[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 238 (Tuesday, December 13, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 73802-73809]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E5-7272]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Notice of Availability of Model Application Concerning Technical 
Specification Improvement To Extend the Completion Times for Inoperable 
Containment Isolation Valves at General Electric Plants Using the 
Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice of Availability.

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SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model application relating 
to changes to the Standard Technical Specifications (STSs) 3.6.1.3, 
``Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs),'' for boiling-water 
reactors (BWR) in NUREG-1433, Revision 3, ``Standard Technical 
Specifications, General Electric Plants, BWR/4,'' and ``NUREG-1434, 
Revision 3, ``Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric 
Plants, BWR/6.'' The proposed change to the STSs 3.6.1.3 would extend 
to 7 days the completion time (CT) (or allowed outage time (AOT)) to 
restore an inoperable PCIV to operable status or isolate the affected 
penetration flow path both for selected primary containment 
penetrations with two (or more) PCIVs and for selected primary 
containment penetrations with only one PCIV. This change is based on 
analyses provided in a generic topical report (TR) submitted by the BWR 
Owners' Group (BWROG). The BWROG, through its participation in the 
Technical Specification (TS) Task Force (TSTF) proposed this change to 
the STSs in Change Traveler No. TSTF-454, Revision 1. This notice also 
includes a model safety evaluation (SE) and a model no significant 
hazards consideration (NSHC) determination relating to this matter.
    The purpose of these models is to permit the NRC to efficiently 
process amendments to incorporate this change into plant-specific TSs 
for General Electric (GE) BWRs. Licensees of nuclear power reactors to 
which the models apply can request amendments conforming to the models. 
In such a request, a licensee should provide supporting documentation 
to confirm the applicability of the SE and NSHC determination to its 
plant.

DATES: The NRC staff issued a Federal Register Notice (70 FR 30151, May 
25, 2005) which provided a model SE and a model NSHC determination 
relating to the extension of the CT for TS actions related to 
inoperable PCIVs at GE plants. The NRC staff hereby announces that the 
model SE and NSHC determination may be referenced in plant-specific 
applications to extend the PCIV completion times as described in 
Revision 1 to TSTF-454. The staff has posted a model application on the 
NRC Web site to assist licensees in using the consolidated line item 
improvement process (CLIIP) to request the subject TS change. The NRC 
staff can most efficiently consider applications based upon the model 
application if the application is submitted within a year of this 
Federal Register Notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bhalchandra Vaidya, Mail Stop: O-7D1, 
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, telephone (301) 415-3308.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-06, ``Consolidated Line Item 
Improvement Process for Adopting Standard Technical Specifications 
Changes for Power Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 2000. The CLIIP 
is intended to improve the efficiency and transparency of NRC licensing 
processes. This is accomplished by processing proposed changes to the 
STSs in a manner that supports subsequent license amendment 
applications. The CLIIP includes an opportunity for the public to 
comment on proposed changes to the STSs, following a preliminary 
assessment by the NRC staff, and finding that the change will likely be 
offered for adoption by licensees. The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to 
evaluate any comments received for a proposed change to the STSs and to 
either reconsider the change or proceed with announcing the 
availability of the change for proposed adoption by licensees. Those 
licensees opting to apply for the subject change to TSs are responsible 
for reviewing the staff's evaluation, referencing the applicable 
technical justifications, and providing any necessary plant-specific 
information. Each amendment application made in response to the notice 
of availability would be processed and noticed in accordance with 
applicable NRC rules and procedures.
    This notice involves an increase in the allowed CTs to restore an 
inoperable PCIV to operable status or isolate the affected penetration 
flow path when selected PCIVs are inoperable at BWRs. By letter dated 
September 5, 2003, the BWROG proposed this change, including 
corresponding changes to the TS Bases, for incorporation into the STSs 
as TSTF-454, Revision 0. By letter dated September 21, 2005, BWROG 
revised the proposed change as TSTF-454, Revision 1. This change is 
based on the NRC staff-approved generic analyses contained in BWROG TR 
NEDC-33046-A, ``Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed 
Primary Containment Isolation Valve AOT Extensions for BWR Plants,'' 
transmitted to the NRC on January 20, 2005, which is accessible 
electronically from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management 
System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML050240360) at the NRC Web site http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/adams.html. This transmittal incorporated TR NEDC-33046, 
submitted on May 3, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML021280156), as 
supplemented by letter dated July 30, 2003 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML032130164), and as approved by the NRC in its letter and SE dated 
October 8, 2004 (ADAMS Accession No. ML042660055). Persons who do not 
have access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the 
documents located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC Public Document Room 
Reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-
mail to pdr@nrc.gov.

Applicability

    This proposed change to revise the TS CTs for selected PCIVs is 
applicable to GE BWRs.
    To efficiently process the incoming license amendment applications, 
the NRC staff requests each licensee applying for the changes addressed 
by TSTF-454, Revision 1, to use the CLIIP to address the seven plant-
specific conditions and the one commitment identified in the model SE, 
as follows:

[[Page 73803]]

Conditions

    1. Because not all penetrations have the same impact on core damage 
frequency (CDF), large early release frequency (LERF), incremental 
conditional core damage probability (ICCDP), or incremental conditional 
large early release probability (ICLERP), a licensee's application must 
provide supporting information that verifies the applicability of TR 
NEDC-33046, including verification that the PCIV configurations for the 
specific plant match the TR and that the risk parameter values used in 
the TR are bounding for the specific plant. Any additional PCIV 
configurations or non-bounding risk parameter values not evaluated by 
the TR should be included in the licensee's plant-specific analysis. 
[Note that PCIV configurations or non-bounding risk parameter values 
outside the scope of the TR will require NRC staff review of the 
specific penetrations and related justifications for the proposed CTs.]
    2. The licensee's application must provide supporting information 
that verifies that external event risk, either through quantitative or 
qualitative evaluation, will not have an adverse impact on the 
conclusions of the plant-specific analysis for extending the PCIV CTs.
    3. Because TR NEDC-33046 was based on generic plant 
characteristics, each licensee adopting the TR must provide supporting 
information that confirms plant-specific Tier 3 information in their 
individual submittals. The licensee's application must provide 
supporting information that discusses conformance to the requirements 
of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)), as they relate to the 
proposed PCIV CTs and the guidance contained in NUMARC 93-01, Section 
11, as endorsed by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.182, ``Assessing and 
Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants.'' 
This should include verification that the licensee's maintenance rule 
program, with respect to PCIVs, includes a LERF and ICLERP assessment 
as part of the maintenance rule process.
    4. The licensee's application must provide supporting information 
that verifies that a penetration remains intact during maintenance 
activities, including corrective maintenance activities. Regarding 
maintenance activities where the pressure boundary would be broken, the 
licensee must provide supporting information that confirms that the 
assumptions and results of the TR remain valid. This includes the 
assumption that maintenance on a PCIV will not break the pressure 
boundary for more than the currently allowed CT.
    5. The licensee's application must provide supporting information 
that it will verify the operability of the remaining PCIVs in the 
associated penetration flow path before applying an extended CT for an 
inoperable PCIV.
    6. Simultaneously utilizing the proposed extended CT for multiple 
inoperable PCIVs and the resulting impact on risk were not specifically 
evaluated by the BWROG. However, TR NEDC-33046 does state that multiple 
PCIVs can be out of service simultaneously during extended CTs and does 
not preclude the practice. Therefore, the licensee's application must 
provide supporting information that confirms that its Tier 3 
configuration risk management program (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)) requires 
that simultaneous application of an extended CT to more than one 
inoperable PCIV in separate penetration flow paths is evaluated. The 
purpose of this evaluation is to ensure that the cumulative risk of 
continued plant operation with multiple inoperable PCIVs utilizing 
extended CTs does not exceed the plant risk value, as determined by the 
analysis presented in TR NEDC-33046.
    7. The licensee must provide supporting information that verifies 
that the plant-specific probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) quality is 
acceptable for this application in accordance with the guidelines given 
in RG 1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in 
Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-specific Changes to the Licensing 
Basis.'' To ensure the applicability of TR NEDC-33046 to a licensee's 
plant, each licensee requesting an amendment must provide additional 
information on PRA quality in the following areas:
    a. Justification that the plant-specific PRA reflects the as-built, 
as-operated plant.
    b. Applicable PRA updates including individual plant examinations 
(IPE) and individual plant examinations of external events (IPEEE) 
findings.
    c. Conclusions of the peer review including any A or B facts and 
observations (F and Os) applicable to the proposed PCIV extended CTs.
    d. The PRA quality assurance program and associated procedures.
    e. PRA adequacy, completeness, and applicability with respect to 
evaluating the plant specific impact of the proposed PCIV extended CT.

Commitment

    The RG 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed 
Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications,'' Tier 3 program ensures 
that, while the plant is in a limiting condition for operation (LCO) 
actions condition with an extended CT for restoring an inoperable PCIV 
to operable status, additional activities will not be performed that 
could further degrade the capabilities of the plant to respond to a 
condition the inoperable PCIV or associated system is designed to 
mitigate and, as a result, increase plant risk beyond that determined 
by the TR analysis. A licensee's implementation of RG 1.177 Tier 3 
guidelines generally implies the assessment of risk with respect to 
CDF. However, the proposed PCIV extended CT impacts containment 
isolation and, consequently, LERF as well as CDF. Therefore, each 
licensee requesting extended CTs for PCIVs under TSTF-454, Revision 1, 
must commit to enhancing its configuration risk management program 
(CRMP), including those implemented under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), the 
maintenance rule, to include a LERF methodology and assessment. This 
commitment and the CRMP enhancements must be documented in the 
licensee's plant-specific application.
    The CLIIP does not prevent licensees from requesting an alternative 
approach or proposing the changes without providing the information 
described in the above seven conditions, or making the requested 
commitment. Variations from the approach recommended in this notice 
may, however, require additional review by the NRC staff and may 
increase the time and resources needed for the review.

Public Notices

    In a notice published in the Federal Register dated May 25, 2005 
(70 FR 30151), the NRC staff requested comment on the use of the CLIIP 
to process requests to extend the CT for selected inoperable PCIVs at 
GE plants, as described in Revision 0 of TSTF-454.
    TSTF-454, Revision 1, as well as the NRC staff's SE and model 
application, may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's 
Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, Public File 
Area O-1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. 
Publicly available records are accessible electronically from the ADAMS 
Public Library component on the NRC Web site, (the Electronic Reading 
Room).
    In response to the notice soliciting comments from interested 
members of the public about modifying the TS requirements regarding an 
increase in the specified CTs to restore an inoperable PCIV to operable 
status or

[[Page 73804]]

isolate the affected penetration flow path when selected PCIVs are 
inoperable at BWRs, the NRC staff received three comments from the 
Owners Group TSTF members. These comments were specific to the model SE 
and are discussed as follows:

Comment 1 (as stated)

    Condition 3, Condition 6, and the one required commitment of 
Section 3.2, Evaluation of Proposed Changes, of the model Safety 
Evaluation are not clear or consistent on the expectations for a 
containment performance assessment (i.e., large early release fraction 
[should be ``frequency''], or LERF) as part of the configuration risk 
management program (CRMP). These conditions should be clarified either 
in the Safety Evaluation or in the CLIIP model application.
    Condition 3 requires licensees to conform to the Maintenance Rule 
requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), as it relates to Primary 
Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV) Completion Times and the guidance of 
NUMARC 93-01, ``Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of 
Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,'' Section 11, including a LERF and 
incremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP) 
assessment as part of the process. In addition, Condition 6 requires 
the CRMP to confirm that simultaneous extended Completion Time entries 
in separate penetration flow paths will not exceed the Regulatory Guide 
1.174 and Regulatory Guide 1.177 acceptance guidelines. The commitment 
required by the Safety Evaluation also requires the licensee's CRMP be 
enhanced to include a LERF methodology and assessment.
    Many licensees do not currently have a probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) Level 2 model built into the CRMP for calculating a 
LERF risk value. Adding the LERF model will significantly delay 
adoption of the proposed Traveler [TSTF-454]. The containment risk 
management assessment is routinely addressed through qualitative 
methods and administrative controls. Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01 allows 
for qualitative assessment methods. Section 11.3.4, Assessment Methods 
for Power Operating Conditions, states, ``Simultaneous removal from 
service of multiple SSCs [structures, systems, and components] requires 
that an assessment be performed using quantitative, qualitative, or 
blended (quantitative and qualitative) methods.'' Sections 11.3.4.1 and 
11.3.4.2 provide guidance regarding quantitative and qualitative 
considerations, respectively.
    Is it the intent of the conditions and commitment to require a PRA 
calculation to quantify LERF risk values for the specific plant 
configurations each time a PCIV is inoperable? Would this apply only 
when the extended Completion Time is used or only when multiple 
penetration flow paths are affected as discussed in Condition 6? Would 
it be acceptable to assess and manage the containment performance 
impacts by qualitative methods and administrative controls as currently 
allowed by NUMARC 93-01 as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.182? For 
example, an assessment program could manage containment performance 
risk by limiting the number of affected penetration flow paths 
depending on factors such as the flow path size and not require a LERF 
calculation for each occurrence.

Response to Comment 1

    The BWROG states that many licensee's do not have a level 2 PRA 
model built into the CRMP for calculating LERF. The BWROG further 
states that adopting a LERF model will significantly delay 
implementation of the proposed TSTF traveler. The BWROG references 
Sections 11.3.4.1 and 11.3.4.2 of NUMARC 93-01 for both quantitative 
and qualitative risk assessment methods in the evaluation of Tier 3. 
Although they are inter-related, the following questions were 
identified in BWROG Comment 1 concerning Conditions 3 and 6 of the 
staff model SE issued for comment on May 25, 2005 (70 FR 30151).
    1. Is it the intent of the conditions and commitment to require a 
PRA calculation to quantify the LERF risk values for the specific plant 
configurations each time a PCIV is inoperable?
    2. Would this apply only when the extended CT is used or only when 
multiple penetration flow paths are effected as discussed in Condition 
6?
    3. Would it be acceptable to assess and manage the containment 
performance impacts by qualitative methods and administrative controls 
as currently allowed by NUMARC 93-01, endorsed by RG 1.182?
    Condition 3 of the model SE is intended to ensure that a licensee's 
CRMP includes a LERF and an ICLERP assessment for PCIVs as part of the 
CRMP and maintenance rule process. The intent of the conditions and 
commitment is to ensure an assessment of risk for the actual resulting 
plant configuration when a PCIV is inoperable. The concerns of the NRC 
staff are that PCIVs affect risk mainly through LERF, and that CRMP 
evaluations performed as part of Tier 3 may not address LERF in the 
risk evaluation. An additional concern of the NRC staff stems from the 
fact that TR NEDC-33046 only evaluated the risk of extending the CT for 
a single PCIV. However, the implementation of the TR allows separate 
concurrent extended CTs for multiple inoperable PCIVs because the 
current and proposed STSs for extended PCIVs allow separate actions 
condition entry for each penetration flow path (see the NRC staff's 
response to Comment 2). As stated by the BWROG in its comment, many 
licensees do not have a PRA level 2 model incorporated into the CRMP 
for the evaluation of LERF. The intent of Condition 3 is to ensure that 
Tier 3 evaluations of both CDF and LERF are performed to assess PCIV 
CTs when PCIVs are determined to be inoperable or taken out of service. 
As stated in Condition 3 of the NRC staff model SE, a licensee's 
application must provide supporting information that discusses the 
plant's conformance to the requirements of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 
50.65(a)(4)) and the guidance contained in NUMARC 93-01, Section 11, as 
endorsed by RG 1.182. With respect to comment 1 in general, the NRC 
staff cannot provide a definitive response without reviewing a plant-
specific approach. The assessment program chosen by a licensee or the 
BWROG (qualitative, quantitative, or combination) must be documented in 
the licensee's application because Tier 3 aspects of the proposed PCIV 
CT extensions were not specifically addressed by TR NEDC-33046. 
Therefore, the NRC staff does not believe that changes to Condition 3 
are warranted.

Comment 2 (as Stated)

    Condition 6 of Section 3.2, Evaluation of Proposed Changes, 
requires the licensee's application to provide supporting information 
that verifies that the potential for any cumulative risk impact of 
failed PCIVs and multiple PCIV extended Completion Time entries has 
been evaluated and is acceptable. The verb tense ``has been evaluated'' 
is confusing. Is [it] the intent to require an assessment of the 
plant's design and historical experience to verify that the potential 
for multiple extended Completion Time entries is low? Please clarify 
either in the Safety Evaluation or in the CLIIP model application what 
the evaluation involves.

Response to Comment 2

    The following question was identified in BWROG Comment 2 concerning 
Condition 6 of the staff model SE issued for comment on May 25, 2005 
(70 FR 30151).


[[Page 73805]]


    The verb tense ``has been evaluated'' is confusing. Is [it] the 
intent of condition 6 to require an assessment of the plant's design 
and historical experience to verify that the potential for multiple 
concurrent use of extended Completion Times is low? Please clarify 
in either the Safety Evaluation or the CLIIP model application what 
the assessment should address.

    Condition 6 is concerned with the Tier 3 analysis that provides 
added assurance that the TR's conclusion that no risk significant 
configurations will result from the proposed extended PCIV CTs remains 
valid over extended periods of plant operation. However, in addition to 
Condition 6, as stated in the NRC staff's TR SE, a licensee adopting TR 
NEDC-33046 must confirm that the conclusions of the generic Tier 2 
analysis are applicable to its facility.
    As already stated, TR NEDC-33046 does not limit the number of PCIVs 
that can concurrently but separately be in an actions condition with an 
extended CT because the PCIV TS actions allow separate condition entry 
for each penetration flow path. The intent of Condition 6 is to ensure 
that, for multiple concurrently inoperable PCIVs, including those 
utilizing extended CTs, the licensee will evaluate the impact on risk 
to verify that the conditions of TR NEDC-33046 remain satisfied. As 
stated in Condition 3 of the NRC staff's model SE, a licensee's 
application to adopt TSTF-454, Revision 1, must provide supporting 
information that discusses the plant's CRMP and inoperable PCIV 
assessment program, the plant's conformance to the requirements of the 
maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)), and the guidance contained in 
NUMARC 93-01, Section 11, as endorsed by RG 1.182 for the assessment of 
risk, including LERF and ICLERP resulting from PCIV maintenance.
    Based on the above, the staff will revise Condition 6 of the model 
SE to clarify the applicability to Tier 3 CRMP as follows:

    (6) Simultaneously utilizing the proposed extended CT for 
multiple inoperable PCIVs and the resulting impact on risk were not 
specifically evaluated by the BWROG. However, TR NEDC-33046 does 
state that multiple PCIVs can be out of service simultaneously 
during extended CTs and does not preclude the practice. Therefore, 
the licensee's application must provide supporting information that 
confirms that its Tier 3 configuration risk management program (10 
CFR 50.65(a)(4)) requires that simultaneous application of an 
extended CT to more than one inoperable PCIV in separate penetration 
flow paths is evaluated. The purpose of this evaluation is to ensure 
that the cumulative risk of continued plant operation with multiple 
inoperable PCIVs utilizing extended CTs does not exceed the plant 
risk value, as determined by the analysis presented in TR NEDC-
33046.

Comment 3 (as stated)

    Condition 1 of Section 3.2, Evaluation of Proposed Changes, uses 
the terms ``incremental conditional core damage frequency (ICCDP)'' and 
``incremental conditional large early release frequency (ICLERP).'' The 
word ``frequency'' in these two terms should be changed to 
``probability.''

Response to Comment 3

    The staff agrees. The editorial errors for definitions of 
incremental conditional core damage frequency (ICCDP) and incremental 
conditional large early release frequency (ICLERP) will be corrected in 
the model SE.

Other Changes to the Notice of Opportunity To Comment, Published in the 
Federal Register Dated May 25, 2005 (70 FR 30151)

    In addition to the changes mentioned in the above discussion of 
comments, editorial changes, such as consistent use of ``TR'' in place 
of ``LTR,'' use of ``CT'' in place of ``AOT,'' etc., have been made 
without altering the original intent to the Notice of Opportunity for 
Comments published in the Federal Register dated May 25, 2005 (70 FR 
30151).
    As described in the model application prepared by the NRC staff, 
licensees may reference in their plant-specific applications for 
adopting this change to STSs, the model SE, model NSHC determination, 
and the environmental consideration in this ``Notice of Availability'' 
published in the Federal Register.

Model Safety Evaluation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation

Consolidated Line Item Improvement

Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Change; Traveler No. TSTF-
454, Revision 1, ``Extend PCIV Completion Times (NEDC-33046)''

1.0 Introduction

    By application dated [ ], [Licensee] (the licensee) requested 
changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for [facility]. The 
proposed changes would revise TS 3.6.1.3, ``Primary Containment 
Isolation Valves (PCIVs),'' by extending to 7 days the completion time 
(CT) to restore an inoperable PCIV to operable status or to isolate the 
affected penetration flow path for selected primary containment 
penetrations with two (or more) PCIVs and for selected primary 
containment penetrations with only one PCIV.

2.0 Regulatory Evaluation

    The existing Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.3, 
requires that each PCIV be operable. The operability of PCIVs ensures 
that the containment is isolated during a design-basis accident (DBA) 
and is able to perform its function as a barrier to the release of 
radioactive material. For boiling water reactor (BWR)/4 plants, if a 
PCIV is inoperable in one or more penetrations, the current required 
action is to isolate or restore the inoperable PCIV to operable status 
within 4 hours for penetrations with 2 PCIVs (except for the main steam 
line, in which case 8 hours is allowed), and within 4 hours for 
penetrations with a single PCIV (except for excess flow check valves 
(EFCVs) and penetrations with a closed system, and for other cases if 
justified with a plant-specific evaluation, in which case 72 hours is 
allowed). Regarding the leakage rate of EFCVs, 72 hours is also 
currently allowed to restore EFCV leakage to within limit. For BWR/6 
plants, the current required actions are the same as those for the BWR/
4 plants, with the exception that there are no TSs for EFCVs. The times 
specified for performing these actions were considered reasonable, 
given the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative 
importance of ensuring containment integrity during plant operation. In 
the case of a single EFCV PCIV or a single PCIV and a closed system, 
the specified CT takes into consideration the ability of the instrument 
and the small pipe diameter (associated with the EFCV) or the closed 
system to act as a penetration boundary.
    On May 3, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated July 30, 2003, the 
BWR Owners Group (BWROG) submitted the generic Topical Report (TR) 
NEDC-33046, ``Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Primary 
Containment Isolation Valve AOT [Allowed Outage Time] Extensions for 
BWR Plants,'' which provided a risk-informed justification for 
extending the TS AOT (also referred to as CT), for a specific set of 
inoperable PCIVs from the current 4 hours or 72 hours to 7 days. 
Specifically, for BWR/4 plants, if a PCIV is inoperable in one or more 
penetrations, the proposed action is to isolate or restore the 
inoperable PCIV to operable status within 7 days for penetrations with 
2 PCIVs (except for the feedwater isolation valves (FWIVs) and the 
residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling suction line PCIVs, in 
which case the 4 hours is kept, and except for the main steam line 
isolation valves (MSIVs), in which case the 8 hours is kept) and within 
4 hours for

[[Page 73806]]

penetrations with a single PCIV, except for EFCVs and penetrations with 
a closed system, in which case 7 days is allowed (and except for other 
cases if justified with a plant-specific evaluation, in which case the 
72 hours is kept). Regarding the leakage rate of EFCVs, 7 days is also 
proposed to restore EFCV leakage to within the limit. For BWR/6 plants, 
the proposed actions are the same as those for the BWR/4 plants with 
the exception that for penetrations with 2 PCIVs, there is an 
additional exception to the 7-day CT (for the low pressure core spray 
system PCIVs, in which case the 4 hours is kept); and with the 
exception that there are no TSs for EFCVs.
    The NRC staff used the guidance of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, 
``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed 
Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Current Licensing Basis, 
November 2002'' and RG 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-
Informed Decision Making: Technical Specifications, August 1998,'' in 
performing its review of this TR. RG 1.174 provides the guidelines to 
determine the risk associated with the proposed change. RG 1.177 
provides a three-tiered approach to evaluate the risks associated with 
proposed license amendments. The first tier evaluates the probabilistic 
risk assessment (PRA) model and the impacts of the changes on plant 
operational risk. The second tier addresses the need to preclude 
potentially high risk configurations, should additional equipment 
outages occur during the CT. The third tier evaluates the licensee's 
configuration risk management program (CRMP) to ensure that the removal 
of equipment from service immediately prior to or during the proposed 
CT will be appropriately assessed from a risk perspective. The NRC 
staff's safety evaluation (SE) dated October 8, 2004, also discusses 
the applicable regulations and additional applicable regulatory 
criteria and guidelines that were considered in its review of TR NEDC-
33046. By letter dated January 20, 2005, BWROG transmitted TR NEDC-
33046-A to NRC, which incorporated the TR NEDC-33046, submitted on May 
3, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated July 30, 2003, and as approved 
by the NRC in a letter and SE dated October 8, 2004.

3.0 Technical Evaluation

3.1 Statement of Proposed Changes

    The proposed changes to STS 3.6.1.3 for BWR/4 and BWR/6 plants, as 
approved in TSTF-454, Revision 1, include:
    1. For the Condition of one or more penetration flow paths with one 
PCIV inoperable in a penetration flow path with two [or more] PCIVs, 
the Completion Times for isolating the affected penetration (in 
Standard Technical Specification (STS) 3.6.1.3 Required Action A.1) are 
revised from ``4 hours except for main steam line AND 8 hours for main 
steam line,'' to ``4 hours [for feedwater isolation valves (FWIVs), 
residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling suction line PCIVs, and 
Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) System PCIVs (NUREG-1434 only)] AND 8 
hours for main steam line isolation valves (MSIVs) [AND 7 days except 
for FWIVs, RHR shutdown cooling suction line PCIVs, LPCS System PCIVs 
(NUREG-1434 only), and MSIVs.]'' For PCIVs not analyzed in NEDC-33046-A 
(i.e., FWIVs and MSIVs), the current Completion Times of 4 hours and 8 
hours of STS 3.6.1.3 Required Action A.1 are maintained; 4 hours for 
FWIVs and 8 hours for main steam lines (i.e., MSIVs as described in the 
current Bases for STS 3.6.1.3 Required Action A.1). For PCIVs analyzed 
in NEDC-33046-A that did not meet the criterion for extension (i.e., 
RHR shutdown cooling suction line PCIVs (for all BWRs) and LPCS System 
PCIVs (for BWR/5 and BWR/6 designs only)), the current Completion Time 
of 4 hours of STS 3.6.1.3 Required Action A.1 is maintained. The 
Completion Time for other PCIVs, associated with penetrations with two 
[or more] PCIVs, is extended to 7 days.
    2. For the Condition of one or more penetration flow paths with one 
PCIV inoperable in a penetration flow path with only one PCIV, the 
Completion Times for isolating the affected penetrations (STS 3.6.1.3, 
Required Action C.1) are revised from ``[4] hours except for excess 
flow check valves (EFCVs) and penetrations with a closed system AND 
[72] hours for EFCVs and penetrations with a closed system,'' to ``[4] 
hours except for excess flow check valves (EFCVs) and penetrations with 
a closed system AND [7days] for EFCVs and penetrations with a closed 
system.'' (For NUREG-1434, the Completion Times for STS 3.6.1.3, 
Required Action C.1 are revised from ``[4] hours except for 
penetrations with a closed system AND [72] hours for penetrations with 
a closed system,'' to ``[4] hours except for penetrations with a closed 
system AND [7days] for penetrations with a closed system.'')
    3. For the Condition of one or more [secondary containment bypass 
leakage rate,] [MSIV leakage rate,] [purge valves leakage rate,] 
[hydrostatically tested line leakage rate,] [or] [EFCV leakage rate] 
not within limit, for NUREG-1433, the Completion Time for restoring 
leakage rate to within limit, when the leakage rate exceeded is the 
EFCV leakage rate (in STS 3.6.1.3 Required Action D.1), is revised from 
``[72 hours for hydrostatically tested line leakage [on a closed 
system] [and EFCV leakage]]'' to ``[72 hours for hydrostatically tested 
line leakage [on a closed system] [AND 7 days for EFCV leakage].'' (The 
EFCV leakage rate Completion Time change is not applicable to NUREG-
1434.)

3.2 Evaluation of Proposed Changes

    The NRC staff's SE on TR NEDC-33046, dated October 8, 2004, found 
that, based on the use of bounding risk parameters for General Electric 
(GE)-designed plants, for the proposed increase in the PCIV CT from 4 
hours (for penetrations with 2 or more PCIVs) or 72 hours (for 
penetrations with a single EFCV PCIV, and penetrations with a single 
PCIV and a closed system) or 72 hours (for EFCV leakage) to 7 days, the 
risk impact of the proposed 7-day CT for the PCIVs, as estimated by 
core damage frequency (CDF), large early release frequency (LERF), 
incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP), and 
incremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP), is 
consistent with the acceptance guidelines specified in RG 1.174, RG 
1.177, and NRC staff guidance outlined in Chapter 16.1 of NUREG-0800, 
``Standard Review Plan.'' The NRC staff found that the risk analysis 
methodology and approach used by the BWROG to estimate the risk impacts 
were reasonable and of sufficient quality. The NRC staff's October 8, 
2004, SE also found the following:

    The Tier 2 evaluation did not identify any risk-significant 
plant equipment configurations requiring TSs, procedure, or 
compensatory measures. TR NEDC-33046 implements a CRMP (Tier 3) 
using 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) to manage plant risk when PCIVs are taken 
out-of-service. PCIV reliability and availability will also be 
monitored and assessed under the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65) to 
confirm that performance continues to be consistent with the 
analysis assumptions used to justify extended PCIVs CTs.
3.2.1 Conditions and Commitment
    The NRC staff's October 8, 2004, SE also found that certain 
conditions and a commitment must be addressed by licensees adopting TR 
NEDC-33046 (or TR NEDC-33046-A transmitted to NRC by letter dated 
January 20, 2005) in plant-specific applications. These conditions and 
the commitment, as clarified herein, that must be addressed

[[Page 73807]]

by licensees adopting TR NEDC-33046-A in plant-specific applications 
that seek approval of TSTF-454, Revision 1, for their plants, are as 
follows:
3.2.1.1 Conditions
    1. Because not all penetrations have the same impact on CDF, LERF, 
ICCDP, or ICLERP, a licensee's application must provide supporting 
information that verifies the applicability of TR NEDC-33046, including 
verification that the PCIV configurations for the specific plant match 
the TR and that the risk parameter values used in the TR are bounding 
for the specific plant. Any additional PCIV configurations or non-
bounding risk parameter values not evaluated by the TR should be 
included in the licensee's plant-specific analysis. [Note that PCIV 
configurations or non-bounding risk parameter values outside the scope 
of the TR will require NRC staff review of the specific penetrations 
and related justifications for the proposed CTs.]
    2. The licensee's application must provide supporting information 
that verifies that external event risk, either through quantitative or 
qualitative evaluation, will not have an adverse impact on the 
conclusions of the plant-specific analysis for extending the PCIV CTs.
    3. Because TR NEDC-33046 was based on generic plant 
characteristics, each licensee adopting the TR must provide supporting 
information that confirms plant-specific Tier 3 information in their 
individual submittals. The licensee's application must provide 
supporting information that discusses conformance to the requirements 
of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)), as they relate to the 
proposed PCIV CTs and the guidance contained in NUMARC 93-01, Section 
11, as endorsed by RG 1.182, ``Assessing and Managing Risk Before 
Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants.'' This should include 
verification that the licensee's maintenance rule program, with respect 
to PCIVs, includes a LERF and ICLERP assessment as part of the 
maintenance rule process.
    4. The licensee's application must provide supporting information 
that verifies that a penetration remains intact during maintenance 
activities, including corrective maintenance activities. Regarding 
maintenance activities where the pressure boundary would be broken, the 
licensee must provide supporting information that confirms that the 
assumptions and results of the TR remain valid. This includes the 
assumption that maintenance on a PCIV will not break the pressure 
boundary for more than the currently allowed CT.
    5. The licensee's application must provide supporting information 
that it will verify the operability of the remaining PCIVs in the 
associated penetration flow path before applying an extended CT for an 
inoperable PCIV.
    6. Simultaneously utilizing the proposed extended CT for multiple 
inoperable PCIVs and the resulting impact on risk were not specifically 
evaluated by the BWROG. However, TR NEDC-33046 does state that multiple 
PCIVs can be out of service simultaneously during extended CTs and does 
not preclude the practice. Therefore, the licensee's application must 
provide supporting information that confirms that its Tier 3 CRMP (10 
CFR 50.65(a)(4)) requires that simultaneous application of an extended 
CT to more than one inoperable PCIV in separate penetration flow paths 
is evaluated. The purpose of this evaluation is to ensure that the 
cumulative risk of continued plant operation with multiple inoperable 
PCIVs utilizing extended CTs does not exceed the plant risk value, as 
determined by the analysis presented in TR NEDC-33046.
    7. The licensee must provide supporting information that verifies 
that the plant-specific probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) quality is 
acceptable for this application in accordance with the guidelines given 
in RG 1.174, ``An Approach for using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in 
Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-specific Changes to the Licensing 
Basis.'' To ensure the applicability of TR NEDC-33046 to a licensee's 
plant, each licensee requesting an amendment must provide additional 
information on PRA quality in the following areas:
    a. Justification that the plant-specific PRA reflects the as-built, 
as-operated plant.
    b. Applicable PRA updates including individual plant examinations 
(IPE) and individual plant examinations of external events (IPEEE) 
findings.
    c. Conclusions of the peer review including any A or B facts and 
observations (F and Os) applicable to the proposed PCIV extended CTs.
    d. The PRA quality assurance program and associated procedures.
    e. PRA adequacy, completeness, and applicability with respect to 
evaluating the plant specific impact of the proposed PCIV extended CT.
3.2.1.2 Commitment
    The RG 1.177 Tier 3 program ensures that, while the plant is in a 
LCO actions condition with an extended CT for restoring an inoperable 
PCIV to operable status, additional activities will not be performed 
that could further degrade the capabilities of the plant to respond to 
a condition the inoperable PCIV or associated system is designed to 
mitigate and, as a result, increase plant risk beyond that determined 
by the TR analysis. A licensee's implementation of RG 1.177 Tier 3 
guidelines generally implies the assessment of risk with respect to 
CDF. However, the proposed PCIV extended CT impacts containment 
isolation and, consequently, LERF as well as CDF. Therefore, each 
licensee requesting extended CTs for PCIVs under TSTF-454, Revision 1, 
must commit to enhancing its CRMP, including those implemented under 10 
CFR 50.65(a)(4), the maintenance rule, to include a LERF methodology 
and assessment. This commitment and the CRMP enhancements must be 
documented in the licensee's plant-specific application.

3.3 Staff Findings

    The NRC staff has reviewed the proposed TS changes and finds that 
they are consistent with previous staff reviews of TR NEDC-33046, 
submitted by letter dated May 3, 2002, as supplemented by letter dated 
July 30, 2003, and as approved by the NRC by letter and SE dated 
October 8, 2004, which are incorporated in TR NEDC-33046-A, transmitted 
to NRC by letter dated January 20, 2005, and TSTF-454, Revision 1, and 
are acceptable. The NRC staff has also reviewed the licensee's 
supporting information and the statements regarding the above 
conditions and commitment and finds them acceptable. Therefore, the NRC 
staff finds that the increase in the CTs from 4 hours (for penetrations 
with 2 or more PCIVs) or 72 hours (for penetrations with a single EFCV 
PCIV, and penetrations with a single PCIV and a closed system) or 72 
hours (for EFCV leakage) to 7 days is justified.

4.0 Regulatory Commitment

    The licensee's letter dated [ ], contained the following regulatory 
commitment: [state the licensee's commitment and ensure that it 
satisfies the commitment in this SE, in section 3.2 above.]
    The NRC staff finds that reasonable controls for the implementation 
and for subsequent evaluation of proposed changes pertaining to the 
above regulatory commitment are best provided by the licensee's 
administrative processes, including its commitment management program. 
The above regulatory commitment does not warrant the creation of a 
license condition (item requiring prior NRC approval of subsequent 
changes).

[[Page 73808]]

5.0 State Consultation

    In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [State] State 
official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The 
State official had [Choose one: (1) No comments, OR (2) The following 
comments--with subsequent disposition by the staff].

6.0 Environmental Consideration

    The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the 
installation or use of a facility component located within the 
restricted area as defined in 10 CFR part 20. The NRC staff has 
determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the 
amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that 
may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in 
individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The 
Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment 
involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no 
public comment on such finding ([XX FR XXXXX, dated Month DD, YYYY]). 
Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for 
categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 
CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental 
assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the 
amendment.

7.0 Conclusion

    The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed 
above, that: (1) There is reasonable assurance that the health and 
safety of the public will not be endangered by the operation in the 
proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance 
with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the 
amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to 
the health and safety of the public.

Model No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

    Description of Amendment Request: The proposed amendment extends 
the completion time (CT) for penetration flow paths with one valve 
inoperable from 4 hours or 72 hours to 7 days. The change is applicable 
to both primary containment penetrations with two (or more) primary 
containment isolation valves (PCIVs) and with one PCIV. This change is 
not applicable to the feedwater isolation valves (FWIVs), the residual 
heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling suction line PCIVs, the low 
pressure core spray (LPCS) PCIVs (boiling water reactor (BWR)/6 only), 
the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), and [list of plant-specific 
valves].
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change revises the completion times (CTs) for 
restoring an inoperable primary containment isolation valve (PCIV) (or 
isolating the affected penetration) within the scope of the Boiling 
Water Reactor (BWR) Owners Group (BWROG) Topical Report (TR) NEDC-
33046-A, ``Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Primary 
Containment Isolation Valve AOT [Allowed Outage Time] Extensions for 
BWR Plants,'' transmitted to NRC by letter dated January 20, 2005, from 
4 hours and 72 hours to 7 days. PCIVs are not accident initiators in 
any accident previously evaluated. Consequently, the probability of an 
accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased.
    PCIVs, individually and in combination, control the extent of 
leakage from the primary containment following an accident. As such, 
PCIVs are instrumental in controlling the consequences of an accident. 
However, the consequences of any accident previously evaluated are no 
different during the proposed extended CTs than during the existing 
CTs. As a result, there would be no significant increase in the 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the 
proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different 
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The 
proposed changes revise the CTs for restoring an inoperable PCIV or 
isolating the affected penetration within the scope of NEDC-33046-A, 
transmitted to NRC by letter dated January 20, 2005, from 4 hours and 
72 hours to 7 days. PCIVs, individually and in combination, control the 
extent of leakage from the primary containment following an accident. 
The proposed CT extensions apply to the reduction in redundancy in the 
primary containment isolation function by the PCIVs for a limited 
period of time, but do not alter the ability of the plant to meet the 
overall primary containment leakage requirements. The proposed change 
does not alter the design, configuration, or method of operation of the 
plant. The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant and no new or different type of equipment will be installed. 
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety. The proposed change revises the CTs for restoring an 
inoperable PCIV or isolating the affected penetration within the scope 
of the NEDC-33046-A, transmitted to NRC by letter dated January 20, 
2005, from 4 hours and 72 hours to 7 days. PCIVs, individually and in 
combination, control the extent of leakage from the primary containment 
following an accident. The proposed CT extensions apply to the 
reduction in redundancy in the primary containment isolation function 
provided by the PCIVs for a limited period of time, but do not alter 
the ability of the plant to meet the overall primary containment 
leakage requirements. In order to evaluate the proposed CT extensions, 
a PRA evaluation was performed in TR NEDC-33046 submitted on May 3, 
2002, as supplemented by letter dated July 30, 2003, and as approved by 
the NRC by letter and SE dated October 8, 2004. The PRA evaluation 
concluded that, based on the use of bounding risk parameters for GE-
designed plants, the proposed increase in the PCIV CTs from 4 hours or 
72 hours to 7 days does not alter the ability of the plant to meet the 
overall primary containment leakage requirements. It also concluded 
that the proposed changes do not result in an unacceptable ICCDP or 
ICLERP according to the guidelines of RG 1.177. Therefore, the proposed 
change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    Based on the above, the proposed change presents no significant 
hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), 
and accordingly, a finding of ``no significant hazards consideration'' 
is justified.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of December, 2005.


[[Page 73809]]


    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
David Terao,
Chief, Plant Licensing Branch G, Division of Operating Reactor 
Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
 [FR Doc. E5-7272 Filed 12-12-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P