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astal Zone formation Center The Global The Technical Volume Two 2000 Report Report to the President HC 79 .E5 G59 1980b V.2 C.2 W" About the Cover The Global 2000 Report to the President presents a pic- ture that can be painted only in broad strokes and with a brush still in need of addi- tional bristles. It is, however, the most complete and con- sistent such picture ever painted by the U.S. Govern- ment. Many rapid and unde- sirable developments are foreseen if public policy con- cerning population stabiliza- tion, resource conservation and environmental protec- tion remain unchanged over the coming decades. Dra- matic changes in public policy are needed around the world. These changes need to be made soon while the picture is yet fluid and nations are still preparing to enter the twenty-first century. The Global 2000 Report to the President Entering the Twenty-First Century A Report Prepared by the Council on Environ- mental Quality and the Department of State Gerald 0. Barney U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NOAA Study Director COASTAL SERVICES CENTER 2234 SOUTH HOBSON AVENUE CHARLESTON SC 29405-2413 Property of CSC Library Preface and Acknowledgments ON MAY 23, 1977, President Carter stated in his Environmental Message to the Congress: Environmental problems do not stop at national boundaries. In the past decade, we and other nations have come to recognize the urgency of international efforts to protect our common environment. As part of this process, I am directing the Council on Environmental Quality and the Department of State, working in cooperation with the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Science Foundation, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and other appropriate agencies, to make a one-year study of the probable changes in the world's population, natural resources, and environment through the end of the century. This study will serve as the foundation of our longer-term planning. Entering the Twenty-first Century is the interagency report prepared by the Global 2000 Study in response to President Carter's directive. The report comprises three volumes: (1) an interpretive report that summarizes the,findings in nontechnical terms, (2) this technical report, which presents the projections and related analyses in greater detail, and (3) a volume of basic documentation on the models used in this Study. The Study was supervised by an executive group cochaired originally by Charles Warren, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, and Patsy Mink, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. During the course of the study Mr. Warren was succeeded by Mr. Gus Speth, and Mrs. Mink by Mr.Thomas Pickering. The other executive group members and participating agencies are as follows: ALVIN ALM (later C. WILLIAM JOAN DAVENPORT FiscHER) Assistant Secretary for Energy and Min- Assistant Secretary for Policy erals Department of Energy Department of the interior RICHARD C. ATKINSON Director RICHARD A. FRANK National Science Foundation Administrator BARBARA BLUM National Oceanic and Atmospheric Deputy Administrator Administration Environmental Protection Agency Department of Commerce RUPERT CUTLER ROBERT A. FRoscH Assistant Secretary for Natural Re- Administrator sources and Environment National Aeronautics and Space Admin- Department of Agriculture istration v vi JOHN J. GILLIGAN qater DOUGLAS BEN- BARDYL 1U.-TIRANA (later JOHN W. NET) MACY) Administrator Director, Federal Emergency Manage- Agency for International Development ment Agency Department of State STANSFIELD TURNER JAMES LIVERMAN 0aterRUTH CLUSEN) Director Assistant Secretary for Environment Central Intelligence Agency Department of Energy FRANK PRESS Director Office of Science and Technology Policy Executive Office of the President Each executive group member designated a member of his or her staff to be a point of coordination for the Study. The coordinators am as follows: WILLIAM ARON ROGER NAILL Director, Office of Ecology and Envi- Office of Analytical Services ronmental Conservation Department of Energy National Oceanic and Atmospheric ALICE POPKIN qater LEwis HUGHES Administration Associate Administrator for Intema- Department of Commerce tional Activities Environmental Protection Agency CARROLL BASTIAN (later ELINOR C. TERHUNE) C. LEROY QUANCE Division of Policy Research and Analy- Economics, Statistics, and Cooperatives sis Service b National Science Foundation Department of Agriculture FRANK RossoMONDO LINDSEY GRANT (later Wm. ALSTON Chief, Enviromnent and Resource Anal- HAYNE) ysis Center Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environ- Central Intelligence Agency ment and Population Affairs PENNY SEVERNS (later JOHN WASIE- Department of State LEWSKI) GORDON LAw Special Assistant to the Administrator Science Advisor to the Secretary Agency for International Development Department of the Interior Department of State GEORGE SHEPHERD (later PETER HOUSE) CLIFFORD MCLEAN Office of The Assistant Secretary for Director, Program Analysis and Evalua- Environment tion Department of Energy Federal Emergency Management Agency LEE M. TALBOT (later KATHERINE B. RICHARD MESERVE GILLMAN) Office of Science and Technology Policy Assistant to the Chairman for interna- Executive Office of the President . tional and Scientific Affairs Council on Environmental Quality JAMES R. MORRISON (later PITT THOME) Executive Office of the President Director,, Resource Observation Divi- sion National Aeronautics and Spare Admin- istration vii Study Plan and Focus President Carter's purpose in requesting this Study was to understand the long-term implications of present policies and programs and to establish a foundation for longer-range planning. Such a foundation cannot be estab- lished by merely publishing official projections. An assessment and a strengthening of the Government's current analytic capabilities is also needed. Accordingly, it was decided early that the Global 2000 Study should exercise and employ the "present foundation" to the fullest extent- possible. As a result the Study has been conducted almost exclusively with Government personnel and Government projection tools. Research and data from outside the Government were used only when needed capabilities and information within the Government were not available. It was alsodecided that methodologies underlying the. Study's projections should be carefully described. Therefore, Chapters 14 through 23 of this technical report contain an analysis--4n relatively nontechnical terms---of every model and analytical tool used to project trends for this Study. Entering the Twenty-First Century builds upon the work of a number of important Government-sponsored organizations that preceded it, including: National Commission on Supplies and Shortages (1975) Advisory Committee on National Growth Policy Processes (1975) National Growth Reports Staff (19172) Commission on Population Growth and the American Future (1972) National Commission on Materials Policy (1970) National Goals Research Staff (1969) Public Land Law Review Commission (1%5) President's Commission on National Goals (1960) Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission (IM) President's Materials Policy ("Paley") Commission (1951) National Resources Planning Board (1939) The work of these organizations has contributed significantly to the Government's present foundation of.tools for longer-range planning relating to population, resources, and,,environment, and one of the Study's first priorities was to review and assess * the impact of this earlier work. The results of this historical review are summarized in Appendix A. Perhaps the most striking feature of this review is the very existence of a 70-year record of Government concern with issues relating to population, resources, and environment-4ssues that are often thought of as new.. There are, however, several genuinely new features emerging in the most recent studie's,. interdependence being perhaps the most important. The early studies view population, resources, and environment primarily as unrelated short-term,national (regional, or even local) topics. Only in the most recent studies does the interrelatedness ofthese three to creasingly pics come in into focus. The present Study is the first Government study to address all three topics from a relatively long-term, global perspective. It also attempts to emphasize interconnections and feedback, but in this much remains to be done. Viii The basic plan for the Global 2000 Study was to identify the long-term global models* currently used by Government agencies and to establish a set of uniform assumptions so that these models and tools could be used by the agencies' projection experts as a single, internally consistent system. Since the models and tools used in this Study are the ones now employed by the agencies in their long-term global analyses, they reflect the present foundation for long-term planning. Collectively, therefore, these models and tools can be thought of as the Government's present "global model." The elements of the Government's global model were not, of course, designed to be used together as an integrated whole. The constituent models were developed separately and at different times to serve the various projection needs of individual agencies. As a result, there are certain inconsistencies in the Government's overall global model. These inconsist- encies and the individual constituent models are described and analyzed in Chapters 14 to 23. While some of the inconsistencies were eliminated during the Study, difficulties were encountered in linking the agencies' models together and in synthesizing the projections into a coherent whole. A group of outside experts (listed in the acknowledgments) met with the agency experts and the Study staff to assist in synthesizing the projections. This group had many criticisms. Some of the problems noted were corrected; others could not be. Excerpts from the criticisms are included in. Appendix B. In spite of remaining weaknesses, the projections reported in Chapters I through 13 present, an important and useful picture of the future. Assuming continued technological progress (but no departures from present public policy), the picture that emerges is one of only modest-if any-global increase in human welfare. In fact, there is real risk that population growth and environmental degradation may lead to a significant decrease in welfare in parts of the world by 2000. (See appendix C for examples of this phenomenon already being observed.) Furthermore unless present efforts to meet human expectations and basic human needs are m6dified between now and 2000, they may undermine biological capabilities to meet basic needs.early in the 21st century. Finally, Chapter 31 suggests that the projections behind this picture would be still more sobering if it had been possible to correct the remaining inconsistencies in the analysis and to supply the missing linkages. The projections were developed assuming no change in public policy.t Clearly policy changes will be made, and these changes will have important * The agencies guided the selection of these models and tools.Emphasis was plated on models that are (1) long-term, (2) global, and (3) used. t Exceptions to this rule wer made in the population projections and the projections of energy impacts on the environment. The population projections assumed that countries that do not already do so will make family planning services available to an appreciable portion of their populations during the 1975--2000 period, and that countries with family planning programs now in operation will extend coverage, particularly in rural areas. The projections of energy impacts on the environment assume that all countries will have implemented U.S. new-source emission-standards by 1985 at all energy-conversion facilities. ix PROJECTION ANALYSIS SECTOR CHAPTER CHAPTER Population 2 15 Gross National Product 3 16 Cliniate 4 17 Technology 5 23 Food 6 18 Fisheries 7 19 Forestry 8 19 Water 9 19 Energy 10 20 Fuel Minerals 11 21 Nonfuel Minerals 12 22 Enviromnent 13 19 effects on long-term trends. Equally clearly, improved tools are needed to analyze and evaluate alternative policies if optimal choices to be made. Since only one policy option-no policy change-was analyzed, the Study is not an adequate basis for detailed policy recommendations. Consequently, no detailed policy recommendations are made, but the chapters presenting the projections and those presenting the analysis of the projection tools (see the following table) unavoidably imply ways in which both the projections and the future might be improved. The Study plan also called for the examination of alternative methodolo- gies for projecting longer-term global trends on an integrated basis. Since the early 1970s, when the Club of Rome sponsored the first global model to examine longer-term trends involving population, resources and the environ- ment, there have been several private-sector'attempts to develop internally consistent global models from a variety of differing perspectives. At least five global models now exist. Chapters 24 to 31 examine these models and compare their results and structures with the Government's global model. Most of the non-Government global models contain many more feedback linkages than it has been possible to achieve in this Study with the agencies' models. Chapter 31 describes the results of experiments in which feedback linkages in two global models were cut to make these two models more closely resemble the linkages achieved by this Study among the agencies' models. Projections from these two global models are distinctly more optimistic when the feedback linkages are missing (as they are in the Government's global model) than when the linkages are present. Finally, it should be stated, that this is the first time the Government has attempted such a broad study, and difficulties in interagency coordination of analyses and assumptions were encountered on an enormous scale. Resolving of the inconsistencies receivedthe first priority of attention, and, in spite of time extensions, other important (but less urgent) objectives thus proved to be unattainable. For example, there is an unevenness in style in the chapters of this volume. There is no indication of the uncertainty associated with most of the numbers reported, and in several places results are reported as, for example, ".3.745816352," when what is really meant is "4, plus or minus 50 percent." It was intended originally to use metric units throughout followed by values in other units in parentheses; instead, the report contains a mixture of metric and other units. (To help the reader with the'units problem, Appendix D provides an extensive set of conversion tables.) A consistent grouping of countries by region, with individual detail provided for a small set of representative countries, was desired, but current methodological differences underlying the agencies' projections made this impossible. In the time available, problems of this sort were simply unavoidable. Acknowledgments Literally hundreds of people contributed in one way or another to this Study, and at different points each contribution was vitally important. Initially, the members of the executive group (listed earlier) made the project possible by establishing guidelines and providing the necessary budget. The agency coordinators (also listed earlier) played a vital role throughout .in helping to identify persons in their agencies who could provide data and analysis. Five persons--George M. Bennsky, Lindsey Grant, Dolores Gregory, Donald King, and Lee M. Talbot-played particularly important roles in the developed of the papers setting forth the initial concept of the Study. . I . I The hardest work-the detailed preparation of the projections-was done by a group of experts, most of whom were already more than fully occupied with other work before this study came along, but somehow they managed to find time to complete their contributions to the study. These experts and their contributions are: PROJECTIONS Chapter I Introduction Gerald 0. B amey Chapter 2 Population Samuel Baum, Nancy B. Frank, Larry Heligman, Donald Bogue, Amy Tsui, Melanie Werkin McClintock, Patricia Baldi Chapter 3 Gross National Gerald 0. Barney, Nicholas G. Carter, Product Lachman Khemani Chapter 4 Climate Russell Ambroziak Chapter 5 Technology Pieter VanderWerf Chapter 6 Food Patrick O'Brien Chapter 7 Fisheries Richard Hennemuth, Charles Rock- wood Chapter 8 Forestry Bruce Ross-Sheriff Chapter 9 Water John J. Boland, John Kammerer, Wal- ter Langbein, James Jones, Peter Free- man, Alan C. More Chapter 10 Energy John Pearson, Mark Rodekohr; Rich- ard BaU, Gregory D'Alessio, Stephen Gage, Leonard Hamilton, Sam Morris, Gerald Rausa, Steve Resnek, Walter Sevian xi Chapter I I Fuel Minerals Walter Dupree Chapter 12 Nonfuel Minerals Gerald 0. Barney, Pieter VanderWerf, Allan Matthews, Alvin Knoerr Chapter 13 Environment Jennifer Robinson and Ger-ald 0. Bar- ney, with major assistance from Jeffrey M. Maclure and Peter Freeman. Other contributors include Wayne Bloch, Dan Botkin, John Costlow, Joel Davis, Erik P. Eckholm, Lawrence Fahey, Stephen Gage, Leonard Hamilton, Barbara Ledeen, Paul E. Lehr, Thomas E. Lovejoy, All= Matthews, Sam 'uel Morris, Albert Printz, Gerald Rausa, Steve Resnek, John Ross, Bruce Ross-Sheriff, Walter Sevian, Fred Smith, George Woodwell, and Pieter VanderWerf. Wayne Bloch with Albert Prmtz assembled an initial in- ventory of the environmental analyses done by the contributing agencies. ANALYSES OF GovERNMENT MODELS Chapter 14 The Government's Ned W. Dearborn, Gerald 0. Barney Global Model Chapter 15 Population Ned W. Dearborn Chapter 16 Gross National Ned W. Dearborn Product Chapter 17 Climate Judith Johnson Chapter 18 Food Ned W. Dearborn Chapter 19 Fisheries, Forestry, Jennifer Robinson Water, and Environment Chapter 20 Energy Pieter VanderWerf Chapter 21 Fuel Minerals Pieter VanderWerf Chapter 22 Nonfuel Minerals Ned W. Dearborn Chapter 23 Technology Pieter VanderWerf, Gerald 0. Barney, Ned W. Dearborn ANALYSES OF OTHER GLOBAL MODELS Chapter 24 Introduction Jennifer Robinson Chapter 25 Worlds 2 and 3 Jennifer Robinson Chapter 26 Mesarovic-Pestel Jennifer Robinson IWorld Model Chapter 27 MOIRA Jennifer Robinson Chapter 28 Latin American Jennifer Robinson World Model Chapter 29 U.N. World Model Jennifer Robinson ComPARisoN OF RESULTS Chapter 30 Introduction Jennifer Robinson Chapter 31 Comparisons Jennifer Robinson, Milivilo Mesarovic, Berry Hughes, Samir Salama, Jeffrey Amlin xii Appendix A Historic Analysis Robert Cahn and Patricia L. Cahn Appendix B Advisory Views Ned W. Dearbom (editor) The thoughtful and insightful writing done by Ned W. Dearborn, Jennifer Robinson, and Pieter VanderWerf of the Global 2000 Study staff, deserves special note and acknowledgment. The Study benefited enormously from the active participation of two groups of expert advisers. One group consists of seven persons who have previously attempted integrated studies of population, resources, and the environment. They are: ANNE CARTER MIHAJLO MESAROVIC Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass. Case Westem Reserve University, NICHOLAs G. CARTER Cleveland, Ohio World Bank, Washington, D.C. DoUGLAs N. Ross ANNE EHRLICH Joint Economic Committee, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif. U.S. Congress, Washington D.C. PETER J. HENRIOT KENNETH E. F. WATT Center of Concem, Washington, D.C. University of Califomia, Davis, Calif. On two occasions these seven met for a total of three days with the agency experts to discuss ways of integrating and improving the projections. Their criticisms were often pointed but always constructive. Some of the problems and inconsistencies they noted could be resolved; others could not be. Excerpts from written criticisms submitted by this group are included in Appendix B. The other group consists of more than one hundred individuals from academic institutions, public interest groups, business, labor, and founda- tions, who read and criticized the manuscripts. Their constructive-some- times rather candid--comments were very helpful in identifying errors, weaknesses, and inconsistencies. Some of their comments are also included in Appendix B. The members of this group are listed at the end of the Acknowledgments. Information regarding forestry and agricultural practices and trends in a score of countries in Affica, Asia, and Latin America was provided on very short notice by U.S. Embassy personnel in response to the Study's last-minute request for information not otherwise available. Their cabled responses, which were particularly helpful in making the environment projections presented in Chapter 13, are reproduced in Appendix C. Assistance. and consulting on particular topics was provided by George Bennsky, Edmond R. du Pont, Frank Pinto, Patrick Caddell, Daniel Tunstall, Nicolai Timenes, Bill Long, Donald King, James L. Holt, John H. DeYoung, Jr., Michael Field, David Overton, and Raphael Kasper. Several persons made special contributions to the study. Story Shem, detailed from the Department of State, served as Special Assistant to the Study Director and provided the primary liaison between the Council on Environmental Quality and the Department of State. In addition, she contributed to the research and writing and found imaginative solutions to a seemingly endless array of institutional, financial and procedural difficul- ties. Jeffrey M. Maclure, a member of the Study's small central staff, xiii contributed to the research and writing, and coordinated much of the final rewriting and editing. Frank Rossomondo often went out of his way to facilitate progress of the Study generally and to locate missing data and needed documents. George Bennsky, Delores Gregory, and Leonardo Neher were always available for valuable counsel and guidance. And Lee Talbot and Lindsey Grant were especially helpful throughout in guiding and shaping the Study. During the final phase of the Study Wm. Alston Hayne, Katherine B. Gillman, Lindsey Grant (then a consultant to the Department of State), and John M. Richardson Jr. contributed significantly to the reviewing and editing. A great deal of credit goes to the persons who brought the pieces of the Study together in an attractive final form. Fred Howard edited the entire manuscript in an incredibly short time. The cartographic and graphic support effort was handled by Holly Byrne and Roy Abel of the CIA's Cartographic Division with consulting assistance from Lawrence Fahey. Charles D. Collison guided the manuscripts through the Govemment Printing Office under difficult circumstances. Louise Neely, Project Secre- tary, managed to remain calm and collected through seemingly endless pressures and illegible manuscript. But the job could not have been done without others, too, including Thomas J. Delaney, Lilia Barr, Linda Arnold, Bernice Carney, Alvin Edwards, Susan Reigeluth, Gavin Sanner, Marie Pfaff, Charles McKeown, Betty Ann Welch, Lachman Khemani, Nancy Boone, Judith Johnson, and Oriole Harris. Finally, indirect-but very important-contributions by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the George Gund Foundation are acknowledged gratefully. GERALD 0. BARNEY Study Director Informal AdAwrs to the Study John Adams Norman E. Borlaug Natural Resources Defense Council International Maize in Wheat Improve- New York, New York ment Robert M. Avedon Mexico City, Mexico Population Reference Bureau Washington, D.C. Daniel B. Botkin Russell Beaton Marine Biological Laboratory Willamette University Woods Hole, Massachusetts Salem, Oregon Wallace Bowman Thomas Bender, Jr. Library of Congress R.A.I.N. Washington, D.C. Portland, Oregon James Benson Shirley A. Briggs Council on Economic Priorities Rachel Carson Trust New York, New York Washington, D.C. xiv David R. Brower Earl Cook Friends of the Earth College of Geoscience San Francisco, California Texas A & M. University Lester R. Brown College Station, Texas Worldwatch Institute Chester L. Cooper Washington, D.C. Institute for Energy Analysis Gerhart Bruckmarm Washington, D.C. International Institute for Applied Sys- Arthur Cordell tems Analysis Science Council of Canada Vienna, Austria Ontario, Canada Reid A. Bryson Robert W. Crosby University of Wisconsin Department of Transportation Madison, Wisconsin Washington, D.C. Nicholas G. Carter Herman Daly World Bank Louisiana State University Washington, D.C. Baton Rouge, Louisiana Verne Charit Richard H. Day Canadian Association for the Club of University of Southern California Rome Los Angeles, California Ottawa, Canada T. L. de Fayer Duane Chapman Department of the Environment Comell University Ottawa, Canada Ithaca, New York Henry L. Diamond Anne W. Cheatham Beveridge, Fairbanks, and Diamond Congressional Clearing House for the Washington, D.C. Future Charles J. DiBona U.S. Congress American Petroleum Institute Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. Wilson Clark Wouter Van Dieren Governor's Office Foundation for Applied Ecology Sacramento, California Edam, The Netherlands Philander P. Claxton, Jr. William M. Dietel World Population Society Rockefeller Brothers Foundation Washington, D.C. New York, New York Harlan Cleveland Scott Donaldson Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies Command and Control Technical Cen- Aspen, Colorado ter, Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph F. Coates Washington, D.C. Office of Technology Assessment Andrew J. Dougherty U.S. Congress * National Defense University Washington, D.C. Washington, D@C. Vary Coates Henry L. Duncombe, Jr. George Washington University General Motors Corporation Washington, D.C. New York, New York John N. Cole Erik Eckholm . Maine Times Worldwatch Institute Brunswick, Maine Washington, D.C. Kent H. Collins Anne H. Ehrlich Charles F. Kettering Foundation Stanford University Dayton, Ohio Stanford, California xv Kenneth R. Farrell Ralph Hofineister Department of Agriculture World Bank . Washington, D.C. Washington, b.C.' Frank Fenner John P. Holdren The Australian National University Energy & Resources Program Canberra, Australia University of California Andrew Ford Berkeley, California University of California Richard Hough Los Alamos, New Mexico Agency for International Development Jay W. Forrester Washington, D.C. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Peter R. Huessy Cambridge, Massachusetts The Environmental Fund Irving S. Friedman Washington, D.C. First National City Bank Benjamin A. Jayne New York, New York Duke University William R. Gasser Durham, North Carolina Department of Agriculture Philip L. Johnson Washington, D.C. Oak Ridge Associated Universities Robert Gelbard Oak Ridge, Tennessee Department of State Edward G. Kaelber Washington, D.C. College of the Atlantic Theodore J. Gordon Bar Harbor, Maine The Futures Group Lawrence R. Kegan Gastonbury, Connecticut Population Crisis Committee James Grant Washington, D.C. Overseas Development Council Thomas L. Kimball Washington, D.C. National Wildlife Federation Reginald W. Griffith Washington, D.C. Reginald Griffith Associates. Washington, D.C, Alexander King International Federation of Institutes for Walter Haim Advanced Study Congressional Research Service Stockholm, Sweden, Washington, D.C. Robert Harnrin Erasmus H. Kloman Joint Economic Committee National Academy of Public Administra- U.S. Congress tion Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. Bruce Hannon George R. Lamb Center for Advanced Computation American Conservation Association. University of Illinois New York, New York Urbana, Illinois Donald Lesh Peter Harnick U.S. Association for the Club of Rome Environmental Action Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. Hans Linnemann Hazel Henderson Economisch En Sociaal Instituut Princeton Center for Alternative Futures Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Princeton, New Jersey Amsterdam, The Netherlands Peter J. Henriot James S. Lipscomb Center of Concern Gorden Gund Foundation Washington, D.C. Cleveland, Ohio xvi Robert Lisensky Norman Myers Willamette University Natural Resources Defense Council Salem, Oregon Nairobi, Kenya Dennis Little Sam Nilsson Congressional Research Service International Federation of Institutes for Library of Congress Advanced Studies' U.S. Congress Solna, Sweden Washington, D.C. Ian C. T. Nisbet Thomas V. Long 11 Massachusetts Audubon Society Committee on Public Policy Studies Lincoln, Massachusetts University of Chicago Patrick F. Noonan Chicago, Illinois Nature Conservancy Thomas E. Lovejoy Washington, D.C. World Wildlife Foundation Patrick O'Dell Washington, D.C. University of Texas Gordon MacDonald Dallas, Texas Mitre Corporation Howard Odum McLean, Virginia University of Florida Thomas F. Malone Gainesville, Florida Holcomb Research Institute Lewis J. Perelman Indianapolis, Indiana Solar Energy Research Institute John McHale Golden, Colorado Center for Integrative Studies Russell Peterson University of Houston Office of Technology Assessment Houston, Texas Washington, D.C. Magda C Iordell McHale David Pimentel Center for Integrative Studies Department of Entomology University of Houston Cornell University Houston, Texas Ithaca, New York George McRobie Dennis Pirages Technology Development Group Department of Government and Politics London, England University of Maryland College Park, Maryland Dennis Meadows Wilson Prichett, III Dartmouth College Environmental Fund Hanover, New Hampshire Washington, . D.C. Donnella Meadows J. A. Potworowski Dartmouth College Energy, Mines and Resources Hanover, New Hampshire Ottawa, Canada Martha Mills League. of Women Voters Education Roger Revelle Fund Center for Population Studies Washington, D.C. Harvard University J. Murray Mitchell, Jr. Cambridge, Massachusetts National Oceanic and Atmospheric Elliot Richardson Administration Department of State Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. Roy Morgan Ralph W. Richardson, Jr. Zero Population Growth Rockefeller Foundation Washington, D.C. New York, New York Xvii Ronald G. Ridker Robert B. Stecker Resources for the Future American Telephone and Telegraph Washington, D.C. Company Peter C. Roberts New York, New York Department of the Environment Robert Stein - London, England international Institute for Environment Walter Orr Roberts and Development Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies Washington, D.C. Aspen, Colorado Thomas B. Stoel, Jr. William Robertson IV Natural Resources Defense Council National Academy of Sciences Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. Richard S. Takasaki Archibald C. Rogers East-West Center RTKL Associates, Inc. Honolulu, Hawaii Baltimore, Maryland Joanna Underwood Rafael M. Salas INFORM UN Fund for Population Activities New York, New York United Nations New York, New York Carl Wahren John E. Sawyer International Planned Parenthood Fed- Andrew W. Mellon Foundation eration New York, New York London, England Lee Schipper Franklin Wallack Royal Academy of Sciences United Automobile, Aerospace and Ag- Stockholm, Sweden ricultural Implement Workers of and Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory America Berkeley, California Washington, D.C. Peter Schwartz Kenneth E. F. Watt Stanford Research Institute Department of Zoology Menlo Park, California University of California James Selvaggi Davis, California Department of Housing and Urban De- Edward Wenk, Jr. velopment Aerospace Research Lab Washington, D.C. University of Washington Arlie Shardt Seattle, Washington Environmental Defense Fund New York, New York N. Richard Werthamer Manfred Siebker Exxon Research and Engineering Com- S.C.I.E.N.C.E. S.P.R.L. pany Brussels, Belgium Florham Park, New Jersey Joseph Smagorinsky Walter Westman National Oceanic and Atmospheric Department of Geography Administration University of California Princeton, New Jersey Los Angeles, California Anthony Wayne Smith Gilbert F. White National Parks and Conservation Asso- Institute of Behavioral Science ciation University of Colorado Washington, D.C. Boulder, Colorado Soedjatmoko Robert M. White National Development Planning Agency National Academy of Sciences Jakarta, Indonesia Washington, D.C. xviii Mason Willrich George Woodwell The Rockefeller Foundation Marine Biological Laboratory New York, New York Woods Hole, Massachusetts Carroll L. Wilson Jane Yarn Massachusetts Institute of Technology Charles A. Lindbergh Fund Cambridge, Massachusetts Atlanta, Georgia Nathaniel Wollman College of Arts and Sciences George Zeidenstein University of New Mexico The Population Council Albuquerque, New Mexico New York, New York )dx CONTENTS Chapter Page Preface and Acknowledgments V List of Tables xxv List of Figures xxxiii List of Maps xxxvii Part I THE PROJECTIONS 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECTIONS 3 The Study Plan 3 The Projections 4 2 POPULATION PROJECTIONS 7 Bureau of the Census Projections 7 Community and Family Study Center Projections 24 Migration 29 3 GNP PROJECTIONS 39 4 CLIMATE PROJECTIONS 51 Climate in the Year 2000 52 The Climate Scenarios 52 Climate Scenarios for the Global 2000 Study 64 5 TECHNOLOGY PROJECTIONS 67 Population 67 Gross National Product 67 Climate 68 Food 68 Fisheries 70 Forestry 70 Water 70 Energy 70 Fuel Minerals 70 Nonfuel Minerals 70 Environment 71 6 FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 73 Caveats 73 Model and Methodology 73 General Results 77 Altematives 1-111: Results and Conclusions 90 Resources and Inputs 96 Costs and Investments 100 Environmental Implications 101 7 FISHERIES PROJECTIONS 105 Marine Fisheries Resources 105 Fresh Water Fisheries Resources 106 Living Marine Resources: Description 107 Living Marine Resources: Potential 108 Marine Pollution III Marine Aquaculture, 112 Economic Demand 113 xx 8 FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 117 Forest Inventories 118 Forest Products 118 The Forest-Man Relationship: Two Systems 119 Forests and Forestry in the Industralized Nations 120 Forests and Forestry in the Less Developed Countries 125 The Special Problem of Tropical Moist Forests 131 Global Linkages and the Year 2000 Scenarios 132 References 134 9 WATER PROJECTIONS 137 Properties of Water Resources 137 The Supply of Water 139 The Demand for Water 141 Future Water Resources 157 Conclusions 158 10 ENERGY PROJECTIONS 161 Basic Assumptions 161 Midrange Energy Forecasts, 1985-90 164 Long-Range Energy Projections 171 Future Oil Potential 175 The Role of Future Technologies 178 Energy Impacts 180 Conclusions 185 References 185 11 FUEL MINERALS PROJECTIONS 187 Resource Terminology 187 Petroleum 189 Natural Gas 191 Coal 192 Nuclear Fuels 193 Hydraulic Resources 194 Geothermal Energy 195 Oil Shale 198 Tar Sands 199 Solar Energy 200 Conclusions 202 References 202 12 NONFUEL MINERALS PROJECTIONS 205 Demand Projections 205 Supply Projections 212 Price Projections 213 Decision Points in the Mineral-Industry System 216 Nonfuel Minerals and the North-South Dialogue 222 Conclusions 224 References 225 13 ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 227 The Population Projections and the Environment 230 The Projections 230 Introduction 230 Population and the Environment in Traditional Cultures 232 Population and the Environment in Industrialized Cultures 238 Population Distribution and the Environment 241 The Population Projections and Human Health 246 Conclusions 251 The GNP Projections and the Environment 251 The Projections 251 Introduction 251 Pollution and Waste Generation 252 Resource Consumption 253 The Use of Chemicals in the Development of Societies 253 Conclusions M Climate Changes and the Environment 256 The Projections 256 Introduction 257 The Climate Scenarios 257 Environmental Consequences of the Climate Scenarios 257 Impact of the Other Projections on Climate 259 Conclusions 267 The Technology Projections and the Environment 270 The Pro)ections 270 Conclusions 272 The Food and Agriculture Projections and the Environment 272 The Projections 272 Introduction 273 Food and the Human Environment 274 Deterioration of Soils 276 Ecological Effects of Fertilizers and Pesticides 283 Crop Vulnerability: Genetic Considerations 288 Food and Nonrenewable Fossil Fuels 292 Conclusions 297 The Projections and the Marine Environment 298 The Projections 298 Introduction 299 Effects of Coastal Development 302 Coastal Pollution 304 Overexploitation of Living Marine Resources 313 Open Oceans 315 Conclusions 316 The Forestry Projections and the Environment 318 The Projections 318 Introduction 310 Deforestation in the LDCs 320 Increased Intensity of Forest Management 325 Global-Scale Environmental Impacts 327 A Projection of Species Extinctions 328 Conclusions 332 The Water Projections and the Environment 333 The Projections 333 Introduction 334 Environmental Developments Affecting Water Supply 334 Impacts of Hydraulic Works 338 Water Pollution 340 Water-Related Diseases 343 Extinction of Freshwater S 344 . pecies Conclusion 34.4 The Energy Projections and the Environment 345 The Projections 345 Introduction 346 Commercial Energy in Industrial Societies 348 Noncommercial fuels 374 Conclusion 380 The Nonfuel Minerals Projections and the Environment 381 The Projections 381 Introduction 381 Direct Environmental Effects of Mining on Land 382 Indirect Effects of Mining on Land 388 Effects of Mining the Seabed 389 Mdi Conclusions 389 Closing the Loops 390 Introduction 390 Assumptions, Discrepancies, and Feedback 408 Summing Up 427 References 431 Part 11 ANALYSIS OF PROJECTION TOOLS: THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL 14 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL: THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 453 The "Government's Global Model" 453 Description of the Present Foundation 455 Analysis of the Present Foundation 460 Interpreting the Projections 480 Strengthening the Present Foundation 482 Summary Descriptions of the 11 Elements 484 15 POPULATION 501 Census Projections 501 Chicago Projections 502 Key Analytic Methodology 502 Basic Principles 503 Basic Components 506 Basic Procedures 509 References 520 16 GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 521 Key Analytic Methodology 522 Basic Principles 5.24 Basic Components 5@6 Basic Procedures 528 17 CLIMATE 535 Key Analytic Methodology 535 Basic Principles and Components 535 Basic Procedures 536 Climate Scenarios 539 Validation 544 Documentation 544 18 FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 545 Key Analytic Methodology 545 Basic Principles 546 Basic Components 550 Basic Procedures 552 19 RENEWABLE RESOURCES 563 Water 564 Fisheries 564 Forestry 565 Environment 565 20 ENERGY 569 Key Analytic Methodology 569 Basic Principles 570 Basic Components 573 Basic Procedures 575 Documentation and Validation 578 21 FUEL MINERALS 579 Key Analytic Methodology 579 Basic Principles 579 Basic Components 580 Basic Procedures 580 Documentation and Validation 580 22 NONFUEL MINERALS 581 Key Analytic Methodology 581 Basic Principles 584 Basic Components 590 Basic Procedures 591 23 TECHNOLOGY 597 Key Analytic Methodologies 597 Basic Principles 599 Basic Components 599 Documentation and Validation 599 Part III ANALYSIS OF PROJECTION TOOLS: OTHER GLOBAL MODELS 24 INTRODUCTION 603 Carrying Capacity 604 Stability and Diversity 605 Ecological Buffering 605 25 WORLDS 2 AND 3 607 The Models and1beir Limitations 608 Method 608 Structure 610 Conclusions 611 Documentation 612 References 613 26 MESAROVIC-PESTEL WORLD MODEL 615 Method 615 Relevance 617 Structure 618 Conclusions 619 Testing and Validation 622 Documentation 623 References 625 27 MOIRA: MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN AGRICULTURE 627 Method 627 Relevance 628 Structure 629 Testing and Validation 631 Assumptions and Conclusions 633 Documentation 634 References 635 28 THE LATIN AMERICAN WORLD MODEL 637 Method 637 Relevance 638 Structure 639 Testing 643 Conclusions 644 Documentation 647 References 647 29 U.N. WORLD MODEL 649 Method 649 Relevance 650 Structure 650 X)dV Testing 653 Conclusions 654 Documentation 655 References 655 Part IV COMPARISON OF RESULTS 30 INTRODUCTION 659 31 THE COMPARISONS 661 Comparison of Integrated Global Models 661 Structure 661 The Government's Global Model vs. the World 3 Model 663 The Government's Global Model vs. the World Integrated Model 672 Conclusions 681 APPENDIXES A Lessons from the Past 685 B Advisory Views: A Critique of the Study 713 C Embassy Reports on Forestry and Agricultural Trends 723 D Metric Conversion Factors 739 Index 751 xxv LIST OF TABLES Table Page 2-1 Bureau of Census Estimates and Projections, Medium Series, Sum- mary Data, 1975-2000 8 2-2 Census Bureau World Estimates and Projections, 1975 and 2000 10 2-3 More Developed Regions and Less Developed Regions--Census Bu- reau Estimates and Projections 12 2-4 Major Regions-Census Bureau Estimates and Projections 15 2-5 Percent Distribution of World Population by Major Region, Census Bureau Medium Series 15 2-6 Population Size, Net Growth, and Percent of World Population of 15 Selected Countries, Census Bureau Medium Series 16 2-7 Broad Age Groups. by More Developed Regions and Less Developed Regions, 1975 and 2000 (Census Bureau) 16 2-8 Percent Distribution of Population, 1975-2000, and 1975-2000 In- crease for Major Regions and Selected Countries, Census Bureau Medium Series 18 2-9 Changes in Functional Age Groups and Total Population, 1975-2000, for World, More Developed and Less Developed Regions, Major Regions, and Selected Countries, Census Bureau Medium Series 19 2-10 Projected Total Population for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (Census Bureau) 20 2-11 Projected Total Fertility Rate for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (Census Bureau) 22 2-12 Projected Average Annual Population Growth Rates for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (Census Bureau Medium Series) 24 2-13 Estimated and Projected Crude Death Rates for World, Major Re- gions, and Selected Countries' (Census Bureau Medium Series) 25 2-14 Estimated and Projected Crude Birth Rates for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (Census Bureau Medium Series) 26 2-15 Annual Decline in Crude Birth Rate (Census Bureau) 26 2-16 CFSC Projected Total Population for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries 28 2-17 CFSC Estimated Total Fertility Rate for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries 30 2-18 Projected Average Annual Population Growth Rates for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (CFSC Medium Series) 31 2-19 Estimated and Projected Crude Death Rates for World, Major Re- gions, and Selected Countries (CFSC Medium Series) 32 2-20 Estimated and Projected Crude Birth Rates for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (CFSC Medium Series) 33 2-21 Comparison of Global 2000 Medium Series Projections without Mi- gration, and U.N. Medium Variant Projections with Migration, 1975 and 2000 35 xxvi 2-22 Population Projections, Medium Series, for U.S. and Mexico, 1975- 2000-No Migration vs. Estimated Net Migration 36 3-1 Annual Growth Rates, Assumptions A to G 41 3-2 GNP Estimates (1975) and Projections and Growth Rates (1985,2000) by Country 44 3-3 GNP Estimates (1975) and Projections and Growth Rates (1985,2000) by Major Regions and Selected Countries and Regions 48 3-4 Population Estimates (1975) and Projections and Growth Rates (1985, 2000) 49 3-5 Per Capita GNP Estimates (1975) and Projections and Growth Rates (1985, 2000) by Major Regions and Selected Countries and Re- gions 50 4-1 Large Global Cooling 54 4-2 Moderate Global Cooling 56 4-3 Same as the Last 30 Years 58 4-4 Moderate Global Warming 60 4-5 Large Global Warming 62 5-1 Electrical Generation from Nuclear and Hydro Power Assumed in Energy Forecasts 71 6-1 Population Growth Rates, Actual and Projected 78 6-2 Per Capita Income Growth Rates, Actual. and Projected 78 6-3 Yield Variations Due to Assumptions Regarding Weather Conditions 79, 6-14 Grain Production and Consumption Growth Rates, Actual and Pro- jected (Alternative 1) 79 6-5 Grain and Total Food Production, Consumption, and Trade, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) 80 6-6 Per Capita Grain and Total Food Production, Consumption, and Trade, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) 82 6-7 Grain and Total Food Production, Consumption, and Trade (Alter- natives 1, 11, 111) 91, 6-8 Per Capita Grain and Total Food Production, Consumption, and Trade (Alternatives 1, 11, 111) 93 6-9 Daily Caloric Consumption in the Less Developed Countries 95 6-10 World Grain Trade Quantities (Alternatives 1, 11, 111) 96 6-11 International Price Indices (Alternatives 1, 11, 111) 96 6-112 Arable Area, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) 97 6-13 Arable Area per Capita, Actual and Projec ted (Alternative 1) 99 6-14 Fertilizer Consumption, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) 100 6-15 Fertilizer Consumption per Arable Hectare, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) 101 7@1 Total World Catch and Selected Categories 105 7-2 Major Species Groups Reported in World Fishery Landings (FAO) 107 7-3 Marine Fisheries Catch by Area, 1975 108 7-4 Catch by Continent and Leading Countries, 1975 108 7-5 Leading Species Groups in World Catch, 1970 and 1975 108 7-6 1970 FAO Projection of Demand for Fish Meal, 1975 and 1985 113 xxvii 7-7 1970 Bell et al. Projections of World Aggregate Consumption of Fish- ery Products, 1975-2000 115 8-1 World Forested Area by Region, 1973 118 Biomass of the World's Forests and Woodlands 119 8-3 Major Traders of Forest Products, 1974 119 8-4 Forest Resources per Capita by Geographic'Region, mid-1970s 120 8-5 Distribution of European Forest Resources Among Subregions, Early 1970s 121 8-6 Forecasts of the Areas of Forest and Open Woodland in Europe, Year 2000 122 8-7 North American Forest Resources, Early 1970s 123 8-8 Asia-Distribution of Forest Resources by Subregion 130 8@-9 Estimates of World Forest Resources, 1978 and 2000 134 9-1 Estimates of Available Global Water Supply for Continents and Se- lected Nations 141 9-2 Per Capita Use of Drinking Water in Less Developed Countries. 1970 144 9-3 Water Use for Various Purposes. by Continent and Selected Nations 147 9-4 Average Annual Water Withdrawal per Unit of Land Area, Selected Geographic Units 149 9-5 Estimates of World Water Use in 1976 and Projections to 2000 150 9-6 Water Use in Selected Countries, 1965 151 9-7 Water Quality in Three Selected Irrigation Areas 151 9-8 Effect of Various Factors on Salt Concentration of Colorado River, United States, 1942-61 152 9-9 Irrigation and Drainage in the Developing Market Economies, 1975, and Targets, 1990 153 9-10 Per Capita Water Availability. 1971 and 2000 156 10-1 Real GNP Growth Rate Assumptions 165 10-2 Population Growth Rate Assumptions 165 10-3 Total World Oil and Energy Consumption, 1985 and 1990, and Av- erage Annual Growth Rates. 1975-90 166 10-4 Regional Energy Balances, 1985 167 10--5 Regional Energy Balances, 1990 168 10-6 Less Developed Oil Exporting Countries: Current Production, Re- .serves, Population, Income 170 10-7 Regional Energy Balances with High OPEC Prices, 1985 171 10-8 Regional Energy Balances with High OPEC Prices, 1990 172 10-9 Long-Run World Energy Assump tions 173 10-10 World Energy Demand, Year 2000 173 10-11 WAES Oil Balance. for Year 2000 174 10-12 U.S. Long-Run Energy Assumptions 175 10-13 Most Recent U.S. Projections for the Year 2000 176 10-14 Incremental Implementation Above Base-Case Levels for Three Al- ternative Energy Technologies, Year 2000 178 10-15 Resource Use for Three Alternative Technologies, Year 2000 179 xxviii 10-16 Emission Projections, 1985 and 1990, Medium-Growth Case 181 1047 Emission Projections, 1985 and 1990, High-Growth Case 182 10-18 Ernission Projections, 1985 and 1990, Low-Growth Case 183 10-19 Recent Estimates of Emissions from Fuel Combustion, Compared with IEES-ESNS Estimates for 1990 184 11-1 Recoverable World Nonrenewable Energy Resources 187 11-2 Reserve and Resource Terminology 189 11-3 Estimates of World Ultimate Production of Crude Oil Made Since 1970 189 11-4 World Cumulative Production, Ultimate Production, and Future Re- sources of Crude Oil as of January 1, 1976 190 11-5 World Petroleum Reserves, January 1, 1978 191 11-6 Density of Petroleum Drilling for Selected Areas of the World, as of End of 1975 191 11-7 Estimates Made Since 1970 of Remaining World Resources of Natural Gas 191 11-8 World Cumulative Production, Ultimate Production, and Future Re- . sources of Natural Gas (January 1, 1976) 192 11-9 World Natural Gas Reserves, January 1, 1978 192 Total World Solid Reserves and Fuel Resources 193 11-11 Lifetime Uranium Requirements for Nuclear Powerplants 194 11-12 World Uranium Resources 194 11-13 Developed and Undeveloped Conventional Hydroelectric Resources of the World 195 11-14 Major Tidal Power Project Sites, Operational and Potential 196 11-15 Estimated Heat Content of Geothermal Resource Base of the United States 197 11-16 Geothermal Powerplants 198 11-17 Identified Shale Oil Reserves of the World 199 11-18 U.S. and World Tar-Sand Oil Resources 200 12-1 Mineral Imports as a Percentage of Mineral Consumption, 1976 205 12-2 World Demand for Minerals, 1985 and 2000 206 12-3 Comparison of Bureau of Mines and Malenbaum Demand Projections for Selected Metals in 1985 and 2000 209 12-4 Life Expectancies of 1974 World Reserves of Mineral Commodities of Particular Concern at Two Different Rates of Demand 212 12 -5 Illustration of Nonfuel Mineral Prices Extrapolated to 2000 with a 5 Percent Growth Rate Beginning in 1980 213 12-6 Comparison of Price Projections for Four Metals in the Year 2000 216 12-7 World Production and Reserves in 1977 (Estimated), Other Resources in 1973-77 (as Data Available), Resource Potential, and Resource Base of 17 Elements 219 12-8 Percentage of World Production of Selected Minerals Traded Inter- nationally, 1950-70 222 12-9 Geographic Distribution of World Resources of Selected Mineral Commodities in 1974 223 12-10 Estimates of Metal Recoveries from Manganese Nodules from the Deep Seabed by 1985 224 13-1 Increase in World Population, 1975-2000 231 13-2 Number of Cattle and Number of Sheep and Goats, 1955-2000 234 13-3, Winrock Projections of World Feed,Resources for Ruminants, by Region 236 13-4 Winrock Projections of World Ruminant Populations, by Region 237 13-5 Annual Grain Consumption per Capita in the 20 Most Populous Coun- tries, 1975 239 13-6 Energy Consumption per Capita in the 20 Most Populous Countries, 1974 239 13-7 Post-Consumer Residential and Commercial Solid Waste Generated and Amounts Recovered, by Type of Material, 1977 240 13-8 Urban Population in All Cities of 100,000 or More 242 13-9 Estimates and Rough Projections of Selected Urban Agglomerations in Developing Countries 242 13-10 Levels and Trends of Life Expectancy at Birth, 1950-2000 248. 13-11 Percentages of Deaths of Children Under the Age of Five Due to Fecally Related and Airborne Diseases of Malnutrition, Latin America, Selected Areas 250 13-12 GNP Trends, 1975-2000, Medium-Growth Rate 252 13-13 Global Summary of Sources and Annual Emissions of Atmospheric Particulate Matter 263 13-14 Typical Climate Changes Caused by Urbanization 267 13-15 Selected Annual Energy Supply Rates for the Earth 267 13-16 Effects of Large Heat Additions to the Atmosphere 268 13-17 Daily per Capita Calorie Consumption, Historic and Projected, by Region, with.Percent of FAO Minimum Standards 275 13-18 Loss of Agricultural Lands, 1960-2000, Selected Industrialized Coun- tries 282 13-19 Average Energy Inputs per Acre in U.S. Corn Production, 1.940-70 293 13-20 Energy Inputs in U.S. Corn Production 293 13-21 Commercial Energy Required for Rice and Corn (Maize) Production, by Modern, Transitional, and Traditional Methods 296 13-22 Categories of Ocean Areas and Types of Pollution, with Effects on Uses and their Duration 301 13-23 Estimates from Annual River Discharges of Amounts of Metals In- jected into the Oceans Annually by Geological Processes and by Man 308 13-24 Total Inventory of Artificial Radionuclides Introduced into the World Oceans, 1970 and 2000 310 13-25 Best Estimates of Petroleum Hydrocarbons Introduced into the Oceans Annually 310 13-26 Annual Ocean Litter Estimates 313 13-27 Effect of Whaling on Stocks of Ten Species of Whales 314 13-28 Timetable of Societal Responses to Mercury Pollution of the Ocean, Minamata Bay, Japan, 1939-73 318 xxx 13-29 Estimates of World Forest Resources, 1978 and 2000 319 13-30 Extinctions of Species Implied by the Global 2000 Study's Projections 331 13-31 Projected Global Supply and Demand for Water by the Year 2000 334 13-32 Global Primary Energy Use, 1975 and 1990, byEnergy Type 346 13-33 Regional Distribution of Global Primary Energy Use, 1975 and 1990 347 13-34 Per Capita Global Primary Energy Use, Annually 1975 and 1990 347 13-35 U.S. Source Documents on the Effects of Pollutants 349 13-36 Projected Annual Emissions: 1985 and 1990, Low-Growth Case 351 13-37 Comparison of the Hard Path Definition and the Energy Information Administration's Projection Series C 360 13-38 Solar Sweden Assumed Production of Goods and Services and Specific Energy Use, 1975 and 2015 365 13-39 Solar Sweden Percent Distribution of Energy, by Energy-Quality Cat- egories A-I, 1971 and 2015 365 13-40 U.S. Department of Energy Studies Underway as of August 1978 to Examine "Soft Path" Options 368 13-41 Energy Supply in 1977 and Two Supply Scenarios for the Year 2000 370 13-42 Relative Environmental Impacts of Low- and High-Energy Growth Futures 370 13-43 Estimated Land Area Utilized for World Mineral Production Com- pared with Annual Production, 1976-2000 383 13-44 Estimates of Solid Wastes Generated Annually by World Production of Selected Mineral Products, 1976-2000 386 13-45 Apparent Opportunities for Further Mineral Development 390 13-46 Summary of Impacts on the Environment Implied by the Global 2000 Study's Population, GNP, and Resource Projections, by Major Environments 392 13-47 Projected Changes in Global Vegetation and Land Resources, 1975- 2000 401 13-48 Urban Population in All Cities of 100,000 or More 407 13-49 Environmental Assumptions Inherent in the Population, GNP, and Resource Projections 410 14-1 Index to Projections and Detailed Discussions Related to Each of the 11 Elements of the Government's Global Model 455 14-2 Selected Contrasting Assumptions of the 11 Elements of the Govern- ment's Global Model 470 14-3 Selected Institutional and Structural Differences Among the Elements of the Government's Global Model 479 15-1 Regions, Subregions, and Countries for Which Population Projections Were Developed 508 15-2 Egyptian Crude Death Rates, 1950-75 513 15-3 Age-Specific Egyptian Mortality Estimates, 1975 515 15-4 Assumed Annual Declines in Crude Birth Rate, Chicago Projections 516 15-5 Projected Annual Declines in Total Fertility Rates, Chicago Projec- tions, Medium Growth Case 517 15-6 Egyptian Personal Expenditure Distributions, 19 '74-75 518 15-7 Estimated Age-Specific Egyptian Fertility Rates, 1975 520 xxxi 16-1 Projected Average Annual Real GNP Growth, by Adjustment Steps, Medium Growth Case, 1975-85 524 16-2 Historical and Projected Average Annual Real GNP Growth for the Western Industrialized and Socialist Nations 528 16-3 Projected Average Annual Real GNP Growth for the High, Medium, and Low Growth Cases, 1977-85 530 16-4 Projected Demand for LDC Exports of Manufactured Goods 531 .16-5 Projected Average Annual Growth of Export of LDC Manufactured Goods, by LDC Group, Medium Growth Case 532 16-6 Projected Average Annual Growth of All LDC Exports, by Type of Export 532 16-7 Average Annual Growth of All LDC Exports, by LDC Group, Me- - dium Growth Case 532 16-8 Projected Exports for LDC Lower-Middle Income Group, by Type of Export, Medium Growth Case . 533 16-9 SIMLINK Calculations for the Low-Middle Income LDC Group, Medium Growth Case, 1977-85 533 16-10 Representative LDC Import Calculations, Lower-Middle Income Group, Medium Growth Case 534 17-1 Correla tion Between Self and Peer Ratings (Examples from Question 1) 537 17-2 Conversion of Expertise. Ranking to Weighted Scale 537 17-3 Definition of Temperature Categories 541 17-4 Percentage of Grouped Probability Densities Lying in Each Temper- ature Category 543 17-5 Frequency of Drought in U.S. in 1991-2000 543 18-1 Food Commodities Specified in the GOL Model 18-2 GOL Model Regions 551 18-3 Variables Used in the GOL Model 553 18-4 Representative Supply Equations: Wheat, Low-Income North Africa and Middle East (Medium-Growth, Rising Energy Price Case) 554 18-5 Representative Demand Equations: Wheat, Low-Income North Africa and Middle East (Medium-Growth, Rising Energy Price Case) 555 18-6' Comparison of Average Annual Projected Population Growth Rates, Medium Series 556 18-7 Representative Wheat Trade and Price Equations: Low-Income North Africa and Middle East (Medium-Growth, Rising Energy Price Case) 556 18-8 Projected Net Exporters of Wheat (Medium-Growth, Rising Energy Price Case) 557 18-9 Arable Area Submodel, Low-Income North Africa and Middle East 558 18-10 Total Food Submodel, Low-Income North Africa and Middle East 558 1&_1I Fertilizer Submodel, Low-income North Africa and Middle East '@58 18-12 Summary Supply Statistics: Low-Income North Africa and Middle East 559 18-13 Summary Demand and Trade Statistics: Low-Income North Africa and Middle East 560 18-14 Summary Meat Statistics: Less Developed Countries and Industrial- ized Nations 561 20-1 The 33 IEES Regions, Grouped According to Energy Position Clas- sification 573 10-2 The 59 Primary Fuel Types in the IEES Supply Submodel 574 20-3 The 13 IEES Transport Modes and the Fuels Carried 574 20-4 Final Energy Products in the IEES Linear Program 575 22-1 World Consumption of 14 Minerals and Materials in the Year 2000 582 22-2 Average Annual Economic Growth to the Year 2000 584 22-3 Base Year National Income 584 22-4 Representative Population Projections 584 22-5 Intensity of Use Statistics: Africa (excluding South Africa), 1951-2000 589 22-6 Intensity of Use Statistics: United States, Refined Copper, 1934-75 589 22-7 Minerals and Materials Consumption: Africa (excluding South Africa), 1951-2000 590 25-1 A Comparison of Levels in World 2 and World 3 610 29-1 Alternative Assumptions Concerning Income Targets and Future Pop- ulation Growth 653 29-2 Growth Rates and Income Gap Under the Assumptions of Basic Scen- arios X and C in the United Nations Model 654 31-1 Exogenous Inputs and Assumptions in World 3 Simulations for the Global 2000 Study 665 XXXM LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1-1 The process of projecting trends. 5 2-1 Twenty-five years of world population growth. 13 2-2 Age-sex composition of population, medium series, 1975 and 2000. 17 4-1 The three Global 2000 Study scenarios compared with the annual mean temperature changes during the past century for the latitude band 00-800N. 65 5-1 Innovative and adopted technology levels for rice production in Thai- land as projected by the GOL (grain, oilseed, livestock) model. 69 6-1 World grain yields, actual and projected under Alternatives 1, 11, 111. 76 6-2 Indices of world grain production, area, and yield, actual and pro- jected. 84 6-3 Energy intensity data. Cross-sectional energy use data plotted against crop and livestock yields for 30 largest food producing countries; 15-year historical series plotted against time for United States and several major European producers. 86 6-4 Energy used in agriculture, 1974. 87 6-5 Energy used in agriculture, plus fertilizer and chemicals, 1974. 87 6-6 World potentially arable, arable, and grain area, actual and projected. 98 6-7 World food production and fertilizer consumption, actual and pro- jected. 102 6-8 Indices of world food production and fertilizer consumption, actual and projected. 103 7-1 Annual catch of marine fish and of all marine animals, showing the downward trend in marine fish since 1970. 106 7-2 Per capita national income vs. income elasticity of fisheries demand in 77 countries. 114 9-1 Annual circulation of the hydrosphere, in quadrillions of cubic meters. 138 9-2 Distribution of withdrawals among major categories of water use, 1965. 142 9-3 Projected water use (withdrawals) for four Asian countries in percent of maximum limit of supply, as represented by runoff from local precipitation. 148 10-1 Demand projections for OPEC oil, 1976-90. 169 10-2 Comparison of global projections, 1975-2000. 174 10-3 Comparison of U.S. projections, 1975-2000. 176 10-4 Cumulative world discovery and production of oil. 177 10-5 World maximum oil production at a medium depletion rate and world demand at three growth rates of oil production. 177 10-6 Primary resources by fuel type for three alternative energy technol- ogies. 179 11-1 Classification of mineral resources. 188 12-1 Average annual demand by energy industries for some commodities, 1975-90, as a percentage of U.S. production in 1973. 210 12-2 Percentage of U.S. reserves needed to meet total energy demand for some commodities, 1975-90. 211 12-3 Energy requirements for recovery of iron, titanium, and aluminum, different grades, various sources. 214 12-4 Mineral product flow and four principal decision points in the flow. 215 12-5 Classification of mineral resources, the "McKelvey box." 217 12-6 The exploded McKelvey box, with indicated stocks and flows. 218 13-1 The two steps in integrating environment into the analysis. 228 13-2 Trend since 1958 in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the at- mosphere. 258 13-3 Global pools and flows of carbon. 260 13-4 Carbon dioxide concentrations implied by various energy scenarios. 262 13-5 Energy flow in the U.S. food chain, in billions of joules. 295 13-6 Transport mechanisms linking the oceans with the other principal parts of the physical world. 300 13-7 The effect of a gradual reduction, starting in 1971, in the use of DDT from a simulation model. 307 13-8 Loss of species through clearing of tropical forest areas-five projec- tions. 329 13-9 A monument to acid rain and air pollution-"Cleopatra's Needle." 336 13-10 Distribution and present production of ultimately recoverable con- ventional crude oil resources of the world. 352 13-11 Possible production rate curves for the world's ultimately recoverable crude oil resources. 353 13-12 Geologically estimated global crude oil production rates compared with consumption rates projected from actual growth over the 1950-75 period. 354 13-13 Historical growth of GNP and commercial energy use in the United States, 1850-1976. 355 13-14 Major regional trends associated with the DOE-MITRE Projection Series C (Hard Path) Energy Development Scenario. 362 13-15 OECD countries' projections of 1985 nuclear generating capacity for the world, by dates of estimates. 364 13-16 The Solar Sweden energy system for the year 2015. 366 13-17 Survey of energy savings in Denmark, 1977-90. 371 13-18 Traditional and reduced demand for energy in Denmark, 1990 and 2005. 372 13-19 Consumption of new mineral materials per person in the United States in 1975. 384 13-20 Arable land per capita, 1955, 1975, and 2000. 403 13-21 Conceptual model for closing the loops. 409 14-1 Sequential steps followed in linking elements of the government's global model. 458 14-2 Linkages achieved between elements of the government's global model. 459 14-3 Inconsistent population and GNP growth rates. 463 xxxv 14-4 Inconsistent commodity trade prices. 465 14-5 Inconsistent commodity trade volumes. 466 14-6 Inconsistent capital and resource utilization. 468 15-1 Population growth, selected countries, 1960-70 and 1970-74. 507 15-2 Egyptian population growth, 1950-2000, Census projections. 511 15-3 Egyptian population growth, 1950L2000, Chicago projections. 512 15@4 Projected Egyptian life expectancies, 1950-2000, medium growth case. 514 15-5 Projected Egyptian total fertility rates, 1950-2000, medium growth case. 519 16-1 Sequential operation of the SIMLINK model. 529 17-1 Global temperatures; historicafrecord of changes in annual mean tem- perature during the past century for the latitude band 6'@-80*N. 538 17-2 Sample response to Question 1; actual example of a single response to the instructions. 538 17-3 Cumulative probability function for Question 1. 539 17-4 Equivalent density function for Question 1. 540 17-5 Adding two density functions for Question 1. 540 17-6 Normalized density function for two respondents to Question 1. 541 17-7 Probability of mean Northern Hemisphere temperature change by the year 2000 as determined by the panel of climatic experts. 542 17-8 Probability of mean Northern Hemisphere temperature change to the year'2000 as determined by the panel of climate experts. 543 210-1 Structure of the International Energy Evaluation System (IEES). 577 22-1 Intensity-of-use curve of a nation whose economy is moving from an industrializing economy to a postindustrialization service econ- omy. 585 22-2 Graphic representation of the 1977 Malenbaurn Report's intensity-of- use table for refined copper, 587 22-3 Graphic representation of the 1977 Malenbaurn Report's intensity-of- use curve for crude steel. 593 22-4 Graphic representation of the 1977 Malenbaurn Report's intensity-of- use table for primary aluminum. 594 26-1 The five 'interrelated planes into which the world is stratified in the Mesarovic-Pestel world model. 616 26-2 Computational sequence of the Mesarovic-Pestel world model. 620 26-3 Historical-pattern no-change scenario, 1975-2020. 622 26-4 Isolationist scenario, 1975-2020. 623 26-5 Energy self-sufficiency fast-nuclear scenario, 1975-2020. 624 26-6 Actual vs. predicted consumption for Western Europe; one of the model's best predictions. 625 26-7 Actual vs. predicted value added in the Japanese extractive industries; one of the model's worst predictions. 625 27-1 Channels of causal influence and major feedback controls in MOIRA. 632 28-1 The demographic sector and objective function of the Latin American world model. 640 28-2 Latin American world model standard simulation for developed coun- tries. 644 xxxvi 28-3 Latin American world model standard simulation for Asia. 645 29-1 Internal st ructure of a region. 651 31-1 World 3 model sector linkages before linkage breaking. 664 31-2 World 3 model after breaking of sectoral linkages and introduction of exogenous drives. 664 31-3 Exogenous inputs to different sectors of the World 3 model. 666 31-4 World 3 model standard run (integrated version). 667 31-5 Four-level population sector with exogenous inputs. 667 31-6 Capital sector with exogenous inputs. 668 31-7 Agriculture sector with exogenous inputs., 669 31-8 Agriculture sector with exogenous inputs assuming no erosion or ur- ban-industrial use. 669 31-9 Renewable resource sector with exogenous inputs. 6.70 31-10 Nonrenewable resource sector with exogenous inputs assuming con- stant marginal cost of the.resource. 671 31-11 Persistent pollution sector with exogenous inputs. 671 31-12 Major linkages in the World Integrated Model with designation of linkages broken in model-integration experiment. 673 31-13 Global population projections for three versions of the World Inte- grated Model. 675 31-14 Global GNP projections for three'versions of the World Integrated Model. 676 31-15 Projections of North American GNP per capita for three versions of the World Integrated Model. 677 31-16 Projections of Latin American GNP per capita for three versions of the World Integrated Model. 678 31-17 Projections of South Asian GNP per capita for four versions of the World Integrated Model. 674 31-18 Projections of South Asian cumulativ -e starvation as a percentage of population for two versions of the World Integrated Model. 680 xxxvii LIST OF MAPS Page Population 9 Gross National Product 40 Gross National Product per Capita 41 Grain Consumption per Capita 74 Grain Trade 75 Per Capita Water Availability (1971) 154 Per Capita Water Availability (2000) 155 Energy Consumption per Capita (1975-1990) 162 Energy Trade (1975-1990) 163 Metal Consumption per Capita 208 Desertification Map 278 Maps in the colored map section GNP Projections: Simulated Trade Linkages (SIMLINK) Methodology Population Projections: Cohort Component Methodology Food Projections: Grain-Oilseed-Livestock (GOL) Methodology Energy Projections: International Energy Evaluation System (IEES) Methodology Nonfuel Minerals Projections: Intensity-of-Use (IOU) Methodology Extent of Commercial Activity Population Density (1975) Agricultural Production Potential Land Use Patterns (1975) Free Range Grazing Pressure, I Part I The Projections i I Introduction to the Projections The President's 1977 Environmental Message The Study Plan required the Global 2000 Study to develop projec- tions of trends in population, resources, and the The approach used in the Global 2000 Study environment for the entire world through the year was relatively simple. Each of the participating 2000. There is nothing uniquely significant about agencies was asked to make projections using the the year 2000, however, and the projections projection tools it currently employs in making reported in this volume are not intended to be long-term projections.* The assignments were as precise estimates for particular years. They are, follows: instead, broadly indicative of the direction in which major trends point. Population: Bureau of the Census and Similarly, it must be stressed that the results of Agency for International this study are projections, not forecasts. Forecasts Development. are attempts to predict the future, which, of GNP: Global 2000 Study staff, course, is influenced by public-policy decisions. with assistance from the In contrast, this study projects foreseeable trends Agency for International under the assumption that present policies and Development, Central policy trends continue without major change.* In Intelligence Agency, and a sense, the projections are intended to be self- World Bank. defeating, in that the basic purpose of the Presi- Climate: National Oceanic and dent's directive was to establish a foundation for Atmospheric longer-term planning-which in turn should lead Administration, to policy changes aimed at altering the projected Department of Agriculture, trends. National Defense University, and Central A considerable amount of longer-range analysis Intelligence Agency. and planning was already being conducted by Technology: The Global 2000 Study various federal agencies prior to this study, but staff, with assistance from usually only in response to the planning require- participating agencies. ments of the agencies' individual areas of respon- sibility. As a result, most longer-term government projections tend to focus on a single factor, directly relevant to the sponsoring agency's area Emphasis was placed on models that are (1) global, (2) of responsibility (for example,, food or population), long-term, and (3) used. The government has large numbers of other models, some of which include more feedback and without adequate consideration of the interrela- interactions than the models used in this Study. The models tions and feedback involved in a world system in chosen, however, are the global, long-term models most which population, resources, and the environment often used by the agencies in their long-term planning and are all interacting variables. analysis. Broad surveys that include other government As the President's directive establishing this models are provided in A Guide to Models in Governmental d Planning and Operations, Office of Research and Develop- study makes clear, however, the time has passe ment, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., when population (or energy, or food, or clean air, Aug. 1974, and in G. Fromm, W. L. Hamilton, and D. E. or public health, or employment) can be consid- Hamilton, Federally Supported Mathematical Models: Sur- ered in isolation. In establishing a foundation for vey and Analysis, National Science Foundation, Washing- longer-range analysis and planning, ways must be ton, D.C., June 1974. A discussion of the evolving role of models in government is provided by M. Greenberger, M. found to better understand the linkages and inter- A. Crenson, and B. L. Crissey in their Models in the Policy actions among these important elements of the Process, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1976, and in world system. Congressional Research Service, Computer Simulation Methods to Aid'National Growth Policy, prepared for the *As discussed in Chapter 14 and summarized in Table 14-2, Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and some policy changes were nevertheless assumed in devel- the Environment, U.S. House of Representatives, Washing- oping the projections. ton: Government Printing Office, 1975. 3 4 THE PROJECTIONS Food: Department of Agriculture. tools, the projections must be made independently Fisheries: National Oceanic and and sequentially. Atmospheric The sequential approach used in this study is Administration and outside illustrated in Figure 1-1. The first step is the consultants. establishment of policy assumptions (assumed Forestry: Central Intelligence constant in this study), followed by projections of Agency, with assistance population, GNP, technology, and climate. These from the Department of assumptions and projections are necessary inputs Agriculture, Department of to the resource projections in the second step. State, and Agency for The resource projections, in turn, are needed for International Development. the environmental analysis. It is only through this Water: Department of the Interior, sequential process that a measure of self-consist- with assistance from ency, coherence, and interrelationship is obtaina- outside consultants. ble with present government projection tools. Fuel Minerals: Department of Energy, Many important linkages, however, cannot be with assistance from the established by this sequential process. In particu- Bureau of Mines and the lar, the population and GNP projections that are Geological Survey., made in the first step are based largely on Nonfuel Minerals: The Global 2000 Study extrapolations of past trends and are uninformed staff, with assistance from by interactive feedback from the resource and the Department of the environmental projections. The resource and en- Interior and outside vironmental analyses, however, project develop- consultants. ments that may significantly influence GNP and Energy: Department of Energy. population trends. Envi Ironment: The Global 2000 Study The Projections staff, with assistance from the Environmental Protection Agency, Agency The agency experts were asked.to produce a for International first, draft of their projections in just six weeks, at Development, and outside which time they, the Global 2000 Study staff, and consultants. a small group of outside experts,* met for a weekend synthesis meeting. The purpose of the This approach has had both advantages and meeting was 'to improve' the consistency of the disadvantages. It was a distinct advantage to be projections and to begin-at least subjectively-to able to move ahead quickly, using previously consiIder the implications of the resource and developed tools. It was also an advantage to be environmental projecfions for the independently able to test and evaluate the existing long-term derived projections.of GNP and population. So analytical capabilities of the govemment. It was a unusual is this type of agency interaction that disadvantage to use projection tools that do not most of the agencies' long-term projection experts lend themselves easily to the analysis of the many were until then not acquainted with each other. interactions among population, resources, and A certain amount of difficulty was expected in environment. It was also a disadvantage that these this preliminary meeting, and, in fact, many analytical tools require that the projections be inconsistencies were revealed. The experts then undertaken sequentially. This last point needs decided collectively how best.to adjust and modify explanation. the projections to improve the internal consistency Future environmental trends depend in large of the whole set. The final projections were measure on demands for resources (minerals, prepared during the following two months. energy, food, water, etc.); therefore, the environ- It must be made clear, therefore, that the mental trends cannot be projected and assessed projections reported in this study are based on the until relevant resource projections have been completed. However, the demand for resources *Anne Carter, Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass.; Ni- depends on the number of people and their cholas G. Carter, World Bank, Washington, D.C.; Anne income, as well as on policy, climate, and tech- Ehrlich, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.; Peter Hen- riot, Center of Concern, Washington, D.C.; Mihajlo Mesa- nology. In the real world (and in more interactive rovic, Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, Ohio; models) all of these variables evolve and interact Douglas Ross, The Conference Board, New York City; and continuously, but with the government's present Kenneth E. F. Watt, University of California, Davis. INTRODUCTION 5 7- Climate P Population Technological Poky First step@ assumption i ,i projections t4N scenario assumptions projectu T1 f 7i Resource projections ergy, Secoh, @$t (food, en water, minero s, etc.) 7,777 -7 -7 nmental @,'J Third p: mr, i r EE?, I im I mp p Figure 1-1. The process of projecting trends. collective judgment of the agency experts who was given throughout to introducing as much participated in the effort. To ensure internal feedback and interaction as possible. The resulting consistency, several adjustments were required in projections are certainly sufficient to indicate the individual agency 'projections. As a result, the general nature and direction of the. trends. Fur- projections may not agree completely with projec- thermore, as discussed in Chapter 31, the inade- tions previously published by the participating quacies and inconsistencies that remain generally agencies. Since the manuscript has not been tend to make the projections more optimistic than subjected to formal interagency clearance proce- they would be if it had been possible to eliminate cedures, the agencies are not responsible for any the inadequacies and inconsistencies. The projec- errors in fact or judgment that may have occurred. tions therefore establish a "best-case" analysis in One striking finding of this.study is that, collec- that (given the assumptions of steady technologi- tively, the executive agencies of the government cal progress, but no public-policy changes) im- are currently incapable of presenting the President proved analysis is Rely to assign more impor- with a mutually consistent set of projections of tance-rather than less-to future problems of world trends in population, resources, and the population, resources, and environment. environment. While the projections presented in Finally, analysis of the limitations and weak- the chapters that follow are probably the most nesses in the models now in use (see Chapters 14 internally consistent ever developed with the long- through 23) provides a basis for developing and range, global models now used by the agencies, introducing improved models. The issues are they are still plagued with inadequacies and incon- important. Population, resources, and environ- sistencies. ment are long-term, global, highly interrelated issues, not likely to disappear without further While the analyses are admittedly imperfect, attention. Improved methods of analysis are they are still highly useful. This is the first time needed to better understand the future implica- that an effort has been made to apply-collec- tions of present decisions and policies. Given tively and consistently-the global, long-range adquate coordination and the necessary resources, models used by the government. Careful attention better models can be developed. 2 Population Projections Population projections comprise one of the Center assume no migration; a final section in this basic prerequisites for predicting and planning for chapter discusses probable developments in mi- future needs in such areas as food, energy, gration and their possible effects on the projec- employment, community facilities, and social tions. services. It would be ideal to have a single The terms used in the tables and the discussions forecast of population on which there was general in this chapter are defined as follows: agreement. However, since the factors influencing Crude birth rate: The .number of births per population trends-fertility, mortality, migration- 1,000 persons in one year (based on midyear are not perfectly predictable, projections usually population). represent individual or collective judgments that differ greatly, even among experts. Indeed, there Crude death rate: The number of deaths per is often even disagreement about the data used as 1,000 persons in one year (based on midyear the base for projections. population). Because of these inherent difficulties, popula- Growth rate: The annual increase (or decrease) tion estimates are presented in this chapter in in the population resulting from a surplus of deficit terms of an illustrative range, with a high and a of births over deaths and a surplus or deficit of low series, representing the highest and lowest migrants into or out of the country, expressed as population counts that may reasonably be ex- a percentage of the base population.* pected to occur, and a medium series, represent- Rate oj'natural increase: The annual increase ing reasonable expectations, given existing trends (or decrease) in the population resulting from a and present knowledge of the underlying factors. surplus or deficit of births over deaths, expressed Two sets of population projections are used in as a percentage of the midyear population. The the Global 2000 Study: those made by the U.S. natural increase of the population does not include Bureau of the Census and those made by the the migration of persons into or out of the Community and Family Study Center (CFSQ of country. the University of Chicago. It was decided to include the CFSC projections Total ftrtility rate (TFR): The average number along with the Census projections in order to of children that would be born per woman if all illustrate how such estimates are affected by women lived to the end of their childbearing years differences in basic assumptions about such fac- and bore children according to a given set of age- tors as fertility rates. For instance, the Census specific fertility rates. It is five times the sum of Bureau's high, medium, and low projections of the age-specific fertility rates, divided by 1,000.t world population in the year 2000 are 14, 8, and 3 percent higher, respectively, than the correspond- Bureau of the Census Projections ing CFSC projections. The detailed Bureau of the Census projections Along with discrepancies between the base-year are presented in Tables 2-10 through 2-14 at the data used in the two sets of projections (popula- end of this section. Tables 2-10 and 2-11 include tion estimates, fertility rates and mortality rates estimates and projections for all three series (high, for 1975), there are also significant differences in medium, and low) to provide an indication of the the way in which each group projected trends in fertility. Using a mathematical model, the CFSC arrived at sioficantly more optimistic projections *Average annual growth rates are computed using the of fertility rates in the year 2000. Differences compound growth formula r = ln(P,1P,)Jt- between the two methodologies will be discussed tPopulation projections usually employ total fertility rate as a unit of measure rather than crude birth rate, in order to further in Chapter 16. avoid methodological difficulties pertaining to age composi- The projections by both the Bureau of the tion, sex ratios, and interaction between fertility and mor- Census and the Community and Family Study tality. 7 8 -THE PROJECTIONS range covered by the projections and to serve as 4. Knowledge and methods of family limitation a basis for comparison with the corresponding will become better known and will be better used CFSC projections. 'Tables 2-12, 2-13, and 2-14 among populations that wish to reduce fertility. show only the medium range projections of popu- Expansion of family limitation practices will ex- lation growth rates, mortality rates, and birth pedite the process of fertility decline, and in rates. Table 2-1 summarizes the salient data from countries where rapid social and economic prog- the Census estimates and projections. The map on ress and s(rong desires for smaller families coin- the following page Illustrates the population cide, fertility decline will be very rapid. changes projected i .n the medium case. In making projections for each country or Assumptions region, the Census Bureau adopted fertility levels for the year 2000 that represented in their judg- Fertility Assumptions. The general assumptions ment the "most likely" level, which corresponds that underlie the Census projections with regard to the level for the medium series. Specific fertility to fertility are: levels were also assumed for the purpose of the high and low series. Consideration was given to 1. Less developed countries will continue to fertility assumptions made in existing projections make moderate progress in social and economic prepared by national agencies or universities, development during the 1975-2000 period. based on the belief that demographers in the 2. As less developed countries (LDCs) progress individual countries could be expected to have a in social and economic development, the fertility special understanding of what are "reasonable" level is expected to decline more or less continu- fertility levels to expect in the future of their own ously but with some temporary plateaus. country. 3. Almost all countries that do not already do For the more developed countries the fertility so will make family planning services available to assumptions in existing official national projec- an appreciable portion of the population during tions were used with, in some instances, slight the 1975-2000 period, and countries with present modification. The aggregates of Eastern and West- family planning programs will extend coverage, ern Europe were projected on the basis of fertility particularly in rural areas. trends -according to the U.N. medium series, with' slight adjustment at the U.S. Bureau of the TABLE 2-1 Census to take account of fertility data available since the U.N. projections were prepared. For the Bureau of Census Estimates and Projections, less developed countries the fertility assumptions Medium Series, Summary Data, 1975-2000 were made on a judgmental basis by demogra- phers who have worked with the demographic (Population in billions) and related socioeconomic data for the individual Popula- Percent Annual countries over extended time periods. Specifically, tion of World Percent a no mathematical model of fertility change was Pop. Growth used. However, in setting the target fertility levels 1975 World 4.09 - and paths of fertility decline for the less developed More developed regions 1.13 28 countries, the demographers took into considera- Less developed regions 2.96 72 tion the following major factors: 1980 World 4.47 - 1.78 More developed regions 1.17 26 0.68 1. Current level of fertility. Less developed regions 3.30 74 2.18 2. Recent trends in fertility. 1985 World 4.88 - 1.77 3. Current levels and recent trends in social and More developed regions 1.21 25 0.70 economic. development. Less developed regions 3.67 75 2.14 4. Current status and approximate past impact 1990 World 5.34 - 1.78 of family planning and public health programs. More developed regions 1.25 23 0.66 5. Government policy on population matters. Less developed regions 4.09 77 2.14 6. Recent fertility trends in countries with 1995 World 5.83. - 1.77 More developed regions 1.29 22 0.59 similar cultural, social, and economic conditions Less developed regions 4.54 78 2.11 and prospects. 2000 World 6.35 - 1.70 7. Expressed "desired" family size in the More developed regions 1.32 21 0.51 population. Less developed regions 5.03 79 2.02 8. Fertility assumptions made by international 'Annual percent growth for the preceding 5-year period. agencies, such as the U.N. and the World Bank. P Ni iq 2000 1975 t 460 1975 2000 3 S and Europe ___moo I T-7 1975 0 214 24 'A' s s I'C 2@0 - --- -- -'1975 5- _4 if; @0 200 9 814 iN 1975 Af 325- 197 katInAMprics "V, lbr, OW, A, OW 7-% @;i,- V'L 10 THE PROJECTIONS Furthermore, two general guidelines were Projection of mortality, using the base year as adopted in setting the range of fertility levels in the starting point, was generally done in one of the year 2000. two ways: 1. The higher the level of fertility at the base 1. Either a target life expectancy at birth (and date, the wider the range of assumed fertility corresponding life table) was chosen for the year levels in the year 2000. 2000 with life expectancies for the intervening 2. The greater the uncertainty about current years obtained by assuming a "reasonable pat- the tern" of change of mortality; or fertility levels and current trends, the greater 2. The pattern and degree of change in mortality range of assumed fertility levels in the year 2000. from year to year was assurned with the eventual Mortaliti, Assumptions. Only one specific mor- life expectancy in the year 2000 "falling out" of the process. tality trend was assumed for each projection, except for the People's Republic of China. Esti- In either case, consideration was always given mates for mortality in the base year of the to the trends and levels shown in national projec- projections and for the projection period through tions and in projections by international organiza- 2000 are developed through the use of life table tions, and by considering the mortality trends in estimates. The life tables for the base year of the similar countries in the region that have already projections were usually compiled from a variety experienced the relevant portion of the mortality of sources, including vital registration data on transition. Target life expectancies for the year deaths by age and sex (adjusted at times for 2000 were sometimes chosen, in fact, to be the underregistration) and survey or census data on same as those already achieved in "leading" deaths by age and sex during the preceding year countries, or previously assumed in national or (after appropriate evaluation and adjustment if U.N. projections. necessary), or by analyzing age distributions of the population at one or more points in time and Total Population applying a variety of demographic techniques such as stable population analysis and use of model life All three Bureau of the Census estimates and tables. In a few countries, such as Nigeria, where projections of total world population are summa- little reliable information is available, "guessti- rized in Table 2-2. The medium series is consid- mates" of the appropriate level of mortality and ered the population growth trend most likely to of the model life table pattern were made, always occur. The high and low series represent a considering estimates that have been made by 11 reasonable range" above and below the medium other institutions, such as the United Nations. series. TABLE 2-2 Census Bureau World Estirnates and Projections Population Size and Net Growth Total Population Net Growth Average (Millions) 1975 to 2000 Annual Growth 1975 2000 Millions Percent Rate (Percent) Medium series 4,090 6,351 2,261 55 1.8 High series 4,134 6,798 2,664 64 2.0 Low series 4,043 5,922 1,879 46 1.5 Vital Rates8 Crude Birth Rate Crude Death Rate Rate of Natural Increase (per 1,000) (per 1,000) (Percent) 1975 2000 1975 2000 1975 2000 Medium series 30.4 25.6 12.3 9.1 1.8 1.6 High series 32.0 29.4 12.9 9.4 1.9 2.0 Low series 28.8 21.9 11.9 8.9 1.7 1.3 Rates shown for 200D refer to midyear B99 to midyear 2000. POPULATION PROJECTIONS 11 The medium series begins with a 1975 base people during the period 1975-2000 (1.88-2.26 population total of about 4.09 billion, a crude birth billion) than during the 1950-1975 period (1.56 rate of 30 per 1,000, and a crude death rate of 12 billion). Oer 1,000. The series implies declines of 16 0¢ in the crude birth rate and 26 percent in Contrasts Between More Developed and Less the crude death rate from 1975 to 2000, generating Developed Regions. There are characteristic de- changes in the natural increase from 1.8 percent mographic differences between the populations of in 1975 to 1.6 percent in 2000. Net population the more developed and less developed regions of growth during this whole 25-year period would the worid (Table 2-3). For example, the estimated add about 2.26 billion to the base population and crude birth rate for the less developed regions in produce an end-of-century world population total 1975 was more than double the estimated crude of about 6.35 billion. birth rate for the more developed regions; the The high series of world population projections estimated crude death rate for the less developed begins with a 1975 base population of 4.13 billion, regions in 1975 was significantly higher than for and the low series with a 1975 base population of the more developed regions; and the resulting rate 4.04 billion.* Using the 1975 base populations of natural increase for the less developed regions and, alternately, the high and low series trends of in 1975 was two-thirds higher than for the more 1975-2000 vital rates, world population would developed regions. These characteristic differ- increase in the high series by about 2.66 billion ences are expected to persist into the future, as between 1975 and 2000 and would total about 6.8 indicated by the projected vital rate differences billion by the end of the century; in the low series, for the year 2000. world population would increase by about 1.88 The medium series for the more developed billion between 1975 and 2000 and would total regions begins with a 1975 base population total of about 5.92 billion by the end of the century. about 1.13 billion, a crude birth rate of about 16 World population growth between 1950 and per 1,000, and a crude death rate of about 9.6 per 1975 is estimated at about 1.56 billion, reflecting 1,000. The series implies a slight change in the an average growth rate of about 1.9 percent per crude birth rate, increasing from 16 in 1975 to a year. The latter may be compared to the medium, peak of 17 by 1985, and thereafter declining to 15 high, and low projections for 1975 to 2000 as by the year 2000, an increase in the crude death follows: rate from 9.6 per 1,000 in 1975 to 10.4 per 1,000 in Average 2000 and an average annual growth rate of 0.6 Net Growth Annual percent. Net population growth during this entire (billions) Growth 25-year period would add about 0. 19 billion to the Rate base population and produce an end-of-century (percent) population figure of 1.32 billion for the more 1950 to 1975 estimates 1.56 1.9 developed regions. 1975 to 2000 projections The same 1975 base population estimate is used Medium series 2.26 1.8 for the more developed regions in the high and High series 2.66 2.0 low series as in the medium series. However, Low series 1.88 1.5 alternately high and low trends in vital rates are The medium projection series suggests that the utilized for 1975 to 2000. Thus, the population of population of the wodd may grow between 1975 the developed regions in the year 2000 might be and 2000 at a slightly lower annual rate than that as high as 1.38 billion or as low as 1.27 billion. observed from 1950 to 1975. The high and low The medium series for the less developed series present alternative increase rates for 1975 regions begins with a 1975 base population total of to 2000. However, it should not be overlooked 2.96 billion, a crude birth rate of about 36 per that irrespective of the medium, high, or low rates 1,000, and a crude death rate of about 13 per of growth during 1975 to 2000, all three projection 1,000. The series implies declines of 21 percent in series indicate a net addition to the world popula- the crude birth rate and 35 percent in the crude tion total of an appreciably greater number of death rate during 1975 to 2000; these changes result in rates of natural increase of 2.2 percent in *Nearly all of the differences between the 1975 estimates of 1975 and 2.0 percent in 2000. Population growth world population in the medium, high, and low series are during this 25-year period would add over 2 billion due to the use of the following alternate 1975 population to the base population, producing an end-of-cen- estimates for the People's Republic of China: medium series, 935 million; high series, 978 million; low series, 889 tury population figure of about 5 billion for the million. less developed regions. 12 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 2-3 More Developed Regions and Less Developed Regions--Census Bureau Estimates and Projections Population Size and Net Growth Average Total population Net Growth Annual Willions) 1975 to 2000 Growth Rate 1975 2000 Millions Percent (Percenf) More developed regions Medium series 1,131 1,323 192 17 0.6 High series 1,131 1,377 246 22 0.8 Low series 1,131 1,274 143 13 0.5 Less developed regions Medium series 2,959 5,028 2,069 70 2.1 High series 3,003 5,420 2,417 80 2.4 Low series 2,912 4,648 1,736 60 1.9 Vital Rates' Crude Birth Rate Crude Death Rate Rate of Natural Increase (per 1,000) (per 1,000) Wercent) 1975 2000 1975 2000 1975 2000 More developed regions Medium series 16.1 15.2 9.6 10.4 0.6 0.5 High series 16.1 17.4 9.6 10.1 0.6 0.7 Low series 16.1 13.0 9.6 10.7 0.6 0.2 Less developed regions Medium series 35.9 28.4 13.4 8.7 2.2 2.0 High series 38.0 32.4 14.1 9.2 2.4 2.3 Low series 33.7 24.3 12.8 8.4 2.1 1.6 Rates shown for 2000 refer to midyear 1"9 to midyear 2WO. For the less developed regions, alternate high population growth from 1975 to the end of the and low projections of population growth for the century would be lower than was the case be- 1975 to 2000 period result in total population tween 1950 and 1975, in ternis of both absolute growth during the period of as high as 2.42 billion increments and rates of growth. or as low as 1.74 billion. For the less developed regions, the medium Estimates of net population growth in the more projection series suggests that the population may developed and less developed regions between grow between 1975 and 2000 at a somewhat lower 1950 and 1975 may be compared to the projections annual rate than that observed from 1950 to 1975. for 1975 to 2000, as follows: Regardless of the differences in the high, medium, Average and low series growth nates, however, all three Annual projections indicate a net addition to the popula- Net Growth Growth tion of the less developed regions of an apprecia- (billions) Rate bly greater number of people during the 1975-20W (percent) period (1.74 to 2.42 billion) than during the More developed regions preceding 25-year period (1.28 billion). 1950 to 1975 0.27 1.1 The population of the less developed regions 1975 to 2OW Medium series 0.19 0.6 comprised about 72 percent of the world's popu- High series 0.25 0.8 lation in 1975 and, according to the three projec- Low series 0.14 0.5 tion series, will constitute 78-80 percent of the Less developed regions world's population in the year 2000. This dramatic 1950 to 1975 1.28 2.3 increase is hardly surprising when one considers 1975 to 2000 that the less developed regions would account for Medium series 2.07 2.1 High series 2.42 2.4 nine-tenths of world population growth according Low series 1.74 1.9 to tfie projections (see Fig. 2-1 for medium series projections). During the previous quarter century, For the more developed regions, all three projec- less developed regions accounted for four-fifths of tion series in the present report indicate that world population growth, and thereby increased "Ol mm c a > m wo ?a M* coo=. z a z. It I > CL 'th S.c > L4 CA m (A co 00.30 ID st zp 0 > 0 * 3 r4 iA fA & CA 2 z CL 0 Z* irp 14 THE PROJECTIONS their share of world population from 66 percent in increment in total population in 2000 than in 1975 1950 to 72 percent in 1975. and, if continued after 2000, would require nearly Note: Hereafter, the-tables and discussions of 140 years to cause the population of the more the Bureau of the Census projections will pertain developed regions to double. only to the medium series of estimates and Major Regions. The medium series of estimates projections unless otherwise specified. and projections of population growth for the world's major regions from 1975 to 2000 are Changes in Selected Vital Rates and Total shown in Table 2-4. Population. The data presented in this chapter Africa's population is characterized by high refer to a projection period of 25 years, from 1975 fertility and high mortality rates-a population of to 2000. In terms of fundamental demographic about 0.81 billion in the year 2000, a net increase change, this is a relatively short time period. Any of 0.42 billion over 1975. This increase would profound modification (barring major calamities) reflect a more than doubling of Aftica's population of world population growth trends, including req- in only 25 years and represents the most rapid uisite changes in age composition, would require population growth rate projected for any major a much longer time to evolve. According to these world region during the period 1975 to 2000. * projections, the population growth rates for the Moderately high crude birth and death rates world as a whole and for the less developed characterize the less developed countries of the regions in particular, will decline only slightly Asia and Oceania region. The projected popula- from 1975 to 2000, despite significant declines in tion of these LDCs in 2000 is 3.63 billion, a net fertility levels. increase of 1.36 billion over 1975, or about 60 For the less developed regions the projected percent of world population growth projected for rate of natural increase declines from 1975 to 2000 this period. by only 12 percent, despite a decline in the crude Fertility remains high in Latin America and birth rate of 21 percent and a decline of 30 percent crude death rates low. The projections indicate a in the total fertility rate.* This projected decline total population of about 0.64 billion by the year of 12 percent notwithstanding, the resulting 2000, a 96 percent increase over 1975. Latin "lower" rate for 2000 of about 2.0 percent per America's projected percent increase is the sec- year is still relatively high. For example, applied ond highest for any major world region. to the larger base population of 5.03 billion, it The populations of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern produces a much higher annual increment of total Europe (including Albania and Yugoslavia) are population in 2000 (99 million) than the 2.2 percent characterized by relatively low fertility, mortality, rate of natural increase produced in 1975 (67 and growth rates. The projections reveal a total million). In fact, an annual rate of natural increase population of 0.46 billion by 2000, or an increase of 2 percent, if continued after 2000, would double of 20 percent over 1975-the second lowest of any the population of the less developed regions in major world region. only 35 years. The industrialized North American countries, For the more developed regions of the world, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zea- the projections indicate a decline from 1975 to land have completed their "demographic transi- 2000 of about one-fourth in the rate of natural tion," and their populations are characterized by increase, concurrently with a slight decline in the relatively low fertility, mortality, and growth rates. crude birth rate and a slight increase in the By the end of the century, their population will projected total fertility rate. However, the rate of increase to about 0.81 billion, or 14 percent over natural increase for 2000 (about 0.5 percent per 1975, by far the lowest percent increase of any year) is quite low; it produces a lower annual major world region. The percentage distribution of world population *T'he difference between the 30 percent decline in the total by major. regions as estimated for 1975 and as fertility rate and the 21 percent decline in the crude birth projected in the medium series for 2000 are shown rate from 1975 to 2000 can be explained as follows. About 6 in Table 2-5. percentage points of the difference is due to a larger The projections indicate that at the end of the proportion of women in the childbearing ages (15-49 years) in 2000 than in 1975. The rest of the difference is due to century the less developed countries of Asia and changes in the age patterns of fertility within the childbear- Oceania will continue to have the highest percent- ing years. The difference between the 21 percent decline in age of world population of any major region by the crude birth rate and the 12 percent decline in the rate of far-about 57.2 percent in 2000, as compared with natural increase is due to the decrease in the crude death rate by a greater percentage than the decrease in the crude about 55.6 percent in 1975. Also, by 2000 Africa's birth rate. and Latin America's percentages of world popu- POPULATION PROJECTIONS 15 TABLE 2-4 Major Region&--CensusBureau Estintatesand Projections Population Size and Net Growth Total Population Net Growth Average (Millions) 1975 to 2000 Annual Growth 1975 2000 Millions Percent Rate (Percent) World 4,090 6,351 2,261 55 1.8 Africa 399 814 416 104 2.9 Asia and Oceania', 2,274 3,630 1,356 60 1.9 Latin America 325 637 312 % 2.7 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe b 384 460 76 20 0.7 North America, Western Europe,c Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 708 809 101 14 0.5 Vital Ratesd Rate of Natural Crude Birth Rate Crude Death Rate Increase (per 1,000) (per 1,000) (Percent) 1975 2000 1975 2000 1975 2000 World 30.4 25.6 12.3 9.1 1.8 1.6 Afr ica 46.7 38.5 19.0 11.3 2.8 2.7 Asia and'Oceania 0 33.7 25.9 13.0 8.7 2. 1 1.7 Latin America ' 37.2 28.7 8.9 5.7 2.8 2.3 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe' 17.7 15.9 9.7 10.5 0.8 0.5 North America, Weste m Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 14.8 14.5 9.6 10.5 0.5 0.4 oDeveloping countries only, i.e.. excluding Japan, Australia. and New Zealand. hEastern Europe includes Albania and Yugoslavia. -Western Europe as used here comprises all of Europe except Eastern Europe, Albania, and Yugoslavia. The U.S.S.R. is also excluded. d Rates shown for 2000 refer to midyear 1999 to midyear 2WO. TABLE 2-5 15 Selected Countries. Estimates and projec- tions of population growth from 1975 to 2000 for Percent Distribution of World Population by the 15 selected countries are presented in Table Major Region, Census Bureau Medium Series 2-6. The largest population increases indicated are 1975 2000 for India and the People's Republic of China, each Africa 9.9 12.8 adding about 0.4 billion inhabitants between 1975 Asia and Oceania& 55.6 57.2 and 2000. The highest percentage increases, how- Latin America 7.9 10.0 ever, are projected for Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europeb 9.4 7.3 Brazil, and Bangladesh, each of which shows ail North America, Western Europe, e Japan, increase of 100 percent or more. The lowest Australia ', and New Zealand 17.3 12.7 percentage increases are projected for the United -Developing countries only, i.e.. excluding Japan. Australia. and New Zealand. States, Japan, and the U.S.S.R. In the year 2OW bEastern Europe includes Albania and Yugoslavia. I -western Europe as used here comprises all of Europe except Ea Istern Europe. the People's Republic of China would still be the Albania,.and Yugoslavia. The.U.S.S.R. is also excluded. world's most populous nation, comprising one- fifth of the world's population. The second most lation will increase significantly, while the percent- populous nation-India-would constitute about age of world population living in the U.S.S.R. and 16 percent of the world's population. The Eastern Europe will decline to about 7.3 percent, U.S.S.R. and the United States would remain the and the percentage living in the nonsocialist more third and fourth most populous nations with about developed countries of North America and West- 5 percent and 4 percent, respectively, and Japan, ern Europe, as well as in Japan, Australia, and which in 1975 was the sixth most populous, of the New Zealand, will decrease to less than 13 15 selected countries, would drop to 10th place percent. with about 2 percent of the total world population. 16 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 2-6 Population Size, Net Growth, and Percent of World Population of 15 Selected Countries, Census Bureau Medium Series Total Population Net Growth, Average Percent of World (millions) 1975 to 2000 Annual Population Country Growth 1975 2000 Millions Percent Rate 1975 2000 (Pervent) People's Republic of China 935 1,329 394 42 1.4 22.9 20.9 India 618 1,021 402 65 2.0 15.1 16.1 Indonesia 135 226 91 68 2.1 3.3 3.6 Bangladesh 79 159 79 100 2.8 1.9 2.5 Pakistan 71 149 78 111 3.0 1.7 2.4 Philippines 43 73 30 71 2.2 1.0 1.2 Thailand 42 75 33 77 2.3 1.0 1.2 South Korea 37 57 20 55 1.7 0.9 0.9 Fgypt 37 65 29 77 2.3 0.9 1.0 Nigeria 63 135 72 114 3.0 1.5 2.1 Brazil 109 226 117 108 2.9 2.7 3.6 Mexico 60 131 71 119 3.1 1.5 2.1 United States 214 248 35 16 0.6 5.2 3.9 U. S. S. R. 254 309 54 21 0.8 6.2 4.9 Japan 112 133 21 19 0.7 2.7 2.1 Age Composition of the Population As projected to 2000, the age composition of Broad Age Groups. The age composition of the the. population of the world.'s more developed world and of the more developed and less devel- regions would still be significantly different from oped regions in 1975 is summarized in Table-2-7 that of the less. developed regions, as can be seen (medium series). The more developed regions had from. Figure 2-2. The age composition of the less significantly higher percentages of population in developed regions would still be very similar to the 15-64 -age group and in the age group 65 and that of the world as,a whole, since 80 percent of over, and a far lower percentage of population in the worid's population would be living in these the 0-14 group. For the world as a whole, the re ons by 2000. percentages of population in the various broad age In absolute figures, the 15-64 age group shows groups were closer to the age composition per- the largest projected increases from 1975 to 2000. centages of the less developed regions, since over The highest percentage increase over 1975, how- 72 percent of the world's population lived in the ever, is shown by the 65 and over group, and the less developed regions in 1975. lowest by the 0-14 group. For the five major world regions and the 15 TABLE 2-7 selected countries, Table 24 shows the percent Broad Age Groups, by More Developed Regions distribution of population by age in 1975 and in and 2000 and the 1975-2000 percent increase in popu- Less Developed Regions, 1975 and 2000 lation by age. . (Census Bureau) Functional Age Groups. Table 2_9 presents a (Population in millions) summary of projected changes -from 1975 to 2000 World More Dev. Less Dev. in the population of certain functional age groups 1975: for the world, the more developed and less 0-14 yrs 1,505 37 281 25 1,224 42 developed regions, the major regions, and 15 15--64 yrs 2,368 58 731 65 1,637 55 selected countries. 65 & over 217 5 119 to 98 3 For the world as a whole, the projected percent All ages 4,090 100 1,131 100 2,959 100 increases in the school-age population are lower 2000: than the projected percent increases in total pop- 0-14 yrs 2,055 32 297 22 1,758 35 Wations, but for Africa, Latin America, and many 15-64 yrs 3,906 62 859 65 3,047 61 of the selected LDCs, the projected 'percent 65 & over 390 6 167 13 223 4 increases in school-age'population are extremely All ages 6,351 100 1,323 100 5,028 too high. For the less developed regions as a whole, e;, Ul@ zz AI JM E2. 14 :14 vy ON, Nli. 15, Ai ME' I 18 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 2-8 Percent Distribution of Population, 1975 and 2000, and 1975-2000 Increase for Major Regions and Selected Countries, Census Bureau Medium Series Percent Distribution of Percent Distribution of Total Population by Age in Percent Increase of Population by Total Population by Age in 1975 Age, 1975 to 2000 2000 0-14 15--64 65 0-14 154A 65 All 0-14 154A 65 and over and over Ages and over Major regions Africa 44 53 3 97 109 129 104 43 54 3 Asia and Oceaniaa 41 56 3 29 78 125 60 32 63 5 Latin America 42 54 4 73 112 124 96 38 58 4 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe b 25 65 10 10 19 49 20 23 65 12 North America, Western Eu- rope,' Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 25 64 11 1 15 36 14 22 65 13 Selected countries People's Republic of China 38 58 4 5 62 116 42 28 66 6 India 40 57 3 36 82 147 65 34 62 4 Indonesia 43 55 2 44 82 201 68 37 60 3 Bangladesh 46 51 3 79 120 85 100 41 56 3 Pakistan 46 51 3 84 133 124 111 40 57 3 Philippines 44 53 3 30 102 119 91 34 62 4 Thailand 43 54 3 45 99 135 77 35 61 4 South Korea 39 58 3 14 75 170 55 28 66 6 Egypt 41 56 3 54 91 136 77 35 60 5 Nigeria 45 53 2 115 111 159 114 45 52 3 Brazil 43 54 3 88 119 167 108 39 57 4 Mexico 48 49 3 88 150 109 119 41 56 3 United States 26 64 10 0 19 40 16 21 66 13 U.S.S.R. 26 65 9 11 20 59 21 23 65 12 Japan 24 68 8 2 16 108 19 20 66 14 *Developing countries only, i.e., excluding Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. bEastern Europe includes Albania and Yugoslavia. 'Western Europe as used here comprises all of Europe except Eastern Europe, Albania, and Yugoslavia. The U.S.S.R. is also excluded. the projected net increase in the school-age popu- tional demands for training and employment. In lation amounts to 0.36 billion (a 48 percent in- more developed regions, the projected increment crease), an enormous increment in terms of main- amounts to only about 0.13 billion persons (an taining or improving the quality of education. By increase of 18 percent). comparison, in the more developed regions of the As may be expected, the growth patterns for world, where neady full enrollment has already the female population in the reproductive ages will been achieved, the projected increment for the be similar to those of the working-age population. school-age group is only 8 million (an increase of Thus, the projected increase of females in the 4 percent). reproductive ages in the less developed regions is The broad age group comprising persons 15-64 about 85 percent from 1975 to 2000, as compared years of age corresponds approximately to a with about 13 percent in the more developed country's working-age (or main working-age) pop- regions. Such rapid growth in the numbers of ulation. For the less developed regions, the pro- women in the fertile ages in the less developed jected 86 percent increase in this group is greater regions will ensure an increase in the absolute than the projected 70 percent increase in total number of births, even if fertility nates decline. population. Among the 15 selected countries, the The highest percentage increases are projected largest projected percentage increases are for for the age group 65 years and over in both less Mexico, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Brazil, and Ni- and more developed regions. Although the growth getia. While such a large growth in working-age of this group is particularly rapid in the less population represents a beneficial increase in the developed regions (127 percent as shown in Table productive sector of the population, the net incre- 2-8), it constitutes only about 6 percent of total ment (about 1.41 billion persons) will create addi- 1975-2000 population increase for these regions. TABLE 2-9 Changes in Functional Age Groups and Total Population, 1975-2000, for World, More Developed and Less Developed Regions, Major Regions, and Selected Countries, Census Bureau Medium Series Females of School-Age Working-Age Popu- Reproductive Age: Old-Age Population: Total Population: Population: 5-14 lation: 15--64 15-49 65 and over Allages Millions Percent Millions Percent Millions Percent Millions Percent Millions Percent World 369 39 1,538 65 619 64 173 80 2,261 55 More developed regions' 8 4 128 18 37 13 49 41 192 17 Less developed regions 361 48 1,410 86 582 85 125 127 2,069 70 Major regions Africa 110 105 231 109 99 108 15 129 416 104 Asia and Oceania' 184 32 994 78 405 76 % 125 1,356 60 Latin America 69 82 196 112 83 111 15 124 312 96 C U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe 7 10 48 19 14 14 18 49 76 20 Northern America, Western Europe,' Japan, Australia, and New Zealand -1 -1 70 15 19 11 29 36 101 14 10 V Selected countries 2 People's Republic of China 9 4 334 62 133 59 43 116 394 42 India 61 39 286 82 114 80 27 147 402 65 Indonesia 18 52 61 82 26 79 5 200 91 68 Z Bangladesh 20 93 48 120 21 126 2 85 79 100 Pakistan 19 % 49 133 21 138 2 124 78 111 Philippines 4 30 23 102 10 96 2 119 30 71 Thailand 6 50 23 99 10 98 2 135 33 77 South Korea 1 14 16 76 6 68 2 170 20 55 Egypt 6 60 19 91 8 89 2 136 29 77 Nigeria 20 122 37 111 16 114 3 159 72 114 Brazil 28 103 70 119 30 116 6 167 117 108 Mexico 17 95 44 150 19 146 2 108 71 119 United States -1 -2 26 19 9 17 9 40 35 16 U.S.S.R. 5 10 34 20 11 16 13 59 54 21 Japan 1 4 12 16 0 9 108 21 19 : Includes North America, Europe (including the U.S.S.R.), Australia, New Zealand, Japan, temperate South America (i.e., Argentina, Chile, Falkland Islands, and Uruguay). Developing countries only, i.e., excluding Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. 'Eastern Europe includes Albania and Yugoslavia. dWestern Europe as used here comprises all of Europe except Eastern Europe, Albania, and Yugoslavia. The U.S.S.R. is also excluded. 20 THE PROJECTIONS In the more developed regions, however, the grow between 1975 and 2000 at a slightly lower increase of, about 41 percent in the size of the old- annual rate than between 1950 and 1975, but that ,,age group is especially significant, since it com- an appreciably greater number of people would be prises one-fourth of the total population increase added to the total world population during the for these regions. 1975-2000 period than during the former period. The less developed regions would account for ,Summary nine-tenths of the world population growth be- The Bureau of Census projections* presented in tween 1975 and 2000. By 2000 these regions would @Tables 2-10 through 2-14 can be summarized comprise more than three-fourths of the world's 'briefly- as follows: population, reflecting notable projected population World population totaled about 4.09 billion increases in Africa, Latin America, and the less persons, in 1975 and as projected in the Bureau of developed countries of Asia and Oceania. As the Census medium series would increase by indicated in Table 2-1, the percentage of the about 55 percent and number about 6.35 billion in world's population in the LDCs continues to 2000. This' means that worid population would increase, approaching 80 percent by 2000. The LDC growth rate declines from about 2.28 percent *A 'more detailed presentation of the Census projections is to 2.02 percent and by 2000 is the predominant provided in U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of the influence in the world growth rate-which de- Census, Illustrative Projections of World Populations to the 21st Century, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Of- clines only slightly, from 1.78 percent in the 1975- fice, 1979. 80 period to 1.70 percent in the 1995-2000 period. . BUREAU OF THE CENSUS PROJECTIONS U.S. Bureau of the Census projections for total population, total fertility rates, population growth rates, crude death rates, and crude birth rates are presented in Tables 2-10 through 2-14. In each table: More developed regions comprise Northern America, temperate South America, Europe, U.S.S.R., Japan, Australia, andNew Zealand. All other regions of the world are classified as less developed regions. Asia and Oceania excludes Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Eastern Ettrope includes Albania and Yugoslavia. Western Europe comprises all of Europe except Eastern Europe (including the U.S.S.R.), Albania, and Yugoslavia. TABLE 2-10 Census Bureau Projected Total Population for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (in thousands) 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 HIGH SERIES World 4,134,049 4,548,928 5,012,753 5,544,671 6,143,076 6,797,504 More developed regions 1,130,989 1,173,831 1,224,157 1,276,131 1,327,400 1,377,258 Less developed regions 3,003,060 3,375,096 3,788,596 4,268,539 4,815,676 5,420,245 Major Regions Africa 398,694 459,653 533,548 621,830 726,565 846,880 Asia and Oceania 2,318,028 2,580,123 2,861,277 3,185,185 3,551,394 3,951,198 Latin America 325,085 377,073 438,7% 509,969 589,698 677,904 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe - 384,336 402,262 422,289 441,660 460,433 479,518 Northern America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 707,906 729,817 756,842 786,028 814,987 842,003 Selected Countries and Regions People's Republic of China 977,862 1,071,378 1,150,998 1,241,497 1,347,876 1,467,860 India 618.470 694,190 786,222 893,586 1,012,943 1,141,900 Indonesia 134,988 150,467 168,155 188,290 210,993 235,720 Bangladesh 79,411 92,319 107,565 125,171 144,862 166,185 Pakistan 70,974 $3,261 98,078 115,339 134,777 156,083 POPULATION PROJECTIONS 21 TABLE 2-10 (Cont.) (In thousands) 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 HIGH SERIES (cont.) Philippines 43,029 49,063 55,545 62,697 70,771 79,773 Thailand 42,473 48,435 55,168 62,805 71,354 80,806 South Korea 36,895 40,946 45,507 50,663 56,087 61,535 Egypt 36,859 42,122 48,250 55,162 62,658 70,534 Nigeria 62,925 72,473 84,271 98,722 116,159 136,934 Brazil 108,882 128,235 151,309 177,977 207,995 241,436 Mexico 60,188 72,214 86,468 103,006 121,618 142,022 United States 213,540 222,395 234,841 248,034 259,823 270,174 U.S.S.R. 254,393 267@577 282,384 296,415 309,551 322,787 Japan 111,566 117,076 122,169 126,768 131,102 135,309 Eastern Europe 129,943 134,685 139,905 145,245 150,882 156,731 Western Europe 343,@17 348,908 355,610 364,172 374,386 384,331 MEDIUM SERIES World 4,090,133 4,470,380 4,884,743 5,340,419 5,833,887 6,351,070 More developed regions 1,130,989 1,169,863 1,211,772 1,252,233 1,289,712 1,3229824 Less developed regions 2,959,143 3,300,516 3,672,971 4,088,186 4,544,175 5,028,246 Major Regions Africa 398,694 458,861 530,567 613,894 708,896 814,272 Asia and Oceania 2,274,471 2,508,490 2,754,505 3,025,189 3,320,192 3,630,195 Latin America 324,M, 374,774 432,486 496,624 565,431 636,937 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe 384,336 .400,789 418,080 433,672 447,658 460,471 Northern America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 707,906 727,466 749,105 771,041 791,710 809,195 Selected Countries and Regions People's Republic of China 934,626 1,007,858 1,075,999 J, 151,665 1,237,029 1,328,645 India 618,471 689,545 764,157 843,643 929,102 1,020,917 Indonesia 134,988 150,246 167,005 185,375 205,425 226,388 Bangladesh 79,411 92,196 106,892 123,202 140,666 158,724 Pakistan 70,974 83,145 97,512 113,754 131,296 149,464 Philippines 42,810 48,181 53,657 59,526 66,064 73,229 Thailand 42,4@O 48,101 54,307 61,051 68,056 75,238 South Korea 36,846 40,604 44,561 48,721 52,902 56,983 Egypt 36,859 42,046 47,739 53,648 59,477 65,380 Nigeria 62,925 72,469 84,215 98,439 115,261 134,680 Brazil 108,797 127,825 149,762 173,723 199,110 225,897 Mexico 59,913 71,136 94,016 98,555 114,450 131,320 United States 213,540 220,497 228,912 237,028 243,581 248,372 U.S.S.R. 254,393 266,304 278,973 290,235 300,020 308,893 Japan 111,566 116,962 121,741 125,870 129,574 132,951 Eastern Europe 129,943 134,485 139,107 143,437 147,638 151,578 Western Europe 343,517 348,733 354,878 362,306 370,702 378,222 LOW SERIES World 4,043,444 4,384,420 4,753,'612 5,140,162 5,533,442 5,921,745 More developed regions 1,130,989 1,166,263 1,200,970 1,231,408 1,256,351 1,274,174 Less developed regions 2,912,455 3,218,157 3,552,642 3,908,754 4,277,091 4,647,571 Major Regions Africa 398,694 457,621 525,247 599,B0 677,723 758,842 Asia and Oceania 2,228,443 2,431,561 2,650,767 2,882,418 3,121,231 3,359,092 Latin America 324,064 370,543 421,024 473,826 527,467 580,958 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe 384,336 399,321 413,884 425,712 434,955 441,680 Northern America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 707,906 725,374 742,689 758,677 772,066 781,174 Selected Countries and Regions People's Republic of China 889,015 937,955 991,581 1,050,502 1,113,447 1,175,761 India 618,471 686,790 757,233 827,960 899,438 974,282 22' THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 2-10 (Cont.) (In thousands) 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 LOW SERIES (cont.) Indonesia 134,988 149,831 164,983 180,321 195,349 209,125 Bangladesh 79,411 91,993 105,995 120,959 136,299 151,136 Pakistan 70,974 83,075 97,169 112,735 128,852 144,181 Philippines 42,630 47,462 52,031 56,682 61,635 66,786 Thailand 42,352 47,813 53,349 58,824 64,219 69,384 South Korea 36 677 39,990 43,372 46,918 50,390 53,550 Egypt 36:859 41,918 46,772 51,067 54,909 58,803 Nigeria 62,925 72,437 83,907 97,313 112,397 128,749 Brazil 108,524 126,508 146,582 168,100 190,688 213,838 Mexico 59,526 68,800 78,432 88,664 99,451 .110,595 United States 213,540 219,078 224,%2 229,919 233,0713 234,328 U.S.S.R. 254,393 265,031 275,563 284,056 290,495 295,115 Japan 111,566 116,733 120,884 124,141 126,7% 128,891 Eastern Europe 129,943 134,290 138,321 141,656 144,460 146,565 Western Europe -343,517 348,457 353,916 359,983 366,132 370,788 TABLE 2-11 Census Bureau Projected Total Fertility Rate' for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries 1915 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 HIGH SERIES World 4.5299 4.2163 4.0892 4.0523 4.0037 3.9189 More developed regions 2.1505 2.3184 2.4060 2.4700 2.5408 2.6080 Less developed regions 5.5202 4.9494 4.6814 4.5493 4.4103 4.2417 Major Regions Africa 6.3847 6.3826 6.3315 6.2211 6.0755 5.6424 Asia and Oceania 5.3501 4.6174 4.2917 4.1600 4.0175 3.8829 Latin America 5.3992 5.2939 5.1726 4.9912 4.7436 4.4952 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe 2.3687 2.4987 2.5284 2.5642 2.6178 2.6719 Northern America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 1.9703 2.1702 2.2987 2.3832 2.4577 2.5328 Selected Countries and Regions People's Republic of China 5.1710 3.6565 3.0870 3.0750 3.0750 3.0750 India 5.3000 5.2099 5.1750 5.0500 4.8000 4.5000 Indonesia 5.3235 4.8805 4.6495 4.4490 4.2495 4.0000 Bangladesh 6.9999 6.8500 6.5500 6.1000 5.5600 5.0000 Pakistan 6.9000 6.6100 6.2700 5.8900 5.4500 5.0000 Philippines 5.3995 4.9005 4.4505 4.1000 3.8995 3.7995 Thailand 5.1675 4.7005 4.4000 4.2005 4.0000 3.9000 South Korea 3.9251 3.4000 3.2250 3.1249 3.1100 3.1000 Egypt 5.8190 5.8500 5.7000 5.4700 5.1000 4.6001 Nigeria 6.6999 6.7000 6.7000 6.6749 6.5499 6.3750 Brazil 5.7800 5.7255 5.6750 5.5755 5.3005 5.0000 Mexico 6.7005 6.4610 6.1600 5.7200 5.2600 4.7000 United States 1.7705 2.2160 2.4785 2.6335 2.6890 2.6965 U.S.S.R. 2.4055 2.5390 2.5690 2.6000 2.6305 2.6610 Japan 1.9245 2.1.122 2.3000 2.3000 2.3000 2.3000 Eastern Europe 2.2699 2.3520 2.4340 2.5160 2.5980 2.6800 Western Europe 2.0219 2.0830 2.1540 2.2520 2.3380 2.4199 MEDIUM SERIES World 4.2654 3.8571 3.6692 3.5456 3.4389 3.3098 More developed regions 2.1481 2.1714 2.1891 2.1921 2.2120 2.2272 Less developed regions 5.1473 4.5051 4.1862 3.9693 3.7799 3.5775 The total fertility rate in a given year basically represents the average number of children each woman would have over her lifetime, assuming the age-specific fertility rates for that yew applied to her Lifetime. POPULATION PROJECTIONS 23 TABLE 2-11 (Cont.) 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 MEDIUM SERIES (cont,) Major Regions Africa 6.3524 6.2884 6.1263 5.8"6 5.4979 5.0156 Asia and Oceania 4.8865 4.0835 3.7307 3.5315 3.3713 3.2238 Latin America 5.2679 5.0546 4.7661 4,4427 4.0520 3.6391 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Eu- rope 2.3694 2.3513 2.3230 2,2920 2.2783 2.2659 Northern America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 1.9697 2.0175 2.0748 2.1051 2.1430 2.1751 Selected Countries and Regions People's Republic of China 4.1280 2.8590 2.5690 2.5620 2.5620 2.5620 India 5.3000 4.6750 4.1749 3.8750 3.6500 3.4999 Indonesia 5.3235 4.7700 4.4205 4.1100 3.8400 3.5000 Bangladesh 6.9999 6.7400 6.2700 5.5900 4.9200 4.2500 Pakistan 6.9000 6.5100 6.0400 5.4999 4.8799 4.2500 Philippines 5.0705 4.3500 3.8495 3.4495 3.3000 3.1995 Thailand 5.0500 4.2500 3.9500 3.6000 3.3005 3.1000 South Korea 3.7889 3.1199 2.7800 2.5499 2.5200 2.5000 Egypt 5.8190 5.6500 5.2000 4.5500 3.9499 3.6000 Nigeria 6.7000 6.6800 6.6499 6.5250 6.2750 5.9000 Brazil 5.7255 5.6000 5.2755 4.9005 4.4000 3.9995 Mexico 6.3600 5.9605 5.4805 5.0005 4.4800 4.0005 United States 1.7705 1.8710 1.9940 2.0615 2.0900 2.0955 U.S.S.R. 2.4055 2.3740 2.3455 2.3170 2.2865 2.2575 Japan 1.9245 2.0622 2.2000 2.1667 2.1333 2.1000 Eastern Europe 2.2699 2.2699 2.2699 2.2699 2.2699 2.2699 Western Europe 2.0220 2.0520 2.0919 2.1340 2.1740 2.2070 LOW SERIES World 3.9942 3.5261 3.3180 3.0877 2.9026 2.7546 More developed regions 2.1473 2.0363 2.0050 1.9429 1.9092 1.8694 Less developed regions 4.7647 4.0%7 3.7747 3.4449 3.17% 2.9761 Major Regions Africa 6.3146 6.1381 5.7409 5.1%9 4.5308 4.0436 Asia and Oceania 4.4170 3.6382 3.3499 3.0668 2.8700 2.7163 Latin America 5.1030 4.6033 4.0976 3.6399 3.2144 2.8949 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Eu- rope 2.3696 2.2162 2.11% 2.0219 1.9429 1.8620 Northern America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 1.%95 1.8774 1.8986 1.8653 1.8622 L8559 Selected Countries and Regions People's Republic of China 3.0830 2.0600 2.0500 2.0500 2.0500 2.0500 India 5.3000 4.5250 3.9500 3.4250 3.1500 3.0000 Indonesia 5.3235 4.5400 3.9995 3.4695 2.9700 2.4995 Bangladesh 6.9999 6.5800 5.9200 5.1100 4.2999 3.5000 Pakistan 6.9000 6.4500 5.9000 5.2300 4.4300 3.5000 Philippines 4.7995 3.8995 3.2505 2.8500 2.6000 2.5000 Thailand 4.9000 4.0000 3.4000 3.0000 2.65W 2.4000 South Korea 3.4099 2.6800 2.3200 2.1799 2.1300 2.1275 Egypt 5.8190 5.3000 4.2001 3.2500 2.7500 2.6000 Nigeria 6.6999 6.6500 6.4500 6.1300 5.5999 4.9999 Brazil 5.5500 5.2000 4.8005 4.4000 3.9750 3.5000 Mexico 5.9120 4.7600 4.0595 3.5695 3.2000 3.0000 United States 1.7705 1.6070 1.6975 1.6940 1.6935 1.6935 U.S.S.R. 2.4055 2.2120 2.1230 2.0335 1.9440 1.8540 Japan 1.9245 1.%22 2.0000 1.9333 1.8667 1.8000 Eastern Europe 2.2700 2.1900 2.1100 2.0300 1.9499 .1.8700 Western Europe 2.0219 2.0039 2.0260 1.9850 1.9750 1.9590 24 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 2-12 Census Bureau Projected Average Annual Population Growth Rates for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (Medium Series) 1975 to 1980 1980 to 1985 1985 to 1990 1990 to 1995 1995 to 2000 World 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 More developed regions 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 Less developed regions 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 Major Regions Africa 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 Asia and Oceania 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 Latin America 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.4 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 Northern America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 Selected Countries and Regions People's Republic of China 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 India 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 Indonesia 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 Bangladesh 3.0 3'0 2.8 2.7 2.4 Pakistan 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.6 Philippines 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 Thailand 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.0 South Korea 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 Egypt 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9 Nigeria 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.1 Brazil 3.2 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.5 Mexico 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.7 United States 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.4 U.S.S.R. 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 Japan 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 Eastern Europe 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 Western Europe 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 Community and Family Study Center pace of population growth is being increasingly Projections felt. This pressure is manifested both at the aggregate (governmental and policy) level and at The CFSC projections Of population, fertility the level of the family and the individual. Modern- rates, death rates, and birth rates are shown in ization is inherently inconsistent with high fertility, Tables 2-16 through 2-20 at the end of this and high fertility is inherently inconsistent with section. most of the objectives and life goals sought by Assumptions most peoples (literacy, health, a higher standard of living, better housing, basic luxury commodi- Fertility Assumptions. The CFSC projections ties, physical comfort). Even in nations where this rest on the condition that fertility has considerably set of pressures has not been officially recognized, more potential for change in population growth they are present and mounting in individual fami- and hence is more important than the other two lies. Environmental, economic, and social factors components of population growth-migration and will increase this pressure substantially during the mortality. The "validity" of the population projec- remainder of this century. tions in this series depends then primarily upon 2. The present pace of economic development assumptions made concerning fertility. In the case and modernization will bring down fertility to the of the CFSC projections, these assumptions rest replacement level gradually through provision of upon a theoretical base somewhat different from facilities and gradual accumulation of knowledge that employed by the Census Bureau and others. and motivation. The pace will be somewhat faster The basic premises underlying the CFSC argu- than that followed by Europe and North America ment are as follows: during the 19th and early 20th centuries because I . Throughout the entire world, in developed of improved communications and improved meth- and developing societies, the need to reduce the ods of contraception. POPULATION PROJECTIONS 25 TABLE 2-13 Census Bureau Estimated and'Projected Crude Death Rates for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (Medium Series) Estimated Projected July I to June 30 1975 1979/80 1984/85 1989/90 1994/95 1999/2000 World 12.3 11.4 10.6 10.1 9.5 9.1 More developed regions 9.6 9.9 10.0 10.1 10.1 10.4 Less developed regions 13.4 11.9 10.8 10.0 9.4 8.7 Major Regions Africa 19.0 17.7 16.0 14.3 12.8 11.3 Asia and Oceania 13.0 11.4 10.4 9.7 9.2 8.7 Latin America 8.9 8.0 7.2 6.6 6.1 5.7 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe 9.7 10.0 10.2 10.3 10.0 10.5 Northern America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 9.6 9.8 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.5 Selected Countries and Regions People's Republic of China 9.8 8.3 7.9 7.9 8.1 8.3 India 14.4 12.7 11.1 10.1 9.2 8.4 Indonesia 18.2 16.1 14.3 12.7 11.3 10.2 Bangladesh 18.2 16.8 15.4 14.2 13.1 12.1 Pakistan 13.6 11.7 10.3 9.2 8.2 7.3 Philippines 10.1 9.3 8.4 7.4 6.4 6.1 Thailand 9.9 9.5 9.0 8.1 7.1 6.7 South Korea 6.2 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.7 6.0 Egypt 12.5 11.9 11.0 9.9 9.0 8.3 Nigeria 22.0 20.4 18.6 16.8 15.0 13.2 Brazil 8.3 7.3 6.5 6.0 5.7 5.7 Mexico 7.2 6.7 6.1 5.4 5.0 4.8 United States 8.9 9.3 9.6 9.8 10.1 10.3 U. S. S. R. 9.3 9.7 10.0 10.2 10.1 10.5 Japan 7.0 7.1 7.3 8.0 8.8 9.7 Eastern Europe 10.4 10.7 10.6 10.4 10.0 10.4 Western Europe 11.0 11.2 11.3 11.2 10.8 11.1 3. The pace of fertility decline is directly 5. Those countries which now have no family influenced by family planning programs, organized planning programs may be expected to begin at on a national or regional basis to provide infor- least weak.(partial) programs within the very near mation, motivation, and contraceptive services. future. Nations that presently have weak or mod- The larger the per capita investment, the more erate family planning programs may be expected wholehearted the official support, and the greater to strengthen them substantially. By the end of the accessibility to the entire public of these the century, every nation on earth may be ex- services, the more rapid will be the decline. pected to have at least some kind of a substantial 4. The pace of the decline of fertility will be family planning effort (either public or private or that of a reverse S curve. When birth rates are both) and these programs may be expected to high and family planning programs are in stages of have a substantial impact in reducing fertility -establishment and gaining social acceptance, the faster than otherwise would be the case. pace will be slow. As birth rates sink to lower Table 2-15 illustrates the impact on future birth levels, the rate of decline will accelerate to a rates of the factors identified above. The right- maximum when the crude birth rate is between 38 hand column of the table shows the estimated 'and 20 per 1,000 women. In this interval, the pace annual decline in crude birth rate that may be may be very rapid. When the crude birth rate expected in the future on the basis of moderniza- reaches the lower 20s, Complete saturation of tion alone, with no special efforts at providing contraception is being approached. Only young family planning information and services. The people still starting families and a residue of downward trend anticipated then is almost linear, reactionary "late adopters" will remain to be with a one-point decline in the crude birth rate -convinced about the need for fertility decline. The every four or five years. Under this set of decline continues, but at a decelerating- rate. conditions, it would require about 135 years for a 26 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 2-14 Census Bureau Estimated and Projected Crude Birth Rates for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (Medium Series) Estimated Projected July I to June 30 1975 1979/80 1984/85 1989/90 1994/95 199912000 World 30.4 29.0 28.5 27.9 27.0 25.6 More developed regions 16.1 16.8 17.0 16.4 15.7 15.2 Less developed regions 35.9 33.3 32.2 -31.5 30.3 28.4 Major Regions Africa 46.7 46.3 45.2 43.5 41.4 38.5 Asia and Oceania 33.7 30.2 29.1 28.5 27.6 25.9 Latin America 37.2 36.9 35.6 33.7 31.2 28.7 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe 17.7 18.6 18.3 17.1 16.1 15.9 Northern America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 14.8 15.4 15.9 15.7 15.1 14.5 Selected Countries and Regions People's Republic of China 27.6 21.6 21.0 21.8 22.5 22.0 India 36.9 33.9 31.3 29.7 28.3 27.1 Indonesia 40.3 37.3 35.3 33.4 31.6 28.9 Bangladesh 47.9 46.7 44.7 41.9 38.8 35.2 Pakistan 44.6 43.7 42.0 39.3 35.8 32.1 Philippines 35.3 31.7 29.5 27.9 27.4 26.3 Thailand 35.8 34.0 33.2 30.8 28.1 26.2 South Korea 26.9 24.6 24.1 22.6 21.6 20.2 Egypt 38.9 38.1 35.8 32.1 28.5 26.9 Nigeria 49.4 49.5 49.3 48.4 46.5 44.1 Brazil 40.2 39.8 37.5 34.8 32.0 30.3 Mexico 42.0 40.7 38.9 36.7 34.0 31.3 United States 14.5 16.1 17.1 16.3 14.8 13.8 U. S. S. R. 18.1 19.1 18.9 17.4 16.4 16.1 Japan 17.0 15.9 14.9 14.2 14.4 14.4 Eastern Europe 17.0 17.6 17.2 16.3 15.6 15.5 Western Europe 13.8 14.3 15.1 15.5 15.4 14.7 population to make the demographic transition The "Strong" column of Table 2-15 shows the from a crude birth rate of 45 to the replacement annual decline in the crude birth rate that CFSC level of about 15 per thousand. expects in the presence of a strong, well-financed, well-organized, and well-administered family plan- TABLE 2-15 ning program that reaches the entire population, Census Bureau Annual Decline in Crude Birth both urban and rural, in a sustained way. Under Rate these conditions, the CFSC estimated that the Crude Birth Rate Strength of Family Planning Effort annual rates of decline would be two to four times (per thousand) Strong Moderate Weak None those that would occur in the absence of a 45 and over .40 .333 .25 .20 program. 40 44 .60 .50 .30 .20 This acceleration in the pace of decline, it is 35-39 .80 .667 .40 .25 estimated, would be capable of bringing about a 30-34 1.00 .75 .50 .25 25-29 1.00 .667 .40 .25 complete demographic transition from a crude 20-24 .80 .50 .30 .20 birth rate of 45 to one of 15 within a span of about 15-19 .60 .333 .25 .20 38 years, or in about one-fourth the time that 13-14 .40 .25 .15 .15 would be required in the absence of a family 40-44 8.0 10.0 17.0 .25 planning program. 35-39 6.0 8.0 12.0 .25 30-34 5.0 7.0 10.0 .20 The assumptions of Table 2-15 were translated 25-29 5.0 8.0 12.0 .20 into annual declines in birth rates for individual 20-24 6.0 10.0 17.0 .25 countries and regions of the world on the follow- 15-19 8.0 15.0 20.0 .25 ing basis: Time required to decline from CBR 45 1. Each country was classified into one of four to CBR = 15 38.0 58.0 88.0 135 categories, according to the level of its family CLIMATE PROJECTIONS 59 TABLE 4-3B SAME AS THE LAST30 YEARS 6 0 0 0 t .2 x .2 E 0 C > RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CARBONDIOXIDE AND TURBIDITY (PERCENT) DURING THE 50 10 10 15 15 PERIOD 1975-2000 1977-80 1981-90 1991-2000 Q) C W C Cr Cr W > > > "E < < < PROBABILITY OF MID-LATITUDE DROUGHT* United States 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.1 Other Mid-Latitude 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.5 0,1 PROBABILITY OF SAHEL DROUGHT** 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.1 PROBABILITY OF MONSOON FAILURE*** Northwest India 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 Other India 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 L Other Monsoon Asia 0.3 1 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 *Frequent-similar to early to mid-1930s and early to mid-1950s;average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1940s and 1960s. **Frequent-similar to 1940-50 and 1965-73 periods; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1950-65 period. -Frequent-similar to 1900-25 period; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1930-60 period. 60 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 44A MODE RATE G LOBA L WARM I NG PROBABILITY OF SCENARIO: 0.25 MEAN NORTHERN HEMISPHERE TEMPERATURE CHANGE SINCE 1969: between 0.250 and 0.60C warmer PROBABILITY OF TEMPERATURE CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with 1970-75) 0 U 0 L) U U L) U o 0 0 Ln to Lq t 0 0 00 t cb @; 0 u@ - qZ . t q a; q a) - 'a 9, C? E - E E cj E 6 E u? E 6 :2 @@ -6 Lh -@ 1 U@ 6 0 0 Polar 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 Northern Higher mid-latitude* 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 hemisphere Lower mid-latitude 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.1 Subtropical 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 Subtropical 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 Southern Lower mid-latitude 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.1 hemisphere Higher mid-latitude* 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 Polar 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 *Growing season in higher middle latitudes: Probability of an increase (decrease) in the length of the growing season exceeding 10 days is 0.4 (0.2@; probability of an increase (decrease) in the variability of the length of the growing season in excess of 25% is 0. 1 (0.2). PROBABILITY OF PRECIPITATION CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with 1941-70) ANNUAL GROWING SEASON (D 5i M C ti M T\ 6 V 0. A ST\ U V 0 A Higher mid-latitude 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 Lower mid-latitude 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 Subtropical 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 PROBABILITY OF PRECIPITATION VARIABILITY CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with average for the previous 25-year period) ANNUAL GROWING SEASON M M Lb a, Ln C Ln LO Ln CN CN C4 cm r4 E A V 0 A E A V. AI Higher mid-latitude 02 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 Lower mid-latitude 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 Subtropical 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 CLIMATE PROJECTIONS 61 TABLE 4-4B MODERATE GLOBAL WARM ING U 6 2 E 6 0 X o @6 .2 :3 -2 U "o iZ M E 0 5 U CA > .0 CL RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CARBON DIOXIDE AND TURBIDITY (PERCENT) DURING THE 60 15 5 10 10 PERIOD IM-2000 _j 1977-80 1981-90 1991-2000 C or Cr Cr > (1, > - 2 LL < E PROBABILITY OF MID-LATITUDE DROUGHT* United States 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 Other Mid-Latitude PROBABILITY OF SAHEL DROUGHT** 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 PROBABILITY OF MONSOON FAILURE*** Northwest India 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 Other India Other Monsoon Asii, *Frequent-similar to early to mid-1930s and early to mid-1950s; average-similar to the frequency over the longest poriod of record available; infrequent-si mi lar to 1940s and 1960s. **Frequent-similar to 1940-50 and 1965-73 periods; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1950-65 period. *"Frequent-similar to 1900-25 pehod; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1930-60 period. 62 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 4-5A LARG E G LOBAL WARM I NG PROBABILITY OF SCENARIO: 0.10 MEAN NORTHERN HEMISPHERE TEMPERATURE CHANGE SINCE 1969: between 0.60and 1.80C warmer PROBABILITY OF TEMPERATURE CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with 1970-75) U U U 0 0 0 Iq U@ 8 in @i ob 'in '0 t '0 t C D 7 7' csi E vi E Lri E -6 LQ CD 0 9 M ix@ -m6 @6 6 0 LC qD 3; -9 3: -: 3: "i @: M Polar 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 Northern Higher mid-latitude* 0.1 0.5 0.4 hemisphere Lower mid-latitude 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.2 Subtropical 0.1 0.8 0.1 Subtropical 0.1 0.8 0.1 Southern Lower mid-latitude 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.2 hemisphere Higher mid-latitude* 0.1 0.5 0.4 Polar 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 *Growing season in higher middle latitudes: Probability of an increase (decrease) in the length of growing season exceeding 10 days is 0.8 (0.0); probability of an increase (decrease) in the variability of the length of the growing season in excess of 25% is 0.0 (0.7). PROBABILITY OF PRECIPITATION CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with 1941-70) ANNUAL GROWING SEASON CU CD C 0 M A U V A E A 0 V 0 A Higher mid-latitude 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.2 Lower mid-latitude 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 Subtropical 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.1 PROBABILITY OF PRECIPITATION VARIABILITY CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with average for the previous 25-year period) ANNUAL GROWING SEASON M (1) Me e) Lo C in 111) PU.) CLr) in C-4 M (N U Cq C14 Cj W V A 53) V 0 A A u A Higher mid-latitude 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 Lower mid-latitude 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2 Subtropical 0,2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2 CLIMATE PROJECTIONS 63 TABLE 4-5B LARGE GLOBAL WARMING 6 c 6 x .8 0 2 @j E 0 U. > 0 0. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CARBON DIOXIDE AND TURBIDITY (PERCENT) DURING THE 90 10 0 0 0 PERIOD 1975-2000 1977-80 1981-90 1991-2000 C 0 e 9 n T 9 > -t: 12D > T > LL LL E < "E PROBABILITY OF MID-LATITUDE DROUGHT- United States 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.1 Other Mid-Latitude 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 PROBABILITY OF SAHEL DROUGHT" 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.3 PROBABILITY OF MONSOON FAILURE*** Northwest India 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.8 Other India 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.7 Other Monsoon Asia 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 0,7 *Frequent-similar to early to mid-1930s and early to mid-1950s; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1940s and 1960s. **Frequent-similar to 1940-50 and 1965-73 periods; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1950-65 period. 'Frequent-similar to 1900-25 period; average-similar to the frequency -over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similarto 1930-60 period. 64 THE PROJECTIONS While average global temperature increased tudes warmed, on the average, by 0.8* C; the moderately, the largest temperature increases lower middle latitudes by.1.0.C; the higher mid- came in the higher latitudes. The Northern Hemi- dle latitudes by 1.4' C; and.the polar latitudes by sphere warmed slightly more than the Southern a remarkable 3.00 C, compared to the early 1970s. Hemisphere due to its greater land area and the Symmetry prevailed as similar temperature. larger thermal inertia of the southern oceans. In changes were observed in both. the Northern and the Northern Hemisphere, the polar latitudes Southern Hemispheres. The increase in tempera- warmed by 1.2* C; the higher middle latitudes by ture was accompanied by a significant increase in 0.5* C, the lower middle latitudes by 0.3' C; and the length of the growing season in the higher the subtropical latitudes by 0.25* C. In the South- middle latitudes, as well as by a substantial em Hemisphere, average temperatures over the decrease in the variability from year to year in the polar latitudes increased by 0.650 C; the higher length of the growing season. middle latitudes by 0.4' C; the lower middle Precipitation levels generally increased, espe- latitudes by 0.3' C; and the subtropical latitudes cially in the subtropical and higher middle lati- by 0.2* C. The increase in global temperature was tudes. In the lower. middle latitudes there was reflected in a moderate increase in the length of little net change of precipitation. Annual precipi- the growing season in higher middle latitudes, but tation variability decreased slightly compared to no significant change in the interannual variability the 1950-75 period; precipitation variability during of the growmig.season was noted. the growing season similarly decreased in the .Annual precipitation levels increased slightly in higher middle latitudes, but increased slightly in the higher middle latitudes but showed little the lower middle and subtropical latitudes. change for, lower latitudinal bands. Growing-sea- The warming trend also ushered in more favor- son precipitation also increased slightly in the able climatic conditions in India and other parts of higher middle latitudes and subtropical regions but Asia. These conditions were similar to those of remained unchanged in the lower middle latitudes. the 1.930-60 period. Monsoon failure was infre- Both annual and growing-season precipitation var- quent, especially in northwest India. But in the iability remained essentially unchanged except for midlatitude areas of the United States, extending a slight increase in the variability of growing- from the Rockies to the Appalachians, drought season precipitation in subtropical latitudes. conditions similar to the mid-1930s And the early Drought conditions again plagued the midlati- to mid-1950s prevail6d. In other midlatitude areas tude areas of the United States, corroborating the of the world, notably Europe, the probability of 20- to 22-year drought cycle hypothesis. Cfimatic drought declined. The increased levels of precipi- conditions were somewhat more favorable in the tation also returned the Sahel region to wetter Asiatic region and in subtropical North Africa. weather conditions. The frequency of monsoon failure, especially in northwest India, resembled more closely the long- Climate Scenarios for the Global 2000 term average; so did the f1requency of drought in Study the Sahel region. The NDU scenarios provide a richness of detail Large Global Warming* that could not be used in the Global 2000 Study. The global cooling trend that began in the 1940s At the beginning of the Study it was assumed that was dramatically reversed in the last quarter of the government's long-term global models would the 20th century. By the year 2000, the mean require climatological inputs, and three simplified Northern Hemisphere temperature had increased scenanos-informed by the National Defense Uni- by about 1* C compared to the early- 1970s. versity study-were developed. More careful in- Climatologists explained that this trend was due vestigation established later that none of the principally to the warming effects of the increasing global long-term models used by the agencies for amounts of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. this Study are capable of accepiing climatological While temperature increased over the entire i.nputs. The energy, food, water and forestry globe, temperature increases were more pro projections all assume implicitly a continuation of nounced at higher latitudes. The subtropical lati- the nearlv ideal climate of the 1950s and 1960s. Although the climate scenarios developed for the Global 2000 Study could not be incorporated into *Statements concerning some details of this scenario reflect the Study's projections, the scenarios are reported a higher degree of certainty than was expressed by the climatologists who participated in this study. See Tables 4- here to indicate the range of climatic change that 5 A and B for the range of uncertainty. should be analyzed in a study of this sort. CLIMATE PROJECTIONS 65 The Global 2000 Case I scenario described crease by 1' C. Most of the warming is in the below is similar to the "same as the last 30 years" polar regions and the higher middle latitudes, with scenario in the NDU study. The Case 11 scenario only slight warming in the tropics. Annual precip- is intermediate between NDU's "moderate warm- itation increases by 5-10 percent, and year to year ing" and "large warming"; similarly, Case III is variance decreases slightly. There is an increased intermediate between NDU's two cooling scena- likelihood of U.S. drought conditions similar to rios. Note that these scenarios span a narrower those of the mid-'30s. range of variation than the National Defense Case III: Cooling. Global temperatures de- University scenarios and that the narrow span crease by 0.5' C. Cooling of P C occurs in the excludes climatological developments that would higher and middle latitudes, with a smaller change have a pronounced effect on future demands for in the tropics and subtropics. Precipitation and supplies offood, wood, water, and energy. amounts decline and variability increases both The three Global 2000 climate scenarios are: from month to month and from year to year. Case L No Change. Yearly rainfall and tem- Storm tracks--and the precipitation they bring- perature statistics are similar to those of the 1941- shift toward the equator, improving conditions in 70 period. Drought conditions in the U.S. continue the upper latitudes of the great deserts And to occur every 20 to 22 years. Monsoon failures worsening them on the equator side. Severe in India become less frequent than recently and monsoon failures are more frequent in India, the Sahel region of Africa no longer experiences severe droughts more frequent in the Sahel. severe drought of the type that occurred in the The three Global 2000 scenarios are compared late '60s and early '70s. in Figure 4-1 with the historical record of temper- Case H: Warming. Global temperatures in- ature changes from the 1870s to the 1970s. 1.0 - GIoW 2000 Cc" "Warn-ing 1 0.8 0 6 . J-0.4- 01 - Global 2000 Com I "No c 0.0 - No c -0.2 Globol 2000,Case III -0.4 "Cooling" -0A 18,60 1880, 1900, 1940 1960 Figure 4-1. The three Global 2000 Study scenarios compared with the annual mean temperature changes during the past century for the latitude band 0*-80*N. The period 1941-70 is the zero reference base. 5 Technology Projections Logically, technology is an input to the Global ing generally declining fertilities and mortalities. 2000 Study projections much as are population, While the Bureau recognizes the possibility of GNP, and climate. But, because technology is so technological breakthroughs in both fields, some highly specific to each type of projection, it was of which are currently under study, it believes impossible to formulate a single set of measures that it is uncertain whether any will be perfected of technological change for all analyses. It was and adopted widely enough by the year 2000 to therefore left to the individual experts to make have a significant impact on fertility and mortality their own assumptions about the effects of tech- levels. Similarly, the Bureau assumed that no nology in their own fields and to develop their regression in either type of technology serious projections from those assumptions as well as enough to significantly affect their forecasts will from the exogenously supplied population, GNP, occur in the near future-for example, major harmful and climate forecasts. They were requested to side effects of existing birth control techniques will make these assumptions as explicit as possible in not be discovered, and new uncontrollable micro- statements to'the Global 2000 Study--often a bial strains harmful to humans will not develop. difficult task, as when trends of technological While technological advance or regression may advance were concealed in time series extrapola- occur before 2000 and shift population growth up or tions of other input variables, or when it was down slightly, the Bureau believes that such oc- unclear whether a particular idea was more cor- currences will not result in increases or decreases rectly considered an assumption or a conclusion. that exceed the limits of its high and low projec- This chapter gathers together the assumptions tions. of technological change made in the individual The discussion of migration in Chapter 2 makes analyses of the Global 2000 project. For the sake no technological assumptions except that world of comprehensiveness, the assumptions behind industrialization will probably continue at about the development of the input forecasts already present rates. considered (population, GNP, climate) are in- cluded. Gros@ National Product In general, the analyses assume that the adop- tion and refine ment of existing technologies will The GNP forecasts in Chapter 3 were made by continue at about the same rate as in the recent analysts in three separate agencies according to past. The verbal analyses often refer to possible somewhat different methods. The forecasts for technological breakthroughs, and many of the industrialized noncommunist and communist quantitative forecasts extrapolate from historical countries, made by a panel of WAES (Workshop data taken from the past two or three decades, on Alternative Energy Strategies) experts and by which were characterized by many such break- the CIA, respectively, are largely the result of throughs. These forecasts implicitly assume, subjectively extrapolating historical growth rates. therefore, that breakthroughs will occur in the Thus, technology is implicitly assumed to contrib- future at recent historical rates. ute to future economic growth about as it has in the recent past. The WAES panel adjusted its Population estimates downward to account for the supposed restrictive effect of slowed future population Technology affects population primarily in the growth. The CIA adjusted its forecasts for parts form of birth control, which lowers fertility, and of Eastern Europe downward on the basis of the health care, which lowers the death rate. In. availability of energy, thus assuming that techno- making the population projections used in the logical advance will not completely counteract an Global 2000 Study, the U.S. Bureau of the Census increasing scarcity of energy. Initially, however, it implicitly assumed continued adoption of both based all of its forecasts on direct extrapolation of forms of technology at moderate rates by project- past trends of GNP and productivity growth, 67 68 THE PROJECTIONS implicitly assuming a continuation of past techno- make the Global 2000 Study's agricultural fore- logical trends. casts assumes that economic variables such as Forecasts for the less developed countries product and input prices will influence food pro- (LDCs) were made by the World Bank (originally duction efficiency as in therecent past. However, for use by the WAES study) in three stages: provision is also made to incorporate an exoge- 1. Projections were developed by analysts on nously estimated trend rate of growth in technol- an independent, country by country basis, relying ogy over and above the,growth explained by on a combination of professional judgment and economic variables. This is done by adjusting the use of specialized country or regional models. regional food yield and thus, implicitly, yields per Typically, past rates of increase in the productiv- hectare. Yield per hectare is the measure of iiy' of new capital investment were implicitly production efficiency used in the GOL model. projected to continue in the future. These in- The exogenous adjustments for changes in yield creases were not explicitly attributed to technolog- are made in the regional production equations. ical change. However, because capital productiv- For each region, GOL has one linear regression ity increases in the past resulted partially from equation for each major agricultural product pro- technological advance, extensions of the upward duced locally. In each equation, total production trend in productivity presumably imply continued is calculated as a function of endogenously deter- advance. mined crop hectarage, a base crop yield, a time 2. Using a computer-based model, the various trend variable, and changes in product prices, country projections were aggregated and adjusted input prices, and the prices of products competing on a globally consistent basis to reflect probable for inputs. The time trend variable is equal to I in economic growth constraints due to likely limita- the first year of the estimation period, to 2 in the tions in the availability of foreign trade earnings second, and so on. It is intended to capture the and foreign investment capital. Each LDC group effects of factors--other than those included in was represented in a way that implicitly assumed the total production equation--that influence total that major increases in the productivity of new yields over time. The most important of these is capital investment will occur in each LDC, in part believed to be technology, which has acted over as a result of technological change (see Chapter time to increase yields. The following steps are 16). For example, in the case of the Other South taken to adjust the estimated coefficient of the Asian LDC group, a given investment was implic- trend variable to reflect country analysts' judg- itly assumed to produce about 60 percent more ments about future productivity trends: incremental GDP in 1985 than in 1977 (in constant dollars). However, there is no way to infer the 1. GOL supply and demand inputs are used to precise extent to which this improved productivity project roughly the direction of likely future price of capital might properly be attributed to techno- movements. logical change. 2. For each region, a measure of likely pressure 3. The projections were further adjusted judg- on supply calculated from the price projections is mentally by Bank and WAES analysts, but these used to estimate changes in "innovative technol- adjustments were not related to assumptions re- ogy," which in turn defines the physical or garding technological change. biological limitation on yield per hectare with the best available technology; the estimation thus Climate assumes that technological advance responds di- rectly to economic incentives. The climate forecasts make no assumptions 3. The innovative technology level for each about technology except that industrial processes region and various data forecasted from the GOL will continue to release large amounts of carbon run (see Step 1) are given to the appropriate dioxide into the atmosphere, with the possible regional analysts within the Department of Agri- effect of warming the earth's atmosphere. No culture. other foreseeable technological developments be- 4. On the basis of the data received, each fore the year 2000 were considered to have a regional analyst re-estimates trend growth in yield significant effect on the climate of the planet. to reflect possible constraints or sources of growth not included in the original regression analysis. Food 5. In each regional production equation of GOL, the coefficient of the time trend variable is As an econometric projection model, the GOL recalculated so that the trend increases approxi- (grain, oilseed, livestock) model that was used to mate the values estimated by the regional analyst. TECHNOLOGY PROJECTIONS 69 6. The GOL model is run with the judgmentally above. The right half of the bottom curve is modified trend coefficients along with the other adopted technology calculated as explained in economic variables cited above. The output of the Step 6. GOL was run twice, once for each of two model is its final forecasts. The yields per hectare years, to get two points from each kind of that can be calculated from the output are called technology with which to draw.the extrapolations "adopted technology" because they are the yields shown. The innovative technology data are, what per hectare that the regions are projected to is given to the Thailand regional analyst to con- actually achieve., sider in setting Thailand's rice output for the Thus, potential yields per hectare in the future,@ adjustment of. the GOL model described in Step estimated - with data from the GOL model, are 3. The adopted, technology data points were used by analysts in adjusting productivity data calculated from the output, of the runs as described within the model. in Step 6. A graph of innovative and adopted technology Fertilizer consumption per unit of food, produc- taken from actual model data is reproduced in tion, also often considered an important measure Figure 5-1. It is for rice production in Thailand. of agricultural technology, is estimated subjec- The first half of each curve is historical data. The tively by Department of Agriculture analysts ion right half of the top curve is future innovative the basis of the GOL output after the modet run technology, calculated as explained in Step 2is complete. The fertilizer consumption and food In the GOL model, both forms of technology are measured as indexes which are set equal to fin some blase year. Innovative Technology Prodixtivity measured in terms of crop and livestock yields AA*t-d Technology ri j V actuol projected,' TORM A Figure 5-1. Innovative and adopted technology levels for rice production in Thailand as projected by the GOL (grain, oilseed, livestock) model. 70 THE PROJECTIONS production data in Chapter 6 show an assumption puter model, assume that only proven techniques of continued increases in fertilizer use per unit of for producing final fossil fuels will be widely food output, from about 800 nutrient tons around enough adopted to significantly -affect the world 1971 to 970 nutrient tons in 1985 and to 1210 energy market by the year 2000. Producers' sup- nutrient tons in the year 2000. ply curves, indirectly representing their cost of production, assume no rapid acceleration in yield. Fisheries The real costs and efficiencies of refining and con- The fisheries analysis assumes that the means verting primary fuels and the costs, routes, and modes of transporting intermediate products are to harvest and process formerly unfished marine also held constant. However, the types of final animals, such as Antarctic krill, will be increas- fuels demanded, the sources of the primary fuels ingly adopted through the year 2000. Ocean pol- used to make them, the refining and conversion lution will continue unabated. Technology will techniques applied in production, and the transpor- soon be ineffective and perhaps counterproductive tation modes and routes all vary according to rela- in increasing catches from natural fisheries because tive costs. Large increases in the adoption of exist- of reduction of fish populations. ing technologies are also assumed to be possible. The IEES allows world shipping and refining Forestry capacities to expand indefinitely to meet world The forestry analysis assumes a continued de- energy demand, and miscellaneous conversions velopment and adoption of technologies that in- capacity to expand up to high limits. Mscellaneous crease both forest productivity and the percentage conversions capacity in 1985 and 1990 is allowed to of that productivity that can be exploited and be as much as two and three times its historical used. Particularly in the industrialized countries, 1975 level, respectively. In general, the expansions the management of forests will become more inten- in re .fining and miscellaneous conversions sive, uses for formerly discarded parts of trees will capacities are restricted to the industrialized na- be found, and cut timber will be used more effi- tions. ciently. In the LDCs, harvesting technologies and The forecasts assume continued new adoption of nuclear and hydro power for electrical genera- uses for formerly ignored species and size classes tion. Regional electrical generation capacities from will be adopted; fuelwood plantations may also be nuclear and hydro (including geothermal and so- established. lar) power are inputs to the IEES; the exact Also assumed is that no fuel as cheap as wood quantities assumed (Table 5-1) show an increase is at present will become as widely available in in total world generation from these power LDCs before the year 2000. sources of about 200 percent from 1975 to 1990. Capacities of conventional thermal generation, Water like refining and transportation capacities, are The following major uses of water are expected determined within the model but allowed to ex- to remain the same through 2000. Currently, they pand as much as necessary to meet final demands. are domestic, irrigation, industrial (primarily in manufacturing but also in mining and mineral Fuel Minereds processing), and energy production (thermal and The primary purpose of the fuel minerals hydroelectric). The two projections of total world analysis was to estimate current world energy water use in Chapter 9 make no explicit techno- resources and reserves. The estimation of re- logical assumptions. The Doxiadis projection gives sources (all potentially recoverable occurrences of no technological justification for its S-shaped a mineral) implicitly assurnes how far,technology growth curve for water use. The Kalinin projec- tion admittedly neglects the possibilities of (1) can or will advance in the recovery of low-grade decreasing water requirements per unit of indus- ores. Exactly how it will advance is typically left unspecified. The estimation of reserves (all re- trial or agricultural output, (2) increasing water sources economically recoverable at current prices purification or desalinization, and (3) increasing with existing technology) assumes by definition no direct use of unpurified and salt water. technological change. I Energy Nonfuel Minerals The energy forecasts, made with the Interna- The nonfuel minerals demand forecasts were tional Energy Evaluation System (IEES) com- made from combinations of expert judgment and TECHNOLOGY PROJECTIONS 71 TABLE 5-1 U.S. primary demand for minerals is projected to 1985 and 2000 by use of a regression analysis Electrical Generation from Nuclear using the following U.S. economic indicators as and Hydro Fbwer Assumed in Energy Forecasts explanatory variables: GNP, Federal Reserve (Terawatt-hours per year) Board index of industrial production, gross private domestic investment, new construction, popula- Indus- Less Centrally tion, and GNP per capita. The historical values of United trialized Devel- OPEC Planned these variables, supplied by the Office of Manage- oped Coun- States Coun- Econo- ment and, Budget, are taken from the 1954-73 tries' Coun- tries Mies tries period. Such a regression equation would implic- 19175 475 1,343 .240 0 - itly assume that the role that technological ad- 1985 vance has had in making mineral consumption Low growth 969 2,492 585 19 760 track the explanatory variables in the past will Medium continue into the future. The forecasts of the growth 975 2,515 585 19 760 regression equations are considered by the indi- High vidual commodity analysts, who then make the growth 976 2,516 585 19 760 final U.S. forecasts after considering other infor- High prices 1,045 2,584 585 19 760 mation relevant to their specific commodity mar- 1990 kets, including expected technological advances. Low growth 1,373 3,316 924 64 1,350 The analysts' forecasts for rest-of-the-world de- Medium mand, are made with consideration of various growth 1,397 3,513 924 64 1,350 world and regional data, including population, High GDP, and GDP per capita, and their own knowl- growth 1,402 3,518 924 64 1,350 edge of world markets and probable technology, High prices 1,555 3,670 924 64 1,350 but without formal regression forecasts of de- 'including the U.S. mand. data analysis. Technology entered the develop- ment of the forecasts taken from the 1977 Malen- Environment baum Report (see Chapter 22) in the derivation of intensity-of-use curves@ Many of the technological, As Chapter 13 assesses the environmental im- assumptions that influenced the construction of pact that would result iif the other forecasts were any one curve tended to be highly specific to the valid, it generally accepts their assumptions and mineral and region for which it was drawn. The conclusions pertaining to technology, in addition general technological assumptions implied in the to its own technological assumptions. The tech- report to underlie all of the curves, with some nological assumptions made specifically for the qualification for individual curves, are: environmental analysis are fisted below. The tech- 1. As an economy grows, it first develops or nological assumptions used to make the other adopts production processes that are relatively forecasts are not repeated here. The general mineral-intensive. Then increasingly it refines assumption underlying the entire environmental these processes or shifts away from them, which analysis is that most environmental problems are contributes to a gradual decline in the economy's the result of conflict between population and mineral intensity of use. general economic growth on the one hand and 2. The advances in mineral production technol- evolved biological systems and physical constants ogy necessary to allow continued growth in pro-. of the globe on the other; technology can aid the duction will be made. Mineral production will management of these problems but not eliminate grow through 2000 quickly and reliably enough to their cause. The sector-specific assumptions are make end-use factors, not supply constraints, the as follows: dominant determinants of mineral consumption. Population. The relatively resource-intensive Economic growth will not be restricted by mineral living habits and practices of the industrialized availability or price; in fact, real mineral Prices nations will continue to supplant other fifestyles may decline in the future. around the world. The Bureau of Mines demand forecasts used Energy. There wHI be a global acceptance of the judgments of the Bureau's individual commod- U.S. new source performance standards in the ity analysts, aided by analyses of historical data. near future. (This is an assumption of the Energy 72 THE PROJECTIONS Systems Network Simulator model used to convert photosynthesis) or soil, water, and air manage- the energy consumption forecasts to emissions ment. Plant breeding will continue to reduce the forecasts, described in Chapter 19). genetic diversity of food crops. Food. The productivity increases projected in Minerals. The means to extract increasingly low- the food analysis will involve no major break- grade mineral ores will continue to be developed and throughs in genetic engineering of food crops adopted. No breakthroughs in reducing the land (such as the development of nitrogen-fixing strains disturbance, water use, or waste quantities resulting or c-4 grains, which are relatively efficient in from mining will occur. 6 Tood and Agriculture Projecfions Recent shifts in world food supplies from sur- industrialized countries against the paucity of plus toward deficit and back again toward surplus information available for the less developed and have generated wide concern as to future food centrally planned countries. The extent to which balances. This chapter reports on world food governments intervene to influencethe quantities projections to 1985 and 2000, emphasizing the and prices of food produced and consumed in problem of food balances in the context of wider much of the world also leaves long-range projec- resource and environmental balances. The projec- tions subject to wholesale revision as agricultural, tions are summarized in the maps on the following food, and trade policies change. pages. The analytic fi-amework used to generate Hence, the food projections presented in.this the projections and their broad implications are chapter must be seen as broad directional indica- highlighted. Resource balances, estimates of the tors only. changing cost and growth in investment required to develop the productive capacity projected to Model and Methodology 2000, and the broad environmental implications of the projections are also treated. The projections outlined below were generated using a world grain-oilseed-livestock (GOL) model and three smaller sets of aggregate food, arable area, and fertilizer relationships. Caveats GOL is a formal mathematical model made up of roughly 1,000 equations describing the function- Long-range projections, particularly food pro- ing and interaction of 'the world's grain, oilseed, jections, are subject to several qualifications. and livestock sectors. More precisely, GOL is a First, estimating changes in population, income, conglomerate of some 28 regional agricultural taste, resources, technology, and weather as well sector models made up of grain, oilseed, and as their interrelationships 25 years in the future livestock supply, demand, and trade equations calls for a number of studies rather than a single that sum to a world total. The parameters for the paper. The wide range of credible studies analyz- mathematical relationships underlying the models ing these factors but reaching conflicting conclu- were estimated using data from 1950 through 1975 sions points up the latitude possible in estimating or were drawn from the literature and the judg- changes in these key variables and their interrela- ment of experts. tionships. The analyses that follow endogenize as The strength of the GOL model lies in its many of these variables and interrelationships as emphasis on cross-regional and cross-commodity possible but depend to a large extent on output quantity and price linkages. The individual grain, from other models that study individual variables oilseed, and livestock sectors within each regional in greater detail. model are linked on the supply side in their Second, highly aggregated food projections with competition for resources, and on the demand so distant a time horizon are not forecasts of what side as intermediate or finished products in the will happen, but rather educated guesses of what human diet. Production and consumption across could happen. Assigning probabilities to projec- regions are balanced at the world'level. Imports tions is consequently difficult; projection studies and exports sum to zero, and world and regional themselves are designed to test alternatives and to trade prices are harmonized. Each of the regional identify potential problems and evaluate possible models provides for physical factors (such as solutions. technical input-output relationships) and economic Third, global food projections in particular de- factors (such as supply, demand, and trade pend on generally limited and sometimes conflict- prices). Exogeneous inputs include population and ing data. Any global food analysis must balance income growth rates, agricultural and trade policy the wealth of information available for most of the assumptions, and weather assumptions. 73 .@p k n- -Ar 783 965 USSRand tqp Euro Jl@l AAW' Uni K 2000 @""fn :A_ ;A rica , 71 Middow "Ag-@'NOU P 3 Ls4n America Irl P F . ....- 1975 X T"% M4, j Z V@@ 17 @4, 65 3 f A S, An 4@ 4@@ k Grain Trade X-1 0 2000 X. A -JJSSR and @effl Europe 200D P V estitm nited States I, and J X j, No" n AfrIc6' 2000 1975 iddle EgMr- X and the m Asin,' uthej n Ask' 1975 2000 SO L K R - Africa L_ 2000 RIM 300 whv. Net exports 11,71. .elm 101.11 -Not imports Latin America 150. Consumption Other industrialize4 exporters 0 . Loctuding Aulkoba. Can$ds. New 7ealand, and Akouqiein Africa j Grain consumption figures IWude grain usecir for tivastocit. a0an U 0 1600 Wo-elels 1500 miles 5037036-78 Alternative II Base Yield Level 2.75@ Alternative I Base Yield Level Note- A@ rgin between alternatives based on Regional Standard Errors and summed to a world total calculated on 1950-76 data 2.25 Alternative III Se Base Yield Level 1.25 1960 Actual 1970 1975 1,985 20M Proocted- rim Alter Base Y* Base Figure 6-1. World grain yields, actual and projected under Alternatives 1, 11, 111. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 77 GOL materials were supplemented with three 1950-75 regional yield series (see Table 6-3 and smaller, informal sets of relationships dealing with Fig. 6-1). Alternative 11 is run assuming petroleum aggregate food production and consumption, ara- prices remain at their real 19174-76 level through ble area, and fertilizer use. The first is used to the year 2000. translate GOL output into indices of total food Alternative 111, which defines a lower bound, production and consumption; the second and third assumes higher population growth and lower per sets of relationships are used to estimate arable capita income growth rates of about 2.1 percent area and fertilizer use. Fertilizer is used as a and 0.7 percent, respectively. Growth in yields is proxy for a larger collection of inputs, including projected assuming poor weather-i.e., assun-drig improved varieties, pesticides, and irrigation. Sec- weather through 2000 to be less favorable than /ondary measures of land-man ratios and use of over the last 25 years. Yields are projected the fertilizer per arable hectare are also generated. equivalent of one standard error below Alternative I levels (see Table 6-3). Alternative III is run assuming that real petroleum prices more than Scenario Definitions double by 2000. Three alternative sets of projections were gen- No provision was made for long-term improve- erated for the Global 2000 Study using different ments or deterioration in climate. It is assumed income, population, and weather assumptions as that the world's climate continues largely as well as different assumptions about the rate of reported over the past several decades, or that petroleum price increases. changes in climate will be small enough tobe Alternative 1, a baseline projection, assumes compensated for by changes in cultural practices median world population and per capitaincome and development of new technology. Assuming growth rates averaging roughly 1.8 percent and no significant climate changes, however, does not 1.5 percent, respectively, through the year 2000 rule out years of good weather comparable to the (Tables 6-1 and 6-2). Growth in yields, ultimately late 1960s in the Soviet Union or bad weather raised or lowered by the producer prices gener- years comparable to the mid-1960s in India. 'Me .ated under a specific alternative, is projected at variations in yields between Alternatives 11 and rates compatible with the technological advances III provide some measure of the good weather- Of the past two decades. Weather is held con- bad weather range likely without a major change @tant-i.e., the impact of weather on yields in climate. through 2000 is assumed to be comparable to that of the past 25 years. Agricultural and trade General Results policies are assumed to continue to be largely While the output generated under Alternatives protectionist in the major importing countries and 1, 11, and III differ with regard to specifics, a trade-expansionist in the. major exporting coun- number of conclusions hold for all three scenarios. tries. Alternative I's median income, population, The following general conclusions pertain to Alter- and weather assumptions are run in combination native I output. first with constant energy prices--i.e., assuming petroleum prices do not increase markedly from Record Growth the real-price highs of 1974-76---and second as- suming marked increases more than double the The world bas the capacity, bothphysical and cost of energy inputs by 2000. As will be noted economic, to produce enough food to meet sub- later, the resultant quantity and price ranges stantial increases in demand through 2000. The quoted under Alternative I reflect not so much projections are compatible in this regard with a uncertainty about petroleum price increases as number of other studies suggesting a world food uncertainty about the ability of the agricultural potential several times higher than current produc- sector to adjust to changes in input costs. tion levels. The food growth rates implied in this Alternative 11, which defines aii optimistic up- Study's production and consumption projections per bound, assumes lower population growth and are comparable to the record increases reported higher per capita income growth of about 1.5 for the 1950s and the 1960s. Growth in the grain percent and 2.4 percent, respectively. Growth in component of total food production and consump- yields is projected assuming favorable weather--:- tion-for which longer historical series are avail- i.e., assuming weather through 2000 to be more able-is also projected near or above the record favorable than weather over the last 25 years. rates of the last two decades and more than Good weather is assumed to raise yields about the double the rate of increase for the first half of equivalent of one standard error calculated on the century (Table 6-A). Several significant quali- 78 THE PROJECTIONS fications are needed, however, to put this growth early 1970s (Tables 6-5 and 6-6). into proper perspective. Driving near-record growth Driving near-record rates of growth on the sup- in demand are equally impressive growth in pop- ply side Are marked increases in the resources ulation in the less developed countries (LDCs) committed to food production-measured roughly and affluence in the industrialized countries. The in terms of land under cultivation-and strong world's food sector must grow at near-record rates gains in productivity-based primarily on wider simply to maintain the benchmark per capita con- adoption of technology and increased use of re- sumption levels reported in the late 196(Js and source-augmenting inputs such as fertilizers and TABLE 6-1 Population Growth Rates, Actual and Projected (Percent) 1985/1975 2000/1975 1970/1960 Alternatives Alternatives I II III I Percent Industrialized countries 1.09 .57 .48 .67 .52 .34 .71 United States 1.26 .70 .52 .96 .55 .27 .94 Other developed exportersa 2.28 2.05 1.99 2.15 1.80 1.60 1.94 Western Europe .80 .33 .30 .35 .43 .31 .52 Japan 1.04 .88 .81 .91 .59 .43 .68 Centrally planned countries 1.54 1.25 .99 1.45 1.21 .94 1.43 Eastern Europe .70 .68 .63 .74 .57 .39 .76 U.S.S.R. 1.25 .93 .80 1.05 .68 .46 .90 People's Republic of China 1.78 1.42 1.10 1.64 1.42 1.14 1.63 Less developed countries 2.56 2.50 2.36 2.66 2.37 2.04 2.71 Latin America 2.82 2.91 2.65 3.04 2.61 2.17 2.94 North Africa/Middle East 2.74 2.75 2.61 2.86 2.75 2.44 3.05 Other African LDCs 2.42 2.61 2.50 2.69 2.68 2.31 2.94 South Asia 2.56 2.34 2.25 2.58 2.13 1.88 2.63 Southeast Asia 2.68 2.50 2.34 2.65 2.20 1.77 2.58 East Asia 2.23 2.13 1.94 2.28 1.99 1.58 2.27 World 1.93 1.79 1.63 1.95 1.77 1.48 2.05 "Canada, Australia, South Africa. Somme: U.S. Bureau of the Census. TABLE 6-2 Per Capita Income Growth Rates, Actual and Projected (Percent) 1985/1975 2000/1985 1960-1970 Alternatives Alternatives 1 11 111 1 11 111 Industrialized countries 3.29 3.41 4.40 2.41 2.57 3.35 1.77 United States 2.52 3.28 4.35 2.12 2.54 3.42 1.55 Other major exporters, 1.87 1.95 2.85 1.10 1.40 2.25 .55 Western Europe 3.52 3.66 4.59 2.74 2.66 3.38 1.97 Japan 8.76 3.10 4.06 2.17 2.49 3.26 1.81 Centmfly planned countries 3.65 2.35 3.22 1.50 2.20 3.15 1.25 Eastren Europe 3.88 2.55 2.85 2.24 2.16 2.60 1.73 U.S.S.R. 5.17 2.30 2.67 1.93 2.06 2.53 1.59 People's Republic of China .90 2.30 3.85 .86 2.30 3.81 .85 Less developed countries 3.13 2.54 3.52 1.55 2.01 3.00 1.03 1 Latin America 2.62 2.64 3.90 1.51 1.84 2.84 .97 North Africa/Middle East 2.79 3.95 4.70 3.35 3.20 4.15 2.26 Other African LDCs 1.00 2.95 3.60 2.35 2.15 3.00 1.38 South Asia .73 1.12 1.91 .20 .66 1.20 .15 Southeast Asia 2.26 2.50 2.65 2.34 2.20 2.58 1.77 East Asia 2.01 3.34 4.37 2.66 2.80 3.98 1.54 World 2,80 2.26 3.23 1.29 1.53 2.42 .66 aCanada, Australia, South Africa Source: Global 2000 Study staff. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 79 TABLE 6-3 Yield Variations Due to Assumptions Regarding Weather Conditions Variation from Kilogram per Hectare, Alternative 1 1985 Equivalent and 2000 Yield 1985 2000 Percent Industrialized countries United States 5.75 250 280 -Other developed exporters �14.50 310 400 Western Europe t 5.00 190 .220 Japan t 4.75 190 160 Centrally planned countries Eastern Europe :t 6.25 220 280 U. S. S. R. :i_ 11.75 240 310 People's Republic of China :t 5.50 100 130 Less developed countries Latin America �8.00 130 200 North 4rica/Middle East �9.00 130 200 Other developing Africa �3.50 50 80 South Asia �4.75 60 so Southeast Asia �6.50 110 160 East Asia �6.00 110 160 Weighted total above" �7.20 180 220 World aggregated" �3.00 70 90 Note:. Yield variations are calculated on the basis of one standard error of the regression of 1950-75 yield data against time. -Production weighted aggregate of regional variations. hVariation calculated using world yield series. Source: Economics, Statistics, and Cooperatives Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. TABLE 6-4 pesticides. The rates of growth in production and the relative importance of area and productivity Grain Production and Consumption Growth gains shown in Figure 6-2's grain data are repre- Rates, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) sentative of the changes projected, for the food ' sector as a whole. Land-man ratios decline 1973-75/ 1985/ 2000/ throughout the projection period, however, and 1951-55 1973-75 , 1985 the productivity gains needed to keep up growth Percent in production come at increasing real cost, partic- Industrialized countries ularly if sharp increases in petroleum prices are Production 2.5 2.5-1.8 1.9-1.7 incorporated into the analysis. Consumption 2.2 2.4-2.0 1.9-1.8 Problems of distribution across and within re- Exporters Production 2.6 2.9-2.5 2.1-2.0 gions also detract from the high world growth Consumption 2.1 2.7-2.2 2.2-2.1 r[Ites shown in Table 6-5. Production and con- Importers sumption increase at faster rates in the LDCs than Production 2.3 l.".2 Consumption 2.1 2.1-1.7 1.6-- 1.5 in the industrialized countries. LDC growth, how Centrally planned countries ever, is from a substantially smaller base. Further- Production 2.8 2.4 1.6 more, the LDC aggregate and many of the re- Consumption 3.0 2.2 1.6 gional totals are somewhat misleading because the Less developed countries difference between individual LI)Cs-i.e., an Ar- Production 2.8 33-3.7 3.0-2.8 gentina compared with an India, or an Egypt Consumption 3.1 3.6-3.6 2.9--2.6 compared with a Bangladesh-are far wider than Exporters the differences between the industrialized coun- - Production 3.2 3.1-4.2 3.2-2.9 tries total and the LDC total. Consumption 3.5 1.7-1.7 2.4-2.3 Importers Growth in food production and consumption Production 2.7 3.3-3.6 3.0-2.8 are not likely to balance at the regional or country Consumption 3.0 3.9-3.7 2.9-2.7 levels. Significant increases in trade--exported by World a few major surplus producers, including the Production 2.7 2.7-2.5 2.1-2.0 United States, Canada, Australia, and several Consumption 2.7 2.7-2.5 2.1-2.0 em .erging exporters such as Thailand and Brazil- tzj 0 C@ 1. --3 n @p :Z -3 n 11 "o, -3 r) 11 -q n no q ri -q o - ; 0 r- " 0 5 ; ? 1'@ g 8 W" 0 R 0 prK.0 .0 mg CL CL E6 0. Ini. CD C'n CW CL 0 eb P4 ;.c M. V co CD ww + t4 + w w 00 7- z; 00 + 00 00 \0 w 00 C) tA cItA -4 + wc@ -1@ -;@ @o LA LA @A @j w @o 9 * (3-1 4) t4 (Z -Q LA W" @A @A 00 tA LA 00 th tA 00 w + + ;@; " t + 'i CD + + 0a, !4 -j CL CL -4 91 kA 4, LA tA tj '.A kA 90 w -10 00 -1 Lo 00 -4 @j :-j 00 -4 00,2, -4 -4 SNOUDWOM 3HJL tri tyl U) (n 0 !4 >e 0. -q C) @v 8 -1 n @p 'R q n n? 5 -3 OY " , ;; P. G@ R g - g 0, 7 R L UI CC, 2. r 0 > OR > 0.- k*b Fj 00 00 ID W @C a, t.A 10 Po p bo @,j @Q @o w 0 LA @o tj 00 00 cu tj + tj ww -,, 9 z;; -4 @o 0 -4 @o -3 00 w 00 k.A @tj t.A ZZ LA 0, 00 LA <Z 00 Lft tA 00 r cr, t4 @o 91 P. 91 PO @A P6 \0 LA @o LA :9@ LA Q 00 m 00 -4 @o 00 w @o @A 4.. P p + + + LA @@ !@ w j twh (7100 91 tj -4 m + + cr, 00 w LA w 00 7i 7;; tA PO PO p 91 PC tj t1i L 00 tlJ @.A 400 a, .91 li @o tj LA 91 Ir ?110 IE z - LA K t ot LA tj @D 60 ;1) 00 SNOI.L3gfO'dd aldfll-IfIDIHOV (INV GOOA '4 CL CL aL 'm I Q,-m r to r- .rz nN < - E - 0 .0n go X + 'A Lft V ;-o 10. -W4 Go -j 00. cy, t4 -J + tA :2 0000 Zo 14 __a t Tj . . a, tj -P. CYN \0 41 tA a, Lj 41 COW 0 -4 42@ + + + tj 11 t.A .11 LA kA .1@w C) tj t9 li w 00 w LA a, p 00 4 :4. 00 4@ 4@. LA t, w w+ LA 00 a li -4 00 NI @O 0 LA W W + + + NJ W -t@ tA ON 00 00 'A w 4@- .91 . . . 90 -4 cps 00 CY, %0 W i:A 1@ t f r + + 00006 j @,o a, @o W 4@, w @o 90 !-A PO -4 w 4. 00 00 C= 0@ a, 00 1@ ll@ 4@- -t@ 00 pa PO p lp 4:1 Q 00 @11 bi 0@ WI 10 ON 00 t1i tA 90 !1, @A @C -S@ .8h, - 00 C7, LA 00 90 00 W SNOIJDgfOSd 9HL Z8 0 z x C6 CL =6 E. CA. CL ft >5 r- c to 00 --J 4@ w + + G w %A W W 00 t-j + -W t4 " m 7- 7- 7- 00 -W W @,J @A 00 LA LA @o ba tA + 0 + tj t4 tj tj t-4 t4 LA @.A + 00 00 r r ww !4 !4 1000 @o @o 00 -W + a ,A 20, @A Z; :4 @o bo LA R!R 800 ao 39 90 PO w Lft @o w w ?o ao 2! 00 -47 tQ w 00 w -j !4 ss -j @A @11 . . :4. uj Go co C7% @-A j 00 00 .414, SNOIIDHfO'dd aldfll-InMMOV (INV G00a VU, v@ -e2 N n;@ FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 85 will be needed to balance excess demand in food- above the levels projected under a constant petro- deficit Western Europe, Japan, the centrally leum price alternative. planned countries, and parts of developing Africa Even a rough estimate of the impact of higher and Asia. World trade varies from alternative to energy prices on agricultural production depends alternative but exceeds record 1973-75 levels by on the timing of price increases, long-run rates of at least 20 percent by 1985 and 60 percent by technological change, and short-run input flexibil- 2000. ity. The real energy price increases projected to Energy Price Impacts 2000 in the energy projections of this study (Chapter 10) are so large as to suggest that the The quantity and price ranges shown in Tables severity of the impact in the long run depends on 6-5 and 6-6 reflect model outputs on the impact the rate at which energy-conserving technologies energy price increases could have on the agricul- replace existing energy-intensive technologies. tural sector. The bottom end of the range provides Little can be done to project the rate or the for no marked increase in the price of energy from impact of such long-run technological change. In real 1973-75 levels. The upper end provides for the shorter term, however, some estimate of the moderately higher real prices by 1985 and substan- impact of higher energy prices can be made on .tially higher real prices by 2000. The range the basis of data on energy intensity and judg- reflects not so much uncertainty about petroleum ments as to how much flexibility farmers in a price increases as uncertainty about the effect particular country have to change input mixes. changing petroleum prices have on agriculture Figure 6-3 can be used to gauge approximate and the ability of farmers to maintain or expand energy intensity and to demonstrate the impor- production while shifting away from energy4nten- tance of energy flexibility. Both cross-sectional sive inputs. A variety of cultural practices and data for the 30 largest agricultural producers, and ,management techniques are available in the short time series data for a smaller number of countries 'and medium terms to minimize the effect of suggest the energy-intensity curve is basically S- energy price increases. The experience of the past shaped. Given the position of countries along ,2-4 years suggests that food and overall agricul- the curve, there appears to be little question that - ong run ,tural production could well adjust in the I past increases in productivity have generally de- substantially higher energy prices, depending pended on marked increases in energy inputs. The. .;Ton the timing.of increases, without the degree of impact of any energy price increase, all other ,dislocation implied at the upper end of the range. things being equal, depends on where a country is 1. The model results suggest that, while world on this energy-intensity curve. The efficiency of ,Oroduction and consumption levels might not be energy use measured roughly in terms of energy .'changed measurably by marked but gradual in- input-product output ratios might well strengthen .creases in energy prices, major shifts within and or weaken the impact of any energy price change, ,across sectors and regions would be likely. The but the general ranking of the countries from fight comparative advantage of the resource7endowed to left would not be likely to change much. The LDCs such as Brazil and Thailand, which use experience of the past 3-4 years of higher energy ,relatively few high energy-intensive inputs, would prices suggests that a country's ability to move 1, If improve. Higher energy prices, however, would back down the curve toward lower energy inten- likely exacerbate problems of comparative disad- sity-i.e., to adjust production techniques without vantage in food production common to many of sacrificing the high productivity associated with the industrialized and higher-income LDCs. advanced technology-is particularly crucial. Adjustments in the food-exporting countries A review of the adjustments U.S. farmers can would likely be mixed. In countries such as the and, in many cases, are making suggests that the United States, higher energy prices could be range of options available even within a basically offset at least partially by increasing the land energy-intensive technology is quite wide. Data resources committed to food production and by from Department of Agriculture and Federal En- decreasing on the use of, or increasing returns to, ergy Administration studies estimate that the en- energy-intensive inputs. The coniparative advan- ergy used in the U.S. agricultural sector in 1974 tage of the traditional food-exporting countries was equivalent to 2,000 trillion Btu (British ther- would likely deteriorate relative to the resource- mal units) or roughly 5,300 Btu per hectare of endowed LDCs but improve relative to most of total cropped area. As Figures 6-4 and 6-5 the industrialized countries and several of the indicate, the largest energy expenditures were resource-tight LDCs. The sizes of these changes reported in cultural operations, transportation, in comparative advantage are projected to keep irrigation, livestock operations, crop drying, and the exporters' sales on the world market at or energy investment in fertilizers and pesticides. iNS 197,IWU'3"e'* im*x of Enww use Per *we Heclm 100) EL =7 P. rL i gz SNO1133fOldd 3HI 98 'Percent of tbkd, kra rn '40 0 EmW in &Wons of ofu Percent of tatof rlmkdbv d-m") F-D 2. fo CL ir CL Energ@ In-,*AVOM of 010 L8 SNO1133folid gHfiliflaMov GNV U00d 89 THE PROJECTIONS A review of the literature on energy-saving or much sharper than a graduated 5- 10 percent per techniques 'suggests that considerable reductions year. The present capabilities of the GOL model in energy use are possible in all of these areas. do not permit more precise measurement of the The energy savings possible from modifying cul- impact of gradually changing petroleum prices or tural practices, which currently account for 20 reliable projections of the impact of more extreme percent of energy use, to provide for reduced or energy price changes. minimum tillage are quite large. Net energy sav- ings range up to 50 percent. Moreover, reduced Continuing Trends tillage in 1975 amounted to only 35.8 million acres, The projections also suggest that the major while conventional tillage amounted to 218.2 mil- trends of the past two decades-41) the increasing lion acres. dependence of LDCs on food imports; (2) the Another potential area of large savings is in growing importance of variability in supply; and fertilizer use, which currently accounts for over (3) the increasing importance of the trade and one-third of total energy expenditures. Significant agricultural policy decisions of a few major ex- energy savings are possible through proper selec- porting and importing countries-are likely to tion and use of fertilizers. The proper timing and continue on to 2000. Shifts in demand toward method of application also contribute to fertilizer livestock products as incomes increase, however, efficiency. Moreover, considerable savings appear are also likely to play an increasingly important possible by changing mixes of fertilizers to empha- role in determining the quantities and prices of size organic and green fertilizers as well as commodities moving on the international market. inorganic chemical fertilizers. The grain trade projections shown in Table 6-5 Irrigation engineers also suggest that it is tech- suggest that the LDCs, excluding food-surplus nologically impossible to reduce the 10 percent of exporters, * face sharp increases in the absolute total energy use accounted for by irrigation by as volume of food imports as well as possible in- much as one half. Reductions in energy consump- creases in the proportion of food imported. tion of as much as 10-20 percent appear to be The increased food imports of many of the de- possible through minimal efforts to increase ini- veloping countries, however, are not without gation pumping plant efficiency, to upgrade water positive implications. The grain gap--the differ- usage and water scheduling, and to adopt runoff ence between grain production and consump- control procedures. tion-is generally seen as an indication of the less Drying grain for storage-which accounts tbr 5- developed countries' inability to feed themselves. 10 percent of energy use-is another area of Increases in imports, however, also measure the potential saving. There appear to be several ways LDCs ability to supplement, limited domestic out- to reduce grain-drying fuel requirements, including put with foreign production. A closer look at more in-the-field drying, better management of the which LDCs import more through 2000 suggests existing system, and the use of new technical that the largest increases are concentrated in the developments such as solar heat. There are also relatively affluent upper one-third of the develop- significant potential savings in the transportation ing world. The calorie gap--the difference be- sector through more efficient use of equipment. tween recommended caloric consumption mini- Keeping these short-term options for minimiz- mums and food energy supplies-sug'gests a much ing energy inputs in mind, the projection alterna- larger, more persistent problem concentrated in tives can be seen in a number of different con- the lowest-income countries but affecting groups texts. Those Alternative I runs assuming constant within higher-income countries as well. The aver- petroleum prices would be valid either given no age LDC per capita calorie gap narrows margin- increase in petroleum prices or given increases at ally through 2000 but, with the number of people a fairly even pace-possibly 5-10 percent per increasing at near-record rates, the absolute size year-provided the agricultural sector maximizes of the gap and the number of people eating below short-term energy savings and ultimately substi- the recommended minimum is projected to in! tutes energy-conserving technologies. A number crease under all but optimistic Alternative 11. of the model's coefficients have been adjusted to While the direction, frequency, and size of reflect estimates of both short-term flexibility in fluctuations in supply will continue to depend energy use and the long-term development of largely on weather, the importance of variability energy-conserving technologies as discussed in in supply is likely to increase markedly as world Chapter 18. The Alternative I projections based productive capacity is used at significantly higher on an increasing petroleum price would be valid should agriculture not adjust to gradual energy -Primarily Argentina and Thailand, but in some scenajios price increases or should the increases be sudden other LI)Cs as well, e.g., Brazil, Colombia, and Indonesia. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 89 levels. The experience of a number of countries , ruminant herd suggest that a larger proportion of suggests that expansion of cultivation into mar- meat supplies will have to come from pork and ginal areas increases susceptibility to weather poultry products heavily dependent on grain and fluctuations. The resource balances reviewed be- oilseed feeds. Moreover, the world's fish catch is low indicate that a larger proportion of the world's an essentially concentrate-free source of animal food supplies will have to be grown on increas- protein, and, should the world's fish catch not ingly marginal areas dependent on favorable increase at the 1.5-2.0 percent rate assumed in (rather than normal) rainfaff and temperature. the model runs, demand- for feed to produce a Reserves are likely to increase in importance as comparable amount of animal protein from pigs a means of ensuring that production windfalls and and chickens could increase grai.n'and oilseed de- temporarily low producer prices do not generate mand by another I percent. The impact on prices production cutbacks in the food-exporong coun- and diets worldwide would be relatively small, tries. Reserves are also likely to increase in since less than 6 percent of the world's protein importance as a means of reducing price fluctua- and 1 percent of the. world's calories are derived tions and the market-rationing effect of short-term from fish and seafood products. However, in se- drops in production in a world of rising real lected countries--such as Japan, where fish ac7 prices. counts for 25 percent of protein supplies and 8 All three alternatives also suggest that the percent of calories--the impact would be very sig- agricultural and trade policies of a small number nificant. of importers and exporters will play an increas- World grain and overall food balances could ingly dominant role in determining the quantities tighten further if the lower-income industrialized and prices of food traded on the world market. countries, centrally planned countries, and the The increased importance of policy decisions in higher-income less developed countries were to the exporting countries would result from their markedly increase their consumption of livestock control of scarce excess productive capacity. The products and adopt the grain-intensive feeding experience of the last five years suggests that techniques of the U.S. World food prices could without marked changes in international trading also be pushed up substancially as price-inelastic conventions, the role of major but sporadic im- food demand in the poorest LDCs competes porters such as the Soviet Union is also likely to against more elastic feed demand in the affluent increase. Protectionist agricultural and trade poli- countries. cies currently allow large countries or blocs rela- tively close to self-sufficiency to avoid the costs Differing Perspectives of adjusting to world production shortfalls. The All three alternatives also suggest that the food current structure of the world market also allows and environmental concerns of the industrialized them to pass on part, if not aR, of the cost of and less developed countries are likely to differ disruptions in their domestic agricultural econo- widely. The prime concern in the industrialized mies for absorbtion by the world market. The countries is likely to be adjustment. The major impact of changes in world supply and demand exporters will continue to face the problem of are consequently likely to be absorbed more and adjusting their production to higher but widely more by countries exporting a large proportion of fluctuating foreign demand. The food-deficit production and countries importing a large propor- higher-income countries will continue to face the tion of consumption on a regular basis. problem of worsening comparative disadvantage AD three alternatives also suggest that, in addi- and increasingly expensive protectionist agricul- tion to population and income growth, shifts in tural and trade policies. The effect of changing consumption patterns are likely to play a major production levels on the environment and the role in shaping demand, particularly beyond 1985. impact of environmental constraints on production @Growth in demand and shifts in taste away from costs, however, wifl be a concern common to all calorie-efficient diets based on cereals and the industrialized countries. starches toward less calorie-efficient, livestock- In contrast, the LDCs are likely to face the ,oriented diets will determine to a large extent the more pressing problem of expanding production- demand price. of'grains, oilseeds, other high- often regardless of environmental costs--to meet protein feeds, and possibly food prices in general. rapidly expanding food needs. Several of the Changes in the proportion of concentrate-fed higher-income countries, such as Korea and Tai- products in the livestock total will be critical in wan, and several of the resource-constrained determining the impact of this shift toward live- countries of North Africa and the -Middle East wifl stock diets and the grain and oilseed balance. face the same comparative disadvantage problems Biological limitations on the expansion of the as many of the food-deficit industrialized coun- 90 THE PROJECTIONS tries, but the bulk of the LDCs will be concerned population, income, yield, and petroleum price with environmental quality only after basic human variables differs widely by regions and over time. needs are met. In the food-importing countries of Western Eu- rope and in Japan, with relatively stable yields and low population growth rates, the crucial Alternatives I-M: Results and demand variables both in 1985 and 2000 are likely to be income growth rates and shifts in taste. The Conclusions crucial determinants of supply are likely to be The projections presented in Tables 6-7 and petroleum prices and domestic agricultural and cific trade policy decisions. Among the traditional 6-8 point up a number of alternative-spe exporters, foreign demand, weather-related fluc- conclusions regarding (1) the impacts of popula- tuations in yields, and, to a lesser extent, petro- tion, income, yield, and petroleum price variations leum price increases will be the most relevant in particular regions and over time, (2) the range considerations. Among the centrally planned of possible LDC food consumption improvements countries, yield variations are likely to continue to through 2000, (3) the variability of world trade and be the most relevant factors. Among the less the role of the U.S. as residual supplier, and (4) developed importing countries, population growth the range of likely world market price increases. is by far the dominant demand factor, with Before reviewing specific conclusions, however, variability in yields dominating on the supply side. comments on the range spanned by the alterna- tives and on short-term versus long-term adjust- The importance of each of these exogenous ments are called for. variables changes over time. Petroleum prices The range covered by the population and in- become more important as increasingly tight re- come growth rates for Alternatives 11 and III is source supplies narrow the alternatives to energy- narTow (see Tables 6-1 and 6-2). The range of intensive food production techniques. Variations yield variations is also narrow (see Table 6-3). in yields are also likely to become more important Given the amount of uncertainty about rates of as agricultural production expands into increas- growth in these variables, the ranges tested here ingly marginal areas more susceptible to weather would appear to be too narrow. Moreover, com- fluctuations. Income growth becomes increasingly parisons in terms of absolute production and important in LDCs as low but sustained growth consumption levels suggest rather minimal differ- over the rest of the century pushes per capita ences between alternatives. However, the combi- levels in the middle-income countries high enough nation of all the favorable assumptions in Alter- to generate shifts in taste toward grain-fed live- native II and all the unfavorable assumptions in* stock products. Alternative III suggests it is highly probable that the outcome for the world and for major region s With regard to improvements in per capita would fall within the range bounded by these two LDC food consumption, even Alternative H's alternatives-particularly if analyzed in terms of combination of optimistic supply and demand per capita (rather than absolute) production and assumptions suggests gains are likely to be small consumption levels. and poorly distributed. Annual gains in per capita consumption for the LDCs as a group average With regard to short-term versus long-term adjustments, the static nature of the GOL model less than 0.5 percent but range as high as I and the long-range specification of its elasticities percent and as low as declining per capita con- limit the model to measuring net long-term adjust- sumption. Given Alternative 111's pessimistic as- ments. The model can say little about the year to sumptions, LDC per capita levels do not grow. year adjustments within the agricultural sector While increase in the high-growth regions slows needed to reach the solutions calculated for 1985 somewhat, per capita consumption levels fall or 2000. Consequently, the fluctuations in endog- below substandard benchmark 1969-71 levels inj enous variables generated by the changes in the low-growth South Asia and Central Afirica. exogenous variables noted above could well be The food problem in many of the LDCs with substantially wider if gauged over a shorter 3- to the slowest growth in consumption appears to be 5-year rather than a 10- to 20-year period. as much a problem of effective market demand as a problem of expanding production. The effect of Results production conAraints-be they limited agricul- A comparison of the results of the alternatives tural resources, inadequate agricultural infrastruc- tested suggests that the impact of changes in tur.e, outdated technology, institutional con- CLIMATE PROJECTIONS 59 TABLE 4-3B SAME AS THE LAST30YEARS C 0 '0 2 C 0 0 _x 0 E 0 .2 0 -2 L) -0 > RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CARBON DIOXIDE AND TURBIDITY IPERCENT) DURING THE 50 10 10 15 15 PERIOD 1975-2000 1977-80 1981-90 1991-2000 CU CM M (7 Z3 n "W 2! > T u_ LL PROBABILITY OF MID-LATITUDE DROUGHT* United States 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 0 0.5 0.4 Other Mid-Latitude 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.3 0 .1 0.4 0.5 0.1 .6 0 ,2 0.1 .6 0 PROBABILITY OF SAHEL DROUGHT** 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.1 PROBABILITY OF MONSOON FAILURE*** Northwest India 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0,5 0.3 Other India 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 Other Monsoon Asia 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 *Frequent-similar to early to mid-1930sand early tomid-1950s;average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1940s and 1960s. **Frequent-similar to 1940-50 and 1965-73 periods; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1950-65 period. -Frequent-similar to 1900-25 period; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; in frequent- si mi lar to 1930-60 period. 60 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 4-4A- MODERATE GLOBAL WARMING PROBABILITY OF SCENARIO: 0.25 MEAN NORTHERN HEMISPHERE TEMPERATURE CHANGE SINCE 1969: between 0.250 and 0.60C warmer PROBABILITY OF TEMPERATURE CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with 1970-75) U U U 0 U U 0 0 U 0 o Ln Oq Lq q . O'D 6 - 6. '7 C? -7 7 0@ ,i E L6 E U, R M Lq M M U!M U U Polar 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 Northern Higher mid-latitude* 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 hemisphere Lower mid-latitude 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.1 Subtropical 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 Subtropical 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 Southern Lower mid-latitude 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.1 hemisphere Higher mid-latitude* 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 Polar 0@1 0.2 O@5 0.1 0.1 *Growing season in higher middle latitudes: Probability of an increase (decrease) in the length of the growing season exceeding 10 days is 0.4 10.2); probability of an increase (decrease) in the variability of the length of the growing season in excess of 25% is 0.1 (0.2). PROBABILITY OF PRECIPITATION CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with 1941-70) ANNUAL GROWING SEASON 31 C E M M C z S A 5 V 0 A L) V a A Higher mid-latitude 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 Lower mid-latitude 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 Subtropical 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 PROBABILITY OF PRECIPITATION VARIABILITY CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with average for the previous 25-year period) ANNUAL GROWING SEASON M, 0, ae M C tn E! Lo Ln U, Ln (N M C,4 U C.4 U C1J M C.4 (N A V 0' A -c A V A Higher mid-latitude 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 Lower mid-latitude 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 Subtropical 1 0.2 1 0.6 1 0.2 1 0.3 05 0.2 @ " e EA CLIMATE PROJECTIONS 61 TABLE 44B MODERATE GLOBAL W A R M I N G o C, 0 'a 0 .a,- 0 x E 0 > RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CARBON DIOXIDE AND TURBIDITY (PERCENT) DURING THE 60 15 5 10 10 PERIOD 1975-2006 1977-80 1981-90 1991-2000 C C W W cr 1E T 2! < LL PROBABILITY OF MID-LATITUDE DROUGHT* United States 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 Other Mid-Latitude PROBABILITY OF SAHEL DROUGHT- 0.3 OA 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 PROBABILITY OF MONSOON FAILURE*** Northwest India 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 Other India Other Monsoon Asi@, *Frequent-similar to early to mid-1930s and early to mid-1950s; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1940s and 1960s. **Frequent-similar to 1940-50 and 1965-73 periods; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1950-65 period. ***Frequent-similar to 1900-25 pehod; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1930-60 period. 62 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 4-5A LARGE GLOBAL WARMING PROBABILITY OF SCENARIO: 0.10 MEAN NORTHERN HEMISPHERE TEMPERATURE CHANGE SINCE 1969: between 0.6'and 1.80C warmer PROBABILITY OF TEMPERATURE CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with 1970-75) U U U L) U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o U@ 9 Ui in 0 in t a t q t q 41 C E E E v@ E v? E L@ E ? 6 L6 :9 C? L6 '. 6 U@ @6 0 0 0 U 0 0 C; 3: 3: 3: C"I C.) 3: Polar 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 Northern Higher mid-latitude* 0.1 0.5 0.4 hemisphere Lower mid-latitude O'l 0.5 0.2 0.2 Subtropical 0"1 0.8 0.1 Subtropical 0.1 0.8 0.1 Southern Lower mid-latitude 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.2 hemisphere Higher mid-latitude* 0.1 0.5 0.4 Polar 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 Growing season in higher middle latitudes: Probability of an increase (decrease) in the length of growing season exceeding 10 days is 0.8 (0.01; probability of an increase (decrease) in the variability of the length of the growing season in excess of 25% is 0.0 (0.7), PROBABILITY OF PRECIPITATION CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with 1941-70) ANNUAL GROWING SEASON M 'm U U V 6 A U V 0 A Higher mid-latitude 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.2 Lower mid-latitude 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 Subtropical 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.1 PROBABILITY OF PRECIPITATION VARIABILITY CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with average for the previous 25-year period) ANNUAL GROWING SEASON 00 In C in in r_ in Lo 8Cj M cli UC14 C-4 M C4 N z V 0) A A A 5 V A Higher mid-latitude 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 Lower mid-latitude 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2 Subtropical 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2 CLIMATE PROJECTIONS 63 TABLE 4-5B LA RG E G LO BAL WARM ING r W 6 ig c x 0 .2 .2 C. E 0 'M 6'0 LL U >-0 CL RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CARBON DIOXIDE AND TURBIDITY (PERCENT) DURING THE 90 10 0 0 0 PERIOD 1975-2000 1977-80 1981-90 1991-2000 C CD oll 0 0 CM n CM cr C, M n cr 4) U Cr "E LD -1 T > LL E U_ < E PROBABILITY OF MID-LATITUDE DROUGHT* United States 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.1 Other Mid-Latitude 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 PROBABILITY OF SAHEL DROUGHT** 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.3 PROBABILITY OF MONSOON FAILURE- Northwest India 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.8 Other India 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.7 Other Monsoon Asia 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.7 *Frequent-similar to early to mid-1930s and early to mid- 1 950s; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1940s and 1960s. **Frequent-similar to 1940-50 and 1965-73 periods; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1950-65 period. -Frequent-similar to 1900-25 period; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similarto 1930-60 period. 64 THE PROJECTIONS While average global temperature increased tudes warmed, on the average, by Q.8' C; the moderately, the largest temperature increases lower middle latitudes by 1.00 C; the:higher mid- came in the higher latitudes. The Northern Hemi- dle. latitudes by 1.4' C; and the polar-latitudes by sphere warmed slightly more than the Southern a remarkable 3.0' C, compared to the early 1970s. Hemisphere due to its greater land area and the Symmetry prevailed as similar temperature larger thermal inertia of the southern oceans. In changes were observed in both the Northern and the Northern Hemisphere, the polar latitudes Southern Hemispheres. The increase in tempera- warmed by 1.2' C; Ihe higher middle latitudes by ture was accompanied by a significant increase in 0.5' C, the lower middle latitudes by 0.3' C; and the length of the growing season in the higher the subtropical latitudes by 0.25' C. In the South- middle latitudes, as well as by a substantial ern Hemisphere, average temperatures over the decrease in the variability from year to year in the polar latitudes increased by 0.65' C; the higher length of the,growing season. middle latitudes by 0.4' C; the lower middle Precipitation levels generally increased, espe- latitudes by 0.3' C; -and the subtropical latitudes cially in the subtropical and higher middle lati- by 0.2' C.The increase in global temperature was tudes. In the lower middle latitudes there was reflected in a moderate increase in the length of little net change of precipitation. Annual precipi- the growing season in higher middle latitudes, but tation variability decreased slightly compared to no significant change in the interannual variability the 1950-75 period; precipitation variability during of the growing season was noted. the growing season. similarly decreased in the Annual precipitation levels increased slightly in higher middle latitudes, but increased slightly in the higher middle latitudes but showed little the lower middle and subtropical latitudes. change for lower latitudinal bands. Growing-sea- The warming trend also ushered in more favor- son precipitation also increased slightly in the able climatic conditions in India and other parts.of higher middle latitudes and subtropical regions but Asia. These conditions were similar to those of remained unchanged in the lower middle latitudes. the 1930-460 period. Monsoon f"ure was infre- Both annual and growing-season precipitation var- quent, especially in northwest India. But in the iability remained essentially unchanged except for midlatitude areas of the United States, extending a slight increase in the variability of growing- from the Rockies to the Appalachians, drought season precipitation in subtropical latitudes. conditions similar to the mid-1930s and the early Drought conditions again plagued the midiati- to mid-1950s prevail6d. In other midlatitude areas tude areas of the United States, corroborating the of the world, notably Europe, the probability of 20- to 22-year drought cycle hypothesis. Climatic drought declined. The increased levels of precipi- conditions were somewhat more favorable in the tation also returned the Sahel region to wetter Asiatic region and in subtropical North Affica. weather conditions. The frequency of monsoon failure, especially in northwest India, resembled more closely the long- Climate Scenarios for the Global 2000 term average; so did the firequency of drought in Study the Sahel region. The NDU scenarios provide a richness of detail Large Global Warming* that could not be used in the Global 2000 Study. The global cooling trend that began in the 1940S At the beginning of the Study it was assumed that was dramatically reversed in the last quarter of the government's long-term global models would the 20th century. By the year 2000, the mean require climatological inputs, and three simplified Northern Hemisphere temperature had increased scenarios-informed by the National Defense Uni- by about V C compared to the early 1970s. versity study-were developed. More careful in- Climatologists explained that this trend was due vestigation established later that none of the principally to the warming effects of the increas' global long-term models used by the agencies for mg amounts of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. this Study are capable of accepting climatological While temperature increased over the entire '.nPuts. The energy, food, water and forestry globe, temperature increases were more pro- projections all assume implicitly a continuation of the nearlv ideal climate of the 1950s and 1960s. nounced at higher latitudes. The subtropical lati- Although ,the climate scenarios developed for the Global 2000 Study could not be incorporated into *Statements concerning some details of this scenario reflect the Study's projections, the scenarios are reported a higher degree of certainty than was expressed by the climatologists who participated in this study. See Tables 4-- here to indicate the range of climatic change that 5 A and B for the range of uncertainty. should be analyzed in a study of this sort. CLIMATE PROJECTIONS 65 The Global 2000 Case I scenario described crease by 10 C. Most of the warming is in the below is similar to the "same as the last 30 years" polar regions and the higher middle latitudes, with scenario in the NDU study. The Case 11 scenario only slight warming in the tropics. Annual pretip- is intermediate between NDU's "moderate warm- itation increases by 5-10 percent, and year to year ing" and "large warming"; similarly, Case III is variance decreases slightly. There is an increased intermediate between NDU's two cooling scena- likelihood of U.S. drought conditions similar to rios. Note that these scenarios span a narrower those of the mid-'30s. range of variation than the National Defense Case III: Cooling. Global temperatures de- Universitv scenarios and that the narrow span crease by 0.50 C. Cooling of V C occurs in the excludes climatological developments that would higher and middle latitudes, with a smaller change have a pronounced effect on future demands for in the tropics and subtropics. Precipitation and supplies offood, wood, water, and energy. amounts decline and variability increases both The three Global 2000 climate scenarios are: from month to month and from year to year. Case I. No Change. Yearly rainfall and tem- Storm tracks-arld the precipitation they bring- perature statistics are similar to those of the 1941- shift toward the equator, improving conditions in 70 period. Drought conditions in the U.S. continue the upper latitudes of the great deserts and to occur every 20 to 22 years. Monsoon failures worsening them on the equator side. Severe in India become less frequent than recently and monsoon failures are more frequent in India, the Sahel region of Africa no longer experiences severe droughts more frequent in the Sahel'. severe drought of the type that occurred in the The three Global 2000 scenanos are compared late '60s and early '70s. in Figure 4-1 with the historical record of temper- Case II: Warming. Global temperatures in- ature changes from the 1870s to the 1970s. 1.0- Global 2000 Ccm 111_@ "Worining" 0.8 01 .6 0.4 0.2 Global 2000 Cam I 0.0 -014 Global 2000,Case III "Cooli -0.6 1860 1880, 1900 1920, 1940 19160 Im 2000, Figure 4- 1. The three Global 2000 Study scenarios compared with the annual mean temperature changes during the past century for the latitude band 0*-80*N. The period 1941-70 is the zero reference base. 5 Technology Projecdons Logically, technology is an input to the Global ing generally declining fertilities and mortalities. 2000 Study projections much as are population, While the Bureau recognizes the possibility of GNP, and climate. But, because technology is so technological breakthroughs in both fields, some highly specific to each type of projection, it was of which are currently under study, it believes impossible to formulate a single set of measures that it is uncertain whether any will be perfected of technological change for all analyses. It was and adopted widely enough by the year 2000 to therefore left to the individual experts to make have a significant impact on fertility and mortality their own assumptions about the effects of tech- levels. Similarly, the Bureau assumed that no nology in their own fields and to develop their regression in either type of technology serious projections from those assumptions as well as enough to significantly affect their forecasts will from the exogenously supplied population, GNP, occur in the near future-for example, major harmful,, and climate forecasts. They were requested to side effects of existing birth control techniques will make these assumptions as explicit as possible in not be discovered, and new uncontrollable micro- statements to the Global 2000 Study-70ften a bial strains harmful to humans will not dev/elop. difficult task, as when trends of technological While technological advance or regression may advance were concealed in time series extrapola- occur before 2000 and shift population'growth up or tions of other input variables, or when it was down slightly, the Bureau believes that such oc- unclear whether a particular idea was more cor- currences will not result in increases or decreases rectly considered an assumption or a conclusion. that exceed the limits of its high and low projec- This chapter gathers together the assumptions tions. of technological change made in the individual The discussion of migration in Chapter 2 makes analyses of the Global 2000 project. For the sake no technological assumptions except that world of comprehensiveness, the assumptions behind industrialization will probably continue at about the development of the input forecasts already present.,rates. considered (population, GNP, climate) are in- cluded. Gros@ National Product In general, the analyses assume that the adop- tion and refinement of existing technologies will The GNP forecasts in Chapter 3 were made by continue at about the same rate as in the recent analysts in three separate agencies according to past. The verbal analyses often refer to possible somewhat different methods. The forecasts for technological breakthroughs, and many of the industrialized noncommunist and communist quantitative forecasts extrapolate from historical countries, made by a panel of WAES (Workshop data taken from the past two or three decades, on Alternative Energy Strategies) experts and by which were characterized by many such break- the CIA, respectively, are largely the result of throughs. These forecasts implicitly assume, subjectively extrapolating historical growth rates. therefore, that breakthroughs will occur in the Thus, technology is implicitly assumed to contrib- future at recent historical rates. ute to future economic growth about as it has in the recent past. The WAES panel adjusted its Population estimates downward to account for the supposed restrictive effect of slowed future population Technology affects population primarily in the growth. The CIA adjusted its forecasts for parts form of birth control, which lowers fertility, and of Eastern Europe downward on the basis of the health, care, which lowers the death rate. In availability of energy, thus assuming that techno- making the population projections used in the logical advance will not completely counteract an Global 2000 Study, the U.S. Bureau of the Census increasing scarcity of energy. Initially, however, it implicitly assumed continued adoption of both based all of its forecasts on direct extrapolation of forms of technology at moderate rates by project- past trends of GNP and productivity growth, 67 68 THE PROJECTIONS implicitly assuming a continuation of past techno- make the Global 2000 Study's agricultural fore- logical trends. casts assumes that economic variables such. as I ]Forecasts for the less developed countries product and input prices will influence food pro- (LDCs) were made by the World Bank (originally duction efficiency as in the recent past. However, foe use by the WAES study) in three stages: provision is also made to incorporate an exoge- 1. Projections were developed by analysts on nously estimated trend rate of growth in technol- an independent, country by country basis, relying ogy over and above the growth explained by on a combination of professional judgment and economic variables. This is done by adjusting the use of specialized country or regional models. regional food yield and thus, implicitly, yields per Typically, past rates of increase in the productiv- hectare. Yield per hectare is the measure of ity of new capital investment were implicitly production efficiency used in the GOL model. projected to continue in the future. These in- The exogenous adjustments for changes in yield creases were not explicitly attributed to technolog- are made in the regional production equations. ical change. However, because capital productiv- For each region, GOL has one linear regression ity increases in the past resulted partially from equation for each major agricultural product pro- \technological advance, extensions of the upward duced locally. In each equation, total production trend in productivity presumably imply continued is calculated as a function of endogenously deter- advance. mined crop hectarage, a base crop yield, a time 2. Using a computer-based model, the various trend variable, and changes in product prices, country projections were aggregated and adjusted input prices, and the prices of products competing on a globally consistent basis to reflect probable for inputs. The time trend variable is equal to I in economic growth constraints due to likely limita- the first year of the estimation period, to 2 in the tions in the availability of foreign trade earnings second, and so on. It is intended to capture the and foreign investment capital. Each LDC group effects of factors--other than those included in was represented in a way that implicitly assumed the total production equation-that influence total that major increases in the productivity of new yields over time. The most important of these is capital investment will occur in each LDC, in part believed to be technology, which has acted over as a result of technological change (see Chapter time to increase yields. The following steps are 16). For example, in the case of the Other South taken to adjust the estimated coefficient of the Asian LDC group, a given investment was implic- trend variable to reflect country analysts' judg- itly assumed to produce about 60 percent more ments about future productivity trends: incremental GDP in 1985 than in 1977 (in constant dollars). However, there is no way to infer the 1. GOL supply and demand inputs are used to precise extent to which this improved productivity project roughly the direction of likely future price of capital might properly be attributed to techno- movements. logical change. 2. For each region, a measure of likely pressure 3. The projections were further adjusted judg- on supply calculated from the price projections is mentally by Bank and WAES analysts, but these used to estimate changes in "innovative technol- adjustments were not related to assumptions re- ogy," which in turn defines the physical or garding technological change. biological limitation on yield per hectare with the best available technology; the estimation thus Climate assumes that technological advance responds di- rectly to economic incentives. The climate forecasts make no assumptions 3. The innovative technology level for each about technology except that industrial processes region and various data forecasted from the GOL will continue to release large amounts of carbon run (see Step 1) are given to the appropriate dioxide into the atmosphere, with the possible regional analysts within the Department of Agri- effect of warming the earth's atmosphere. No culture. other foreseeable technological developments be- 4. On the basis of the data received, each fore the year 2000 were considered to -have a regional analyst re-estimates trend growth in yield significant effect on the climate of the planet. to reflect possible constraints or sources of growth not included in the original regression analysis. Food 5. In each regional production equation of GOL, the coefficient of the time trend variable is As an econometric projection model, the GOL recalculated so that the trend increases approxi- (grain, oilseed, livestock) model that was used to mate the values estimated by the regional analyst. TECHNOLOGY PROJECTIONS 69 6. The,GOL model is run with the judgmentally above. The right half of the bottom curve is modified trend coefficients along with the other adopted technology calculated as explained in economic .variables cited above. The output of the Step 6. GOL was run twice, once for each of two model is its final forecasts. The yields per hectare years, to get two points from each kind. of that can be calculated from the output are called technology with which to draw the extrapolations "adopted technology" because they are the yields shown. The innovative technology- data are what per hectare that the regions are projected to is given to the Thailand regional analyst to con- actually achieve. sider in setting Thailand's,rice output for the Thus, potential yields per hectare in the future, adjustment of the GOL model described in Step estimated with data from the GOL'model, are 3. The adopted technology data points were used by analysts in adjusting productivity data calculated from the output of the runs as described within the model. in Step 6. A graph of innovative and adopted technology Fertilizer consumption per unit of food produc- taken from actual model data is reproduced in tion, also often considered an important measure Figure 5-1. It is for rice production in Thailand. of agricultural technology, is estimated subjec- The first half of each curve is historical data. The tively by Department of Agriculture analysts on right half of the top curve is future innovative the basis of the GOL output after the model run technology, calculated as explained in Step 2 is complete. The fertilizer consumption andfood 777-@77 '77 77 in the GOL model,both forms of technolc4y are n4i 4 As , I ex qw ic -a io 7 nd e h-h' re set4qual to,1 In-s r. Innovative Technology -Productivity @nvosumd terins of crop livestock yields Adopted Technology rT "Or - 'rime Figure 5-1. Innovative and adopted technology levels for rice production in Thailand as projected by the GOL tgrain, oilseed, livestock) model. and "@A 70 THE PROJECTIONS production data in Chapter 6 show an assumption puter model, assume that only proven techniques of continued increases in fertilizer use per unit of for producing final fossil fuels will be widely food output, from about 800 nutrient tons around enough adopted to significantly affect the world 1971 to 970 nutrient tons in 1985 and to 1210 energy market by the year 2000. Producers' sup- nutrient tons in the year 2000. ply curves, indirectly representing their cost of production, assume no rapid acceleration in yield. Fisheries The real costs and efficiencies of refining and con- verting primary fuels and the costs, routes, and The fisheries analysis assumes that the means modes of trunsporting intermediate products are to harvest and process formerly unfished marine also held constant. However, the types of final animals, such as Antarctic krill, will be increas- fuels demanded, the sources of the primary fuels ingly adopted through the year 2000. Ocean pol- used to make them, the refining and conversion lution will continue unabated. Technology will techniques applied in production, and the transpor- soon be ineffective and perhaps counterproductive tation modes and routes all vary according to rela- in increasing catches from natural fisheries because tive costs. Large increases in the adoption of exist- of reduction of fish populations. ing technologies are also assumed to be possible. The IEES allows world shipping and refining Forestry capacities to expand indefinitely to meet world The forestry analysis assumes a continued de- energy demand, and miscellaneous conversions capacity to expand up to high limits. Mscellaneous velopment and adoption of technologies that in- conversions capacity in 1985 and 1990 is allowed to crease both forest productivity and the percentage be as much as two and three times its historical of that productivity that can be exploited and 1975 level, respectively. In general, the expansions used. Particularly in the industrialized countries, in refining and miscellaneous conversions the management of forests will become more inten- capacities are restricted to the industrialized na- sive, uses for formerly discarded parts of trees will be found, and cut timber will be used more effi- tions. ciently. In the LDCs, harvesting technologies and The forecasts assume continued new adoption of nuclear and hydro power for electrical genera- uses for formerly ignored species and size classes tion. Regional electrical generation capacities from will be adopted; fuelwood plantations may also be nuclear and hydro (including geothermal and so- established. lar) power are inputs to the IEES; the exact Also assumed is that no fuel as cheap as wood is at present will become as widely available in quantities assumed (Table 5-1) show an increase LDCs before the year 2000. in total world generation from these power sources of about 200 percent from 1975 to 1990. Capacities of conventional thermal generation, Water like refining and transportation capacities, are The following major uses of water are expected determined within the model but allowed to ex- to remain the same through 2000. Currently, they pand as much as necessary to meet final demands. are domestic, inigation, industrial (primarily in manufacturing but also in mining and mineral Fuel Minerals processing), and energy production (thermal and hydroelectric). The two projections of total world The primary purpose of the fuel minerals water use in Chapter 9 make no explicit techno- analysis was to estimate current world energy logical assumptions. The Doxiadis projection gives resources and reserves. The estimation of re- no technological justification for its S-shaped sources (all potentially recoverable occurrences of growth curve for water use. The Kalinin projec- a mineral) implicitly assumes how far technology tion admittedly neglects the possibilities of (1) ran or Will advance in the recovery of low-grade decreasing water requirements per unit of indus- ores. Exactly how it will advance is typically left trial or agricultural output, (2) increasing water unspecified. The estimation of reserves (all re- purification or desalinization, and (3) increasing sources economically recoverable at current prices direct use of unpurified and salt water. with existing technology) assumes by definition no technological change. Energy Nonfuel Minerals The energy forecasts, made with the Intema- The nonfuel minerals demand forecasts were tional Energy Evaluation System (IEES) com- made from combinations of expert judgment and TECHNOLOGY PROJECTIONS 71 TABLE 5-1 U.S. primary demand for minerals is projected to 1985 and 2000 by use of a regression analysis Electrical Generation from Nuclear using the following U.S. economic indicators as and Hydro Fbwer Assumed in Energy Forecasts explanatory variables: GNP, Federal Reserve (Terawatt-hours per year) Board index of industrial production, gross private domestic investment, new construction, popula- Indus- Less Centrally tion, and GNP per capita. The historical values of United trialized Devel- OPEC Planned these variables, supplied by the Office of Manage- States Coun- oped Coun- Econo- ment and Budget, are taken from the 1954-73 trie S. Coun- tries mies tries period. Such a regression equation would implic- 1975 475 1,343 240 0 - itly assume that the role that technological ad- 1985 vance has had in making mineral consumption Low growth 969 2,492 585 19 760 track the explanatory variables in the past will Medium continue into the future. The forecasts of the growth 975 2,515 585 19 760 regression equations are considered by the indi- High vidual commodity analysts, who then make the growth 976 2,516 585 19 760 final U.S. forecasts after considering other infor- High prices 1,045 2,584 585, 19 760 mation relevant to their specific commodity mar- 1990 kets, including expected technological advances. Low growth 1,373 3,316 924 64 1,350 The analysts' forecasts for rest-of-the-world de- Medium mand are made with consideration of various growth 1,397 3,513 924 64 1,350 world and regional data, including population, High GDP, and GDP per capita, and their own knowl- growth 1,402 3,518 924 64 1,350 edge of world markets and probable technology, High prices 1,555 39670 924 64 1,350 but without formal regression forecasts of de- ,including ft U.S. mand. data analysis. Technology entered the develop- ment of the forecasts taken from the 1977 Malen- Environment baum Report. (see Chapter 22) in the derivation of intensity-of-use curves. Many of the technological As Chapter 13 'assesses the environmental im- assumptions that influenced the construction of pact that would result if the other forecasts were any one curve tended to be highly specific to the valid, it generally accepts their assumptions and mineral and region for which it was drawn. The conclusions pertaining to technology, in addition general technological assumptions implied in the to its own technological assumptions. The tech- report to underlie all of the curves, with some nological assumptions made specifically for the qualification for individual curves, are: environmental analysis are fisted below. The tech- 1. As an economy grows, it first develops or nological assumptions used to make the other adopts production processes that are relatively forecasts are not repeated here. The general mineral-intensive. Then increasingly it refines assumption underlying the entire environmental these processes or shifts away from them, which analysis is that most environmental problems are contributes to a gradual decline in the economy's the result of conflict between population and general economic growth on the one hand and mineral intensity of use. evolved biological systems and physical constants 2. The advances in mineral production technol- of the globe on the other; technology can aid the ogy necessary to allow continued growth in pro- management of these problems but not eliminate duction will be made. Mineral production will their cause. The sector-specific assumptions are grow through 2000 quickly and reliably enough to as follows: make end-use factors, not supply constraints9 the dominant determinants of mineral consumption. Population. The relatively resource-intensive Economic g 'rowth will not be restricted by mineral living habits and practices of the industrialized availability or price; in fact, real mineral prices nations will continue to supplant other fifestyles may decline in the future. around the wodd. The Bureau of Mines dern and forecasts used Energy. There will be a global acceptance of the judgments of the Bureau's individual commod- U.S. new source performance standards in the ity analysts, aided by analyses of historical data. near future. (This is an assumption of the Energy 72 THE PROJECTIONS Systems Network Simulator model used to convert photosynthesis) or soil, water, and air manage- the energy consumption forecasts to emissions ment. Plant breeding will continue to reduce the forecasts, described in Chapter 19). genetic diversity of food crops. Food. The productivity increases projected in Minerals. The means to extract increasingly low- the food analysis will involve no major break- grade mineral ores will continue to be developed and throughs in genetic engineering of food crops adopted. No breakthroughs in. reducing the land (such as the development of nitrogen-fixing strains disturbance, water use, or waste quantities resulting or c-4 grains, which are relatively efficient in from mining will occur. 6 Food and Agriculture Projections Recent shifts in world food supplies from sur- industrialized countries against the paucity Of plus toward deficit and back again toward surplus information available for the less developed and have generated wide concern as to future food centrally planned countries. The extent to which balances. This chapter reports on world food governments intervene to influencethe quantities projections to 1985 and 2000, emphasizing the and prices of food produced and consumed in problem of food balances in the context of wider much of the world also leaves long-range projec- resource and environmental balances. The projec- tions subject to wholesale revision as agricultural, tions are summarized in the maps on the following food, and trade policies change. pages. The analytic f1ramework used to generate Hence, the food projections presented in this the projections and their broad implications are chapter must be seen as broad directional indica- highlighted. Resource balances, estimates of the tors only. changing cost and growth in investment required to develop the productive capacity projected to Model and Methodology 2000, and the broad environmental implications of the projections are also treated. The projections outlined below were generated using a world grain-oilseed-livestock (GOL) model and three smaller sets of aggr egate food, arable area, and fertilizer relationships. Caveats GOL is a formal mathematical model made up of roughly 1,000 equations describing the function- Long-range projections, particularly food pro- ing and interaction of 'the world's grain, oilseed, jections, are subject to several qualifications. and livestock sectors. More precisely, GOL is a First, estimating changes in population, income, conglomerate of some 28 regional agricultural taste, resources, technology, and weather as well sector models made up of grain, oilseed, and as their interrelationships 25 years in the future livestock 'supply, demand, and trade equations calls for a number of studies rather than a single that sum to a world total. The parameters for the paper. The wide range of credible studies analyz- mathematical relationships underlying the models ing these factors but reaching conflicting conclu- were estimated using data from 1950 through 1975 sions points up the latitude possible in estimating or were drawn from the literature and the judg- changes in these key variables and their interrela- ment of experts. tionships. The analyses that follow endogenize as The strength of the GOL model lies in its many of these variables and interrelationships as emphasis on cross-regional and cross-commodity possible but depend to a large extent on output quantity and price linkages. The individual grain, from other models that study individual variables oilseed, and livestock sectors within each regional in greater detail. model are linked on the supply side in their Second, highly aggregated food projections with competition for resources, and on the demand so distant a time horizon'are not forecasts of what side as intermediate or finished products in the will happen but rather educated guesses of what human diet. Production and consumption across could happen. Assigning probabilities to projec- regions are balanced at the world'Ievel. Imports tions is consequently difficult; projection studies and exports sum to zero, and world and regional themselves are designed to test alternatives and to trade prices are harmonized. Each of the regional identify potential problems and evaluate possible models provides for physical factors (such as solutions. technical input-output relationships) and economic Third, global food projections in particular de- factors (such as supply, demand, and tradi pend on generally limited and sometimes conflict- prices). Exogeneous inputs include population and ing data. Any global food analysis must balance income growth rates, agricultural and trade policy the wealth of information available for most of the assumptions, and weather assumptions. 73 Q@l V, A x AY v"A > A XV 783 965 v, 197 WEIR' 0 USSR and t%n Europ 7K gkM 193 t'A Uni -PARA a@d 14@ 105 2000 _@p g@" I', wzx, N Africa aRd 1975 n -the Midd@ a- % 283 N 4a#n America -AM wf,@" 0 of ;All@llt @I'MWA WOO X@O@ MO Vie- t @A- 4S'P, Av@ Nc @Z A 21 W5, A@Z 4 "A"'NP" @j % TE% x mv R W E 1975 M Sr and Europe 61 and United States No Aid' MKOR-41 and the die 4- --2Q00 1975 AM 2000 1975 Latin America 1975 V, Other Industrialize go - Ail M lia Can M, go 'qm@, 4 X, % wo 3.25 Alternative 11 base Yield Level 2.75 Alternative I Base Yield Level Nol r9in between alternative$ based on Regional Standard Errors and summed to a world total calculated on 1950-76 data 2.25 Alternative III Base Yield Level 1.75 1.25 1960 1965 Actual 1970 1975 1985 2000 Pro*ted rinm V A Ba B_se Figwv 6-1. World grain yields, actual and projected under Alternatives 1, 11, M. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 77 GOL materials were supplemented with three 1950-75 regional yield series (see Table 6-3 and smaller, informal sets of relationships dealing with Fig. 6-1). Alternative H is run assuming petroleum aggregate food production and consumption, ara- prices remain at their real 1974-76 level through ble area, and fertilizer use. The first is used to the year 2000. translate GOL output into indices of total food . Alternative 111, which defines a lower bound, production and consumption; the second and third assumes higher population growth and lower per sets of relationships are used to estimate arable capita income growth rates of about 2.1 percent area and fertilizer use. Fertilizer is used as a and 0.7 percent, respectively. Growth in yields is proxy for a larger collection of inputs, including projected assuming poor weather-4.e., assuming improved varieties, pesticides, and inigation. Sec- weather through 2000 to be less favorable than ondary measures of land-man ratios and use of over the last 25 years. Yields are projected the fertilizer per arable hectare are also generated. equivalent of one standard error below Altemative I levels (see Table 6-3). Altemative III. is run assuming that real petroleum prices more than Scenario Definitions double by 2000. . Three altemative sets of projections were gen- No provision was made for long-term improve- erated for the Global 2000 Study using Merent. ments or deterioration in climate. It is assumed income, population, and weather assumptions as that the world's climate continues largely as well as Merent assumptions about the rate of reported over the past several decades, or that petroleum price increases. changes in climate will be small enough to be Alterriative 1, a baseline projection, assumes compensated for by changes in cultural practices median world population and per capitaincome and development of new technology. Assuming growth rates averaging roughly 1.8 percent and no significant climate changes, however, does not 1.5 percent, respectively, through the year 2000 rule out years of good weather comparable to the 'iffables 6-1 and 6-2). Growth in yields, ultimately late 1960s in the Soviet Union or bad weather raised or lowered by the producer prices gener- years comparable to the mid-1960s in India. The -'ated under a specific altemative, is projected at variations in yields between Altematives H and ,rates compatible with the technological advances III provide some measure of the good weather- @of the past two decades. Weather is held con- bad weather range likely without a major change ,.stant-i.e., the impact of weather on yields in climate. ,through 2000 is assumed to be comparable to that @of the past 25 years. Agricultural and trade General Results policies are assumed to continue to be largely While the output generated under Altematives protectionist in the major importing countries and 1, 11, and Ill differ with regard to specifics, a trade-expansionist in the major exporting coun- number of conclusions hold for all three scenarios. tries. Altemative I's median income, population, The following general conclusions pertain to Alter- and weather assumptions are run in combination native I output. first with constant energy prices-i.e., assuming petroleum prices do not increase markedly from Record Growth the real-price highs of 19174-76--and second as- The world has the capacity, both physical and suming marked increases more than double the cost of energy inputs by 2000. As will be noted economic, to produce enough food to meet sub- later, the resultant quantity and price ranges stantial increases in demand through 2000. The quoted under Altemative I reflect not so much Projections are compatible in this regard with a uncertainty about petroleum price increases as number of other studies suggesting a world food uncertainty about the ability of the agricultural Potential several times higher than current produc- sector to adjust to changes in input costs. tion levels. The food growth rates implied in this Altemative 11, which defines ai@i optimistic up- Study's production and consumption projections per bound, assumes lower population growth and are comparable to the record increases reported higher per capita income growth of about 1.5 for the 1950s and the 1960s. Growth in the grain percent and 2.4 percent, respectively. Growth in component of total food production and consump- yields is projected assuming favorable weather- tion-for which longer historical series are avail- i.e., assuming weather through 2000 to be more able-is also projected near or above the record favorable than weather over the last 25 years. rates of the last two decades and more than Good weather is assumed to raise yields about the double the rate of increase for the first half of equivalent of one standard error calculated on the century (Table 6-4). Several significant quali- 78 THE PROJECTIONS fications are needed, however, to put this growth early 1970s (Tables 6-5 and 6-6). into proper perspective. Driving near-record growth Driving near-record rates of growth on the sup- in demand are equally impressive growth in pop- ply side are marked increases in the resources ulation in the less developed countries (LDCs) committed to food production-measured roughly and affluence in the industrialized countries. The in terms of land under cultivation-and strong world's food sector must grow at near-record rates gains in productivity-based primarily on wider simply to maintain the benchmark per capita con- adoption of technology and increased use of re- sumption levels reported in the late 1966s and source-augmenting inputs such as fertilizers and TABLE 6-1 Population Growth Rates, Actual and Projected (Percent) 1985/1975 2000/1975 1970/1960 Alternatives Alternatives III I Percent Industrialized countries 1.09 .57 .48 .67 .52 .34 .71 United States 1.26 .70 .52 .96 .55 .27 .94 Other developed exporters' 2.28 2.05 1.99 2.15 1.80 1.60 1.94 Westem Europe .80 .33 .30 .35 .43 .31 .52 Japan 1.04 .88 .81 .91 .59 .43 .68 Centrally planned countries 1.54 1.25 .99 1.45 1.21 .94 1.43 Eastern Europe .70 .68 .63 .74 .57 .39 .76 U.S.S.R. 1.25 .93 .80 1.05 .68 .46 .90 People's Republic of China 1.78 1.42 1.10 1.64 1.42 1.14 1.63 Less developed countries 2.56 2.50 2.36 2.66 2.37 2.04 2.71 Latin America 2.82 2.91 2.65 3.04 2.61 2.17 2.94 North Africa/Middle East 2.74 2.75 2.61 2.86 2.75 2A4 3.05 Other African LDCs 2.42 2.61 2.50 2.69 2.68 2.31 2.94 South Asia 2.56 2.34 2.25 2.58 2.13 1.88 2.63 Southeast Asia 2.68 2.50 2.34 2.65 2.20 1.77 2.58 East Asia 2.23 2.13 1.94 2.28 1.99 1.58 2.27 World 1.93 1.79 1.63 1.95 1.77 1.48 2.05 aCanada, Australia, South Africa. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. TABLE 6-2 Per Capita Income Growth Rates, Actual and Projected (Percent) 1985/1975 2000/1985 1960-1970 Altematives Alternatives Industrialized countries 3.29 3.41 4.40 2.41 2.57 3.35 1.77 United States 2.52 3.28 4.35 2.12 2.54 3.42 1.55 Other major exporters, 1.87 1.95 2.85 1.10 1.40 2.25 .55 Western Europe 3.52 3.66 4.59 2.74 2.66 3.38 1.97 Japan 8.76 3.10 4.06 2.17 2.49 3.26 1.81 Centrally planned countries 3.65 2.35 3.22 1.50 2.20 3.15 1.25 Eastren Europe 3.88 2.55 2.85 2.24 2.16 2.60 1.73 U.S.S.R. 5.17 2.30 2.67 1.93 2.06 2.53 1.59 People's Republic of China .90 2.30 3.85 .86 2.30 3.81 .85 Less developed countries 3.13 2.54 3.52 1.55 2.0 1 3.00 1.03 Latin America 2.62 2.64 3.90 1.51 1.84 2.84 .97 North Africa(Middle East 2.79 3.95 4.70 3.35 3.20 4.15 2.26 Other African LDCs 1.00 2.95 3.60 2.35 2.15 3.00 1.38 South Asia .73 1.12 1.91 .20 .66 1.20 .15 Southeast Asia 2.26 2.50 2.65 2.34 2.20 2.58 1.77 East Asia 2.01 3.34 4.37 2.66 2.80 3.98 1.54 World 2.80 2.26 3.23 1.29 1.53 2.42 .66 'Canada, Australia, South Africa Somme: Global 2W Study staff. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 79 TABLE 6-3 Yield Variations Due to Assumptions Regarding Weather Conditions Variation from Kilogram per Hectare Alternative 1 1985 Equivalent and 2000 Yield 1985 2000 Percent Industrialized countries United States 5.75 250 280 Other developed exporters :t 14.50 310 400 Weste r Europe 5.00 190 220 Japan 4.75 190 160 Centrally planned countries Eastern Europe :t 6.25 220 280 U.S.S.R. --11.75 240 310 People's Republic of China 5.50 100 130 Less developed countries Latin America 8.00 130 200 North Africa/Middle East 9.00 130 200 Other developing Africa 3.50 50 80 South Asia 4.75 60 80 Southeast Asia 6.50 110 160 East Asia 6.00 110 160 Weighted total above@l 7.20 180 220 World aggregated" 3.00 70 90 Note:. Yield variations are calculated on the basis of one standard error of the regression of 1950-75 yield data against time. - Production weighted aggregate of regional variations. hVariation calculated using world yield series. Source: Economics, Statistics, and Cooperatives Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. TABLE 6-4 pesticides. The rates of growth in production and the relative importance of area and productivity Grain Production and Consumption Growth gains shown in Figure 6-2's grain data are repre- Rates, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) sentative of the changes projected for the food sector as a whole. Land-man ratios decline 1973-75/ 1985/ 20M/ throughout the projection period, however, and 1951-55 1973-75 1985 the productivity gains needed to keep up growth Percent in production come at increasing real cost, partic- Industrialized countries ularly if sharp increases in petroleum prices are Production 2.5 2.5-1.8 1.8-1.7 incorporated into the analysis. Consumption 2.2 2.4-2.0 1.9-1.8 Problems of distribution across and within re- Exporters Production 2.6 2.9-2.5 2.1-2.0 gions also detract from the high world growth Consumption 2.1 2.7-2.2 2.2-2.1 rates shown in Table 6-5. Production and con- Importers sump tion increase at faster rates in the LDCs than Production 2.3 L".2 in the industrialized countries. LDC growth, how- Consumption 2.1 2.1-1.7 1.6-1.5 ever, is from a substantiaBy smaller base. Further- Centrally planned countries Production 2.8 2.4 1.6 more, the LDC aggregate and many of the re- Consumption 3.0 2.2 1.6 gional totals are somewhat misleading because the Less developed countries difference between individual LDCs-i.e., an Ar- Production 2.8 3.3-3.7 3.0--2.8 gentina compared with an India, or an Egypt Consumption 3.1 3.6-3.6 2.8-2.6 compared with a Bangladesh-are far wider than Exporters the differences between the industrialized coun- Production 3.2 3.1--4.2 3.2-2.9 Consumption 3.5 1.7-1.7 2.4-2.3 tries total and the LDC total. Importers Growth in food production and consumption Production 2.7 3.3-3.6 3.0-2.8 are not likely to balance at the regional or country Consumption 3.0 3.&-3.7 2.8-2.7 levels. Significant increases in trade---exported by World a few major surplus producers, including the Production 2.7 2.7-2.5 2.1-2.0 United States, Canada, Australia, and several Consumption 2.7 2.7-2.5 2.1-2.0 emerging exporters such as Thailand and Brazil- TABLE 6-5 Grain and Total Food Production, Consumption, and Trade, Actual and Projected (Alternative I) Grains Food (million metric tons) (1969-71 = 100) 1969-71 1973-75 1985 2000 1969-71 1985 2000 Industrialized countries Production 401.7 434.7 569.5- 525.9 739.7- 679.1 100.0 126.6-118.1 157.0-143.7 Consumption 374.3 374.6 486.2- 465.3 648.4- 610.8 100.0 121.0-116.6 155.8-147.7 Trade +32.1 +61.6 +83.3-+60.6 +91.3-+68.3 United States Production 208.7 228.7 304.0- 297.1 416.0- 402.0 100.0 137.8-134.9 184.3-178.5 Consumption 169.0 158.5 210.9- 199.8 290.0- 272.4 100.0 119.6-114.0 160.3-151.3 Trade +39:9 +72.9 +93.1-+97.3 + 126.0-+129.6 Other developed exporters Production 58.6 61.2 93.0- 83.1 121.9- 106.1 100.0 139.1-126.7 175.4-155.6 Consumption 33.2 34.3 47.1- 45.5 68.1- 65.2 100.0 126.8-123.2 173.3-166.8 Trade +28.4 +27.7 +45.9-+37.6 +53.8-+40.9 Western Europe Production 121.7 132.9 160.0- 133.0 182.8- 153.0 100.0 119.1-105.0 133.5-114.6 Consumption 144.2 151.7 182.2- 175.5 225.9- 213.1 100.0 115.1-111.5 138.5-131.6 Trade -21.8 -19.7 -22.2--42.5 -43.1--60.1 2 Japan M Production 12.7 11.9 12.5- 12.7 19.0- 18.0 100.0 102.0-103.6 125.0-131.5 Consumption 27.9 30.1 46.0- 44.5 64.4- 60.1 100.0 150.7-146.3 205.6-192.8 Trade -14.4 -19.3 -33.5--31.8 -45.4--42.1 Z Centrally planned countries Production 401.0 439.4 567.0 722.0 100.0 138.2 174.0 Consumption 406.6 472.4 596.0 758.5 100.0 143.3 179.9 Trade -5.2 -24.0 -29.0 -36.5 Eastern Europe Production 72.1 89.4 110.0 140.0 100.0 146.2 183.2 Consumption 78.7 97.7 118.5 151.5 100.0 144.4 181.7 Trade -6.1 -7.8 -8.5 -11.5 U.S.S.R. Production 165.0 179.3 230.0 290.0 100.0 137.7 172.7 Consumption 161.0 200.7 242.5 305.0 100.0 148.5 185.9 Trade +3.9 -10.6 -12.5 -15.0 People's Republic of China Production 163.9 176.9 227.0 292.0 100.0 134.0 169.0 Consumption 166.9 180.8 235.0 302.0 100.0 136.0 171.4 Trade -3.0 -3.9 -8.0 -10.0 Less developed countries Production 306.5 328.7 471.7- 490.7 735.0- 740.6 100.0 154.4-161.4 244.5-247.7 Consumption 326.6 355.0 526.0- 5223 789.8- 772.4 100.0 163.4-162.8 247.8-242.8 Trade -18.5 -29.5 -54.3--31.6 -54.8--31.8 TABLE 6-5 (continued) Grains Food (million metric tons) (1969-71 = 100) 1969-71, 1973-75 1985 2000 1969-71 1985 2000 Exportersa Production 30.1 34.5 48.5- 54.4 78.1- 84.0 100.0 132.5-142.9 209.2-225.0 Consumption 18.4 21.5 25.7- 25.5 36.7- 36.0 100.0 122.2-121.7 160.8-158.0 Trade +11.3 +13.1 +22.8-+28.9 +41.4-+48.0 Importers" Production 276.4 294.2 423.2- 436.3 656.9- 656.6 100.0 156.0-158.4 247.0-249.3 Consumption 308.2 333.5 500.3- 496.8 753. 1'- 736.4 100.0 166.2-164.6 254.0-248.9 Trade -29.8 -42.6 -77.1--60.5 -96.2--79.8 0 Latin America a Production 63.8 72.0 101.0- 111.9 182.6- 185.9 100.0 158.7-174.8 279.5-284.4 > Consumption 61.2 71.2 99.5- 98.2 168.8- 166.0 100.0 162.7-160.7 269.7-265.3 Z Trade +3.2 +0.2 +1.5-+13.7 +13.8-+19.9 a North Africa/Middle East > 0 Production 38.9 42.4 56.2- 56.8 92.2- 89.0 100.0 146.3-148.1 252.5-257.8 X Consumption 49.5 54.1 80.6- 79.6 127.5- 123.7 100.0 167.4-165.1 276.1-267.3 r) Trade - 9.1 -13.8 -24.4--22.8 -35.3--29.7 Other African LDCs Production 32.0 31.3 47.1- 50.0 61-3- 63.7 100.0 150.7-160.2 197.1-204.9 Consumption 33.0 33.8 51.9- 51.5 63.3- 63.0 100.0 161.2-160.0 196.4-196.4 Trade -1.0 -2.4 -4.8- -1.5 -2-0- +0.7 South Asia Production 119.1 127.7 184-2- 186.0 265.0- 259.0 100.0 154.0-155.5 221.8-216.8 Consumption 125.3 135.1 199.7- 199.0 284.3- 275.7 100.0 158.7-158.2 226.2-219.4 Trade -6.2 -9.3 -15.5--13.0 -19.3--16.7 0 Southeast Asia Z Production 22.8 21.4 38.3- 41.4 62-0- 65.0 100.0 179.1-194.3 295.3-310.0 W Consumption 19.3 17.9 30.5- 30.5 47-9- 47.0 100.0 168.0-168.0 268.8-263.6 Trade +3.4 +3.7 +7.8-+10.9 +14.1-+18.0 East Asia Production 29.9 34.0 44.9- 44.6 71-9- 73.0 100.0 155.8-154.7 251.4-255.3 Consumption 38.3 42.9 63.8- 63.5 98.0- 97.0 100.0 173.1-172.3 267.7-264.9 Trade -8.8 -9.7 -18.9--18.9 -26.1--24.0 World Production 1,109.2 1,202.8 1,608.2-1,583.6 2,196.7-2,141.7 100.0 141.5-140.5 194.0-191.0 Consumption 1,107.5 1,202.0 1,608.2-1,583.6 2,196.7-2,141.7 100.0 141.5-140.5 194.0-191.0 Trade +1.7 -0.8 Note: in trade figures + indicates export; minus sign indicates import. 'Argentina and Thailand. hAll others, including several countries that export in some scenarios (e.g., Brazil, Indonesia, and Colombia). 00 00 TABLE 6-6 Per Capita Grain and Total Food Production, Consumption, and Trade, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) Grains Food (kilograms per capita) (1969-71 = 100) 1%9-71 1973-75 1985 2000 1969-71 1985 2000 Industrialized countries Production 573.6 592.6 718.9- 663.8 838.5- 769.8 100.0 112.9-104.5 128.8-118.4 Consumption 534.4 510.7 613.7- 587.3 735.0- 692.4 100.0 108.8-104.9 127.7-121.2 Trade +45.8 +84.0 +105.1- +76.5 +103.5- +77.4 United States Production 1,018.6 1,079.3 1,331.2-1,301.0 1,697.4-1,640.3 100.0 124.8-122.2 156.0-151.1 Consumption 824.9 748.0 923.5- 874.9 1,183.3-1,111.5 100.0 108.5-103.4 135.9-128.3 Trade +194.7 +344.0 +407.7-+426.1 +514.1-+528.8 Other developed exporters Production 1,015.6 917.0 1,117.4-1,052.1 1,052.0- 915.6 100.0 103.3- 98.6 99.6- 88.7 Consumption 575.4 514.0 596.3- 576.1 587.7- 562.6 100.0 98.6- 96.0 97.5- 94.3 Trade +492.2 +415.0 +581.1-+476.0 +464.3-+353.0 Western Europe X Production 364.9 388.4 441.5- 367.0 470.7- 394.0 100.0 111.0- 95.2 117.1-101.0 M Consumption 432.4 443.3 502.8- 484.3 581.7- 548.8 100.0 107.4-104.1 121.4-115.5 10 X Trade -65.4 -57.6 -61.3--117.3 -111.0--154.8 0 Japan tri Production 121.7 108.5 102.1- 103.7 142.9- 135.4 100.0 83.4- 84.5 111.3-106.1 Consumption 267.5 274.4 375.7- 363.4 484.4- 452.3 100.0 130.4-126.6 164.2-154.2 Trade -138.1 -175.9 -273.6--259.7 -341.5--316.7 Z Centrally planned countries Production 356.1 368.0 411.5 451.1 100.0 116.7 129.6 Consumption 361.0 395.6 432.5 473.9 100.0 122.4 135.8 Trade -4.6 -20.1 -21.0 -22.8 Eastern Europe Production 574.0 693.0 788.6 921.9 100.0 132.7 153.3 Consumption 626.6 757.4 849.5 997.6 100.0 131.1 152.1 Trade -48.6 -60.5 -60.9 -75.8 U.S.S.R. Production 697.6 711.2 812.8 903.2 100.0 115.6 128.1 Consumption 663.1 7%.1 856.9 949.9 100.0 127.9 141.4 Trade +16.1 -42.0 -44.1 -46.7 People's Republic of China Production 216.3 217.6 237.6 259.0 100.0 108.7 117.4 Consumption 220.2 222.4 246.0 267.8 100.0 110.3 119.1 Trade -4.0 -4.8 -8.4 -8.8 Less developed countries Production 176.7 168.7 182.0- 189.4 195.6- 197.1 100.0 101.7-106.5 109.5-110.8 Consumption 188.3 182.2 203.0- 201.6 210.2- 205.5 100.0 107.7-106.7 111.0-108.6 Trade -10.7 -15.1 -21.0- -12.2 -14.6- -8.4 TABLE 6-6 (continued) Grains Food (kilograms per capita) (1969-71 = 100) 1%9-71 1973-75 1985 2000 1%9-71 1985 2000 Exporters' Production 491.0 521.9 541.1- 606.9 624.5- 671.7 100.0 90.6- 97.7 102.6-110.4 Consumption 300.1 325.3 286.7- 284.5 293.5- 287.8 100.0 83.6- 83.2 78.9- 77.4 Trade +184.3 +198.2 +254.4-+322.4 +331.1-+383.9 Importers" Production 159.4 173.8 169.2- 174.4 180.8- 180.7 100.0 104.3-106.0 110.0-110.8 Consumption 177.7 193.6 200.0- 198.6 207.3- 202.7 100.0 111.2-110.1 113.3-110.8 Trade -17.2 -24.1 -30.8- -24.2 -26.5- -21.9 Latin America 0 Production 236.1 241.0 247.6- 247.4 305.9- 311.4 100.0 108.2-118.9 131.5-133.7 0 Consumption 238.3 244.0- 240.8 282.8- 278.1 100.0 > 226.5 110.9-109.6 127.1-125.1 Z Trade +11.8 +2.7 +3.7- +33.6 +23.1- +33.3 0 North Africa/Middle East > Production 217.1 214.6 201.8- 203.9 218.3- 222.5 100.0 87.2- 88.3 95.9- 98.2 0 100.0 X Consumption 276.2 273.8 289.4- 285.8 301.8- 292.8 101.8-100.3 105.9-102.2 Trade -50.8 -69.8 -87.6--81.9 -83.6--70.3 Other African LDCs Production 134.9 118.3 130.7- 138.7 109.0- 113.2 100.0 98.1-104.3 81.2- 84.5 C@ Consumption 139.1 127.7 144.0- 142.9 112.5- 112.0 100.0 105.0-104.2 81.3- 80.9 X Trade -4.2 -9.1 -13.3- -4.2 -3.6- +1.2 tri South Asia Production 161.6 162.4 170.0- 171.7 174.0- 170.0 100.0 104.6-105.6 107.0-104.6 0 1. tri Consumption 176.0 171.8 184.3- 183.7 186.7- 181.0 100.0 107.8-107.4 109.2-105.8 Trade -8.4 -11.8 -14.3--12.0 -12.7--11.0 -3 Southeast Asia 0 Z Production 244.7 214.5 273.6- 295.8 301.9- 316.5 100.0 116.3-126.4 129.2-135.9 W Consumption 207.2 182.6 217.9- 217.9 233.2- 228.5 100.0 108.9-108.9 117.1-114.6 Trade +37.5 +31.9 +55.7-+77.9 +68.7-+87.5 East Asia Production 137.3 136.0 139.9- 138.9 161.1- 163.5 100.0 104.6-104.9 121.1-122.8 Consumption 176.2 171.5 198.8- 197.8 219.5- 217.3 100.0 116.2-115.6 128.7-127.3 Trade -40.4 -38.8 -58.9--58.9 -58.5--53.8 World Production 311.5 313.6 337.7- 332.6 352.2- 343.2 100.0 109.5-108.5 117.0-114.5 Consumption 311.0 313.4 337.7- 332.6 352.0- 343.2 100.0 109.5-108.5 117.0-114.5 Trade +0.5 +0.2 Note: in trade figures, + indicates export; minus sign indicates import. 'Argentina and Thailand. 6AH others, including several countries that export in some scenarios (e.g., Brazil, Indonesia, and Colombia). 00 w 25D -"x 235 Projected Production Changes too,- Projected Yield Changes S A 'T -3, "CIA Historic Production Historic Yield Projected Area Changes 77IF g -- @Hirtric @Ar. "fT Sim, -Of" 0-5, W; 0" 47 W-, ,Q-7 'vP J !@t,, A.' Figure 6-2. Indices of world grain production, area and yield, actual an4. ptqj _t qc C4 FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 85 will be needed to balance excess demand in food- above the levels projected under a constant petro- deficit Western Europe, Japan, the. centrally leum price alternative. planned countries, and parts of developing Africa Even a rough estimate of the impact of higher and Asia. World trade varies from alternative to energy prices on agricultural production depends alternative but exceeds record 1973-75 levels by on the timing of price increases, long-run rates of at least 20 percent, by 1985 and 60 percent by technological change, and short-run input flexibil- 2000. ity. The real energy price increases projected to Energy Price Impacts 2000 in the energy projections of this study (Chapter 10) are so large as to suggest that the The quantity and price ranges shown in Tables severity of the impact in the long run depends on 6-5 and 6-6 reflect model outputs on the impact the rate at which energy-conserving technologies energy price increases could have on the agricul- replace existing energy-intensive technologies. tural sector. The bottom end of the range provides Little can be done to project the rate or the for no marked increase in the price of energy from impact of such long-run technological change. In real 1973-75 levels. The upper end provides for the shorter term, however, some estimate of the inoderately higher real prices by 1985 and substan- impact of higher energy prices can be made on fially higher real prices by 2000. The range the basis of data on energy intensity and judg- reflects not so much uncertainty about petroleum ments as to how much flexibility farmers in a price increases as uncertainty about the effect particular country have to change input mixes. changing petroleum prices have on agriculture Figure 6-3 can be used to gauge approximate and the ability of farmers to maintain or expand energy intensity and to demonstrate the impor- production while shifting awayfrom energy4nten- tance of energy flexibility. Both cross-sectional sive inputs. A variety of cultural practices and data for the 30 largest agricultural producers, and management techniques are available in the short time series data for a smaller number of countries and medium terms to minimize the effect of suggest the energy-intensity curve is basically S- energy price increases. The experience of the past shaped. Given the position of countries along 2-4 years suggests that food and overall agricul- the curve, there appears to be little question that tural production could well. adjust in the long run past increases in productivity have generally de- to substantially higher energy prices, depending pended on marked increases in energy inputs. The on the timing *of increases, without the degree of impact of any energy price increase, all other dislocation implied.at the upper end of the range. things being equal, depends on where a country is . The model results suggest that, while world on this energy-intensity curve. The efficiency of production and consumption levels might not be energy use measured roughly in terms of energy changed measurably by marked but gradual in- input-product output ratios might well strengthen creases in energy prices, major shifts within and or weaken the impact of any energy price change, across sectors and regions would be Rely. The but the general ranking of the countries from right comparative advantage of the resource-endowed to left would not be likely to change much. The LDCs such as Brazil and Thailand, which use experience of the past 3-4 years of higher energy relatively few high energy-intensive inputs, would prices suggests that a country's ability to move improve. Higher energy prices, however, would back down the curve toward lower energy inten- likely exacerbate problems of comparative disad- sity-i.e., to adjust production techniques without vantage in food production common to many of sacrificing the high productivity associated with the industrialized and higher-income LDCs. advanced technology-is particularly crucial. Adjustments in the food-exporting countries A review of the adjustments U.S. farmers can would likely be mixed. In countries such as the and, in many cases, are making suggests that the United States, higher energy prices could be range of options available even within a basically offset at least partially by increasing the land energy-intensive technology is quite wide. Data resources committed to food production and by from Department of Agriculture and Federal En- decreasing on the use of, or increasing returns to, ergy Administration studies estimate that the en- energy-intensive inputs. The comparative advan- ergy used in the U.S. agricultural sector in 1974 tage of the traditional food-exporting countries was equivalent to 2,000 trillion Btu (British ther- would likely deteriorate relative to the resource- mal units) or roughly 5,300 Btu per hectare of endowed LDCs but improve relative to most of total cropped area. As Figures 6-4 and 6-5 the industrialized countries and several of the indicate, the largest energy @ expenditures were resource-tight LDCs. The sizes of these changes reported in cultural operations, transportation, in comparative advantage are projected to keep irrigation, livestock operations, crop drying, and the exporters' sales on the world market at or energy investment in fertilizers and pesticides. - ------------------ Cross sectional data Japan @An 300 - West Germany H X 200- 0 United Kingdom 0 Z 100- United States 'k-Time series clato India Indonesia Brazil Ni rio T10*11ndex of Crop and LIMStock V@Ws Figure 6-3. Energy intensity data. Cross-sectional energy use data plotted against crop and livestock yields for 30 largest food producing countries; 15-year historical series plotted against time for United States and several major European producers. 40 Energy - Wo 40.1 invested" in Gasoline chemicals: - 700 f"lizers, 3.7 bit gals. 500 pesticides, Cultural herbicides, 30 operations fungicides 600 till, plant, 0 0 Diesel Fuel cultivate, tv 30 400 RZ > 2.6 bil. gals. applications, Son harvest > ca I Transportation 0 20 hauling, pickup 400 t: x 3DQ trucks, some auto 20 300 M Irrigation Natural Gas Cc to 200 167 bil cubic ft. Crop L.P. Gas drying 3 0 100 Z 1.5 bil. gals. J. Electricity (A 32 bil. kWh too 10 0', FW Oil Livesitock, Miscellaneous 300 mill. Qok.. dairy, Poultry frost protection, electric overhead other 0 01' Figure 6-4. Energy used in agriculture, 1974. Figure 6-5. Energy used in agriculture, plus fertilizer and chemicals, 1974. 00 88 THE PROJECTIONS A review of the literature on energy-saving or much sharper than A graduated 5-10 percent per techniques suggests that considerable reductions year. The present capabilities of the GOL model, in energy Use are possible in all of these areas. do not permit more precise measurement of the- The energy savings possible from modifying cul- impact of gradually changing petroleum prices 6r' tural practices, which currently account for 20 reliable projections of the impact of more extreme percent of energy use, to provide for reduced or energy price changes. minimum tillage are quite large. Net energy sav- ings runge up to 50 percent. Moreover, reduced Continuing Trends tillage in 1975 amounted to only 35.8 million acres, The projections also suggest that the, major while conventional tillage amounted to 218.2 mil- trends of the past two decade"l) the increasing lion acres. , dependence of LDCs on food imports; (2) the Another potential area of large savings is in growing importance of variability in supply; and fertilizer use, which currently accounts for over (3) the increasing importance of the trade and'i one-third of total energy expenditures. Significant agricultural policy decisions of a few major ex energy savings are possible through proper selec- porting and importing countries-are likely t tion and use of fertilizers. The proper timing and continue on to 2000. Shifts in demand towar method of application also contribute to fertilizer livestock products as incomes increase, however', efficiency. Moreover, considerable savings appear are also likely to play an increasingly important possible by changing mixes of fertilizers to empha- role in determining the quantities and prices oe size organic and green fertilizers as well as commodities moving on the international market . inorganic chemical fertilizers. The grain trade projections shown in Table 6-5i Irrigation engineers also suggest that it is tech- suggest that the LDCs, excluding food-surplus," nologically impossible to reduce the 10 percent of exporters, * face sharp increases in the absolute,' total energy use accounted for by irrigation by as volume of food imports as well as possible in- much as one half. Reductions in energy consump- creases in the proportion of food imported. tion of as much as 10-20 percent appear to be The increased food imports of many of the de-* possible through miitimal efforts to increase irri- veloping countries, however, are not without gation pumping plant efficiency, to upgrade water positive implications. The grain gap-the differ- usage and water scheduling, and to adopt runoff ence between grain production and consump- control procedures. tion-is generally seen as an indication of the less. Drying grain for storage-which accounts for 5- developed countries' inability to feed themselves. 10 percent of energy use-is another area of Increases in imports, however, also measure the' potential saving. There appear to be several ways LDCs ability to supplement limited domestic out- to reduce grain-drying fuel requirements, including put with foreign production. A closer look at more in-the-field drying, better management of the which LDCs import more through 2000 suggests existing system, and the use of new technical that the largest increases are concentrated in the developments such as solar heat. There are also relatively affluent upper one-third of the develop-. significant potential savings in the transportation ing world. The calorie gap--the difference be- sector through more efficient use of equipment. tween recommended caloric consumption mini-. Keeping these short-term options for minimiz- mums and food energy supplies-suggests a much ing energy inputs in mind, the projection alterna- larger, more persistent problem concentnated in tives can be seen in a number of different con- the lowest-income countries but affecting groups texts. Those Alternative I runs assuming constant within higher-income countries as well. The aver- petroleum prices would be valid either given no age LDC per capita calorie gap narrows margin- increase in petroleum prices or given increases at ally through 2000 but, with the number of people a fairly even pace-possibly 5-10 percent per increasing at near-record rates, the absolute size' year-provided the agricultural sector maximizes of the gap and the number of people eating below'. short-term energy savings and ultimately substi- the recommended minimum is projected to in- t.utes energy-conserving technologies. A number crease under all but optimistic Alternative H. of the model's coefficients have been adjusted to While the direction, frequency, and size o reflect estimates of both short-term flexibility in fluctuations in supply will continue to depend' energy use and the long-term development of largely on weather, the importance of variability energy-conserving technologies as discussed in in supply is likely to increase markedly as world Chapter 18. The Alternative I projections based productive capacity is used at significantly higher on an increasing petroleum price would be valid should agriculture not adjust to gradual energy *Primarily Argentina and Thailand, but in some scenarios price increases or should the increases be sudden other LI)Cs as well, e.g., Brazil, Colombia, and Indonesia. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 89 levels. The experience of a number of countries ruminant herd suggest that a larger proportion of suggests that expansion of cultivation into mar- meat supplies will have to come from pork- and ginal areas increases susceptibility to weather poultr y products heavily dependent on grain and fluctuations. The resource balances reviewed be- oilseed feeds. Moreover, the world's fish catch is low indicate that a larger proportion of the world's an essentially concentrate-free source of animal food supplies will have to be grown on increas- protein,.and, should.the world's fish catch not ingly marginal areas dependent on favorable increase at the 1.5-2.0 percent rate assumed in (rather than normal) rainfall and temperature. the model runs, deman& for feed to. produce a Reserves are likely to increase in importance as comparable amount of animal protein from pigs a means of ensuring that production windfalls and and chickens could increase grain'and oilseed de- temporarily low producer prices do not generate mand by another 1 percent. The impact on prices production cutbacks in the food-exporpng coun- and diets worldwide would be relatively small, tries. Reserves are also likely to increase in since less than 6 percent of the world's protein importance as a means of reducing price fluctua- and I percent of the world's calories are derived tions and the market-rationing effect of short-term from fish and seafood products. However, in se- drops in production in a world of rising real lected countries-such as Japan, where fish ac- drices. counts for 25 percent of protein supplies and 8 ' All three alternatives also suggest that the percent of calories-the impact would be very sig- agricultural and trade policies of a small number nificant. of importers and exporters will play an increas- World grain and overall food balances could ingly dominant role in determining the quantities tighten further if the lower-income industrialized and prices of food traded on the world market. countries, centrally planned countries, and the The increased importance of policy decisions in higher-income less developed countries were to the exporting countries would result from their markedly increase their consumption of livestock control of scarce excess productive capacity. The products and adopt the grain-intensive feeding experience of the last five years suggests that techniques of the U.S. World food prices could without marked changes in international trading also be pushed up substancially as price-inelastic conventions, the role of major but sporadic im- food demand in the poorest LI)Cs competes porters such as the Soviet Union is also likely to against more elastic feed demand in the affluent increase. Protectionist agricultural and trade poli- countries. cies currently allow large countries or blocs rela- tively close to self-sufficiency to avoid the costs Differing Perspectives of adjusting to world production shortfalls. The All three alternatives also suggest that the food current structure of the world market also allows and environmental concerns of the industrialized them to pass on part, if not all, of the cost of and less developed countries are likely to diffi@r disruptions in their domestic agricultural econo- widely. The prime concern in the industrialized mies for absorbtion by the world market. The countries is likely to be adjustment. The major impact of changes in world supply and demand exporters will continue to face the problem of are consequently likely to be absorbed more and adjusting their production to higher but widely more by countries exporting a large proportion of fluctuating foreign demand. The food-deficit production and countries importing a large propor- higher-income countries will continue to face the tion of consumption on a regular basis. problem of worsening comparative disadvantage All three alternatives also suggest that, in addi- and increasingly expensive protectionist agricul- tion to population and income growth, shifts in tural and trade policies. The effect of changing consumption patterns are likely to play a major production levels on the environment and the role in shaping demand, particularly beyond 1985. impact of environmental constraints on production Growth in demand and shifts in taste away from costs, however, will be a concern common to all calorie-efficient diets based on cereals and the industrialized countries. starches toward less calorie-efficient, livestock- In contrast, the LI)Cs are likely to face the oriented diets will determine to a large extent the more pressing problem of expanding production- demand price. of grains, oilseeds, other high- often regardless of environmental costs-to meet protein feeds, and possibly food prices in general. rapidly expanding food needs. Several of the Changes in the proportion of concentrate-fed higher-income countries, such as Korea and Tai- products in the livestock total will be critical in wan, and several of the resource-constrained determining the impact of this shift toward live- countries of North Africa and the- Middle East will stock diets and the grain and oilseed balance. face the same comparative disadvantage problems Biological limitations on the expansion of the as many of the food-deficit industrialized coun- 90 THE PROJECTIONS tries, but the bulk of the LDCs will be concerned population, income, yield, and petroleum price with environmental quality only after basic human variables differs widely by regions and over time. needs are met. In the food-importing countries of Western Eu- rope and in Japan, with relatively stable yields and low population growth rates, the crucial Alternatives I-M: Results and demand variables both in 1985 and 2000 are likely to be income growth rates and shifts in taste. The Conclusions crucial determinants of supply are likely to be petroleum prices and domestic agricultural and The projections presented in Tables 6-7 and trade policy decisions. Among the traditional 6-8 point up a number of alternative-specific exporters, foreign demand, weather-related fluc- conclusions regarding (1) the impacts of popula- tuations in yields, and, to a lesser extent, petro- tion, income, yield, and petroleum price variations leum price increases will be the most relevant in particular regions and over time, (2) the range considerations. Among the centrally planned of possible LDC food consumption improvements countries, yield variations are likely to continue to through 2000, (3) the variability of world trade and be the most relevant factors. Among the lesg the role of the U.S. as residual supplier, and (4) developed importing countries, population growth the range of likely world market price increases. is by far the dominant demand factor, with Before reviewing specific conclusions, however, variability in yields dominating on the supply side. comments on the range spanned by the alterna- tives and on short-term versus long-term adjust- The importance of each of these exogenous ments are called for. variables changes over time. Petroleum prices The range covered by the population and in- become more important as increasingly tight re- come growth rates for Alternatives II and III is source supplies narrow the alternatives to energy- narrow (see Tables 6-1 and 6-2). The range of intensive food production techniques. Variations yield variations is also narrow (see Table 6-3). in yields are also likely to become more important Given the amount of uncertainty about rates of as agricultural production expands into increas- growth in these variables, the ranges tested here ingly marginal areas more susceptible to weather would appear to be too narrow. Moreover, com- fluctuations. Income growth becomes increasingly parisons in terms of absolute production and important in LDCs as low but sustained growth consumption levels suggest rather minimal differ- over the rest of the century pushes per capita ences between alternatives. However, the combi- levels in the middle-income countries high enough nation of all the favorable assumptions in Alter- to generate shifts in taste toward grain-fed live- native 11 and a the unfavorable assumptions in stock products. Alternative III suggests it is highly probable that the outcome for the world and for major regions With regard to improvements in per capita would fall within the range bounded by these two LDC food consumption, even Alternative II's alternatives-particularly if analyzed in terms of combination of optimistic supply and demand per capita (rather than absolute) production and assumptions suggests gains are likely to be small consumption levels. and poorly distributed. Annual gains in per capita With regard to short-term versus long-term consumption for the LDCs as a group aver-age adjustments, the static nature of the GOL model less than 0.5 percent but range as high as I and the long-range specification of its elasticities percent and as low as declining per capita con- limit the model to measuring net long-term adjust- sumption. Given Alternative III's pessimistic as- ments. The model can say little about the year to sumptions, LDC per capita levels do not grow. year adjustments within the agricultural sector While increase in the high-growth regions slows needed to reach the solutions calculated for 1985 somewhat, per capita consumption levels fall or 2000. Consequently, the fluctuations in endog- below substandard benchmark 1%9-71 levels in enous variables generated by the changes in the low-growth South Asia and Central Affica. exogenous variables noted above could well be The food problem in many of the LDCs with substantially wider if gauged over a shorter 3- to the slowest growth in consumption appears to be 5-year rather than a 10- to 20-year period. as much a problem of effective market demand as a problem of expanding production. The effect of Results production constraints-be they limited agricul- A comparison of the results of the alternatives tural resources, inadequate agricultural infrastruc- tested suggests that the impact of changes in ture, outdated technology, institutional con- TABLE 6-7 Grain and Total Food Prodwtion, Consumption, and Trade (Alternatives I, H, 111) 1985 2000 Grain Food Grain Food (million metric tons) (1%9-71 = 100) (million metric tons) (1%9-71 = 100) Industrialized countries Production 569.5- 525.9 568.1 536.2 126.6-118.1 127.3 118.2 739.7- 679.1 730.0 683.3 157.0-143.7 157.1 143.5 Consumption 486.2- 465.3 515.7 455.9 121.0-116.6 127.1 114.6 648.4- 610.8 687.6 590.2 155.8-147.7 165.7 143.6 Trade +83.3-+60.6 +52.4 +80.3 +91.3-+68.3 +42.4 +93.1 United States Production 304.0- 297.1 297.5 309.7 137.8-134.9 135.1 140.2 416.0- 402.0 409.8 414.0 184.3-178.5 181.8 183.5 Consumption 210.9- 199.8 229.5 194.4 119.6-114.0 129.2 111.2 290.2- 272.4 325.0 256.8 160.3-151.3 178.3 143.2 0 Trade +93.1-+97.3 +68.0 +115.3 +126.0-+129.6 +84.8 +157.2 0 Other developed exporters > Production 93-0- 83.1 91.5 78.7 139.1-126.7 137.3 121.2 121.9- 106.1 126.0 107.3 175.4-155.6 180.6 157.1 Z Consumption 47.1- 45.5 49.9 44.2 126.8-123.2 133.0 120.3 68.1- 65.2 75.9 65.9 173.3-166.8 190.6 168.4 > Trade +45.9-+37.6 +41.6 +34.5 +53.8- +40.9 +50.1 +41.4 0 Western Europe w Production 160.0- 133.0 166.0 135.5 119.1-105.0 122.9 103.5 182.8- 153.0 184.3 143.0 133.5-114.6 134.4 108.3 Consumption 182.2- 175.5 188.8 173.3 115.1-111.5 118.6 110.4 225.9- 213.1 229.9 208.5 138.5-131.6 140.6 129.2 Trade -22.2--42.5 -22.8 -37.8 -43.1- -60.1 -45.6 -65.5 Japan Production 12.5- 12.7 13.1 12.3 102.0-103.6 104.2 %-0 19.0- 18.0 19.5 19.0 125.0-131.5 139.3 138.0 tri Consumption 46.0- 44.5 47.5 44.0 150.7-146.3 155.2 144.8 64.4- 60.1 66.4 59.0 205.6-192.8 211.5 189.5 Trade -33.5--31.8 -34.4 -31.7 -45.4- -42.1 -46.9 -40.0 Centrally planned countries Production 567.0 589.5 534.0 138.2 143.7 130.1 722.0 746.0 691.0 174.0 179.5 166.1 Consumption 5%.0 597.5 578.5 143.3 143.8 139.1 758.5 755.0 730.0 179.9 179.2 173.2 Z Trade -29.0 -8.0 -44.5 -36.5 -9.0 -39.0 En Eastern Europe Production 110.0 114.5 104.0 146.2 151.7 138.8 140.0 145.0 136.0 183.2 189.4 178.3 Consumption 118.5 119.5 116.5 144.4 145.6 1412 151.5 151.0 148.0 181.7 181.2 177.8 Trade -8.5 -5.0 -12.5 -11.5 -6.0 -12.0 U.S.S.R. Production 230.0 245.0 210.0 137.7 146.4 126.0 290.0 305.0 270.0 172.7 181.5 161.0 Consumption 242.5 244.5 232.0 148.5 149.7 142.2 305.0 304.0 289.0 185.9 185.3 176.3 Trade -12.5 +.5 -22.0 -15.0 +1.0 -19.0 People's Republic of China Production 227.0 230.0 220.0 134.0 135.6 130.2 292.0 2%.0 285.0 169.0 171.1 165.2 Consumption 235.0 233.5 230.0 136.0 135.2 133.4 302.0 300.0 293.0 171.4 170.4 166.7 Trade -8.0 -3.5 -10.0 -10.0 -4.0 -8.0 Less developed countries Production 471.7- 490.7 485.3 470.5 154.4-161.4 158.9 152.9 735.0- 740.6 757.0 745.3 244.5-247.7 268.2 246.4 Consumption 526.0- 522.3 529.7 506.3 163.4-162.8 165.1 157.1 789.8- 772.4 790.4 799.4 247.8-242.8 261.2 249.0 Trade -54.3--31.6 -44.4 -35.8 -54.8- -31.8 -33.4 -54.1 TABLE 6-7(cont.) Grain and Total Food Production, Consumption, and Trade (Alternatives I, II, III) 1985 2000 Grain Food Grain Food (million metric tons) (1969-71 = 100) (million metric tons) (1969-71 = 100) Exporters!' Production 48.5- 54.4 48.7 52.2 132.5-142.9 133.0 139.7 78.1- 84.0 81.0 79.3 209.2-225.0 216.9 212.4 Consumption 25.7- 25.5 26.1 25.6 122.2-121.7 124.1 122.0 36.7- 36.0 37.7 39.3 160.8-158.0 165.2 172.2 Trade +22.8-+28.9 +22.6 +26.6 +41.4- +48.0 +43.3 +40.0 Importers" Production 423.2- 436.3 436.6 418.3 156.0-158.4 159.9 155.6 656.9- 656.6 676.5 666.0 247.0-249.3 271.9 24&8 Consumption 500.3- 496.8 503.6 480.7 166.2-164.6 166.3 160.9 753.1- 736.4 752.2 760.1 254.0-248.9 268.1 254.5 Trade -77.1--60.5 -67.0 -62.4 -96.2- -79.8 -75.7 -94.1 Latin America Production 101.0- 111.9 104.3 107.6 158.7-174.8 163.6 168.4 182.6- 185.9 195.4 188.4 279.5-284.4 298.4 288.1 Consumption 99.5- 98.2 103.7 97.2 162.7-160.7 169.2 159.2 168.8- 166.0 172.5 160.6 269.7-265.3 275.4 257.0 Trade +1.5-+13.7 +.6 +10.4. +13.8- +19.9 +22,9 +27.8 North Africa/Middle East 56.2- 56.8 57.3 53.0 146.3-148.1 149.6 136.9 92.2- 89.0 94.5 88.1 252.5-257.8 259.3 240.4 Production Consumption 80.6- 79.6 80.9 79.9 167.4-165.1 168.1 165.8 127.5- 123.7 125.5 132.5 276.1-267.3 271.4 287.7 Trade -24.4--22.8 -23.6 -26.9 -35.3- -29.7 -31.0 -44.4 Other African LDCs Production 47.1- 50.0 48.6 45.5 150.7-160.2 155.6 145.5 61.3- 63.7 63.1 61.5 197.1-204.9 203.0 197.8 0 Z Consumption 51.9- 51.5 51.5 48.5 161.2-160.0 160.0 150.5 63.3- 63.0 60.7 62.0 196.4-196.4 189.1 193.2 th Trade -4.8- -1.5 -2.9 -3.0 -2.0- +3 +2.4 -.5 South Asia Production 184.2- 186.0 190.0 178.6 154.0-155.5 158.9 149.3 265.0- 259.0 269.0 271.0 221.8-216.8 225.2 226.9 Consumption 199.7- 199.0 200.0 186.3 158.7-158.2 159.0 148.0 284.3- 275.7 290.7 293.9 226.2-219.4 231.3 233.9 Trade -15.5--13.0 -10.0 -7.7 -19.3- -16.7 -21.7 -22.9 Southeast Asia Production 38.3- 41.4 38.6 39.6 179.1-194.3 180.6 185.5 62.0- 65.0 62.6 64.1 295.3-310.0 298.3 305.6 Consumption 30.5- 30.5 29.9 30.7 168.0-168.0 164.5 169.1 47.9- 47.0 46.0 49.9 268.8-263.6 257.8 280.4 Trade +7.8-+10.9 +8.7 +9.9 +14.1- +18.0 +16.6 +14.2 East Asia Production 44.9- 44.6 46.5 43.2 155.8-154.7 161.4 149.7 71.9- 73.0 72.4 72.2 251.4-255.3 253.1 252.4 Consumption 63.8- 63.5 63.17 61.3 173.1-172.3 172.9 166.2 98.0- 97.0 95.0 100.5 267.7-264.9 259.4 274.6 Trade -18.9--18.9 -17.2 -18.1 -26.1- -24.0 -22.6 -28.3 World Production 1,608.2-1,583.6 1,642.9 1,540.7 141.5-140.5 144.5 137.0 2,196.7-2,141.7 2,233.0 2,119.6 194.0-191.0 198.0 191.5 Consumption 1,608.2-1,583.6 1,642.9 1,540.7 141.5-140.5 144.5 137.0 2,196.7-2,141.7 2,233.0 2,119.6 194.0-191.0 198.0 191.5 Trade Awe: in trade figures, + indicates export; minus sign indicates import. 'Argentina and Thailand. bAll others, including several countries that export in some scenarios (e.g., Brazil, Indonesia, and Colombia). TABLE 6-8 Fer Capita Grain and Total Food Production, Consuniption, and Trade (Alternatives 1, 11, HI) 1985 2000 Grain Food Grain Food (kilograms) 0 969-71 = 100) (kilograms) (1%9-71 100) I Industrialized countries Production 718.9- 663.8 719.2 669.7 112.9-104.5 115.2 105.0 838.5- 769.8 847.5 716.9 128.8-118.4 131.8 108.8 Consumption 613.7- 587.3 656.9 569.4 108.8-104.9 115.2 102.1 735.0- 692.4 798.3 619.2 127.7-121.2 139.1 110.0 Trade +105.1- +76.5 +62.3 +100.3 +103.5- +77.4 +49.2 +97.7 United, States Production 1,331.2-1,301.0 1,324.6 1,322.1 124.8-122.2 124.2 124.0 1,699.4-1,6403 1,719.1 1;479.5 156.0-151.1 157.8 137.4 M 0 Co 'nsumption 923.5- 874.9 1,021.9 829.9 108.5-103.4 118.9 98.7 1,183.3-1,111.5 1,363.3 917.7 135.9-128.3 154.8 107.9 0 Trade +407.7-+426.1 +302.7 +492.2 +514.1-+528.8 +355.8 +561.8 0 Other developed exporters > Z Production 1,117.4-1,052.1 1,176.5 983.1 103.3- 98.6 107.6 93.6 1,052.0- 915.6 1,244.5 833.8 98.6- 88.7 112.5 82.8 0 Consumption 5%.3- 576.1 641.6 552.2 98.6- 96.0 104.4 93.0 587.7- 562.6 749.7 512.1 97.5- 94.3 127.4 94.1 > Trade +581.1-+476.0 +534.9 +431.0 +464.3-+353.0 +494.8 +321.7 0 Western Europe X Production 441,5-- 367.0 459.6 372.8 111.0- 95.2 114.8 %.5 470.7- 394.0 480.2 355.4 117.1-101.0 119.2 92.8 Consumption 502.8- 484.3 522.8 476.8 107.4-104.1 110.9 102.7 581.7- 548.8 599.0 519.2 121.4-115.5 124.5 110.1 Trade -61.3--117.3 -63.2 -104.0 -111.0---154.8 -118.8 -162.8 C: Japan w Production 102.1- 103.7 107.8 100.1 83.4- 84.5 87.3 82.0 142.9- 135.4 141.3 129.1 111.3-106.1 110.2 101.8 tT' Consumption 375.7- 363.4 390.8 358.1 130.4-126.6 135.1 124.9 484.4- 452.3 481.2 401.1 164.2-154.2 163.2 138.3 Trade -273.6--259.7 -283.0 -258.0 -341.5--316.7 -339.9 -272.0 2 Centrally planned countries Production 411.5 452.5 369.6 116.7 127.6 107.2 451.1 489.2 375.3 129.6 135.6 112.8 d Consumption 432.5 458.5 400.4 122.4 125.0 115.9 473.9 495.1 3%.5 135.8 138.4 119.0 0 Z Trade -21.0 -6.0 -30.8 -22.8 -5.9 -21.2 w Eastern Europe Production 788.6 825.5 74 1. 3 132.7 138.4 125.4 921.9 071.9 846.2 153.3 161.1 141.6 Consumption 849.5 861.6 830.4 131.1 132.8 128.4 997.6 1,012.1 920.8 152.1 154.2 141.2 Trade -60.9 -36.1 -89.1 -75.8 -40.2 -74.6 U. S. S. R. Production 812.8 877.5 732.2 115.6 124.6 104,5 903.2 979.7 773.9 128.1 138.7 110.3 Consumption 856.9 875.8 808.8 127.9 130.6 120.9 949.9 976.4 828.4 141.4 145.2 123.7 Trade -44.1 +1.7 -76.7 -46.7 +3.3 -54.4 People's Republic of China Production 237.6 260.0 216.2 108.7 117.8 99.9 259.0 278.0 214.0 117.4 125.2 99.0 Consumption 246.0 263.8 226.0 110.3 117.5 102.3 267.8 281.8 220.0 119.1 124.7 99.9 Trade -8.4 -3.8 -9.8 -8.8 -3.8 -6.0 Less developed countries 182.0- 189.4 190.4 178.3 101.7-106.5 106.7 99.1 195.6- 197.1 210.2 176.6 109.5-110.8 119.5 99.1 Production Consumption 203.0- 201.6 207.8 191.8 107.7-106.7 110.8 101.8 210.2- 205.5 219.4 189.5 11 1.0@108.6 116.7 99.9 Trade -21.0- -12.2 -17.4 -13.5 -14.6- -8.4 -9.2 -12.9 TABLE 6-8 (cont.) Per Capita Grain and Total Food Production, Consumption, and Trade (Alternatives 1, 11, 111) 1985 2000 Grain Food Grain Food (kilograms) (1969-71 = 100) (kilograms) (1969-71 = 100) I Exporters4l Production 541.1- 606.9 552.3 573.0 90.6- 97.7 92.5 94.0 624.5- 671.7 663.7 545.6 102.6-110.4 109.0 94.6 Consumption 286.7- 284.5 296.0 281.0 83.6- 83.2 86.3 82.1 293.5- 287.8 308.9 270.4 78.9- 77.4 93.0 72.7 Trade +254.4-+322.4 +256.3 +291.9 +331.1-+383.9 +354.8 +275.2 Importers" Production 169.2- 174.4 177.4 164.1 104.3-106.0 108.7 102.2 180.8- 180.7 194.5 163.4 110.0-110.8 120.3 99.4 Consumption 200.0- 198.6 204.6 188.6 111.2-110.1 113.1 105.6 207.3- 202.7 216.2 186.5 113.3-110.8 119.1 101.8 Trade -30.8- -24.2 -27.2 -24.4 -26.5- -21.9 -21.7 -23.1 Latin America Production 247.7- 247.4 264.3 259.6 108.2-118.9 114.9 113.0 305.9- 311.4 346.6 286.0 131.5-133.7 147.8 123.6 Consumption 244.0- 240.8 262.8 234.5 110.9-109.6 118.7 106.9 282.8- 278.1 306.0 243.8 127.1-125. 1 136.7 110.8 -4 Trade +3.7- +33.6 +1.5 +25.1 +23.1- +33.3 +40.6 +42.2 North Africa/Middle East Production 201.8- 203.9 209.0 188.4 87.2- 88.3 91.0 80.1 218.3- 222.5 239.9 188.6 95.9-98.2 107.4 80.3 0 Consumption 289.4- 285.8 295.1 294.1 101.8-100.3 104.2 99.7 301.8- 292.8 318.6 283.7 105.9-102.2 112.9 98.4 Trade -87.6- -81.9 -86.1 -95.6 -83.6- -70.3 -78.7 -95.0 Other African LDCs Production 130.7- 138.7 136.2 125.5 98.1-104.3 102.3 94.0 109.0- 113.2 123.8 108.0 81.2- 84.5 92.7 80.5 0 144.0- 142.9 144.4 133.7 105.0-104.2 105.3 97.3 112.5- 112.0 119.1 108.8 81.3- 80.9 86.3 78.5 z Consumption (A Trade -13.3- -4.2 -8.1 -8.3 -3.6- +1.2 +4.7 -0.8 South Asia Production 170.0- 171.7 177.1 160.7 104.6-105.6 108.9 98.8 174.0- 170.0 178.1 152.1 107.0-104.6 109.6 93.5 Consumption 184.3- 183.7 186.4 167.7 107.8-107.4 109.0 98.0 186.7- 181.0 192.4 164.9 109.2-105.8 112.5 %.4 Trade -14.3- -12.0 -9.3 -7.0 - -12.7- -11.0 -14.3 -12.8 Southeast Asia Production 273.6- 295.8 282.0 278.1 116.3-126.4 120.1 119.4 301.9- 316.5 322.7 282.5 129.2-135.9 138.7 120.4 Consumption 217.9- 217.9 218.5 215.6 108.9-108.9 109.2 107.6 233.2- 228.5 237.1- 219.9 117.1-114.6 119.2 10.0 Trade +55.7- +77.9 +63.6 +62.5 +68.7-1 +87.5 +85.6 +6.2.6 East Asia Production 139.9- 138.9 148.4 131.9 104.6-104.9 111.2 08.5 161.1- 163.5, 168.7 140.4 121.1-122.8 126.9 105.0 Consumption 198.8- 197.8 203.3 IVA I t6.2-115.6 118.9 109.2 219.5- 217.3 221.3 195.5 128.7-127.3 129.7 114.2 Trade -58.9- -58.9 -54.9 -55.2 -58.5- -53.8 -52.6 -55.1 World Production 337.7- 332.6 354.4 315.4 109.5-108.5 114.0 103.0 352.2- 343.2 373.0 302.0 117.0-114.5 126.0 104.0 Consumption 337.7- 332.6 354.4 315.4 109.5-108.5 114.0 103.0 352.0- 343.2 373.0 302.0 117.0-114.5 126.0 104.0 Trade Note: In trade figures, + indicates export; minus sign indicates import. aArgentina and Thailand. "All others, including several countries that export in some scenarios (e.g., Brazil, Indonesia, and Colombia). FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 95 straints, or any combination thereof --- am obvious The surplus productive capacity of the tradi- in countries such as Mexico and Egypt. The tional exportem-particularly Canada, South Af- impact of demand constraints--be they low in- rica, and Australia-4s projected to decrease be- come, skewed income distribution, foreign ex- yond 1985 as a result of growth in domestic change shortages, or any combination thereof- demand. Given the added capacity of several are also obvious in countries such as Bolivia and emerging developing exporters, however, excess Haiti. The regions showing the smallest improve- productive capacity is expected to be more than ments through 2000, however, are those with, adequate to balance the highest import demand severe supply and demand problems. The typical projected in 2000 but at real prices somewhat agricultural economy in South Asia and much of above 1973-75 levels. The model implies that the Sahelian and Central Aftica will be hard pressed major exporters will continue to play a crucial to produce an additional 5-1() kilograms of grain role in balancing world supply and demand by per capita over the next 10 years; their consumers, slowing production in Alternative 11-type situa- however, are also likely to be hard pressed to tions in order to avoid the buildup of price- demand an added 5-10 kilograms. It should be depressing surpluses, and by increasing export noted that Alternative U's production increase is availability under Alternative 111-type situations to relegated largely to reducing imports rather than slow down price increases. increasing consumption. The per capita food en- The U.S. is projected to play an increasingly ergy supplies shown in Table 6-9 suggest that dominant role in this balancing procedure. As the effective market demand is likely to lag below world's residual supplier, the U.S. is projected to nutritional demand measured in terms of even the expand exports faster than the other major traders most minimal requirements. in a tight world supply situation but to contract The results of Alternatives II and III also exports faster in a loose supply situation. The suggest that world trade is likely to vary far more marked variability of yields in the other major than world production and consumption. While exporters shifts an even larger share of the world production and consumption vary as much adjustment on the U.S. in periods of weather as 10 percent from Alternative II to Alternative fluctuations. As Table 6-10 shows, while the III, world trade varies as much as 35 percent. margin between Alternative 11 and III world Among the food-deficit countries, variations in the export levels is roughly 35 percent in both 1985 import demand of the centrally planned countries and 2000, the margin for exporters excluding the' are largest-ranging from 9 to 47 million metric U.S. is 10-20 percent, and the margin for the U.S. tons in 1985 and 10 to 40 million metric tons in is 65-90 percent. 2000. The import demand of most of the other Alternatives II and III also suggest that the major importers, including Japan, South Asia, range of possible real-price changes is wide. North Afiica/Middle East, East Asia, and, to a Under optimistic Alternative II, an index of real lesser extent, Western Europe, shows strong but world market prices increases 30 percent from relatively stable growth (Table 6-10). 1%9-71 to 2000. Alternative III's tighter supply TABLE 6-9 Daily Caloric Consumption in the Less Developed Countries 1%9-71 1973-74 1985 2000 Calories per capita per day Less developed countries 2165 2135 2310-2290 2350 2210 2370-2330 2390 2165 Latin America 2525 2540 2690-2670 28tO 2630 2935-2905 3080 2710 North Africa/Middle East 2421 2482 2465-2430 2525 2415 2530-2460 2655 2390 Other African LDCs 2139 2071 2245-2230 2255 2095 1840-1830 1920 1800 South Asia 2036 1954 2155-2145 2175 2005 2180-2130 2230 1985 Southeast Asia 2174 2270 2320-2320 2325 2300 2400-2365 2425 2310 East Asia 2140 2205 2310-2340 2380 2260 2505-2480 2520 2320 Note: PAO minimum requirements estimated at 2,375 calories per day for Latin America, 2,325 calories in developing Africa, aod 2,210 calories in developing Asia. Skewed caJoric consumption, however, suggests national caloric consumption averages would have to be 110-125 percent of the minimums to ensure that lowest income classes would be consuming at minimum levels. Source: Tables 6-6 and 6-7. 96 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 6-10 World Grain Trade Quantities (Alternatives 1, H, III) Historic 1995 2000 1969-71 1973-75 1 If III 1 11 111 Millions of metric tons World exports Developed exporters 68.3 100.3 139.0-134.9 109.8 149.8 179.8-170.5 134.9 198.6 United States 39.9 72.9 93.1- 97.3 68.0 115.3 126.0-129.6 84.8 157.2 Other developed exporters 28.4 27.7 45.9- 37.6 41.8 34.5 53.8- 40.9 50.1 41.4 Developing exporters 11.3 13.1 22.8- 28.9 22.6 26.6 41.4- 48.0 43.3 40.0 World imports Developed importers 36.2 39.0 55.7- 74.3 61.2, 69.5 88.5-102.2 92.5 105.5 Centrally planned importers 5.2 24.0 29.6 8.7 46.6 36.5 9.0 39.0 Developing importers 29.3 45.3 77.1- 60.5 67.0 614 %.2- 79.8 75.7 94.1 World Total (net export basis) 79.6 113.7 161.8-163.8 132.4 176.4 221.2-218.5 178.2 238.6 Note: Trade quoted on a net regional basis for total grains and is consequently smaller than trade quoted for individual grains and individual countries. and doubling of petroleum prices generates more with a general Alternative III-.type situation (Table than a 100 percent increase over the same 30-year 6-11). period. A mote detailed analysis of the model's output suggests that the effect of world market price increases varies widely by region and com- Resources and.Inputs modity. Countries importing or exporting a large proportion of their total supply on a regular basis, A closer look at the projections suggests that a such as Japan and the United States, are strongly substantial increase in the share of the, world's affected. In those parts of the world that are near resources committed to food production *will be self-sufficiency, the effect of price changes would needed to meet population- and'income-generated be substantially smaller. Among the industrialized growth in demand through 2000. A number of importing countries near self-sufficiency, higher recent studies conclude the earth's physical re- world prices could strengthen protectionist agri- sources and expanding technology can sustain a cultural and trade policy tendencies. In most of 4-6 percent rate of , growth in food production. the regions of the world, however, domestic Realizing even the 2.1 percent growth to 2000 supply and demand pressures and govemment shown in Table 6-5, however, will entail higher intervention to minimize the effect of world food real costs and increased pressure on the world's price movements on domestic prices would be far resource and environmental balances. more important determinants of actual production and consumption levels. The poorest LDCs accus- Natural Resources tomed to importing to fill basic food needs, however, could find themselves priced out of the Table 6-12's arable area data provides one world market to an even greater extent than in rough measure of food pressure on finite resource 1973-75 should their production shortfalls coincide supplies. Under all the alternatives tested, growth TABLE 6-11 International Price Indices- (Alternatives 1, 11, 111) 1%9-71 1972-74 1975-77 1985 2000 Real 1969-71 $ 100 World market weighted food prices 100.0 165.0 120.0 110-130 105 135 145-195 130 215 Note: Price index movements indicative of direction of change and order of magnitude ottly; static nature of the GOL (grain, oilseed, livestock) model and its use of long-run elasticities can understate price adjustments in the short and medium term. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 97 in arable area slows-generally to less than half put into an extended fallow rotation if any long- the rate of increase over the last two and a half term productivity is to be maintained. Population decades-despite producer,price incentives to ac- pressure on and or semiarid land in these regions celerate the rate of expansion. Physical con- in particular has caused soil-fertility losses, dete- straints, both in the absolute sense of running out rioration of limited water resources, and declining of cultivatable land -and in the relative sense of returns to increasingly costly cultivation. The net the increasing scarcity of good and reasonably return to intensifying use of higher-quality land accessible land, affect virtually all of the regions suggests that economically and environmentally shown in Table 6-5 by 2000 (Fig. 6-6). optimum cropped area is far smaller than -the Although felt generally throughout the world, potential or maximum area generally measured in pressure on land resources is likely to vary widely physical surveys. and to evoke a number of different responses. Arable area will undoubtedly continue to ex- The projections suggest that absolute constraints pand in other regions of the world, particularly in will be most marked in Western Europe, Eastern parts of South America, Central Africa, and East Europe, Japan, South Asia, China, North Africa and Southeast Asia. But by 2000, even in these and the Middle East, and parts of Central America regions where arable area has not reached a and East Asia by the early 1990s. Arable area in maximum, the costs of expansion are likely to be many of these regions will quite likely begin to substantially higher as cultivation moves toward contract before 2000 as demand for land for forested areas or wasteland, and as water supplies nonagricultural uses' increases and as the eco- and water management become constraints. nomic and environmental costs of maintaining Table 6-13's declining land-man ratios add a cultivated areas near physical maxima becomes population dimension to the problem of absolute prohibitive. Reports on land and water manage- and relative constraints on arable area. In general, ment problems suggest that marginal or submar- regions with the tightest absolute constraints,re- ginal land in Sudano-Sahelian Africa, North Aftica port large populations, low incomes, and average and the Middle East, and parts of heavily popu- caloric consumption levels below recommended lated Asia will have to be returned to pasture or minimums. TABLE 6-12 Arable Area, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) Alternative I 1951-55 1961-65 1971-75 1985 2000 Millions of hectares Industrialized countries 361.2 371.8 400.3 392.2 399.1 United States 188.5 180.5 200.5 195.0 208.0 Other major exporters 72.5 89.0 104.0 102.0 99.0 Western Europe 95.1 96.4 90.1 89.5 87.0 Japan 5.1 5.9 5.7 5.7 5.1 Centrally planned countries 384.3 404.5 414.5 417.5 a 420.02 Eastern Europe 55.0 56.0 54.4 U.S.S.R. 219.8 229.5 232.5 People's Republic of China 109.5 119.0 127.5 Less developed countries 529.2 607.1 662.0 706.0 723.5 Latin America 93.5 114.0 136.5 155.0 165.0 North Africa/Middle East 78.5 86.3 91.5 92.5 91.0 Other African LDCs 116.0 146.5 160.5 175.0 182.5 South Asia 196.0 200.5 207.5 209.0 207.0 Southeast Asia 22.7 31.6 34.9 39.0 41.0 East Asia 22.5 28.2 31.1 35.5 37.0 World 1,274.7 1,383.4 1,476.8 1,513.7 1,538.6 Arable area in centrally planned countries thought to be at or near maximum. Growth in land used outside the agricultural sector approximately balances arable area increases. 00 PotentioHy Arable Area XZ V,, @'Moo' - Arable Area 0 z % Per Capita j006 7 w Grain Area 1-71 20W d"O' Figure 6-6. World potentially arable, arable, and grain area, actual and projected. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 99 TABLE 6-13 Arable Area per Capita, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) Alternative 1 1951-55 1%1-65 1971-75 1985 2000 Arable hectares per capita Industrialized countries .61 .56 .55 .50 .46 United States 1.17 .95 .95 .86 .84 Other major exporters 1.72 1.66 1.58 1.29 .94 Western Europe .33 .30 .26 .24 .22 Japan .06 .06 .05 .05 .04 Centrally planned countries .45 .39 .35 .30 .26 Eastern Europe .50 .47 .43 .39 .36 U.S.S.R. 1.16 1.02 .93 .83 .73 People's Republic of China .19 .18 .16 .0 .11 Less developed countries .45 .40 .35 .27 .19 Latin America .56 .51 .47 .38 .28 North Africa/Middle East .68 .58 .47 .33 .22 Other African LDCs .72 .73 .62 .49 .32 South Asia .38 .32 .26 .19 .13 Southeast Asia .38 .41 .35 .28 .20 East Asia .15 .15 .13 .11 .08 World .48 .44 .39 .32 .25 Nwe: Arable area includes land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas ire counted only once), temporary meadows for mowing or pasture, land under market and kitchen gardens (including cultivation under glass), and land temporarily fallow or lying idle. Source: Economics, Statistics, and Cooperative Service, U.S. Departme6t of Agriculture. Countries with the broadest latitude for expan- a proxy for a much larger bundle of productivity- sion report smaller populations but higher popula- expanding inputs, Table 6-14's estimates can be tion growth rates and limited agricultural infra- used as rough indications of the growth associated structure and investment monies-4actors likely to with Table 6-5's projections. The 90-100 percent accelerate growth in their domestic food needs on increase in food production projected through the one hand while slowing the pace or raising the 2000 under Alternative I suggests roughly a 180 cost of increases in production on the other. percent increase in fertilizer use from 80 million AD three alternatives also suggest substantial metric tons in 1973-75 to 225 million in 2000. pressure to increase not only the quantity of The measures of fertilizer use per arable hectare in resources committed to agriculture but also the Table 6-15 point ti@ the increasingly input-intensive intensity of their use. Increasing use of already nature of food production through the end of the cultivated land is possible through multiple crop- century. ping, i.e., enlarging harvested area faster than Expanding food production through increased arable area. Even in those countries where re- use of resource-augmenting inputs, however, is source endowment is such that expansion in subject to diminishing marginal returns. In highly arable area is possible, economic returns to inten- simplistic terms, the 20 million ton increase in sification are likely to rival returns on developing fertilizer Consumption from the early 1950s to the remaining land and water resources by 1990. In early 1960s was associated with a 200 million ton many of the temperate regions unsuited to multi- increase in grain production suggesting a 10:1 ple cropping, similar pressures to intensify are ratio. Growth from the early 1960s through the likely to generate changes in land use-shifts out early 1970s appears to have been at a somewhat of grasslands into higher-yielding or higher-valued lower ratio of 8.5: 1. The increases projected under crops, for example, and shortening of fallow Alternative I imply a further deterioration in this periods. grain:fertilizer ratio to roughly 7.0:1 by 1985 and 5.5:1 by 2000. Ratios within individual regions Resource-Augmenting Inputs vary widely, from as low as 3-4:1 in the countries Pressure on the supply side is also likely to already fertilizing heavily to as high as 10-20:1 in generate increases in the use of inputs (such as the developing countries at the bottom of what fertilizer, pesticides, and high-yielding varieties) to appear to be S-shaped fertilizer response and augment natural resources. If fertilizer is used as fertilizer adoption curves. Changes in these world 100 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 6-14 Fertilizer Consumption, Actual andfrojected (Alternative 1) 1951-55 1961-65 1971-75 Alternative I 1985 2000 Thousands of metric tons Industrialized countries 13,675 25,075 39,900 57,150 84,000 United States 5,175 9,400 16,850 26,250 40,000 Other major exporters 1,050 2,025 3,375 5,500 9,750 Western Europe 6,525 11,850 17,650 23,000 31,000 Japan 925 1,800 2,025 2,400 3,250 Centrally planned countries 3,525 9,100 28,125 49,250 77,500 Eastern Europe 1,375 3,950 9,850 17,500 24,500 U.S.S.R. 2,000 3,700 12,850 22,000 33,500 People's Republic of China 150 1,450 5,425 9,750 19,500 Less developed countries 1,075 3,625 11,925 28,500 58,750 Latin America 375 1,250 3,900 8,750 20,750 North Africa/Middle East 225 650 2,000 4,250 8,750 Other African LDCs 50 175 550 2,500 4,500 South Asia 150 625 3,425 7,750 159000 Southeast Asia - 200 450 2,000 3,500 East Asia 275 725 1,600 3,250 6,250 World 18,275 37,800 79,950 134,900 220,250 Note: Measures in nutrient tons. Fertilizer total includes nitrogenous fertilizer (N), phosphates (P10d, and potash (KgO) used for agricultural production only. Historic usage patterns suggest that the total is made up of approximately 50 percent nitrogenous fertilizers, somewhat over 25 percent phosphates, and somewhat under 25 percent potash. Source: Economics, statistics, and Cooperatives Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. ratios could well be slowed or reversed by either potentially arable land. As increased pressure on changes in the distribution of scarce fertilizer supply generates wider use of high-productivity supplies to increase use in higher-return areas or inputs, water management could become the sin- by technological advances similar to the develop- gle most important constraint on increasing yields merlt of fertilizer-responsive wheat and rice vari- in the developing world. eties through the late 1950s and early 1960s (Figs. 6-7 and 6-8). Costs and Investments Water Resources All three alternatives indicate that projecting . The key role water plays in developing new food balances to 2000 is a question not of capacity resources and intensifying cropping suggests that alone but also of private and public cost. The pressure on water resources is likely to increase projection results presented in Tables 6-5 through even faster than pressure on arable land and 6-9 suggest that the world's productive capacity inputs. Water, management--defined to include is more than adequate to meet the largest foresee- conventional irrigation activities as well as flood able increases in demand to the end of the control, drainage, and soil-erosion control--is al- century. However, real food prices are projected ready the limiting factor on expanding production to increase even if the price of inputs from outside in large areas of the world. FAO estimates suggest the agricultural sector are assumed to remain that over half of the investment in land develop- constant. Projected price increases would un- ment of the 1960s and early 1970s was concen- doubtedly be even larger if the GOL model's trated in water development projects. r@uture private producer and consumer prices were ex- growth in resources committed to agriculture and panded to reflect the public and social costs the successful intensification of resource use are associated with developing and maintaining the likely to depend to an even greater extent on productive capacity needed in 2000. The margin providing more water and improved water man- between public and private costs in the agricul- agement in the arid and semiarid areas, and on tural sector has traditionally been Wide. In gen- drainage and managing surplus water in the humid eral, the expense of developing and -expanding and wet areas that together make up well over productive capacity has been funded largely by half of the world's remaining reserves of arable or. public investment. Productivity gains have also FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 101 TABLE 6-15 Fertilizer Consumption per Arable Hectare, Actual and Projected (Alternative I) Alternative 1 1951-55 1961-65 1971-75 1985 2000 Kilograms per arable hectare Industrialized countries 40 65 100 145 210 United States 30 50 85 135 190 Other major exporters 15 25 35 55 100 Western Europe 70 125 195 255 355 Japan 180 305 355 420 635 Centrally planned countries 10 20 70 120 185 Eastern Europe 25 70 180 315 440 U.S.S.R. 10 15 55 95 145 People's Republic of China 1 10 45 75 150 Less developed countries 2 5 20 40 80 Latin America 5 10 30 55 125 North Africa/Middle East 5 10 20 45 95 Other African LDCs 1 5 15 25 South Asia 5 15 35 70 Southeast Asia 5 15 50 85 East Asia 10 25 50 90 170 World 15 30 55 90 145 Note: Measures in nutrient kilograms. Sourcer Economics, Statistics, and Cooperatives Service, U.S. Department ofAgriculture. depended to a large extent on public investments 2000. The public costs associated with the produc- in education, technology, and extension work. tion levels in Table 6-5 are likely to be several The relationship between public and private times projected private costs. Large public invest- costs have varied widely from country to country ments in basic infrastructure will be needed; the due to differing resource endowments and agricul- institutional organization of agriculture in many tural and trade policies. The most marked differ- LDCs leaves the bulk of capital-intensive expan- ences, however, have been between the industrial- sion (as compared to labor-intensive maintenance) ized and less developed countries. of productive capacity to the public sector. Public Among the industrialized countries-particu- resources can be injected through market in- larly the Western European countries and Japan- creases in farm returns or directly through devel- governments supplement public investments with opment projects. A significant proportion of the farm income and price supports. The projections capital, goods, and services needed, however, will imply that public costs in many of these countries have to come from, foreign sources on a conces- will have to increase several times faster than sional basis if improvements in the agricultural private costs-possibly 3 to 4 times faster-if farm sector are not to slow progress in the rest of the production incentives are to be kept high and if economy. new productive capacity is to be developed and old capacity maintained. Public costs will likely increase faster than pfivate costs in several of the Environmental Implications LCDs with similar problems of high price supports and limited agricultural resources. While the GOL model does not explicitly ad- The situation in many LDCs is likely to be in dress environmental issu .es, the environmental flux beyond 1985. Development policies aimed at difficulties likely to be, associated with the prejec- taxing the agricultural sector--4ndirectly .by keep- tions outlined above appear to be manageable in ing, farm prices low, or directly by financing theory. Management options within the agricul- development in other sectors of the economy- tural sector are wide enough, particularly if sup-' have kept public costs much closer to private plemented with environmentally sensitive technol- costs. The projections in Tables 6-5 through 6-8 ogy, to solve the problems inherent in using @i indicate that a M reversal of conventional public larger proportion of the world's resources in an and private cost margins will be necessary by increasingly intensive manner to produce food. 102 THE PROJECTIONS 4w - 300 - World Food Production in constant 1961-65 dollars (billion) i75 200- :9 2U .0 100 175 - World Fertilizer Consumption in million metric of nutrients -125 23@I "5 'Adtkd Nine Rpre 6-7. World food production and fertilizer consumption, actual and projected. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 103 600 300 400- World Fertilizer COM on 3-00 World Food Production 200- 100- Projected' ry" Figure 6-9. Indices of world food production and fertilizer consumption, actual and projected. 104 THE PROJECTIONS Environmental problems Rely to be associated and pests of high-yield varieties grown in mono- with future increases in food production are worth cultures; the potential toxicity of growth-stimuiat- cataloging, however. ing additives used in animal husbandry ; and the There appear to be two broad categories of effects of changing techniques in food collection, possible problems-those related to expanding processing, and distribution. Man-made inputs and intensifying the use of resources, and those tend to raise productivity initially; if mismanaged, related to increased use of inputs such as fertil- however, they tend to reduce productivity in the izers and pesticides. - medium and long term, to result in increased Among the first group are problems of deterio- output of products of questionable quality, and to rating soil fertility, problems of soil loss and contribute to pollution in other sectors of the sedimentation, problems of desertification, and economy. problems related to irrigation (such as soil and The information available on fertilizer and pes- water salinization, changing water tables, and ticide pollution is fragmentary and generally lim- pollution of water required for nonagricultural ited to microstudies. The potential for widespread uses). If untreated, the problems of this first group pollution due to the primary as well as the cause a gradual deterioration in resource produc- secondary and tertiary effects of fertilization and tivity and declin:uig levels of output. pest control is clear. However, the levels of Detailed information on the extent of past pesticide and fertilizer use projected in Tables fertility losses, erosion losses, desertification, and 6-14 and 6-15 are well below currently defined salinization is limited. Problems have been most maxima. marked in countries where man-land pressures are Fertilizer and pesticide pollution problems can greatest, where agricultural technologies are prim- also result from misuse. Even relatively small itive, where soil conservation measures are quantities of ferilizers and pesticides can generate limited, and where climate factors do not favor major environmental problems if they are used intensive cultivation. Areas reporting the severest improperly. The fast growth in the use of fertil- problems include the Sudano-Sahelian countries izers and pesticides implied by the projections for of Africa and areas of South Asia, North Africa most LDCs over the next three decades point up and the Middle East, East Africa, and Latin the need. for expanding and upgrading farm edu- America. Future problems are likely to continue cation programs and monitoring input use to to be associated with pressure to expand agricul- ensure the optimum trade-off between food pro- ture into marginal areas and to utilize marginal duction increases and environmental quality. resources more intensively. Table 6-12 suggests In summary, while solutions to foreseeable potential problems even in land-extensive areas Of envirortmental problems in expanding food pro- Africa and South America by 2000.. _ duction are theoretically available, their applica- Similar problems in many industrialized coun- tion-particularly in those parts of developing tries, including the U.S. and Australia, have been countries experiencing the greatest environmental offset to some degree by technological improve- stress-4s in question. Ultimately, the environ- ments and upgraded management practices. The mentally positive or negative nature of increases range of technological and managerial options in food production is likely to depend on short- available, however, is limited by basic land char- term versus long-term costs. The real food price acteristics, tillage techniques, and farmers' incen- increases projected for the decades ahead could tives to adopt conservation practices. The most well make the short-term costs of environmentally successful efforts-to date have centered on reduc- positive agriculture seem high and the long-run ing the intensity of land use and implementing costs of an environmentally negative agriculture programs for minimum or conservation tillage, seem small. In the industrialized countries, inter- contour plowing, ten-acing, strip cropping, extend- nalizing the cost of pollution--translating public ing dry or green fallow, minimizing runoff and costs into private producer and consumer costs- wind erosion, and improving crop rotation. The could narrow the margin between short-term and majority of these programs, however, are likely to long-term costs and accelerate the move to an be costly in terms of short-range reductions in environmentally positive agriculture. In most less output or increases in unit production costs. developed countries, however, questions of grain Among the second group of problems related 'to gaps and calorie gaps are likely to outweigh increased use of inputs are: fertilizer and pesticide problems of environment well beyond the'year pollution; the increased susceptibility to diseases 2000. MEMORANDUM OF CALL _________________________________________________________________________________________________________ TO: ________________________________________________________________________________________ YOU WERE CALLED BY-- YOU WERE VISITED BY-- RECEIVED ____________________________________________________________________________________________ OF (Organization) _____________________________________________________________________________________________ PHONE NO. PLEASE CALL-- CODE/EXT.______________________________________________FTS WILL CALL AGAIN IS WAITING TO SEE YOU RETURNED YOUR CALL WISHES AN APPOINTMENT _________________________________________________________________________________________ MESSAGE 7 Fisheries Projections Marine Fisheries Resources fully exploited. In fact, many are severely over- exploited The catch of crustaceans has been The total nominal world catch of marine am- nearly constant since 1970 at about 2.0 nimt. mals in 1975 was 59.7 million metric tons (mint). Mollusks have increased, but in only small The catch from inland areas was 10.4 mint, which amounts. It seems unlikely, therefore, that the includes some of the diadromous species. Marine generally accepted annual potential of 100 mrnt of fish accounted for 49.3 mint. The total aquatic traditional marine species will be achieved on a catch in 075 of 69.7 mint was roughly the same sustained basis. It is more likely that the potential as 1970 (69.6 mint), the last year of steadily is nearer the present catch, or about 60 ninit. increasing. annual catches. Between 1970 and Technological and social developments over the 1975, the average annual total had actually de- next 25 years will not, therefore, cause an increase creased somewhat, primarily, but not entirely, due in sustained yield of the traditional marine fisher- to the failure of the Peruvian anchovetta fishery ies. It is more likely that extended jurisdictions (Tables 7-1 and Fig. 7-1). ownward will decrease the actual yield as management The trend in marine fish has been d der the optimum yield concept brings fishing since the peak year of 1970, demonstrating that un the traditional marine fish populations are now mortality down to magnitudes more in fine with stable, profitable fisheries. Technological ad- TABLE 7-1 vances will likely be needed to just keep the cost of fishing in line with market values. To maintain Total World Catch and Selected Categories present yields will also require development of markets for a wider variety of species in order to (Millions of metric tons) take advantage of inevitable cyclic changes in Freshwa- Crusta- species productivity, and implementation of con- Total ter and Marine ceans Mollusks servational management practices, Diadrorn- Fish . and To a large extent, the current fisheries yields ous Mollusks have been maintained by development of formerly 1953 - - 19.1 2.6 - nontraditional species, e.g., capelin and sprat in 1954 - - 20.3 2.9 - the northern Atlantic and pollock in the northern 1955 28.9 - 21.3 2.8 - Pacific. New fisheries in the next 25 years will 1956 30.8 - 22.7 2.9 - 1957 31.7 5.1 22.8 3.0 - continue to develop by seeking species as a -1958 33.3 5.6 24.1 3.0 - replacement for decimated traditional stocks in 1959 36.9 6.1 26.8 3.3 - Waditional markets. Species will likely be smaller 1960 40.2 6.6 29.2 3.6 - in size and shorter lived. These fisheries may 1%1 43.6 7.0 32.2 3.5 - increase productivity per unit area, but they will 1%2 44.8 6.8 35.6 3.8 - 1%3 46.6 7.0 36.4 4.1 - also create problems in marketing, particularly for 1964 51.9 7.2 40.9 4.0 - direct consumption. Their development may also 1%5 53.3 7.8 39.6 4.1 2.9 restrain rebuilding of traditional stocks because of 1%6 57.3 8.1 43.0 4.3 3.0 ecological interactions. The actual theoretical po- 1%7 60.4 8.2 45.9 4.5 3.2 1%8 63.9 9.3 48.7 5.0 3.5 tential of marine protein becomes quite large, 10 1969 62.6 9.8 47.2 4.7 3.2 to 100 times that of traditional fishery forms, if 1970 69.6 11.6 52.7 5.1 3.4 one is willing to accept that plankton and very 1971 70.9 12.2 52.5 5.1 3.4 small vertebrates can and will be utilized. It is 1972 66.2 12.4 47.2 5.3 3.6 unlikely that a significant stable fishery will de- 1973 66.8 12.8 47.1 5.4 3.5 1974 70.4 12.6 50.8 5.5 3.5 velop on these forms with a few possible excep-- 1975 69.7 13.4 49.3 5.8 3.8 tions. Source: Food and Agriculture Organization, Yearbook of Fishery Statistics; Utilization of kritl in the Antarctic is now Catches and Landings, vols. 16, 24, 32, 40. developing, and may result in large annual yields 105 106 THE PROJECTIONS 7 L @C V YA All categories Marine Fish @J'46' -30- ,''26 ,10 IV6$ 100 19 @-'@,:2000 75 7 L L- Figure 7-1. Annual catch of marine fish and of all marine animals, showing the downward trend in marine fish since 1970. sometime in the next 10-15 years. There is some The 60 mmt marine animal catch in 1975 is potential for developing fisheries on mesopelagic roughly equivalent to 12 mmt of protein. It has" fishes, e.g., lantern fishes, particularly since these been calculated that about 36 grains per day per are distributed in areas outside of national jurisdic- person is an adequate diet of protein (thc average tions. Processing and economic considerations daily U.S. protein intake is about 65 grains). will constrain development of both these poten- Thus, the present fisheries catch would supply tials. about 28 percent of the required protein intake for If present trends continue, recreational marine a population of 4 billion people. This will decrease fisheries will increase over the next 25 years to by 2000 to 25 percent of the requirement for a the point where they will have to replace a population of 6 billion people, even if the total significant share of the present commercial fishery aquatic yield increases to 100 mmt. mortality if the resource is to be managed for Culture of marine species probably produces sustained, maximal yields. This is now more a less than 3 mmt currently but has had a real development in the U.S. than elsewhere in the potential for increasing the supply of marine world but may become a global problem by the animals. This is particularly true for mollusks year 2000. (except squid) in estuarine areas. Demand is Natural changes in ocean climate will not expected to increase, but primarily in the high- greatly affect the total potential yield. Species market-price, low-volume species. Production compositions may change and regional productiv- from culture will be slow at first. Over the next 25 ity may change, but the resource has a basic years it might double to around 6 mint. adaptability which should offset any total changes. Man-made changes are different. Pollution and Fresh Water Fisheries Resources physical side effects of other uses such as mineral extraction and powerplants will have an overall The reported harvest of naturally produced negative effect on productivity. If pollution contin- fresh water fish was about 10 mint in 1975 and ues unabated as appears to be the prognosis, the has not increased over the last five years. There effect will be a significant reduction in fishery appears to be no potential for increased yields yields, but there will be a lag in the effects of from this type of fishery. pollution on the marine resources. Thus, a mo&@ The present production from fresh water culture erate to low decrease in potential due to this effect is uncertain. A large share of this is attributed to would occur during the next 25-year period but the People's Republic of China and Asian pond would become more severe thereafter. culture. The aquaculture potential in fresh water FISHERIES PROJECTIONS 107 where nutrition and primary productivity can be percent of the landings. The largest part of the artifically enhanced is, perhaps, the greatest of fishery resource is located on or above the conti- any in terms of realization. The only natural nental shelf out to a water depth of 150 fathoms. limitation is water supply. Even the species that do provide high yields are The potential yields of marine and fresh water not on the average very densely distributed. Adult resources will only be realized if good manage- demersal fish, those associated closely with the ment, based on a good understanding of the bottom, average about one individual per cubic ecosystem is obtained. The principal ecological meter. Pelagic fish also average about one per research required is on the fundamental processes cubic meter. These adult fish range from 0. 1 to whereby energy is transformed and distributed in 100 kg in size. Zooplankton, thi small animals the ecosystem, and on the effects of abiotic that drift in the water column, average about 100 factors on productivity and species success. individuals per cubic meter and weigh 0.01 grams or less. Almost all organisms are not uniformly Living Marine Resources: Description distributed and tend to aggregate in dense concen- trations, which provide the basis for today's The number of different categories (families, successful fisheries. genus, species) of marine animals reported in The productivity of some of the richest areas is world harvest data is well over a thousand. based on a variable habitat and a multispecies. Because some species are not reported and some fauna. Sustained yields of from 3.0 metric tons not yet exploited, the total numbers of marine per kM2 of surface area (northeast Arctic, New species that might enter the harvest would number England shelf) to 5.0 (North Sea) have been in tens of thousands. An abbreviated list of obtained by intensive fisheries. Most of the shelf species groups used by FAO (the U.N. Food and area is located well within 200 miles of the Agriculture Organization) to report landings is coastline. given in Table 7-2. Most of the species are rare or The largest share of the marine catch (60 sparsely distributed and do not form a resource percent) in 1975 came from the temperate waters significant enough for harvest. Off New England, of the northern Pacific and Atlantic oceans. The for example, there are about 200 species of fish, catch from@ the central and southern zones fol- of which only 30 contribute 3,000 or more metric lowed in order (Table 7-3). The north temperate tons each per year and in total amount to 95 seas have large areas of very productive shelf, TABLE 7-2 Major Species Groups Reported in World Fishery Landings (FAO) FRESHWATER FISHES: CRUSTACEANS: MISCELLANEOUS AQUATIC Carps, barbels and other cyprinids Freshwater crustaceans ANIMALS: Tilapias and other cichlids Sea spiders, crabs, etc. Frogs and other amphibians Miscellaneous freshivater fishes Lobsters, spiny-rock lobsters, etc. Turtles and other reptiles Squat lobsters, nephrops, etc. Sea squirts and other tunicates DIADROMOUS FISHES: Shrimps, prawns, etc. Horseshoe crabs and other arachnoids Sturgeons, paddlefishes, etc. Krill, planktonic crustaceans, etc. Sea urchins, sea cucumbers, and other River eels Miscellaneous marine crustaceans echinoderm Salmons, trouts, smelts, etc. Miscellaneous aquatic invertebrates Shads, milkfishes, etc. MOLLUSCS: Miscellaneous diadromous fishes Freshwater molluscs MISCELLANEOUS AQUATIC Abalones, winkles, conchs, etc. ANIMAL PRODUCTS: MARINE FISHES: Oysters Pearls, mother-of-pearl, shells, etc. Flounders, halibuts, soles, etc. Mussels Corals Cods, bakes, haddocks, etc. Scallops, pectens, etc. Sponges Redfishes, basses, congers, etc. Clams, cockles, arkshells, etc. Aquatic bird guano, eggs, etc. Jacks, mullets, sauries, etc. Squids, cuttlefishes, octopuses, etc. Herrings, sardines, anchovies, etc. Miscellaneous marine molluscs AQUATIC PLANTS: Tunas, bonitos, billfishes, etc. Brown seaweeds Mackerels, snoeks, cutlassfishes, etc. WHALES, SEALS, AND OTHER Red seaweeds Sharks, rays, chimaeras, etc. AQUATIC MAMMALS: Green seaweeds and other algae Miscellaneous marine fishes Blue whales, fin whales, sperm Miscellaneous aquatic plants whales, etc. Minke whales, pilot whales, etc. Porpoises, dolphins, etc. Eared seals, hair seals, walruses, etc. Miscellaneous aquatic mammals .108 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 7-3 Twenty countries exceeded 1,0 million Imetric Marine Fisheries Catch by Area, 1975 tons. Chile and Peru, notably, depend on one species, the anchovetta, the fishery which failed (Mil .lions of metric- tons) in 1972 and has not yet recovered. South Africa (pilchard and anchovy) and Norway (capelin) are Atlantic Pacific Total heavily dependent on one main fishery. The North 15.9 19.3 35.2 remainder are rather well diversified. Central 6.4 9.3 15.7 Much of the world catch is taken in or near South 3.4 4.9 8.3 home waters. The long-distant fleets, however, Total 25.7 33.5 59.2 have been important to many countries, both traditionally (Spain, Portugal) and in the light of recent developments (e.g., Japan, U.S.S.R., and the intensity of fishing has been very great as Cuba, Poland, Korea). well.-These areas border the industrialized coun- The leading species group in 1975 catches was tries, which have developed strong coastal fishing the herrings-sardines-anchovies group, which has fleets. Initial expansion of long-distance fishing traditionally been at the top but has dropped from fleets took place in the north Atlantic area. 44 to 30 percent of the 10 leading species groups. The same countries comprised the 10 leading The cod-hake-haddock species group is a close fishing nations from 1970 to 1975 (Table 7-4). The second; together the two groups account for about top two,3apan and the U.S.S.R., have the'largest 40 percent of the total catch (Table 7-5). The, catches from nonhome waters; Cuba has the herrings group is utilized to a large extent for fish largest proportion of distant water catches The meal and oil. The cods are almost totally used for direct human consumption. The redfishes and 10 leaders take 44 - mmt, or about 63 percent of jacks catches have increased more than the others the total. The Republic of South Korea has the since 1970. largest relative increase in catch since 1970, more The total 1975 catch in U.S. continental shelf than double, followed by Cuba (1.6 times) and areas was abou .t 5.8 mmt, the foreign catch in Denmark (1.5 times). these waters about 3.0 mint. The U.S. consumes most of its catches in the United States and imports about 70 percent of its total fish consump- TABLE 7-4 tion. In this respect, it is unique in the world. Catch by Continent and Leading Countries, 19175 Almost all of the U.S. catch, except tuna, is taken from the U.S. continental shelf. (millions oftnetric tons) Rank Living Marine Resources: Potential Of 10 Catch Several aspects of living marine resources are Highest of prime importance for projecting their use and Africa 4.5 South Africa 1.3 N. America 4.8 TABLE 7-5 Canada 1.0 S U.S. 2.8 Leading Species Groups in World Catch, 1970 South America 6.0 Chile 1.1 and 1975 4 Peru 3.4 Asia 30.7 (Millions of metric tons) 8 South Korea 2.1 1970 .1975 Philippines 1.3 Thailand 1.4 Herrings, sardines, anchovies 21.6 13.7 Socialist Republic of Vietnam 1.0 Cods, hakes, haddocks 10.5 11.8 3 China 6.9 Redfishes, basses, congers 3.9 5.0 7 India 2.3 Mackerels, cutlassfishes 3.1 3.6 Indonesia 1.4 Jacks, mullets, sauries 2.6 3.5 1 Japan 10.5 Salmons, trouts, smelts 2.1 2.8 Europe 12.6 Tunas, bonitos, billfishes 2.0 1.9 9 Denmark 1.8 Shrimps, prawns 1.0 1.2 6 Norway 2.6 Squids, octopuses 0.9 1 -I 10 Spain 1.5 Flounders, halibuts, soles 1.3 1.1 2 U.S.S.R. 9.9 Total 49.0 45.7 FISHERIES PROJECTIONS 109 productivity. First, they are renewable resources respect to the resourre and, to a lesser extent, the and have the potential for continuing productivity. same is true of the offshore limits. Because of The harvest of 'this. productivity is based on the differing concepts of optimality and management, axiom that the net natural rate of growth is national objectives may be quite differently per- changed when population magnitude changes. In ceived, even for the same population. This tends particular, when population magnitude decreases to further exacerbate the harmony between man from virgin levels, the rate of growth increases and nature that is essential for continued and and the net increase provides the surplus yield for optimal utilization of the resource. This is critical harvest. The rate of growth is limited, however, at present with respect to the effects of fishing but being at its maximum in the midrange of density perhaps even more critical in the future with levels, which limits surplus yield. respect to pollution and other man-made changes Between the existing populations of marine in the marine environment. plants and animals and their environments an Up to this time, a natural environment has been intricate balance has evolved, based on feedback assumed when studying and estimating the pro- mechanisms that provide the optimal reactions of ductivity of marine resources. This assumption' populations to the natural ecological variations. can no longer be maintained. This creates even The populations have co-evolved with a wide greater difficulties in understanding the underlying range of natural changes and are adapted to them. natural processes than those experienced in the In terms of our span of time, "What is past is past. The effects of man's changes in the environ- prologue." We do not understand the system well ment are much more subtle, at least initially, than enough to predict the possible changes. Neverthe- those of the fisheries. They are also probably less, we can be confident the populations will longer lasting. Hence, detection of their effects maintain themselves in varying composition but (and subsequent correction) will come througha with generally the same productivity. Marine very much delayed and dampened 'feedback. So animals have not co-evolved with man, and our much so, that it may be useless to attempt interventions cause changes which are potentially management on the basis of detection and correc- very different from those experienced by the tion. At any rate, the uncertainties create great natur-al system and for which the populations do difficulties in projecting the future course of not have the appropriate built-in feedback. Man is events. not sensitive to the effects of such changes. Out Productivity of the living marine resources has technology has developed to the point where we been estimated using two general methods. One is can drive the ecosystem into a disequilibrium based on estimating primary productivity, the from which recovery is unpredictable. The control production of protoplasm or carbon by,photosyn- we now exert in managing the populations is thesis and then extrapolating the conversion of based entirely on a pervasive and intense fishing this energy upwards through the food chain. It mortality that significantly alters population mag- can start with estimates of sunlight entering the nitude. The feedback is entirely through our oceans, with estimates of the standing crop of observation of effects and our reactions, both of phytoplankton (chlorophyll), with estimates of the which are constrained by an economics totally fixation of carbon, or some combination thereof. independent of the marine biosphere. The time Beyond this empirical base, the extrapolations span of changes in the ecosystem is probab 'ly into production of other elements in the food quite out of phase with human desires. Our chain are based on theoretical assumptions, concepts of optimality are very different, from backed by some experimental work, of the con- nature's, and our ignorance of the natural system version coefficients between trophic layers. The is very great. Thus, man's continuing activities in estimates of potential depend to a great extent on the marine ecosystem means that maintaining the definition of the trophic layers or the group of potential productivity in the long run is problemat- species from which the yield is to be obtained. ical, and reduced productivity in the short run is These decisions or judgments can change esti- most likely. A significant example of this aspect is mates by factors of from 10 to 100. It is not the geopolitical treatment of the resources. always clear what is assumed or what animals are Living marine resources are globally considered included in the different levels. The other ap- as, a common property to be held and managed in proach utilizes observations of actual fishery perpetual trust. The scope of commonality is a yields and field surveys of the resources. variable factor and recently has been defined in Most of the ocean areas that are productive of terms of extended coastal jurisdictions. Division fishery resources have been exploited to some by national boundaries is totally artificial with degree. Potential can, therefore, be. usefully esti- 110 THE PROJECTIONS mated by examining the available statistics and possible improvements are limited.and the de- extrapolating therefrom. Lack of accurute reports clines have become increasingly apparent in re- limits the accuracy of such estimates of course, as cent years. It has also become apparent that does the inference that past performance reflects previously observed highs in cycles cannot neces- future potential. Where only surveys of standing sarily be achieved again after intense exploitation. stock are available, assumptions about the annual That is, the potential for a population to react to turnover rate must be made, similar to the tropho- favorable environment is lessened after a high dynamic approach. mortality has been exerted upon it, at least within In both approaches, the overall world total the time spans of 10-20 years, within which the potential is the most precise, since the sum of majority of intense fisheries have been developed. regional and species estimates may average out This may, in part, be caused by species changes the errors of estimate. The regional estimates will triggered by the selective exploitation. change in accuracy in relation to the amount of Relations among species have"not explicitly data and analyses available. On the other hand, been included in most of the estimates of poten- once certain types of areas are defined, and tial. It is documented that shifts have taken place estimates of production per unit area are obtained in some intensely exploited areas (California for some, extrapolation to the total becomes more coast, sardine and anchovy; North Sea, multiple meaningful. The trophodynamics approach utilizes species). It has been observed that the replace- this feature more successfully than the fishery ment populations tend to be of the smaller sized, approach because it does not depend on the shorter-lifespan species. In some cases, yield has vagaries of historical exploitation patterns. The been maintained, but often at the expense of trophodynarnic estimates tend to be greater than heavier fishing. In other cases, yield has de- the fishery-based estimates. The former is estimat- creased, perhaps because the species was less ing a resource potential that includes the total desirable. organic biomass in arbitrary categories and is less In any event, although it has been the case that restained by the implications of practical and fishing has been directed at certain desired spe- feasible fisheries. Thus, the estimates' potential cies, it has also been the case that the gear has are likely to be biased upward in relation to what not been selective enough. The unselective mor- may be achieved. They may be biased upward tafity has, in many cases, been directed at large also because the efficiency of transfer of energy biomass populations, partly because of the devel- may be less than assumed when the populations opment of long-distant, large-vessel fleets, but it is are being selectively fished, although this is a also due, in coastal fisheries, to the high economic currently debated issue. returns. In any mixed species population, which The fishery-based estimates have increased with not by accident occurs in most productive areas, time. This is characteristic of trend extrapolation the fishing mortality exerted on the smaller bio- methods. The very recent experience of fisheries ' mass species, often inadvertently, is greater than however, has led to less optimism about the total that which will maximize long-run yields. Thus, in extractable amounts of living marine resources. general, total area yield has, in many cases, Many of the estimates have been made to promote proven to be less than estimates based on individ- fishery development by stressing the fact that ual species assessment. In addition to these fac- more is available. But outside of this aspect, some tors, many estimates include organisms that have estimates assume that past trends could be simply not yet been subjected to exploitation and are in linearly extrapolated in time and that laws of the so-called lower trophic levels. diminishing returns (limits of biological productiv- The potential of these populations is often ity) would not apply for some time to come. The estimated by multiplying upward from an inverted more specific estimates were often based on the conversion coefficient the consurription by preda- concept and method of maximum sustainable tor populations. Predator and prey cannot be yield. Many of these calculations were based on simply added together. Also, it is not obvious that data from rapidly developing fisheries that were what was consumed by predators in the system is not stabilized to the extent needed for accurate available to man either from an ecological view- estimates and, because of the opportunistic nature point or from a practical technical viewpoint. of 'fisheries, were based on short-term, above- Most published studies agree that the north average population magnitudes. Some animal pop- temperate areas of both the Atlantic and Pacific ulations do cycle. Fisheries are seldom started at Oceans are now being fished to the full potential. population lows. Improved technology has also This corresponds to the belt of highly industrial- masked real declines in populations, but the ized nations which, with few exceptions, are the FISHERIES PROJECTIONS world leaders in fishing. The central and southern overcoming severe social and economic con- sectors of fisheries have been developing primarily straints. Development will have to be carefully through long-distance fleet expansion, and the planned so that the balance and equilibrium of the potential is probably greater than present catch- marine ecosystem are not radically perturbed. more so for the southern temperate Atlantic and There is not enough information to evaluate the the central Pacific region than the other regions. real possibilities of sustained increases in yields, The total increased yield from lightly exploited to say nothing of their practicality. areas has been estimated at 30-50 million tons. The species available strongly influence the devel- Marine Pollution opment of fisheries. Thus, the estimated increase in potential yield over current yield is made up of Industrialization, which is heaviest in the North- hakes in the southwest Atlantic and croakers and ern Hemisphere, is now introducing pollutants small pelagics in the central zones. Some increase into the oceans in quantities which are beginning in cephalopod yield has also been predicted. to cause significant deleterious effects on re- Exploration for krill in the Antarctic Ocean sources and the environment. The important (Atlantic sector primarily) is now underway. The coastal zones are being changed at ever increasing potential has been estimated by various authors at rates to the detriment of natural resource produc- 25-100 million metric tons. Doubtless the popula- tivity. tion is large, but there are many unanswered Worldwide attention to this process is attra cted questions. Do these euphausfids undergo cycles of by the more spectacular, acute events that have density, and is a present high what is attracting direct, but short-term, effects on man (large oil attention? Will the present turnover rate continue spills that affect beaches, heavy metal injections as fishing mortality increases? Will this interfere that poison people). The more important effects, with recovery of whale populations? The answers however, stem from the largely unnoticed, and are not yet available. The more recent comprehen- undetected, chronic low-level pollution. Because sive fishery-based estimates and the better defined most pollutants fall in the latter category and do trophodynamic estimates provide a range of po- not generate public outcry, the general attitude is tential of 100-150 mint. to consider the oceans as an important resource The yields of traditional species in the more to be utilized in disposing of the wastes of man. heavily exploited areas, which are included in the This utilization requires the identification of sub- estimates, have not held up in recent years. In stances that jeopardize marine resources and hu- many areas, the so-called nontraditional species man health and the determination of acceptable are already being harvested (e.g., capelin and levels--an extremely slow process because the squid in the north Atlantic) at maximal levels. pathways and effects are extremely complex and Thus much of the hypothesized expansion is in long-term. Demonstrable threats to marine re- fact a replacement yield and is not additional in sources are seldom available within time spans terms of potential to the present yields. In addition that could effectively stop the pollution prior to to the ecological constraints on estimates of poten- adverse accumulations. tial, the more practical constraints of society The residence time in the oceans of the pollu- (economics, technology, management) will surely tants is minimally a matter of decades, but in- reduce the ability to utilize what has been esti- creases to centuries or greater for. a host of mated as future potential expansion. For example, substances. The process of.transport to the ocean the most efficient fishing operation at present will and accumulation to detectable, but not necessar- average 50 tons per day in good conditions. The ily ineffectual, levels is also in many cases a same efficiency applied to zooplank-ton would matter of decades or centuries. average much less than half a ton per day. How a given material will affect components of These considerations lead to the conclusion that the ocean, and how much of a substance or the present world harvest of marine fish of about habitat modification jeopardizes a resource re- 60 mint will not increase on a sustained basis. quires an ability to predict events in the ocean._ Furthermore, it will only be maintained with good This in turn requires a knowledge of the natural management of fisheries and protection of the processes in the undisturbed system. It is highly marine environment. The total world harvest of problematical that such knowledge will be accu- marine renewable resources, based on exploiting mulated rapidly enough to detect and correct natural production, could be increased substan- adverse effects. tially by the year 2000, perhaps to as much as 100 Productivity of marine resources can be re- mint. To achieve this, however, will require duced by destruction or change of habitat as well 112 THE PROJECTIONS as by bio-accumulation of chemicals, most notably ence on Aquaculture concluded that even with in the coastal zones of industrialized countries. existing technology a doubling of world food Estuarine areas are highly productive, and are an production from aquaculture will occur within the important, and limiting, factor in the life cycles of next decade and that a 5-10 fold increase by the many species of fish and shellfish. Atmospheric year 2000 is feasible if the necessary scientific, transport of pollutants is also affecting the open financial, and organizational support becomes ocean environment far from the sites of direct available. discharge and origin. Man's emissions into the Development of energy-intensive high-technol- atmosphere are now at least about 10 percent of ogy culture of species requiring high-protein diets the naturally occurring flux. will undoubtedly continue in the next two dec- Most of man's activities lead to pollution and ades, especially in industrialized countries, but physical change of the environment. Most of these substantial production of herbivorous species in changes must be viewed as potentially reducing natural waters-designed to yield relatively, low-,. natural productivity. It is only in physically re- cost animal protein--should expand even more stricted areas, under controllable and predictable rapidly, particularly in less developed countries, situations, that man can increase productivity. and particularly in tropical and subtropical areas Because such areas are limited, pollution of the with year-round growing season. An. important oceans at increasing rates will likely have the role of industrialized countries'will relate to im- effect of reducing overall yields of marine re- provement of the technology required for exten- sources. sive culture production of inexpensive animal protein in less developed parts of the world by such methods as genetic selection for high food- Marine Aquaculture conversion efficiency and rapid growth, testing of low-cost diets from natural products, and training@;, Aquaculture, defined as the culture or husban- of technicians. The role of aquaculture in inte- dry of aquatic organisms in fresh or salt water, grated rural development, through provision of yielded an estimated 6 mmt of food in 1975- better diet, jobs, and cash crops, can be significant roughly 10 percent of the world production of in less developed countries. Aquaculture there fishery products. Yields from aquaculture doubled would be primarily in the form of small-scale, in the period 1970-1975; much of the increase was low-technology, labor-intensive operations. in high-unit-value species in industrialized coun- The potential of ocean ranching-not only of tries. Some countries now depend on aquaculture anadromous species, but also of coastal-migratory for a significant part of fish and shellfish produc- species-will be exploited within the next two tion. Japanese aquaculture production increased decades, and substantial increases in yields (as fivefold (to 500,000 metric tons) in the period well as augmentation of fished stocks) can be 1970-1975, while Isr-ael now derives almost half expected in proportion to public and private its finfish from aquaculture. United States aqua- investment in this approach to fish production. An culture production in 19175 was only 65,000 metric important qualifying comment here would be the tons, about 3 percent of U.S. fish and shellfish need for consider-ation of impacts of introduced landings, but this limited amount still constituted populations on natural stocks, and the need to (in 19175) about a quarter of our salmon produc- determine and consider the total carrying capacity tion, about two-fifths of our oyster production, of the ocean areas involved. and about half of our catfish and crawfish produc- Expansion of food production through aquacul- tion. ture must be a matter of national policy and There is cause for reasoned optimism when national priority--4nuch as the expansion of dis- considering increased food production from aqua- tant-water fishing fleets was in many countries culture. Despite institutional, economic, environ- (particularly the socialist countries with plannnedil mental, and technological constraints, global economies) during the 1960s. Included in such yields are increasing. Intensive culture of high- policy would be improvement in the technological unit-value species--such as pen-rearing of salmon base, development of legal protection for aquacul- and raceway culture of shrimp--is approaching ture enterprises, control of coastal/estuarine pol- the point of economic feasibility, and extensive lution, and encouragement of capital investment. culture of animals that utilize very short food With increasing restrictions on harvests from'l chains--such as oysters, mussels, and mullet- continental shelf waters of other nations, the I has the potential for enormous expansion with aquaculture option should become much more- existing technology. The 19176 FAO World Confer- attractive as a protein food source. FISHERIES PROJECTIONS 113 Economic Demand percent for every 100 percent growth in income, e Asian demand to increase 109 percent for 'every ,Projection of past trends in landings into th 100 percent growth in income, and so on. These future assumes that costs of harvesting increasing estimates depend upon the rather awkward as- quantities of fishery products, adjusted for infla- sumption of constant prices for fishery products. tion, will not rise more rapidly than in the past. This, in turn, suggests a whole host of other In its world projection to 1985, FAO estimated the demand for industrial fish separately, assum- assumptions about fishery technology, species abundance, and patterns of fishery management. ing that the demand for industrial fish was func- World forecasts often ignore geographical differ- tionally related to the demand for poultry and ences in population and income growth and the hogs. Demand of fish meal for poultry and hog effects of these different rates of growth on world production was estimated to grow at a higher rate demand for fishery products. for the period 1%5-1975 than for 1975-1985, so .In an effort to overcome some of these difficul_ the growth progression was a step function. ties, FAO in 1970 attempted to estimate the Any long-term forecast is bound to present income elasticity of demand for world fishery numerous difficulties, but the FAO method poses products and to project the demand for food fish some special problems. The greatest drawback to to 1975 and 1985 on the basis of 1%9 FAO the FAO estimation procedures is their lack of expectations about world population and income adjustment for possible price changes, their use of trends (Fable 7-6). The FAO approach assumed unchanging country by country income elasticity 0. - demand for food fish would grow with world coefficients for the time of their forecast, their income, but not at the same rate as world income. failure to disaggregate by species, and the lack of Thus, for example, U.S. and Canadian demand explanatory information on their derived demand for food fish would be expected to increase 20 equations for industrial fish. TABLE 7-6 1970 FAO Projection of Demand for Fish Meal, 1975 and 1985 (Thousands ofmetric tons, product weight) 1975 1985 Consumption Projected . Projected 1961-63 Rate of Projected Rate of Projected Increase Demand Increase Demand (percent per year) (percent per year) Industrialized countries 2,408 4.5 4,250 3.6 5,390 North America 668 2.8 960 2.4 1,140 Europe EEC 734 4.4 1,280 3.5 1,620 Northwest Europe 517 4.1 870 3.1 1,040 South Europe 104 8.5 300 6.7 460 Other industrialized countries Japan 340 5.8 710 4.6 960 Others 45 8.5 130 5.9 170 Centrally planned countries 231 11.2 920 8.6 1,550 U.S.S.R. 119 11.0, 460 9.2 900 Other European countries 112 11.5 460 7.9 650 China - - - - - Other Asian countries - - - - - Less developed countries 221 8.3 620 8.9 1,560 Latin America - - 310 - 710 Africa, South of Sahara - - 30 - 130 Near East - - 60 - 130 Asia - - 220 - 590 World Total 2,860 5.6 5,790 4.9 8,500 Meal from offal 230 6.2 500 6.6 1,000 Demand for meal from fish 2,630 5.5 5,290 4.7 7,5W Demand for fish for meal 13,150 5.5 26,450 4.7 37,500 Note: To convert the demand for meal from fish to the demand for fish a conversion factor of 5 is used, i.e., it is assumed that 5 tons of fish make Iton of meal. Source: Food and Agriculturai Organization, Pro@isional Indicative World Plan for Agricultural DeMopmeni, Rome, 1970. 114 THE PROJECTIONS In 1970 Frederick W. Bell et al. sought to model predicted price increases, sometimes sub- overcome several of the cited disadvantages of stantial increases. The FAO group did not attempt the FAO projection methodology. The Bell @ group this, so the two forecasts are somewhat different undertook to estimate price and income elasticity in their intent. FAO sought to forecast what the of demand by species (Table 7-7) and by major world demand would be if prices did not change, consuming country for the years 1975, 1985, while the Bell group attempted to forecast what and 2000. Incorporated into the Bell analysis world prices and quantity demand would be if was an assumed decline in the income elasticity resource scarcities developed as expected. Of demand for food fish for the world starting at Because the Bell Group attempted more than 0.68, in 1965, but declining to 0.22 by 1985, and FAO, there were more places where their forecast leveling out at about that point. This is in compar- could go awry. Interestingly enough, both fore- ison with the FAO estimate which remains at 0.68 casts came out about the same for the 1975 throughout their projection. The Bell group as- predictions, and both were higher than-but sumption of a declining income elasticity is based relatively close to-the actual landing of 69.7 upon the empirical observation that in general mmt (FAO had predicted 74.1 mmt, the Bell richer countries consume less fish per capita (Fig. Group 74.0). Where the two forecasts diverge is 7-2). in the later years. For 1985, FAO predicted a The Bell group also incorporated into their demand of 106.5 mmt, the Bell group 78.6. For model selective assumptions, on a species by the year 2000, the Bell group predicted 83.5 mrnt; species basis, about supply constraints. Their FAO did not make the projection. 7-7-7 1.60 A.40- 1.30' - 1.20 1.10 1. 00 .80,:r .70 @30 AO.- .30 .10 00 500 @M 2000 2,500 3,00W 3,500, 4,500 liars pe, capita, national income in do Figure 7-2. Per capita national income vs. income elasticity of fisheries demand in 77 countries. (Frederick W Bell ef al., unpublished manuscript, 1969) FISHERIES PROJECTIONS 115 TABLE 7-7 19170 Bell et al. Projections of World Aggregate Consumption of Fishery Products,,-1975-20M (Thousands of metric tons, round weight) Changes 1%5-67a 1975 1985 2000 1%5-67 to 2000 (percent) Food fish Groundfish 6,368 6,940 5,761 4,763 -25.2 Tuna 1,291 1,456 1,615 1,657 28.4 Salmon 476 481 485 485 1.9 Halibut 58 58 58 58 0 Sardines 871 1,464 1,848 2,370 172.1 Shrimp 634 1,066 1,347 1,479 133.3 Lobsters 137 174 192 145 5.8 Crabs 328 481 517 386 17.7 Clams 478 535 626 694 45.2 Scallops 166 236 281 322 94.0 Oysters 777 1,218 1,755 2,453 215.7 Other fish 25,086 32,659 41,504 53,524 113.4 Total food fish 36,670 46.768 55,989 68,226 86.4 Fish meal 20,440 27,170 22,634 15,1% -25.7 Total (food and meal) 57,110 78,938 78,623 83,532 46.3 1 Average ofactual. Source: Frederick W. Bell et al., The Future of the World's FisherY Resources (National Marine Fisheries Service, File Manuscript No. 65. 1) Dec. 1970.. These predictions comprise the best available rate to 2000 and a 3.0 percent growth in per capita world demand estimates, although they are both income. out of date. There is need for a new effort in World income may rise 3.2-4.1 percent annually which price and income elasticities are re-esti- from 19r75 to 1985, depending upon whether one mated by species and by country, and revised accepts the low or the high growth rate assump- maximum sustainable yield and other supply fac- tion. From 19175 to 2000 the low projection is 2.9 tor calculations are introduced; projections should percent per year and the high 4.2 percent. On the then be made on the basis of contemporary basis of these assumptions, a crude adjustment of estimates of country by country population and the FAO projection suggests a world fish demand income projections. for 1985, under the constant price assumption, of 92-98 mmt (as opposed to FAO's projected 106 The FAO projections assumed a world popula- mmt). A parallel adjustment for the Bell group tion growth rate to 1985 of 2.1 percent and a per study suggests 72-76 mmt for 1985 (as opposed to capita income growth of 3.2 percent. The Bell their projected 78.6) and 81-83 mmt for 2000 (as Group assumed a 1.7 percent population growth opposed to their projected 83.5). 8 Forestry Projections Twenty-two years ago, forests covered over more industrialized nations, consumption of wood one fourth of the world's land surface. Now products is expected to rise sharply with increas- forests cover one fifth. Twenty-two years from ing GNP per capita. Relative prices of industrial now, in the year 2000, forests are expected to wood products, paper, sawn lumber, wood panels, have been reduced to sixth of the land area. wood-based chemicals, plastics, and many other The world's forest is I y to stabilize on about products, are sure to increase. The effects may be one seventh of the land area around the year somewhat disruptive, but substitutes will probably 2020.* be found for the-'products that become too expen- The economic implications of this transition sive. No catastrophic changes are foreseen. from a period of global forest wealth to a period In the less developed countries (LDCs), where of forest poverty are more apparent from the most of the deforestation will occur, people will expected change in wood per capita. The world forgo the increased use of paper and other indus- now grows about 80 cu m (cubic meters) per trial wood products that might have been expected capita of wood in trees large enough to be to follow increased GNP, and the effect on commercially valuable. In the year 2000, there welfare will be negative but bearable. But indus- will be only 40 cu in per capita, even if the trial wood products are much less important in deforestation rate stabilizes now. If the deforesta- LDCs than charcoal and ftielwood used for cook- tion rate continues to increase with population ing and heating, and poles used for framing growth, there will be substantially less than 40 cu structures'for shelter. Prices and absolute scarcity m per capita.t Yet by the year 2000, GNP is will put fuetwood and charcoal out of economic expected to have increased significantly in both reach of not only the subsistance sector but also the mdfe and less industrialized nations. In the much of the market sector of the LDC popula- tions. *The estimates of forest area as a fraction of the world's land area are derived as follows (references are to work 's in forested area is thus calculated to be about 2.57 billion the list of references at the end of this chapter, unless cited hectares, and the year 2000 area is about 2.1 to 2.2 billion in full). The forest area in 1950 was 4.85 billion hectares, hectares. The assumption that the deforestation rate will not according to Whittaker and Likens. That figure excludes accelerate with population and GNP growth is arbitrary, woodland, shrubland, and savannah. The forest area in 1973 chosen to be on the conservative side. That. the forest area was about 2.66 billion hectares, according to data from will stabilize at about 1.8 billion hectares follows from the Persson (1974), the Economic Commission for Europe, and observation that the forests of the more industrialized J. T. Micklewright ("Forest and Range Resources of the nations have already stabilized at about 1.45 billion hectares United States and Factors that Affect Their Use," unpub- (Micklewright and European Economic Commission) and lished manuscript prepared for the 8th World Forestry that about 365 million hectares of forest in the less devel- Congress, Oct. 1978). That figure refers to "closed forest". oped nations is physically or economically inaccessible to For the United States, closed forest excludes forest land logging and land-clearing operations (European Economic incapable of producing more than 1.4 cubic meters of Commission and Sommer). At the present deforestation industrial wood per hectare per year. For Canada, it rate, the accessible forests in the less industrialized nations excludes land incapable of producing stands of trees 4 will have been razed before 2020, but the rate will undoubt- inches in diameter or larger on 10 percent or more of the edly slow down as the forests available for cutting diminish. area. For the rest of the world, it excludes land where tree Thus the inference that the forest area will stabilize around crowns cover less than 20 percent of the area and land the year 2020. The fractions are derived using 13.003 billion which has a primary use other than forestry. Interpolating hectares as the world's total land area. That figure is from between the 1950 forest area and the 1973 area suggests that Persson (1974); it includes 19 percent of arctic regions and 22 years ago the forested area was over 4 billion hectares. excludes the Antarctic, Greenland, and Svalbard. The present forest area and the forest area for the year 2000 fThe estimates of present and future wood volume per are calculated by factoring the 1973 area by an annual net capita were derived by factoring forest areas for each region deforestation rate of 18 to 20 million hectares. This rate is by the wood volume per hectare for each region as aggregated data from a variety of sources, including Persson estimated by Persson (1974). The estimates of forest area by (1974), Sommer, and several series of reports from U.S. region for the year 2000 used in this calculation were embassies in the less industrialized nations. The 1978 derived from the sources cited in previous footnote. 117 118 THE PROJECTIONS I To provide some insight into the economic and TABLE 8-1 environmental transition occurring as a result of World Forested Area by Region, 1973 changes in the world's forests, this paper first discusses the status of forest inventories and the Closed economic significance of forests from a global Forest standpoint. Then trends and prospects for forests Open Total (% of and forestry in each of the main geographic Forest Closed Wood- Land land regions are reviewed. The special problems of the Land Forest land Area area) world's most complex ecosystems, the tropical Millions of hectares Per- moist forests, are treated briefly in a separate cent North America 630 470 (176) 1,841 25 section. Finally global linkages that will make the Central America 65 60 (2) 272 22 year 2000 forest situation in the tropics important South America 730 530 (150) 1,760 30 to the people of the temperate zone are cited. Africa 800 190 (570) 2,970 , 6 Europe 170 140 29 474 30 U.S.S.R. 915 785 115 2,144 35 Asia 530 400 (60) 2,700 15 Forest Inventories Pacific area 190 80 105 842 10 Several recent reports have mistakenly indi- World 4,030 2,655 (1,200) 13,003 20 cated that the world contains 4.5 billion hectares Notes: Data on North American forests represent a mid-1970s estimate. Data on U.S.S.R. forests are a 1973 survey by the Soviet government (see Reference of forests plus over 2.3 billion hectaxes of open 3). Other data are from Persson (1974); they represent an eady-1970s estimate. Woodlands.' Apparently there is some confusion Forest land is not always the sum of closed forest plus open woodland, as it includes scrub and brushland areas which are neither forest nor open woodland, over the distinction between "forest land" and and because it includes deforested areas where forest regeneration is not taking place. In computation of total land area, Antarctic, Greenland, and Svalbard are "forest," and it seems to be common practice to not included-, t9 percent of arctic regions are included. use forest area data from 1950, as though neither extent of forests nor knowledge about forest areas were changing. In fact, the world has only about global figure must be considered an "informed 2.6 billion hectares of closed forest and another guess. 13 1.2 billion hectares of open woodlands and savan- The wood resources in the world's forests have nahs, according to the most recent and best global been estimated by extrapolating from detailed estimates .2 forest inventories carried out in the various re- About half of the closed forests are located in gions and biomes. the LDCs of the tropic and subtropic regions, Most forest inventories are concerned with the where exploding populations are rapidly destroy- quantity of wood that might be extracted in logs ing forests for farmland and for fuel. The other of commercially useful size. Analysts concerned half are in the industrialized, nations, mainly the with ecological processes, with fuel and other U.S.S.R., Canada, and the U.S., where their nonindustrial products, or with biomass conver- extent is relatively stable in spite of increasing sion and other innovative concepts, need to know demands for forest products. Table 8-1 shows the the total forest biomass. It is possible to multiply distribution of forests by global region. the estimates of biomass density for each ecosys- Information about forest areas is scarce for tem type, as given by Whittaker and LikenS4 by many countries. The data that are available are the present area covered with each major forest classified according to widely varying definitions type, as given by Persson. This calculation (Table from year to year and from country to country. 8-2) indicates that the total biomass of the world's The task of evaluating and synthesizing all these forests and woodlands is on the order of 400 to heterogeneous data was undertaken by the World 500 billion tons of carbon. Forest Inventory project of the Food and Agticul- lure Organization (FAO) in the 1950s and 1960s Forest Products and, when FAO discontinued the work in the early 19170s, by Reidar Persson at the Royal College of Worldwide production of forest products, in- Forestry in Stockholm. Persson considers the area cluding fuelwood, as well as wood for construc- data to be "relatively reliable" (accuracy of - 5- tion, for paper and for other industrial products, 10 percent) for about half of the world's closed totaled at least 2.4 billion cu in (in underbark forest. The data are "poor" (t 40-100 percent) roundwood equivalent) in 19175.5 About half of the for about a third of the closed forest area, and wood harvest is in the industrialized nations where intermediate (� 20 percent) for the rest. The harvest and production vary with economic information on open woodlands is so poor that the cycles. The other half is in the LDCs where most FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 119 TABLE 8-2 manufactured products. As a result, most coun- tries both import and export. With a few excep- Biomass of the World's Forests and Woodlands tions, demand for forest products in industrialized Total nations is greater than production, so that most Biomass Biomass industrialized nations are net importers. Many of 1973 Area Density (billion the less developed nations, on the other hand, (millions (tons tons produce more nonfuel forest products than they Forest Type ha) carbonlha) carbon) can consume and are net exporters. This comple- Tropical rain (tropical mentarity is expected to become even greater and subtropical wet during the next 20 years. As it happens, few of evergreen) 568 202.5 115 the major forest product net exporters are among Tropical seasonal the more rapidly developing LDCs that are likely (tropical and subtropical moist and to be narrowing the consumption gap by the year dry deciduous) 1,112 157.5 175 2000. Table 8-3 indicates the rank order of the Temperate evergreen major net importers and net exporters of forest (temperate coniferous) 448 157.5 65 products. Temperature deciduous (temperature broadleaved) 135.0 The Forest-Man Relationship: Boreal (Boreal) 672 90.0 60 Two Systems Woodland, shrubland and savannah (open Forest resources and the total wood harvest are woodlands) 1,000 22.5 22 about evenly divided between the industrialized Total 3,800 437 , . and the less developed nations. Otherwise, most Notes: The data on areas of each forest type are from Persson (1974). The aspects of the forest-man relationship are pro- biomais d nsities for each forest type are from Whittaker and Likens (1975). Persson .seforest types are named in parenthesis. indicating how they are foundly different in the two types of economies. assumed to correspond to Whittaker and Likens' ecosystem types for this marriage of the two sets of data. Persson does not disaggregate coniferous and The industrialized nations am three times richer in broadloaved temperate forest areas, so it was necessary to use the mean of the forest resources per capita. Table 84 indicates biomass density figures for the two types (i.e., W tons carbon per hectare); however this manipulation introduces a potential error of less than 5 percent. the distribution of forest area and growing stock per capita in the early 1970s. The gap indicated by these -data is widening rapidly. Resources per of the production is fuelwood for cooking, used by people who are so poor that they'are hardly aware of short-term variations in global markets. TABLE 8-3 Supply factors affecting the production of forest Major Traders of Forest Products, 1974 products include not only forest area and standing crop, but also the physical accessibility, species Exports Imports mix and quality of the timber, as well as the Major Less Major Less availability of capital, labor, and management Net Imports Net Exports expertise for road or rail construction and for the Exporters (millions Importers (millions other developments necessary to forest exploita- $) $) tion. Factors affecting production from the de- Canada 4,921 Japan 4,365 mand side include size and socioeconomic char- Sweden 3,601 United Finland 2,273 Kingdom 3,795 acteristics of the indigenous population, rates of U.S.S.R. 1,552 Italy 1,442 investment in wood-processing technology, trans- Ivory Coast 706 German Fed. 1,439 portation costs to foreign markets, national eco- Indonesia 666 France 1,186 nomic growth rates, and market development Austria 540 Netherlands 1,085 Malaysia, U.S.A. 746 achievements. Each nation's annual wood harvest Sabah 373 Belgium-Lux. 504 is also strongly affected by institutional and politi- Philippines 237 Spain 479 cal constraints on forest resource development Romania 218 Denmark 472 and exploitation. These constraints vary from Malaysia, Norway 416 political restrictions on international trade to indig- Peninsula 200 Australia 295 Gabon 133 German DR 284 erious demand for recreation or other noncon- Chile 115 Switzerland 259 sumptive use of forest resources. Portgual 112 Argentina 245 Forest products enter into world trade at an New Zealand 94 Hungary 244 stages-@ primary, semiprocessed, processed and Hong Kong 193. 120 THE PROJECTIONS capita decline in the industrialized countries at the clearing forest lands. The natural ecologies are relatively slow rate of population growth (0.6 likewise basically different. For the most part, 1he percent per year), but in the LDCs the rate is the LDCs are located in the tropics and subtropics, sum of the relatively high population growth rate where natural cycles and,processes are very rapid and the relatively high deforestation rate, which and forcefid. Most industrialized nations are in the means a decrease of 3-6 percent per year in some temperate or boreal regions, where energy and nations, and an even faster decrease in others. materials cycle more slowly through the ecosys- The second major difference in man-forest rela- tems, and where nature is generally less forceful. tions in the two types of economies is in the Because the man-forest systems of the two pattern of forest,product consumption. The indus- types of economies are so dissimilar, they will be trialized nations consume over 90 percent of the treated separately in the remainder of this paper- world's processed forest products, while the except for the important links between the two LDCs consume nearly 90 percent of the wood types of systems, including trade, technology used as fuel. The use of wood for fuel in the transfer, and ecological linkages, which will be industrialized nations may increase somewhat, as considered at the end of the paper. prices rise for the ftiels that have been displacing its use during the past 25 years. Theonly other factor that seems likely to substantially alter Forests and Forestry in the Industrialized consurn ti patterns between now and the year I p on , Nations 2000 is the impending scarcity of wood for fuel and lumber in the LDCs. The U.S.S.R. Ecological aspects of the man-forest relations are as disparate as the economic aspects in the The Soviet Union has, by far, the single largest developed and developing world. The LDCs have forest resource base in the world, with 785 million mainly labor-intensive agricultural systems. In- hectares of forested land growing 75 billion cu rn creased production to meet the demands of grow- (overbark) of industrial sized. wood. The growing the stock is over a third greater than that of the U.S. mg populations must come from increasing labor intensity or from increasing the agricultural and Canada combined. The net annual increment land base, which usually implies clearing forests. in growing stock (growth less natural losses) is on By contrast, the human ecology of the industrial- the order of 880 million cu in (overbark), or 1.2 ized nations comprises mainly capital-intensive percent of growing stock.6 This does not mean systems, in which increased agricultural produc- the resource is unlimited, however. tion is generally achieved by investing more Fourteen percent of the forested area has such capital in already developed land, rather than by slow growth that it is considered unproductive; another 36 percent is not considered to be com- mercially exploitable, mainly because it is inacces- TABLE8-4 sible. Thus only 465 million cu m of net annual Forest Resources per Capita by Geographic growth are presently or potentially available with .present transportation and harvesting technolo- Region, mid-1970s gies. Open Fuelwood production, which takes up about 20 Closed Wood- percent of the total cut now, has been declining Forest land Growing slowly. Lumber production, which takes the larg- Area Area Stock est share of the wood harvest, about 40 percent, (halcap) (halcap) (m*ap)_ has had hardly any growth during the 196N and North America 2.0 0.7 179 1970s. Production of pulp, paper, and fiberboard Central America 0.5 0.02 50 has grown much faster, but the growth rate has South America 2.4 0.7 428 been slackening for the past decade. Stagnation of Africa 0.4 1.3 92 Europe 0.3 0.1 27 total production of forest products is explained U.S.S.R. 3.0 0.4 310 partly by the geographic isolation of the forests, Asia 0.2 0.3 17 85 percent of which are in northern and eastern Pacific 3.6 4.8 390 U.S.S.R., far from the population, 85 percent of World 0.7 0.3 80 which is in the southern and western portions of More industrial 1.3 0.4 128 Less industrial 0.4 0.3 61 the country. Large areas of European U.S.S.R. Sources: Population data from Population Reference Bureau 1977); Forest area are being overcut. For example, the mature stands am volume data from Persson (1974). of Karelia, which account for 5 percent of Soviet FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 121 total and 20 percent of pulp production, will last Europe has about 135 million hectares of com- only 25 years at the present rate of exploitation .7 mercially exploitable closed forest, with a growing The future of Soviet forestry is difficult to stock of 15 billion cu in (overbark). Another 9 predict. A large unsatisfied domestic demand for million hectares of closed forest are classed unex- industrial wood products already exists, as indi- ploitable, because of very low productivity or cated by persistant gaps between production tar- inaccessibility, or because they are reserved for gets and actual output of all the major wood various noncommercial uses. The distribution of products during the past decade. If current trends forest resources among subregions is indicated in continue, the Sbviet's forest industry will be able Table 8-5. The Nordic countries have the largest to satisfy neither domestic nor foreign demand for share of forest resources and have long been its products. exporters to the rest of Europe. Their great wealth In the longer term, the Soviets need to step up of forests per capita suggests that this relationship the reforestation programs, which have been ne- will continue indefinitely. 10 glected in the past. More reliance on Siberian The total wood harvest declined in Europe by 5 forests will be inevitable, but the distance to percent in 1972 and by 10 percent in 1975. In both western markets is enormous, and exploitation is years industrial wood production dropped. unlikely to grow rapidly until roads or railways Whether those declines signal a transition to a are built for other purposes. period 'of slowing growth for the forest products We know little about the reservation of forest industry* is uncertain. A 1976 study commissioned environments for aesthetic values, recreation, or 'by the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe other nonconsumptive use in the U.S.S.R. A Tass (ECE), European Timber Trends and Prospects report claims that forest is being planted at the 1950 to 2000, made predictions for forest products rate of 2 million hectares per year, much of it as consumption based on alternative assumptions groves around cities for "zones of rest" and on about growth of gross domestic product (GDP).. the steppes as shelter belts, which are said to For both high and low GDP growth conditions, "insure grain yield increases" by up to 25 per- the study projects that: (1) fuelwood consumption cent. 8 will continue to decline, though more slowly than in the past; (2) sawnwood consumption will con- Europe tinue to grow, but at a decreasing rate; (3) Forest is one of the few major natural resources consumption of paper and wood-based panels will in which Europe can expect to remain reasonably increase at an accelerating rate, and by the year self-sufficient. 9 By the year 2000, total wood 2000 each will account for a larger portion'of total consumption is expected to increase by 45 to 80 wood use thail will sawnwood; (4) supply of percent, but European forests should supply 80 wood, including imports, will be less than demand percent of the increase. by the year 2000 and will be the main constraint TABLE8-5 Distribution of European Forest Resources Among Subregions, Early 1970s Net Annual Annual Increment Fellings Exploitable Growing Net Annual Fellings per Forest Stock Increment per Area (170) M (0/0) Capita Capita (cu m (cu m underbark) underbark) Nordic countries 37 29 30 33 6.9 7.2 European Economic Community 21 20 23 23 0.3 0.4 Central Europe 3 6 5 5 1.5 1.3 -Southern Europe 22 19 19 17 0.7 0.6 Eastern Europe 18 26 23 22 0.9 0.8 Total 100 100 100 100 0.8 0.7 Measure 138 13.0 393 368 million billion million million hectares cu In cu m cu In underbark underbark underbark Source: U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, European Timber Trends and Prospects 1950 to 2000, pp. 66, 67. 122 THE PROJECTIONS on consumption. Adjusted for the supply con- purification, recreation opportunities, and aes- straint, total wood consumption during the 1975 thetic qualities. to 2000 period is expected to rise at an annual No statistics are available on the forest area in compound rate of 1.3 to 2.0 percent, based on Europe as a whole which has been set aside from assumed GDP per capita growth of 3.1 to 4.1 commercial production for use as parks, nature percent. The ECE study concludes that if more reserves, protection forests, campsites, and so on. countries will begin providing greater incentives Most studies lump such areas with the nonprod- for improved forest management, the projected uctive and inaccessible forests, which together growth in consumption to the year 2000 can be account for about 6 percent of the European real@ed without impairing the forests' potential forest. for sustained production beyond that date. Forested area is expected to increase in all of Environmentally, there will be substantial the European subregions, mainly as a result of changes in European forests during the years to afforestation programs. The area of scrub and 2000. Few, if any, natural forest areas remain open woodlands in southern Europe and espe- now; the present structure and composition of the cially in Spain should decrease as large areas are forest reflects a long history of use and manage- converted to productive closed forest. In the ment. As management intensifies, the forests will Nordic countries, natural regeneration has been become younger and still less diverse. This will more important than planting in the past, but lead to the reduction of some ecological niches planting will have to increase during the next and is likely to cause the extinction of some plant quarter century if the harvests are to be sustained and animal species and changes in the population in spite of the recent tendency to overcutting. In dynamics of others. Meanwhile, pressure is cer- the rest of Europe, afforestation and reforestation tain to grow for management of forests to enhance programs will continue at the pace set during the noncommercial values such as ecosystem stabil- past 20 years, about 150 thousand hectares per ity, protection of water quality and flow, air year. Table 8-6 indicates the ECE study's fore- TABLE8-6 Forecasts of the Areas of Forest and Open Woodland in Europe, Year 2000 Forest and Open Woodlands Exploitable Forest Other Percent Percent Percent of Total of Forest Period. Total Area of Forest Area and Open Land Area and Open Wood- Woodlands lands millions millions millions of ha of ha of ha Nordic countries 1970 58.0 52 50.5 87 7.5 13 2000 61.0 54 51.2 84 9.8 16 European Economic Community 1970 32.6 22 28.9 88 3.7 12 2000 34.0 23 30.6 90 3.4 10 Central Europe 1970 4.8 39 3.8 80 1.0 20 2000 5.2 43 4.5 85 0.8 15 Southern Europe a 1970 52.0 29 @9.8 57 22.1 43 2000 53.2 31 38.4 72 15.1 28 Eastern Europe 1970 27.7 29 25.1 90 2.6 10 2000 29.9 31 27.4 92 2.5 8 Total 1970 175.0 32 138.1 79 36.9 21 2000 183.3 34 152.0 83 31.3 17 Change 1970-2000 Area +8.3 +13.9 -5.6 Percent +5% +1090, -15% Including Cyprus and Israel. Source: Economic Commission for Europe, European Timber Trends and Prospects 1950 to 2000. p. 80. FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 123 casts of the forest areas in the year 2000. For the future of North American forestry seems rather whole region, the forested area is expected to be uncertain. In the early 1970s, before the recent 5 percent larger. perturbations in the global industrial economies, North America the U.S. Forest Service published a study analyz- ing trends and making projections of demand, Canada and the United States are about equally supply, and consumption of wood products. That endowed with forest resources. Each has over 200 study, The Outlook for Timber in The United million hectares of productive forest, and each has States, assumed a GNP increase of 4 percent per about 19 billion cu m of growing industrial-size'd year during the 1970-2000 period and projected wood. Most of the U.S. forest is accessible, and it the U.S. demand for wood products would rise has been used and managed more intensively than by 1.3-2 percent per year, depending on how the Canadian forest. More use generally means a wood product prices change. Increased harvests younger and more rapidly growing forest, and for of the U.S. forest would depend mainly on this reason as well as better growing conditions, changes in relative wood prices and on political annual growth of the U.S. forest is significantly decisions regarding intensity of use of the publicly higher than that of the Canadian forest. On a per owned forest. Under the various assumptions, the hectare basis, the U.S. forest grows nearly as study indicated that the volume of wood supplied rapidly as the European forest. Table 8-7 summa- from the U.S. forest in the year 2000 would. be rizes the present forest resource situation for between 140 and 190 percent of the volume North America. supplied in the year 1970. Most of the volume Because of the recent variation from the longer would come from increased fellings, but part trends in the growth of industrial wood use, the would come from technological advances that TABLE 8-7 North American Forest Resources, Early 1970s Resource U.S.A. Canada North Unit (1970) (1973) America Stocked commercial forest a Million hectares 194 220 414 Unaccessible productive foreStli Million hectares 5 - 5 Reserved forests (parks, etc) c Million hectares 8 15 24 Total productive forest 4 Million hectares 207 235 442 Unstocked commercial foreSte Million hectares 8 17 26 Open woodlands and other forests of extremely low productivity I Million hectares 103 73 176 Growing stock on commercial forest (underbark volume) Billion cubic meters 19 19 38 Cu meters per hectare 93 75 87 Net annual growth on commercial forest land Million cubic meters 527 270 797 (underbark volume) h Cu meters per hectare 2.6 1.1 1.8 Percent growing stock 2.9 1.5 2.1 Cu meters per capita 2.4 11.5 3.3 1974 fellings (underbark volume) Million cubic meters 402 167 545 1975 fellings (underbark volume) Million cubic meters 358 147 505 1974 fellings as percent of net annual growth Percent 76 62 68 'For the U.S.A.. commercial forest is defined as forest land producing or cubic meters of industrial wood per hectare per year. For Canada. this capable of producing crops of industrial wood inexcess of 1.4cubicmeters per includes forest land not suitable for regular harvest because of extremely low hectare per year in natural stands and not withdrawn from timber use. For productivity. Canada, commercial forest is defined as forest land suitable for regular OFor the U.S.A.. this is the volume, suitable for industrial wood use, in trees harvest, capable of producing stands oftrees 4inchesdiameter orlargeron to over 5 inches diameter. For Canada. the definition is presurnably similar. For percent or more of the area, excluding agricultural land currently in use. both, the unstocked commercial forest area is included in the calculation. bThis refers to forest in Alaska that meets the production criteria but is too hNet annual growth is total growth less volumes of trees dying annually. inaccessible to be used commercially. Apparently it refers to wood in the parts of trees suitable for industrial wood 'These are forest lands reserved for noncommercial use. Whether all of the 15.5 use, and apparently it does not net out the volume lost to forest fires. million hectares reserved in Canada are actually productive forest is not clear Fellings refers to removals plus harvesting losses, apparently only wood of from the available sources. size suitable for industrial wood use is included. This measure is provided to dThis category excludes some woodland that would meet the tree growth allow comparison of annual fellings to net annual growth. The ratio offellings criteria, but is not included in forestry statistics because it has been developed to removals was inferred from data provided in U.S. Forest Service (1974), below, and the figures for fellings were calculated by applying that ratio to the for non-forestry commercial use (e.g., residential land). 6For Canada, this is probably an underestimate, as it includes only unstocked removals as reported in FAO (1977). federal and provincial lards that have been allocated to wood production. Sources: U.S. Forest Service, The Outlook for Timber in the United States, 'For the U.S.A., this includes stands of pinyon-juniper, woodland-grass, Washington: GPO, 1974; Cliff (1973); Micklewright (1977); FAO (1977)@ Cana- chaparral, subalpine forests, and other woodlands incapable of producing 1.4 dian Forestry Service, "Canada's Forests," Ottawa: 1974. 124 THE PROJECTIONS would make harvesting and processing more effi- tares per year in the U.S. since 1960. During the cient. If efficiency of softwood production in- . same period, the area planted with trees has creases 12 percent by the year 2000, and efficiency averaged about 650,000 hectares per year. The of hardwood production increases 4 percent, I I remainder, except the relatively small portion and if hardwood use gains on softwood use to dropped from the commercial forest land inven- become a third of the total volume harvested by tory, is left for natural forest regeneration. If the 2000, 12 then the year 2000 fellings in U.S. forests trend continues, the U.S. forest will be less could be between 130 and 175 percent of 1970 completely stocked than it is now. This will not fellings. significantly affect wood production in the year Those projections correspond to a total annual 2000 but will have a negative effect in the longer felling in U.S. forests of from 510 to 690 million term if reforestation programs are not accelerated. cu in (underbark) of industrial-sized wood. The The situation in Canada, where the area harvested lower cut could be accommodated within the or burned annually is about 2.5 million hectares, present net annual growth of the forest, which is is similar. The pressure for reforestation in Can- estimated at 527 million cu in (underbark). The ada is likely to be lower, and costs of reforestation higher projection cannot be realized on a sustained there are higher because of the greater problems yield basis without a substantial increase in the of accessibility. net annual growth of the forest, which can only In the year 2000, the North American forest is occur with an increased intensity of management. likely to be marginally smaller, be less well Increases in demand for Canadian forest prod- stocked, have fewer slow-growing mature trees ucts will depend on the same factors that influence and more fast-growing young trees, contain larger demand in the U.S., except that rising prices of areas reserved for noncommercial use, and have a wood relative to other products would dampen lower ecological diversity in the nonreserved demand less for Canada than for the U.S., be- areas. The magnitude of these changes will de- cause Canada would supply a larger proportion of pend partly on exogenous economic factors and the U.S. demand under that condition. The Cana- partly on the attitude of the public towards forest dian wood harvest is expected to increase by management. about 2 percent per year, to reach 215 million cu In recent years, environmental awareness has in (underbark) in the year 2000.13 With that increased significantly in both Canada and the increase, the harvest would still be below the net United States. As a result there has been consid- annual growth, which is currently about 270 erable public resistance to forest management million cu in (underbark). More significantly, it techniques such as clear-cutting, which are eco- would be below 240 cu in, which is the Canadian nornically sound, at least in the short term, but Forest Service's estimate of the annual cut allow- which are aesthetically disagreeable and environ- able for sustained yield conditions on the portion mentally dubious. It is likely the management for of the Canadian forest that is accessible under wood production will be constrained on increasing current economic and technological conditions. proportions of the 27 percent of the U.S. commer- Thus there is unlikely to be any strong pressure cial forest that is publicly owned and on the 59 for increased intensity of Canadian forest manage- percent of the forest that is privately owned by ment during the next 25 years. parties other than forest industry companies. It is The condition of the North American forest theoretically possible for the managers of the environment in the year 2000 will depend to a public forests to increase production of all the considerable extent on economic developments types of benefits provided by the forest, but that will affect management intensity. The Out- without a greatly expanded environmental educa- look for Timber in the United States forecasts tion effort, it is unlikely that the public will be that the U.S. commercial forest area will be 6 well enough informed and motivated by the year million hectares smaller by the year 2000. Similar 2000 to demand management programs that will estimates are not available for the Canadian optimize production of all the forest's benefits. forest; probably the changes will be less as the smaller population of Canada will be making fewer Pacific Area demands for alternative uses of forest land. The fact that the annual harvest is less than the Japan is second only to the United States in net annual growth disguises the low rate of volume of wood imported, and is the world's reforestation in North America. The commercial largest net importer of wood products. Although forest area partially or totally harvested plus the Japan has experienced the world's most rapid area burned have averaged about 4 million hec- - increase in industrial wood consumption during FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 125 the past 25 years, and although 68 percent of commercial forests will become more intensive, Japan is forested, domestic production has been and this will lead to lower ecological diversity. declining steadily as a result of overcutting during The forest area reserved for noncommercial use the postwar years and several constraints on use will increase in North America, and noncommer- of the existing mature forests. cial factors will become more prominant in forest Japan has a good forestry program, and by the management decisions in the other industrialized year 2000 the domestic wood production may be regions. Except in Europe, Japan, and New rising again. The country will continue to be a Zealand, forests in the year 2000 win be less fully mAjor importer for the foreseeable future, how- stocked than now, as cutting will continue to ever, consuming a substantial proportion of the outpace tree planting and natural regeneration. sawlogs and pulpwood produced in western North For the most part, the cutover land will not be America and most of the Philippine mahogany allocated to other uses, however, and will be and other high-value logs from Southeast Asia. available for reforestation during the 21st century. The other nations with developed economies If the industrialized nations recover ftilly from and substantial forest areas in the Pacific are the economic setbacks of the past few years, then Australia and New Zealand. Australia has about consumption of wood will continue to rise and 38 million hectares of closed forest, only 20 supplies will begin to be tight within, the 1978- percent of it coniferous. New Zealand has 6.2 2000 period. Production costs for softwood ex- million hectares, 70 percent coniferous. It is a ports will rise as more remote areas must be major net exporter of wood products, while Aus- logged in both the U.S.S.R. and Canada, so prices tralia is a net importer. will rise. The already rising demand for imports Only vague forecasts of the future of forest from the tropical forests of the less developed environment in the two nations can be given here. countries will increase further. Management of the -New Zealand forest is rela- In the more distant future, rising prices for tively intensive and the general trend has been use wood products may lead to improved stocking in of monocultures of fast-growing exotic species for the northern forests and to heavier reliance by the reforestation, rather than reliance on natural re- wood products industry on plantation forestry in generation of native species. As a result, the New southern Europe, in the southern U.S. and in the Zealand forest has become less diverse ecologi- troPics. cally and more subject to catastrophic losses from pests and diseases. It seems likely that significant Forests and Forestry in the Less proportions of the natural forest will -be effectively reserved for noncommercial use. Developed Countries Tropical rain forest comprises a substantial part Demand, Supply, and Deforestation Of the Australian resources, and it has all the typical rain forest problems of wood heterogene- The LI)Cs contain nearly half of the world's ity, soil instability, climate harshness and poor closed forest area and over half of the growing resiliance after commercial exploitation. Aus- stock of industrial-sized wood. These forest re- tralia's agronomy is capital-intensive, so that pro- sources play an important role in economic devel- duction increases can generally be effected better opment by providing subsistance, shelter, employ- by increasing capital inputs on already cleared ment, resources for development of other sectors, land where there are high-quality soils than by and, for some LI)Cs, an important export com- clearing forest lands with marginal soils. Until the modity to earn foreign exchange. cost of Australia's wood. imports becomes too . The demand for industrial wood products within high, or until technological advances make capital- the LDCs will increase rapidly with economic intensive harvesting and processing of tropical development, because the elasticity of demand for forests more economic, the Australian forest en- wood products is high among relatively poor vironment is likely to remain relatively stable. consu Imers so long as wood supplies are abun- dant. 14 As income increases further, the demand Summary for paper products rises rapidly. Most of LDCs rely on imports of paper now, but recent techno- Use of land for forests and for agriculture are in logical breakthroughs have made paper production approximate equalibrium throughout most of the based entirely on mixed hardwoods possible. industrialized nations. Thus the forest area is Where economic development progresses, capital relatively stable and will be only marginally to develop modern wood-processing facilities smaller in the year 2000. The management of should become available. 126 THE PROJECTIONS Even where economic progress is not made, forest land accessible to them long ago (e.g., demand for forest products has been rising and Afghanistan), other densely populated nations that will continue to rise. Tightening supplies of soft- still have substantial forest resources will have woods in the industrialized nations are causing lost most of them before the year 2000 (e.g., increased use of hardwoods for sawwood, wood Indonesia, Thailand), and some sparsely popu- panels, and pulp, and tropical hardwoods have lated nations with vast forests will still have vast been capturing an increasing portion of this mar- forests in the year 2000 (e.g., Gabon, Congo). ket. Furthermore the demand for fuelwood win The process of deforestation is poorly under- rise with the population growth of the LDCs, stood. Apparently most of the forest losses result regardless of progress in industrialization. LDCs from clearing and burning for agriculture, with now get about one-fourth of their commercial much of the wood being used only to the extent energy from fuelwood; the proportion may de- that its ashes constitute fertilizer for one or two crease where industrialization progresses; but the season's crops. An estimated 190 million hectares absolute quantity will probably increase with of cleared tropical forests are used for shifting growth of cottage industries. In any case, most of agriculture. After rudimentary clearing, the land is the fuelwood is used for cooking in residences. burned and crops are grown for a year or two. Ten years ago it seemed that increased use of Then it is fallowed for about a decade, while a bottled gas and kerosene would constrain the degraded forest develops, and that re-estabfishes rising consumption of wood for residential fuel, at least some of the soil's fertility for the next but the five-fold petroleum price increases have round of clearing, burning and planting. The thrown most of the demand back to wood. system breaks down as populations increase and For the near future, the supply side of the the fallow periods are necessarily shortened, and forestry picture seemsbright for the well-forested eventually the forest loses its capacity to regener- LDCs. There is still an abundant supply of virgin ate and to restore the soil's fertility. The land is tropical timber, and technological advances in abandoned, and often forest is not re-established. processing are resulting in the use of a higher The balance between deforestation caused by proportion of tree species and size classes. Forest shifting agriculture and that caused by farmers land is generally less expensive in the LDCs than clearing land for permanent settlement is un- in the industrialized nations, and forest labor is known, and nothing is known about how the inexpensive and in abundant supply. Finally, the deforestation rate changes as the forest base LDCs have a comparative advantage in the devel- diminishes. Nor does anyone know how much of opment of tree plantations, as the long growing the forests now remaining in the LDCs is on seasons and high insolation available in the tropics arable land, and even the definition of arable may result in wood growth rates three to five times be changing. higher than in the temperate environments. The deforestation rate is closely related to the Unfortunately, these favorable factors are over- rate of commercial logging. Hardly any of the shadowed by the specter of deforestation. The LDC forests are under intensive management. In forest product supply picture is bright only for the most cases, reforestation after logging is left to near term. The current forest stock of the LDCs, chance. In densely populated regions, farmers about 1.1 billion hectares of mature closed forest, often follow the loggers to complete the process is being consumed at the rate of about 20 million of razing the forest. In less densely populated hectares per year. About two thirds of the tropical areas, natural regeneration may result in refores- forests are economically accessible, and if the tation, but the forests that result are generally present rate of deforestation were to continue degraded and seldom have commercial value. most of the accessible forest would be lost by How deforestation is related to the fuelwood year 2000. If the rate is assumed to increase with harvest is another unknown, and the statistics on the populations of the LDCs, then virtually all of fuelwood use are only crude guesses. Where the the accessible tropical forest would be gone by fuelwood comes from is even less well known. the year 2000. Much of the wood, perhaps most of it, is con- However, it is more likely that the overall LDC verted to charcoal. This is a cottage industry that deforestation rate will decline before the year supports many farmers clearing forests during 2000, for the simple reason that the people who their first years in a newly settled area. In other are doing most of the cutting will begin to run out places, rapid deforestation is only for fuel and of forests to cut. Forests and population are not is independent of the local demand for agricul- evenly distributed. Some nations cleared all the tural land. FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 127 Denudation of land, caused by the demand for year 2000, the Amazon forest will cover less than ftielwood, is -thought to be most rapid and to have half the area it does now. In Central America and the most severe environmental consequences in northwestern South America, -closed forests are the dry open woodlands of the tropics. In such diminishing at about 2 percent per year and are areas, tree cutting often leads not to a degraded likely to be completely removed from arable areas woodland but rather to a desert. 15 by the year 2000. The deforestation of lowland Because so few details are known about the forests in those areas will depend largely on how process of deforestation and about the rates at the high costs of clearing, drainage, and disease which it occurs under varying economic, demo- control relate to the demand for increased food graphic, and environmental conditions, it is quite production. In Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia, and impossible to predict the global condition of Brazil, the rate of clearing of open woodlands will forests in the LDCs in the year 2000. It is depend on implementation of proposed schemes possible, however, to review current regional to make the savannah soil arable. If the new conditions, which may give some rough indica- methods work as expected, the savannah wood- tions of which areas will still have forests 22 years lands could be significantly reduced by the year from now. 2000, but that will take some pressure off the moist tropical forests, especially in Brazil. Latin America Man-made forests were reported to cover 1.9 million hectares in Brazil and another 1.7 million Closed forests cover about 725 million hectares, hectares in the rest of Latin America. It is a small over one-third of the total land area of Latin area relative to the deforestation rate, but conser- America. Open woodlands cover another 400 vation of the forest environment is not the objec- million hectares. Nearly all of the softwoods are tive of these plantings. They are industrial wood in Central America. Three-quarters of the tropical plantations, about one third conifers and much of .moist forest is in the Amazon basin. Open wood- the rest eucalyptus, and they do represent a lands predominate in parts of Central America, in significant beginning for plantation forestry. In northeastern and central Brazil, -in the Andean Brazil the planting rate is reported to be gaining valleys of Bolivia, Peru, and Chile, and in the momentum; in some areas natural forests are Chaco of Bolivia, Argentina, and Paraguay. razed to provide land, for the fast-growing com- The volume of growing stock of commercial mercial species. Some of the firms involved have size is higher than in any other region of the had economic setbacks, but it seems likely that in world, about 90 billion cubic meters. On a per the long run plantations will be providing most of hectare basis, the volume varies from 92 cu in in Latin America's wood supply. Central America, where the forests are similar to Increasing demand for processed wood prod- those of North America, Europe,. and Asia, to ucts in southern Brazil is likely to lead to in- over 250 cubic meters in parts of the Amazon creased investment in modem facilities that will Basin. The moist forests are extremely heteroge- be able to process a wider variety of species than neous, with up to 100 species per hectare and the present domestic and export markets can use. with plant associations, varying greatly over short This will make profitable the exploitation of forest distances. Only 10 to 30 percent,of the,standing areas where now the commercially valuable spe- volume in the Amazon basin is commercially cies are too widely scattered. The development of valuable, the rest of the wood is an impediment a forest products industry and construction of from the point of view of commercial loggers. For processing facilities is a priority feature in the this reason, logging operations have concentrated national planning frameworks of most of the well- more on the less dense stands where commercially forested Latin American nations, though only in valuable wood may be more abundant and more Brazil is implementation of such plans likely to accessible. have a significant impact on the forest environ- Deforestation rates vary with population den- ment by the year 2000. sity, as commercial logging operations are not yet well developed in most of Latin America. In the Amazon basin, the deforestation rate is estimated Africa at 4 percent per year. 16 In the past, forests were With only' about 6 - percent of its land area cut only along the perimeters and along rivers, but covered with closed forests, Africa is the least new roadway infi-astructures are rapidly increasing forested of the three tropical regions. The conti- the accessible area. it seems likely that by the nent contains about 180 minion hectares of closed 128 THE PROJECTIONS forest, 88 percent of which is tropical moist forest increase and as economic development makes in Central and West Africa. The area of open crops more valuable, the shifting agriculturalists woodlands is estimated to be about three times are likely to expand into more remote areas of the area of closed forest. 17 natural forest, and to cause permanent deforesta- The 1975 harvest of forest products comprised tion on larger portions of the areas they are about 320 million cu m (underbark) of wood, of already using. which 84 percent was ftielwood and charcoal, and Permanent agriculture is also likely to take 5 percent was unprocessed roundwood used as increasing areas of moist forest land in the coming poles and posts, mainly for construction. Thus decades. Growing demand for products of tree only about I I percent of the harvest, or 35 million and bush crops, including coffee, cocoa, and oil cu m, was used for sawn or other industrially palm, will probably result in significant deforesta- processed Wood products. About one third of this tion. industrial wood was exported, most of it as logs, In the seasonally dry areas, shifting cultivation most of it to Europe. The rest was consumed also occurs; often the effects are more deleterious within the region, mainly as sawwood for con- than in the rainforest zone, as the vegetation struction. The main exporters, in order of volume recovers more slowly. Most of the closed forest exported, are Ivory Coast, Gabon, Cameroon, in such areas have been insulated from deforesta- Ghana, Congo, Nigeria and Zaire. Most of the tion pressures by tsetse infestations. Gradual prog- countries of Africa are net importers of wood. ress is being made in tsetse eradication, however, The continent as a whole is a net importer of and permanent clearing of most of the woody sawwood, paper, and paperboard, and a net vegetation is one of the necessary elements in exporter of industrial logs, plywood, veneers, maintaining eradication. fiberboard, and charcoal.18 In the open woodlands, gradual denudation The demand within Africa for processed indus- results from overgrazing, from burning too fre- trial wood products is expected to grow by 6 to 9 quently for pasture improvement, and from wood- percent per year between now and the year 2000. gathering for fuel in the more densely populated However, much.of the industrial wood production areas. Since the effect of these factors is too is likely to continue to be directed to Europe gradual to be easily discemable, there is presently rather than to be traded within Africa, so that the no way to estimate the rate at which the savannah increasing Africa demand is unlikely to be satis- environments are being degraded. Recent atten- fied. tion focused on the desertification process is likely The demand for fuelwood used at the household to lead to some study of how open woodlands are level is likely to increase at about the rate of changed, and predictions may be possible within population increase, while the demand for fuel- a decade. wood used for production of commercial energy Persson's and other recent studies have indi- may increase somewhat faster, as the small-scale cated that the moist tropical forests of Africa now industrial sector grows. Supply is already insuffi- cover less than half of the area for which they are cient to meet demand in many countries, and with designated as the natural vegetation climax. Of no economically available substitute for woodfuel, course, most of this change is the result of energy consumption per capita has been falling in clearing and burning by man and grazing by parts of North Africa. domestic livestock. The rate at which the change Changes in the African forest environment have has occured is unknown. It seems likely that the been best researched and described by R. Per Isson rate has been increasing, and that the next halving in his 1977 study, Forest Resources of Africa. '9 of the forested area will occur much more quickly. He indicates that agriculture is the main cause of Persson and the other sources calculate that the deforestation. The area cleared annually for shift- closed forest area of Africa is decreasing by at least ing cultivation in the rainforest zone is 2 to 4 2 million hectares per year and suggest that the rate million hectares. There is no estimate of the may be higher. The greatest change is in West proportion of this area that is intact natural forest. Africa, where large populations and large forests In the more densely populated humid areas of both occur. In North Africa, there is probably no West Africa, large forest areas are reported to net decrease in forested area, as there is limited have become denuded and badly eroded waste- forest left to cut and as intensive tree planting has lands in recent years, because of the pressure to begun in several countries. There is an shorten the fallow periods. Persson estimates that environmental change, however, since the natural 40 million hectares of the rainforest may be under vegetation of North Africa continues to be thinned use for shifting cultivation. As rural populations out and the replacement forests are monocultures FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 129 of single age classes. Catastrophic change does not in. About one-fourth of the wood harvested for seem imminent in Central Africa. Gabon, Central processed products was exported, mostly as saw- African Republic, northern Congo, and logs, mostly to Japan. The main exporters, in southeastern Cameroon all have vast forests and order of value of forest product exports, were sparse populations. However, if access becomes Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, China, Mon- easier, fast destruction of forests can start, even golia, Burma, and Thailand. where populations are relatively low. As in Africa and Latin America, the demand By the year 2000, the closed forest area of for wood products is expected to rise rapidly in Africa will have been reduced from 180 to 146 the Asian LDCs, driven by rapid population million hectares if deforestation continues at the increases and by substantial gains in GDP per present rate. It seems likely that the rate will capita. A 1976 study by FA022 projected that increase, and the forest area may be as small as with GDP increases of 2.5 to 3.5 percent per.year, 130 million hectares by then. Most of the change the Asian LDCs would increase consumption of will have resulted from clearing for agriculture. forest products by 2 to 2.5 times during the 1971 Timber cutting for industrial wood products is to 1991 period, and consumption of fuelwood, as likely to result in changes in botanic composition a direct simple ftinction of population growth, was of the forests, but not in very much deforestation. expected to be 1.6 times greater. The projections Woodcutting for ftielwood, charcoal, and poles, assumed that relative prices of wood products on the other hand, will probably cause degradation would remain the same, and that the proportion of open woodlands and complete destruction,of of wood exported would not increase. The pro- many of the mangrove forests. Assuming no jected consumption rates were then compared to changes in current patterns of land use or in forecasts of sustainable yield from the region's priorities of development project funding, substan- forests to indicate the extent of the wood harvest tial areas that are covered now with moist tropical shortfA that can be expected by 1991. forest will become barren wastelands with, sods Supply of wood depends on the volume of that have no potential for production, and many growing stock, the net annual growth rate, the areas that are dry open woodlands now will rate of cutting and the efficiency of processing. become deserts. The 1976 FAO study used estimates of growing stock ranging from about 50 cu in per hectare in Asia South Asia and in the communist countries to 75 cu in per hectare in insular Southeast Asia. The The less developed nations of South and South- net annual growth is estimated at about 2 percent east Asia contained about 250 million hectares of of the growing stock, or 1.5 cu. in per hectare per closed forest in 1973. China, Mongolia, and the year. Thus the total net annua II growth for the two Koreas contained another 110 million hec- region's forest is on the order of 540 million cu in, tares .20 Since then, South and Southeast Asian which is less than the 1975 harvest. forests have probably decreased by about 25 By 1991, more of the annual growth will be million hectares, while in the more northern occurring in plantations. Most of the plantations countries of Asia, afforestation programs have to date are in China, where the main objective offset some of the losses, so that the net decline has been watershed protection. Afforestation to in forest area is probably less. The Asian LDCs regulate water flow and to counter soil erosion have about 135 million hectares of rainforest, 55 began 30 years ago in China. As many as 100 million hectares of tropical moist deciduous forest, million hectares may have been planted in the 95 million hectares of other deciduous forests, and years since, but the survival rate of the seedlings 50 million hectares of coniferous forests .21 has been low. The Chinese government has not The Asian subregions are widely variable with yet released forest statistics on a national level, regard to the distribution of forest resources. but the FAO study uses an estimate of about 30 Table 8-8 summarizes data on distribution of million hectares of plantation trees in China in resources by subregion. 1970, plus another 2.3 million hectares in the other The 1975 harvest of forest products in Asian Asian LDCs. The plantation area in 1990 is LDCs totaled about 650 million cu in (underbark). expected to be on the order of 60 million hectares. Fuelwood and charcoal accounted for about 78 Deforestation is occurring most r-apidly in the percent of the total; unprocessed poles, posts, and LDCs of tropical Asia. The Green Revolution has pitprops accounted for another 6 percent. Sawn caused only about half the food production in- and other processed wood products accounted for creases achieved in Asia over the past two 16 percent of the total harvest, or 104 million cu decades. The other half has come from expanding 130 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 8-8 Asia--Distribution of Forest Resources by Subregion Operable Forest Areas (millions of hectares) Operable Closed Forest Total Area Subregion Inoperable of In use Total Closed Forest Asia Far East region 279.8 378.3 158.7 537.0 South Asia 53.2 58.5 12.0 70.5 Continental Southeast Asia 52.3 72.6 18.5 91.1 Insular Southeast Asia 36.0 71.9 32.9 124.8 East Asia developing 4.0 5.2 1.4 6.6 Oceania developing 2.1 16.3 23.0 39.3 East Asia developed 24.1 24.1 1.1 25.2 Oceania developed 29.2 29.2 20.2 49.4 Centrally planned countries 78.9 100.5 29.6 130.1 Growing Stock--Closed Forest Currently Operable Closed Forests Commercial All Closed Forests Species Total Conif- Broad- Broad- Total Conif- Broad- erous leaved leaved erous leaved million M, Asia Far East region 29,000 5,600 23,400 15,000 39,000 7,000 32,000 South Asia 3,000 400 2,600 1,900 3,500 600 2,900 Continental Southeast Asia 5,000 1 5,000 3,400 6,300 50 6,200 Insular Southeast Asia 9,200 40 9,200 5,200 13,300 50 13,200 East Asia developing 60 30 30 30 80 40 40 Oceania developing 1,600 30 1,500 700 3,000 30 3,000 East Asia developed 2,000 1,100 900 800 2,100 1,100 1,000 Oceania developed 1,500 400 1,100 1,000 2,000 500 1,500 Centrally planned countries 6,500 3,600 2,900 2,300 8,400 4,700 3,700 Source: European Economic Commission (1976), pp. 18, 19. the area harvested, by increasing the crops per vation in that country is estimated at 2 million year in some places and by clearing new fields in hectares. others. The yield increases seem to be reaching a Commercial logging by itself does not necessar- plateau in several of the Asian LDCs, so that an fly result in destruction of the forest cover, but in even greater proportion of the needed 3 to 4, most of the Asian LDCs the loggers are responsi- percent per year increase in food production may ble for making the forest accessible to farmers. In have to come from newly cleared fields. most cases the settlement of logged-over land is Forest areas for which conversion to farmland spontaneous, rather than planned. is already planned are substantial in continental The FAO study estimates that by 1990, the and insular Southeast Asia, and shifting agricul- operable forest area in South Asia and Southeast ture is consuming an increasing portion of both Asia will be reduced by 34 percent, while the insular and mainland forests. In the Philippines, forest area in China and the Koreas will have a 4 an estimated 200,000 hectares of forest is de- percent net increase because of continued affores- stroyed by the shifting farmers each year. In tation. The study assumes that techniques of Thailand, they clear an estimated 250,000 hectares harvesting, marketing, and processing will im- per year. In Indonesia, shifting cultivation is said prove so that 90 percent of the logs will be to have devastated about 30 million hectares of commercially used, as opposed to only 25 perrent forest, which are now degraded grasslands, and at present. The study further assumes that the the forest currently being used for shifting culti- trees outside the closed forests will continue to FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 131 supply about 250 million cu in of fuelwood per than in the sods. As the plants gradually-die, fall, year on a sustained basis. and decompose, the enormous mass-of vegetation By the year 2000, the natural closed forests of quickly recaptures the nutrients" However, the South and Southeast Asia are likely to be reduced slash and bum method of-the shifting farmers to less than 100 million hectares. The natural results in sudden release Of-the plant nutrients at forests that remain will be either in inaccessible a time when power of the vegetation to recapture mountainous or swampy regions, or will be pro- the nutrients has been greatly reduced. Because tected by law, or will be so degraded as to be of the quantity and intensity of tropical rains, the commercially useless. These subregions may have soluable nutrients are usually leached too deeply about 5 million hectares of plantation forests by into the earth, and are effectively lost from the that time. In China, Mongolia, and the Koreas, ecosystem. the forest area may increase slightly, as forest Modification through selective logging seems clearing is offset by continued afforestation. likely to have a less permanent effect on the forest Erosion, siltation, flooding, and other problems ecosystems, since at present only a small propor- associated with deforestation are likely to have tion of the trees are commercially useful, and only become a severe constraint on food production by the stems of those trees are removed from the the year 2000 in South and Southeast Asia. The forest. Physical destruction that results from selec- ecological diversity of the region will be much tive logging is considerably greater in tropical lower, and populations of the remaining fauna moist forests than in the temperate zone forests, may be expected to fluctuate much more widely, however. The tropical moist forest is usually with some species becoming extinct in the low multistoried, with commercially valuable trees flux and other species becoming hazardous pests often limited to those which form the upper-most in the high flux. It seems likely that some of the story. The crowns of such trees are large and region's present potential to support human pop- vines form strong physical links within and be- ulations will have been irretrievably lost. tween the several stories. As a result the felling operations are massively destructive. Even more destructive are the extraction operations. In addi- The Special Problem of Tropical tion to its direct impact on the vegetation, the Moist Forests extraction process disturbs large expanses of the forest floor, often exposing mineral soil to erosion As already indicated, the most drastic changes and to other forms of physical and chemical in forest resource inventories and in forest envi- degradation, which occur much more rapidly in ronments will occur in the less developed coun- hot wet climates than in temperate zone areas. tries. All types of forests in those countries will Most studies of tropical forestry forecast that be affected: evergreen rainforests, moist deci- the number of species and proportion of size duous forests, dry deciduous forests, and open classes used will be greatly increased during the woodlands. The effects of changes in the first two next decade. There are several advantages to types will be of greatest importance, for several increased intensity of forest use, the main one reasons: first, because the evergreen and deci- being that more wood can be harvested from less duous moist forests of the tropics cover larger land. There are many potential problems however. areas than the other types; second, because the Nutrient depletion will be increased as greater moist forests have less potential for recovery; and volumes of wood will be removed. Ecological third, because the moist forests are genetically diversity will be lowered, and consequent popula- and ecologically richer resource systems. tion explosions of pest plants and animals are It is useful to distinguish between forest modi- likely to occur. Water yield and quality are likely fication and transformation. Modification results to suffer if large areas are intensively cut-over, as from selective logging and from shifting agricul- very little is known about how to forestall water ture; transformation results when the original or problems in the tropics. The few techniques for modified natural forest is totally removed and is water conservation that have been developed are replaced by agricultural settlement, man-made seldom implemented, as the institutional structure forest or wasteland. Modification of moist tropical is lacking. Effects of intensive forest use on soil forests through shifting agriculture is generally structure and sod microorganisms in the tropics believed to result in a permanent degradation of are virtually unknown, but are almost certain to biological productivity. This is because most of be negative. The commercial and environmental the plant nutrients in a tropical moist forest quality of the second-growth forest that will follow system are held in the standing plant cover, rather intensive forest use is another unknown. It will be 1-32 THE PROJECTIONS lowert an the quality of second growth that now runoff and streams are filled suddenly with silt- follows selective logging, unless improved silvicul- laden water that may be contaminated with pesti- tural technique'sare developed and implemented. cides, fertilizers, or other pollutants. As steeper Techniques for Minimizing the environmental slopes are deforested, the stream flows become damage that will result from intensified use of more erratic. Sedimentation in streambeds raises tropical moist forests have been proposed, and them, ftirther increasing flood frequency and se- some research has begun to develop new meth- verity. At the same time, groundwater tables fall ods, such as logging in relatively narrow strips, and wells become seasonal at best. Reservoirs leaving wider strips of natural forest undisturbed. and other irrigation works become choked with However the capital and institutional constraints silt, and must be dredged at high cost or aban- on improved management of logged-over areas, doned and replaced with new, more expensive and the lack of control that LDC governments systems. There is, of course, a limit to the suitable have over operations of commercial loggers, are sites for reservoirs. likely to prevent conservation on any substantial The effect of tropical moist forest on microch- portion of the tropical moist forests. mate is related mainly to the balance between Resource planners for tropical regions have no sensible heat and latent heat in the environment. method with which to determine the balance When the forest is razed, the heat that had fueled between the benefits and costs of transforming the evapotranspiration process instead raises the tropical moist forest land to other uses. The environment's temperature, usually to the detri- benefits are usually relatively immediate and can ment of seed germination, plant survival, animal be measured in terms of economic gains. This survival, and human comfort. Where soil is poor paper has no solution to the problem of weighing and natural moist forest is not replaced with year- benefits against costs. Rather the main environ- round agriculture or man-made forest, there may mental costs will be briefly reviewed, to indicate be a positive feedback in the microclimate system the kinds of changes that may be forecast for the that leads to self-generuting aridity. year 2000. These costs include: the risk of creating a useless wasteland; the acceleration of rainwater Global Linkages and the Year 2000 runoff, with consequent erosion, siltation, and failure to recharge aquifers; the loss of ecological Scenarios diversity; the more extreme microclimate; and the permanent loss of genetic resources. Global Linkages The loss of ecological diversity is the most Changes in the forest environments of the subtle cost. Tropical moist forests are believed to several regions will impact on global environment comprise the most complex ecosystems in nature. and global economic interactions in several ways. Their diversity gives them great stability in rela- The interregional linkages include: availability of tion to the kinds of natural changes under which genetic resources, trade of forest products, effects they have evolved. Under conditions of forest of deforestation on climate and on the. production destruction by man however, the diversity makes and trade of agricultural products, and interna- them fragile rather than stable .23 Where tropical tional transfer of technology for forest manage- moist forest is removed, that kind of forest and ment and for wood processing. nearly all the species it contains will disappear .24 During the coming decades, some forest plant There are other consequences of the loss of the and animal species will become extinct as intensi- forest's diversity, which may become more im- fied use leads to ecological simplification of the mediate costs. Animal communities, like tree temperate zone forests. More importantly, communities, are much less diverse after the hundreds of species will become extinct as the forest is destroyed. The populations of remnant moist tropical forests are razed. There will be animals often become very high, and cause mas- local effects on ecosystem stability and global sive depredations on newly created croplands. effects on agriculture. The genetic reservoir for Water quality, quantity, and timing in tropical many tropical crops is in the moist forests. These streams and aquifers depend to a great extent on include bananas, cocoa, oil palm, mango, many the forest cover. Where the cover is maintained, other fruits, rubber, lac, and various resins. Im- rainwater infiltrates the soil, streams are fed proving production from any of these crops may gradually by subsurface flows of relatively clean depend, as development of hybrid maize de- water, and aquifers are recharged by deep infiltra- pended, on the availability of wild varieties of the tion. Where forest cover is removed from sloping domestic plant. For most such crops, genetic land, more of the rainwater becomes surface research has hardly begun, and as wild varieties FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 133 are lost, there is less potential for development of thus inhibits precipitation, causing a man-made high-yield strains, or of strains resistant to pests, desert.27 diseases, and drought. Also, opportunities for The most significant of the global linkages is development of new products, medicines, foods, probably the impact of deforestation on the wel- drinks, resins, specific pesticides, and so forth, fare of the LDC populations. Energy crises caused are diminished as the tropical moist forests are by short supplies of off in the industrial nations cleared. will not be more profound than the crises caused The interregional linkage provided by interna- by short supplies of fuelwood and charcoal in the tional trade in forest products will be stronger in LDCs. Fuel consumption per capita is already some cases and in others will disappear. Japan minimal for both the rural and urban LDC poor. and Western Europe will be increasingly depend- They will have to cut back consumption even ent on Canada and the U.S.S.R. for pulp supplies more as populations grow and wood becomes and for softwood sawlogs. Japan will no longer be scarce. Gradually the urban poor will have to able to import sufficient tropical hardwood saw- allocate a larger portion of their incomes, and the logs and veneer logs from Asia, and European rural poor a larger portion of their time, to importers will be paying -much higher prices for aquisition of the minimum amount of fuel needed sawlogs from Africa. Only northern South Amer- for - survival. These reallocations of money and ica is likely to be exporting more sawlogs in the time. will erode productivity and consequently year 2000 than it does now. The United States human welfare. will probably remain self-sufficient in pulpwood - Deforestation increases food production in the and may become more nearly self-sufficient in LDCs wherever it leads to an increase in the sawlogs as the global supply becomes tighter. arable land area. As the limits of arable land are Scientists have wondered and speculated about approached, however, continued deforestation the impact of forests on climate since the time of suppresses agricultural production. The negative Plato, but as yet there is no agreement on how effects include direct environmental processes, deforestation affects regional and global climates. such as the siltation of irrigation works, and Three mechanisms through which deforestation indirect effects. As wood has become scarce in may be changing'climate have been discussed in South Asia, for example, cattle dung and crop recent articles. First, the carbon dioxide content residues that once functioned to maintain soil of the atmosphere is increased as carbon stored in fertility have been used for fuel. -In India, Paki- forest biomass and in forest soils is released. stan, Java, Madura, and in parts of Central However, the amount of carbon being released to America and West Africa, the negative effects of the atmosphere has not been accurately estimated, deforestation have already begun to constrain and the proportion of the C02 re-stored in wood food production. It appears likely that by the year elsewhere or absorbed by the oceans has not been 2000, the effects will be severe throughout the determined. Measurements of atmospheric C02 tropical regions. Both fuel and food shortages do confirmthat the concentration of carbon in the could result in increased LDC demands for aid, atmosphere has been increasing at the rate of 0.2 and suppression of the LDC economies may percent per year since 1958, and that the rate is reduce markets for the products of the industrial- accelerating. Most of that increase is due to ized economies. burning of fossil fuels., however. It seems likely that the C02 content of the atmosphere will The Year 2000 Scenarios increase by at least 25 percent during the 1978- 2000 period, buthow this will affect global or The future may be less gloomy than the fore- regional climates is,unknown .25 going implies. To some extent, the negative im- Another mechanism through which deforesta- pacts of deforestation may be offset by reforesta- tion may affect regional or global climate changes tion and afforestation programs. Furthermore it is change of the earth's surface albedo, which, may be possible for some countries to slow down along with the increased ratio of sensible to latent the deforestation rates. In Thailand, for example, heat, may affect the generation and dissipation of the government announced in January 1978 that it tropical easterly waves or may affect the dynamics would begin to use its most extraordinary powers of general atmospheric circulation .26 The third of summary judgment and even execution to mechanism is the increase in dust from deforested punish unauthorized cutting in the national forests. areas. At least one climatologist has argued that This resolve follows years of failurr, to enforce the in the Rajputana region of India, extensive atmos- less powerftil forest protection laws already in pheric dust prevents moist air from rising, and existence. The change was prompted by an. in- 134 THE PROJECTIONS creasing frequency of disastrous floods and also Matters. Other changes, such as implementation by an investigation that indicated the forest re- of crash programs for fuelwood plantations, could source was being destroyed at the rate of 13 require aid programs developed by international percent per year and would be totally lost within agencies. Increased investment in silviculture in a decade. Whether LDC governments have suffi- the industrialized countries and more plantations cient control over farmers and loggers remote of fast-growing trees for industrial wood produc- from the seats of government to keep them from tion in the LDCs are most likely developments. cutting the forests in desperate quest for cropland Table 8-9 summarizes forecasts of forest re- and wood products remains to be seen. sources by global region for the year, 2000. The An optimistic scenario would have governments figures represent a mildly optimistic scenario. of the LDCs bringing deforestation under control during the next decade, so that by 1990 forests would be transformed to cropland only where TABLE8-9 soils were known to be arable. Logging would be accompanied in both the developed and develop- Estimates of World Forest Resources, 1978 ing world by intensified silvicultural efforts that and 2000 would assure sustained yields of wood products. Reforestation with mixed species of trees for Growing Stock industrial wood would be greatly accelerated in of Commercial the LDCs, and a crash program of developing Sized Wood in Closed Forests village fuelwood plantations would be imple- and in Open mented. Reforestation and afforestation for wa- Closed Forest Woodlands tershed protection would be given top priority in (millions of (billions cu m the development programs of South and Southeast hectares) overbark) Asia and Central America, as would the develop- 1978 2000 1978 2000 ment and diffusion of solar cookers and bio-gas U.S.S.R. 785 775 79 77 generation plants. Genetic resources would be Europe 140 150 15 13 conserved with programs combining national North America 470 464 58 55 parks and germ plasm banks. New technologies Japan, Australia, that increase the efficiencies of forest harvesting New Zealand 69 68 4 4 and wood processing would be developed and Sub .total- 1,464 1,457 156 149 Latin America 550 329 94 54 become economic so quickly that the rapidly Africa 188 150 39 31 increasing demands for industrial wood products Asian and Pacific could be met without overcutting. LDCs 361 181 38 19 While each of the above developments is possi- Subtotal (LDCs) 1,099 660 171 104 ble, it seems unlikely that they will all occur in the relatively brief 1978-2000 period. World 2,563 2,117 327 253 A more realistic scenario includes some but not World population (billions) 4.3 6.4 all of the above changes in policies and trends. Wood per capita Some changes, such as resolve by a goverriment (cu in) 76 40 to spend whatever political capital is necessary to Source: Based on calculations from preceding tables and deforestation rates protect its forest resources, am entirely internal cited in the footnote at the beginning of this chapter. REFERENCES 1. For example, R. H. Whittaker and G. E. Likens, "The Persson discusses the confidence limits of the data at Biosphere and Man," in H. Lieth and R, H. Whittaker, length and concludes that his global summaries, quoted eds., Primary Productivity of the Biosphere. New York: in this paper, are probably overestimates of the 1973 Springer, 1975. This is a basic reference for papers on forest area. global effects of deforestation, and the data have been 3. Persson, 1974; R. Persson, Forest Resources of Africa, used as the current baseline for rather complex models, Stockholm: Royal College of Forestry, 1977. for example, by R. Revelle, and W. Munk, "The 4. Whittaker and Likens. Carbon Dioxide Cycle and the Biosphere," in Energy 5. Food and Agriculture Organization, Yearbook of Forest and Climate, Washington: National Academy of Sci- Products, Rome: FAO, 1977. ences, 1977. 6. Data on Russian forest resources are from a 1973 2. R. Persson, World Forest Resources, Stockholm: Royal inventory, reported in Economic Commission for Eu- College of Forestry, 1974. This is the most detailed and rope, European Timber Trends and Prospects,, 1950 to best documented global forest inventory ever published. 2000, Geneva: FAO, 1976. FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 135 7. J. Holowacz, Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 19. Persson, Forest Resources of Africa. "The Forests and the Timber Industry of the USSR,- 20. Persson, World Forest Resources; Food and Agriculture unpublished manuscript, 1973; R. N. North and J. J. Organization, Development and Forest Resources in Solecki, University of British Columbia, "The Soviet Asia and the Far East: Trends and Perspectives 1961- Forest Products Industry: Its Present and Potential 1991, Rome: FAO, 1976. Exports," unpublished manuscript, 1976. 21. Calculated by factoring the areas in each forest type, as 8. "Planting of Forests in Russia," Tass, May 3, 1973. indicated in Persson, World Forest Resources, Sommer, 9. Food and Agriculture Organization, Forest Resources and FAO Development and Forest Resources in Asia, in the European Region, Rome: FAO, 1976. by the deforestation rates in each subregion. 10. Economic Commission for Europe. 11. E. P. Cliff, Timber: The Renewable Resource, Wash- 22. FAO, Development and Forest Resources in Asia. ington: Government Printing Office, 1973. 23. Duncan Poore, "The Value of Tropical Moist Forest 12. Ibid. Ecosystems and the Environmental Consequences of 13. Ibid. Their Removal," Unasylva, 28:112, pp. 127-43. 14. G. R. Gregory, Forest Resource Economics, New 24. Ibid. York: Ronald, 1972. 15. E. P. Eckholm, Losing Ground-Environmental Stress 25. Revelle and Munk. and World Food Prospects, New York: Norton, 1976. 26. R. E. Newall, "The Amazon Forest and Atmospheric 16. A. Sommer, "Attempt at an Assessment of the World's Circulation," in W. H. Mathews et al., eds., Man's Tropical Forests," Unasylva, 28:112, pp. 5-25. Impact on the Climate, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 17. Persson, Forest Resources of Africa. 1971. 18. Food and Agriculture Organization, Yearbook of Forest 27. R. A. Bryson and T. J. Murray, Climates of Hunger, Products. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977. 9 Water Projections Of a the substances found on the earth, those In common usage, a resource is something most fundamental to the existence of man, or to that can be used for supply or support. This the existence of life itself, are unqu 'estionablY definition includes most, if not all, components of water and air. Water comprises some three-quar- the physical environment. Resources that attract ters of the surface of the earth, including the great the attention of analysts and policyrnakers, how- oceans, the inland lakes and rivers, and the polar ever, are those that display an additional charac- icecaps. Water is the major constituent of living teristic-scarcity. If all resources were available matter, thether animal or vegetable. The processes in unlimited quantity wherever and whenever of life depend upon a continuous exchange of desired, resource planning and resource manage- water between living matter and the environment, ment would not be required. Most resources are and this exchange constitutes an important link in scarce in some sense, and these scarce (or eco- the global hydrologic cycle. nomic) resources are the legitimate object of From the time primitive man first organized for national and global concern. the gathering or production of food and clothing, This chapter will examine the resource nature water has been a critical factor in man's economic of water, in particular the properties that distin- activities. Lakes, rivers, and oceans have pro- guish it from other scarce resources. Water supply vided sustenance, transportation, and protection. will be discussed, as well as the nature of the Population centers evolved along the shores of demand for water, together with the problems of water bodies, and economic development took identifying existing scarcity and of predicting place along shores and major river valleys. scarcity in the future. Finally, the nature of Increasing development and advancing technol- adjustments to water scarcity, including their ogy have served to further magnify man's depend- implications for other resource stocks, will be ence upon water. In modem societies, water is reviewed. used for human consumption, for transport of wastes, for sanitation in general, for the produc- Properties of Water Resources tion of energy, for all types of industrial produc- tion, for agricultural production, for transporta- The concept of water as an economic resource, tion, and for recreation. subject to scarcity and dependent upon rational In order to confine this discussion to the uses management, is not universally shared. Water has of water of most interest to resource planning, often been ignored in resource planning efforts or only those uses requiring deliberate diversion of has been presumed to obey economic laws differ- water from the hydrologic cycle (by withdrawal ent from those that apply to other resources. The from stream, lake, or aquifer) will be considered. planning and construction of water supply works, This excludes such "in-strearn" uses as water the allocation of water among users, the pricing of transportation, use of water as an energy source, water-4hese and other activities have been fre- and flood-plain agriculture. quently influenced by the notion that water is While the identification of water as an important virtually "free goods," which should be provided natural resource seems beyond argument, water as cheaply as possible in any quantity desired. has not always been viewed as a resource in the Even where water is conspicuously scarce, it same sense as coal, petroleum, mineral ores, may be diverted to low-value uses to the detri- timber, and crops. In fact, the management and ment of other users and of future supplies. At the utilization of water has followed patterns distinctly same time, water shortages occur worldwide with dfferent fi-om those of other economic resources. increasing frequency, due to drought or other The differences may stem from the relative abun- reasons, often leading to serious economic disrup- dance of water in many parts of the world, or tion and human suffering. from ambiguity concerning the resource nature of A number of specific properties of water re- water. sources contribute to the tendency to inappro- 137 138 THE PROJECTIONS priate water policy and combine to frustrate the water on the globe is unavailable or unsuitable attempts at rational water resource planning. Six for beneficial use, because of salinity (seawater) general properties of water resources are listed or location (polar icecaps). The beneficial use of below. water requires more than the coincidence of 1. Water is ubiquitous. It may be safe to say supply and demand; the characteristics of the that no place on earth is wholly without water. In water supplied must match the requirements of general, vast quantities of water surround most the use for which the water is demanded. locales of human activity. While the means by 3. Water is a renewable resource. The forces of which water is moved to the point of use may be nature constantly renew all water resources. The of concern, and while the quality of available process is depicted, in broad outline, in Figure 9- water may not be all that could be hoped for, the 1, which divides the hydrologic cycle into three existence of water is a fundamental assumption. major water locations: the atmosphere, the land, 2. Water is a heterogeneous resource. While and the oceans. Water falls from the atmosphere few natur-al resources are perfectly homogeneous as precipitation on both land and oceans. A in the environment or in their use, water may be portion of that falling on land returns to the the least homogeneous of all. Although used in atmosphere as a consequence of evaporation and the liquid form, water is found as a liquid, a solid, of transpiration by living matter. Water that does or a gas. As a liquid, it may exist as a lake or a not return irnmediately to the atmosphere is stored sea, as a flowing stream, or as an underground in lakes and rivers, as icecaps and glaciers, or as deposit. Its chemical and biological constituents underground reserves, or it runs off to the oceans. vary widely. Water uses may range from human The water that enters the oceans by precipitation consumption to cooling sheets of hot steel, and or by runoff from land is essentially returned to each use implies constraints on chemical or bio- the atmosphere by evaporation. The chemical and logical quality. In fact, more than 99 percent of biological quality of water at various places and IV fHE To ATER. c- rs@ ATMOSPHERE @e V, 13 f44 All 'V LAND WORLD @OCEANS 4. Lakes, rivers 230 1,350,000 Subsurface 7,000 77 Ice caps and glaciers 26,000 w R V- "i Figure 9-1. Annual circulation of the hydrosphere, in quadrillions of cubic meters. WATER PROJECTIONS 139 times is also subject to deterioration and renewal, ornies of scale-water is very inexpensive. The especially in lakes and streams. An important point-of-use cost of water in the United States is aspect of the renewability of water is the limited seldom more than $0.30 per metric ton (for yet significant ability of man to intervene in the municipally supplied water) and may be as little renewal process. Modem technology permits the as $0.03 per metric ton (for irrigation water). By exchange of water between surface sources (lakes, contrast, very few minerals can be purchased for rivers) and ground water sources, the restoration as little as $30 per metric ton at the minehead. of contaminated water to higher levels of quality, In summary, then, water is a substance found the reclamation of water from the sea, and, in almost everywhere on earth, although in many some instances, the alteration of the pattern of different forms and qualities. Water is renewable, precipitation. While such efforts have resource either by natural processes or, to some extent, by costs in themselves, their possibility modifies the human intervention. Most societies have tended renewability characteristic of water in important to treat water as a common property resource, Ways. thus concealing the opportunity costs that may be 4. Water may be common property. Unlike associated with water use. Water is used in very mineral resources, which are relatively well de- large quantities and is very inexpensive; aggregate fined in space and subject to private ownership in worldwide water use is about three orders of many societies, water is ubiquitous and nonsta- magnitude larger than the total of all mineral tionary. Accordingly, property rights in a water products produced, and typical water costs are resource are typically ill defined or nonexistent about three orders of magnitude lower than the (the system of water rights in the Western states costs of the least expensive mineral products. constitutes an important partial exception). Since These properties have important consequences water withdrawals are, in principle, available to for studies of future water resource trends. Be- all comers without direct charge for withdrawal, cause of the ubiquitousness, the heterogeneity, any opportunity costs that might be associated and the renewability of water, it is difficult to with withdrawal are not faced by the withdrawer, characterize supply, now or in the future. The and no inherent mechanism for efficient allocation quantity and quality of the water available at a exists. Water is typically treated as a free good by particular time and at a particular place constitute actual users, even during times of scarcity, when the relevant supply; aggregate or summary statis- many potential users may be excluded. Users tics are nearly meaningless. recognize the costs of capturing, treating, and The common-property characteristic of water, transporting water but do not associate cost with the large quantities used, and the low user costs the water itself. As a result, past patterns of water all act as deterrents to forecasting future water use provide only a flawed guide to future, hope- use. While it may be tempting to extrapolate past fully more efficient, allocations. water-use experience, the possibilities for changes 5. Water is used in vast quantities. Because of in the structure of use in response to relatively the many uses to which water is put and the minor adjustments in.the way water is managed liberal quantities traditionally associated with are so great as to render extrapolation essentially many uses, the quantity of water used annually useless. As will be seen in the following section, exceeds by far the total quantity used of any other further problems arise when specific supply fore- single resource, or of many other resources taken casts must be compared to specific demand fore- together. In recent years, the total quantity of the casts. world's production of minerals, including coal, petroleum, metal ores, and nonmetals, has been The Supply of Water estimated as about 8 x 109 metric tons per year. Total water use, on the other hand, has been Water available for use in human activities is, estimated near 3 x 1012 metric tons per year, for practical purposes, water found in streams, nearly three orders of magnitude larger. This fresh water lakes, and in fresh water aquifers amounts to about 800 metric tons per person per (ground water). While brackish and saline water, year, worldwide, including all water used in (non- including seawater, may be used for some limited hydropower) energy production, in industry, and purposes and may be rendered useful for other for irrigated agriculture, as well as water for purposes by desalting, total water supply is cus- domestic and municipal uses. tomarily measured in terms of fresh water avail- 6. Water is very inexpensive. For various rea- able on or under the surface of the land. Since sons-including water's common property nature, water bodies are constantly replenished, the aver- the nature of water supply technology, and econ- age rate of replenishment is ordinarily of greater 140 THE PROJECTIONS interest than the volume of water available at any ground-water storage, and return flows from other specific time. Two major exceptions are: (1) In water users, but data are not available to determine the case of water withdrawal from streams, some the magnitude or significance of these additions to minimum amount of water storage may be re- water supply. quired to permit,the desired rate of withdrawal in Table 9-1 summarizes estimates of replenish- the presence of highly variable strearnflow, and ment rates for the populated continents of the (2) certain ground-water deposits, especially in earth and for selected nations. The figures repre- and or semiarid areas, may be very large by sent the excess of precipitation over evapotran- comparison to annual inflows and may be spiration. This excess, the net replenishment rate, -mined" by setting withdrawals consistently in is expressed in two ways: as cubic kilometers per excess of inflows. year and as billion gallons per day. Divided by Replenishment of surface and ground-water re- land area (after converting the second measure to sources occurs as a consequence of precipitation. cubic feet per year), these data yield estimates of A portion of the total quantity of precipitation is the average rate of replenishment per unit land returned to the atmosphere by evaporation and area, expressed in millimeters per year and inches transpiration, a portion becomes inflow to the per year, respectively. These estimates provide a ground-water reserves, and the remainder runs Off reasonably comparable index of the relative avail- as surface drainage. In the absence of human ability of water at various locations in the world. withdrawals, inflows to ground-water resources Unfortunately, calculations performed on the are usually matched by outflows, through springs basis of nations and continents inevitably blur the or seeps, to surface water bodies. A first approxi- inherent variation in the data. Many nations, such mation of the overall rate of replenishment, there- as the United States, consist of areas which range fore, may be obtained by measuring the total from very and to very humid; water may be surface-water discharge from a specific watershed. exceedingly scarce in the Southwest but abundant Unmeasured outflows from ground-water (such as in the Pacific Northwest. Even so, the average discharges from the ocean floor), net ground-water annual runoffs for nations can be seen to range storage, and/or the existence of ground-water from 4 millimeters for Egypt (not including inflows withdrawals may cause this measure to understate the true replenishment rate. from other nations via the Nile River) to 1,300 The use. of replenishment rate in estimating millimeters for the Philippines. The United States supply carries further liabilities. As the area under is close to the world average at 250 millimeters. study becomes large (a major river basin, a nation, The larger the land area of a nation, the longer or a part thereof) the replenishment rate under- the major river systems within the nations, and states the true supply because it fails to reflect the more seacoast included, the more seriously reuse possibilities. As each user withdraws and these data may understate the true availability of uses water, wastewater flows are generated and water. On the other hand, environmental consid- returned to the stream or lake. These return flows erations may require minimum flows in streams, are then available to other users, water quality especially those draining into significant estuaries, permitting. Quality requirements can be met by which substantially reduce the annual volumes of dilution, by relying on in-stream purification proc- water that can actually be withdrawn from ground esses, by wastewater treatment before discharge, and surface sources. Where surface storage or by water treatment after withdrawal, or by a extensive well fields are required to accomplish a combination of these. The more effectively the desired withdrawal, economic costs may prevent desired water quality can be maintained ' the or delay a potential supply from becoming an greater the potential for reuse of return flows. actual one. The supply of water available to a given area, As a result of the considerations discussed therefore, cannot be estimated on the basis of above, it is impossible to make meaningful state- data now available, but a lower bound can be ments concerning the supply of water available determined by measuring or estimating the total across the world, or throughout any continent or surface water discharge from the area. This annual nation. Meaningful statements describing supply volume of water is potentially available for with- can be made only for relatively small areas and drawal, although storage facilities might be re- then only after detailed on-site investigation of the quired to satisfy certain patterns of withdrawal. nature and behavior of the actual water resources Additional, unmeasured sources of supply include available to that area. Therefore, the data pre- ground water that leaves the area in some way sented in this section are included only to illustrate other than as surface discharge, net additions to the shortcomings of aggregate calculations and to WATER PROJECTIONS 141 TABLE 9-1 Estimates of Available Global Water Supply for Continents and Selected Nations' Mean Annual Discharge (Water Supply) Land Area Mean Annual Runoff cubic billion 1,0W 1,0W milli- I.nches kmlyr gallday miles 2 kM 2 meters AFRICA 4,220 3,060 11,800 30,600 139 5.5 Egyptb 4.0 2.9 387 1,000 4.0 0.2 Nigeria 261 189 357 924 284 11 ASIA 13,200 9,540 17,200 44,600 2% 12 Bangladesh 129 93.3 55.1 143 915 36 China 2,880 2,080 3,690 9,560 300 1 @ India 1,590 1,150 1,270 3,290 485 19 Indonesia 1,510 1,090 747 1,934 1,000 39 Japan 396 286 144 372 1,070 42 Pakistan 73 52.8 310 804 90.2 3.6 Philippines 390 282 116 300 1,300 51 South Korea 60 43.4 38.0 98.5 609 24 Thailand 171 124 198 514 335 13 Turkey (both continents) 172 124 301 781 215 8.5 U.S.S.R. (in Asia) 3,320 2,400 6,760 17,500 190 7.5 AUSTRALIA-OCEANIA (Australia, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea) 1,960 1,420 3,250 8,420 245 9.6 Australia (including Tasmania) 382 276 2,970 7,690 49.8 2.0 EUROPE 3,150 2,280 3,770 9,770 323 13 U.S.S.R. (entire nation) 4,350 3,150 8,650 22,400 194 7.6 U.S.S.R. (in Europe) 1,030 744 1,890 4,900 210 8.3 NORTH AMERICA 5,960 4,310 8,510 22,100 286 11 Mexico 330 239 762 1,970 165 6.5 United States (50 states)c 2,340 1,700 3,620 9,360 250, 9.9 SOUTH AMERICA 10,400 7,510 6,880 17,800 583 23 Brazil 5,670 4,100 3,290 8,510 666 26 GLOBAL (excluding Antarctica) 38,900 28,100 51,600 134,000 290 11 Africa 3,400 2,460 29,800 114 Asia 12,200 8,820 44,100 276 Australia (-Oceania) 2,400 1,740 8,900 269 Europe 2,800 2,030 10,000 282 North America 5,900 4,270 24,100 242 South America 11,100 8,030 17,900 618 Antarctica 2,000 1,450 14,100 141 Global 39,700 28,700 149,000 266 Global (excluding Antarctica) 37,700 27,300 134,000 280 Data are rounded to 2 or 3 significant figures. Egypt is a good example of some nations whose additional water supplies come from large rivers entering or passing through the nation but having their upstream source in one or more other nations. The Nile is the mqior Egyptian water supply, but the Nile is largely fed by precipitation and stream systems located south of Egypt and is therefore not included in the data shown for Egypt. @ The figures for the 48 conterminous states are: area, 3,020,000 square miles; mean runoff, 1,900,000 cubic feet per second; water supply, about 1,200 billion gallons per day, or 1,620 cubic kilometers per year. Sources: Runoff data for all but the global areas and continents at end of table were compiled from statistics in M. 1. L'vovich. Global Water Resources and Their Future (in Russian), 1974, pp. 264-70. The somewhat comparable data for each continent at the end of the table are from Albert Baumgartner and Eberhard Reichel, The World Water Balance: Mean Annual Global. Continental and Maritime Precipitation, Evaporation and Run-off, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1975. provide some indication of the gross differences - Domestic use existing among the various regions of the world. - Industrial use (both in manufacturing and min- erals extraction and processing) The Demand for Water - Crop irrigation Water is used to perform a wide variety of . Energy production (not including hydropower) functions in human society. Among the major uses to which water withdrawn from surface and In each use, some fraction of the amount with- ground sources may be put are: drawn is consumptive use (it is evaporated or 142 THE PROJECTIONS incorporated into a product), and the remainder is time to time (for example by the Economic' retumed to the environment, where it may be Commissions for Europe and for Asia and the Far available for later withdrawal by another user.* East). In order to estimate the amount of water The distribution of withdrawals among three of use for all regions on a systematic basis in the these uses (domestic, industrial, agricultural) for absence of such first-hand statistics, recourse may 16 selected countries is shown in Figure 9-2. be made to comparisons with demographic and Data on the above uses have been compiled for related data that are more generally available and the U.S. at 5-year intervals by the U.S. Geological which are generally considered in projections of Survey. Scattered data have been compiled for ftiture natural development. other countries and reprinted and published from Domestic use, for example, can be estimated froin data on urban and rural populations, using Preferred water use terms used in this chapter are water figures on per capita use where such data me withdrawn (or withdrawals), and water consumed (consump- available. Use factors for European countries tive use). Water withdrawn is pumped or diverted for use range from 76 to 270 liters per day per capita, from a stream, lake, or aquifer. After use, part of the water with a general average of 150 liters. Estimates of withdrawn returns to a stream, lake, or aquifer, and is per capita use for developing countries, published available for reuse. The other part has been consumed by the World Health Organization, are given in during use-by evaporation, transpiration, drinking by man or beast, or by incorporation into a food or other product. Table 9-2. Ther term "consumption" should be avoided because, Industrial use can be estimated from data on although usually meaning water withdrawn, the word itself the production of various commodities, (e.g., see may be confused with "consumed." Water demand, water ECOSOC, 1969). Water-product ratios are highly requirements, and water use also usually refer to water withdrawals rather than water consumed, except when variable among industrial plants depending, among otherwise noted. other things, on the particular plant process, costs Z 7 Domestic sector Agriculture Idus" h loc- so- 60- % 1b 40- 20- low MM BulWic Czechoslovakia East France West Hungary India Israel Gwmony Germany (1968) (1960) 0: 100- 44444 so- 60- Ix 40 20- Li MW how how Tan Japan .@,M@xko Mang@oliicr, Poland U.S.tjt. u.x. xanio U'S. (1970) Figure 9-2. Distribution of withdrawals among major categories of water use, 1965. Distribution by water-use types reflects the economic characteristics of a nation. lAdaptedfrom G. R. White et al., Resources and Needs: Assessment of the World Water Situation, U.N. Water Conference, 1977) WATER PROJECTIONS 143 of water, and recycling. For the purposes of this of water supply data, these large aggregates mask chapter, the ratio of water use to the population important variations in the data. Within each engaged in manufacturing is used as a simple country, water withdrawals are doubtless concen- measure. For the U.S., the water use/population trated in specific areas, so that certain areas will ratio is 2,500 gallons per day per capita or about have withdrawal rates much above that given for 9,500 liters. In several Asian countries, the ratio the country, and other areas will be much below. nins from 2,150 to 8,600 liters per day per capita. Nevertheless, average water withdrawals are seen The ratio for Japan is about 4,500 liters per day to vary from a low of just over I millimeter for per capita (or 1,640 cubic meters per year per Brazil to a maximum of 301 millimeters for Japan. capita). Experience in the U.S. indicates that The latter figure can be traced to very high about 11 percent of industrial withdrawal is con- withdrawals for cooling thermoelectric power sumed. plants, as well as relatively high withdrawals for Irrigation use can be estimated from data on other industrial uses and for crop irrigation. irrigated acreage, recognizing that this irrigation 'Forecasts of future water withdr-awals require use varies climatically, and with the techniques consideration of all the various determinants of used for irrigation (a maximum under gravity-flow water demand. Ideally, each water-using sector ditch irrigation, a minimum under trickle irrigation would be considered separately, and the factors schemes). that influence water use would be identified, Irrigation experience in the.U.S. indicates that quantified, forecast, and combined, using an ap- about 3.1 acre-feet per acre (0.95 hectare-meters propriate demand function, to yield a forecast of per hectare) is withdrawn for irrigation. This depth future water use. Thus domestic water use would app