[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 251 (Tuesday, December 31, 2002)]
[Notices]
[Pages 79906-79911]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-32995]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

National Nuclear Security Administration


Record of Decision for the Final Environmental Impact Statement 
for the Relocation of Technical Area 18 Capabilities and Materials at 
the Los Alamos National Laboratory

AGENCY: Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration.

ACTION: Record of Decision.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) is issuing this Record of Decision on the 
proposed relocation of Technical Area 18 (TA-18) capabilities and 
materials at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the State of New 
Mexico. This Record of Decision is based on the information and 
analysis contained in the TA-18 Relocation Environmental Impact 
Statement (DOE/EIS-319), and other factors, such as programmatic and 
technical risk, construction requirements, and cost. NNSA has decided 
to implement the Preferred Alternative, which would relocate Security 
Category I/II missions and related materials to the Device Assembly 
Facility at the Nevada Test Site. This alternative includes facility 
modification and transportation of special nuclear materials and 
equipment required to support Security Category I/II missions. 
Regarding Security Category III/IV alternatives, NNSA has determined 
that additional studies are required and thus is not making a decision 
on this set of missions.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the TA-18 
Relocation EIS or Record of Decision, or to receive a copy of the TA-18 
Relocation EIS, contact: James J. Rose, Document Manager, National 
Nuclear Security Administration (NA-53), U.S. Department of Energy, 
1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-5484. 
For information on the DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy 
and Compliance (EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (205) 586-4600, or leave a message 
at (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    The DOE's NNSA prepared this Record of Decision pursuant to the 
regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality for implementing 
NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA Implementing Procedures 
(10 CFR part 1021). This Record of Decision is based, in part, on DOE's 
TA-18 Relocation EIS (DOE/EIS-319).
    NNSA is responsible for providing the Nation with nuclear weapons, 
ensuring the safety and reliability of those nuclear weapons, and 
supporting programs that reduce global proliferation. These missions 
are accomplished with a core team of highly trained nuclear experts. 
One of the major training facilities for those personnel is located at 
Technical Area 18 (TA-18) within the Los Alamos National Laboratory 
(LANL), Los Alamos, New Mexico. The operations at TA-18 enable DOE and 
other government personnel to gain knowledge and expertise in advanced 
nuclear technologies that support the following: (1) Nuclear materials

[[Page 79907]]

management and criticality safety; (2) emergency response in support of 
counter-terrorism activities; (3) safeguards and arms control in 
support of domestic and international programs to control excess 
nuclear materials; and (4) criticality experiments in support of 
Stockpile Stewardship and other programs. Criticality experiments 
involve systems of fissile material(s), called critical assemblies, 
which are designed to reach a condition of nuclear criticality in a 
controlled manner. The capability to conduct criticality experiments 
also includes development of nuclear instruments, measurement and 
evaluation of integral cross sections, accident simulation, dosimetry, 
and the detection and characterization of nuclear material. A critical 
assembly is a machine used to manipulate a mass of fissile material in 
a specific geometry and composition. The critical assembly machines 
proposed for relocation are the Flattop, Planet, Comet, and Godiva, 
which are currently located in TA-18 facilities called CASAs (Critical 
Assembly Storage Areas).
    NNSA uses a cost-effective, graded approach to provide safeguards 
and security for special nuclear materials (SNM). Quantities of SNM 
stored at each site are categorized into Security Categories I, II, 
III, and IV with the greater quantities included under Security 
Categories I/II and lesser quantities included in descending order 
under Security Categories III/IV. Areas supporting Security Category I/
II activities are protected by a Perimeter Intrusion Detection and 
Assessment System (PIDAS) designed to detect, control, or deny access 
to these areas. Each CASA at TA-18 is surrounded by a PIDAS.
    TA-18 operations at LANL include Security Category I/II, as well as 
Security Category III/IV activities. Security Category I/II activities 
are associated primarily with the operation of the Flattop, Planet, 
Comet and Godiva critical assembly machines. Security Category III/IV 
activities are associated with various experiments and storage 
involving small quantities of SNM and the operation of the critical 
assembly machine.
    Though TA-18 is judged to be secure by DOE's independent inspection 
office, its buildings and infrastructure are from 30 to more than 50 
years old and are increasingly expensive to maintain and operate. 
Additionally, the TA-18 operations are located in a canyon which is 
difficult to secure, resulting in increasingly high costs to maintain a 
security infrastructure for the special nuclear materials (SNM) used 
and stored at the site. NNSA wishes to maintain the important 
capabilities currently provided at TA-18 in a manner that reduces the 
long-term costs for safeguards and security. NNSA proposes to 
accomplish this by relocating the TA-18 capabilities and materials to a 
new location.

Alternatives Considered

    NNSA evaluated the environmental impacts associated with the 
proposed action of relocating TA-18 capabilities and materials 
associated with Security Category I/II activities to a new location. 
Location alternatives for Security Category I/II activities and 
materials include the following DOE sites: (1) A different site at LANL 
at Los Alamos, New Mexico; (2) Sandia National Laboratories at 
Albuquerque, New Mexico (SNL/NM); (3) Nevada Test Site (NTS) near Las 
Vegas, Nevada; and (4) Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) near 
Idaho Falls, Idaho.
    In conjunction with the relocation of Security Category I/II 
activities, NNSA also evaluated the environmental impacts associated 
with the relocation of TA-18 Security Category III/IV activities, 
including SHEBA, within LANL, and considered two alternatives not 
involving relocation: the No Action Alternative and the TA-18 Upgrade 
Alternative. These alternatives are described in greater detail below.

No Action Alternative

    This alternative would maintain the current missions at TA-18 as 
described for the Expanded Operations Alternative in the LANL Site-Wide 
Environmental Impact Statement (LANL SWEIS) and the associated Record 
of Decision (64 FR 50797). Under the No Action Alternative, the 
operations conducted at TA-18 would continue at the level described in 
the LANL SWEIS with no major construction, facility modifications, or 
changes to the infrastructure associated with buildings or safeguards 
and security. Current SNM inventories (all security categories), as 
well as the criticality experiments machines, would remain in place. 
The No Action Alternative may limit NNSA's ability to support future 
TA-18 mission requirements.

TA-18 Upgrade Alternative

    This alternative would upgrade the buildings, infrastructure and 
security infrastructure of existing TA-18 facilities to continue 
housing these TA-18 operations at their present location at LANL. 
Current SNM inventories (all security categories), as well as the 
criticality experiments machines, would remain in place.
    Under the Upgrade Alternative, some construction activities would 
be necessary. New construction would consist of: (1) A new one-story 
office and laboratory building, (2) a new one-story control room, (3) a 
new one-story pre-engineered metal storage building, and (4) a new 
storage vault. In addition, some modifications to existing facilities 
would also be needed. The modifications include: installation of high-
efficiency particulate air filters in conjunction with negative 
pressurization of the CASAs; paving and surfacing improvements; 
replacement of potable and fire-protection water systems; replacement 
of the sanitary sewage system; storm-water management improvements; 
site grading; additions or replacements of heating, ventilating, and 
air conditioning; power distribution and monitoring; lightning 
protection; grounding; surge suppression; PIDAS upgrades; and physical 
security enhancements.

LANL New Facility Alternative

    This alternative would locate the TA-18 Security Category I/II 
activities in a new building to be constructed near the Plutonium 
Facility 4 (PF-4) at LANL's TA-55. The new Security Category I/II 
operations building would consist of above-grade structures that would 
house support operations and below-grade structures that would house 
criticality assembly areas and SNM vaults. A low-scatter bay would be 
located in a new pre-engineered-type building above ground. Access to 
the facility would be through a new Protected Area Access Control 
Building. The PF-4 PIDAS would be enlarged to encompass this new 
facility.

SNL/NM Alternative

    This alternative would locate the TA-18 Security Category I/II 
operations within a new Security Category I/II facility to be 
constructed within TA-V at SNL/NM. The new Security Category I/II 
operations building would include nuclear material storage vaults, and 
critical assembly facilities. The alternative would also involve the 
modification and renovation of 10 existing aboveground buildings within 
SNL/NM's TA-V area. Structures that would be located in the aboveground 
renovations would include emergency response staging and maintenance, 
electronics and machine shops, instrumentation laboratory, critical 
assembly control rooms and warehouse, a low-scatter facility, waste 
management storage areas, and radioactive-source storage areas.

[[Page 79908]]

NTS Alternative

    This alternative would locate the TA-18 Security Category I/II 
operations in and around the existing the Device Assembly Facility 
(DAF). Currently, DAF is used for the assembly of subcritical 
experiments, as well as other miscellaneous national security missions. 
To accommodate the relocated TA-18 operations, modifications to the DAF 
would include: modifications to internal walls, floors, and ceilings; 
addition of bulk and penetration-shielding materials; demolition of 
fire-suppression and other water systems; and, raceway additions 
connecting the critical assemblies to their control rooms and power 
supplies. A new low-scatter building would also be constructed and 
placed outside the DAF, within its PIDAS.

ANL-W Alternative

    This alternative would locate the TA-18 Security Category I/II 
operations in the existing Fuel Manufacturing Facility (FMF) and other 
existing buildings at ANL-W. New construction to expand the existing 
FMF would be required to accommodate the relocated TA-18 operations. 
Security upgrades would also be necessary. The facilities proposed for 
the relocation of Security Category I/II activities are: FMF, with a 
proposed new addition; the Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) facility; 
the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) containment and power 
plant; the Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) facility; and a new General-
Purpose Experimental Building (GPEB). Storage vault space requirements 
for Security Category III SNM would be provided in four different 
vaults within the protected area. Two of the vaults currently exist, 
while the other two would be constructed along with the new additions.

Relocation of SHEBA and Other Security Category III/IV Activities

    As discussed above, in conjunction with the relocation of TA-18 
Security Category I/II activities to either LANL's TA-55, SNL/NM, NTS, 
or ANL-W, a portion of the TA-18 Security Category III/IV activities 
(the SHEBA activities) would either be relocated to a new structure at 
LANL or remain at TA-18 and the rest of the Security Category III/IV 
activities would either be relocated to existing or new structures at 
LANL or remain at TA-18.
    The relocation of the SHEBA activities to a new location at LANL 
would involve either the construction of a new structure on top of an 
existing bunker or the construction of a new bunker and cover 
structure. The bunker, in both cases, would be used to house the SHEBA 
solution tanks and support equipment. A new control and training-room 
structure would be built in relatively close proximity to the 
construction of the new SHEBA bunker, but outside the SHEBA radiation 
zone.
    The relocation of the TA-18 Security Category III/IV activities, 
other than SHEBA, to LANL's TA-55 would involve the construction of a 
new laboratory and a new office building at TA-55 in the proximity, but 
outside the PIDAS, of the proposed new underground facility for 
Security Category I/II activities. If a decision is made that Security 
Category III/IV activities remain at TA-18, some internal modifications 
to TA-18 facilities would be required, but no new construction. 
Internal modifications would be limited to rearrangement of internal 
spaces.

Preferred Alternative

    As stated in the TA-18 Relocation Final EIS, NNSA's Preferred 
Alternative is the NTS Alternative for Security Category I/II materials 
and activities. The preferred alternative is the alternative that the 
agency believes would fulfill its statutory mission, giving 
consideration to environmental, economic, technical, and other factors.
    As stated in the TA-18 Relocation Final EIS, the preferred 
alternative for Security Category III/IV activities is that those 
activities would remain at LANL. However, NNSA is currently pursuing 
additional studies and will issue a separate record of decision 
regarding these Security Category III/IV activities.

Environmentally Preferable Alternative

    Ordinarily, the environmentally preferable alternative is the 
alternative that causes the least impact to the environment; it is also 
the alternative that best protects, preserves, and enhances historic, 
cultural, and natural resources. The analyses indicated that there 
would be very little difference in environmental impacts among the 
alternatives analyzed and also that the impacts would be small. After 
considering impacts to each resource area by alternative, NNSA has 
identified the ANL-W Alternative as having relatively the fewest 
impacts to the environment; it is also the alternative that best 
protects, preserves, and enhances historic, cultural, and natural 
resources.

Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

    NNSA weighed environmental impacts as one factor in its decision-
making, analyzing existing environmental impacts and the potential 
impacts that might occur for each reasonable alternative including the 
irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources.

Land Use

    Differences among alternatives are primarily associated with 
facility construction. The only alternative with no new construction is 
the No Action Alternative. Potential land disturbance would range from 
0.2 hectares (at TA-18; Upgrade Alternative) to 1.8 hectares (LANL New 
Facility and SNL/NM alternatives). In addition, 0.08 hectares of land 
could be disturbed at LANL's TA-39 for the relocation of SHEBA and 1.6 
hectares of land could be disturbed for the relocation of other 
Security Category III/IV activities at LANL's TA-55. No land use change 
would result from implementing any of the alternatives.

Transportation

    Except for the No Action Alternative and the TA-18 Upgrade 
Alternative, all other site relocation alternatives would require the 
transportation of equipment and materials. Such transportation would 
involve the relocation of approximately 2.4 metric tons (2.6 tons) of 
special nuclear material (SNM), and approximately 10 metric tons (11 
tons) of natural and depleted uranium and thorium, as well as support 
equipment, some of which would be radioactively contaminated. For each 
of the relocation alternatives, the environmental impacts and potential 
risks of such transportation would be small, less than one fatality per 
10,000 years under normal and accident conditions. The potential 
transportation risks would differ between the relocation alternatives 
primarily as a function of the transportation distance. Based on 
distance, the ANL-W Alternative would have the highest potential 
impact, the NTS Alternative the second-highest, the SNL/NM Alternative 
the third-highest, and the LANL New Facility Alternative the least risk 
(compared to the No Action and TA-18 Upgrade Alternatives). There is 
little variation in impacts between alternatives because effects are 
small, and any projected increased transport of radioactive materials 
is not enough to make a significant change.

Socioeconomics

    Employment changes would also be very small (around 20 new hires) 
for the alternatives involving the relocation of TA-18 activities to 
new sites (SNL/NM, NTS, or ANL-W), while the overall operations 
workforce at LANL would

[[Page 79909]]

remain the same regardless (TA-18, TA-55 or TA-39). Construction 
activities would involve temporary increases in the workforce with a 
maximum peak of 300 construction workers (LANL New Facility, SNL/NM 
alternatives) to 120 construction workers or less for the other 
alternatives. The peak number of construction workers for SHEBA and 
other Security Category III/IV activities relocation would be less than 
50. These workforce changes would have no noticeable impact on the 
socioeconomic conditions of the associated regions of influence.

Geology and Soils

    No impacts to geology or geological conditions are expected in any 
of the alternatives. Proposed new facilities and renovated buildings 
would be evaluated, designed, and constructed in accordance with DOE 
Order 420.1 and sited to minimize the risk of geologic hazards. The 
potential exists for contaminated soils and possibly other media to be 
encountered during excavation and other site activities for all 
alternatives involving new construction. Prior to commencing ground 
disturbance, NNSA would survey potentially affected areas to determine 
the media extent and nature of any contamination and implement required 
remediation in accordance with the procedures established under each 
site's environmental restoration program.

Water Resources

    Surface water would not be used to support new construction or 
modification of existing facilities at any of the sites considered for 
relocation. No impacts on surface water are expected from operations of 
TA-18 facilities and there would be no direct discharge of sanitary or 
industrial effluent to surface waters under all alternatives. 
Wastewater would be collected and conveyed to existing wastewater 
treatment facilities. Storm-water runoff from construction areas could 
potentially impact downstream surface water quality, although any 
effects on runoff quality would likely be localized around immediate 
points of disturbance or construction lay-down areas.
    Groundwater would be required during construction for such uses as 
dust control and soil compaction, washing and flushing activities, and 
to meet the potable and sanitary needs of construction employees. It is 
estimated that construction activities would require from 50 thousand 
liters per year (ANL-W Alternative) to a maximum of 17 million liters 
per year (LANL New Facility, SNL/NM Alternatives) during construction. 
Facility operations would require approximately 6.9 million liters per 
year of groundwater under all alternatives. Groundwater required during 
the period of construction or operation should not impact regional 
groundwater levels or availability for any of the alternatives 
considered. No operational impacts on groundwater quality are expected 
for any of the alternatives.

Biological Resources

    With the exception of the No Action Alternative and the ANL-W 
Alternative, construction of new facilities would impact terrestrial 
resources due to the loss of small amounts of native vegetation 
consisting of Ponderosa pine at LANL, grassland at SNL/NM, and creosote 
bush at NTS. Because of the small amount of land disturbance, the 
habitat loss would be small and potential disturbance of wildlife would 
be temporary. Construction activities would have no impact on existing 
wetlands at LANL.
    Potential impact on the federally threatened desert tortoise at NTS 
may occur under the NTS Alternative during construction. However, due 
to the low population density of the desert tortoise at NTS, it is 
doubtful that this impact would exceed allowable losses. Operational 
activities would not impact terrestrial resources at any of the 
alternative sites.

Air Quality

    Non-radioactive hazardous air pollutants would not be expected to 
degrade air quality or affect human health under any of the 
alternatives. Small quantities of criteria and toxic air pollutants 
would be generated from the operation of emergency diesel generators 
during testing and other routine activities at all alternative 
relocation sites. The resulting concentrations would be well below 
ambient quality standards at all alternative relocation sites with the 
exception of LANL's TA-55 where the maximum ground-level concentration 
of nitrogen dioxide could exceed the 24-hour standard at the nearest 
public access road (Pajarito road). Short-term concentrations on public 
roads from testing of the emergency diesel generators at TA-55 would be 
controlled by appropriate design of the generator stack or other 
appropriate engineering or management measures including limitations on 
testing the diesel generators to favorable meteorological conditions.
    Construction of new buildings and modifications of existing 
buildings at the alternative sites would result in a temporary increase 
in air quality impacts from construction equipment, trucks, and 
employee vehicles. Although emissions would vary with the magnitude of 
the construction activities at each alternative relocation site the 
maximum ground-level concentrations would be well below the ambient air 
quality standards at all alternative sites with the exception of LANL's 
TA-55 where the short-term concentrations of total suspended particles 
and particulate matter could exceed standards at public receptors 
adjacent to the site. Construction air quality impacts at the site 
would be mitigated by implementing standard dust-control practices as 
required by the state air quality control agency.

Visual Resources

    Activities related to the construction of new buildings and 
building modifications at the alternative relocation sites would result 
in a temporary change to the visual appearance of the sites due to the 
presence of construction equipment and possible increased dust. The 
overall appearance of the existing landscape would not change under any 
of the alternatives.

Noise

    Construction of new buildings and modifications of existing 
buildings would result in some temporary increase in noise levels near 
the area from construction equipment and activities. However, there 
would be no change in noise levels due to normal TA-18 operations under 
all alternatives.

Site Infrastructure

    The projected demands on key infrastructure resources associated 
with site construction and building modification are well within the 
infrastructure capabilities at each of the alternative sites. It is 
also projected that the existing infrastructure resources would be 
adequate to support the proposed TA-18 activities over 25 years for all 
alternative sites.

Cultural Resources

    No impact to known prehistoric, historic, Native American, or 
paleontological resources is expected from construction or operational 
activities under all site alternatives. Because most of the proposed 
new construction would occur in previously disturbed land, it is 
unlikely that construction of new facilities at any of the sites could 
disturb previously unknown prehistoric, Native American or 
paleontological resources.

[[Page 79910]]

Consultation with the State Historic Preservation Officers and tribal 
representatives would be conducted in accordance with site cultural 
resource management plans.

Waste Management

    Construction of new buildings and modifications of existing 
buildings at the alternative sites would mostly generate non-hazardous 
waste, and some hazardous (e.g., contaminated oil) and low-level 
radioactive waste. The projected one time non-hazardous construction 
waste generation volume under the action alternatives would vary 
depending on the size of renovation/modification needs and would 
contribute a very small fraction to the annual production of waste at 
each site. The impact of managing this waste at the alternative 
relocation sites would be minimal.
    The projected annual waste generation volume from operations 
associated with TA-18 activities would not change from the No Action 
Alternative volume. For all alternatives, the activities generate 
annually 145 cubic meters of solid low-level radioactive waste, 1.5 
cubic meters of mixed low-level radioactive waste, and 4 cubic meters 
of solid hazardous waste. In addition, refurbishment and replacement of 
critical assembly machine parts prior to relocation would generate a 
one-time 1.5 cubic meters of mixed low-level and low-level radioactive 
solid waste at LANL. No liquid mixed low-level or low-level radioactive 
waste and/or hazardous waste would be generated during the operation. 
The impact of managing wastes at all relocation sites would be minimal.

Worker and Public Health

    Public and occupational health and safety impacts were evaluated in 
terms of industrial, chemical and radiological consequences.

Industrial

    During construction, yearly nonfatal occupational injuries/
illnesses could increase by an estimated maximum of 16 above the No 
Action Alternative. During the operation of all TA-18 activities (both 
Security Category I/II and III/IV activities), the estimated total 
number of yearly nonfatal occupational injuries/illnesses among the 
workforce would be 7 for all alternatives. No occupational fatalities 
are expected for the duration of the proposed action.

Chemical

    No chemical has been identified that would be a risk to workers or 
the members of the public from construction activities at alternative 
sites. During operation, very small quantities of industrial-type 
chemicals, such as ethanol, isopropyl alcohol, phenyl phosphine, 
magnesium dioxide, and xylene would be used under all alternatives. The 
quantities of these chemicals that could be released to the atmosphere 
are minor and well below the regulatory screening levels that would 
require additional analysis. Workers would be protected from exposure 
to hazardous chemicals by adherence to Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration and Environmental Protection Agency standards.

Radiological

    There would be no radiological impacts to the members of public 
from construction activities. Construction workers could receive very 
small doses above background radiation level from exposure to radiation 
from other past or present activities at alternative sites. These 
workers would be protected through appropriate training, monitoring, 
and management control limiting their exposure and ensuring that the 
doses are kept as low as reasonably achievable.
    Normal operations of critical experiments would generate small 
quantities of air-activation products (i.e., argon gas [argon-41]), 
about 110 curies per year that would be released to the environment. 
SHEBA operations, by the nature of its design and purpose, would 
generate the majority of argon-41 during operations (about 100 curies). 
Under all alternatives, the radiological impacts to the members of 
public from these releases would be lower than that of the existing TA-
18 operations. For all alternatives, the radiation exposure to the 
members of the public would be small, and well below the regulatory 
limit of 10 millirem per year. For all sites, the maximally exposed 
offsite individual would receive less than 0.067 millirem per year from 
operational radiological releases associated with TA-18 activities. 
Statistically, this translates into a risk that one additional fatal 
cancer would occur approximately every 20 million years due to TA-18 
operations. The maximum collective dose to general public living within 
80 kilometers (50 miles) would be less than 0.1 person-rem per year (No 
Action Alternative, TA-18 Upgrade Alternative), which corresponds to 
approximately 5.0 x 10-5 estimated latent cancer fatalities, 
or one in every 20,000 years of operation. The collective dose to the 
population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) under other alternatives 
would be smaller, ranging from 0.020 person-rem (SNL/NM Alternative) to 
0.000070 person-rem (NTS Alternative).
    The direct dose (from gamma, and neutron radiation) to a member of 
the public from critical experiments under all alternatives, except for 
the current TA-18 and new SHEBA location, would be essentially zero. 
The maximum direct dose to a member of the public from activities at 
TA-18 location would be less than 4.75 millirem per year, with an 
estimated 2.4 x 10-6 latent cancer fatalities per year of 
operation. The maximum direct dose to a member of the public from SHEBA 
operations would be about 1 millirem per year with an estimated latent 
cancer fatality risk of 5 x 10-7 per year. Statistically 
speaking, the maximum risk of an individual member of public developing 
a latent cancer fatality from exposure to this direct radiation would 
be less than one in every 410,000 years of operation.
    The annual average dose to a worker involved in TA-18 activities 
would be the same under all alternatives and is estimated to be 100 
millirem per year with a corresponding risk of developing latent cancer 
fatality of 4 x 10-5 per year. There would be a one-time 
dose to the workers of 2.3 person-rem from SNM handling activities that 
would be transported from TA-18 to alternative relocation sites (i.e., 
LANL TA-55, SNL/NM, NTS, and ANL-W). SHEBA relocation would also incur 
a one-time dose to workers of 0.02 person-rem.

Facility Accidents

    The accident analyses considered a wide spectrum of potential 
operational accident scenarios including uncontrolled reactivity 
insertion, inadvertent criticality, fire, explosion (i.e., hydrogen 
detonation), and earthquake, covering both the range of TA-18 
activities and the radioactive material at risk. The accident scenarios 
chosen for the evaluation bound the impacts of all reasonably 
foreseeable accidents that could occur at existing or relocated TA-18 
facilities. The accident risks were estimated in terms of both the 
frequency of the event and the consequences of such event. The risk of 
an accident is defined as the product of the accident frequency and the 
associated consequences to the population within 80 kilometers. The 
highest potential annual risk of excess latent fatalities among the 
population within 80 kilometers would be less than 5.1 x 
10-5 (i.e., about one chance in 19,000 per year of a latent 
cancer fatality), for the bounding accident analyzed. The No Action 
Alternative, and specifically SHEBA operations,

[[Page 79911]]

would produce the highest potential accident impact, primarily due to 
the design of SHEBA. The potential annual risk of excess latent cancer 
fatalities among the population at the alternative sites ranges from 
7.7 x 10-10 (NTS Alternative) to 2.2 x 10-7 (SNL/
NM Alternative).
    There would be no hazardous chemicals or explosives used or stored 
at existing and relocated TA-18 facilities, other than minor industrial 
quantities, that would impact workers or the public under accident 
conditions.

Environmental Justice

    Based on the analysis of all resource areas and demographic 
information on low-income and minority populations, NNSA does not 
expect any environmental related issues (i.e., the projected impacts 
are not disproportionately high and adverse for minority or low income 
populations) from TA-18 activities under all alternatives.

Comments on the Final EIS

    NNSA distributed approximately twelve hundred copies of the Final 
EIS for review and to date, has received only two comments on the EIS. 
Both individuals were concerned that the relocation of the TA-18 
missions would be a threat to national security through the loss of 
existing resources presently located at LANL. Both individuals 
indicated that these resources, especially experienced personnel, had 
been built up over a number of years and would not be present at 
another location.

Other Decision Factors

    In assessing the alternatives for Security Category I/II missions, 
the NNSA considered other key factors such as programmatic impacts, 
construction risk, security concerns and overall cost.

Programmatic Risk

    Due to the importance of the TA-18 missions in the Nation's overall 
security posture, the potential risk of programmatic impacts were 
assessed by reviewing the ability for each alternative to meet 
programmatic requirements and to determine the degree of synergy each 
option provided the mission set. While all alternatives met the basic 
program requirements, it was determined that the LANL New Facility and 
NTS Alternatives were more advantageous than SNL and ANL-W for 
minimizing programmatic risk to Security Category I/II activities. 
First, LANL New Facility and NTS offered improved security and 
operating flexibility that would allow for the accomplishment of 
programmatic work for the next few decades due to facility age and 
location. Additionally, LANL and NTS provided programmatic synergy as 
both sites have existing mission requirements that complement the TA-18 
mission set. SNL had increased programmatic risk because of the age of 
the facilities that would be modified under the alternative. ANL-W was 
determined to have the highest programmatic risk because it was no 
longer an NNSA site, had minimal programmatic synergy (namely through 
criticality research and training) and its remote location. The No 
Action and TA-18 Upgrade Alternatives were recognized to minimize 
programmatic risk initially, but would have increasing difficulty in 
meeting requirements, as the TA-18 facilities would reach the end of 
their useful life and operational/security requirements evolved.

Construction Risk

    NNSA considered the risk from construction activities for the 
alternatives, taking into account the concepts proposed for each 
alternative. Factors that were examined included the age of the 
existing facility (if modifications would occur), the extent of 
modifications, and the complexity of designs. From this examination, it 
was determined that the NTS offered the least construction risk from 
the standpoint of facility age, design complexity, and extent of 
modifications. The NTS Alternative was based on a facility that was 
designed to modern safety standards as opposed to the TA-18 Upgrade, 
SNL, and ANL-W Alternatives that were based on refurbishing multiple 
buildings that approached 30-40 years in age. As with modifying 
buildings of this age, NNSA has found from past experience that there 
is inherently more risk from discovering unknown design aspects of the 
buildings. Finally, the LANL New Facility Alternative, while providing 
the newest location for the TA-18 missions, offered moderate 
construction risk due to the nature of the underground design.

Costs

    In reviewing the overall costs associated with relocation of the 
TA-18 Security Category I/II missions, it was determined that most 
options fell within a similar cost range when considering construction, 
transportation, and project management activities as well as lifecycle 
costs with a few exceptions. Preliminary relocation cost estimates 
indicated that the NTS Alternative was the lowest from a construction 
standpoint, but there was a potential for slightly higher lifecycle 
costs from operating activities due to the campaign structure proposed. 
Additionally, NTS as well as SNL and ANL-W had higher transportation 
costs associated with their alternative from off-site movement of 
materials than with the LANL options. The highest cost estimate was 
associated with the TA-18 Upgrade Alternative, driven by the current 
age of the TA-18 complex and uncertainties with future operational and 
security facility requirements. The remaining alternatives fell between 
these extremes, showing slight differences between them in terms of 
construction and lifecycle costs.

Mitigation Measures

    Impacts were sufficiently small to negate the need for specific 
mitigative actions. This is not to say that the NNSA will not implement 
the normal storm water run-off control measures, waste minimization 
programs and other such normal activities so as to minimize adverse 
impacts to the environment, wherever possible.

Conclusion

    NNSA has considered environmental impacts, stakeholders concerns, 
risks, costs, and national policy in its decisions regarding the 
relocation of TA-18 Security Category I/II missions and activities and 
has decided to implement the preferred alternative, transfer of 
missions to the Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada Test Site. At 
this time, the NNSA does not issue a decision regarding location of TA-
18 Security Category III/IV missions and activities within LANL; 
however, additional studies will be performed and a separate record of 
decision will be issued sometime in 2003.

    Issued in Washington, DC, this 5th day of December, 2002.
Linton Brooks,
Acting Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.
[FR Doc. 02-32995 Filed 12-30-02; 8:45 am]
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