified in open session that:
Not surprisingly, the same areas where we have the
most concern with regard to monitoring the [START]
treaty provisions are the areas where we would be most
concerned about cheating. Because of the inherent
covert nature of mobile missiles, the cheating
scenarios that would be particularly troublesome are
those that would involve the covert production and
deployment of such missiles and their launchers.
An outgrowth of the historical difficulty in monitoring
missile production is that estimates of Russia's nondeployed
missile inventory are less than certain. While Russia is not
believed to have maintained a large-scale program to store
several hundred or more undeclared, nondeployed strategic
ballistic missiles, it is possible that some undeclared
missiles have been stored at unidentified facilities. Since the
mobile SS-25 likely will become the mainstay of the land-based
leg of the Russian strategic triad the committee is concerned
about possible imbalances in deployed SNDVs.
Counterbalancing this concern somewhat, are a number of
interlocking provisions in the START Treaty regarding mobile
missiles. These provisions render more easily detectable any
militarily significant, covert deployment of Russian mobile
missiles. Though the effectiveness of a combination of
provisions, ranging from continuous portal monitoring of the
Votkinsk facility (where the SS-25 currently is produced) to
suspect site inspections and locational restrictions on mobile
ICBMs, stages, and solid rocket motors, can only be gauged over
time, the committee believes these provisions to be adequate,
provided Russia continues along the path to greater openness.
Failing that, new concerns over Russian motivations to engage
in clandestine activity may emerge, calling into question the
verifiability of both START and START II.
Secretary Perry underscored the importance of Russian
openness when he stated that:
There are three factors which make cheating, I think,
improbable in START II. The first is just the general
openness of communications and exchange of personnel
which now exists between our two countries. For
example, I have, myself, been to the Russian test range
at Baikinur. I have been to the operational test side
at Pervomaysk. I have examined the missiles and their
control centers in great detail. I have discussed
detailed issues about these programs with the
scientists in the program and with the operational
officers in the Strategic Rocket Forces. That kind of
communication makes it very difficult to execute
successfully a cheating program.
For his part, General Shalikashvili noted:
* * * we think it is very difficult to picture a
scenario that would give an advantage to the Russians
to cheat. They have already, under the treaty, the
ability to successfully accomplish deterrence and
accomplish the military task of covering necessary
targets. So any cheating would at best give them some
ability to increase their reserve. And the cost of
being caught at cheating would far outweigh any of that
advantage.
Therefore, I see very little incentive for them to
cheat, but I am also very confident that should they,
we would be in a very good position through the
inspections and verification procedures, to detect
that.
Motivations to cheat and the Russian record of compliance
These assurances, in and of themselves, cannot constitute
an acceptable level of comfort with the verification provisions
of START II. Senate consideration of the START II Treaty will
take place in the context of growing concern about the economic
and political stability of the Russian Federation as well as
growing tensions with its newly-independent neighbors. Even as
START has been ratified by all Parties and each signatory has
undertaken steps to accelerate its implementation, tensions
have increased between Russia and neighboring states as a
result of Russian military action in Chechnya. Moscow has
simultaneously begun to reorder Russia's ``legitimate''
security requirements in both the conventional and nuclear
areas. The military implications of rising tensions within
Russia and on its peripheries are not clear but portend
difficulties for any arms control accord. The committee is
concerned that the poor showing of the Russian army in Chechnya
and the dismal outlook for Russian conventional forces in the
near- and mid-term have revived interest in certain circles in
a ``cheap nuclear fix.'' Certainly suspicions about Russian
nuclear intentions could create delays on the part of Ukraine
and Kazakstan in meeting their de-nuclearization commitments,
and may prompt the U.S. to reconsider its posture.
Despite all of this, the committee believes the Senate
should ratify the START II Treaty, demanding that the Russian
Federation break with its own lackluster treaty compliance
track-record and that inherited from its predecessor. It is
critical that Russia alter its behavior, for example with its
ongoing biological weapons program, its failure to begin
implementing the Bilateral Destruction Agreement for its
chemical weapons program, its failure to meet the time-line for
destruction under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe, and persistent evidence of Russian noncompliance with
the ABM Treaty. The committee believes some of these
difficulties may be attributable to a Cold War overhang in
strategic culture and weapons programs, and that START II
affords a useful means of dialogue and engagement. In the
balance, the committee has determined that, with the triad of
3,500 warheads remaining once START II is implemented, the size
and mix of U.S. nuclear forces will be sufficient to deter
Russia even in the event of a break-out.
VI. START II Implementation
The Department of Defense and the Congressional Budget
Office have both provided preliminary cost estimates of START
II implementation using the following assumptions: (1) the
United States will draw down to the aggregate limit of no more
than 3,500 warheads by January 1, 2003; (2) this reduction will
include the elimination of all Peacekeeper launchers; (3) the
United States will retain 14 Trident submarines, with each
Trident II D-5 downloaded to 5 warheads. These assumptions are
based on the results of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), but
do not reflect NPR programmatic costs.
These estimates also assume that the United States will
exercise all START II on-site inspection rights, including
those for the elimination of all SS-18 missiles and their
launch canisters, the conversion of 90 SS-18 silos and the four
additional reentry vehicle on-site inspections (RVSOI) allowed
annually at converted SS-18 silos. Likewise, heavy bomber
inspection and protection are included in these figures.
A preliminary estimate suggests that the total costs might
amount to approximately $201.9 million between 1995 and the end
of the second Treaty reduction phase in 2003. These costs break
are as follows:
Million
Elimination of MIRVed ICBMs....................................... $42.5
Reduction of deployed SLBM warheads............................... 110.0
ICBM launcher elimination......................................... 14.5
Bomber exhibitions................................................ 1.3
Data reporting.................................................... 2.0
Bomber conversion................................................. 10.5
Verification of SS-18 silo conversion............................. 12.6
Verification of missile and launch canister elimination........... 2.8
Verification of rail-mobile ICBM launcher elimination............. 2.9
Additional reentry vehicle inspectors............................. 2.8
-----------------------------------------------------------------
________________________________________________
Total....................................................... 201.9
The figures show the total estimated cost of U.S.
compliance to be approximately $180.8 million with the majority
of that (about 61 percent) to be dedicated to deployed SLBM
warhead reductions. Total START II costs for verification of
Russian compliance are approximately at $21.1 million, with the
verification of silo conversions representing about 60 percent
of that total.
It is important to contrast these relatively small, eight
year costs for START II with the START implementation costs for
just FY1994 and FY1995. For this period, the Department of
Defense budgeted approximately $180 million for START
implementation. This investment forms the basis for meeting
START II requirements and will allow these reductions to be
undertaken at moderate cost.
Two additional inspection and security issues are worthy of
mention. First, START II does not add any new inspectable
facilities in the U.S. (although the portion of Whiteman A.F.B.
where the B-2 bomber is deployed will be subject to inspection
under START II only). This will help minimize costs as well as
security concerns. Second, U.S. heavy bombers, particularly the
B-2, will be subject to more intrusive exhibitions and
inspections than under the START Treaty. The START II Treaty
requires inspections to verify that heavy bombers are not
actually equipped for more nuclear weapons than declared, but
also allows portions of the heavy bomber not related to this
determination to be shrouded. The U.S. Air Force is developing
an inspection implementation plan that will ensure protection
of sensitive/classified information during the inspection/
exhibition.
The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA)
The Committee has confidence in the proven competency of
the On-Site Inspection Agency. OSIA has assured the committee
that it will be ready to implement START II as soon as it is
ratified and enters into force; its personnel have conducted
468 INF inspections, 278 escort missions, 22 START exhibitions,
218 START mock inspections and have almost 7 full years of day-
to-day experience in portal monitoring. On March 1, 1995, OSIA
began START baseline operations. This 120-day intensive period
will position that agency to execute START II effectively.
OSIA has submitted a detailed assessment of operational
differences confronting U.S. inspectors under START II versus
those under the START Treaty. Those additional verification
provisions involving OSIA include:
Extensive U.S. inspection permitted of the detailed
procedures for converting SS-18 silos to launch single-
warhead ICBMs of the type SS-25;
An additional four inspections per year to confirm
that only single-warhead ICBMs are installed in the 90
converted SS-18 silos;
Detailed procedures for destroying SS-18 missiles and
launch canisters in the presence of U.S. inspectors;
One-time exhibitions to demonstrate the number of
nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers are actually
equipped; and
Exhibition of observable differences between nuclear
heavy bombers and heavy bombers of the same type and
variant reoriented to a conventional role.
Though some of these inspections, such as data updates,
reentry vehicle (RV), conversion or elimination, and heavy
bomber distinguishability exhibitions, are to be accomplished
within the context of START, there are several unique START II
inspections and exhibitions which place greater demands on OSIA
personnel and resources. These range from heavy ICBM missile
and associated launch canister eliminations to conversion of
heavy ICBM silos, additional reentry vehicle on-site
inspections related to the converted heavy ICBM silos,
inspections of eliminations of mobile ICBMs and their
launchers, additional heavy bomber actual equipage exhibitions,
inspections of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role,
and inspections of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional
role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role.
From an operational standpoint--the planning and arranging
for the logistical infrastructure needed to conduct an
inspection or escort mission--START II inspections and
eliminations would closely resemble those conducted under INF
and those set to occur under START. Team composition will be,
as in INF and START, a mixture of weapons specialists and
linguists. Weapons accountability, however, poses of distinct
challenge. Because the Treaties use different counting rules,
specific weapons systems may be attributed with different
numbers of warheads under each Treaty. Since a single
inspection will do ``double-duty'' for both treaties, a
thorough knowledge of both treaties by inspection team members
(especially team chiefs) is essential. The terms of both
Treaties would be in force simultaneously. Both sets of
inspection records must reflect the weapons accountability of
the particular agreement to which they apply. The key here is
that the counting process and record keeping for both treaties
would occur during the same inspection. These accounting
differences apply to both sides, and a U.S. inspector or
escort's job would require these different rules to be applied
properly in every inspection.
VII. Committee Action
On behalf of the United States, President Bush signed the
START II Treaty on January 3, 1993 in Moscow in the Russian
Federation. The Treaty, along with two Protocols, a Memorandum
of Understanding, and Letters Signed by U.S. and Russian
Representatives was transmitted to the Senate on January 20,
1993 and referred on the same day to the Committee on Foreign
Relations.
The committee held public hearings on the Treaty and
related strategic nuclear matters in May and June 1992 with
Administration witnesses, and again in January, February, and
March 1995 with Administration and private-sector witnesses.
January 31, 1995 (open session)
The Honorable Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, with:
The Honorable Linton Brooks, Chief U.S. Negotiator to the
START II Negotiations;
The Honorable John Holum, Director, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency.
February 28, 1995 (open and closed sessions)
Mr. Douglas MacEachin, Deputy Director for Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency.
March 1, 1995 (open session)
The Honorable William Perry, Secretary of Defense;
General John Shalikashvili, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
March 29, 1995 (open session)
Mr. Stephen Hadley, Esquire, Attorney, Shea and Gardner;
Mr. Sven Kraemer, President, Global 2000;
Mr. Michael Krepon, President, Henry L. Stimson Center;
Mr. Jack Mendelsohn, Deputy Director, The Arms Control
Association.
May 11, 1993 (open session)
The Honorable Warren Christopher, Secretary of State.
May 18, 1993 (open session)
The Honorable Linton Brooks, Chief U.S. Negotiator to the
START II Negotiations;
Mr. Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Director, U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency;
Mr. Douglas MacEachin, Deputy Director for Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency.
June 17, 1993 (open session)
The Honorable Lawrence Eagleburger, Former Secretary of
State.
June 24, 1993 (open and closed sessions)
The Honorable R. James Woolsey, Director of Central
Intelligence.
At a markup on December 12, 1995, the committee considered
a draft resolution of ratification including six conditions and
seven declarations. All were agreed to by the committee by a
roll call vote of 18-0.
The conditions and declarations and the rationale for
approving them are as follows:
Condition 1: Noncompliance
Since reductions under START II build upon those mandated
by START, the provisions of the two treaties are interrelated.
However, START II is a bilateral treaty and does not include
all Parties to START (Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine).
Implementation of the START II Treaty must take into account
the possibility and effect of noncompliance by START Parties
that are not Parties to the START II Treaty. Under such
circumstances, the U.S. would be forced to question its
continued adherence to START II since, as a practical matter,
noncompliance by one of these states would likely consist of
their retaining some form of a nuclear capability. Condition
(1) establishes the framework by which the President may seek
to bring a noncompliant Party into compliance, or by which the
President may accommodate the changed circumstances. Any
modification or change in obligations shall be submitted for
the advice and consent of the Senate, and in the event that
noncompliance persists, the President shall seek a Senate
resolution of support for continued U.S. adherence to one or
both START treaties.
Condition 2: Treaty obligations
It has been implied by senior government officials in the
Russian Federation that Russian ratification of the START II
Treaty is contingent upon continued adherence by the United
States to Russian interpretations of U.S. obligations under the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The U.S. government does not
accept such a linkage. This provision states the view of the
Senate that in ratifying this treaty, no such linkage may be
implied.
Condition 3: Financing implementation
Article I, paragraph 6, provides for an accelerated
schedule of reductions in the event that both Parties agree on
a program of financial assistance to fulfill the Treaty. The
second phase of reductions would be completed two years
earlier, by December 31, 2000 (as opposed to January 1, 2003),
if agreement on assistance can be reached. However,
ratification and implementation of START II is in no way
contingent upon such an agreement. As a means of ensuring
Russian commitment to the Treaty, Russia must share a
substantial portion--if not all--of the burden of Russian
implementation of START II.
Condition 4: Exchange of letters
The President also transmitted to the Senate documents
associated with the START II Treaty. These documents are three
exchanges of letters embodying agreements on various aspects of
the Treaty.
(4a) The first exchange of letters pertains to the
negotiation of an agreement between Russia and Kazakstan
regarding SS-18 missiles and launchers on the territory of
Kazakstan. In his response to Russian Foreign Minister
Kozyrev's commitment to spare no effort to conclude such an
agreement (both made on December 29, 1992), Secretary of State
Eagleburger made it clear that the START II Treaty would be
submitted to the United States Senate for its advice and
consent based on the understanding that the agreement referred
to by Minister Kozyrev (providing for the movement to Russia
and elimination of heavy ICBMs from Kazakstan) would be signed
and implemented, and that all deployed and non-deployed heavy
ICBMs and associated launch canisters now located on the
territory of Kazakstan will have been removed to Russia and
destroyed no later than seven years after entry into force of
the START Treaty. The Senate will ratify the START II Treaty
based upon the understanding that the SS-18 heavy ICBM will be
eliminated as an entire class of missile.
(4b) The second exchange of letters between Secretary of
State Eagleburger and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, dated
December 29, 1992, and December 31, 1992, relates to heavy
bombers and constitutes the assurance of the United States of
America, during the duration of the START II Treaty, never to
have more nuclear weapons deployed on any heavy bomber than the
number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution for that type
or variant. This letter creates no new legal obligation for the
United States. It simply reiterates U.S. Treaty obligations per
paragraph 3 of Article IV of the START II Treaty.
(4c) The third exchange of letters between Russian Minister
of Defense Grachev and Secretary of Defense Cheney, dated
December 29, 1992, and January 3, 1993, sets forth a number of
assurances on Russian intent regarding the conversion and
retention of silo launchers originally designed for the RS-20/
SS-18 heavy ICBM. Minister Grachev reaffirms the steps that
Russia will take to convert these silos and assures the
Secretary of Defense that only SS-25 type missiles will be
deployed in these converted silos.
Specifically, Russia provides commitments to install a
restrictive ring 2.9 meters in diameter in the top of the SS-18
silo launcher, to fill the base of the launcher with five
meters of concrete, to refrain from installing in the silo any
missile launch canister with a diameter in excess of 2.5
meters, to install only RS 12M/SS-25 missiles in the converted
silos, and to allow for verification of the silo conversion.
All but one of these assurances are contained in either the
main text of the START II Treaty, or in its Elimination and
Conversion Protocol. The commitment to only install SS-25 type
missiles in the converted silos represents a new obligation
undertaken by the Russian Federation.
These documents are relevant to the consideration of the
Treaty by the Senate, and are of the same force and effect as
the provisions of the START II Treaty. These letters are
understood to be legally binding, carrying with them the
obligation of both Parties to comply with the commitment
associated with the letters and the right of each Party to
enforce the obligation under international law.
Condition 5: Space-launch vehicles
The Elimination and Conversion Protocol of the START II
Treaty provides two alternatives for eliminating heavy ICBMs:
either through physical destruction or by use as a space-launch
vehicle (SLV). Under the START Treaty, Russia is similarly
allowed to use ballistic missiles to deliver objects into the
upper atmosphere or outer space. These provisions highlight the
fact that SLVs are virtually indistinguishable from nuclear-
capable ballistic missiles. The Administration has indicated
that agreement has been reached with the Russian Federation
under which there will be strict accountability for all
ballistic missiles associated with the START Treaty. The Senate
reaffirms its position that SLVs comprised of any item limited
by START or START II are subject to the obligations of the
relevant treaty.
Condition 6: National technical means and Cuba
This condition reiterates the Clinton Administration's
position--expressed in a letter to the Committee dated April 6,
1995--that the obligation of Parties to both START and START II
not to interfere with one another's national technical means of
verification does not preclude the United States from pursuing
options to urge the Russian Federation to dismantle its
electronic eavesdropping facility at Lourdes, Cuba. Removal of
that facility in no way constitutes interference with Russian
Treaty verification capability, but rather the removal of an
asset devoted to signals intelligence collection against the
United States.
Declaration 1: Cooperative threat reductions
Neither START nor START II require the dismantlement of the
warheads downloaded to meet treaty limits. The Russian
Federation will possess exactly as much fissionable, weapons-
grade material (possibly as much as 900 tons) as it had before
START II was negotiated. Indeed, the size of Russia's fissile
material stocks will increase since warheads are being
withdrawn to Russia from Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakstan. For
example, approximately 632 of Kazakstan's 810 warheads had been
returned to Russia by March 1995.
The ultimate disposition of these stocks is of concern to
the United States. Given that political and economic
uncertainty have weakened centralized control over nuclear
weapons materials, Russia has emerged as a serious
proliferation concern. Several incidents involving the
smuggling of weapons-usable materials in Russia and Europe
underscore this concern. Former Director of Central
Intelligence R. James Woolsey stated in testimony before
Congress that Russian criminal organizations, in particular,
have established elaborate infrastructures that may ultimately
be used to facilitate the transfer of fissile material to
states seeking to accelerate their own weapons development
programs, such as Iran, Libya, or North Korea.
Accordingly, the committee encourages the Administration to
continue vigorously with current Safe and Secure Dismantlement
Talks. Every avenue should be pursued to improve confidence in
the integrity of Russia's nuclear material stockpiles and the
irreversibility of the process of nuclear weapons reduction.
Declaration 2: Asymmetry in reductions
Unlike START, which mandates a minimum rate of reductions
in items such as heavy ICBM launchers, START II contains no
specific legal obligations by either Party to reduce at a given
rate. Rather, START II requires only that reductions be of a
``sustained'' nature. Thus Russia is not obligated to eliminate
or convert a specified number of missiles or launchers per
year. Russian failure to engage in a significant, sustained
effort would prompt, at a minimum, concerns over Russian intent
to comply with START II commitments. In addition, given the
current pace of U.S. reductions, the cost and long lead-time
associated with reconstitution of nuclear forces, and the
increased significance of each warhead in a reduced arsenal,
asymmetry in the implementation of START II could create a
strategic imbalance whereby the United States would be
incapable of meeting its targeting requirements. The Chairman
is concerned that the initial process of U.S. dismantlement
under START ran far in advance of Russia's. At the time of the
release of the Administration's Nuclear Posture Review, the
U.S. had decreased its arsenal to 6,000 deliverable warheads,
whereas Russia retained roughly 9,000.
The resolution of ratification indicates that the committee
believes that the United States needs to articulate a clear
policy regarding the pace of disarmament to be conducted under
the START II Treaty in order to avoid any strategic imbalance
endangering the national security of the United States. The
Senate therefore urges the President to regulate reductions
under both START and START II to avoid such a possibility.
Declaration 3: Expanding strategic arsenals in countries
other than Russia
Both the START Treaty and the START II Treaty deal solely
with the strategic arsenals of the former Soviet Union and the
United States. However, the resolution recognizes that the
spread of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile
technology could lead to a new and significant threat to the
United States. The United States should not ignore these
trends. Given that nuclear weapons will remain the cornerstone
of U.S. deterrent strategy notwithstanding reductions under
START or START II, in the event of such a development--or the
possibility of such a development--the President should consult
with the Senate on an urgent basis to determine whether
continued adherence to START II Treaty levels remains in the
national security interests of the United States.
Declaration 4: Substantial further reductions
Consistent with its pledge under the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to pursue in good faith
negotiations on the issue of nuclear disarmament, the Senate
calls upon the parties to this treaty to seek further strategic
offensive arms reductions as consistent with their national
security interests and calls upon the nuclear-weapon states to
give careful and early consideration to corresponding
reductions.
Declaration 5: Missile technology control regime
The United States has urged a number of nations to become
members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)--or to
adhere to its ``guidelines''--in order to reduce the risks
associated with the proliferation of ballistic missiles and
other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
Established in 1987, the purpose of the regime is to limit
transfers of equipment and technology that would contribute to
unmanned nuclear weapons delivery systems capable of delivering
a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a range of at least 300
kilometers. This Committee declaration urges the President to
insist on the adherence of Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine to
the guidelines of the MTCR.
Declaration 6: Further arms reduction obligations
This declaration affirms the Committee's intention to
consider agreements between the United States and other
countries involving militarily significant obligations on U.S.
forces only as treaties. Some in the Executive branch persist
in the mistaken belief that it is constitutionally acceptable
to undertake militarily significant accords by Executive
agreements supported by a simple majority vote in both Houses
of Congress.
Declaration 7: Treaty interpretation
The Committee declaration on Treaty Interpretation affirms
that the principles of treaty interpretation, derived as a
necessary implication from the Constitution, set forth in
Condition (1) of the Senate's resolution of ratification of the
INF Treaty (May 27, 1988) apply to all treaties. These
principles apply regardless of whether the Senate chooses to
say so in its consideration of any particular treaty.
Following this discussion, the committee voted 18-0 to
recommend to the Senate that it advise and consent to the
ratification of the START II Treaty, together with its
Protocols and Memorandum of Understanding, all transmitted to
the Senate in Treaty Doc. 103-1, subject to the Conditions and
Declarations set forth in the Resolution of Ratification.
Voting in the affirmative were Senators Helms, Pell, Lugar,
Biden, Kassebaum, Sarbanes, Brown, Dodd, Coverdell, Kerry,
Snowe, Robb, Thompson, Feingold, Thomas, Feinstein, Grams, and
Ashcroft.
VIII. Resolution of Ratification
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein), That (a) the Senate advise and consent to the
ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on January 3,
1993, including the following protocols and memorandum of
understanding, all such documents being integral parts of and
collectively referred to as the ``START II Treaty'' (contained
in Treaty Document 103-1), subject to the conditions of
subsection (b) and the declarations of subsection (c):
(1) The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination
of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion
of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the
``Elimination and Conversion Protocol'').
(2) The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of
Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United
States and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known
as the ``Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol'').
(3) The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead
Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the
``Memorandum on Attribution'').
(b) Conditions.--The advice and consent of the Senate to
the ratification of the START II Treaty is subject to the
following conditions, which shall be binding upon the
President:
(1) Noncompliance.--If the President determines that
a party to the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, signed at Moscow on July 3, 1991 (in this
resolution referred to as the ``START Treaty'') or to
the START II Treaty is acting in a manner that is
inconsistent with the object and purpose of the
respective Treaty or is in violation of either the
START or START II Treaty so as to threaten the national
security interests of the United States, then the
President shall
(A) consult with and promptly submit a report
to the Senate detailing the effect of such
actions on the START Treaties;
(B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the
highest diplomatic level with the noncompliant
party with the objective of bringing the
noncompliant party into compliance;
(C) in the event that a party other than the
Russian Federation is determined not to be in
compliance--
(i) request consultations with the
Russian Federation to assess the
viability of both START Treaties and to
determine if a change in obligations is
required in either treaty to
accommodate the changed circumstances,
and
(ii) submit for the Senate's advice
and consent to ratification any
agreement changing the obligations of
the United States; and
(D) in the event that noncompliance persists,
seek a Senate resolution of support of
continued adherence to one or both of the START
Treaties, notwithstanding the changed
circumstances affecting the object and purpose
of one or both of the START Treaties.
(2) Treaty obligations.--Ratification by the United
States of the START II Treaty obligates the United
States to meet the conditions contained in this
resolution of ratification and shall not be interpreted
as an obligation by the United States to accept any
modification, change in scope, or extension of the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation
of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow on
May 26, 1972 (commonly referred to as the ``ABM
Treaty'').
(3) Financing implementation.--The United States
understands that in order to be assured of the Russian
commitment to a reduction in arms levels, Russia must
maintain a substantial stake in financing the
implementation of the START II Treaty. The costs of
implementing the START II Treaty should be borne by
both parties to the Treaty. The exchange of instruments
of ratification of the START II Treaty shall not be
contingent upon the United States providing financial
guarantees to pay for implementation of commitments by
Russia under the START II Treaty.
(4) Exchange of letters.--The exchange of letters--
(A) between Secretary of State Lawrence
Eagleburger and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Andrey Kozyrev, dated December 29, 1992,
regarding SS-18 missiles and launchers now on
the territory of Kazakstan,
(B) between Secretary of State Eagleburger
and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev, dated
December 29, 1992, and December 31, 1992,
regarding heavy bombers, and
(C) between Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev
and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, dated
December 29, 1992, and January 3, 1993, making
assurances on Russian intent regarding the
conversion and retention of 90 silo launchers
of RS-20 heavy intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) (all having been submitted to
the Senate as associated with the START II
Treaty),
are of the same force and effect as the provisions of
the START II Treaty. The United States shall regard
actions inconsistent with obligations under those
exchanges of letters as equivalent under international
law to actions inconsistent with the START II Treaty.
(5) Space-launch vehicles.--Space-launch vehicles
composed of items that are limited by the START Treaty
or the START II Treaty shall be subject to the
obligations undertaken in the respective treaty.
(6) NTM and cuba.--The obligation of the United
States under the START Treaty not to interfere with the
national technical means (NTM) of verification of the
other party to the Treaty does not preclude the United
States from pursuing the question of the removal of the
electronic intercept facility operated by the
Government of the Russian Federation at Lourdes, Cuba.
(c) Declarations.--The advice and consent of the Senate to
ratification of the START II Treaty is subject to the following
declarations, which express the intent of the Senate:
(1) Cooperative threat reductions.--Pursuant to the
Joint Statement on the Transparency and Irreversibility
of the Process of Reducing Nuclear Weapons, agreed to
in Moscow, May 10, 1995, between the President of the
United States and the President of the Russian
Federation, it is the sense of the Senate that both
parties to the START II Treaty should attach high
priority to--
(A) the exchange of detailed information on
aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on
stocks of fissile materials, and on their
safety and security;
(B) the maintenance at distinct and secure
storage facilities, on a reciprocal basis, of
fissile materials removed from nuclear warheads
and declared to be excess to national security
requirements for the purpose of confirming the
irreversibility of the process of nuclear
weapons reduction; and
(C) the adoption of other cooperative
measures to enhance confidence in the
reciprocal declarations on fissile material
stockpiles.
(2) Asymmetry in reductions.--It is the sense of the
Senate that, in conducting the reductions mandated by
the START or START II Treaty, the President should,
within the parameters of the elimination schedules
provided for in the START Treaties, regulate reductions
in the United States strategic nuclear forces so that
the number of accountable warheads under the START and
START II Treaties possessed by the Russian Federation
in no case exceeds the comparable number of accountable
warheads possessed by the United States to an extent
that a strategic imbalance endangering the national
security interests of the United States results.
(3) Expanding strategic arsenals in countries other
than russia.--It is the sense of the Senate that, if
during the time the START II Treaty remains in force or
in advance of any further strategic offensive arms
reductions the President determines there has been an
expansion of the strategic arsenal of any country not
party to the START II Treaty so as to jeopardize the
supreme interests of the United States, then the
President should consult on an urgent basis with the
Senate to determine whether adherence to the START II
Treaty remains in the national interest of the United
States.
(4) Substantial further reductions.--Cognizant of the
obligation of the United States under Article VI of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons of
July 1, 1968 ``to pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at any early date and to nuclear disarmament
and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control'', it
is the sense of the Senate that in anticipation of the
ratification and entry into force of the START II
Treaty, the Senate calls upon the parties to the START
II Treaty to seek further strategic offensive arms
reductions consistent with their national security
interests and calls upon the other nuclear weapon
states to give careful and early consideration to
corresponding reductions of their own nuclear arsenals.
(5) Missile technology control regime.--The Senate
urges the President to insist that the Republic of
Belarus, the Republic of Kazakstan, Ukraine, and the
Russian Federation abide by the guidelines of the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). For purposes
of this paragraph, the term ``Missile Technology
Control Regime'' means the policy statement between the
United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic
of Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan, announced
April 16, 1987, to restrict sensitive missile-relevant
transfers based on the MTCR Annex, and any amendments
thereto.
(6) Further arms reduction obligations.--The Senate
declares its intention to consider for approval
international agreements that would obligate the United
States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments
of the United States in a militarily significant manner
only pursuant to the treaty power as set forth in
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution.
(7) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the
applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally
based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in
Condition (1) of the resolution of ratification with
respect to the INF Treaty. For purposes of this
declaration, the term ``INF Treaty'' refers to the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination
of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles,
together with the related memorandum of understanding
and protocols, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.
IX. Article-by-Article Analysis
President Bush submitted to the Senate a 75 page Article by
Article Analysis of the START II Treaty text, Protocols,
Memorandum of Attribution, and associated documents which is
set forth in Treaty Doc. 103-1, pp. 1-75. The Treaty text,
Protocols, Memorandum of Attribution, and associated documents,
including the Article by Article Analysis, together with the
testimony and other authoritative representations directed to
the meaning and legal effect of the Treaty which were provided
by officials from the Administration to various inquiries from
the Senate during its consideration of the START II Treaty are
all part of the ``shared understanding'' between the Executive
Branch and the Senate as to both the meaning of the Treaty and
the way the United States will interpret it--all in accordance
with the constitutionally based Treaty interpretation
principles clarified in Condition (1) of the INF Treaty and
reaffirmed in the recent CFE Treaty.
The following summary is based upon the administration's
summaries, analysis, testimony, and other submissions to the
Committee on Foreign Relations. Due to the brevity of the
Treaty, specific references are provided to the appropriate
material only as necessary to assist the Senate's review.
I. The START II Treaty
The Treaty between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (The START II Treaty) consists of the
main Treaty text and three documents formally transmitted to
the Senate by President George Bush on January 20, 1993 (Treaty
Doc. 103-1) for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification
pursuant to Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
Constitution.
Transmitted with the START II Treaty and its associated
documents within Treaty Doc. 103-1 for the information of the
Senate as associated with but not integral parts of the START
II Treaty were three exchanges of letters embodying legally
binding commitments from the Russian Federation and the United
States concerning the removal of SS-18 missiles from Kazakstan,
the deployment of nuclear weapons on heavy bombers, and Russian
conversion of SS-18 missile silos. These documents are relevant
to the consideration of the START II Treaty by the Senate.
A. The treaty text (Treaty Doc. 103-1, pp. 32-41; see pp. 1-18 for
analysis)
Article I, paragraph 1, obligates the Parties to meet START
reductions and then to continue to reduce so that by seven
years after the START Treaty's entry into force (December 5,
2001), the aggregate number of warheads deployed by each Party
on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers does not exceed 4,250, as
counted pursuant to Articles III and IV of the START II Treaty
(Treaty Doc. 102-20, pp. 3-21; see pp. 743-771 for analysis).
This is the first phase of START II reductions.
Paragraph 2 establishes the following warhead sublimits for
the first phase of reductions:
2,160 for deployed SLBMs;
1,200 for ICBMs with more than one attributable
warhead;
650 for deployed heavy ICBMs.
Paragraph 3 obligates the Parties to undertake a second
phase of reductions so that by no later than January 1, 2003,
the aggregate number of warheads deployed by each Party on
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers does not exceed 3,500.
Paragraph 4 establishes the following warhead sublimits for
the second and final phase of reductions:
1,750 for deployed SLBMs;
0 for ICBMs with more than one attributable warhead;
0 for deployed heavy ICBMs.
Paragraph 5 commits both Parties to the two phase time-
line. Upon completion of the first phase, the second phase of
reductions will commence. However, neither this paragraph nor
the Treaty contain specific legal obligations by either Party
to reduce at a given rate. Unlike START, which mandates a
minimum rate of reductions of heavy ICBM launchers, for
example, START II requires only that reductions be of a
``sustained'' nature. Thus Russia is not obligated to eliminate
or convert a specified number of missiles or launchers per
year, though failure to engage in a significant, sustained
effort would prompt concerns over Russian intent to comply with
START II commitments.
Paragraph 6 allows the possibility of accelerated
reductions should both Parties agree on a program of
assistance. Ratification and implementation of the START II
Treaty is in no way contingent upon U.S. provision of any
financial guarantees or a program of assistance.
Article II, paragraph 1, requires the elimination by
January 1, 2003, of all MIRVed ICBM launchers (including
nondeployed, test, and training launchers) or their conversion
to accommodate only single-warhead ICBMs. Exempted from this
provision are those launchers of non-``heavy'' ICBMs permitted
under the START Treaty to be located at space launch
facilities.
Paragraph 2 exempts silo launchers of downloaded ICBMs from
the requirement in paragraph 1, thus enabling the U.S. to
retain all Minuteman III ICBMs and Russia to retain 105 SS-19
ICBMs. Russia gains the right to retain 105 SS-19s in Article
III of the START II Treaty.
Paragraph 3 requires the elimination of silo launchers to
be undertaken in accordance with Section II of the Conversion
or Elimination Protocol to the START Treaty (Treaty Doc. 102-
20, pp. 84-101; see pp. 873-895 for analysis). In addition,
while most SS-18 launchers must be physically destroyed,
including all those at space launch facilities, 90 launchers
may be converted to accommodate single-warhead ICBMs. While the
START Treaty requires destruction of 154 of the former Soviet
Union's 308 heavy ICBM launchers by the conclusion of the first
seven-year reduction phase (Treaty Doc. 102-20, p. 2; see pp.
741-743 for analysis and thirty third agreed statement at pp.
61-63 and 834-846), START II further requires elimination or
conversion of all heavy ICBM launchers, although--as mentioned
previously--90 of these may be converted. That leaves, as a
practical matter, 64 heavy ICBM launchers that must be
destroyed by the end of the second phase of reductions.
Paragraph 4 prohibits the emplacement of any ICBM launch
canister with a diameter greater than 2.5 meters in any of the
90 converted heavy ICBM launchers. This prohibition reinforces
the commitment made by Defense Minister Grachev to Secretary of
Defense Cheney in a letter dated December 29, 1992 (Treaty Doc.
103-1, pp. 72-73; see p. 7 for analysis).
Paragraph 5 requires the elimination of heavy ICBM
launchers at space launch facilities.
Paragraph 6 obligates both Parties to completely eliminate
through destruction or by space-launch all deployed and non-
deployed heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters by January 1,
2003.
Paragraph 7 specifies that each Party maintains the right
to inspect the destruction of heavy ICBMs and heavy ICBM launch
canisters, as well as the conversion of silo launchers for
heavy ICBMs.
Paragraph 8 sets forth the commitment by both parties to
not transfer heavy ICBMs to any state.
Paragraph 9 prohibits both Parties, beginning on January 1,
2003, from producing, acquiring from any other state, flight-
testing, or deploying MIRVed ICBMs.
Article III, paragraph 1, specifies that START II will use
the ``counting'' rules for attributing warheads established in
Section I of the START Memorandum of Understanding for deployed
ICBMs and SLBMs (Treaty Doc. 102-20, pp. 324-693; see pp. 1055
to 1066 for analysis), and by paragraph 4 of Article III of the
START Treaty (Treaty Doc. 102-20, pp. 3-13; see pp. 743-762 for
analysis) in the case of new intercontinental and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles.
Paragraph 2 allows for the use of downloading to reduce the
number of warheads attributed to a missile, following the same
rules as established under START (Treaty Doc. 102-20, pp. 3-13;
see pp. 743-762 for analysis). Like the START Treaty, START II
bans downloading of heavy ICBMs and of new types of ICBMs and
SLBMs.
Subparagraph 2(a) allows the Parties to exceed the START
limit of 1,250 for the total allowable number of downloaded
warheads.
Subparagraph 2(b) further relaxes START's sublimit on
downloading of no more than 500 warheads to be removed from
ICBMs and SLBMs other than the U.S. Minuteman III ICBM and the
Russian SS-N-18 SLBM.
Subparagraph 2(c) relaxes the START prohibition, imposed
under subparagraph 5(c)(iii) of Article III of that treaty
(Treaty Doc. 102-20, pp. 3-13; see pp. 743-762 for analysis),
on downloading more than four warheads per missile. Instead,
each Party is allowed to remove up to five warheads from no
more than 105 ICBMs of one type. Russia therefore will be
enabled to download 105 SS-19s from six to one warhead, and
will retain these missiles beyond the deadline banning all
MIRVed ICBMs. These missiles will only be deployable in silos
which possessed a missile of that type at the time of START's
signing.
Subparagraph 2(d) permits both Parties to retain--rather
than replace--reentry vehicle platforms downloaded by more than
two warheads, in contrast to subparagraphs 5(b)(iii) and
5(b)(iv) of Article III of START (Treaty Doc. 102-20, pp. 3-13;
see pp. 743-762 for analysis) which requires both Parties to
remove and destroy reentry vehicle platforms in order to take
advantage of downloading provisions.
Paragraph 3 prohibits the production, flight-testing, or
deployment of ICBMs or SLBMs with more than the number of
warheads attributed to it, and precludes the uploading of
missiles that have been downloaded.
Article IV, paragraph 1, establishes constraints on heavy
bombers. Whereas under START counting rules, 150 U.S. and 180
Soviet heavy bombers equipped with air-launch cruise missiles
(ALCMs) are discounted by up to fifty percent in terms of the
number of attributable warheads, and non-ALCM equipped heavy
bombers are considered to have only one warhead, paragraph 1
specifies that all heavy bombers shall be attributed with the
largest number of warheads with which any type or variant was
actually equipped. Thus START II departs significantly from
START in attributing warheads to heavy bombers.
Paragraph 2 sets forth the agreement that the number of
warheads attributed to a heavy bomber of a given type or
variant would be that number listed in the Memorandum on
Attribution (MOA).
Paragraph 3 prohibits either side from equipping heavy
bombers with more warheads than attributed in the MOA.
Paragraph 4 requires a one-time exhibition of each type and
variant of heavy bomber in order to demonstrate, for the
purposes of the Memorandum on Attribution, the number of
nuclear weapons with which each type or variant of bomber will
be equipped. These exhibitions are to be conducted no later
than 180 days after START II's entry into force and, in another
departure from START, will allow inspection of the B-2 Spirit
heavy bomber.
Paragraph 5 allows the Parties to alter the number of
warheads attributed to their heavy bombers, requiring 90-day
advance notification and exhibition of either the last or the
first heavy bomber so modified, depending on whether the Party
wishes to increase or decrease the number of attributable
warheads, or to introduce a new variant of heavy bomber.
Paragraph 6 requires that all inspections and exhibitions
relating to the preceding two paragraphs be conducted according
to the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol, and as provided
for in paragraph 1 of Article V of the START II Treaty.
Paragraph 7 allows Parties to reorient to a conventional
role those heavy bombers not accountable under START as being
equipped with ALCMs. Reorientation may be done without any
conversion procedures, but the reoriented bombers must have
observable differences from similar bombers with nuclear roles.
This is in addition to the right under START to convert up to
76 heavy bombers to non-nuclear missions.
Paragraph 8, subparagraph 8(a), restricts the number of
reoriented heavy bombers to 100 at any one time, subparagraph
8(b) requires segregated basing for the bombers, and 8(c) bans
their participation in nuclear missions or exercises and
prohibits their crews from training or exercising for nuclear
missions. Finally, subparagraph 8(d) requires that if fewer
than all of the bombers of a type or variant are to be
reoriented, then those bombers must have differences observable
by National Technical Means and by on-site inspections. These
differences need not be functional, in contrast with the
requirement under START that converted bombers be
``distinguishable.''
Paragraph 9 affords each Party the right, after a 90-day
advance notification, to return reoriented heavy bombers to a
nuclear role. However, these bombers may not again be
reoriented. In order to aid in the enforcement of the
prohibition on subsequent reorientation, if only a portion of
the total of a given type or variant of heavy bomber are so
reoriented, those bombers must have observable differences.
Paragraph 10 requires a minimum 100 kilometer separation
between bases for conventionally-oriented heavy bombers and
storage facilities for heavy bomber nuclear armaments.
Paragraph 11 requires that reoriented bombers remain
subject to START Treaty provisions, including inspections.
These bombers will continue to be attributed one warhead each
under START Treaty counting rules.
Paragraphs 12 and 13 provide for exhibitions of heavy
bombers to demonstrate observable differences between types and
variants oriented towards different missions (e.g. nuclear
versus conventional).
Paragraph 14 requires that all inspections conducted
pursuant to Article IV be done in accordance with the
Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol.
Article V, paragraph 1 specifies that, except as provided
for elsewhere in the START II Treaty, START provisions shall be
used to verify and implement START II.
Paragraph 2 establishes the Bilateral Implementation
Commission (BIC) to resolve compliance issues or to agree upon
additional measures necessary to improve the viability and
effectiveness of START II.
Article VI specifies that the Treaty is subject to
ratification prior to entering into force, and will not enter
into force prior to the START Treaty. Second, the START II ban
on the transfer of heavy ICBMs to a third state or states shall
be provisionally applied as of the date of signature of START
II. It also stipulates that the START II Treaty will remain in
force for the duration of the START Treaty. Both Parties have
the right to withdraw from the Treaty with six months notice if
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this
Treaty have jeopardized a Party's supreme interests.
Article VII is identical in content to Article XVIII of the
START Treaty, providing for amendments to the START II Treaty.
Such amendments would be subject to ratification as specified
in Article VI of the Treaty.
Article VIII provides for the registration of the Treaty
with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Final Provision of the START II Treaty records that the
Treaty was done at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies,
each in the English and Russian languages, and each being
equally authentic.
B. The elimination and conversion protocol
The Elimination and Conversion Protocol consists of three
sections, the first setting forth procedures for the
elimination of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters, the
second establishing procedures for the conversion and
confirmation of conversion of SS-18 silo launchers, silo
training launchers, and silo test launchers, and the third
discussing of inspection costs and equipment.
Section 1, Paragraph 1 provides two alternatives for
eliminating heavy ICBMs. A Party may either use the procedures
set forth in Section I, which are to take place at elimination
facilities for ICBMs specified in the START Treaty, or it may
eliminate heavy ICBMs by using them for delivering objects into
the upper atmosphere or outer space. In both cases, advance
notification must be provided, for the former via the Nuclear
Risk Reduction Centers (NRCCs) 30 days in advance. The latter
requires 24 hours of advance notice through the NRRCs.
Paragraph 2 provides that the inspected Party: shall remove
the missile's reentry vehicles; may remove the electronic and
electro-mechanical devices of the missiles's guidance and
control system, as well as other elements not subject to
elimination; shall remove the missile from its launch canister
and disassemble the missile into stages; shall remove liquid
propellant from the missile; may remove or actuate auxiliary
pyrotechnic devices; may remove penetration aids, including
devices for their attachment and release; and may remove
propulsion units from the self-contained dispensing mechanism.
Paragraph 3 describes the confirmatory inspection to take
place prior to the destruction. Inspectors may confirm the type
and number of missiles to be eliminated by visual observation
and measurement. On-site observation is necessary since
National-Technical Means cannot confirm that the objects
presented for destruction are real.
Paragraph 4 specifies the elimination process to be
followed for destruction of heavy ICBMs. Missile stages,
nozzles, and missile interstage skirts are to be cut into two
pieces of approximately equal size; and the self-contained
dispensing mechanism (as well as the front section), including
the reentry vehicle platform and the front section shroud, are
to be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size and
crushed.
Paragraph 5 states that launch canisters of heavy ICBMs
shall be cut into two or three pieces. These procedures apply
to launch canisters eliminated with their heavy ICBMs, as well
as to launch canisters for missiles eliminated through flight-
testing, or through launching into the upper atmosphere or
space. They also apply to empty launch canisters existing at
the time of the Treaty's entry into force (EIF).
Paragraph 6 requires a factual written report containing
the results of the inspection team's observation of the
elimination process to confirm the conclusion of the
inspection.
Paragraph 7 states that heavy ICBMs will no longer be
subject to the limitations of this Treaty upon completion of
the procedures set forth in Section I.
Section 2, paragraph 1 requires that conversion of silo
launchers of heavy ICBMs (including silo training launchers of
heavy ICBMs and silo test launchers of heavy ICBMs) be carried
out in situ and be subject to inspection. Launchers of heavy
ICBMs at space launch facilities may not be converted, but must
be destroyed. Silo elimination will be done according to START
rules.
Paragraph 2 provides that the missile and launch canister
must be removed from a silo launcher prior to conversion.
Paragraph 3 states that Russia will be considered to have
begun converting heavy ICBM silo launchers (including training
and test launchers) as soon as the silo door is opened and the
missile and its canister removed. Notification is to be
provided according to paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section IV of the
Notification Protocol to the START Treaty (Treaty Doc. 102-20,
pp. 283-308; see pp. 1008-1033 for analysis).
Paragraph 4 sets forth the conversion process for heavy
ICBM silos. They are: opening the door and removing the missile
and launch canister; pouring five meters of concrete into the
base of the silo; and installing a restrictive ring with a
diameter of no more than 2.9 meters into the upper portion of
the silo in a way that precludes removal without destruction of
the ring and its attachment to the silo wall.
Paragraph 5 provides the U.S. the right to confirm that the
aforementioned procedures have been carried out. Russia is
required to notify the U.S. (through the NRRCs) at least 30
days in advance of pouring the concrete, and upon completion of
all of the procedures specified.
Paragraph 6 confers the right of the United States to
observe the entire process of pouring concrete into each heavy
ICBM silo that is to be converted, and to measure the diameter
of the restrictive ring. Inspection teams are limited to ten
inspectors drawn from the START list of inspectors, as
specified by Section II of the Inspection Protocol to the START
Treaty (Treaty Doc. 102-20, pp. 102-282; see pp. 896-1008 for
analysis). These inspections shall not count against any
inspection quotas established by the START Treaty. In addition,
heavy ICBM elimination inspections do not count against START
Treaty quotas.
Paragraph 7 provides an alternative method for confirming
conversion, providing the right to measure the depth of each
heavy ICBM silo that is to be converted before the concrete has
been poured, and to return and remeasure the silo depth after
the concrete has hardened. In addition, paragraph 7 provides
for the right to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring.
Inspection teams are limited to ten inspectors drawn from the
START list of inspectors, as specified by Section II of the
Inspection Protocol to the START Treaty (Treaty Doc. 102-20,
pp. 102-282; see pp. 896-1008 for analysis), and these
inspections do not count against any inspection quotas
established by the START Treaty.
Paragraph 8 gives Russia the right to carry out further
conversion measures after the completion of the procedures
specified in paragraphs 6 or 7 or, if such procedures are not
conducted, 30 days after notification of completion of the
procedures specified in paragraph 4.
Paragraph 9 authorizes, in addition to the reentry vehicle
inspections provided for in the START Treaty, four additional
reentry vehicle inspections each year of ICBMs deployed in
converted silo launchers. Procedures set forth in the
Inspection Protocol to the START Treaty (Treaty Doc. 102-20,
pp. 102-282; see pp. 896-1008 for analysis) will be used during
these inspections. In addition to confirming that the missile
installed in the converted silo has only one reentry vehicle,
these inspections permit the U.S. visually to confirm the
presence of the restrictive ring and of the launch canister and
missile that Russia has placed in the silo.
Paragraph 10 states that, upon completion of the procedures
specified in paragraphs 6 or 7, the silo being converted shall
be considered to contain a deployed ICBM to which one warhead
is attributed.
Section III provides the right to use equipment in these
inspections agreed-upon in the Bilateral Implementation
Commission. It also apportions nearly all the costs of these
inspections to the United States since the U.S. has no heavy
ICBMs to inspect.
C. The exhibitions and inspections protocol
The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections consists of a
Preamble and two sections. It sets forth detailed procedures
for the conduct of exhibitions of heavy bombers and for
inspections conducted incident to those exhibitions.
Section I, paragraph 1 provides for heavy bomber
exhibitions different from exhibitions required under the START
Treaty. Paragraph 1 repeats the requirements of Article IV of
the START II Treaty for three types of exhibitions:
(1) Exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments. The purpose of such an exhibition is to demonstrate
to the other Party the number of nuclear weapons for which a
heavy bomber is actually equipped. Similarly, an exhibition is
required if the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy
bomber is actually equipped is changed.
(2) Exhibitions of heavy bombers reoriented to a
conventional role. Such an exhibition is intended to
demonstrate to the other Party the specified differences
between reoriented bombers and other heavy bombers of the same
type or variant that have a nuclear role. Such differences must
be both observable by national technical means of verification
and visible during on-site inspection.
(3) Exhibitions of heavy bombers reoriented to a
conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role.
Such exhibitions serve both to demonstrate the number of
nuclear weapons for which the heavy bomber actually will be
equipped and to demonstrate the differences between the heavy
bombers being returned and heavy bombers of the same type or
variant that are either (a) still in a conventional role or (b)
never were reoriented.
Paragraph 2 provides identical basic rules on location,
date, duration, and inspection team composition for each of the
three types of exhibitions. The procedures of the START Treaty
apply to these exhibitions, except as modified by the Protocol.
Specifically, each heavy bomber shall be subject to inspection
for no more than two hours. Photographs must be provided to
show all relevant differences between types and variants of
reoriented/nonreoriented heavy bombers. Finally, these
exhibitions do not count against START inspection quotas.
Section II, paragraph 1 provides rules for the inspections
of heavy bombers during exhibitions. Section II also provides
additional procedures for data update inspections and new
facility inspections conducted pursuant to the START Treaty.
New facility inspections are included since, under the
provisions of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol to the
START Treaty, such inspections include inspection of applicable
heavy bombers at new airbases. Baseline exhibitions are to be
conducted to provide an initial demonstration of the number of
nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers of a given type and
variant are actually equipped. The additional inspection
procedures for data update and new facility inspections allow
periodic reconfirmation of this attribution. However, no
requirement exists to load armaments for inspections. Further,
there is no requirement to give direct access to the underside
of the wings of the B-2 in order to prove that no weapons are
located there. Nor would there be access to the interior of any
heavy bomber (except for weapons bays).
Paragraph 2 provides a right to shroud portions of a heavy
bomber not subject to inspection. This right applies to all
heavy bombers, but is primarily intended to protect the B-2 and
future bombers. Two hours are allocated for inspections during
exhibitions, and 32 hours are provided for the conduct of data
update or new facility inspections. Given this, there is a
possible conflict between the two Treaties. In order to provide
for a situation where more time would be required than
allocated by the START Treaty, the United States will, if
necessary, seek, in the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission established by the START Treaty, the right to extend
the period of inspection to allow for the completion of START
II inspection procedures.
Paragraph 3 requires the in-country escort to provide the
number of nuclear weapons for which the heavy bomber is
actually equipped and to identify the differences that are
observable by NTM and visible during inspection. Additional
measures may be agreed upon by the Parties with respect to the
Protocol to improve the viability and effectiveness of the
START II Treaty. Pursuant to Article VI, the Protocol is deemed
to be an integral part of the START II Treaty.
D. The memorandum on attribution
The Memorandum on Attribution (MOA) consists of a Preamble
and five Sections. It establishes the database needed to record
the following data:
The number of nuclear weapons for which each heavy
bomber of a type and a variant is actually equipped;
The aggregate number of bomber weapons counted
against the limits established in Article I of the
Treaty;
The numbers and locations for heavy bombers
reoriented to a conventional role and for heavy bombers
subsequently returned to a nuclear role;
The differences observable to national technical
means of verification for heavy bombers reoriented to a
conventional role, and for heavy bombers reoriented to
a conventional role that are subsequently returned to a
nuclear role;
The number and location of ICBMs and SLBMs downloaded
by amounts greater than allowed by the START Treaty, or
ICBMs and SLBMs downloaded without destruction of the
reentry vehicle platform;
The number and location of heavy ICBM silos converted
to carry single-warhead ICBMs; and
The number of heavy ICBMs eliminated and remaining to
be eliminated.
Only Treaty-related data that are different from the data
in the START Memorandum of Understanding are included in this
MOA.
Section I sets forth the number of warheads for which
deployed heavy bombers (other than those reoriented to a
conventional role) are actually equipped. The accuracy of the
data provided is the responsibility of the Party owning the
given heavy bomber. In addition, this Section provides a record
of the aggregate number of warheads attributed to such heavy
bombers. Under the START Treaty, older U.S. heavy bombers
awaiting elimination at the Davis-Monthan conversion or
elimination facility are included in the Memorandum of
Understanding, since such bombers count against the START
Treaty delivery vehicle and warhead totals. Since these older
bombers will be eliminated before the expiration of the seven
year reductions period, when the first limits under START II
must be reached, the number of nuclear weapons for which they
are actually equipped was not included in the START II MOA.
Section II records the aggregate number of heavy bombers
reoriented to a conventional role and the bases at which they
are located. In addition, this Section allows the recording of
observable differences. Since no heavy bombers have yet been
reoriented to a conventional role, this Section is unlikely to
contain any data when the first data exchange occurs 30 days
after entry into force of the START II Treaty.
Section III provides data on the numbers and locations of
ICBMs and SLBMs downloaded under the provisions of Article III
of the Treaty. The format is identical to that of Section III
of the START Treaty Memorandum of Understanding.
Section IV provides data on the numbers and locations of
heavy ICBM silos (in practice, silo launchers for Russian SS-18
ICBMs) which have been converted pursuant to the Elimination
and Conversion Protocol. Since the START Treaty requires that
geographic coordinates not be released to the public, the
locations referred to in this Section will be given by use of
the silos designators found in the Memorandum of Understanding
to the START Treaty. Section IV also provides data on the
number of heavy ICBMs which remain deployed in Russia, remain
nondeployed in Russia, or have been eliminated in order to
measure progress toward the elimination of all heavy ICBMs.
Section V requires each Party to notify the other of
changes in the attribution and data contained in this
Memorandum. Unlike the START Treaty, the START II Treaty does
not prescribe in detail the specific content of notifications.
X. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL
It is an illuminating illustration of how far we have come
in arms control that all 18 Members of the Committee on Foreign
Relations gave their support to the START II Treaty and
recommended that it be ratified. I recall that the very first
of the strategic offensive arms agreements--the 1972 SALT I
Interim Agreement--brought on extensive expressions of concern.
In the end it was approved with some Members expressing relief
that it would be of only limited duration--five years--and thus
not sufficiently enduring to endanger the national security of
the United States. The 1979 SALT II Agreement was a highly
controversial, ambitious undertaking over which the Committee
was deeply divided. The treaty was finally approved in a 9-6
vote. SALT I foundered after the brutal Russian invasion of
Afghanistan. That treaty never came into force, although it set
the stage for continued efforts. The START I Treaty in 1991 was
the first offensive arms agreement to dramatically reduce the
nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union and the United
States. START I cut the arsenals by one-third, and this treaty
will reduce by another one-third the nuclear forces possessed
by the United States and the Russian Federation. It had
overwhelming--but not unanimous--support in the Committee.
These major undertakings, together with the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty limiting strategic defensive arms,
truly represent a continuum of arms control that has already
had considerable benefits to the nations involved and promise
still more over the next seven years.
There is no question that all of this effort, more than two
decades-long, characterized by new initiatives that build upon
earlier achievements step-by-step, has been critically
important in the effort to curb the costly and essentially
pointless arms competition that characterized much of the
postwar period prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. While
I, together with many others, am pleased that we finally have
reached a point at which we can anticipate the elimination of
the most destabilizing weapons--land-based missiles with
multiple warheads, it also is saddening to realize that this
nation's leaders might have been wiser earlier. The pointless
and wasteful MIRV competition that has been central to the arms
race well might have been averted.
It is useful to recall that the Committee and the Senate
endeavored in 1970 to forestall the development of MIRVed
systems.
Senate Resolution 211 stated in part:
* * * Whereas development of multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles by both the United States
and the Soviet Union represents a fundamental and
radical challenge to such stability;
Whereas the possibility of agreed controls over
strategic forces appears likely to diminish greatly if
testing and deployment of multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles proceed;
Resolved further, That the President should propose
to the Government of Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics an immediate suspension * * * of the further
development of all offensive and defensive nuclear
strategic weapons systems, subject to national
verification or such measures of observation and
inspection as may be appropriate.
Senate Resolution 211 was introduced by Senator Edward
Brooke and 39 cosponsors (with three later additions) on June
17, 1969. The Foreign Relations Committee reported favorably S.
Res. 211 on March 24, 1970, and it passed the Senate on April
9, 1970, on a vote of 72 to 6.
I remember well making the case to several senior
Administration officials that we would do well to do our best
to avoid a race in multiple-warhead missiles. Nonetheless, the
Administration did not agree with the Senate on the matter,
believing instead that the United States enjoyed a
technological lead over the Soviet Union, and would do better
if MIRVs were allowed. Accordingly, the United States never
proposed, in any serious way, that MIRVs be banned in SALT I.
Two decades later, Soviet MIRVs have become a matter of
considerable concern, and much effort in START and further
effort in connection with the de-MIRVing Treaty have been
required to deal with the problem. Now, 25 years later, it is
clear how prescient the Senate was. Now that we are coming full
circle, only five of S. Res. 211's cosponsors--Senators Dole,
Hatfield, Inouye, Kennedy and I--remain in the Senate.
I am reminded of the thought of T.S. Eliot in his poem,
Little Gidding:
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
The achievements of SALT, START and the ABM Treaty
demonstrate that the United States and the successors to the
Soviet Union are fulfilling pledges made repeatedly since the
1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty to reduce their nuclear arsenals.
These pledges were seen as justification by other nations for
decisions to refrain from nuclear weapons testing, join the
non-proliferation treaty as non-nuclear weapon states and,
earlier this year, to agree upon the permanent extension of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
I hope very much that we will have the wisdom to understand
what has been achieved, the resolve to preserve our
achievements, and the foresight to build upon them.
At present, the 1972 ABM Treaty is under serious assault by
people who believe that the United States should have a nation-
wide defense against ballistic missile attack. This notion runs
directly counter to the concept underlying the ABM Treaty--that
ensuring that neither side could have an effective national
defense against missile attack would reassure each side's
confidence in the deterrent value of its strategic offensive
forces, thus enhancing deterrence and opening the way to
meaningful reductions. That concept has proved correct.
Those who insist that the United States should build a
national defense regardless of whether it would destroy the ABM
Treaty may, in the end, undermine both START I and START II and
also destroy possibilities for further reduction during this
era. A Russian decision not to ratify START II because of their
concern about our commitment to the ABM Treaty could only lead
to unwanted and unnecessary strategic uncertainty. Should the
process of reduction be halted, the remaining Russian threat
could be so great that the limited national defense now being
advocated by some would be laughable. Should we then raise
defense spending to cope with the threat, we would create
further privations for taxpayers as the budget-balancing effort
was destroyed, and we could find ourselves back in an arms
race.
Surely, we need not repeat such past mistakes. We need to
recognize that there are real new arms control challenges to be
met and overcome. We should focus on these opportunities and
bring our best thinking and diplomacy to bear. If we do our
work well, we will surely avoid much needless and debilitating
military spending.
In truth, there is no time to waste as we move to meet arms
control challenges. Immediate priority should go to two
activities; one within the province of the Senate, and a second
within the province of the Executive Branch for the moment.
First, this Committee should complete at an early date the
several additional hearings now contemplated on the Chemical
Weapons Convention and proceed as soon as possible to
consideration and, I would hope, approval of ratification. I
chaired seven hearings on the Chemical Weapons Convention in
1994, and there was overwhelming evidence that the Convention
merited and had gained wide-spread support in the Executive
Branch, the Congress, the national security community and the
chemical weapons industry.
Delay in further consideration has raised the possibility
that the Russian Federation may act at an earlier date than the
United States and that the United States may not be a party
when the requisite 65 nations have joined and the Convention
comes into force. It would be very unfortunate for the world to
start establishing the regime under which the Chemical Weapons
Convention will operate with the United States on the outside
looking in. It would be far better for us to lend our
considerable expertise to the venture and help ensure that this
ground-breaking agreement prohibiting the manufacturing,
storage, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons is brought
into force and enforced with the United States in a central
role.
Second, the Administration should do everything it can to
avoid any deviation from the path toward a comprehensive ban on
all nuclear testing. The President has made the wise decisions
that the United States will support a treaty that is
permanently binding upon the parties and that will press for a
treaty that completely bans all nuclear explosions.
Earlier this year the United States led the highly
successful effort at the United Nations to secure the permanent
extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We made it clear to
the non-nuclear weapons states represented that we took our
obligation seriously to end nuclear testing. We must not falter
now for our own self-interest and for the interest of those who
understand the imperative that we continue our best to control
the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
As additional priorities we should undertake very serious
analysis as to just what further steps to reduce the nuclear
arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation are in
our interest and what kinds of reductions we might hope the
other three nuclear powers--China, Britain, and France--might
undertake. We will be much more comfortable with further
reductions if all the nuclear powers are talking and
cooperating and moving their arsenals to steadily lower levels.
Each achievement in that regard will help reinforce the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
In recent years, the United States has led other nations in
the development of sanctions to be applied to individuals and
nations taking dangerous actions with regard to chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons proliferation as well as the
missiles that might be used for their delivery. In most
instances, we have led the world in our initiative and
willingness to set higher standards. Fortuitously, we have been
willing to lead, rather than wait for consensus. As a result,
it should be clear to all that we and other responsible nations
will not tolerate proliferation-related activities.
There should be no doubt that we face new and changing
proliferation threats. We must be careful, however, neither to
underrate nor to overrate the threat. If we underrate the
threat, we and others will become law in meeting it. If we
overrate, we are likely to waste precious resources over-
responding. For instance, we do not want to spend major sums of
money to develop a missile defense to counter a threat that
many experts believe may never pose a serious threat to
America.
We are trying through various means to get potential
proliferant nations, such as China and North Korea, to
constrain themselves in their activities and exports. We are
quite properly trying to use diplomatic efforts throughout the
world to deal with proliferation problems and to set nations
with worrisome activities on a different course. It will
enhance this effort considerably if we are willing to respond
effectively, as required by law, to dangerous proliferation-
related activities by others. For instance, when sanctions
should be imposed for various activities, we must not shy away
from making that decision. The Executive Branch should
understand that in many cases it has the authority to waive the
imposition of sanctions, should the President consider that to
be in order. That is a far more preferable course and one that
can be discussed freely by the Congress and Executive Branch.
It is infinitely more honest and understandable than turning a
blind eye to illicit activity, and it would avoid the danger of
sending the wrong message to potential proliferators.
The international barriers to proliferation are being
steadily broadened and strengthened. As a very important
example, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the required
implementing legislation will mean that much activity that was
previously permitted will now be criminalized. Throughout the
world, police will be able to investigate and stop chemical
weapons schemes such as the one that led to the Tokyo subway
incident and more secure as a result.
More than ever the benefits of arms control as an
enhancement of our national security and as a way to spare our
citizenry needless expenditures and needless risks should be
imminently clear. I am deeply convinced that the people
steadily are becoming better informed on the merit of arms
control and want it fostered and nurtured.
Many of the activities of arms control are separate, but as
time has passed they are threads that have come together. A
true fabric of sensible restraint is indeed being woven.