[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 246 (Tuesday, December 23, 2003)]
[Notices]
[Pages 74262-74273]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-31314]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility 
Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations

Background

    Pursuant to Public Law 97-415, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (the Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this regular 
biweekly notice. Public Law 97-415 revised section 189 of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), to require the Commission to 
publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued, 
under a new provision of section 189 of the Act. This provision grants 
the Commission the authority to issue and make immediately effective 
any amendment to an operating license upon a determination by the 
Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards 
consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a 
request for a hearing from any person.
    This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or 
proposed to be issued from November 27 through December 11, 2003. The 
last biweekly notice was published on December 9, 2003 (68 FR 68654).

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating 
Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, 
and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following 
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under 
the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation 
of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis 
for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown 
below.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received 
before action is taken. Should the Commission take this action, it will 
publish in the Federal Register a notice of issuance and provide for 
opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects that 
the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.

[[Page 74263]]

Copies of written comments received may be examined at the Commission's 
Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public 
File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 
Maryland. The filing of requests for a hearing and petitions for leave 
to intervene is discussed below.
    By January 22, 2004, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714, which is 
available at the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, 
Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 
Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the 
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public 
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing 
or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the 
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the 
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or 
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of 
a hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's PDR, 
located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, by the above date. 
Because of continuing disruptions in delivery of mail to United States 
Government offices, it is requested that petitions for leave to 
intervene and requests for hearing be transmitted to the Secretary of 
the Commission either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-
1101 or by e-mail to hearingdocket@nrc.gov. A copy of the request for 
hearing and petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and because of continuing disruptions in 
delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is requested 
that copies be transmitted either by means of facsimile transmission to 
301-415-3725 or by e-mail to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. A copy of the 
request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene should also be 
sent to the attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for a hearing will 
not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the 
presiding officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment which is available for public inspection at 
the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File 
Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. 
Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide 
Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic 
Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there 
are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the 
NRC PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by e-mail to 
pdr@nrc.gov.

[[Page 74264]]

Carolina Power & Light Company, Docket No. 50-261, H. B. Robinson Steam 
Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, Darlington County, South Carolina

    Date of amendment request: June 11, 2003, as supplemented by letter 
dated August 20, 2003, and October 13, 2003.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
modify Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.16, ``Containment Leakage Rate 
Testing Program'' to allow a one-time extension of the containment Type 
A leak rate test interval from once in 10 years to once in 15 years.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Increase 
in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated.
    The proposed change to TS 5.5.16 provides a one-time extension 
of the containment Type A test interval to 15 years for HBRSEP (H. 
B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant), Unit No. 2. The proposed TS 
change does not involve a physical change to the plant or a change 
in the manner in which the plant is operated or controlled. The 
containment vessel is designed to provide a leak-tight barrier 
against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment 
in the unlikely event of postulated accidents. As such, the 
containment vessel is not considered as the initiator of an 
accident. Therefore, the proposed TS change does not involve a 
significant increase in the probability of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    The proposed change involves only a one-time change to the 
interval between containment Type A tests. Types B and C leakage 
testing will continue to be performed at the intervals specified in 
10 CFR part 50, Appendix J, Option A, as required by the HBRSEP, 
Unit No. 2, TS. As documented in NUREG-1493, ``Performance-Based 
Containment Leakage-Test Program,'' industry experience has shown 
that Types B and C containment leak rate tests have identified a 
very large percentage of containment leak paths, and that the 
percentage of containment leak paths that are detected only by Type 
A testing is very small. In fact, an analysis of 144 integrated leak 
rate tests, including 23 failures, found that none of the failures 
involved a containment liner breach. NUREG-1493 also concluded, in 
part, that reducing the frequency of containment Type A testing to 
once per 20 years results in an imperceptible increase in risk. The 
HBRSEP, Unit No. 2, test history and risk-based evaluation of the 
proposed extension to the Type A test interval supports this 
conclusion. The design and construction requirements of the 
containment vessel, combined with the containment inspections 
performed in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers (ASME) Code, Section XI, and the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 
50.65) provide a high degree of assurance that the containment 
vessel will not degrade in a manner that is detectable only by Type 
A testing. Therefore, the proposed TS change does not involve a 
significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a New 
or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated.
    The proposed change to TS 5.5.16 provides a one-time extension 
of the containment Type A test interval to 15 years for HBRSEP, Unit 
No. 2. The proposed change to the Type A test interval does not 
result in any physical changes to HBRSEP, Unit No. 2. In addition, 
the proposed test interval extension does not change the operation 
of HBRSEP, Unit No. 2, such that a failure mode involving the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated is created.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction 
in the Margin of Safety.
    The proposed change to TS 5.5.16 provides a one-time extension 
of the containment Type A test interval to 15 years for HBRSEP, Unit 
No. 2. The NUREG-1493 study of the effects of extending containment 
leak rate testing found that a 20 year extension for Type A testing 
resulted in an imperceptible increase in risk to the public. NUREG-
1493 found that, generically, the design containment leak rate 
contributes a very small amount to the individual risk, and that the 
decrease in Type A testing frequency would have a minimal affect on 
this risk, since most potential leak paths are detected by Type B 
and C testing.
    The proposed change only involves a one-time extension of the 
interval for containment Type A testing; the overall containment 
leak rate specified by the HBRSEP, Unit No. 2, TS is being 
maintained. Type B and C testing will continue to be performed at 
the frequency required by the HBRSEP, Unit No. 2, TS. The regular 
containment inspections being performed in accordance with the ASME 
Code, Section XI, and the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) provide a 
high degree of assurance that the containment will not degrade in a 
manner that is only detectable by Type A testing. In addition, a 
plant-specific risk evaluation demonstrates that the extension of 
the Type A test interval from 10 years to 15 years results in a 
``very small'' increase in risk for those accident sequences 
influenced by Type A testing and a ``small'' increase in risk when 
compared to the test frequency of 3 tests per 10 years.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety.
    Based on the above discussion, Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., 
has determined that the requested change does not involve a 
significant hazards consideration.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Steven R. Carr, Associate General Counsel--
Legal Department, Progress Energy Service Company, LLC, Post Office Box 
1551, Raleigh, North Carolina 27602.
    NRC Section Chief: Allen G. Howe.

Duke Energy Corporation, et al., Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Catawba 
Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, York County, South Carolina

    Date of amendment request: March 20, 2003.
    Description of amendment request: The amendments would revise the 
Technical Specifications to update the heatup, cooldown, criticality, 
and inservice test pressure and temperature limits for the reactor 
coolant system.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

First Standard

    Does operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed 
amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes to the reactor coolant system (RCS) 
pressure-temperature (P/T) limits are developed utilizing the 
methodology of ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers) XI, 
10 CFR (part) 50 Appendix G, in conjunction with the methodology of 
Code Case N-640. Usage of these methodologies provides compliance 
with the underlying intent of 10 CFR (part) 50 Appendix G and 
provides operational limits that ensure failure of the reactor 
vessel will not occur. The proposed changes to allow operation with 
two pumps capable of injecting into the RCS and utilization of the 
residual heat removal (RHR) suction relief valves has been evaluated 
and determined to provide adequate protection of the RCS from the 
worst case pressure transient.
    The probability of any design basis accident (DBA) is not 
affected by these changes, nor are the consequences of any DBA 
affected by these changes. The P/T limits, and low temperature 
overpressure protection (LTOP) setpoints, and Tenable 
value are not considered to be initiators or contributors to any 
accident analysis addressed in the Catawba UFSAR (updated final 
safety analysis report).

[[Page 74265]]

    The proposed changes do not adversely affect the integrity of 
the RCS such that its function in the control of radiological 
consequences is affected. The changes do not alter any assumption 
previously made in the radiological consequence evaluations nor 
affect the mitigation of the radiological consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated. The proposed changes to the TS are 
consistent with the intent of the flexibility currently provided in 
NUREG-1431, Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse 
Plants, Revision 2.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated in the updated final safety analysis report 
(UFSAR) because the accident analysis assumptions and initial 
conditions will continue to be maintained.

Second Standard

    Does operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed 
amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any accident previously evaluated.
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve any physical alteration of 
plant systems, structures, or components. The requirements for the 
P/T limit curves and LTOP setpoints remain in place. The fundamental 
approach follows approved ASME and Westinghouse report methodology. 
The proposed curves and change to the enable temperature for LTOP 
system reflect changes in material properties acknowledged and 
managed by regulation and an upgrade in technology, which has been 
approved by ASME.
    The proposed changes to allow operation with two pumps capable 
of injecting into the RCS and utilization of the RHR suction relief 
valves has been evaluated. The evaluation has shown that both the 
PORVs (power-operated relief valves) and RHR suction relief valves 
provide adequate relief protection of the RCS from the worst case 
pressure transient and provide equivalent protection to that already 
allowed by the current TS (technical specification).
    The proposed changes do not introduce new failure mechanisms for 
system structures, or components not already considered in the 
UFSAR. Therefore, the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any accident previously evaluated is not created 
because no new failure mechanisms or initiating events have been 
introduced.

Third Standard

    Does operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed 
amendment involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes are developed utilizing the methodology of 
ASME XI, 10 CFR (part) 50 Appendix G, in conjunction with Code Case 
N-640 and Code Case N-641 methodology. Usage of these methodologies 
provides compliance with the underlying intent of 10 CFR (part) 50 
Appendix G and provides operational limits that ensure failure of 
the reactor vessel will not occur. Although the Code Cases 
constitute relaxation from the current requirements of 10 CFR (part) 
50 Appendix G, the alternative methodology allowed by the Code is 
based on industry experience gained since the inception of the 10 
CFR (part) 50 Appendix G requirements for which some of the 
requirements have now been determined to be excessively 
conservative. The more appropriate assumptions and provisions 
allowed by the Code Cases maintain a margin of safety that is 
consistent with the intent of 10 CFR (part) 50 Appendix G, i.e., 
with regard to the margin originally contemplated by 10 CFR (part) 
50 Appendix G for determination of RCS P/T limits.
    The analyses completed for this proposed TS amendment 
demonstrate that established acceptance criteria continue to be met. 
Specifically, the P/T limit curves, LTOP setpoints, allowances for 
operating two pumps, utilization of RHR suction relief valves and 
LTOP Tenable values provide acceptable margin to vessel 
fracture under both normal operation and LTOPs design basis (mass 
addition and heat addition) accident conditions. The proposed 
changes to the TS are consistent with the intent of the flexibility 
currently provided in NUREG-1431, Standard Technical Specifications 
for Westinghouse Plants, Revision 2. Therefore, there will be no 
significant reduction in a margin of safety as a result of the 
proposed changes.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Ms. Lisa F. Vaughn , Legal Department 
(PB05E), Duke Energy Corporation, 422 South Church Street, Charlotte, 
North Carolina 28201-1006.
    NRC Section Chief: John A. Nakoski.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249, Dresden 
Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Grundy County, Illinois; Docket 
Nos. 50-254 and 50-265, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 
2, Rock Island County, Illinois

    Date of application for amendment request: March 28, 2003, as 
supplemented by letter dated October 23, 2003.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would 
revise the technical specifications to reduce the main steam line low 
pressure primary containment isolation allowable value.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    Current licensing bases events remain bounding for ATWS, 
transient, and accident analyses. For the bounding events, a 
reduction in the allowable value for the MSL LPIS produces no 
significant change in the limiting results with respect to the 
acceptance criteria. The proposed change does not alter the response 
of plant equipment to transient conditions, nor does it introduce 
any new equipment, modes of system operation or failure mechanisms. 
The proposed change does not adversely impact structures, systems, 
or components.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.

ECCS-LOCA Performance

    In the analyses used to evaluate the ECCS-LOCA performance, the 
MSIVs are assumed to close at the start of the accident for all 
break locations. Therefore, the low pressure isolation trip is not 
used in the LOCA analyses and the LOCA analysis results are not 
affected by the reduction in the LPIS.
    For large breaks in the MSL (both inside and outside 
containment), the MSIV closure is initiated by a high steam line 
flow signal at the beginning of the event, well before the LPIS is 
reached. For these cases, the ECCS performance is not affected by 
the reduction in the LPIS.
    If the steam line break is too small to result in a high flow 
isolation signal, MSIV closure may be initiated by another signal 
(e.g., high steam line tunnel temperature or low reactor water 
level) or it may occur due to the LPIS trip. In either case, steam 
line breaks of any size are not the limiting events with respect to 
ECCS performance, and a 40 psi reduction in the LPIS will not affect 
compliance with the acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50.46, 
``Acceptance criteria for emergency core cooling systems for light-
water nuclear power reactors.''
    Based on the above discussions, the reduction of the MSIV LPIS 
has no adverse impact on the plant response to a LOCA or on 
compliance with the acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50.46.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of a previously 
evaluated ECCS-LOCA accident.

Containment System Response

    In evaluating containment response to pipe breaks inside 
containment, the MSIVs are assumed to close at the start of the 
accident for all break locations in the containment system response 
analyses. Therefore, the low pressure isolation trip is not assumed 
and the analysis results are not affected by the reduction in the 
LPIS.
    In the event that MSIV closure does not occur at the beginning 
of the accident, MSL isolation is effectively achieved as the 
pressure regulator closes the turbine control and bypass valves in 
an attempt to maintain turbine throttle pressure at the regulator 
setpoint of approximately 925 psig. Thus, for events other than 
breaks in the main steam

[[Page 74266]]

line, isolation occurs before the LPIS is reached.
    For large breaks in the MSL (both inside and outside 
containment), the MSIV closure is initiated by a high steam line 
flow signal at the beginning of the event, well before the LPIS is 
reached. For these cases, the containment system response is not 
affected by the reduction in the LPIS. For a steam line break too 
small to result in a high flow isolation signal, MSIV closure may be 
initiated by another signal (e.g., low reactor water level) or it 
may occur due to the LPIS trip. Small breaks do not determine the 
peak drywell shell temperature and equipment qualification (EQ) 
envelope. Large breaks, as characterized in Section 3.3.2 of 
Attachment 4, are large enough to depressurize the reactor 
irrespective of the MSIV closure. Hence, a 40-psi reduction in the 
LPIS will not affect the peak drywell shell temperature or the 
drywell temperature EQ envelope.
    Based on the above discussions, the reduction of the MSIV LPIS 
has no adverse impact on the containment system response.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated for containment system response.

Subcompartment Pressurization

    The MSL break mass and energy release used in the evaluation are 
based on steady-state reactor operating conditions. Therefore, the 
low pressure isolation trip is not used in the subcompartment 
pressurization analysis. In addition, the peak annulus 
pressurization loads occur at the beginning of the event, well 
before MSIV closure can occur.
    The subcompartment pressurization results are not affected by 
the reduction in the MSL LPIS.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated for subcompartment pressurization.

Appendix R Fire Protection

    The reactor system response for the Appendix R fire protection 
analysis was performed during the Extended Power Uprate (EPU) 
project. The sequence of events for the analysis shows that closure 
of the MSIVs is initiated on low-low reactor water level. However, 
before the LPIS setpoint is reached, the turbine control valves 
closing on low inlet pressure effectively isolate steam flow 
following a scram. The revised LPIS has no adverse impact on the 
reactor system response to an Appendix R fire protection event.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated for Appendix R fire protection.

Station Blackout

    The initiating event for a station blackout, a loss of off-site 
power, results in MSIV closure at the beginning of the event. The 
reduction of the MSL LPIS has no adverse impact on the reactor 
system response during a station blackout.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of a previously 
evaluated station blackout event.

High Energy Line Break

    The steam line break analysis assumes closure of the MSIVs due 
to high steam line flow at the beginning of the event. Thus, the low 
pressure isolation trip is not used in the analyses and the results 
are not adversely affected by the reduced LPIS.
    The steam line break case determines the short-term peak steam 
tunnel temperature. However, the range of break sizes for which the 
low pressure isolation trip initiates MSIV closure is limited. Such 
a break must be large enough to depressurize the vessel below the 
pressure regulator setpoint, approximately 925 psig, but small 
enough such that high steam line flow trip does not result. Although 
such cases could result in an increase in the mass and energy 
released, similar to a larger line break, isolation will still occur 
before the LPIS is reached. The isolation will occur as a result of 
Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature--High for any leak greater than 
1% rated steam flow. Thus, a 40 psig reduction in the LPIS will not 
adversely affect the peak temperature in the steam tunnel. In 
addition, the dynamic effects (e.g., pipe whip and jet impingement) 
on other structures, systems and components are unaffected by the 
reduced LPIS.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of a high energy line 
break accident previously evaluated.

Radiological Consequences

    The MSIVs are assumed to close due to high steam line flow at 
the start of an accident in the analysis. The low pressure isolation 
trip is not used in the mass release analysis and the radiological 
consequences are not affected by the reduction of the LPIS.
    If the steam line break is too small to cause a high flow 
isolation signal, MSIV closure may be initiated by another signal 
(e.g., high steam tunnel temperature or low reactor water level) or 
it may result from the low pressure isolation trip. Thus, a 40 psig 
reduction in the LPIS will have no adverse impact on the 
radiological consequences. The radiological consequences of a 
reduction in the MSL LPIS are addressed further in Section 6 of this 
attachment.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated for radiological consequences.
    2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different 
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    General Electric Company (GE) evaluated the impact of reducing 
the LPIS analytical limit from 825 to 785 psig, including analysis 
of transient and safety related licensing bases for DNPS, Units 2 
and 3, and QCNPS, Units 1 and 2. Current licensing bases events 
remain bounding for ATWS, transient, and accident analyses. The 
proposed change revises the allowable value of TS Table 3.3.6.1-1, 
Function 1.b, but does not alter the instrumentation or control 
logic of the Primary Containment Isolation System.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin 
of safety?
    Response: No.
    The revised LPIS does not change the current licensing bases 
events, which remain bounding for ATWS, transient and accident 
analyses. The conclusion that a reduction in the MSIV LPIS will not 
have an adverse impact on plant accident analyses is valid. The LPIS 
was analyzed by GE during the EPU project for impact on safety 
limits and safety margins and was determined to be a non-impacted 
item. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Mr. Edward J. Cullen, Vice President, 
General Counsel, Exelon Generation Company, LLC, 300 Exelon Way, 
Kennett Square, PA 19348.
    NRC Section Chief: Anthony J. Mendiola.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374, LaSalle 
County Station, Units 1 and 2, LaSalle County, Illinois

    Date of amendment request: August 19, 2003.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would 
modify Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.13, ``Primary Containment 
Leakage Rate Testing Program,'' by identifying a specific exception to 
the testing guidance contained in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.163, 
``Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program.''
    LaSalle County Station (LSCS) Units 1 and 2 conduct their leakage 
rate testing of the primary containments to the requirements of 10 CFR 
50.54(o) and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix J, Primary Reactor Containment 
Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors,'' Option B as modified 
by approved exemptions. Additionally, the program is in accordance with 
the guidelines contained in RG 1.163. The proposed TS change would take 
exception to RG 1.163 guidance by allowing the testing of potential 
valve atmospheric leakage paths (e.g., valve stem packing), that are 
not exposed to reverse direction Type B or C leakage test pressure 
during the regularly scheduled Type A test. A list of the potential 
valve atmospheric leakage paths, the leakage rate measurement method 
and the acceptance criteria will be contained in the program. This 
exception will be

[[Page 74267]]

applicable only to valves that are not isolable from the primary 
containment free air space.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase 
in probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    The proposed change will revise LaSalle County Station, Units I 
and 2, Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.13, ``Primary Containment 
Leakage Rate Testing Program'' by identifying a specific exception 
to the testing guidance contained in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.163, 
``Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program.''
    The function of the primary containment is to isolate and 
contain fission products released from the reactor Primary Coolant 
System (PCS) following a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident 
(LOCA) and to confine the postulated release of radioactive material 
to within limits. The probability of an accident previously 
evaluated is not dependent on the test-frequency of the primary 
containment Type A, B or C testing. The test interval associated 
with primary containment testing is not a precursor of any accident 
previously evaluated. The proposed specific exception to the testing 
guidance contained in RG 1.163 will continue to test all potential 
valve atmospheric leakage paths and will not be a precursor to a 
Design Basis Accident (DBA). Containment testing does provide 
assurance that the LaSalle County Station primary containments will 
not exceed allowable leakage rate values specified in the Technical 
Specifications and will continue to perform their design function 
following an accident.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated. The proposed change does not affect the control 
parameters governing unit operation or the response of plant 
equipment to transient conditions. The proposed change does not 
introduce any new equipment, modes of system operation or failure 
mechanisms.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously 
evaluated.
    3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety.
    The integrity of the primary containment is verified through 
Type B and Type C local leak rate tests (LLRTs) and the overall leak 
tight integrity of the primary containment is verified by a Type A 
integrated leak rate test (ILRT) as required by 10 CFR part 50, 
Appendix J, ``Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-
Cooled Power Reactors.'' These tests are performed to verify the 
essentially leak tight characteristics of the primary containment at 
the design basis accident pressure. The proposed change for a 
specific exception to the testing guidance contained in Regulatory 
Guide (RG) 1.163 will continue to test all potential valve 
atmospheric leakage paths and does not effect the test acceptance 
criteria for Type A, B or C testing. Therefore, LSCS has determined 
that the proposed change provides an equivalent level of protection 
as that currently provided.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
requested amendments involve no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Mr. Edward J. Cullen, Deputy General 
Counsel, Exelon BSC--Legal, 2301 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19101.
    NRC Section Chief : Anthony J. Mendiola.

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC, Docket No. 50-410, Nine Mile 
Point Nuclear Station Unit No. 2, Oswego County, New York

    Date of amendment request: November 20, 2003.
    Description of amendment request: The licensee proposes to revise 
the safety limit minimum critical power ratio (SLMCPR) values in 
section 2.1.1.2 of the Technical Specifications (TSs). The SLMCPR 
values are based on cycle-specific calculations done for the next fuel 
cycle, Cycle 10, using methodology previously approved by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC).
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis 
against the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c). The NRC staff's 
analysis is presented below:
    The first standard requires that operation of the unit in 
accordance with the proposed amendment will not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated. The proposed SLMCPR values, calculated using an NRC-approved 
methodology, will be made in a manner such that conservatism is 
maintained through compliance with applicable NRC regulations and 
guidance. No hardware design change is involved with the proposed 
amendment, thus there will be no adverse effect on the functional 
performance of any plant structure, system, or component (SSC). All 
SSCs will continue to perform their design functions with no decrease 
in their capabilities to mitigate the consequences of postulated 
accidents. SLMCPR values were not previously factored into the 
probability of accidents, nor were they factored into scenarios of 
previously analyzed accidents. Accordingly, the revised SLMCPR values 
will lead to no increase in the consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated, and no increase of the probability of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    The second standard requires that operation of the unit in 
accordance with the proposed amendment will not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated. The proposed amendment is not the result of a hardware 
design change, nor does it lead to the need for a hardware design 
change. There is no change in the methods the unit is operated. As a 
result, all SSCs will continue to perform as previously analyzed by the 
licensee, and previously evaluated and accepted by the NRC staff. 
Therefore, the proposed amendment will not create the possibility of a 
new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
    The third standard requires that operation of the unit in 
accordance with the proposed amendment will not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety. Since the licensee did not propose to 
exceed or alter a design basis or safety limit, the proposed amendment 
will not affect in any way the performance characteristics and intended 
functions of any SSC. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not 
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    Based on the NRC staff's analysis, it appears that the three 
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff 
proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no 
significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston & 
Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005-3502.
    NRC Section Chief: Richard J. Laufer.

Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No. 50-390, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, 
Unit 1, Rhea County, Tennessee

    Date of amendment request: November 21, 2003.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
allow the position of a rod to be monitored by

[[Page 74268]]

a means other than the movable incore detectors.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    (1) Will operation of the facility in accordance with this 
proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    No. The proposed change provides an alternative method for the 
monitoring of the position of a rod once the position of the rod is 
verified using the moveable incore detector system. The proposed 
monitoring of stationary gripper coil parameters provides a 
reasonably similar approach to rod position monitoring as that 
provided by the movable incore detector system. In particular, the 
ability to immediately detect a rod drop or misalignment is not 
directly provided by the movable incore detector system or by the 
monitoring of stationary gripper coil parameters. Additionally, 
neither the movable incore detector system, nor the monitoring of 
stationary gripper coil parameters, provides the capability to 
verify rod position following a reactor trip or shutdown. Therefore, 
the monitoring of stationary gripper coil parameters, in lieu of the 
use of the movable incore detector system, provides an equivalent 
and acceptable method of monitoring rod position while a position 
indicator is inoperable.
    Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the 
proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    (2) Will operation of the facility in accordance with this 
proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    No. As described above, the proposed change provides only an 
alternative method of monitoring the position of a rod. No new 
accident initiators are introduced by the proposed alternative 
manner of performing rod position monitoring. The proposed change 
does not affect the reactor protection system or the reactor control 
system. Hence, no new failure modes are created that would cause a 
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the 
proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
    (3) Will operation of the facility in accordance with this 
proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of 
safety?
    No. The bases for TS (Technical Specification) 3.1.8 state that 
the operability of the rod position indicators is required to 
determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with 
the control rod alignment and insertion limits. The proposed change 
does not alter the requirement to determine rod position but 
provides an alternative method for monitoring the position of the 
affected rod after the position of the rod is verified using the 
moveable incore detector system. As a result, the initial conditions 
of the accident analysis are preserved and the consequences of 
previously analyzed accidents are unaffected.
    Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the 
proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in the 
margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: General Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority, 
400 West Summit Hill Drive, ET 11A, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.
    NRC Section Chief: Allen G. Howe.

Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses

    During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, 
the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has 
determined for each of these amendments that the application complies 
with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The 
Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the 
Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR chapter I, which are set 
forth in the license amendment.
    Notice of consideration of issuance of amendment to facility 
operating license, proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination, and opportunity for a hearing in connection with these 
actions was published in the Federal Register as indicated.
    Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that 
these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in 
accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), 
no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be 
prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an 
environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 
10 CFR 51.12(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, 
it is so indicated.
    For further details with respect to the action see (1) the 
applications for amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3) the Commission's 
related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment as 
indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at 
the Commission's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint 
North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), 
Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from 
the Agencywide Documents Access and Management Systems (ADAMS) Public 
Electronic Reading Room on the internet at the NRC Web site, http://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS 
or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, 
contact the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) Reference staff at 1-800-
397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by email to pdr@nrc.gov.

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-
318, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Calvert 
County, Maryland

    Date of application for amendments: December 13, 2002, as 
supplemented September 25, 2003.
    Brief description of amendments: These amendments changed the 
Technical Specifications (TSs) by removing the requirement to have the 
charging pumps operable when thermal power is greater than 80% of rated 
thermal power. The change also removes Surveillance Requirement 3.5.2.4 
for verifying the required charging pump flow rate. The change to TS 
3.5.2 does not modify any other charging pump requirements in the 
Technical Requirements Manual (e.g., requirements of charging pump 
availability for boration and cooldown remain in effect).
    Date of issuance: December 3, 2003.
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within 
30 days.
    Amendment Nos.: 260 and 237.
    Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69: 
Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: February 18, 2003 (68 
FR 7812).
    The September 25, 2003, supplemental letter provided clarifying 
information that did not enlarge the scope of the amendment as noticed 
in the original Federal Register notice or change the initial proposed 
no significant hazards consideration determination.
    The Commission's related evaluation of these amendments is 
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 3, 2003.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

[[Page 74269]]

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-
318, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Calvert 
County, Maryland

    Date of application for amendments: May 28, 2003, as supplemented 
November 25, 2003.
    Brief description of amendments: These amendments changed the 
reactor pressure vessel pressure-temperature limit cooldown curves in 
the Calvert Cliffs 1 and 2 Technical Specifications by incorporating a 
different range of temperatures for which a maximum cooldown rate of 
100[deg]F/hr is acceptable.
    Date of issuance: December 9, 2003.
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within 
120 days.
    Amendment Nos.: 261 and 238.
    Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69: 
Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: July 8, 2003 (68 FR 
40701).
    The November 25, 2003, supplemental letter provided clarifying 
information that did not change the initial proposed no significant 
hazards consideration determination.
    The Commission's related evaluation of these amendments is 
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 9, 2003.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.
    Entergy Gulf States, Inc., and Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 
50-458, River Bend Station, Unit 1, West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana.
    Date of amendment request: March 14, 2003, as supplemented by 
letter dated June 24, 2003.
    Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises Technical 
Specification (TS) 3.8.1, ``AC Sources--Operating,'' Surveillance 
Requirements (SRs) pertaining to the testing of the Division 1 and 2 
standby diesel generators (DGs). Specifically, the proposed changes 
eliminate mode restrictions that previously prevented performance of 
SRs during Modes 1 and 2 for the Division 1 and 2 DGs. The changes 
allow the performance of SR 3.8.1.9 and SR 3.8.1.10 for the Division 1 
and 2 DGs during any plant operating mode.
    Date of issuance: November 7, 2003.
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented 
30 days from the date of issuance.
    Amendment No.: 137.
    Facility Operating License No. NPF-47: The amendment revised the 
Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: (68 FR 18275). The June 
24, 2003, supplemental letter provided clarifying information that did 
not change the scope of the original Federal Register notice or the 
original no significant hazards consideration determination. The 
Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a 
Safety Evaluation dated November 7, 2003.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-286, Indian Point 
Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3, Westchester County, New York

    Date of application for amendment: May 28, 2003, as supplemented on 
June 24, 2003.
    Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised Technical 
Specification (TS) Section 3.4.3, ``RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) 
Limits,'' and section 3.4.12, ``Low Temperature Overpressure Protection 
(LTOP),'' to incorporate revised reactor pressure vessel P/T limits and 
overpressure protection system limits to allow operation up to 20 
effective full-power years. Specifically, the amendment changed TS 
Figures 3.4.3-1 to 3.4.3-3 and TS Figures 3.4.12-1 to 3.4.12-4.
    Date of issuance: December 3, 2003.
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented 
within 30 days.
    Amendment No.: 220.
    Facility Operating License No. DPR-64: Amendment revised the 
Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: July 22, 2003 (68 FR 
43389).
    The June 24 letter provided clarifying information that did not 
enlarge the scope of the amendment request or change the initial 
proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated December 3, 2003.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 
No. 2, Pope County, Arkansas

    Date of application for amendment: May 1, 2003, as supplemented by 
letter dated September 30, 2003.
    Brief description of amendment: The amendment modifies the 
surveillance testing requirements for the containment spray system by 
deleting the requirement to verify the position of valves that are 
locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in their correct position (and by 
deleting wording regarding the verified valves being positioned to take 
suction from the refueling water tank), and replacing the quantitative 
allowable pump degradation value with a requirement to verify the pumps 
perform in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.
    Date of issuance: December 4, 2003.
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within 
60 days from the date of issuance.
    Amendment No.: 252.
    Facility Operating License No. NPF-6: Amendment revised the 
Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: May 27, 2003 (68 FR 
28851).
    The September 30, 2003, supplemental letter provided clarifying 
information that did not change the scope of the original Federal 
Register notice or the original no significant hazards consideration 
determination.
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated December 4, 2003.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249, Dresden 
Nuclear Power Station (DNPS), Units 2 and 3, Grundy County, Illinois

    Date of application for amendments: February 27, 2003, as 
supplemented on July 17, July 31, September 11, and November 25, 2003.
    Brief description of amendments: The amendments revise Technical 
Specification Section 3.4.9, ``Reactor Coolant System Pressure and 
Temperature (P/T) Limits,'' incorporating revisions to the P/T limit 
curves. The amendment also deletes the license conditions specified in 
DNPS Unit 2 Facility Operating License Section 2.C(8) and DNPS Unit 3 
Facility Operating License Section 3.P, ``Pressure-Temperature Limit 
Curves.''
    Date of issuance: November 26, 2003.
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented 
within 30 days of the date of issuance.
    Amendment Nos.: 205/197.
    Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25: The amendments 
revised the Facility Technical Specifications and license conditions 
specified in the Facility Operating Licenses.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 5, 2003 (68 FR 
46242).
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated November 26, 2003.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

[[Page 74270]]

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-352 and 50-353, Limerick 
Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania

    Date of application for amendments: November 26, 2002.
    Brief description of amendments: These amendments revised TS 
3.1.3.1, ``Control Rod Operability,'' by adding new Limiting Condition 
for Operation criteria and applicable ACTION requirements for scram 
discharge volume (SDV) vent and drain valves. The changes also modified 
TS 3.6.3, ``Primary Containment Isolation Valves,'' to clarify the 
relationship between TS 3.1.3.1 and TS 3.6.3 regarding SDV vent and 
drain valves.
    Date of issuance: November 26, 2003.
    Effective date: As of date of issuance and shall be implemented 
within 60 days.
    Amendment Nos.: 168 and 131.
    Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-39 and NPF-85: The amendments 
revised the Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: January 7, 2003 (68 FR 
803).
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated November 26, 2003.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-334 and 
50-412, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Beaver County, 
Pennsylvania

    Date of application for amendments: March 26, 2003.
    Brief description of amendments: These amendments modify Technical 
Specifications (TSs) 4.0.1 and 4.0.3 to be consistent with the Improved 
Standard Technical Specifications. The amendments also modify the TS 
requirements for missed surveillances in TS 4.0.3 to be consistent with 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission-approved Technical Specification Task 
Force (TSTF), Standard Technical Specification Change TSTF-358, 
Revision 6.
    Date of issuance: November 25, 2003.
    Effective date: As of the date of its issuance and shall be 
implemented within 60 days.
    Amendment Nos.: 258 and 140.
    Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-66 and NPF-73: Amendments 
revised the Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: June 24, 2003 (68 FR 
37577).
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated November 25, 2003.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Southern California Edison Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-
362, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, San Diego 
County, California

    Date of application for amendments: December 9, 2002, as 
supplemented by letter dated August 28, 2003.
    Brief description of amendments: The changes would revise Technical 
Specification (TS) 3.75, ``Auxiliary Feedwater System,'' Surveillance 
Requirement (SR) 3.7.5.2 Frequency. Specifically, the wording of the 
Frequency of SR 3.7.5.2 would change from ``31 days on a Staggered Test 
Basis'' to ``In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.'' This 
change is requested to implement recommendations of the Standard 
Technical Specifications for Combustion Engineering Plants, NUREG-1432, 
Revision 2.
    Date of issuance: November 25, 2003.
    Effective date: November 25, 2003, to be implemented within 60 days 
of issuance.
    Amendment Nos.: Unit 2--191; Unit 3--182.
    Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-10 and NPF-15: The amendments 
revised the Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: January 7, 2003 (68 FR 
812).
    The August 28, 2003, supplemental letter provided additional 
information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of 
the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's 
original no significant hazards consideration determination.
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated November 25, 2003.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

STP Nuclear Operating Company, Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499, South 
Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Matagorda County, Texas

    Date of amendment request: November 14, 2002, as supplemented by 
letters dated October 30, and November 6, 2003.
    Brief description of amendments: The amendments revise the Updated 
Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to eliminate the turbine missile 
design basis.
    Date of issuance: December 2, 2003.
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented 
within 30 days of issuance. The UFSAR changes shall be implemented in 
the next periodic update to the UFSAR in accordance with 10 CFR 
50.71(e).
    Amendment Nos.: Unit 1--158; Unit 2--146.
    Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80: The amendments 
revised the UFSAR.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: February 18, 2003 (68 
FR 7821).
    The October 30, and November 6, 2003, supplemental letters provided 
additional information that clarified the application, did not expand 
the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change 
the NRC staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination as published in the Federal Register on February 18, 2003 
(68 FR 7821).
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated December 2, 2003.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

STP Nuclear Operating Company, Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499, South 
Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Matagorda County, Texas

    Date of amendment request: May 22, 2003, as supplemented by letters 
dated September 10 and September 30, 2003.
    Brief description of amendments: The amendments change the 
pressurizer safety valve lift tolerance, as specified in Technical 
Specification (TS) 3.4.2.2, ``Reactor Coolant System,'' from plus/minus 
(+/-) 2 percent (%) to +2% and -3%.
    Date of issuance: December 2, 2003.
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented 
within 30 days of issuance.
    Amendment Nos.: Unit 1--159; Unit 2--147.
    Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80: The amendments 
revised the TSs.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: June 24, 2003 (68 FR 
37583).
    The September 10 and September 30, 2003, supplemental letters 
provided clarifying information that was within the scope of the 
original Federal Register notice (68 FR 37583) and did not change the 
initial no significant hazards consideration determination.
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated December 2, 2003.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

[[Page 74271]]

Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296, 
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3, Limestone County, 
Alabama

    Date of application for amendments: August 7, 2003.
    Description of amendment request: The amendments modified Technical 
Specification (TS) requirements for mode change limitations to adopt 
Industry/TS Task Force (TSTF) change TSTF-359, ``Increase Flexibility 
in Mode Restraints.''
    Date of issuance: December 1, 2003.
    Effective date: Date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days.
    Amendment Nos.: 249, 286 & 244.
    Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68. 
Amendments revised the TSs.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: October 14, 2003 (68 FR 
59221).
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated December 1, 2003.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No. 50-327, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 
(SQN), Units 1 and 2, Hamilton County, Tennessee

    Date of application for amendment: March 13, 2003, as supplemented 
July 30, 2003.
    Description of amendment: The amendment revises the boron 
concentration requirements in Technical Specifications (TSs) 3.5.2, 
``Cold Leg Accumulators,'' and 3.5.5, ``Refueling Water Storage Tank.'' 
The revised boron concentration requirement is a function of the number 
of tritium producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) in the core.
    Date of issuance: December 1, 2003.
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented no 
later than startup from an outage in which TPBARs are loaded into the 
reactor.
    Amendment Nos.: 289 & 279.
    Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79: Amendment 
revised the TSs.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: April 15, 2003 (68 FR 
18286). The supplemental letter provided clarifying information only 
and did not change the scope of the original amendment request or the 
initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated December 1, 2003.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and 
Final Determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration and 
Opportunity for a Hearing (Exigent Public Announcement or Emergency 
Circumstances)

    During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, 
the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has 
determined for each of these amendments that the application for the 
amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules 
and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as 
required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 
CFR chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment.
    Because of exigent or emergency circumstances associated with the 
date the amendment was needed, there was not time for the Commission to 
publish, for public comment before issuance, its usual 30-day notice of 
consideration of issuance of amendment, proposed no significant hazards 
consideration determination, and opportunity for a hearing.
    For exigent circumstances, the Commission has either issued a 
Federal Register notice providing opportunity for public comment or has 
used local media to provide notice to the public in the area 
surrounding a licensee's facility of the licensee's application and of 
the Commission's proposed determination of no significant hazards 
consideration. The Commission has provided a reasonable opportunity for 
the public to comment, using its best efforts to make available to the 
public means of communication for the public to respond quickly, and in 
the case of telephone comments, the comments have been recorded or 
transcribed as appropriate and the licensee has been informed of the 
public comments.
    In circumstances where failure to act in a timely way would have 
resulted, for example, in derating or shutdown of a nuclear power plant 
or in prevention of either resumption of operation or of increase in 
power output up to the plant's licensed power level, the Commission may 
not have had an opportunity to provide for public comment on its no 
significant hazards consideration determination. In such case, the 
license amendment has been issued without opportunity for comment. If 
there has been some time for public comment but less than 30 days, the 
Commission may provide an opportunity for public comment. If comments 
have been requested, it is so stated. In either event, the State has 
been consulted by telephone whenever possible.
    Under its regulations, the Commission may issue and make an 
amendment immediately effective, notwithstanding the pendency before it 
of a request for a hearing from any person, in advance of the holding 
and completion of any required hearing, where it has determined that no 
significant hazards consideration is involved.
    The Commission has applied the standards of 10 CFR 50.92 and has 
made a final determination that the amendment involves no significant 
hazards consideration. The basis for this determination is contained in 
the documents related to this action. Accordingly, the amendments have 
been issued and made effective as indicated.
    Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that 
these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in 
accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), 
no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be 
prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an 
environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 
10 CFR 51.12(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, 
it is so indicated.
    For further details with respect to the action see (1) the 
application for amendment, (2) the amendment to Facility Operating 
License, and (3) the Commission's related letter, Safety Evaluation 
and/or Environmental Assessment, as indicated. All of these items are 
available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document 
Room, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available 
records will be accessible from the Agencywide Documents Assess and 
Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the 
Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. 
If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in 
accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC Public 
Document Room (PDR) Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or 
by email to pdr@nrc.gov.
    The Commission is also offering an opportunity for a hearing with 
respect to the issuance of the amendment. By January 22, 2004, the 
licensee may file

[[Page 74272]]

a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to 
the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest 
may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a 
party in the proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a 
petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition 
for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the 
Commission's ``Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' 
in 10 CFR part 2. Interested persons should consult a current copy of 
10 CFR 2.714, which is available at the Commission's PDR, located at 
One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike 
(first floor), Rockville, Maryland, and electronically on the Internet 
at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/
cfr/. If there are problems in accessing the document, contact the PDR 
Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to 
pdr@nrc.gov. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to 
intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic 
Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the 
Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on 
the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the designated Atomic 
Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a hearing or an 
appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses. Since the Commission has made a final determination 
that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, if a 
hearing is requested, it will not stay the effectiveness of the 
amendment. Any hearing held would take place while the amendment is in 
effect.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's PDR, 
located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, by the above date. 
Because of the continuing disruptions in delivery of mail to United 
States government offices, it is requested that petitions for leave to 
intervene and requests for hearing be transmitted to the Secretary of 
the Commission either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-
1101 or by e-mail to hearingdocket@nrc.gov. A copy of the petition for 
leave to intervene and request for hearing should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and because of continuing disruptions in 
delivery of mail to United States government offices, it is requested 
that copies be transmitted either by means of facsimile transmission to 
301-415-3725 or by e-mail to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. A copy of the 
request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene should also be 
sent to the attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for a hearing will 
not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the 
presiding officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., et al., Docket No. 50-425, 
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 2, Burke County, Georgia

    Date of amendment request: November 5, 2003.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
extend the surveillance interval for the Memories Test portion of the 
Actuation Logic Test for: (1) Power Range Block (Switch position 1), 
(2) Intermediate Range Block (Switch position 2), (3) Source Range 
Block (Switch positions 3 and 4), (3) Safety Injection (SI) Block, 
Pressurizer (Switch positions 5 and 6), (4) SI Block, High Steam 
Pressure Rate (Switch positions 7 and 8), (5) Auto SI Block (Switch 
position 9), and (6) Feedwater Isolation on P14 or SI (Switch positions 
10 and 11). In addition to the functions listed above, the licensee is 
requesting an extension of the surveillance interval for the portions 
of the Actuation Logic Test for Feedwater Isolation on P14 or SI that 
pass through the memories circuits and the Power Range block of the 
Source Range Trip test for the Unit 2 Train B Solid State Protection 
System to the next refueling outage at the end of Cycle 10 or the next 
Unit 2 shutdown to MODE 5, whichever comes first.
    Date of issuance: December 3, 2003.
    Effective date: December 3, 2003.
    Amendment No.: 108.
    Facility Operating License No. NPF-81: Amendment revises the 
technical specifications.
    Public comments requested as to proposed no significant hazards 
consideration (NSHC): Yes. November 18, 2003 (68 FR 65092). The notice 
provided an opportunity to submit

[[Page 74273]]

comments on the Commission's proposed NSHC determination. No comments 
have been received. The notice also provided an opportunity to request 
a hearing by December 18, 2003, but indicated that if the Commission 
makes a final NSHC determination, any such hearing would take place 
after issuance of the amendment. The Commission's related evaluation of 
the amendment, finding of exigent circumstances, state consultation, 
and final NSHC determination are contained in a safety evaluation dated 
December 3, 2003.
    Attorney for licensee: Mr. Arthur H. Domby, Troutman Sanders, 
NationsBank Plaza, Suite 5200, 600 Peachtree Street, NE., Atlanta, 
Georgia 30308-2216.
    NRC Section Chief: John A. Nakoski.

    Dated in Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day of December, 2003.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Ledyard B. Marsh,
Director, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 03-31314 Filed 12-22-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P