[House Report 109-396]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
109th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 109-396
_______________________________________________________________________
Union Calendar No. 216
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
----------
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT AND DOCUMENT ANNEX
by the
SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND
RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
March 16, 2006.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT AND DOCUMENT ANNEX
109th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 109-396
_______________________________________________________________________
Union Calendar No. 216
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
__________
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT AND DOCUMENT ANNEX
by the
SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND
RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
March 16, 2006.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND
RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA
TOM DAVIS, (VA) Chairman
HAROLD ROGERS (KY)
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS (CT)
HENRY BONILLA (TX)
STEVE BUYER (IN)
SUE MYRICK (NC)
MAC THORNBERRY (TX)
KAY GRANGER (TX)
CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING (MS)
BILL SHUSTER (PA)
JEFF MILLER (FL)
Members who participated at the invitation of the Select Committee
CHARLIE MELANCON (LA)
GENE TAYLOR (MS)
WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON (LA)
CYNTHIA MCKINNEY (GA)
SHELIA JACKSON-LEE (TX)
Staff Designations
David L. Marin, Staff Director Kim Baronof, Professional Staff
J. Keith Ausbrook, Special Counsel Risa Salsburg, Professional Staff
Lawrence J. Halloran, Deputy Susie Schulte, Professional Staff
Special Counsel Shalley Kim, Professional Staff
Robert Borden, Senior Associate Wimberly Fair, Professional Staff
Special Counsel Chuck Turner, Special Investigator
Daniel Matthews, Senior Robert White, Press Secretary
Professional Staff Drew Crockett, Art Editor
Arthur Wu, Senior Professional Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Staff Amy Laudeman, Deputy Clerk
Thomas E. Hawley, Senior Robin Butler, Administrative
Professional Staff Officer/Financial
Grace A. Washbourne, Senior Administrator
Professional Staff Michael Sazonov, Staff Assistant
Kim Kotlar, Senior Professional Pat DeQuattro, Coast Guard Fellow
Staff Jay O'Callahan, Research Assistant
Anne Marie Turner, Associate Michael Arkush, Editorial
Special Counsel Assistant
Charles M. Phillips, Associate Margaret Peterlin, Speaker's
Special Counsel Designee
Steve Castor, Assistant Special
Counsel
Brooke Bennett, Assistant Special
Counsel
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, March 16, 2006.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to
Hurricane Katrina, I submit herewith the committee's
supplementary report and document annex to the 109th Congress.
Tom Davis,
Chairman.
(iii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
FORMER UNDERSECRETARY MICHAEL BROWN'S COMMUNICATIONS WITH WHITE
HOUSE OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, REFLECTED A DISREGARD
FOR THE PROCEDURES OF THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN............... 1
I. Introduction.....................................................1
II. Brown Deliberately Ignored the National Response Plan............2
ADDITIONAL VIEWS SUBMITTED BY THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BEHALF OF
REPRESENTATIVE CHARLIE MELANCON AND REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM
JEFFERSON...................................................... 7
DOCUMENT ANNEX................................................... 11
Union Calendar No. 216
109th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 109-396
======================================================================
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
_______
March 16, 2006.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Tom Davis, from the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, submitted the
following
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT AND DOCUMENT ANNEX
On March 16, 2006, the Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina approved and adopted a report entitled, ``A Failure of
Initiative Supplementary Report and Document Annex.'' The
chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the
House.
FORMER UNDERSECRETARY MICHAEL BROWN'S COMMUNICATIONS WITH WHITE
HOUSE OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, REFLECTED A DISREGARD
FOR THE PROCEDURES OF THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN
I. Introduction
The Select Committee's efforts to obtain documents and
other information from the White House are well-documented in
the Select Committee's original report. While the Select
Committee received more than 22,000 pages from the Executive
Office of the President and the Office of the Vice President,
the White House refused to produce communications among senior
White House staff and would not permit witnesses to testify or
be interviewed regarding communications with senior White House
officials and the President.
Before the Select Committee on September 27, 2005, Former
Department of Homeland Security Undersecretary for Emergency
Preparedness and Response Michael D. Brown told the Select
Committee he would not respond to certain questions regarding
his communications with senior White House officials, including
the President. Brown told the Select Committee, ``I'm being
advised by counsel that I can't discuss with you my
conversations with the President's Chief of Staff and the
President.'' \1\
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\1\ Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency Before House Katrina Select Comm., 109th Cong. 79
(Sept. 27, 2005) (statement of Michael Brown, former Dir., Federal
Emergency Management Agency) [hereinafter Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm.
Hearing].
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On February 10, 2006, however, Brown appeared before the
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,
declaring that, as a private citizen, he no longer felt bound
by the same restrictions that applied to his previous
testimony.\2\ In that appearance, he testified about specific
conversations with, among others, White House Chief of Staff
Andrew Card, Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph Hagin, and the
President.
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\2\ Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Roles of U.S. Dept of
Homeland Security and FEMA Leadership Before Sen. Homeland Sec. and
Gov'tl Affairs Comm., 109th Cong. 25-26 (Feb. 10, 2006) (statement of
Michael Brown) [hereinafter Feb. 10, 2006 Sen. Homeland Sec. Hearing].
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Deprived previously of this information, the Select
Committee served a subpoena on Brown that same day, compelling
him to appear on Monday, February 13, 2006.\3\ In lieu of his
appearance on that date, the Select Committee took testimony
from him in a sworn deposition on Saturday, February 11, 2006.
In that testimony, he discussed his conversations with
President Bush and Chief of Staff Card, among others.\4\
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\3\ Subpeona served on Michael Brown by House Katrina Select Comm.
Staff in Wash., D.C. (Feb. 10, 2006).
\4\ See Deposition of Michael Brown by House Katrina Select Comm.
Staff in Wash., D.C. (Feb. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Brown Dep.].
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Brown's communications with the White House generally
confirm the Select Committee report's findings. They confirm
the Select Committee's conclusions regarding the use of the
National Response Plan's (NRP) protocols and procedures and the
potential for better response if the President had been
involved in the details of the response at an earlier date.
But Brown's communications with the White House also raise
serious questions about when and how the White House becomes
involved in disaster response under the NRP. Brown testified he
regularly communicated with senior White House officials and
asked for their assistance in the response. It is well-
documented that the response at all levels of government was
inadequate. The record establishes that Brown deliberately
ignored the procedures, responsibilities, and mechanisms of the
NRP and called directly on the White House for assistance
instead.
II. Brown Deliberately Ignored the National Response Plan
Brown's communications with the White House and his sworn
statements to the Select Committee and others reflect his
deliberate decision to ignore the NRP. The NRP was required to
be promulgated under the Homeland Security Act and was
established at the direction of the President under Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 5 ``to align Federal
coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a
unified, all-discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic
incident management.'' \5\ It was designed to ``serve[] to
unify and enhance the incident management capabilities and
resources of individual agencies and organizations acting under
their own authorities in response to a wide array of potential
threats and hazards.'' \6\ Thirty-two Departments and Agencies
of the federal government adopted it.\7\
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\5\ Dep't of Homeland Sec., National Response Plan (Dec. 2004) at i
[hereinafter NRP].
\6\ Id.
\7\ Id. at v-viii.
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The NRP was completed in 2004 and provided new tools for
dealing with disasters, including catastrophic disasters. These
tools include the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC)
and its constituent entity the National Response Coordinating
Center, the Regional Response Coordinating Center, the
Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG), the Catastrophic
Incident Annex,\8\ and the designation of the Secretary of
Homeland Security as the person responsible for execution of
``overall coordination of federal incident management
activities'' \9\ in a disaster.
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\8\ Id. at ix-x.
\9\ Id. at 15.
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Brown's own testimony establishes that he ignored or
circumvented the procedures under the NRP for managing the
disaster. Brown's testimony demonstrates that he deliberately
chose to disregard key provisions of the plan, communicating
with White House officials to secure resources. His
circumvention of the NRP contributed to depriving the nation of
an opportunity to determine whether the NRP worked. While it is
clear that the federal, state, and local response was
inadequate, it is not clear that the NRP itself would not have
worked, or worked better, if it had been executed by those
responsible for doing so, including Brown.
Brown chose to operate as he had in previous disasters--
prior to the adoption of the NRP. Responding to questions from
Select Committee Chairman Tom Davis, Brown testified that he
relied on his ``previous experience with lots of disasters'' to
``relay [his needs] to Hagin or Card, and it would get done. .
. .'' \10\ He reported that if he ``needed, for example, DOD to
do something in particular, then either [Deputy Secretary]
Gordon England, or Secretary [Donald] Rumsfeld or Assistant
Secretary Paul McHale would call me and confirm that, yeah, we
just got a call from Andy, and . . . we are going to get that
done for you.'' \11\ He testified that he had ``literally
dozens'' of conversations or e-mails with senior White House
staff, including the President, the Vice President, Card,
Hagin, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, and Karl
Rove.\12\
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\10\ Brown Dep. at 16.
\11\ Id.
\12\ Id. at 8.
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Brown virtually boasted that he deliberately avoided
communicating with the Secretary of Homeland Security Michael
Chertoff. When asked in the Senate by Senator Lieberman whether
he had talked to Chertoff on Monday, August 29, and why he
``would . . . not have if that was the chain of command,'' he
responded: ``Because I'm still operating that I need to get
things done, and the way I get things done is I request them
from the White House . . . .'' \13\
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\13\ Feb. 10, 2005 Sen. Homeland Sec. Hearing at 44.
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He further testified in the Senate that calling Chertoff
for support ``would have wasted my time. . . .'' \14\ Brown
claimed that ``DHS was an additional bureaucracy that was going
to slow me down even more. And the way I got around that was
dealing directly with the White House.'' \15\ Senator Bennett
observed, ``[I]f I were Secretary Chertoff and I had a Deputy
Secretary who would prefer to call the White House rather than
talk to me, I would find that very disturbing.'' \16\
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\14\ Id. at 65-66.
\15\ Id. at 69.
\16\ Id. at 66.
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At the same time as he was eager to call the White House
for assistance, Brown tried to cut off communications with the
Secretary. He told another FEMA official: ``I did tell
[Secretary Chertoff] privately that the phone calls were
killing me, and he said he understood. He assures me he is not
trying to interfere, but they are literally driving me crazy.''
\17\
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\17\ E-mail from Michael Brown to Brooks Altschuler, Dep. Chief of
Staff, FEMA (Sept. 1, 2005, 21:31).
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He also admitted that Card directed him to use the proper
procedures. He testified that Card responded to a request:
Mike, we are going to have to follow the protocol. We
are going to have to follow the chain of command on
this one. And I took that to mean that the way we have
played ball for the past couple of years, we are not
going to play ball that way, and now we are going to
play ball by ``if you really need something, you need
to go to Chertoff or back though HSOC or whatever you
are going to do and do those requests that way.'' \18\
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\18\ Brown Dep. at 17.
Brown operated under the old procedures, despite his own
recognition of changes to the NRP and at FEMA. In both his
September 27, 2005 appearance before the Select Committee and
his February 11, 2006 deposition, he complained about FEMA
budget cuts and reorganization at DHS.\19\ In response to
Chairman Davis's question about whether the NRP had changed
since the 2004 hurricane season in Florida, Brown replied: ``It
had. It had.'' \20\ Brown was also asked: ``[It] looks [as if]
you may have spent a couple of years fighting a system that you
didn't like, and then when the disaster came, it came [time] to
use that system you chose not to use it. How would you address
that?'' \21\ He responded:
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\19\ See Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 114, 115-117
(statements of Michael Brown); Brown Dep. at 41, 43, 85. See also Sept.
27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 77, 99, 114, 139-140 (statements of
Michael Brown).
\20\Brown Dep. at 17.
\21\ Id. at 94.
I would say that is generally true because the system
that is in place works, whether it is catastrophic or
not. The system that is in place worked.\22\
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\22\ Id.
But that was emphatically not the system in place for
Hurricane Katrina, and Brown deliberately ignored it. He
admitted that he never advised the Secretary to designate
Hurricane Katrina as an Incident of National Significance \23\
and never even discussed with Chertoff activating the NRP's
Catastrophic Incident Annex.\24\ He testified that he would
have ``fought the activation of the IIMG as hard as [he]
could.'' \25\ He testified that, if he had gone through the
HSOC or the Secretary, it would have ``added two new phone
calls and two new layers to get things done.'' \26\ Similarly,
he objected to the designation of the Principal Federal
Official for an Incident of National Significance because ``it
adds an additional layer of bureaucracy.'' \27\ He testified:
``[T]hat's why I am such an opponent of the PFO designation . .
. .'' \28\
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\23\ Brown Dep. at 48-49.
\24\ Id. at 93.
\25\ Id. at 95.
\26\ Id. at 48.
\27\ Id. at 49.
\28\ Id.
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Yet when asked if these were the ``mechanisms'' for
managing disasters under the NRP and for pushing resources into
the field, he responded: ``Right.'' \29\ When confronted with
that fact that he ``choose [sic] not to use them,'' again, his
unambiguous response was ``Right.'' \30\
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\29\ Id. at 94-95.
\30\ Id.
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At the same time, while he plainly perceived the structures
of the NRP to be bureaucratic, he admitted that he had no
reason to think that those structures could not and would not
respond to his needs. When asked if he had ``any reason to
think that you couldn't get [the logistics mission] assignment
accomplished through regular channels,'' he testified: ``No. I
really didn't.'' \31\ Thus, there did not appear to be any need
to communicate with the White House to obtain the assistance
that he sought.
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\31\ Id. at 92. Even when Brown had the opportunity to seek
assistance from the White House, he did not. When Andy Card asked Brown
directly on Monday, August 29--the evening following landfall--if there
were ``[a]nything you want me to do?'' Brown did not ask for anything,
saying only that ``[h]ousing, transportation and environment could be
long term issues.'' (E-mail from Michael Brown to Andy Card, Chief of
Staff, White House (Aug. 29. 2005; 22:00) in response to E-mail from
Andy Card to Michael Brown (Aug. 29, 2005; 21:51:07).) Moreover, in the
August 28 video teleconference in which the President appeared, Brown
did not request anything. (Daily Video Teleconference [``VTC''] amongst
key officials dated Aug. 28, 2005, Transcript at 14-15). Later in the
same conference call, Brown asked Louisiana State Coordinating Officer
Jeff Smith if he had ``any unmet needs, anything that we're not getting
to you that you need . . .;'' Smith replied simply ``Mike, no.'' (Id.
at 18.)
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Finally, Brown also appears to have represented to
Secretary Chertoff that he could live with the changes at FEMA,
when in fact he could not. According to Secretary Chertoff's
testimony, Chertoff and Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson met
with Brown and specifically asked him if he was ``going to have
a problem functioning as the head of FEMA'' with the changes at
FEMA that Brown had opposed.\32\ Chertoff testified that they
told Brown it was ``perfectly creditable to say, I can't go
along with this. I want to leave. If you are going to stay,
though, we need to have your full commitment. He told us he had
felt he had gotten a fair hearing and would give this his full
commitment.'' \33\ Brown's refusal to follow the NRP seems
contrary to that representation.
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\32\ Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Homeland Sec. Dept's
Preparation and Response Before Sen. Homeland Sec. and Gov'tl Affairs
Comm., 109th Cong. 24 (Feb. 15, 2006) (statement of Michael Chertoff,
Sec., Dept Homeland Sec.).
\33\ Id. at 24-25.
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It is not clear that following the NRP's procedures would
have dramatically altered the government's response to
Hurricane Katrina. It is clear, however, that it was Brown's
responsibility to use those procedures. It is equally clear, by
his own admission, Brown failed to follow them. He thought he
could just ignore the NRP and do it the way he did it in
Florida in 2004. That way involved direct communication with
the White House to get resources, circumventing the Secretary
of Homeland Security and the interagency processes and
mechanisms designed to speed relief to disaster victims.
The nation will never know whether its response would have
been better if the NRP had been followed. We only know the
actual response, where the NRP was not followed, was woefully
inadequate.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS SUBMITTED BY THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BEHALF OF
REPRESENTATIVE CHARLIE MELANCON AND REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM JEFFERSON
Michael Brown appeared before the Select Committee on
February 11, 2006. His testimony, while self-serving, provided
a window into how he, Secretary Chertoff, and the White House
responded to Hurricane Katrina. His testimony raises questions
about the competence of the response at the highest levels of
government.
The majority supplemental views emphasize Mr. Brown's
insubordination and failure to follow the National Response
Plan. We agree that Mr. Brown's testimony demonstrates serious
deficiencies in his job performance. But his testimony also
raises questions about the roles of Secretary Chertoff and
White House officials that remain unanswered to this day.
Mr. Brown testified that he recognized that FEMA was
overwhelmed and needed assistance from other departments,
especially DOD. He said he tried to get this assistance by
working the process from the bottom up, by sending requests
through the FEMA mission assignment process, and from the top
down, by requesting White House assistance. Neither seemed to
work.
In previous disasters, Mr. Brown had been able to rely on
the White House to break through red tape. But this time,
operating with a new Secretary of Homeland Security and under
the newly created National Response Plan, he said that the
White House was less responsive to his requests. Mr. Brown
appeared to have no clear method for getting what he needed
from other agencies. Mr. Brown said that when he informed White
House officials of the problems he was having, nobody at the
White House took any initiative to break through bureaucratic
obstacles.
Even after the publication of lengthy reports by this
Committee and by the White House, we still know very little
about what top White House officials knew and what actions they
took to respond to Hurricane Katrina.
Mr. Brown's Testimony about the White House
Mr. Brown testified that he had ``innumerable''
conversations with White House officials, including the
President, the Vice President, Andrew Card, Joe Hagin, National
Security Adviser Steven Hadley, Lee Ann McBride, Karl Rove, and
Domestic Policy Adviser Claude Allen. He said that he had
probably spoken to Homeland Security Adviser Fran Townsend, but
that he did not have regular contact with her.
Mr. Brown stated that he did not know how many
conversations he had with the President. He said that the
President would occasionally join in on his calls with Joe
Hagin. Mr. Brown stated: ``From my point of view, at that time,
the President was clearly engaged.''
Mr. Brown stated that although FEMA did not have Cabinet-
level status under this Administration, he had been able to
work well with the White House in previous disasters. In
previous disasters, ``if I needed anything specific, I would
relay that to Hagin or Card and it would get done.''
Things worked differently during this Hurricane Katrina.
This time, the White House became ``bureaucratic'' and provided
less assistance. During one phone call, Andrew Card told him
that requests need to go through the ``chain of command.'' He
understood Mr. Card to be telling him, ``if you really need
something, you need to go to Chertoff or back through HSOC or
whatever you are going to do and do those requests that way.''
Informed that White House Deputy Homeland Security Adviser
Ken Rapuano had told the Committee that when he left the White
House at 10 p.m. on Monday, August 29, conflicting reports were
still coming in about the severity of the impact on New
Orleans, Mr. Brown testified that these statements were
``disingenuous.''
He argued that the White House should have had clear
information about the severity by that time and should have
known that the levees had breached. He noted specifically that
White House Homeland Security Council staff, including Ken
Rapuano, Bethany Nichols, and Joel Bagnal, were on the regular
video teleconferences that provided situational information.
He pointed to a teleconference held the evening of August
29 to discuss Marty Bahamonde's report on the grim condition of
New Orleans, and noted: ``So either they all went home or they
were all asleep during the SVTS, but there was a conference
call that evening to discuss exactly what Marty had reported.''
Mr. Brown would not respond to a question about whether he
thought it was irresponsible for Mr. Rapuano, the most senior
official in the White House at the time, to go home at 10 p.m.
without clear situational awareness, but noted that he would
have acted differently.
Mr. Brown's Testimony about Secretary Chertoff
Mr. Brown told the Committee that Secretary Chertoff was
not involved in the response immediately. Once he became
involved however, Mr. Chertoff called frequently regarding
``the most minute details of operation.'' According to Mr.
Brown, ``the micromanagement was amazing,'' to the point where
Mr. Brown stated that he ``couldn't get my job done.'' He also
said that Mr. Chertoff's involvement ``exacerbated'' problems.
Mr. Brown expressed dismay at the ``whole leadership
issue,'' stating that ``the problem I had was, I wasn't
perceived as the leader down there because I was undermined.
Who was the face of Katrina?'' He continued:
In Florida, who's in charge of Florida? By God, I'm in
charge. Now, in Louisiana and Mississippi, we've got
this whole dance going around. Is Chertoff in charge?
Is Mr. Brown in charge? The President? Who's in charge
here?
Well, in my opinion, the President's always in charge,
and when it comes these disasters whatever the cause of
the disasters is, the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Director of FEMA, he's in charge. But you
can't be the leader and you can't do that when you're
being undermined and micromanaged.
Mr. Brown told the Committee that he was ``specifically
constrained by Secretary Chertoff and told to stay in Baton
Rouge.'' On Wednesday, August 31, as he was on a plane flying
back from Biloxi and a meeting with Governor Barbour, ``I
received a phone call in which I got my rear end chewed out by
Michael Chertoff for having been in Mississippi.'' He said that
in that call, ``I was instructed not to leave Baton Rouge.'' He
also said: ``I knew that this FEMA Director could not operate
under those conditions because you can't run a disaster sitting
in an office. . . . I can't sit in a stupid office and try to
run a disaster that covers 90,000 square miles and run it like
a blasted bureaucrat.'' Mr. Brown stated that this call was the
``tipping point because I knew, okay, this is a different
game.''
Conclusion
The Committee's meeting with Mr. Brown was a valuable
addition to the investigative record. His failure to work
within the system did not reflect well on Mr. Brown, as the
majority views note. But his statements also raise serious
questions about the performance of the White House and
Secretary Chertoff that should be further examined.
DOCUMENT ANNEX
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