[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 10 (Tuesday, January 17, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2576-2578]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-418]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[ IA-05-055]
Prasoon Goyal; Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed
Activities (Effective Immediately)
I
Mr. Prasoon Goyal was previously employed, at times relevant to
this Order, as a Senior Engineer at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power
Station (Davis-Besse) operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
(FENOC or licensee). The licensee holds License No. NPF-3 which was
issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission)
pursuant to 10 CFR part 50 on April 22, 1977. The license authorizes
the operation of Davis-Besse in accordance with the conditions
specified therein. The facility is located on the licensee's site near
Oak Harbor, Ohio.
II
On August 3, 2001, the NRC issued Bulletin 2001-001,
``Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration
Nozzles,'' (Bulletin). In the Bulletin, the NRC requested that all
holders of operating licenses for pressurized water nuclear power
reactors (PWR), including FENOC for the Davis-Besse facility, provide
information to the NRC relating to the structural integrity of the
reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head penetration nozzles at their
respective facilities. The information requested from the licensees
included the extent of RPV head penetration nozzle leakage and cracking
that had been found to date, a description of the inspections and
repairs undertaken to satisfy applicable regulatory requirements, and
the basis for concluding that a licensee's plans for future inspections
would ensure compliance with applicable regulatory requirements. The
NRC also required that all Bulletin addressees, including FENOC, submit
a written response to the NRC in accordance with the provisions of 10
CFR 50.54(f). That regulation provides, in part, that upon request of
the NRC, an NRC-licensee must submit written statements, signed under
oath or affirmation, to enable the NRC to determine whether the license
should be modified, suspended, or revoked.
On September 4, October 17, and October 30, 2001, the licensee
provided written responses to the Bulletin. Additionally, the licensee
met with the NRC staff on numerous occasions during October and
November of 2001 to provide clarifying information. Based, in part, on
the information provided by FENOC in its written responses to the
Bulletin and during meetings with the NRC staff, the NRC staff allowed
the licensee to continue operation of the Davis-Besse facility until
February 2002, rather than requiring FENOC to shut the unit down to
perform inspections by December 31, 2001, as provided in the Bulletin.
On February 16, 2002, FENOC shut down Davis-Besse for refueling and
inspection of control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) RPV head penetration
nozzles. Using ultrasonic testing, the licensee found cracks in three
CRDM RPV head penetration nozzles and on March 6, 2002, the licensee
discovered a cavity in the RPV head in the vicinity of CRDM Penetration
Nozzle No. 3. The cavity measured approximately 5 to 7 inches long, 4
to 5 inches wide, and penetrated through the 6.63 inch-thick low-alloy
steel portion of the RPV head, leaving the stainless steel cladding
material (measuring 0.202 to 0.314 inches-thick) as the sole reactor
coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary. A smaller cavity was also found
near CRDM Penetration Nozzle No. 2.
The licensee conducted a root cause evaluation and determined,
contrary to the earlier information provided to the NRC, that the
cavities were caused by boric acid from the RCS released through cracks
in the CRDM RPV head penetration nozzles. The root cause evaluation
found that the licensee conducted limited cleaning and inspections of
the RPV head during the Twelfth Refueling Outage (12RFO) that ended on
May 18, 2000. However, neither the limited RPV head cleaning nor the
resultant inspections during 12RFO were sufficient to ensure that the
significant boric acid deposits on the RPV head were only a result of
CRDM flange leakage, as supposed, and were not a result of RCS pressure
boundary leakage.
On March 6 and March 10, 2002, the licensee provided information to
the NRC concerning the identification of a large cavity in the RPV head
adjacent to CRDM Penetration Nozzle No. 3. The NRC conducted an
Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) inspection at Davis-Besse from March 12
to April 5, 2002, to determine the facts and circumstances related to
the significant degradation of the RPV head. The results of the AIT
inspection were documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2002-03,
issued on May 3, 2002. A follow-up Special Inspection was conducted
from May 15 to August 9, 2002, and on October 2, 2002, the NRC issued
the AIT Follow-up Special Inspection Report No. 50-346/2002-08
documenting ten apparent violations associated with the RPV head
degradation.
On April 22, 2002, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) initiated
an investigation at Davis-Besse to determine, among other matters,
whether FENOC and individual employees at the Davis-Besse facility
failed to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC in its
September 4, October 17, and October 30, 2001, responses to the
Bulletin and during numerous conference calls and meetings in violation
of 10 CFR 50.9 and 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2). The OI report (No. 3-2002-
[[Page 2577]]
006) was issued on August 22, 2003. A copy of the OI report was
provided to the U. S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of the United
States Attorney, Northern District of Ohio for review. The matter
remains under continued Federal investigation.
Mr. Goyal, through the performance of his engineering duties,
through his direct involvement in the licensee's 1996 RPV head
inspection and cleaning activities, and through oral and written
communications with other FENOC employees was aware of the results of
previous RPV head inspections.
Mr. Goyal was the engineer responsible for performing the
1996 reactor head inspection during the Tenth Refueling Outage (10RFO).
During a sworn, transcribed interview with OI, Mr. Goyal stated that he
could not see the top of the RPV head during 10RFO due to the limited
access through the mouseholes and the accumulation of boric acid on the
RPV head.
Mr. Goyal wrote Potential Condition Adverse to Quality
Report (PCAQR) 96-0551 documenting that the accumulation of boric acid
on the head and the size of the mouseholes limited the extent of the
inspection. Mr. Goyal documented in PCAQR 96-0551, in part:
``Since the boric acid deposits are not cleaned it is difficult
to distinguish whether the deposits occurred because of the leaking
flanges or the leaking CRDM.''
``This PCAQR is the quality document which recorded the boric
acid deposit on the RV head. The deposits were discovered during the
visual inspection of the RV head performed through the mouseholes
utilizing a video camera. The extent of the inspection was limited
to approximately 50 to 60% of the head areas because of the
restrictions imposed by the location and sized of mouseholes. The
inspection showed varying sizes of boric acid mounds scattered in
various areas of head. It is extremely difficult to develop an
estimate of the amount of boric acid deposit because of the deposit
scatter and limited inspection.''
Mr. Goyal authored a ``White'' paper, distributed to other
Davis-Besse staff on May 8, 1996, that discussed control rod drive
nozzle cracking within the nuclear power industry. Mr. Goyal documented
in the ``White'' paper, in part:
``All plants, except Davis-Besse and Arkansas Nuclear 1, have
large access holes in the skirt area of the service structure to
view/clean the entire head. Davis-Besse's access is limited to about
50 percent of the head area.''
Several FENOC employees, including Mr. Prasoon Goyal, were
responsible for the information provided to the NRC by FENOC in
response to the Bulletin.
III
Prasoon Goyal was employed by FENOC as a senior engineer in the
Design Basis Engineering organization at Davis-Besse at the time the
responses to the Bulletin were developed and transmitted to the NRC.
Mr. Goyal was a design engineer and the individual who reviewed the
licensee's 1996 inspection of the CRDM flanges, and conducted the
licensee's inspection of the RPV head and CRDM nozzles during 10RFO.
Mr. Goyal reviewed the October 17, 2001 supplemental response to
the bulletin. On October 17, 2001, Mr. Goyal concurred as ``Design
Basis Engrg--Mech'' [Design Basis Engineering--Mechanical] in the
issuance of the licensee's October 17, 2001 supplemental response to
the Bulletin.
Item 1.d of the Bulletin requested each pressurized water reactor
(PWR) licensee, including FENOC for Davis-Besse, to provide a
description of the RPV head penetration nozzles and RPV head inspection
(including type, scope, qualification requirements, and acceptance
criteria) that were performed at PWRs in the 4 years preceding the date
of the Bulletin, and the findings resulting from the inspections. The
licensees were requested to include a description of any limitations
(insulation or other impediments) to accessibility of the bare metal of
the RPV head for visual examinations.
On September 4, 2001, FENOC submitted its written response to the
Bulletin for Davis-Besse. On October 17, 2001, FENOC submitted a
supplemental response to the Bulletin for Davis-Besse and included
information not provided in the September 4, 2001, response with regard
to RPV inspections and cleaning conducted during 10RFO. Attachment 1 to
the licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response to the Bulletin
stated under the section entitled, ``Summary,'' in part:
``In May 1996, during a refueling outage, the RPV head was
inspected. No leakage was identified, and these results have been
recently verified by a re-review of the video tapes obtained from
that inspection.''
The October 17, 2001, supplemental response to the Bulletin also
stated under the section entitled, ``Previous Inspection Results,'' in
part:
``The inspections performed during the 10th, 11th, and 12th
Refueling Outage (10RFO, conducted April 8 to June 2, 1996; 11RFO,
conducted April 10, to May 23, 1998; and, 12RFO, conducted April 1
to May 28, 2000) consisted of a whole head visual inspection of the
RPV head in accordance with the DBNPS Boric Acid Control Program
pursuant to Generic Letter 88-05, `Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon
Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants.' The
visual inspections were conducted by remote camera and included
below insulation inspections of the RPV bare head such that the
Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) nozzle penetrations were viewed.
During 10RFO, 65 of 69 nozzles were viewed, during 11RFO, 50 of 69
nozzles were viewed, and during 12 RFO, 45 of 69 nozzles were
viewed.''
Information included under Column 6 of Attachment 2 of the
licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response stated, in part,
that 24 nozzles have a ``flange leak evident.'' Note 1 on the same
table stated, in part:
``In 1996 during 10 RFO, the entire RPV head was inspected.
Since the video was void of head orientation narration, each
specific nozzle view could not be correlated.''
The licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response was
materially incomplete and inaccurate in that the licensee did not view
the stated number of RPV head penetration nozzles during the referenced
outages, and the licensee believed that only five RPV head control rod
drive mechanism flanges were leaking instead of the 24 RPV head control
rod drive mechanism flanges noted in the response. Mr. Goyal was aware
that the licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response was
materially incomplete and inaccurate and concurred on the response,
thereby allowing it to be submitted to the NRC.
Based on the above information, the NRC concludes that Mr. Goyal
had sufficient knowledge of the condition of the RPV head and the
limitations experienced during the RPV head inspections conducted
during 10RFO, and notwithstanding that knowledge, he deliberately
provided materially incomplete and inaccurate information, when on
October 17, 2001, he concurred on the licensee's October 17, 2001,
supplemental response to the NRC.
The information provided by the licensee under oath in the Bulletin
supplemental response was material to the NRC because the NRC used the
information, in part, to allow FENOC to operate Davis-Besse until
February 2002 rather than requiring the plant to shut down by December
31, 2001, to conduct inspections of the head as discussed in Item
3.v.1. of the Bulletin.
Based on the above information, Mr. Prasoon Goyal, while employed
by the licensee, engaged in deliberate misconduct by deliberately
providing incomplete or inaccurate information that he knew was not
complete and accurate in all material respects to the NRC, a violation
of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2).
[[Page 2578]]
Mr. Goyal's actions also placed FENOC in violation of 10 CFR 50.9. The
NRC determined that these violations were of very high safety and
regulatory significance because they involved a pattern of deliberate
documentation of inaccurate or incomplete information that was required
to be submitted to the NRC. Had the NRC been aware of this incomplete
and inaccurate information, the NRC would likely have taken immediate
regulatory action to shut down the plant and require the licensee to
implement appropriate corrective actions.
IV
The NRC must be able to rely on the licensee and its employees to
comply with NRC requirements, including the requirement to provide
information and maintain records that are complete and accurate in all
material respects. Mr. Goyal's deliberate actions raise serious doubt
as to whether he can be relied upon to comply with NRC requirements and
to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC.
Consequently, I lack the requisite reasonable assurance that
licensed activities can be conducted in compliance with the
Commission's requirements and that the health and safety of the public
will be protected if Mr. Goyal is permitted to be involved in NRC-
licensed activities. Therefore, the public health, safety and interest
require that Mr. Goyal be prohibited from any involvement in NRC-
licensed activities for a period of one year effective immediately.
Additionally, Mr. Goyal is required to notify the NRC of his first
employment in NRC-licensed activities for a period of one year
following the prohibition period.
V
Accordingly, pursuant to sections 103, 104, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182
and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR 50.5, and 10 CFR
150.20, It is hereby ordered that effective immediately:
1. Mr. Prasoon Goyal is prohibited for one year from the date of
this Order from engaging in NRC-licensed activities. The NRC considers
NRC-licensed activities to be those activities that are conducted
pursuant to a specific or general license issued by the NRC, including
those activities of Agreement State licensees conducted pursuant to the
authority granted by 10 CFR 150.20.
2. If Mr. Goyal is currently involved with another licensee in NRC-
licensed activities, he must immediately cease those activities, and
inform the NRC of the name, address and telephone number of the
employer, and provide a copy of this Order to the employer.
3. For a period of one year after the one-year period of
prohibition has expired, Mr. Goyal shall, within 20 days of acceptance
of his first employment offer involving NRC-licensed activities or his
becoming involved in NRC-licensed activities, as defined in Paragraph
IV.1 above, provide notice to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, of the name,
address, and telephone number of the employer or the entity where he
is, or will be, involved in NRC-licensed activities. In the
notification, Mr. Goyal shall include a statement of his commitment to
compliance with regulatory requirements and the basis why the
Commission should have confidence that he will now comply with
applicable NRC requirements.
The Director, Office of Enforcement, may, in writing, relax or
rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by Mr. Goyal of
good cause.
VI
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, Prasoon Goyal must, and any other
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this
Order, and may request a hearing on this Order within 20 days of the
date of this Order, consideration may be given to extending the
response time for submitting an answer as well as the time for
requesting a hearing, for good cause shown. A request for extension of
time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Enforcement,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a
statement of good cause for the extension. The answer may consent to
this Order. Unless the answer consents to this Order, the answer shall,
in writing and under oath or affirmation, specifically admit or deny
each allegation or charge made in this Order and shall set forth the
matters of fact and law on which Mr. Goyal or other person adversely
affected relies and the reasons as to why the Order should not have
been issued. Any answer or request for a hearing shall be submitted to
the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Rulemakings
and Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies also shall be
sent to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant General Counsel for
Materials Litigation and Enforcement at the same address, to the
Regional Administrator, NRC Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Lisle,
IL 60532-4352, and to Mr. Goyal if the answer or hearing request is by
a person other than Mr. Goyal. Because of continuing disruptions in
delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is requested
that answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to the Secretary
of the Commission either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-
1101 or by e-mail to [email protected] and also to the Office of
the General Counsel either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-
415-3725 or by e-mail to [email protected]. If a person other than
the Mr. Goyal requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with
particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely affected by
this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309.
If a hearing is requested by Mr. Goyal or a person whose interest
is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating
the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to
be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be
sustained.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), Mr. Goyal, may, in addition to
demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move
the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the
Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion,
unfounded allegations, or error.
In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions
specified in Section V above shall be effective immediately and final
20 days from the date of this Order without further order or
proceedings. If an extension of time for requesting a hearing has been
approved, the provisions specified in Section V shall be final when the
extension expires if a hearing request has not been received.
Dated this 4th day of January 2006.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Martin J. Virgilio,
Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Research, State, and
Compliance Programs, Office of the Executive Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. E6-418 Filed 1-13-06; 8:45 am]
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