3. *How often the collection is required:* As necessary in order that adequate and timely reports of radiation exposure be made to individuals involved in NRC-licensed activities.

4. *Who is required or asked to report:* Licensees authorized to receive, possess, use, or transfer material licensed by the NRC.

5. *The number of annual respondents:* 280

6. *The number of hours needed annually to complete the requirement or request:* 39,918 (approximately 34,566 reporting hours—an average of 5 minutes per response, and 5,352 recordkeeping hours—an average of 18 hours per recordkeeper)

7. *Abstract:* Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 19, requires licensees to advise workers on an annual basis of any radiation exposure they may have received as a result of NRC-licensed activities or when certain conditions are met. These conditions apply during termination of the worker's employment, at the request of a worker, former worker, or when the worker's employer (the NRC licensee) must report radiation exposure information on the worker to the NRC. Part 19 also establishes requirements for instructions by licensees to individuals participating in licensed activities and options available to these individuals in connection with Commission inspections of licensees to ascertain compliance with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, Title II of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and regulations, orders and licenses thereunder regarding radiological working conditions.

The worker should be informed of the radiation dose he or she receives because: (a) that information is needed by both a new employer and the individual when the employee changes jobs in the nuclear industry; (b) the individual needs to know the radiation dose received as a result of an accident or incident (if this dose is in excess of the 10 CFR Part 20 limits) so that he or she can seek counseling about future work involving radiation, medical attention, or both, as desired; and (c) since long-term exposure to radiation may be an adverse health factor, the individual needs to know whether the accumulated dose is being controlled within NRC limits. The worker also needs to know about health risks from occupational exposure to radioactive materials or radiation, precautions or procedures to minimize exposure, worker responsibilities and options to report any licensee conditions which may lead to or cause a violation of Commission regulations, and individual radiation exposure reports which are available to him.

Submit, by April 13, 1998, comments that address the following questions:

1. Is the proposed collection of information necessary for the NRC to properly perform its functions? Does the information have practical utility?

2. Is the burden estimate accurate?

3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected?

4. How can the burden of the information collection be minimized, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology?

A copy of the draft supporting statement may be viewed free of charge at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW (lower level), Washington, DC. OMB clearance packages are available at the NRC worldwide web site (http://www.nrc.gov) under the FedWorld collection link on the home page tool bar. The document will be available on the NRC home page site for 60 days after the signature date of this notice.

Comments and questions about the information collection requirements may be directed to the NRC Clearance Officer, Brenda Jo. Shelton, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, T–6 F33, Washington, DC, 20555–0001, or by telephone at 301–415–7233, or by Internet electronic mail at BJS1@NRC.GOV.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day of February, 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Brenda Jo. Shelton,

NRC Clearance Officer, Office of the Chief Information Officer.

[FR Doc. 98–3271 Filed 2–9–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–317 and 50–318]

Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2); Exemption

I

The Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (BGE or the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–53 and DPR–69, which authorize operation of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (the facilities), respectively. The license provides, among other things, that the facilities are subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.

The facilities are pressurized-water reactors located at the licensee's site in Calvert County, Maryland.

The licensee is implementing an upgrade to the existing Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 emergency diesel generator (EDG) 1B during the upcoming Unit 1 refueling outage (RFO–14). RFO–14 is scheduled to commence on April 3, 1998, and is expected to be completed in early June 1998. To support the upgrade, the licensee has identified one temporary exemption required at this time. The exemption is specified below.

II

The *Code of Federal Regulations* at 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Criterion 2 (GDC–2) requires that structures, systems, and components important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, such as tornadoes, without the loss of capability to perform their safety functions.

The licensee has requested the temporary exemption from GDC–2 because of the planned upgrade of the Unit 1 EDG 1B. The effort will require temporary removal of two steel doors, which will expose the out-of-service Unit 1 EDG 1B and the operating Unit 2 EDGs 2A and 2B, as well as the support systems for the out-of-service Unit 1 EDG 1B and the operating Unit 2 EDGs 2A and 2B. Unit 2 EDGs 2A and 2B must be operable to support the operation of Unit 2. These EDGs require protection from the effects of missiles, generated by natural phenomena.

The licensee indicates that the steel missile doors will be removed four times during RFO–14; only one door will be removed at a time. The licensee estimates that each of the missile door removals will take less than 24 hours, which will result in a total removal time of about 100 hours during the scheduled 60-day outage.

The licensee is providing compensatory action to ensure the safe operation of Unit 2, for the short periods that the steel missile doors will be removed. To cover all severe weather conditions, as defined in the plant site Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures 3.0, Attachment 17, a concerted effort will be made to reinstall the missile doors if a tornado or a hurricane watch is issued or if sustained winds are predicted to be greater than 50 miles an hour at the site. When the missile shield is removed, it is left connected to the crane used to remove it. A crane operator remains at the crane controls during the time the missile shield is removed. In addition to

the crane operator, three people are used to handle the movement of the shield and fasten it in place. These people are drawn from the crew working on the diesel upgrade since the shield is removed only when they are working in the area. The time required to reinstall the missile shield is approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes. This time includes 30 minutes to 45 minutes to move and position the shield, and 30 minutes to completely torque a minimum of 13 bolts to hold it in place. The installation time is considered sufficient since plant procedures require that the missile shield be reinstalled on an adverse weather watch, rather than waiting until a warning is issued. The only factor that would impede the reinstallation of the missile doors would be the safety of the individuals performing the reinstallation. The licensee has also stated that the missile doors between the EDG 1B room and the EDG 2A room is a fire barrier but not a flood barrier. The fire barrier will be breached when the door is removed to pass EDG parts through. Plant procedures require a fire watch if any fire barrier is to remain open. The procedures will be followed from the time the door is removed until it is replaced.

Considering the existing design features and the compensatory measures proposed by the licensee, the likelihood of damage to the exposed EDGs and the support systems from postulated missiles generated by natural phenomena is minimal for the short periods that the protective doors will be removed. Also, on the basis of the compensatory measure provided, reasonable assurance exists that the ability to reinstall the missile doors will be maintained during any severe weather that could result in airborne missiles. Therefore, there is reasonable assurance that the proposed GDC–2 exemption will present no undue risk to public health and safety.

III

The Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), that special circumstances, as set forth in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(v), exist. The exemption would provide only temporary relief from the applicable regulation (GDC–2). The exemption is requested for a specific period, after which the facility would again be in conformance with all the requirements of GDC–2. The licensee has made good faith efforts in considering alternatives to the exemption request and has concluded that without the subject exemption, the EDG upgrade can only be conducted when both units are shut down.

On the basis of this information and review of the licensee's submittal, as summarized in the Safety Evaluation, the NRC staff concludes that the likelihood of unacceptable damage to the exposed portions of the operable EDGs and support systems as a result of weather-induced missiles during short-duration exposures in the exemption period is low.

On the basis of the low probability of the occurrence of unacceptable events, coupled with the compensatory measure to which the licensee has committed, the NRC staff finds the proposed exemption from GDC–2 to be acceptable.

IV

Accordingly, the Commission has determined that pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the subject exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security. The Commission further determines that special circumstances, as provided in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(v), are present that justify the exemption; namely, that the exemption would provide only temporary relief from the applicable regulations and that the licensee has made good faith efforts to comply with the regulations.

Therefore, the Commission hereby approves the following exemption: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, may operate without conforming to the requirements of GDC–2 as they apply to the exposed portions of the Unit 2 EDGs 2A and 2B and the support systems for the EDGs, providing that the compensatory measure, as described herein, is in place for the period of the exemption.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that granting the above exemption will have no significant impact on the quality of the human environment (62 FR 114).

The subject Unit No. 1 EDG 1B upgrade GDC–2 exemption is effective from the date of issuance through July 31, 1998.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of February 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Collins,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98–3272 Filed 2–9–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–269, 50–270, and 50–287]

Duke Energy Corporation; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–38, DPR–47, and DPR–55, issued to the Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee), for operation of the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, respectively, located in Seneca, South Carolina.

If approved, the proposed amendments would amend the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Technical Specifications (TS) to revise the present wording used to specify refueling outage surveillances to indicate that the surveillances are to be performed on an 18-month frequency.

The original Oconee TS required that certain surveillances be performed annually and, therefore, were not constrained to performance with a unit in the refueling condition. As a result, the licensee has not interpreted a surveillance that is specified to be performed at refueling outage frequency as meaning that the unit must be in a refueling outage to satisfy the requirement. Therefore, some surveillances specified at a refueling outage frequency were performed at times other than during a refueling outage. In discussions with the NRC staff on January 29, 1998, the licensee was informed of the staff's interpretation of Oconee's TS that concluded any surveillance that was specified to be performed during refueling outages must be performed with the unit in a refueling outage. Thus, any surveillances performed at power, in past forced outages, or during planned shutdowns, would not satisfy the TS requirements. The licensee then immediately began to evaluate the impact of the staff's literal interpretation of the TS. On January 30, 1998, the licensee confirmed that certain surveillances had been performed at times other than during a refueling outage and that implementation of the staff's interpretation of the surveillances designated in the TS as ''refueling outage'' would result in exceeding the time constraints allowed in the TS and, in accordance with TS 3.0, would result in the forced shutdown of Units 2 and 3 and interfere with the planned startup of Unit 1. However, the licensee